New Perspectives

Interdisciplinary Journal of Central & East European Politics and International Relations

Vol. 26, No. 1/2018

Contents
Editorial
The World Is (Not) Heated 7
Benjamin Tallis

Special Section: The Prague Agenda 15

Michal Smetana, Anastasia Kazteridis, Matthew Kroenig,
Sadia Tasleem, Richard Price, Jeffrey Fields, Jason Enia,
Angela Kane, Dieter Fleck

Research Articles
Writing Kafka’s Soul: Disciplinary Power, Resistance & the 63
Authorship of the Subject
Nicholas Dungey

History, Nationalism, and Democracy: Myth and Narrative in 87

Viktor Orbán’s ‘Illiberal Hungary’
Michael Toomey

The Fourth Generation: From Anti-Establishment to Anti-Systém 109

Parties in Slovakia
Oľga Gyárfášová

Cultural Cut
HHhH & The 7th Function of Language 135
Laurent Binet

Notes on Contributors 155

New Perspectives Vol. 26, No. 1/2018 5

 87 108
History, Nationalism and Democracy:

▲
Myth and Narrative in Viktor Orbán’s
‘Illiberal Hungary’
MICHAEL TOOMEY
University of Limerick, Ireland

Abstract: This article studies the relationship between nationalistic discourse and Hungary’s ‘illib-
eral turn’ from the election of Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party in the 2 010 Hungarian elections
up until 2 015 . It begins by examining the arguments of authors such as Jeffrey Alexander,
Quentin Skinner, and Tapio Juntunen in order to establish a theoretical framework for how
political actors construct and manipulate historical myths for their own political purposes.
It then goes on to examine how Orbán specifically uses and constructs narratives sur-
rounding the Treaty of Trianon and Miklós Horthy, the interwar leader of Hungary. This ar-
ticle argues that in addition to allowing Orbán to build a defensive shield against criticism
from international and domestic actors, these interpretations of Hungarian history restore
to prominence the interwar-era ‘populist-urbanist’ cleavage, and allow Orbán to create an
exclusionary image of Hungarian nationalism. Thus, this serves to legitimize Orbán and
Fidesz, while denying opposition parties from both the right and the left the opportunity
to stake claims to being true representatives of the Hungarian people.

Keywords: Fidesz, Hungary, nationalism, Trianon, Horthy, Orban

HISTORICAL AND NATIONALIST NARRATIVES IN POST-2 0 1 0

HUNGARY
Since the victory of Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz party in the 2 010 Parliamentary
elections, much academic attention has been focused on Hungary’s ‘illiberal turn’
and its consequences for democracy in the country. The increasingly authoritarian
tendencies there have been accompanied by a notable intensification of nationalis-
tic sentiment on the part of Orbán and many of his fellow party members, and fa-
cilitated by politicized retellings of Hungary’s past (particularly as they relate to the
country’s experiences during the interwar period and the years prior to the country’s
occupation by Nazi Germany in March 194 4 ). This surge has manifested itself in a
number of policy initiatives, but most visibly in the cases of the creation of the Hun-
garian Citizenship Law in 2 011 (which extended the possibility of citizenship to any
Hungarian-speaking descendant of Hungarian citizens who lived within the coun-

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MICHAEL TOOMEY

try’s pre-19 2 0 borders) and the construction of a controversial statue in Budapest’s

Szabadság Tér (Freedom Square) commemorating “all the victims” of the “German
occupation” of Hungary during the Second World War (e.g. Euractiv, 2 014 ).
In some ways, this may be seen as nothing new, as politicized historicist narra-
tives and symbolic politics have long been associated with Hungarian politics.
Throughout the 2 0 th Century, periods of regime change in the country were marked
by the creation of new political identities and historical ‘truths’ which were always
in line with the respective new government’s ideological perspective, a dynamic
that continued following the country’s transition to democracy in the early 19 9 0 s
(Greskovits, 2 012 : 7 51 ). In this vein, for many years, Orbán and his party have at
least partially relied upon their elaboration and dissemination of particular historical
understandings and narratives as a political tool. An example of this could be wit-
nessed in their construction of metaphorical associations between the 2 0 0 6 anti-
government protests that occurred in Budapest and the 1956 Hungarian Revolution
(Oltay, 2 013 : 16 5 ). In addition, they adopted a ‘victim discourse’ in the late 2 0 0 0 s
and early 2 010 s which sought to explain Hungarian history as being a series of (ex-
ternally imposed) disasters. This then allowed for the framing of the introduction of
a new constitution for the country in 2 012 as part of a more comprehensive and
conclusive reckoning with the legacy of Soviet communism than the one that had
initially taken place after the democratization in the early 1990s (Kovács and Mindler-
Steiner, 2 015 : 54 ; Oltay, 2 013 : 14 ).
Between 2 010 and 2 015 , however, Hungary’s historical politicization has tended
to revolve around Miklós Horthy (Hungary’s interwar –and wartime –leader) and
the Treaty of Trianon, the peace settlement Hungary signed with the Allies follow-
ing its defeat (as part of Austria-Hungary) in World War I. This is most visibly, but not
only, represented in initiatives such as the aforementioned Citizenship Law and the
Szabadság Tér statue, and it is part of a ‘reconnection’ on the part of Orbán with
Hungary’s pre-communist past (Rupnik, 2 012 : 13 5 –13 6 ).1 This approach recalls and
reconstructs the country’s ‘urbanist-populist’ cleavage, a crucial dynamic in the in-
terwar years which separated the country into two camps: one, based in Budapest,
which was composed of liberal, socialist, and Jewish elites, and the other, which was
made up of the ‘true’ Hungarians of the countryside and the peasantry (Gerner,
2 0 0 6 : 101 ).
What is unique about this contemporary approach is its ‘parachronistic’ charac-
ter: it retrospectively makes the assumption that the entire Hungarian ‘nation’ suf-
fered (and continues to suffer) a collective cultural trauma as a result of the Trianon
settlement, and it also involves a construction of Horthy as a ‘predecessor’ to Orbán
in his status as a leader who sought to redress this trauma. This served several pur-
poses for Orbán. It has allowed him to outflank political opponents (such as the
Movement for a Better Hungary, also known as Jobbik) that were previously per-

