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SECOND DIVISION

OSCAR S. ORTIZ, G .R. No. 238289

Petitioner,
Present:

PERLAS-BERNABE, S.A.J,
-versus- Chairperson,
GESMUNDO,
LAZARO-JAVIER,
FOREVER RICHSONS LOPEZ, and
TRADING CORPORATION, ROSARIO* , JJ
CHARVERSON WOOD
INDUSTRY CORPORATION,
and ADAN CO,
Respondents.

DECISION

LOPEZ, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 assailing the

September 22, 2017 Decision2 and February 21, 2018 Resolution3 of the Court
of Appeals-Cagayan de Oro City (CA) that upheld the rulings of the labor
tribunals and dismissed petitioner's complaint for illegal dismissal and money
claims.

ANTECEDENTS

On June 28, 2013, Oscar S. Ortiz (Oscar), filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal and monetary claims against Forever Richsons Trading Corporation
(Forever Richsons), now Charverson Wood Industry Corporation, and Adan

* Designated additional Member per Special Order No. 2797 dated November 5, 2020.
1
Rollo, pp. 47-84.
2 Id. at 88-97; penned by Associate Justice Ronaldo B. Martin, with the concurrence of Associate Justices

Oscar V . Badelles and Louis P. Acosta.

3
Id. at 98-99.

I
Decision 2 G.R. No. 238289

Co (respondents). 4 In his Position Paper,5 Oscar narrated that he was hired by

Forever Richsons in June 2011, and signed a 5-month employment contract
with Workpool Manpower Services (Workpool Manpower). Despite the
expiration of the contract, Oscar continued to work for respondents. Sometime
in April 2013, news spread among the personnel of respondents that five of
its previous employees won their case in the CA. Thereafter, respondents'
paymaster, Paulino Tinoy, required the workers to sign a 5-month
employment contracts, blank papers, and vouchers. For fear of having their
employment terminated, most of the employees acquiesced; a handful,
including Oscar and one William Longakit, however, refused to sign. 6

To support his claims, Oscar alleged that he was a regular employee of

the respondents since he served them for two years after the expiration of his
5-month contract, and that he performed tasks which were necessary and
desirable to respondents' usual business of plywood manufacturing and
marketing. He was illegally dismissed after he refused to sign a new 5-month
employment contract, blank vouchers, and papers. Moreover, Oscar submitted
some of his payslips to prove that he was paid a daily wage of P155.00, far
from the mandated minimum daily wage. 7 Neither was Oscar paid holiday
pay, 13 th month pay, service incentive leave pay, and overtime pay. Finally,
Oscar prayed to be reinstated and be granted backwages, as well as moral and
exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. 8

For their part, respondents averred that they entered into a contract with
vVorkpool Manpower - a legitimate job contractor, certified9 by the
Department of Labor a..'1d Employment (DOLE) for the supply of workers who
will perform various jobs in the production and office areas. 10 Oscar signed a
Contract Agreement as Project Worker with Workpool Manpower covering
his employment from January 24, 2013 to June 24, 2013.u Workpool
Manpower's manager, Bethuel B. Cruzado, attested that Oscar was an
employee of Workpool Manpower whose employment was terminated by
reason of the expiration of his contract. 12 Thus, Oscar is not an employee of
the respondents; he was hired by Workpool Manpower for a specific
undertaking and for a fixed duration; and his salaries were paid by V✓orkpool
Manpower. Considering that Oscar is not an employee of the respondents,
there is no way for them to dismiss him, nor can he claim for monetary
benefits from them. 13

4
Id. at 100. Oscar claimc-:d fcff t¾e folwwing monerzry benefits: CO unpaid salaries/wages; (2) holiday
pay; (3) premium pay for res; day/holiiav pay; (4) overtime pay; (5) allo,,vances; (6) 13 th month pay; and
(7) service incentive leave pay, as wen <'!S moral and exempiary damages.
5
Id. at 101-1!4.
6 Id.at115-ll7.
' Id. at 118.
' Id. at 112.
9
Id. at 148-149.
10 id. at 131--133.
" Id. at. 134.
12 ld. at 135-136.
13 Id. at 126-128.

r
Decision 3 G.R. No. 238289

In his reply, Oscar maintained that he was an employee of the

respondents, and that the latter submitted forged documents to show that he is
an employee ofWorkpool Manpower. 14

