Frank Scalambrino - Philosophical Principles of The History and Systems of Psychology-Springer International Publishing Palgrave Macmillan (2018)

PHILOSOPHICAL PRINCIPLES
OF THE HISTORY AND

SYSTEMS OF PSYCHOLOGY
Essential Distinctions
Frank Scalambrino
Philosophical Principles of the History and
Systems of Psychology
Frank Scalambrino
Philosophical
Principles of the
History and Systems
of Psychology
Essential Distinctions
Frank Scalambrino
Department of Philosophy
John Carroll University
University Heights, OH, USA
ISBN 978-3-319-74732-3 ISBN 978-3-319-74733-0 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74733-0
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To psychē (ψυχή)
Preface
As a kind of epigraph, toward contextualizing the central concern of this

book, I would inscribe, as still pertinent for contemporary psychology,
the following quote from William James’ The Principles of Psychology:
The fundamental conceptions of psychology are practically very clear to us,

but theoretically they are very confused, and one easily makes the obscurest
assumptions in this science without realizing, until challenged, what inter-
nal difficulties they involve. When these assumptions have once established
themselves (as they have a way of doing in our very descriptions of phe-
nomenal facts) it is almost impossible to get rid of them afterwards or to
make any one see that they are not essential… (1918: 145)
This Preface is divided into three (3) parts. First, a general characteriza-
tion of the structure, function, and content of this book. Second, a brief
characterization of some of the motivation for writing this book. Third, a
general overview of the book.
(1) This book may be of interest to anyone who wishes to “think
through” the history of Western psychology. In fact, its original title was:
Philosophical Principles of the History and Systems of Psychology: Essential
Distinctions for Thinking Through Psychology. Specifically, this book is
intended as supplementary for History and Systems of Psychology
courses. It “fills a gap” in the literature, so to speak, in that though there
vii
viii Preface
are many excellent “history of psychology” textbooks available today, a

gap exists which may be traced to two aspects of the very nature of such
books. First, the sheer amount of information contained, necessarily, in
history of psychology textbooks makes it difficult for students to hold all
the information in mind. Second, history of psychology textbooks are, of
course, organized in relation to the vastness of the past, despite the histo-
riographic choices faced by the historians who construct them.
Hence, it should be emphasized that this book is not a history text-
book. If it were a history textbook, then it would be missing a good
amount of information, for example compared to books produced by the
likes of Sahakian (1975), Brennan (2003), Hergenhahn and Henley
(2013), or Walsh et al. (2014). Keeping with the reference to the History
and Systems of Psychology course, it would be more accurate to say this
book is a systems textbook. Thus, on the one hand, this book is able to be
manageably concise for students to hold in mind; in this way our focus
on principles and essential distinctions may function as mnemonic
devices for students. On the other hand, this book is organized in terms
of principles and “systems,” understood as constituted by clusters of prin-
ciples. Moreover, after reviewing countless textbooks for, and teaching
multiple sections of, the History and Systems of Psychology course, it
seems clear that the structure and function of this book may be seen as
“filling a gap” in the available literature.
Further, regarding the content of this book—forgive me for pointing
it out—the authors of textbooks for the History and Systems of
Psychology course have all been trained as psychologists. The value added
of having someone with a PhD in philosophy construct a book for think-
ing through the history and systems of Western psychology will hopefully
be evident after reading this book. Historians of psychology, philosophi-
cal psychologists, and psychologists with a desire for a panoramic view of
their discipline have an understanding that Aristotle and Kant, for exam-
ple, have been quite influential in the history of psychology; however, it
is rare to find a rendering of the history of philosophy sufficient for stu-
dents studying the history of psychology. The intention written into this
book is that readers will invoke history while thinking through systems,
whether it be in terms of a genealogy or history of contemporary psychol-
ogy or in terms of an examination of the historicity of the principles and
Preface
ix
commitments which have constituted the study of psychology through-

out Western history.
A characterization of this book in terms of the technical vocabulary of
historiography may be helpful for some readers. Thus, invoking Richard
Rorty’s (1984) “Four Genres” of historiography—discussed in Chap. 2—
this book may be understood as engaged in “rational reconstruction,” as
opposed to “historical reconstruction,” “canon-formation,” or “doxogra-
phy.” Yet, the “rational reconstruction” here is directed at the philosophi-
cal principles out of which selections constitute the systems of psychology.
As a result, such a “reconstruction” may be seen as a point of departure
for a “revisionist canon-formation,” in Rorty’s terminology; however, a
better—and a more readily understood—characterization of this book
for the purpose of a Preface may come from saying: this book re-orients
psychologists to the way the systematization of the history of psychology
relates to philosophy, that is, to psychology’s unavoidably “underlying”
philosophy. Previous books in regard to the History and Systems of
Psychology tend toward doxography and to deemphasize the constitutive
role of philosophical principles, especially for contemporary psychology,
as if psychology’s relation to philosophy were merely an aspect of an intel-
lectual historiography.
(2) As a result, this book contributes a statement of the principles from
which the history of psychology may be systematically examined, and
then works toward showing the differences across the major systems,
which have manifested in the history of Western psychology, toward a
starting point and orientation for further critical thinking. One of the
problems plaguing contemporary psychologists in regard to theorizing
psychology may be characterized as a “confusion of levels.” On the one
hand, many psychologists embrace the political principles of equality and
cultural diversity. In terms of theory this is standardly characterized as a
“commitment to pluralism.” Of course, one of the signs of such pluralism
is the agreement to civility despite disagreement. All this is good. However,
on the other hand, this commitment has been erroneously embraced by
many a graduate student—and, unfortunately for those they serve, some
clinical psychologists—such that a kind of “anything goes” attitude may
emerge. The actions brought-forth under the sway of such an attitude
may or may not be labeled with the technical terms of “eclecticism” or
x Preface
“anarchism.” Yet, in either case, the erroneous embrace of pluralism

entails coopting the ideal of pluralism for the sake of excusing oneself
from thinking critically and self-reflectively in regard to the practice of
psychology. The idea which is absolutely necessary for practitioners so
they may emerge from such confusion is: Incommensurability. The idea is
reflected in this book’s subtitle: Essential Distinctions.
That is to say, we should recognize that there truly are essential distinc-
tions between the various systems which throughout history have been
used to characterize and identify the practice and study of psychology.
Perhaps nowhere is such lax as irresponsible as it is in the field of psycho-
therapy. Some psychologists in the mere description of the services they
provide—because they ignore or do not understand incommensurabil-
ity—illustrate not a commitment to pluralism (again, forgive me for
pointing it out) as much as an incompetence regarding the history and
systems of psychology, which means an incompetence regarding the the-
ory of their practice. It is as if they advertise: I will be a “blank screen” and
provide you with “psychoanalysis,” while I share personal information
with you and transfer all sorts of “caring” feelings toward you through my
office environment and personal comportment. We should have the
courage to stand by our convictions (and commitments) and agree to dis-
agree. Such a stance signifies a real commitment to pluralism.
This book should orient readers to the principles, the constellations of
which constitute different systems of psychology, and to the essential dis-
tinctions between the different systems which emerge from their differ-
ently principled constitutions. That is to say, we can think through
psychology by way of the innumerable persons, events, and facts which
constitute its history, or we can think through psychology by way of the
logic of its systems. This book takes the latter approach. In doing so, what
a system rejects is often of more importance than what it affirms. In other
words, when we find the points at which a system (personifying it for the
sake of illustration) would say: “That is not, and cannot be, me,” then we
have made true gains toward understanding the activities and applica-
tions appropriate for such a system. In other words, true pluralism accepts
that “psychology as the Behaviorist views it” is not “psychology as the
Psychoanalyst views it,” and neither is “psychology as the Existentialist
views it.”
Preface
xi
(3) The Introduction of this book provides an understanding of the

notions of “history” and “system” operable for the History and Systems
of Psychology. Whereas the principles and distinctions enumerated and
explicated in the Introduction are of a generally philosophical nature, the
principles and distinctions of Chap. 2 are specifically oriented toward
gaining an understanding of the science of psychology in regard to both
its natural science (Naturwissenschaften) and its human science
(Geisteswissenschaften) expressions. Further, the discussion of Aristotle on
“univocity” provides a helpful bulwark against Postmodern readings of
the kind of systematization of psychology for which this book advocates.
On the one hand, we may say that the systematization is intended “prag-
matically” or for “regulative,” rather than reifying, purposes. On the other
hand, just as Aristotle pointed to the requirement of univocal meaning as
necessary for any scientific endeavor, so too against the Postmodern aver-
sion to systematization we may modestly suggest that our approach is
better on, at least, pedagogical grounds; otherwise, the reductio ad absur-
dum to which the Postmodern alternative amounts leads us into an edu-
cational situation in which we can no longer discern why plumbing and
sandwich-making should not be included in the curriculum for
psychologists.
The rest of the book—Chaps. 3, 4, 5, and 6—discuss the philosophi-
cal principles of the History and Systems of Psychology beginning with
Socrates and Plato and moving into our contemporary situation. By
examining the Pre-Modern to the Modern Periods, Chap. 3 discusses the
principles of psychology during a time in its history when a sharp distinc-
tion was not made between the principles of psychology and the princi-
ples of ethics or morality. The period of Western history discussed in
Chap. 4 amounts to a smorgasbord of methodological principles which
have been carried forward and still influence the study of psychology
today. Chapter 4 takes the Renaissance and the Modern Scientific
Revolution as its point of departure. With emphasis on Descartes and
Early Modern philosophers up to and including Kant, this chapter illus-
trates the search for a method on which to base, what was at the time
called the “new philosophy.” In a remarkably direct analogy, the “new
psychology” based on the experimental method and modeled after the
natural sciences is discussed in Chap. 5.
xii Preface
Beyond a discussion of the influence of “post-Kantian” principles

found in the theorizing of Hegel, Darwin, and Marx, for example, Chap.
5 discusses the influence of Wundt and Titchener and the manner in
which the principles understood as methodological innovations provided
the context within which contemporary psychology emerged. This chap-
ter includes heuristics standard for History and Systems of Psychology,
for example the essential distinctions between Naturwissenschaften and
Geisteswissenschaften and the “Four Forces” of contemporary psychology.
Moreover, special effort is made throughout this book to organize the
discussion of principles around a tripartite distinction between “struc-
ture,” “function,” and “method.” Thus, the principles constituting the
incommensurability between each of the Four Forces is also presented in
terms of this tripartite distinction.
Finally, this book concludes with a discussion of essential distinctions
between “Turns,” often understood as “Cultural Turns” in the history of
Western psychology. This includes the “LinguisticTurn,” “Postmodernism,”
the “Cognitive Turn,” aka the “Cognitive Revolution,” and the “Historical
Turn,” aka the “Historic Turn” (for symmetry with “Linguistic”). On the
one hand, this chapter functions as the conclusion of the book by provid-
ing an illustration—whether understood in terms of progress or not—of
the contemporary state of the previously operable principles. On the
other hand, it seeks to provide a discussion toward the principles consti-
tuting the current state of Western psychology from a systems perspec-
tive. In this way, just as one may find persons today who understand and
practice psychology from the point of view of any of the Four Forces, so
too each of the different “Turns” still stand as viable ways to contextualize
contemporary psychology. Therefore, all of these essential distinctions
have the potential to be used by the reader toward systematically thinking
through the history of Western psychology.
University Heights, OH, USA Frank Scalambrino

Preface
xiii
Bibliography
James, William. 1918. The Principles of Psychology. Vol. 1. New York: Dover
Publications.
Sahakian, William S. 1975. History and Systems of Psychology. London: Wiley.
Brennan, James F. 2003. History and Systems of Psychology. Upper Saddle, NJ:
Prentice Hall.
Walsh, Richard T., Thomas Teo, and Angelina Baydala. 2014. A Critical History
and Philosophy of Psychology: Diversity of Context, Thought, and Practice.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rorty, Richard. 1984. The Historiography of Philosophy: Four Genres. In
Philosophy in History: Essays on the Historiography of Philosophy, ed. R. Rorty,
J.B. Schneewind, and Q. Skinner, 49–76. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Hergenhahn, B.R., and Tracy Henley. 2013. An Introduction to the History of
Psychology. Stamford, CT: Wadsworth Publishing.
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank the Drs. Nicholas and Dorothy Cummings Center
for the History of Psychology for allowing me access to their archives and
special collections at the University of Akron.
I would like to thank Dr. Dawn Mitchell, Psy.D., Dr. Stephen T
Penepacker M.D., Dr. Elizabeth Aram, Psy.D., Dr. James Swindal, Dr.
Jim Collier, Dr. Steve Fuller, Dr. Todd DuBose, Dr. Stephen A. Minnick,
and Dr. Robert Arp. I would like to thank my “Deleuzian” friend Beth
Metcalf for our recent conversations regarding Deleuze and for her
encouragement and affirmation. I would also like to thank Carter, Taylor,
and Lexie, Elisa, Hannah, Jonathan, Nate, Ryan, and Zachary for their
continued encouragement and friendship. I would like to thank my for-
mer students, especially those from The Chicago School of Professional
Psychology, Kent State University, the Illinois College of Lake County,
Walsh University, Duquesne University, the University of Dallas, and the
University of Akron. I would like to thank all those patients and clients
who inspired me to continue to study psychology while I was working in
multiple capacities, from my time answering suicide hotline calls to
doing chemical dependency counseling, to working as a forensic moni-
tor of persons NGRI, to doing pre-hospital admission screening, and to
working as the Director of Emergency and Community Psychiatric
Services at the Community Mental Health Suicide Prevention Respite
Unit and Clinical Intervention Center, which I founded in Ohio
xv
xvi Acknowledgments
in 2003. Lastly, I would like to thank my psychology professors from

Kenyon College: Dr. Lecesse, Dr. Levine, Dr. Murnen, Dr. Smolak, Dr.
Stolzfus, and Dr. Williams.
I received no outside funding or sabbatical with which to write this
book.
Contents
1 Introduction: The Project of the Philosophical Archeology

of the History and Systems of Psychology 1
2 Some Historically Based Essential General Distinctions 45
3 Pre-Modern to Early Modern: From Mirror of God

to Mirror of Nature 89
4 The Early Modern Battle for the Archimedean Point 129
5 Modernism to Post-Modernism: Method as Archimedean

Point 161
6 Conclusion: Post-Modern Turning Away from Method 195
Bibliography 215
Index 247
xvii
1
Introduction: The Project
of the Philosophical Archeology
of the History and Systems
of Psychology
The intention of this project is to furnish us with a principled systematic

understanding of essential distinctions with which to think through the
history of Western psychology. Throughout the course of this book terms
such as “principle,” “system,” “history,” and even “psychology” will be
further clarified. The following terms have been selected for clarification
in the introduction because they will be essential and fundamental in
clarifying terms later in the book. Moreover, it is important to keep in
mind that the material with which we are dealing is history, that is, the
history of Western psychology. Thus, we will begin by taking into consid-
eration the principles of historiography—the study of the writing of his-
tory; the principles according to which historians inscribe events from
the past into historical narratives.
Ultimately, a system dealing with history, especially in the light of his-
toriography, must be philosophical. This is the case because there is too
much disagreement as to what “psychology” refers to—especially when
considered across the history of Western psychology. In other words,
when different participants in the history of a discipline disagree regard-
ing the very elements of what constitutes participation in that discipline,
then there is too much essential disagreement, that is, disagreement about
the essence of the discipline, to suggest there is an essential systematic
© The Author(s) 2018 1

F. Scalambrino, Philosophical Principles of the History and Systems of Psychology,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74733-0_1
2 F. Scalambrino
order to the elements constituting the discipline. Rather, what is needed

is an explication of the choices being made by participants in the history
of such a discipline.
Just as a discipline can tolerate a plurality of choices constituting its
practice, the distinctions regarding which such choices are being made
may be understood as constituting a systematic understanding of that
discipline in general. For example, throughout the history of psychology,
including today, we find essential disagreement as to what “psychology”
is even supposed to be the study of; is psychology the study of biology,
spirituality, behavior, mind, unconscious drives and motives, or the use
of freedom? Though it may be tempting to say “all the above,” some
understandings, as the history of psychology illustrates for us, of what
constitutes the elements of psychology are essentially distinct from other
understandings—we will clarify this later in the book in terms of
“incommensurability.”
Thus, choices—and commitment to those choices—constitute the
activities of the discipline of psychology from out of the potential ways
psychology can be practiced, and the best indicator of how psychology
can be practiced is how psychology has been practiced, that is, its history.
What is more, the choices and commitments which constitute the disci-
pline of psychology are made from within a system of distinctions. Now,
though it may not be possible to reveal or explicate the entire system of
such distinctions, it is possible to become more or less familiar with it.
Therefore, (stated in the other direction) by increasing our familiarity
with the system of essential distinctions from which choices and commit-
ments constitute the activities of psychology, we increase our ability to
think through the activities of contemporary psychology and the history
of Western psychology.
1.1 What Is History?

In regard to the study of history, there are several standard distinctions
which are essential for our understanding of the history of psychology.
We will discuss the following distinctions: (a) distinct understandings of
“History,” that is, “History v. the Past,” (b) “Original v. Reflective v.
Introduction: The Project of the Philosophical Archeology… 3
Philosophic History,” and (c) “Understandings of the Past: Cyclical v.

Linear v. Chaos,” (d) distinct understandings of “Historiography,” that is
“Presentism v. Historicism,” (e) “Western Historical Periodization,” (f )
“Sacred v. Profane History,” (g) “Internal v. External History,” (h)
“Primary v. Secondary Sources,” (i) “Witting v. Unwitting Testimony,” (j)
“Salient v. Deterministic Selection,” (k) “Author Intent v. Reader Utility.”
(a) “History” refers to the re-presentation of the past, or, as historians
like to say, “History” refers to “what historians do.” “The Past,” then, is
supposed to refer to everything that has already happened. This initial
distinction points to the importance of historiography, that is, the “writ-
ing” or activity of constructing the narratives which constitute history.
(b) G.W.F. Hegel (1770–1831), in his Philosophy of History, provided the
following distinctions. “Original History” refers to simply recording
events from the past; the best practice of which being “the annals of his-
tory” or recordings of events as they transpire. “Reflective History” refers
to re-presenting history with importance placed more on the Present
time in which the history is being re-presented than on when the events
occurred. Hegel divided “Reflective History” into “Universal,”
“Pragmatic,” and “Critical” history.
Whereas “Universal History” aims to re-present an entire history of,
for example, some movement, culture, people, or nation, “Pragmatic
History” re-presents historical events as if they were presently happening,
that is, making them “Virtually Present”. Hegel characterized “Critical
History” as a “History of History,” that is, “a criticism of historical narra-
tives and an investigation of their truth and credibility” (Hegel 1901:
50). Finally, “Philosophic History” refers to the “thoughtful consider-
ation” of history. In other words, according to Hegel., when historians
seek to identify the presence of “universal laws” to which historical narra-
tives may be subordinated, then the resulting narrative may be called
“philosophic.” Thus, philosophic history may be understood as the
decoding of original and universal history to identify the presence and
development of various socio-cultural and economic evolutions, which
original and universal histories leave concealed.
(c) Our initial distinction between history and the past, should cast the
cliché “history repeats itself,” in a more complicated light. That is to say,
we are not as concerned with the habitual tendencies of historiographers
4 F. Scalambrino
as we are with witnessing patterns repeating throughout the past. Thus,

the past may be characterized according to different principles.
Understanding the past as “Cyclical” when writing historical narratives,
especially reflective and philosophic narratives, means that patterns dis-
cernible in the past may be found endlessly repeating across histories. In
the West the Cyclical understanding of the past is often associated with
ancient Greek cosmological thinking and historians who limit the influ-
ence of technology to “change our cycle,” while also discerning endless
repetition given the potentials of “universal human nature” (cf. Deleuze
2006; cf. O’Brien 1969; cf. Sarno 1969; cf. Vico 2002). A “Linear”
understanding of the past provides a different principle for historical nar-
ratives. If the past has a linear character to it, then it is headed toward
some culmination. When traversing the line is thought to provide a cul-
mination better than the line’s point of departure, then the linear histori-
cal narratives are construed as “Progressive,” and when the line is
conversely understood, then they are considered “Regressive.”
It is important to note, a number of historians and philosophers of
history articulate their historical understanding of our own presence in
history as at the conclusion of a Progressive Linear understanding of the
past, for example Francis Fukuyama (1952–) and Jean Baudrillard
(1929–2007). Thus, Fukuyama speaks of “the end of history” as the end
of the idea of historical progress (1992). Similarly, Baudrillard saw
Progressive Linear understandings of the past as “utopian-based,” and
with the failure of economies and politics to accomplish such a utopia has
come the collapse of the idea of progression toward such a goal; for exam-
ple, Baudrillard points to several moments in history each of which he
declares to be “the illusion of the end,” such as the “World Wars,” the
“Cold War,” and “Y2K” (1994; cf. Baudrillard 2006).
Finally, some historians characterize the past in terms of Chaos, rather
than a cycle or a line. The following quote from Richard Rorty
(1931–2007) provides an excellent description of the writing of history
in regard to the past as Chaos, especially with its reference to Pragmatic
history.
The final stage of the Pragmatist’s Progress comes when one begins to see
one’s previous peripeties [reversals of condition or fortune] not as stages in
the ascent toward Enlightenment, but simply as the contingent results of

encounters [e.g.] with various books which happened to fall into one’s
hands. This stage is pretty hard to reach, for one is always being distracted
by daydreams: daydreams in which the heroic pragmatist plays a Walter
Mitty-like role in the immanent teleology of world history. But if the prag-
matist can escape from such daydreams, he or she will eventually come to
think of himself or herself as, like everything else, capable of as many
descriptions as there are purposes to be served. There are as many descrip-
tions as there are uses to which the pragmatist might be put, by his or her
self or by others. This is the stage in which all descriptions (including one’s
self-description as a pragmatist) are evaluated according to their efficacy as
instruments for purposes, rather than by their fidelity to the object
described (Rorty 1999: 92)
The past characterized. as Chaos, then, not only casts historical narratives
in the light of contingency, it completely undermines the idea of prog-
ress. In other words, whereas historical events may be contingently deter-
mined and yet indicate progress toward a goal in a (cyclically or linearly)
unfolding past, this understanding of Chaos characterizes the past as nei-
ther progressing cyclically nor linearly.
(d) As will become clear by the end of the book, the distinction between
“Presentism” and “Historicism” is essential for thinking through a num-
ber of the systematic aspects in the history of Western psychology. There
is much to be said about this distinction; to start with, we can recognize
its affinity to the distinction between Original and Reflective history,
especially the Pragmatic and Critical types of Reflective history. That is to
say, “Historicism” refers to the study of the past in the past’s terms. In
other words, insofar as it is possible to “fuse” the horizon of our under-
standing with the horizon of the understanding of the past in question,
Historicism seeks to understand the meaning and value of the past as it
would have been understood at the time it happened. Thus, Historicism
holds an affinity to Original History.
Conversely, writing history from the perspective of “Presentism” means
interpreting and evaluating the past in terms of presently accepted values
and understanding. We may distinguish between mild and strong ver-
sions of Presentism. Mild Presentism holds an affinity to Reflective
6 F. Scalambrino
History in that viewing the past from the position of mild Presentism
means interpreting the past from within our present horizon. As we will
see, the word “our” in the previous sentence will be seen as relative to
culture by some contemporary psychologists. For now, the position of
strong Presentism suggests it is not possible to “fuse” the horizon of our
present understanding of values and meaning with a past horizon. Much
hinges on this distinction since nowadays it is commonplace to pass judg-
ment on actions performed in the distant past; however, from the posi-
tion of strong Presentism such judgments may amount to mere opinion,
since it is as if to not have “been in the shoes of ” those involved in the
past may mean to not be able to truly evaluate or appropriately under-
stand the past situation in question (cf. Clark 2004; cf. Gadamer 1989;
cf. Gergen 1985; cf. Stocking 1968).
To illustrate this important distinction further, note how the historian
Herbert Butterfield (1900–1979) defined Presentism as “the tendency in
many historians … to praise revolutions provided they have been success-
ful, to emphasize certain principles of progress in the past and to produce
a story which is the ratification if not the glorification of the present”
(Butterfield 1931: 5). Further, he criticized the Presentist practice of
abstracting things from their historical context and judging them apart
from their context … [to] study the past with one eye … upon the present
is the source of all sins and sophistries in history, starting with the simplest
of them, the anachronism … [it is] what we mean by … “unhistorical”.
(Butterfield 1949: 11–12)
Whereas Butterfield may be seen here advocating for Historicism, advo-

cates for Presentism, in response—especially those affirming a Linear
Progressive understanding of the past—point to “the privilege of retro-
spection,” noting: “In history we know what happened afterwards, and the
actors don’t. The arrow of time makes our knowledge intrinsically superior
to that of the actors …” (Tosh 2003: 653).
On the one hand, then, notice how advocates draw on other distinc-
tions for support. That is, emphasizing a Progressive understanding of the
past undermines the idea that we would want, or need, to know the past
“for its own sake.” On the other hand, notice how advocates of either
position can move toward stronger/more extreme versions to defend their

position. In this way, for example, strong Presentism developed into
“social constructionism” (cf. Berger and Luckmann 1966) by emphasiz-
ing the socio-cultural-economic forces influencing the construction of
historical narratives, including our historical understanding of our own
presence in history. In other words, it is not a big leap to go from the idea
that socio-cultural-economic forces determine our view of the past to the
idea that socio-cultural-economic forces determine our view of the pres-
ent. Thus, despite its critical stance toward previously constructed his-
torical narratives, it is as if strong Historicism attempts to use the principle
of strong Presentism against Presentism by suggesting our historical
understanding of our presence in history is itself historically conditioned.
That is to say, strong Historicism is critical of a view which may be associ-
ated with Presentism, namely that we have progressed to a point in his-
tory in which we presently embody the truth toward which the past was
striving, so to speak, such that we can now criticize past historical narra-
tives as biased.
(e) Given our discussion thus far, it should be clear that there are many
ways to characterize the past, in the West, into historical periods. The
following Western Historical Periodizations have been selected, then, for
the pragmatic reason that they essentially embody the traditional stan-
dard in Western scholarship. The following Periodizations may be referred
to as the Threefold, Fourfold and Ninefold models, respectively. The
three (3) historical periods of the Threefold division and the spans are as
follows:
1. Pre-Modern (600 BC–1600)

2. Modern (1601–1972)
3. Post-Modern (1973–Today)
Note that the Post-Modern historical period contains a hyphen. It is not

uncommon to see the word written in one of three ways: Postmodern,
Post-Modern, or (Post)Modern. Whereas the first version is technically
an “art term,” the second refers to a period of history, and the third is used
to emphasize that whatever is being described as “Postmodern,” is merely
a continuation of the Modern. Thus, the philosophical movement titled
8 F. Scalambrino
“Postmodernism”—to be discussed later—originates from an attitude of

“widespread disillusionment.” In other words, a suspicion of all “meta-
narratives,” justifying value-systems and truths. For example, a
Postmodern attitude toward institutionalized psychology may call the
various values and truths of “the clinic” into question by, for instance,
questioning whether clinical activities such as current prescription prac-
tices regarding psychiatric medication are influenced by pharmaceutical
companies, especially through their “reps,” or by insurance-reimbursement
policies.
Moreover, it may help in terms of a cultural contextualization to note
that the birth of Post-Modernity coincides with the release of the band
Pink Floyd’s album Dark Side of the Moon. Whereas the Sixties are seen
by many as a kind of culmination—whether Progressive or Retrogressive,
the Seventies are usually depicted in terms of peripeties pointing to wide-
spread disillusionment with, and attempts to “contradict,” traditional
aspects of Modernism. This included not only notions of the “nuclear
family,” but also notions of socio-cultural historical progress in general.
The four (4) historical periods of the Fourfold division and their time
spans are as follows:
1. Ancient (600 BC–400)

2. Middle Ages (401–1600)
3. Modern (1601–1900)
4. Contemporary (1901–Today)
Whereas the Fourfold division tends to be used to refer to philosophical

and psychological movements in general, the Ninefold division enters
into more specificity. On the one hand, though culture influenced the
designation of periods in the Ninefold division, for example the
Renaissance, it does not attempt to indicate nor exhaustively represent a
cultural periodization, which would inevitably include the “Romantic
Period” (c. 1800–1850) and the “Victorian Era” (1837–1901). On the
other hand, of course significant events from within such time spans,
despite not being listed in the Ninefold division, hold influence and rel-
evance for the history and systems of Western psychology.
1. Pre-Platonic (600 BC–300 BC)

2. Hellenistic (301 BC–100 BC)
3. Roman (101 BC–400)
4. Medieval (401–1400)
5. Renaissance (1401–1600)
6. Early Modern (1601–1800)
7. Nineteenth Century (1801–1900)
8. Twentieth Century (1901–2000)
9. Twenty-first Century (2001–Today)
(f ) The remaining distinctions all pertain to the writing of history in that

they characterize the various kinds of decisions made in regard to what
counts as history. The first of these distinctions is between “Sacred” and
“Profane” history. Whereas Sacred history takes the Bible as its point of
departure for understanding history, Profane history is more concerned
with “secular” events and secular interpretations of events when writing
and understanding history. In other words, should the past event in ques-
tion be understood in terms of a religious tradition and its documents, or
not? Be sure that the simplistic and straightforward nature of this distinc-
tion does not conceal its importance for thinking through the history and
systems of psychology. In this regard, a few words of explication may be
of value here.
There is a tendency, especially among twentieth-century textbooks
regarding the history and systems of psychology, to consider—what in
the twenty-first century is now called—the “new psychology” as legiti-
mate psychology and everything prior to the “new psychology” to be phi-
losophy merely progressing toward a stage in which psychology becomes
scientific. Despite this tendency to distinguish between “old” and “new”
psychology and, then, to consider “old” psychology outdated and obso-
lete, many people today still adhere to the principles and, thereby, sustain
a psychological worldview in terms of the so-called “old” psychology.
Therefore, the distinction between Sacred and Profane history remains
viable for thinking through the history and systems of psychology.
The Modern version of the question of the Sacred and the Profane is
cast in terms of whether psychology should consider questions of moral-
ity within its domain. Like the separation between Church and State,
10 F. Scalambrino
these domains may be seen as essentially distinct. To illustrate, consider

the following quote from Antonio Gramsci (1891–1937).
A distinction must be made between civil society … (i.e. in the sense of

political and cultural hegemony of a social group over the entire society, as
ethical content of the State), and on the other hand civil society in the
sense in which it is understood by Catholics, for whom civil society is
instead political society of the State, in contrast with the society of family
and that of the Church. (Gramsci 1971: 447–448)
Similar to the distinction between the past and history, it is possible to

understand one-and-the-same “civil” action in accordance with different
principles and worldviews. At the same time, there will be points of irrec-
oncilable difference regarding one-and-the-same action; for example,
some action acceptable, or at least not illegal, within civil society, the
Church may consider a sin. Thus, when considering the passing of time
in writing and understanding the history and systems of psychology, the
distinction between Sacred and Profane allows for a deeper appreciation,
for example in terms of multiple viewpoints and in terms of irreconcil-
ably different interpretations.
(g) “Internal History” considers events in the passing of time only
insofar as they influenced the discipline whose history is in question.
Conversely, “External History” refers to events considered peripheral
and, though perhaps historically contextualizing, of little to no influence
on the discipline whose history is in question (cf. Richards 1987). Again,
just like with (f ), there is potential for this distinction to be complicated.
That is to say, especially regarding Postmodernism in psychology, if one
understands socio-cultural and economic influences to determine, to
some extent, the writing of psychology’s history, then it may not be
immediately clear that events seemingly External to the discipline of psy-
chology have not influenced the writing of its history. Recalling Hegel’s
distinctions above, Critical history of psychology may largely be under-
stood as engaged in the practice of providing a history of the history of
psychology for the purpose of uncovering the seemingly External events
influencing the history of psychology.
(h) Anyone researching in the Humanities should already know the

distinction between “Primary” and “Secondary” sources. An interesting
question that comes from historian discussions of the distinction: Are
translations of Primary texts Secondary sources? If we were to think of the
original work as the Primary source, then it follows that translations are,
by virtue of being translated, Secondary sources. According to historian
Arthur Marwick (1936–2006), “Primary sources, as it were, form the
basic ‘raw material’ of history; they are sources which came into existence
within the period being investigated.” (2001: 26). Keeping in mind the
distinction between Presentism and Historicism, notice Marwick was
careful to point out that a Primary source belongs to the historical period
in which it “came into existence” (cf. Kragh 1989). That is to say, “The
articles and books written up later by historians, drawing upon these
primary sources, converting the raw material into history, are secondary
sources” (Marwick 2001: 26).
(i) The distinction between “Witting and Unwitting Testimony” origi-
nated from the historian of science Henry Guerlac (1910–1985).
According to Marwick, “‘Witting’ means ‘deliberate’ or ‘intentional’;
‘unwitting’ means ‘unaware’ or ‘unintentional’ [and] ‘Testimony’ means
‘evidence’.” (2001: 172). Therefore, “‘witting testimony’ is the deliberate
or intentional message … of a document or other source; the ‘unwitting
testimony’ is the unintentional evidence (about for example, the attitudes
and values of the author, or about the ‘culture’ to which he/she belongs)
that it contains.” (Ibid: 172–173). Notice that this distinction may apply
to the “Primary source” itself, or it may apply to the historian construct-
ing a “Secondary source.” For example, “Witting testimony” may be “the
information or impression that the person or persons who originally
compiled the document or source intended to convey … or record.”
(Ibid: 173).
(j) The distinction between “Salient and Deterministic Selection”
refers to a series of standard principles in the writing of history. These
principles are: Zeitgeist, Ortgeist, Great Person Theory, Artifacts, Wars,
and Worldview Shifts. Whereas “Salient” suggests a person, thing, or
event is particularly noticeable on its own, “Deterministic” suggests a
threshold such that some person, thing, or event becomes history-worthy,
so to speak, by differing from other persons, things, or events in regard to
12 F. Scalambrino
the feature in question. In other words, many people performed actions

today, however, unless those actions exceed threshold-levels regarding
some feature, historians may not consider the actions as having “made
history” (cf. Marwick 1993). It is worth pointing out that the features
and thresholds vary across cultures, economies, and historical periods,
and, therefore, may be understood as dependent variables.
All histories, then, may be analyzed in regard to how these principles
influenced their writing. Whereas Zeitgeist means “spirit of the time,”
Ortgeist means “spirit of the place.” Thus, these principles function as
potential justifications for writing some activity into history. For exam-
ple, consider how original documents are, of course, produced in some
language. Some key examples may be the “New Testament” of the Bible
being written in Greek or Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason being
written in German. Some argue that these documents in some way
required the languages in which they were written. It is as if, were Kant
writing in some language other than German, then perhaps he would not
have come to realize the ideas presented in the Critique of Pure Reason.
Along these same lines, historians sometimes suggest it was the Zeitgeist,
“the spirit of the time,” or the Ortgeist, “the spirit of the place,” which is
ultimately responsible for determining, or constituting as salient, some
thing or event as history-worthy. As may be expected, these two princi-
ples are often contrasted with the “Great Person Theory,” which—remain-
ing with our example—might suggest that Kant could have produced his
book regardless of his language, nationality, or historical period (suppos-
ing someone else did not write it before him).
Of course given the present ubiquity of historical narratives, it is per-
haps commonplace to notice that histories seem to be written around
Wars, artifacts, and worldview shifts. To be clear, “artifacts” may include
technological inventions, laboratory and medical devices, and books. On
the one hand, an examination of the histories of Western psychology
illustrates the point. On the other hand, as noted above, all of these prin-
ciples can be “played-off” one another, so to speak, such that, for exam-
ple, various artifacts or Wars may be understood as responsible for a
Zeitgeist, Ortgeist or worldview shift. Keeping this in mind allows for
Critical and Philosophic thinking through the history of psychology.
Moreover, the various systems of psychology may be understood as so
many worldview shifts in the history of psychology. Thus, the relations

between the various systems may be Critically and Philosophically exam-
ined in regard to, for example, logic and history; that is, not just why is
this system supposed to be better than its competitors, but what were the
conditions which led to its formation; and, how might it best suit this
Zeit, Ort, Person, War, artifact, etc?
(k) Finally, the distinction between “Author Intent and Reader Utility”
helps provide clarification and lends itself to Critical and Philosophic
thinking in the history of psychology. Like the distinction between
Internal and External History and Witting and Unwitting Testimony,
there will be times when the difference between Author Intent and Reader
Utility is significant. Perhaps the three most common: First, when the
Author is understood as a Primary source and the historian constitutes
the Reader. In such cases, the Reader need not be understood as merely
passively receiving the Author’s Intention. For example, a Reader’s focus
may be on Unwitting Testimony or may be strongly determined by
Historicism or Presentism. Second, when the Author is understood as a
Secondary source, the Reader may simply disagree with the Author or
decide differently in regard to the salience of evidence presented, and not
presented, by the Author. Third, when the Author is understood as
strongly determined by Historicism, the Reader may understand the
Author’s comments as historically contextualized, for example in terms of
the Author’s social, cultural, economic, or political context. In these ways,
we may justify significant differences between our interpretation—as the
Reader’s—of some work, despite its Author’s Intent, as we, for example,
Critically and Philosophically consider the history and systems of Western
psychology.
1.2 What Is the Value of Learning History?

Of the perennial questions which emerge when studying the history and
systems of Western psychology, the most immediate may be: Why should
we study history? In response textbooks in the history and systems of
psychology traditionally devote a section to addressing this question.
Hence, the content of this section may be understood as an articulation
14 F. Scalambrino
of the traditional approaches toward answering this question: (l) the

Poetic Necessity of History, (m) History as Illumination, (n) History as
Philosophical Laboratory.
Of course we may be skeptical of the capacity for historical narratives
to accurately reflect events of the past. Representing such a position Jean-
Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) infamously suggested:
the facts described by history are far from being an exact portrayal of the
same facts as they happened … and what lessons can I draw from an event
of whose true cause I am ignorant? The historian gives me one, but he
counterfeits it; and critical history itself, which is making such a sensation,
is only an art of conjecture, the art of choosing among several lies the one
best resembling the truth. (Rousseau 2010: 392–393)
In fact, Rousseau’s is not the only way to cast historical narratives in a

skeptical light. Yet, the question of the value of learning history seems to
take its foothold before the question of the accuracy of history is even
raised. Because we may be motivated to study history even if historical
narratives are merely approximate truths, the question of the value of
learning history is still a viable question despite Rousseau’s insight. In
other words, the question of the value of learning history seems moti-
vated such that even if historical narratives are “true,” what is the value of
learning history. Therefore, the following addresses this latter contextual-
ization of the question. However, there will be more to say about
Rousseau’s contextualization of the question in discussing Postmodernism.
(l) The “Poetic Necessity of History” is a twofold reference. On the one
hand, it refers to the sense in which human creation comes from some-
thing, rather than from nothing. That is to say, not only must there have
already been something present from the past that individuals must use
as material with which to create, but also, collectively, as humans endure
the process of existence the various states of creation necessarily have a
past by being part of that process. Thus, “For the historian of Psychology
who is also a psychologist, the discipline’s history is therefore in itself a
psychological phenomenon.” (Richards 2002: 7). This is especially the
case when history is understood by the psychologist such that “we are
looking at Psychology’s role in the dynamic psychological process by
which human nature constantly recreates, re-forms, and regenerates

itself.” (Ibid). However, if human nature is not the aim of your investiga-
tion, the process may also be examined in terms of our (human) inherit-
ing a body of knowledge, a culture, and so forth (cf. Csikszentmihalyi
1996; cf. Harris 2009; cf. Moravcsik 1981; cf. Mumford 2003; cf. Serres
1982; cf. Simonton 2004). On the other hand, the patterns of action
applied to the past may already—partially or completely—have been
applied in the past. Thus, the “poetic necessity of history” refers also to an
inherent desire to know the past. The phrase comes from historian George
M. Trevelyan (1876–1962).
The dead were and are not. Their place knows them no more and is ours
today … The poetry of history lies in the quasi-miraculous fact that once,
on this earth, once, on this familiar spot of ground, walked other men and
women, as actual as we are today, thinking their own thoughts, swayed by
their own passions, but now all gone, one generation vanishing into
another, gone as utterly as we ourselves shall shortly be gone … (Trevelyan
1949: 13)
What was it like to study psychology in the past? Why were the people
studying psychology in the past asking the questions they asked? Was
there some aspect of psychology they could see that is presently opaque
to us? Imagine the questions you might ask if you were given the oppor-
tunity to speak with the likes of Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas,
Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Freud, Jung,
Skinner, Rogers, Satir, or Deleuze, for example.
(m) From historian Will Durant (1885–1981) comes the suggestive
metaphor of history as “a lantern of understanding held up to the present
and the future.” (Durant 1939: 614). The sentiment resonates well with
the ancient Greek proverb that “History is philosophy teaching by exam-
ple.” How do psychologists who are also historians of psychology under-
stand this “illuminating” power of history? They seem to agree that the
value of learning history, at a minimum, consists in: “Knowing how to
establish a scholarly project by placing one’s own ideas amidst what oth-
ers have said. Citing sources as both intellectual and social touchstones
… [and] Justifying one’s decisions in determining what is important.”
16 F. Scalambrino
(Green 1994: 95; cf. Geuter 1983; cf. Vaughn-Blount et al. 2009). For, as
psychologist and historian of psychology Robert I. Watson (1909–1980)
aptly noted: “None of us can escape history … History cannot be denied;
the choice is between making it a conscious determinant of our behavior
as psychologists, or allowing it to influence us unawares. There is no alter-
native.” (Watson 1966: 64). Thus, learning the history of psychology
functions as a kind of increase in illumination in regard to thinking in the
field of psychology.
(n) Another metaphor that characterizes the remaining traditional
responses to the question regarding the value of learning history men-
tioned here is that of a “philosophical laboratory.” The metaphor was
emphasized by philosopher and historian of philosophy Étienne Gilson
(1884–1978). For our purpose the idea the metaphor invokes may be
divided in terms of “progress,” “inspiration,” and “critical deconstruc-
tion.” According to the historian Polybius (c. 200-c.118 BC) “there is no
more ready corrective of conduct than knowledge of the past.” (Polybius
1922: 3). Similarly, George Santayana (1863–1952) famously claimed,
“Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”
(2011: 172; cf. Fuchs et al. 2007). Of course, as noted above, these tru-
isms do not determine whether the past should be understood as Linear
or Cyclical.
Be that as it may, historians advocating for an understanding of history
as a “philosophical laboratory” often emphasize that history should be
understood in terms of progress. Thinking through the question “How is
scientific progress possible?” philosopher of science Gaston Bachelard
(1884–1962) held that the history of science is an essential component of
scientific theory (2016; cf. Bergson 2004; cf. Jones 1991). Simply put,
how can there be progress if you do not know from what you are pro-
gressing? It is helpful to show a distinction here between what we may
call teleological and epistemological “progress.” Whereas “teleological
progress” suggests that the past, and thereby reality itself, is progressing
toward some purposeful end, “epistemological progress” more modestly
suggests that progress has been made from an earlier state of knowledge.
Epistemological progress need not take a stance in regard to whether the
progress is teleological in nature. Thus, historians critical of the idea of
teleological progress critique historical narratives for the immodesty of
their claims. Such historical narratives are pejoratively called “Whig,” or

“Whiggish,” understandings of history (cf. Butterfield 1931).
Though the idea of history as a “philosophical laboratory” allows for
multiple understanding of progress, it is important to stress that even if it
were to amount to merely learning a “history of errors,” learning history
would still be of essential value. Moreover, learning history may be of
“inspirational value.” Coded in history are the hopes of the previous
members of our historical community, so to speak. Just as the activities,
that is, the “experimenting,” performed in a laboratory by a community
of scientists informs the very identity of that community and its under-
standing of progress, so too as a fruitful and commonly expressed analogy
has it: history is to its community what memory is to the individual.
Conversely, historians point to the analogous relation between amnesia
and not learning history; it is as if without history a community can nei-
ther fully understand its own identity nor be positioned to best navigate
its future.
In this way, “Thanks to our knowledge of history we find that instead
of being totally adrift in an endless and featureless sea of time, we do have
some idea at least of where we are and of who we are.” (Marwick 1970:
18). Thus, the history of psychology has the capacity to function as a
“philosophical laboratory” through which the community of individuals
who study and practice psychology may be inspired by the goals of the
community, orient to the progress of the discipline’s “laboratory,” and
derive a participatory-identity “within the community,” even though that
community may be understood as spanning the history of the West.
Finally, it is important to emphasize that it is from within such a philo-
sophical laboratory and the progress and hopes of a discipline’s historical
community that “critical deconstruction” takes place. Otherwise, critical
deconstruction “throws the discipline out with the bath water.” In other
words, those who would have the discipline of psychology totally decon-
structed thereafter have no ground upon which to stand as a “psycholo-
gist.” Lest they be willing to take some other discipline, such as philosophy,
as the point of departure for such a devastating deconstruction, then their
critical deconstruction must take place within the discipline’s laboratory,
that is, the history of psychology. Notice, in this way, so long as a separate
discipline is not taken as a point of departure, then activities of “critical
18 F. Scalambrino
deconstruction” directed at the history of a discipline may be—perhaps

ironically—understood as contributing to “progress” for the discipline.
In order to clarify, before concluding this section, briefly consider three
terms and an example. The three terms are: Historicity, Genealogy, and
Hegemony. “Historicity” refers to the actuality and authenticity of some
thing or event in the past. Thus, if your claim that some chair is an
authentic piece of Victorian Era furniture is to be factual, then the chair
must have actually originated—been brought into existence—during the
time of the Victorian Era. Notice how the idea of historicity helps us
further clarify the distinction between Historicism and Presentism.
Historicism holds that things and events both can and should be under-
stood in terms of their historicity. Presentism holds that it is not possible
to understand some thing or event in terms of its historicity. We may be
able to factually date in the past the thing or event in question; however,
our understanding of its meaning will be inextricably bound to the pres-
ent point of departure from which we seek to understand it.
In terms of “critical deconstruction,” then, “genealogy” refers to the
practice of tracing a thing’s or an event’s history with regard to the “con-
ditions for the possibility of ” the thing or event in question. Genealogy
may be considered a methodology of “critical deconstruction” insofar as
the genealogy is performed so that the conditions for the historically sig-
nificant things or events may be accounted for beyond the present “stan-
dard” historical narrative in which the things or events are considered
significant based on our present aims and present understanding. In this
way, the goal of genealogy is to criticize and deconstruct the presently
accepted historical narrative. Of course, the history of Western philoso-
phy offers a number of ways to characterize the conditions for the possi-
bility of things and events. Therefore, the term “hegemony”—“Episteme”
in Foucault’s vocabulary (1971)—is helpful here in that it may refer to
whatever conditions are presently dominating the historian’s construc-
tion of narratives. Moreover, because these conditions are actual, they
may also condition the birth of various historically significant things or
events beyond mere narrative constructions. For example, Michel
Foucault’s (1926–1984) genealogy of mental health clinics provides an
account of the birth of such clinics which—taking philosophy as its point
of departure—may be critical of narratives inclusive to the discipline of
psychology which otherwise account for the “birth” of the clinics (1988;
cf. Foucault 1994). Thus, it may be said that “critical deconstruction”
calls the historicity of a thing or an event into question (cf. Barthes 1978;
cf. Danziger 1990; cf. Deleuze 2004; cf. Deleuze and Guattari 2004;
Derrida 1978; cf. Nietzsche 1989).
Finally, consider the following example of the ways in which the three-
fold and fourfold historical divisions of Western philosophy are “stan-
dardly” characterized. As preface to discussing the fourfold division, the
threefold division consists of: Thinking as aspiring to be the Divine
Mirror of God in the Pre-Modern Worldview; Thinking as aspiring to be
the Mirror of Nature in the Modern Worldview, and Thinking under-
stood as the Mirror of Culture, that is, influenced, if not fully determined
by, social, economic, and historical forces in the Post-Modern Worldview.
In regard to the “standard” way to characterize the fourfold historical
division of Western philosophy: For the Ancient Period, “philosophy”
referred to a “way of living.” On the one hand, notice how though we
may be able to characterize this accurately in general—be it from primary
Original History, etc.—if we take a Presentist stance we may still claim to
not fully understand the particularities of the meaning of “philosophy as
a way of living” in the way the ancient Greeks, for instance, understood
it. On the other hand, despite the possibility of a Presentist critique,
when “psychotherapy” is thought to be essentially a synonym for “phi-
losophy,” the point of view of ancient Western philosophy is often
invoked (cf. Entralgo 1970; cf. Hadot 1995, 2002; cf. Howard 2000; cf.
Moes 2000; cf. Szasz 1988, 1997).
For the Middle Ages, “philosophy” was—according to this “standard
characterization”—understood as “the handmaiden to theology.” This
may be variously explicated; however, in brief, it is as if because the
Middle Ages had the advantage, over the essentially (retrospectively char-
acterized) “pagan” Ancient Period, of the Christian revelation, the only
role thought left to philosophy was the clarification of theology, or “faith
seeking understanding.” The question of the primacy of theology, then,
surfaces regarding this historical period from the point of view of the
Presentism/Historicism distinction. That is to say, as will become clearer
throughout this book, there is a fundamental and essential distinction
regarding philosophy between the first two and the latter two historical
20 F. Scalambrino
periods in the West. The former being essentially “Theo-centric,” and the
latter “Ego-centric.” For instance, just as the Gramsci quote above, in
expressing two different understandings of “society,” may be understood
as characterizing two different worldviews, so too this historical shift may
be understood as an essential distinction characterizing different under-
standings of psychology, especially regarding psychology and the domain
of morality. Of course, the consequences of the historical-shift, to which
this distinction refers, still ripples through the discipline of psychology
and its various ways of being understood.
One of the particularly relevant shifts in worldview which is under-
stood to have occurred in the history of the West from the first two to the
second two periods of the fourfold historical division regards the relation-
ship among words, concepts, and things. That is, do words primarily refer
to concepts or to things? The “standard” understanding, again in general
at this point, holds that the first two periods tended, at least, to under-
stand words as referring primarily to concepts, and the second two peri-
ods, especially the Modern Period, tended to understand words as
referring primarily to things (Brümmer 1981: 35–64; Cunningham
1988: 22–46; Petit 1977: 5; Wehrle 2000: 175–177; cf. Foucault 1971;
cf. O’Callaghan 2003; cf. de Saussure 2011). As will be clear later in the
book during a discussion of different theories of truth, the very identity
of philosophy, and thereby psychology, is seen as at stake here in the his-
tory of philosophy. In other words, is philosophy ultimately semantics,
metaphysics, or theory of knowledge?
For the Modern Period, “philosophy” was—according to this “stan-
dard characterization”—understood as “the handmaiden to science.”
Whereas the aim of a philosophical worldview from the first two periods
of the fourfold division may be understood as attempting to understand
nature, and the place of humans in it, the Modern Period is characterized
by Descartes’, perhaps infamous, declaration from his 1637 Discourse on
the Method for Conducting One’s Reason Well and for Seeking Truth in the
Sciences that—by way of science—humans shall “render ourselves, as it
were, masters and possessors of nature” (Descartes 1998: 35). Thus,
Modern philosophical thinking is historically characterized in terms of a
shift from the project to achieve—to whatever extent possible—a “God’s
eye” view of nature, to the project to bend “the will,” so to speak, of
nature to that of our own, that is, from Theo-centric to Ego-centric. That
is to say, what is the method for discovering how to control nature?
For the Contemporary Period, “philosophy” is understood, not sur-
prisingly, in a number of diverse ways. However, an efficient, albeit two-
fold, way, to characterize philosophy emerges according to this “standard
characterization.” First, we cannot determine the meaning of “philoso-
phy” in the Contemporary Period, because we are living it presently. Of
course, the distinction between Presentism and Historicism may be oper-
able here. Second, “philosophy” in the Contemporary Period refers to the
ability to be “critical.” Insofar as this is the case, it behooves us to be able
to think through the history and systems of Western psychology as a
constitutive part of not only the Critical and Philosophical history of
psychology but also of the discipline of psychology itself. Thus, an anal-
ogy with the night sky may help express a summary statement of the
ground covered at this point. Just as over time some stars in the night sky
seem more visible than others and just as different constellations are
brought into focus by the varying visibility of different stars, so too his-
tory provides an important context within which the various shifts in
worldviews and systems may be understood in terms of selections among
philosophical principles. Of course, the principles, according to this anal-
ogy, then, refer to the stars and the visibility of the stars refers to the
emphasis and prominence of various principles throughout history.
1.3 What Is a System?