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 HISTORY, NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY

ceived to be further to the right on the political spectrum (although perhaps this
perception is no longer the case) (Schultheis, 2 018 ; Toth, 2 018 ). It delegitimizes any
internal or external opposition to himself and his party’s rule, since the opposition
is then perceived as being treacherous to the Hungarian nation. Most importantly,
it allows Orbán to construct an exclusivist understanding of the Hungarian nation,
which renders him and his party the sole representatives of ‘true’ Hungarians, and
his political opponents as treacherous usurpers. In exploring these issues, this arti-
cle addresses the following research questions:
• How are narratives and discourses surrounding the Treaty of Trianon and Miklos Hor-
thy constructed in modern Hungary?
• How do these narratives and discourses inform and shape the political strategies
and successes of Viktor Orbán and Fidesz?
The article begins by establishing the analytical and methodological framework
through which these questions are explored in it. This framework is substantially
based on Jeffrey Alexander’s (2 0 0 4 ; 2 012 ) theories surrounding the construction
and elaboration of ‘cultural traumas’, but also integrates literature on the politics of
history and the application of parachronistic and anachronistic viewpoints in the es-
tablishment of historical myths, narratives, metaphors, and analogies. Moving on
from this, the article will then discuss the specificities and uniqueness of the roles
played by the ‘Horthy’ and ‘Trianon’ discourses in contemporary Hungarian poli-
tics, the reasons for their particular prominence following the 2 010 parliamentary
elections, and their relationship with previous myths and narratives promulgated by
Orbán. Finally, it will conclude by discussing the implications these particular con-
structions of history have for Hungary’s ‘illiberal turn’, and how they function to fa-
cilitate Orbán’s continued dominance over the country’s political scene.

‘TRAUMA’, NARRATIVE, AND THE POLITICS OF HISTORY AND

HISTORICITY
One of the primary objectives of this paper is to unpack and explain the ways in
which national ‘traumas’ can potentially contribute to the construction of politically
useful myths and narratives. A trauma can be defined as being an occurrence
whereby a social group believes that they have been the victim of a traumatic event
which has left deep, significant impacts upon the collective psyche of the group,
which last into perpetuity (Alexander, 200 4: 1). According to Sztompka, for a cultural
trauma to develop amongst a given society, it must necessarily have experienced a
social change which contains four key characteristics: that the change occurred rap-
idly and suddenly, that it was substantive and had a broad scope affecting a swathe
of members of the affected community, that it was caused exogenously and not (or
at least not knowingly) by the community itself, and that it was experienced as being
unexpected, unpleasant, repulsive, and/or shocking (Sztompka, 2 0 0 0 a: 4 5 2 ). Sz-

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MICHAEL TOOMEY

tompka describes a bottom-up process through which a societal or cultural trauma

is elaborated and realized. According to this approach, cultural traumas…

[…] appear only when people start to be aware of [their] common plight, per-
ceive the similarity of their situation with that of others, [and] define it as shared.
They start to talk about it, exchange observations and experiences, gossips and
rumors, formulate diagnoses and myths, identify causes or villains, seek for con-
spiracies, decide to do something about it, envisage coping methods. They de-
bate, even quarrel and fight among themselves about all this. Those debates
reach the public arena, are taken by the media, expressed in literature, art,
movies […] (Sztompka, 2 0 0 0 b: 27 9 –2 8 0 ).

The existence of a trauma within any society, however, is never an indisputable or

self-evident historical or social fact, and a particular event cannot simply be assumed
to be traumatic. According to Alexander, when one considers social systems, “[…]
societies can experience massive disruptions that do not become traumatic […] for
traumas to emerge at the level of the collectivity, social crises must become cultural
crises” (Alexander, 2 012 : 15 ). According to Alexander, collective cultural traumas
are not connected directly to ‘traumatic’ events, as events in and of themselves are
not necessarily traumatic: instead, they are socially constructed based on the per-
ceptions of the affected society before, during, and/or after the event, and may in-
deed be entirely imagined (Alexander, 2 0 0 4 : 8 ). Additionally, he argues that these
‘traumas’ are constructed and given meaning by “carrier groups”,2 who articulate the
nature and significance of national traumas in pursuit of their own ideals and mate-
rial interests (Ibid.: 11 –12 ).
In order for the idea that the community in question has been traumatized to be
accepted by its constituent members, the carrier groups need to effectively engage
in the construction of complex (and potentially divisive and polarizing) symbolic
narratives and stories (Alexander, 2 012 : 17 ). As such, ‘trauma’ is as much a function
of particular constructions of a society’s history as it is a function of any particular
material historical fact, and in contrast to Sztompka’s understanding of how cultural
traumas emerge, its realization may be elite-driven as much as it may be grassroots-
driven. In this sense, the existence of a cultural trauma may just as easily reflect the
perspectives, experiences, and priorities of the carrier or elite group in question, as
it does the broader society from which the carrier group is drawn. As this process is
inherently subject to interpretation, it thus becomes necessary to consider the mech-
anisms through which history may be constructed and historical narratives given
meaning.
Even at their most banal level, the manner in which historical myths and narratives
are constructed and interpreted, and the lessons, meanings, and understandings de-

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 HISTORY, NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY

rived from them, are crucial to the ways in which the politics of a given state or or-
ganization may be shaped. This is because these depictions not only shape the way
in which the members of a given community may understand and perceive the pres-
ent, but they can also subsequently shape the identities and inform the future behav-
iours of these actors and alter perceptions of what actions and relations are considered
acceptable and unacceptable (Browning, 2002: 48). Bliesemann de Guevara agrees
with this, arguing that “…myths are one of the structuring elements of broader dis-
courses which construct political problems and legitimate policy solutions” (Bliese-
mann de Guevara, 2016: 19). She goes on to state that there are four major types of
socio-political functions of historical myths: determining functions, meaning the use of
myths to distort language and knowledge in the service of maintaining or imposing a
given hierarchical order; enabling functions, meaning the coping strategies used by or-
ganizations for dealing with societal influences or dilemmas; naturalizing functions,
which are the ways in which certain myths structure knowledge in such a way that the
myth is ‘naturalized’, and that subsequently can allow for the crystallization of certain
hierarchical structures; and constituting functions, meaning the construction of sig-
nificance and meaning through narratives and paradigms which themselves drive the
construction of what people consider ‘knowledge’ (ibid.: 32–36).
There is no one ‘correct’ or ‘true’ way for historical research to be carried out,
and different modes of analysis serve various purposes and functions, with no nec-
essary inherent hierarchy of appropriateness amongst them (Hobson and Lawson,
2 0 0 8 : 416 –417 ). If this is the case, then it is also possible to state that there is no
one necessary way in which to elaborate and explain the findings and stories. How-
ever, it is crucial to understand at the same time that historical research is often
fraught with inaccuracies, flawed assumptions, and incorrect, anachronistic, or
parachronistic readings of a given actor’s intentions or objectives. Skinner, for in-
stance, highlights the fact that historical and historicist research is filled with muddled
logic and factual errors, and that attempts to overcome these problems by, for in-
stance, divorcing events and pieces of literature from their specific social context
can lead to anachronistic mistakes whereby historians apply their own expectations
and values to those of the actors they are interpreting (Skinner, 19 6 9 : 4 –5 , 12 ). As
such, he argues that “perennial problems” do not exist in philosophy (or elsewhere),
and that “…there are only individual answers to individual questions… there is in con-
sequence simply no hope of seeking the point of studying the history of ideas in the
attempt to learn directly from the classic authors by focusing on their attempted an-
swers to supposedly timeless questions” (ibid.: 5 0 ).
Joseph Femia, while broadly agreeing with Skinner’s arguments surrounding the
potential pitfalls of historical and historicist research, disagrees with his broader
points about the temporal specificity of historical events. He argues that while his-
toricism should aim to ensure that past events are not completely ripped away from

