George T Dennis, Trans - Maurice's Strategikon. Handbook of Byzantine Military Strategy
George T Dennis, Trans - Maurice's Strategikon. Handbook of Byzantine Military Strategy
George T Dennis, Trans - Maurice's Strategikon. Handbook of Byzantine Military Strategy
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·INTRODUCTION·
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and then Hunnish, warriors, all horsemen, marked a break with Ro-
man military tradition.
In the western part of the empire the Roman army disintegrated
and was gradually replaced by the private armies of great landowners
or those of Germanic warlords. In the East the army, as other institu-
tions, continued in being but was profoundly transformed. The pe-
riod in which this transformation occurred, however, is one in which
there is an unfortunate gap in our historical sources. Reliable infor-
mation about the middle and late fifth century is not plentiful, and
the army which emerges after that is very different from what it had
been.
The eastern half of the empire had been badly shaken by Ger-
manic invaders, Huns, and !saurians; religious controversies rankled,
and the Persians were still a menace. But its larger population,
its greater economic resources, its prosperous municipal life, and its
solid administrative structure helped it to weather the series of crises
which had submerged the West. The concept of one empire per-
sisted, though, and it was the emperor's duty to make that concept a
reality. Emperor Justinian, in particular, directed all his energies to-
ward achieving that goal.
Justinian played a leading role in the government during his uncle
Justin's reign ( 518- 27) and ruled by himself to 565. The restoration
of the universal Roman Empire animated his every move. This ob-
viously included the recovery of the western lands occupied by Ger-
manic tribes. The talented general Belisarius sailed to Africa in 533
with a force of 18,000 troops, and within a year secured the submis-
sion of the Vandals. In 535 he began what would become a twenty
years' war against the Ostrogoths in Italy. Eventually the Byzantine
armies under the command of Narses completed the subjugation of
the country. A section of Spain was also reconquered, and for a while
the Mediterranean almost became a Roman lake again.
While the credit for these impressive achievements belongs to the
efficient management of Justinian and to some outstanding generals,
mention must be made of their choice of armament and tactics. In
the course of the fifth century these had evolved and improved. The
Romans learned from their enemies, Teutonic or Persian, and turned
their weapons against them. The Roman soldier in Justinian's time
usually fought on horseback. Protected by his helmet and by mail,
lamellar, or scale armor, he carried bow and arrow and a sword or
else spear and shield. In the first chapter of his history of Justinian 's
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N T R 0 D u c T 0 N
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not to pay the tribute, war broke out and dragged on for some
twenty years without either side gaining a clear victory. Most of it
was fought over Armenia, which both states coveted for strategic
and economic reasons. For the Byzantines, in addition, a good source
of mercenaries had dried up when the Germanic peoples migrated
elsewhere. They were coming to rely more and more on the Arme-
nians for soldiers, and could not allow their land to fall under Persian
rule. Internal troubles in Persia finally solved the problem for the
Byzantines. The eil}peror Maurice (582-602) was able to carry the
war to a successful conclusion, and in 591 arranged for a peace treaty
in which the Persians yielded much of their Armenian conquests to
Byzantium.
In the Balkan peninsula the situation could be considered even
more serious. Early injustinian's reign Slavic tribes began wandering
and raiding across the Danube into the Balkans. It was not long be-
fore one of the nomadic peoples of Asia, the Avars, arrived and estab-
lished a loose sort of empire in East Central Europe. The Avars, who
are mentioned several times in the Strate9ikon, easily asserted their
authority over the Slavs, and then turned their attention toward the
Byzantine borders. In 582, the year of Maurice's accession to
the throne, they seized the important fortified city of Sirmium and,
with the Slavs, laid waste the entire Balkan peninsula. In the next few
years Thessalonica was attacked twice. Far more ominous, though,
was the fact that the Slavs were no longer content with raiding, but
were settling themselves permanently on Byzantine land.
Maurice could do little against the Slavs until he had brought the
Persians under control, and it was not until 592 that he commenced
large-scale operations against them. Several times the Byzantine
army crossed the Danube and defeated the Slavs and Avars. But
there were simply too many of them in those remote and hostile
regions, and the campaigns dragged on. The soldiers became dis-
couraged at continuing a war they could not win. In 602, when or-
dered to spend the winter north of the Danube, they revolted,
marched on Constantinople, overthrew Maurice, and proclaimed
the half-barbarian Phokas as emperor. Without opposition the Slavs
then continued their occupation of the Balkans.
