CCG REPORT

Strengthening the Weakest Links

Strategies for Improving the Enforcement of Environmental
Laws Globally

Anita Sundari Akella

James B. Cannon
 About the Center for
Conservation and Government

The mission of the Center for Conservation and Government at Conservation

International is to catalyze effective public sector responses to the crisis of biodiversity
loss by engaging governments and related public institutions in seeking conservation
solutions.

About Conservation International

CI believes that the Earth’s natural heritage must be maintained if future generations
are to thrive spiritually, culturally, and economically. Our mission is to conserve
the Earth’s living heritage, our global biodiversity, and to demonstrate that human
societies are able to live harmoniously with nature.

COVER PHOTOS © CI, LEFT TO RIGHT: HAROLDO CASTRO,

© 2004 CONSERVATION INTERNATIONAL PATRICK JOHNSTON, JOHN MARTIN
 Table of Contents
Foreword 2
Section I Introduction 3
Section II Enforcement in Context 5
Section III Enforcement Economics: 8
Theoretical Underpinnings
Section IV Overview of Country Case Study Results 11
Case Study 1: Bahia, Brazil—The Atlantic Forest
Case Study 2: Chiapas, Mexico—The Selva Maya
Case Study 3: Indonesia—Papua Province
Case Study 4: Palawan, Philippines—The Calamianes Islands

Section V Synthesis of Results and Global Lessons Learned 19

Section VI Investment Priorities for Strengthening 27
Enforcement Performance
Section VII Conclusion 30
Bibliography 32
Endnotes 33
Glossary of Abbreviations 34
 Foreword
Effective conservation defies simplistic solutions. Despite decades of effort and
significant financial investment from governments, nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), and others, the illegal exploitation of natural resources remains a driving
cause of biodiversity loss.
Today, conservation organizations rightly recognize that a multifaceted response—one
that engages local communities, supports alternative livelihoods, promotes sustain-
able resource management, and educates consumers—is necessary. A core problem,
however, continues to be weak enforcement of laws that were designed to safeguard
wildlife and protected areas.
As valuable supplies of timber, fish, and other natural resources diminish, the pressure
increases on those resources that remain. Frequently, creating protected areas and hir-
ing people to guard them are perceived as adequate enforcement responses. Although
those steps are essential, the true challenge is far greater.
Enforcement systems are holistic in nature and must be conceived of and dealt with
accordingly. Strong enforcement requires not only good detection but also effective
investigation, prosecution, conviction, and application of penalties. For this reason,
investments that strengthen only one part of this “chain” will not succeed as long as
other pronounced weaknesses exist. Because enforcement systems in many countries
are often deficient in all those areas, current systems do not effectively deter environ-
mental crime.
This report from Conservation International examines and draws lessons from
intensive enforcement research in four biodiversity-rich countries. Using an innovative
analytical framework, it quantifies the risks and rewards of illegal activity, underscor-
ing how weak enforcement actually is. The analysis also synthesizes results from
those countries to identify a set of common enforcement weaknesses. It concludes by
recommending three priority areas for global investment to strengthen enforcement.
Conservation International hopes that this report helps governments, donors, NGOs,
and others better conceptualize the enforcement challenge. We believe that reframing
the challenge is vital to ensuring that investments in strengthening enforcement are
made in a strategic and targeted way. This approach will help ensure that resources
deployed to guarantee the survival of natural landscapes and the species that inhabit
them are used to the best possible effect.
We look forward to your comments and to further discussion on this important topic.

Nicholas P. Lapham
Vice President and Director
Center for Conservation and Government
Conservation International

2
 Introduction SECTION I

Poor enforcement in the environmental realm affects a diverse range of victims.

Entire societies are affected when countries lose important sources of revenue
In each country, our
that would have accrued from legitimate commerce in natural resources, or when
overall governance is undermined by lawlessness in the natural resources sector. The
objective was to
livelihoods of traditional resource users are destroyed by illegal loggers and fishers.
Those lawbreakers exploit forests and oceans with no regard for future productivity.
determine why enforce-
Downstream communities are devastated by flash floods from debris coming out of
illegally logged forests that protect watersheds, with the poor often being affected
ment was not working,
disproportionately. and then to contribute to
Biodiversity conservation efforts are also severely compromised by poor enforcement.
In the absence of enforcement, both traditional and more innovative solutions for development of cost-
countering biodiversity loss may not be successful. Creation of protected areas,
measures to protect endangered species, tradable development rights, and ecosystem effective investment
services markets alike may fail if people cannot be held to the agreements they make.
Despite the efforts of conservationists over time, the quality and effectiveness of strategies for strength-
enforcement still fall far short of where they need to be.
Although weak enforcement is generally acknowledged as a widespread and significant
ening enforcement
problem, the full complexity of the underlying causes of this weakness is often not
understood. Consequently, the most commonly applied solutions are overly simplistic.
performance.
If systematic analysis is not done, then raising fines, investing in more cars, or hiring
more detection agents may seem appropriate strategies for improving enforcement
performance. However, those investments may not be the most effective or cost-
effective strategies. Identical investments in another aspect of enforcement—for
instance, offering specialized training to prosecutors who argue environmental cases
in court—might yield a stronger deterrent against environmental crime. Even where
investments in stronger detection are needed—as is often the case—such investments
may underperform unless other weaknesses in the enforcement system are addressed at
the same time.
Identifying weaknesses in an enforcement regime and devising investments that
yield the best returns in enforcement performance can be challenging. Enforcement
economics1 provides a simple, yet elegant, theoretical framework for analyzing each
component of the “enforcement chain” so that weaknesses can be pinpointed and
addressed. This holistic approach is rooted in the understanding that enforcement
does not consist of detection alone. Rather, enforcement is a “chain” that also includes
the subsequent steps of arrest, prosecution, and conviction. For an enforcement system
to effectively deter environmental crime, each of those steps must happen efficiently.
The system is only as strong as the weakest link in this chain.
In 2000, with support from the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID), we at Conservational International (CI) began analyzing the quality of
enforcement in four priority biodiversity-rich countries. In each country, our objec-
tive was to determine why enforcement was not working, and then to contribute to
development of cost-effective investment strategies for strengthening enforcement

3
performance. Our adaptation of an enforcement economics While this approach has many advantages and makes a useful
methodology that had been developed for the fisheries context 2 contribution, it also suffers the drawback that it emphasizes
proved a useful analytical tool for this work. the technical reasons for weak enforcement. However, this is
valuable since enforcement agencies are generally dealing with
In each country, our work resulted in developing strategic symptoms, and rarely analyze or concern themselves with
action plans that would improve enforcement performance and addressing the root causes for illegal activities. This approach
were tailored to suit each site. Those plans were designed in may also downplay the importance of factors such as unfair
collaboration with enforcement agency officials, civil society laws, lack of alternative legal incomes, corruption, and lack of
representatives, and other key stakeholders. political will. However, carrying out parallel investigations of
For multiple reasons, the enforcement economics analyses were and responses to the other issues can neutralize that drawback.
carried out in close dialogue with enforcement agencies in The common understanding and trust built up by using this
each site. First, this collaboration allowed us improved access approach to strengthen enforcement also provides a sound basis
to sensitive enforcement data. Second, by incorporating the for more difficult and delicate political and governance discus-
agencies into our efforts, we hoped to build awareness of key sions regarding corruption and political will.
enforcement problems in the agencies, and to increase their In this study, synthesizing the problems identified in each site
understanding of how the system worked as a whole. Third, will allow us to develop a set of overall lessons learned. The
working with multiple agencies allowed us to facilitate and synthesis will reveal a number of enforcement challenges that
encourage interagency dialogue. Fourth, the relationships with were common across countries. The lessons learned will point
senior enforcement agency officials provided researchers with to a set of priority investment areas for improving enforcement
additional personal protection as they did their field work. performance. This piece will briefly discuss site-level results,
Finally, through our collaboration, we ensured that the agencies but it will focus primarily on the common themes that emerged
themselves helped lead the process of developing the enforce- from synthesis of the results that have been drawn from the
ment-strengthening action plans, thereby increasing ownership participatory site-level work. We believe that the lessons learned
and the likelihood that the plans would be implemented. can contribute significantly to efforts toward developing a
global agenda of priority actions that will strengthen imple-
Key actors and decisionmakers in enforcement agencies and
mentation of both natural resource legislation and protected
government are most effectively drawn into a discussion about
area boundaries.
improving an enforcement system when the arguments are
presented clearly and rigorously and are complemented by This report will begin by putting the discussion of enforcement
supporting evidence about where and why weaknesses exist. in its proper context. After describing the enforcement econom-
When robust proposals for investments that can increase the ics methodology, we will present an overview of results from
system’s effectiveness are proffered and when the proposals use the four country case studies. We will then identify and discuss
a clear analytical framework, opportunities for collaboration common weaknesses that are prevalent across sites. Finally,
with agencies to design, finance, and implement improvement we will detail a clear set of technical investment priorities for
strategies become evident. enforcement.

4
 Enforcement in Context SECTION II

For the purposes of this paper, “enforcement” is defined as the system comprising
detection, apprehension, prosecution, and conviction of lawbreakers. Strengthening
Enforcement
enforcement is a means to an end, not an end in itself. The end goal of improving
enforcement is to eliminate illegal activities or to reduce them to tolerable levels—in
strengthening is only one
other words, to improve compliance. Enforcement contributes to that goal by directly
suppressing criminal activity and by creating a deterrent effect.
of a number of ways of
Enforcement strengthening is only one of a number of ways of contributing to the contributing to the end
end goal of improving compliance. Other ways include preventative measures such
as developing alternative legal sources of income, improving public awareness and goal of improving
support for the laws, reducing the opportunity to break the law, lowering the demand
for illegal products, reducing the profits of illegal activities relative to legal ones, and compliance.
reforming the law to legalize hitherto illegal activities.

Ways to Improve Compliance

Considerable debate takes place over the best ways to improve compliance with
particular natural resource and environmental laws. The answer will vary according
to the type and scale of crime, the market for the product, the identity of the perpetra-
tors, and the reasons for which they act illegally. For instance, traditional hunting of
endangered and newly protected species by indigenous peoples requires a response
different from that for professional wildlife poaching or commercial-scale illegal log-
ging by organized criminal gangs. Co-management approaches may often be the most
just and efficient approach for the former type of illegal activity, but the assistance of
government enforcement agencies is likely required for the latter. Co-management
approaches involve local communities in enforcement activities in a way highly
tailored to local issues. Whether illegal activities are practiced for cultural reasons or
are key to livelihoods, co-management approaches often combine enforcement with
developing alternative activities that are culturally acceptable.
The best way to improve compliance will also vary depending on why enforcement
against a particular crime is inadequate. Some causes, such as inadequate financial or
human resources, or poor training, can be relatively easier to rectify. Others—
particularly those where the solution may lie outside the control of enforcement
agencies—are far harder to rectify. Problematic causes include lack of support for laws
widely viewed as unjust, political uncertainty, lack of political support for stronger
enforcement, and ingrained corruption.
Compliance is usually best improved by implementing a mix of preventative and
enforcement-strengthening measures together. It is generally accepted that stand-alone
efforts to strengthen enforcement are rarely the most effective way forward. However,
this actuality does not mean enforcement strengthening can be ignored. A certain
level of increased enforcement is necessary to improve compliance in most situations
and will be a crucial element, for instance, when combating organized, commercial-
scale illegal activities.