When we hear the word “system” it brings to mind the concept of plural-
ity. In other words, “system” implies an interconnection of multiple parts.
In fact, because there are many different types of systems and particular
ways of systematizing different disciplines, it is helpful to recognize that
the study of systems most generally belongs to the field of “mereology.”
“Mereology,” derived from the “study of ” the ancient Greek word for
“part,” refers to the study of parts and wholes, the relationship between
parts, and the relationship between parts and wholes. On the one hand,
it is important to note that “Mereology is not a logical theory because its
terms and axioms cannot be deduced from the principles of logic.”
22 F. Scalambrino
(Sobociński 1984: 42; cf. Peregrin 2001; cf. Von Bertalanfy 1968). On
the other hand, every major Western philosopher—beginning even with
the Pre-Platonic philosophers—can be seen as having a “mereology.”
Anticipating what will be considered more fully below, it is important to
note that because mereology cannot be simply reduced to logic, mereol-
ogy often takes precedence when a theorist enters into discussions of
“ontology” or the parts of a system a theorist takes to have some kind of
being.
Though there is, of course, much more to say about “systems,” con-
sider how the following two terms relate to what has already been said:
“infinite regress” and “incommensurability.” In regard to taking some
thing as having a kind of being and, then, considering it as a part in a
system, notice how systems may be understood as relating like—as a con-
venient and popular metaphor states it—a “matryoshka” or “Russian
nesting doll.” That is, a system may be placed within another system,
which may be placed within another system, and so on. The idea that
such placement within another system may go on endlessly is the idea
captured by: “infinite regress.” Traditionally, at least, it is seen as a virtue
of a theory that it avoids infinite regress. Yet, this gives rise to the problem
of “priority” or “privilege” in the sense that—to use the metaphor again—
some one of the dolls must be the doll at which we stop, and go no fur-
ther. Now, with actual physical dolls we could point to the physical
constraints, as if at some magnitude it becomes impossible for us to con-
struct a doll, then the last created size of doll would be seen as doll that
stopped the infinite regress. However, when dealing with theories—as
non-physical beings—it may be much more difficult to recognize “where”
the regress stops.
After discussing “incommensurability” we will summarize both of
these ideas in regard to mereology and the idea of a “system.” Though the
term has always been a part of the vocabulary of Western philosophy (cf.
Plato 1860: 16d1; cf. Aristotle 1984: 983a16, 1967: 106b1, 1956:
430a31), “Incommensurability” is associated with the philosophers of
science Paul Feyerabend (1924–1994) and Thomas Kuhn (1922–1996).
The term refers to the sense in which two theories may relate to each
other in such a way that they have “no common measure” (cf. Feyerabend
2001: 33; cf. Feyerabend 1983: 211; cf. Kuhn 1996: 4–5 and 37–39).
Now, of all that may be said regarding the work of Feyerabend and Kuhn,
for our purpose we want to notice how incommensurability can be
explained in terms of the difference between, for example, two different
systems in which each theory may be located. In other words, even
though two different theories may—on the surface—appear to be about
the same thing, concept, or word, it is possible for the theories to be
incommensurable with one another insofar as their systems do not allow
for a “common measure” of the thing, concept, or word in question. This
is easier to see when it is spread across history; for example, think of the
difference between the night sky in the Ptolemaic system and in the
Copernican system. However, as we will see, it is even possible to have
incommensurability between two psychologists viewing, at the exact
same time, the ostensibly same psychological phenomenon.
Due to opposition to the work of Feyerabend and, especially, Kuhn,
some historians have attempted to strip their special vocabulary terms of
meaning; therefore, rather than emphasize, for example, Kuhn’s notion
of a “paradigm” and a “paradigm-shift” we will use these words, in this
book, as essentially synonymous with the terms “worldview” and
“worldview-shift.” An even better expression, were it not more cumber-
some, would be “system-view” and “system-view-shift.” However, for the
context, consider the following from Kuhn regarding the historicity of
such distinctions.
As a former physicist now mainly engaged with the history of that science,
I remember well my own discovery of the close and persistent parallels
between the two enterprises I had been taught to regard as polar. A belated
product of that discovery is the book on Scientific Revolutions …
Discussing either developmental patterns or the nature of creative innova-
tion in the sciences, it treats such topics as the role of competing schools and
of incommensurable traditions, of changing standards of value, and of altered
modes of perception. Topics like these have long been basic for the art histo-
rian but are minimally represented in writings on the history of science
[emphases added]. (Kuhn 1969: 403)
Regarding systems, then, in the history of Western psychology, it is clear

that different systems, or “schools,” compete with each other, that they
24 F. Scalambrino
have different standards of evaluation, and that taking a point of view

from within different systems actually involves a “shift” in one’s mode of
perception. That is to say, two different psychologists viewing, at the
exact same time, the ostensibly same psychological phenomenon may
actually perceive it differently.
This is to be understood in terms of theory more than, for example,
two different subjective perceptions of, say, the color blue. In other words,
the same behavior may be perceived as an expression of resistance to
unconscious forces, a habitually instantiated reaction, the result of a mis-
applied pattern of past coping, or the action of a free agent; moreover,
were we to examine the principles constituting each of the different sys-
tems from which such theoretical characterizations would be a consistent
depiction of the behavior, then we would see these theoretical character-
izations may, in fact, be incommensurable. For instance, insofar as
unconscious forces are deterministic, then the system from which such a
view is produced would be incommensurable with the system which
views the action as involving free agency. Moreover, just as two different
observers of the same star in the night sky may perceive that star as being
in different constellations, it would still be possible for a philosophical
characterization of the primary constellations in which the star could be,
or has been, seen, and to illustrate the styles of clustering stars (principles)
which determined the different constellations. Note well, however, that
such an activity is a theoretical activity, and, therefore, it is essentially dif-
ferent from the practical activity of applying some particular location of
the star in a constellation to a reading (keeping with the analogy) in
regard to someone’s birth chart. In other words, a philosophical “meta-
view,” so to speak, of the systems of psychology does not relieve a practi-
tioner of selection and commitment of a particular system at the point of
application.
Consider how psychologist and historian of psychology Robert
I. Watson discussed Kuhn’s innovative vocabulary. “In one of its mean-
ings a paradigm is a contentual model, universally accepted by practitio-
ners of a science at a particular temporal period in its development …
Illustrative in astronomy is the Ptolemaic paradigm which gave way to
the Copernican paradigm” (Watson 1967: 435). Notice, Watson’s use of
the term “contentual” to attempt to capture what has been discussed thus
far in this section; that is, a “paradigm” or “worldview” is “contentual”

because it is a system for understanding the content, taking the content to
be parts of a whole system. In other words, we have this information and
these facts (though even such perceptions may be contested from the
perspective of some worldviews in psychology)—such as the observation
of some behaviors, and in comprehending the observation in terms of
some system, we may ask how do these parts relate to each other in a
whole? Often the whole would include theories that are fundamental to
the system-view being worked out. Put another way, what theories should
we use to constellate the parts? Thus, the selection between principles—
such as, for instance, between determinism and free agency—constitutes
a system by limiting what counts as other parts of the whole and by limit-
ing how the rest of the parts may be constellated. This is an important
insight because it allows us to think through incommensurable “para-
digms,” “worldviews,” or systems by examining the essential distinctions
across which various selections have comprised the principles of the
systems.
On the one hand, then, it is important to note regarding systems in
psychology that they serve a “guidance” or “regulative” function. That is,
a system “functions as an intellectual framework, it tells [psychologists]
what sort of entities with which their scientific universe is populated [i.e.
the parts of a system a theorist takes to have some kind of operative
being] and how these entities behave, and informs its followers what
questions may legitimately be asked” (Watson 1967: 436). On the other
hand, what every psychologist and historian of psychology should recog-
nize in the twenty-first century is that there is no
universal agreement about the nature of our contentual model … In psy-

chology there is still debate over fundamentals. In research, findings stir
little argument but the overall framework is still very much contested.
There is still disagreement about what is included in the science of psychol-
ogy. (Watson 1967: 436)
Moreover, there are some historians of psychology who see the suggestion
that psychology liberated itself in the nineteenth century, “either from
parent disciplines [such as philosophy or biology] or from external social
26 F. Scalambrino
concerns during its formative period” (Woodward and Ash 1982: v), as
merely a popular narrative among psychologists derived from deliberate
historiographical choices (cf. Feigl 1959; cf. Klein 1970; cf. Rachlin
1994; cf. Van Kaam 1966: esp. 107–109). Were psychology to unani-
mously adopt a worldview, or paradigm, then the discipline—to use
Kuhn’s terminology—would be engaged in “normal science,” as opposed
to a state of “crisis” in which different worldviews may be understood as
“battling” or vying to be the system of psychology (cf. Slife et al. 2017; cf.
Toulmin 1972). When either a system becomes the system for a time or
when some major shift occurs in the understanding of the set of princi-
ples involved in the crisis of vying systems, then a “revolution” may be
said to have taken place; otherwise, when different systems or clusters of
principles alternate emphasis over time it is called a “turn,” not a
revolution.
To sum thus far, then, notice that it becomes highly unproductive and
unhelpful for us to understand systems in terms of an infinite regress.
This is because it would be as if there were no “traction.” We could point
to one “level” of system and our interlocutor could simply point to a dif-
ferent level, then we could follow suit, and it would be as if we were both
caught in an endless freefall. As a result, history and systems of psychol-
ogy rightfully uses history to stop an infinite regress of systems; that is to
say, these are the systems (constituted by principles chosen across essen-
tial distinctions) from within which persons during this particular period
of time understood their point of view. Whereas advocates of some his-
torically based system may, of course, understand psychology solely in
terms of that system, given the twenty-first-century state of the disci-
pline, such activity is inevitably part of the vying for their chosen system
to be taken on as the “norm” or considered presently the best (cf. Mandler
1996). Ultimately, being able to think through the multiple systems in
the history of psychology is the purpose of this book. Of course, our
purpose may also be understood as allowing for psychologists to better
advocate for whichever system they presently privilege, for example, by
being able to understand multiple worldviews and the essential differ-
ences across worldviews. In this way, the notion of “incommensurability
reiterates the importance of learning how to think through the history of
psychology, so as to be able to think through the relations within and

between different systems.
For instance, this notion reminds us that we are not simply talking
about different points of view throughout the history of Western psy-
chology; rather, we are talking about different points of view from within
different contextualizations and constellations of principles. Thus, some
of the points of view cannot simply resolve into one another, since the
“worlds” within which each constitutes a different worldview are simply
too different from one another. By understanding systems in regard to
psychology this way—as constituted by principles selected in regard to
essential distinctions—the notion of an “eclectic” system is undermined,
or rather “eclectic” merely becomes the name given to a system before it
receives a historically designated name. Ultimately, this is because the
essential distinctions—whether they can all be enumerated or not—
remain sufficiently constant; if they were to change too much, then we
would no longer be considering systems of psychology, since the distinc-
tions and principles would pertain to some other topic. For example, it is
surely a confusion to think it necessary that psychologists learn the prin-
ciples of plumbing. Orienting oneself to those principles provides one
with a worldview specific to the profession of plumbing, etc. not
psychology.
Though this understanding of the idea of a “system” is not novel, its
application in terms of this book may be. In fact, a seminal article pub-
lished in 1933 in The Psychological Review titled “The Formal Criteria of
a Systematic Psychology” written by John A. McGeoch (1897–1942) is
worth quoting here at length.
as one reads the eclectics themselves, one is struck by the fact that what
they are trying to do, in their escape from the bonds of existing systems, is
to erect another, less a priori and less “finished,” perhaps, but still a system,
out of the principles which have been found to be most adequate in preceding
systems [emphasis added] … It is better, therefore, to attempt to systematize
admittedly and rationally. One need not, as a result, found a “school” or
nurture a cult. It is possible to be a psychologist, not a defender of a school,
and yet to attempt to order constructively the field one studies. (1933: 4)
28 F. Scalambrino
It is interesting to note that the article from which this excerpt comes was
written before the canonization and popularization of Kuhn’s notion of
“incommensurability.” In the wake of Kuhn, whereas McGeoch enumer-
ates “principles of connection” and “principles of selection,” in this book
we consider principles of selection primal and constitutive in regard to
the constructive ordering of systems. For the remainder of this section we
will briefly examine some traditional characterizations of “systems” artic-
ulated in textbooks and other sources used in the study of “the history
and systems of psychology.” These include five (5) entries from the
American Psychological Association Dictionary of Psychology (2007) and
two History and Systems of Psychology textbooks which take McGeoch’s
principles as a point of departure, that is, Systems and Theories in Psychology
(1963) and Theories and Systems of Psychology (1972 & 1979).
According to the American Psychological Association Dictionary of
Psychology, “system” means:
(1) any collective entity consisting of a set of interrelated or interacting ele-

ments that have been organized together to perform a function. (2) an
orderly method of classification or procedure. (3) a structured set of facts,
concepts, and hypotheses that provide a framework of thought or belief, as
in a philosophical system. (VandenBos 2007: 918)
Because this definition of “system” invokes the notions of “structure,”

“function,” and “frame” it will be helpful to see how these terms are
defined. On the one hand, “structure” means: “a relatively stable arrange-
ment of elements or components organized so as to form an integrated
whole. Structure is often contrasted with function to emphasize how
something is organized or patterned rather than what it does.” (Ibid:
901), and “function” means “the use or purpose of something” (Ibid:
392). Moreover, notice from the definition of “system” how “function”
and “performance” belong together. On the other hand, “frame of refer-
ence” means “the set of assumptions or criteria by which a person or
group judges ideas, actions, and experiences.” (Ibid: 388), and “cognitive
system” is defined as “a set of cognitions that are organized into a mean-
ingful complex with implied or stated relationships between them.” (Ibid:
191). Now, we should draw two conclusions here. First, the answer to the
question “What is a System?” given in this section is perfectly consistent

with answers considered “standard” both presently and historically.
Second, insofar as “system” is associated with “structure,” then, “system”
may be standardly contrasted with performance. The relevance of these
conclusions will increase by the end of this book.
There have been prior attempts to apply a “principles” approach to the
History and Systems of Psychology, such as the ones based on McGeoch’s
work in Systems and Theories in Psychology (1963 & 1987) and Theories
and Systems of Psychology (1972 & 1979). By the 1979 publication of
Lundin’s Theories and Systems of Psychology, he had incorporated a way of
viewing the above criteria as establishing the structure of a system and the
following criteria toward expressing the function a system should serve.
Thus, we have the following two lists of criteria.
Criteria regarding the “structure of a system:
(1) Definition. The system must contain a definition of the field of

psychology;
(2) Postulates. The system must make its postulates explicit;
(3) Data Selection. The nature of the data to be studied must be
specified;
(4) Mind-Body Interaction. A mind-body position must be taken;
(5) Principles of Organization. A system should account for the prin-
ciples according to which it organizes data.
(6) Principles of Selection. A system should account for the principles
according to which it selects data, i.e. considers data salient. (Adapted
from Marx and Hillix 1963: 49 and Lundin 1972: 2–3).
Criteria regarding the “function” of a system:
(1) Organization. A system should be able to organize diverse facts and

principles, relating them in a way that is meaningful. A haphazard
accumulation of data will lead only to confusion, disorder and mis-
understanding [emphasis added].
(2) Inference. Along with the observed data, theoretical propositions
may be included so things fit together in a meaningful whole.
30 F. Scalambrino
(3) Heuristic function. A system or theory which leads to the discovery

of new findings, experimental or otherwise is said to have a heuristic
function. The theory’s propositions allow for the generation of new
research.
(4) Interpretation. Whereas the Heuristic function of systems point us
in new directions and the Inference function of systems allow us to
fill-in missing information regarding data and observations, the
Interpretation function provides us with a framework or frame of
reference for understanding the meaning of data and observations.
(5) Morale function. Ordinarily, systems and theories are developed by
people either working alone or in a group. These people share basic
convictions and profit from interaction with each other [emphasis
added].
(6) Limiting function. This refers to what is going to be included or left
out, for example, in regard to theoretical innovations or potential
data to be examined. (Adapted from Lundin 1979: 8; cf. Lichtenstein
1967).1
There are only three points to be made here, beyond the value of merely
presenting these lists. First, despite these excellent insights expressed in
the journal literature and textbooks regarding the History and Systems of
Psychology, no one had combined these insights with those expressed by
Kuhn. Second, emphasis was added to the term “principles” to highlight
how the term was relegated to the content being organized, as opposed to
the very principles in accordance with which the organization of content
is performed; rather, the term “basic convictions” was used to refer to the
shared principles from which the shared practices flow, thereby constitut-
ing a community of practitioners or school of thought. Third, reading the
above lists from a philosophical perspective, the first question which
comes to mind is: Why were they trying to recreate the wheel? That is, just
as the APA definition stated, “as in a philosophical system,” the systematic
articulation of the work of philosophers has a long history, and it does not
use these lists of criteria to organize the information. In other words, we
should use the philosophical principles according to which philosophy
itself is standardly organized, for example in regard to the “criteria regard-
ing structure” list. Moreover, the “criteria regarding function” list directly
relates to the former list in that it refers to the function of a structure

constructed in accordance with the “criteria regarding structure.” Put
bluntly, the systems of psychology have their own ontologies, epistemolo-
gies, and theories of predication, by way of which they may by differenti-
ated; moreover, by thinking about them in these terms, one is able to
“think though” the history and systems of Western psychology without
privileging any one system of psychology over another.
Some further clarification regarding the second and third points will
prove helpful. As has been clear since the time of Aristotle, “philosophy”
transcends the classification of the sciences. Of course this may be easily
understood by simply realizing that the sciences are classified according
to some philosophy. When the physical eye sees, it does not see itself see-
ing. However, as should be common knowledge among those who study
the history of psychology, psychologists in the twentieth century, espe-
cially, seemed quite eager to establish their “independence” from philoso-
phy, for example as the “new psychology.” This is usually cast in terms of
psychology as a separate discipline from philosophy, and if when you hear
“discipline” you think of offices occupied by people, then you may not
take issue with the idea expressed. Yet, if you understand that philosophy
is not a separate “discipline” from which psychology can be separated,
then the eagerness seems more culturally and politically (not to mention
probably economically) motivated. This issue—figuratively call it “psy-
chology’s anxiety to establish its ‘independence’”—may account for the
desire to “recreate the wheel,” so to speak (cf. Finkelman 1978).
1.4 What Are Principles & Distinctions?

To begin, it is helpful to notice the difference between two easy to con-
fuse terms. The term “principal” can be used as either a noun or an adjec-
tive; as a noun it means a person or property of a specified rank or type,
and as an adjective it means that whatever it describes is first or most
important in rank. The term “principle” is a noun, and it refers to “that
from which anything in any way proceeds; a starting point of being, or
of change, or of knowledge, or of discussion.” (Wuellner 1956: 4). Thus,
a “principle” may function as a foundation for a system of thinking,
32 F. Scalambrino
understanding, or behaving. These terms may be easily confused, since

using the former as an adjective we may correctly refer to principles as
principal. However, it is, of course, the term “principle” which interests
us in this book, and because the ancient Greek term for “principle” was
“archē” or “archai” in the plural, the project of uncovering the principles
of the systems of Western psychology may be referred to as an
“archaeology.”
Traditionally, principles may be divided into principles of reality (or
“ontological” principles) and principles of logic (or “mental” principles).
In regard to the former, a being or some part of a being may be consid-
ered a principle of being or principle of reality, and if some other being
comes from the principle, then the principle may be called a principle of
change. In regard to the latter type of principles, they refer to “a source of
knowledge or of thought; especially a truth from which another truth or
truths proceed.” (Ibid: 5) The relationship between order and principles
provides additional illumination for the relationship between principles
and systems. Notice, “The means precede the end in the order of execu-
tion.” (Ibid: 39). That is, “The end is the correct principle of the selec-
tion, direction, order (arrangement), and subordination of the means.”
(Ibid). In this way, terms “selection” and “order” should recall “principles
of organization” and “selection,” noted above, with the end being the
truth, or identity of the system of “psychology” with which the practitio-
ner is operating.
In order to appreciate the value of explicating the principles operable
regarding the systems of psychology throughout history in the West, we
will enumerate a few principles and an example here. First is the “principle
of identity,” which in its ontological formulation holds, “Whatever is, is”,
and in its logical formulation holds “The true is true; the false is false.”
(Ibid: 14–15). Next is the “principle of non-contradiction,” which in its
ontological formulation holds, “A thing cannot both be and not be at the
same time in the same respect or relation,” and in its logical formulation
holds, “The same judgment cannot at the same time in the same meaning
be both true and false.” (Ibid). Two more. The “principle of causality”
holds “Every physical change requires a cause distinct from the subject
changed, and the new form arising in the subject” and “Whatever comes
to be comes to be from another being.” (Ibid: 30). Lastly, the “principle
of finality” holds “Every agent or nature in acting must act for an end.”
(Ibid: 38).
Notice the power of these principles for ordering knowledge. For
example, consider the principle of non-contradiction (PNC). The PNC
is the motor force behind alibis. If you know where a person was at the
time some crime was committed (and that place was not the place where
the crime was committed), then you know the person in question is not
guilty of the crime. Moreover, you know the person is not guilty of the
crime even though you do not know who is guilty of the crime. In fact,
Aristotle called the principle of non-contradiction “the most firm of all
first principles.” (1984: 1005b11–23).
Thus, it was through the power of articulating these principles that
Aristotle was credited with originating “science” in the West. His descrip-
tion of science in general from the beginning of his Physics (184a10–21)
points to the value of principles, as he understood them.
In every systematic inquiry where there are first principles, or causes, or

elements, knowledge and science result from acquiring knowledge of these;
for we think we know something just in case we acquire knowledge of the
primary causes, the primary first principles, all the way to the elements. It
is clear, then, that in the science of nature as elsewhere, we should try first
to determine questions about the first principles. (Irwin 1990: 3)
The idea here is that if we were to encounter some random thing and
were to provide a systematic inquiry into it, then we would be hoping to
uncover the principles, causes, and elements which would constitute
“scientific” knowledge of the thing in question.2 Conversely, to the extent
that “science,” or our systematic inquiry, can uncover the truth of reality,
then we will come to understand that reality in question in terms of “first
principles.” It is because these principles are the ultimate first principles
from which knowledge proceeds that Aristotle thinks them constitutive
of “science.”
Notice, then, because the systems of Western psychology which we
will be examining all purport to be accurate approaches to that to which
“psychology” is supposed to refer, the standpoint of principles is a good
position in relation to the approaches. That is to say, our aim is to find
34 F. Scalambrino
some common ground on which to compare and contrast the different

systems; though each system may be radically different from one another,
each system is still a system. In this way, going back to the example of
“encountering some random thing” from the previous paragraph: there
may be several different ways to engage in the systematic inquiry of the
random thing we have encountered, and, in fact, the random thing may
in the light of each system seem different; however, insofar as each of
those systems is aiming to produce true knowledge of the thing, then
ultimately each of those systems will be articulated in terms of first prin-
ciples which will be the same for them all. For example, each system will
identify what is to be examined. Each system will direct its inquiry at
some reality and articulate its findings logically. Even in extreme examples
like the “Freudian Unconscious,” which is supposed to not operate in
accordance with—or be constrained by—the principle of non-
contradiction, Sigmund Freud, of course, was constrained by the princi-
ple of non-contradiction when articulating his psychoanalytic system of
which the Unconscious is a part.
As a transition, then, from discussing principles to discussing distinc-
tions, consider the following distinctions Aristotle made in regard to the
principle of causality. As the following makes clear, Aristotle understood
the principle of a thing’s identity—the type of being it is—to be inti-
mately related to the principle of causality.
Knowledge is the object of our inquiry, and men do not think they know a
thing till they have grasped the ‘why’ of it (which is to grasp its primary
cause). So clearly we too must do this as regards both coming to be and
passing away and every kind of natural change, in order that, knowing
their principles, we may try to refer to these principles each of our prob-
lems. (1950: 194b17–23)
Notice how this quote from Aristotle echoes the strategy of discovering
the principles so that the “problems” encountered in the course of sys-
tematic inquiry can be “referred to these principles.” Of course, the prin-
ciples in this case are more commonly known as Aristotle’s “Four Causes.”
Whereas knowing the Four Causes constitutes knowing “the why” of a
thing for Aristotle, it is the distinctions among the causes which allow us
to think of each as a separate principle, and they are: “the Material Cause,”
“the Formal Cause,” “the Efficient Cause,” and “the Final Cause.”
The “Material Cause” refers to “that out of which a thing comes to be,”
for example, “the bronze of the statue, the silver of the bowl, and the
genera of which the bronze and the silver are species.” (Aristotle 1950:
194b23). In order to more easily understand the “Formal Cause,” it may
be helpful to recall, as mentioned in general above, Aristotle’s “word-
concept- thing” understanding of signification. As noted by Thomas
Aquinas (1225–1274), “Since according to [Aristotle], words are signs of
ideas, and ideas likenesses of things, evidently words refer to things signi-
fied through the medium of an intellectual conception.” (Aquinas 1920:
150/ST Ia, 13, 1). In this way, “Formal Cause” refers to “the form or the
archetype, i.e. the statement of the essence and its genera, are called
‘causes’ … and the parts of the definition.” (Aristotle 1950: 194b26).
Since the concept “human” belongs to the genus “animal” with the spe-
cific difference being “rational,” the definition of “human” would be
“rational animal,” this states the essence of the being, then, that is human.
To attempt to define “human” merely as an “animal” would be an insuf-
ficient definition, as it would merely invoke the “Material Cause,” in
terms of the genera, out of which the “human” is made. Moreover, it
would not be a good definition in that with such a concept you could not
tell the difference between cats and humans.
The “Efficient Cause” refers to “the primary source of the change or
coming to rest … and generally what makes of what is made and what
causes change of what is changed.” (Aristotle 1950: 194b30). In the
sculpture example, the sculptor is the Efficient Cause. We may even go so
far as to say that the sculptor had the idea of the shape into which the
Material would be placed, and placing the Material in that Form makes
the sculptor the Efficient Cause. Finally, the “Final Cause” refers to “the
sense of end or ‘that for the sake of which’ a thing is done, for example
health is the [Final] cause of walking about.” (Ibid: 194b34). In this way,
the “Final Cause” refers to the purpose for which the Efficient Cause put
the Material in the Form; thus, recalling the “principle of finality,” the
Final Cause stands out as the ultimate reason which unites the other
causes. Final translates the ancient Greek “telos,” and so “teleology” refers
to the study of a thing’s development toward its end.3
36 F. Scalambrino
“Distinction” invokes the ontological formula of the “principle of

identity and difference,” which may be articulated as:
Things, or objective concepts, which are the same as a third thing, or objec-
tive concept, are the same as each other [—identity]. But if one of them is
the same as a third and the other is different from that same third, these
two are different from each other [—difference]. (Wuellner 1956: 25)
There are three major types of distinction to discuss here: real, virtual,
and purely rational. There is a real distinction between two individually
existing things; that is, the table and the chairs are really distinct, and two
different chairs are really distinct. Next, consider how it is possible to
conceptually differentiate between “human” and “rational animal,” that
is, they are two different concepts; however, the distinction does not per-
tain to any real difference. Thus, though the concepts are distinct, it is a
purely rational distinction since it has no grounding in reality. Lastly, a
virtual distinction is a rational distinction, which does have some basis in
reality. Whereas there is no difference in reality between a thing and the
qualitative aspects to the material of which it is made, it is possible to
identify a conceptual difference. For example, we may talk about the dif-
ference between this chair and the wood of which it is composed; how-
ever, in reality, there is no difference between this chair and the wood of
which it is composed.
Anticipating what will be considered more fully below, when regarding
a plurality of concepts or things it is not enough to merely point out dif-
ferences among the plurality, if we hope to gain, or sustain, a systematic
understanding of the plurality. Rather, principles are needed in addition
to distinctions. Unfortunately, articles and textbooks regarding the sys-
tems in the history of Western psychology have a tendency to merely list
distinctions, as if they are merely a haphazard rhapsody of binary opposi-
tions. For instance, though not worth reproducing in its entirety here,
R. I. Watson’s list of eighteen (18) binary oppositions also appears in
James F. Brennan’s celebrated textbook History and Systems of Psychology
(2003: 133). The list includes:
“Conscious mentalism v. Unconscious mentalism; Mechanism v.
Vitalism; Determinism v. Indeterminism; Empiricism v. Rationalism;
Functionalism v. Structuralism; Monism v. Dualism; Quantitativism v.

Qualitativism,” and so on. (cf. Watson 1967: 436–437). However, by the
end of the next chapter we will have an idea of the principles by way of
which the organization of these distinctions provides for a more system-
atic understanding of the various patterns of selection exemplifying the
various systems of Western psychology.
Notes
1. I constructed both of these lists by initially inserting them as quotes; how-
ever, upon further reflection, I corrected the grammatical structure of
some of the locutions and added clarifying articulations. Therefore, I take
credit for the lists as a totality—especially insofar as they cannot be found
elsewhere in this form; however, the lists do contain partial, and at times
completely verbatim, quotes from the cited authors. Readers are encour-
aged to look at the primary sources if they would like to determine the
exact differences between my presentation of the lists here and informa-
tion presented in the cited sources.
2. At this point we need not concern ourselves with different historical
understandings of “science,” we will address the difference at a later point.
Moreover, “systematic knowledge” would be a suitable substitute for “sci-
entific knowledge” in either case.
3. Though Aristotle is, of course, credited with systematizing the Four
Causes, it is worth pointing out that they can be found already stated in
Plato’s dialog Timaeus (30a).
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2
Some Historically Based Essential
General Distinctions
2.1 What Is Psychology?

Etymologically, the word “psychology” comes from the combination of
two ancient Greek words: ψυχή and λογός, that is, transliterated as
psychē and logos, respectively. Whereas the latter term means “reason, defi-
nition, to give an account of, or study of ” (cf. Peters 1967: 110–111), the
meaning of the former term has proved more ambiguous. For the ancient
Greek philosophers, as we will see, it meant something like “life-principle”
or “force that animates.” However, it would be inaccurate to equate the
ancient Greek thinking of Plato and Aristotle, for example, with an
Eastern animism such as the kind found in Japanese Shintōism (cf.
Scalambrino 2017). At the same time, the Latinate term anima was used
to translate the Greek ψυχή, and anima is the root of the English “anima-
tion.” Hence, in the West, beings are said to have ψυχή if they can
self-animate.
Of course, following Plato’s understanding of ψυχή as divine and
immortal, the Modern translation of the Latin anima of the Christianized
Middle Ages in the West into “soul” tends to carry clear theological con-
notations, for example souls may go to Heaven or souls were created by
God, and so on. Further, many attempts have been made—especially in

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74733-0_2
46 F. Scalambrino
the Modern and Contemporary Periods—to “naturalize” ψυχή, which

means to account for ψυχή in purely natural or material terms. There
will be more to say about this as we proceed through the course of the
book; however, it is important to note that much is at stake in regard to
how ψυχή is understood. Thus, throughout history in the West there
have been many different attempts to account for the “origin” of the term
“psychology.” Of course because there may be much at stake regarding
how we understand ψυχή, we will examine some of the major candidates
for the origin of the term “psychology.” The convention of continuing to
use “ψυχή,” rather than “soul” or “psychē” has been adopted for this book
to function as a reminder to the reader of the historical depth involved in
our discussion.
During the time in the West when psychologists were particularly anx-
ious to establish their independence from philosophy, there were philoso-
phers who spoke out against the idea that psychology could be a discipline
completely separated from philosophy. For example, Herbert Feigl iden-
tified “what is perhaps the most painful philosophical embarrassment of
psychology: the definition of its very subject matter. As the well-known
saying goes: psychology first lost its soul, later its consciousness, and
seems now in danger of losing its mind altogether.” (1959: 121). Feigl’s
notion points to the progressive naturalization of the understanding of
ψυχή along the history and systems of Western psychology. It is worth
noting a contemporary emergence in the history of psychology which
directly relates to Feigl’s comment. Though he may have intended the
comment humorously, it speaks to the historical-shifts which have
occurred from system to system in regard to the ontology—that is, the
ontological principles—operable along the history of psychology.
Whereas psychologists celebrated such a shift away from philosophy, it is
as if, presently, the momentum of the slide threatens to do to “psychol-
ogy” precisely what the psychologists hoped to do to philosophy. That is
to say, “psychology” presently runs the risk of being subsumed by the
disciplines of biology and neuroscience (cf. Gazzaniga 2006; cf. Henriques
2004; cf. Kagan 2013; cf. Leonelli 2016; cf. Lilienfeld 2012; cf. Miller
2010).
Some Historically Based Essential General Distinctions 47
Of course, as our book emphasizes, thinking and theorizing are them-

selves “philosophical activities,” and it should be commonly understood
among psychologists that
what is now called the science of psychology used to be called mental phi-
losophy. As such it had to do with what many generations of philosophers
had been thinking about … This resulted in the accumulation of a mass of
data, both factual and conjectural, pertaining to the realm of the mind. It
was this heritage of mental philosophy as it had taken shape by the 1870s
and 1880s that the pioneering laboratory psychologies had at their dis-
posal. (Klein 1970: viii)
In this way, despite advances in the study of biology and neuroscience,

recalling the philosophical nature of “psychology” makes Cambridge phi-
losopher of science John Rust’s suggestion more palpable, that is: “Where
the areas of interest of the two disciplines [philosophy and psychology]
overlap, even the established psychologist frequently makes philosophical
errors which would be apparent to the first year philosophy student.”
(1987: 49). Thus, one of the aims of learning the history and systems of
Western psychology, and recalling its intimate relation to philosophy, is
for psychologists to decrease the number of such “philosophical errors.”
A number of studies have been constructed tracing the history of the
use of the term “psychology” (cf. Vidal 2011: 25–30; cf. Merz 1965:
200–201; cf. Krstic 1964; cf. Lamanna 2010; cf. Lapointe 1973). In sum,
the Middle Ages referred to the studies found in Plato and Aristotle
regarding ψυχή as the “scientia de anima,” and by the 1570s, though
apparently used once prior, and on into the Early Modern Period, the
term “psychologia,” that is, “psychology” took its place. Along the lines of
this shift from scientia de anima to psychologia a shift from study of “soul”
to study of “mind” occurred. Moreover, anticipating what will be consid-
ered more fully throughout this book, it may be said that the conflict
between whether to characterize ψυχή in terms of “natural” science or
not (cf. Dilthey 1989, 2010; cf. Ladd 1892; cf. Raue 1889; cf. Titchener
1914; cf. Wundt 2014) is as old as the apparent disagreement between
Plato and Aristotle on the issue. As we shall see, this issue has manifested
in various ways throughout the entire history of psychology in the West.
48 F. Scalambrino
When considering the history of Western psychology in general across

the fourfold historical division (similar to the characterization of philoso-
phy noted above), then, whereas the Ancient Period emphasized a con-
cern for both the structure and function of ψυχή, with the emphasis shift
toward morality and the notion that the structure of ψυχή had been
sufficiently revealed, the Middle Ages emphasized a concern more for
function than structure. Of course, though it is not possible to eliminate
one in favor of the other, it is heuristically and mnemonically valuable for
us to characterize the fourfold division in this way. Next, with the Modern
Period the emphasis shifted to concerns for the best method for examin-
ing ψυχή, and—as we will see—Kant’s discovery of the “Transcendental
Method,” had a twofold consequence for the history of psychology at the
level of characterizing its emphases in general.
On the one hand, Kant’s work is standardly considered “revolution-
ary.” That is to say, the Transcendental Method was supposed to have
ended the quest of the Modern Period to discover the best method for
examining ψυχή. Of course, what Kant’s method revealed is a systematic
unity at the heart of ψυχή. In regard to his revolution’s value for philoso-
phy we hear talk of the “architectonic” of reason. This discovery illumi-
nates Kant as a kind of “system architect,” even though it is the method
that reveals, rather than constructs, the architecture itself. On the other
hand, Kant’s revolution influenced thinking about ψυχή so much going
forward in history, that there is a sense in which all the major theorists
after him either engage in a kind of architectural design or react strongly
against such “systematizing.” In this way, again for heuristic and mne-
monic value, we may characterize twentieth-century Western psychology
in terms of its history and systems as initially attempting to operational-
ize the Transcendental Method (as it was understood by the psychologists
attempting the operationalization), and concluding with reactions against
the system-building of the architects, that is, the “Great Men” of Western
psychology. Two more points to make regarding this movement across
the historical periods.
First, the movement in the history of psychology from system-building
to reaction against system-building architects mirrors the same move-
ment which took much less time to play out in the history of Western
philosophy. That is to say, whereas German Idealism, especially Kant and
Hegel, represents a zenith of systems-building—philosophers today still

marvel at the magnitude and majesty of these “cathedrals”—
“existentialism,” referring to the philosophical ideas of Søren Kierkegaard
(1813–1855) and Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900), represents a reac-
tion against what may be characterized as the “oppressive” relation indi-
vidual existences may experience upon encountering the revelations of
such systems and system architects. Second, it becomes possible, then, to
retrospectively understand the history and systems of Western psychol-
ogy in terms of the elements with which we just characterized the four-
fold division. That is, whereas writings from the Ancient Period regarding
ψυχή certainly seem aware of some sense in which ψυχή may be charac-
terized from the perspective of many different systems and approached by
way of many different methods, competition between systems was very
much a reality, since each was attempting to articulate the truth regarding
the structure and function of ψυχή. With the dominance of the Christian
Church, then, in the Middle Ages, considering the truth of ψυχή to have
been essentially already revealed regarding structure (identity and place in
nature) and function (morality), emphasis could be shifted toward articu-
lating the place of ψυχή within a larger system.
Now, just as the system architects of the Middle Ages—Thomas
Aquinas towering above the others—constructed systems based on reve-
lation and philosophy (or “faith and reason”), the system architects of the
Modern Period constructed systems based on reason and experience. We
will discuss the reasons for this shift in more detail below; however, the
point to emphasize is that just as the Early Modern thinkers may have
considered the faith-based systems and architects “oppressive,” the
Contemporary Postmodernists and Eclectics find the systems of the
Modern Period “oppressive.” Moreover, it is heuristically and mnemoni-
cally quite valuable to recognize that this movement may be understood
in terms of movement along a spectrum from “faith and reason” based to
“reason and experience” based to “experience and anarchy” based.
Though, it is important to understand that “anarchy” here is used as a
technical term. That is, as noted above, archē comes from the ancient
Greek term for “principle,” for example as found in archeology and archi-
tecture. So, at the extreme end of “resistance” to systems and systems
50 F. Scalambrino
architects are theorists who reject a principled approach, simply in virtue

of the fact that it is a principle-approach, that is, anarchy.
In sum, then, the history of the systems of Western psychology may be
characterized as emphasizing structure, function (or both together in
terms of “development”), or neither in terms of “eclecticism.” A distinc-
tion exists between a moderate and a more extreme eclecticism, then, in
that moderate eclecticism goes by the name “theoretical integration” and
the name “unsystematic eclecticism” refers to extreme eclecticism, that is,
“anarchy” (cf. Beutler 1983; cf. Feyerabend 1983, 1987; cf. Geelan 1997
cf. Hart 1986; cf. Prochaska and DiClementi 1986). Whereas eclecticism
as “theoretical integration” falls within a kind of “pragmatism” invoking
theory merely to secure the best fit available presently “between the inter-
vention, the patient, the problem, and the setting” (Murray 1986: 414),
“unsystematic eclecticism” often uses justifications from outside of the
discipline in the attempt to alter theorizing internal to the discipline. For
example, individuals without degrees in engineering are usually not cho-
sen to engineer rollercoasters; however, if one were to see this as unfair or
an example of the “tyranny of engineering,” then one might advocate for
non-engineers to engineer roller coasters. Of course, this book’s emphasis
on choices and commitment in the design of theories and systems for
psychology stands by the suggestion that, though psychologists may be
ignorant of the principles involved in their thinking and acting, it is not
possible to avoid principles. For example, it is a principle of anarchy to
not adhere to principles.
Thus, for the sake of organization across the chapters of this book we
will adhere to the following general division regarding the principles of
the history and systems of Western psychology: (a) principles related to
the study of ψυχή in isolation; (b) principles related to the study of ψυχή
not in isolation; (c) principles related to the appropriate way to study
ψυχή. This general division may be characterized in terms of (a) the
structure of ψυχή—which includes the tripartite “Orthodox” Western
characterization and the various historically based shifts in emphases
regarding structural-primacy, (b) the functions of ψυχή—which includes
relations to environment (behavior) and relations within communities
(social), action performance, and speech, and (c) methodological issues
in psychology—which includes the various historically based concerns
regarding causality and the conflict between psychology as a natural or a

