Frank Scalambrino - Philosophical Principles of The History and Systems of Psychology-Springer International Publishing Palgrave Macmillan (2018)
Frank Scalambrino - Philosophical Principles of The History and Systems of Psychology-Springer International Publishing Palgrave Macmillan (2018)
Frank Scalambrino - Philosophical Principles of The History and Systems of Psychology-Springer International Publishing Palgrave Macmillan (2018)
Philosophical
Principles of the
History and Systems
of Psychology
Essential Distinctions
Frank Scalambrino
Department of Philosophy
John Carroll University
University Heights, OH, USA
This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer International
Publishing AG part of Springer Nature.
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
To psychē (ψυχή)
Preface
This Preface is divided into three (3) parts. First, a general characteriza-
tion of the structure, function, and content of this book. Second, a brief
characterization of some of the motivation for writing this book. Third, a
general overview of the book.
(1) This book may be of interest to anyone who wishes to “think
through” the history of Western psychology. In fact, its original title was:
Philosophical Principles of the History and Systems of Psychology: Essential
Distinctions for Thinking Through Psychology. Specifically, this book is
intended as supplementary for History and Systems of Psychology
courses. It “fills a gap” in the literature, so to speak, in that though there
vii
viii Preface
Bibliography
James, William. 1918. The Principles of Psychology. Vol. 1. New York: Dover
Publications.
Sahakian, William S. 1975. History and Systems of Psychology. London: Wiley.
Brennan, James F. 2003. History and Systems of Psychology. Upper Saddle, NJ:
Prentice Hall.
Walsh, Richard T., Thomas Teo, and Angelina Baydala. 2014. A Critical History
and Philosophy of Psychology: Diversity of Context, Thought, and Practice.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rorty, Richard. 1984. The Historiography of Philosophy: Four Genres. In
Philosophy in History: Essays on the Historiography of Philosophy, ed. R. Rorty,
J.B. Schneewind, and Q. Skinner, 49–76. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Hergenhahn, B.R., and Tracy Henley. 2013. An Introduction to the History of
Psychology. Stamford, CT: Wadsworth Publishing.
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank the Drs. Nicholas and Dorothy Cummings Center
for the History of Psychology for allowing me access to their archives and
special collections at the University of Akron.
I would like to thank Dr. Dawn Mitchell, Psy.D., Dr. Stephen T
Penepacker M.D., Dr. Elizabeth Aram, Psy.D., Dr. James Swindal, Dr.
Jim Collier, Dr. Steve Fuller, Dr. Todd DuBose, Dr. Stephen A. Minnick,
and Dr. Robert Arp. I would like to thank my “Deleuzian” friend Beth
Metcalf for our recent conversations regarding Deleuze and for her
encouragement and affirmation. I would also like to thank Carter, Taylor,
and Lexie, Elisa, Hannah, Jonathan, Nate, Ryan, and Zachary for their
continued encouragement and friendship. I would like to thank my for-
mer students, especially those from The Chicago School of Professional
Psychology, Kent State University, the Illinois College of Lake County,
Walsh University, Duquesne University, the University of Dallas, and the
University of Akron. I would like to thank all those patients and clients
who inspired me to continue to study psychology while I was working in
multiple capacities, from my time answering suicide hotline calls to
doing chemical dependency counseling, to working as a forensic moni-
tor of persons NGRI, to doing pre-hospital admission screening, and to
working as the Director of Emergency and Community Psychiatric
Services at the Community Mental Health Suicide Prevention Respite
Unit and Clinical Intervention Center, which I founded in Ohio
xv
xvi Acknowledgments
Bibliography 215
Index 247
xvii
1
Introduction: The Project
of the Philosophical Archeology
of the History and Systems
of Psychology
The final stage of the Pragmatist’s Progress comes when one begins to see
one’s previous peripeties [reversals of condition or fortune] not as stages in
Introduction: The Project of the Philosophical Archeology… 5
The past characterized. as Chaos, then, not only casts historical narratives
in the light of contingency, it completely undermines the idea of prog-
ress. In other words, whereas historical events may be contingently deter-
mined and yet indicate progress toward a goal in a (cyclically or linearly)
unfolding past, this understanding of Chaos characterizes the past as nei-
ther progressing cyclically nor linearly.
(d) As will become clear by the end of the book, the distinction between
“Presentism” and “Historicism” is essential for thinking through a num-
ber of the systematic aspects in the history of Western psychology. There
is much to be said about this distinction; to start with, we can recognize
its affinity to the distinction between Original and Reflective history,
especially the Pragmatic and Critical types of Reflective history. That is to
say, “Historicism” refers to the study of the past in the past’s terms. In
other words, insofar as it is possible to “fuse” the horizon of our under-
standing with the horizon of the understanding of the past in question,
Historicism seeks to understand the meaning and value of the past as it
would have been understood at the time it happened. Thus, Historicism
holds an affinity to Original History.
Conversely, writing history from the perspective of “Presentism” means
interpreting and evaluating the past in terms of presently accepted values
and understanding. We may distinguish between mild and strong ver-
sions of Presentism. Mild Presentism holds an affinity to Reflective
6 F. Scalambrino
History in that viewing the past from the position of mild Presentism
means interpreting the past from within our present horizon. As we will
see, the word “our” in the previous sentence will be seen as relative to
culture by some contemporary psychologists. For now, the position of
strong Presentism suggests it is not possible to “fuse” the horizon of our
present understanding of values and meaning with a past horizon. Much
hinges on this distinction since nowadays it is commonplace to pass judg-
ment on actions performed in the distant past; however, from the posi-
tion of strong Presentism such judgments may amount to mere opinion,
since it is as if to not have “been in the shoes of ” those involved in the
past may mean to not be able to truly evaluate or appropriately under-
stand the past situation in question (cf. Clark 2004; cf. Gadamer 1989;
cf. Gergen 1985; cf. Stocking 1968).
To illustrate this important distinction further, note how the historian
Herbert Butterfield (1900–1979) defined Presentism as “the tendency in
many historians … to praise revolutions provided they have been success-
ful, to emphasize certain principles of progress in the past and to produce
a story which is the ratification if not the glorification of the present”
(Butterfield 1931: 5). Further, he criticized the Presentist practice of
abstracting things from their historical context and judging them apart
from their context … [to] study the past with one eye … upon the present
is the source of all sins and sophistries in history, starting with the simplest
of them, the anachronism … [it is] what we mean by … “unhistorical”.
(Butterfield 1949: 11–12)
the facts described by history are far from being an exact portrayal of the
same facts as they happened … and what lessons can I draw from an event
of whose true cause I am ignorant? The historian gives me one, but he
counterfeits it; and critical history itself, which is making such a sensation,
is only an art of conjecture, the art of choosing among several lies the one
best resembling the truth. (Rousseau 2010: 392–393)
The dead were and are not. Their place knows them no more and is ours
today … The poetry of history lies in the quasi-miraculous fact that once,
on this earth, once, on this familiar spot of ground, walked other men and
women, as actual as we are today, thinking their own thoughts, swayed by
their own passions, but now all gone, one generation vanishing into
another, gone as utterly as we ourselves shall shortly be gone … (Trevelyan
1949: 13)
What was it like to study psychology in the past? Why were the people
studying psychology in the past asking the questions they asked? Was
there some aspect of psychology they could see that is presently opaque
to us? Imagine the questions you might ask if you were given the oppor-
tunity to speak with the likes of Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas,
Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Freud, Jung,
Skinner, Rogers, Satir, or Deleuze, for example.
(m) From historian Will Durant (1885–1981) comes the suggestive
metaphor of history as “a lantern of understanding held up to the present
and the future.” (Durant 1939: 614). The sentiment resonates well with
the ancient Greek proverb that “History is philosophy teaching by exam-
ple.” How do psychologists who are also historians of psychology under-
stand this “illuminating” power of history? They seem to agree that the
value of learning history, at a minimum, consists in: “Knowing how to
establish a scholarly project by placing one’s own ideas amidst what oth-
ers have said. Citing sources as both intellectual and social touchstones
… [and] Justifying one’s decisions in determining what is important.”
16 F. Scalambrino
(Green 1994: 95; cf. Geuter 1983; cf. Vaughn-Blount et al. 2009). For, as
psychologist and historian of psychology Robert I. Watson (1909–1980)
aptly noted: “None of us can escape history … History cannot be denied;
the choice is between making it a conscious determinant of our behavior
as psychologists, or allowing it to influence us unawares. There is no alter-
native.” (Watson 1966: 64). Thus, learning the history of psychology
functions as a kind of increase in illumination in regard to thinking in the
field of psychology.
(n) Another metaphor that characterizes the remaining traditional
responses to the question regarding the value of learning history men-
tioned here is that of a “philosophical laboratory.” The metaphor was
emphasized by philosopher and historian of philosophy Étienne Gilson
(1884–1978). For our purpose the idea the metaphor invokes may be
divided in terms of “progress,” “inspiration,” and “critical deconstruc-
tion.” According to the historian Polybius (c. 200-c.118 BC) “there is no
more ready corrective of conduct than knowledge of the past.” (Polybius
1922: 3). Similarly, George Santayana (1863–1952) famously claimed,
“Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”
(2011: 172; cf. Fuchs et al. 2007). Of course, as noted above, these tru-
isms do not determine whether the past should be understood as Linear
or Cyclical.
Be that as it may, historians advocating for an understanding of history
as a “philosophical laboratory” often emphasize that history should be
understood in terms of progress. Thinking through the question “How is
scientific progress possible?” philosopher of science Gaston Bachelard
(1884–1962) held that the history of science is an essential component of
scientific theory (2016; cf. Bergson 2004; cf. Jones 1991). Simply put,
how can there be progress if you do not know from what you are pro-
gressing? It is helpful to show a distinction here between what we may
call teleological and epistemological “progress.” Whereas “teleological
progress” suggests that the past, and thereby reality itself, is progressing
toward some purposeful end, “epistemological progress” more modestly
suggests that progress has been made from an earlier state of knowledge.
Epistemological progress need not take a stance in regard to whether the
progress is teleological in nature. Thus, historians critical of the idea of
teleological progress critique historical narratives for the immodesty of
Introduction: The Project of the Philosophical Archeology… 17
psychology which otherwise account for the “birth” of the clinics (1988;
cf. Foucault 1994). Thus, it may be said that “critical deconstruction”
calls the historicity of a thing or an event into question (cf. Barthes 1978;
cf. Danziger 1990; cf. Deleuze 2004; cf. Deleuze and Guattari 2004;
Derrida 1978; cf. Nietzsche 1989).
Finally, consider the following example of the ways in which the three-
fold and fourfold historical divisions of Western philosophy are “stan-
dardly” characterized. As preface to discussing the fourfold division, the
threefold division consists of: Thinking as aspiring to be the Divine
Mirror of God in the Pre-Modern Worldview; Thinking as aspiring to be
the Mirror of Nature in the Modern Worldview, and Thinking under-
stood as the Mirror of Culture, that is, influenced, if not fully determined
by, social, economic, and historical forces in the Post-Modern Worldview.
In regard to the “standard” way to characterize the fourfold historical
division of Western philosophy: For the Ancient Period, “philosophy”
referred to a “way of living.” On the one hand, notice how though we
may be able to characterize this accurately in general—be it from primary
Original History, etc.—if we take a Presentist stance we may still claim to
not fully understand the particularities of the meaning of “philosophy as
a way of living” in the way the ancient Greeks, for instance, understood
it. On the other hand, despite the possibility of a Presentist critique,
when “psychotherapy” is thought to be essentially a synonym for “phi-
losophy,” the point of view of ancient Western philosophy is often
invoked (cf. Entralgo 1970; cf. Hadot 1995, 2002; cf. Howard 2000; cf.
Moes 2000; cf. Szasz 1988, 1997).
For the Middle Ages, “philosophy” was—according to this “standard
characterization”—understood as “the handmaiden to theology.” This
may be variously explicated; however, in brief, it is as if because the
Middle Ages had the advantage, over the essentially (retrospectively char-
acterized) “pagan” Ancient Period, of the Christian revelation, the only
role thought left to philosophy was the clarification of theology, or “faith
seeking understanding.” The question of the primacy of theology, then,
surfaces regarding this historical period from the point of view of the
Presentism/Historicism distinction. That is to say, as will become clearer
throughout this book, there is a fundamental and essential distinction
regarding philosophy between the first two and the latter two historical
20 F. Scalambrino
periods in the West. The former being essentially “Theo-centric,” and the
latter “Ego-centric.” For instance, just as the Gramsci quote above, in
expressing two different understandings of “society,” may be understood
as characterizing two different worldviews, so too this historical shift may
be understood as an essential distinction characterizing different under-
standings of psychology, especially regarding psychology and the domain
of morality. Of course, the consequences of the historical-shift, to which
this distinction refers, still ripples through the discipline of psychology
and its various ways of being understood.
One of the particularly relevant shifts in worldview which is under-
stood to have occurred in the history of the West from the first two to the
second two periods of the fourfold historical division regards the relation-
ship among words, concepts, and things. That is, do words primarily refer
to concepts or to things? The “standard” understanding, again in general
at this point, holds that the first two periods tended, at least, to under-
stand words as referring primarily to concepts, and the second two peri-
ods, especially the Modern Period, tended to understand words as
referring primarily to things (Brümmer 1981: 35–64; Cunningham
1988: 22–46; Petit 1977: 5; Wehrle 2000: 175–177; cf. Foucault 1971;
cf. O’Callaghan 2003; cf. de Saussure 2011). As will be clear later in the
book during a discussion of different theories of truth, the very identity
of philosophy, and thereby psychology, is seen as at stake here in the his-
tory of philosophy. In other words, is philosophy ultimately semantics,
metaphysics, or theory of knowledge?
For the Modern Period, “philosophy” was—according to this “stan-
dard characterization”—understood as “the handmaiden to science.”
Whereas the aim of a philosophical worldview from the first two periods
of the fourfold division may be understood as attempting to understand
nature, and the place of humans in it, the Modern Period is characterized
by Descartes’, perhaps infamous, declaration from his 1637 Discourse on
the Method for Conducting One’s Reason Well and for Seeking Truth in the
Sciences that—by way of science—humans shall “render ourselves, as it
were, masters and possessors of nature” (Descartes 1998: 35). Thus,
Modern philosophical thinking is historically characterized in terms of a
shift from the project to achieve—to whatever extent possible—a “God’s
eye” view of nature, to the project to bend “the will,” so to speak, of
Introduction: The Project of the Philosophical Archeology… 21
nature to that of our own, that is, from Theo-centric to Ego-centric. That
is to say, what is the method for discovering how to control nature?
For the Contemporary Period, “philosophy” is understood, not sur-
prisingly, in a number of diverse ways. However, an efficient, albeit two-
fold, way, to characterize philosophy emerges according to this “standard
characterization.” First, we cannot determine the meaning of “philoso-
phy” in the Contemporary Period, because we are living it presently. Of
course, the distinction between Presentism and Historicism may be oper-
able here. Second, “philosophy” in the Contemporary Period refers to the
ability to be “critical.” Insofar as this is the case, it behooves us to be able
to think through the history and systems of Western psychology as a
constitutive part of not only the Critical and Philosophical history of
psychology but also of the discipline of psychology itself. Thus, an anal-
ogy with the night sky may help express a summary statement of the
ground covered at this point. Just as over time some stars in the night sky
seem more visible than others and just as different constellations are
brought into focus by the varying visibility of different stars, so too his-
tory provides an important context within which the various shifts in
worldviews and systems may be understood in terms of selections among
philosophical principles. Of course, the principles, according to this anal-
ogy, then, refer to the stars and the visibility of the stars refers to the
emphasis and prominence of various principles throughout history.
(Sobociński 1984: 42; cf. Peregrin 2001; cf. Von Bertalanfy 1968). On
the other hand, every major Western philosopher—beginning even with
the Pre-Platonic philosophers—can be seen as having a “mereology.”