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MICHAEL TOOMEY

the social context in which they transpired, this does not mean that historical ideas
need to be straitjacketed in the past, with no application or relevance to modern
events (Femia, 19 81 : 12 6 –127 ). He goes on to note that political ideas are crucially
dependent on given historical and/or philosophical traditions for their genesis and
development, and are rarely results of completely original thought (ibid.: 134). While
this may indeed be the case, Skinner’s arguments about the need to properly con-
textualize historical events and historical research still hold. As Tapio Juntunen points
out, historical myths function through their replacement of historical narratives that
may or may not be deeply contextual and specific to a specific period in time with
overgeneralized universal meta-narratives (Juntunen, 2 017: 6 2 –6 3 ). Subsequently,
this can result in observers seeing “the world as more unchanging than it is,” and can
lead to the lessons drawn from these overgeneralized narratives being applied to
cases and events that are only superficially, or that are not at all, similar (ibid.). Specif-
ically, this can lead to ‘parachronistic’ errors, which simplify the intricacies of past
events and discard important elements of these events in order to shoehorn them
into palatable frameworks that can easily serve the interests and perspectives of the
present, regardless of whether or not they have anything in common with the cur-
rent situation (ibid.: 71 ).
An analysis of the literature on this subject indicates that many of the authors seem
focused on the issue of honest mistakes made in the process of applying historical
metaphors or analogies to present-day problems. However, we must also be care-
ful to note that the construction of some political ideas may indeed be knowingly
based on inaccurate or even false readings of historical traditions. In such cases,
these ‘mistakes’ may be intentionally made in the construction of politically
favourable myths and narratives. Even where they are not being made intentionally,
and where the elaborator of the flawed narrative may genuinely be seeking to ren-
der an ‘honest’ account of history, having a vested interest in a narrative being in-
terpreted in a certain way can lead to errors being ignored or glossed over. Political
concerns and imperatives often exist in tension with the examination and discus-
sion of historical subjects (Lazaroms and Gioielli, 2 012 : 6 5 6 ). When we combine
this with our previous discussion of the way in which cultural and social traumas are
constructed through the elaboration of historical narratives (as opposed to existing
as a matter of fact), it highlights the importance of understanding the manner
through which these discussions and discourses are established, and of under-
standing the political imperatives informing their establishment.

CONSTRUCTING TRAUMA, TRAGEDY AND (A) SAVIOUR(S): THE

TRIANON AND HORTHY DISCOURSES IN ORBÁN’S HUNGARY
At this point, this paper moves on to discussing the ways in which Fidesz (and their
leader, Viktor Orbán) constructed and employed historical myths and narratives in

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 HISTORY, NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY

the period between 2 010 and 2 015 , and the political purposes these myths and nar-
ratives served. During this time, Fidesz’s use of historical myths and analogies was
primarily centred on events that occurred in the country during the interwar period,
and specifically on the Treaty of Trianon and the subsequent rule of Miklós Horthy.
It should not be a controversial statement to say that the Treaty of Trianon was one
of the most important events, and Horthy (symbolically, at least) one of the most im-
portant figures, in Hungarian history: the Trianon settlement led to the creation of
the modern territorial borders of the Hungarian state, while Horthy was the head of
state for almost the entirety of one of the most tumultuous periods in the country’s
history.
However, the broader significance of each arguably lay in what they symbolized.
Trianon, for many Hungarians (both then and now), represented the humiliation of
their nation, marked the definitive end of the Kingdom of Hungary, and created an
enduring perception amongst nationalist circles that Hungary had been uniquely
hard done by the post-WWI settlement, and by the foreign powers that imposed it
(Traub, 2 015 ). Meanwhile, although Horthy was Hungary’s head of state from 19 2 0
until 194 4 , he was not the only figure of power in the country; oftentimes, actors
such as his Prime Ministers, István Bethlen, Gyula Gömbös, and Pál Teleki, would
take more decisive roles in decision-making processes (Molnár, 2 0 01 : 2 87 ). How-
ever, an intense propaganda campaign built around him during this time allowed
for the construction of an image of him as the heroic military saviour of the nation,
who would seek to bring about a restitution of the ‘injustices’ wrought upon the
country at Trianon, and thus restore the nation’s honour and glory. This interpreta-
tion would eventually become dominant in the country from the early 19 2 0 s until
194 0 , and served an important role in legitimating the interwar regime (Romsics,
2 0 0 9 : 9 8 –9 9 ; Turbucz, 2 014 : 11 ).
Official statements relating to a possible re-visitation of the Trianon settlement
have been a common theme of Viktor Orbán’s career, at least since his first rise to
the Prime Minister’s office in 19 9 8 . Throughout the period between the 19 9 8 and
2 0 0 6 elections, Orbán repeatedly irked neighbouring countries (while receiving ac-
claim from nationalist groups amongst the Hungarian diaspora) for his advocacy of
a ‘cultural and social reunification’ with ethnic Hungarian communities in neigh-
bouring countries, and his references to Transylvania being “part of Hungary’s living
space in the Carpathian Basin” (The Economist, 2 0 0 2 ; British Broadcasting Corpo-
ration, 2 0 0 0 ; The American Hungarian Federation, 2 0 0 4 ). On the other hand, pos-
itive references to Horthy are a relatively new development, and as late as 2 013 ,
Horthy was largely being publicly commemorated only by those on the extreme
right of the country’s political spectrum, and particularly by supporters of the Job-
bik party.3 Since then, however, Orbán’s approach towards Horthy subtly became
more positive. This was initially marked by his adoption of a non-committal and even