human science. Organizing the various historically based expressions and
emphases of principles in terms of this general division should provide
greater overall coherence for readers.
2.2 H
ermeneutic Distinctions: On Naming
and Reading
The purpose of this section is regulative. In other words, we will examine
a number of distinctions here which will help readers navigate the remain-
ing discussion in this book. Thus, this is not intended to be an exhaustive
discussion of “hermeneutics.” Moreover, this excursion into “hermeneu-
tic distinctions,” namely distinctions helpful for interpreting some of the
worldview-shifts in the history of Western psychology, is not necessarily
a pre-judgement in favor of understanding psychology as a “human sci-
ence.” Rather, these “hermeneutic distinctions” are directed at the philo-
sophical and historical characterizations of the worldview-shifts.
Addressing the relation between word, thing, and concept, directly—
though not exhaustively—this section will provide clarification relevant
for understanding later discussions of the functions of ψυχή and the vari-
ous historically based systems which rely upon hermeneutics-related dis-
tinctions for differentiation from other systems. The distinctions to be
discussed include: (a) Aristotle on “naming,” (b) definition, (c) truth, (d)
the relation between science and methodology, and (e) styles of reading
and historiography. Again, anticipating what will be considered more
fully below, a brief explication of these distinctions here will be helpful;
for example, much resistance—rooted primarily in Postmodernism—
may be conjured up in Contemporary Period theorists upon reading the
word “essential.” In addition, then, to clarifying this book’s use of the
term “essential,” this section will also provide the groundwork from
which readers may appreciate multiple historically based conflicts across
approaches, theories, and systems of Western psychology.
Aristotle began his work titled (The) Categories by noting: “When
things have only a name in common and the definition of being which
corresponds to the name is different, they are called homonymous. Thus,
52 F. Scalambrino
for example, both a man and a picture are animals.” (1956: 1a1–3). He
contrasts this term with synonymous and paronymous; however, before dis-
cussing their differences, consider the reference to “a picture.” By recog-
nizing that “a picture” is an image of the thing, we may see even more
relevance here for psychology; that is, both the image of the sandwich
“in” ψυχή and the edible thing composed of bread “outside” ψυχή may
be signified by the term “sandwich.” However, only one of those “sand-
wiches” has nutritional content. Therefore, for Aristotle, whereas the one
is imaginary, the other is real. In this way it is clear that though someone
may suggest that “meaning slides” as an articulation of the homonymous
nature of terms, Aristotle would not accept such a characterization. Why?
Because Aristotle may be called a kind of “essentialist.”
In general, “essentialism” is simply the position that there are at least
some things that have essential properties. The key to understanding
essence, according to Aristotle, hinges on how “definition” functions. In
a similar structure to the above quote, Aristotle explained, “When things
have the name in common and the definition of being which corresponds
to the name is the same, they are called synonymous.” (1956: 1a5–7).
Notice his phrase “definition of being.” Volumes could be written on this
topic; thus, we will just state the idea here as directly as possible. The
Scholastic philosophers of the Middle Ages referred to Aristotle’s charac-
terization of naming in the following way: “equivocity” for homonymous;
“univocity” for synonymous; “denominative” for paronymous. When dif-
ferent uses of the same term are said to be “equivocal” it means that,
despite being the same word, the uses have different meanings: (dog)
bark and (tree) bark; (financial) bank and (river) bank, and so on. In this
way, the fact that the same terms, that is, arrangement of letters, appear
in different uses is merely “accidental,” and not “essential,” to the differ-
ent meanings. Paronymous terms—usually verbs—are called “denomina-
tive” because they are terms derived from nouns or adjectives. For
example, “I see you eyeing my sandwich.” “Eyeing” here (and its variant
“eye ballin”) is a verb derived from a noun (eye ball). However, it is uni-
vocity which interests us most here.
We need one more distinction, then, and by combining it with uni-
vocity, we can think through the way Aristotle envisioned “essence.” The
next distinction is between, on the one hand, that which is re-presented
by being signified by a name and, on the other hand, the name in per-
forming the signification. Aristotle cross-references two distinction, that
is: the difference between “said of ” and “not said of ” and the difference
between “present in” and “not present in.” Thus, we arrive at a fourfold
distinction: (1) “said of ” and “not in”; (2) “in” and “not said of ”; (3) “said
of ” and “in”; (4) “not said of ” and “not in.” (Aristotle 1956a: 1a20–1b5).
In regard to the first, according to standard explications, we say “Socrates
is a man.” Whereas “man” is “said of ” Socrates, “man” is not “in” Socrates.
To believe that “man” were in Socrates would be to believe that every
other “man” is—at least in part—Socrates. Of course, that is not the case.
Aristotle’s second example (2) is “knowledge.” We say “knowledge is “in”
Socrates, but we do not say that Socrates is knowledge.
Aristotle’s third example may be a little tricky to understand, given the
second example. (3) Aristotle’s example is about the term “subject.” Thus,
in regard to “a subject,” we say “knowledge is in a subject, the soul, and is
also of a subject,” for example “grammar.” Notice—this is quite impor-
tant—if it were not for Aristotle’s “word-concept-thing” understanding
of signification, then Aristotle would consider these two uses of “subject”
to be homonymous; however, given his understanding of signification,
the “subject” is always already, first and foremost, a subject of predication
in the process of signification. Finally, (4) Aristotle’s last example is about
the indexical “this,” that is, the “concrete particular” man or horse that we
call “Socrates” or “Bucephalus,” respectively. This last example led
Scholastic philosophers to make a distinction between “the this” and “the
what” or the “thisness” and the “whatness” of a being. Moreover, it is “the
what” that indicates the essence of the being in question, and it is “the
what” that is used in the being’s definition.
Notice, then, in regard to Aristotle’s first cross-reference of distinctions
(1) that “man” is “said of ” Socrates but not “in” Socrates reveals that the
word “man” points to a universal concept. Further, this concept can func-
tion like a kind of category in regard to reality. For example, “man” may
be “said of ” Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and Alexander “the Great” univo-
cally. What is more, there seems to be—Aristotle apparently believed—a
hierarchy among such universals, for example universal concepts. That is
to say, notice that “animal” may also be said univocally in reference to
Socrates, Plato, and so on; however, using the term “animal” also applies
54 F. Scalambrino
to cats and dogs. Hence, Aristotle reasoned that even though “animal”
accurately and univocally refers to the beings called “Socrates” and
“Plato,” the term is not specific enough to indicate what the category to
which Socrates and Plato belong essentially is. In this way, Aristotle
deemed the universal concept “animal” to be the “genus” (i.e. in general,
generic, genre) and the “specific difference” between Socrates and cats
and dogs to be “rationality.” As a result, “rational animal” characterizes a
kind of natural category in terms of univocity and universality.
Finally, given all this terminology, we may say that “the whatness”—
the category of what—to which Socrates and Plato belong indicates their
essence. Of all that may be said of Socrates and Plato, for example that
they enjoyed sandwiches or liked to dress in togas, they are essentially
rational animals—what a human or “man” is is a rational animal. Recalling
the previous paragraph; therefore, the definition of “man” is the logical
(because we are still involved in Aristotle’s “word-concept-thing” under-
standing of signification) genus combined with the specific difference. As
a result, Aristotle uses definition to indicate a thing’s essential nature (cf.
Aristotle 1967: 141b24; cf. Aristotle 1964: 100a1–b3), and in this way,
of course, definitions constitute the foundations of scientific knowledge
for Aristotle (cf. Deslauriers 2007: 15). Aristotle contrasts “accidental”
with “essential.” It is merely accidental that Socrates wore one toga instead
of another or had a certain length of beard. Hence, if we are to have sci-
entific knowledge, it must be about what is essential not what is acciden-
tal (cf. Aristotle 1984: 1026b22–24).
In other words, suppose we want to have a science which studies
plumbing. We might set out to study the kinds of actions that plumbers
perform. However, we would not be interested in studying all of the
actions that plumbers perform, lest we would need to consider such
activities as: in what direction is a plumber’s head pointed when the
plumber sleeps at night; how much mayonnaise do plumbers put on
sandwiches, and so on. Yet, notice, even though we may say that those
activities are activities performed by plumbers, those activities are not
essential to plumbing. Whereas we might attempt an objection here by
suggesting psychology needs to study all aspects of an individual—includ-
ing the accidental aspects of that individual, notice that, on the one hand,
there can be no science of an individual, in that the individual is not a
universal, and, on the other hand, psychology is the science or study of

ψυχή, not some one particular person only. Thus, whatever will be the
definition of ψυχή, it must be meant univocally and understood as
applying universally to all instances of ψυχή. “For the definition of
[ψυχή] ought to be true of every [ψυχή].” (Aristotle 1967: 139a26–27).
The above covers parts (a) and (b) of this section. What remains are: (c)
truth, (d) the relation between science and methodology, and (e) styles of
reading and historiography. Thus, the following distinctions regarding
truth will be helpful for us, not only because they provide clarification
regarding important vocabulary terms. The following distinctions may be
considered “standard” in Western philosophy regarding how a claim may
be understood as true (cf. Papineau 2012: 45–50; cf. Puntel 2001). The
truth of claims may be divided into “semantic,” “epistemological,” and
“ontological” truths. The distinction regarding “semantic” truths is “ana-
lytic” as opposed to “synthetic” truths. As a perennial example has it, we
can know that the claim “All unmarried men are bachelors” is true, merely
by knowing the meaning of all the words involved in the claim. That type
of truth is “analytic” truth. In regard to the claim “The majority of the
people in the building you are currently in are bachelors,” it is not clear
merely from the words used in the claim whether it is true or false; rather,
we would need to check the facts of the situation.
The distinction operable in regard to “epistemological” truth is between
a priori and a posteriori. Though at times this distinction may sound a
good deal like the “semantic” distinction, this distinction is between
kinds of knowledge; yet, at the same time, there may be some overlap,
since we are talking about truth claims, that is, meaningful statements,
one must be able to understand the meaning of the claim. A classic exam-
ple, then, shows that so long as we understand the meaning of the term
“triangle,” then we can have a priori knowledge that the next triangle we
encounter will have three sides. An example of an a posteriori claim would
be “Cats like to eat mayonnaise.” In order for us to know whether that
claim is true, we would have to perform observations. Notice, then, the
semantic distinction is analogous with the epistemological distinction;
yet, at the same time, the former is about the meaning of words, and the
latter is about having knowledge.
56 F. Scalambrino
The distinction operable in regard to “ontological” truth claims is

between “necessary” and “contingent” truth. Now, this distinction can be
even trickier depending on how we conceive of “chance,” or whether we
believe in “free choice.” Supposing we believe in chance and free choice,
then we may say that necessary truths are truths that could not have been
otherwise, and contingent truths are truths that could have been other-
wise. We will think about these distinctions a good deal more; however,
at this point, it will be enough to note that “ontological” truth claims
refer to beings or the nature of events and things. Thus, there are what
may seem trivially true examples, that is, “If an animal-body is not alive,
then it is dead.” The point is not so much about the meaning of the words
or our knowledge as it is about the necessity of being. That is, necessarily,
some natural thing is either alive or dead.
Combining the distinctions regarding naming and definition along
with those regarding truth, we may now describe the distinctions regard-
ing science and methodology. To begin, when we know that we are deal-
ing with a system, we need to know how the system is to be understood.
That is, are we dealing with an atomistic or holistic system? In regard to
the former, all of the parts come together to form the whole. In regard to
the latter, the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. Many philosophi-
cal puzzles emerge regarding the being of the whole—if in fact it is greater
than the sum of its parts; however, for our purpose at this point, we
merely want to notice how to think through such a characterization of a
system. An example from Aristotle’s Metaphysics should suffice.
According to Aristotle, imagine having all of the materials needed to
construct a house. Suppose the material to be merely laying in a heap. We
may even go so far as to think that every part of the house is already fash-
ioned to specification, so long as we think of all the fashioned parts as
merely being in a pile or heap. Now, Aristotle points out (1) those parts
make up a whole heap; (2) the parts of the heap could be exhaustively
fashioned, that is, without any parts left over to make something other
than a house; (3) when the parts of the heap are re-organized such that
those same parts go from being a heap to being a house, then at the
moment the heap becomes a house, the house may be understood as
more than the heap, that is, the sum of the parts (cf. Aristotle 1984:
1041b5). Just how relevant this distinction is for thinking through
sychology may be surprising. Ultimately, it seems the principle of how

p
to understand the constitution of the system under examination—
whether it be atomistic or holistic—has a reciprocal relationship with the
methodology one uses to examine the system. That is to say, one selects a
method for examining organic wholes, when one believes there are
organic wholes—greater than the sum of their parts—to be examined,
and one selects a method for examining uni-dimensionally analyzable
wholes, when one believes the system to be examined is exhaustively rep-
resented by its parts.
In regard to the history of Western psychology, as we shall see, to gen-
eralize approaches to the question of how to methodically study ψυχή,
we need both the distinction between natural and human sciences and
atomistic and holistic systems. If we are following Aristotle’s essentialism,
we may think that science investigates naturally occurring kinds, and
therefore, if there is to be a science of ψυχή, then we will need to approach
it in terms of it universal and univocally identifiable parts. Yet, we would
need to further clarify how the parts should be understood as relating to
the whole. For example, ψυχή itself may even be understood as a part of
a greater whole. In contradistinction to the universality and univocal
identifiability as criteria, a more “human science” approach may treat the
categories to be examined as more of a “social construction” (cf. Daniel
1986). Such an approach would place more emphasis on the historicity
of the parts of a system and the historicity of the principles involved in
the organization of the parts of a system. Yet, again, further clarification
would be needed regarding whether the system in question were under-
stood as atomistic or holistic.
Given that some may understand Aristotle’s essentialism as having a
kind of a priori necessity, that is, epistemological and ontological truth to
it, how may there even be room for a more “human science” reading of
the relation between word, concept, and thing? The answer involves how
concepts are understood to be “universal.” On the one hand, the context
of this question is called “the problem of universals,” and, again, much
could be said about the problem. On the other hand, a brief characteriza-
tion of different readings of “universals” is sufficient for the purpose of
this book. For we are not attempting to solve the problem in as much as
we want to be acquainted with the different possible answers to use as so
58 F. Scalambrino
many different characterizations when thinking through the history and

systems of Western psychology. In other words, we can understand the
philosophical principles involved in the various ways the different under-
standings of universals are characterized without attempting to solve the
philosophical problem which would eliminate all but one
characterization.
The possible positions are: “Platonic Realism,” “Moderate Realism,”
“Conceptualism,” and “Nominalism.” Basically, Platonic Realism takes
universals to be things themselves. That is, a category of material things
may be understood as a real non-material thing, or as an idea that does
not depend on human minds for its reality. Moderate Realism takes uni-
versals to be real, but only in relation to the actual things which fit into
the universal category. That is to say, there is no Platonic heaven in which
we find the “universal triangle,” but rather individual triangles whose
presence makes the univocal name “triangle” refer to something real.
Conceptualism holds that the universals are concepts in minds, and
though we may be able to use these concepts to “pick out” things external
to minds, such ability does not mean that the universals are real outside
the mind. Nominalism takes universals to be merely names; that is, they
only have a “vocal,” so to speak, reality, and that “reality” may be merely
conventional. Thus, notice Realism, Conceptualism, and Nominalism
places emphasis on thing, concept, and word, respectively.
Finally, in regard to the relation between science and methodology,
these possible positions function like principles. For example, the differ-
ence between “description” and “explanation” indicates a perennial dis-
tinction regarding science and methodology. Staying with our
philosophical distinction between things, concepts, and words, a “descrip-
tion” refers to the use of words to describe some thing (or event), and an
“explanation” refers to a special kind of description; that is, one that
accounts for things or events in terms of essences or causes. This means
an explanation is a description in univocal terms regarding the universal
aspects of things involved in some event (or state of affairs). “Causation,”
then, is considered a part of an explanation because it refers to a charac-
terization of relations between the universal aspects involved. Thus, we are
said to “solve” a problem when we provide an “explanation” in regard to
the descriptions found in a problem. Yet, as we will see below, the closing
of the Early Modern Period involved David Hume’s (1711–1776) infa-

mous skepticism regarding causation, and in many ways, we still feel the
ripples from Hume’s skepticism in the Contemporary Period.
One way to paraphrase the results of Hume’s skepticism regarding cau-
sation is in regard to the oft quoted: “Correlation does not imply causa-
tion,” or even better, “Correlation does not necessarily mean causation.”
We may characterize the movement forward in history regarding this
skepticism as a movement from “Correlation does not necessarily mean
causation” to “There may be no such thing as causation” or “Causation is
not real” (emphases for the sake of referring to previously discussed dis-
tinctions). The results may also be paraphrased in terms of “description”
and “explanation”—basically (think Aristotle’s Four Causes here)
exchange “explanation” for “cause.” That is, “There is no such thing as
explanation,” or “Explanation is not real.” Notice, then, if explanation is
a special kind of description, which turns out to be illusory, then we
are—as one standard Contemporary narrative has it—left only with
descriptions and descriptions of descriptions. Hence, these distinctions—
between description and explanation—are essential for thinking through
the history of psychology, and we will discuss them throughout the rest
of the book. For now, a note regarding methodology is in order.
One standard Contemporary approach to the methodological dimen-
sion of psychology attempts to undermine explanation, and, thereby, a
natural science methodology in the study of ψυχή—despite, or precisely
because of, its association with the “scientific method.” Thus, the distinc-
tion between description and explanation points directly to the distinc-
tion between psychology as a “human science” and psychology as a
“natural science.” Recall Dilthey’s—in no uncertain terms—suggestion
that:
Psychology can be a foundational human science only if it stays within the

limits of a descriptive discipline that establishes facts and uniformities
among facts. It must clearly distinguish itself from explanative psychology,
which strives to derive the whole human, cultural world by means of cer-
tain assumptions. (Dilthey 1989: 84)
60 F. Scalambrino
Of course, these “certain assumptions” are those discussed above regard-

ing universal specification of things. It is in this way that distinctions may
be understood as “hermeneutic” in that they refer to different ways of
describing or “interpreting,” as opposed to a process of essential specifica-
tion. In regard then to this essential tension between description and
explanation, “interpretation” becomes a principle in the study of ψυχή.
As we will see, this principle can be pushed to the extreme of questioning
that there are any things at all or, at least, that there can be no real differ-
ence between the identity of a thing and the concepts and words used to
describe it (cf. Berger and Luckmann 1966; cf. Fleck 1979; Gergen
1985).
The historical period associated with such an extreme understanding
of the principle is, of course, called “Postmodernism.” One way to describe
“Postmodernism” would be to note the manner in which proponents of
Postmodernism identify standard narratives—such as those found in the
study of ψυχή—and call the formation of such narratives into question,
often suggesting alternative narratives, since no narrative can be a “best
explanation” of reality. One way this is accomplished is by highlighting
various “styles” of interpreting or “reading” reality. This makes sense, of
course, because—as the story goes—we do not have “reality” so much as
we have words, such as the word “reality.” Just as above we noted, then,
that explanation leads to the “solution” of problems, description without
explanation is said to lead to “dissolution.” The idea being that the prob-
lem itself is merely present due to a nexus of description or interpreta-
tion—the “bewitchment of language.” It is thought, then, that a
re-description may result in the problem’s being “dissolved” back into
mere words. Thus, two more “hermeneutics-related” distinctions will suf-
fice for now: the distinction between hermeneutics and deconstruction
and distinctions regarding different styles of reading.
The distinction between hermeneutics and deconstruction may be
understood by recalling that “hermeneutics” points to the study of differ-
ent ways of describing or “interpreting” things, as opposed to a process of
essential specification. “Deconstruction,” then, points to the fact that
whatever interpretation is presently accepted, it will eventually be re-
described or “interpreted-away,” so to speak. It is as if, were hermeneutics
a snapshot of description change, deconstruction would be a—seemingly
perpetual—time-lapse image of description change. In this way, both

hermeneutics and deconstruction fall on the description over explanation
side of the debate, and both participate in the “human science” reading
of ψυχή. What is more, deconstruction—despite being associated with
Postmodernism—is actually the way out of Postmodernism. That is to
say, whereas Postmodernists may justify the re-structuring of knowledge
and power systems based on the idea that the structure is not grounded
in an essential explanation, deconstruction reveals that whatever new
structure takes the place of the old structure, the new structure will itself
not be grounded in an essential distinction. Thus, despite “being in the
same camp,” so to speak, regarding psychology as a science and descrip-
tion over explanation, Postmodernists tend to not like the deconstruc-
tionist “gadfly” who undermines what may be seen as a Postmodern
political agenda. This distinction emerges as essential for contemporary
psychology, as we will discuss below; however, it is beneficial to briefly
explicate it here, so as to show an awareness of the distinction and related
issues as we move through the historically based principles in subsequent
chapters.
In conclusion, we will discuss “styles of reading.” This discussion points
back to the Introduction’s discussion of historiography in that historiog-
raphy may be understood as a “writing” that involves the interpretation
and “reading” of the past. We may identify “three modes of reading” and
“four styles of writing history.” In regard to the former:
there are three modes of reading: (1) reading aloud, (2) ‘phonic’ reading,
where, as in thinking, the sounds of what is read remain in the mind, and
(3) normal ‘efficient’ rapid reading, where the sense ‘eliminates’ the sound.
Poetry (and usually drama) always requires phonic reading. The translator,
at least, has to be ready to switch (switching the sound on) to phonic read-
ing when faced with conversation in the texts and rhetorical writing such
as poetry and drama. (Newmark 1998: 1; cf. Vlieghe 2016)
Notice that “switching the sound on” regarding words reveals a different
way to “read” and interpret the meaning of the words. Further, whereas
“reading aloud” invokes a performative “reading” of the words, “efficient”
or “normal” reading performs a type of selection (i.e. “turning off the
62 F. Scalambrino
sound”). Highlighting the “selection” or “interpretation” taking place is

important because the meaning of what is read is ultimately founded
upon the groundwork laid by such interpretation. In this way, a
Postmodern strategy for approaching natural science and essential speci-
fication is to emphasize the importance of what is “marginalized” or
“excluded” before “natural science” even begins its interpretations.
On the one hand, the Postmodern strategy may be read as a critical
description of the scientific hypothetico-deductive method itself. On the
other hand, the method of natural science “makes things that work,” and
one engineer reading the instructions provided from another probably
does not care to have illustrations and comments regarding the facial
expressions or voice inflections from the engineer(s) producing the
instructions. Yet, and this becomes an interesting peculiarity involved in
the study of ψυχή, is it the case that “theatrics” and “performance” influ-
ence the results? To draw an analogy that might infuriate some “natural
scientists” (cf. Sokal 1996; cf. Sokal and Bricmont 1998), is the principle
of superposition or something like wave-particle duality (cf. Schrödinger
1926) operative in the study of ψυχή (cf. Chapman and Chapman 1982;
cf. Schwartz et al. 2005; cf. Bruza et al. 2015)?
Finally, the history and systems of psychology is itself not immune to
such criticism. Consider the following way to systematize (or “write”) the
history of psychology: (a) Canon-formation, (b) Doxography, (c) Rational
Reconstruction, and (d) Historical Reconstruction. Whereas Doxography
is thought to perform the most “interpretive violence” to the historicity
of past thinkers, texts and systems, Historical Reconstruction is thought
to perform the least “interpretive violence.” However, recalling our dis-
cussion of Presentism and Historicism above, it will always be possible for
someone to advance the critical claim that Historical Reconstruction is
too interpretation-based and temporally displaced to be non-Presentist
enough. Such a tension will always be a part of Canon-formation.
“Canon-formation” refers not only to the practice of determining what
readings are to be considered legitimate to study within a discipline, but
it also involves determining which styles of interpretation are deemed
appropriate to bring to the readings. For example, it is nearly impossible
to find a textbook for the History and Systems of Psychology today which
includes a chapter on “demonic possession.” Thus, Canon-formation
functions at the level of disciplines analogous to the way “natural science”

selects what will count as an object to be studied.
“Doxography” refers to “awkward attempts to make a new question fit
an old canon” (Rorty 1984: 62). This would be like using history to
inquire into Aristotle’s theory of “neural backpropagation.” Doxography
is, therefore, the style of interpreting the past which most often receives
the criticism of “anachronism.” In attempting to frame the history of
psychology in terms of progress, some History and Systems textbooks,
despite projecting a rational or historical reconstruction, lapse into
Doxography (cf. Baydala and Smythe 2012). What seem to be among the
greatest criticisms of Doxography are that, one, such textbooks include
large amounts of information, and sometimes it seems as though the only
relevance is that the information pertains to the historical period in ques-
tion; two, by definition, Doxography does not attempt to articulate the
historicity of the topics or artifacts under discussion. Rational reconstruc-
tion, in contrast, may or may not attempt to articulate the historicity
involved. Rational reconstruction involves using history to help expand
our own present viewpoint. This was praised above as a value of learning
history.
Lastly, whereas rational reconstruction is “pragmatic” and possibly
“philosophical,” historical reconstruction may be “original,” “pragmatic,”
or “philosophical.” Historical reconstruction seeks to abide by the prin-
ciple that, as “Intellectual Historian” Quentin Skinner states it: “No
agent can eventually be said to have meant or done something which he
could never be brought to accept as a correct description of what he had
meant or done [emphasis added].” (Skinner 1969: 60; quoted in Rorty
1984: 50). In a self-critical note, then, we may say that in the writing of
this book we are actively avoiding Doxography, and showing how to be
critical of Canon-formation—while essentially following along the path
of figures, texts, and topics considered Canonical in the West, as we oscil-
late between rational and historical reconstruction. This is, on the one
hand, an admission of the inevitability of the Presentism of our view-
point, while, on the other hand, an admission of a deep commitment to
the affirmation of the historicity of psychology’s subject matter, for exam-
ple, even literally at the level of writing “ψυχή” as a reminder that those
who study “neural backpropagation” are in solidarity with the concerns
and commitments of Aristotle, among others.
64 F. Scalambrino
2.3 Principles from the Philosophy

of Psychology Necessary for Thinking
Through the History & Systems
of Psychology
The general principles under discussion in this section provide a philo-
sophical vocabulary with which to think through the different worldview-
shifts in the history of Western psychology. They may be divided into
general principles of: (a) Ontology, (b) Ontological Priority, and (c)
Agency, or the question of the “freedom of the will.” Due to the historic-
ity of the principles related to “Theory of Knowledge,” or “Epistemology”
and “Criteriology,” their discussion, which continues here from Sects. 1.4
and 2.2 above is distributed across the historical periods as the third cat-
egory of principles discussed in Chaps. 3, 4, and 5 below.
“Ontology” refers to the study of be-ing., or, more precisely, “ontol-
ogy” refers to the study of the be-ing of beings. The convention of writing
“being” with a hyphen emphasizes the term’s use as the participle of the
verb “to be,” as opposed to a noun (cf. Wilhelmsen 1956: 59). Thus, if we
were to count the beings in the room, each person in the room would
count as a being; however, in order to signify the activity of being that
person, so as to examine the activity, we emphasize the “ing” by writing
“be-ing.” In this way, we can think about the difference in be-ing of the
different beings in the room, with less confusion.
So, on the one hand, when we ask: What is ψυχή? We are engaging in
ontology. Volumes could be written on “ontology” and “The History of
Ontology,” so we will be purposefully succinct here, and in keeping with
our discussion of “things, concepts, and words,” notice how all three of
them can be seen from the standpoint of ontology. Whereas philosophy
of language or linguistics may be the proper domain for “words” and
logic for “concepts,” to ontology—it would seem at first—only the study
of “things” belongs. However, ontology should be considered the most
general and fundamental of all branches of philosophy in that if what we
set out to study is at all, then ontology encompasses it. In other words,
“concepts” have the kind of be-ing specific to them, for example we may
say their be-ing is “mental” or that they are “mental” beings. Likewise, of
words we may say their be-ing is “verbal” or “written,” or, more generally,
we could engage in an examination of the be-ing of signs, etc. Thus, the
point emphasized here is that “ontology” should be considered the most
general and fundamental of the branches of philosophy and that no(-)
thing that we discuss in psychology can possibly escape its viewpoint. Of
course, that is because if what we are talking about is any(-)thing at all,
then, we can study its be-ing.
Since technically “ontology” names a genus and the “ontology of psy-
chology” a species of general ontology, in order to be clear we will start
with be-ing in general. As Paul J. Glenn (1893–1957) rightly noted,
“Ontology is a science. That is to say, it is a body of doctrine, set forth in
a manner that is systematic, logical, and complete, and it presents reasons
to justify its data and to evidence its conclusions.” (Glenn 1939: 3). One
way to ask a first question, then, in regard to be-ing in general may be:
How many different kinds of be-ing are there? For our purpose, the pos-
sible answers to this question are: One, Two, or Unknown. Further, the
traditional possible characterizations of this enumeration are: Material,
Non-Material (Mental or Spiritual), or Unknown. Thus, if someone takes
a “monist” position, they believe there is only one kind of be-ing, and the
next question we would ask is how they characterize that kind of be-ing.
Of course, “materialism” tends to refer to a monist ontology in which all
be-ing is characterized as material. When someone takes a “dualist” posi-
tion, they believe there are two different kinds of be-ing, and the next
question we would ask is how they characterize the relationship between
these two different kinds of being—ultimately material and
non-material.
Dualist ontology in regard to psychology is almost always depicted in
terms of Descartes’ infamous “mind-body” problem. Thus, the be-ing of
the body is said to be material and the be-ing of the mind to be non-
material. That some of the content of experience comes from the body
and some from the mind characterizes a “problem of heterogeneity.” That
is to say, ultimately, how are we to account for the combination of two
ontologically different be-ings? Dualists inevitably seem to privilege one
of the kinds of be-ing over the other kind. In either case, we will examine
the relationship between the different types of be-ing in terms of onto-
logical priority. That is, the different ways to characterize the relationship
66 F. Scalambrino
between mind and matter or non-material and material give priority to

one of the types of be-ing. What is more, the “problem of heterogeneity”
persists for theorizing in psychology even if our dualism is only a “prop-
erty dualism.”
Recalling Aristotle’s distinction between “essential” and “accidental,”
general ontology analogously differentiates between “substances” and
“properties.” In other words, just as we can make various changes to
beings without changing the being essentially, so too we can understand
non-essential property changes as changes to the properties of a thing,
rather than changes to the thing’s substance. For example, when a sitting
Socrates stands up and dances or changes clothes, it is accurate to say that
he has, in some way, changed; however, the change is not a “substantial
change.” A substantial change (think about “essence” and “species” from
the discussion above) would be for him to change into a cat or, according
to Aristotle, to die.
The distinction, then, between substance and property allows for dif-
ferent ways of relating, articulating, and responding to the “problem of
heterogeneity.” For example, it is possible for a theorist to recognize that
there seem to be non-material be-ings, despite the theorist’s commitment
to only thinking of material as substantial. Thus, it is possible to be a
“substance monist” and a “property dualist” simultaneously. In fact, this
is one potential solution to the mind-body problem in that it denies het-
erogeneity. That is, the be-ing of the body has an experience and the
properties of that experience which the body expresses are both material
and non-material, for example sensations and thoughts. The important
point here is that be-ing can be differentiated in terms of priority—sub-
stances are prior to their properties. Socrates must be before he can be
dancing, and when he stops dancing he does not stop be-ing.
Now, because it is not always the case that substance is understood in
terms of matter, Aristotle provided us with a standard vocabulary with
which we can discuss substances, even if we cannot see or touch them.
The term is “substratum” and its variant “substrate.” Thus, we can speak
of a substrate persisting “beneath” property changes. This is one of the
ways philosophers argue that you are still the same person as you were
when you were an infant—certainly you have changed since then; the
idea is some substratum has persisted through all of the change between
then and now. In order to avoid equivocation it is helpful to use “sub-

strate” instead of “subject.” The latter term refers to the subject in a predi-
cation. Again, ontological priority will help provide the principles with
which to think through the special ontology of psychology. However,
before proceeding to a discussion of ontological priority, we should dis-
cuss some standard ontological terms used to characterize dualistic rela-
tions in regard to properties and two principles of the special ontology of
psychology: qualia and propositional attitudes.
We often find the following terms used to characterize dualistic rela-
tions: “Representation,” “Reduction,” “Elimination,” “Supervenience,”
“Emergence,” and “Epiphenomenal.” The term “Representation” is used
to characterize the sense in which one property is said to represent
another. For example, the imagination is supposed to produce an image
which represents some external body, for example a sandwich. In this way
we could say imagination re-presents some(-)thing which is physical in a
non-physical way. “Representation,” then, is often used as the genus, or
generic term, to cover all the ways in which ψυχή re-presents what it is
originally external to it. In this way, a sensation, a perception, a fantasy
image, a concept, and an idea, for example, may all be understood as dif-
ferent specifications, or types, of representation.
The term “Reduction” refers to reducing some theory to a different
theory or the existence of some being to a different being. Thus, simply
put, if there are two theories, say physics and psychology, and it turns out
that all of the laws and theories of psychology can be explained by the
laws and theories of physics, but not the other way around, then psychol-
ogy could be “reduced” to physics. In terms of beings, perhaps the easiest
example would be illusions. When we experience a “magic trick” for the
first time we may not be able to adequately explain what happened, and
when asked to do so we may produce all sorts of fantastic suppositions;
however, when we hear an adequate explanation, for example, there were
two ladies in the box and the magician cut the box between them, then
those fantastic suppositions are reduced to the actuality of the situation.
Similarly, in terms of mind-body dualism, some psychologists believe
mental properties reduce to the physical properties of the body, and theo-
ries invoking mental beings ultimately reduce to theories involving non-
mental beings.
68 F. Scalambrino
Reduction plays an important role for thinking in psychology. As will

be discussed below, physics and interaction between physical beings is
often characterized as “mechanistic” and “deterministic.” This means, of
course, that given certain conditions, the behavior of physical systems
seems to be quite predictable. Such is one of the benefits of understand-
ing psychology as a natural science, that is the predictability and control
associated with natural scientific experiments. In fact, this is so much so
the case that some theorists—such as proponents of “Radical Empiricism”
or “Positivism”—go so far as to suggest there may be little need to answer
the ontological question, namely, what is ψυχή? However, when we ask
the ontological question, as noted above, it can be answered in material
or non-material, that is, physical or non-physical, terms. When emphasis
is placed on physical description or explanation, then reduction may be
the strategy used to limit the beings under discussion to those which can
be accounted for mechanistically or deterministically.
The distinction at work here then is between “integrated” and “organ-
ismic” wholes. Whereas the natural science perspective tends to think of
systems in atomistic terms, the human science perspective tends to think
of ψυχή as a gestalt, that is, a whole that is greater than the sum of its
parts. Thus, standardly, the parts may be “integrated” into a whole and
the whole may be reduced to its parts from a natural scientific perspec-
tive. However, from a human science perspective, though integration is
important, the essential feature of ψυχή and the beings studied by psy-
chology may, in fact, be their ir-reducible nature. In fact, many theorists
regarding ψυχή today seem to have accepted that there are some non-
physical aspects or properties to the human psychological experience
which cannot be reduced. Those aspects go under the name “qualia.”
After a brief word about them, we will conclude this discussion of
reduction.
Though Charles S. Peirce (1839–1914) is often credited with first
using the term in a way that points toward its present meaning (cf. Peirce
1982), C.I. (Clarence Irving) Lewis (1883–1964) is credited with
solidifying the meaning of the term “qualia” to refer to the aspects of
sensory experience which are non-material and purely subjective, such as
each individual’s experience of the color red or the scent of a rose.
There are recognizable qualitative characters of the given [in an experi-

ence], which may be repeated in different experiences, and are thus a sort
of universals; I call these “qualia.” But although such qualia are universals,
in the sense of being recognized from one to another experience, they must
be distinguished from the properties of objects. Confusion of these two is
characteristic of many historical conceptions, as well as of current essence-
theories. The quale is directly intuited, given, and is not the subject of any
possible error because it is purely subjective [emphasis added]. The property
of an object is objective. (1991: 121)
Lewis clarifies that by “universals” he does not mean the “‘universals’ of

logic, which we discussed above.” (Ibid: 61). Lewis was also concerned to
note that qualia “have no names.” (Ibid). That is to say, the particular
visual sense-data of an individual’s experience of the color red—the “what
it is like” for you when you see the color red—is too subjective to be dif-
ferentiated from others and thereby named; yet, so long as the color can
be seen, then sensory experiences universally have such qualities, though
the experience of the quality may be different for each individual (cf.
Nagel 1974; cf. Levine 1983; cf. Jackson 1986; cf. Chalmers 1996).
Notice, that we do not need a special apparatus to be able to recognize
the existence or presence of these aspects in our experiences. Thus, the
standard way philosophers and psychologists began referring to our abil-
ity to pay attention to qualia is with the, perhaps historically unfortu-
nate, term “introspection.” The term may be unfortunate because it is so
vague and general.1 The “intro” prefix suggests one needs to look “in” or
“inward.” However, the qualia are an aspect of the representation itself,
so there is no need to take the representation and then go searching for
qualia. Lewis attempts to capture this relationship between qualia and
representation by using the term “given.” That is, the qualia are simply
there in our experiences. Qualia are quite important then because they
seem to represent a “line in the sand,” so to speak, that even the most
hard-nosed natural scientists cannot deny. In terms of reduction, since
qualia seem to be irreducible to physical properties, the natural scientific
strategy has been to deny the need to reduce them. In other words, natu-
ral science can get along fine by just ignoring them (cf. Kim 1998, 2005).
Yet, the human science perspective points to the fact that qualia, in many
70 F. Scalambrino
ways, factor into the very things that make human life human and the
value of “having” a ψυχή. For example, the smell of rose or a sandwich,
the experience of humor, or the experience of love.
It is convenient, then, to speak of three different kinds of reduction;
that is, to make a distinction between “explanation reduction,” “ontologi-
cal reduction,” and “eliminative reduction” (cf. Fodor 1968). As a simple
example, “explanation reduction” refer to the reduction of one explana-
tion to another—this may or may not be considered a sign of “progress,”
that is, one theory replacing another. We have been discussing “ontologi-
cal reduction,” that is, a dualism regarding the properties of experience
with the idea that the non-physical aspects reduce to—can be accounted
for in terms of—the physical properties. However, “eliminative reduc-
tion,” or simply “elimination” refers to the idea that the non-physical
should and will be explained away; for example, whether in terms of a
physical theory that shows psychological theory to be superfluous or in
terms of the realization that non-physical beings are illusions. This latter
characterization is the one more often claimed in the Contemporary
Period, and is known as “Eliminative Materialism.”
The position of Eliminative Materialism suggests mental properties do
not actually exist, rather we tend to talk as though they exist because our
language was merely a kind of “folk psychology” prior to advances made
in technology and neuroscience (cf. Sellars 1956). Thus, the argument
goes that talk of mental properties, for example belief, desire and love,
should be “eliminated” in favor of talk regarding neurochemical activity.
Moreover, notice, it is not that love reduces to sympathetic nervous sys-
tem activity, which would suggest that love exists but depends on sympa-
thetic nervous system activity for its be-ing; rather, love is supposed to be
eliminated by sympathetic nervous system activity, such that were we
always aware of the truth of nervous system activity, we would never have
invented the word “love.” Hence, it would follow for eliminative materi-
alists that consciousness and mental properties are “illusions” (cf.
Churchland 1981; cf. Dennett 1991; cf. Churchland 1992).
The term “supervenience” is often used to characterize the relation
between a mental property and a property of the body when the mental
property cannot be reduced to or eliminated in terms of the physical
property of the body. Definitions of “supervenience” are usually highly
technical sounding, and comment on it as a “relation of covariation.”

Simply put, we say M properties “supervene” on B properties only if
variations in M properties will vary with respect to B properties. As one
contemporary philosopher of mind noted,
mental characteristics are in some sense dependent, or supervenient, on

physical characteristics. Such supervenience might be taken to mean that
there cannot be two events alike in all physical respects but differing in
some mental respect, or that an object cannot alter in some mental respect
without altering in some physical respect. (Davidson 1970: 88)
Thus, changes in the qualia of experience will have some co-varying

changes to the body of the ψυχή in question, according to the principle
of supervenience. As we will see later, supervenience plays a role in under-
standing how “causation” in psychology works. On the one hand, those
who embrace the principle of supervenience accept the presence of non-
physical properties or qualia. On the other hand, despite acknowledging
the presence of ir-reducible non-physical properties, if causation can only
occur in terms of physical interaction, then the natural science-based
physicalists tend to think the non-physical properties are essentially
undermined or irrelevant to the science of psychology—or, rather,
biology.
Lastly, we will discuss “emergence,” “epiphenomenalism,” and “propo-
sitional attitudes” before discussing ontological priority. “Emergence” is
another term used to characterize the ir-reducible relation between men-
tal and physical properties. Thus, we often hear that “consciousness
emerges, or is an emergent property, of the brain.” The value of the char-
acterization, ontologically, is thought to be the manner in which it uses
physical be-ing to account for the origin of non-physical beings, despite
the inability to reduce the non-physical beings to the physical.
“Epiphenomenalism” is a term which extends the meaning of emergence
with an explicit focus on causation. That is to say, when we say that two
properties (one physical and one non-physical) are “epiphenomenal,”
then what we are saying is that the physical property accounts for the
origin of (or causes) the non-physical property, and the non-physical
72 F. Scalambrino
property cannot be reduced to the physical; however, whereas the physi-

cal property has causal-power, the non-physical does not.
For example, qualia exist; however, it is not the smell of the rose that
causes us to do anything subsequent to the experience. Rather, anything
we do subsequent to the experience—despite our characterizing the cause
of our subsequent action in terms of the qualia—is actually caused by the
physical properties which were “epiphenomenal” with the qualia. It is
important to notice that just as epiphenomenalism was originally dis-
cussed by William James (1842–1910) in the mechanistic terms of
“automatism” (cf. James 1918), so too the principle of epiphenomenal-
ism makes way for the determinism of the natural scientific perspective—
relegating the non-physical properties to something like, Gilbert Ryle’s
(1990–1976) infamous characterization, a (causally inefficacious) “ghost
in the machine” (1949).
Now, just as we can see a structural analogy between essence and acci-
dent and substance and property, so too there is a distinction to be made
between “state” and “content.” Thus, “property” and “state” are synony-
mous; however, we tend to use the term “state” when we want to focus on
its content. Moreover, the initial importance of distinguishing between
states and their content is to differentiate between, on the one hand,
qualitative properties of experience regarding which we do not tend to
distinguish between the property and its content (qualia), and, on the
other hand, properties or states of experience regarding which we do tend
to distinguish between the property and its content. Examples of the
former type of property include sensations, tickles, and pains, and exam-
ples of the latter include beliefs, desires, and fears. Notice that the latter
examples seem to have a “content” to them such that the property points
beyond itself.
In other words, the latter examples involve what “phenomenologists”
call “intentionality.” Thus, it may be helpful to look at the meaning of
“intentionality,” and the classic statement of the meaning of “intentional-
ity” comes from Franz Brentano (1838–1917).
Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the

Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object,
and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a
content [emphasis added], direction toward an object (which is not to be

understood here as meaning a thing) … although they do not do so in the
same way. In … judgement something is affirmed or denied, in love loved,
in hate hated, in desire desired and so on … No physical phenomenon
exhibits anything like it. (1973: 88–89)
Notice, then, for those who do follow the distinction, be-ing tickled may
be understood as a property of the body; likewise, whereas pain would be
a property of the body, worry would be a mental state, for example, about
potential pain—in which case “pain” would be the “intentional” content
of the mental state of worry.
Of course, the content of a state can be—and usually is—characterized
in terms of a “proposition.” Martin believes it will rain; Aristotle worries
the hemlock will be painful. Thus, philosophers often refer to these states
as “propositional attitudes.” The term comes from Bertrand Russell
(1872–1970).
What sort of name shall we give to verbs like “believe” and “wish” and so
forth? I should be inclined to call them “propositional verbs.” This is merely
a suggested name for convenience, because they are verbs which have the
form of relating an object to a proposition … you might call them “atti-
tudes,” but I should not like that because it is a psychology term, and
although all the instances in our experience are psychological, there is no
reason to suppose that all the verbs I am talking of are psychological … I
can only say all I know are. (Russell 2010: 60)
Thus, in regard to the special ontology of psychology, in describing human

experience in terms of the beings studied by psychology, we may say that
ψυχή is said to have, or take, various “attitudes” toward “propositions.”
Because the content of propositional attitudes is usually expressed in the
non-technical and non-jargon terms of “ordinary language,” approaches
in psychology that describe the activity of ψυχή in such a way are often
labeled “folk psychology” or, the wider term, “commonsense psychology.”
However, as noted above, eliminative materialists believe we should elim-
inate such approaches to psychology completely.
74 F. Scalambrino
In sum, so far in this section we have discussed the principles of gen-

eral ontology, monism and dualism and substance and property, some
standard ontological terms used to characterize dualistic relations in
regard to properties, and two principles of the special ontology of psy-
chology: qualia and propositional attitudes. We are now ready to discuss
“ontological priority.” Again, just as “priority” means to be deemed more
important or to be dealt with first, the terms used to refer to types of
“ontological priority” are often used to refer to entire systems of psychol-
ogy. Thus, we have “Materialism,” “Idealism,” “Empiricism,” “Nativism,”
“Vitalism,” “Mechanism,” “Behaviorism,” “Structuralism,” and
“Functionalism.”
In general, Materialism and Idealism are polar opposites. Put simply,
“Materialism” (which at this point may be considered synonymous with
“Physicalism”) refers to a monistic ontological system in which every-
thing, that is, all beings, are material. Thus, “Idealism” refers to a monis-
tic ontological system in which everything, that is, all beings, are
non-material. In this way, of course, “ontological priority” is given to
material in the former system and the non-material in the latter. Moving
on to dualisms, then, the relation between “Empiricism” and “Nativism”
is analogous to that between “Materialism” and “Idealism.” That is to say,
in reference to ontology, “Empiricism” acknowledges a dualism of mate-
rial and non-material beings; however, it gives priority to the material.
“Nativism,” then, in reference to ontology, refers to a dualism of material
and non-material beings; however, it gives priority to the non-material.
Here, of course, “priority” means a kind of “firstness” and position of
importance over the other type of substance or property. Now, to be clear
both of these terms—“Empiricism” and “Nativism”—have other mean-
ings, and though these other meanings will appear below, some general
remarks may benefit us here.
In regard to “theory of knowledge” or “criteriology” and “epistemol-
ogy,” “Empiricism” and “Nativism” refer to types of justification for our
knowledge. Whereas “Empiricism” refers to our gaining knowledge
through the material aspects of experience, “Nativism” refers to our gain-
ing knowledge from the non-material “innate ideas” in regard to experi-
ence. What is more, the term “Empiricism” can be further clarified into
“Classical Empiricism,” “Sensationalism” or “Sensism,” and “Radical
Empiricism” or “Positivism.” The theory of knowledge characterization

of “Empiricism” just given refers to “Classical Empiricism,” that is, the
source of our knowledge is the materially rooted bodily senses. Notice,
that Classical Empiricism does not deny dualism. Sensationalism, then,
is the position that does deny dualism, in favor of materialism. Why is
this not simply materialism? Because “Materialism” refers to an ontologi-
cal position, and “Sensationalism” refers to an epistemological position.
Lastly, “Radical Empiricism” usually goes by the name “Positivism,”
which is a position identified by the “verification principle.” This princi-
ple holds all knowledge—in order to count as knowledge—must receive
verification through sensory-experience. What is the essential distinction
between “Radical Empiricism” and “Sensationalism”? “Sensationalism”
or “Sensism” is the epistemological position that denies the dualism,
whereas “Radical Empiricism” does not deny the dualism, it only declares
it unknowable.
The distinction between “Vitalism” and “Mechanism” invokes the dis-
tinction, regarding systems, between holism and atomism, respectively.
The historical beacons regarding this distinction, and standardly invoked
to explicate it, are Aristotle and post-Cartesian Early Modern philoso-
phers. Basically, Aristotle took living biological things understood holisti-
cally to be the epitome of natural beings. Thus, natural beings are
characterized, teleologically and holistically, by attributing a “vital force”
to them. Since this “force” leaves the body when the body dies, the prin-
ciple of “Vitalism” distinguishes ψυχή as more than a mere “meat
machine.” Of course, Descartes and the Early Modern conception of the
body may be characterized in mechanical terms. That is, recalling the
controllability and predictability of causation regarding physical systems,
organic life has often been characterized in atomistic and mechanistic
ways. For example, the body is mechanistically understood as a machine
made out of meat, and the atomistic conception of such a machine sug-
gest the whole is simply the integration of all its parts working together.
Similar to the tripartite characterization of “Empiricism,” the
Contemporary term “Behaviorism” may be characterized as threefold. It
is important to keep in mind that “Behaviorism” is equally a technical
term in both philosophy and psychology; this may be contrasted, for
example, with the term “Psychoanalysis,” which is not. We may distin-
76 F. Scalambrino
guish between “Logical Behaviorism,” “Methodological Behaviorism,”

and “Radical Behaviorism.” Logical behaviorism “maintains that all men-
tal predicates (or descriptive and explanatory terms) may be translated,
paraphrased, defined, analyzed, reduced, eliminated, or replaced by
behavioral and environmental terms.” (Margolis 1984: 36). Metho
dological behaviorism is quite simply the idea that psychology should
only study behavior; that is to say, psychology should not investigate
“mental events,” any kind of “internal experience,” or relations between
cognitions. In this way, methodological behaviorism is analogous to
eliminative materialism’s eliminative reduction of the mental, that is,
non-material.
Lastly, “Radical Behaviorism” refers to B. F. Skinner’s (1904–1990)
position that mental states are only “collateral products of the contingen-
cies which generate behavior” (1953: 75), and his outright denial—in his
book titled Beyond Freedom and Dignity—of free will (1971). That is,
mental or cognitive activities have been invented … What is involved in

attention is not a change of stimulus or of receptors but the contingencies
underlying the process of discrimination … Discrimination is a behavioral
process: the contingencies, not the mind [nor the person], make the dis-
criminations. (1953: 116–117)
In this way, radical behaviorism denies free will and also even the notion
of a “self.” For, “A self is a repertoire of behavior appropriate to a given set
of contingencies.” (1971: 194; cf. Wegner 2003). Thus, according to
Skinner, logical, radical and methodological behaviorism amount to an
understanding of the “contingencies” found within a “physical system,”
and “It is in the nature of an experimental analysis of human behavior
that it should strip away the functions previously assigned to autono-
mous man and transfer them one by one to the controlling environment.”
(Ibid).
In regard to the philosophical principles of the systems of Western
psychology, the terms “Structuralism” and “Functionalism” do not refer
simply to “schools of thought,” rather, they refer to explanatory choices
and ontological characterizations. Given the goal of history of psychology
textbooks to legitimate “movements” of psychology, there is a tendency
to identify Wundt and Titchener with “Structuralism” and Dewey and

the “American Pragmatists” with “Functionalism.” This characterization
is not wrong; however, the terms may also be understood as principles in
regard to systems. In this way, “Structuralism” refers to the ontological
parts and organization of ψυχή and the ontological structure of language,
for example. Similarly, “Functionalism” as a philosophical principle refers
to the study of, and explanatory use of, “function” in regard to ψυχή (cf.
Angell 1907). As we will see, functionalism is historically characterized as
the principle responsible for the movement away from behaviorism and
toward the “Cognitive Revolution.” Thus, in discussing functionalism we
will also discuss the shift from what is called the “Identity Thesis” to
“Multiple Realizability,” and “Computationalism.”
Recall above we noted the American Psychological Association’s defini-
tion of structure: “a relatively stable arrangement of elements or compo-
nents organized so as to form an integrated whole. Structure is often
contrasted with function to emphasize how something is organized or
patterned rather than what it does.” (VandenBos 2007: 901). Further, we
have invoked the term “structure” when speaking about parts of a system.
Thus, “the concept of structure is of course intimately related to that of
analysis—we reveal structures by analyzing wholes into parts.” (Peregrin
2001: 1). Yet, when we shift from the term “structure” to “Structuralism,”
what new meaning does that latter term add?
In a chapter titled “How Do We Recognize Structuralism? (1967),”
Gilles Deleuze (1925–1995) enumerates a number of criteria for recog-
nizing “Structuralism.” The most important for our purpose here are the
first two, that is, a symbolic characterization and a relative positionality.
Simply put, ontologically, the “structures” with which “Structuralism” is
concerned are neither images, things, nor words, in as much as they con-
cepts (which do not refer to things or words). Second, there must be
some originary point which determines the organization of the “struc-
ture,” for example, an object of experience to which the organization of
the structure then refers. Together, then, we may recognize that there is
an object of experience and the concepts or words that refer to the object
of experience may be understood as parts which relate to each other in a
whole. This whole is understood as a “third realm.” It is not itself a con-
cept that refers to the object of experience, and it is not the object of
78 F. Scalambrino
experience; rather it is the “structure” in which the concepts or words

relating to the object of experience have an organized location.
As we will see below, one of the important aspects of structuralism is
the ability to theorize about “structure activation.” This kind of theoriz-
ing can be found often throughout the history and systems of Western
psychology. For example, it is a kind of structuralism to suppose ψυχή
has a structure and to characterize experience in terms of its activation—
sensation leads to perception, which leads to conceptualization and ratio-
nal deliberation about the object experience. Thus, the notion of
“spreading activation” across a connectionist network invokes a kind of
structuralism (cf. Higgins 1991). Also, the idea that human motivation
traverses an Id, Ego, Super-Ego invokes a kind of structuralism, and the
idea that words are associated to one another invokes a kind of
structuralism.
The idea that some individual thing performs a function naturally
seems to suggest that other individual things could also perform the same
function (cf. Dewey 1886, 1896; cf. Shoemaker 1981). This is the idea of
“Multiple Realizability,” which suggests that psychological functions
could be accomplished by multiple different factors. Prior to
“Functionalism,” there was a tendency to adhere to the “Identity Thesis”
when theorizing the relationship between physical and non-physical
properties. In other words, there was an assumption that irreducibly
mental aspects of human experience could be taken as tokens of a type or
kind of mental activity and the type of activity or the individual tokens
would have a one-to-one ratio with some physical activity. This kind of
thinking comes up in “brain localization” projects and even may be seen
in behavioral analysis. However, by shifting the ontological priority from
the properties to the functions, functionalism provides a way to theorize
non-physical properties—such as qualia—into causation relations of pri-
marily physical systems. Simply put, whatever the qualia may be, it is the
function it serves in a physical system that is important, that is to say,
qualitative aspects—though not ontologically reducible—can be explan-
atorily reduced to otherwise physical theories.
Interestingly, then, though functionalism is “philosophically-
responsible” for a move away from radical behaviorism (cf. Chomsky
1957, 1959) and to the inclusion of non-physical properties in theories
regarding ψυχή (cf. Putnam 1975), it is also responsible for a move

toward “Computationalism” (cf. Pylyshyn 1984; cf. Hurley 2005). This
latter idea is often associated with the “Cognitive Revolution” or
“Cognitive Turn,” and connectionist ideas, such as those related to
“Artificial Intelligence.” Simply put, if, according to functionalism, the
functions of ψυχή are multiply realizable, then they should be artificially
realizable, since human and robot actions are “functionally equivalent”
(cf. Heal 1986). If the connections and spreading-activations across neu-
ral networks of the brain could be modeled by computer programs, then
perhaps a kind of artificial life, or at least, thinking could be spawned. It
is as if, the activity of ψυχή is essentially a kind of “computation” taking
place in the activity of the brain, and the result of this idea is twofold.
First, the computational activity of ψυχή should be able to be simulated
by a computer. Second, the functions of the activity of ψυχή should be
multiply realizable, for example, by things other than human brains—
this raises questions of robot pain, and so on.
Lastly, a less radical result of functionalism refers to the ideas of
propositional attitudes and “Mindreading.” We discussed the former
idea above. In regard to the latter, we need to first distinguish between
the terms “Mindreading” and “Mind Reading.” Since the latter term is
perhaps more familiar, we will start there. “Mind Reading,” two sepa-
rate words, refers to “extrasensory perception or ESP. This is often char-
acterized as belonging to the genre of “psychic power” (cf. Rhine 1934,
1973). The former term, “Mindreading,” one word, refers to the ability
to represent, explain, predict, and respond to the “mental states” of
others. The idea is often traced back to classical theories of empathy
and sympathy; however, we can see it in action when, for example, we
finish someone else’s sentence before them. Notice, how, on the one
hand, in regard to this example, explanations of how it is possible to
finish someone else’s sentence may invoke the structure of language or
grammar. On the other hand, explanations of mindreading may invoke
an awareness of the function the other person was attempting to per-
form, as evidenced by the person’s actions and based on the situation,
and so on.
Mindreading is often accounted for in terms of “simulation,” and sim-
ulation may be understood in multiple ways. Systems which give onto-
80 F. Scalambrino
logical priority to physical be-ing may invoke the idea that watching
someone perform certain functions produces neural activity in the
observers brain which is similar to the neural activity in the brain of the
person performing the function (cf. Mach 1897; cf. Place 1956; cf. Smart
1959), and, as a result, the observer is able to represent, explain, predict,
and respond to the “mental states” of the performer. Simulation could
also be understood in terms of behavioral mimesis or mirroring; that is,
the repeated “rehearsal” of certain behaviors allows us to recognize the
performance of the behavior patterns in others. Systems which give onto-
logical priority to non-physical properties of socio-culturally based struc-
tures may invoke the ability to recognize the propositional attitude being
exhibited or the “language game” being played, and so on.
The final principle from the philosophy of psychology to discuss
regards “the question of the freedom of the will” and of “Agency.” As we
acknowledged in regard to Radical Behaviorism, some systems of psy-
chology do not believe humans have a free will. In order to better navi-
gate thinking through this aspect of systems across the history of Western
psychology, introducing philosophy’s technical vocabulary on the issue of
free will is beneficial. In order to compare systems across historical peri-
ods, we should briefly characterize four (4) philosophical principles
regarding freedom of the will, that is, Fatalism, Hard Determinism, Soft
Determinism or Compatibilism, Incompatibilism, Libertarianism, and
Indeterminism. For our purpose, the term “Fatalism” refers to events that
cannot be changed, and this may include whatever it is that we do during
those events. Thus, if they are in the future, then they are “on the way
here,” and nothing can be done to stop them from arriving. Of course, it
is possible to take the position of Fatalism without thinking that all events
are fated.
A distinction is standardly made between causal and logical determin-
ism. The former holds that the laws of nature in combination with past
states and events determine future states and events without any chance of
a differently determined outcome. Logical determinism holds that every
claim is either true or false, including claims made about the future (i.e.
even though the future has not happened when the claim is made). Thus,
logical determinism includes the “problem of foreknowledge,” which in
its deterministic characterization holds that if some being were able to
have true foreknowledge of someone’s action in the future, then that per-
son’s future action would be determined—they would not be free to act
differently. In this way, the characterization of a system as closed in such
a way that all events are caused by prior events in a chain of conditions is
called “Hard Determinism” (cf. Zagzebski 1991, 2002).
The problems with Hard Determinism are often characterized in three
ways. First, people may want to believe they could have acted differently
than they did, perhaps even if only just changing something at the
moment of the event itself. Second, people may want to understand
action in terms of “agent causation,” meaning that the agent of the action
is in control over, or at least has, freedom of will. Third, people may want
to believe the future is open, that is, it is contingent and not necessarily
determined. Thus, the terms “Soft Determinism” and “Compatibilism”
are synonymous. They refer to the idea that a deterministic system and
free will are compatible. “Incompatibilism,” then, refers to the idea that a
deterministic system and free will are not compatible. “Libertarianism”
(not the political term) refers to the idea that freedom of the will exists (it
is not an illusion) and that determinism is a false characterization of real-
ity. At the extreme opposite end of the spectrum, so to speak, is
“Indeterminism,” which holds that determinism is false because all events
are the outcome of chance.
Given the amount of vocabulary terms introduced in this section, it
may be beneficial to list them here. We discussed ontology and ontologi-
cal principles such as: “Substance Monism,” “Substance Dualism,” and
“Property Dualism.” We discussed principles characterizing dualistic rela-
tions such as: “Representation,” “Reduction,” “Elimination,”
“Supervenience,” “Emergence,” and “Epiphenomenal.” In this context
we also discussed “qualia,” “intentionality,” and “propositional attitudes.”
In regard to ontological priority, we discussed principles and distinctions
such as those regarding: “Materialism,” “Idealism,” “Empiricism,”
“Nativism,” “Vitalism,” “Mechanism,” “Behaviorism,” “Structuralism,”
and “Functionalism.” This included a discussion of logical, m ethodological
and radical Behaviorism. We also discussed the principles of “Multiple
Realizability,” “Mindreading,” “Simulation,” and “Computationalism.”
Finally, we discussed principles regarding “Agency,” specifically in regard
to the possibility of “freedom of the will.”
82 F. Scalambrino
In conclusion, the above distinctions should inform our discussion of

the following historically based systems of psychology. What makes this
activity an activity of “thinking through” the systems is that priority shifts
from historical period to period is constituted by shifts in the priority of
the principles operative to think in regard to ψυχή from the different
historical points of view regarding systems. Perhaps the most striking
example—which is why it appears in the chapter titles—occurs when the
principles and distinctions regarding “methodology” shift in priority over
those regarding ontology. Of course, ontology has such an essential role
in the constitution of systems that theorists attempting to avoid it need
to stipulate as much. Which is to say that the principles and distinctions
of ontology will continue to be operable as we think through the history
and systems of Western psychology, even when considering the point of
view of “systems” which attempt to ignore ontology by emphasizing
method and even those which are avowedly anarchist.
Notes
1. The method of “introspection” refers to the observation and examination
of one’s own mental states, and is often contrasted with “external observa-
tion.” However, the Leibnizian term “apperceive” or “apperception” would
have been much better.
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3
Pre-Modern to Early Modern:
From Mirror of God to Mirror of Nature
3.1 P
rinciples of Psychology from Socrates
and Plato
There are two issues which anyone discussing Socrates (470–399 BC)
and Plato (c. 428–347 BC) should mention as disclaimers. First, if
Socrates wrote any philosophical dialogs or produced any philosophical
works in writing, none of them have survived. Therefore, it is usual and
customary to mention the scholarly disclaimer that “We don’t really
know exactly what Socrates thought.” This is standardly referred to as
“The Socratic Problem” (cf. de Vogel 1955; cf. Boys-Stones and Rowe
2013; cf. Cain 2007). At the same time, this does not stop us from dis-
cussing the “philosophical thoughts of Socrates” as mentioned by his con-
temporaries and students—especially Aristophanes (c. 450–c. 386 BC)
and his students Xenophon (c. 430-c. 350 BC) and Plato. Second, though
Plato’s writings were not lost, there is still the problem of the relation
between the dialog form in which he wrote and interpreting it toward
knowing “this is what Plato thought.” This is standardly referred to as
“The Problem of Interpreting Plato’s Dialogs.” At the same time, despite
these disclaimers, scholars, of course, continue to talk about “Plato’s phi-
losophy” based on what he wrote in his Dialogs (cf. Corlett 2005; cf.

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74733-0_3
90 F. Scalambrino
Coulter 1976; cf. Blondell 2002; cf. Klagge and Smith 1992; cf. Gadamer
1980; cf. Heidegger 2003; cf. Kahn 1996; cf. Zuckert 2009).
What this means for the principles of psychology emerging from
ancient Greek philosophers can be safely summed in the following way.
It certainly seems to be the case that Socrates was interested in wisdom
for the sake of ψυχή. For example, Plato famously attributed to Socrates
the claim, “The unexamined life is not worth living.” (Plato 1997a:
38a5–6). Moreover, this activity of “examining life,” that is, one’s own life
and the lives of others, was characterized in a twofold way. On the one
hand, this activity is “philosophy,” and, on the other hand, to perform
this activity is to “care for ψυχή.” The passage is worth quoting at length:
As long as I draw breath and am able, I shall not cease to practice philoso-
phy, to exhort you and in my usual way to point out to any one of you
whom I happen to meet: “… are you not ashamed of your eagerness to
possess as much wealth, reputation, and honors as possible, while you do
not care for nor give thought to wisdom or truth, or the best possible state
of your soul [ψυχή]?”. (Plato 1997a: 29d4–e2; cf. Plato 1997c: 107c)
This idea, then, of the “best possible state of ψυχή” points to an original
association between psychology and ethics and morality. That is to say,
the discussion of ψυχή by Socrates and Plato is, ultimately, in the service
of soteriology. We want to live the best life we can, and so we need wis-
dom (i.e. philosophy) to do so. Moreover, with what should this wisdom
be concerned so that we may live the best possible life? The answer,
according to Socrates and Plato: ψυχή. Hence, we find the principles of
psychology emerging from ancient Greek philosophers contextualized in
terms of ethics, morality, teleology, and, especially, soteriology.
Given the difficulties with attributing philosophical principles to
Socrates, beyond the principle that the very goal of philosophy is to care
for ψυχή, we may also, at least, attribute the principle of “freedom” to
Socrates. That is, Socrates believed in the principle of freedom to such an
extent that he, ultimately, became a martyr for it—when he was told he
could no longer philosophize he accepted “execution.” Thus, to Socrates
we attribute the principles of psychology that ψυχή is a non-determined
be-ing, that is, “free,” and the principle that some ways of thinking are
Pre-Modern to Early Modern: From Mirror of God to Mirror… 91
better than others insofar as these ways of thinking lead to a better state
of be-ing for ψυχή. Presumably, then, Plato’s philosophy may be read as
an explication of the theory of be-ing and the theory of knowledge which
account for the best possible state of be-ing for ψυχή. As a result, Socrates
and, especially, Plato have a psychology, that is, an account of ψυχή,
articulated for the sake of “saving” ψυχή from a worse state of be-ing.
This will, of course, continue to be the context and purpose of psychol-
ogy through the Middle Ages.
If we were to try to identify one principle in Plato’s psychology which
we may use to organize the remaining principles of his psychology, it
would be: the principle of the immortality of ψυχή (esp. Plato 1997c:
78b–80b, 1997e: 608d). This is the case for a number of reasons; how-
ever, the most important two are the following. First, all theories of ψυχή
(viz. theories which take ψυχή to be non-illusory) may be divided into
those which believe ψυχή to be immortal and those which believe ψυχή
is not immortal. Second, when you think of ψυχή as immortal, it imme-
diately casts a light on ψυχή from which other principles follow. Thus,
from the principle of the immortality of ψυχή we arrive at the principle
of re-incarnation. This contextualizes the discussion of the structure of
ψυχή in that the various functions of ψυχή may be organized according
to a structure the appropriate activation of which leads to salvation, and
that is precisely the kind of psychology we find in the writings of Plato.
According to Plato, the ψυχή (e.g. the “soul”) is immortal, despite the
obvious fact that bodies die (cf. Plato 1997c: 105c). Without going too
deeply into Plato’s philosophy here, we may simply say that Plato under-
stood ψυχή as a non-material be-ing, similar to a geometric form. Though
you may flatten any number of rubber tires, doing so does not destroy the
form of circle. That is, appropriately placing the material of rubber into
the form of a circle constitutes a “tire.” However, when that tire is
destroyed the form in which the material formerly was is not destroyed.
As the “form of the body,” ψυχή is not destroyed when the body dies (cf.
Plato 1997b, c, e). Though this does point to a kind of dualism, there are
two primary reasons why Plato does not have a “Mind-Body Problem”
such as that which will later be found in Descartes’ philosophy (cf.
Ostenfeld 1987). First, the dualism between ψυχή and body found in
Plato is not a substance dualism since the body cannot exist without
92 F. Scalambrino
ψυχή. Second, the principle of re-incarnation makes it such that not

only may more than one body be attributed to one ψυχή (across multiple
embodied-lives or incarnations), but also from the point of view of the
one ψυχή in regard to the multiple embodiments, each body is like a
kind of “shadow” of ψυχή, that is, a “surface effect” in regard to the
material dimension.
In his famous “Cave Allegory,” (Plato 1997e: 514a–520a) which may
be found at the beginning of Book VII in Plato’s Republic, the allegorical
theme of “shadows” and the play of shadows is polysemic. That is, Plato
uses the theme to characterize multiple aspects of ψυχή. At the existential-
level, found in the Republic’s culmination, that is, Book X, the play of
shadows characterizes the multiple re-incarnations of ψυχή until it is able
to fully liberate itself from the process of re-incarnation. Again, without
explicating it here, we may say that Plato’s psychology affirms the prin-
ciples of Fatalism in that Plato seemed to believe certain events (but not
all events) which occur in each embodiment of ψυχή are “fated” in that
they could not be avoided based on the particularities of each existence
and embodiment. One way to quickly visualize this is in terms of drop-
ping a floating device into a flowing stream. Depending upon where in
the stream the device is dropped subsequent stages of the stream will be
encountered. Though, of course, there may be ways to trivialize this
example, it still works to help those not trained in philosophy gain some
type of visualization of the relationship between the conditions of one’s
coming-into-be-ing and the subsequent events experienced during that
embodiment.
Next, at the structural-level, the shadows refer to the power of imagi-
nation to perceive materially instantiated beings. Just as at the existential-
level the body, that is, ψυχή’s material-instantiation, is like a shadow in
relation to ψυχή, so too other beings are primarily non-material. Further,
because the power of imagination is associated with the body (a theme
the principles of which will receive an explicit articulation later from
Aristotle), the products of the power of imagination may be understood
as shadows of “true reality,” according to Plato. That is to say, the form is
more important than its many material instances. Learning, then, accord-
ing to Plato is a kind of “remembering.” The Greek term is anamnēsis,
and it is usually translated as “recollection.” This is because when ψυχή
understands what a thing is, it does so by recognizing the form of which

the thing is a material instance, and since, ultimately, the forms and ψυχή
are timeless in their original natural state, for Plato, ψυχή is recollecting
its original state in which it related to the forms without a physical body.
In doing so, notice, ψυχή is reminded of itself as it truly is.
Thus, ideas are most important among the structures we experience,
and ideals are most important in determining ψυχή’s activity. Notice,
even when that means one is faced with martyrdom for ideals. As a result,
Plato’s soteriology may be explicated in terms of the reciprocal relation
between ethical ideals and the structure of ψυχή. For, in structural terms,
it is a certain activation of ψυχή which will lead to its ultimate liberation
from the process of re-incarnation. As a result, ultimately, we will clarify
the structural-, functional-, and existential-levels as they relate to the
theological-level for Plato. For example, in his dialog titled Phaedo, aka
“On ψυχή” or “About ψυχή” by ancient commentators and echoing a
principle of the ancient Eleusinian Mysteries, Plato described embodi-
ment as a kind of “prison” for ψυχή (cf. 1997c: 62b; cf. Plato 1997d:
249e4–250b1; cf. Burkert 1989; cf. Ruck 1986; cf. Scalambrino 2016a;
Wasson et al. 2008). Liberation from the prison of physical-embodiment
turns out to be the context—as a kind of goal and purpose for physically
embodied ψυχή—with which to ultimately organize the principles of,
and clarify, Plato’s psychology.
According to Plato, the structure of ψυχή is tripartite, and this divi-
sion coincides with the Western “Orthodox” view of the structure of
ψυχή. Namely, ψυχή is divided into “affection,” “cognition,” and “cona-
tion,” a term more commonly expressed by “volition.” We should note
that these three parts of ψυχή coincide with the organizing principles of
“pathos,” “logos,” and “ethos,” respectively (cf. Burnyeat 1976). This helps
clarify Plato’s psychology; he characterized the function of ψυχή in terms
of desire or love, which structurally may be understood as the use of voli-
tion in an ethical way—a way which refers to the use of cognition (logos)
to guide volition (ethos) in controlling how ψυχή is affected (pathos),
through the body. This is the famous “Scala Amoris” or “Ladder of Love”
(cf. Plato 1997f: 209e–212a; cf. Frede 1993; cf. Iglesias 2016: 91; cf.
Reeve 2006: xxxii; cf. Scalambrino 2016b), which will be contrasted later
with Aristotle’s “Scala Natura” or “Ladder of Nature.”
94 F. Scalambrino
The function of ψυχή is soteriological, then, insofar as its appropriate

functioning “in a body” will eventually accomplish a restoration to its
natural state; yet, we must keep in mind that as a non-material be-ing,
the natural state of ψυχή for Plato is actually a super-natural state—a
state in which ψυχή does not have a physical body. This will also be con-
trasted later with Aristotle’s understanding of ψυχή’s natural state in
terms of physical and ethical harmony. Thus, Plato’s characterization of
ψυχή’s natural state is in terms of ethical and theological harmony. It will
be helpful to briefly discuss two stories found in Plato’s dialogs. The first
is known as “The Charioteer Allegory” (1997d: 246a–254e) and the sec-
ond as the “Scala Amoris” (1997f: 209e–212a).
In his “Charioteer Allegory,” Plato speaks of “a pair of winged horses
and a charioteer” (1997d: 246a). The chariot may be understood as refer-
ring to the body, the charioteer the intellect, and the horses as the forces
of impulsion. The horse “on the right” Plato calls “noble” and a “lover of
honor.” The horse “on the left” Plato calls “ignoble” and a “lover of plea-
sure” (1997d: 253a–254e). The story allegorizes physically embodied
ψυχή. In other words, the horses represent the forces of desire which
affect ψυχή through its be-ing physically embodied. The charioteer’s
gaining control of the horses represents the ability of ψυχή to use its
intelligence to function in a way that returns it to its original non-
physically embodied state. The example Plato uses is love, specifically
when a person is in the presence of someone they love, that is, the
“beloved.”
It is as if the body relates to love through the impulsions of the horses,
and the intellect relates to love more form(al)ly. It is “as if by a bolt of
lightning,” according to Plato, “When the charioteer sees that face [of the
beloved], his memory is carried back to the real nature of Beauty.” (Plato
1997d: 254b4). On the one hand, notice the reference to anamnēsis. That
is, the charioteer, which represents the intellect of ψυχή, recollects the
“Platonic heaven” or realm of the forms through its encounter with the
beloved. However, the “ignoble horse” on the left (i.e. “sinister horse”),
relates to the beloved in terms of the beloved’s present material instance.
Thus, in order for the charioteer to go toward the realm in which the
beloved truly is, the charioteer must contend with the material-loving
sinister horse. On the other hand, because ψυχή is presently physically

embodied the charioteer, the chariot, and the horses must be understood
as representing a whole. Thus, we are back to the ethical component of
Plato’s psychology, because the actions performed by the individual in the
presence of the beloved are either directed by the horses or the charioteer,
and it is, according to Plato, only when the actions are directed by the
charioteer that ψυχή gains ground toward liberation from
physical-embodiment.
Now, of all the ancient Greek terms for “love,” in Plato’s dialogs two
different terms are featured. They are “erôs” and “philia” (cf. Santas 1979).
On the one hand, of course, these two different terms—representing
erotic love and platonic love, respectively—coincide with the love of the
horses and the love of the charioteer, respectively. On the other hand,
these two different terms characterize the change which occurs regarding
ψυχή’s desire and volition as it turns (“Cave Allegory” reference intended)
away from the material dimension and is restored to its natural original
state. Because this is understood as a kind of “ascension” for ψυχή away
from its present physical-embodiment, the accomplishment of this
change is characterized as a kind of climbing a “ladder” or “stairway.”
Thus, the movement refers to the “Scala Amoris,” that is, the ladder of
love, and the story in which the Scala Amoris is invoked describes a per-
son becoming a philosopher. In other words, philia is the word for love in
the etymological definition of “philosophy” as the love of wisdom (sophia).
In this way, just as the Cave Allegory describes a prisoner ascending from
a cave and being free as a philosopher, so too the Scala Amoris refers to the
change in direction for ψυχή such that ψυχή may be freed from the
process of be-ing physically embodied.
Finally, in regard to function, because the theological-level unifies the
structural-, functional-, and existential-levels for Plato, we will briefly
discuss Plato’s theological principles here insofar as they provide clarifica-
tion for his psychology. For, as the Italian Renaissance Neo-Platonic phi-
losopher and Catholic priest Marsilio Ficino (1433–1499) noted
regarding the Charioteer, “before Socrates can affirm that love restores us
to heaven, he has to examine a number of things concerning the condi-
tion of the soul, both divine and human.” (Ficino 1981: 86). The three
theological principles we will discuss, then, are the principle of the
96 F. Scalambrino
“Transcendentals,” the principle of the “daimon,” and the principle of

“henosis.” Whereas the Transcendentals give us some idea of what is
beyond the cycle of re-incarnation for ψυχή, the latter two principles
further explicate Plato’s soteriology regarding ψυχή from a theological
point of view.
The ontological distinction between the “categorical” and the “tran-
scendental” is essential for clarifying and organizing Plato’s principles.
Simply put, if we were to categorize every thing that is, then we would
discover some properties cannot be contained by the categories of be-ing.
What that means is that though things themselves belong in one category
or another (the cat is not a tree), some properties of things “transcend” or
“climb across” the different categories of be-ing. These properties are
called the “Transcendentals.” Just as both a cat and a tree can be good and
beautiful, so too Goodness, Beauty, Truth, Unity (Oneness), and Be-ing,
are the universal properties of Be-ing itself, that is, the Transcendentals.
There is, of course, much more that can be said here; however, we will
continue to explicate Plato’s principles of psychology, rather than launch
into a fuller discussion of the Transcendentals. What is important for us
to recognize is that for Plato were we to “purify” the be-ing of each thing,
then that thing would reduce down to its properties of pure be-ing until
the material properties by way of which it may be physically categorized
are eliminated. Hence, from a theological perspective, then, it is as if
divine be-ing (as pure be-ing) is all Good, all Beautiful, True, Unified (or
One) and it Is (cf. Plato 1997c: 70d).
Now, combine the insight regarding pure be-ing from the theological
perspective with the structural, functional, and existential principles of
psychology noted above. The idea is that when ψυχή recollects the realm
of the forms, it is recollecting pure be-ing, which includes the “higher”
more pure aspects of its own structure, and, recalling the Charioteer
Allegory, the extent to which ψυχή is able to navigate toward the realm
of pure be-ing is the extent to which ψυχή is able to purify itself in rela-
tion to the material-based properties which constitute the categorical
existence of its present embodiment. Moreover, from the perspective of
be-ing physically embodied ψυχή is “uniting” with pure be-ing when it
purifies itself. Thus, in regard to what we called the existential-level dis-
cussed by Plato in Book X of his Republic, with each physical-embodiment
endured by ψυχή in the process of re-incarnation, the extent to which

ψυχή is able to purify itself during each incarnation is the extent to
which it is able to unite and “grasp onto,” so to speak, pure be-ing—as
if grasping something so that it may pull itself from the material-quick-
sand of physical-embodiment. This union with the divine is called
“henosis.”
Anticipating what will be considered more fully below, the principle of
henosis seems to endure throughout the history of Western psychology as
a structural and functional principle of ψυχή. However, the Modern
Period may be seen as an attempt to strip the principle of its theological
context. In order to understand the principle of henosis and its role in
organizing Plato’s principles of psychology we need to briefly discuss one
more perennial principle—the principle of the “daimon.” As Plato
describes the process of re-incarnation at the moment in which ψυχή
receives a new physical-embodiment, in addition to the fated events,
ψυχή chooses a “daimon” (Plato 1997e: 617e). For our purpose here, we
will simply say the term “daimon” refers to a non-physically instantiated
voice that is “heard in the mind.” Thus, the daimon was understood as a
be-ing somehow mid-way between the divine realm of pure be-ing and
humans (cf. Diamond 1996; cf. Greenbaum 2016; cf. Scalambrino
2016a, for a deeper discussion of the daimon). Moreover, regarding the
structure of ψυχή, in the Timaeus Plato refers to the daimon as “the most
sovereign part of our soul [ψυχή] as god’s gift to us, given to be our guid-
ing spirit.” (Plato 1997g: 90a).
Though it may seem strange upon first hearing it: the daimon is another
perennial principle in the history of Western psychology. For our pur-
pose, notice the following. The ancient Greek prefix “eu” means “good”
or “well,” and, interestingly, when combined with the word “daimon” it
creates the ancient Greek term translated as “happiness,” that is,
Eudaimonia. Thus, it is as if when a person has a good relationship with
the voice in their mind, then they are capable of flourishing and experi-
ence a state of be-ing we call “happiness.” Notice, because the Greeks
seemed to believe these be-ings may be good or bad, daimons are often
compared to guardian angels or tempting demons, respectively; thus, in
the Middle Ages the daimon was contextualized in terms of “Psychomachia”
or “Soul War.” This is the idea often invoked in popular culture as an
98 F. Scalambrino
angel on one shoulder and a devil on the other shoulder as they both
attempt to persuade you—it may also be seen as a variant of Plato’s
Charioteer Allegory. Further, in the Modern Period, stripped of theologi-
cal connotation, the principle of the daimon is understood as the princi-
ple of conscience. However, as we will see in our discussion of principles
from the Middle Ages, a distinction can be made between the daimon
and conscience insofar as “the concerns of the daimon seem to be con-
fined to future contingencies (as opposed to pangs of conscience after the
act) and does not always have to do with judgments of moral value.”
(Beckman 1979: 76).
In sum, we may now see how the structural-, functional-, existential-,
and theological-levels combine to organize and clarify Plato’s principles
regarding ψυχή. In order for ψυχή to liberate itself from the process of
re-incarnation, it must purify itself during its present physical-
embodiment—this is why Plato’s psychology is ultimately in the service
of soteriology and the origin of Western psychology is characterized in
terms of ethics, morality, and theology. Thus, the extent to which ψυχή
is able to purify itself during its present physical-embodiment determines
the extent to which ψυχή is united with divine pure be-ing upon disem-
bodiment. If that union (henosis) is not sufficient, then ψυχή receives
another physical-embodied with its accompanying fated events and
daimon. Plato is clear that ψυχή chooses these accoutrements, so to
speak, of its next embodiment; however, it is also clear that there are con-
straints on ψυχή’s choices which involve ψυχή’s development along the
Scala Amoris. For example, if you are so affected by the power of money
to acquire material-gain that you love money in this physical-embodiment,
then when faced with choices from your perspective you will be choosing
what you love, but from the perspective of pure be-ing you will be mis-
understanding the true value of be-ing physically embodied in those
types of lives. The same goes for the daimon; you select the “co-pilot,” so
to speak, whom you think will help you accomplish whatever it is you
love.1
In this way, Plato’s psychology is soteriological and teleological, since
ψυχή’s self-knowledge is always already in the service of the purification
of its be-ing. Moreover, knowledge of the structure and function of ψυχή
characterizes ψυχή’s development toward restoration to its original state

of be-ing—making the actualization or accomplishment of that state of
be-ing its purpose or telos. The principles of Plato’s psychology, then, pro-
vide a narrative description of ψυχή’s categorical existence in the physical
with which ψυχή may recollect its transcendental existence toward lib-
eration from the cycle of re-incarnation. Thus, from the perspective of
purified ψυχή, it is as if the shadowy state of physical-embodiment were
a mere epiphenomenon. Moreover, to the extent that the experience of
time depends on a continuum of physical change for ψυχή to “count,”
then purified ψυχή in the “Platonic Heaven” is timeless. So, again, if we
were to turn the point of view, from the perspective of purified ψυχή it
is as if the process of be-ing embodied may be characterized as a kind of
“pulsing” in and out, as it were, of the physical realm (cf. Scalambrino
2011; cf. Scalambrino 2017). The term for this is “palingenesis,” which
comes from the ancient Greek palin (again) and genesis (to begin).
Now that we have discussed the principles and distinctions associated
with (a) the structure of ψυχή and (b) the functions of ψυχή in Plato’s
psychology, we will conclude this section with a discussion of (c) the
methodological issues in Plato’s psychology. Just as Alfred North
Whitehead famously noted that the “safest general characterization of the
European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes
to Plato” (Whitehead 1985: 39), having covered this much ground in
Plato will help make discussion below more concise. As we will see when
we begin discussing principles of Western psychology from the Modern
Period, Pre-Modern thinkers were more ontology-centric than
methodology-centric; however, it will be helpful for us to discuss meth-
odology—as Presentist as such an endeavor may be—for at least the sake
of recognizing the continual presence of principles differently contextual-
ized and emphasized across the history and systems of Western
psychology.
We often hear of something called the “Socratic Method,” whether it be
in regard to Plato, classroom exercises, or Law School. In perhaps its most
basic description, the “Socratic Method” refers to a question and answer
process. This may be between multiple individuals or a person thinking-
through some topic. The technical term for this type of back-and-forth is
100 F. Scalambrino
called “dialectic,” and we may distinguish between “constructive” and

“destructive” dialectic. Whereas the former refers to the type of back-and-
forth for the purpose of leading toward some novel—at least for one of the
interlocutors—conclusion, the latter refers to a process in which one of
the interlocutors is asking questions for the sake of criticizing some initial
opinion(s) or claim(s). For, understanding
that the essence of things is the ultimate goal in science, as in the rational
world in general, Plato formulated his dialectics as a method, or opera-
tional principle. It may be described as a procedure to carry one from the
superficial material of things to the underlying forms… Dialectic is a pro-
cess of thinking or reasoning which contrasts with observation or immedi-
ate contact. (Kantor 1963: 102)
This can be seen repeatedly in Plato’s dialogs, especially the ones in which
Socrates is featured as a character. For our purpose, we need only men-
tion two more methodological principles regarding Plato’s psychology.
They are “myth-making” and “theurgy” (cf. Uždavinys 2010: 65–70; cf.
Jung and Kerényi 1969).
Though both of these principles characterize Plato’s methodology, as
we will quickly notice, they flow directly from his ontology. That is, just
as the power of imagination is associated with the physical body, the
“higher” and more “pure” structures of ψυχή are beyond the power of
imagination. Yet, in order to discuss these higher aspects of be-ing it is
often valuable to invoke metaphors and allegories, that is, images. Thus,
the process of constructing images for the sake of describing that which
is beyond the power of imagination is called “myth-making,” and the
narrative products of the process are called “myths.” On the one hand,
myths are non-falsifiable, for example ψυχή is not actually in a “cave” or
driving a chariot, so it would do little good to try to prove that ψυχή is
not in a cave or driving a chariot. Yet, on the other hand, the historicity
of these “myths” is different from the connotation given to the term in
the Contemporary Period—where “myth” means “fallacy” or “necessarily
false.” Therefore, myth-making may be understood as an essential prin-
ciple of Plato’s methodology.
Lastly, the purification and henosis process noted above may also be
characterized in terms of a methodology for Plato. In other words, recall
the process of purification and recollection for ψυχή results in the revela-
tion of truth. Thus, one may purposefully embark on the process of puri-
fication and recollection for the sake of discovering the truth of be-ing.
Interestingly because accomplishing such purification is tantamount to
be-ing like, if not fully assimilating oneself to, the pure be-ing of divine
beings, this process as a purposeful method may be called “theurgy.” If
henosis is the union brought about by our purification from the perspec-
tive of physically embodied ψυχή recollecting in regard to its present
incarnation, then theurgy is action in the other direction, so to speak,
from the realm of divine pure be-ing on physically embodied ψυχή. In
this way, referencing the Neoplatonist Iamblichus’ (c. 245–c. 325) On the
Mysteries,
the theurgical, as universal and divine, is the opposite of anything particular

and individualistic, anything based on one’s subjective whims and egocen-
tric drives. Without the fundamental realization of our own nothingness
… no one can be saved, because in theurgical union gods are united only
with gods, or rather “the divine is literally united with itself ” (Iamblichus
2003: 47.4–47.8). This should in no way be conceived as communication
between the mortal man and the immortal divinity (as one person address-
ing another), but rather communication of the divine in us with the divine
in the universe. (Uždavinys 2010: 83)
It is as if “theurgy” refers to a method by way of which the mind of ψυχή

purifies to a mirror of the divine, that is, pure be-ing, or stated in a more
contemporary way, it is as if Plato has a theurgical method through which
ψυχή’s mind may become a mirror of God. It is in this way that one may
say of dialectic that it is “the method of attaining assimilation to God
through consciousness of the ultimate One-in-the-many, prior to the
return to the One itself.” (Anton 1992: 15–16). The “One-in-the-many”
is the pure be-ing which is in every being, the transcendental dimension
of every thing. It is as if we re-collect the transcendental from within the
categorical experiences of be-ing.
102 F. Scalambrino
3.2 Principles of Psychology from Aristotle