Anticipating what will be considered more fully below, it is important to
note that because mereology cannot be simply reduced to logic, mereol-
ogy often takes precedence when a theorist enters into discussions of
“ontology” or the parts of a system a theorist takes to have some kind of
being.
Though there is, of course, much more to say about “systems,” con-
sider how the following two terms relate to what has already been said:
“infinite regress” and “incommensurability.” In regard to taking some
thing as having a kind of being and, then, considering it as a part in a
system, notice how systems may be understood as relating like—as a con-
venient and popular metaphor states it—a “matryoshka” or “Russian
nesting doll.” That is, a system may be placed within another system,
which may be placed within another system, and so on. The idea that
such placement within another system may go on endlessly is the idea
captured by: “infinite regress.” Traditionally, at least, it is seen as a virtue
of a theory that it avoids infinite regress. Yet, this gives rise to the problem
of “priority” or “privilege” in the sense that—to use the metaphor again—
some one of the dolls must be the doll at which we stop, and go no fur-
ther. Now, with actual physical dolls we could point to the physical
constraints, as if at some magnitude it becomes impossible for us to con-
struct a doll, then the last created size of doll would be seen as doll that
stopped the infinite regress. However, when dealing with theories—as
non-physical beings—it may be much more difficult to recognize “where”
the regress stops.
After discussing “incommensurability” we will summarize both of
these ideas in regard to mereology and the idea of a “system.” Though the
term has always been a part of the vocabulary of Western philosophy (cf.
Plato 1860: 16d1; cf. Aristotle 1984: 983a16, 1967: 106b1, 1956:
430a31), “Incommensurability” is associated with the philosophers of
science Paul Feyerabend (1924–1994) and Thomas Kuhn (1922–1996).
The term refers to the sense in which two theories may relate to each
other in such a way that they have “no common measure” (cf. Feyerabend
2001: 33; cf. Feyerabend 1983: 211; cf. Kuhn 1996: 4–5 and 37–39).
Introduction: The Project of the Philosophical Archeology… 23
Now, of all that may be said regarding the work of Feyerabend and Kuhn,
for our purpose we want to notice how incommensurability can be
explained in terms of the difference between, for example, two different
systems in which each theory may be located. In other words, even
though two different theories may—on the surface—appear to be about
the same thing, concept, or word, it is possible for the theories to be
incommensurable with one another insofar as their systems do not allow
for a “common measure” of the thing, concept, or word in question. This
is easier to see when it is spread across history; for example, think of the
difference between the night sky in the Ptolemaic system and in the
Copernican system. However, as we will see, it is even possible to have
incommensurability between two psychologists viewing, at the exact
same time, the ostensibly same psychological phenomenon.
Due to opposition to the work of Feyerabend and, especially, Kuhn,
some historians have attempted to strip their special vocabulary terms of
meaning; therefore, rather than emphasize, for example, Kuhn’s notion
of a “paradigm” and a “paradigm-shift” we will use these words, in this
book, as essentially synonymous with the terms “worldview” and
“worldview-shift.” An even better expression, were it not more cumber-
some, would be “system-view” and “system-view-shift.” However, for the
context, consider the following from Kuhn regarding the historicity of
such distinctions.
As a former physicist now mainly engaged with the history of that science,
I remember well my own discovery of the close and persistent parallels
between the two enterprises I had been taught to regard as polar. A belated
product of that discovery is the book on Scientific Revolutions …
Discussing either developmental patterns or the nature of creative innova-
tion in the sciences, it treats such topics as the role of competing schools and
of incommensurable traditions, of changing standards of value, and of altered
modes of perception. Topics like these have long been basic for the art histo-
rian but are minimally represented in writings on the history of science
[emphases added]. (Kuhn 1969: 403)
Moreover, there are some historians of psychology who see the suggestion
that psychology liberated itself in the nineteenth century, “either from
parent disciplines [such as philosophy or biology] or from external social
26 F. Scalambrino
concerns during its formative period” (Woodward and Ash 1982: v), as
merely a popular narrative among psychologists derived from deliberate
historiographical choices (cf. Feigl 1959; cf. Klein 1970; cf. Rachlin
1994; cf. Van Kaam 1966: esp. 107–109). Were psychology to unani-
mously adopt a worldview, or paradigm, then the discipline—to use
Kuhn’s terminology—would be engaged in “normal science,” as opposed
to a state of “crisis” in which different worldviews may be understood as
“battling” or vying to be the system of psychology (cf. Slife et al. 2017; cf.
Toulmin 1972). When either a system becomes the system for a time or
when some major shift occurs in the understanding of the set of princi-
ples involved in the crisis of vying systems, then a “revolution” may be
said to have taken place; otherwise, when different systems or clusters of
principles alternate emphasis over time it is called a “turn,” not a
revolution.
To sum thus far, then, notice that it becomes highly unproductive and
unhelpful for us to understand systems in terms of an infinite regress.
This is because it would be as if there were no “traction.” We could point
to one “level” of system and our interlocutor could simply point to a dif-
ferent level, then we could follow suit, and it would be as if we were both
caught in an endless freefall. As a result, history and systems of psychol-
ogy rightfully uses history to stop an infinite regress of systems; that is to
say, these are the systems (constituted by principles chosen across essen-
tial distinctions) from within which persons during this particular period
of time understood their point of view. Whereas advocates of some his-
torically based system may, of course, understand psychology solely in
terms of that system, given the twenty-first-century state of the disci-
pline, such activity is inevitably part of the vying for their chosen system
to be taken on as the “norm” or considered presently the best (cf. Mandler
1996). Ultimately, being able to think through the multiple systems in
the history of psychology is the purpose of this book. Of course, our
purpose may also be understood as allowing for psychologists to better
advocate for whichever system they presently privilege, for example, by
being able to understand multiple worldviews and the essential differ-
ences across worldviews. In this way, the notion of “incommensurability
reiterates the importance of learning how to think through the history of
Introduction: The Project of the Philosophical Archeology… 27
as one reads the eclectics themselves, one is struck by the fact that what
they are trying to do, in their escape from the bonds of existing systems, is
to erect another, less a priori and less “finished,” perhaps, but still a system,
out of the principles which have been found to be most adequate in preceding
systems [emphasis added] … It is better, therefore, to attempt to systematize
admittedly and rationally. One need not, as a result, found a “school” or
nurture a cult. It is possible to be a psychologist, not a defender of a school,
and yet to attempt to order constructively the field one studies. (1933: 4)
28 F. Scalambrino
It is interesting to note that the article from which this excerpt comes was
written before the canonization and popularization of Kuhn’s notion of
“incommensurability.” In the wake of Kuhn, whereas McGeoch enumer-
ates “principles of connection” and “principles of selection,” in this book
we consider principles of selection primal and constitutive in regard to
the constructive ordering of systems. For the remainder of this section we
will briefly examine some traditional characterizations of “systems” artic-
ulated in textbooks and other sources used in the study of “the history
and systems of psychology.” These include five (5) entries from the
American Psychological Association Dictionary of Psychology (2007) and
two History and Systems of Psychology textbooks which take McGeoch’s
principles as a point of departure, that is, Systems and Theories in Psychology
(1963) and Theories and Systems of Psychology (1972 & 1979).
According to the American Psychological Association Dictionary of
Psychology, “system” means:
There are only three points to be made here, beyond the value of merely
presenting these lists. First, despite these excellent insights expressed in
the journal literature and textbooks regarding the History and Systems of
Psychology, no one had combined these insights with those expressed by
Kuhn. Second, emphasis was added to the term “principles” to highlight
how the term was relegated to the content being organized, as opposed to
the very principles in accordance with which the organization of content
is performed; rather, the term “basic convictions” was used to refer to the
shared principles from which the shared practices flow, thereby constitut-
ing a community of practitioners or school of thought. Third, reading the
above lists from a philosophical perspective, the first question which
comes to mind is: Why were they trying to recreate the wheel? That is, just
as the APA definition stated, “as in a philosophical system,” the systematic
articulation of the work of philosophers has a long history, and it does not
use these lists of criteria to organize the information. In other words, we
should use the philosophical principles according to which philosophy
itself is standardly organized, for example in regard to the “criteria regard-
ing structure” list. Moreover, the “criteria regarding function” list directly
Introduction: The Project of the Philosophical Archeology… 31
of finality” holds “Every agent or nature in acting must act for an end.”
(Ibid: 38).
Notice the power of these principles for ordering knowledge. For
example, consider the principle of non-contradiction (PNC). The PNC
is the motor force behind alibis. If you know where a person was at the
time some crime was committed (and that place was not the place where
the crime was committed), then you know the person in question is not
guilty of the crime. Moreover, you know the person is not guilty of the
crime even though you do not know who is guilty of the crime. In fact,
Aristotle called the principle of non-contradiction “the most firm of all
first principles.” (1984: 1005b11–23).
Thus, it was through the power of articulating these principles that
Aristotle was credited with originating “science” in the West. His descrip-
tion of science in general from the beginning of his Physics (184a10–21)
points to the value of principles, as he understood them.
The idea here is that if we were to encounter some random thing and
were to provide a systematic inquiry into it, then we would be hoping to
uncover the principles, causes, and elements which would constitute
“scientific” knowledge of the thing in question.2 Conversely, to the extent
that “science,” or our systematic inquiry, can uncover the truth of reality,
then we will come to understand that reality in question in terms of “first
principles.” It is because these principles are the ultimate first principles
from which knowledge proceeds that Aristotle thinks them constitutive
of “science.”
Notice, then, because the systems of Western psychology which we
will be examining all purport to be accurate approaches to that to which
“psychology” is supposed to refer, the standpoint of principles is a good
position in relation to the approaches. That is to say, our aim is to find
34 F. Scalambrino
Knowledge is the object of our inquiry, and men do not think they know a
thing till they have grasped the ‘why’ of it (which is to grasp its primary
cause). So clearly we too must do this as regards both coming to be and
passing away and every kind of natural change, in order that, knowing
their principles, we may try to refer to these principles each of our prob-
lems. (1950: 194b17–23)
Notice how this quote from Aristotle echoes the strategy of discovering
the principles so that the “problems” encountered in the course of sys-
tematic inquiry can be “referred to these principles.” Of course, the prin-
ciples in this case are more commonly known as Aristotle’s “Four Causes.”
Whereas knowing the Four Causes constitutes knowing “the why” of a
thing for Aristotle, it is the distinctions among the causes which allow us
Introduction: The Project of the Philosophical Archeology… 35
to think of each as a separate principle, and they are: “the Material Cause,”
“the Formal Cause,” “the Efficient Cause,” and “the Final Cause.”
The “Material Cause” refers to “that out of which a thing comes to be,”
for example, “the bronze of the statue, the silver of the bowl, and the
genera of which the bronze and the silver are species.” (Aristotle 1950:
194b23). In order to more easily understand the “Formal Cause,” it may
be helpful to recall, as mentioned in general above, Aristotle’s “word-
concept- thing” understanding of signification. As noted by Thomas
Aquinas (1225–1274), “Since according to [Aristotle], words are signs of
ideas, and ideas likenesses of things, evidently words refer to things signi-
fied through the medium of an intellectual conception.” (Aquinas 1920:
150/ST Ia, 13, 1). In this way, “Formal Cause” refers to “the form or the
archetype, i.e. the statement of the essence and its genera, are called
‘causes’ … and the parts of the definition.” (Aristotle 1950: 194b26).
Since the concept “human” belongs to the genus “animal” with the spe-
cific difference being “rational,” the definition of “human” would be
“rational animal,” this states the essence of the being, then, that is human.
To attempt to define “human” merely as an “animal” would be an insuf-
ficient definition, as it would merely invoke the “Material Cause,” in
terms of the genera, out of which the “human” is made. Moreover, it
would not be a good definition in that with such a concept you could not
tell the difference between cats and humans.
The “Efficient Cause” refers to “the primary source of the change or
coming to rest … and generally what makes of what is made and what
causes change of what is changed.” (Aristotle 1950: 194b30). In the
sculpture example, the sculptor is the Efficient Cause. We may even go so
far as to say that the sculptor had the idea of the shape into which the
Material would be placed, and placing the Material in that Form makes
the sculptor the Efficient Cause. Finally, the “Final Cause” refers to “the
sense of end or ‘that for the sake of which’ a thing is done, for example
health is the [Final] cause of walking about.” (Ibid: 194b34). In this way,
the “Final Cause” refers to the purpose for which the Efficient Cause put
the Material in the Form; thus, recalling the “principle of finality,” the
Final Cause stands out as the ultimate reason which unites the other
causes. Final translates the ancient Greek “telos,” and so “teleology” refers
to the study of a thing’s development toward its end.3
36 F. Scalambrino
Things, or objective concepts, which are the same as a third thing, or objec-
tive concept, are the same as each other [—identity]. But if one of them is
the same as a third and the other is different from that same third, these
two are different from each other [—difference]. (Wuellner 1956: 25)
There are three major types of distinction to discuss here: real, virtual,
and purely rational. There is a real distinction between two individually
existing things; that is, the table and the chairs are really distinct, and two
different chairs are really distinct. Next, consider how it is possible to
conceptually differentiate between “human” and “rational animal,” that
is, they are two different concepts; however, the distinction does not per-
tain to any real difference. Thus, though the concepts are distinct, it is a
purely rational distinction since it has no grounding in reality. Lastly, a
virtual distinction is a rational distinction, which does have some basis in
reality. Whereas there is no difference in reality between a thing and the
qualitative aspects to the material of which it is made, it is possible to
identify a conceptual difference. For example, we may talk about the dif-
ference between this chair and the wood of which it is composed; how-
ever, in reality, there is no difference between this chair and the wood of
which it is composed.
Anticipating what will be considered more fully below, when regarding
a plurality of concepts or things it is not enough to merely point out dif-
ferences among the plurality, if we hope to gain, or sustain, a systematic
understanding of the plurality. Rather, principles are needed in addition
to distinctions. Unfortunately, articles and textbooks regarding the sys-
tems in the history of Western psychology have a tendency to merely list
distinctions, as if they are merely a haphazard rhapsody of binary opposi-
tions. For instance, though not worth reproducing in its entirety here,
R. I. Watson’s list of eighteen (18) binary oppositions also appears in
James F. Brennan’s celebrated textbook History and Systems of Psychology
(2003: 133). The list includes:
“Conscious mentalism v. Unconscious mentalism; Mechanism v.
Vitalism; Determinism v. Indeterminism; Empiricism v. Rationalism;
Introduction: The Project of the Philosophical Archeology… 37
Notes
1. I constructed both of these lists by initially inserting them as quotes; how-
ever, upon further reflection, I corrected the grammatical structure of
some of the locutions and added clarifying articulations. Therefore, I take
credit for the lists as a totality—especially insofar as they cannot be found
elsewhere in this form; however, the lists do contain partial, and at times
completely verbatim, quotes from the cited authors. Readers are encour-
aged to look at the primary sources if they would like to determine the
exact differences between my presentation of the lists here and informa-
tion presented in the cited sources.
2. At this point we need not concern ourselves with different historical
understandings of “science,” we will address the difference at a later point.
Moreover, “systematic knowledge” would be a suitable substitute for “sci-
entific knowledge” in either case.
3. Though Aristotle is, of course, credited with systematizing the Four
Causes, it is worth pointing out that they can be found already stated in
Plato’s dialog Timaeus (30a).