5
Unjust Laws and Unfair Enforcement efforts to ensure that laws are enforced more fairly. Unequal
application of enforcement may simply indicate that the rich
A key concern over strengthening enforcement in isolation can afford better lawyers. In such cases, the main need may be
is the risk of enforcing unjust or counterproductive laws. For for legal assistance for those who are unable to afford lawyers
instance, traditional users may be unfairly criminalized when themselves. However, unequal application of the law may also
government forest policy and laws fail to respect the rights and be a symptom of corruption.
concerns of indigenous peoples or local communities, as has
often occurred during the creation of logging concessions or
protected areas by colonial or central governments. The answer Ways to Reduce Corruption
to unfair or counterproductive laws is legal reform and—de- The different types of corruption—petty or grand, collusive or
pending on the circumstances—compensation for “regulatory noncollusive—pose many challenges to the various approaches
takings” by government. The answer is not weak enforcement. for improving compliance. Enforcement strengthening itself
In general, enforcement-strengthening efforts should not be can help reduce corruption, both directly by detecting it and
applied to disputed laws that are undergoing reform, although indirectly because better enforcement makes corruption more
such thinking has been exploited, for instance, in Papua, by expensive and more difficult. Corruption itself undermines all
illegal loggers, who argue that they are acting in community parts of the enforcement system, and efforts to combat corrup-
interests so they can escape enforcement efforts. tion, therefore, need to be integral to enforcement-strengthen-
Enforcing disputed laws will likely rouse opposition to enforce- ing programs. Enforcement-strengthening efforts should start
ment strengthening, particularly from essentially pro-reform by cleaning up the enforcement and licensing agencies them-
allies. This opposition would be unfortunate, because weak selves. Greater confidence and trust in government agencies
enforcement of other, undisputed laws is often identified as one is necessary as a base for strengthening broader public respect
of the reasons that local and indigenous groups are harmed by for the law and its institutions. Anticorruption efforts include
illegal activities. One way forward is to focus initial enforce- supporting nongovernmental organization (NGO) or civil
ment-strengthening efforts on noncontentious laws that are society watchdogs, as well as various efforts within the enforce-
generally seen as legitimate. Ideally, those laws would be the ment system, such as introducing appropriate checks and
ones governing crimes that have the largest economic, social, balances, ensuring pay and bonus structures to create appropri-
and environmental effect. Reinforcing enforcement to combat ate incentives, revising staffing procedures, and making public
crimes that are having direct negative effects on local popula- the enforcement information needed to evaluate performance.
tions could also help build local confidence in and support for Those efforts must include the judiciary. A clean and effective
law enforcement. Strengthening environmental and natural judiciary that hears cases fairly will encourage well-intentioned
resource laws that protect the rights and livelihoods of the poor enforcement agents and prosecutors so they know there is a
is also a key element of poverty-reduction strategies. point to doing their jobs well. A clean and effective judiciary
can also lead reform efforts within the enforcement system,
In some cases, the laws may not be at issue, but their applica- thereby rooting out and punishing corrupt officials.
tion is viewed as illegitimate by local stakeholders because the
stakeholders are not adequately involved in decisionmaking. In In extreme cases, high levels of corruption can call into
such situations, co-management approaches—for instance, of question whether investing in stronger enforcement is really
natural resources or protected areas—may be necessary to build worthwhile until corruption is brought under some semblance
local support. of control. While it is likely that corruption will reduce the
effectiveness of investments in enforcement strengthening, it is
In other cases, the laws may be generally accepted as appropri- unlikely that the benefits will be nullified completely. In fact,
ate and fair, but enforcement may be applied unequally, with strengthening the rule of law is generally viewed as an essential
the rich and powerful—or the enforcement agency staff mem- part of anticorruption efforts. As a special case, the rigorous
bers themselves—avoiding justice. Again, this circumstance is analyses of enforcement systems of the type described here
not a reason for weak enforcement but rather for increased promote transparency and understanding and are generally
considered a useful component of efforts to reduce corruption.
A clean and effective judiciary that Another issue generally linked to corruption is military involve-
ment in illegal activities. The commonly accepted long-term
hears cases fairly will encourage well- answer is to “get the soldiers back in the barracks” and create
a “modern” army, meaning one that is fully funded by central
intentioned enforcement agents government, is under its full control, and fulfills only regular
military functions. In the short term, the answer may be to seek
and prosecutors.... agreement that some questionable parts of the military’s busi-
6
ness operations be legalized. However, the agreement would compliance directly and can ease the enforcement challenge.
be conditional on not engaging in any illegal activities such as Balanced compliance-improvement efforts that include such
resource extraction in particular areas, particularly protected measures and enforcement strengthening are likely to be more
areas and indigenous lands. While some parts of the military cost-effective than efforts that overemphasize one measure at
may often be engaged in illegal activities, either directly or the expense of investments in the others.
through corrupt practices, the military in general may need to
be engaged directly in finding solutions. In many countries, for Efforts that recognize and address the legitimate concerns of
instance, the cooperation of the military is required to combat various stakeholders are also likely to be most successful in
illegal logging carried out on a large scale by organized crime, building and maintaining political will for action. Opposi-
particularly when elements in the military are involved in the tion from elites defending their entrenched interests is often
illegal logging. blamed for lack of political will for enforcement strengthening.
However, unless laws are seen to be fair and to be applied fairly,
then opposition from those supporting community rights and
Ways to Raise Public Awareness grassroots reform may undermine the political will for stronger
In other cases, both the laws and their implementation may be enforcement. Building and maintaining the political will for
fair, but public understanding and support for the laws may be improving compliance will generally require building and
low. Under those circumstances, awareness raising and educa- maintaining a broad pro-reform alliance.
tion efforts are a priority. In other cases, a law may be fair in
For many good reasons, therefore, enforcement-strengthening
theory, but the absence of other livelihood options may make
efforts should not proceed as stand-alone activities. Rather,
its application extremely punishing in practice. The answer is
their success is augmented if they are carried out together with a
not weak enforcement, but additional assistance and support to
package of activities that fall into two general classes: (1) preven-
develop alternative income opportunities, along with possible
tative activities that directly improve compliance while reducing
legal reform.
enforcement challenge and (2) activities designed to ensure that
Legal and procedural reform, compensation, legal aid, public the laws and their enforcement are workable and fair. The most
outreach, innovative co-management, anticorruption efforts, effective package of activities will vary from place to place and
and support for alternative legal livelihoods can improve should be developed by local experts and stakeholders.

7
 Enforcement Economics:
SECTION III Theoretical Underpinnings
[A]n enforcement system Description of the Quantitative Model
can be considered Economists focusing on the question of enforcement have suggested that the economic
deterrent “value” of an enforcement regime can be determined as follows:
“effective” only if it Enforcement Disincentive = Pd × Pa|d × Pp|a × Pc|p × Fine × e−rt

generates an enforce- Where:

P = probability
ment disincentive that is d = detection

larger than the financial a|d = arrest given detection

p|a = prosecution given arrest
incentives motivating the c|p = conviction given prosecution
illegal behavior. e = a mathematical constant, the exponential function of 1
r = interest rate
t = time from detection to fine
In this model,3 the frequency and intensity of illegal behavior are assumed to be
proportional to the net profits from illegal behavior. If the gross profits of illegal
behavior are greater than the expected value of the enforcement disincentive—that
is, if violators of environmental laws believe that their profit will be greater than what
they will have to pay for breaking the law—then the net profits of illegal activity are
positive, and violators will choose to commit the crime. By the same token, if the
expected value of the enforcement disincentive is high enough to make the net profits
of illegal activity negative, they will decide not to commit the crime.
As shown in the equation above, the value of the disincentive to commit an envi-
ronmental crime is equivalent to the probabilities of each step in the legal process
happening, multiplied by the amount of the fine, and discounted for the time between
detection and paying the fine. According to this logic, an enforcement system can be
considered “effective” only if it generates an enforcement disincentive (ED) that is
larger than the financial incentives (profit) motivating the illegal behavior. For this
analysis, “effectiveness” will be defined as such.
The assumptions underpinning this economic framework are closest to reality in the
case of commercial illegal activities that are being run on a rational profit-making
basis. The underlying assumptions are less well suited to illegal activities that occur as
part of subsistence livelihoods or that are driven by cultural objectives. Nonetheless,
the model structure is still a useful framework for analyzing the performance of
enforcement of noncommercial crimes.
This model offers four particularly interesting insights into enforcement systems:
1. If the probability—or even the perceived probability—of any one of the
elements in the enforcement chain is zero, then the value of the entire chain is

8
 reduced to zero. The enforcement regime presents no
disincentive to breaking environmental laws. [E]nforcement systems are holistic
2. By this logic, enforcement systems are holistic in nature
and must be conceived of and dealt with as such. The
in nature and must be conceived of
disincentive value generated by an enforcement regime
relies not only on how well the agencies responsible for
and dealt with as such.
each element of the enforcement chain do their indi- In many instances, getting the data necessary to run the
vidual piece but also on how well those agencies work quantitative model may be difficult. Enforcement agencies
together as a system. The system is only as strong as its may prohibit access to official enforcement records because
weakest link. those records are seen as sensitive, potentially embarrassing,
or even damaging to the agencies. Or official enforcement
3. An element-by-element examination of the enforce-
records may be so poorly maintained that collecting accurate
ment system will help pinpoint exactly where in the
data that can be used to calculate observed probabilities is
process—and within which agencies—weaknesses are
virtually impossible. The difficulty of designing surveys and
being generated.
questionnaires that accurately capture information for calcula-
4. The time element is an important one, because discount- tion of perceived probabilities makes that alternative equally
ing4 for each year between detection and payment of challenging.
the fine will significantly reduce (a) the value of the fine
Nonetheless, even where the collection of quantitative data is
to the violator, (b) the overall value of the disincentive
not possible, the enforcement economics model can provide an
provided by the enforcement regime, and (c) the disin-
excellent analytical framework. The underlying premise of the
centive to commit an environmental crime.
model—that the overall success or failure of the enforcement
Determining the disincentive created by an enforcement system relies on the effective execution of each step in the
regime, therefore, requires calculation of the probabilities of enforcement chain—can guide a process of gathering expert
detection, arrest, prosecution, and conviction. Either observed opinion and anecdotal evidence for a qualitative analysis. A
probabilities or perceived probabilities can be used in this methodical examination of the performance of each step in the
determination—using the former gives an actual value to the system—using information from key informants such as field
enforcement disincentive, while using the latter tells us what agents, prosecutors, and other experts—will not yield a numeric
the expected value of the enforcement disincentive is to the calculation of the enforcement disincentive but will provide
violator. Observed probabilities can be determined by collect- precise insights into how effective an enforcement regime is in
ing data from official records on incidence of detection and so deterring environmental crime.
forth. Perceived probabilities are determined through the use of
socioeconomic surveys or questionnaires. Determinants of the Quality of Enforcement
Perceived probabilities may be a better indication of disincen- Although the quantitative enforcement economics model
tive value than observed probabilities, because violators of the identifies which probabilities in the enforcement chain are low,
law act on their perception of how effective an enforcement it does not answer the question of why probabilities are low.
system is. In other words, the deterrent effect of an enforcement The determinants of the quality of enforcement are factors
system will vary depending on how its effectiveness is com- that influence how efficiently enforcement activities are carried
municated to violators and to the public at large. out and, therefore, affect the probabilities of detection, arrest,
prosecution, conviction, and penalty. For instance, the prob-
As experience with and information about the enforcement
ability of detection is determined not only by obvious factors
system develops, transparency increases. Thus, observed and
such as numbers of park guards or availability of equipment but
perceived values might be expected to become closely correlated
also by less-obvious factors such as pay and reward structures to
or to converge. Having both pieces of information is ideal,
environmental protection agents.
because it facilitates analysis of both where the weaknesses in
the enforcement chain lie and how people’s perceptions of the Each successive link in the enforcement chain can be analyzed
enforcement regime will affect their behavior. Furthermore, in similarly to identify factors that are contributing to poor
instances in which a lack of data precludes the calculation of performance for that aspect of the chain. By way of example,
an observed probability, perceived probability can reasonably a partial listing of the determinants of the quality of enforce-
be used as a proxy. Only rarely, however, are both pieces of ment, as applied specifically to each link in the enforcement
information available. chain, follows:

9
 • Probability of detection is correlated to the incentives to social attitudes toward the crime, and to quality of
given to park guards, rangers, and forest and fishery evidence.
environmental protection agents (e.g., pay levels and
• Probability of conviction given prosecution is correlated
other rewards); to availability of equipment; to number of
to rewards for judges and magistrates, to capacity of the
personnel charged with detecting environmental crimes;
justice system, to nature of the crime, to social attitudes
and to technical knowledge and skill of personnel.
toward the crime, and to quality of evidence.
• Probability of arrest given detection is correlated to
Weaknesses that often undermine all steps in the enforcement
police pay and reward structure, to availability of equip-
chain are generated when enforcement agents, police officers,
ment, to quality of evidence, and to social perceptions
prosecutors, or judges fear negative repercussions from doing
about the crime.
their jobs properly or when they are intimidated or co-opted
• Probability of prosecution given arrest is correlated to by those breaking the law. Analysis of the determinants of the
rewards for prosecutors, to capacity of the justice system quality of enforcement clarifies why enforcement is weak, thus
and those in it to prosecute environmental crimes, to complementing quantitative analysis of where weaknesses exist
whether the illegal act is a criminal or civil offense, in the enforcement chain.