Given the ground already covered in the Plato section above, this section
begins with a discussion of Aristotle in regard to Plato’s principle of the
immortality of ψυχή, it then moves directly to Aristotle’s (c) methodol-
ogy culminating in a discussion of the principles from Aristotle regarding
the (a) structure and (b) function of ψυχή. As we will see, these latter two
aspects of Aristotle’s psychology together constitute a veritable develop-
mental psychology and the beginnings of a naturalistic learning theory in
terms of “associationism.” One perennial exegetical issue regarding
“Aristotle’s philosophy,” in general, is the question of its relation to
“Plato’s philosophy,” in general. Keeping in mind “The Problem of
Interpreting Plato’s Dialogs,” the standard response to this question
involves mentioning that Aristotle was Plato’s student for twenty (20)
years. It also involves noting that despite their differences—and there are
some quite significant differences—Aristotle may be understood as “sys-
tematizing” Plato toward a kind of “science” of philosophy. This is an
important description of the relation between Plato and Aristotle, since
later we will learn that Immanuel Kant’s relation to Aristotle is much like
Aristotle’s relation to Plato; that is, Kant may be understood as “system-
atizing” or “re-organizing” Aristotle.
Recalling how, above, we identified “the principle of the immortality
of ψυχή” as essential for organizing the principles of Plato’s psychology,
Aristotle disagreed with Plato regarding this principle. Thus, the relation
between Plato’s psychology and Aristotle’s psychology is analogous—
though not identical—with the contemporary distinction between the
human science and the natural science approaches to the study of ψυχή.
One of the primary reasons that the relation is not identical is that
Aristotle’s approach is holistic, and he believes in the non-material sub-
stantial be-ing of God. So, though he does not have a Cartesian mind-
body problem, he also does not see non-physical be-ing as mere
epiphenomenon. However, having said all that, Aristotle held that when
the individual body dies, then the ψυχή associated with that body also
ceases to be.
In order to understand Aristotle regarding the principle of the immor-

tality of ψυχή it is helpful to examine how Aristotle famously described
ψυχή. In his treatise, which is standardly considered the first scientific
treatment of, and textbook on, ψυχή, titled “On ψυχή” (which we
often refer to in one of its Latin or English translations as De Anima or
On the Soul), he gives three different analogies, or metaphors, in terms
of: an ax (1956: 412b13–14), an eye (Ibid: 412b20–22), and a ship’s
captain (Ibid: 413a8–9). Anticipating what will be considered more
fully below, it is important to consider the suggestion by Aristotle schol-
ar’s that in discussing his third analogy for ψυχή it seems to raise “the
possibility of some enduring aspect of soul essentially uninvolved with
body yet still functional.” (Polansky 2010: 168; cf. Tracy 1982).
However, despite this possibility, we will stand by his more straightfor-
ward statements which clearly deny the principle of the immortality of
ψυχή.
Aristotle’s analogies for ψυχή immediately illuminate his psychology
for us. First, “Suppose that a tool, for example an ax, were a natural [not
artificial] body, then being an ax would have been its essence, and so its
ψυχή; if this disappeared from it, it would have ceased to be an ax”
(Aristotle 1956: 412b13–14). Second, he went on to apply the analogy
to “the parts of a living body,” as opposed to the non-living, artificial, ax.
“Suppose that the eye were an animal—sight would have been its soul
[ψυχή] … the eye being merely the matter of seeing; when seeing is
removed the eye is no longer an eye, except in name—no more than the
eye of a statue or of a painted figure.” (Ibid: 412b20–22). Lastly, he
notes that it is not clear whether ψυχή may be “the actuality of its body
in the sense in which the sailor is the actuality of the ship.” (Ibid:
413a8–9).
Before delving into Aristotle’s formal definition of ψυχή, notice what
the analogies in combination suggest. Aristotle seems to understand
ψυχή as the power or principle the presence of which constitutes a natu-
ral body’s be-ing alive and what it is. That is, the ψυχή of a body deter-
mines—like a form to its matter—what the body is, that is, its essence.
Further, to say that ψυχή is the power of sight is to say that its presence
in relation to its body is the performing of the very function which makes
104 F. Scalambrino
the body what it is. The ψυχή of the eye is its actual vision, that is, no
vision no eye-ψυχή. Finally, the sailor analogy points to the more Modern
and Contemporary problem of “mental causation.” Can the ψυχή direct
and control its body or cause change to physical bodies? Of course, it
certainly seems as though seeing something influences the directions in
which the eye moves.
In order to understand Aristotle’s formal definition of ψυχή, we need
to understand how he intends the meaning of the term “actuality.” Not
surprisingly, the principles of actuality and potentiality are a hallmark of
Aristotle’s philosophy. To begin, “actuality” translates two different terms
in Aristotle—energeia and entelecheia, and “potentiality” translates “dyna-
mis,” which means “power” or “potency” and resembles the term
“dynamic.” Noticing that Aristotle’s second term translated as “actuality”
includes the Greek term “telos,” the actuality of entelecheia connotes the
contemporary understanding of “self-actualization,” as if there is a struc-
ture with parts originally non-actualized but with the potential to-be
actualized; thus, entelecheia—indicating the actualization of what the
thing essentially had the potential to be—connotes completion or matu-
ration. In a similar, but different way, energeia—looking a good deal like
the contemporary term “energy”—means something like “being-at-work
being-what-it-is.” (cf. Sachs 2001; cf. Polansky 1983). Thus, the actual
eyesight of the eye may be understood as the actualization of the properly
organized parts of the eyeball that is seeing (entelecheia), and as the eye
continues to actually see, it continues to be what it is (energeia) an actual
eye, that is, not merely a potential eye.
Lastly, when Aristotle discusses the relation between potentiality and
actuality there is another distinction which is essential for us, if we are
to think through Aristotle’s psychology. The distinction is between “first
potentiality,” “second potentiality,” and “actuality,” and the classic
example is the potential to learn French. We may say that two different
individuals are both born with the potential to speak the French lan-
guage. In this way they are “equal.” However, when one of them learns
how to speak French, then they are in a different relation to the activity
of speaking French than they were originally. Thus, for Aristotle, they
have moved from “first potentiality” to “second potentiality,” and when
they activate that “second potentiality,” then “voilà” they are actually
speaking French. Notice that moving from first potentiality to second
potentiality is a “first actuality.”
We are now ready for Aristotle’s formal definition of ψυχή. Recalling
Aristotle’s Four Causes from above, Aristotle’s holism is implied in his
“hylomorphism,” which refers to physical bodies as matter (hylē) and
form (morphē) composites. Keep in mind these composites are gestalts,
that is, the actual whole is greater than the sum of its parts (cf. Aristotle
1984: 1050b1). According to Aristotle, then,
given that there are bodies of such and such a kind, namely, having life, the
soul [ψυχή] cannot be a body; for the body is the subject or matter, not
what is attributed to it. Hence the soul [ψυχή] must be a substance in the
sense of the form of a natural body having life potentially within it. But
substance is actuality, and thus soul [ψυχή] is the actuality of a body … the
soul [ψυχή] is the first actuality of a natural body having life potentially
[emphasis added]. (1956: 412a17–27)
Aristotle’s naturalistic perspective shines through here: just as the parts of

a house may be organized in such a way (or not) so that they become a
house and a house comes into be-ing, so too when a natural body is orga-
nized in a way proper to its essential functions—like seeing for the eye –,
then the actualization that constitutes the be-ing alive of the natural body
is its ψυχή. The sailor analogy interestingly comes into play here, then,
in that ψυχή emerges from the vitality of the properly formed physical
being, and afterward is capable of directing that physical body.
Fascinatingly, this emergence is from universal be-ing, not from matter
(i.e. not as contemporary physicalists often articulate a naturalistic posi-
tion); however, it is still the case for Aristotle that when the organization
and vitality of the body cease to be, then ψυχή also ceases to be: “the soul
[ψυχή] cannot be without a body.” (Aristotle 1956: 414a20). This may
require some clarification; according to Aristotle:
the study of the soul [ψυχή] … must fall within the science of nature. Hence
a physicist would define an affection of soul [ψυχή] differently from a
dialectician; the latter would define, e.g. anger as the appetite for returning
pain for pain, or something like that, while the former would define it as a
106 F. Scalambrino
boiling of the blood or warm substance surrounding the heart. The one
assigns the material conditions, the other the form or account; for what he
states is the account of the fact, though for its actual existence there must
be embodiment of it in a material such as is described by the other [empha-
sis added]. (Ibid: 403a27–403b4)
First off, notice in this quote Aristotle associates explanation with the sci-
ence of nature and description with dialectic. Contemporary psycholo-
gists seem to have a tendency to interpret statements from Aristotle such
as this block quote in too Modern of a context, rather than in terms of
the historicity of “Aristotle’s divisions of science.” For example, Aristotle
divides the different branches of knowledge and learning into (1) “theo-
retical,” (2) “practical,” and (3) “productive” sciences. Moreover, he fre-
quently reaffirms the principles of this division; that is, the theoretical
sciences seek knowledge for its own sake, the practical sciences for the
sake of improving behaviors and excellence in action, and the productive
sciences for the sake of producing useful or beautiful creations (cf.
Aristotle 1950: 192b8–12; cf. 1984: 1025b25; cf. 1967: 145a15–16).
In this way, when Aristotle deemed psychology a natural science he
still understood it as a theoretical science. This means his naturalistic
perspective is still different from the eliminative position which he, in the
above block quote, associates with approaching ψυχή from the perspec-
tive of physics. Physics, of course, was also a theoretical science; however,
as Aristotle noted above, physics is concerned with matter and Aristotelian
psychology with form. Moreover, Aristotle considered medicine a pro-
ductive science. Therefore, in addition to the fact that Aristotle sees the
difference between the methods of natural science and medicine as that
between the theoretical sciences and the productive sciences, Aristotle’s
relation to Hippocrates (460–370 BC) regarding psychology is analogous
only in regard to the extent their subject matters coincide in biology (cf.
Hergenhahn 2009: 51). Thus, in regard to the methodology for Aristotle’s
psychology, it is involved in the principle of “knowledge for its own sake,”
as a theoretical science. For this reason, on the one hand, we find a dis-
tinction between dialectic and demonstration, reflecting a similar empha-
sis found in Plato’s dialogs. On the other hand, though Aristotle may
technically be called an “empiricist,” and he does engage in “inductive”
reasoning regarding ψυχή; anticipating a later discussion of “Modern

empiricism,” we will need to clarify the place of Aristotle’s induction in
his methodology of psychology as a theoretical science.
That is, with this in mind, Aristotle’s methodology may be character-
ized as a clarifying and streamlining of the “Socratic Method.” Thus, as it
was with Plato, “dialectic” may be understood as a three-step process,
whether this be in terms of the resolution of two contradictory terms, for
example thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, or whether it be in terms of a
development of a (1) first idea into (2) something different with a (3)
return to supplement the first idea. Hence, the previous technical charac-
terization also still holds: we may distinguish between “constructive” and
“destructive” dialectic. Here is a helpful analogy regarding these vocabu-
lary terms: “Dialectic: Discovery:: Demonstration: Justification.” That is
to say, dialectic has an interesting twofold function which may be charac-
terized in terms of “discovery.” Whereas destructive dialectic discovers
ways to criticize arguments and discern their truth by having the parts of
arguments placed into its three-step process, constructive dialectic dis-
covers truth by developing meaning. In this way, dialectic begins with
phenomena, in that “phenomena” may refer to opinions or products of
perception (cf. Owen 1986). Because we have already discussed the
destruction and construction of opinions regarding the “Socratic Method”
above, here we want to focus on dialectic in regard to products of percep-
tion, especially in relation to demonstration. This points to the heart of
Aristotle’s methodology. Moreover, though we may attribute “induction”
and “inductive reasoning” to Aristotle, we must keep his “word-concept-
thing” understanding of signification in mind—his induction is dealing
primarily with “concepts” and secondarily with “things,” even in the case
of perceptual experience.
Notice that if you cannot justify your position or claim, then you seek
to discover support—whether in the form of evidence or other opin-
ions—with the idea that once you acquire the needed justification, you
will be able to demonstrate the validity of your position or the truth of
your claim. It is worth quoting Aristotle at length here.
The premise of demonstration differs from the premise of dialectic in that

the former is the assumption of one member of a pair of contradictory
108 F. Scalambrino
statements (since the demonstrator does not ask a question but makes an
assumption), whereas the latter is an answer to the question which of two
contradictory statements is to be accepted. This difference, however, will
not affect the fact that in either case a syllogism results; for both the dem-
onstrator and the interrogator draw a syllogistic conclusion by first assum-
ing that some predicate applies or does not apply to some subject. (Aristotle
1964b: 23b24–24a34)
Focusing on the “syllogistic conclusion,” Aristotle will require that the

results of both dialectic and demonstration must be stated in terms of a
rational deductive argument such that the conclusion logically follows
from the combination of premises. In regard to demonstration, then, on
the one hand, “hypotheses are the origins of demonstrations.” (Aristotle
1984: 1013a16). On the other hand, “By the starting points of demon-
stration I mean the common beliefs, on which all men base their proofs.”
(Aristotle 1984: 996b26–30; cf. Barnes 1969).
This points to the heart of Aristotle’s methodology and what is stan-
dardly understood to be the first systematization in regard to scientific
inquiry with the essential distinction that Aristotle’s empiricism was a
more passive observation than Modern controlled experiment (cf.
Dickinson 1986: 49). For what Aristotle was discussing here is the for-
mulation and logical examination of hypotheses, and, in general, “scien-
tific knowledge” involves knowing the principles, causes, and elements
from which knowledge may be demonstrated and justified (cf. Ziman
1978). Initially these must be discovered.
When the objects of an inquiry, in any department, have principles, causes,

or elements, it is through acquaintance with these that knowledge and
understanding is attained. … therefore, in the science of nature too our
first task will be to try to determine what relates to its principles. (Aristotle
1950: 184a10–17)
In this way, ψυχή functions as a kind of principle itself to explain “the

functioning of all mortal living things” (cf. Polansky 2010: 163), ψυχή
functions as a principle in works by Aristotle such as Parts of Animals
(1937) and the Generation of Animals (1965). Thus, with Aristotle we
already have a “developmental psychology,” however, it is articulated in

terms of his methodology and natural science. We will discuss this next;
to conclude this discussion of Aristotle’s methodology, notice that by
isolating the structure of the “Socratic Method” Aristotle articulated a
kind of “scientific method” in that dialectic may be used regarding phe-
nomena (accepted opinions of others or phenomena of perceptual experi-
ence) and through such discovery demonstrations may be logically
formulated to justify initial hypotheses.
What remains to be said about Aristotle’s psychology, then, is a discus-
sion of his developmental psychology and learning theory. As we noticed
from the American Psychological Association’s definition of “develop-
ment,” it derives from taking a synchronic understanding of structure
and making it diachronic by combining function with structure. Whereas
the structure and function of ψυχή for Aristotle are ontological princi-
ples of organic (i.e. holistic) natural beings, considering the structure of
ψυχή over time regarding the natural functions of the composite being—
the ensouled natural body or the embodied ψυχή—both a natural teleol-
ogy and a natural soteriology emerge. That is to say, the natural
development of a being in regard to its natural functions constitutes the
actualization of the parts of its structure which were previously in poten-
tiality. Of course, Aristotle takes this to be the purpose of the natural
beings ψυχή. As a simple example, if the natural-physical body does not
receive nutrition, then it will not survive; therefore, the presence of a
principle of growth and nutrition (ψυχή) “in” the body serves the pur-
pose of sustaining the life of the body. Similarly, it is by actualizing the
potentiality to consume nutrition that an ensouled body “saves” itself,
that is, soteriology. Thus, the natural functions of the structure of ψυχή
actualized over time constitute Aristotle’s developmental psychology;
however, the historicity of his theory is such that he characterized ψυχή’s
actualization over time in terms of teleology and soteriology.
The principle of “associationism” is essentially the naturalistic reading
with which to oppose Plato’s theory of recollection, that is, anamnēsis. In
its basic form, then, the principle of association provides a way to account
for co-occurrence, for example of sensations, feelings, perceptions, or
concepts. Because we are able to associate images, words, concepts, and
110 F. Scalambrino
things with one another, we are able to learn. Recall, Plato’s theory of
anamnēsis was presented in the context of the question: Is learning more
like putting sight into the blind or more like remembering? The natural-
istic reading, then, provides an account of learning that is more like
putting sight into the blind. As will be emphasized in discussion of the
Modern Period, where theories of knowledge showcase rationalism—
knowing by rational inference and intuition—in contrast to empiri-
cism—knowing in terms of evidence from the embodied senses. Though
it may technically be anachronistic to attempt to characterize Aristotle’s
philosophy in terms of the epistemological positon of “empiricism,” we
can still see the principle of association and the empirical principle of
learning through the senses at work in Aristotle’s philosophy of
psychology.
As if distinguishing a theory of learning from the naturalistic stand-
point and in direct contradistinction from Plato’s theory of recollection,
we can find passages such as the following in Aristotle’s writings.
When we recollect, then, we undergo one of the earlier changes, until we

undergo the one after which the change in question habitually occurs. And
this is exactly why we hunt for the successor, starting in our thoughts from
the present or from something else, and from something similar, or oppo-
site, or neighboring [contiguous]. By this means recollection occurs.
(Aristotle 2006: 451b16–20)
It is standardly noted, then, that with the above declaration Aristotle

provided the first “scientific,” or, at least, systematic, statement of the
“laws of association,” that is, the laws of similarity, contrast, and contigu-
ity. Further, in Aristotle’s philosophy “habit” often functions as a princi-
ple of explanation, so much so that he may be seen as, at least, sketching
out the parameters for Modern theories of behavioral conditioning, cog-
nitive accounts of memory function such as “priming,” and even neuro-
scientific eliminativist accounts of learning.
It can happen that by undergoing certain changes once, a person is more

habituated than he is by undergoing other changes many times. And this is
why after seeing some things once, we remember better than we do after
seeing other things many times. (Ibid: 451b10)
Of course, the principle of habit is showcased most prominently in

Aristotle’s ethics. Moreover, it is Aristotle’s ethical theory which may be
seen as providing a kind of culmination to the structural and natural-
functional accounts of ψυχή found in his De Anima. In fact, it is in terms
of Aristotle’s ethical theory that we will find his remaining principles
regarding the structure and function of ψυχή.
Recalling Plato’s Scala Amoris, Aristotle’s naturalistic perspective pro-
vides us with what is standardly called a Scala Natura in contrast. That is
to say, whereas it was an “ascension” in regard to desire and love which
differentiates ψυχή in terms of teleology and soteriology, for Aristotle it
is natural, that is, biologically based, function which differentiates ψυχή
in regard to development and thriving or terrestrial happiness. Aristotle
famously differentiated types of ψυχή based on natural functions into:
(1) “vegetable” or “plant” ψυχή with the natural functions of “nutrition,
growth, and reproduction,” (2) “animal” ψυχή with the natural func-
tions of “sense perception and appetite or desire,” and (3) “human” ψυχή
with the use of reason and rationality as a differentiating natural function
(cf. Aristotle 1956). On the one hand, we want to recognize the Scala
Natura here. That is, there is a “natural hierarchy” which may be seen
across the natural functions. In this way, natural function may be seen as
a principle of explanation for Aristotle as well. As we move “up” from the
plant to human ψυχή, notice each subsequent level retains the potential
to perform the functions found at the “lower” level of ψυχή, while at the
same time gaining more power, that is, the potency to perform even more
ψυχή-based functions. Thus, the Scala Natura describes the natural hier-
archy of beings in nature in terms of the type of ψυχή which constitutes
their be-ing (cf. Benjafield 2012: 12–13).
On the other hand, the principle of natural function also differenti-
ates the plant ψυχή from the animal ψυχή, and so on. This differentia-
tion also characterizes the limits to the structures of the different types
of ψυχή in terms of teleology and soteriology—the azalea has no desire
to paint a sunset. In this way, just as ψυχή is the actualization of a living
body, the teleological structure of ψυχή will be—for Aristotle—func-
tionally constrained by the natural capacities of the body. It is worth
noting that this is one of the reason’s Aristotle does not have a mind-
112 F. Scalambrino
body problem; that is, just as for him there is no ψυχή without a living
body, so too:
we can dismiss as unnecessary the question whether the soul [ψυχή] and
the body are one: it is as though we were to ask whether the wax and its
shape are one, or generally the matter of a thing and that of which it is the
matter. (Aristotle 1984: 412b5–9)
To more fully explicate Aristotle’s teleology and soteriology regarding

human psychology—not his plant or animal psychology—we must look
at his account of human excellence. The account is exclusively human in
that it takes into account physical-embodiment and the use of rational-
ity; moreover, it provides a further level of distinction specifically in
regard to Aristotle’s human psychology. That is to say, the above noted
capacities indicating steps along the Scala Natura are all contained within
the human ψυχή, that is, humans are capable of nutrition, reproduction,
sense perception, and so on. However, there is more to the structure of
the human ψυχή than what was necessary to state in order to merely dif-
ferentiate it from the plant and animal.
Aristotle also used the principle of natural function to enumerate the
various human excellences. Though it is of course possible to ask of all
natural functions whether they are being completed well—for example is
this being perceiving its environment accurately or receiving sufficient
nutrition?—these natural functions of physical-embodiment involve the
specifically human ψυχή function of the use of reason.
Now each function is completed well by being completed properly in

accordance with its virtue. And so the human good proves to be activity of
the soul in accord with virtue, and indeed with the best and most complete
virtue, if there are more virtues than one. (Aristotle 2009: 1098a17)
Further, whereas above we characterized Plato’s theurgy as if it were a

supernatural capacity for “action in the other direction,” that is, from
beyond physical-embodiment to physical-embodiment. Aristotle’s virtue
theory may be characterized in terms of a naturalization of this action in
the other direction by way of the power of “habit.” For, “It should be said,
then, that every virtue causes its possessors to be in a good state and to
perform their functions well.” (Ibid: 1106b17). Now, though it would be
beyond the scope of this book to launch into a discussion of Aristotle’s
accounting for different human virtues, his discussion of different “char-
acter types” is precisely a discussion of the higher structure of the human
ψυχή noted above.
According to Aristotle there are technically six (6) “character types” in
regard to his virtue ethics; however, we will only examine the four (4)
human character types. These are: (1) Virtuous, (2) Continent, (3)
Incontinent, and (4) Vicious character types. Recalling what we referred
to above as the Western “Orthodox” view of the structure of ψυχή and
its characteristic divisions into “affection,” “cognition,” and “conation,”
we noted three organizing principles: “pathos,” “logos,” and “ethos.” These
principles may be used to illustrate distinctions across the character types.
The Continent character type is one in which the individual feels the
temptation to act in accordance with pathos, rather than logos; however,
they tend to overcome the pathos, thereby establishing an ethos that tends
to “hold in” the temptations of pathos, that is, to choose in accordance
with logos. The Incontinent character type is the exact opposite; having a
tendency not to “hold in” the temptations of pathos, this character type
establishes an ethos that tends to choose not in accordance with logos. The
Virtuous character type chooses in accordance with logos and has estab-
lished such a strong ethos tendency that this character type does not expe-
rience the temptations of pathos. The Vicious character type is the exact
opposite; having a tendency to not concern itself with logos, it merely
looks for opportunities to “discharge” its vices, that is, act in accordance
with pathos. (cf. Aristotle 2009: 1102a–1114b).
Though there is, of course, much more that could be said about
Aristotle’s character types, this explication should be sufficient to illus-
trate three points. First, the character types coincide with the ship captain
analogy of ψυχή. That is to say, it is in terms of the organizing principles
of pathos, logos, and ethos that we may articulate how ψυχή is able to exert
influence over an otherwise deterministic physical embodiment, that is,
primarily in terms of habit (ethos). As Aristotle explained, “Someone may
say that all people aim at the apparent good, but have no control over the
appearance, but the end appears to each person in a form answering to that
114 F. Scalambrino
person’s character [emphasis added].” (Ibid: 1114b1). Second, the teleo-

logical and soteriological aspects regarding the structure and function of
ψυχή are shown here in that becoming Virtuous “saves” ψυχή from the
deterministic “animal” pathos of its physical embodiment. Only as
Virtuous, Aristotle suggested for us, can ψυχή actualize its freedom.
Notice, it is in terms of be-ing Virtuous, then, that Aristotle explains
Eudaimonia, that is, human thriving and happiness, and in this way com-
pletes the naturalistic account of that which received a supernatural
account in Plato. For it is through the actualization of natural function
that ψυχή achieves the highest excellence possible, given the conditions
of human physical-embodiment. Lastly, we should inquire why it is that
action in accordance with logos can lead to happiness. The answer may be
seen in looking at the wider context of ψυχή’s natural functions. That is
to say, for Aristotle it is as if the principles of structure and function con-
stitute all of nature; ψυχή is constituted by natural functions and relates
to its environment in terms of the natural functions which are operable
for both it and the environment in its present situation. Put simply, this
amounts to saying that there is a “Natural Law” governing situations, and
acting in accordance with it may be the best for which we can hope, that
is, such accord with nature is excellence for ψυχή. This will be thema-
tized further in the next section.
3.3 Principles from the Philosophy

of Epicurus, Epictetus, and the Catholic
Church
Given the content of this section we begin with two disclaimers. First, on
the one hand, the influence of Christianity—especially through the phil-
osophical principles established in the Middle Ages by Catholic
philosopher-priests—on subsequent psychology is undeniable; however,
our interest here is to explicate philosophical principles, not to provide an
interpretation of Christianity. Second, we are not considering Eastern or
Middle Eastern principles of psychology, and for that reason Buddhist,
Hindu, Jewish, or Islamic principles of psychology, for example, will not
be discussed here. Of course, the shift in worldview from Aristotle to

Christianity may be characterized as a move toward the supernaturalism
of Plato; yet, it is in a way that affirms, rather than denies, many of
Aristotle’s principles regarding ψυχή. This is perhaps most easily noticed
by discussing some principles from Epicurus (341–270 BC) and Epictetus
(55–135) as to “bridge” into this section from the notion of Natural Law
with which we concluded the Aristotle section. Specifically we will dis-
cuss principles of desire from Epicurus, principles of freedom from
Epictetus, and both as they relate to Natural Law. In regard to the
Catholic philosopher-priests of the Middle Ages, then, we will discuss the
following principles: (1) the structural principles of intentionality and
conscience, (2) the functional principles of the “interior life,” person-
hood, and confession and prayer, and (3) Ockham’s methodological prin-
ciple, aka “Ockham’s razor,” which, inadvertently perhaps, allowed for
the principles of Modern science to “revolutionize” the history of Western
psychology (cf. Swindal 2017).
The principle of free will is essential for psychology. Just like the prin-
ciple of the immortality of ψυχή, the position one takes in regard to these
principles immediately makes the resulting system incommensurable
with other systems. Arguing for the value of some types of choice over
others is fruitless if your audience believes “choice” is an illusion. The “free
will problem,” is standardly thought to have originated with the Hedonist
Epicurus (cf. Huby 1967; cf. Schneewind 1998); however, the idea of a
“free will” is standardly thought to have originated with the Stoic Epictetus
(cf. Frede 2011; cf. O’Keefe 2005). Whereas Epicurus and Epictetus share
the naturalistic perspective with Aristotle, Epicurus and Epictetus were
materialists. Further, though the cosmologies of these three philosophers
may be characterized in significant contrast, their psychologies agree in
terms of holism (cf. Gill 2006b); moreover, this is thought to be the case,
despite the fact that Epicurus is famously an atomist in terms of his cos-
mology. Thus, he believed the material universe is not fully deterministic
since there is an element of chance involved; he called this “the swerve”—
atoms sometimes “swerve,” thereby, adding an element of chance such
that one could have acted differently than one did.
In fact what some have called the “substantial holism” common to
these three philosophers regarding ψυχή seems to have been the model
116 F. Scalambrino
for the subsequent distinct notion among Catholic philosophers of ψυχή

as a “substantial form.” Their substantial holism in regard to ψυχή
amounts to an understanding of the structure of ψυχή according to the
following three principles: (1) all ψυχή is body, but not all body is ψυχή,
(2) only what is extended in space and capable of action exists—therefore
ψυχή is extended in space, and (3) ψυχή cannot exist without the
body—therefore ψυχή is not immortal (cf. Gill 2006a: 209). Though it
is considered presentistic and anachronistic to place Plato and Aristotle
on the spectrum of positions regarding “free will,” whereas Epicurus was
an Incompatibilist and not a Determinist, Epictetus advocated for a
Fatalistic worldview and yet was a Compatibilist. However, despite these
differences, there are multiple similarities, such as: Aristotle’s divisions of
ψυχή, what may be called the Hedonist principle of pursuing pleasure
and avoiding pain, and a principle of rational agency. This latter principle
may be seen in terms of the Hedonist Epicurus’ principles regarding
desire and the Stoic Epictetus’ principles of comprehension or under-
standing. Further, insofar as these principles illuminate Hedonist and
Stoic articulations of teleology and soteriology, then they also illuminate
structural and functional interpretations of ψυχή toward an articulation
of Hedonist and Stoic psychologies.
There is a distinction between three types of desire for Epicurus: (1)
“natural and necessary” desires, (2) “natural and non-necessary” desires,
and (3) “vain and empty” desires. The classic examples include: (1) desires
for food and shelter, (2) desires for luxurious food or luxurious shelter,
and (3) desires for power, wealth, fame, and the like (cf. Epicurus 1994).
Epicurus pointed out that whereas the first of the types of desire are easy
to satisfy, they are necessary for life, difficult to eliminate, and they are
naturally limited, that is, if you are hungry, your desire can be satisfied by
a limited amount of food, the second and third types of desire are not
necessary for an individual to survive. Moreover, desires of the third type
have no natural limit. It is for these reasons, then, that the desires can be
associated with the natural functions of embodied ψυχή, on the one
hand, and a “Natural Law” may be developed, on the other. That is to say,
it seems to be a Natural Law that there is a natural limit to certain types
of desire and not to others. Those who go against the Natural Law will
suffer unnatural experiences, or, at least, so goes the Natural Law theoriz-
ing of these ancient Greek ethicists.
In order to understand the Stoic principles of comprehension and
understanding—and their relation to the Natural Law—it is helpful to
initially think about their cosmology. Stoic cosmology is cyclical, and the
individual is subordinate to universal nature, which has a teleology and
progresses circuitously, as if in terms of an endless Big Bang and Big
Crunch cycle. At the moment before the Big Bang, there is only God,
and through the Big Bang the universe is produced out of God; however,
God is not thereby separate from the universe. Moreover, as a fiery kind
of material, God was characterized by the Stoics as a kind of “craftsman-
like fire.” This is the context, then, for a Stoic psychology (cf. Epictetus
1998), and in order to understand Stoic Compatibilism, we should keep
in mind how individual embodied ψυχή’s are always already subordinate
to the endless cycling of God as nature.
Whereas Stoic Fatalism follows directly from Stoic cosmology, Stoic
Compatibilism may be seen by examining the process by which a Stoic
relates to fate. For example, according to Epictetus,
Remember that you are an actor in a drama such as the playwright wishes
it to be. If he wants it short, it will be short; if long, long. If he wants you
to play a beggar, play even that capably; or a lame man, or a ruler, or a
private person. For this is yours, to play the assigned role well. Casting is
the business of another. (Epictetus 1998: §17)
Further, “Don’t seek for things to happen as you wish, but wish for things
to happen as they do, and you will be free from disturbance.” (Ibid: §8).
Notice, then, that Epictetus is not suggesting that ψυχή’s body will never
experience pain or discomfort; rather, he is suggesting that ψυχή will not
be as disturbed by the pain and discomfort as it could be. Moreover,
notice that the mechanism that is supposed to free ψυχή from distur-
bance is characterized in terms of thinking and understanding. How is
this supposed to work? Precisely by understanding that whatever it is you
are experiencing you could not have avoided experiencing it. Now, on the
one hand, this sounds exactly like Determinism and a lack of freedom,
because you could not have avoided the experience. However, ψυχή is
118 F. Scalambrino
free to understand the experience in different ways. Thus, the Stoics see
Determinism (as Fatalism) and free will as Compatible.
On the other hand, what are the different ways in which ψυχή can
relate to its fated experiences? Recalling Aristotle, ψυχή can relate in
terms of pathos or logos. The Stoics are sometimes criticized as “lethally
high-minded” because they see relating to fated events emotionally as
“pathetic.” In order to cultivate Stoic “a-pathy” one needs to be more logi-
cal and accept that the experience was fated, that is, determined. For
instance, consider this bit of Stoic wisdom:
As for everything that delights your mind or is useful or beloved, remember

to describe it as it really is, starting with the smallest thing. If you are fond
of a pot, say “it is a pot that I am fond of.” For then, if it breaks, you will
not be upset. If you kiss your child or your wife, say that you are kissing a
human being. Then if they die you will not be upset. (Epictetus 1998: §3)
For the Stoic, precisely because they are fatalistic, the best we can hope
for is to get a grip on what it is that we have been fated to endure. The
classic statement of the prescribed use of rational agency called “katalep-
sis,” that is, to get a conceptual grip or logical comprehension, comes
from Cicero’s discussion of Zeno of Citium (c. 334-c. 262 BC), the
founder of the Stoicism:
he would display his hand in front of one with the fingers stretched out and
say ‘A visual appearance is like this’; next he closed his fingers a little and
said, ‘An act of assent is like this’; then he pressed his fingers closely together
and made a fist, and said that that was comprehension (and from this illus-
tration he gave to that process the actual name of katalepsis, which it had
not had before) … (Cicero 1967: 2.145)
To sum, it is as if though ψυχή can neither escape the experience of the

natural laws nor of the sequence of the events in the flow of God’s cosmic
unfolding, ψυχή does have rational control over the part of its structure
with which it relates to its fate. This fate includes not just the external natu-
ral functions of the environment but also the natural functions of one’s
fated embodiment. Stoic Compatibilism and the Stoic understanding of
Natural Law have been referred to as the system “into which the Church
Fathers were able to pour the first conceptions of Christian n

atural law and
to impart them to the world of their time.” (Rommen 1998: 10).
One of the ways, then, to philosophically characterize the context of
Catholic psychology is in terms of the movement of a kind of return to
the supernaturalism of Plato informed by the alterations and “progress”
exemplified by naturalistic thinkers such as Aristotle, Epicurus, and
Epictetus. Recall from the above discussion of theurgy and Plato’s phi-
losophy, we referenced “action in the other direction” to characterize the
capacity for a supernatural power to intervene or interact with physically
embodied ψυχή. This, of course, becomes an essential point of departure
for Catholic psychology. Beyond Aristotle’s discussion of natural func-
tion and the excellences or virtues regarding natural function, Catholic
philosophers enumerated the supernatural, or theological, virtues of
“Faith, Hope, and Love (e.g. Charity).” The perennial definition comes
from Aquinas:
additional principles must be given by God to man by which he can thus

be ordered to supernatural happiness. … These additional principles are
called theological virtues: first, because they have God as their object, inas-
much as by them we are rightly ordered to God; secondly, because they are
infused in us by God alone; and finally, because these virtues are made
known to us only by divine revelation in Sacred Scripture. (Aquinas 1920:
I–II, q. 62, a. 1)
Notice, then, that through Catholic psychology the structure of ψυχή is

again considered necessarily in relation to the divine. That is to say, just
as we saw in Plato and Stoicism, ψυχή functions appropriately when in
the proper relation to embodied experience. Thus, even “mental health,”
for example the possibility of happiness, becomes subsumed under
morality.
Thus, these principles of psychology developed from the previous phi-
losophers; yet originating from the Catholic point of view, regarding the
structure of ψυχή are “intentionality” and “conscience,” and regarding
the function of ψυχή are the principle of “interior life” and the principle
of “personhood.” In his commentary on 1 Corinthians 15—which it is
quite interesting to read with the above comments about Stoicism in
120 F. Scalambrino
mind—Aquinas emphasizes, against Plato, that the person is not identi-

cal with the soul, that is, ψυχή:
the Platonists positing immortality, posited re-incorporation, although this

is heretical. … it is clear that man naturally desires his own salvation; but
the soul, since it is part of man’s body, is not an entire man, and my soul is
not I. (Aquinas 2012: §924)
Put simply, the idea is that the person is greater than the sum of its parts,
and just as the composite of ψυχή and physical-body may be understood
in the Aristotelian terminology of form and matter, respectively, so too
through resurrection from the dead the material part of the composite—
it is believed—will be replaced by a celestial or non-physical body; there-
fore, as fully spiritual the person will live forever.
As an integral and spiritual component of the physically embodied and
living person, there are principles regarding ψυχή which contribute to
the trajectory of the person into its non-physically embodied life. These
principles are “intentionality” and “conscience.” The former principle
characterizes the person’s free will in regard to sin and may be retrospec-
tively thought operable in differentiating Aristotle’s character types; fur-
ther, re-asserting the Scala Amoris—though re-contextualized now in
terms of free will and Christian Love—“holiness is in the will and we are
saved by what we love” (Sheed 1946: 10 & cf. Ibid: 61). The latter prin-
ciple characterizes the internal dialog indicative of an ethos, and may be
understood as relating to the notion of the daimon from Plato. Aristotelian
character-building now is directed at a super-natural afterlife with the
potential for the super-natural happiness of beatitude, beyond any tem-
porary happiness for which the naturalistic philosophers advocated.
In terms of function, then, intentionality and conscience as structural
aspects of ψυχή in relation to one another constitute ψυχή’s “inward-
facing,” so to speak, functional principle of the “interior life” of the per-
son (cf. Garrigou-Lagrange 2015: 4–17). Personhood, as Aquinas
indicated above, has become an important principle in that it is not
knowledge “in” ψυχή that unites it with the transcendental dimension, it
is the willing “of ” ψυχή that unites its holistically understood person
with God. “Outward-facing,” then, would be the soteriological-theurgical
component from Plato after progressing through dialectical exchange

with the philosophies of Aristotle, Epicurus, and Epictetus, among oth-
ers. This component may be characterized in a number of ways; however,
for our purpose, we will point to “confession” and “prayer” in that these
principles have, throughout the history of Western psychology, been con-
sidered psychotherapeutic (cf. Jung 2001, 2014; cf. Worthen 1974).
Thus, with Catholic philosophy Western psychology reached the pinna-
cle of its identification with morality.
It is now standard to locate the groundwork for the Modern Period’s
movement away from the Medieval-Scholastic system of the Middle Ages
in the principles of the excommunicated Catholic monk William of
Ockham (1285–1347), especially his nominalism and what is referred to
as “Ockham’s Razor” (cf. Swindal 2017; cf. Kugelmann 2011). In regard
to the “problem of universals” discussed above and in opposition to the
“realist” philosophers we have been discussing thus far, Ockham was a
“nominalist.” In order to get clear on Ockham’s position, recall from the
discussion of Aristotle’s methodology, dialectic was understood in the
context of his “word-concept-thing” understanding of signification.
Ockham basically emphasizes that it is a mistake to treat a word as a
thing. Words are just names, and as such may not refer to any thing in
reality at all. On the one hand, Ockham’s nominalism, then, has a lasting
effect on Aristotle’s dialectic—despite its naturalistic perspective (cf.
Ockham 1990; cf. Maurer 1978; cf. Panaccio 2004). Basically, Ockham
separates induction from dialectic, leaving a kind of empiricism without
realism in its place. We can still investigate the things of reality; however,
Ockham was against considering their description to be real. Ockham
himself continued to use dialectal arguments; however, history attests
that he successfully re-framed the use of dialectic as a means of persua-
sion, rather than a scientific method for discovering truth (cf. Maurer
1999: 113–125; cf. Stump 1989: 253).
On the other hand, Ockham’s razor may be seen as an articulation of a
principle stated in Aristotle’s discussion of demonstration. According to
Aristotle, “Let that demonstration be better which, other things being
equal, depends on fewer postulates or suppositions or propositions. For if
they are equally familiar, knowing will come about more quickly in this
way; and that is preferable.” (Aristotle 1964a: 86a34–36). However,
122 F. Scalambrino
Ockham’s combination of this principle with nominalism may be seen as

a shift toward a different methodology (cf. Brampton 1964). Both Galileo
(1564–1642) and Newton (1643–1727) emphasize Ockham’s razor as a
“principle of parsimony,” Ernst Mach (1838–1916) emphasized it as a
“principle of economy,” and Stephen Hawking, while celebrating it, indi-
cates “Heisenberg’s uncertainty Principle” as an evolved version:
We could still imagine that there is a set of laws that determine events
completely for some supernatural being who, unlike us, could observe the
present state of the universe without disturbing it. However, such models
of the universe are not of much interest to us ordinary mortals. It seems
better to employ the principle of economy known as Ockham’s razor and
cut out all the features of the theory that cannot be observed. (Hawking
and Mlodinow 2007: 91)
The effect of Ockham’s razor as a scientific principle has been champi-

oned, then—especially as a principle of progress—against Pre-Modern
“scientific” uses of dialectical reasoning. Simply put, basing a transcen-
dental theory on reality is problematic, since there is disagreement regard-
ing the words used to describe that reality (cf. Wood 1990: 194; cf. Wood
2015: 170). What this means is that it may be difficult—despite coherent
uses of the term “be-ing”—to explain the relation between the be-ing of
ψυχή and the be-ing of all beings (even when the Being of that be-ing is
understood as a Person theurgically, so to speak, interacting with ψυχή).
Moreover, it may be consider explanatorily unnecessary for many think-
ers. On the one hand, given an understanding of ψυχή as a physical being,
discussion of the transcendental dimension in relation to ψυχή may be
eliminated from the naturalistic perspective. On the other hand, as the
Contemporary Period can attest, it is not clear if living by Ockham’s razor
means for psychologists that they must eventually also cut out the very of
idea of ψυχή itself—in the service of ultimately becoming biologists. In
this way, the approach of natural science to ψυχή has been to eliminate the
previously supposed entities which have come to be considered explanato-
rily unnecessary, while at the same time avoiding positing any new beings
if not necessary for explanation. This, as we have already seen has led to
some systems of Western psychology in which p ersonhood, freedom of the
will and ψυχή itself have been considered explanatorily unnecessary (cf.
Frankfurt 2009: 197). Notice, the idea that such aspects are humane or
belong in descriptions of ψυχή in that psychology is a human science,
have met with opposition from the natural science perspective which sug-
gests that those are aspects of morality, theology, or politics and, ultimately,
may not need to be included in a science of psychology.
Notes
1. For many readers it may be helpful to think of this discussion as Plato’s
Western explication of the Eastern notion of “karma” (cf. Scalambrino
2017: 30–35).
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4
The Early Modern Battle
for the Archimedean Point
4.1 Principles from the Renaissance

and the Modern Scientific Revolution
The purpose of this section is to introduce the Renaissance principles
which influenced the “Modern Scientific Revolution” and Early Modern
psychology. The discussion of René Descartes’ (1596–1650) influence on
Early Modern psychology, then, will be presented in terms of his innova-
tions regarding the structural, functional and methodological principles
in the study of ψυχή. Though names such as Copernicus, Galileo, and
Francis Bacon are always associated with the Modern Scientific
Revolution, we will invoke them here only insofar as is needed to indicate
the principles of this historical period regarding Western psychology.
The following five (5) principles are standardly associated with the
Renaissance: Classicalism, Secularism, Humanism, Perspectivism, and
Individualism. The two historical events most often referenced as influ-
encing the shift in worldview accomplished by the Renaissance are the
“Western Schism” and the “Protestant Reformation.” During the Western
Schism (1378–1417) the corruption associated with the Catholic
Church—such as concubinage and the sale of indulgences and religious

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74733-0_4
130 F. Scalambrino
offices—led to three different men all claiming to be the Pope. Ultimately,

in regard to the principles operable in regard to the study of ψυχή, the
Western Schism and the Protestant Reformation significantly called the
authority of the Catholic Church into question. In fact, were we to char-
acterize the conditions which led to the emphasis of these principles in
Kuhnian terms, we could say that it was a “crisis of authority.” Thus,
where it was actually sacrilege to not adhere to the principles of the
Catholic Church regarding the supernatural, due to the authority of the
Church, the same held with regard to Aristotle’s philosophical under-
standing of nature. Yet, just like the Schism and the Reformation regard-
ing the Church, technological advances at the time made Aristotle’s
physics—especially his characterization of motion—increasingly difficult
to accept.
The principle of Classicalism refers to the return to Classical sources in
search of alternative methods, descriptions, and explanations from those
offered by the Church and Aristotle or their combination as “Scholastic-
Aristotelianism.” Thus, the study of Plato—recall Aquinas’ denouncing
his ontological and soteriological views of ψυχή above as “heretical”—
experienced a significant upsurge. The principle of Secularism may be
characterized in multiple ways; however, for our purpose it represents the
formulation into a principle of the separation of morality and theology
from science. The principle of Humanism, then, takes human concerns
and concerns for humanity—as opposed to concerns for the divine—as
its point of departure. Whereas principles pertaining to the supernatural
and the divine were Absolute and totalizing in character, the principles of
the Renaissance were more Relativistic.
Such was especially the case regarding Renaissance aesthetics, for
example manifesting in painting and sculpture, from where the principle
of Perspectivism derived (cf. Edgerton 2009). In mereological terms we
may say that Perspectivism represents a shift in emphasis from the whole
to its parts—each part has a different perspective on the whole; moreover,
this relegation of the whole can be radically conceived to the point of its
vanishing, that is, the perspective of parts without a perspective from the
point of view of a whole. Not only was such thinking important for a
movement toward atomism away from Aristotle’s holism but also toward
Individualism. For of all that may be said of the principle of Individualism,
The Early Modern Battle for the Archimedean Point 131
it is perhaps enough for us to note here the famous quote from Coluccio
Salutati (1331–1406) “heaven belongs by right to those energetic men
who have sustained great struggles and achieved fine works on earth”
(Baudrillart 1907: 15; cf. Cassirer 1963: 73–74; cf. Burckhardt 1995; cf.
Foucault 1988). In this way, a person is understood as able to actualize its
unique individual potential to make a contribution to community and
history.
As the historicity of Renaissance self-commentary shows, there was a
distinction operable at the time between “old” and “new philosophy.”
There was a call for a “new philosophy” to replace the old authorities
given the Renaissance “expectation of what a philosophy should do, and
a sentiment that the old philosophy was not doing it properly.” (Menn
1998: 34; cf. Edwards 2013; cf. Knight 1982). The call for a “new phi-
losophy” was first and foremost understood as a call for a new method.
The basic idea here is that now that the authority of Aristotle and the
Church had been called into question what is needed is a method to
replace such “appeal to authority.” Essentially there were two types of
methodology which were contenders: induction and deduction. In terms
of the early distinction between dialectic and demonstration, induction
and deduction function as types of demonstration. Whereas the conclu-
sions from inductive methodology claim probability, those from deduc-
tive methodology claim certainty. When these methods are taken to be
the centerpieces of respective theories of knowledge in the Early Modern
Period, the theories of knowledge are Empiricism and Rationalism.
Though in hindsight it is standard to refer to the Rationalist Descartes
as the “Father of Modern Philosophy,” in terms of the “new philosophy”
he is rather at its conclusion than its origination. At the origin of the
“new philosophy” was the beginning of Empiricism. Bernadino Telesio
(1509–1588) advocated for Radical Empiricism in the form of
Sensationalism (cf. Kristeller 1964; cf. Leijenhorst 2010). His methodol-
ogy was followed by the less radical Empiricism of Francis Bacon
(1561–1626). With Classicalism’s revival of interest in Plato’s philosophy
came both Nicholas of Cusa (1401–1464) and Marsilio Ficino
(1433–1499) and the development of a principle of “dynamic interme-
diation,” using Plato’s idea of the Scala Amoris, between God and the
Cosmos (cf. Cassirer 1963). Just as in Plato, Recollection changes ones
132 F. Scalambrino
relation to embodiment, so too ψυχή’s ability to witness the Transcendental

dimension allows for humans to witness holiness, despite the carnality of
physical-animal-embodiment. Telesio may be seen as attacking this idea
covertly by criticizing the idea of conceptual-mediation of reality in gen-
eral—think Occam’s razor here. In other words, his Radical Empiricism
was supposed to end the process of using, especially Aristotle’s, ideas to
mediate the experience of nature. The hope was that somehow nature
might “speak for herself.” The “new philosophy” was in search of a “non-
discursive” relation to nature out of which its truth may be revealed, and
it would find such a relation in terms of mathematics.
In this way, the importance of art in the Renaissance for science cannot
be overstated insofar as the innovations taking place in terms of
Perspectivism and the deciphering of mathematical relations found in
nature could be understood as the discovery of the human ability to
“read” the “book of nature.” On the one hand, this may be articulated in
terms of methodology. On the other hand, this relation between art,
mathematics, and nature originated with Leonardo da Vinci (1452–1519)
and was carried forward in principle by Galileo. In his Republic Plato
famously characterized the difference between dialectic and mathematics
in terms of “upward” and “downward” movement, respectively (Plato
1997: 511d–523a; cf. Cornford 2013: 67; cf. Cassirer 1963: 171–172).
Leonardo and Galileo both conceived of their methodologies as attempts
to combine these two movements, and, when seen in terms of the com-
bination of induction and deduction, this are often characterized as the
birth of the “scientific method” (cf. Crombie 1996; cf. Drake and Levere
1999). Given this groundwork, we can now understand Descartes’ place
in relation to the Renaissance and the “new philosophy.”
There is an issue which anyone discussing Descartes may mention as
disclaimer. During Descartes’ lifetime people were still being killed for
making “heretical” claims; Giordano Bruno (1548–1600) was burned at
the stake for, among other beliefs, his affirmation of the Copernican sys-
tem (cf. Isaiah 40:22) and belief in re-incarnation (cf. Bruno 2004; cf.
Bruno 1998; cf. Yates 1964), and Galileo was convicted of heresy as
recently as 1633. Thus, disclaimer is often made that Descartes’ concern
to remain alive may have influenced the manner in which he presented
his thoughts (cf. Gibson 2017). Be that as it may, Descartes, of course,

famously wrote a Discourse on Method (1637) in addition to works titled
“Rules for the Direction of the Mind” (1628), and Principles of Philosophy
(1644), all of which deal explicitly with methodology.
Descartes’ methodology may be seen as the perfect combination of
dialectic and demonstration toward a non-heretical justification of the
mathematization of nature by using the “upward” movement of critical
dialectic to arrive at a certainty from which to begin the “downward”
movement of demonstration. Plato emphasized that mathematics begins
with hypothetical first principles and dialectic with non-hypothetical first
principles, and whereas the “scientific method” of Leonardo and Galileo
must still begin with hypothetical principles in observing nature,
Descartes pointed to a non-hypothetical certainty by observing ψυχή.
Further, given the importance of the principle of interiority or “the inte-
rior life” for the Christian understanding of salvation, Descartes’
Subjectivism and principle of self-consciousness fit nicely into a Christian
worldview. Moreover, Descartes’ method affirmed the relativistic needs of
the “new philosophy” in that it grounded subject-object binary opposi-
tion in terms measurement dependent on the point of view of the
observer. His method seemed to allow for the co-ordination of objective
certainty with the subjective certainty he had established through his
infamous principle of the Cogito.
In brief, Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) may be read
as a way of meeting the methodological criteria for the “new philosophy.”
The first two meditations represent his critical-dialectic in which he
engages in hyperbolic doubt until he arrives at a certainty; that is, he can-
not doubt that he is doubting, and as a kind of thinking, this thinking
means that some thinking thing exists (or in the language of the Discourse
on Method: “I think, therefore I am” Cogito Ergo Sum). After arriving at
this certainty of the subject, he then proceeds to demonstrate how it is
possible to be certain of objects. Thus, Descartes understood the Cogito
as the Archimedean point needed to lift science out of the jurisdiction of
the Church. There are a number of principles which move to the fore-
ground through Descartes, then, which are different from the principles
emphasized in Pre-Modern thinking.
134 F. Scalambrino
The overarching way to refer to what Descartes accomplished is that he

shifted philosophy from a “Theo-centric” model to an “Ego-centric”
model. Moving philosophy from dialog to soliloquy, Descartes anchored
the different “worlds” of spirit and nature in mind and body by affirming
a substance dualism based on the Cogito. From there Descartes was able
to characterize mind in terms of rationality and body in terms of math-
ematics. He affirmed the principles of Nativism in that “the natural light”
of rationality contains Innate Ideas with which we identify the various
qualities of nature which may then quantified. On the one hand, his
methodology ushers in the principle of mechanism by regarding the
physical interactions between bodies in nature to be understood as math-
ematically determinable and, thereby, deterministic. On the other hand,
his methodology infamously left us with the “Mind-Body Problem,” in
that subsequent thinkers note the inadequacy of his theorizing to account
for interaction between two heterogeneous substances, that is, mind and
body; or—put another way—how can there be freedom within, or in
relation to, mechanistic and deterministic nature?
In sum, we have seen the impetus for Descartes’ methodology in regard
to the Renaissance call for a “new philosophy,” and we have seen it char-
acterized in terms of its emphasis regarding principles upon which
Modern thinking is founded, for example Ego-centric justification. Just
as the Modern Period is often characterized as a reduction or elimination
of Aristotle’s Four Causes to the Material and Efficient causes in an affir-
mation of Ockham’s razor, the “Modern Scientific Revolution” affirmed
the principle of atomism over holism and mechanism over teleology. In
regard to the structure of ψυχή, then, for Descartes animal ψυχή is
mechanistic—so much so that animals are essentially machines—and the
rational ψυχή (as it was called above by Aristotle) for Descartes is the
mind with its mechanical operations of volitions, affections, and judg-
ments (cf. Meditation III). In regard to function, the will affirms or
denies, that is, pursues or avoids, just like a machine. In Meditation VI,
Descartes criticizes Aristotle’s metaphor of the ship captain for ψυχή,
suggesting that the “thinking thing” that is, the mind is one with the
body. Anticipating what will be considered more fully below, Descartes’
methodology with its rational, mechanical, and atomistic systematization
of substance dualism will be debated primarily regarding its Mind-Body
problem—at times in terms of freedom and nature.
4.2 Principles from the Age

of Enlightenment: Early Modern
Subjectivity and Personality
As could be expected by considering his moniker, the “Father of Modern
Philosophy,” Descartes’ accomplishment of the “new philosophy” estab-
lished the context regarding how to understand ψυχή for the Modern
Period. Most importantly for psychology is the general problem of ψυχή’s
identity, or, more specifically, the problem of subjectivity and the prob-
lem of personality in the wake of the “new philosophy.” This section will
state these problems as they emerged from Descartes’ work before address-
ing the responses which constitute Early Modern philosophical psychol-
ogy. In general there are four (4) types of response, and these responses
cover a number of philosophers from Locke to Kant. It is this period of
time (from Descartes to Kant) that History and Systems of Psychology
textbooks usually address as a “direct” influence on Contemporary psy-
chology; moreover, there is a clear line of development across this period
of time. Just as Descartes’ psychology has been labeled the “way of ideas”
and Locke’s the “new way of ideas,” so too we have Locke’s Essays on
Human Understanding and Leibniz’s New Essays on Human Understanding.
Further, whereas Berkeley’s contribution is a more extreme version of
Locke’s, Hume’s is even more extreme.
Thus, moving into Late Modernism and more contemporary theories
of psychology, there are six (6) endpoints to the four (4) types of response
to Descartes’ “new philosophy” to be taken up out of Early Modern phi-
losophy: (1) the Radical Empiricism of Positivism, (2) Locke’s Newtonian
Empiricism (with or without its extreme articulation by Berkeley), (3)
the “Associationism” of Hume’s Nominalistic Empiricism, or the reac-
tions to Hume: (4) Wolff’s development of Leibniz’s philosophical psy-
chology, (5) Thomas Reid’s “Folk Psychology,” and (6) Kant’s
Transcendental Psychology. It is especially valuable for a psychologist to
understand the incommensurabilities present between these various sys-
tems as responses to the Modern problematic set in motion by Descartes,
since the principles and the relations between the principles of these
incommensurable systems may be used to clarify the identities and
incommensurabilities of Contemporary systems of psychology.
136 F. Scalambrino
According to Kant, in regard to the Age of Enlightenment there is a

