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Anything Could Happen: Newly Declassified CIA Documents Tell an Entirely

Article  in  North Korean Review · October 2016

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“The Pueblo incident, in North Korea‟s view, appears to have been a windfall opportunity to
sharpen the diversionary confrontation in Korea, to stimulate U.S.-South Korean differences, and
to put greater pressures on U.S. policy in Asia. The seizure of the Pueblo was not part of an
elaborate scenario prepared in advance.”

CIA “Weekly Summary”

The USS Pueblo (AGER-2) was an American ELINT and SIGINT Banner-class technical
research ship, boarded and captured by North Korean forces on January 23, 1968 in what is now
known as the "Pueblo Incident." When the Pueblo steamed out of Japan with 83 crewman on
board, most were inexperienced at sea, unaware of any possible threat and unsure of the
intelligence ship‟s mission.1 In “Pueblo‟s Main Task Was to Survey Russian Fleet,”2 special to
the New York Times, written after the crew‟s release, Bernard Weinraub noted:

More than half of the crewmen had never been to sea before, including 20 of the
29 communications and decoding specialists in the secret “research space.”
Although the ship was on an intelligence gathering mission, only two crew
members spoke Korean. About six enlisted men and officers, however, spoke
Russian.3

According to testimony at the court of inquiry and conversations with Naval officials,
Weinraub said “the primary phase of the Pueblo‟s final mission was to collect data on Russian
naval operations in the Sea of Japan.”4 The secondary mission, he said, was to move along the
North Korean coast to check on radar installations and the movement of submarines in the area. 5
According to Weinraub, the relative importance that the U.S. Navy placed on the Pueblo‟s two
missions was underscored by the fact that the ship‟s two Korean-speaking crewmen joined the
Pueblo in December 1967, that‟s only two weeks before the former cargo ship set sail for North
Korea from Yokosuka, Japan.6
Initially a U.S. Army general purpose supply vessel, the Pueblo (FS-3447) was built in
1944, and retired ten years later.8 Then in 1966, it was brought back into service under Operation
Clickbeetle, a joint Naval Intelligence and NSA effort.9 The conversion of cargo ships to spy
vessels (actually inspired by Soviet surveillance operations dating back to the late-1950s), 10
Clickbeetle was a top-secret Navy program to pack refurbished freighters with advanced
electronics, outfitting them with state-of-the art equipment to intercept signals/communications
intelligence.11 The repairs also involved the creation of metal rooms known as the “Sod Hut”
where technicians would operate the surveillance gear to intercept and gather sonar, radar, and
other types of electronic traffic.12
When the Pueblo mission began, tasked with conducting a general search for the North
Korean Army‟s and Navy‟s use of low-powered VHF communications by units along the east
coast,13 some of the crew understood the risk; others did not. In a letter home, Navy fireman
Norman W. Spear of Portland, Maine wasn‟t specific about the mission that he and the rest of the
crew were about to embark upon14—a mission that would find the men held captive in hostile
North Korea, subjected to torture and the threat of death, for precisely eleven months. 15 Spear‟s
letter, postmarked January 4, 1968, was written just before Navy Commander Lloyd “Pete”
Bucher and his crew departed Japan.16 In that letter, Spear, 25, told his father that they were
embarking on a 30-day cruise and that they wouldn‟t hear from him again until after the Pueblo
had returned to her base in Japan. 17 Noting the uncertainty of the mission, Spear wrote, “anything
could happen and that no one [knows] what to expect.”18 Three weeks later, an officer from
Naval Air Station Brunswick in Maine would inform Norman‟s mother that her son was aboard
that intelligence ship seized by the North Koreans. 19

The U.S. Response

Within two hours of the Pueblo‟s seizure, Fifth Air Force began deployments from Japan
to Korea.20 President Lyndon B. Johnson approved the initial US Air Force (USAF) deployments
and 12 Air National Guard (ANG) units were mobilized. 21 By the 30th, 34 F-105s from Kadena
Air Base (AB) were at Osan AB; 14 F-4Cs from Misawa AB were at Kunsan AB, and 22 F-102s
from Naha AB were at Suwon AB. 22 On Feb 4th, 14 RF-4Cs arrived at Taegu AB from South
Vietnam. 23 And three U.S. Navy aircraft carriers took stations off the coast of South Korea.24
The USAF response to the Pueblo crisis was named Operation COMBAT FOX. 25 The initial
deployments of USAF units were eventually replaced by other active duty, Air Force Reserve,
and ANG units.
In addition to the Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), U.S. Air Force, deployments, Tactical Air
Command deployed three squadrons of F-4Ds as well as EB-66 electronic warfare aircraft and F-
105 Wild Weasels. 26 Strategic Air Command (SAC) deployed one squadron each of B-52
bombers and KC-135 tankers to Kadena AB. Aerospace Defense Command made their first ever
overseas deployment, sending F-106s to Osan AB. 27 Meanwhile, PRIME BEEF and RED
HORSE civil engineering teams from across the Pacific and the U.S. were rushed to South Korea
to provide immediate construction and repair support.28
Although the map above appears to show the Pueblo anchored in the middle of a small
bay, the ship‟s exact lat/long coordinates—as reported in declassified CIA reports—remain
redacted. 29 Recipients of the report were cautioned that the scan of the photography was
accomplished over a short time, and therefore does not constitute a “finished intelligence
judgment,” and that future detailed analysis might result in additional information. 30 The CIA
Black Shield Missions, flown by Lockheed A-12 Blackbirds, covered the southern half of North
Korea and the eastern tip of the Shandong Peninsula on the east coast of Communist China. 31
Interpretability of the photography was said to be fair-to-good with approximately 90% cloud-
free coverage over the land areas. 32 According to one report, 108 of the 138 Committee for
Imagery Requirements and Exploitation (COMIREX) targets fell within this coverage, although
two were cloud covered.33 In addition, three new targets were also reported.34 Additional details,
the report said, could be obtained from cabled reports disseminated by the National Photographic
Interpretation Center (NPIC) and the 67th Reconnaissance Technical Squadron (RTS) out of
Yokota Airbase in Japan.35
The whereabouts of the USS Pueblo—“at an offshore anchorage in a small, isolated bay
north of Wonsan” with “two North Korean patrol boats anchored alongside”—was first reported
on January 26th, that‟s three days after the ship was seized, in CIA Black Shield Mission Report
#6847.36 The Pueblo was seen anchored in Changjahwan Bay harbor, 2.4 nautical miles east by
northeast of North Korea‟s Munchon Naval Base, Wonsan, 37 which in turn was located a few
kilometers north of Wonsan. 38 As seen in aerial reconnaissance photographs, a motor torpedo
boat (P-6 PT) was moored alongside and a “probable” YAG (Yard Auxiliary General), a
miscellaneous service craft, was situated off the Pueblo‟s port beam.39 It could not be determined,
however, whether the Pueblo had been damaged or if any dismantling had taken place;40 nor was
there any evidence of salvage operations observed in the vicinity where the crew of the Pueblo
may have jettisoned “special equipment.”41

