CCAL's Lex Populi: Centre For Constitutional and Administrative Law
CCAL's Lex Populi: Centre For Constitutional and Administrative Law
CCAL's Lex Populi: Centre For Constitutional and Administrative Law
Lex Populi
Issue- 3
2018
DIRECTOR'S MESSAGE
Ideas, newer and bolder perspectives hold within them the power to change the
trajectory of growth of a nation. Every idea needs a platform to build upon. In order to
ensure the constant growth and development of a legal framework, it is of utmost
importance that discourses and discussions are promoted. The spirit of
constitutionalism has seen a consistent rise globally and therefore there is a prolific need
for deliberation and assimilation of it. Gujarat National Law University has always
strived to be a pioneer in the area of learner-centric teaching and policy oriented
research endeavours. The University has aspired to be a confluence of national as well
as international emerging trends of law. Law being deeply implicated in our economic,
political, and social worlds, any pursuit of social change invariably involves an
engagement with law. The Constitution being the grundnorm of all laws plays a pivotal
role in strengthening a nation's legal framework. I am delighted that the Centre for
Constitutional and Administrative Law (CCAL) is providing such a platform to the
students where ideas can be freely expressed and analysed. The Centre by way of its
magazine Lex Populi provides a wonderful opportunity to the students to put forward
their views which further foster the growth of legal scholarship. A deeper analysis of
the law in consonance with the emerging areas and contemporary issues is the prime
focus of the new edition. I am sure that this publication will go a long way in
contributing to the promotion of scholarship in the core areas of law. I urge the student
community to make use of this opportunity to voice their opinions. I wish CCAL the
best success in this endeavour.
Prof, (Dr.) Bimal N. Patel
Director and
Professor of Public International Law
Gujarat National Law University, Gujarat, India
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CCAL's Lex Populi (Issue: 3) 2018
Ever since the beginning of the Constitution of India, voluminous literature has
evolved on the subject. The Centre for Constitutional and Administrative Law has
attempted to conduct activities to engage students and public at large. The magazine
Lex Populi seeks to serve the GNLU community as an intellectual resource that
encourages dialogue and discussion in the areas of Constitutional and Administrative
Law. The first and second editions of the magazine, though a humble beginning,
created a space for itself within the university. This space has grown bigger with this
edition of the magazine wherein the number of articles has increased. This edition
delves into the intricacies of Constitutional and Administrative Law. The magazine not
only exhibits the literary skills of students but also serves as a platform for legal analysis.
The previous editions of this magazine received acceptance and appreciation from the
legal fraternity, which encouraged the Centre to pursue it further by coming up with its
third edition.
As yet again a new year dawns on us; I encourage the student body to engage in debates
and strive to discover newer perspectives. I wish the magazine the utmost success in this
regard.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
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I. COVER STORY
the directive. It must be executed voluntarily without coercion or undue influence. The
directive should clearly state in writing as to the various circumstances when medical
treatment can be withdrawn. It should also specify the name of a guardian who would
execute the directive in a situation where the executor becomes incapable of giving
consent. But the execution of the directive by the guardian must be consistent with
what is stated in the directive. If there is a situation that there is more than one valid
directive, the most recent one would be considered. An advance medical directive
would have to be signed by the executor in the presence of two witnesses and by the
jurisdictional Judicial Magistrate of First Class. The document should then be sent to
the jurisdictional District Court for it to be preserved.
The procedure for giving effect to the advance medical directive has also been provided
by the Supreme Court. If the patient is terminally ill and has a prolonged illness with no
hope of recovery or is in a vegetative state, an advance medical directive can be given
effect. The physician has to first be sure that the patient has no hope for recovery. The
physician is to then consult the guardian and close relatives and let them know of the
options available. If the patient is in a position to communicate, his 'will' would be given
paramount importance.