“motto of enlightenment,” and it exhorts: “Have courage to use your own
understanding!” (Kant 1983: 41). Though we are, of course, only con-
cerned to discuss psychology here, the Age of Enlightenment may be
understood as a period of time—prompted by the principles of the
Renaissance—in which thinkers were doing just that in regard to all the
aspects of human existence, especially the natural and the human sci-
ences. However, despite its spirit, the Age may still be seen in terms of its
collective activity and development of solutions to perennial philosophi-
cal problems characterized in terms of the principles emphasized by the
Modern Period. Thus Descartes bequeathed the Age with the problem of
subjectivity and, as if it were the price to be paid for acquiring the “new
philosophy,” Early Modern subjectivity was haunted by “Solipsism.”
Recall that Descartes’ method found certainty by following ideas to
the point of being certain that the presence of ideas cannot be doubted.
As a result this is often called “the way of ideas.” Anticipating what
becomes of this way of ideas in Modern philosophy, it is interesting to
note its relation to what above we called Aristotle’s “word-concept-thing”
understanding of signification. As we will discuss in a moment, in com-
bination with the shift from a Theo-centric to an Ego-centric worldview
the “word-concept-thing” understanding of signification leads to
Solipsism, that is, the idea that there is no way to know how our ideas
and concepts relate to things. In regard to the problem of subjectivity,
recall Descartes’ characterization of essentially everything that is mental.
In Meditation III Descartes makes the following two seminal claims: On
the one hand, “I first group all my thoughts into certain classes … Some
of these thoughts are like images of things … Some of these thoughts are
called volitions or affects, while others are called judgments.” (Descartes
2006: 20). On the other hand, “here I must inquire particularly into
those ideas that I believe to be derived from things existing outside me.
Just what reason do I have for believing that these ideas resemble those
things?” (Ibid: 21).
For Descartes, it is as if combining the principles of secularism and
individualism accomplished a separation, so to speak, from the “Unity”
of the Transcendental dimension, leaving Early Modern philosophy with
a Mind-Body problem, the problem of subjectivity, and Solipsism. For
example, what is the Cartesian subject? As Franz Brentano once charac-

terized explicitly in regard to the first quote above from Meditation III:
“it is one thing to produce the judgment and quite another thing to be
that judgment.” (Brentano 1966: 29). Recall from Descartes’ statement
of the Cogito in Meditation II: “I am therefore precisely nothing but a
thinking thing.” (Descartes 2006: 15). In this quite literal way, then, the
Cartesian subject is the subject of judgement. Now, if the Theo-centric
system were still operable, this subject could be characterized—as
Berkeley essentially would come to characterize it in his 1710 A Treatise
Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge—as a thought in the mind
of God. However, in light of the principle of Secularism and the project
of the “new philosophy,” Descartes’ subject is—again—quite literally the
thoughts present—like a ghost—in a machine made of meat, and to quote
Descartes: “nothing but.”
On the one hand, notice that in conjunction with Descartes’ substance
dualism this characterization of subjectivity should seem highly problem-
atic. That is, because of the Mind-Body problem we cannot even say—as
Locke would come to characterize it in his 1689 An Essay Concerning
Human Understanding—that the body “has” these ideas. It is for this
reason that the Cartesian subject has invoked—in fact, by Descartes him-
self—the imagery of a camera obscura (cf. Olson 2014). On the other
hand, in regard to the historicity of Descartes’ articulation of such a sub-
ject, it may not have seemed as problematic to Descartes as it may from a
more panoramic view of the history Western philosophy. The basic idea
comes down to the distinction between “conscience” and “conscious” in
what may be called the Early Modern principle of self-consciousness.
Notwithstanding the daimon of ancient Greek philosophy, recalling that
reflection on one’s actions would have had a moral context in the Middle
Ages, it has been suggested that with the advent of Secularism such refec-
tion, by taking on a non-moral context, produced the division between
conscience and being self-conscious (cf. Balibar 1992; cf. Lewis 1960). In
this way, what Descartes may have simply meant was that the very aware-
ness of the ideas as ideas was a kind of self-conscious idea, and from the
point of departure of self-consciousness, one recognizes the subject in the
subject-object binary opposition to be the ideas (cf. Thiel 2011: 43–45;
cf. Angell 1904: 376–390).
138 F. Scalambrino
Taken in combination, then, that is, the Cartesian subject and the
principle of the camera obscura, or in other terms the “way of ideas” and
a secular “word-concept-thing” understanding of signification, we arrive
at Solipsism. Just as the principle of the camera obscura refers to the way
the image inside of its dark space is an inversion of the thing outside it,
so too we arrive at the second quote noted above from Descartes’
Meditation III: “here I must inquire particularly into those ideas that I
believe to be derived from things existing outside me. Just what reason do
I have for believing that these ideas resemble those things?” (Descartes
2006: 21). Thus, the problem of Solipsism is that one may not be able to
know whether any thing outside one’s own mind truly exists (cf. Johnstone
1991). Given these problems in Descartes’ characterization of ψυχή, we
are now in a better position to understand the four (4) types of response
to Descartes’ “new philosophy”—covering a number of philosophers
from Locke to Kant—and to provide context for understanding the vari-
ous philosophical principles which emerge regarding psychology in the
Modern Period (cf. Brennan 2003: 89–117).
First, there was the “positivist” response. In regard to this period in
Western history we may characterize the two different types of positivistic
response as “sensorium-positivism” and “contractual-positivism.”
Basically, positivism takes sensory experience to be the exclusive source of
knowledge; if some thing cannot be confirmed through sensory experi-
ence, then it does not exist. For this reason, positivism is associated with
materialism and the idea that if whatever it is that is under discussion
cannot be found in space, then it does not exist. Thus, the principle of the
spiritual, or non-material, characterization of ψυχή as not in space (and
thereby not confirmable through sensory experience) amounts to reveal-
ing “ψυχή” as a fiction (cf. Riskin 2002: 19–68). The Early Modern
philosophers associated with sensorium-positivism are Étienne Bonnot
de Condillac (1714–1780) and Julien Offray de La Mettrie (1709–1751).
Condillac not only denied Descartes’ principle of nativism, he denied the
presence of non-material “mind” at all. In this way, of course, Condillac
was a material monist (cf. de Condillac 2001). La Mettrie, emphasizing
the principle of mechanism, understood psychology as essentially a
physiology of meat machines governed by the hedonistic principle (cf. de
La Mettrie 2003). Hence, Solipsism is thought to be avoided because we

are all material things, the self-animating of which may recognize other
things through sensory experience.
Though similar to the above French “sensorium-positivism,” an English
“contract-positivism” may be attributed to Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679).
Though Hobbes too affirmed the principle of material monism, the
essential distinction between the two types of positivistic ways to avoid
the problem of Solipsism is that subjectivity for Hobbes requires a con-
tract (cf. Frost 2005). In this way, the Hobbesian subject differs from the
Cartesian subject in that it is not the subject of judgment, that is, words
or ideas; rather, it is the subject of contractual agreement (cf. Byron 2015;
cf. Deleuze 2005). Moreover, though Hobbes also understood humans as
meat machines operating in accordance with the hedonistic principle, he
revered the creative-power which comes from mathematical ability such
that he thought that through such a capacity humans might be thought
of as “mortal gods” (cf. Miller 2011). Thus, it is as if for both of these
types of positivism the structure of ψυχή is understood as material, and
the function of ψυχή is understood in mechanistic terms governed by the
hedonistic principle; the subject is the material body, and the person is
(emphasizing the legal nature of the term) the capacity to enter into a
contractual agreement.
Second, there was the “Mental Passivity” response. This response was
born out of the empiricism of John Locke (1632–1704), and we should
keep in mind that Locke characterized himself as an “under-laborer” for
Newton. Some of the key principles associated with Locke are his re-
emphasis of Aristotle’s idea of tabula rasa to use against Descartes’ prin-
ciple of nativism and his use of Aristotle’s principle of association to
breathe Protestant Christianity into Hobbes’ characterization of person-
hood. Locke was—like Descartes—a substance dualist; however, Locke
characterized the relation between body and mind—matter and spirit—
in terms of Aristotle’s Efficient Causation. In other words, the mind is a
“blank slate” and ideas are “written” on it through the sensory experiences
of the body. Moreover, Locke characterizes this relation in terms of the
camera obscura, and, anticipating what will be considered more fully
below, it is worth quoting at length:
140 F. Scalambrino
this is the only way that I can discover; whereby the ideas of things are
brought into the understanding … external and internal sensation are the
only passages that I can find of knowledge to the understanding. These
alone, as far as I can discover, are the windows [emphasis added] by which
light is let into this dark room: for methinks, the understanding is not
much unlike a closet wholly shut from light, with only some little opening
left, to let in external visible resemblances, or ideas of things without;
would the pictures coming into such a dark room but stay there, and lie so
orderly as to be found upon occasion, it would very much resemble the
understanding of man, in reference to all objects of sight, and of the ideas
of them. (Locke 1841: 93–94)
As noted above, the problem of Solipsism haunts Early Modern philoso-

phy to such an extent that—as can be seen in the above quote—Locke’s
philosophy of experience has been characterized as a “veil of ideas” or a
“veil of perception,” such that the things on one side of the veil are differ-
ent from the way they appear on the other side. Locke’s “windows” allow
for the external things and their internal re-presentations to correspond
in terms of “primary qualities,” with “secondary qualities” pertaining
only to their re-presentation.
Now, technically Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) should be
discussed next; however, since he initiates the “Mental Activity” response,
he is discussed below; yet, it should be noted that his response to the
camera obscura imagery is to suggest that ψυχή (what he calls “monad”)
has “no windows” (Leibniz 1989: 214 [Monadology §7]). Thus, though
both of the next two representatives of the “Mental Passivity” response
may be understood as taking this position, technically Leibniz took it
first. The first of the next two representatives, then, Bishop George
Berkeley (1685–1753) was, of course, interested in a non-secular reading
of Locke’s “new way of ideas” and “veil of perception.” In this way,
Berkeley advocates for three principles: first, the principle of spiritual
monism—he claims that the be-ing of every thing that is either mental or
depends on a mind; second, the principle of “dogmatic idealism”—he
claims that there is no such thing as “matter.” Lastly, both of these are
captured in what is sometimes called “Berkeley’s principle,” that is, “to be
is to be perceived.” (Berkeley 1910: 32). In regard to the “veil of
perception” or “ideas” he argued: “Properly and immediately nothing can
be perceived but ideas. All material things therefore are in themselves

insensible, and to be perceived only by their ideas.” (Berkeley 1979: 41).
He then asked the rhetorical questions:
But how can that which is sensible be like that which is insensible? Can a
real thing in itself invisible be like a color; or a real thing which is not
audible, be like a sound? In a word, can anything be like a sensation or idea,
but another sensation or idea? (Ibid)
Thus, in regard to the relations among words-ideas-things, he concluded:

“I am not for changing things into ideas, but rather ideas into things;
since those immediate objects of perception, which according to you, are
only appearances of things, I take to be the real things themselves.” (Ibid:
77), and as a result, “all those bodies … of the world, have not any sub-
sistence without a mind … their being is to be perceived … From what
has been said it follows there is not any other Substance than Spirit, or
that which perceives.” (Berkeley 1910: 32–33).
Finally, David Hume (1711–1776) took a similar position; however,
as an atheist he eliminated any principle which might contribute to a
revival of a Theo-centric system. Since the time of at least Aristotle, there
has been a principle of empiricism, which was considered axiomatic in
Scholasticism—call it the Peripatetic principle—that: “Nothing is in the
intellect that was not first in the senses.” Whereas every empiricist affirms
this principle, Hume points out that there is no sensory verification for a
number of ideas in the intellect; he showed that such ideas are rather
grounded in the “association” of other ideas. Though the principle of the
association of ideas had been around since Aristotle, Hume was the first
Modern thinker to employ it in an atheistic context. In doing so, he sug-
gested ideas such as “causation” and “the self ” are based on “relations of
ideas.” (cf. Hume 1993: 15; cf. Waxman 1994; cf. Bricke 1980). Hume
infamously argued:
Philosophers begin to be reconciled to the principle, that we have no idea of

external substance, distinct from the ideas of particular qualities. This must
pave the way for a like principle with regard to mind, that we have no
notion of it, distinct from the particular perceptions. (Hume 1985: 677)
142 F. Scalambrino
The main thrust of Hume’s argument is threefold. First, this complete

denial of a “mind,” just like his denial of a “self ” or “person,” can be seen
as an Early Modern affirmation of the principle of elimination. Next,
on the one hand, the ideas we have which are based on “relations of
ideas” are not reality-based. They are “constructs.” The study of the
principles which influence or determine the construction of these ideas
has become a major concern in Contemporary psychology. On the
other hand, “Hume’s problem” may be characterized in terms of a priori
propositions.
That is, if either ideas like “causation” are not reality-based, since we
have no sensory verification for them or such ideas have pragmatic value
(however we can never know how they relate to mind-external reality),
then—in either case—how are a priori judgments possible? In other
words, how can humans make accurate predictions about causation—for
example how motion in one billiard ball will cause motion in another bil-
liard ball—before ever having a similar experience on which to base the
prediction? Hume’s problem—as we will discuss further in other sec-
tions—has had a significant impact on subsequent thinking, especially in
regard to the philosophy of science. In sum, then, it is as if across these
three representatives of the empirical “Mental Passivity” response to
Solipsism, the “new way of ideas” leads to the extreme position requiring
either God to secure the subject and remove the problem of Solipsism or
the complete removal of the subject and, thereby, the problem of
Solipsism, in favor of social (i.e. non-Solipsistic) justifications for con-
structs such as the “self ” or the “subject” (cf. Yolton 1984). Moreover, for
Locke and Hume, the structure of ψυχή is understood as material, and
the function of ψυχή is understood in mechanistic terms with “will”
governed by the hedonistic principle and “understanding” governed by
the principle of association.
Third, there was the “Mental Activity” response. This response was
born out of the rationalism of Leibniz (1646–1716). On the one hand,
the guiding principle here, in general, follows the way of ideas by suggest-
ing “mind” is known through ideas, and—emphasizing activity—that
body is known through action. On the other hand, Leibniz’s influence is
often underestimated by Contemporary psychologists. Yet, we should be
able to recognize among the following principles from Leibniz just how
far-reaching—beyond even Modern psychology—his thinking continues

to be. Leibniz’s psychological principles include (1) unconscious influ-
ences on the mind, which were identified with activity of the body (cf.
Leibniz 1997: 54–59; cf. Leibniz 1989: 214–216), (2) innate potencies
and dispositions as intense folds within ψυχή (cf. Deleuze 1993), (3) he
combined the idea of innate potencies with an inside out, so to speak,
version of Plato’s theory of Recollection—the beginnings of a psychody-
namic archetype theory (cf. Leibniz 1997: 52), and (4) by conceiving of
“resistance” to unconscious influences as an activity, Leibniz was able to
reconfigure the idea of passivity into activity: passive reception is actually
an active release of the resistance (Ibid: 171–176).
Leibniz invented the term “apperception”—the capacity to perceive
oneself perceiving—in his discussion of Locke’s discussion of human
understanding. Critically invoking the Peripatetic principle, he noted,
against Locke’s tabula rasa, “Someone will confront me with this accepted
philosophical axiom, that there is nothing in the soul [ψυχή] which does
not come from the senses. But an exception must be made of the soul
[ψυχή] itself.” (Leibniz 1997: 111). Leibniz’s nativism, then, is far more
radical than Descartes’ in that what would be consider “the body” previ-
ously is now considered the activity of innate potentialities—the devel-
opment of ψυχή’s intense folds (cf. Parkinson 1982). Self-consciousness
takes on the metaphor of a “mirror” (again) with Leibniz, and Leibniz
attempts to return to the mind as mirror of God metaphor by claiming
the interiority of ψυχή (recall it is conceived by Leibniz as a monad—
camera obscura—without windows) mirrors the Cosmos or Nature; how-
ever, through appropriate activity (morality) ψυχή can be clarified so as
to realize that the Cosmos it is reflecting is God (cf. Scalambrino 2015).1
Before Kant’s philosophy took its rightful place, towering over the pre-
vious Early Modern philosophers, there was an attempt to systematize
Leibniz’s philosophy particularly worth mentioning for psychology. That
attempt was made by Christian von Wolff (1679–1754). The “Mental
Activity” response was essentially a German endeavor, and before Kant
Wolff’s philosophy was famously celebrated in Germany. As can be seen
by the titles of his major works in psychology, Wolff attempted to
re-
interpret Early Modern philosophy taking Leibniz as a point of
departure—Empirical Psychology (1732) and Rational Psychology (1734).
144 F. Scalambrino
Though this would basically be the same strategy Kant would later
employ, Wolff’s interpretation remained within the scope of the position
of Rationalism, like Leibniz.
The Leibnizian roots of the major and lasting principles with which
Wolff is credited may be clearly seen. On the one hand, Wolff’s focus on
the potentialities located in ψυχή by Leibniz became “faculty psychol-
ogy,” that is, the association of the study of psychology with mental facul-
ties. On the other hand, the previous Cartesian distinction understood as
the Mind-Body Problem was now understood—through Leibniz back to
Aristotle’s divisions between animal and human—in terms of ψυχή as
sensation and imagination (Body) and understanding and reasoning
(Mind). Thus, according to the “Mental Activity” response: methodolog-
ically it pushes even further—as with the strategy found in Berkeley and
Hume—into the camera obscura model; the structure of ψυχή is under-
stood as spiritual, and the function of ψυχή is understood in terms of
activity—including what was previously understood as “passive” bodily
functions as they relate to mind.
Fourth, there was the “Folk Psychology” response. In addition to being
identified as a critic of both Berkeley and Hume specifically and the “way
of ideas” generally, Thomas Reid (1710–1796) also founded the “Scottish
School of Common Sense.” It is founded on an appeal to a “common
sense,” which is thought to be composed of intuitive judgments, which
Reid called “first principles” “principles of common sense” or “self-evident
truths.” (Reid 1853: 230). Of course, the suggestion is that some philo-
sophical problems are mere extravagances, founded on decadent-thought,
or simply unnecessary concerns is often followed by the suggestion that
there is a kind of knowledge “common” to humans which allows them to
understand situations as they really are and without any further or unnec-
essary explication. This has been associated with the “folk” (from the
German “Volk”) as the way in which “the people” commonly under-
stand—in our case—mental operations and psychology (cf. Gallie 2010:
42; cf. Bering 2006; cf. Nichols 2004).
Thus, Reid’s criticism of the “way of ideas” suggests that it leads to
skepticism regarding aspects of reality that common sense knows better
than to doubt: especially “causation” and having a “self.” For example,
Reid claimed “I am not thought, I am not action, I am not feeling; I am
something that thinks and acts and suffers” (Reid 1853: 345). Anticipating
what will be considered more fully below, “Folk Psychology” and
“Common Sense” are often (necessarily) the target of some of the more
reductive and eliminative explanations regarding the structure and func-
tions ψυχή. Moreover, another question which will be of interest in the
final sections of the book: supposing “Folk Psychology” to be an accurate
characterization of ψυχή: to what extent is that characterization a cul-
tural and historical construction?
4.3 P
rinciples from Kant’s Copernican
Revolution: The Transcendental
Dimension Regained
Despite all that could be said about the contributions made to Western
thought and psychology by Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), the following
section is designed for the purpose of helping those studying the history
and systems of Western psychology to understand Kant’s pivotal place
and critical difference from the thinkers discussed thus far. Hence, this
section is composed of a brief disclaimer and characterization followed by
a series of seven (7) questions and brief answers aiming at Kant’s accom-
plishments as contributions to the history of Western psychology. It is
not uncommon for History and Systems of Psychology textbooks to
make comments like: “The importance of Kant for the psychological tra-
dition cannot be overestimated.” (Kantor 1969: 211). However, the
amount of training required to be able to truly work with Kant’s thoughts
is usually too much to expect of anyone who is not a “philosopher,” so a
resource of perhaps inestimable value to psychologists goes untapped.
Just as we noted above that Whitehead suggested all of Western phi-
losophy may be a “footnote to Plato,” Lewis White Beck (1913–1997)
famously pointed out: “There is a saying among philosophers, ‘You can
philosophize with Kant or against Kant, but you cannot philosophize
without him’” (Beck 1950: 1). Similarly, Richard Rorty said of Kant, “He
simultaneously gave us a history of our subject, fixed its problematic, and
professionalized it (if only by making it impossible to be taken seriously
146 F. Scalambrino
as a ‘philosopher’ without having mastered the first Critique)” (Rorty

1979: 149). Moreover, Kant’s philosophy has been—as we will see—
rightly called “revolutionary.” In fact, Kant’s “Critical Philosophy” is
essentially constituted by three different books, the Critique of Pure
Reason, the Critique of Practical Reason, and the Critique of the Power of
Judgment. Though all of these books contain valuable and original insight
into ψυχή, given the depth and complexity of Kant’s thought we will
barely be scratching the surface here of the first of those books.
Question 1: What is Kant’s “Copernican Revolution”? Kant’s revolution
may be stated in terms of a response to Hume or in terms of Aristotle’s
“word-concept-thing” understanding of signification. We will briefly
state all both. According to Kant,
Up to now it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to the
objects; but all attempts to find out something about them a priori though
concepts that would extend our cognition have, on this pre-supposition,
come to nothing. Hence, let us once try whether we do not get farther …
by assuming that the objects must conform to our cognition. (Kant 1998:
B xvi)
The above quote is considered the statement of Kant’s “Copernican

Revolution” in his own words. The basic idea is that just as Copernicus
suggested we switch our assumption from the sun revolving around the
earth to the earth around the sun, so too Kant suggested we switch from
the mind conforming to objects to the objects conforming to mind.
There is a very simple way to state this in terms of the physical dimension;
however, the example may be easily misunderstood if we attempt to
extend it too far: Think of how there are things external to us that—even
though they are there—we cannot see them, for example germs or x-rays.
This suggests that whatever it is that we are seeing, the reason we are see-
ing it is because we have the capacity to see it. The more naïve way to
explain the situation would be to say we see it because it is there; however,
we know now that there may be many things in front of us presently
which we cannot see because we do not have the capacity to see them.
As a criticism of Hume, what Kant’s revolution does is it provides a
way to account for a priori knowledge, that is, knowledge of such aspects
of reality as “causation” without using the principle of empiricism. How

Kant accomplishes this is by noting that the understanding of “causation”
derives from the very structure of ψυχή to which objects must conform
if they are to be experienced by humans. We will have a bit more to say
about this when answering the next question. In terms of Aristotle’s
“word-concept-thing” understanding of signification, it is as if Kant has
provided a Leibnizian “Mental Activity” reading of Aristotle resulting in
what may be called an “extra-dimensional” reading of the “way of ideas.”
That is to say, just as Leibniz granted the presence of “petite perceptions”
toward which we are unconscious, so too Kant’s revolution uses “thing”
to refer to that which conforms to ψυχή’s structures before it has con-
formed. After conforming to ψυχή’s structures, then it is an “object of
experience.” Thus, words and concepts only refer to things insofar as we
can know them; however, in the act of knowing them they are no longer
things, they are objects of our knowing. Again, as we move through the
rest of the questions this explication of Kant’s revolution should gain
clarification.
Question 2: What method does Kant originate, and what are its conse-
quences for subsequent psychology? As Kant himself referred to it—it is the
method of “Transcendental Logic.” Transcendental logic originated with
Kant, and he contrasted it with “formal logic,” noting that formal logic
pertains to forms of thought and transcendental logic is the science of the
forms which are the conditions for the possibility of objects (Kant 1998:
A50–57/B74–82). Whereas earlier thinkers applied rationality in the
attempt to understand ψυχή, as if it were an observable object, Kant
rationally organized Aristotle’s (by way of Leibniz’s) principles of potenti-
ality and actuality to reveal the a priori aspects which logically, that is,
necessarily, must be a part of ψυχή’s structure for humans to have objec-
tive experience in general. On the one hand, the consequences of Kant’s
“transcendental method” have been acknowledged across the sciences (cf.
Monod 2004; cf. Makkreel 2003; cf. Cevalley 1994).
On the other hand, there is another standard comment made—yet
without significant clarification—regarding Kant in nearly every History
and Systems of Psychology textbook. After noting the issue in general we
will discuss its clarification. “Kant himself was clear in denying the possi-
bility of traditional rational psychology and in expounding the irrelevance
148 F. Scalambrino
of empirical psychology to his project in the first Critique” (Hatfield 1992:

209; cf. Kant 1998: A 741/B 769). Thus, the issue seems to be that Kant
would not have consider viable many of the post-Kantian approaches to
psychology which have actualized in the history of Western psychology.
However, it is interesting to realize that “there have been readers of [Kant’s
first Critique], from the time of its publication down to the present, who
have contended that it is primarily a work in psychology.” (Hatfield 1992:
209; cf. Schmidt 2008).
To clarify Kant’s disparaging remarks about psychology, then: On the
one hand, some emphasize the historical-context of Kant’s understanding
of the term “empirical psychology,” and go on to point out that even a
cursory comparison of the respective tables of contents from Kant’s
Anthropology (cf. Kant 2006) and contemporary Introduction to
Psychology textbooks show striking similarity—in fact, some suggest that
Kant’s anthropology textbook, by contemporary standards, counts as a
psychology textbook (cf. Hatfield 1998: 424). Moreover, given termino-
logical differences between eighteenth century Germany and twenty-first
century America, perhaps Kant would not be so disparaging in regard to
these psychological methodologies today (cf. Schmidt 2008). On the
other hand, some commentators understand Kant’s disparaging remarks
about rational and empirical psychology as critically directed at their
methodology, that is, the inability of the “way of ideas,” namely “intro-
spection” and the “sensory verification” of empirical psychology, to reach
ψυχή’s Transcendental dimension. Certainly, the latter understanding
would be consistent with the logic of Kant’s philosophy; in order to have
an empirical science there must be something that you can experience
through the senses to subsequently study; however, as the a priori condi-
tion for the possibility of experience, it is not possible to experience ψυχή
directly through the senses; therefore, technically, there can be no
empirical science of psychology—just like there can be no empirical sci-
ence of formal logic. As a result, what today goes by the name empirical
psychology, Kant considered philosophical anthropology (cf. Hatfield
1992; cf. Kitcher 1993; cf. Makkreel 2003).
Question 3: According to Kant, what is the structure and function of
ψυχή? The answer to this question invokes the structural models noted
above, especially those of Aristotle and Wolff. Basically, just as we noted
a distinction in Aristotle’s psychology between the animal and the ratio-

nal intellectual ψυχή, Wolff’s Leibnizian conception divided ψυχή into
sensation and imagination (Body) and understanding and reasoning
(Mind). Kant’s structure of experience, then, maps directly onto these
divisions; however, it does so in the context of the Kantian Copernican
Revolution. That is to say, Kant’s structure of ψυχή, divides initially into
“sensibility” and “understanding.” Often given the multiple uses of the
word “understanding,” at this level of dividing ψυχή structurally into the
“two stems” of experience, the latter stem is called “the understanding
broadly construed.” This clarification makes more sense in the context of
Kant’s discussion of the function of ψυχή.
Keeping in mind (1) that the structure under consideration is the
structure to which things must conform to be experienced as objects and
(2) that Kant is participating in the “Mental Activity” response to the
“new philosophy,” the rest of the structure of ψυχή may be most easily
seen through a discussion of the activity constituting its functioning.
Now, though psychologists say that “Functionalism” began with John
Dewey and “The Chicago School,” philosophers say it began with Kant,
since, for Kant, the structure of ψυχή is essentially a complex of capaci-
ties—similar to the intense folds in Leibniz. Moreover, Kant understood
the activity (think “Mental Activity” response) to which objects conform
to be the function of “synthesis,” and understood the intelligibility of this
synthetic activity in terms of “judgment.” That is to say, for a human to
have an objective experience is for ψυχή to perform a judgment (cf.
Keller 1998: 46; cf. Paton 1997; cf. Allison 2004). When thinking
involves intuitions from sensibility, then that use of reason is called
“impure,” and when thinking does not involve intuitions from sensibil-
ity, then that use of reason is called “pure reason.” On the one hand,
notice it is from this essential distinction that the title of Kant’s book
derives, that is, the Critique of Pure Reason. On the other hand, this makes
sense of Kant’s claim to critique knowledge to “make room for faith”
(Kant 1998: Bxxx), which is consistent with the idea that there can be no
sensory verification of God through the natural powers of human
sensation.
In this way, we can divide the two structural “stems” of experience
further in terms of function. In the stem of sensibility we find the pure
150 F. Scalambrino
intuitions of space and time “at the bottom” of the structure of ψυχή
and, then, the “threefold” synthesis of the “power of imagination.” In the
stem of the understanding broadly construed we find conceptual under-
standing and, then, thinking, and both of these activities function in
terms of different types of judgment, which also correspond with subjec-
tivity, objectivity, and certainty regarding objective mind-external reality.
One of the most important parts of the Critique of Pure Reason for under-
standing these elements under discussion is the section called the
“Transcendental Deduction.” Further, there are two pieces left to discuss
in order to more fully answer the question: according to Kant, what is the
structure and function of ψυχή? Yet, these two pieces—in conjunction
with what has already been said—answer the next two questions, respec-
tively. Therefore, we will pick up the rest of this answer as we differentiate
Kant from Descartes in the next two questions. Incidentally, it is worth
noting that one of the most common mistakes encountered in regard to
Kant’s thinking is that some psychologists tend to suggest there is no dif-
ference between his thinking and that of Descartes’. However, the attempt
to read Kant as Descartes radically misses Kant; the two areas most rele-
vant for the history of Western psychology are Descartes’ Mind-Body
problem and the difference in the ways they understand subjectivity.
Question 4: How does Kant solve Descartes’ Mind-Body Problem? There are
only two ways to solve the Mind-Body problem. The first is to deny the
problem; for example, by formulating a monist ontology, which ultimately
denies any, but perhaps a “property,” dualism on which to base the Mind-
Body problem. The second is to follow Kant’s “Transcendental Deduction.”
Kant’s deduction specifically, and the Critique of Pure Reason generally,
may be read as a demonstration—deriving from a dialectic involving the
(initially hypothetical) first principle of the Kantian Revolution—in accor-
dance with Transcendental logic, and it is so systematic that its structure
provides a place for, that is, a self-encompassing account of, both demon-
stration and dialectic. Thus, anticipating what will be considered more
fully in the next chapter, a fundamental component of dialectic for Kant
is that it must not be one of “pure reason.” Otherwise, despite any logical
consistency within a dialectic of pure reason, it will ultimately lead, accord-
ing to Kant, to “Transcendental Illusion” (cf. Guyer 1989; cf. Henrich

1969; cf. Paton 1931; cf. Ameriks 2003).
Now, in regard to Descartes’ Mind-Body problem, the problem derives
from the “heterogeneity” of the two substances. In other words, there are
material beings and there are non-material beings, and the problem
inquires in regard to how they are supposed to be connected. Kant’s way
to solve the Mind-Body problem, then, derives from the synthetic activ-
ity constituting an experience. As noted above, the two stems being com-
bined which correspond with body and mind in Descartes are “sensibility”
and “understanding” in Kant. We also noted that sensibility contains
“pure” intuitions of space and time. These intuitions function like forms
in which sensory content constitutes the material of a, thereby, percep-
tual (matter-form) composite. Further, the concepts of the understand-
ing are “pure.” Hence, when the synthetic activity of judgment combines
sensory (body) content with the “higher” (in the structure) forms of
understanding (i.e. mind), for Kant the two parts being combined are
not heterogeneous. They are homogenous as pure intuitions synthesized
with pure concepts. Notice how, in this way, the structure of ψυχή func-
tions like a kind of “filter” in regard to mind-external things. Only the
things which can con-form to the filter are picked up by the filter and
experienced as objects. Thus, the Kantian Revolution solves Descartes’
Mind-Body problem.
Question 5: How is Kant’s theory of subjectivity different from Descartes’?
This question is not about the subjective aspects of experience, rather this
question is about the subject of experience, that is, the subject undergo-
ing an experience. See the previous two sections for a fuller discussion of
Descartes’ theory of the subject. To begin recall that “judgment” accord-
ing to Descartes is an “idea” and according to Kant is a “synthetic activ-
ity.” In order to understand Kant’s theory of the subject we must again
look at the Transcendental Deduction. Just as sensibility was associated
with the body and understanding with the mind, so too sensibility is
associated with empiricism and understanding with rationalism. Notice,
then, it is the synthetic activity that points to the Kantian subject.
Moreover, the Cartesian subject would be located in the understanding
section of Kant’s structural account of ψυχή. In other words, this is one
way to notice that Descartes is a rationalist and Kant is not. The synthetic
152 F. Scalambrino
activity points beyond empiricism and rationalism to—you guessed it—

the Transcendental dimension.
In other words, Transcendental logic points out that if there is an actu-
alization of a synthetic power, then there must be a potential for that
actualization. We know there is such actualization, so the actualization
itself points to the potentiality. The unity of this pointing is called by
Kant the “Transcendental Unity of Apperception.” Using the term
“apperception” indicates that it is possible to gain an awareness of one’s
self as that thing which is performing the synthetic action. The term
“thing” is only used here to indicate its structural position, or rather its
position beyond the structure, insofar as it is the power conditioning
experience which manifests experience in terms of the structure. Just like
the seeing eye cannot see itself, so too the subject revealed by Kant is
Transcendental. Which, returning to the earlier methodological point, is
why there can be no direct empirical investigation of Transcendental
ψυχή. Thus, because this revelation of ψυχή depends on the Kantian revo-
lution and Transcendental logic, this understanding of (Transcendental)
subjectivity cannot be Descartes’—or that of any one doing psychology before
Kant.
Moreover, this is not the self-conscious apperception of Leibniz or the
self-consciousness discussed by Descartes, Locke, and so on, this is the
self-consciousness of the Transcendental be-ing of the self. Think Plato;
Kant’s method has re-discovered the Transcendental dimension of ψυχή,
and just as we saw it was possible in Plato to envision physically embod-
ied experience from the point of view of the Transcendental dimension,
so too Kant’s Transcendental Unity of Apperception is that point of view
insofar as we can uncover it through Transcendental logic. Kant himself
paid homage to Plato (1998: B 370) and Plato’s awareness of the
Transcendental dimension; however, we can look back over the previous
chapters to see just how different Kant’s subject is from Plato’s. The fol-
lowing quote from Kant may add further clarity.
The consciousness of the ego proves that life is not located in the body, but
in a special principle differing from the body; that as a consequence this
principle can continue to exist without body, and that its life is not thereby
diminished but augmented. This is the sole proof that can be given a priori,
and one drawn from the knowledge and nature of the soul [ψυχή] compre-
hended a priori by us. (Kant 2001: 176–177)
Thus, Kant avoids Solipsism, and despite his continued use of terms such
as “subject” and “ego,” he avoids the Egoism associated with the ego-
centric shift accomplished by the “way of ideas.”
Lastly, notice how Kant’s description of his position in general differ-
entiates him from the thinkers of the “way of ideas” associated with the
“new philosophy.” In the section of the Critique of Pure Reason titled “On
the Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection,” distancing himself from
Leibniz and Locke, Kant famously claimed Leibniz “intellectualized
appearances” just as Locke “sensualized all of the concepts of understand-
ing.” (1998: A 271/B 327; cf. Deleuze 1984). Further, in regard to
Descartes and Berkeley, Kant noted that his and theirs are “Idealist” posi-
tions; however, here is how he differentiated himself from them: “The
dogmatic idealist would be one who denies the existence of matter, the
skeptical idealist one who doubts them because he holds them to be
unprovable.” (1998: A 377). Whereas the former is Berkeley, the latter is
Descartes (cf. 1998: B 274). Finally, in regard to his own position, that is,
Transcendental Idealism, Kant pointed out regarding appearances “that
they are all together to be regarded as mere representations and not as
things in themselves, and accordingly that space and time are only sensi-
ble forms of our intuition, but not … something given in themselves
(independent of our sensibility).” (1998: A 369). This also differentiates
Kant from Hume, for example, Kant noted “The transcendental idealist,
on the contrary, can be an empirical realist, hence … he can concede the
existence of matter without going beyond mere self-consciousness and
assuming something more than the certainty of representations” (1998:
A 370). Notice, Kant’s certainty is not based on the Cartesian methodology
of the “new philosophy” culminating in the Cogito, it is based on Kant’s
methodology of Transcendental logic (cf. Allison 2004; cf. Ameriks 1982,
cf. Cicovacki 1997; cf. Deleuze 1984).
Question 6: What is Kant’s theory of Personhood? In what amounts to an
overview of Kant’s developmental theory of psychology, he claimed
regarding the human predisposition to self-fulfillment “We may conve-
niently divide this predisposition, with respect to function, into three
154 F. Scalambrino
divisions, to be considered as elements in the fixed character and destiny

of man.” (Kant 1960: 33). Notice, of course, Kant’s clarification that this
division is “with respect to function.” The three divisions are: (1) “The
predisposition to animality in man, taken as a living being; [2] The pre-
disposition to humanity in man, taken as a living and at the same time a
rational being; [3] The predisposition to personality in man, taken as a
rational and at the same time an accountable being.” (Ibid.). Kant further
clarified these three developmental characterizations of function by
invoking something which sounds a good deal like the Scala Amoris from
Plato. That is, Kant associated one’s developmental actualization with
self-love, and he cross-referenced them with the above divisions regarding
predisposition.
(1) “The predisposition to animality in mankind may be brought
under the general title of physical and purely mechanical [deterministic]
self-love, wherein no reason is demanded.” (2) “The predisposition to
humanity can be brought under the general title of a self-love which is
physical and yet compares … [i.e.] we judge ourselves happy or unhappy
only by making comparison with others. Out of this self-love springs the
inclination to acquire worth in the opinion of others.” (3) The predisposi-
tion to personality is the capacity for respect for the moral law as in itself
a sufficient incentive of the will.” (Kant 1960: 34). Notice, then, just as
Aristotle’s animal ψυχή is without rationality, so too Kant’s “animality”
indicates a kind of love in which “no reason is demanded.” The second
type of self-love stems from the rational capacity of the human, and
because rationality reveals ratios, this type of self-love is based on com-
parisons derived by illuminating various ratios between one’s self and
others. Finally, the last type of self-love belongs to Personhood, and one
has, according to Kant, self-actualized to the level of being a “person”
when one is able to have self-love based on being accountable to Moral
Law. Thus, persons for Kant have self-respect by respecting themselves as
a part of the Moral Law, and this will receive further clarification regard-
ing the next question.
Question 7: How does Kant make Free Will compatible with Mechanism?
Given all that has been said thus far we may be brief here. Notice from the
previous question “mechanism” is associated with animality, first and fore-
most, and even humanity insofar as ego-based comparison is natural and
mechanical unless one is able to transcend such triviality by means of self-

respect. Just as the person, then, is able to relate to itself as a Transcendental
be-ing, it is able to relate to nature as determined by laws. This is a resurgence
of what was previously called the “Natural Law.” Ultimately, then, the per-
son understands that it is free to perform synthetic activity based on different
understandings of situations (think Aristotle’s “Character Types” again), and
yet, when ψυχή relates to situations in terms of its lower capacities—like a
“self-imposed immaturity” (Kant 1983: 41), then it does not respect the law-
like nature of the situations. That is to say, in psychological terms such
arrested development may be read in terms of teleological and soteriological
non-self-actualization. Thus, it is free to either follow the Moral Law or not,
according to Kant. This is related to Kant’s famous “Categorical Imperative,”
especially the first of its three formulations; however, though it is beyond our
current scope, we should point out that the reason our personal choices are
supposed to be according to maxims which are universalizable is because the
Natural Law applies universally. Hence, Kant’s moral theory cannot be para-
phrased by the “Golden Rule” (cf. Walsh et al. 2014: 138).
Notes
1. I express this notion in the classroom by saying: Your external perception
is a reflection of your internal perfection. Given Leibniz’s metaphysics it
would also be accurate to say: Your external perception is an expression of
your internal perfection. Perfection here, of course, means “completion”
in the sense of teleology (and soteriology).
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5
Modernism to Post-Modernism: Method
as Archimedean Point
5.1 P
rinciples of Post-Kantian Speculation
and Naturalization
The stage set by the “new philosophy” and the struggle against Solipsism
and Egoism associated with Early Modern philosophy produced an array
of methodological options for Late Modern psychologists. Recalling that
the problem of Solipsism belongs to the general category of skeptical
problems and that Descartes initiated his method in relation to skepti-
cism, the following blurb from a history of Western psychology textbook
accurately depicts the “Post-Kantian” situation:
[Psychologists] thought that a way of escape had been opened up from the
skeptical positon … But the Hegelian elaboration of certain metaphysical
aspects of Kant’s thinking, aspects which are not essential to it, brought us
to a full stop … In their discouragement many trooped back past Kant to
the neighborhood of Hume’s position. (Metzger 1971: 331)
This is an important historical insight with which to begin our “Post-

Kantian” discussion, because otherwise it would be quite natural to won-
der why so much conflict and disagreement continues despite Kant’s