The CIA’s Jan. 26, 1968 “Weekly Summary”

Since 2010, the National Security Agency (NSA) has released over 200 documents
concerning the seizure in international waters of the USS Pueblo and the subsequent shoot-down
in April 1969 of a Navy EC-121 signals intelligence (SIGINT) aircraft.42 According to Retired
Navy Commander Richard A. Mobley, the two incidents are best considered together since they
reveal related systemic flaws in indications and warning, intelligence analysis, military planning,
and command and control.43 Plus, Mobley said, “Many of the same U.S. national and theater
decision makers and intelligence staffers participated in both incidents.”44 Other documents, such
as personnel and medical files, have been released but with redactions, exempt from disclosure
since their release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy. A third group of
documents, produced by the CIA‟s Directorate of Intelligence, pertain to the negotiations
surrounding the return of the USS Pueblo and its crew.45
On January 23, 2015, the author filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request with
the CIA concerning three specific aspects of the Pueblo Incident. Although documents
concerning the first two were released within a few months, those concerning “Negotiations for
the (USS Pueblo) ship‟s return” weren‟t released until very recently. One of those recently-
released documents, a Weekly Summary by the CIA‟s Directorate of Intelligence—originally
marked “Secret,” dated a few days after the Pueblo was seized, and only declassified by the CIA
on December 22, 2015—states: “North Korea‟s audacious actions in attempting to assassinate
South Korean President Pak Chong-hui and in seizing the USS Pueblo and its crew were
apparently individual, uncoordinated actions,” 46 both incidents “probably aimed primarily at
generating diversionary pressures on the U.S.” Around that same time, that CIA report said,
Communist forces in South Vietnam were poised to launch a major country-wide offensive.47 By
undertaking these “risky adventures,” the CIA thought the North Koreans were carrying out Kim
Il-sung‟s prescription for combating American power on a world-wide scale. 48
According to the CIA, Premier Kim, over the course of a year, had repeatedly described
Vietnam as the “focal point of the world struggle,” urging all Communist regimes take “more
positive actions” to aid Hanoi, the capital of North Vietnam, by forcing the U.S. to “disperse” its
strength. 49 On January 19, 1968, the day the North Korean raiding party crossed the
Demilitarized Zone on its way to Seoul, Pyongyang radio broadcast Kim Il-sung‟s call for
“blows” against the U.S. “in all parts of the world,” in order to “split its forces to the maximum
degree.”50 Kim insisted: “We must tie the U.S. up wherever it puts its feet, so that it cannot move
around freely.”51
During an attempted attack on the South Korean Presidential Palace, 31 armed North
Korean guerillas entered the South, disguised as South Korean soldiers, with plans to assassinate
President Pak Chong-hui of South Korea and other top officials. 52 The gunfight with South
Korean authorities in the streets near the Palace caused many South Korean casualties. 53 Most of
the armed guerillas were shot to death; only one, however, was arrested.54 Although the heavily-
armed North Korean raiding party failed to execute its assigned mission of blowing up the
presidential mansion, the CIA Weekly Summary said it managed to penetrate to within 800
meters of „Blue House‟ (Chong Wa Dae) before being drawn off by South Korean police. 55 But
the mere fact that Korean leaders had ordered such a highly provocative venture, the CIA said,
indicates they were prepared for a sharp confrontation on the 38 th parallel. 56 In the CIA‟s view, it
also seemed likely that Pyongyang was counting heavily on the U.S. to restrain the South
Koreans to prevent a military escalation in Korea that would require a major diversion of U.S.
military resources from Vietnam. 57
During initial talks concerning the Pueblo Incident at Panmunjom, the CIA‟s Weekly
Summary said North Korea had adopted a “defiant stand” and “appeared determined to prolong
the confrontation for some time.”58 During a Military Armistice Commission meeting on January
24th, the senior North Korean representative flatly rejected the U.S. demand for the immediate
return of the ship and its crew, 59 remaining silent on Pyongyang‟s intentions regarding the
disposition of the Pueblo. 60 Despite this provocative stand, CIA analysts believed that North
Korea was probably “not prepared to press events to the point of an uncontrollable conflict.”61
Pyongyang was also seeing to avoid responsibility for the Seoul raid by portraying it as part of
the South Korean people‟s “heroic struggle” against the regime of President Park Chung-hee.62
Also according to that CIA Weekly Summary, the events in Vietnam and North Korea
would sharply increase pressure on the South Korean Government to mount strong retaliatory
action. 63 The seizure of the Pueblo, following on the heels of the Seoul raid, had deepened public
concern over North Korean intentions and over the security situation in the South. 64 The success
of the North Korean team in penetrating Seoul had generated loud criticism of the government.65
President Pak had urged the cabinet and party leaders to “Prepare measures to counter and root
out once and for all such atrocious activities” as the Seoul raid. 66 Despite firm U.N. Command
prohibitions against unilateral South Korean reprisals, the CIA said Pak had permitted some
punitive raids against the North in the past.67 “Any further aggravation of the confrontation,” the
CIA Weekly Summary said, “might impel Pak to authorize more extensive retaliatory action and
make it more difficult to control the course of events.”68