The physician is then required to form a Medical Board consisting of the Head of the
treating Department and at least three experts from the fields of general medicine,
cardiology, neurology, nephrology, psychiatry or oncology with experience in critical
care and with overall standing in the medical profession of at least twenty years. The
Medical Board of the hospital is to then give a preliminary opinion whether the
directive can be given effect. If the medical board gives the answer in affirmative then
the physician is required to inform the jurisdictional collector who would form another
Medical Board. The permission from such board is essential. Thus, if the permission is
given by the medical board, the directive can be given effect. There could also be a
situation where the medical board refuses to grant permission. The close relatives or
guardians, in such a case, can file a writ under Article 226 and the High Court is then the
competent authority to decide whether the directive can be given effect or not.
This is the current law relating to advance medical directive. It is only time which will
help us ascertain whether the current law laid down by the Supreme Court is adequate
or not.
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1. Shakti Vahini v. Union of India2: Right to choose Life Partner is a fundamental Right
Chief Justice Dipak Mishra, Justice AM Khanwilkar and Justice DY Chandrachud
gave a decision on March 27, 2018, in which it was held that Right to choose Life
Partner is a Fundamental Right. The judgment deals with the concept of 'honour
killing' which emerges from the deeply entrenched belief in caste system. Honour
Killing means homicide of family members which have been carried out in a belief
that the deceased has bought dishonor to the family. It is perceived that the family
member has violated the so-
existing 'principles of
community'. These principles
of community do not
recognize the individual's
liberty to choose life partner.
The petitioner, in the present
case, is an organization who
has conducted research study on honour killing in various States of India. It was
prayed by the said petitioner that the Court should issue mandamus to state
governments to launch prosecution of offenders in such cases as this activity results
in the violation of human rights and fundamental rights of a person.
In this case, the court discouraged the functioning of the Khap Panchayats because
they, in the opinion of the bench, are extra-constitutional bodies, engaged in
feudalistic activities and commit crimes under Indian Penal Code. The informal
institutions for delivery of justice are not acceptable under the eyes of law. Since
"Rule of Law" accepts the determination of rights and violations only by formal
institutions. Hence, according to the court, the Khap Panchayat cannot create a dent
in the exercise of said right. The court also remarked that the "Sapinda" and
"Sagotra" marriages have no sanction of law and thus they should be stopped in
entirety. The court in this present case has laid down various preventive measures
along with punitive and remedial actions which are to be taken into consideration.
It is now well accepted, after this decision of the court that the consent of clan or
2
AIR 2018 SC 1601
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family or community is immaterial to enter into wedlock. The consent of couple will
piously get primacy. The court held that "The choice of an individual is inextricable
part of dignity which cannot be interfered in the fructification of said choice. When
two adults marry out their volition, they choose their path; they consummate their
relationship; they feel that it is their goal and they have the right to do so. Such
infringement and obstruction is, unequivocally, constitutional violation. Extra
constitutional perceptions of the community have to be melted into oblivion paving
for smooth path of liberty."
2. State of Karnataka v. State of Tamil Nadu3: Karnataka directed to release 177.25
TMC of water to Tamil Nadu
The Supreme Court on February 16, 2018 resolved the 120 year old Cauvery Dispute
by upholding the 2007 Cauvery Tribunal Award with minor tweaks. The court in this
judgement increased Karnataka's water share from the river by 14.75 thousand
million cubic feet considering the demand of high drinking potable water in the city
of Bengaluru. The water shares of Kerala and Puducherry were left untouched in
this case. This arrangement between the states is to prevail for 15 years, as held by the
court. As consequence of the aforesaid allocation, the Bench said the state of
Karnataka would now be required to make available at the inter-state border with
Tamil Nadu, i.e., at Billigundulu, 177.25 TMC of water for the basin.
In this landmark opinion, the court considered rivers to be the national assets and
thus no state can claim to have possession over them. A bench led by Chief Justice of
India had held that rivers must be shared on equitable basis among states. The court
observed that, "This principle of equitable apportionment as is now intrinsically
embedded generally in pursuit for apportionment of water of an international
drainage basin straddling over two or more states predicates that every riparian state
is entitled to a fair share of the water according to its need, imbued with the
philosophy that a river has been provided by nature for the common benefit of the
community as a whole through whose territory it flows even though those territories
may be divided by frontiers as postulated by law".