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2
Some Historically Based Essential
General Distinctions
what is now called the science of psychology used to be called mental phi-
losophy. As such it had to do with what many generations of philosophers
had been thinking about … This resulted in the accumulation of a mass of
data, both factual and conjectural, pertaining to the realm of the mind. It
was this heritage of mental philosophy as it had taken shape by the 1870s
and 1880s that the pioneering laboratory psychologies had at their dis-
posal. (Klein 1970: viii)
2.2 H
ermeneutic Distinctions: On Naming
and Reading
The purpose of this section is regulative. In other words, we will examine
a number of distinctions here which will help readers navigate the remain-
ing discussion in this book. Thus, this is not intended to be an exhaustive
discussion of “hermeneutics.” Moreover, this excursion into “hermeneu-
tic distinctions,” namely distinctions helpful for interpreting some of the
worldview-shifts in the history of Western psychology, is not necessarily
a pre-judgement in favor of understanding psychology as a “human sci-
ence.” Rather, these “hermeneutic distinctions” are directed at the philo-
sophical and historical characterizations of the worldview-shifts.
Addressing the relation between word, thing, and concept, directly—
though not exhaustively—this section will provide clarification relevant
for understanding later discussions of the functions of ψυχή and the vari-
ous historically based systems which rely upon hermeneutics-related dis-
tinctions for differentiation from other systems. The distinctions to be
discussed include: (a) Aristotle on “naming,” (b) definition, (c) truth, (d)
the relation between science and methodology, and (e) styles of reading
and historiography. Again, anticipating what will be considered more
fully below, a brief explication of these distinctions here will be helpful;
for example, much resistance—rooted primarily in Postmodernism—
may be conjured up in Contemporary Period theorists upon reading the
word “essential.” In addition, then, to clarifying this book’s use of the
term “essential,” this section will also provide the groundwork from
which readers may appreciate multiple historically based conflicts across
approaches, theories, and systems of Western psychology.
Aristotle began his work titled (The) Categories by noting: “When
things have only a name in common and the definition of being which
corresponds to the name is different, they are called homonymous. Thus,
52 F. Scalambrino
for example, both a man and a picture are animals.” (1956: 1a1–3). He
contrasts this term with synonymous and paronymous; however, before dis-
cussing their differences, consider the reference to “a picture.” By recog-
nizing that “a picture” is an image of the thing, we may see even more
relevance here for psychology; that is, both the image of the sandwich
“in” ψυχή and the edible thing composed of bread “outside” ψυχή may
be signified by the term “sandwich.” However, only one of those “sand-
wiches” has nutritional content. Therefore, for Aristotle, whereas the one
is imaginary, the other is real. In this way it is clear that though someone
may suggest that “meaning slides” as an articulation of the homonymous
nature of terms, Aristotle would not accept such a characterization. Why?
Because Aristotle may be called a kind of “essentialist.”
In general, “essentialism” is simply the position that there are at least
some things that have essential properties. The key to understanding
essence, according to Aristotle, hinges on how “definition” functions. In
a similar structure to the above quote, Aristotle explained, “When things
have the name in common and the definition of being which corresponds
to the name is the same, they are called synonymous.” (1956: 1a5–7).
Notice his phrase “definition of being.” Volumes could be written on this
topic; thus, we will just state the idea here as directly as possible. The
Scholastic philosophers of the Middle Ages referred to Aristotle’s charac-
terization of naming in the following way: “equivocity” for homonymous;
“univocity” for synonymous; “denominative” for paronymous. When dif-
ferent uses of the same term are said to be “equivocal” it means that,
despite being the same word, the uses have different meanings: (dog)
bark and (tree) bark; (financial) bank and (river) bank, and so on. In this
way, the fact that the same terms, that is, arrangement of letters, appear
in different uses is merely “accidental,” and not “essential,” to the differ-
ent meanings. Paronymous terms—usually verbs—are called “denomina-
tive” because they are terms derived from nouns or adjectives. For
example, “I see you eyeing my sandwich.” “Eyeing” here (and its variant
“eye ballin”) is a verb derived from a noun (eye ball). However, it is uni-
vocity which interests us most here.
We need one more distinction, then, and by combining it with uni-
vocity, we can think through the way Aristotle envisioned “essence.” The
next distinction is between, on the one hand, that which is re-presented
Some Historically Based Essential General Distinctions 53
by being signified by a name and, on the other hand, the name in per-
forming the signification. Aristotle cross-references two distinction, that
is: the difference between “said of ” and “not said of ” and the difference
between “present in” and “not present in.” Thus, we arrive at a fourfold
distinction: (1) “said of ” and “not in”; (2) “in” and “not said of ”; (3) “said
of ” and “in”; (4) “not said of ” and “not in.” (Aristotle 1956a: 1a20–1b5).
In regard to the first, according to standard explications, we say “Socrates
is a man.” Whereas “man” is “said of ” Socrates, “man” is not “in” Socrates.
To believe that “man” were in Socrates would be to believe that every
other “man” is—at least in part—Socrates. Of course, that is not the case.
Aristotle’s second example (2) is “knowledge.” We say “knowledge is “in”
Socrates, but we do not say that Socrates is knowledge.
Aristotle’s third example may be a little tricky to understand, given the
second example. (3) Aristotle’s example is about the term “subject.” Thus,
in regard to “a subject,” we say “knowledge is in a subject, the soul, and is
also of a subject,” for example “grammar.” Notice—this is quite impor-
tant—if it were not for Aristotle’s “word-concept-thing” understanding
of signification, then Aristotle would consider these two uses of “subject”
to be homonymous; however, given his understanding of signification,
the “subject” is always already, first and foremost, a subject of predication
in the process of signification. Finally, (4) Aristotle’s last example is about
the indexical “this,” that is, the “concrete particular” man or horse that we
call “Socrates” or “Bucephalus,” respectively. This last example led
Scholastic philosophers to make a distinction between “the this” and “the
what” or the “thisness” and the “whatness” of a being. Moreover, it is “the
what” that indicates the essence of the being in question, and it is “the
what” that is used in the being’s definition.
Notice, then, in regard to Aristotle’s first cross-reference of distinctions
(1) that “man” is “said of ” Socrates but not “in” Socrates reveals that the
word “man” points to a universal concept. Further, this concept can func-
tion like a kind of category in regard to reality. For example, “man” may
be “said of ” Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and Alexander “the Great” univo-
cally. What is more, there seems to be—Aristotle apparently believed—a
hierarchy among such universals, for example universal concepts. That is
to say, notice that “animal” may also be said univocally in reference to
Socrates, Plato, and so on; however, using the term “animal” also applies
54 F. Scalambrino
to cats and dogs. Hence, Aristotle reasoned that even though “animal”
accurately and univocally refers to the beings called “Socrates” and
“Plato,” the term is not specific enough to indicate what the category to
which Socrates and Plato belong essentially is. In this way, Aristotle
deemed the universal concept “animal” to be the “genus” (i.e. in general,
generic, genre) and the “specific difference” between Socrates and cats
and dogs to be “rationality.” As a result, “rational animal” characterizes a
kind of natural category in terms of univocity and universality.
Finally, given all this terminology, we may say that “the whatness”—
the category of what—to which Socrates and Plato belong indicates their
essence. Of all that may be said of Socrates and Plato, for example that
they enjoyed sandwiches or liked to dress in togas, they are essentially
rational animals—what a human or “man” is is a rational animal. Recalling
the previous paragraph; therefore, the definition of “man” is the logical
(because we are still involved in Aristotle’s “word-concept-thing” under-
standing of signification) genus combined with the specific difference. As
a result, Aristotle uses definition to indicate a thing’s essential nature (cf.
Aristotle 1967: 141b24; cf. Aristotle 1964: 100a1–b3), and in this way,
of course, definitions constitute the foundations of scientific knowledge
for Aristotle (cf. Deslauriers 2007: 15). Aristotle contrasts “accidental”
with “essential.” It is merely accidental that Socrates wore one toga instead
of another or had a certain length of beard. Hence, if we are to have sci-
entific knowledge, it must be about what is essential not what is acciden-
tal (cf. Aristotle 1984: 1026b22–24).
In other words, suppose we want to have a science which studies
plumbing. We might set out to study the kinds of actions that plumbers
perform. However, we would not be interested in studying all of the
actions that plumbers perform, lest we would need to consider such
activities as: in what direction is a plumber’s head pointed when the
plumber sleeps at night; how much mayonnaise do plumbers put on
sandwiches, and so on. Yet, notice, even though we may say that those
activities are activities performed by plumbers, those activities are not
essential to plumbing. Whereas we might attempt an objection here by
suggesting psychology needs to study all aspects of an individual—includ-
ing the accidental aspects of that individual, notice that, on the one hand,
there can be no science of an individual, in that the individual is not a
Some Historically Based Essential General Distinctions 55
there are three modes of reading: (1) reading aloud, (2) ‘phonic’ reading,
where, as in thinking, the sounds of what is read remain in the mind, and
(3) normal ‘efficient’ rapid reading, where the sense ‘eliminates’ the sound.
Poetry (and usually drama) always requires phonic reading. The translator,
at least, has to be ready to switch (switching the sound on) to phonic read-
ing when faced with conversation in the texts and rhetorical writing such
as poetry and drama. (Newmark 1998: 1; cf. Vlieghe 2016)
Notice that “switching the sound on” regarding words reveals a different
way to “read” and interpret the meaning of the words. Further, whereas
“reading aloud” invokes a performative “reading” of the words, “efficient”
or “normal” reading performs a type of selection (i.e. “turning off the
62 F. Scalambrino
words we may say their be-ing is “verbal” or “written,” or, more generally,
we could engage in an examination of the be-ing of signs, etc. Thus, the
point emphasized here is that “ontology” should be considered the most
general and fundamental of the branches of philosophy and that no(-)
thing that we discuss in psychology can possibly escape its viewpoint. Of
course, that is because if what we are talking about is any(-)thing at all,
then, we can study its be-ing.
Since technically “ontology” names a genus and the “ontology of psy-
chology” a species of general ontology, in order to be clear we will start
with be-ing in general. As Paul J. Glenn (1893–1957) rightly noted,
“Ontology is a science. That is to say, it is a body of doctrine, set forth in
a manner that is systematic, logical, and complete, and it presents reasons
to justify its data and to evidence its conclusions.” (Glenn 1939: 3). One
way to ask a first question, then, in regard to be-ing in general may be:
How many different kinds of be-ing are there? For our purpose, the pos-
sible answers to this question are: One, Two, or Unknown. Further, the
traditional possible characterizations of this enumeration are: Material,
Non-Material (Mental or Spiritual), or Unknown. Thus, if someone takes
a “monist” position, they believe there is only one kind of be-ing, and the
next question we would ask is how they characterize that kind of be-ing.
Of course, “materialism” tends to refer to a monist ontology in which all
be-ing is characterized as material. When someone takes a “dualist” posi-
tion, they believe there are two different kinds of be-ing, and the next
question we would ask is how they characterize the relationship between
these two different kinds of being—ultimately material and
non-material.
Dualist ontology in regard to psychology is almost always depicted in
terms of Descartes’ infamous “mind-body” problem. Thus, the be-ing of
the body is said to be material and the be-ing of the mind to be non-
material. That some of the content of experience comes from the body
and some from the mind characterizes a “problem of heterogeneity.” That
is to say, ultimately, how are we to account for the combination of two
ontologically different be-ings? Dualists inevitably seem to privilege one
of the kinds of be-ing over the other kind. In either case, we will examine
the relationship between the different types of be-ing in terms of onto-
logical priority. That is, the different ways to characterize the relationship
66 F. Scalambrino
ways, factor into the very things that make human life human and the
value of “having” a ψυχή. For example, the smell of rose or a sandwich,
the experience of humor, or the experience of love.
It is convenient, then, to speak of three different kinds of reduction;
that is, to make a distinction between “explanation reduction,” “ontologi-
cal reduction,” and “eliminative reduction” (cf. Fodor 1968). As a simple
example, “explanation reduction” refer to the reduction of one explana-
tion to another—this may or may not be considered a sign of “progress,”
that is, one theory replacing another. We have been discussing “ontologi-
cal reduction,” that is, a dualism regarding the properties of experience
with the idea that the non-physical aspects reduce to—can be accounted
for in terms of—the physical properties. However, “eliminative reduc-
tion,” or simply “elimination” refers to the idea that the non-physical
should and will be explained away; for example, whether in terms of a
physical theory that shows psychological theory to be superfluous or in
terms of the realization that non-physical beings are illusions. This latter
characterization is the one more often claimed in the Contemporary
Period, and is known as “Eliminative Materialism.”
The position of Eliminative Materialism suggests mental properties do
not actually exist, rather we tend to talk as though they exist because our
language was merely a kind of “folk psychology” prior to advances made
in technology and neuroscience (cf. Sellars 1956). Thus, the argument
goes that talk of mental properties, for example belief, desire and love,
should be “eliminated” in favor of talk regarding neurochemical activity.
Moreover, notice, it is not that love reduces to sympathetic nervous sys-
tem activity, which would suggest that love exists but depends on sympa-
thetic nervous system activity for its be-ing; rather, love is supposed to be
eliminated by sympathetic nervous system activity, such that were we
always aware of the truth of nervous system activity, we would never have
invented the word “love.” Hence, it would follow for eliminative materi-
alists that consciousness and mental properties are “illusions” (cf.
Churchland 1981; cf. Dennett 1991; cf. Churchland 1992).
The term “supervenience” is often used to characterize the relation
between a mental property and a property of the body when the mental
property cannot be reduced to or eliminated in terms of the physical
property of the body. Definitions of “supervenience” are usually highly
Some Historically Based Essential General Distinctions 71
Notice, then, for those who do follow the distinction, be-ing tickled may
be understood as a property of the body; likewise, whereas pain would be
a property of the body, worry would be a mental state, for example, about
potential pain—in which case “pain” would be the “intentional” content
of the mental state of worry.
Of course, the content of a state can be—and usually is—characterized
in terms of a “proposition.” Martin believes it will rain; Aristotle worries
the hemlock will be painful. Thus, philosophers often refer to these states
as “propositional attitudes.” The term comes from Bertrand Russell
(1872–1970).
What sort of name shall we give to verbs like “believe” and “wish” and so
forth? I should be inclined to call them “propositional verbs.” This is merely
a suggested name for convenience, because they are verbs which have the
form of relating an object to a proposition … you might call them “atti-
tudes,” but I should not like that because it is a psychology term, and
although all the instances in our experience are psychological, there is no
reason to suppose that all the verbs I am talking of are psychological … I
can only say all I know are. (Russell 2010: 60)
In this way, radical behaviorism denies free will and also even the notion
of a “self.” For, “A self is a repertoire of behavior appropriate to a given set
of contingencies.” (1971: 194; cf. Wegner 2003). Thus, according to
Skinner, logical, radical and methodological behaviorism amount to an
understanding of the “contingencies” found within a “physical system,”
and “It is in the nature of an experimental analysis of human behavior
that it should strip away the functions previously assigned to autono-
mous man and transfer them one by one to the controlling environment.”
(Ibid).
In regard to the philosophical principles of the systems of Western
psychology, the terms “Structuralism” and “Functionalism” do not refer
simply to “schools of thought,” rather, they refer to explanatory choices
and ontological characterizations. Given the goal of history of psychology
textbooks to legitimate “movements” of psychology, there is a tendency
Some Historically Based Essential General Distinctions 77
logical priority to physical be-ing may invoke the idea that watching
someone perform certain functions produces neural activity in the
observers brain which is similar to the neural activity in the brain of the
person performing the function (cf. Mach 1897; cf. Place 1956; cf. Smart
1959), and, as a result, the observer is able to represent, explain, predict,
and respond to the “mental states” of the performer. Simulation could
also be understood in terms of behavioral mimesis or mirroring; that is,
the repeated “rehearsal” of certain behaviors allows us to recognize the
performance of the behavior patterns in others. Systems which give onto-
logical priority to non-physical properties of socio-culturally based struc-
tures may invoke the ability to recognize the propositional attitude being
exhibited or the “language game” being played, and so on.