“Heave to or I’ll fire on you”

Earlier this year (2016), Rodong Sinmun, the official newspaper of the Central Committee
of the Workers' Party of North Korea, published a story in English on the Pueblo Incident
entitled “Pueblo Can Never Be Sent Back to U.S.”69 Only days earlier, the State Assembly of
Colorado (which has a small city by the name of “Pueblo”) adopted a resolution demanding that
North Korea return the American ship by that same name.70 According to Rodong Sinmun, the
resolution was then distributed to President Obama, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of
the House, and the governor of the State of Colorado.71 The bill called for observing January
23rd—the day when the U.S. spyship was seized—as "USS Pueblo Day” every year, "praising
the sacrificing spirit of the then crewmen and persistently demanding its return.” 72 Indeed,
Colorado House and Senate lawmakers had unanimously endorsed the joint resolution, repeating
the demand that North Korea return the Navy spyship they surrounded and seized on that day in
1968. 73 Pyongyang‟s response on Saturday, February 20, 2016 was swift, but not entirely
unexpected:

It is very ridiculous for the U.S. to insist on the return of the ship which was
captured by seamen of the Korean People's Army while conducting all sorts of
despicable espionage to invade the inviolable DPRK nearly half a century ago.
Great irony is that it is kicking up a row over the issue of the captured spy ship.
No matter what noisy rackets the U.S. may kick up in demand of the return of
the ship, they would get it nowhere. The U.S. more frequent "commemorations"
of the day of ship Pueblo would bring bitterer sense of shame and humiliation to
it. The electronic spying equipment, secret documents and the ship Pueblo can
never be sent back as they were captured while conducting espionage in
territorial waters of the DPRK. Those things belong to the victors. The ship
Pueblo is on display in Pyongyang to tell the present and future generations and
world people that it is a U.S. armed spy ship captured by seamen of the KPA.
The DPRK will as ever mercilessly beat back those encroaching upon its
sovereignty even a bit to protect the dignity of Juche Korea.74

Pyongyang‟s assertion that the Pueblo was “captured while conducting espionage in
territorial waters of the DPRK,” however, remains a major point of contention; the U.S. Navy
insisting that the American vessel remained in international waters the entire time. At some point
(the exact date is unknown), the Office of Naval
Intelligence offered their analysis of the incident. A
briefing, 1 held in secret by Lt. Douglas M. Hackett, 2
covered two aspects of the Pueblo Incident: a) the seizure
of the ship and b) an analysis of the evidence that North
Korea provided in support of its claim that the Pueblo
had impeded in North Korean waters. The briefing began
with a description of the mission and the instructions the
crew received prior to departing for North Korea.75
According to Lt. Hackett, the USS Pueblo sailed
from Japan on January 11, 1968, according to her own
report which was transmitted twelve days later;76 and she
entered her operation areas: Mars, Venus and Pluto (See
map) on January 12th. 77 The Pueblo‟s mission was to gather data on electronic installations along
the east coast of North Korea.78 It‟s clear from her sailing order, Hackett said, that the Pueblo
had specific instructions that while carrying out her task, her closest point of approach was to be
not nearer than 13 nautical miles from the North Korean land mass or offshore islands. 79

1
The briefing was created by the Department of State Office of the Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs and was sent to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) for Archiving.
2
Lt. Hackett is now CDR Douglas Hackett, USN (Ret.). In 2015, Hackett gave a presentation on the Pueblo Incident
in a joint presentation by Naval Intelligence Professionals (NIP) and the Int'l Spy Museum in Washington, D.C.
 “All position reports transmitted by the Pueblo with respect to events on or
before [January on] the 23rd place her more than 13 nautical miles at sea in strict
conformity with her orders …”80