The court also directed the Centre to set up the Cauvery Management Board as
suggested by the Tribunal in six weeks to implement the court's decision. The court
also upheld the validity of two agreements namely, the 1892 and 1924 agreements
entered between the composite Madras Presidency and the princely state of Mysore
3
(2018) 4 SCC 1
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as binding since they neither share any political arrangement nor touched any facet
of sovereignty of India. The court observed that the agreements cover the areas of
larger public interest, which do not have any political element, and in this
background, the agreements are neither inoperative nor completely extinct.
3. Shafin Jahan v. Asokan KM4 – Kerala High Court was wrong in annulling the
marriage between Hadiya and Shafin Jahan
This judgement is popularly known as the "Love Jihad Case". In this case, the
Supreme Court has set aside the Kerala High Court judgement annulling the
marriage between Hadiya and Shafin Jahan. This decision was passed in lieu of the
statement made by Hadiya during her personal appearance before the court. The
High Court had annulled the marriage under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India, which according to the Supreme Court was wrong.
In a personal statement made by Hadiya, she had admitted her marriage with
appellant no 1. The factual score reveals that Hadiya was converted to Islam and she
subsequently married a Muslim man named Shafin Jahan. The Kerala high Court
observed this marriage as "sham" and thus annulled it. The High Court directed her
safe return to the protective custody of her Hindu parents. The High Court also
made some controversial observations like: "a girl aged 24 years is weak and
vulnerable, capable of being exploited in many ways" and "her marriage being the
most important decision in her life, can also be taken only with the active
involvement of her parents."
Against this decision of Kerala High Court, Hadiya's husband filed Special Leave
Petition before the Supreme Court. According to him, the marriage was annulled
without any legal basis and that "the impugned order is an insult to the independence
of women of India as it completely takes away their right to think for themselves and
brands them as persons who are weak and unable to think and make decisions for
them. That the same is against their fundamental rights and should be struck down".
The Supreme Court noted that the right to privacy of an individual should be
preserved which includes people's freedom to eat and dress the way they want and to
believe in any ideology or religion, as long as it doesn't harm others. The Supreme
Court said that the state and courts cannot and should not interfere in these matters.
It is not anyone's business what somebody else wears, consumes, believes in or who
they marry. The apex court observed that the right to marry a person of one's choice
4
AIR 2018 SC 1933
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held that the fundamental right to a meaningful existence includes a person's choice
to die without suffering. The five judges' bench unanimously agreed that, "A
dignified death should follow a meaningful existence".
5. Bar Council of India v. AK Balaji6: Foreign Law Firms are not allowed to practice in
India
The Supreme Court through this ruling settled a long standing argument on whether
foreign firms or attorneys should be allowed to enter the domestic legal market or
not. Various people have been opposing the entry of foreign law firms in India as
Indian advocates are not allowed to practice in the U.K., the U.S., Australia and other
nations, except on fulfilling onerous restrictions like qualifying tests, experience or
work permit.
Through this decision, the court has held that foreign lawyers cannot carry out any
litigation or non-litigation work in India on a permanent basis. The apex court,
through this judgment, has upheld the earlier decisions given by the Bombay and
Madras High Court on the same matter. However, the court has allowed foreign law
firms to give legal advice to their clients on foreign laws. It has been enumerated in
the judgment that the Bar Council of India has regulatory control over overseas legal
professionals even if they are in the domestic country for temporary assignments. A
bench comprising of Justices Adarsh Kumar Goel and RF Nariman has observed
that "Foreign lawyers or law firms can take up tasks here only on a purely temporary
or casual basis. In such cases too, they will be governed by the BCI's code of conduct
for lawyers."