The final principle from the philosophy of psychology to discuss
regards “the question of the freedom of the will” and of “Agency.” As we
acknowledged in regard to Radical Behaviorism, some systems of psy-
chology do not believe humans have a free will. In order to better navi-
gate thinking through this aspect of systems across the history of Western
psychology, introducing philosophy’s technical vocabulary on the issue of
free will is beneficial. In order to compare systems across historical peri-
ods, we should briefly characterize four (4) philosophical principles
regarding freedom of the will, that is, Fatalism, Hard Determinism, Soft
Determinism or Compatibilism, Incompatibilism, Libertarianism, and
Indeterminism. For our purpose, the term “Fatalism” refers to events that
cannot be changed, and this may include whatever it is that we do during
those events. Thus, if they are in the future, then they are “on the way
here,” and nothing can be done to stop them from arriving. Of course, it
is possible to take the position of Fatalism without thinking that all events
are fated.
A distinction is standardly made between causal and logical determin-
ism. The former holds that the laws of nature in combination with past
states and events determine future states and events without any chance of
a differently determined outcome. Logical determinism holds that every
claim is either true or false, including claims made about the future (i.e.
even though the future has not happened when the claim is made). Thus,
logical determinism includes the “problem of foreknowledge,” which in
its deterministic characterization holds that if some being were able to
Some Historically Based Essential General Distinctions 81
have true foreknowledge of someone’s action in the future, then that per-
son’s future action would be determined—they would not be free to act
differently. In this way, the characterization of a system as closed in such
a way that all events are caused by prior events in a chain of conditions is
called “Hard Determinism” (cf. Zagzebski 1991, 2002).
The problems with Hard Determinism are often characterized in three
ways. First, people may want to believe they could have acted differently
than they did, perhaps even if only just changing something at the
moment of the event itself. Second, people may want to understand
action in terms of “agent causation,” meaning that the agent of the action
is in control over, or at least has, freedom of will. Third, people may want
to believe the future is open, that is, it is contingent and not necessarily
determined. Thus, the terms “Soft Determinism” and “Compatibilism”
are synonymous. They refer to the idea that a deterministic system and
free will are compatible. “Incompatibilism,” then, refers to the idea that a
deterministic system and free will are not compatible. “Libertarianism”
(not the political term) refers to the idea that freedom of the will exists (it
is not an illusion) and that determinism is a false characterization of real-
ity. At the extreme opposite end of the spectrum, so to speak, is
“Indeterminism,” which holds that determinism is false because all events
are the outcome of chance.
Given the amount of vocabulary terms introduced in this section, it
may be beneficial to list them here. We discussed ontology and ontologi-
cal principles such as: “Substance Monism,” “Substance Dualism,” and
“Property Dualism.” We discussed principles characterizing dualistic rela-
tions such as: “Representation,” “Reduction,” “Elimination,”
“Supervenience,” “Emergence,” and “Epiphenomenal.” In this context
we also discussed “qualia,” “intentionality,” and “propositional attitudes.”
In regard to ontological priority, we discussed principles and distinctions
such as those regarding: “Materialism,” “Idealism,” “Empiricism,”
“Nativism,” “Vitalism,” “Mechanism,” “Behaviorism,” “Structuralism,”
and “Functionalism.” This included a discussion of logical, m ethodological
and radical Behaviorism. We also discussed the principles of “Multiple
Realizability,” “Mindreading,” “Simulation,” and “Computationalism.”
Finally, we discussed principles regarding “Agency,” specifically in regard
to the possibility of “freedom of the will.”
82 F. Scalambrino
Notes
1. The method of “introspection” refers to the observation and examination
of one’s own mental states, and is often contrasted with “external observa-
tion.” However, the Leibnizian term “apperceive” or “apperception” would
have been much better.
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86 F. Scalambrino
3.1 P
rinciples of Psychology from Socrates
and Plato
There are two issues which anyone discussing Socrates (470–399 BC)
and Plato (c. 428–347 BC) should mention as disclaimers. First, if
Socrates wrote any philosophical dialogs or produced any philosophical
works in writing, none of them have survived. Therefore, it is usual and
customary to mention the scholarly disclaimer that “We don’t really
know exactly what Socrates thought.” This is standardly referred to as
“The Socratic Problem” (cf. de Vogel 1955; cf. Boys-Stones and Rowe
2013; cf. Cain 2007). At the same time, this does not stop us from dis-
cussing the “philosophical thoughts of Socrates” as mentioned by his con-
temporaries and students—especially Aristophanes (c. 450–c. 386 BC)
and his students Xenophon (c. 430-c. 350 BC) and Plato. Second, though
Plato’s writings were not lost, there is still the problem of the relation
between the dialog form in which he wrote and interpreting it toward
knowing “this is what Plato thought.” This is standardly referred to as
“The Problem of Interpreting Plato’s Dialogs.” At the same time, despite
these disclaimers, scholars, of course, continue to talk about “Plato’s phi-
losophy” based on what he wrote in his Dialogs (cf. Corlett 2005; cf.
Coulter 1976; cf. Blondell 2002; cf. Klagge and Smith 1992; cf. Gadamer
1980; cf. Heidegger 2003; cf. Kahn 1996; cf. Zuckert 2009).
What this means for the principles of psychology emerging from
ancient Greek philosophers can be safely summed in the following way.
It certainly seems to be the case that Socrates was interested in wisdom
for the sake of ψυχή. For example, Plato famously attributed to Socrates
the claim, “The unexamined life is not worth living.” (Plato 1997a:
38a5–6). Moreover, this activity of “examining life,” that is, one’s own life
and the lives of others, was characterized in a twofold way. On the one
hand, this activity is “philosophy,” and, on the other hand, to perform
this activity is to “care for ψυχή.” The passage is worth quoting at length:
As long as I draw breath and am able, I shall not cease to practice philoso-
phy, to exhort you and in my usual way to point out to any one of you
whom I happen to meet: “… are you not ashamed of your eagerness to
possess as much wealth, reputation, and honors as possible, while you do
not care for nor give thought to wisdom or truth, or the best possible state
of your soul [ψυχή]?”. (Plato 1997a: 29d4–e2; cf. Plato 1997c: 107c)
This idea, then, of the “best possible state of ψυχή” points to an original
association between psychology and ethics and morality. That is to say,
the discussion of ψυχή by Socrates and Plato is, ultimately, in the service
of soteriology. We want to live the best life we can, and so we need wis-
dom (i.e. philosophy) to do so. Moreover, with what should this wisdom
be concerned so that we may live the best possible life? The answer,
according to Socrates and Plato: ψυχή. Hence, we find the principles of
psychology emerging from ancient Greek philosophers contextualized in
terms of ethics, morality, teleology, and, especially, soteriology.
Given the difficulties with attributing philosophical principles to
Socrates, beyond the principle that the very goal of philosophy is to care
for ψυχή, we may also, at least, attribute the principle of “freedom” to
Socrates. That is, Socrates believed in the principle of freedom to such an
extent that he, ultimately, became a martyr for it—when he was told he
could no longer philosophize he accepted “execution.” Thus, to Socrates
we attribute the principles of psychology that ψυχή is a non-determined
be-ing, that is, “free,” and the principle that some ways of thinking are
Pre-Modern to Early Modern: From Mirror of God to Mirror… 91
better than others insofar as these ways of thinking lead to a better state
of be-ing for ψυχή. Presumably, then, Plato’s philosophy may be read as
an explication of the theory of be-ing and the theory of knowledge which
account for the best possible state of be-ing for ψυχή. As a result, Socrates
and, especially, Plato have a psychology, that is, an account of ψυχή,
articulated for the sake of “saving” ψυχή from a worse state of be-ing.
This will, of course, continue to be the context and purpose of psychol-
ogy through the Middle Ages.
If we were to try to identify one principle in Plato’s psychology which
we may use to organize the remaining principles of his psychology, it
would be: the principle of the immortality of ψυχή (esp. Plato 1997c:
78b–80b, 1997e: 608d). This is the case for a number of reasons; how-
ever, the most important two are the following. First, all theories of ψυχή
(viz. theories which take ψυχή to be non-illusory) may be divided into
those which believe ψυχή to be immortal and those which believe ψυχή
is not immortal. Second, when you think of ψυχή as immortal, it imme-
diately casts a light on ψυχή from which other principles follow. Thus,
from the principle of the immortality of ψυχή we arrive at the principle
of re-incarnation. This contextualizes the discussion of the structure of
ψυχή in that the various functions of ψυχή may be organized according
to a structure the appropriate activation of which leads to salvation, and
that is precisely the kind of psychology we find in the writings of Plato.
According to Plato, the ψυχή (e.g. the “soul”) is immortal, despite the
obvious fact that bodies die (cf. Plato 1997c: 105c). Without going too
deeply into Plato’s philosophy here, we may simply say that Plato under-
stood ψυχή as a non-material be-ing, similar to a geometric form. Though
you may flatten any number of rubber tires, doing so does not destroy the
form of circle. That is, appropriately placing the material of rubber into
the form of a circle constitutes a “tire.” However, when that tire is
destroyed the form in which the material formerly was is not destroyed.
As the “form of the body,” ψυχή is not destroyed when the body dies (cf.
Plato 1997b, c, e). Though this does point to a kind of dualism, there are
two primary reasons why Plato does not have a “Mind-Body Problem”
such as that which will later be found in Descartes’ philosophy (cf.
Ostenfeld 1987). First, the dualism between ψυχή and body found in
Plato is not a substance dualism since the body cannot exist without
92 F. Scalambrino
angel on one shoulder and a devil on the other shoulder as they both
attempt to persuade you—it may also be seen as a variant of Plato’s
Charioteer Allegory. Further, in the Modern Period, stripped of theologi-
cal connotation, the principle of the daimon is understood as the princi-
ple of conscience. However, as we will see in our discussion of principles
from the Middle Ages, a distinction can be made between the daimon
and conscience insofar as “the concerns of the daimon seem to be con-
fined to future contingencies (as opposed to pangs of conscience after the
act) and does not always have to do with judgments of moral value.”
(Beckman 1979: 76).
In sum, we may now see how the structural-, functional-, existential-,
and theological-levels combine to organize and clarify Plato’s principles
regarding ψυχή. In order for ψυχή to liberate itself from the process of
re-incarnation, it must purify itself during its present physical-
embodiment—this is why Plato’s psychology is ultimately in the service
of soteriology and the origin of Western psychology is characterized in
terms of ethics, morality, and theology. Thus, the extent to which ψυχή
is able to purify itself during its present physical-embodiment determines
the extent to which ψυχή is united with divine pure be-ing upon disem-
bodiment. If that union (henosis) is not sufficient, then ψυχή receives
another physical-embodied with its accompanying fated events and
daimon. Plato is clear that ψυχή chooses these accoutrements, so to
speak, of its next embodiment; however, it is also clear that there are con-
straints on ψυχή’s choices which involve ψυχή’s development along the
Scala Amoris. For example, if you are so affected by the power of money
to acquire material-gain that you love money in this physical-embodiment,
then when faced with choices from your perspective you will be choosing
what you love, but from the perspective of pure be-ing you will be mis-
understanding the true value of be-ing physically embodied in those
types of lives. The same goes for the daimon; you select the “co-pilot,” so
to speak, whom you think will help you accomplish whatever it is you
love.1
In this way, Plato’s psychology is soteriological and teleological, since
ψυχή’s self-knowledge is always already in the service of the purification
of its be-ing. Moreover, knowledge of the structure and function of ψυχή
Pre-Modern to Early Modern: From Mirror of God to Mirror… 99
that the essence of things is the ultimate goal in science, as in the rational
world in general, Plato formulated his dialectics as a method, or opera-
tional principle. It may be described as a procedure to carry one from the
superficial material of things to the underlying forms… Dialectic is a pro-
cess of thinking or reasoning which contrasts with observation or immedi-
ate contact. (Kantor 1963: 102)
This can be seen repeatedly in Plato’s dialogs, especially the ones in which
Socrates is featured as a character. For our purpose, we need only men-
tion two more methodological principles regarding Plato’s psychology.
They are “myth-making” and “theurgy” (cf. Uždavinys 2010: 65–70; cf.
Jung and Kerényi 1969).
Though both of these principles characterize Plato’s methodology, as
we will quickly notice, they flow directly from his ontology. That is, just
as the power of imagination is associated with the physical body, the
“higher” and more “pure” structures of ψυχή are beyond the power of
imagination. Yet, in order to discuss these higher aspects of be-ing it is
often valuable to invoke metaphors and allegories, that is, images. Thus,
the process of constructing images for the sake of describing that which
is beyond the power of imagination is called “myth-making,” and the
narrative products of the process are called “myths.” On the one hand,
myths are non-falsifiable, for example ψυχή is not actually in a “cave” or
driving a chariot, so it would do little good to try to prove that ψυχή is
not in a cave or driving a chariot. Yet, on the other hand, the historicity
of these “myths” is different from the connotation given to the term in
the Contemporary Period—where “myth” means “fallacy” or “necessarily
false.” Therefore, myth-making may be understood as an essential prin-
ciple of Plato’s methodology.
Pre-Modern to Early Modern: From Mirror of God to Mirror… 101
Lastly, the purification and henosis process noted above may also be
characterized in terms of a methodology for Plato. In other words, recall
the process of purification and recollection for ψυχή results in the revela-
tion of truth. Thus, one may purposefully embark on the process of puri-
fication and recollection for the sake of discovering the truth of be-ing.
Interestingly because accomplishing such purification is tantamount to
be-ing like, if not fully assimilating oneself to, the pure be-ing of divine
beings, this process as a purposeful method may be called “theurgy.” If
henosis is the union brought about by our purification from the perspec-
tive of physically embodied ψυχή recollecting in regard to its present
incarnation, then theurgy is action in the other direction, so to speak,
from the realm of divine pure be-ing on physically embodied ψυχή. In
this way, referencing the Neoplatonist Iamblichus’ (c. 245–c. 325) On the
Mysteries,
the body what it is. The ψυχή of the eye is its actual vision, that is, no
vision no eye-ψυχή. Finally, the sailor analogy points to the more Modern
and Contemporary problem of “mental causation.” Can the ψυχή direct
and control its body or cause change to physical bodies? Of course, it
certainly seems as though seeing something influences the directions in
which the eye moves.
In order to understand Aristotle’s formal definition of ψυχή, we need
to understand how he intends the meaning of the term “actuality.” Not
surprisingly, the principles of actuality and potentiality are a hallmark of
Aristotle’s philosophy. To begin, “actuality” translates two different terms
in Aristotle—energeia and entelecheia, and “potentiality” translates “dyna-
mis,” which means “power” or “potency” and resembles the term
“dynamic.” Noticing that Aristotle’s second term translated as “actuality”
includes the Greek term “telos,” the actuality of entelecheia connotes the
contemporary understanding of “self-actualization,” as if there is a struc-
ture with parts originally non-actualized but with the potential to-be
actualized; thus, entelecheia—indicating the actualization of what the
thing essentially had the potential to be—connotes completion or matu-
ration. In a similar, but different way, energeia—looking a good deal like
the contemporary term “energy”—means something like “being-at-work
being-what-it-is.” (cf. Sachs 2001; cf. Polansky 1983). Thus, the actual
eyesight of the eye may be understood as the actualization of the properly
organized parts of the eyeball that is seeing (entelecheia), and as the eye
continues to actually see, it continues to be what it is (energeia) an actual
eye, that is, not merely a potential eye.
Lastly, when Aristotle discusses the relation between potentiality and
actuality there is another distinction which is essential for us, if we are
to think through Aristotle’s psychology. The distinction is between “first
potentiality,” “second potentiality,” and “actuality,” and the classic
example is the potential to learn French. We may say that two different
individuals are both born with the potential to speak the French lan-
guage. In this way they are “equal.” However, when one of them learns
how to speak French, then they are in a different relation to the activity
of speaking French than they were originally. Thus, for Aristotle, they
have moved from “first potentiality” to “second potentiality,” and when
Pre-Modern to Early Modern: From Mirror of God to Mirror… 105
they activate that “second potentiality,” then “voilà” they are actually
speaking French. Notice that moving from first potentiality to second
potentiality is a “first actuality.”