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MICHAEL TOOMEY

conciliatory attitude towards the erection of statues of Horthy in the towns of Kereki
and Csokako in 2 012 , and the unveiling of a Horthy commemorative plaque in the
city of Debrecen in the same year (Dempsey, 2 012 ; Verseck, 2 012 ; Schleifer, 2 014 ).
This was followed by his more active approach to the re-visitation of Horthy’s legacy
with the 2 014 installation of the ‘Memorial to the Victims of German Occupation’
in Szabadság Tér in Budapest, and his even more favourable attitude toward the in-
terwar Regent in the subsequent year.4

Trianon: Parachronistically Constructing a Collective

Trauma
Following Hungary’s defeat in World War I, the country’s political establishment un-
derwent a dramatic upheaval which subsequently led to the emergence of its first
democratic political system under the premiership of Mihály Károlyi (Romsics, 1999:
9 0 ). This new government sought to allay the various ethnic divisions within the
country which had been reinforced by the war through the creation of constitutional
guarantees of political representation and autonomy and, in so doing, to at least
somewhat protect the territorial integrity of the Hungarian state. The Károlyi ad-
ministration’s capacity to implement these reforms (along with other pressing social
reforms) soon began to creak under the weight of an impending economic collapse,
and the territorial demands of the neighbouring regimes in Serbia, Czechoslovakia
and Romania (ibid.: 91 –9 5 ). Indeed, according to Kontler, as early as January 1919 ,
the democratic Hungary had already effectively lost control of some 5 0 % of its pre-
WWI territory and population (Kontler, 2 0 0 2 : 3 3 0 ).
The subsequent agreement of the Treaty of Trianon one year later saw these losses
confirmed and even expanded. In total, almost three-quarters of the territory of pre-
war Hungary and two-thirds of its population were ceded to the newly independent
states of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, and also to Romania. These territories, whilst
predominantly populated by the respective majority ethnic groups of the states they
were awarded to, also contained large Hungarian populations, who found themselves
as minorities in the new states. This perceived loss of territory and population is widely
thought to have contributed to the undermining of progressive and liberal demo-
cratic elements in the interwar Hungarian society, and a consequent growth in sup-
port for revanchist and radical populist platforms (on both the right and the left) in the
following months and years (Kontler, 2002: 332; Ormos, 2007: 20, 23). This subse-
quently led to the emergence of a brief left-wing regime in the country led by Béla
Kun, which fought a war against Czechoslovakia and Romania in order to recoup
Hungary’s territorial losses. The emergence of this Soviet republic in Central Europe
alarmed the attendees of the Paris Peace Conference, who in turn provided support
to the Romanian and Czechoslovak armies to turn back the Hungarian advance, and
so consolidated the new borders (Romsics, 1999: 106).

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 HISTORY, NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY

In the ensuing years, the reasons for why Trianon occurred started to be of par-
ticular relevance to Hungarians, with the subsequent interpretation of the events
being that they were not just a punishment for Hungary’s defeat in WWI, but also a
result of the emergence of Kun’s short-lived socialist republic. Thus, during the in-
terwar years, Jews, socialists, and liberal or progressive democratic politicians (who
were all associated with the various governments during the period of the Trianon
negotiations) often received blame for the excoriating terms of the treaty (Gerner,
2006: 98). Deriving from this, a cleavage emerged in Hungarian society between the
so-called ‘urbanists’ and ‘populists’. The ‘urbanists’ were considered to be made up
of a cohort of liberal, socialist, and Jewish elites, primarily based in Budapest and
other large population centres, while the ‘populists’ were composed of the ‘true’
Hungarians of the smaller towns and villages, and the rural countryside, and of the
peasantry (ibid.: 101 ). In addition, the ‘urbanists’ were perceived as having a West-
ern European identity, while the ‘populists’ (at least according to several key intel-
lectuals and public figures associated with this group) had a more ‘Magyar’, Asiatic
and Turanian identity or, at the very least, an identity that was neither fully ‘western’
nor ‘eastern’ (Esbenshade, 2 014 : 17 9 –18 0 ).
It is certainly true that Hungarian society has been, and continues to be, deeply
affected by Trianon. Both Kristian Gerner and Jan-Werner Mueller, for instance, have
argued that the country has an abiding “obsession” with, and a sense of resentment
resulting from, this period in its history (Gerner, 2 0 0 6 : 9 8 ; Mueller, 2 011 : 7 ). The
terms of the Trianon settlement are commonly believed by Hungarian nationalists to
be a unique injustice suffered by the nation.5 However, the extent to which Trianon
is a trauma ‘carried’ by the grassroots of Hungarian society is debated. Krisztián
Ungváry argues that the legacy of Trianon remains crucial as it led to a situation
whereby Hungarians who lived outside of the state’s new borders were forcibly as-
similated into the majority cultures of their new states, and that it is this, along with
the subsequent inequality suffered by these Hungarians, that perpetuates the
‘trauma’ of Trianon; on the other hand, Éva Kovacs contests the idea that Hungari-
ans are necessarily traumatized by the legacy of Trianon, arguing that the matter is
no longer truly relevant to the lives of Hungarians, and that it exists purely in the
country’s cultural memory (Laczó, 2 011 ). Likewise, Gabor Egry opposes Ungváry’s
position by arguing that Hungarians that found themselves living outside of Hun-
gary’s borders after 19 2 0 were neither universally victimized by the authorities in
their new countries nor universally accepted by nationals of the ‘new’ Hungary, and
that the extent of the trauma of Trianon was thus unclear, even in the immediate af-
termath of the settlement (Egry, 2 012 ). Thus, while the sheer presence of a debate
on the issue shows that Trianon retains an influence on Hungarian discourses sur-
rounding nationality and democracy in the modern era, the degree to which the
elaboration of the cultural trauma associated with it continues to be a bottom-up

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MICHAEL TOOMEY

process (in the manner described by Sztompka [2 0 0 0 b]) in the modern era is lim-
ited, and it is dependent upon the actions of elite ‘carriers’ for much of its develop-
ment.
It is with this in mind, then, that the significance of Viktor Orbán and Fidesz as the
carriers of the Trianon trauma becomes even greater. Throughout much of his po-
litical career, Orbán’s messages have been based on the concept of a ‘national uni-
fication’ project which would seek to somehow redress the Trianon Treaty (Bozóki,
2 011 : 6 4 9 ). Upon returning to power in 2 010 , Orbán has been able to deliver tan-
gible results in this regard through his introduction of legislation such as the previ-
ously-mentioned Citizenship Law, and the creation of a ‘National Unity Day’6
commemorating the country’s perceived territorial losses in 19 2 0 . Throughout this
time, he and his fellow party members have been at pains to stress the linkages be-
tween the law, the Unity Day and Trianon. For instance, the proponents of the bill
that eventually led to the creation of the National Unity Day stated the following as
justification for the legislation:

The Treaty of Trianon signed on June 4, 1920 left an indelible, yet to this day un-
resolved mark on the consciousness of the peoples of Central Europe, for gen-
erations influencing directly or indirectly political and historical events in the
region… while for some countries Trianon meant the realization of their aspira-
tion to a national identity and as such was a progressive event, for Hungarians
it was the greatest tragedy of the 2 0 th century. The national remembrance and
the interest of promoting a common future for the peoples of the Carpathian
Basin vindicating European values, gives us the task of understanding and re-
solving the issues brought up by the decisions taken at Trianon. At the same
time, it gives us the opportunity to prove that, despite a historic tragedy, the
Hungarian nation, nurtured by her culture and language, is capable of national
renewal and the solution of her historic tasks (Kövér and Semjén, 2 010 ).