The Labor Arbiter (LA), in a Decision dated November 28, 2013,

dismissed Oscar's complaint for his failure to implead Workpool Manpower
as an indispensable party. 15 The LA held that, "to adjudicate the whole
controversy[,] especially on the issues of illegal dismissal and money
claims[,] and to determine completely the liabilities of [the] parties, " 16 it is
necessary to implead W orkpool Manpower. It was also ruled that Oscar
became Workpool Manpower's regular employee because of his continued
employment after the lapse of his 5-month employment contract, and that
based on the evidence on record, Workpool Manpower is a legitimate labor
contractor. 17

Oscar appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). 18

On June 11, 2014, theNLRC denied the appeal, 19 and affirmed theLA'sruling
that Workpool Manpower is an indispensable party since it was alluded to be
Oscar's direct employer. Oscar's motion for reconsideration, 20 was likewise
denied by the NLRC. 21

Before the CA, 22 Oscar's petition for certiorari was dismissed, and the
NLRC decision - that Workpool Manpower is an indispensable party- was
affirmed. For one, the CA agreed with the labor tribunals that Workpool
Manpower is the employer of Oscar. Also, the CA declared that "the labor
arbiter ordered [Oscar] to implead [Workpool Manpower] as it found that it
is an indispensable party to the case. [OscarJ refused to obey such order and
argued that [Workpool Manpower] is not an indispensable party because it
is a labor-only contractor. "23 Moreover, it was raised that the CA decision in
Charverson Wood Industry Corporation v. National Labor Relations
Commission and William Longakit (Longakit case ),24 is not applicable to
Oscar since in the Longakit case there was no allegation of a contract between

14
Id. at 153-159.
15 Id. at 169-173. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WIIBREFORE, premises considered, this complaint is hereby dismissed for failure to
implcad and/or joined [sic] WORKPOOL MANPOWER SERVICES as an indispensable party to
this case.
SO ORDERED.
16 Id. at 173.
17
Id.at171-172
18 Id. at I 74-175.
19 Id. at 245-248. The dispositive portion of the NLRC's Decision provides:
MIEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED
for lack of merit and the decision appealed from AFFIRMED, subject to the above qualification.
SO ORDERED.
20 Id. at 249-266.
21 Id. at 267-269.
22
Supra note 2.
23
Rollo, p. 94.

!
24 CA-G.R. SP No. 06422-MIN.
 Decision 4 G.R. No. 238289

Longakit and Workpool Manpower, while in the case of Oscar, he

categorically admitted that he signed an employment contract with W orkpool
Manpower. Aggrieved, Oscar moved for the reconsideration, 25 but was
denied. 26 Hence, this petition.

THE PARTIES' ARGUMENTS

Invoking the highest interest of substantive justice and equity, Oscar

prays for this Court to declare him a regular employee of the respondents;
affirm that Workpool Manpower is a labor-only contractor; render his
dismissal as illegal; and order his reinstatement with full backwages, as well
as attorney's fees. Oscar asserts that the CA erred when it failed to appreciate
that he is a regular employee of the respondents, and that he cannot be
dismissed without just cause and due process of law; and when it dismissed
his petition for failure to obey the order to implead Workpool Manpower as
an indispensable party, a purely technical ground in blatant violation of his
substantive rights. Oscar maintains that W orkpool Manpower is a labor-only
contractor; thus, he is a regular employee of the respondents. For one, he was
directly hired by the respondents on June 11, 2011, at their office in Mahayag,
Bunawan, Davao City. Respondents exercise control and supervision over his
work as receiver of the Dahul machine, and operator of the spreader machine,
and core cutter machine. It was also the respondents who paid his wages.
During the course of his employment, respondents illegally dismissed him
because of his refusal to sign a new 5-month employment contract. 27

On the other hand, respondents assert that Oscar is not their employee
as shown by his employment contract with Workpool Manpower, and
numerous documents revealing that Workpool Manpower paid for Oscar's
wages and contributions to the Social Security System, Pag-IBIG Fund, and
PhilHealth. As Oscar's employer, Workpool Manpower is an indispensable
party in this case. 28

THE COURT'S RULING

The petition is meritorious.