We are now ready for Aristotle’s formal definition of ψυχή. Recalling
Aristotle’s Four Causes from above, Aristotle’s holism is implied in his
“hylomorphism,” which refers to physical bodies as matter (hylē) and
form (morphē) composites. Keep in mind these composites are gestalts,
that is, the actual whole is greater than the sum of its parts (cf. Aristotle
1984: 1050b1). According to Aristotle, then,
given that there are bodies of such and such a kind, namely, having life, the
soul [ψυχή] cannot be a body; for the body is the subject or matter, not
what is attributed to it. Hence the soul [ψυχή] must be a substance in the
sense of the form of a natural body having life potentially within it. But
substance is actuality, and thus soul [ψυχή] is the actuality of a body … the
soul [ψυχή] is the first actuality of a natural body having life potentially
[emphasis added]. (1956: 412a17–27)
the study of the soul [ψυχή] … must fall within the science of nature. Hence
a physicist would define an affection of soul [ψυχή] differently from a
dialectician; the latter would define, e.g. anger as the appetite for returning
pain for pain, or something like that, while the former would define it as a
106 F. Scalambrino
boiling of the blood or warm substance surrounding the heart. The one
assigns the material conditions, the other the form or account; for what he
states is the account of the fact, though for its actual existence there must
be embodiment of it in a material such as is described by the other [empha-
sis added]. (Ibid: 403a27–403b4)
First off, notice in this quote Aristotle associates explanation with the sci-
ence of nature and description with dialectic. Contemporary psycholo-
gists seem to have a tendency to interpret statements from Aristotle such
as this block quote in too Modern of a context, rather than in terms of
the historicity of “Aristotle’s divisions of science.” For example, Aristotle
divides the different branches of knowledge and learning into (1) “theo-
retical,” (2) “practical,” and (3) “productive” sciences. Moreover, he fre-
quently reaffirms the principles of this division; that is, the theoretical
sciences seek knowledge for its own sake, the practical sciences for the
sake of improving behaviors and excellence in action, and the productive
sciences for the sake of producing useful or beautiful creations (cf.
Aristotle 1950: 192b8–12; cf. 1984: 1025b25; cf. 1967: 145a15–16).
In this way, when Aristotle deemed psychology a natural science he
still understood it as a theoretical science. This means his naturalistic
perspective is still different from the eliminative position which he, in the
above block quote, associates with approaching ψυχή from the perspec-
tive of physics. Physics, of course, was also a theoretical science; however,
as Aristotle noted above, physics is concerned with matter and Aristotelian
psychology with form. Moreover, Aristotle considered medicine a pro-
ductive science. Therefore, in addition to the fact that Aristotle sees the
difference between the methods of natural science and medicine as that
between the theoretical sciences and the productive sciences, Aristotle’s
relation to Hippocrates (460–370 BC) regarding psychology is analogous
only in regard to the extent their subject matters coincide in biology (cf.
Hergenhahn 2009: 51). Thus, in regard to the methodology for Aristotle’s
psychology, it is involved in the principle of “knowledge for its own sake,”
as a theoretical science. For this reason, on the one hand, we find a dis-
tinction between dialectic and demonstration, reflecting a similar empha-
sis found in Plato’s dialogs. On the other hand, though Aristotle may
technically be called an “empiricist,” and he does engage in “inductive”
Pre-Modern to Early Modern: From Mirror of God to Mirror… 107
statements (since the demonstrator does not ask a question but makes an
assumption), whereas the latter is an answer to the question which of two
contradictory statements is to be accepted. This difference, however, will
not affect the fact that in either case a syllogism results; for both the dem-
onstrator and the interrogator draw a syllogistic conclusion by first assum-
ing that some predicate applies or does not apply to some subject. (Aristotle
1964b: 23b24–24a34)
things with one another, we are able to learn. Recall, Plato’s theory of
anamnēsis was presented in the context of the question: Is learning more
like putting sight into the blind or more like remembering? The natural-
istic reading, then, provides an account of learning that is more like
putting sight into the blind. As will be emphasized in discussion of the
Modern Period, where theories of knowledge showcase rationalism—
knowing by rational inference and intuition—in contrast to empiri-
cism—knowing in terms of evidence from the embodied senses. Though
it may technically be anachronistic to attempt to characterize Aristotle’s
philosophy in terms of the epistemological positon of “empiricism,” we
can still see the principle of association and the empirical principle of
learning through the senses at work in Aristotle’s philosophy of
psychology.
As if distinguishing a theory of learning from the naturalistic stand-
point and in direct contradistinction from Plato’s theory of recollection,
we can find passages such as the following in Aristotle’s writings.
body problem; that is, just as for him there is no ψυχή without a living
body, so too:
we can dismiss as unnecessary the question whether the soul [ψυχή] and
the body are one: it is as though we were to ask whether the wax and its
shape are one, or generally the matter of a thing and that of which it is the
matter. (Aristotle 1984: 412b5–9)
then, that every virtue causes its possessors to be in a good state and to
perform their functions well.” (Ibid: 1106b17). Now, though it would be
beyond the scope of this book to launch into a discussion of Aristotle’s
accounting for different human virtues, his discussion of different “char-
acter types” is precisely a discussion of the higher structure of the human
ψυχή noted above.
According to Aristotle there are technically six (6) “character types” in
regard to his virtue ethics; however, we will only examine the four (4)
human character types. These are: (1) Virtuous, (2) Continent, (3)
Incontinent, and (4) Vicious character types. Recalling what we referred
to above as the Western “Orthodox” view of the structure of ψυχή and
its characteristic divisions into “affection,” “cognition,” and “conation,”
we noted three organizing principles: “pathos,” “logos,” and “ethos.” These
principles may be used to illustrate distinctions across the character types.
The Continent character type is one in which the individual feels the
temptation to act in accordance with pathos, rather than logos; however,
they tend to overcome the pathos, thereby establishing an ethos that tends
to “hold in” the temptations of pathos, that is, to choose in accordance
with logos. The Incontinent character type is the exact opposite; having a
tendency not to “hold in” the temptations of pathos, this character type
establishes an ethos that tends to choose not in accordance with logos. The
Virtuous character type chooses in accordance with logos and has estab-
lished such a strong ethos tendency that this character type does not expe-
rience the temptations of pathos. The Vicious character type is the exact
opposite; having a tendency to not concern itself with logos, it merely
looks for opportunities to “discharge” its vices, that is, act in accordance
with pathos. (cf. Aristotle 2009: 1102a–1114b).
Though there is, of course, much more that could be said about
Aristotle’s character types, this explication should be sufficient to illus-
trate three points. First, the character types coincide with the ship captain
analogy of ψυχή. That is to say, it is in terms of the organizing principles
of pathos, logos, and ethos that we may articulate how ψυχή is able to exert
influence over an otherwise deterministic physical embodiment, that is,
primarily in terms of habit (ethos). As Aristotle explained, “Someone may
say that all people aim at the apparent good, but have no control over the
appearance, but the end appears to each person in a form answering to that
114 F. Scalambrino
suffer unnatural experiences, or, at least, so goes the Natural Law theoriz-
ing of these ancient Greek ethicists.
In order to understand the Stoic principles of comprehension and
understanding—and their relation to the Natural Law—it is helpful to
initially think about their cosmology. Stoic cosmology is cyclical, and the
individual is subordinate to universal nature, which has a teleology and
progresses circuitously, as if in terms of an endless Big Bang and Big
Crunch cycle. At the moment before the Big Bang, there is only God,
and through the Big Bang the universe is produced out of God; however,
God is not thereby separate from the universe. Moreover, as a fiery kind
of material, God was characterized by the Stoics as a kind of “craftsman-
like fire.” This is the context, then, for a Stoic psychology (cf. Epictetus
1998), and in order to understand Stoic Compatibilism, we should keep
in mind how individual embodied ψυχή’s are always already subordinate
to the endless cycling of God as nature.
Whereas Stoic Fatalism follows directly from Stoic cosmology, Stoic
Compatibilism may be seen by examining the process by which a Stoic
relates to fate. For example, according to Epictetus,
Remember that you are an actor in a drama such as the playwright wishes
it to be. If he wants it short, it will be short; if long, long. If he wants you
to play a beggar, play even that capably; or a lame man, or a ruler, or a
private person. For this is yours, to play the assigned role well. Casting is
the business of another. (Epictetus 1998: §17)
Further, “Don’t seek for things to happen as you wish, but wish for things
to happen as they do, and you will be free from disturbance.” (Ibid: §8).
Notice, then, that Epictetus is not suggesting that ψυχή’s body will never
experience pain or discomfort; rather, he is suggesting that ψυχή will not
be as disturbed by the pain and discomfort as it could be. Moreover,
notice that the mechanism that is supposed to free ψυχή from distur-
bance is characterized in terms of thinking and understanding. How is
this supposed to work? Precisely by understanding that whatever it is you
are experiencing you could not have avoided experiencing it. Now, on the
one hand, this sounds exactly like Determinism and a lack of freedom,
because you could not have avoided the experience. However, ψυχή is
118 F. Scalambrino
free to understand the experience in different ways. Thus, the Stoics see
Determinism (as Fatalism) and free will as Compatible.
On the other hand, what are the different ways in which ψυχή can
relate to its fated experiences? Recalling Aristotle, ψυχή can relate in
terms of pathos or logos. The Stoics are sometimes criticized as “lethally
high-minded” because they see relating to fated events emotionally as
“pathetic.” In order to cultivate Stoic “a-pathy” one needs to be more logi-
cal and accept that the experience was fated, that is, determined. For
instance, consider this bit of Stoic wisdom:
For the Stoic, precisely because they are fatalistic, the best we can hope
for is to get a grip on what it is that we have been fated to endure. The
classic statement of the prescribed use of rational agency called “katalep-
sis,” that is, to get a conceptual grip or logical comprehension, comes
from Cicero’s discussion of Zeno of Citium (c. 334-c. 262 BC), the
founder of the Stoicism:
he would display his hand in front of one with the fingers stretched out and
say ‘A visual appearance is like this’; next he closed his fingers a little and
said, ‘An act of assent is like this’; then he pressed his fingers closely together
and made a fist, and said that that was comprehension (and from this illus-
tration he gave to that process the actual name of katalepsis, which it had
not had before) … (Cicero 1967: 2.145)
Put simply, the idea is that the person is greater than the sum of its parts,
and just as the composite of ψυχή and physical-body may be understood
in the Aristotelian terminology of form and matter, respectively, so too
through resurrection from the dead the material part of the composite—
it is believed—will be replaced by a celestial or non-physical body; there-
fore, as fully spiritual the person will live forever.
As an integral and spiritual component of the physically embodied and
living person, there are principles regarding ψυχή which contribute to
the trajectory of the person into its non-physically embodied life. These
principles are “intentionality” and “conscience.” The former principle
characterizes the person’s free will in regard to sin and may be retrospec-
tively thought operable in differentiating Aristotle’s character types; fur-
ther, re-asserting the Scala Amoris—though re-contextualized now in
terms of free will and Christian Love—“holiness is in the will and we are
saved by what we love” (Sheed 1946: 10 & cf. Ibid: 61). The latter prin-
ciple characterizes the internal dialog indicative of an ethos, and may be
understood as relating to the notion of the daimon from Plato. Aristotelian
character-building now is directed at a super-natural afterlife with the
potential for the super-natural happiness of beatitude, beyond any tem-
porary happiness for which the naturalistic philosophers advocated.
In terms of function, then, intentionality and conscience as structural
aspects of ψυχή in relation to one another constitute ψυχή’s “inward-
facing,” so to speak, functional principle of the “interior life” of the per-
son (cf. Garrigou-Lagrange 2015: 4–17). Personhood, as Aquinas
indicated above, has become an important principle in that it is not
knowledge “in” ψυχή that unites it with the transcendental dimension, it
is the willing “of ” ψυχή that unites its holistically understood person
with God. “Outward-facing,” then, would be the soteriological-theurgical
Pre-Modern to Early Modern: From Mirror of God to Mirror… 121
We could still imagine that there is a set of laws that determine events
completely for some supernatural being who, unlike us, could observe the
present state of the universe without disturbing it. However, such models
of the universe are not of much interest to us ordinary mortals. It seems
better to employ the principle of economy known as Ockham’s razor and
cut out all the features of the theory that cannot be observed. (Hawking
and Mlodinow 2007: 91)
will and ψυχή itself have been considered explanatorily unnecessary (cf.
Frankfurt 2009: 197). Notice, the idea that such aspects are humane or
belong in descriptions of ψυχή in that psychology is a human science,
have met with opposition from the natural science perspective which sug-
gests that those are aspects of morality, theology, or politics and, ultimately,
may not need to be included in a science of psychology.
Notes
1. For many readers it may be helpful to think of this discussion as Plato’s
Western explication of the Eastern notion of “karma” (cf. Scalambrino
2017: 30–35).
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128 F. Scalambrino
it is perhaps enough for us to note here the famous quote from Coluccio
Salutati (1331–1406) “heaven belongs by right to those energetic men
who have sustained great struggles and achieved fine works on earth”
(Baudrillart 1907: 15; cf. Cassirer 1963: 73–74; cf. Burckhardt 1995; cf.
Foucault 1988). In this way, a person is understood as able to actualize its
unique individual potential to make a contribution to community and
history.
As the historicity of Renaissance self-commentary shows, there was a
distinction operable at the time between “old” and “new philosophy.”
There was a call for a “new philosophy” to replace the old authorities
given the Renaissance “expectation of what a philosophy should do, and
a sentiment that the old philosophy was not doing it properly.” (Menn
1998: 34; cf. Edwards 2013; cf. Knight 1982). The call for a “new phi-
losophy” was first and foremost understood as a call for a new method.
The basic idea here is that now that the authority of Aristotle and the
Church had been called into question what is needed is a method to
replace such “appeal to authority.” Essentially there were two types of
methodology which were contenders: induction and deduction. In terms
of the early distinction between dialectic and demonstration, induction
and deduction function as types of demonstration. Whereas the conclu-
sions from inductive methodology claim probability, those from deduc-
tive methodology claim certainty. When these methods are taken to be
the centerpieces of respective theories of knowledge in the Early Modern
Period, the theories of knowledge are Empiricism and Rationalism.
Though in hindsight it is standard to refer to the Rationalist Descartes
as the “Father of Modern Philosophy,” in terms of the “new philosophy”
he is rather at its conclusion than its origination. At the origin of the
“new philosophy” was the beginning of Empiricism. Bernadino Telesio
(1509–1588) advocated for Radical Empiricism in the form of
Sensationalism (cf. Kristeller 1964; cf. Leijenhorst 2010). His methodol-
ogy was followed by the less radical Empiricism of Francis Bacon
(1561–1626). With Classicalism’s revival of interest in Plato’s philosophy
came both Nicholas of Cusa (1401–1464) and Marsilio Ficino
(1433–1499) and the development of a principle of “dynamic interme-
diation,” using Plato’s idea of the Scala Amoris, between God and the
Cosmos (cf. Cassirer 1963). Just as in Plato, Recollection changes ones
132 F. Scalambrino
Taken in combination, then, that is, the Cartesian subject and the
principle of the camera obscura, or in other terms the “way of ideas” and
a secular “word-concept-thing” understanding of signification, we arrive
at Solipsism. Just as the principle of the camera obscura refers to the way
the image inside of its dark space is an inversion of the thing outside it,
so too we arrive at the second quote noted above from Descartes’
Meditation III: “here I must inquire particularly into those ideas that I
believe to be derived from things existing outside me. Just what reason do
I have for believing that these ideas resemble those things?” (Descartes
2006: 21). Thus, the problem of Solipsism is that one may not be able to
know whether any thing outside one’s own mind truly exists (cf. Johnstone
1991). Given these problems in Descartes’ characterization of ψυχή, we
are now in a better position to understand the four (4) types of response
to Descartes’ “new philosophy”—covering a number of philosophers
from Locke to Kant—and to provide context for understanding the vari-
ous philosophical principles which emerge regarding psychology in the
Modern Period (cf. Brennan 2003: 89–117).