10
 Overview of
Country Case Study Results SECTION IV

From 2000 to 2004 the Center for Conservation and Government (CCG) used the
enforcement economics methodology as an analytical framework for assessing the
The existing enforcement
effectiveness of enforcement in four countries: Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, and the
Philippines. In each country, we examined enforcement of a specific crime in a part of
regimes in the countries
the country where biodiversity was under substantial threat. To make the analyses site
specific, we modified the generalized form of the ED model to accurately reflect the
we studied are weak, and
steps composing the enforcement chain in each country. The type of environmental
crime examined varied in each site, thereby reflecting the most pressing threat
not one of them provides
identified in each country or region. Finally, depending on the handling of the crimes
studied in each country, we determined whether to analyze administrative or judicial
an adequate disincentive
enforcement processes.5 to offset the incentives
In each site, the analysis of enforcement effectiveness was used to develop strategic
action plans for strengthening key weaknesses in partnership with local enforcement that are driving illegal
agency6 officials and other stakeholders.7
Because we worked closely with enforcement agencies in executing the site-level
environmental activities.
analyses, we intentionally did not focus on the issue of corruption. In interviews and
other discussions, corruption was identified as an important factor contributing to
weak enforcement in all four countries. However, we did not further examine this
issue in all case studies. Therefore, although corruption was a major challenge in each
site, we will offer no specific commentary on corruption.
In this section, we will present a short background on each site, as well as the quan-
titative results and some key points of interest about the results from each site. This
overview of site-level quantitative findings is limited and is not a full reflection of the
very detailed systemic analysis done in each site. However, the overview will serve as
the basis for in-depth exploration of lessons learned from the synthesis of results across
those sites.
As a group, the case studies gave quantitative validation of one thing that most
conservationists already know: Enforcement of natural resource and biodiversity laws
and regulations is abysmal in these biodiversity-rich countries. The existing enforce-
ment regimes in the countries we studied are weak, and not one of them provides an
adequate disincentive to offset the incentives that are driving illegal environmental
activities. While some of their failings are caused by resource limitations, myriad other
factors contribute significantly to the agencies’ poor performance. The issues that
make enforcement ineffective do not lie in any one step of the enforcement chain or in
any single agency, but are pervasive throughout the systems.

11
Case Study 1: Bahia, Brazil— This ecosystem has long been under threat from a variety of
actors. Originally, cocoa farmers were the primary engine of
The Atlantic Forest ecosystem degradation. More than 400,000 hectares of this
region were converted from forest to cocoa between 1960
* * * and 1980 (Alger and Caldas 1994). As cocoa production has
Environmental Violation Analyzed: Illegal logging and declined, beginning in the early 1990s, the degradation of
deforestation primary and secondary forest fragments in Southern Bahia has
intensified. With the decline, cocoa farmers have switched into
Scale of Crime: Small-scale extraction of logs, or clearing for even more destructive economic activities like raising full-sun
agricultural purposes coffee, cattle ranching, and logging (their perennial fallback
Administrative or Judicial: Judicial activity). Deforestation of forested areas on private lands or in
protected areas has also risen because of the increased numbers
Components of the Enforcement Chain: Detection, citation, of landless peasants who were formerly employed on cocoa
prosecution, conviction, and penalty plantations. The combined factors have contributed to the
ongoing high-level threat to Southern Bahia’s remaining forest
Agencies Analyzed: Brazilian Institute for the Environment fragments.
and Renewable Resources (Instituto Brasileiro do Meio
Ambiente e dos Recursos Naturais Renováveis—IBAMA) Logs illegally extracted from this region are generally processed
(detection and citation), Ministério Público (prosecution), in local sawmills and are used domestically—in Bahia itself
judiciary (conviction and penalty) and in states such as Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais, where
demand for wood is high (Mesquita 1997). Deforested areas
* * * are generally converted to other uses—poor farmers may use
the land for subsistence farming, whereas larger farmers often
The Atlantic Forest is one of the world’s hotspots of plant and
convert it to one of the more destructive activities described
animal endemism and diversity. Currently, less than 8 percent
earlier.
of the original Atlantic Forest is still standing (Galindo-Leal
and Câmara 2003). The fragments of primary forest found In Southern Bahia, our analysis focused on cases of illegal
in a roughly 14,000-square-kilometer area of Southern Bahia logging and deforestation that had occurred in a 72-municipal-
make it one of the richest centers of endemism in the Atlantic ity region between the years of 1995 and 2002. While there
Forest. It is also the only remaining habitat for a variety of are state agencies charged with detection, our effort focused
plant and animal species, including the endangered primates on cases originating with detection by IBAMA, the federal
Leontopithecus chrysolmelas (golden-headed lion tamarind) and environmental agency that has had the longest-standing
Cebus xantosthernos (golden-breasted capuchin). responsibility for enforcement in the region. The enforcement

Case Study 1 Table: Atlantic Forest, Bahia, Brazil

Cumulative
Probability Value 8 Probability

Probability of detection given illegal logging/deforestation Pd 1

Probability of citation given detection Pa|d 1

Probability of prosecution given citation Pp|a 0.51 0.51

Probability of conviction given prosecution Pc|p 0.16 0.082

Average value of penalty $100.91

Average time elapsed (days) t 451

Enforcement disincentive ED $6.44

Profits to illegal logging/deforestation $75.00

12
process analyzed in this case was a judicial process, so we also
tracked the cases through the hands of public prosecutors and In Bahia, only half of all detected offenses
into the courts.
According to research done by the Instituto de Estudos
are prosecuted, and an even lower
Socioambientais do Sul da Bahia (Institute for Social and
Environmental Studies of Southern Bahia—IESB), the profits
percentage of offenders are convicted.
to illegal logging from harvesting as little as one tree in the
biodiversity-rich forests of this region are $75.9 Using the convicted. Penalties are relatively low, and the slow functioning
enforcement economics methodology, we found the value of the of the system ensures that violators, even if sanctioned, do not
disincentive generated by the enforcement system in this region “pay” for their offenses until well after a year has passed—dur-
was only $6.44. ing which time they can continue to violate the law. In such
circumstances, having outstanding detection would make very
Qualitative analysis demonstrates that the primary factors little difference. This case study validates the assertion that
contributing to ineffective enforcement in Southern Bahia10 are detection alone is not enforcement and that investments across
the following: the enforcement chain are necessary to make the system more
effective.
• Budgetary constraints
The government’s instinct has often been to spend any enforce-
• Jurisdictional confusion
ment-strengthening money that becomes available on acquiring
• Procedural inefficiencies more cars and hiring more people for detection efforts. While
those additions are undoubtedly important, our analysis
• Low technical capacity suggests that the Bahian system’s effectiveness would improve
• Lack of interagency cooperation more through concurrent investments in other elements of
the enforcement chain—training prosecutors and judges, for
In calculating the ED for Southern Bahia, we had to make two instance.
generous assumptions. Data limitations11 precluded the calcula-
tion of precise quantitative values for probability of detection
Case Study 2: Chiapas, Mexico—
and probability of citation upon detection. For this analysis,
therefore, we assumed both those probabilities to be 100 percent. The Selva Maya
However, detailed qualitative analysis previously conducted in
the region (Akella, Orlando, Araujo, and Cannon 2004) has * * *
clearly demonstrated that the probabilities are not that high in Environmental Violation Analyzed: Illegal wildlife hunting
either case. The probability of detection is quite low owing to a and trade
number of factors including lack of public willingness to report
environmental crimes, jurisdictional confusion, and lack of Scale of Crime: Subsistence-level hunting
equipment and personnel. Likewise, probability of citation upon
Administrative or Judicial: Administrative
detection is low because detection agents often give warnings
rather than writing up citations and, in some instances, may Components of the Enforcement Chain: Detection, inquiry,
be bribed into “overlooking” a detected illegal act. If calculated processing, sanction, and penalty
using the true probabilities of detection and citation upon
detection, the ED would undoubtedly be much lower than the Agency Analyzed: Federal Prosecutorial Service for Envi-
already paltry $6.44 calculated through this work. ronmental Protection (Procuradoría Federal de Protección
Ambiental—PROFEPA) (administrative process encompassing
These data show that the cumulative probability of an illegal all steps)
act being penalized is only 0.082. However, this cumulative
probability is also artificially high because we assumed the * * *
probabilities of detection and citation upon detection were both
The Mesoamerica Hotspot is the second richest global hotspot,
1. In reality, the ultimate probability of a crime being penalized
in part because of its geographic position at the interface
is far less than 0.082.
between North America and South and Central America and
In this case, even with (assumed) 100 percent detection, the the Caribbean. The Selva Maya forms the northern part of
enforcement system is ineffectual at countering the incentives the Mesoamerica Hotspot, occupying southeastern Mexico,
to log or deforest. In Bahia, only half of all detected offenses northern Guatemala, and Belize. The Selva Maya is a unique
are prosecuted, and an even lower percentage of offenders are mosaic of tropical ecosystems resulting from hundreds of

13
years of management by the ancient Mayans. Its biodiversity then passes the case on to the prosecutors of the Ministério
significance stems from the presence of two major classes of Público (MP), who process it and try it in court. However,
tropical ecosystems: montane tropical forests and lowland our analysis found that the local PROFEPA office sends only
rain forests. Those ecosystems incorporate populations of 2 percent of wildlife hunting and trade cases on to the MP
key endangered species, including the major remaining (i.e., the probability of prosecution13 given detection is only
populations of Tapirus bairdii (Baird’s tapir), the Ara macao 0.02). The reason, PROFEPA personnel suggest, is that the
cyanoptera (scarlet macaw), the Agriocharis ocellata (ocellated majority of the cases they handle have insufficient evidence
turkey), and a subspecies of the Tayassu pecari ringens (white- to be useful to the MP (Conservation International—Selva
lipped peccary). Maya 2003).
Wildlife biodiversity in the Selva Maya (including the above- Given the low percentage of cases that go through the judicial
named species) is severely threatened by hunting for bush meat process, we focused our analysis on the administrative
and commercial trade. Mexico has an active internal trade process instead. This administrative process—from detection
in native wild parrots and other species. Mexican reptile and through sanction—occurs wholly within PROFEPA, through
bird species are often exported illegally. Intense demographic its Judicial Area Sub-Delegation. Because PROFEPA chose
pressure and poverty in the region are the primary underlying to process the bulk of the wildlife violations in our sample
causes of wildlife hunting. The main focus of current con- administratively, this process was the most relevant one to
servation strategies in Selva Maya is on habitat conservation. analyze.
However, hunting levels are giving rise to increasing concerns
about the emergence of “empty forests.” Averaging PROFEPA’s data on the value of confiscations, we
estimated the profits to illegal wildlife hunting and trade in
In the Selva Maya, we hoped to focus on the activities of both the Selva Maya at $191.57 per trip. On the basis of available
small- and large-scale wildlife hunters and traders, using data data, we found that the value of the enforcement disincentive
on violations detected between 1999 and 2001. However, the generated by PROFEPA’s administrative system is only $5.66.
records we found of wildlife hunting and trading cases that
were initiated by PROFEPA during this time period were only Qualitative analysis showed that the main causes of ineffective
for small-scale, subsistence-level hunting. Although large-scale enforcement in Selva Maya are the following:
commercial hunters and traders are quite active in the region,
case records for commercial-scale wildlife hunting and trading • Inadequate and unclear laws governing wildlife hunting
activities were not found in local PROFEPA offices. and trade

PROFEPA, a federal agency, is the primary authority dealing • Lack of technical capacity
with wildlife violations in the Selva Maya. Mexican law allows
• Scarcity of necessary equipment
for environmental violations to be handled through either a
judicial process or an administrative process. In the judicial • Poor collaboration among environmental enforcement
process, PROFEPA does the initial detection and inquiry and agencies