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74733-0_5
162 F. Scalambrino
success regarding the problems of the “new philosophy.” Moreover, one

of the major differences between the Pre-Modern to Modern and the
Modern to Post-Modern division of Western history is the sheer amount
of potentially relevant information for psychology. As a result, an even
greater amount of compression of historical data will be necessary, if we
are to keep to the path from which we will be capable of thinking through
the history and systems of Western psychology.
In his Contemporary Theories and Systems in Psychology, Benjamin
Wolman (1908–2000) confidently, and rightly, declared, “These are the
three main sources of contemporary psychology: Pavlov, Freud, and neo-
Kantianism.” (1960: 21). If we look at the same categories of principles
involved in these three sources, for example in regard to methodology
and the structure and function of ψυχή, then we will be able to both
clarify the similarities, differences, and incommensurabilities across these
“sources” of Contemporary systems and provide a classification at the
“highest level of philosophical specification” possible, prior to examining
the Post-Modern criticisms of essential distinctness, on the one hand,
and the Post-Modern criticisms of systems of psychology in general, on
the other. Anticipating what will be considered more fully below, the
mention here of a few historical events in the West will provide helpful
context. The Age of Enlightenment is standardly said to have run from
c.1685–c.1815; Kant published the first edition of the Critique of Pure
Reason in 1781; the French Revolution lasted from 1789–1799,
Romanticism is standardly said to have run from c.1800–c.1850, and
“the high priest of Romanticism,” Jean-Jacques Rousseau, lived from
1712–1778.
On the one hand, as the title of this section suggests, three (3) main
“post-Kantian” approaches to Kant’s Revolution can be discerned: (a) the
attempt to return to some pre-Kantian Revolution style of thinking, or
attempts to use Kant as a point of departure for dialectical approaches,
which would ultimately (b) “naturalize” Kant or push his thought into
(c) “speculative” thinking. On the other hand, by the end of this chapter,
we will examine the four (4) major paradigms (i.e. systems) which
emerged to historically constitute Contemporary psychology, and, as we
will see, these paradigms emerged with clearly definable incommensura-
bility constituting their uniqueness. Thus, the beginning of this chapter
Modernism to Post-Modernism: Method as Archimedean Point 163
illustrates the manner in which post-Kantian approaches to Kant’s revo-

lution will influence the solidification the four (4) major paradigms of
Contemporary Western psychology. Specifically, the first two (2) of these
paradigms emerge from the first of the post-Kantian approaches and
through Pavlov and Freud; the approach closest to Kant’s own will con-
stitute the “neo-Kantian” third paradigm, and the dialectical approaches
to Kant’s revolution will constitute the fourth paradigm.
Whereas this section of the chapter will discuss the latter two of the
main post-Kantian approaches to Kant’s writings, the next section will
discuss the first approach insofar as it finds expression in the “new psy-
chology” of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Of course,
there may have been much—even unbeknownst to all historians—cross-
influencing of theorists by theories and theorists; however, the paradigms
which emerged may still be characterized as unique categories of princi-
ples, if seen in the light of the philosophical principles which constitute
its incommensurability. On the one hand, these categories are generally
classified in terms of Natural or Human science approaches to the study
of ψυχή. On the other hand, these categories are specifically character-
ized by the Pavlovian, Freudian, and neo-Kantian approaches to the study
of ψυχή—with the fourth paradigm becoming solidified near the mid-
point of the twentieth century.
Recall, from above, that we have already seen how categorization-by-
way-of-incommensurability functioned in the Pre-Modern Period regard-
ing the principle of ψυχή’s freedom or free will. Similarly, the neo-Kantian
paradigm, or category of principle clusters, affirms the principle of ψυχή’s
freedom, while the Pavlovian and Freudian paradigms do not. However,
because we will be encountering the Postmodernism of the Contemporary
Period, we will witness attempts—we especially have Freudian
Psychoanalysis in mind here—to “read” the major theoretical approaches
to the study of ψυχή differently than they were originally intended by
their authors. Again, it is not impossible to re-read or re-interpret theo-
retical approaches in psychology; this, as we mentioned above in Chap. 2
and will discuss further below, is an aspect of what has been called the
“Death of the Author” in Contemporary philosophy. Yet, at the same
time, there are constraints to such activity.
164 F. Scalambrino
That is to say, when the re-reading changes the original theory’s consti-
tutive cluster of principles in such a way as to make the re-reading incom-
mensurable with the theory of which it purports to be a re-reading, then
it cannot simultaneously appeal to, for example, the methodological
principles with which it is now incommensurable, simply by giving itself
the name of the previous theory. For instance, if we are given a Dr. Seuss
book and told that it is a manual for assembling a car engine, even if we
believe that it is such a manual, we will not be able to use it to assemble a
car engine. Trying to argue that Freud’s theory can belong to any paradigm
one likes in the history of psychology is not just silly, it is intellectually
dishonest. That is to say, Freud appeared at a specific point in history, and
based on primary and secondary sources we can get, at least, an
approximate-enough sketch of Freudian psychoanalysis as a system to
identify true incommensurabilities between Freudian Psychoanalysis and
other systems in the history of Western psychology—claiming otherwise
(most likely as an inauthentic marketing tactic or a lack of courage to
commit to, and stand by, a set of principles) is like claiming Dr. Seuss
wrote manuals for assembling car engines.
Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776–1841) is standardly referred to as
“Kant’s immediate successor.” However, Herbart’s denial of Kant’s posi-
tion regarding the unknowability of things essentially marks a regression
to the philosophy of Leibniz. Two ideas which indicate the category
which Herbart will occupy, then, are his emphasis on “the unconscious”
and his “mental mechanics.” According to one commentary,
Every idea, according to Herbart, has the tendency to maintain itself and
to drive out ideas with which it is incompatible; and ideas vary in strength
… An idea that is weak may gain admittance to consciousness, and main-
tain itself there, if the ideas above the threshold are congenial with it …
Mental life is thus mainly a struggle between ideas, each of which is active,
each of which strives to attain and maintain a place in consciousness, and
each of which tends to repel all ideas except those with which it is compat-
ible. (Heidbreder 1933: 66)
Now, from the perspective of historiography there are many ways to dis-
cuss Herbart given one’s various political affiliations and whatever issues
regarding which one chooses to focus; however, our purpose here is not
to argue whether Freud’s theory of unconscious activity is or is not like
Herbart’s, etc. Our purpose is to identify the categories of principles into
which these systems would fit based on their principles, and, of course,
Herbart’s will fit in the category associated with Freud.
After Herbart the next “neo-Kantian” discussions of ψυχή would be
those associated with German Idealism, which is dated—if including
Kant—from c.1781–c.1849. The two thinkers we need to include are
Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860) and G.W.F. Hegel (1770–1831). We
begin with Schopenhauer because he belongs to the same general cate-
gory as Herbart. Schopenhauer’s discussion of “will” in nature may be
understood as an attempt to naturalize—despite its speculative nature—
Kant’s Transcendental Idealism. The basic idea is that ψυχή should be
understood as subject to the forces of nature; nature may speculatively be
said to have a “will” of its own to which individual ψυχή’s are subjected,
for example Schopenhauer discussed the urge toward sexual activity and
eating in terms of the “will-to-live.” Further, he sought to categorize the
ways in which this will of nature produces illusions for its own sake; for
example, Schopenhauer infamously characterized “love” as an illusion
produced by nature to ensure the survival of the species. Yet, ψυχή, of
course, is, initially at least, unconscious to the illusory nature of such
experiences (cf. Schopenhauer 2005: 35–36).
Of all that could be said about Hegel, we should at least acknowledge
his Phenomenology of Spirit, published in 1807, as a neo-Kantian work
regarding ψυχή (cf. Hegel 1977). Hegel develops the Kantian dialectic—
though in a way that Kant actually anticipated and argued against—
toward a political, religious, and cultural theory of history. Whereas
Hegel’s discussion regarded, of course, “spirit,” his is the same dialectic
which Karl Marx (1818–1883) famously “turned upside down” (he
thought to stand it on its feet) to discover “historical materialism.” In
both cases, we may see their theories as not only constituted by a princi-
ple of socio-historical ontological priority but also individual ψυχή—
especially in terms of consciousness and self-consciousness—is
characterized as an object determined by the respective socio-historical
forces. Whatever influence on psychology these theorists had in immedi-
ate proximity to the publication of their ideas, their influence on
166 F. Scalambrino
sychology was even more significant—as we will see—in the Post-

p
Modern Period. However, in regard to the categories under discussion,
Hegelian and Marxist thinking participate in the constitution of another
neo-Kantian approach to psychology.
There are two more influences from the nineteenth century whose
selection of principles contribute to the categorization of the essentially
distinct (incommensurability-based) Contemporary psychological sys-
tems. They are the evolutionary theories of Jean-Baptiste Lamarck
(1744–1829) and Charles Darwin (1809–1882) and the nineteenth-
century “existentialist” theories of Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855) and
Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900). Notwithstanding Nietzsche’s provoca-
tive claims that he was the “first psychologist” in the West, the next sec-
tion will discuss the systems standardly characterized as the “new
psychology.” Moreover, just as the terms “new philosophy” and “new psy-
chology” truly were used at their respective places in history, so too some-
thing of a repetition may be discerned from what clearly amounts to a
direct analogy between their applications in history—whether intended
by the later authors or not. Moreover, recall we are not concerned to
include as much information and name-dropping as possible; thus, for
instance, the relationship between Darwin and Alfred Russel Wallace
(1823–1913) is not within the scope of our concern presently.
The standard way to discuss Darwin’s contribution to Modern psy-
chology is in contrast to Kant; usually stated in terms of two principles,
it is the first of which that is supposed to make Darwin’s contribution
revolutionary. The principles are: the elimination of final causes regarding
development and materialism (cf. Weinert 2009). As the standard expli-
cation goes, Darwin provides a model for biology which is different from
any of the previous philosophers discussed, since all of them believed in
Aristotelian Final Causes, that is, purpose-driven nature. However, as is
relevant for the next section, E. B. Titchener (1867–1927) repeatedly
laments throughout his Systematic Psychology: Prolegomena that most of
the “new psychologies” fall back into “teleological” theorizing, despite
their avowal of “Darwinism.” (Titchener 1927). The second principle is
“materialism,” which we have already discussed. What needs clarification,
then, is the distinction between the evolutionary theories of Darwin and
Lamarck.
The essential distinction between Darwin and Lamarck can be stated

in terms of the difference between the “mechanism of natural selection”
and the “mechanism of use-inheritance,” respectively. The classic example
regards giraffes. On the one hand, for Lamarck, giraffes stretched their
necks to reach tree leaves, and thus the characteristic long neck of the
giraffe developed over time and was passed on to subsequent generations.
On the other hand, for Darwin, giraffes with short necks, since they
could not reach the food source, eventually died out, and therefore, the
surviving giraffes are the ones with long necks. Again, despite the clear
preference for Darwin’s explanation over Lamarck’s, the latter’s principle
of use-inheritance, as we shall see, will find traction and enthusiasm in
Postmodernism. Finally, two further principles follow from the principle
of (the mechanism of ) natural selection: “the principle of variation” and
“the principle of the correlation of growth.” The former principle suggests
that there will be variation to the species produced over-time, some of
which—depending on natural selection—may be incorporated into the
future expressions of the species. The latter principle suggests: “Organisms
are integrated systems and adaptive change in one part can lead to non-
adaptive modification of other features.” (Darwin 1859: 182). In other
words, though giraffes developed longer necks due to natural selection,
their longer necks may be beneficial in regard to functions other than the
one(s) involved in the natural selection, that is, (in this case) eating.
Lastly, then, existentialism is standardly said to arise with Kierkegaard
and Nietzsche; further, it is clear from the primary and secondary sources
that both of these thinkers were reacting to Post-Kantian innovations.
Whereas Hegel was read as emphasizing the community and collective
spirit over the individual, Kierkegaard emphasized—to borrow a phrase
from Heidegger—the mineness of existence. What this means is that even
if there is a predictable pattern that every human goes through given
some historical, geographical, and socio-economic status, for example,
Kierkegaard would still emphasize the value of the personal choices and
first-person perspective traversing the pattern. Though we could say his is
an emphasis on the “subjective” point of view, the “personal” point of
view better characterizes it—Kierkegaard was not concerned with such
“subjective” aspects of experience as color perception, etc. Likewise,
though more avowedly directed at Schopenhauer, Nietzsche also
168 F. Scalambrino
advocated for the individual. Whereas Schopenhauer’s philosophy was

pessimistic and tragic—depicting life as full of illusion and, ultimately,
total loss, Nietzsche advocated for an interpretation of life as an adven-
ture and a contest (cf. Kierkegaard 2009, 1998, 1980, 1988; cf. Nietzsche
1967, 1974, 1977, 1979, 1989; cf. Scalambrino 2015a). Moreover,
because “existentialism,” takes the focus off of universal spirit and the will
of nature, respectively, placing it on the individual—“personalistic,”
rather than “naturalistic”1—and the individual’s freedom and self-realiza-
tion, is in multiple ways a return to the spirit of Kant’s philosophy.
5.2 P
rinciples of the “New” Psychology:
The Birth of the Laboratory
For better or for worse, as every psychologist should know, the idea upon
which the discipline of psychology’s independence was finally established
was the idea that psychology could be an experimental science. In other
words, it was supposed that psychology could be a science like physics or
biology, that is, a natural science (cf. Adams 1931: 8; Ash 2005: 100; cf.
Dewey 1884). Recalling Feigl’s joke noted above in Section 5, though the
rhetoric of experimental science succeeded in establishing psychology as
its own discipline, the idea that psychology is a natural science today, is
more the idea that biology (especially neuroscience) should be the disci-
pline which studies “psychology.” Be that as it may, what we need to be
sure to keep in mind when thinking through the principles of the systems
of psychology as they emerged in this historical period of the West is that
these systems, despite their differences, were vying for the claim to the
title of “psychology as a natural science.”
Keeping in mind that Sigmund Freud’s (1856–1939) Project for a
Scientific Psychology appeared in 1895 and the Russian physiologist Ivan
Pavlov (1849–1936) did not win his “Nobel Prize in Physiology or
Medicine” for “classical conditioning” until 1904, two of the “three main
sources of contemporary psychology” have not yet emerged in the year
1870. Thus, “introspection,” “extraspection,” and “association” character-
ize the methods of the “new psychology” initially, as the non-Kantian
principles inherited from Descartes, Hobbes, Locke, Leibniz, and Hume

settle into a method distinctive of the “new psychology.” It is worth quot-
ing at length A History of Experimental Psychology from 1929:
There was something fresh and exciting in the 1870s about the new experi-
mental psychology that Wundt called “physiological psychology.” It has all
the status of a new scientific endeavor. It was something more than the
sensory experiments of physiologists, like E.H. Weber’s and Johannes
Müller’s discoveries. It was more than the philosophers’ turning toward
science as an aid, than Herbart’s use of mathematics, than Lotze’s writing a
‘medical’ psychology. There was really something new here, a scientific
activity with its own name. It is true that most of the new research was on
perception, but even so there was hope for a complete experimental psy-
chology as soon as there had been time. Fechner had already provided new
methods of measurement. Helmholtz was showing how researches in vision
and hearing were to be done, and he was not alone. (Boring 1950: 384)
It is clear from this excerpt that its author—Edwin G. Boring

(1886–1968)—provides a progressive reading of the history of Western
psychology, according to which the “physiological psychology” of
Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920) quite literally and actually ushered in a
“new psychology.” Moreover, as Boring emphasized, for the “new psy-
chology” Wundt provided “its structure and form, its self-consciousness,
its name, its first formal laboratory, its first experimental journal, as well
as the systematic patter with respect to which the experiments could be
formulated and given their significance.” (Ibid.). The question we should
be asking, then, is: How did Pavlov and Freud come to eclipse Wundt?
In regard to the principles at work across these systems “between psy-
chophysical methods and physiological theories” (cf. Sinatra 2006) vying
for the claim to the title of “psychology as a natural science,” each of the
different psychologists may be understood (philosophically) as thinking
through the methodological, structural, and functional principles regarding
ψυχή with which to characterize the “new psychology.” Thus, as we will
see, Wundt’s methodological choice was neither extraspective or determin-
istic enough for Behaviorism nor reductionistic or unconscious-oriented
enough for Psychoanalysis. It is worth quoting Boring at length one last
time regarding the principles of the “new psychology.” Thus, initially,
170 F. Scalambrino
this new psychology was introspective, sensationistic, elementistic and

associationistic. It was introspective because consciousness was its subject-
matter … It was sensationistic because sensation shows what the nature of
consciousness is. The imageless thoughts were not to claim status until the
century had changed. It was elementistic, because the whole conception at
the start was of a mental chemistry, and it seemed as if sensations, images
and feelings might well be the elements which make up those compounds
that are the stuff of psychology. And it was associationistic because associa-
tion is the very principle of compounding … Later this sort of psychology
came to be called the psychology of content, in contradistinction to the psy-
chology of act which bore Brentano’s label … Experimental psychology
knew what to do, more or less, with a psychology of content. The acts …
were elusive and did not stand up to observation like the contents. (1950:
385)
Wundt’s “new psychology” has been called “voluntarism”—not to be

confused with the philosophical-theological position—because he still
embraced a non-deterministic principle of agency; this may be under-
stood as either too Leibnizian or too Kantian to square with a natural
science understanding of ψυχή. For, following the “Mental Activity”
approach of Leibniz and Kant, Wundt theorized experience in terms of
“apprehension,” “apperception,” and “volition.” That is to say, a volun-
tary, that is, intentional, use of the will is the condition for apprehending
sensation within the apperception of consciousness—or, “attention” for
short (cf. Wundt 1904). As a result of adhering to this principle, Wundt
understood individual psychology along the lines of a natural science or
Naturwissenschaften and social psychology along the lines of moral phi-
losophy, that is, a human science, or Geisteswissenschaften (cf. Danziger
1979: 207; cf. Scalambrino 2018).
However, the eclipse of Wundt’s system began with his student (and
English translator) E. B. Titchener, that is, his student’s more positivistic
approach to the method of introspection; thus, though beyond our pres-
ent scope, a spectrum of uses of the term “introspection” may be identi-
fied from Descartes through Titchener, despite the general sameness of
the meaning in opposition to extraspection (cf. Araujo 2016: 154–167;
cf. Gillespie 2006; cf. Singh 1999: 100). Just as objective experimenta-
tion could take place by way of extraspection, so too could experimenta-
tion take place by way of introspection with the aid of instruments to

objectify various aspects of experience. As a result, “experimental intro-
spection” names the method of asking individual’s to verify, based on
self-report, the experience of various sensations (cf. Boring 1953; cf.
Hilgard 1987). Of course, the goal was to make the natural science of
psychology as much like a purely “physical science” as possible. According
to Titchener, “Physical science, then, explains by assigning a cause; men-
tal science explains by reference to those nervous processes which corre-
spond with the mental processes that are under observation.” (Titchener
1910: 41). Recalling the distinction between Naturwissenschaften expla-
nation and Geisteswissenschaften description, “We may bring these two
modes of explanation together if we define explanation itself as the state-
ment of the proximate circumstances or conditions under which the
described phenomenon occurs.” (Ibid.). Titchener, then, provided the
following illustration: “Dew is formed under the condition of a differ-
ence of temperature between the air and the ground; ideas are formed
under the condition of certain processes in the nervous system.
Fundamentally, the object and the manner of explanation, in the two
cases, are one and the same.” (Ibid).
Moreover, in this way, introspection could be combined with even
more positivistic principles regarding the structure and function of ψυχή.
For example, by allowing for the phenomena of experience to be based on
the “nervous system,” rather than “sensation,” the previous French
“sensorium-positivism” evolved into the “phenomenal-positivism” associ-
ated with Ernst Mach (1838–1916) and Richard Avenarius (1843–1896).
In fact, under the label of “save the appearances” (by not inferring them
away in favor of an unobservable a priori) and consistent with a line of
thought running from Hume’s to John Stuart Mill’s (1806–1873)
associationism, the influence of “Machism” continued into the 1920’s
influencing the establishment of “The Vienna Circle” and later “Logical
Positivism.” (cf. Blackmore and Itagaki 2013: 2–3). Thus, the embrace of
positivistic principles (whether phenomenally or materialistically under-
stood) can be seen in Titchener’s “Positivistic Structuralism,” the psycho-
physics of Ernst H. Weber (1795–1878) and Gustav T. Fechner
(1801–1887), and in Hermann Ebbinghaus’ (1850–1909) use of the
methods of the “new psychology” regarding associationism (cf. Robinson
172 F. Scalambrino
1964) differentiate them from Wundt’s “Voluntarism” (cf. Baker 1992;

cf. Danziger 1979).
Lastly, Titchener’s Systematic Psychology provides a good explanation of
the principles which differentiate his “Positivistic Structuralism” from
“Pragmatic Functionalism.” According to Titchener,
These, then, seem to be the four main characteristics of the functional sys-
tems. The subject-matter of psychology is duplicated, though [1] function
is preferred to content; [2] consciousness is a solver of problems; [3] the
whole course of the mental life is regarded teleologically; and [4] psychol-
ogy is written as a preface to philosophy or some practical discipline. (1927:
193)
Importantly, we should clarify the second principle which he attributed

to “Pragmatic Functionalism.” Titchener’s clarification itself involved
quoting James R. Angell’s (1869–1949) Psychology: An Introductory Study
of the Structure and Functions of Human Consciousness (1904), “conscious
activities emerge at the point where reflex acts are found inadequate to
meet the needs of particular situations”; “if the reflexes and the automatic
acts were wholly competent to steer the organism throughout its course,
there is no reason to suppose that consciousness would ever put in an
appearance.” (Angell 1904: 50; cf. Titchener 1927: 183). Of course
Dewey’s discussion of Pragmatic Functionalism as a “new psychology”
involved not only an avowal of the principles of Darwinian evolution but
also a criticism of “introspection” (Dewey 1884). Yet, as Titchener
pointed out, “A view of this sort seems, indeed, to be logically bound up
with the view that consciousness is primarily and actively a matter of
function, and only secondarily and passively a matter of content.” (1927:
184). Thus, Titchener accused Pragmatic Functionalism of reducing
“consciousness” to mere instrumentality.
Interestingly, a direct analogy may be seen regarding scientific method-
ology, revolution, and the relation between the emergence of the “new
philosophy” and the “new psychology.” This “Renaissance cycle” of reject-
ing positions previously considered authoritative will cycle yet again in
the transition from Modernity to Post-Modernity. In sum, we have seen
how the principles of methodology, structure and function regarding
ψυχή shaped the systems characteristic of the “new psychology.” This sets
the stage to discuss the “three main sources of contemporary psychology:
Pavlov, Freud, and neo-Kantianism.” (Wolman 1960: 21). Moreover, the
criticism of Pragmatic Functionalism from Titchener’s Positivistic
Structuralism shall prove prophetic in the culmination of the “new psy-
chology” and essential eclipse of the systems of psychology just discussed.
That is to say, anticipating what will be considered more fully below, the
idea—noted above—that “there is no reason to suppose that conscious-
ness would ever put in an appearance” may retrospectively read as if it
were a suggestion to Pavlov and Freud.
5.3 C
onstitutive Principles of the “Four
Forces of Psychology”
The purpose of this section is to state the “highest,” so to speak, four (4)
categories into which early-twentieth-century Western psychological sys-
tems may be placed. As noted above, these may be understood as “para-
digms,” but should be thought of as categorizations of clusters of
principles, which emerged with clearly definable incommensurability
constituting their uniqueness. Thus, it is precisely not the purpose of this
section to list all of the different variations within a category or the text-
books and times associated with each alteration. Such would be the pur-
pose for a history textbook; however, our purpose is to gain a vision of the
history and systems of Western psychology, at the level of systems, so as
to think through the principles and essential distinctions regarding their
constitution. Because we have been moving toward the “Information
Age” the proliferation of many different systems of contemporary psy-
chology could be articulated—some argue that just as there are lists of
over 250 different kinds of psychotherapy (cf. Corsini 2001), there could
be just as many different psychologies. It is neither our intention to take
a stance in opposition to such proliferation of psychological systems nor
do we believe that every one of however many systems there may be are
essentially incommensurable with one another.
174 F. Scalambrino
Hence, by rising to the level of essential incommensurability, we arrive

at: (1) a way to categorize a proliferation of psychological systems, (2) a
way to think about and talk about different systems, and (3) a ground
from which to be critical. This last aspect is quite important because
without it psychology loses its identity, and though from the perspective
of some political allegiances those words might sound good, the problem
is that the disciplines willing to take over the domain and funding, etc. of
psychology are not “losing their identity.” For example, if you pride your-
self as a psychoanalyst, you should be able to state the principles of your
position and be able to identify how you are not a behaviorist. Moreover,
from the point of view of philosophy, if you cannot identify what your
position is not, then you do not really know your position. Is the activity
of eating a sandwich psychoanalysis? If you think so, then you do not
truly understand psychology.
The “Four Forces” of Psychology are: Behaviorism, Psychoanalysis,
Neo-Kantianism, and “General Systems Theory.” The progenitors of
these systems are respectively: Ivan Pavlov (1849–1936), Sigmund Freud’s
(1856–1939) Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), and Ludwig von Bertalanffy
(1901–1972). Rather than consider any one of Kant’s “neo-Kantian”
innovators as the progenitor of the “third force” of psychology, it solves a
number of problems to refer the category directly to Kant. Consistent
with the manner in which the historical systems of psychology have been
discussed in the previous sections, this section will consider the principles
of the Four Forces which will reveal their essential incommensurabilities,
that is, the methodological, structural and functional principles regarding
ψυχή. Also, it is important to keep in mind that we are considering these
categories as original, that is, prior to the influence of any innovators, and
prior to the influence of the “Cognitive Revolution.” As needed, innova-
tions and influences will be addressed later.
Behaviorism’s methodology is extraspective. As John B. Watson opened
his seminal paper of 1913, “Psychology as the behaviorist views it is a
purely objective experimental branch of natural science.” (Watson 1913:
158). It is environment-centric in that it considers the organism’s relation
to things in the environment. In that ontological priority is assigned to
behavior, it retains an essentially mechanistic vision for psychology,
revealing its connection with the Early Modern French sensorium-
positivists, and its emphasis on the principles of reflex, conditioning, and

habit-formation reveal its connection to the earlier associationist think-
ing. The fact that consciousness need not put in an appearance, reveals
the extent to which it is amenable to materialistic monism and the phe-
nomenalism of Hume. Lastly, in regard to function, just as there is no
need for consciousness to put in an appearance, so too there is no need
for “freedom of the will” to put in an appearance. As we concluded above
in regard to this issue: logical, radical and methodological Behaviorism
amount to an understanding of the “contingencies” found within a
“physical system,” and “It is in the nature of an experimental analysis of
human behavior that it should strip away the functions previously assigned
to autonomous man and transfer them one by one to the controlling
environment [emphasis added].” (Skinner 1971: 194).
Freudian Psychoanalysis occupies a different category of methodologi-
cal principles from Behaviorism, not because it is not extraspective;
rather, introspection too has a place in Freudian Psychoanalysis, and
Freud was clearly willing to consider a patient (or analysand’s) “free asso-
ciations.” Thus both extraspection and introspection have a place in the
methodology of Freudian Psychoanalysis, so long as both are grounded in
his understanding of what the science of psychoanalysis is. For example,
if we take the “Project” of 1895 to indicate the beginning of his psycho-
analytic writing and the posthumously published An Outline of
Psychoanalysis (1940) to indicate the end of his psychoanalytic writing,
then from beginning to end Freud gave the same characterization of psy-
choanalysis: Freudian psychoanalysis is a natural science.
For Freud, “the intellect and the mind are objects for scientific research
in exactly the same way as any non-human things.” (Freud 1933: 159).
Thus, in the beginning,
The intention of this project is to furnish us with a psychology which shall

be a natural science: its aim, that is, is to represent psychical processes as
quantitatively determined states of specifiable material particles and so to
make them plain and void of contradiction. (Freud 1895: 355)
And, at the end, “Psychoanalysis is a part of the mental science of psy-

chology … Psychology, too, is a natural science. What else can it be?”
176 F. Scalambrino
(1940: 282; cf. Grünbaum 1984; cf. Macmillan and Crews 1997; cf.
Sulloway 1992; cf. Zepf 2016). Anticipating what will be considered
again below, taking the word “contradiction” as a point of departure for
interpreting Freud’s “Project,” some have located a “dialectic of desire” in
Freud’s system. Tracing a line of thought from Jean-Martin Charcot’s
(1825–1893) student Pierre Janet (1859–1947) in which he used a dis-
tinction originating from Maine de Biran (1766–1824) between the
immediate data of consciousness—reminiscent of the “bare sensation” of
Early Modern French sensorium-positivism—and “the self ” as an active
energy, Freud’s “dialectic of desire” may be understood as his attempt to
provide a naturalistic account of this line of thought.
That is, Janet saw an “antithesis” between “the automatism of subcon-
scious acts” of ψυχή and the “personalized apprehension of things” which
was picked up in Henri Bergson’s (1859–1941) theorizing. From there:
To “mechanism” the philosopher of creative evolution [Bergson] opposes

“dynamism,” a principle which is allied to vitalism so soon as it suggests a
creative force in life. Dynamism … is based upon a dialectic of mind and
matter. This dialectic leads it straight toward the problems of knowledge
and reality … The dynamical principles of Freud are of the same general
character as those which we have found in Janet and Bergson. (Bentley
1921: 10)
Moreover, a naturalization or “materialization” of the dialectic is, of

course, possible, as Darwin and Marx have shown (cf. Skoll 2014: esp.
Ch. 3). Thus, as we will see, the innovators of Freud who read the “dia-
lectic of desire” not in terms of natural science are actually shifting to the
French (Maine de Biron, Janet, and Bergson) position, instead of Freud’s.
In regard to structure, Freud offered multiple models of ψυχή, for
example the “structural” and “topographical.” However, for the purpose
of identifying a principle which makes Freudian Psychoanalysis incom-
mensurable with the other “Forces” of psychology, we may simply notice
that he gave “the unconscious”—biologically construed—ontological
priority (cf. Freud 1915; cf. Sulloway 1992). Further, his
bio-organism- centric psychoanalysis espoused an “identity theory of
mind,” aka “type physicalism” or “reductive materialism.” (cf. Smith
1999: 49–57; cf. Smith 2001: 405–406; cf. Solomon 1974). Freud’s sys-
tem also evidences incommensurability in relation to Behaviorism regard-
ing function; however, since the question of free will may be said to
characterize the central principle regarding function, we will need to look
beyond the surface to see the incommensurability between Freudian
Psychoanalysis and Behaviorism regarding function.
What makes the issue complicated in Freud’s theorizing is the presence
of both an affirmation of teleology and an affirmation of determinism.
On the one hand, whether one approaches the question of free will in
Freud by way of his infamous claim that “anatomy is destiny” (1961:
178, 1957: 189) or by way of his “psychosexual stages,” (1953) he seems
to suggest that there are progressive stages at which to arrive—or not—,
and, therefore, it seems like individuals may have freedom in the actual-
ization of stages. On the other hand, Freud was explicitly and avowedly a
determinist; noting, for example, “You nourish the illusion of there being
such a thing as psychical freedom, and you will not give it up. I am sorry
to say I disagree with you categorically over this.” (Freud 1963: 49).
Not surprisingly Freud linked this position with the accomplishment
of the “new psychology,” that is, “I ventured to tell you that you nourish
a deeply rooted faith in undetermined psychical events and in free will,
but that this is quite unscientific and must yield to the demand of a deter-
minism whose rule extends over mental life.” (Ibid: 106). Further, note
well that he characterized even rational deliberation about the future as
“the unfulfilled but possible futures to which we still like to cling in phan-
tasy, all the strivings of the ego … which nourish in us the illusion of Free
Will [emphasis added]” (1955: 236). Moreover, it makes sense that, as
Thomas Szasz (1920–2012) pointed out, “although an entire volume of
the Standard Edition of Freud’s collected works is devoted to an index,
there is no entry for responsibility in it.” (2001: 237).
Ultimately, the “Third Force” of psychology is grounded in Kant’s phi-
losophy; that is, it is not a psychology grounded in the thinking of, for
example, Descartes, Locke, or Hume. The term “Third Force” psychology
comes from the psychologists Abraham H. Maslow (1908–1970) and
Carl R. Rogers (1902–1987). The name was supposedly derived as a reac-
tion to Psychoanalysis as a “First Force” and Behaviorism as a “Second
Force” in psychology. Two of the twentieth-century “Existentialist”
178 F. Scalambrino
hilosophers whose work has clearly influenced Third Force psychology

p
are Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) and Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–1980).
In many ways, the Third Force is the diametrical opposite of the other
two “forces.” In terms of structure the first two forces were mechanistic
and materialistic; in terms of function they were deterministic, and in
terms of methodology they were reductionistic, if not positivistic, that is,
exemplary of Naturwissenschaften.
Thus, in discussing the “Third Force” of psychology, there will be three
key features which differentiate it from the other forces. The first, which
may be considered structural, is that the Third Force gives ontological
priority to the conscious individual human-person. On the one hand,
this immediately differentiates it from all of the other forces in that by
relating to ψυχή in terms of the conscious individual human-person,
consciousness very much makes an appearance—to turn a locution refer-
ring to Titchener’s portent phrase above. On the other hand, this may be
seen as an affirmation of two Renaissance principles. First, the Third
Force of psychology affirms the principle of Individualism by recognizing
the individual’s ability to self-actualize its unique, or “ownmost,” poten-
tial. Second, it affirms the principle of Humanism by recognizing the
dignity and primacy of the person over, for example, unconscious deter-
ministic forces or environment-based reflexes. There are, of course, differ-
ent perspectives within Third Force psychology on how to understand the
affirmation of these principles; a topic to be addressed below.
It is in terms of function that the various interpretations and approaches
within the Third Force of psychology appear most unified. This principle
of function, then, is “freedom.” That is to say, two principles are needed
to differentiate Third Force psychology from the other forces in terms of
incommensurability: Third Force psychology is non-deterministic, and
Third force psychology gives ontological priority to the individual per-
son. Whereas the former differentiates the Third Force from Freudian
Psychoanalysis and Behaviorism, the latter differentiates it from all of the
other forces, that is, the “Fourth Force” as well. In this way, Third Force
psychology affirms notions such as “responsibility” and “commitment”
(cf. Rogers 1964). Regarding the “Humanists,” whereas for Rogers the
way to “develop an acceptable self-concept, to realize one’s potential,
[and] to achieve self-actualization” was through “a process of self-discovery
and self-acceptance,” for Maslow “self-actualization requires the satisfac-

tion of lower order physiological needs, and needs for safety, love, and
self-esteem.” (Kimble 1985: 15).
Moreover, recall that according to the account of ψυχή revealed
through Kant’s Transcendental Logic, a “predisposition to personality is
the capacity for respect for the moral law as in itself a sufficient incentive
of the will.” (Kant 1960: 34). Because the human will has the potential to
be non-mechanical in its relation to the environment, its embodiment,
and its own existence, the person is free. Psychologists working within
this system may or may not contextualize this freedom in terms of moral-
ity and theology (cf. DuBose 2013; cf. Camus 1991, 1992). This idea—
as we will see more clearly regarding methodology—has been elaborated
into the idea of “meaning-making,” and, in this way, the Third Force of
psychology emphasizes the manner in which individuals “create them-
selves” and the meaning of their existence through their own choices, that
is, their use of freedom (cf. Maslow 1943, 1968, 1970a, b; cf. Rogers
1961, 1963a, b, 1965, 1979, 1995; cf. Frankl 2006; cf. Spinelli 2005).
Whereas the perspective of function emphasized unity across the vari-
ous interpretations and approaches within the Third Force of psychology,
the perspective of methodology emphasizes diversity. We must not con-
fuse the diversity of methodology with an anarchic-eclecticism. For
example, inspired by Existentialism and Humanism and frustrated with
the de-personalizing agendas of Freudian Psychoanalysis and Behaviorism,
many psychologists from diverse methodological backgrounds were uni-
fied by the structural and functional principles of the Third Force of psy-
chology; in fact, some were “psychoanalysts who left the Freudian fold
because they were dissatisfied with its blind allegiance to the natural
scientific account of the mind.” (Burston 2003: 312; cf. Pandora 2002:
38). Thus, of the innovators of Freud’s system, we must ask whether they
embrace the structural and functional principle of the Third Force of
psychology, and it is an either/or situation, that is, there is a genuine
incommensurability between Freudian psychoanalysis and the Third
Force of psychology in terms of their constitutive principles. Anticipating
what will be considered more fully below, because the Third Force of
psychology has a human science or Geisteswissenschaften orientation, one
of the methods associated with the meaning-making activities of ψυχή is
180 F. Scalambrino
the study of Hermeneutics. So, in the Post-Modern Period we will see

what is considered by many to be a Hermeneutic Psychoanalysis, which
is also a human science. The only point to make here is that, to the extent
that such an approach is truly a human science, then it is incommensu-
rable with Freudian Psychoanalysis.
The diverse methodologies of the Third Force of psychology have often
been called “Qualitative Methods.” This is unfortunate for Third Force
psychologists, since it implies that they are somehow barred from using
“Quantitative Methods,” which is simply not true—such thinking stems
from a lack of understanding the principles constituting the Third Force’s
incommensurability with other systems. Despite the vagueness of the
term “holism,” in general, we may distinguish between the essence of
Third Force psychology’s methodology and the essence of Freudian
Psychoanalysis and Behaviorism in that the Third Force is non-
reductionistic, that is, it embraces “holism” by regarding the whole per-
son as “greater than the sum of its parts.” In doing this it respects the
dignity of the person’s humanity and avoids “de-personalizing” the indi-
vidual. The primary three methods involved are: Phenomenology,
Phenomenography, and Hermeneutics.
There are many variations across these categories; however, in general
we may say that when a researcher is interested in the merely subjective
aspects of the person’s experience, then the methodology of
“Phenomenography” is involved; that is, questions like: “What was your
experience of the event?” are asked, and the researcher is not interested in
investigating the objective nature of the person’s experience (cf. Husserl
1977, 1970; cf. Marton 1981, 1986; cf. Svensson 1997). The principle
distinguishing between “Phenomenology” and “Phenomenography” is
directly analogous to the difference between Kantian and Cartesian sub-
jectivity, respectively (cf. Heidegger 1962b, 1997; cf. Rockmore 2011).
That is to say, though it is true that Phenomenology studies the subjective
structure of human experience, it does so for the purpose of explicating
the psychological structures determining the object of that subject’s expe-
rience. To clarify, one: Consider the APA Dictionary’s definition, “phe-
nomenology should be distinguished from introspection as it is concerned
with the relationship between acts of consciousness and the objects of
such acts.” (VandenBos 2007: 695). Two, following from the “Mental
Activity” tradition, the human sensorium dynamically overflows—in

that it has more potential content than it can “process,” and, therefore, a
distinction is to be made between the “intentional” acts of consciousness
(noesis) and the content (noema) selected from out of the overflow by the
acts. Phenomenology describes this intentional selection process in ter-
minology developed out of Kant (cf. Scalambrino 2015b), not “in terms
of their relationship to events in the body or in the external world.”
(VandenBos 2007: 695; cf. Husserl 1983: 211–233 & 181).
Hence, when psychologists are not concerned with the subject’s condi-
tions for experiencing an object as much as with the manner in which the
subject characterizes its own experience, then such psychologists are not
performing Phenomenology, they are performing Phenomenography; to
mix the two up is to commit the logical fallacy of “Psychologism”
(Scalambrino 2015b). As the phenomenologist Edmund Husserl
(1859–1938) explained it: “the expression psychologism” applies to “any
interpretation which converts objectivities into something psychological
in the proper sense” (Husserl 1969: 169; cf. Hopkins 2006). In other
words, the objective aspects of human experience are “psychologized”
when “their objective sense, their sense as a species of objects having a
peculiar essence, is denied in favor of the subjective mental occurrences,
the data in immanent or psychological temporality” (Husserl 1969: 169;
cf. Scalambrino 2015b). At any moment of some human subject’s experi-
ence of the content of that moment may be differentiated between the
objective and subjective aspects of the experience, and one is guilty of psy-
chologism when one treats the objective (universalizable) aspects of the
experience as if they are merely subjective. Though different subjects have
different perspectives, to claim the reality of a situation is not universally
true because it rather depends on the subjective determination of subjects
is to commit the fallacy of psychologism.2
Also in regard to the methodology of phenomenology, Gestalt psy-
chology features prominently as another “neo-Kantian” source of con-
temporary psychology with its principles of “retrospection,” “imageless
thought,” and the principle (what they call “the Law”) of “Prägnanz.”
Gestalt psychology has been characterized as the “antithesis of Wundtian
Structuralism.” (Sahakian 1975: 155). Retrospection adds to introspec-
tion and extraspection: looking “backward,” rather than “inward” or
182 F. Scalambrino
“outward.” And, it was used to reveal the principle of “imageless thought.”