First, there was the “positivist” response. In regard to this period in
Western history we may characterize the two different types of positivistic
response as “sensorium-positivism” and “contractual-positivism.”
Basically, positivism takes sensory experience to be the exclusive source of
knowledge; if some thing cannot be confirmed through sensory experi-
ence, then it does not exist. For this reason, positivism is associated with
materialism and the idea that if whatever it is that is under discussion
cannot be found in space, then it does not exist. Thus, the principle of the
spiritual, or non-material, characterization of ψυχή as not in space (and
thereby not confirmable through sensory experience) amounts to reveal-
ing “ψυχή” as a fiction (cf. Riskin 2002: 19–68). The Early Modern
philosophers associated with sensorium-positivism are Étienne Bonnot
de Condillac (1714–1780) and Julien Offray de La Mettrie (1709–1751).
Condillac not only denied Descartes’ principle of nativism, he denied the
presence of non-material “mind” at all. In this way, of course, Condillac
was a material monist (cf. de Condillac 2001). La Mettrie, emphasizing
the principle of mechanism, understood psychology as essentially a
physiology of meat machines governed by the hedonistic principle (cf. de
The Early Modern Battle for the Archimedean Point 139
this is the only way that I can discover; whereby the ideas of things are
brought into the understanding … external and internal sensation are the
only passages that I can find of knowledge to the understanding. These
alone, as far as I can discover, are the windows [emphasis added] by which
light is let into this dark room: for methinks, the understanding is not
much unlike a closet wholly shut from light, with only some little opening
left, to let in external visible resemblances, or ideas of things without;
would the pictures coming into such a dark room but stay there, and lie so
orderly as to be found upon occasion, it would very much resemble the
understanding of man, in reference to all objects of sight, and of the ideas
of them. (Locke 1841: 93–94)
But how can that which is sensible be like that which is insensible? Can a
real thing in itself invisible be like a color; or a real thing which is not
audible, be like a sound? In a word, can anything be like a sensation or idea,
but another sensation or idea? (Ibid)
Though this would basically be the same strategy Kant would later
employ, Wolff’s interpretation remained within the scope of the position
of Rationalism, like Leibniz.
The Leibnizian roots of the major and lasting principles with which
Wolff is credited may be clearly seen. On the one hand, Wolff’s focus on
the potentialities located in ψυχή by Leibniz became “faculty psychol-
ogy,” that is, the association of the study of psychology with mental facul-
ties. On the other hand, the previous Cartesian distinction understood as
the Mind-Body Problem was now understood—through Leibniz back to
Aristotle’s divisions between animal and human—in terms of ψυχή as
sensation and imagination (Body) and understanding and reasoning
(Mind). Thus, according to the “Mental Activity” response: methodolog-
ically it pushes even further—as with the strategy found in Berkeley and
Hume—into the camera obscura model; the structure of ψυχή is under-
stood as spiritual, and the function of ψυχή is understood in terms of
activity—including what was previously understood as “passive” bodily
functions as they relate to mind.
Fourth, there was the “Folk Psychology” response. In addition to being
identified as a critic of both Berkeley and Hume specifically and the “way
of ideas” generally, Thomas Reid (1710–1796) also founded the “Scottish
School of Common Sense.” It is founded on an appeal to a “common
sense,” which is thought to be composed of intuitive judgments, which
Reid called “first principles” “principles of common sense” or “self-evident
truths.” (Reid 1853: 230). Of course, the suggestion is that some philo-
sophical problems are mere extravagances, founded on decadent-thought,
or simply unnecessary concerns is often followed by the suggestion that
there is a kind of knowledge “common” to humans which allows them to
understand situations as they really are and without any further or unnec-
essary explication. This has been associated with the “folk” (from the
German “Volk”) as the way in which “the people” commonly under-
stand—in our case—mental operations and psychology (cf. Gallie 2010:
42; cf. Bering 2006; cf. Nichols 2004).
Thus, Reid’s criticism of the “way of ideas” suggests that it leads to
skepticism regarding aspects of reality that common sense knows better
than to doubt: especially “causation” and having a “self.” For example,
Reid claimed “I am not thought, I am not action, I am not feeling; I am
The Early Modern Battle for the Archimedean Point 145
something that thinks and acts and suffers” (Reid 1853: 345). Anticipating
what will be considered more fully below, “Folk Psychology” and
“Common Sense” are often (necessarily) the target of some of the more
reductive and eliminative explanations regarding the structure and func-
tions ψυχή. Moreover, another question which will be of interest in the
final sections of the book: supposing “Folk Psychology” to be an accurate
characterization of ψυχή: to what extent is that characterization a cul-
tural and historical construction?
4.3 P
rinciples from Kant’s Copernican
Revolution: The Transcendental
Dimension Regained
Despite all that could be said about the contributions made to Western
thought and psychology by Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), the following
section is designed for the purpose of helping those studying the history
and systems of Western psychology to understand Kant’s pivotal place
and critical difference from the thinkers discussed thus far. Hence, this
section is composed of a brief disclaimer and characterization followed by
a series of seven (7) questions and brief answers aiming at Kant’s accom-
plishments as contributions to the history of Western psychology. It is
not uncommon for History and Systems of Psychology textbooks to
make comments like: “The importance of Kant for the psychological tra-
dition cannot be overestimated.” (Kantor 1969: 211). However, the
amount of training required to be able to truly work with Kant’s thoughts
is usually too much to expect of anyone who is not a “philosopher,” so a
resource of perhaps inestimable value to psychologists goes untapped.
Just as we noted above that Whitehead suggested all of Western phi-
losophy may be a “footnote to Plato,” Lewis White Beck (1913–1997)
famously pointed out: “There is a saying among philosophers, ‘You can
philosophize with Kant or against Kant, but you cannot philosophize
without him’” (Beck 1950: 1). Similarly, Richard Rorty said of Kant, “He
simultaneously gave us a history of our subject, fixed its problematic, and
professionalized it (if only by making it impossible to be taken seriously
146 F. Scalambrino
Up to now it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to the
objects; but all attempts to find out something about them a priori though
concepts that would extend our cognition have, on this pre-supposition,
come to nothing. Hence, let us once try whether we do not get farther …
by assuming that the objects must conform to our cognition. (Kant 1998:
B xvi)
intuitions of space and time “at the bottom” of the structure of ψυχή
and, then, the “threefold” synthesis of the “power of imagination.” In the
stem of the understanding broadly construed we find conceptual under-
standing and, then, thinking, and both of these activities function in
terms of different types of judgment, which also correspond with subjec-
tivity, objectivity, and certainty regarding objective mind-external reality.
One of the most important parts of the Critique of Pure Reason for under-
standing these elements under discussion is the section called the
“Transcendental Deduction.” Further, there are two pieces left to discuss
in order to more fully answer the question: according to Kant, what is the
structure and function of ψυχή? Yet, these two pieces—in conjunction
with what has already been said—answer the next two questions, respec-
tively. Therefore, we will pick up the rest of this answer as we differentiate
Kant from Descartes in the next two questions. Incidentally, it is worth
noting that one of the most common mistakes encountered in regard to
Kant’s thinking is that some psychologists tend to suggest there is no dif-
ference between his thinking and that of Descartes’. However, the attempt
to read Kant as Descartes radically misses Kant; the two areas most rele-
vant for the history of Western psychology are Descartes’ Mind-Body
problem and the difference in the ways they understand subjectivity.
Question 4: How does Kant solve Descartes’ Mind-Body Problem? There are
only two ways to solve the Mind-Body problem. The first is to deny the
problem; for example, by formulating a monist ontology, which ultimately
denies any, but perhaps a “property,” dualism on which to base the Mind-
Body problem. The second is to follow Kant’s “Transcendental Deduction.”
Kant’s deduction specifically, and the Critique of Pure Reason generally,
may be read as a demonstration—deriving from a dialectic involving the
(initially hypothetical) first principle of the Kantian Revolution—in accor-
dance with Transcendental logic, and it is so systematic that its structure
provides a place for, that is, a self-encompassing account of, both demon-
stration and dialectic. Thus, anticipating what will be considered more
fully in the next chapter, a fundamental component of dialectic for Kant
is that it must not be one of “pure reason.” Otherwise, despite any logical
consistency within a dialectic of pure reason, it will ultimately lead, accord-
The Early Modern Battle for the Archimedean Point 151
The consciousness of the ego proves that life is not located in the body, but
in a special principle differing from the body; that as a consequence this
principle can continue to exist without body, and that its life is not thereby
diminished but augmented. This is the sole proof that can be given a priori,
The Early Modern Battle for the Archimedean Point 153
and one drawn from the knowledge and nature of the soul [ψυχή] compre-
hended a priori by us. (Kant 2001: 176–177)
Thus, Kant avoids Solipsism, and despite his continued use of terms such
as “subject” and “ego,” he avoids the Egoism associated with the ego-
centric shift accomplished by the “way of ideas.”
Lastly, notice how Kant’s description of his position in general differ-
entiates him from the thinkers of the “way of ideas” associated with the
“new philosophy.” In the section of the Critique of Pure Reason titled “On
the Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection,” distancing himself from
Leibniz and Locke, Kant famously claimed Leibniz “intellectualized
appearances” just as Locke “sensualized all of the concepts of understand-
ing.” (1998: A 271/B 327; cf. Deleuze 1984). Further, in regard to
Descartes and Berkeley, Kant noted that his and theirs are “Idealist” posi-
tions; however, here is how he differentiated himself from them: “The
dogmatic idealist would be one who denies the existence of matter, the
skeptical idealist one who doubts them because he holds them to be
unprovable.” (1998: A 377). Whereas the former is Berkeley, the latter is
Descartes (cf. 1998: B 274). Finally, in regard to his own position, that is,
Transcendental Idealism, Kant pointed out regarding appearances “that
they are all together to be regarded as mere representations and not as
things in themselves, and accordingly that space and time are only sensi-
ble forms of our intuition, but not … something given in themselves
(independent of our sensibility).” (1998: A 369). This also differentiates
Kant from Hume, for example, Kant noted “The transcendental idealist,
on the contrary, can be an empirical realist, hence … he can concede the
existence of matter without going beyond mere self-consciousness and
assuming something more than the certainty of representations” (1998:
A 370). Notice, Kant’s certainty is not based on the Cartesian methodology
of the “new philosophy” culminating in the Cogito, it is based on Kant’s
methodology of Transcendental logic (cf. Allison 2004; cf. Ameriks 1982,
cf. Cicovacki 1997; cf. Deleuze 1984).
Question 6: What is Kant’s theory of Personhood? In what amounts to an
overview of Kant’s developmental theory of psychology, he claimed
regarding the human predisposition to self-fulfillment “We may conve-
niently divide this predisposition, with respect to function, into three
154 F. Scalambrino
Notes
1. I express this notion in the classroom by saying: Your external perception
is a reflection of your internal perfection. Given Leibniz’s metaphysics it
would also be accurate to say: Your external perception is an expression of
your internal perfection. Perfection here, of course, means “completion”
in the sense of teleology (and soteriology).
Bibliography
Allison, Henry E. 2004. Kant’s Transcendental Idealism. New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press.
Ameriks, Karl. 1982. Kant’s Theory of Mind: An Analysis of the Paralogisms of Pure
Reason. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
———. 2003. Interpreting Kant’s Critiques. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
156 F. Scalambrino
Deleuze, Gilles. 1984. Kant’s Critical Philosophy: The Doctrine of the Faculties.
Trans. H. Tomlinson. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Deleuze, Gilles. 1993. The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque. Trans. T. Conley.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
———. 2005. Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza. Trans. M. Joughin.
New York: Zone Books.
Drake, Stillman, and Trevor H. Levere. 1999. Essays on Galileo and the History
and Philosophy of Science: Volume I. Toronto, Canada: Toronto University
Press.
Descartes, René. 1998. Discourse on the Method for Conducting One’s Reason Well
and for Seeking Truth in the Sciences. Trans. D.A. Cress. Indianapolis, IN:
Hackett Publishing.
———. 2006. Meditations, Objections, and Replies. Ed. and Trans. R. Ariew and
D. Cress. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing.
Edgerton, Samuel Y. 2009. The Mirror, the Window, and the Telescope: How
Renaissance Linear Perspective Changed Our Vision of the Universe. Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press.
Edwards, Michael. 2013. Time and the Science of the Soul in Early Modern
Philosophy. Leiden: Brill.
Foucault, Michel. 1988. Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the
Age of Reason. Trans. A. Sheridan. New York: Vintage Books.
Frost, Samantha. 2005. Hobbes and the Matter of Self-Consciousness. Political
Theory 33 (4): 495–517.
Gallie, Roger D. 2010. Thomas Reid: Ethics, Aesthetics and the Anatomy of the
Self. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Gibson, A. Boyce. 2017. The Philosophy of Descartes. Vol. I & II. London:
Routledge.
Guyer, Paul. 1989. Psychology and the Transcendental Deduction. In Kant’s
Transcendental Deduction: The Three Critiques and the Opus postumum, ed.
E. Förster. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Hatfield, Gary. 1992. Empirical, Rational, and Transcendental Psychology:
Psychology as Science and as Philosophy. In The Cambridge Companion to
Kant, ed. P. Guyer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
———. 1998. Kant and Empirical Psychology in the 18th Century. Psychological
Science 9 (6): 423–428.
Henrich, Dieter. 1969. The Proof-Structure of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction.
The Review of Metaphysics 22 (4): 640–659.
Hume, David. 1985. A Treatise of Human Nature. London, England: Penguin.
158 F. Scalambrino
Walsh, Richard T., Thomas Teo, and Angelina Baydala. 2014. A Critical History
and Philosophy of Psychology: Diversity of Context, Thought, and Practice.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Waxman, Wayne. 1994. Hume’s Theory of Consciousness. Cambridge: Cambridge
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Yates, Frances A. 1964. Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition. Chicago:
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Yolton, John W. 1984. Thinking Matter: Materialism in Eighteenth-Century
Britain. Minneapolis, MN: Minnesota University Press.
5
Modernism to Post-Modernism: Method
as Archimedean Point
5.1 P
rinciples of Post-Kantian Speculation
and Naturalization
The stage set by the “new philosophy” and the struggle against Solipsism
and Egoism associated with Early Modern philosophy produced an array
of methodological options for Late Modern psychologists. Recalling that
the problem of Solipsism belongs to the general category of skeptical
problems and that Descartes initiated his method in relation to skepti-
cism, the following blurb from a history of Western psychology textbook
accurately depicts the “Post-Kantian” situation:
[Psychologists] thought that a way of escape had been opened up from the
skeptical positon … But the Hegelian elaboration of certain metaphysical
aspects of Kant’s thinking, aspects which are not essential to it, brought us
to a full stop … In their discouragement many trooped back past Kant to
the neighborhood of Hume’s position. (Metzger 1971: 331)
That is to say, when the re-reading changes the original theory’s consti-
tutive cluster of principles in such a way as to make the re-reading incom-
mensurable with the theory of which it purports to be a re-reading, then
it cannot simultaneously appeal to, for example, the methodological
principles with which it is now incommensurable, simply by giving itself
the name of the previous theory. For instance, if we are given a Dr. Seuss
book and told that it is a manual for assembling a car engine, even if we
believe that it is such a manual, we will not be able to use it to assemble a
car engine. Trying to argue that Freud’s theory can belong to any paradigm
one likes in the history of psychology is not just silly, it is intellectually
dishonest. That is to say, Freud appeared at a specific point in history, and
based on primary and secondary sources we can get, at least, an
approximate-enough sketch of Freudian psychoanalysis as a system to
identify true incommensurabilities between Freudian Psychoanalysis and
other systems in the history of Western psychology—claiming otherwise
(most likely as an inauthentic marketing tactic or a lack of courage to
commit to, and stand by, a set of principles) is like claiming Dr. Seuss
wrote manuals for assembling car engines.
Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776–1841) is standardly referred to as
“Kant’s immediate successor.” However, Herbart’s denial of Kant’s posi-
tion regarding the unknowability of things essentially marks a regression
to the philosophy of Leibniz. Two ideas which indicate the category
which Herbart will occupy, then, are his emphasis on “the unconscious”
and his “mental mechanics.” According to one commentary,
Every idea, according to Herbart, has the tendency to maintain itself and
to drive out ideas with which it is incompatible; and ideas vary in strength
… An idea that is weak may gain admittance to consciousness, and main-
tain itself there, if the ideas above the threshold are congenial with it …
Mental life is thus mainly a struggle between ideas, each of which is active,
each of which strives to attain and maintain a place in consciousness, and
each of which tends to repel all ideas except those with which it is compat-
ible. (Heidbreder 1933: 66)
Now, from the perspective of historiography there are many ways to dis-
cuss Herbart given one’s various political affiliations and whatever issues
Modernism to Post-Modernism: Method as Archimedean Point 165
regarding which one chooses to focus; however, our purpose here is not
to argue whether Freud’s theory of unconscious activity is or is not like
Herbart’s, etc. Our purpose is to identify the categories of principles into
which these systems would fit based on their principles, and, of course,
Herbart’s will fit in the category associated with Freud.
After Herbart the next “neo-Kantian” discussions of ψυχή would be
those associated with German Idealism, which is dated—if including
Kant—from c.1781–c.1849. The two thinkers we need to include are
Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860) and G.W.F. Hegel (1770–1831). We
begin with Schopenhauer because he belongs to the same general cate-
gory as Herbart. Schopenhauer’s discussion of “will” in nature may be
understood as an attempt to naturalize—despite its speculative nature—
Kant’s Transcendental Idealism. The basic idea is that ψυχή should be
understood as subject to the forces of nature; nature may speculatively be
said to have a “will” of its own to which individual ψυχή’s are subjected,
for example Schopenhauer discussed the urge toward sexual activity and
eating in terms of the “will-to-live.” Further, he sought to categorize the
ways in which this will of nature produces illusions for its own sake; for
example, Schopenhauer infamously characterized “love” as an illusion
produced by nature to ensure the survival of the species. Yet, ψυχή, of
course, is, initially at least, unconscious to the illusory nature of such
experiences (cf. Schopenhauer 2005: 35–36).
Of all that could be said about Hegel, we should at least acknowledge
his Phenomenology of Spirit, published in 1807, as a neo-Kantian work
regarding ψυχή (cf. Hegel 1977). Hegel develops the Kantian dialectic—
though in a way that Kant actually anticipated and argued against—
toward a political, religious, and cultural theory of history. Whereas
Hegel’s discussion regarded, of course, “spirit,” his is the same dialectic
which Karl Marx (1818–1883) famously “turned upside down” (he
thought to stand it on its feet) to discover “historical materialism.” In
both cases, we may see their theories as not only constituted by a princi-
ple of socio-historical ontological priority but also individual ψυχή—
especially in terms of consciousness and self-consciousness—is
characterized as an object determined by the respective socio-historical
forces. Whatever influence on psychology these theorists had in immedi-
ate proximity to the publication of their ideas, their influence on
166 F. Scalambrino
5.2 P
rinciples of the “New” Psychology:
The Birth of the Laboratory
For better or for worse, as every psychologist should know, the idea upon
which the discipline of psychology’s independence was finally established
was the idea that psychology could be an experimental science. In other
words, it was supposed that psychology could be a science like physics or
biology, that is, a natural science (cf. Adams 1931: 8; Ash 2005: 100; cf.
Dewey 1884). Recalling Feigl’s joke noted above in Section 5, though the
rhetoric of experimental science succeeded in establishing psychology as
its own discipline, the idea that psychology is a natural science today, is
more the idea that biology (especially neuroscience) should be the disci-
pline which studies “psychology.” Be that as it may, what we need to be
sure to keep in mind when thinking through the principles of the systems
of psychology as they emerged in this historical period of the West is that
these systems, despite their differences, were vying for the claim to the
title of “psychology as a natural science.”
Keeping in mind that Sigmund Freud’s (1856–1939) Project for a
Scientific Psychology appeared in 1895 and the Russian physiologist Ivan
Pavlov (1849–1936) did not win his “Nobel Prize in Physiology or
Medicine” for “classical conditioning” until 1904, two of the “three main
sources of contemporary psychology” have not yet emerged in the year
1870. Thus, “introspection,” “extraspection,” and “association” character-
ize the methods of the “new psychology” initially, as the non-Kantian
Modernism to Post-Modernism: Method as Archimedean Point 169
There was something fresh and exciting in the 1870s about the new experi-
mental psychology that Wundt called “physiological psychology.” It has all
the status of a new scientific endeavor. It was something more than the
sensory experiments of physiologists, like E.H. Weber’s and Johannes
Müller’s discoveries. It was more than the philosophers’ turning toward
science as an aid, than Herbart’s use of mathematics, than Lotze’s writing a
‘medical’ psychology. There was really something new here, a scientific
activity with its own name. It is true that most of the new research was on
perception, but even so there was hope for a complete experimental psy-
chology as soon as there had been time. Fechner had already provided new
methods of measurement. Helmholtz was showing how researches in vision
and hearing were to be done, and he was not alone. (Boring 1950: 384)
These, then, seem to be the four main characteristics of the functional sys-
tems. The subject-matter of psychology is duplicated, though [1] function
is preferred to content; [2] consciousness is a solver of problems; [3] the
whole course of the mental life is regarded teleologically; and [4] psychol-
ogy is written as a preface to philosophy or some practical discipline. (1927:
193)
ψυχή shaped the systems characteristic of the “new psychology.” This sets
the stage to discuss the “three main sources of contemporary psychology:
Pavlov, Freud, and neo-Kantianism.” (Wolman 1960: 21). Moreover, the
criticism of Pragmatic Functionalism from Titchener’s Positivistic
Structuralism shall prove prophetic in the culmination of the “new psy-
chology” and essential eclipse of the systems of psychology just discussed.
That is to say, anticipating what will be considered more fully below, the
idea—noted above—that “there is no reason to suppose that conscious-
ness would ever put in an appearance” may retrospectively read as if it
were a suggestion to Pavlov and Freud.
5.3 C
onstitutive Principles of the “Four
Forces of Psychology”
The purpose of this section is to state the “highest,” so to speak, four (4)
categories into which early-twentieth-century Western psychological sys-
tems may be placed. As noted above, these may be understood as “para-
digms,” but should be thought of as categorizations of clusters of
principles, which emerged with clearly definable incommensurability
constituting their uniqueness. Thus, it is precisely not the purpose of this
section to list all of the different variations within a category or the text-
books and times associated with each alteration. Such would be the pur-
pose for a history textbook; however, our purpose is to gain a vision of the
history and systems of Western psychology, at the level of systems, so as
to think through the principles and essential distinctions regarding their
constitution. Because we have been moving toward the “Information
Age” the proliferation of many different systems of contemporary psy-
chology could be articulated—some argue that just as there are lists of
over 250 different kinds of psychotherapy (cf. Corsini 2001), there could
be just as many different psychologies. It is neither our intention to take
a stance in opposition to such proliferation of psychological systems nor
do we believe that every one of however many systems there may be are
essentially incommensurable with one another.
174 F. Scalambrino
(1940: 282; cf. Grünbaum 1984; cf. Macmillan and Crews 1997; cf.
Sulloway 1992; cf. Zepf 2016). Anticipating what will be considered
again below, taking the word “contradiction” as a point of departure for
interpreting Freud’s “Project,” some have located a “dialectic of desire” in
Freud’s system. Tracing a line of thought from Jean-Martin Charcot’s
(1825–1893) student Pierre Janet (1859–1947) in which he used a dis-
tinction originating from Maine de Biran (1766–1824) between the
immediate data of consciousness—reminiscent of the “bare sensation” of
Early Modern French sensorium-positivism—and “the self ” as an active
energy, Freud’s “dialectic of desire” may be understood as his attempt to
provide a naturalistic account of this line of thought.
That is, Janet saw an “antithesis” between “the automatism of subcon-
scious acts” of ψυχή and the “personalized apprehension of things” which
was picked up in Henri Bergson’s (1859–1941) theorizing. From there:
1999: 49–57; cf. Smith 2001: 405–406; cf. Solomon 1974). Freud’s sys-
tem also evidences incommensurability in relation to Behaviorism regard-
ing function; however, since the question of free will may be said to
characterize the central principle regarding function, we will need to look
beyond the surface to see the incommensurability between Freudian
Psychoanalysis and Behaviorism regarding function.
What makes the issue complicated in Freud’s theorizing is the presence
of both an affirmation of teleology and an affirmation of determinism.
On the one hand, whether one approaches the question of free will in
Freud by way of his infamous claim that “anatomy is destiny” (1961:
178, 1957: 189) or by way of his “psychosexual stages,” (1953) he seems
to suggest that there are progressive stages at which to arrive—or not—,
and, therefore, it seems like individuals may have freedom in the actual-
ization of stages. On the other hand, Freud was explicitly and avowedly a
determinist; noting, for example, “You nourish the illusion of there being
such a thing as psychical freedom, and you will not give it up. I am sorry
to say I disagree with you categorically over this.” (Freud 1963: 49).
Not surprisingly Freud linked this position with the accomplishment
of the “new psychology,” that is, “I ventured to tell you that you nourish
a deeply rooted faith in undetermined psychical events and in free will,
but that this is quite unscientific and must yield to the demand of a deter-
minism whose rule extends over mental life.” (Ibid: 106). Further, note
well that he characterized even rational deliberation about the future as
“the unfulfilled but possible futures to which we still like to cling in phan-
tasy, all the strivings of the ego … which nourish in us the illusion of Free
Will [emphasis added]” (1955: 236). Moreover, it makes sense that, as
Thomas Szasz (1920–2012) pointed out, “although an entire volume of
the Standard Edition of Freud’s collected works is devoted to an index,
there is no entry for responsibility in it.” (2001: 237).
Ultimately, the “Third Force” of psychology is grounded in Kant’s phi-
losophy; that is, it is not a psychology grounded in the thinking of, for
example, Descartes, Locke, or Hume. The term “Third Force” psychology
comes from the psychologists Abraham H. Maslow (1908–1970) and
Carl R. Rogers (1902–1987). The name was supposedly derived as a reac-
tion to Psychoanalysis as a “First Force” and Behaviorism as a “Second
Force” in psychology. Two of the twentieth-century “Existentialist”
178 F. Scalambrino
[a] coding technique” (Wiener 1965: 42). For example, as W. Ross
Ashby’s An Introduction to Cybernetics characterizes it, the “unpredictable
behavior of an insect that lives in and about a shallow pond, hopping to
and fro among water, bank, and pebble, can illustrate a machine in which
the state transitions correspond to” a probability-based pattern that can
be analyzed statistically (Johnston 2008: 31; Heidegger 1976; cf.
Scalambrino 2015c; cf. von Uexküll 2010). With such principles and
innovations in methodology, the study of ψυχή was able to shift further
toward neuroscience. For instance, Evan Thompson’s Mind in Life (2007)
provides an excellent summary of the present state of this shift.
Moreover, just as General Systems Theory has a way of subsuming
previously opposed “variables,” such as those of “mind” and “body,” so
too the Fourth Force of psychology seemingly can incorporate the meth-
odologies of the other forces, for example association, introspection, phe-
nomenography, phenomenology, and hermeneutics; however, because
the results of these methods are used to characterize correlations from the
perspective of the system (even if it is the “neuro-system” of the individ-
ual as dynamic differentiation of the environment), the incommensura-
bility between the clusters of principles constituting the “forces” of
Western psychology still stands. Yet, it is especially through such power
of Systems methodology to subsume the methods of the other forces that
it brought about what is known as the “Cognitive Revolution” in Western
psychology (cf. O’Donahue et al. 2003). We will conclude this discussion
below in regard to the “Cognitive Turn” in the history of Western psy-
chology, since the “Cognitive Revolution” in psychology is really the
“Systems Revolution” in philosophy.
Notes
1. As a compromise among different readings of Nietzsche’s often epigram-
matical writings, I have taken to referring to Nietzsche’s philosophy as a
kind of “ecstatic naturalism.” Yet, for the purpose of Nietzsche’s “existen-
tial” philosophy as a neo-Kantian influence on Contemporary psychol-
ogy, his emphasis on the individual and the value of life-affirmation
Modernism to Post-Modernism: Method as Archimedean Point 187
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Modernism to Post-Modernism: Method as Archimedean Point 189
6.1 T
he Linguistic Turn: Agency’s Slide
from Discursive to Postmodern Condition
In this concluding chapter we will consider the major “turns,” aka “revo-
lutions” depending on your perspective, regarding the Contemporary
Period of Western psychology. In general the history of these turns may
be characterized in three ways. First, there are those who support the
continuing influence and presence of the Fourth Force of psychology, for
example, by attempting to find the most appropriate way to characterize
“the system” from within which ψυχή may be examined. Second, there
are those who are critical of the Fourth Force of psychology by being
“anarchist” regarding its principles—though in this way its criticizers also
essentially criticize the other “forces” also. Third, there are those who are
critical of the Fourth Force of psychology by attempting a re-turn or pro-
duce a reconstruction of a different “force” of psychology, that is, one of
the first three “forces.” It is important to keep these two types of criticism
distinct, since the one rejects and the other embraces principles. Further,
such characterizations allow us to indicate how a criticism may invoke
Freud, for example, in either a destructive or constructive (respectively)
dialectic. That is to say, are you invoking Freud merely to attack the
principles of the Fourth Force, or are you invoking Freud to advocate for
the First Force over the Fourth?
The “Linguistic Turn” refers to a movement which began taking shape
in the early twentieth century. In the context of understanding its rele-
vance for the history of Western psychology, note that it may be seen as
an attempt to provide an identity to the “system” of the Fourth Force of
psychology. In other words, the study of humans and the study of ψυχή
was thought to be best approached methodologically through the study
of language (cf. de Saussure 2011; cf. Austin 1975; cf. Wittgenstein 1969,
1980, 1982, 2001; cf. Valsiner and Rosa 2007). This may be understood
in a Modern or a more Post-Modern way (cf. Rorty 1992b). The former
interpretation holds as closely as possible to a science of language as a
“system.” The idea here is that there is enough universality and objectivity
in the human use of language to form a solid base for psychology. The
latter interpretation emphasizes the relativity of language use, that is,
“actions speak louder than words” (cf. Henle 1992). Whereas in the for-
mer interpretation this relativity still accounts for the objectively subjec-
tive uses of language, in the latter interpretation the relativity is read as
politically based, not psychologically based. That is to say, your language
use reflects not your “inner” psychology as much as your “outer” political
affiliations and socio-economic, geographic, and historical situation.
There are three points we need to draw from the “Linguistic Turn” for
the History and Systems of Western psychology. First, the above distinc-
tion between the objective and the subjective use of language is an essen-
tial and irreducible distinction, so long as we take “Language” as the
primary system which psychology studies. This distinction often invokes
discussion of the “Humpty Dumpty” theory of language, since both sides
of the distinction are illustrated in Chap. 6, the “Humpty Dumpty”
chapter of Through the Looking-Glass, with Alice taking the objective-side
and “Humpty” taking the subjective-side (cf. Carroll 2006). Second,
though it does not resolve the distinction, if we are to understand linguis-
tic utterances (some might say: if an utterance is to truly count as a lin-
guistic communication), then the principles of Hermeneutics become
operable once again. On the objective-side it is as if each individual is a
poem, or continuous poetic-expression, of the language-system within
Conclusion: Post-Modern Turning Away from Method 197
6.2 T
he Performative Turn: The Essence
of Postmodernism
Just as the principle of Hermeneutics re-emerged in the Linguistic Turn,
the principle of Freedom or free will and agency receives emphasis in the
Performative Turn (cf. Petit 2001). This is especially the case regarding
identity, for example by way of culture, and the capacity to be critical of
non-freely determined characterizations of actions and events. On the
one hand, the idea is quite simple. Regardless of whatever term is used to
identify “the system,” many individuals will still believe they are free,
despite whatever extent to which they may be part of such a system.