It was clarified that legal practice would include litigation and non-litigation work,
such as giving opinion, drafting instruments, participation in conferences involving
legal discussions as well. Only advocates enrolled with the BCI are entitled to
practice law in India. All other persons can appear with permission of the court,
authority of person before whom proceedings are pending. On a question as to how
to determine whether the practice is casual or frequent, the court answered that it is
to be decided on facts of each and every case as the conclusion will vary from
situation to situation. The BCI or the Centre will be at liberty to make appropriate
rules in this regard. The Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) companies operating
in India can run their business because they do not fall within the ambit of the
Advocates Act. These companies provides a wide range of services to customers like
6
2018 SCC Online SC 214
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word processing, secretarial support, transcription and proof reading services, travel
desk support services and others. It was also ruled that foreign law firms and lawyers
did not have an "absolute right" to conduct arbitration proceedings and disputes
arising out of contracts relating to international commercial arbitration.
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in April 2018, in a rare instance of a televised trial. Park had colluded with Choi Soon-sil
and accepted bribes in return for policy favours from companies like Samsung and
Lotte. Park Guen-Hye was impeached in 2016 when allegations of the scandal
emerged.
China – The Chinese Communist party removed limits on the number of Presidential
terms a person could hold, paving the way for Xi Jinping to be re-elected. In March
2017, Mr. Jingping was unanimously re-elected as the President.
Iran – Parliament passed an amendment to their drug laws, restricting the imposition
of the death penalty to fewer offences. In drug trafficking cases, the quantity of
possession of drugs was increased, to attract the death sentence. However, repeat
offenders who had previously been meted out 15 years to life in prison or the death
sentence, and individuals who are armed and intend to use those arms against law
enforcement officials would not be exempt from the more lenient provisions.
Individuals who head drug cartels, or use children as trafficking drugs will also not be
eligible for lighter sentences. The amendments must be approved by the Guardian
Council, an Islamic juristic body, to ascertain whether they are in consonance with
Sharia law, before it is approved.
Malaysia – Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak dissolved Parliament in April two
months before his term was actually to expire, accelerating the general elections. The
dissolution comes on the heels of a term encumbered by a multi-billion dollar state
fund scandal and pressure to win the next election amidst falling popularity with the
electorate.
South Korea – The Law of Political Parties has been criticised for being vague, and for
giving the power of regulating political parties to the Ministry of Interior in violation of
international standards which require it to be done by a body that is independent of the
executive.
Uzbekistan – The Senate of Oliy Majilis of Uzbekistan passed "On Constitutional
Court of the Republic of Uzbekistan". The comprehensive constitutional law defines
the powers of the Constitutional Court, widens its mandate, brings clarity to the
qualifications of judges and incorporates principles for the functioning of the Court.
Europe
United Kingdom – In a June 2016 referendum, the UK decided to leave the European
Union. On 29 March 2017, British Prime Minister Teresa May triggered article 50 of the
Lisbon Agreement which has state stipulations for exiting the EU. This exit, popularly
dubbed Brexit will take effect by 29 March 2019. Thereafter, a transition period will
comm. ence and will continue till 31 December 2009, when businesses and individuals
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will be given the chance to adapt to the legal and regulatory changes of Brexit. In June,
May called for snap elections – the result of which left her party seriously lower in
strength in Parliament. A Brexit divorce deal was reached in December 2017.
Spain – In October 2017, Catalonia called a referendum for independence from Spain.
Though the Spanish constitutional court declared it illegal, the majority of voter
turnout voted for secession, and shortly after, the majority in the Catalan party declared
independence. Madrid invoked emergency powers and dismissed the Parliament and
called for elections, but separatists won a majority. Deposed Catalan President Charles
Puigdemont remains in exile, facing the possibility of arrest due to sedition charges, if
he returns to Spain.
Africa
Mauritania – In August 2017, the people of Mauritania went to polls on a range of
constitutional changes. Despite voter turn-out being low, the majority voted in
constitutional changes that had been sought by the President Mohamed Ould Abdel
Aziz. The referendum which was called after the senate refused to comply with
President Aziz's proposals for constitutional changes found support for the abolition
of the senate – the Upper House of Mauritania's Parliament, modifications to the
national flag and the national anthem, and changes in the composition of the
constitutional courts.