The first indication that anything unusual had taken place came sometime after 11:30am
(Korean time) on January 23rd when the Pueblo‟s radio operator transmitted “more company,”
and said that he intended to keep his circuit open. 81 This radio circuit was maintained
continuously during the incident, and the first formal report of the incident was sent out at
approximately 1:00pm. 82 The Pueblo, in describing the incident, said that a North Korean SO-1
class subchaser had been encountered at noon, Korean time. As the subchaser approached, the
Pueblo took a radar fix to verify her position, which put her 15.8 nautical miles from the nearest
land, the North Korean island of Ung-do. 83 [See nautical chart] When the SO-1 subchaser
reported her noon position to a shore station, she was approximately two nautical miles from the
Pueblo and 17.9 nautical miles from that island of Ung-do; that‟s 5.9 nautical miles outside of
the North Korean claimed waters.84
Ten minutes later, the subchaser identified the Pueblo as “GER-2,” which was painted on
both sides of the Pueblo‟s bow. 85 The subchaser then reported the Pueblo‟s position as 18.3
nautical miles from Ung-do; that‟s 6.3 nautical miles outside North Korea‟s claimed territorial
waters. 86 During this period, the Pueblo was dead in the water while conducting a special
hydrographic operation known as a “Hansen cast,”
which is accomplished by taking simultaneous
water temperatures and samples at various
predetermined depths.87 The ship‟s position must be
precise in order to make seasonal comparisons with
subsequent casts in the same exact position. 88
The Pueblo stated in her message that the
subchaser had signaled requesting the Pueblo‟s
nationality, to which the Pueblo responded by
hoisting the U.S. ensign (flag) and the international
signal for hydrographer. 89 The subchaser then
signaled, “Heave to or I‟ll fire on you,” and the
Pueblo responded, “I am in international waters.” 90 The subchaser continued to circle the
Pueblo. 91 This message concluded by indicating that the Pueblo intended to remain in the
territory, if possible; this in accordance with the standing instructions regarding such
harassment.92
The next message from the Pueblo, sent just after 1:15 pm Korean time, described a
rapidly worsening situation: 93 The subchaser had been joined by three motor torpedo boats;
several MiG aircraft had appeared overhead; and one of the North Korea units signaled, “Follow
in my wake”; and one was backing toward the Pueblo with an armed boarding party. 94 The first
part of the Pueblo‟s 1:15 pm message gave the relative position of the four North Korean vessels
laying 200-300 yards away. 95 The message then changed tone saying, “Motor torpedo boat #604
is backing toward the bow with armed landing party, attempting to board. Pueblo: All ahead
right full rudder. Departing the area under escort. Intention: Depart the area.” 96 The Pueblo sent
no formal messages, but for the next hour and 17 minutes, her radio operator sent a stream of
fragmentary reports, some of which were sent on instructions from the ship‟s officer. 97 At 1:26
pm and 1:28 pm, the radio operator transmitted, “They plan to open fire on us now”; and for the
next hour, the North Koreans fired on the Pueblo with both 57mm guns and machine guns.98
Subsequent reports from the Pueblo and the North Koreans indicated that there were four
wounded onboard, one of whom later died, 99 the details of which were later described by a
member of the Pueblo crew during an interview by BBC in 2012.100
Skip Schumacher, 24, was the Operations Officer on the Pueblo when it was captured. As
long as the Pueblo stayed in international waters no one imagined that the North Koreans might
try to capture it; so the crew were totally unprepared when the unthinkable happened. 101 At the
time, the Pueblo was off the coast of Wonsan, North Korea's most active and largest cargo and
military port, when a local harbor patrol vessel sent a message warning the crew that they should
allow them to board. When the Americans refused, the North Koreans opened fire. 102 “We didn't
have anything to fire back with. The whole notion was that we were to be an unarmed trawler-
like vessel; that was our disguise," 103 Schumacher said. Although the captain of the Pueblo tried
to buy the crew some time by heading out to sea, the ship's maximum speed was only about 15
miles per hour, no match for North Korean vessels.104
During that time, the crew's main concern was to destroy all sensitive material on board
before it fell into enemy hands; by burning documents in metal barrels or cans, a slow and
painstaking process. 105 The North Koreans, who understood exactly what was going on, opened
fire each time they saw smoke emerging from the ship. 106 In just over an hour, one sailor was
dead and about a third of the crew were injured. 107 The captain of the ship, Commander Lloyd M
Bucher, decided he had no choice but to surrender.108
The crew were taken ashore, transported to Pyongyang, and thrown in prison. 109 North
Korea's immediate concern was to extract confessions from the crew, so they began with
Commander Bucher, beating him severely when he refused to admit that the ship had violated
territorial waters and that it was a spy ship. 110 As Schumacker recalls, they put a gun to his head
and said, “That's it, we're going to kill you.” And yet, despite clicking the revolver on an empty
chamber, Schumacker said he still refused. 111 But when the interrogators threatened to shoot
each member of the crew, one-by-one, starting with the youngest, Bucher gave in and signed the
confession, 112 which each senior crew member was also made to sign. 113 The crew‟s false
confession, coerced under threat of death, and later published, was the North Korean
Government‟s triumphant justification for the capture of the Pueblo.114
Back in the U.S., news of the Pueblo's capture was greeted with anger and dismay; but
since there was no intelligence on where the men were being held, a rescue mission wasn‟t
possible. 115 So the slow process of negotiations began. 116 In Pyongyang, while the men were
being made to write endless confessions of guilt,117 they were busy planning their own acts of
defiance, using the North Korean‟s own propaganda
machine to their advantage.118 On one occasion, a group
of eight sailors were photographed by the North
Koreans to demonstrate to the world how well the crew
was being treated. 119 In the photograph, every sailor
held up his middle finger, a lewd gesture not recognized
by their captors. 120 "We told them the finger was a
Hawaiian good luck,” Schumacher said, “so they
thought that was wonderful.” 121 When the photograph
was later published in TIME Magazine, the crew was
praised for their courage.122 But when the photograph
made its way back to North Korea, and their captors realized they had been made fools of, they
reacted with anger and violence. 123 They wanted to know all double entendre and slang they had
used during their months of captivity; and they were beaten very badly. "It was really quite
brutal," Schumacher said. 124
 The CIA’s Analysis of Commander Bucher’s Initial Statements