The general rule is that only questions of law may be raised and
resolved by this Court in petitions under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
because the Court, not being a trier of facts, is not duty-bound to reexamine

25
Rollo, pp. 337-350.

y
26
Supra note 3.
27
Rollo, pp. 61-81.
28
Id. at 424-432.
Decision 5 G.R. No. 238289

and calibrate the evidence on record. 29 Findings of fact of quasi-judicial

bodies, especially when affirmed by the CA, are generally accorded finality
and respect. 30 In exceptional cases, 31 however, such as the instant case, when
the findings of fact are conflicting, this Court may review and re-evaluate the
evidence on record. 32 Here, on the one hand, the LA concluded that Oscar is
a regular employee ofWorkpool Manpower, and that the latter is a legitimate
labor-only contractor. On the other hand, the NLRC and the CA refrained
from determining the contracting relationship of the parties. 33 Instead, the
NLRC and the CA's rulings centered on the failure of Oscar to implead
Workpool Manpower as an indispensable party. In view of the foregoing
differing conclusions of the labor tribunals and the CA, we undertake to
decide the contracting relationship of the respondents and Workpool
Manpower.

Considering the allegations of the parties, it is crucial to determine

whether labor-only contracting exists. Incidentally, it must be resolved
whether there is an employer-employee relationship between Oscar and the
respondents, and whether Oscar was illegally dismissed.

Article 106 of the Labor Code, defines labor-only contracting as an

arrangement where a person, who does not have substantial capital or
investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises,
among others, supplies workers to an employer to perform activities which
are directly related to the principal business of the employer. To implement
the law, Department Order (DO) No. 18-02, series of 2002, 34 and later, DO
No. 18-A, series of 2011, were issued, which declare that labor-only
contracting is prohibited. Labor-only contracting was further defined as an
arrangement where the contractor merely recruits, supplies or places workers

29 Deocariza v. Fleet Management Services Phils., Inc., 836 Phil. 1087, 1097 (2018); Quintanar v. Coca-
Cola Bottlers, Philippines, Inc., 788 Phil. 385,401 (2016).
30
Deocariza v. Fleet Management Services Phils., Inc., 836 Phil. 1087 (2018).
31
Id. at 1097. 1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; 2) when
the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; 3) when there is grave abuse of
discretion; 4) when the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; 5) when the fmdings offact are
conflicting; 6) when in making its findings, the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or
its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; 7) when the findings
are contrary to that of the trial court; 8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; 9) when the facts set forth in the petition, as well as in the petitioner's
main and reply briefs, are disputed by the respondent; 10) when the findings of fact are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; or I I) when the Court of
Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion. (See Manila Shipmanagement & Manning, Inc. v.
Aninang, [824 Phil. 916, 925 (2018).])
32
Alaska Milk Corporation v. Paez. G.R No. 237277, November 27, 2019; Consolidated Building
Maintenance, Inc. v. Asprec, 832 Phil. 630, 642 (2018).
33 Rollo, p. 248. The pertinent portion of the NLRC's Decision reads:
The matter of whether or not [Workpool Manpower] is a labor-only contractor has yet to
be determined in the arbitration proceedings, with it be given a day in court to be heard.
Otherwise, it would deprive [Workpool Manpower] of its fundamental right to due process.
Thus, there can be no final determination of such issue without [Workpool Manpower] being
impleaded as respondent in this case. xx x.
34 Rules Implementing Articles 106 to 109 of the Labor Code, as Amended; see also DO No. 18-A, Series
of 2011, which became effective on December 4, 2011.

)
Decision 6 G.R. No. 238289

to perform a job, work or service for a principal; 35 and (a) the contractor does
not have substantial capital or investments in the form of tools, equipment,
machineries, work premises, among others, and the employees recruited and
placed are performing activities which aTe usually necessary, or desirable to
the operation of the company, or directly related to the main business of the
principal within a definite or predetermined period, regardless of whether such
job, work or service is to be performed, or completed within, or outside the
premises of the principal; or (b) the contractor does not exercise the right to
control over the performance of the work of the employee. 36

Verily, not all forms of contracting are prohibited. The law allows
contracting and subcontracting of services, but closely regulates these
activities for the protection of workers. An employer can contract out part of
its operations, provided, it complies with tlie limits and standards provided in
the Labor Code and in its implementing rules. 37 Contracting or subcontracting
shall be legitimate if all the following circumstances concur:

(a) The contractor must be registered in accordance with the rule and
carries a distinct and independent business and undertakes to
perform the job, work or service on its own responsibility, according
to its own manner and method, and free from control and direction
of the principal in all matters connected with the performance of the
work except as to the results thereof;

(b) The contractor has substantial capital and/or investment; and

(c) The Service Agreement ensure compliance with all the rights and
benefits under Labor Laws.38

While the existence of registration in favor of a contractor is a strong

badge of legitimacy, the elements of substantial capital, or investment and
control over the workers may be examined to rebut the presumption of
regularity to prove that a contractor is not a legitimate one. 39 In Consolidated
Building lYfaintenance, Inc. v. Asprec, Jr., 40 this Court held that there was
legitimate job contracting since the contractor was able to prove that it had
sufficient capital and investment to sustain its manpower business, and that it
ran a trade independent from Llie principal. Likewise, the contractor retained
the right of control over its employees and exercised the right in the selection
and engagement, payment of wages, dismissal, and control over the
employees' conduct. 41

35
DO No. 18-02, series of 2002, Sec. 5.
36
DO No. 18-A, series of20! I, Sec. 6.
37 Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc. vs. Dela Cr.a, 622 Phil. 886, 902 (2009).
38
DO No. 18-A, series of 2011, Sec. 4.
39
See Consolidated Building Maintenance, Inc. v. Asprec, J7 , Supra note 32, at 644.
40 832 Phil. 630 (2018).
41
Id. at 647-650.

I
Decision 7 G.R. No. 238289

In this case, the respondents submitted two ofWorkpool Manpower's

certificates of registration with the DOLE Davao Region: the first was issued
on April 16, 2010, and valid until April 15, 2013; 42 and the second was issued
June 14, 2013, valid until June 13, 2016. 43 Notwithstanding Workpool
Manpower's registration, its contractor status may be evaluated on the basis
ofits activities. 44 Differently stated, in distinguishing between permissible job
contracting and prohibited labor-only contracting, the totality of the facts and
the surrounding circumstances of the case are to be considered, each case to
be determined by its own facts, and all the features of the relationship
assessed. 45

To begin with, the agreement46 between Workpool Manpower and the

respondents was entered into on January 22, 2013, effective until January 22,
2014,47 and states that Workpool Manpower shall supply workers to the
respondents to perform various jobs in the production and office. areas subject
to its terms and conditions. We note, however, that Oscar started working for
the respondents in June 2011, when he applied for a job directly with the
respondents, and signed his employment contract within the work premises of
the respondents. That the contract he signed was with Workpool Manpower
as employer, does not have a leg to stand on since the document was not
presented as evidence. The respondents merely countered that "there is no
competent proof that complainant was hired by herein CWIC but rather, it is
Workpool who engaged him for a specific undertaking and duration. 48
Consequently, there is nothing to support the allegation that Oscar was hired
and employed by Workpool Manpower.

Moreover, a careful perusal of the agreement between the respondents

and Workpool Manpower, shows that the latter's obligation was solely to
provide workers and nothing more. The contract between the principal and. the
contractor is not the final word on how the contracted workers relate to the
principal and the purported contractor; the relationship must be tested on the
basis of how they actually operate.49 Other than the respondents' bare
allegation and mere presentation of certificates of registration to show that
Workpool Manpower is a legitimate job contractor, no other proof
demonstrates that Workpool l\1anpower had substantial capital or investment
to be utilized in providing the contracted services. Neither was it shown that
Workpool Manpower provided its workers with tools or equipment necessary
to carry out the services required by the respondents. On t.he contra.ry, Oscar
declared that the workers used machines owned bv the resnondents in th.e
" '
production of plywood. In effect, \Vorkpool Ma.7.power car.not be considered

42
Rollo, p. 148.
43
Id. at 149.
44
Consolidated Huilding Ji,,faintenance, (nc. v. Asprec, Jr., supra note 32 at 645.
45
Alaska Afilk C01poration v. Paez, supra note 32.
.u; Rollo) PP- 131-133.
47 Id. at i°3.3.
48
Id. at 126-127.
49
Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc. ·v. Dela Cruz) supra note 37 ~ at 905.