The introduction of the Citizenship Law and the creation of the National Unity Day
serve an important purpose. They either imply the existence of a national trauma
surrounding Trianon, or attempt to retroactively construct such a trauma (almost as
if the argument was that if a ‘solution’ was found, then surely there must have been
a problem that existed which necessitated this solution in the first place). Fidesz and
Orbán thus act through these policies and discourses as clear examples of Alexan-
der’s (2012) ‘carrier groups’ for the elaboration and articulation of the Hungarian cul-
tural ‘trauma’ surrounding Trianon.
This elaboration and articulation of trauma serves immediate political goals for
them, as they lend credence to Fidesz’s nationalistic credentials (without the imple-
mentation of which, the party’s adoption of nationalistic discourse would seem hol-

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 HISTORY, NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY

low and lack credibility). In addition, it allows Fidesz (and Orbán specifically) to be
presented as the ‘saviours’ of the Hungarian nation who are bringing restitution to
the country for its losses suffered during the 2 0 th Century, and as its defenders
against any attempt to inflict a ‘second Trianon’ upon the populace. Indeed, refer-
ences by Fidesz representatives and other right-wing figures to the need to defend
Hungary against a recurrence of this ‘disaster’ began to emerge following the onset
of the European migration crisis towards the end of 2 015 , and have increased in fre-
quency in the ensuing years.7 The Orbán regime has made repeated connections to
this topic through issues relating to control of borders, self-determination and an
unwillingness to bow to the demands of outsiders (‘Brussels’ and ‘liberal’ Western
Europeans) in this regard.
The Orbán regime’s construction and use of the trauma of Trianon has not been
confined to the Citizenship Law and the National Unity Day. Following the annexa-
tion of Crimea by Russia in early 2 014 and the outbreak of the separatist conflict in
Eastern Ukraine, and coming immediately in the wake of his victory in the 2014 Hun-
garian parliamentary elections, Orbán gave a speech wherein he demanded that
ethnic Hungarians in Ukraine be given autonomy, and that they be allowed to avail
themselves of a dual citizenship (Gardner, 2 014 ; Zalan, 2 014 ). Elaborating on this
point, he argued that “…the Hungarian issue has been unresolved since the Second
World War”, and stated that his government would henceforth be pursuing these
concessions for Hungarians throughout the Carpathian Basin (a region that en-
compasses parts of Slovakia, Ukraine, Serbia, and Croatia, along with Hungary)
(Zalan, 2 014 ). These demands were swiftly rejected by the Ukrainian government,
and did not receive much consideration from other governments in the region either.
Given the curt treatment of these comments, and the lack of any subsequent esca-
lation of actions by the Hungarian government, it is likely that these comments were
not made with the intention of being taken fully seriously outside of Hungary. In-
stead, their intended audience was more likely a domestic one.8 Comments such as
these bolster the idea of a Hungarian cultural trauma, and of the urgent necessity of
resolving this trauma, and contribute to the creation of an image amongst the Hun-
garian population of Viktor Orbán as a ‘tragic’ national saviour who is engaged in
an earnest, but possibly futile, effort to redress the ‘injustices’ inflicted upon the na-
tion at Trianon.
This approach is historically careless and presumptuous, as it asserts that revising
or otherwise rectifying Trianon is an issue which is of pressing concern for Hungar-
ian people in the 21 st Century. It is parachronistic, as it uses a simplified under-
standing of Hungarian history, as past events are ripped from their context (the idea
that the Hungarian ‘nation’ was necessarily ‘traumatized’ by the Trianon treaty) to
serve the interests of present day actors and activities. However, it is also an effec-
tive and successful strategy, as it restores to modern day relevance the ‘populist-ur-

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MICHAEL TOOMEY

banist’ cleavage, and situates Fidesz firmly on the side of the populists. As such, any
domestic opposition to their rule can be dismissed as being made up of the mod-
ern descendants of the feckless and corrupt urbanists, whose incompetence was re-
sponsible for the infliction of the trauma of Trianon on the pure, uncorrupt populists.
Thus, when the party attacks particular civil society organizations as being agents of
‘meddling foreigners’ and tries to threaten their access to funding (Dunai and Ko-
ranyi, 2 014 ; Novak, 2 014 ), or when Orbán describes Brussels as “the new Moscow”
and alleges that the EU is trying to colonize Hungary (Deutsche Welle, 2 013 ), such
statements carry greater weight amongst nationalistic circles in the country. Like-
wise, the manner in which the trauma is constructed allows for anyone who might
seek to contest the Trianon narrative to be similarly dismissed as the allegedly self-
interested urbanists, who are supposedly seeking to deny the suffering of the Hun-
garian people so as to deflect attention from their own culpability.
Orbán’s role as the ‘carrier’ of the Trianon trauma is highlighted by the previously
discussed debate over the trauma’s existence and relevance in modern Hungary.
However, it should not be taken to mean that because the Trianon trauma is largely
an elite-driven one, the general population is a passive actor in this process. As
Jacques Ranciere argues, “…every spectator is an actor in her story; every actor,
every man of action, is the spectator of the same story” (Ranciere, 2 0 0 9 : 17 ). In this
sense, then, while Orbán’s narratives surrounding Trianon are misleading and par-
tial, they are also successful precisely because a receptive audience actively chooses
to accept them and internalize them. This then permits Orbán to shape and direct
the modern day construction of the Trianon trauma in such a way that it allows him
to extract the maximum possible value from it.