Although he failed to contain the Slavic invaders, Maurice may
well be regarded as one of the outstanding Byzantine rulers. He still
thought in terms of a universal Roman Empire, and he reorganized
the territories remaining in the West along military lines. The exar-
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N T R 0 D u c T 0 N
2. History <f the Byzantine State, trans. J. Hussey (New Brunswick, N.J.,
1969), 80.
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N T R 0 D u c T 0 N
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xv
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xvi
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in the organization of the army and its tactics. Long ago F. Aus-
saresses concluded that although the emperor's authorship cannot be
categorically proven, all the evidence is clearly in favor of it. 8
More recently John Wiita has proposed that the treatise may have
been written by Philippicus, general and brother-in-law of Maurice. 9
He seems to have served with Maurice on the eastern frontier in
577-82, and in 583 became supreme commander in those regions
(magister militum per orientem). He accumulated some wealth and built
a monastery and villa near Constantinople. Although not consis-
tently successful on the battlefield, he had good rapport with his
officers and troops. An experienced and cautious general, he was
noted for his study of history and the characteristics of other nations.
He had a special interest in Hannibal, which is of some relevance,
since two of the half-dozen or so anecdotes in the book concern him.
In short, he possessed the qualities found in the author of the Stra-
tegikon. He was forced to spend the years 603-610 in a monastery,
which would have given him the opportunity for reflection, re-
search, and writing. He died about 615.
In the ancient and medieval worlds, of course, naming an em-
peror as author of a work does not necessarily mean that he took pen
in hand and actually wrote out the words. It could, and often enough
did, mean that the work was composed and written at his orders or
under his direction. Such could be the case with Maurice and his
Handbbok. Still, there are so many personal touches that one be-
comes almost convinced that the work was planned and written
directly by an experienced military commander, a general or an em-
peror. Whether this person was Emperor Maurice is a question to
which no unqualified answer can be given.
The original Strategikon consisted of the first eleven books, for the
author explicitly concluded his work at the end of Book XI. The
general index at the beginning may have been compiled by the au-
thor, and the introduction too was probably composed by him and
included in the original work, for in style and content it clearly forms
an integral part of the text. Book XII, or most of it, was added later,
but not much later, and certainly by the author himself. In explaining
the articles of war to the infantry he states: ". . . as we mentioned in
the treatise on the cavalry."
xvii
N T R 0 D u c T 0 N
10. The history of the text is discussed in detail by Dennis, Das Strategikon,
28-42.
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N T R 0 D u c T 0 N
xix
N T R 0 D u c T 0 N
:xx
N T R 0 D u c T 0 N
11. Apart from Scheffer's Latin and Mihaescu 's Rumanian translations, there is
a Russian one by K. Tsybyshev, Mavrikii Taktika i Strate9ija (St. Petersburg,
1903), and two in French, both unpublished, cited by Dain, "Les Strate-
gistes," 344.
xxi
M A u R c E s
1. Maurice had decreed that all imperial documents should begin: "In the
name of our Lord Jesus Christ, our God and Savior." Then the Trinitarian
formula came to be employed regularly, its first recorded use being in 605:
see John Wiita, "The Ethnika in Byzantine Military Treatises" (Ph.D. diss.,
University of Minnesota, 1977), 21.
8
s T R A T E G K 0 N
cred we are doing. Our concern, rather, has been with practicality
and brevity of expression. With this in mind, a good number of Latin
terms and other expressions in ordinary military use have been em-
ployed to make it easier to understand the subject matter. If, then,
anything useful be found in this comPosition, thanks be to Almighty
God, who has favored us with some understanding of these matters.
And if any general should through his own experience and diligence
come to understand more about such matters, thanks be again to
God, the giver of all good things, and may we, if we seem too enthu-
siastic, be judged leniently.
First, we urge UPon the general that his most imPortant concern
be the love of God and justice; building on these, he should strive to
win the favor of God, without which it is imPossible to carry out any
plan, however well devised it may seem, or to overcome any enemy,
however weak he may be thought. For all things are ruled by the
providence of God, a providence which extends even to the birds
and the fishes. A helmsman, now, even the best, finds that his skill is
useless when the winds are not blowing favorably, but when he has
them with him and also puts his skill to use, he has no difficulty in
doubling the ship's run. So it is with a good general. Armed with the
favor of God and, without pausing to rest, employing his tactical and
strategical skills, he manages the army entrusted to him with confi-
dence and is able to counter the various machinations of the enemy.