I
Decision 8 G.R. No. 238289

as an independent business with its own equipment, means, and method

capable of carrying out manufacturing plywood as required by the
respondents. Instead, it only supplied manpower to the respondents. The
possession of substantial capital or investments is indispensable in proving a
contractor's legitimacy. 50

Another conclusive indicator of labor-only contracting is the fact that

the contractor does not exercise control over its purported employees. 51 Right
of control refers to the right reserved to the person for whom the services of
the contractual workers are performed, to determine not only the end to be
achieved, but also the manner and means to be used in reaching that end. 52
The pertinent portion of the agreement between the respondents and
Workpool Manpower, states:

6. It is expressly and clearly understood and agreed that the CLIENT is not [the]
employer of the CONTRACTOR and/or its hired workers or employees.
Nothing herein shall be construed as establishing the relationship of employer
and employee, between the CLIENT and CONTRACTOR. As such, the
CONTRACTOR shall at times be personally and directly responsible for the:

a. Control and supervision over the personnel it may utilize to perform

the contracted jobs without prejudice to the right of the CLIENT to
report and protest 6to [sic] the CONTRACTOR any untoward act,
omission, negligence, nonfeasance, incompetence or any misdeeds
of said personnel so as to achieve the quality performance the
CLIENT requires. The CONTRACTOR shall have the sole right to
discipline, suspend or dismiss any of its employees;

b. payments of salary and other benefits of the employees in

accordance with applicable laws and regulations in the area of
assignment in order

c. not to interfere their services [.] 53

On the other hand, Oscar attested, and the respondents did not dispute,
that he was assigned the following tasks: (1) receiver in the Dahul 1 machine,
which is used to strip the bark of logs; (2) spreader machine operator of the
plywood finish assembly department; (3) core cutter operator at the
production section; and (4) piling 3-feet Cross Band and gathering and
burning of wood debris. 54 It cannot be denied that the duties of Oscar involve
the production and manufacturing of the respondents' main product, plywood.
Thus, his functions are necessary and desirable to the usual business and trade
of the respondents. In addition, the machines operated by Oscar were owned

so Alaska Milk Corporation v. Paez, supra note 32.

"Substantial capital'' refers to paid-up capital stocks/shares of at least Three Million Pesos
(P3,000,000.00) in 1he case of corporations, partnerships and cooperatives; in 1he case of single
proprietorship, a net wor1h ofat least Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00)[.J DO No. 18-A, series of
2011, Sec. 3 (!).
51
DO No. 18-A, series of2011, Sec. 5 (ii); DO No. 18-02, series of 2002, Sec. 6 (b).
52
DO No. 18-A, series of20! 1, Sec. 3 (i).
53
Rollo, p. 132.
54
Id. at 115.

l
Decision 9 G.R. No. 238289

by the respondents. Also, it was the respondents' leadmen in the

sections/departments who taught and trained Oscar to use and operate the
machineries. 55 Finally, it was respondents' paymaster, Paulino Tinoy, who
paid his wages. 56

Evidently, Workpool Manpower is a mere supplier oflabor who had no

sufficient capitalization and equipment to undertake the production ·and
manufacture of plywood as independent activities, separate from the trade and
business of the respondents, and had no control and supervision over the
contracted personnel. W orkpool Manpower is a labor-only contractor.

It is worth mentioning that there are three parties in a legitimate

contracting relationship, namely: the principal, the contractor, and the
contractor's employees. In this trilateral relationship, the principal, controls
the contractor and his employees with respect to the ultimate results or output
of the contract; the contractor, on the other hand, controls his employees with
respect, not only to the results to be obtained, but -with respect to the means
and manner of achieving this result. This pervasive control by the contractor
over its employees results in an employer-employee relationship between
them. 57

In a labor-only contracting situation, the contractor simply becomes an

agent of the principal; either directly or through the agent, the principal then
controls the results as well as the means and manner of achieving the desired
results. In other words, the party who would have been the principal in a
legitimate job contracting relationship, and who has no direct relationship
with the contractor's employees, simply becomes the employer in the labor-
only contracting situation with direct supervision and control over the
contracted employees. Strictly speaking, in labor-contracting, there is no
contracting, and no contractor; there is only the employer's representative who
gathers and supplies people for the employer. 58