Case Study 2 Table: Selva Maya, Chiapas, Mexico

Cumulative
Probability Value12 Probability

Probability of detection given illegal wildlife hunting/trade Pd 1

Probability of inquiry given detection Pi|d 0.58 0.58

Probability of processing given inquiry Pp|i 0.69 0.4

Probability of sanctions given processing Ps|p 0.03 0.012

Average value of penalty $545.47

Average time elapsed (days) t 263

Enforcement disincentive ED $5.66

Profits to illegal wildlife hunting/trade $191.57

14
Given the data constraints, we again made the generous trade. The low rate of detection of large-scale wildlife opera-
assumption in this case that the probability of detection tions, combined with a low rate of sanctions, could mean that
was 1. Again, qualitative research has demonstrated that this this system presents virtually no deterrent to lucrative com-
probability is most likely very low. The single fact that no files mercial wildlife hunting and trade.
for cases of large-scale commercial wildlife hunting and trade
were found exemplifies this. Even assuming perfect detection, Case Study 3: Indonesia—
analysis shows that the system does a very poor job of offsetting
the incentives driving illegal hunting and trade. Papua Province
Sadly, this assumption of perfect detection also means that the * * *
very low 0.012 cumulative probability of a crime resulting in
sanctions is artificially high. In reality, given that the prob- Environmental Violation Analyzed: Mostly the shipment of
ability of detection is not really 1, the probability of sanction is illegal logs
even lower than 0.012.
Scale of Crime: Average nearly 2,000 m3 of logs per crime
It is evident that the most serious problems are at the point
Administrative or Judicial: Judicial
of sanctioning violators and imposing penalties. Only 0.03 of
the cases that make it through the processing stage results in Components of the Enforcement Chain: Detection, investi-
any sanction. When offenders know that—even if they are gation, police review, prosecution, conviction, and penalty
detected, investigated, and processed—the chances of their
Agencies Analyzed: Provincial Office for Natural Resources
being sanctioned is so low, they are unlikely to take the threat
Conservation (Balai Konservasi Sumber Daya Alam—BKSDA)
of enforcement very seriously.
(detection and investigation); Provincial Forestry Service (Dinas
The particularly low probability of sanction given processing in Kehutanan) (detection and investigation); military (detection);
this case may reflect a deliberate policy of weak enforcement, customs (detection); police (detection, investigation, and review);
given the fact that those responsible for small-scale subsistence Ministry of Forestry (detection, investigation); Attorney General
hunting are the poor and disadvantaged people who have few (prosecution); Ministry of Justice (conviction and penalty)
alternatives.
* * *
However, if this probability also applies in more serious cases,
it is very troubling. The limitations of PROFEPA’s data made it Papua Province, Indonesia, is the western half of the island of
impossible to determine whether this same low rate of sanctions New Guinea. The island forms one of the world’s last three
is prevalent in cases of commercial-scale wildlife hunting and mega-diversity tropical wildernesses and, as such, is a global

Case Study 3 Table: Papua Province, Indonesia

Cumulative
Probability Value14 Probability

Probability of detection given illegal logging Pd 0.032

Probability of investigation given detection Pi|d 0.68 0.022

Probability of police review given investigation Pr|i 0.84 0.018

Probability of prosecution given police review Pp|r 0.41 0.007

Probability of conviction given prosecution15 Pc|p 0.85 0.006

Average value of penalty $1,197.0016

Average time elapsed (days) t 269

Enforcement disincentive ED $6.4717

Profits to illegal logging $91,967.36

15
priority for biodiversity conservation. Papua Province also has Selva Maya sites, because the probability of detection was not
the largest remaining forest areas in Indonesia and is the source assumed to be 1 in this site.
of an increasingly significant amount of Indonesia’s logs and
timber products. However, it is now one of the major areas of The probability of detection in this case appears extraordinarily
commercial-scale illegal logging in Indonesia. low in comparison to the other probabilities associated with
steps in the enforcement system. If our estimate of total
Commercial-scale illegal logging comes in various forms and is quantity of illegal logging is correct, then improving detection
carried out by a variety of actors. The illegal activity of greatest is the topmost priority in this case.20 Detection is low because
concern occurs in areas where logging is not permitted (e.g., of the lack of rangers, as noted previously, but also because few
watershed protection forests, protected areas) and is linked to people are willing to appear as witnesses or inform enforcement
companies with licenses to log areas nearby. Those companies authorities when they detect forest crime. People are hesitant to
may carry out the logging themselves, subcontract to smaller come forward because enforcement agencies do not do enough
local companies, or simply buy logs without obtaining appro- to protect witnesses and informants from suspects. Furthermore,
priate papers to demonstrate legality. people believe the enforcement agencies are corrupt or incompe-
tent and will not use the information properly or effectively.
Although large-scale illegal logging is taking place, little
evidence was found of enforcement efforts in the forest. This Relatively speaking, investigation, police review, prosecution,
absence is largely because of the low numbers of rangers and conviction are being done well, although there is still
available to carry out patrols. Instead, most enforcement efforts room for improvement. It is important to remember that
are targeted at interdicting large shipments of logs that are not the other probabilities, while higher, are still too low for the
accompanied by the correct paperwork (either because the logs system to function effectively even if detection is improved
were illegally cut or because they were being smuggled out to significantly, given the size of penalties imposed. Hence, it is
avoid taxes and fees). Hence, the example presented here gener- not appropriate to focus all available resources on improving
ally concerns the enforcement of shipping large quantities of detection alone. Raising the probability of detection to 1 in
illegal timber out of Papua on large ships.18 Because of the large this case would bring the enforcement disincentive21 only up to
volumes involved, the values in this example are a few orders of roughly $200—larger than the current disincentive, but still
magnitude larger than those in earlier examples. Although such an inadequate deterrent. Without larger penalties, confiscation
illegal acts can be considered either crimes or administrative of logs and equipment, and improvements in the other enforce-
violations, most were treated as criminal cases. Our analysis ment steps, illegal logging will continue to be lucrative.
shows that although the profits to logging in this case are close
to $100,000, the value of the disincentive presented by the It is commonly suggested that raising fines can fi x poor
enforcement regime is under $7. Put one way, if only the fine compliance, because it is thought that if the fine is higher,
is considered, the incentives are approximately 14,000 times violators will be deterred from breaking the law. While it is true
larger than the disincentives to illegally log in Papua.19 that higher penalties do present a greater deterrent, the effects
of increasing penalty size are diminished by the low probability
Qualitative analysis demonstrated that ineffective enforcement of actually being penalized. Three findings emerge from this
in Papua can be largely attributed to the following: observation. First, weaknesses in the enforcement system need
• Overlapping and inconsistent laws governing logging to be fi xed if large penalties are to translate into effective deter-
rents. Second, when the probability of actually being penalized
• Lack of coordination between agencies and between is low, the size of the penalty required to create a deterrent
local, provincial, and central offices of single agencies becomes very large (in this case the penalty would need to be
raised to many millions of dollars). Third, the required size
• Inadequate budgetary resources
of penalty can quickly exceed what is politically or culturally
• Insufficient numbers of trained forest investigators viable, meaning other enforcement steps must be strengthened
for realistically sized penalties to create an effective deterrent.
• Lack of incentives for effective performance
While corruption and lack of political will are major reasons for
poor compliance with forestry and nature conservation laws in Case Study 4: Palawan, Philippines—
Indonesia, this study focused on the technical reasons for poor The Calamianes Islands
enforcement (for reasons explained earlier).
* * *
The cumulative probability of being convicted of illegal timber
shipping in Papua is only 0.006. This number is more realistic Environmental Violation Analyzed: Illegal fishing with
than the cumulative probabilities calculated for the Bahia and dynamite and cyanide

16
Scale of Crime: Small-scale illegal fishing by local communi- enforcement of fisheries laws has remained a pronounced
ties and seasonal fishermen in municipal waters and areas of challenge.
ancestral domain
While local villagers often identify seasonal fishermen and
Administrative or Judicial: Judicial neighboring villages for illegal fishing, interviews with key
informants have revealed that community members also
Components of the Enforcement Chain: Detection, arrest, participate in cyanide and dynamite fishing. High international
filing, prosecution, conviction, and penalty demand for live fish makes destructive fishing a lucrative
source of income for fishermen (Mayo-Anda, Dalabajan, and
Agencies Analyzed: Philippines National Police (PNP) Mari-
Lasmarias 2004).
time Unit (detection, arrest, filing, sometimes prosecution);
Philippines National Coast Guard (detection, arrest, filing); In Palawan, CI worked closely with a local partner, the Envi-
public prosecutors (prosecution); municipal and regional courts ronmental Legal Assistance Center (ELAC).23 Our work fo-
(conviction and penalty) cused on cyanide and dynamite fishing cases that had occurred
between 1999 and 2002. Thus, we examined the effectiveness
* * * of the judicial process that began with detection by the PNP
Maritime Unit or the Coast Guard,24 then passed through the
Northern Palawan’s marine environment is particularly rich public prosecutors or chiefs of police acting as prosecutors, and
in biodiversity. The region’s Calamianes Islands form part of ended with final resolution in the courts system.
the “coral triangle,” which supports the world’s richest coastal
marine biodiversity. The productivity of the waters of Northern Detailed economic and livelihood analysis of the LRFT
Palawan was once incredibly high. However, those fishing conducted by Conservation International (Conservation
grounds are now considered depleted because of overfishing. International—Philippines 2002) calculated the profits to
With the reported dwindling catches and high international cyanide and dynamite fishing at $70.57 per trip. The enforce-
demand for the live reef fish trade (LRFT), many fishers have ment economics analysis demonstrates that the value of the
shifted to more destructive methods. disincentive generated by the enforcement regime is only $0.09,
or virtually zero.
Cyanide and dynamite fishing for the LRFT have resulted
in the deterioration of critical coral reef habitat. Illegal Qualitative analysis identified the following factors as being the
trade of live fish species such as the Cheilinus undulatus primary causes of ineffective enforcement in the Calamianes:
(Napoleon wrasse) and the Cromileptes altivelis (barramundi
• Low infrastructure capacity
cod) seriously threatens their survival. Although fisheries
jurisprudence in the Philippines is considered good, effective • Low technical capacity

Case Study 4 Table: Calamianes Islands, Palawan, Philippines

Cumulative
Probability Value 22 Probability

Probability of detection given cyanide/dynamite fishing Pd 0.062

Probability of arrest given detection Pa|d 0.003 0.00019

Probability of filing given arrest Pf|a 0.85 0.00016

Probability of prosecution given filing Pp|f 0.62 0.0001

Probability of conviction given prosecution Pc|p 0.24 0.00002

Average value of penalty $4,463.32

Average time elapsed (days) t 210

Enforcement disincentive ED $0.09

Profits to cyanide/dynamite fishing $70.57

17
 difficult to justify devoting additional personnel and resources
[W]e decided to invest in helping establish to enforcement against destructive fishing in local waters.25
In that situation, it was questionable whether funneling
detection, apprehension, and adjudication resources into those agencies would improve the enforcement
system.
functions within the municipalities. However, we found that local governments and communities
• Procedural inefficiencies had a strong interest in ensuring that illegal fishing rules were
enforced in municipal waters or in areas of ancestral domain.
• Lack of interagency coordination Therefore, it seemed that dedicating resources to developing
• Lack of incentives for effective performance a co-management approach to fisheries enforcement would be
a more appropriate and successful means of achieving better
The cumulative probability of someone being convicted of enforcement in the Calamianes.
illegal dynamite or cyanide fishing in the Calamianes is very
low at only 0.00002. As in the Papua case, the fact that no Philippines federal law allows for (1) citizens’ arrest of envi-
assumption was made about the probability of detection makes ronmental violators and (2) establishment of administrative
this cumulative probability more realistic. adjudication bodies at the municipal level, which are empow-
ered to handle such violations administratively—confiscating
The numbers for probability of arrest given detection and equipment, holding offenders, and charging small fines. In
probability of filing given arrest merit some specific attention, the fishing municipalities of the Calamianes, politicians and
because they are particularly interesting. Examination of the citizens alike have an interest in seeing the productivity of
two probabilities demonstrates the importance of gathering their waters protected. They also share an interest in seeing
qualitative information that can help interpret and judge the outsiders and other violators punished for destructive fishing
accuracy of the quantitative results. The very low probability of practices.
arrest upon detection is troubling not only because it is so low
but also because the system’s corruption appears to be embed- Rather than trying to improve the judicial process that has
ded in this low probability. Many detection records indicated handled these cases to date, we decided to invest in helping
that a violator had been caught at sea and his equipment and establish detection, apprehension, and adjudication functions
catch had been confiscated but that the violator had escaped within the municipalities. Our partner ELAC is currently
before an arrest could be made. Given the confiscation of working with local authorities in three municipalities to write
equipment—including the boat—escape would seem implau- and pass municipal fishing ordinances; training community
sible. It seems more likely that this low rate of arrest reflects members and citizens groups in detection and apprehension;
bribery of arresting officers by dynamite and cyanide fishers. and working with municipal authorities, civil society groups,
If we consider this information, the relatively high probability NGOs, and community leaders to form municipal adjudica-
of filing given arrest, seems less impressive. While the 0.85 tion bodies comprising representatives from each of those
probability calculated from our sample may lead to the conclu- sectors.
sion that filing does happen a majority of the time, the number
of cases making it past arrest to the filing stage is minimal. National-level policy work will also be necessary to ensure the
Furthermore, qualitative data indicate that the filing process is effectiveness of the adjudication bodies. For instance, current
so rife with issues that filing generally does not happen within laws dictate that the maximum monetary penalty that a mu-
the time frame prescribed by law. nicipal adjudication body can charge is PhP 2,500 (US$50).
Furthermore, the law mandates that any fines collected by the
One of the enforcement-strengthening strategies developed in adjudication bodies are not remitted to the municipality but
the Palawan case is worth mentioning, because it is different rather go into the Philippines National Treasury. The ef-
from the strategies developed through our work in other fectiveness of municipal adjudication bodies will be augmented
places. In the rest of our sites, we focused on fi xing the exist- if (1) they are allowed to assign higher administrative penalties
ing enforcement system. In the Philippines, this was not our to offenders, and (2) if collected penalties, or some percent-
focus. In our discussions with enforcement personnel from age of them, are retained locally to finance municipal-level
PNP Maritime Unit and the Coast Guard, as well as with enforcement efforts.
prosecutors, it became clear that enforcement of illegal fishing
was not viewed as a top priority for those agencies. Their The value of this example is that it suggests that in some
multiple responsibilities—which encompass not only envi- instances—when enforcement performance is poor and there
ronmental issues but also customs and immigration issues, is little support for fi xing it—it may be useful to explore the
as well as generally maintaining peace and order—made it viability of alternative enforcement systems.