America
Paraguay – Paraguay faced a constitutional crisis in March 2017 when the Senate
passed a Bill to allow Presidents to stand for more than one term. The Constitution
which was passed in 1992 had prohibited multiple terms, coming on the heels of a 35-
year dictatorship. However, the crisis was averted when President Horacio Cartes
announced he would not be standing for re-election after he was inspired by Pope
Francis' urging for peace and dialogue. The announcement was also to assuage
concerns of foreign investors that Cartes' re-election could spark unrest in the country
and be detrimental to business.
North America – As part of the 2015 nuclear agreement, which requires Presidential
waiver every 4 months, Donald Trump waived sanctions against Iran in January 2018.
This followed a decertification in October 2017. However, Trump threatened
America's exit from the deal if other allies refused to agree to a slew of proposed
changes. He has promised Congressional amendments to domestic legislation that
governs US participation in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
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V. MIND SPEAK
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to "the person's for the time being engaged in carrying on the administration"24 but
referred to the government as the visible symbol of the State25. The seditious
intention which is essential26 to prosecution for seditious libel must be founded is an
intention to incite violence or to create public disturbance27 or to excite hatred against
the Government28.
Albeit the contours of the offence, as aforementioned, have been precisely
demarcated, the governments, by disregarding the same, have been exploiting the
open-endedness of the provision by cracking down on dissenters and critics by
charging them of Sedition; raising concerns with regard to the provision's
constitutionality in terms that it transgresses the citizens' right to free speech and
expression. The Preamble and Article 19(1) (a) to the Constitution of India
guarantees every citizen with liberty of speech and expression which includes the
right to propagate one's views through any communication media29. But this mother
of all liberties30 is not unchecked and is qualified by Article 19(2) which seeks not to
affect any law which imposed reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right to
freedom in the interests of the public order.
'Public order' is the even tempo of the life of the community31. It is an expression
which signifies a state of public safety32 and tranquillity33 which prevails amongst the
members of a political society as a result of the internal regulations enforced by the
government which they have established. Anything which affects public tranquillity
also affects public order and may assume such grave proportions as to threaten the
security of the State34.
It is well recognized in all legal systems that the right to freedom of speech and
expression means that any person may say what he pleases so long as he doesn't
infringe the sedition law35. The purpose of the crime of sedition was to prevent the
government established by law from being subverted because the continued
existence of the government established by law is an essential condition of the
stability of the State36. Disapprobation37 and mere allegations against government are
not sedition38. It is only when discussion or advocacy reaches the level of
24
Queen Empress v. Bal Gangadhar Tilak and Mahadev Bal, Supra note 9.
25
Supra note 5.
26
Satyendra Nath Majumdar v. The King Emperor, AIR 1931 Cal 337 (2).
27
Boucher v. R, 1951 SCR Canada 265
28
Sachin Das v. Emperor, AIR 1936 Cal 524.
29
A.K. Gopalan v. The State of Madras, 1950 AIR 27.
30
Dheerendra Patanjali, Freedom of Speech and Expression India v America: A Study,
http://www.indialawjournal.org/archives/volume3/issue_4/article_by_dheerajendra.html
31
Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, [1970] 3 S.C.R. 288.
32
The Superintendent, Central Prison, Fatehgarh v. Ram Manohar Lohia, [1960] 2 S.C.R. 821
33
Brij Bhushan and Anr. v. The State of Delhi, Supra note 14.
34
Romesh Thappar v. The State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124.
35
Halsbury's Laws of England, LexisNexis Butterworths, 2nd Edn 1932, Vol. II, p. 39.
36
Supra note 5.
37
Supra note 9.
38
Explanation 2, § 124A, Indian Penal Code, 1860. 17
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incitement that Article 19(2) kicks in39. It is at this stage that a law may be made
curtailing the speech or expression that leads inexorably to or tends to cause public
disorder40 or tends to cause or tends to affect the sovereignty & integrity of India, the
security of the state etc.41
It is can be unequivocally conceived that expressions, however fuming and
provocative, will not constitute sedition unless they incite violence against
government established by law and cause public disorder42. Hence the provision does
not exceed the bound of reasonable restrictions on the right of freedom of speech
and expression and is clearly, therefore, saved from the vice of unconstitutionality43.
