Security Dilemma vs. US Policy Towards China
Security Dilemma vs. US Policy Towards China
Security Dilemma vs. US Policy Towards China
1*
Relations)
September 2001
of Power.”
Security Dilemma Vs. US Policy Towards China in the Post-Cold War Era
1*
Xiandai Guoji Guanxi is the journal of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations.
2
John H. Herz, “Idealist Internationalism and Security Dilemma”, World Politics, Vol. 2(1950), p.157-158;
International Politics in the Atomic Age, Columbia University Press, 1959, p.231.
military budgets, and weapon acquirement). The Asia-
Pacific is the most prevailing and outstanding security
dilemma in the world.3
Since China is viewed as a rising “revisionist” power
in the Asia-Pacific, the “China Threat” is very popular in
Japan and Southeast Asian countries. The territorial
disputes between China and Japan, India, Vietnam, the
Philippines, Brunei, and Malaysia—plus tensions across the
Taiwan Strait—have provided the US with certain
opportunities to alienate China from its neighbors by
playing up the security dilemma. In Strategic Appraisal
1996, the RAND Corporation recommended that the US
government reinforce alliances with Japan and ROK, improve
cooperation with ASEAN, and support the defense of Taiwan
and ASEAN in order to contain China.4
The most conspicuous example of the US using the
security dilemma theory to contain China is the issue of
Taiwan.5 The US never ceased, but continued to upgrade
arms sales to Taiwan in order to guarantee the so-called
military balance between the Mainland and Taiwan. In
April 2000, newly elected President Bush proclaimed that
the US would assist in the self-defense of Taiwan at all
costs, sending a clear signal to the concerned parties
that the policy goal of the US was to prolong the “no war,
no independence, and no unification” situation infinitely.
Some Americans believed that the arms race between the
3
SHI Yinhong, “Security Dilemma and the Need for a Security Regime in East Asia”, Strategy and Management,
2000.4, p.87.
4
Zalmay Khalizad, “U.S. Grand Strategy: Implications for the United States and the World”, Strategic Appraisal
5
Although Taiwan is a province not a state, we could still apply the security dilemma theory to the case given the
fact that Taiwan is publicly engaged in military confrontation with the Mainland.
and frontier security of China would be at stake.
disintegration.
3.As long as the status quo of “no war, no
independence, and no unification” across the strait
is maintained, Taiwan would remain a pro-US entity
that has no other option but to totally rely on the
Americans for security and protection. The Mainland
would then be on the strategic defensive, and its
influence in East Asia would be largely constrained.
The US could then ensure that the regional situation
will continue to be favorable, and maintain its
unique dominance in East Asia. Taiwan publicly
confronting the Mainland would not only justify the
American involvement in regional security affairs,
but would also worry China’s neighbors that a
potential reunification by military means could lead
to regional turmoil and endanger the economic and
security interests of the region, hence creating a
disadvantageous security environment for China.
4.To sustain a certain degree of tension across the
6
LIU Jinghua, “The Rise and Fall of Hegemonism”, China Economic Press, 1997, p. 148.
consolidating military bases in Japan and South Korea, the
unprecedented challenges.
Balance of Power Vs. US Policy Towards China in the Post-Cold War Era
7
Kenneth Waltz, Theories of International Politics (Chinese Translation), University of People’s Public Security
8
GUO Xuetang, “Collective Security Vs. Balance of Power—the Evolution of International Political System”,
9
Hans Morgenthau, International Politics—Striving for Power and Peace (Chinese Translation), Shanghai
10
Hans Morgenthau, International Politics—Striving for Power and Peace (Chinese Translation), Shanghai
11
Kenneth Waltz, Theories of International Politics (Chinese Version), University of People’s Public Security
12
Lee Kuan Yew, “How Will Bush Administration Maintain Stability in East Asia”, The Straits Times, April 13,
2001.
13
MA Yu’an, “Japan’s Geo-Foreign Strategy—Seeking the Big Political Power Status”, World Economy and
14
Janis C. Hosing, The Reagan Administration and U.S. Policy toward PRC and Taiwan, Mass: Oelgesch Lager
15
The New York Times, April 21, 2001.
16
Samuel Huntington, Cultural Conflicts and Restructuring of World Order, www.shuku.net
expansion, ABM revision, and Chechnya, the US could only
containing China.
17
CHEN Fengjun ed., International Relations in the Asia-Pacific after the Cold War, Xinhua Press, 1999, p.162.
18
Tokyo Shinbun, April 16, 1996.
19
The Los Angeles Times, February 26, 1994.
20
Michael Green and Patrick Cronin, The US-Japan Alliance: Past, Present and Future (Chinese translation),
21
WANG Hongbin and NI Feng, “US-Japan Alliance Vs. Asia-Pacific Security”, Contemporary Asia-Pacific,
1998.3, p.6.
India relationship today is “just like an unsunken,
unrotten, but static boat”.22 The stagnant Sino-India
relations opened a door for the US to attempt to rope in
India to contain China. The unhappy experience with China
in the past and the current suspicion of Beijing has made
New Delhi an ideal partner in Asia for the US when
implementing a containment strategy against China.23 In
order to contain China, the US even acquiesced in the
Indian nuclear tests because it felt Russia from the
North, Japan and South Korea from the East, and India from
the West and the South could check a rising China. “One
day Americans will be grateful to the Indian nuclear
tests.”24 When visiting India, Mr. Huntington advocated in
an undisguised way that, “…in the future India has three
options. First, to remain an insolated country, then it
will be marginalized; second, to stand only with other
Asian countries, then it will be under the shadow of China
forever; and third, to coordinate with the US, then it
will not only enjoy economic prosperity but also safeguard
its security.”25 Some believed that the US was building a
security line encircling China by allying Japan, South
Korea, India, the Philippines and Thailand. India was
viewed as the fortress in the West wing.26
India always regarded China as “the biggest challenge
in the region and threat to its security in the 21st
Century.”27 American scholars also perceived the Indian
intention of containing China through the hands of the US.
“India’s strategy is to exploit the conflicts between
China and the US and to act as a part-time agent for the
latter so to resist the danger from China.”28 This means
that there are quite a number of common interests between
India and the US in containing China, and there could be
more common ground between them in this regard in the
future.
Besides, the US did its utmost to expand its military
22
Ms. Mira Sinha Bhattacharjea’s (Co-Chairperson, Institute of Chinese Studies, India) speech at the Seminar on
the Status Quo and Prospects of the Sino-India Relations sponsored by China Review (a Hong Kong-based
23
Washington Quarterly, Winter 2000.
24
Thomas L. Friedman, “Indian Asks Why America Ignores It and Courts China”, International Herald Tribune,
1998.
25
Global Times, June 1, 2001.
26
Joe Pan Cousie, “Pressing China”, Intelligence Digest, January 21, 2000.
27
LIANG Jiejun, “India’s Trans-century National Security Strategy”, Xiandai Guoji Guanxi, 1999.5, p.23.
28
William Walker, “International Nuclear Relations After the Indian and Pakistani Test Explosions”, International
Conclusion