18
 Synthesis of Results and
Global Lessons Learned SECTION V

A number of site-specific problems were found in each country where the enforcement
economics analysis was conducted. Site-specific action plans were developed to address
Our discussions with
them. Those action plans are currently being used to help implement enforcement-
strengthening activities in those countries.
global enforcement
Another contribution of the enforcement economics case studies—and the one experts have confirmed
discussed here—was that they allowed us to identify five key weaknesses that were
present across the four sites. Our discussions with global enforcement experts have that the common
confirmed that the common challenges identified in our work exist in many countries
of biodiversity importance. Understanding the lessons learned in a generalized sense challenges identified in
can be a useful way to begin incorporating enforcement strengthening into global
conservation strategies. our work exist in many
This section will present the five most important common challenges that we found in
our sites:
countries of biodiversity
1. Poor interagency cooperation importance.
2. Inadequate budgetary resources
3. Technical deficiencies in laws, agency policies, and procedures
4. Insufficient technical skills and knowledge
5. Lack of performance monitoring and adaptive management systems
As noted earlier, carrying out this work in close partnership with the enforcement
agencies themselves has resulted in a focus on largely technical measures. However,
successfully tackling the challenges will have a positive effect on other challenges
not explicitly listed, such as corruption (e.g., through improving agency resources,
streamlining procedures, promoting interagency cooperation and supervision). While
not all necessary enforcement-strengthening activities are captured, the ones discussed
here are all essential if enforcement is to be strengthened successfully.
Each issue will be described in detail and discussed as we draw on site-level examples,
as well as on information gathered by talking to global enforcement experts.

Challenge 1: Poor Interagency Cooperation

In the countries studied, we found that the multiple agencies charged with enforce-
ment rarely communicate nor are they mandated (by policy or law) to do so. This
lack of integration is both horizontal and vertical—that is to say, the various agencies
involved in a single step of the enforcement chain do not coordinate with one another,
much less with agencies responsible for other steps of the enforcement chain. For
instance, prosecutors make little effort to work with detection agents in building
cases, even when their own understanding of environmental law or detection agency
procedures is limited. And judges do not consult with any other agencies to gather
information on damages caused that might help assess appropriate penalties.

19
 that case files would remain in limbo and unprocessed for long
[E]fforts to reduce some time-consuming periods of time, sometimes exceeding the statute of limitations.

procedural inefficiencies have been In the Philippines, this same type of situation occurred because
detection agents and prosecutors were uncertain as to which
compromised by agency politics. courts should handle which cases,28 and they would frequently
file cases in the wrong courts. This misfiling either would
delay prosecution of the case or would result in files being
This poor coordination occurs in part because individual
mishandled or lost.
agencies have little incentive to work more closely together.
Individual agencies most often perform their function in the Jurisdictional confusion causes poor detection, failure to
enforcement chain in isolation. If their performance is checked prosecute, and lengthy delays in the time it takes for cases to
at all, it is also in isolation. The effectiveness of the enforce- get through the system. This lack of clarity is not the result of
ment system as a whole is rarely considered. Although overall some great complexity in how jurisdiction is assigned; it comes
performance is greatly enhanced when agencies collaborate from a simple lack of information. It seems likely that such situ-
and act as a system, this collaboration rarely happens. Getting ations could be easily resolved if agencies communicated better
agencies to collaborate in this way may often require formal and reached a working consensus on questions of jurisdiction
instructions to do so from local and national political leaders. and collaboration.
Even when individual agencies fully understand the holistic
nature of enforcement or their role in the system, their author- Procedural Inefficiencies
ity is limited to their own function. The inefficiencies that The lack of interagency cooperation generates procedural
result from poor coordination are significant, as the following inefficiencies that undermine the effectiveness of enforcement.
examples demonstrate. For this reason, persuading agencies to Agencies that rarely interact cannot develop strategies for
think and act holistically, as a system, is a useful step forward.26 streamlining their handling of environmental violations. As a
consequence, procedural issues can compromise the proper and
Jurisdictional Confusion
timely functioning of the enforcement system.
The enforcement economics analyses revealed that jurisdic-
In Papua Province, Indonesia, the political processes of decen-
tional confusion is common among detection agencies, pros-
tralization and special autonomy have reorganized the reporting
ecutorial services, and even courts. With respect to detection,
lines that used to connect local-level forestry services to the
this jurisdictional confusion often results in important areas
Ministry of Forestry. Regardless of the merits of such a process,
having no routine detection activities. In Southern Bahia, the
one unintended result has been the breakdown of information
federal and state detection agencies were unclear on which areas
flows between regency (local), provincial, and central forestry
and which types of crimes were within whose jurisdiction. As
units. The result is that the provincial forestry department
a result, each agency tended to decide that the other agency
is often unaware of many of the cases being handled at the
was most likely responsible. Thus, some of the most important
regency level, and the Ministry of Forestry is unaware of many
repositories of biodiversity in the region were largely ignored.27
of the cases of illegal logging that have been detected in Papua.
The same failure happened in Palawan, where both the This lack of information can greatly impede the probability of
Philippines National Police Maritime Unit and the Coast arrest in cases of, for instance, illegal log shipments, given that
Guard insisted that the same areas fell under the jurisdiction the Ministry of Forestry still finances joint operations with
of the other agency. The failure of detection agencies to clarify the navy and needs information to decide where to carry out
jurisdictional confusion and coordinate activities so that operations. In a few cases, local enforcement agencies were not
priority areas are patrolled has a substantial effect on quality of aware of the illegal logging cases that were identified by the
detection. Detection is weak for many reasons, but the contri- Ministry of Forestry.
bution of jurisdictional confusion between detection agencies is
Also in Papua Province, efforts to reduce some time-consuming
often overlooked.
procedural inefficiencies have been compromised by agency
Similar problems exist in prosecutorial services and courts. politics. Standard forest rangers are not qualified to carry out
Because detection agencies have a limited understanding of investigations and must call in the police. For all crimes, the
how prosecutors are organized, citations or case files are often police are the primary investigation agents who collect the
misdirected. In Brazil, for instance, we found that case files evidence and present it to prosecutors. Given the workload of
that should have gone to state prosecutors were being sent to the police, there are often delays in investigating forest crime
federal prosecutors, and vice versa. Because federal and state cases. In the interest of improved efficiency, a mechanism was
prosecutors have little interaction, no efficient procedure existed set up whereby forest rangers could undertake investigations
for getting case files to the right prosecutor. The result was as Forest Civil Investigators (FCIs). To become an FCI, a
20
forest ranger must undergo special training from the police in In Brazil, we found that many cases are never prosecuted for
carrying out investigations, must get a decree that is from the lack of adequate evidence to support the charge being made. In
Ministry of Forestry and is endorsed by both the police and issuing citations, detection agents are required to record name
attorney general headquarters in Jakarta, and must submit that of the offender, locale of the crime, and nature of the crime.
decree to the Ministry of Justice in order to receive an FCI However, they often fail to provide important supporting infor-
license. A ranger qualified as an FCI can, in theory, investigate mation—reports from witnesses, photographic evidence, and
forest crimes under the supervision of regency police and can the like—making it difficult or even impossible for prosecutors
work directly with prosecutors. However, the police have not to argue cases successfully. In both Indonesia and Mexico,
been entirely comfortable with the new arrangements and have inadequate quality of evidence was commonly cited as a reason
sought to retain their role as primary investigators and interme- for police not sending cases to prosecutors or for prosecutors
diaries between forest rangers and prosecutors. Although many deciding not to submit cases to court. Although lack of techni-
rangers have received training to become an FCI, few have cal capacity (training in quality of evidence) is certainly partly
successfully gotten their license from the Ministry of Justice. to blame, so too is the lack of interagency communication,
If the FCI mechanism cannot be made to work, then some which means detection and investigation agencies are not aware
alternative is needed for reducing delays in investigations. what the next agency up the “chain” is looking for.
The situation in Southern Bahia provides another example Lack of information on the prosecutor’s part can lead to poorly
of procedural inefficiency. In that region, upon detecting argued cases. In one case from the south of Bahia, IBAMA
a violation and writing up a citation, the detection agency agents detected trucks that were illegally transporting logs,
IBAMA—rather than directly handing over the case to the confiscated the equipment and timber, and filed citations with
prosecutor in the locale of the crime—would send the citation the appropriate prosecutor’s office. Unfortunately, the public
to IBAMA’s nearest regional office. The regional office would, prosecutor allegedly did not know that a notice of equipment
in turn, send the file to IBAMA’s state headquarters in the confiscation is usually accompanied by a citation for an
capital, Salvador. IBAMA in Salvador would then send it to the environmental violation. The defense attorneys appeared in
MP’s state headquarters in Salvador, who would send it to the court with only the confiscation notices, the prosecutor did not
appropriate regional MP office,29 who would then pass it on to link the confiscation to an environmental violation, and the
the prosecutor in the locale of the crime. The case began in the judge returned the trucks with no penalty.
locale of the crime and ended there—yet, in between, it would
The anecdotal evidence from all four countries and from people
pass through as many as six offices in three cities. The results
working on enforcement globally is full of stories of cases that
of this time-consuming voyage were significant—cases would
were unsuccessful because of insufficient evidence or poor
get “lost” (unintentionally or intentionally); prosecution would
prosecution. Many cases might have turned out differently
be delayed; and, in some instances, the three-year statute of
had the detection agents or investigators known what evidence
limitations was exceeded, making prosecution impossible.
a prosecutor would need, and had the prosecutor understood
Again, the convoluted or unclear procedures are not necessary; what information the detection agency could provide. But
they simply have not been clarified or improved upon. Simple in the countries we studied, this type of consultation is not
discussion among upper management of agencies across the required and is unlikely to happen organically. As a result, cases
enforcement chain could result in more efficient procedures that may have otherwise served as enforcement success stories
that would improve the effectiveness and timeliness of the have ended up being examples of what not to do.
enforcement system.
Weak Cases Challenge 2: Inadequate Budgetary Resources
Poor collaboration between agencies charged with different
In each of the case study sites, inadequate resources com-
enforcement functions often precludes prosecutors from
promise the ability of detection and investigation agencies,
building effective cases and prosecuting them successfully.
prosecutorial services, and the judiciary to fulfill their enforce-
Analysis showed that often prosecutors—even those with
ment responsibilities effectively. The personnel and infrastruc-
little understanding of environmental law and environmental
ture issues generated by persistently low levels of funding can
crime—would not consult with detection agents or inspectors
be observed across the enforcement chain.
to inform themselves of the details of the case. For their part,
detection agents and investigators, if they fail to consult with Low salaries for detection and investigation positions make
prosecutors, are often unaware of what information or evidence them unappealing to highly qualified applicants. As a result,
is necessary for building strong cases. Weak cases are unlikely the education level of many agents is quite low. While limited
to result in convictions and present a serious obstacle to schooling does not necessarily preclude them from being excel-
enforcement effectiveness. lent field agents, it may lead to inefficiencies in the handling