Conclusion
The first and most important fundamental duty of every government is the
preservation of order, since order is the condition precedent to all civilization and
the advance of human happiness. This duty has no doubt been sometimes
performed in such a way as to make the remedy worse than the disease; but it does not
cease to be a matter of obligation because some on whom the duty rests have
performed it ill44. Hence, misuse doesn't warrant abrogation of a provision which is
constitutionally valid. The provision should be retained while the following measures
could be taken to minimize its misuse:
1. The provision ails of obfuscating vocabulary which makes it vulnerable to
misuse. The diction should be revised to make it unambiguous.
2. By prescribing a disproportionate optimum punishment of life
imprisonment even for the words spoken, it designs a nefarious power
structure that is inherently illiberal and dangerously oppressive45. Hence, the
punishment of life imprisonment should be done away with and substituted
by alternative apropos liability.
39
A good example of the difference between advocacy and incitement is Mark Antony's speech in Shakespeare's immortal classic Julius Caesar.
40
Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. & Ors. v.Union of India, [1962] 3 S.C.R. 842,
41
Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015 )5SCC 1, AIR 2015 SC 1523.
42
Niharendu Dutt Majumdar v. The King Emperor, (1868) 11 Cox. C.C. 44.
43
Supra note 5.
44
Supra note 36.
45
Kaleeswaram Raj, A case against the sedition law, Frontline Magazine, Print Edn. March 18, 2016.
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waiting period (Iddat) and is neither recognized by the Constitution nor an integral
part of even personal laws of Muslims. Further, the distinction is arbitrary because a
man can give unilateral divorce without any reasonable cause. In these practices,
women lack the right to justifiable reason and in order to get divorce, have to give up
their 'dower' amount. Women are also subjected to severe mental agony in most
cases. Thus, it was argued that the right of a woman to human dignity, social esteem
and self-worth were vital facets and abrogation of the same provides a good ground
to invalidate 'Triple Talaq' on the grounds of morality.
Additionally, if after pronouncing a 'Talaq-ul-Bidat', a husband wants to reunite with
his divorced wife, the wife has to practice 'halala',47 which involves remarrying
another man, consummating the second marriage, getting divorced and observing
the 'iddat' period before marrying the first husband again. This is extremely
derogatory to the dignity of a woman and against the fundamental duty under
Article 51-A(e) of the Constitution which mandates a duty on every citizen of India
to renounce practices derogatory to the dignity of women.
Although the present bench did not exclusively decide the practice of 'halala', it was
said that the determination of the present controversy of 'Triple Talaq', may
however, coincidentally render an answer even to this issue. The court said that
unconstitutional practices do not
constitute custom and the same
were void with respect to Article 13
of Indian Constitution. It was
pointed out by the bench, that
gender equality and dignity of
women, were non-negotiable. It is
also worthwhile to note that the
constitutional bench stated that in
terms of Article 141, the case of Shamim Ara v. State of U.P48 is the law that is
applicable in India and also the law of the land. In that case, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court held that 'Triple Talaq' shall not be considered as valid unless it is proved that it
was pronounced for a reasonable cause and there have been attempts of
reconciliation and arbitration as dictated by the Islamic scriptures.
This bench, in addition to the discussions of plethora of judgments on the issue of
'Triple Talaq', also took cognizance of traditional Islamic law and was convinced
47
Tahir Mahmood & Saif Mahmood,
Muslim Law In India And Abroad, 22 (2012). at 182
20
48
Shamim Ara v. State of U.P., AIR 2002 SC 3551.
CCAL's Lex Populi (Issue: 3) 2018
from various verses of the Holy Quran that 'Triple Talaq' in one sitting was
considered as only one 'talaq' during the Prophet's time and during the early years of
the second Caliph Umar49. Furthermore, Islam also abhors the practice of divorce in
such a hasty manner and mandates that the parties must undergo reconciliation and
arbitration before pronouncing divorce.
Justice Joseph, supporting Justice Nariman's judgement, in his separate judgement
said, "What is held to be bad in the Holy Quran cannot be good in Shariat and, in that
sense, what is bad in theology is bad in law as well".
