G.R. No.

133917       February 19, 2001 At around 9:30 in the morning of August 8, 1996, while the team
were positioned in the house of SPO1 Paguidopon, a "trisikad"
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,  carrying the accused-appellants passed by. At that instance, SPO1
vs. Paguidopon pointed to the accused-appellants as the pushers.
NASARIO MOLINA y MANAMA @ "BOBONG" and Thereupon, the team boarded their, vehicle and overtook the
GREGORIO MULA y MALAGURA @ "BOBOY", accused- "trisikad."11 SPO1 Paguidopon was left in his house, thirty meters
appellants. from where the accused-appellants were accosted.12

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: The police officers then ordered the "trisikad" to stop. At that point,
accused-appellant Mula who was holding a black bag handed the
same to accused-appellant Molina. Subsequently, SPO1 Pamplona
To sanction disrespect and disregard for the Constitution in the name introduced himself as a police officer and asked accused-appellant
of protecting the society from lawbreakers is to make the government Molina to open the bag.13 Molina replied, "Boss, if possible we will
itself lawless and to subvert those values upon which our ultimate settle this."14 SPO1 Pamplona insisted on opening the bag, which
freedom and liberty depend.1 revealed dried marijuana leaves inside. Thereafter; accused-
appellants Mula and Molina were handcuffed by the police officers.15
For automatic review is the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of
Davao City, Branch 17, in Criminal Case No. 37,264-96, finding On December 6, 1996, accused-appellants, through counsel, jointly
accused-appellants Nasario Molina y Manamat alias "Bobong" and filed a Demurrer to Evidence, contending that the marijuana allegedly
Gregorio Mula y Malagura alias "Boboy," guilty beyond reasonable seized from them is inadmissible as evidence for having been
doubt of violation of Section 8,3 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 obtained in violation of their constitutional right against unreasonable
(Republic Act No. 6425), as amended by Republic Act No. searches and seizures.16 The demurrer was denied by the trial
7659,4 and sentencing them to suffer the supreme penalty of death. court.17 A motion for reconsideration was filed by accused-appellants,
but this was likewise denied. Accused-appellants waived presentation
The information against accused-appellants reads: of evidence and opted to file a joint memorandum.

That on or about August 8, 1996, in the City of Davao, On April 25, 1997, the trial court rendered the assailed decision, 18 the
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable decretal portion of which reads:
Court, the above-named accused, in conspiracy with each
other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and WHEREFORE, finding the evidence of the prosecution
feloniously was found in their possession 946.9 grants of alone without any evidence from both accused who waived
dried marijuana which are prohibited. presentation of their own evidence through their counsels,
more than sufficient to prove the guilt of both accused of
CONTRARY TO LAW.5 the offense charged beyond reasonable doubt, pursuant to
Sec. 20, sub. par. 5 of Republic Act 7659, accused
Upon arraignment on September 4, 1996, accused-appellants pleaded NASARIO MOLINA and GREGORIO MULA, are
not guilty to the accusation against them.6Trial ensued, wherein the sentenced to suffer a SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH
prosecution presented Police Superintendent Eriel Mallorca, SPO1 through lethal injection under Republic Act 8176, to be
Leonardo Y. Pamplona, Jr., and SPO1 Marino S. Paguidopon, Jr. as effected and implemented as therein provided for by law, in
witnesses. relation to Sec. 24 of Rep. Act 7659.