That is, the “Würzburg School,” led by Oswald Külpe (1862–1915) pro-
duced experiments in which they would ask participants if they agree
with some of Nietzsche’s aphorisms. For example, do you agree with
§115 from Beyond Good & Evil: “The sense of the tragic gains and wanes
with sensuality.” (Nietzsche 1989: 90), or §175: “In the end one loves
one’s desire and not what is desired.” (Ibid: 93)? After recording a
response, participants were asked to “retrospect” and notice whether any
images consistently corresponded to such activities as “affirmation” or
“denial” (cf. Mayer and Orth 1901; cf. Seel 2011: 1366–1371; cf. Köhler
1970; cf. Perls et al. 1994).
On the one hand, this seems to indicate that some kinds of thinking
can occur without being accompanied by images. Finally, this led to the
idea that such—what Kant would have called “synthetic transcenden-
tal”—activity takes place outside of awareness. Thus, on the other hand,
this allows for discussion both of such conditions for the possibility of con-
scious human experience and the principle of “Prägnanz.” The latter idea
being, then, that even if given fragmented or fragmentary sensory input,
Gestalt phenomenology reveals that “acts of consciousness” fill-in or
complete what is lacking, and are, therefore, “organizing” and active
beyond mere recognition of what things may be environmentally present.
The principle of “Prägnanz” is, of course, holistic, then—keeping in
mind the “imageless” contributions to experience—in that it suggests the
whole of experience is greater than the sum of its analytically identifiable
parts (cf. Scalambrino 2014). This will also be relevant for the methodol-
ogy of Hermeneutics regarding the agency of the species-specific meaning-
making actions of ψυχή.
Last of the three primary methods of the Third Force is “Hermeneutics.”
Because Section 6 above is dedicated to a discussion of Hermeneutics, we
may be brief here. Recall that the term “hermeneutics” points to the
study of different ways of describing or “interpreting,” as opposed to a
process of essential specification. This is different from Phenomenology
and Phenomenography, though it may incorporate information from
both. Hermeneutics is associated with “meaning-making,” for example
narrative descriptions of a person’s lived-experience. A basic premise
holds for the use of Hermeneutics in psychology that when we have an
experience we provide a description of the experience to ourselves; fur-

ther, we incorporate the description of the experience into our “life story.”
As we noted above regarding Kant’s philosophy, just as we have regulative
ideas, which mediate our experience and influence the meaning we find
in existence, so too “a person functions in terms of a creative representa-
tion of the world rather than in terms of a passive reaction to the physical
environment.” (Kimble 1985: 16). Hermeneutics, in regard to psychol-
ogy, studies how persons make meaning, choose their actions, and dwell
in a meaningful “world” (cf. Smith and Osborn 2003). Anticipating what
will be considered more fully below, a concluding discussion of the
Hermeneutic method below will help us understand two (2) different
historical “turns” of the late twentieth century. That is, emphasis may be
placed on the historicity of the language through the performance of
which one “makes meaning.” Or, emphasis may be placed on the perfor-
mance itself.
The question of Hermeneutics relates in interesting ways to the ques-
tion of the relationship between Existentialism and Humanism. Though
beyond the scope of our present discussion, anticipating its presence in
the background of our conclusion, we should at least note the following.
Not only because “Existentialists” tend to have an inherent aversion to
“isms,” but also disagreements among them, make the “Existentialist”
idea of “Freedom” difficult to characterize beyond its Kantian-base.
Famously Heidegger and Sartre disagreed on the relationship between
Existentialism and Humanism, and this may be understood in terms of
how to characterize Freedom. Whereas Sartre in his writings Being &
Nothingness and especially “The Humanism of Existentialism,” aka
“Existentialism is a Humanism,” seemed to believe he was explicating
Heidegger’s position from Being &Time, Heidegger’s explicit disagree-
ment appeared in his “Letter on Humanism” (cf. Sartre 1992, 1993; cf.
Heidegger 1962a, 1993). Thus, in regard to the Hermeneutic question
of meaning-making, Sartre seemed to emphasize absolute freedom as
“inescapably dreadful,” despite any “deterministic excuses,” and Heidegger
seemed to emphasize freedom in regard to what may be accomplished
given our situatedness within historical-expressions of Be-ing. Roughly,
the Humanism of Sartre’s position may be likened to the idea that you are
only as limited as your imagination and knowledge or “where there’s a
184 F. Scalambrino
will there’s a way.” Yet, Heidegger’s emphasis on language as “the house of

Being” and his concern that we are the “shepherds of Be-ing” suggests a
greater focus on one’s present existential conditions than perhaps is found
in Sartre’s approach (cf. Heidegger 2001; cf. Guignon and Adams 2003;
cf. Scalambrino 2015d; cf. Solomon 1987).
In regard to the “Fourth Force,” then, there is a straightforward way to
illuminate its incommensurability from the other “forces”; however,
given the nature of the Fourth Force, it may be the most difficult of the
four to tell apart from the others at first glance. Ultimately, because the
Fourth Force gives ontological priority to systems, it differs from the
other forces insofar as those forces give ontological priority to the indi-
vidual, and insofar as they do not, then the Fourth Force sets out to
subsume them. For example, Behaviorism is enviro-centric; however, by
focusing on the conditioning of the individual, it reduces the environ-
ment to its involvement regarding the conditioning of the individual,
rather than the individual as a part of the environment as a systemic
whole.
Bertalanffy suggested, regarding the essential distinction between the
animal and the human-person found in the history of Western philoso-
phy, that one cannot simply choose one pole of the opposition and assign
ontological priority to it. Rather, it is the system of which both the ani-
mal and the human-person are parts to which, according to the psycho-
logical application of General Systems Theory, must be given ontological
priority (cf. von Bertalanffy 1967, 1968, 1969, 1981). For example, in
terms of family or couples therapy, it is not individuals as much as it is the
family or the couple, as a systemic entity, which is “in therapy,” that is,
toward which the therapy is oriented. Systems may be “closed” (we are
able to know all the variables and functions involved in the system) or
“open” (we can know the system essentially in terms of its operable vari-
ables and functions, but not the totality). Thus, in either case, the meta-
phors of “Laplace’s Demon” or the “Limitless” idea from popular
American culture are relevant for the Fourth Force of psychology (von
Bertalanffy 1967: 128).
Along with the shift in ontological priority comes a shift of emphases
regarding multiple principles of philosophical psychology—the two most
prominent being the principles of “Emergence” and “Multiple
Realizability.” As noted above regarding these principles, their emphasis

brings forth a different methodological relation to causation. In other
words, “A stimulus (i.e. a change in external conditions) does not cause a
process in an otherwise inert system; it only modifies processes in an
autonomously active system” (Ibid: 129). Thus, the principle of homeo-
stasis found, for example, in mechanistic theories such as the Freudian
hydraulic model, opens onto cultural terrain beyond the hedonistic prin-
ciple. Further, the Fourth Force emphasizes the principle of difference or
differentiation. That is to say, the pre-systems principle of individuation
is transformed into the principle of differentiation (since everything
remains “within” the system), and from the perspective of the system as a
whole, differentiation is understood as transformation into a more “het-
erogeneous” condition (Ibid: 130; cf. Deleuze 1994).
Bertalanffy is clear that “Organisms are not machines”; however, “they
can to a certain extent become machines, congeal into machine.” (von
Bertalanffy 1967: 131; cf. Deleuze and Guattari 1980). He referred to
this way in which organisms may be differentiated as “the principle of
progressive mechanization.” (von Bertalanffy 1967: 131). According to
the principle of “boundary regulation,” then, it is still possible to speak of
ψυχή, though in terms of differentiated phases of change in the system
(cf. de Mul 2016). What is more, though Bertalanffy emphasizes a kind
of human dignity—in that human organisms include “symbolic activi-
ties” and, therefore, cannot be reduced to mere “biologistic notions”—he
also recognized the manner in which the principle of progressive mecha-
nization leaves even the human organism susceptible to control regarding
its functions in the system. Such “control theory,” though the impulse for
which may be seen in Bacon and Descartes, in terms of General Systems
Theory is called “cybernetics.” Interestingly, this term comes from the
Greek for “steersman,” and therefore is directly analogous to Aristotle’s
discussion of ψυχή as the sailor or “ship’s captain.” Yet, from the Systems
perspective, the control is directed at the system, and, therefore, at the
individual, by way of the system.
As Norbert Wiener explained it in his seminal Cybernetics; or, Control
and Communication in the Animal and Machine (1965): “the newer study
of automata, whether in the metal or in the flesh, is a branch of commu-
nication engineering,” and this involves a “quantity of information and
186 F. Scalambrino
[a] coding technique” (Wiener 1965: 42). For example, as W. Ross
Ashby’s An Introduction to Cybernetics characterizes it, the “unpredictable
behavior of an insect that lives in and about a shallow pond, hopping to
and fro among water, bank, and pebble, can illustrate a machine in which
the state transitions correspond to” a probability-based pattern that can
be analyzed statistically (Johnston 2008: 31; Heidegger 1976; cf.
Scalambrino 2015c; cf. von Uexküll 2010). With such principles and
innovations in methodology, the study of ψυχή was able to shift further
toward neuroscience. For instance, Evan Thompson’s Mind in Life (2007)
provides an excellent summary of the present state of this shift.
Moreover, just as General Systems Theory has a way of subsuming
previously opposed “variables,” such as those of “mind” and “body,” so
too the Fourth Force of psychology seemingly can incorporate the meth-
odologies of the other forces, for example association, introspection, phe-
nomenography, phenomenology, and hermeneutics; however, because
the results of these methods are used to characterize correlations from the
perspective of the system (even if it is the “neuro-system” of the individ-
ual as dynamic differentiation of the environment), the incommensura-
bility between the clusters of principles constituting the “forces” of
Western psychology still stands. Yet, it is especially through such power
of Systems methodology to subsume the methods of the other forces that
it brought about what is known as the “Cognitive Revolution” in Western
psychology (cf. O’Donahue et al. 2003). We will conclude this discussion
below in regard to the “Cognitive Turn” in the history of Western psy-
chology, since the “Cognitive Revolution” in psychology is really the
“Systems Revolution” in philosophy.
Notes
1. As a compromise among different readings of Nietzsche’s often epigram-
matical writings, I have taken to referring to Nietzsche’s philosophy as a
kind of “ecstatic naturalism.” Yet, for the purpose of Nietzsche’s “existen-
tial” philosophy as a neo-Kantian influence on Contemporary psychol-
ogy, his emphasis on the individual and the value of life-affirmation
suffices, and, therefore, the question of how to interpret his philosophy in

relation to “naturalism” need not be decided here.
2. Depending upon the attitude of the psychologist reading this: one may
celebrate my pointing out that many of the so-called phenomenological
psychologists commit “psychologism” by making the above noted mistake
regarding phenomenology; further, one may celebrate my pointing out
that the distinction between phenomenology and phenomenography will
fix that mistake. Or, one may be enraged that I am saying something
which goes against the political-psychological-establishment regarding
“phenomenological psychology.” However, I assure you (dear reader), the
fundamental failure of “phenomenological psychologists” to differentiate
between phenomenology and phenomenography has led to their theoreti-
cal stagnation. For, when you have reached the point at which you are
willing to denounce all objectivity, then you have reached a point at which
you are completely out of touch with reality. These psychologists need to
realize that it can be simultaneously true that the psychological products
of your subjective relation to some event or thing may be subjectively valid,
while also being objectively wrong. Jurisprudence dismisses, every day
without hesitation, the kinds of judgments that cause these psychologists
to falter. For example, someone kills another person; no matter how the
perpetrator articulates the subjective aspects of the action, no articulation
will be grounds for doubting the objectivity of the action—the victim is
still dead. Suppose the perpetrator says, “When I did it the color red was
present to me” or “I thought the plumber had my sandwich,” regardless of
what the perpetrator says, it does not change the objective truth that the
victim is dead. Now, how the perpetrator articulates the subjective aspects
of their performance of the action may influence how the action is char-
acterized—first degree murder, man slaughter, self-defense, Not Guilty by
Reason of Insanity, and so on. However, if it is true that the perpetrator
killed another person, then no subjective description of that action will
change its objective truth. An example even more to the point: despite the
feelings of some psychologists about what I am saying, what I am saying
about the fallacy of psychologism and the distinction between phenome-
nology and phenomenography is still true.
188 F. Scalambrino
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6
Conclusion: Post-Modern Turning Away
from Method
6.1 T
he Linguistic Turn: Agency’s Slide
from Discursive to Postmodern Condition
In this concluding chapter we will consider the major “turns,” aka “revo-
lutions” depending on your perspective, regarding the Contemporary
Period of Western psychology. In general the history of these turns may
be characterized in three ways. First, there are those who support the
continuing influence and presence of the Fourth Force of psychology, for
example, by attempting to find the most appropriate way to characterize
“the system” from within which ψυχή may be examined. Second, there
are those who are critical of the Fourth Force of psychology by being
“anarchist” regarding its principles—though in this way its criticizers also
essentially criticize the other “forces” also. Third, there are those who are
critical of the Fourth Force of psychology by attempting a re-turn or pro-
duce a reconstruction of a different “force” of psychology, that is, one of
the first three “forces.” It is important to keep these two types of criticism
distinct, since the one rejects and the other embraces principles. Further,
such characterizations allow us to indicate how a criticism may invoke
Freud, for example, in either a destructive or constructive (respectively)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74733-0_6
196 F. Scalambrino
dialectic. That is to say, are you invoking Freud merely to attack the
principles of the Fourth Force, or are you invoking Freud to advocate for
the First Force over the Fourth?
The “Linguistic Turn” refers to a movement which began taking shape
in the early twentieth century. In the context of understanding its rele-
vance for the history of Western psychology, note that it may be seen as
an attempt to provide an identity to the “system” of the Fourth Force of
psychology. In other words, the study of humans and the study of ψυχή
was thought to be best approached methodologically through the study
of language (cf. de Saussure 2011; cf. Austin 1975; cf. Wittgenstein 1969,
1980, 1982, 2001; cf. Valsiner and Rosa 2007). This may be understood
in a Modern or a more Post-Modern way (cf. Rorty 1992b). The former
interpretation holds as closely as possible to a science of language as a
“system.” The idea here is that there is enough universality and objectivity
in the human use of language to form a solid base for psychology. The
latter interpretation emphasizes the relativity of language use, that is,
“actions speak louder than words” (cf. Henle 1992). Whereas in the for-
mer interpretation this relativity still accounts for the objectively subjec-
tive uses of language, in the latter interpretation the relativity is read as
politically based, not psychologically based. That is to say, your language
use reflects not your “inner” psychology as much as your “outer” political
affiliations and socio-economic, geographic, and historical situation.
There are three points we need to draw from the “Linguistic Turn” for
the History and Systems of Western psychology. First, the above distinc-
tion between the objective and the subjective use of language is an essen-
tial and irreducible distinction, so long as we take “Language” as the
primary system which psychology studies. This distinction often invokes
discussion of the “Humpty Dumpty” theory of language, since both sides
of the distinction are illustrated in Chap. 6, the “Humpty Dumpty”
chapter of Through the Looking-Glass, with Alice taking the objective-side
and “Humpty” taking the subjective-side (cf. Carroll 2006). Second,
though it does not resolve the distinction, if we are to understand linguis-
tic utterances (some might say: if an utterance is to truly count as a lin-
guistic communication), then the principles of Hermeneutics become
operable once again. On the objective-side it is as if each individual is a
poem, or continuous poetic-expression, of the language-system within
Conclusion: Post-Modern Turning Away from Method 197
which it operates—recall the discussion of different styles of reading from

Sect. 2.2 above. This is not to be understood as a surface effect, but rather
as including the individual’s self-reflection. That is to say, depending
upon the grammar and vocabulary you use to “reflect upon yourself,”
then that vocabulary may be said to constrain your “reflections” to the
point of possibly even itself determining your self-understanding.
Third, as it threatens to become a fully biological or cognitive-
behavioral “Medical Model” based science, the defenders of Humpty
Dumpty charge the scientists with being first and foremost a cultural
force. That is to say, defenders of the subjective-side (and one individual
may be seen supporting different “sides” depending on the issue in ques-
tion) argue that what the “objective-side” is actually attempting to accom-
plish is a kind of hegemony in regard to what may and may not be
considered “psychology.” Of course, on some level this is true, and the
question we should be asking is does its truth warrant some type of ethi-
cal restraint? After all, we usually do not attempt to restrain scientists for
“being right.” However, there are instances regarding bio-ethics (cf.
Scalambrino 2018) in which political restraints are explicit, so the argu-
ment that a certain type of psychology is “destructive for society” may be
able to gain some political-traction. Moreover, it is interesting to notice
how this “move” on the part of the subjective-side supporters is a re-turn
to the times when psychology and morality were not considered
separable.
In sum, the distinction between the objective and subjective use of
language initiates the concern to find some other system in which to pos-
sibly ground language. The major candidates who emerged in this regard
were Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951)—this aspect of Wittgenstein’s
work is often referred to as the “after the Philosophical Investigations
period” or his “later period”—and Martin Heidegger (1889–1976)—this
aspect of Heidegger’s work is often referred to as his “middle period” or,
depending on your perspective, his “later period.” Whereas Wittgenstein
sought to ground language in “agreement” and agreement in “form of
life,” Heidegger sought to ground language in Be-ing, or, again depend-
ing on your perspective, he may have considered language equi-primordial
with Be-ing. Interestingly, then, the work of both of these philosophers
has been appropriated by General Systems Theory or the Fourth Force of
198 F. Scalambrino
psychology. However, as we will see in the next section, the “Linguistic

Turn” gives way to the “Performative Turn” precisely because of the oscil-
lation between the sides of the objective and subjective understanding of
language use.
6.2 T
he Performative Turn: The Essence
of Postmodernism
Just as the principle of Hermeneutics re-emerged in the Linguistic Turn,
the principle of Freedom or free will and agency receives emphasis in the
Performative Turn (cf. Petit 2001). This is especially the case regarding
identity, for example by way of culture, and the capacity to be critical of
non-freely determined characterizations of actions and events. On the
one hand, the idea is quite simple. Regardless of whatever term is used to
identify “the system,” many individuals will still believe they are free,
despite whatever extent to which they may be part of such a system.
Thus, resistance to the hegemony of the system—however identified—
indicates the impulse of the Performative Turn. However, on the other
hand, because the various expressions of the Performative Turn are—
given its essence—necessarily localized, that is, not “universal” perfor-
mances, and they often resist being even philosophically systematized,
discussions of the Performative Turn can become quite complicated.
As noted above, the anarchic impulse—the attempt to avoid associa-
tion with any principles at all—reaches its zenith in the Performative
Turn. In fact, the “Performative Turn” refers to Postmodernism in its
most purified expression. Thus, Postmodernism represents a revival of an
antiauthoritarian Renaissance posture; however, this time (after Darwin,
Marx, Freud, and Nietzsche) it often may be seen attempting to resist
even the “authority” of rationality, and especially “absolute truth.” It is
important, then, to notice that when various thinkers such as Freud are
invoked that it may not be in the service of propping up some sort of
“Freudian system” as much as it may be the attempt to provide arguments
against “the system,” or even any system. This is often why the ad homi-
nem argument, which is fallacious from a rational perspective, circulates
like a kind of Postmodern currency in the Performative Turn. That is to

say, some Postmodern anarchists like to launch localized attacks on the
supporters of the objective-science systems approach to psychology, as if
a psychoanalytic description of a scientist’s motivations would debunk
the findings of science. Of course, if the findings are objective, “fit” the
theory, and “work,” then no psychoanalytic description—no matter how
accurate, incidentally—would debunk the scientific findings. Yet, what
such ad hominem attacks might accomplish is the reduction of the politi-
cal influence of those findings; that is to say, in the Performative Turn,
psychology performs “Cultural Criticism,” and, in this way, (social) psy-
chology finds itself in the service of culture and politics.
Perhaps no theory has critically re-emerged during the Performative
Turn with as confusing-effects in psychology as Freud’s psychoanalytic
theory. For example, there are those who now claim Freudian psychoana-
lytic theory is a “Human Science”—it is not. We will examine two differ-
ent lines of thought here insofar as they are relevant to the Performative
Turn and the principles of Western psychology in the Contemporary
Period. First, the theoretical account of Freudian psychoanalysis as a
Geisteswissenschaften alternative system of psychology congealed through
the work of Paul Ricoeur (1913–2005) and Jürgen Habermas (b.1929).
Second, perhaps psychology found its purest Postmodern performance in
the irony and parody expressed—and mostly without “breaking charac-
ter”—in the likes of Jacques Lacan (1901–1981). That is, from his self-
selected costumes to his bent cigars, it is because of him—and we should,
therefore, give him the credit, that is, this is not an ad hominem state-
ment—that Lacan and other Postmodern figures are now referred to as
“clowns” (cf. Tobias 2007; cf. Little 2002).
In regard to Freudian psychoanalysis as a “Human Science,” Adolf
Grünbaum (b. 1923) has conclusively shown that such an understanding
of Freudian psychology is wrong (cf. Grünbaum 1984, 1990). However,
because the Performative Turn is—like Humpty Dumpty—more inter-
ested in subjective use than objective truth, that such an interpretation of
Freudian psychoanalysis is both theoretically incoherent and would have
gone even against Freud’s wishes, noted above, has not stopped academics
from continuing to celebrate such an interpretation (cf. Habermas 1972:
246; cf. Jaspers 1974: 91; cf. Ricoeur 1970: 359, 1981: 271). On the one
200 F. Scalambrino
hand, these theorists, especially Habermas, are self-aware of the

“transgressive” nature of their reading of Freud, also known in general as:
the “violence of interpretation” (cf. Aulagnier 2001), and they also seem
to recognize two essential steps in shifting Freud from nature to nurture:
articulate a theory of “desire” and extend his ideas to culture (cf. Ricoeur
1981: 7).
Thus, the question becomes: if we follow such a “Hermeneutic” appro-
priation of Freudian theory to the context of culture, then what work is
there for such theorizing to do that may still be called “psychology”?
Ultimately, either the answer is none (and we have left the field of psy-
chology for politics or political activism) or this is a place from which
psychologists can engage in “cultural criticism.” Moreover, as Deleuze
and Guattari infamously pointed out in regard even to those psycholo-
gists who use such Hermeneutic appropriations of Freudian theory in the
clinic with individual patients, those “psychoanalysts” are criticizing—
and helping the analysand learn to self-criticize—the cultural identity
they express as a part of its system. Of course, we must keep in mind that
“culture criticism” is rhetorical; that is to say, it does not need to be a fact-
based discourse, that is, facts are just one way to accomplish its goal which
is persuasion. (cf. Szasz 1998, 2010). Yet, since as it is often said that social
evolution is “Lamarckian,” much is at stake in terms of the culture which
we perpetuate. Also, it is important to keep in mind that in the context
of cultural criticism, as noted above, culture, specifically its performance,
is given ontological priority as “the system,” that is, from a Fourth Force
of psychology perspective (cf. Biernacki 2000; cf. Brodsky and LaBrada
2017; cf. Möhring 2003).
Lacan, then, represents an extreme example of the Hermeneutic appro-
priation of Freudian theory to the context of culture. “Reorienting Freud
to a postmodern context, Lacan carries forward certain of his principles
and reconciles in his best efforts psychoanalysis to postmodern language
and social theory.” (Martin and Pesta 2016: 132; cf. Nancy and Lacoue-
Labarthe 1992; cf. Žižek 1987). Though Hermeneutics may be operative
with any psychology which engages in “interpretation,” Lacan’s theoriz-
ing in regard to subject constitution (for example, cf. 1991, 1977), sug-
gests a characterization of his appropriation of Freud in terms of Saussure
and Surrealism (cf. Lacan 1965; cf. Greely 2001; cf. Suleiman 1990; cf.
Williams 1981). According to Lacan, “Hieroglyphics of hysteria …
enigmas of inhibition, oracles of anxiety … these are the hermetic ele-
ments that our exegesis resolves” (1982: 69–70). Moreover, it is in this
way that—beyond merely the subject’s word choice—everyday life may
be understood in terms of dreaming and fantasizing à la Surrealism (think
Marx’s notion of “false consciousness”). Thus, on the one hand, Fourth
Force (so-called) psychoanalytic theory functions as cultural criticism,
since culture is the ground of these dreams and fantasies; and, on the
other hand, Lacan’s roguish and clownish performances may be seen as a
resistance to be subject to the culture-system (cf. Elliott 2004; cf. Peters
and Ceci 1980). For a similar example of Postmodern irony and parody
“without breaking character” see Dancing with Cats (Silver and Busch
2014).
For a different understanding of the Performative Turn, psychologists
may look to the work of Gilles Deleuze (1925–1995). What Deleuze
offers psychology in relation to the Fourth Force may be characterized as
a return to Kant; further, it may be understood as a return “through the
systems perspective” in that it gives ontological priority to the transcen-
dental dimension by way of the (recall the term from above) “differenti-
ated individual,” and this individual is understood as a systematic part of
its environment from the very Transcendental point indicating the origin
of its differentiation. In this way, Deleuze provides a theory which remains
continuously new in that it subsumes any attempt to identify it with a
generalization. (cf. Deleuze 1994, 2004; cf. Deleuze and Guattari 2004,
1980). Simply put, Deleuze’s “systems theory” re-turns psychology to the
Transcendental dimension. There are only two brief points we need con-
sider here to understand how Deleuze relates to the Performative Turn
and the “Cognitive Revolution” of General Systems Theory, which we
will consider in the following section.
First, Deleuze offers a theory, beyond “Structuralism,” for psychology
by emphasizing the function of “intensity” as the Transcendental condi-
tion constituting structures. In other words, Deleuze offers us a method
for theorizing that which is always already different from its identifiable
manifestations. However, this is more profound than any re-turn to the,
202 F. Scalambrino
or a, “Unconscious.” Recall that from a systems perspective the individual

is constituted through a principle of difference; rather than understand
this ontologically most primordial be-ing as language, Deleuze
characterizes it as Difference-in-Itself; that is to say, it is that which is
always already different from any general characterization in terms of a
system. Notice how on the one hand, this characterization carries its
capacity to be a critical theory embryonically within itself, so to speak,
since every characterization of it is necessarily contextual and temporary.
Difference-in-Itself is different from itself (cf. Deleuze 1994). One way to
understand this difference is in terms of “intensity” and another is in
terms of ψυχή. The principle of freedom applies, whatever term is used to
identify “the system,” regarding the agency of that which we call “ψυχή,”
though it be involved as a part or portion of the system (cf. Phillips 2006).
On the other hand, Deleuze’s theory represents a kind of perfection of
dynamic process theorizing in that it allows for and anticipates the re-
coding and phase changes characteristic of systems.
Second, Deleuze’s work may be seen as attempting to provide us with
a vocabulary of continual appropriation. In this way, it is as if he is onto-
logically theorizing “Be-coming,” rather than “Being.” Thus, the indi-
vidual as an already differentiated assemblage of the system is always
already in the process of be-coming a differently expressed assemblage of
the system. A particularly helpful expression of Deleuze’s vocabulary may
be found in his two volume set titled Capitalism and Schizophrenia writ-
ten with Félix Guattari (1930–1992). Envisioning environmental inter-
actions in terms of coding and re-coding—for example the way the body
might adjust itself to catch a falling object which has unexpectedly slipped
from your hand—provides a context within which the kinds of
“Computationalism” and “Connectionism” associated with the
“Cognitive Revolution” might widen their horizons (cf. Bachmann-
Medick 2016: 95). In other words, Deleuze’s re-turn to the Transcendental
dimension and Transcendental philosophy invokes a deeper holism
beyond even the contemporary politicized characterization of neurosci-
entific research in terms of pluralism and inter-disciplinary studies (cf.
Thompson 2007).
6.3 T
he Cognitive Turn: Almost “Normal
Science” in Psychology
To be sure, the “psychology of cognition” was not new in the 1950s. For
example, we find the following definition indicating that practitioners of
the “new psychology” were already working toward an explication of the
“Psychology of Cognition.” The following comes from 1874:
Cognition is a general name which we may apply to all those mental states
in which there is made known in consciousness either some affection or
activity of the mind itself, or some external quality or object. The Psychology
of Cognition analyzes knowledge into its primary elements, and seeks to
ascertain the nature and laws of the processes through which all our knowl-
edge passes in progressing from its simplest to its most elaborate condition.
(Jardine 1874: 1–2)
Yet, “the nature and laws of the processes through which all our knowl-
edge passes” would not find its most productive context until the control-
based theories of information-processing and cybernetics took shape (cf.
Shannon and Weaver 1949; cf. Miller 2003; cf. Gardner 1987: 19–32; cf.
Thompson 2007: 8). However, we must keep in mind, as was noted
above, that cybernetics may apply even to the First and Second Forces of
psychology and does not of necessity apply to the Fourth Force. That is
to say, General Systems Theory—as Bertalanffy characterized it—may or
may not be understood in terms of cybernetics. Thus, importantly, there
may still be room within the Fourth Force of psychology for the principle
of free will.
The term “Normal Science” is used in “Paradigm Theory” to denote
the paradigm through which practitioners understand the work they are
performing within a discipline when the discipline has essentially and
universally “settled,” so to speak, on that paradigm. Though the emer-
gence of General Systems Theory has undeniably influenced the disci-
pline of psychology as a whole, there is sufficient resistance to General
Systems Theory that it would be unfair to conclude “Cognition” refers to
the paradigm upon which contemporary psychology has settled. At the
204 F. Scalambrino
same time, the Cognitive Turn has been so influential across the
Humanities in general that it used to be referred to as the “Cognitive
Revolution” (cf. cf. Hobbs and Burman 2009; cf. Knapp and Robertson
2017; cf. Dember 1974; cf. Weimer and Palermo 1973; cf. Joynson
1970). At this point, as we are now witnessing the push-back against the
Cognitive Turn across the disciplines of the Humanities, it is easy to find
historical research calling the use of the term “revolution” into question.
However, there clearly has taken place within the history and systems of
Western psychology a “Cognitive Turn.”
The Cognitive Turn is usually described as having two (2) different
phases. There is little disagreement about how to identify the “first phase”
of the Cognitive Turn, as it was the first phase which provided us with the
“computer processing” metaphor for the materialist reduction of psychol-
ogy to “the brain” (cf. Dehaene 2014; cf. Boden 2006; cf. Harré 1995; cf.
Evans 1992; cf. Gardner 1987;). However, the “second phase” essentially
may be seen as an echo of the distinction between the Linguistic and the
Performative Turns. That is to say, the second phase has been character-
ized, on the one hand, as the “Discursive Turn” and, on the other, as the
“Agential Turn” (cf. Harré 1995: 26; cf. Rottschaefer 1997: 125). From
the perspective of those who resist understanding psychology as a
“Cognitive Science,” there are a number of options—just as there were
regarding what belongs “outside” structure in the tension between lan-
guage and performance—including affect, volition, and the Transcendental
dimension. However, for those who embrace psychology as a Cognitive
Science, retrospective efforts may be found attempting to locate the
emergence of Cognitive Science from the work of Descartes (cf. Chomsky
2004: 607). This complexity, of course, contributes to whatever confu-
sion there may be about the identity of the Contemporary study of ψυχή.
As a result, it is, at least, helpful to understand what may have been a
“Cognitive Revolution” outside of psychology—in culture and the
Humanities in general—as a “Cognitive Turn” regarding the Fourth Force
within psychology. In this way, “Computationalism” and “Connectionism”
become emphasized functional principles along with Multiple Realizability
and the ontological and structural principles of Eliminative Materialism and
Reductionism. Moreover, the concerns which were prominent regarding the
principles of realism, phenomenalism conceptualism, and nominalism may
be seen as operable again insofar as in order to “reduce” some phenomena of
experience to an observable system of cognitive processing, we must have

some understanding of what it is we are reducing. From the perspective of
these principles, then, we may see that it was the combination of a “psychol-
ogy of cognition”—more Cartesian and mechanistic than Kant’s—with
technology and General Systems thinking which conditioned the Cognitive
Turn.
Moreover, the presence of the influence of General Systems Theory
may be noticed immediately in the “neural network” descriptions regard-
ing structure in the Cognitive Turn and the “connectionist” descriptions
regarding function.
Connectionist models assume that information processing takes place

through the interaction of large numbers of simple processing units that
pass activation through connection weights. Knowledge is stored in con-
nection weights that modulate the transfer of activity from one unit to the
next. Learning occurs typically by presenting a network of units with a set
of inputs and outputs and utilizing error-correction algorithms to change
the connection weights such that the input predicts the output. (Schneider
and Graham 1992: 513)
On the one hand, such “Computationalism” in regard to “connection

weights” has been referred to as “machine functionalism” invoking
Bertalanffy’s principle—and the Early Modern notion—of mechaniza-
tion. The tension, then, found in the oscillation between structure and
function and language and use, reemerges. Yet, just as General Systems
Theory is said to bridge the methods of extraspection and introspection,
so too advocates for “Connectionist models” follow Bertalanffy’s sugges-
tion that systems may be articulated so as to affirm or deny the principle
of Freedom, and, thereby, the principle may be seen producing an essen-
tial distinction within the Cognitive Turn between, on the one side, the
“Soft Determinists” or “Compatibilists” and Libertarians, and, on the
other, the “Incompatibilists” and multiple-realizability-oriented “Hard
Determinists” (cf. Tryon 2014: 114; Dreyfus 1992; cf. Knapp and
Roberston 2017; cf. Chipman 2017). Recall, the principle of Freedom
differentiated the Geisteswissenschaften or human sciences of the Third
Force from the Naturwissenschaften or natural science-oriented
Behaviorism and Freudian Psychoanalysis.
206 F. Scalambrino
6.4 T
he Historical Turn: Self-Reflective
Thinking Through Psychology
Beyond Postmodernism
The “Historical Turn,” aka the “Historic Turn,” has been announced in
both the natural and the human sciences (cf. Bird 2008; cf. Griffiths
1996; cf. McDonald 1996; cf. Spiegel 2005; cf. Glock 2013). What per-
haps stands out most about the Historical Turn is that it does not emerge
as an answer to a question—for example, what is the “normal science”
paradigm of psychology? – as much as it emerges to formulate questions
and “think through” possible answers. Recalling the first two sections of
the Introduction to this book, the Historical Turn is understood as the
activation of a capacity for practitioners of a discipline to be “self-
reflective.” On the one hand, it is as if it is not possible for practitioners
of psychology to not have a principled point of view regarding ψυχή. As
we suggested above, from the perspective of the history and systems of
Western psychology, that is, from the standpoint of a Historical Turn, to
be consistently an “anarchist” is to consistently act in accordance with the
principle(s) of disavowing principles. Thus, the Historical Turn provides
the kind of univocity which, at least, allows for productive communica-
tive action across paradigms, despite the necessarily enduring incommen-
surabilities and the twists and Turns associated with Contemporary
Western psychology.
On the other hand, as we also briefly discussed above, since solutions
to problems, legitimacy, and progress toward becoming the “normal sci-
ence” paradigm (even if “transgressively” from within a Performative
Turn) are foundational elements for the discourses and narratives of psy-
chology outside of a Historical Turn, it is within a Historical Turn that
the various contextualizations of events and things receive a disciplinary-
specific context. Keeping in mind the standpoints of anarchism, progress
to “normal science,” and “eclecticism,” this context is important for
psychology to retain its integrity as a discipline. That is to say, even if the
various approaches constituted by differently selected clusters of princi-
ples sustain incommensurable disagreement regarding the identity of
ψυχή, the tradition and the practice of the study of ψυχή upon which
such disagreement stands is affirmed in a Historical Turn, and that affir-

mation may be the last bastion and rallying point for psychology against
the leveling effects of cybernetics and Postmodernism. In other words,
psychology’s Historical Turn is the point at which psychology affirms its
integrity.
It is, of course, important to recognize the difference between the affir-
mation of psychology’s integrity and its dis-integration. Whereas the for-
mer affirms incommensurability the latter seeks to deny incommensurability
in any number of ways. In general—from the perspective of the Historical
Turn in Contemporary Western psychology—there seems to be three
general options. First, we either accept the pluralism constituted by the
incommensurability between systems or paradigms in psychology, or we
attempt to reduce the incommensurabilities. The second two options
relate to the latter strategy. Second, then, we use various principles associ-
ated with the Performative Turn to reduce or eliminate incommensura-
bility, not for the sake of establishing psychology’s identity as much as for
the sake of the principles of equality or anarchy. That is to say, a popular
Postmodern strategy is to simply ignore any purported truth if it does not
fit with the political principles you embrace. A clear anarchy example of
such a strategy is to talk as if any activity can be considered an activity of
psychology, since we do not want to “marginalize” any interpretations. A
clear eclecticism example is to talk as if a psychologist cannot be inconsis-
tent or incorrect in the practice of psychology, for example in performing
clinical experiments or psychotherapy, because psychologists may want to
think of themselves as above reproach. Incommensurability, then, may be
inconvenient for such psychologists. Third, it is clear that some practitio-
ners of psychology are working toward the establishment of a “normal
science” system or paradigm for psychology. Of course, were this option
to be accomplished, it would provide, and affirm the integrity of, a new
identity for the study of ψυχή.
It is in the light of incommensurability where we may most clearly see
the importance of principles of selection from which thinking through
psychology and performing activities consistent with an integrity-
sustaining understanding of psychology may occur; the Historical Turn
provides the appropriate prism for such light. At the same time, the
Historical Turn is self-reflective enough that it can sustain the tension
208 F. Scalambrino
between Historicism and Presentism which was at the basis of major rifts
in other contexts. For example, in regard to the evolution of systems,
“Selection processes are historical because the relative fitness of characters
is a function of the historical conditions in which selection takes place”
(Griffiths 1996: 515). Yet, notice that the historical conditions operable
at the moments of principle selection do not eclipse our capacity to think
through the selected principles, within the historical context, despite any
Presentist opacity which may otherwise influence our understanding of
those historical conditions.
For, “Historicizing is nothing more nor less than the constant asking
of questions about how something came to be and about what effects
things have had over time. To historicize is to accept that” historical nar-
ratives about the past are constructed (McDonald 1996: 32). If nothing
else, we can see that the history of psychology is a historiographical con-
struction regarding the past choices made by practitioners pertaining to
principles.
It is in this sense that the “linguistic turn” is giving way to the “historical
turn,” since historicism—understood as an acknowledgement of the con-
tingent, temporally, and socially situated character of our beliefs, values,
institutions, and practices—subtends both the retention of an attenuated
concept of discourse as that which creates the conditions of possibility for,
and the constituents of, a given culture … (Spiegel 2005: 25)
If the principles are essential, then the historiography may be character-

ized by Mild Presentism, and if the principles are merely cultural, eclec-
tic, or anarchically denied, then such Postmodern, and social
constructionist historiography may be characterized by Strong Presentism.
Further, as we noted above, whereas the Performative Turn may justify
the re-structuring of knowledge and hegemonic power systems based on
the idea that the structure is not grounded in an essential explanation, the
Historical Turn “deconstructively” reveals that whatever knew structure
takes the place of the old structure, the new structure will itself not be
grounded in an essential distinction; moreover, going beyond
Postmodernism, the new structure will be grounded in a historiographi-
cal construction, that is, history (cf. Glock 2013; cf. Kane 2000).
Thus, the question emerges for Contemporary Western psychology:

Just as “psychology as the Behaviorist views it” is not “psychology as the
Psychoanalyst views it,” and neither is “psychology as the Existentialist
views it,” how may Contemporary psychology philosophically sustain
both pluralism and incommensurability? Again, the Historical Turn itself
emerged not so much directly toward an answer to this question, as
toward a context with which to appropriately formulate the question;
that is, the “Historical Turn” may refer to the accomplishment of a con-
text in which to regard the principles selected throughout the history of
Western psychology without either privileging a paradigm of psychology
as a point of view or reducing psychology to a different discipline.
Moreover, the Historical Turn provides a context in which we can see the
incommensurabilities between the clusters of principles constituting the
multiple systems and paradigms of psychology; in this way, when we
“think through” the multiple systems in regard to ψυχή and when we
enact, or “perform,” activities from one of the standpoints of the multiple
systems in regard to ψυχή, we are able to do so with a principled, system-
atic, self-reflective awareness, and integrity. It is as if, invoking the anal-
ogy of the night sky from the Introduction, with the Historical Turn, we
emerge from Postmodernism, to see—once more—the stars.
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Index1
A Association(ism), 59, 90, 102,

Anarchy/anarchism, x, 49, 50, 206, 109, 110, 139, 141, 142,
207 144, 168, 170, 171, 186,
Apperception, 82n1, 143, 152, 170 198
Aquinas, Thomas, 15, 35, 49, 119, Augustine, 15
120, 130
Archaeology, 32
Aristotle, viii, xi, 15, 22, 31, 33–35, B
37n3, 45, 47, 51–57, 63, 66, Bachelard, Gaston, 16
73, 75, 92–94, 102–116, 118, Barthes, Roland, 19
119, 121, 130–132, 134, 139, Baudrillard, Jean, 4
141, 144, 147–149, 154, 185 Behaviorism, 74–78, 81, 174, 175,
Aristotle’s 4 Causes, 35, 37n3, 59, 177–180, 184, 205
105, 134 Bergson, Henri, 16, 176
Aristotle’s character types, 113, 120, Berkeley, George, 135, 137, 140,
155 141, 144, 153
Aristotle’s “word-concept-thing” Boring, Edwin G., 169, 171
understanding of signification, Brentano, Franz, 72, 137, 170
35, 53, 54, 121, 136, 146, 147 Bruno, Giordano, 132
Note: Page number followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

1

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74733-0
248 Index
C Empiricism, 37, 74, 75, 81, 108,

Camera obscura, 137–140, 143, 144 110, 121, 131, 139, 141, 147,
Canon-formation, ix, 62, 63 151, 152
Cognitive Revolution (Cognitive Epictetus, 114–123
Turn), xii, 77, 79, 174, 186, Epicurus, 114–123
201–205 Epiphenomenalism, 71, 72
Computationalism, 77, 79, 81, 202, Existentialism, 49, 167, 168, 179,
204, 205 183
Conceptualism, 58, 204
Cybernetics, 185, 203, 207
F
Fatalism, 80, 92, 117, 118
D Feyerabend, Paul, 22, 23, 50
Deleuze, Gilles, xv, 4, 15, 19, 77, Folk psychology, 70, 73, 135, 144,
139, 143, 153, 185, 200–202 145
Derrida, Jacques, 19 Four Forces of psychology, 173–186
de Saussure, Ferdinand, 20, 196 Freedom, 2, 80, 81, 90, 114, 115,
Descartes, René, xi, 15, 20, 65, 75, 117, 122, 134, 163, 168,
91, 129, 131–139, 143, 177–179, 183, 198, 202, 205
150–153, 161, 169, 170, 177, Freud, Sigmund, 15, 162–165, 168,
185, 204 169, 173–177, 179, 195, 196,
Deterministic/determinism, 11, 24, 198–200
25, 37, 68, 72, 80, 81, Fukuyama, Francis, 4
113–115, 117, 118, 134, 154,
169, 177, 178
Dewey, John, 77, 78, 149, 168, G
172 Gadamer, Hans-Georg, 6, 90
Dialectic, 100, 101, 106–109, 121, Galilei, Galileo, 122, 129, 132, 133
131–133, 150, 165, 176, 196 Geisteswissenschaften (human
Doxography, ix, 62, 63 science), xi, xii, 170, 171, 179,
Durant, Will, 15 199, 205
Genealogy, viii, 18
General Systems Theory, 174,
E 184–186, 197, 201, 203, 205
Egoism, 153, 161 Gilson, Etienne, 16
Eleusinian Mysteries, 93 Glenn, Paul J., 65
Elimination, 67, 81, 134, 142, 166 Gramsci, Antonio, 10, 20
Emergence, 46, 67, 71, 81, 105, Grünbaum, Adolf, 176, 199
172, 184, 203, 204 Guerlac, Henry, 11
Index
249
H L
Hegel, G.W.F., xii, 3, 10, 15, 49, Lacan, Jacques, 199–201
165, 167 Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, 135,
Heidbreder, Edna, 164 140, 142–144, 147, 149, 152,
Heidegger, Martin, 15, 90, 167, 178, 153, 155n1, 164, 169, 170
180, 183–185, 197 Linguistic Turn, xii, 195–198, 208
Hermeneutics, 51, 60, 61, 179, Locke, John, 135, 137–140, 142,
180, 182, 183, 186, 196, 143, 152, 153, 169, 177
198, 200
Historical Reconstruction, ix, 62, 63
Historicism, 3, 5–7, 11, 13, 18, 19, M
21, 62, 208 Marwick, Arthur, 11, 12, 17
Hobbes, Thomas, 139, 169 Marx, Karl, xii, 29, 165, 176, 198,
Humanism, 129, 130, 178, 179, 183 201
Hume, David, 59, 135, 141, 142, Maslow, Abraham, 177–179
144, 146, 153, 161, 169, 171, Materialism, 65, 70, 74–76, 81, 138,
175, 177 165, 166, 204
Humpty Dumpty, 196, 197, 199 McGeoch, John, 27–29
Husserl, Edmund, 180, 181 Mechanistic, 68, 72, 75, 134, 139,
142, 175, 178, 185, 205
Mind-Body Problem/Problem of
I Heterogeneity, 65, 66, 91, 102,
Idealism, 48, 74, 81, 140, 153, 165 112, 134, 136, 137, 144, 150,
Imageless Thoughts, 170, 181 151
Incommensurability, x, xii, 22, 23, Mindreading, 79, 81
26, 28, 162, 163, 166, 173, Multiple Realizability, 77, 78, 81,
174, 177–180, 184, 186, 207, 184, 204, 205
209
Intentionality, 72, 81, 115, 119, 120
N
Nativism, 74, 81, 134, 138, 139,
K 143
Kant, Immanuel, viii, xi, 12, 15, 48, Natural Law, 114–119, 155
102, 135, 136, 138, 143–155, Naturwissenschaften (natural science),
161–166, 168, 170, 174, 177, xi, xii, 170, 171, 178, 205
179, 181–183, 201, 205 New philosophy, xi, 131–138, 149,
Kierkegaard, Søren, 15, 49, 166–168 153, 161, 162, 166, 172
Kuhn, Thomas, 22–24, 26, 28, 30 New psychology, xi, 9, 31, 163, 166,
Külpe, Oswald, 182 168–173, 177, 203
250 Index
Nietzsche, Friedrich, 15, 19, 49, Reduction, 67–70, 76, 81, 134, 199,
166–168, 182, 186n1, 198 204
Nominalism, 58, 121, 122, 204 Renaissance, xi, 8, 9, 95, 129–134,
136, 172, 178, 198
Representation, 67, 69, 81, 153, 183
P Ricoeur, Paul, 199, 200
Pavlov, Ivan, 162, 163, 168, 169, Rogers, Carl, 15, 177, 178
173, 174 Rorty, Richard, ix, 4, 5, 63, 145,
Phenomenography, 180–182, 186, 146, 196
187n2 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 14, 162
Phenomenology, 165, 180–182, 186,
187n2
Plato, xi, 15, 22, 37n3, 45, 47, 53, S
54, 89–102, 106, 107, Santayana, George, 16
109–112, 114–116, 119–121, Sartre, Jean-Paul, 178, 183, 184
123n1, 130–133, 143, 152, Scala Amoris, 93–95, 98, 111, 120,
154 131, 154
Polybius, 16 Scala Natura, 93, 111, 112
Positivism, 68, 75, 135, 138, 139, Schopenhauer, Arthur, 165, 167,
171, 176 168
Postmodernism, xii, 7, 10, 14, 51, Skinner, B.F., 15, 63, 76, 175
60, 61, 163, 167, 198–202, Solipsism, 136, 138–140, 142, 153,
206–209 161
Prägnanz, 181, 182 Soteriology, 90, 93, 96, 98, 109,
Presentism, 3, 5–7, 11, 13, 18, 19, 111, 112, 116, 155n1
21, 62, 63, 208 Supervenience, 67, 70, 71, 81
Propositional Attitude, 67, 71, 73, Szasz, Thomas, 19, 177, 200
74, 79–81
Psychoanalysis, x, 75, 163, 164, 169,
174–180, 199, 200, 205 T
Teleology, 4, 35, 90, 109, 111, 112,
116, 117, 134, 155n1, 177
Q Titchener, Edward B, xii, 47, 77,
Qualia, 67–69, 71, 72, 74, 78, 81 166, 170–173, 178
Transcendental, 48, 96, 99, 101,
120, 122, 132, 135, 136,
R 145–155, 165, 179, 182, 201,
Rational Reconstruction, ix, 62, 63 202, 204
Realism, 58, 121, 204 Trevelyan, George M., 15
Index
251
V The “Way of Ideas”, 135, 136,

Vitalism, 37, 74, 75, 81 138, 140, 142, 144, 147,
von Bertalanffy, Ludwig, 174, 184, 148, 153
185, 203, 205 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 196, 197
Wolman, Benjamin, 162, 173
Wundt, Wilhelm, xii, 47, 77,
W 169, 170, 172
Watson, John B., 174
Watson, Robert I., 16, 24, 25, 36, 37

Frank Scalambrino - Philosophical Principles of The History and Systems of Psychology-Springer International Publishing Palgrave Macmillan (2018)

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PHILOSOPHICAL PRINCIPLES

OF THE HISTORY AND

ISBN 978-3-319-74732-3 ISBN 978-3-319-74733-0 (eBook)

Library of Congress Control Number: 2018936139

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018

Cover illustration: Brain light / Alamy Stock Photo

Printed on acid-free paper

As a kind of epigraph, toward contextualizing the central concern of this

The fundamental conceptions of psychology are practically very clear to us,

are many excellent “history of psychology” textbooks available today, a

commitments which have constituted the study of psychology through-

“anarchism.” Yet, in either case, the erroneous embrace of pluralism

(3) The Introduction of this book provides an understanding of the

Beyond a discussion of the influence of “post-Kantian” principles

University Heights, OH, USA Frank Scalambrino

in 2003. Lastly, I would like to thank my psychology professors from

1 Introduction: The Project of the Philosophical Archeology

2 Some Historically Based Essential General Distinctions 45

3 Pre-Modern to Early Modern: From Mirror of God

4 The Early Modern Battle for the Archimedean Point 129

5 Modernism to Post-Modernism: Method as Archimedean

6 Conclusion: Post-Modern Turning Away from Method 195

The intention of this project is to furnish us with a principled systematic

© The Author(s) 2018 1

order to the elements constituting the discipline. Rather, what is needed

1.1 What Is History?

Philosophic History,” and (c) “Understandings of the Past: Cyclical v.

as we are with witnessing patterns repeating throughout the past. Thus,

the ascent toward Enlightenment, but simply as the contingent results of

Whereas Butterfield may be seen here advocating for Historicism, advo-

position can move toward stronger/more extreme versions to defend their

1. Pre-Modern (600 BC–1600)

Note that the Post-Modern historical period contains a hyphen. It is not

“Postmodernism”—to be discussed later—originates from an attitude of

1. Ancient (600 BC–400)

Whereas the Fourfold division tends to be used to refer to philosophical

1. Pre-Platonic (600 BC–300 BC)

(f ) The remaining distinctions all pertain to the writing of history in that

these domains may be seen as essentially distinct. To illustrate, consider

A distinction must be made between civil society … (i.e. in the sense of

Similar to the distinction between the past and history, it is possible to

(h) Anyone researching in the Humanities should already know the

the feature in question. In other words, many people performed actions

many worldview shifts in the history of psychology. Thus, the relations

1.2 What Is the Value of Learning History?

of the traditional approaches toward answering this question: (l) the

In fact, Rousseau’s is not the only way to cast historical narratives in a

which human nature constantly recreates, re-forms, and regenerates

their claims. Such historical narratives are pejoratively called “Whig,” or

deconstruction” directed at the history of a discipline may be—perhaps

1.3 What Is a System?

Regarding systems, then, in the history of Western psychology, it is clear

have different standards of evaluation, and that taking a point of view

far in this section; that is, a “paradigm” or “worldview” is “contentual”

universal agreement about the nature of our contentual model … In psy-

psychology, so as to be able to think through the relations within and

(1) any collective entity consisting of a set of interrelated or interacting ele-

Because this definition of “system” invokes the notions of “structure,”

question “What is a System?” given in this section is perfectly consistent

University Heights, OH, USA Frank Scalambrino

1 Introduction: The Project of the Philosophical Archeology

2 Some Historically Based Essential General Distinctions 45

3 Pre-Modern to Early Modern: From Mirror of God

4 The Early Modern Battle for the Archimedean Point 129

5 Modernism to Post-Modernism: Method as Archimedean

6 Conclusion: Post-Modern Turning Away from Method 195

1.1 What Is History?

1.2 What Is the Value of Learning History?

1.3 What Is a System?

1.4 What Are Principles & Distinctions?

2.1 What Is Psychology?

sychology may be surprising. Ultimately, it seems the principle of how

2.3 Principles from the Philosophy

called “dialectic,” and we may distinguish between “constructive” and

3.2 Principles of Psychology from Aristotle