21
 months or longer. Because substitutes must handle all types
Perhaps the most important overarching of cases when they arrive, environmental cases are often not
prioritized and go unprocessed during the substitute’s rotation.
consequence of inadequate budget If this omission happens more than once, the likelihood is high
that the three-year statute of limitation will be exceeded so that
resources is that the shortfall makes the case can no longer be prosecuted. In the rural offices and
courts that have remained open, the lack of basic infrastructure
implementing new strategies to improve such as computers has complicated efforts to handle and
track cases efficiently. In the Selva Maya, PROFEPA reports
enforcement performance very difficult. that its limited number of PROFEPA prosecutors are severely
overworked, each handling an insurmountable number of case
of paperwork or the preparation of cases. The low salaries, files. According to the agency, this major factor contributes to
combined with a lack of recognition or reward structures, may the poor performance of prosecutors in building and presenting
also contribute to high incidence of corruption or bribe-taking cases.
among field agents. As described, the enforcement economics Another important consequence of insufficient budgets is
analyses did not explicitly address corruption. However, that enforcement agencies are unable to provide the specific
anecdotal evidence from all four sites indicates that corruption environmental training or ongoing capacity-building programs
is considered a major obstacle to effective enforcement. that could significantly improve enforcement performance of
The personnel and equipment shortages that result from budget their personnel. The effects of poor capacity, as well as field-
limitations also affect enforcement quality. A lack of human based examples of those effects, are more amply discussed in
resources makes it difficult for detection and investigation subsequent sections.
agencies to adequately cover critical ecosystems. In Bahia, for
Perhaps the most important overarching consequence of
instance, two detection agents with one car between them were
inadequate budget resources is that shortfalls make implement-
charged with all detection activities in a critical 72-municipal-
ing new strategies to improve enforcement performance very
ity, 200-square-kilometer area at the time of our study.
difficult. While it is certainly true that the resources available
In Papua Province, the police are the lead agency charged with to enforcement agencies are not always being used efficiently,
investigating forest crimes. The police are overworked and do it is equally true that any concerted overhaul of enforcement
not have the necessary training in forestry law to be able to performance will require far more funding than what is cur-
investigate the more technical infringements effectively. The rently available. Without greater financial resources, therefore,
advent of forest rangers trained as investigators could remedy it seems unlikely that lasting change in enforcement systems
both capacity and training problems, but too few such trained will be possible.
FCIs are currently in Papua. During the time this research
was being carried out, there were only three FCIs in the whole Challenge 3: Technical Deficiencies in Laws,
province (approximately 1 for every 15 million hectares).
Agency Policies, and Procedures
This issue affects the likelihood and success of prosecution and
conviction. In Palawan, biodiversity-rich municipalities—by The legitimacy of environmental laws and the fairness of their
virtue of being remote—do not have full-time prosecutors or enforcement are key factors that affect the weakness of enforce-
judges. Proceeding with a case, therefore, implies filing cases ment and the success of strengthening activities, as discussed
with the prosecutor in Puerto Princesa. Because reaching previously. This study, however, did not assess the legitimacy or
Puerto Princesa requires either a lengthy boat journey or an fairness of laws. Rather, it focused on technical failings of the
expensive plane journey, we found that many cases were not be- laws themselves (i.e., lack of clarity in the laws being enforced,
ing filed at all. Detection agencies, already low on equipment, disproportionately low penalties, or ambiguity in sentencing
could not spare their limited boats, and financial resources for guidance). This study also examined technical weaknesses in
flying were unavailable. As a result, cases either were falling the laws and procedures governing how the enforcement system
out of the system altogether or were being poorly handled by operates.
undertrained chiefs of police acting as prosecutors. Effective enforcement is undermined when the laws the
In Southern Bahia, budget shortfalls have led to the closure of system is meant to uphold are unclear. Likewise, when internal
many rural prosecutorial offices and courts in municipalities of enforcement agency policies do not support effective enforce-
conservation importance. Consequently, environmental cases ment, the action of those agencies is bound to be less than
from those municipalities cannot be processed or judged until optimal. Analysis of the enforcement systems in our case study
substitute prosecutors and judges pass through once every six sites demonstrates that although clear laws and good policies

22
are fundamental to guaranteeing the deterrent value of an
enforcement regime, these laws and policies are often lacking. Laws established at different levels ... may
Legal Framework be overlapping or contradictory, thereby
Weak legislation can take many forms. In some instances, the
law may not clearly define what constitutes an environmental undoing one another.
crime, or it may be inconsistent in its treatment of comparable
violations (illegal hunting vs. illegal fishing, for instance). The powers over production forests to the provincial and regency
Selva Maya case study provides a telling example of this type (local) governments. Although the law decentralizing power
of weakness. “[Mexico’s] General Law on Ecological Balance did require that local laws conform with various national
and Environmental Protection (LGEEPA) defines wild flora laws, the Ministry of Forestry did not do enough to make
and fauna, in sections XVII and XVIII. However, due to the local authorities fully aware of all aspects of the new laws.
lack of definition of wild flora and fauna in the constitution Consequently, the newly empowered local officials drafted
and the fact that no clear definition of species exists, their legal legislation and issued permits largely as they saw fit, often
standing is not clear. This lack of clarity is important given failing to comply with the requirements of national laws. The
that clearly defined concepts indicating to which goods the result is logging operations that are legal according to local
regulations apply are key … [to determining the] appropriation permits, but illegal under national law. This confusion creates
and [use] of these resources. If this clarity does not exist, there a significant “gray area” in the law that must be reformed
is room for diverse interpretations of the law and regulations, (Patlis 2002).
which creates legal loopholes that make enforcement efforts
Either the penalty structures for environmental crimes may
difficult” (Reuter and Habel 2004).
not be clearly defined by law or the penalties prescribed by
Brazil’s progressive Law of Environmental Crime of 1998, law may be so low that they neither compensate for damages
although poorly implemented, provides a positive example of a nor contribute to a credible deterrent. Weaknesses in the
strong national environmental law. This law consolidates leg- penalty prescriptions were found across the countries studied.
islation regarding most environmental violations—which had As described earlier, Philippines law allows for establishing
previously been scattered in diverse special laws—under one municipal-level adjudication bodies to handle environmental
legal statute, thereby ensuring internally consistent treatment violations administratively. But it then limits the effectiveness
of diverse violations. Furthermore, because this federal law of those administrative adjudication bodies by setting the
explicitly characterizes which acts constitute “environmental maximum fine they can charge at PhP 2,500, or US$50.
crimes,” it provides a much stronger basis for legal action than Brazil’s Law of Environmental Crime is explicit in describing
the prior penal structure. the appropriate penalties for violations of different magnitudes.
However, it also allows judges to apply “alternative sentences,”
Clear roles and mandates for agencies charged with enforce- but it provides no clear guidelines for how alternative sentences
ment of environmental legislation may not be established in the should be set. In Bahia, that lack of clarity results in judges
law. This situation can compromise the enforcement agencies’ applying extremely low alternative penalties or penalties that
ability to execute their functions or, to the contrary, can are not commensurate with the level of damage done to the
provide them with legal cover to avoid their responsibilities. In environment.
Bahia, for instance, the division of enforcement responsibilities
between federal and state detection agencies was established Internal Agency Policies
in a “Federative Pact.” Although the pact was agreed to by all Of course, even strong laws cannot be effectively enforced
parties, it did not carry the weight of law. As a result, when the when internal enforcement agency policies do not support good
federal and state agencies—whose activities it was meant to performance.
govern—did not deliver on their enforcement responsibilities,
they did so without facing any substantial penalty or sanctions. For instance, budget allocation policies contribute significantly
The successful use of the Philippines’ law allowing for citizens’ to weaknesses in overall enforcement. The effects of persistent
arrests of environmental violators provides a positive example of low levels of funding on the performance by detection and
how a clear mandate can empower agencies or even civil society investigation agencies, prosecutors, and judges have already
to enforce natural resource regulations. been described. In the sites studied, the lack of good policies
regarding periodic training, interagency collaboration, or
Laws established at different levels (i.e., federal, state, and lo- performance monitoring was also troubling. The absence of
cal) may be overlapping or contradictory, thereby undoing one such policies underscores the point that enforcement agencies
another. In Papua Province, Indonesia, the political legislative fail to incorporate these important components of effective
processes of decentralization and special autonomy handed the enforcement into their operations.
23
Challenge 4: Insufficient Technical Skills and work primarily on forest crime but have limited understanding
of wildlife issues. Even though wildlife hunting and trafficking
Knowledge are major threats, very few capacity-building opportunities are
One factor hampering the effectiveness of the enforcement offered for these themes. Interviews revealed that PROFEPA
regimes studied was inadequate technical capacity across the inspectors who had been working five to seven years had
enforcement chain. Although personnel shortages caused by received at most two training courses in that time, not neces-
budget shortfalls were often lamented, enforcement agencies sarily on these topics. Because there is inadequate wildlife
in the sites studied were relatively less concerned with the expertise, when specialists’ reports on wildlife are requested
technical skills of existing personnel. As noted earlier, greater by the MP, they are often written by forestry experts. In many
budgetary resources might permit more training or salaries instances, the resulting reports either are poorly formulated or
high enough to attract higher-caliber employees. However, incorrectly identify species, making their utility to MP prosecu-
when the training offered to staff members is insufficient, hav- tors negligible.
ing more insufficiently trained staffers is unlikely to improve In many instances, quality of evidence gathered initially was
performance. Although having more enforcement agency staff very poor. By the time a case got to prosecution, there was no
members would no doubt help, increasing their individual longer any way to prove the crime. In Bahia, public prosecu-
technical skills and knowledge is also critical. tors recounted instances in which the evidence submitted by
Detection agents, investigators, prosecutors, and judges in the IBAMA was insufficient, but it could not be improved by
study sites all had limitations in their individual skills and the time of prosecution because, for instance, (1) a deforested
knowledge that might have been remedied through periodic virgin forest patch would already be grown over with secondary
or even one-time intensive training, but had not been. Instead, vegetation, or (2) a sawmill would have been dismantled and
detection agents receive limited training at the beginning of moved elsewhere, leaving no evidence.
their careers, if at all, and prosecutors and judges are rarely Detection agents often lacked the skills to think strategically
up-to-date on environmental law or policy. If and when some about optimizing use of limited resources to ensure targeted
training was given, each agency generally trained its own, efforts focused on priority areas and threats. For instance,
without the benefit of cross-fertilization that incorporating the fact that PROFEPA in the Selva Maya shows a number
other enforcement agencies in the capacity-building process of subsistence hunting cases but no wildlife trafficking cases,
might have provided. The effect of this weak capacity is when wildlife trafficking is known to be a major problem in
self-evident—when the enforcement actors do their jobs poorly the region, is telling. Unless PROFEPA agents are able to act
because they lack the skills they need, the enforcement system strategically to make linkages from the “subsistence” hunters
cannot function effectively. they encounter to the real drivers of the wildlife trade, their
work will be ineffectual in stemming biodiversity loss. This
Detection Agents and Investigators
study indicates that they currently lack the technical skills
Effective detection requires a variety of skills, and the job of a necessary to work at this level and, consequently, are having
detection agent or investigator can be challenging. Individual little effect on the most damaging problem.
agents must know enough law to identify an environmental
Detection and investigation agencies are not giving their
violation, must be able to accurately assess the nature of a
personnel the training that they need to be highly effective in
crime as well as the species and ecosystems involved, and must
their jobs. Clearly, there are many reasons: limited financial
be adept at collecting evidence and doing paperwork so that
resources, restricted internal technical expertise, and so on.
prosecutors are well equipped in court. The detection and
When people think about fi xing detection of illegal forest
investigation agencies must also know how to plan patrols,
clearing, for example, they most often argue for high-tech
mount proactive investigations, and help prosecutors build
solutions involving satellites and remote sensing capabilities.
strong cases.
While remote sensing can be a cost-effective way of detecting
Sadly, because of a lack of investment in human capital, infringements across large regions (and of special value when
detection agents and investigators in the countries we studied the areas are remote and not patrolled), it is not sufficient for
lacked many skills. In Bahia, we found various citations on strengthening enforcement unless the resources and capabilities
which detection agents had made errors—for instance, in to use the information effectively are available. Our work
describing the crime or assessing the nature of the crime—that indicates that complementary investments are needed to
made prosecution impossible. In Selva Maya, detection agents build the capacity of enforcement agencies’ human capital. In
had difficulty telling the difference between endangered and some—perhaps most—situations, investments in training the
not endangered wildlife, and they could not identify violations existing staff members could have an equally impressive effect
as a consequence. This limitation affected success in latter steps on quality of detection. Furthermore, the work of capacitated
of the enforcement chain. For instance, PROFEPA investigators detection agents and investigators would surely guarantee better
24
success in the latter steps of the enforcement system, further
contributing to systemic effectiveness. Poor training and lack of prosecutorial
Prosecutors technical capacity significantly undermine
Capacity issues compromise the quality of environmental crime
prosecution. In most of the countries we studied, there are no the performance of an enforcement regime.
specific prosecutors for the environment. Rather, prosecutors
are expected to handle all types of cases—from heinous crimes crime—improving prosecutor performance will prove difficult.
to petty theft to environmental violations. They receive little However, dedicating specific effort to building a core base of
training in environmental law and are, therefore, unable to capacitated prosecutors who can work with detection agencies
handle environmental cases well. To be effective, prosecutors to build strong cases, and who can present compelling cases
require more than just a sound understanding of environmental and appropriate sentencing recommendations to judges, could
law and its advances. They must also be knowledgeable about measurably improve the performance of enforcement overall.
detection agency procedures and capabilities, so that they can
Judges
maximize the information they have to work with. Further-
more, they must be able to determine what evidence is needed Like the other agencies involved in the enforcement system,
to make a strong argument in an environmental crime case, so the judiciary’s capacity deficit on environmental issues com-
that they can instruct detection agents and investigators who promises the quality of enforcement performance. In part, this
are helping build the case. Finally, they must understand the weakness results from the fact that, like prosecutors, judges are
concept of compensation of environmental damages, so that responsible for hearing all types of cases, and they receive no
they can make appropriate penalty recommendations to judges. special training in environmental law. This issue may even be
more pronounced among the members of the judiciary than
Examples demonstrating that prosecutors neither understand
among prosecutors. In Brazil, for instance, while the Ministério
detection agency procedure nor have the skills necessary to
Público (the ministry that houses public prosecutors) has made
guide the process of evidence collection have already been
some effort in recent years to draw attention to environmental
presented. The effect of prosecutors’ limited capacity to build
law issues, the magistracy has made no such strides. As a result,
and present strong cases is clearly demonstrated by results
a judge is unlikely to improve his or her environmental knowl-
from the case study sites. For instance, in Selva Maya, one
edge through institutional means and can do so only through
of the major factors contributing to lengthy processing times
personal interest (Tessller 2001). The outcome of this lack of
in PROFEPA’s administrative process is poor prosecutorial
capacity is predictable—judges often consider environmental
performance. Even though PROFEPA assigns specific prosecu-
crime to be less serious than other forms of crime, fail to
tors to handle environmental cases exclusively, they are respon-
convict environmental offenders, and frequently apply penalties
sible for all different types of environmental crimes. They also
that do not compensate for damages when they do convict.
lack the environmental law training necessary to execute this
While specific environmental courts presided over by judges
responsibility effectively.
with specific environmental training might be more effective,
Analysis shows that case arguments and penalty recommenda- such systems rarely exist in practice.
tions sent by PROFEPA prosecutors to the Judicial Area
In Brazil, our work showed that the penalties being applied by
Subdelegate for final approval are frequently returned to the
judges were insufficient and were not in keeping with the spirit
prosecutors without approval because of inadequacies in how
of that country’s Law of Environmental Crime. Although the
the cases are presented. In many instances, cases were returned
law is fairly explicit about what types of penalties (including jail
because the subdelegate felt that the arguments written were
time) are allowable for environmental crimes of different mag-
not well founded in legislation, that the cases had been poorly
nitudes, it also allows for the application of alternative penalties
drawn up, or that suggested sanctions were inadequate. When
that can keep offenders from spending time in jail. Even in the
a case would be returned to the prosecutors, their excessive
case of alternative penalties, penalties should be commensurate
workload would result in those cases falling to the bottom of
with the severity of the crime. However, our sample showed
the list of priorities, delaying proper presentation and final
that in many instances, major cases of deforestation were being
approval of the sanction by the subdelegate.
punished with very light penalties—such as (1) volunteering
Poor training and lack of prosecutorial technical capacity with the local university’s parks and garden corps or (2) donat-
significantly undermine the performance of an enforcement re- ing a basket of food to a charitable institution. Whether those
gime. In the prevailing climate in the countries studied—where penalties were the result of judges either underestimating the
prosecutors have limited training on environmental law and importance of environmental crime or not understanding the
are responsible for handling cases related to every type of penalty prescriptions of the law is unclear. With better training