A week after the Pueblo incident began, the CIA prepared a psychological and political
analysis of Commander Bucher‟s public statements, unaware of the physical and psychological
abuse the crew had endured (and would continue to endure for eleven months). According to the
CIA, Pyongyang‟s “propaganda exploitation” of the seizure of the Pueblo consisted primarily of
two “alleged statements” made by Commander Bucher. 125 His first statement, broadcast of
January 24th, was a “confession.”126 [The CIA added the quotation marks] His second statement,
broadcast two days later, was described as an interview by the North Korean press, which, except
for a few exceptions, closely followed his first statement. 127 In the opinion of the CIA, the
statements attributed to Bucher were for the most part “straight recitals of Communist
propaganda and were obviously dictated by Pyongyang.” 128 Bucher‟s statements, however, did
not indicate some aspects of the position Pyongyang took later on with respect to the Pueblo‟s
capture.
The most obvious intent of Bucher‟s statements, the CIA report said, was to establish the
credibility of North Korea‟s version of the incident; for example, his statement that the Pueblo
had deliberately “deeply intruded into the coastal waters” of North Korea. 129 Once the crew was
released and debriefed, however, the CIA realized that the statement was “induced by threat.”130
After stressing the point on the Pueblo‟s “intrusion,” Bucher‟s statements give “detailed and
somewhat lurid accounts” of the Pueblo‟s recent “provocative” activities. 131 Bucher had also
allegedly confessed that the Pueblo had violated the waters of “Peoples China and other socialist
countries,” and in fact had entered North Korean waters after performing “espionage
assignments along the Soviet Union‟s maritime province.” 132 By doing so, the CIA report said,
the North Koreans had perhaps hoped that such a charge would make it difficult for China and
the Soviet Union to withhold full support for their position. 133 In fact, the Pueblo had traveled
directly from Japan to its station along the North Korean coast. 134
In Bucher‟s statements, he labeled the Pueblo‟s mission as a “plain act of aggression,”
stating that the ship operated under the guise of an oceanographic research vessel. 135 He also
allegedly stated that the Pueblo‟s mission was “laid on by the CIA,” and that he and his men
were tempted to undertake their mission by CIA “dollars and honor.” 136 In addition, the two
civilians on board the ship were described as “special espionage agents who are conducting
military espionage missions” 137 as well as “other important, special assignments.” 138 Such
statements, the CIA report said, can be viewed largely as a predictable propaganda attempt to
“publicize and discredit U.S. intelligence-gathering operations.” 139 Bucher‟s statements also
“plainly indicate Pyongyang‟s concern to publicize the case it rightly or wrongly feels it has for
the retention of the Pueblo and its crew.” 140 In the CIA‟s view, Pyongyang felt it was in a
position to use the Pueblo as a bargaining chip in negotiations with the U.S. 141 In a January 28
editorial in the authoritative North Korean newspaper Nodong Sinmun, the Pueblo incident was
depicted as “a flagrant trampling on the Korean armistice agreement,”142 which strongly implied
that Pyongyang saw the final disposition of the Pueblo and its crew as a “subject of
negotiation—no doubt lengthy—at Panmunjom.”143
Commander Bucher‟s second statement, unlike in his first, drew a connection between
the capture of the Pueblo and the war in Vietnam. 144 Bucher allegedly said the Pueblo‟s mission
against North Korea was in preparation for “a new war of aggression in Asia,” 145 adding, the U.S.
“regards Korea and Vietnam as two fronts” of the war.146 The CIA found it worthy of note that
Bucher‟s second statement—issued after Pyongyang had additional time to reflect upon the
public position it wished to adopt—stressed a connection with Vietnam. 147 “Whatever the degree
of premeditation involved in the capture of the Pueblo,” a CIA report said, “Pyongyang now
apparently sees its seizure of our ship as a way to support Hanoi by placing diversionary pressure
on the U.S.”148 In recent months, the report said, North Korean propaganda was increasingly
concerned with linking “U.S. imperialism” in Vietnam and South Korea, 149 and North Korea saw
its possession of the Pueblo and its crew as a “golden opportunity to intensify this propaganda
line—a factor militating against an early release of the crew.”150
Another indication that Pyongyang probably wanted to hold the Pueblo and its crew for
as long as feasible, the CIA said, was Bucher‟s statement that he and his crew “should be
punished in accordance with the criminal law” of North Korea.151 A day earlier, Nodong Sinmun
likewise stated that members of the crew were “criminals” who must be “dealt with by law” and
receive “due punishment.”152 So it seemed quite possible that the crew would not be brought to
trial. 153 Instead, Commander Bucher was allowed to plead for his crew‟s release.154 Pyongyang
had left open the option of releasing the crew at any time. 155

The Negotiations

From the moment the incident began on January 23rd, the North Koreans steadfastly
refused to negotiate for the release of the Pueblo and crew. A CIA Situation Report (SITREP)
the following day at 7am—large portions of which remain classified—states, “North Korea is
continuing to take a hard line on the Pueblo Incident.”156 At a Military Armistice Commission
meeting at Panmunjom that day, the senior delegate, Maj. Gen. Pak Chung-kuk, flatly rejected a
U.S. demand for the immediate release of the Pueblo and its crew. 157 He also falsely accused the
Pueblo of committed “intolerable provocations” when it “illegally infiltrated [into North Korean
waters] on an espionage mission.” 158 He further claimed the crew of the Pueblo had fired on
North Korean patrol boats.159 U.S. Rear Admiral John V. Smith had demanded that Pyongyang
return the ship and its 83-man crew, apologize for the incident, and be aware that the U.S.
reserves the right to demand compensation. 160