The right given under Article 25(1) and Article 25(2)(a) to the state reserves the right
to regulate any secular activities which may be associated with religious practice and
there is a further right given to the State by sub clause (b) under which the State can
legislate for social welfare and reform even though by doing so, it might interfere
with religious practices. If religious beliefs or practices conflict with matters of social
reform or welfare then such religious beliefs or practices must yield to the higher
requirements of social welfare and reform. This feeling of sacrifice is what
constitutes 'Unity in Diversity'.
49
Sahih Muslim, Hadith No. 1482.
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violence but held Gandhiji guilty of sedition as he observed that he was bound by the
law to do so and he was accordingly sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a
period of six years.
The issue of Sedition was anxiously discussed during the Constituent Assembly
debates. In 1947, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, who went on to become the first Home
Minister of India made an exception for "seditious, obscene, blasphemous,
slanderous, libelous or defamatory" language,53 which was vehemently opposed by
many political parties including the Communist Party of India. Finally an
amendment was moved to drop the word from the Penal Code and not allow it to
infringe the 'Freedom of Speech and Expression'. The word accordingly
disappeared from the Constitution when it was adopted but Section 124A did remain
in operation. The first case which aroused in independent India was related to the
publishing of objectionable content in a magazine named 'Organizer', run by the
RSS. The matter went to the Supreme Court and the apex court accordingly directed
the magazine publishers to clear the 'provocative' content. Sedition laws remained in
the statute book post-independence and were used by both the State and Central
Governments to resist political dissent.
The first major constitutional hurdle to sedition laws came in 1958 when the
constitutional validity of Section 124A was challenged before the Allahabad High
Court. A three judge special bench comprising Justice M Desai, N Gurtu, N Beg, JJ.
allowed the appeal while setting aside the conviction of one Ram Nandan and
accordingly struck down Section 124A of IPC as void.54 This decision was overruled
by the Supreme Court in 1962 in Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar55 wherein it was
held that the Section does not suffer from the vices of unconstitutionality. The case
involved one Kedar Nath a member of the Forward Communist Party in Bihar who
was involved in terming the officers of C.I.D as "dogs", the Indian National
Congress as "Goondas", he went on saying that he believe in revolution, which will
come and in the flames of which the capitalists, zamindars and the Congress leaders
of India, who have made it their profession to loot the country, will be reduced to
ashes and on their ashes will be established a Government of the poor and the
downtrodden people of India. Subsequently, Kedar Nath Singh was convicted by the
Trial Court under Section 124A and Section 505 and was sentenced to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year. In this landmark case the Supreme
Court was confronted with two conflicting view of the Federal Court56 and the Privy
53
Atul Dev, "A History of Infamous Section 124-A".
54
55
Ram Nandan v. State, AIR 1959 All 101. 23
Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955.
56
Niharendu Dutt Majumdar v. The King, (1942) F.C.R. 38.
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Council57, the former asserted that public disorder or the reasonable anticipation or
likelihood of public disorder is the gist of the offence and the latter was of the
opinion that the speech itself, irrespective of whether or not it leads to an incitement,
could be an offence. Considering Article 19A of the Constitution, the bench
observed that, "If the view taken by the Federal Court was accepted then Section
124A would be constitutional but if the view of the Privy Council was accepted it
would suffer from the vices of unconstitutionality, then accordingly the view of
Federal Court was accepted.
57
King-Emperor v. Sadashiv Narayan Bhalerao,
I.L.R. (1947) IndAp 89. 24
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However, sliced any way, the truth is that the judiciary has its institutional failings —
the Karnan saga may simply be a course reading case in demonstrating to us how
expanding these imperfections are. The decision in the impugned case has various
conceptions. The Supreme Court's request is indistinct and not genuinely steady
with the Constitution. A judge of the HC or the SC must be evacuated by a dominant
part vote in the Parliament, according to 124(4). This is the place the May 9 order
arrange turns out to be marginally precarious — while it arranges that Karnan be
expelled from all his legal obligations, it doesn't clear up whether he is evacuated as a
judge. Without a doubt, taking ceaselessly Karnan's forces and works and reproving
him to jail adds to expelling him as judge for all down to earth purposes — which is a
choice the Parliament, and not the judiciary, must take.