25
in environmental law, however, both issues might have been
resolved. Even when detection and prosecution are
The role of the judge in the enforcement process is extremely
important. Appropriate sentencing and penalties are critical
weak, an effective and fair judge may
to the effectiveness of an enforcement regime. Even when
detection and prosecution are done perfectly, a judge whose
prove to be a catalyst in encouraging those
understanding of environmental law is limited and who
sentences and applies penalties inappropriately may easily undo
agencies to improve their performance.
the good work of the agencies that handled the case earlier in
the enforcement chain. Even when detection and prosecution the enforcement chain—detection agencies, prosecutorial
are weak, an effective and fair judge may prove to be a catalyst services, and the judiciary—do not maintain uniform case
in encouraging those agencies to improve their performance. tracking systems and do not calculate performance data or
But in the absence of specific training on environmental law monitor their performance in any systematic fashion. No
and on application of penalties in environmental cases, judges individual agency appears to monitor its own performance or
are more likely to contribute to a system’s failure to present a even manage its case data in a way that would be conducive to
substantial deterrent to environmental violations. doing such monitoring. Perhaps more important, the agen-
cies as a group do not work together to monitor the overall
As this section demonstrates, capacity issues are not limited effectiveness of the system, which comprises all of them. As
to one agency or one component of the enforcement chain. a result, those agencies are unable to adapt their enforcement
Rather, they permeate the system, creating inefficiencies and activities to improve effectiveness—either individually or as a
compromising effectiveness across the system. Efforts must be system.
made to build the technical knowledge and skills of personnel
in agencies throughout the enforcement system, if low technical Although most agencies do keep some records, there is little
capacity is to be removed as an obstacle to weak enforcement. consistency in the content or quality of the records that are
kept. Electronic case files are rare; when paper case files do
exist, they are not managed or organized in any systematic way.
Challenge 5: Lack of Performance Monitoring Tracking the progress of a case from the early stages of detec-
and Adaptive Management Systems tion through conviction and penalty can be virtually impos-
sible, because each agency that handles a case file numbers it
An overarching problem found consistently across sites and differently.
across agencies was the failure to monitor performance or to
make any systematic, routine efforts to measure effectiveness This weak system of data collection and management dem-
and to develop action plans for improving performance. In each onstrates that no effective efforts to review past performance
site, we found that the enforcement agencies had never done the are made by the detection agencies. Because they do not assess
type of systematic analysis of their performance that we have their own performance, those agencies are unable to identify
presented here. where the weaknesses in their overall system may lie. As a
result, they do not understand the complex causes of those
The complexity of gathering data for the quantitative case weaknesses and are unable to work jointly to develop adaptive
study analyses highlighted the fact that agencies involved in management strategies to improve performance.

26
Investment Priorities for Strengthening
Enforcement Performance SECTION VI

The preceding synthesized analysis demonstrates how numerous and complex the
problems are that plague enforcement systems. However, the analysis also shows
Solutions that focus
how methodical examination of an enforcement system can make understanding the
problems easier. Once the problems and their diverse causes are understood, some very
on only one step of the
commonsense solutions for strengthening enforcement performance become obvious. enforcement chain, or
Efforts to improve enforcement of environmental laws have frequently relied on mak-
ing large investments in detection. In the few places where weak detection is the only that fail to address the
major problem in the enforcement system, such investments will be highly effective.
However, the holistic vision of the enforcement economics framework makes one many issues contributing
thing clear. Solutions that focus on only one step of the enforcement chain, or that fail
to address the many issues contributing to a weak step, will have little effect on the to a weak step, will have
overall quality of enforcement in situations where enforcement is weak for a number
of reasons. To be most effective, investments must be directed at improving multiple little effect on the overall
facets of the problem simultaneously. In that way, scarce conservation dollars spent on
enforcement will be spent wisely. quality of enforcement....
Numerous organizations provide international technical assistance on environmental
enforcement issues to biodiversity-rich countries. Many offer highly specialized
training in one component of the enforcement system. Such organizations can greatly
increase their effect by ensuring that their technical assistance packages are part of a
broader comprehensive strategy for strengthening enforcement performance.
Using the findings of our enforcement work in the four case study sites, we have
identified three technical enforcement-strengthening priorities that we think should
be part of a global conservationist strategy for strengthening enforcement of natural
resource legislation and protected areas. The priorities, which are aimed at strengthen-
ing specific enforcement weaknesses, are also intended to serve the additional purpose
of augmenting interagency collaboration.
These recommendations are made at a fairly general level. The full potential breadth
of the recommendations is best defined through broader consultation with interna-
tional experts in environmental legislation, in monitoring enforcement performance,
and others. Similarly, site-specific enforcement-strengthening programs should be
designed in consultation with local experts and enforcement practitioners.
All the recommendations are derived from the work described here and, hence, are
technical in nature (as noted earlier). However, as previously described, technical
enforcement-strengthening efforts should not proceed as stand-alone activities. Rather,
it is essential for success that they be carried out as part of a package of activities that
fall into two general classes: (1) preventative activities that directly improve compli-
ance and reduce the enforcement challenge and (2) activities designed to ensure that
the laws and their enforcement are workable and fair. The most effective package of
activities will vary from place to place and should be developed by local experts and
stakeholders.

27
Investment Priority 1: Reform Enforcement actors. Providing comprehensive training programs that can be
adapted to different sites, as well as running those programs,
Policy is likely one of the most cost-effective ways to improve perfor-
Without an underlying framework of environmental legislation mance across the enforcement chain. Capacity-building efforts
that is consistent and clear, an enforcement system cannot be should incorporate the following elements, among others:
effective. When laws are weak in their language, or limited in • Improve performance of detection agents, prosecutors,
their coverage, they become open to interpretation and legal and judges through periodic training. Given the fact
loopholes, making them difficult to enforce. Similarly, in the that legislation and agency policies and procedures are
absence of internal policies that promote good performance, the consistently being updated or modified, it is critical that
activities of enforcement agencies are unlikely to be optimal. training—both in the classroom and through on-the-job
Any global effort to strengthen enforcement of environmental training—be offered to those audiences on a continuing
laws must dedicate substantial resources to improving the basis.
quality of environmental legislation and of enforcement agency • Involve all agencies in the enforcement chain in the
policies. Specifically, the efforts should focus on the following process of designing curricula for each audience.
reforms, among others: Although each agency responsible for a component of
• Increase budget allocations to agencies across the the enforcement chain claims that it can train its own
environmental enforcement chain. Funding should personnel, efforts to date have been either insufficient or
be earmarked within the agencies’ budgets for specific of limited availability. If representatives from across these
enforcement-strengthening activities. agencies worked together to determine what training
each set of actors needs, training programs could be
• Strengthen, clarify, and consolidate legislation. Particu- much more effective. Integrated training programs
lar attention should be paid to clearly defining environ- would provide trainees with a clearer vision of how the
mental violations, developing guidelines for applying overall system works. By so doing, they could ensure that
penalties, and ensuring that penalties prescribed by law the efforts of one agency or institution would bolster the
are internally consistent and sufficient to compensate for efforts of the later agencies and institutions that handle
environmental damages. environmental cases.
• Establish guidelines for interagency cooperation and • Take advantage of existing technical assistance partner-
annual performance reporting. Building the provisions ships with donor government agencies. A number of
into either law or internal agency policies not only will international aid agencies have existing technical assis-
allow enforcement agencies to be more mindful of their tance and capacity-building programs with enforcement
performance but also will force them to think like a agencies in biodiversity-rich countries. For instance, U.S.
system. agencies, including the Forest Service, State Department,
Environmental Protection Agency, and Fish and Wildlife
• Create the legal framework for alternative enforcement
Service, often have bilateral capacity-building activities
systems to operate. Because official enforcement systems
in countries of biodiversity importance. Intergovernmen-
may be ineffective, establishing the legal bases for
tal agencies such as the United Nations, Organization
community-based or other supplementary systems can
for Economic Cooperation and Development, and World
augment the likelihood of a credible deterrent.
Conservation Union also have some capacity to provide
this type of support. Consolidating the ongoing work
Investment Priority 2: Build Enforcement of multiple agencies into strategically designed capacity-
building efforts can increase their impact. Furthermore,
Capacity maximizing the use of existing means of capacity
The poor capacity of detection and investigation agents, building can substantially reduce the additional costs of
prosecutors, and judges presents a daunting challenge to expanded training programs.
effective enforcement. When enforcement personnel lack the
• Incorporate specialized local NGOs, think tanks, and
training necessary to perform their duties, all elements of the
institutes in capacity-building efforts. Enforcement
enforcement chain, and hence the deterrent value of the overall
training programs should not be developed only with
enforcement regime, are compromised.
government enforcement agencies. Many countries have
Any global effort to improve enforcement performance in strong local organizations or institutes whose expertise in
countries of high biodiversity importance must devote sub- the fields of environmental legislation, biological priority
stantial resources to building the capacity of these enforcement setting, and capacity building is very strong and can