At this point, Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc. v. Dela Cruz, 59 1s

enlightening:

Where, as in this case, the main issue is labor contracting and a labor-
only contracting situation is found to exist as discussed below, the question of
whether or not the purported contractors are necessary parties is a non-issue;
these purported contractors are mere representatives of the principal/employer
whose personality, as against that of the workers, is merged -,,ifu faat of the

55
Cf. Alaska }vfilk Corporation v_ Paez. et al., G.P_ No. 237277, November 27, 2019, supra note 32.
56
Rollo, pp. 115-116.
57
Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., inc. v. Dela Cruz,. supra note 37, at 900.
58
Id. at 900-90 I.
59
622 Phil. 886 (2009).

t
Decision 10 G.R. No. 238289

principal/employer. Thus, this issue is rendered academic by our conclusion that

labor-only contracting exists. Our labor-only contracting conclusion, too, answers
the petitioner's argument that coruusion results because the workers will have two
employers. 60 (Emphases supplied.)

Considering that the respondents and Workpool Manpower's

contracting relationship is a prohibited form of contracting, it is no longer
necessary to implead Workpool Manpower as a party to the case. It is a
consequence of labor-only contracting that the personality of the principal and
the contractor is merged into one. Thus, Workpool Manpower becomes a mere
representative of the respondents, who is the employer of Oscar.

Since Oscar is deemed an employee of the respondents, we now delve

into the issue of his dismissal.

It is axiomatic that regular employees may only be terminated for just

or authorized cause. 61 The burden of proof to establish valid cause for
dismissal, and that the employee was afforded due process, is on the
employer. 62 Here, respondents insist that Oscar's employment was tenninated
for alleged expiration of his contract. However, we have already established
that Oscar rendered work for the respondents that are necessary a.rid desirable
in its primary business of manufacturing and marketing plywood for more
than one year. As a consequence, Oscar is a regular employee and his
dismissal must be for a valid cause, and cannot be merely because of end of
contract. On this note, the respondents failed to provide proof of either just,
or authorized cause for the termination of Oscar's employment. The
respondents were unable to discharge their burden of proof.

Pursuant to Article 279 of the Labor Code, 63 Oscar is entitled to

reinstatement without loss of seniority rights; payment ofbackwages inclusive
of allowances and other benefits, or their monetary equivalent from the time
his compensation was withheld up to the time of actual reinstatement; or if
reinstatement is no longer possible, Oscar may be entitled to separation pay
equivalent to one month pay for every year of service up to the finality of this
judgment. 64

60
ld.at901.
61 LABOR CODE, Art. 279, reads:
Security of Tenure. - In cases ofregular employment, t.'le employer sha!! not terrnina1e the sc-;_vI~s
ofan employee except for a just Caus.:-. or when authorized by this Title. A.n employee who is unjusiiy
dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without !0Ss of seniority right.'- and other
privileges a.'1.d to his full backwages, inc!usive of ai1cwances, and to his other benefits or their
monetary equiva1_e-.nt computed from the time his compensati0n was withheld .from hir.2 u.p to the time
of his actual remstatement.
02
Purayday v. Shogun Shipping Co., Inc., G.R. No. 204555, July 6. 2020.
63
Supra note 6 l.
64
See Petron Corpoiation v. Caberte, 759 Phil. 353, 371-372 (2015).

t
Decision 11 G.R. No. 238289

FOR THE STATED REASONS, the petition is GRANTED. The

September 22, 2017 Decision and February 21, 2018 Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 06555-l\1IN are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Petitioner Oscar S. Ortiz is declared illegally dismissed, and
respondents are ORDERED to reinstate petitioner to his former position
without loss of seniority rights and other privileges, and to pay petitioner's
backwages and other benefits computed from the time of his dismissal to the
time of actual reinstatement.

SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR:

ESTELA M. P~RNABE
Senior Associate Justice
Chairperson

Jj__J__;_
G.GESMUNDO AMY .A~RO~.JAVIER
Js1:aciate Justice

(On Official Leave)

RICARDO R. ROSARIO
Associate Justice
De6sion 12 G.R. No. 238289

A TT ESTA TI ON

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court's Division.

ESTELA J1i~RNABE
Senior Associate .Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the

Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

DIOSDADO
Chief