Also, there seems to be an aimless exercise of suo motu control. Under the
Constitution, the SC and the HCs are given the ability to take cognizance of issues
regardless of the possibility that an instance of question is not documented before
them (i.e., "suo motu powers"). This power is conceded on the assumption that it will
be utilized sensibly, sparingly and with attentiveness. The suo motu control does not,
obviously, enable the courts to outperform the lead of law.
Nevertheless, the Indian judiciary through its landmark pronouncement has tried to
maintain a balance between freedom of speech and the courts' ascendancy to punish
for its contempt. The Supreme Court's judgement in the case of Vinay Chandra
Mishra60 belabored the position of law regarding contempt and proposed that the
judiciary acts not just as the guardian of law and third pillar but in fact the foremost
pillar of a democratic State.
"The object of the discipline enforced by the Court in case of contempt of court is
not to vindicate the dignity of the court or the person of the judge, but to prevent
undue interference with the administration of justice", noted Justice L. Bowen.61 Be
it civil or criminal the judges do not have any security when it comes to contempt of
court. Section 3 of Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 grants limited protection to judges
against civil and criminal proceedings for any act, thing or word, committed, done or
spoken by him when , or in the course of acting or purporting to act in the discharge
of his official or judicial duty or function. Section 77 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
affords similar protection to judges: Nothing is an offence which is done by a judge
when acting judicially in the exercise of any power which is, or which in good faith he
believes to be, given to him by law. The Constitution of India and the Contempt of
60
AIR 1995 SC 2348
61
Hellmore v. Smith (2) (1886), L. R., 35 C. D., 455. 26
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Courts Act, 1971 empowers the apex court to punish for contempt of court, with no
protection to judges.
The discretion given to judges in determining what contempt is and how to punish it
has led scholars to argue that the contempt power gives too much authorization
power to judges.
The judiciary is the immaculate interpreter of justice in tandem with learned legal
practitioners. "Contempt of court" literally amounts to "legal blasphemy" so any
attempt to denigrate top judicial officers should be nipped in bud at the very outset.
But it does not mean that judges are above law and are free to arrogate legal power to
misuse them whimsically. From the above, it is clear that the contempt of court
jurisdiction is not exercised to protect the dignity of an individual Judge, but to
protect the administration of justice from being maligned and with respect to a
defamatory attack on a Judge is concerned, it would be open to him to proceed
against the libeler in a proper action, if he so chooses. Judiciary is an indispensable
tier in the administration of justice. Judiciary has special role in the society. It
deserves protection against baseless criticisms against itself.
27
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VI. QUIZ
29
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7. The idea of Concurrent list is taken from the Constitution of which of the
following Countries?
i. Ireland
ii. Australia
iii. France
iv. Germany
Answers: 1. (ii); 2. (iii); 3. (ii); 4. (i); 5. (iv); 6. (iii); 7. (ii); 8. (iii); 9. (i); 10. (i)
30
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Faculty Members:
• Dr. Avinash Bhagi, Asst. Prof. of Law
• Dr. Divya Tyagi, Asst. Prof. of Law
• Mr. Shashi Bhushan Sharma, Assistant Prof. (Research)
• Ms. Ritushree Khandelwal, Teaching and Research Associate (Law)
• Ms. Anu Mishra, Teaching and Research Associate (Law)
Student Members:
• Aditya Gor, Batch: 2015-20
• Pragya Jain, Batch: 2016-21
• Samira Mathias, Batch: 2015-20
• Shivdutt Trivedi, Batch: 2014-19
• Torsha Dasgupta, Batch: 2014-19
31
Centre for Constitutional and Administrative Law
Gujarat National Law University
Attalika Avenue, Knowledge Corridor, Koba, Koba (SUB P.O) Gandhinagar - 382426, Gujarat, INDIA
Website: www.gnlu.ac.in E-mail: [email protected] / [email protected]
Phone No. : +91-79-23276611/23276612