28
 help make training efforts locally relevant. Such groups for managing data and calculating performance statis-
should be incorporated into the process of designing and tics.
executing training programs.
• Reach agreement on enforcement statistics (indicators)
to be produced annually. Given the variety of enforce-
Investment Priority 3: Implement Performance ment statistics and the different purposes they serve, it is
Monitoring and Adaptive Management Systems important for enforcement agencies across the chain to
agree to a set of indicators to be produced annually. The
When enforcement agencies do not monitor their individual process of developing indicators agreed to by all agencies
performance or do not work together to assess the whole can be complicated and may take a few years. While that
system’s effectiveness in deterring environmental violations, process is under way, the enforcement economics model’s
they cannot implement the changes vital to improving the probabilities, which measure the success rate of each step
system. In many developed countries, enforcement agencies in the enforcement chain, can serve as basic indicators of
are required to periodically calculate performance indicators, enforcement performance.
which are made publicly available. But the poor collection and
• Train key staff members in data collection and manage-
management of data by enforcement agencies in biodiversity-
ment, analysis of enforcement statistics, and develop-
rich countries makes this type of regular performance evalua-
ment of strategic enforcement-strengthening plans. To
tion very difficult and expensive.
successfully implement performance monitoring and
Investments in other enforcement-strengthening efforts must adaptive management systems, an integrated corps of
be complemented by investments in developing enforcement technical staff members with the capacity to develop,
performance monitoring and adaptive management systems. It generate, and interpret enforcement indicators must be
is only with such systems that the success or failure of the other created. To be highly effective, this group’s members
investments can be gauged. The design of performance moni- must understand both the broad enforcement system and
toring and adaptive management systems should incorporate the operations of individual agencies. This knowledge
the following elements: will allow members to work with senior management
of the enforcement agencies to understand the reasons
• Develop standardized data management systems
behind identified weaknesses and to develop strategic
for use across agencies. Integration of case-tracking
solutions.
databases makes observing the progress of cases as they
move through the enforcement chain feasible, which • Require annual publication and public disclosure
it currently is not in many places. Tracking cases from of enforcement performance reports. Informed civil
beginning to end is a basic use of information—but even society can be a strong engine for reform. Evaluating
that information can be used to calculate basic perfor- performance of individual agencies and the overall
mance indicators such as the enforcement economics system annually, in addition to making evaluation
model’s probabilities. Developing a simple multiagency results transparently available, is critical to ensuring
case-tracking system can lay the groundwork for future that enforcement agencies continually work to perform
interagency efforts to develop more complicated systems effectively.

29
 SECTION VII Conclusion
This finding does not The poor enforcement of natural resource laws in countries of high biodiversity
importance is widely acknowledged, but its underlying causes are often poorly under-
bode well for biodiversity stood. The primary innovation of the enforcement economics analyses detailed here
is that they present a rare quantitative measure of exactly how bad enforcement is. In
conservation efforts, sites where a probability of detection could be estimated, the cumulative probability of
a case resulting in a conviction was less than 0.01. In other words, less than 1 percent
because many innovative of environmental crimes result in a conviction.
What the numbers reveal is stunning. In all sites studied, the deterrent generated
approaches to conserva- by the enforcement regime was grossly insufficient to offset the incentives that drive
illegal environmental activity. We believe that this result is not particular to the coun-
tion require adequate tries that we analyzed, but rather that enforcement of environmental laws is abysmal
in most countries of biodiversity importance.30 This finding does not bode well for
enforcement if they are biodiversity conservation efforts, because many innovative approaches to conservation
require adequate enforcement if they are to be effective.
to be effective. Clearly, enforcement of environmental laws should not be seen as an end unto itself.
Ultimately, improving enforcement is only one of the elements necessary to ensure
compliance. For enforcement strengthening to contribute to increasing compliance, the
laws to be enforced must be just and equitable. Furthermore, enforcement must be part
of a package that also includes two other types of actions: (1) preventative activities
that directly improve compliance and reduce the enforcement challenge and (2) activi-
ties designed to ensure that the laws and their enforcement are workable and fair.
The underlying causes of poor enforcement are many, and problems often permeate
every step of the enforcement chain. Our work in the field points to five common
challenges that impede effective enforcement. First, poor interagency cooperation
makes it difficult for the enforcement system to run smoothly and to work effectively
as a system. Second, inadequate budgetary resources cause personnel and infrastruc-
ture weaknesses that compromise quality of enforcement. Furthermore, this lack of
budget makes any concerted overhaul of the enforcement system impossible and makes
lasting change difficult. Third, technical deficiencies in the laws and agency policies
that support effective enforcement—which are fundamental for the system’s proper
functioning—make performance less than optimal. Fourth, insufficient technical
skills and knowledge of personnel from across the enforcement chain lead to poor
execution of enforcement responsibilities, thus reducing the likelihood that violators
will be sanctioned. Finally, the lack of performance monitoring and adaptive manage-
ment systems means that neither enforcement agencies nor the public at large have any
concrete indication of how effective the system is in deterring environmental crime.
Without a precise understanding of where the system’s weaknesses are and why they
exist, strategic plans to improve performance cannot be designed and implemented.
Because enforcement systems are holistic in nature, a system can be only as strong as
the weakest element in the chain. That being the case, investments in improving one
element in the chain will be ineffective if other elements remain weak. While raising
fines and investing in detection capacity are common solutions to weak enforcement,
the enforcement economics logic clearly demonstrates that such investments in
30
isolation are unlikely to be effective in most cases. However, the by investments in developing enforcement performance
investment priorities presented in this analysis fit the profile of monitoring and adaptive management systems. Such systems
the type of efforts that are likely to result in significant im- will allow the success or failure of the other investments to be
provement of enforcement performance. Improving the quality gauged.
of environmental legislation and enforcement agency policies is
critical to ensuring that the foundation for enforcement efforts If scarce conservation dollars are to be spent on strengthening
is solid. Building capacity of personnel across the enforcement enforcement, they must be spent in ways that will guarantee
chain is vital to effective enforcement, because lack of capacity the maximum improvement in performance. The challenges
frequently contributes to inefficiencies in the functioning of noted here demonstrate that while the factors contributing to
the system. Capacity-building efforts should be implemented weak enforcement are complex, understanding those factors is
using jointly developed training programs that are executed simple if the right analytical framework is used. Once they are
in partnership with local expert institutions and with those understood, effective and efficient solutions for addressing the
international technical assistance providers that are already challenges become apparent. Strengthening the weakest links
working with enforcement agencies. Finally, investments in in this way is an indispensable part of any package whose aim is
other enforcement-strengthening efforts must be complemented to successfully achieve biodiversity conservation.

31
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32
 Endnotes
1 Defined as a vein of behavioral economics that sprang from efforts to 18 There were a few cases of logging without a permit.
understand the factors influencing the decision whether or not to commit a 19 All information is from Suryadi , Cannon, and Widjayanto (2004). The value
crime (Becker 1968). of the disincentive climbs to nearly $1,000 when the value of confiscated
2 Sutinen 1987. timber is included.
3 Developed from Sutinen 1987. 20 The probability of detection was obtained by dividing the quantity of illegal
4 The quantitative analyses that are presented here used a 20 percent discount timber by the estimated total quantity of illegal logging. The quantity of illegal
rate. timber detected was obtained from the case information. The estimated
total quantity of illegal logging was based on information from the Provincial
5 An administrative process occurs entirely within the detection agency Forestry Service.
generally, does not involve appearing in court, and can result in sanctions like
confiscation or a fine. A judicial process begins in the detection agency and
21 Considering the penalty alone.
ultimately ends up in the courts system, where sentence is assigned by a 22 Note that these probabilities translate into likelihoods of 6.2, 0.3, 85, 62, and
judge. 24 percent.
6 For this report, “enforcement agency” refers not only to detection agencies 23 Local data collection in the Calamianes was done by ELAC. Analysis was
and investigators but also to prosecutorial services and the judiciary—name- done jointly.
ly, all the agencies involved in the enforcement chain. 24 Both of which are provincial branches of a federal agency.
7 The detailed findings on factors affecting performance in each site, as 25 For instance, the Philippines Coast Guard is mandated to enforce “all
well as the strategic action plans developed to improve performance, are applicable laws upon the high seas and territorial waters of the Philippines
published separately. including all ports, custom zones, waterways, and other inland waters”
8 Note that these probabilities translate into likelihoods of 100, 100, 51, and 16 (Mayo-Anda, et al. 2004).
percent. 26 Analyzing and explaining the performance of the whole enforcement system
9 This value is based on 1997 data from IESB (Mesquita 1997), corrected to can also provide incentive to cooperate more closely—a point that will be
calculate an equivalent 2004 value. explored in subsequent sections.
10 Although corruption was also identified as a contributing factor, no specific 27 Ironically, when licensing powers are unclear, agencies are more likely to
analysis of corruption was conducted. fight for the right to do the licensing—because the licensing agency receives
licensing fees.
11 Per IBAMA procedure, records of complaints and overall detections are not
kept, and the first record of a case is the citation that is filled out by IBAMA. 28 Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, or Regional Trial Court.
12 Note that these probabilities translate into likelihoods of 100, 58, 69, and 3 29 Either the state prosecutor’s or federal prosecutor’s office, but files often
percent. would be sent to the wrong one.
13 Please note that probability of prosecution is different from probability of 30 These often are developing countries. Although enforcement is often poor
processing; the former refers to the judicial process and the latter refers to in developed countries, the lower opportunity cost of not acting illegally in
the administrative process that was the focus of this study. these richer countries makes environmental rule-breaking less pervasive.
14 Note that these probabilities translate into likelihoods of 3.2, 6.8, 84, 41, and
85 percent.
15 Probability of conviction is for cases heard in regency (local) courts. The
probability of conviction presented here does not include the results of
appeals to higher courts.
16 The average value of the penalty and confiscated timber is $164,706 (rupiah
to US$ exchange rate of 9.383 rupiah to US$1 for the period of 2001–2003.
Source: Pacific Exchange Rate Service at the Sauder School of Business,
University of British Columbia).
17 The enforcement disincentive including the value of confiscated timber is
$890.43.

33
 Glossary of Abbreviations
BKSDA Provincial Office for Natural Resources Conservation
CCG Center for Conservation and Government
CI Conservation International
ED enforcement disincentive
ELAC Environmental Legal Assistance Center
FCI Forest Civil Investigators
IBAMA Brazilian Institute for the Environment and Renewable Natural Resources
IESB Institute for Social and Environmental Studies of Southern Bahia
LRFT live reef fish trade
MP Ministério Público
NGO nongovernmental organization
PNP Philippines National Police
PROFEPA Federal Prosecutorial Service for Environmental Protection
LGEEPA General Law on Ecological Balance and Environmental Protection
USAID U.S. Agency for International Development

34
 This research was
conducted with support
from the USAID Global
Conservation Program

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