Horthy: Mythically Constructing a Tragic National

Saviour
In contrast to Trianon, the popular legacy and memory of Miklos Horthy is even
more contested. Following Béla Kun’s brief interlude as the leader of Hungary, Hor-
thy was installed as the Regent of Hungary (in effect, its Head of State) after a mili-
tary coup had toppled Kun’s regime.9 This coup was supported by Britain and
France, and was followed up in the country with a period known as the ‘White Ter-
ror’, when army units loyal to Horthy carried out a series of retributive attacks on the
remaining Socialists, and on societal elements (including Jewish people and liberals)
that were seen as having been loyal to Kun’s regime (Ormos, 2007: 66–69). Horthy’s
domination of Hungary’s political scene in the subsequent years leading up to 194 4
was so complete that, in the words of Ignác Romsics, “…it is entirely fitting that it
should be referred to as the Horthy era” (Romsics, 19 9 9 : 12 9 ).
Hungary subsequently lurched towards right-wing extremism and authoritarian-
ism (albeit without becoming a totalitarian state) in the late 19 2 0 s and 19 3 0 s, sign-

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 HISTORY, NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY

ing alliances with Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany in 19 27 and 19 3 9 , respectively
(Hoensch, 1996: 136–141; Romsics, 1999: 190–191). Horthy was also able to deliver
some partial revisions to the Trianon settlement. These included a significant rear-
mament program, the achievement between 19 3 8 and 19 3 9 of significant territorial
concessions from Czechoslovakia in the regions of Slovakia and Ruthenia, and the
addition in 194 0 and 1941 of lands that had previously been ceded to Romania and
Yugoslavia (respectively), which set off a wave of national celebration and jubilation
(ibid.: 19 9 –2 01 ).
However, these developments would also eventually lead Hungary to disaster, as
the country found itself on the losing side of yet another major international conflict.
With the tide of war seemingly turning against the Axis powers in WWII, by 194 3
Horthy had already started to send out peace overtures to the Allies. Having found
out about this, Hitler ordered the occupation of Hungary in March 194 4 , and in Oc-
tober 194 4 he appointed the leader of the extremist Arrow Cross Party (Ferenc
Szálasi) in place of Horthy as the puppet ruler of the state. Szálasi then accelerated
the campaign of extermination against the Hungarian Jewish population, which had
already begun under Horthy’s tenure10 (Lendvai, 19 9 9 : 4 2 3 –4 24 ). This sealed the
fate of the country, as it was occupied by the Soviet Union in February 194 5 , which
left it firmly in the hands of the Communists for the duration of the Cold War.
As a result, Horthy’s legacy to Hungary could reasonably be argued to be one of
defeat and occupation, without even mentioning his (at least partial) culpability for
the fate of the Hungarian Jewish community. Regardless of this, after 2 010 Fidesz
and Orbán began a subtle, but noteworthy, rehabilitation of Horthy. This is most ap-
parent in their wording of the preamble to the 2 011 constitution, which at one point
states:

We date the restoration of our country’s self-determination, lost on the nine-

teenth day of March 194 4 , from the second day of May 19 9 0 , when the first
freely elected body of popular representation was formed. We shall consider
this date to be the beginning of our country’s new democracy and constitu-
tional order. We hold that after the decades of the twentieth century which led
to a state of moral decay, we have an abiding need for spiritual and intellectual
renewal… Our Fundamental Law shall be the basis of our legal order, it shall be
an alliance among Hungarians of the past, present and future. It is a living frame-
work which expresses the nation’s will and the form in which we want to live
(Constitute Project, 2 013 ).

According to this formulation, the periods of Nazi and Communist rule over Hun-
gary are explicitly delegitimized and excised from the history of Hungary as a self-
determining country (Bozoki, 2 011 : 6 5 9 –6 6 0 ). By contrast, Horthy’s period of rule

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 MICHAEL TOOMEY

is dislocated from its connection to Hungary’s experiences during WWII and the
period of German occupation that largely resulted from his decisions. As such, Hor-
thy’s regency is normalized and included in the avowed period of the country’s his-
tory of self-determination, which establishes a linkage between his regime and the
rule of the Orbán government.11 Subsequently to this, in 2 014 Fidesz decided to
erect another monument in Szabadság Tér (it is separate to the bust of Horthy which
sits in the same square, and which is referenced in endnote ix) which sought to com-
memorate the “Victims of the German Occupation”.12 The monument depicts a
giant eagle attacking a statue of the Angel Gabriel (used here as a symbol of Hun-
gary, albeit a somewhat unusual and obscure one); the message of this is quite clear:
Hungary and, virtually by extension, Horthy are reconstituted as victims of Germanic
aggression, and the suffering of the country as a whole is equated with that of its
Jewish population.
It is important to note that during his first period as Prime Minister between 19 9 8
and 2 0 0 2 , Orbán had also taken steps to minimize the role of Horthy and his ad-
ministration in the Holocaust, and to shy away from criticizing him (Dempsey, 2 012 ;
Verseck, 2012). For instance, the high-profile and internationally recognized13 House
of Terror Museum in Budapest, established by Fidesz in 2 0 0 2 , minimized Horthy’s
role in the atrocities suffered by the Hungarian population before and during WWII,
whilst largely putting the blame on Szálasi’s Arrow Cross party, and presented the
crimes committed during the communist era as being equal to, if not greater than,
the crimes committed during the Holocaust (Gerner, 2 0 0 6 : 10 2 –10 4 ).
However, after 2010, Orbán’s approach shifted from a mere minimization of Hor-
thy’s offences (which still implied some blame) towards a sanitization and a reha-
bilitation of Horthy. The Szabadság Tér statue cannot be decoupled from the
sentiments expressed in the preamble to the constitution, as both contribute to the
creation of a revisionist understanding of history. It constructs the Hungarian nation
as not being truly responsible for the crimes committed on its soil during WWII, and
thus allows Horthy to be conceived of as being an honourable and courageous na-
tionalist leader who defied Hitler’s demands and defended both Hungary and its
Jewish population for as long as he could (Jenne, 2 016 : 11 –12 ).
In the manner that Juntunen and Skinner both describe, and similarly to Fidesz
and Orbán’s discourses surrounding Trianon, this approach is parachronistic, ig-
noring the specificities of the context within which Horthy’s regime is historically lo-
cated so as to serve the interests of the present-day Hungarian government. Again,
this is related to the government’s efforts to recreate the ‘populist-urbanist’ cleavage
for their 21 st-century audience. During the interwar years, Horthy functioned as an
‘antidote’ to the urbanists,14 having achieved some measure of restitution for the
country following the chaos experienced during the immediate aftermath of the
conclusion of WWI. During his period of regency, regime stability was restored, and