Meanwhile, the U.S. Task Force led by the nuclear powered aircraft carrier
Enterprise, with destroyers Higbee, Truxton, and Osbourn had moved to a new
rendezvous area 120 nautical miles south of South Korea and 120 nautical miles
southwest of Sasebo, Japan. 161 The destroyers Collett and O‟Bannon also
steamed toward that same rendezvous point.162

On January 28th, there was still no hint of Pyongyang‟s conditions for the release of the
ship and crew. 163 Pyongyang, in an editorial in the official Nodong Sinmun, reiterated its
rejection of U.N. consideration of the Pueblo case. 164 A day earlier, Boris Batrayev, a KGB
officer with the Soviet Embassy in New Delhi, had suggested that Pyongyang may wish to swap
the Pueblo and its men for North Koreans charged with terrorism in South Korea,165 hinting that
Soviet efforts to persuade Pyongyang to release the ship in return for an admission of guilt and
perhaps the payment of a fine had been unsuccessful. 166
In a later conversation, Batrayev implied strongly that despite a hands-off posture, which
the CIA said Moscow had to maintain toward the problem publically, the Soviet Union was
interested in working behind the scenes to resolve it. 167 Batrayev said Moscow was gathering
information on the crisis and interested in finding out from the U.S. and North Korea what each
wanted and what each would give up to achieve a peaceful settlement.168 According to the CIA,
Batrayev was apparently the source of news reports to the effect that Soviet Premier Alexei
Kosygin told Indian Prime Minister Gandhi that the Pueblo incident could have been a “genuine
mistake”—without saying on whose part—and that the dispute is a “routine matter.”169
 A few days later, on January 31 st,170 North Korea indicated that it might “eventually” be
willing to discuss the Pueblo incident with the U.S. at Panmunjom. 171 Kim Kwang-Hyop, a
member of the secretariat of the central committee of North Korea‟s communist party, said in
Pyongyang that “there is precedent for the treatment of similar cases [as the Pueblo incident] at
the Korean Military Armistice Commission.” 172 “It is a miscalculation,” however, Kim said, “if
the U.S. imperialists think they can solve the incident of the intrusion of the Pueblo into the
territorial waters of our country by military threats or by the method of aggressive war or through
illegal discussions at the United Nations,”173 adding that “it will be a different story if they want
to solve this question by method of the previous
practice.” 174 According to the CIA, Kim was
probably referring to negotiations at Panmunjom in
1963-64 which resulted in the release of two U.S.
helicopter pilots downed in North Korea.175
In the end, the release of the Pueblo crew—
the ship itself remains in North Korea as a sort of
trophy—didn‟t come for eleven months. At all times,
in fact, the Pueblo was in international waters; the
Americans knew it and so did the North Koreans;
and pretty much everything the North Koreans did
and said from that point on was a lie. They falsely
claimed the Pueblo was in North Korean waters;
they falsely claimed the crew had fired on North
Korean patrol boats; and when the commander
refused to confess, they forged documents, altered the ship‟s log, and doctored the commander's
recorded confession. The North Koreans wanted a confession, and no amount of negotiations or
negotiating skill was going to get the crew back home safely until North Korea got their false
confession. The Pueblo incident demonstrates the futility of trying to negotiate with an adversary
that wants what it wants when it wants it, and won't give in until they get it.

The Release of the Crew

Dateline: Panmunjom, Korea, Monday, Dec. 23, 1968: “As a light snow fell on the barren
hills surrounding Panmunjom, the 82 surviving member crew members of the intelligence ship
Pueblo crossed a narrow bridge between North and South Korea to end eleven months of
captivity,” read a New York Times front-page headline story. 176 After nearly a year of “tortuous
negotiations,” the U.S. Government obtained freedom for the Pueblo men by signing a document
of “solemn apology” to the North Koreans, a document that was repudiated by the American
representative even before it was signed.177 To obtain their release, U.S. Army Maj. Gen. Gilbert
H. Woodward had also signed a North Korean document asserting that the Pueblo had violated
North Korean territorial waters and had been spying when it was captured. 178 General Woodward,
the senior representative of the United States in the Military Armistice Commission for Korea,
protested that he was signing the statement “to free the crew and only to free the crew;” 179
adding there was no convincing evidence that the ship had violated North Korean waters or done
anything illegal or improper.180
The first to cross the bridge, known as the “Bridge of No Return” (ever since the time of
the Korean War), was the body of Duane D. Hodges, a sailor who had died during the capture of
the Pueblo.181 Then came Commander Bucher, followed by the rest of the crew in reverse order
of rank.182 The men, all wearing dark blue North Korean uniforms and caps, were each identified
by Bucher as they came over the bridge.183 From a distance, some of the men seemed to be
smiling broadly; others appeared solemn. 184 Bucher, who had made tape-recorded confessions of
having violated North Korean waters and engaged in espionage, said he had done so only
because of what he termed “pretty vivid” threats to the safety of the crew made by their
captors.185 He also said that he and other crew members had been beaten and abused during their
captivity. 186 But had the Pueblo strayed into North Korean territorial waters? On the day of their
release, Commander Bucher said “at no times” had the ship intruded into the 12-mile territorial
waters claimed by North Korea, adding, “we were attacked on the open sea and captured on the
open sea. It is as clear and simple as that.”187
The transfer of the crew from North to South appears to have gone smoothly. As they
reached the Joint Security Area of Panmunjom, the men were put aboard buses, provided with
warm clothing, and driven about four miles to the U.N. Command‟s advance camp. 188 At the
advance camp, they were greeted by General Charles H. Bonesteel 3 rd, the commander of U.S.
and U.N. forces in Korea.189 After they were allowed to rest briefly there, eight helicopters flew
the men to the 121st Army Evacuation Hospital, about ten miles west of Seoul, where they
underwent examinations and received any necessary medical treatment.190 The photo shows the
men being escorted by Military Police (MP‟s) to the evacuation hospital. 191 According to a
military spokesman, the crew was to be flown to San Diego the next day, after a night‟s stay at
the hospital. 192 So Air Force jet transports stood by at Kimpo Airfield in Seoul to ferry the crew
to the U.S.193
In 1970, sometime after the crew had returned to the U.S., Commander Lloyd M. Bucher,
Captain USS Pueblo, wrote the story of the Pueblo Incident. In “Bucher: My Story,” 194 Bucher
reflected back on that fateful day in January 1968 when his ship was fired upon and boarded, and
the crew held hostage by the North Koreans:

As I look back now on the great crisis of my life, the illegal seizure on the high
seas of my ship, USS Pueblo, by North Korean warships on January 23, 1968, I
cannot help wondering exactly when and where events took the first capricious
turn toward disaster. I am not a man who has avoided adventure and excitement;
to the contrary, I have sought them out, but always within the framework of
careful planning and discipline. Yet, I ask myself why it happened that I, Lloyd
March Bucher, a man of humble origin who had made himself a dedicated but
otherwise anonymous naval officer, was singled out by fate to play a notorious
key role in an incident that drastically affected the lives of hundreds of other
people and shook to its foundation the defense policy of my country. 195

In 1977, nine years after North Korean gunboats seized the USS Pueblo, Bernard
Weinraub again wrote on the Pueblo; this time, he interviewing Lloyd M. Bucher, its retired
commander with 27 years in the Navy, who was living quietly in a secluded ranch house,
growing avocados, painting and studying art.196 Bucher said the U.S. Navy and U.S. Government
had learned little from the Pueblo Incident and that the eleven months he spent as a prisoner in a
North Korean prison had remained but a burning memory.197 “It will be with me for the rest of
my days,” Bucher said. “There are emotional wounds that won't heal.” 198 By that time, Bucher
had become a “hefty figure”; he spoke slowly and tensely about the past, and the future; and said
the entire dark experience of the Pueblo was virtually meaningless for the Navy. 199 “What has
the Navy learned, what has the Government learned?” Bucher was asked. “Very little.” 200
At the start of that week, Korea had once again found itself prominently in the news, with
attention focused first on the Carter Administration's decision to withdraw U.S. ground troops
from South Korea, and then on the attack on an American helicopter that left three crewmen
dead; a fourth captured but was later released. 201 Bucher thought the withdrawal of American
troops from South Korea was a profound error.202 “The presence of American troops, perhaps
 more than any other factor, keeps the North Koreans from pushing to the brink of war,” he
said. 203 “At some point in time, the North Koreans can mount a really vicious campaign, a
guerrilla campaign, politically undermining the government, raising discontent among students,
bringing tremendous pressures down on the government and finally destroying its credibility.”
Could American troops help prevent this? “The North Koreans can be so cruel…They are willing
to undertake all kinds of expeditions, take risks. It will be very difficult for South Korea to
withstand those pressures from the North,”204 Bucher said.