The antecedent facts are as follows: The Branch Clerk of Court of this court, is ordered to
immediately elevate the entire records of this case with the
Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court, Manila, for the
Sometime in June 1996, SPO1 Marino Paguidopon, then a member of automatic review of their case by the Supreme Court and its
the Philippine National Police detailed at Precinct No. 3, Matina, appropriate action as the case may be.
Davao City, received an information regarding the presence of an
alleged marijuana pusher in Davao City.7 The first time he came to
see the said marijuana pusher in person was during the first week of SO ORDERED.19
July 1996. SPO1 Paguidopon was then with his informer when a
motorcycle passed by. His informer pointed to the motorcycle driver, Pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised penal Code and Rule 122,
accused-appellant Mula, as the pusher. As to accused-appellant Section 10 of the Rules of Court, the case was elevated to this Court
Molina, SPO1 Paguidopon had no occasion to see him before the on automatic review. Accused-appellants contend:
arrest. Moreover, the names and addresses of the accused- appellants
came to the knowledge of SPO1 Paguidopon only after they were I.
arrested.8
THAT THE MARIJUANA IS IN ADMISSIBLE IN
At about 7:30 in the morning of August 8, 1996, SPO1 Paguidopon EVIDENCE FOR HAVING BEEN SEIZED IN
received an information that the alleged pusher will be passing at VIOLATION OF APPELLANTS' CONSTITUTIONAL
NHA, Ma- a, Davao City any time that morning.9 Consequently, at RIGHTS AGAINST UNREASONABLE, SEARCHES
around 8:00 A.M. of the same day, he called for assistance at the AND SEIZURES;
PNP, Precinct No. 3, Matina, Davao City, which immediately
dispatched the team of SPO4 Dionisio Cloribel (team leader), SPO2
Paguidopon (brother of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon), and SPO1 II.
Pamplona, to proceed to the house of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon
where they would wait for the alleged pusher to pass by.10
 THAT ASSUMING IT IS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE, a person: (a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT OTHERWISE PROVED committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
THEIR GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT; AND offense (arrest in flagrante delicto); (b) when an offense has just been
committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
III. knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it (arrest effected in hot pursuit); and (c) when the person
to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
THAT, FINALLY, ASSUMING THEIR GUILT HAS establishment or a place where he is serving final judgment or is
BEEN PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
THE IMPOSABLE PENALTY FOR VIOLATION OF being transferred from one confinement to another ( arrest of escaped
SEC. 8 OF RA No. 7659 (sic), IN THE ABSENCE OF prisoners ).27
ANY AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE, IS LIFE
IMPRISONMENT, NOT DEATH.20
In the case at bar, the court a quo anchored its judgment of
conviction on a finding that the warrantless arrest of accused-
The Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and MO1ion (In Lieu of appellants, and the subsequent search conducted by the peace
Brief), wherein he prayed for the acquittal of both accused-appellants. officers, are valid because accused-appellants were caught in
flagrante delicto in possession of prohibited drugs.28 This brings us to
The fundamental law of the land mandates that searches and seizures the issue of whether or not the warrantless arrest, search and seizure
be carried out in a reasonable fashion, that is, by virtue or on the in the present case fall within the recognized exceptions to the
strength of a search warrant predicated upon the existence of a warrant requirement.
probable cause. The pertinent provision of the Constitution provides:
In People v. Chua Ho San,29 the Court held that in cases of in
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their flagrante delicto arrests, a peace officer or a private person may,
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or commit an offense. The arresting officer, therefore, must have
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to personal knowledge of such fact or, as recent case law adverts to,
be determined personally by the judge after examination personal knowledge of facts or circumstances convincingly indicative
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the or constitutive of probable cause. As discussed in People v.
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the Doria,30 probable cause means an actual belief or reasonable grounds
place to be searched and the persons or things to be of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the
seized.21 absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the
person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is
Complementary to the foregoing provision is the exclusionary rule based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently
enshrined under Article III, Section 3, paragraph 2, which bolsters strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the
and solidifies the protection against unreasonable searches and person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be
seizures.22 Thus: founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the
peace officers making the arrest.

Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding

section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any As applied to in flagrante delicto arrests, it is settled that "reliable
proceeding. information" alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious
enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting
officers, are not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would
Without this rule, the right to privacy would be a form of words, justify an in flagrante delicto arrest. Thus, in People v.
valueless and undeserving of mention in a perpetual charter of Aminnudin,31 it was held that "the accused-appellant was not, at the
inestimable human liberties; so too, without this rule, the freedom moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he
from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing
severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish was descending the gangplank of the MN Wilcon 9 and there was no
means of coercing evidence as not to merit this Court's high regard as outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he
a freedom implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.23 was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from
the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier
The foregoing constitutional proscription, however, is not without of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to
exceptions. Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and apprehension."
the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following
instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a Likewise, in People v. Mengote,32 the Court did not consider "eyes...
moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) darting from side to side :.. [while] holding ... [one's] abdomen", in a
seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused himself crowded street at 11:30 in the morning, as overt acts and
waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures;24 and (6) circumstances sufficient to arouse suspicion and indicative of
stop and frisk situations (Terry search).25 probable cause. According to the Court, "[b]y no stretch of the
imagination could it have been inferred from these acts that an
The first exception (search incidental to a lawful arrest) includes a offense had just been committed, or was actually being committed or
valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid was at least being attempted in [the arresting officers'] presence." So
warrantless arrest which must precede the search. In this instance, the also, in People v. Encinada,33 the Court ruled that no probable cause
law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be is gleanable from the act of riding a motorela while holding two
made --- the process cannot be reversed.26 As a rule, an arrest is plastic baby chairs.1âwphi1.nêt
considered legitimate if effected with .a valid warrant of arrest. The
Rules of Court, however, recognizes permissible warrantless arrests.
Thus, a peace officer or a private person may, without warrant, arrest
Then, too, in Malacat v. Court of Appeals,34 the trial court concluded This belies the claim of SPO1 Pamplona that he knew the name of
that petitioner was attempting to commit a crime as he was "`standing accused-appellants even before the arrest, to wit –
at the comer of Plaza Miranda and Quezon Boulevard' with his eyes
'moving very fast' and 'looking at every person that come (sic) nearer "Q-       When you said that certain Mula handed a black
(sic) to them.'"35 In declaring the warrantless arrest therein illegal, the bag to another person and how did you know that it was
Court said: Mula who handed the black bag to another person?

Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto ... A-       Because I have already information from
arrest preceding the search in light of the lack of personal Paguidopon, regarding Mula and Molina, when they pass
knowledge on the part of V u, the arresting officer, or an by through the street near the residence of Paguidopon. He
overt physical act, on the part of petitioner, indicating that a told that the one who is big one that is Gregorio Mula and
crime had just been committed, was being committed or the thin one is Nazario Molina"39
was going to be committed.36
The aforecited testimony of SPO1 Pamplona, therefore, is entirely
It went on to state that – baseless SPO1 Pamplona could not have learned the name of
accused-appellants from SPO1 Paguipodon because Paguipodon
Second, there was nothing in petitioner's behavior or himself, who allegedly conducted the surveillance, was not even
conduct which could have reasonably elicited even mere aware of accused-appellants' name and address prior to the arrest.
suspicion other than that his eyes were "moving very fast" -
an observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu and Evidently, SPO1 Paguidopon, who acted as informer of the arresting
his teammates were nowhere near petitioner and it was officers, more so the arresting officers themselves, could not have
already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk. Petitioner and his been certain of accused-appellants' identity, and were, from all
companions were merely standing at the comer and were indications, merely fishing for evidence at the time of the arrest.
not creating any commotion or trouble...
Compared to People v. Encinada, the arresting officer in the said
Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to case knew appellant Encinada even before the arrest because of the
believe that petitioner was armed with a deadly weapon. latter's illegal gambling activities, thus, lending at least a semblance
None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged of validity on the arrest effected by the peace officers. Nevertheless,
grenade was "discovered" "inside the front waistline" of the Court declared in said case that the warrantless arrest and the
petitioner, and from all indications as to the distance consequent search were illegal, holding that "[t]he prosecution's
between Yu and petitioner, any telltale bulge, assuming that evidence did not show any suspicious behavior when the appellant
petitioner was indeed hiding a grenade, could not have been disembarked from the ship or while he rode the motorela. No act or
visible to Yu.37 fact demonstrating a felonious enterprise could be ascribed to
appellant under such bare circumstances."40
Clearly, to constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites
must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act Moreover, it could not be said that accused-appellants waived their
indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is right against unreasonable searches and seizure. Implied
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been
presence or within the view of the arresting officer.38 more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or
coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within
In the case at bar, accused-appellants manifested no outward the purview of the constitutional guarantee.41
indication that would justify their arrest. In holding a bag on board
a trisikad, accused-appellants could not be said to be committing, Withal, the Court holds that the arrest of accused-appellants does not
attempting to commit or have committed a crime. It matters not that fall under the exceptions allowed by the rules. Hence, the search
accused-appellant Molina responded "Boss, if possible we will settle conducted on their person was likewise illegal. Consequently, the
this" to the request of SPO1 Pamplona to open the bag. Such marijuana seized by the peace officers could not be admitted as
response which allegedly reinforced the "suspicion" of the arresting evidence against accused-appellants, and the Court is thus, left with
officers that accused-appellants were committing a crime, is an no choice but to find in favor of accused-appellants.
equivocal statement which standing alone will not constitute probable
cause to effect an inflagrante delicto arrest. Note that were it not for
SPO1 Marino Paguidopon (who did not participate in the arrest but While the Court strongly supports the campaign of the government
merely pointed accused-appellants to the arresting officers), accused- against drug addiction and commends the efforts of our law-
appellants could not be the subject of any suspicion, reasonable or enforcement officers towards this drive, all efforts for the
otherwise. achievement of a drug-free society must not encroach on the
fundamental rights and liberties of individuals as guaranteed in the
Bill of Rights, which protection extends even to the basest of
While SPO1 Paguidopon claimed that he and his informer conducted criminals.
a surveillance of accused-appellant Mula, SPO1 Paguidopon,
however, admitted that he only learned Mula's name and address after
the arrest. What is more, it is doubtful if SPO1 Paguidopon indeed WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao
recognized accused-appellant Mula. It is worthy to note that, before City, Branch 17, in Criminal Case No. 37, 264-96,
the arrest, he was able to see Mula in person only once, pinpointed to is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to establish
him by his informer while they were on the side of the road. These their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellants Nasario
circumstances could not have afforded SPO1 Paguidopon a closer Molina y Manamat alias "Bobong" and Gregorio Mula y
look at accused-appellant Mula, considering that the latter was then Malagura alias "Boboy", are ACQUITTED and
driving a motorcycle when, SPO1 Paguidopon caught a glimpse of ordered RELEASED from confinement unless they are validly
him. With respect to accused-appellant Molina, SPO1 Paguidopon detained for other offenses. No costs.
admitted that he had never seen him before the arrest.
SO ORDERED.