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 HISTORY, NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY

a partial restoration of the country’s pre-WWI borders was achieved through his al-
liances with Hitler and Mussolini. Thus, from the perspective of Fidesz, Horthy serves
as a useful analogy (or even a predecessor) for the travails and accomplishments of
the current government.
Orbán is likewise presented as an ‘antidote’ to what they characterize as the weak
and incompetent ‘urbanist’ administration of Ferenc Gyurscany15 –and the Budapest
liberal elite more widely - who is constantly striving for a solution to the ‘Trianon’
issue that will allow for the restoration of the Hungarian pride and honour. As was
noted earlier, the suggested restoration of the territories previously controlled by
the Kingdom of Hungary is geopolitically impossible, and has already been flatly re-
jected by those countries that would be affected by it. However, the ingenuity of
Orbán’s approaches lies precisely in the fact that ‘Trianon’ cannot ever be resolved;
his intended audience is not external, but internal. As such, by engaging in a per-
petual battle to restore the country’s lost honour, he continues to reconstruct the Tri-
anon trauma, while also consolidating his image as the tragic national saviour (in a
similar manner to the way in which the previously mentioned interwar ‘Horthy-cult’
continued to be used to burnish and legitimate Horthy’s position as the heroic mil-
itary saviour striving to resolve Trianon).

CONCLUSION: THE USES OF ‘TRIANON’ AND ‘HORTHY’

The analysis presented above showed that Viktor Orbán has sought to tap into vari-
ous streams of Hungarian nationalist history through manipulating and historicizing
understandings of the country’s experience during the interwar years, and then using
these interpretations as implicit and explicit analogies and as lessons for the con-
temporary actions of his government. Through these approaches, Trianon becomes
constructed as an uncontestably traumatic event, one which has fundamentally and
detrimentally affected the ‘true’, non-urbanist Hungarian nation as a whole, and
which demands restitution (even one hundred years after the fact). Meanwhile, Hor-
thy is reconstructed as a courageous defender of the true Hungarian nation and Hun-
garian national interests, who sought to provide this restitution and to restore stability
to the country, but was tragically undone by the country’s occupation by Germany
in 194 4. In this manner, he becomes the spiritual predecessor of Orbán, who likewise
delivered Hungary from the abyss of the economic and political instability wrought
on the country, and who has also struggled against overwhelming odds and foreign
adversaries to achieve a sustainable solution to the Trianon trauma. Thus, Orbán’s
rule is afforded a façade of nobility as the actions of the mythic saviour of the nation,
who is selflessly seeking to restore the Hungarian dignity and pride.
There are a number of purposes for the use of these discursive strategies. Firstly,
as mentioned earlier, Fidesz and Orbán function as carriers for the development
and elaboration of the cultural trauma associated with Trianon. This allows them to

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 MICHAEL TOOMEY

cast themselves as the guardians of the broader Hungarian nation’s interests (as op-
posed to merely being the leaders of the Hungarian state). As such, Fidesz and
Orbán become analogous with Hungary itself – the ‘true’ Hungary, that is. Their
more nationalistic policies (such as the Citizenship Law or the National Unity Day)
become inherent, indisputable parts of the Hungarian culture and nationality. Using
this construction, they can claim to have taken decisive steps towards healing the
country’s ‘trauma’ (which they themselves are largely responsible for elaborating).
Additionally, this allows them to deflect any criticisms from international actors such
as the EU or from the indigenous civil society of other aspects of their ‘illiberal turn’
by saying that these are attacks on Hungary itself (rather than just attacks on the
country’s government) by foreign powers and their domestic proxies (Jenne and
Mudde, 2 012 : 15 3 ; Hodonyi and Trüpel, 2 013 ; Saltman and Herman, 2 013 ). As a re-
sult of this, opposition movements find themselves delegitimized and deprived of re-
sources, while the regime’s critics from the European Commission and the European
Parliament find their critiques inadvertently fulfilling Fidesz’s narratives, and thus re-
inforcing the party’s grip on Hungarian society.
However, this is just one aspect of these narrative strategies, and it represents
only one function of Fidesz and Orbán’s approach. A much more important point
to consider is who the intended audiences for these narratives are, and what the
message that is being communicated is. In truth, these messages are likely not being
created for the purposes of communicating Hungary to the outside world, and are
not intended to majorly expand Fidesz’s voting base or counteract left-wing criti-
cism. Nor are they likely to be focused to any great extent on changing people’s
minds about the historical legacy of Horthy. Instead, these narratives are targeted
more towards right-wing nationalists in the country, many of whom would already
view Horthy as being a courageous and tragic figure. Thus, by seeking to recon-
struct Horthy’s interwar image as the virtuous military hero who sought to guide
the nation through a particularly turbulent time in its history, Orbán legitimizes the
admiration such people hold for Horthy. In so doing, this creates affinities between
Orbán and the nationalist right in the country, and removes a potential obstacle to
their absorption into his broader coalition of voters.
By seeking to rehabilitate the image of Horthy (at least from an official state gov-
ernment standpoint rather than from an academic standpoint) and to resolve the
ongoing trauma associated with the Trianon treaty, Orbán firmly aligns himself with
the ‘populist’ segment of Hungarian society. This then serves to create an image of
the Hungarian nation that is exclusionary of both people on the left and political
groupings on the right of the political spectrum. The ‘true’ Hungarians find their sole
representation in Fidesz and Orbán. Meanwhile, the left-wing opposition parties
and civil society activists become the modern incarnation of the urbanist cleavage,
and are more easily castigated as being agents of the perversion of the general will

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 HISTORY, NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY

of the nation, who might prevent the resolution of the Trianon trauma if they could.
On the other side, the Jobbik party (specifically) are equally excluded. By appropri-
ating the legacy of Horthy for himself, Orbán is able to pre-empt Jobbik, and force
them to either accept the mantle of being the heirs to Szálasi’s Arrow Cross fascists
or (as has transpired) move towards the political centre and away from the right. So
while Orbán’s spiritual predecessor is reconstructed as a brave and honorable leader
and defender of the nation, Jobbik (unwillingly) either become the successors of a
group that eventually betrayed Hungary and collaborated with its enemies, or, ef-
fectively, urbanists. This assists in the consolidation of Fidesz’s electoral base, and
prevents their support from being eroded by anyone from further to the right of
them on the political spectrum.
Through this, it is possible to see how Fidesz and Orbán use partial and parachro-
nistic approaches to Hungarian history as a discursive tool for legitimizing and con-
solidating their rule over Hungary. By constructing a ‘cultural trauma’ that has been
suffered by the Hungarian people as a result of the Treaty of Trianon, they can sub-
sequently claim credit for having attempted to resolve it through steps such as the
Citizenship Law and the National Unity Day; this can be constantly recycled, as by
its sheer nature Trianon can never realistically be fully resolved. As such, policies re-
lated to the redress of the trauma can be continually introduced and claimed do-
mestically as steps towards the ultimate redemption of Hungary’s national honour
without ever truly removing the spectre of Trianon from Hungarian life. By reclaim-
ing the legacy of Horthy, Orbán can ensure that he alone reaps the electoral re-
wards from these strategies whilst bolstering his image as the strong and determined
leader tragically beset by domestic and foreign adversaries intent on thwarting him.
Broadly speaking, then, the strategy revolves around resuscitating the ‘populist-ur-
banist’ cleavage of the interwar years in the 2 010 s, and ensuring that Fidesz, and
only Fidesz, can lay claim to being the ‘true’ representatives of and heirs to the pop-
ulist tradition. In this way, the approaches of Fidesz and Orbán outlined in this paper
seem to have been broadly successful thus far, and have been an important part of
Hungary’s post-2 010 ‘illiberal turn’.

ENDNOTES
1 According to Rupnik, this reconnection is most notable in the way in which it reflects Horthy’s own
twin obsessions: his strident opposition to ‘Bolshevism’, and his irredentist desire to reverse the territo-
rial losses resulting from the Treaty of Trianon (Rupnik, 2 012 : 13 5 ).
2 According to Alexander, there is not necessarily any specific characteristic to these carrier groups, who
may be “…prestigious religious leaders or groups whom the majority has designated as spiritual pari-
ahs...[they may] be generational…national…[or] institutional…” (Alexander, 2 0 0 4 : 11 ).
3 Indeed, at the unveiling of a monument to Horthy in Szabadság Tér in Budapest, Jobbik politicians had
effusively praised Horthy’s role in “…[rebuilding] the country after the deadly Bolshevik rampage fol-

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 MICHAEL TOOMEY

lowing the First World War and the catastrophe of Trianon, which was the darkest time in the history of
[the] country” (Jobbik, 2 013 ).
4 Indeed, in more recent months Orbán has gone on to adopt even more nakedly pro-Horthy stances,
going so far as to describe him as being an “exceptional statesman” in a speech given in Budapest in
2017 (Balogh, 2017a). While this statement falls outside of the chronological focus of this paper, it is use-
ful to note that Orbán’s veneration of Horthy has not died down in the subsequent years, but instead,
it has become ever more brazen.
5 References to the unjustness of the terms of the Treaty of Trianon are frequently made at rallies by the
Jobbik party, and the revanchist ‘Greater Hungary’ map is often adopted and displayed by members of
nationalist and ‘patriotic’ groups. One example of this rhetoric appeared during an anti-EU protest in Bu-
dapest in 2 012 when protestors chanted “Down with Trianon” (Jobbik, 2 012 ).
6 The idea for the creation of a national commemoration of Trianon was originally proposed by the Job-
bik party, and was part of their platform during the 2 010 elections. It was not until after the elections
that Fidesz adopted this policy (Biro Nagy et al., 2 013 : 24 5 –247 ).
7 Although they lie somewhat outside the chronological scope of this article, it is important to highlight
some specific cases here. As early as December 29 th 2 015, the Budapest Beacon reported that János
Lázár, a senior figure in the Hungarian government, opposed the settlement of refugees in Hungary on
the grounds that it could lead to Hungarians becoming a minority in their own land, which was a sup-
posed precondition for the Trianon settlement (Novak, 2015); likewise, in a speech in March 2017 com-
memorating the 1848 revolution, Viktor Orbán thematically (albeit not explicitly) linked the government’s
opposition to the refugee quotas with its restoration of the ‘unity’ of the Hungarian nation (Orbán, 2017).
In contrast, Balogh reports on the far more explicit linkages made by several pro-government historians
and public figures between the refugee crisis and the potential for a ‘new Trianon’ (Balogh, 2017b).
8 Although it lies outside of the scope of this article, it is interesting to note that similar tactics to those
described here have previously been used by Orbán and Fidesz. A case in point would be the 2 015
anti-refugee billboard campaign, in which billboards were erected throughout the country containing
messages such as “If you come to Hungary, you should not take Hungarians’ jobs”; the messages were
written in Hungarian, a language very few refugees to the country spoke (Nolan, 2 015 ).
9 Horthy’s appointment as Regent essentially meant that Hungary became an autocratic government
with him as the leader. This was because Hungary, although legally a kingdom, did not have a king;
when the rightful claimant to the throne, King Charles, attempted to ascend it in October 19 21, Horthy
(with the backing of the Allies) had him taken prisoner and exiled (Lendvai, 19 9 9 : 3 81 ).
10 It is important to note that prior to the appointment of Szálasi, deportations of Hungarian Jews had al-
ready begun between April and July 194 4 , but then they were halted by Horthy in the face of an in-
ternational outcry; however, these initial deportations did not include the Jewish population of
Budapest. Following Szalasi’s installation as ruler of the country, the deportations and massacres were
restarted, and this time they included the Budapest Jews.
11 Given that Horthy was an avowed conservative, and was supported throughout his tenure by right-
wing and far-right political groupings, his regime could be more easily seen as a spiritual predecessor
of Orbán’s government than as a predecessor of Ferenc Gyurcsány’s government (for instance).

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 HISTORY, NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY

12 An inscription above the statue states in Hungarian: “The Memorial for the Victims of the German Oc-
cupation”.
13 Amongst its other distinctions, the House of Terror Museum is recognized as a member of the EU’s Plat-
form of European Memory and Conscience (Platform of European Memory and Conscience, 2 018 ).
14 According to Balogh (2011), Horthy was actually criticized in his time by intellectuals from the ‘populist’
camp, who were largely left-wing; however, she also notes that in the modern era, the heirs of the ‘pop-
ulist’ mantle are predominantly right-wing, and that Fidesz are very much part of this group.
15 Orbán’s accession to the position of Prime Minister in the 2 010 elections came in the wake of the cul-
mination of eight years of rule by the Hungarian Socialist Party. These years were marked by economic
turmoil, with the country experiencing ballooning budgetary deficits between 2 0 0 2 and 2 0 0 6 , which
were subsequently followed by one of the most severe recessions in the EU in 2 0 0 8 . In addition to this,
massive, sustained street protests were experienced in several major cities in 2 0 0 6 after the leaking of
then Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány’s ‘Balaton speech’ to the press, in which he admitted that the
Socialist government had been lying to the Hungarian people about the troubles facing the country’s
economy.

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