1
Weinraub, Bernard. “Pueblo‟s Main Task Was to Survey Russian Fleet,” New York Times, Mar. 3, 1969, p. 5.
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid.
5
Ibid.
6
Weinraub, Bernard. “Pueblo‟s Main Task Was to Survey Russian Fleet,” New York Times, Mar. 3, 1969, p. 5.
7
http://www.navsource.org/archives/09/61/6102.htm
8
Lerner. Mitchell (Prof. of History, Ohio State University). “The USS Pueblo Incident,” a seminar on a “little-known chapter
in Cold War history,” MIT, Wednesday Seminars Fall 2002, Nov. 13, 2002.
9
Ibid.
10
Ibid.
11
Ibid.
12
Ibid.
13
Mobley, Richard A. “Lessons from the Capture of the USS Pueblo and the Shootdown of a US Navy EC-121—1968 and
1969,” Studies in Intelligence. Vol. 59, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2015), p. 1.
14
“Sailor on the Pueblo Wrote that „Anything Can Happen‟,” New York Times, Jan, 25, 1968, p. 14.
15
The Pueblo was captured on January 23, 1968 and released on December 23, 1968.
16
“Sailor on the Pueblo Wrote that „Anything Can Happen‟,” New York Times, Jan, 25, 1968, p. 14.
17
Ibid.
18
Ibid.
19
Ibid.
20
“This Month in USAF and PACAF History,” Pacific Air Forces, US Air Force, OPR: PACAF/HO, Jan. 2016.
21
Ibid.
22
Ibid.
23
Ibid.
24
Ibid.
25
Ibid.
26
Ibid.
27
Ibid.
28
Ibid.
29
“Highlights,” North Korea Mission BX 6847, NPIC/R-17/68, Jan. 26, 1968 (approved for release, July 2001).
30
Ibid.
31
Ibid.
32
Ibid.
33
Ibid.
34
Ibid.
35
Ibid.
36
Ibid.
37
Ibid.
38
Ibid.
39
Ibid.
40
Ibid.
41
Ibid.
42
Mobley, Richard A. “Lessons from the Capture of the USS Pueblo and the Shootdown of a US Navy EC-121—1968 and
1969,” Studies in Intelligence. Vol. 59, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2015), p. 1.
43
Ibid.
44
Ibid.
45
The bulk of the documents upon which this article relies were declassified and approved for release on December 22, 2015.
46
“North Korea Provokes New Confrontation,” Weekly Summary, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, Jan. 26, 1968, pp. 6-7.
47
Ibid.
48
Ibid.
49
Ibid.
50
Ibid.
51
Ibid.
52
Japan‟s National Police Agency (Tokyo), archives:
https://www.npa.go.jp/archive/keibi/syouten/syouten271/english/0403.html
53
Ibid.
54
Ibid.
55
“North Korea Provokes New Confrontation,” Weekly Summary, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, Jan. 26, 1968, pp. 6-7.
56
Ibid.
57
Ibid.
58
Ibid.
59
Ibid.
60
Ibid.
61
Ibid.
62
Ibid.
63
Ibid.
64
Ibid.
65
Ibid.
66
Ibid.
67
Ibid.
68
Ibid.
69
“Pueblo Can Never Be Sent Back to U.S.: Pyongyang: Rodong Sinmun and KCNA.kp (English), Feb. 20, 2016.
70
Ibid.
71
Ibid.
72
Ibid.
73
“Lawmakers Unite in Return of USS Pueblo,” The Pueblo Chieftain, Feb. 1, 2016.
74
“Pueblo Can Never Be Sent Back to U.S.,” Rodong Sinmun, Tuesday, Feb. 23, Juche 105 (2016).
75
“Analysis of the North Korean Evidence,” Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), presented by Lt. Douglas M. Hackett, 1968.
76
Ibid.
77
Ibid.
78
Ibid.
79
Ibid.
80
Ibid.
81
Ibid.
82
Ibid.
83
Ibid.
84
Ibid.
85
Ibid.
86
Ibid.
87
Ibid.
88
Ibid.
89
Ibid.
90
Ibid.
91
Ibid.
92
Ibid.
93
Ibid.
94
Ibid.
95
Ibid.
96
Ibid.
97
Ibid.
98
Ibid.
99
Ibid.
100
Chloe Hadjimatheou, Chloe. “Sailor recalls 1968 North Korean capture of USS Pueblo,” BBC World Service, Jan. 23,
2012.
101
Ibid.
102
Ibid.
103
Ibid.
104
Ibid.
105
Ibid.
106
Ibid.
107
Ibid.
108
Ibid.
109
Ibid.
110
Ibid.
111
Ibid.
112
Ibid.
113
Ibid.
114
Ibid.
115
Ibid.
116
Ibid.
117
Ibid.
118
Ibid.
119
Ibid.
120
Ibid.
121
Ibid.
122
Ibid.
123
Ibid.
124
Ibid.
125
“A Psychological and Political Analysis of Commander Bucher‟s Statements” (secret), CIA, Jan. 29, 1968.
126
Ibid.
127
Ibid.
128
Ibid.
129
Ibid.
130
Handwritten; “A Psychological and Political Analysis of Commander Bucher‟s Statements” (secret), CIA, Jan. 29, 1968.
131
“A Psychological and Political Analysis of Commander Bucher‟s Statements” (secret), CIA, Jan. 29, 1968.
132
Ibid.
133
Ibid.
134
Ibid.
135
Ibid.
136
Ibid.
137
Ibid.
138
Ibid.
139
Ibid.
140
Ibid.
141
Ibid.
142
Ibid.
143
Ibid.
144
Ibid.
145
Ibid.
146
Ibid.
147
Ibid.
148
Ibid.
149
Ibid.
150
Ibid.
151
Ibid.
152
Ibid.
153
Ibid.
154
Ibid.
155
Ibid.
156
Pueblo SITREP (as of 0700 EST), Intelligence Memorandum (top secret), CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, Jan. 24, 1968.
 157
Ibid.
158
Ibid.
159
Ibid.
160
Ibid.
161
Ibid.
162
Ibid.
163
Ibid.
164
Ibid.
165
Ibid.
166
Ibid.
167
Ibid.
168
Ibid.
169
Ibid.
170
Ibid.
171
Ibid.
172
Ibid.
173
Ibid.
174
Ibid.
175
Ibid.
176
“82 in Pueblo Crew Freed; U.S. Gives North Koreans „Confession,‟ Disavows It,” New York Times, Dec. 23, 1968, p. 1.
177
Ibid.
178
“Pueblo Officer Says He Tricked Captors with False Charts,” New York Times, Dec. 27, 1968, p. 1.
179
Ibid.
180
Ibid.
181
“82 in Pueblo Crew Freed; U.S. Gives North Koreans „Confession,‟ Disavows It,” New York Times, Dec. 23, 1968, p. 1.
182
Ibid.
183
Ibid.
184
Ibid.
185
Ibid.
186
Ibid.
187
“Skipper Cites Beatings and „Pretty Vivid‟ Threats,” New York Times, Dec. 23, 1968, p. 3.
188
“82 in Pueblo Crew Freed; U.S. Gives North Koreans „Confession,‟ Disavows It,” New York Times, Dec. 23, 1968, p. 1.
189
Ibid.
190
Ibid.
191
Ibid.
192
Ibid.
193
Ibid.
194
Bucher: My Story was penned by Mark Rascovich, the author of “Bedford Incident,” a Cold War thriller.
195
Butcher, Lloyd with Mark Rascovich. Bucher: My Story, Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1970, p. 1.
196
Weinraub, Bernard. “Bucher Says U.S. Failed to Learn From the Pueblo,” New York Times, July 17, 1977, p. 1.
197
Ibid.
198
Ibid.
199
Ibid.
200
Ibid.
201
Ibid.
202
Ibid.
203
Ibid.
204
Ibid.

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