Thus, resistance to the hegemony of the system—however identified—
indicates the impulse of the Performative Turn. However, on the other
hand, because the various expressions of the Performative Turn are—
given its essence—necessarily localized, that is, not “universal” perfor-
mances, and they often resist being even philosophically systematized,
discussions of the Performative Turn can become quite complicated.
As noted above, the anarchic impulse—the attempt to avoid associa-
tion with any principles at all—reaches its zenith in the Performative
Turn. In fact, the “Performative Turn” refers to Postmodernism in its
most purified expression. Thus, Postmodernism represents a revival of an
antiauthoritarian Renaissance posture; however, this time (after Darwin,
Marx, Freud, and Nietzsche) it often may be seen attempting to resist
even the “authority” of rationality, and especially “absolute truth.” It is
important, then, to notice that when various thinkers such as Freud are
invoked that it may not be in the service of propping up some sort of
“Freudian system” as much as it may be the attempt to provide arguments
against “the system,” or even any system. This is often why the ad homi-
nem argument, which is fallacious from a rational perspective, circulates
Conclusion: Post-Modern Turning Away from Method 199
and Surrealism (cf. Lacan 1965; cf. Greely 2001; cf. Suleiman 1990; cf.
Williams 1981). According to Lacan, “Hieroglyphics of hysteria …
enigmas of inhibition, oracles of anxiety … these are the hermetic ele-
ments that our exegesis resolves” (1982: 69–70). Moreover, it is in this
way that—beyond merely the subject’s word choice—everyday life may
be understood in terms of dreaming and fantasizing à la Surrealism (think
Marx’s notion of “false consciousness”). Thus, on the one hand, Fourth
Force (so-called) psychoanalytic theory functions as cultural criticism,
since culture is the ground of these dreams and fantasies; and, on the
other hand, Lacan’s roguish and clownish performances may be seen as a
resistance to be subject to the culture-system (cf. Elliott 2004; cf. Peters
and Ceci 1980). For a similar example of Postmodern irony and parody
“without breaking character” see Dancing with Cats (Silver and Busch
2014).
For a different understanding of the Performative Turn, psychologists
may look to the work of Gilles Deleuze (1925–1995). What Deleuze
offers psychology in relation to the Fourth Force may be characterized as
a return to Kant; further, it may be understood as a return “through the
systems perspective” in that it gives ontological priority to the transcen-
dental dimension by way of the (recall the term from above) “differenti-
ated individual,” and this individual is understood as a systematic part of
its environment from the very Transcendental point indicating the origin
of its differentiation. In this way, Deleuze provides a theory which remains
continuously new in that it subsumes any attempt to identify it with a
generalization. (cf. Deleuze 1994, 2004; cf. Deleuze and Guattari 2004,
1980). Simply put, Deleuze’s “systems theory” re-turns psychology to the
Transcendental dimension. There are only two brief points we need con-
sider here to understand how Deleuze relates to the Performative Turn
and the “Cognitive Revolution” of General Systems Theory, which we
will consider in the following section.
First, Deleuze offers a theory, beyond “Structuralism,” for psychology
by emphasizing the function of “intensity” as the Transcendental condi-
tion constituting structures. In other words, Deleuze offers us a method
for theorizing that which is always already different from its identifiable
manifestations. However, this is more profound than any re-turn to the,
202 F. Scalambrino
6.3 T
he Cognitive Turn: Almost “Normal
Science” in Psychology
To be sure, the “psychology of cognition” was not new in the 1950s. For
example, we find the following definition indicating that practitioners of
the “new psychology” were already working toward an explication of the
“Psychology of Cognition.” The following comes from 1874:
Cognition is a general name which we may apply to all those mental states
in which there is made known in consciousness either some affection or
activity of the mind itself, or some external quality or object. The Psychology
of Cognition analyzes knowledge into its primary elements, and seeks to
ascertain the nature and laws of the processes through which all our knowl-
edge passes in progressing from its simplest to its most elaborate condition.
(Jardine 1874: 1–2)
Yet, “the nature and laws of the processes through which all our knowl-
edge passes” would not find its most productive context until the control-
based theories of information-processing and cybernetics took shape (cf.
Shannon and Weaver 1949; cf. Miller 2003; cf. Gardner 1987: 19–32; cf.
Thompson 2007: 8). However, we must keep in mind, as was noted
above, that cybernetics may apply even to the First and Second Forces of
psychology and does not of necessity apply to the Fourth Force. That is
to say, General Systems Theory—as Bertalanffy characterized it—may or
may not be understood in terms of cybernetics. Thus, importantly, there
may still be room within the Fourth Force of psychology for the principle
of free will.
The term “Normal Science” is used in “Paradigm Theory” to denote
the paradigm through which practitioners understand the work they are
performing within a discipline when the discipline has essentially and
universally “settled,” so to speak, on that paradigm. Though the emer-
gence of General Systems Theory has undeniably influenced the disci-
pline of psychology as a whole, there is sufficient resistance to General
Systems Theory that it would be unfair to conclude “Cognition” refers to
the paradigm upon which contemporary psychology has settled. At the
204 F. Scalambrino
same time, the Cognitive Turn has been so influential across the
Humanities in general that it used to be referred to as the “Cognitive
Revolution” (cf. cf. Hobbs and Burman 2009; cf. Knapp and Robertson
2017; cf. Dember 1974; cf. Weimer and Palermo 1973; cf. Joynson
1970). At this point, as we are now witnessing the push-back against the
Cognitive Turn across the disciplines of the Humanities, it is easy to find
historical research calling the use of the term “revolution” into question.
However, there clearly has taken place within the history and systems of
Western psychology a “Cognitive Turn.”
The Cognitive Turn is usually described as having two (2) different
phases. There is little disagreement about how to identify the “first phase”
of the Cognitive Turn, as it was the first phase which provided us with the
“computer processing” metaphor for the materialist reduction of psychol-
ogy to “the brain” (cf. Dehaene 2014; cf. Boden 2006; cf. Harré 1995; cf.
Evans 1992; cf. Gardner 1987;). However, the “second phase” essentially
may be seen as an echo of the distinction between the Linguistic and the
Performative Turns. That is to say, the second phase has been character-
ized, on the one hand, as the “Discursive Turn” and, on the other, as the
“Agential Turn” (cf. Harré 1995: 26; cf. Rottschaefer 1997: 125). From
the perspective of those who resist understanding psychology as a
“Cognitive Science,” there are a number of options—just as there were
regarding what belongs “outside” structure in the tension between lan-
guage and performance—including affect, volition, and the Transcendental
dimension. However, for those who embrace psychology as a Cognitive
Science, retrospective efforts may be found attempting to locate the
emergence of Cognitive Science from the work of Descartes (cf. Chomsky
2004: 607). This complexity, of course, contributes to whatever confu-
sion there may be about the identity of the Contemporary study of ψυχή.
As a result, it is, at least, helpful to understand what may have been a
“Cognitive Revolution” outside of psychology—in culture and the
Humanities in general—as a “Cognitive Turn” regarding the Fourth Force
within psychology. In this way, “Computationalism” and “Connectionism”
become emphasized functional principles along with Multiple Realizability
and the ontological and structural principles of Eliminative Materialism and
Reductionism. Moreover, the concerns which were prominent regarding the
principles of realism, phenomenalism conceptualism, and nominalism may
be seen as operable again insofar as in order to “reduce” some phenomena of
Conclusion: Post-Modern Turning Away from Method 205
6.4 T
he Historical Turn: Self-Reflective
Thinking Through Psychology
Beyond Postmodernism
The “Historical Turn,” aka the “Historic Turn,” has been announced in
both the natural and the human sciences (cf. Bird 2008; cf. Griffiths
1996; cf. McDonald 1996; cf. Spiegel 2005; cf. Glock 2013). What per-
haps stands out most about the Historical Turn is that it does not emerge
as an answer to a question—for example, what is the “normal science”
paradigm of psychology? – as much as it emerges to formulate questions
and “think through” possible answers. Recalling the first two sections of
the Introduction to this book, the Historical Turn is understood as the
activation of a capacity for practitioners of a discipline to be “self-
reflective.” On the one hand, it is as if it is not possible for practitioners
of psychology to not have a principled point of view regarding ψυχή. As
we suggested above, from the perspective of the history and systems of
Western psychology, that is, from the standpoint of a Historical Turn, to
be consistently an “anarchist” is to consistently act in accordance with the
principle(s) of disavowing principles. Thus, the Historical Turn provides
the kind of univocity which, at least, allows for productive communica-
tive action across paradigms, despite the necessarily enduring incommen-
surabilities and the twists and Turns associated with Contemporary
Western psychology.
On the other hand, as we also briefly discussed above, since solutions
to problems, legitimacy, and progress toward becoming the “normal sci-
ence” paradigm (even if “transgressively” from within a Performative
Turn) are foundational elements for the discourses and narratives of psy-
chology outside of a Historical Turn, it is within a Historical Turn that
the various contextualizations of events and things receive a disciplinary-
specific context. Keeping in mind the standpoints of anarchism, progress
to “normal science,” and “eclecticism,” this context is important for
psychology to retain its integrity as a discipline. That is to say, even if the
various approaches constituted by differently selected clusters of princi-
ples sustain incommensurable disagreement regarding the identity of
ψυχή, the tradition and the practice of the study of ψυχή upon which
Conclusion: Post-Modern Turning Away from Method 207
between Historicism and Presentism which was at the basis of major rifts
in other contexts. For example, in regard to the evolution of systems,
“Selection processes are historical because the relative fitness of characters
is a function of the historical conditions in which selection takes place”
(Griffiths 1996: 515). Yet, notice that the historical conditions operable
at the moments of principle selection do not eclipse our capacity to think
through the selected principles, within the historical context, despite any
Presentist opacity which may otherwise influence our understanding of
those historical conditions.
For, “Historicizing is nothing more nor less than the constant asking
of questions about how something came to be and about what effects
things have had over time. To historicize is to accept that” historical nar-
ratives about the past are constructed (McDonald 1996: 32). If nothing
else, we can see that the history of psychology is a historiographical con-
struction regarding the past choices made by practitioners pertaining to
principles.
It is in this sense that the “linguistic turn” is giving way to the “historical
turn,” since historicism—understood as an acknowledgement of the con-
tingent, temporally, and socially situated character of our beliefs, values,
institutions, and practices—subtends both the retention of an attenuated
concept of discourse as that which creates the conditions of possibility for,
and the constituents of, a given culture … (Spiegel 2005: 25)
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H L
Hegel, G.W.F., xii, 3, 10, 15, 49, Lacan, Jacques, 199–201
165, 167 Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, 135,
Heidbreder, Edna, 164 140, 142–144, 147, 149, 152,
Heidegger, Martin, 15, 90, 167, 178, 153, 155n1, 164, 169, 170
180, 183–185, 197 Linguistic Turn, xii, 195–198, 208
Hermeneutics, 51, 60, 61, 179, Locke, John, 135, 137–140, 142,
180, 182, 183, 186, 196, 143, 152, 153, 169, 177
198, 200
Historical Reconstruction, ix, 62, 63
Historicism, 3, 5–7, 11, 13, 18, 19, M
21, 62, 208 Marwick, Arthur, 11, 12, 17
Hobbes, Thomas, 139, 169 Marx, Karl, xii, 29, 165, 176, 198,
Humanism, 129, 130, 178, 179, 183 201
Hume, David, 59, 135, 141, 142, Maslow, Abraham, 177–179
144, 146, 153, 161, 169, 171, Materialism, 65, 70, 74–76, 81, 138,
175, 177 165, 166, 204
Humpty Dumpty, 196, 197, 199 McGeoch, John, 27–29
Husserl, Edmund, 180, 181 Mechanistic, 68, 72, 75, 134, 139,
142, 175, 178, 185, 205
Mind-Body Problem/Problem of
I Heterogeneity, 65, 66, 91, 102,
Idealism, 48, 74, 81, 140, 153, 165 112, 134, 136, 137, 144, 150,
Imageless Thoughts, 170, 181 151
Incommensurability, x, xii, 22, 23, Mindreading, 79, 81
26, 28, 162, 163, 166, 173, Multiple Realizability, 77, 78, 81,
174, 177–180, 184, 186, 207, 184, 204, 205
209
Intentionality, 72, 81, 115, 119, 120
N
Nativism, 74, 81, 134, 138, 139,
K 143
Kant, Immanuel, viii, xi, 12, 15, 48, Natural Law, 114–119, 155
102, 135, 136, 138, 143–155, Naturwissenschaften (natural science),
161–166, 168, 170, 174, 177, xi, xii, 170, 171, 178, 205
179, 181–183, 201, 205 New philosophy, xi, 131–138, 149,
Kierkegaard, Søren, 15, 49, 166–168 153, 161, 162, 166, 172
Kuhn, Thomas, 22–24, 26, 28, 30 New psychology, xi, 9, 31, 163, 166,
Külpe, Oswald, 182 168–173, 177, 203
250 Index
Nietzsche, Friedrich, 15, 19, 49, Reduction, 67–70, 76, 81, 134, 199,
166–168, 182, 186n1, 198 204
Nominalism, 58, 121, 122, 204 Renaissance, xi, 8, 9, 95, 129–134,
136, 172, 178, 198
Representation, 67, 69, 81, 153, 183
P Ricoeur, Paul, 199, 200
Pavlov, Ivan, 162, 163, 168, 169, Rogers, Carl, 15, 177, 178
173, 174 Rorty, Richard, ix, 4, 5, 63, 145,
Phenomenography, 180–182, 186, 146, 196
187n2 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 14, 162
Phenomenology, 165, 180–182, 186,
187n2
Plato, xi, 15, 22, 37n3, 45, 47, 53, S
54, 89–102, 106, 107, Santayana, George, 16
109–112, 114–116, 119–121, Sartre, Jean-Paul, 178, 183, 184
123n1, 130–133, 143, 152, Scala Amoris, 93–95, 98, 111, 120,
154 131, 154
Polybius, 16 Scala Natura, 93, 111, 112
Positivism, 68, 75, 135, 138, 139, Schopenhauer, Arthur, 165, 167,
171, 176 168
Postmodernism, xii, 7, 10, 14, 51, Skinner, B.F., 15, 63, 76, 175
60, 61, 163, 167, 198–202, Solipsism, 136, 138–140, 142, 153,
206–209 161
Prägnanz, 181, 182 Soteriology, 90, 93, 96, 98, 109,
Presentism, 3, 5–7, 11, 13, 18, 19, 111, 112, 116, 155n1
21, 62, 63, 208 Supervenience, 67, 70, 71, 81
Propositional Attitude, 67, 71, 73, Szasz, Thomas, 19, 177, 200
74, 79–81
Psychoanalysis, x, 75, 163, 164, 169,
174–180, 199, 200, 205 T
Teleology, 4, 35, 90, 109, 111, 112,
116, 117, 134, 155n1, 177
Q Titchener, Edward B, xii, 47, 77,
Qualia, 67–69, 71, 72, 74, 78, 81 166, 170–173, 178
Transcendental, 48, 96, 99, 101,
120, 122, 132, 135, 136,
R 145–155, 165, 179, 182, 201,
Rational Reconstruction, ix, 62, 63 202, 204
Realism, 58, 121, 204 Trevelyan, George M., 15
Index
251