It is this which makes things tum out to one's advantage and which
brings one's plans to a favorable conclusion. To those he deals with
the general should appear calm and untroubled; his food and cloth-
ing should be plain and simple; his entourage should not be elaborate
and ostentatious; he should be tireless and painstaking in attending
to his duties, not slack or careless; care and persistence will easily
carry him through the most difficult situations. If he shows no con-
cern for a problem, that problem will show no concern for him.
He should often deliberate about his most serious problems and
carry out what he has decided with as little delay and risk as Possible.
For opPortunity is what cures problems. To his subordinates he
should appear even-tempered. He ought not to be easy in dealing
with those who have committed offenses out of cowardice or care-
lessness in the hope of being regarded as a good leader, for a good
leader does not encourage cowardice and laziness. On the other
hand, he ought not to punish hastily and without a full investigation
9
M A u R c E s
just to show he can act firmly. The first leads to contempt and dis-
obedience; the other to well-deserved hatred with all its conse-
quences. Both of these are extremes. The better course is to join fear
with justice, that is, impase a fitting punishment upon offenders after
proof of guilt. This, for reasonable men, is not punishment, but cor-
rection, and aids in maintaining order and discipline.
10
s T R A T E G K 0 N
BOOK I·
Introduction
2. It seems that the Roman manner, taken from the steppe nomads, consisted
of drawing the bowstring with thumb and forefinger, whereas the Persians
did it with the lower three fingers: A. Bivar, "Cavalry Equipment and Tac-
tics on the Euphrates Frontier," Dumbarton Oaks Papers 26 (1972): 285.
3. These exercises are mentioned by Vegetius, Epitoma rei militaris, I, 18. The
Life of St. Anastasius the Persian (martyred in 628) records that in March
the soldiers were accustomed to equip their horses and train them for
battle: Acta S. Anastasii Persae, ed. H. Usener, Programma Universitatis Bon-
nae ( 1884 ), 23.
11
M A u R c E s
12
s T R A T E G K 0 N
Unskilled men should use lighter bows. Given enough time, even
those who do not know how to shoot will learn, for it is essential that
they do so.
The horses, especially those of the officers and the other special
troops, 5 in particular those in the front ranks of the battle line,
should have protective pieces of iron armor about their heads and
breast plates of iron or felt, or else breast and neck coverings such as
the Avars use.
The saddles should have large and thick cloths; the bridles should
be of good quality; attached to the saddles should be two iron stir-
rups, 6 a lasso with thong, hobble, a saddle bag large enough to hold
three or four days' rations for the soldier when needed. There should
be four tassels on the back strap, one on top of the head, and one
under the chin.
The men's clothing, especially their tunics, whether made of
linen, goat's hair, or rough wool, should be broad and full, cut ac-
cording to the Avar pattern, so they can be fastened to cover the
knees while riding and give a neat appearance.
They should also be provided with an extra-large cloak or hooded
mantle of felt with broad sleeves to wear, large enough to wear over
their armament, including the coat of mail and the bow. Then, in
case it should rain or be damp from the dew, by wearing this gar-
ment over the coat of mail and the bow they may protect their arma-
ment and still not find it awkward to use the bow or the lance. Such
cloaks are also necessary in another way on patrol, for when the mail
is covered by them, its brightness will not be seen at a distance by the
enemy, and they also provide some protection against arrows.
Each squad should have a tent, as well as sickles and axes to meet
any contingency. It is well to have the tents of the Avar type, which
combine practicality with good appearance. 7
The men, especially those receiving allowances for the purpose,
should certainly be required to provide servants for themselves, slave
or free, according to the regulations in force. At the time of dis-
tributing pay, care should be taken, just as with the soldiers, to regis-
ter the servants and their arms, and inquiry should be made to know
5. That is, dekarch, pentarch, tetrarch, and the two file guards.
6. For stirrup Maurice uses the word skala, step or stair, for it had only recently
come into use among the Byzantines and they did not have a special word
for it.
7. The Avar tents were round and roomy.
13
M A u R c E s
under what sort of title they receive their pay. Should they neglect
this and find themselves without servants, then in time of battle it
will be necessary to detail some of the soldiers themselves to the
baggage train, and there will be fewer fighting in the ranks. But if, as
can easily happen, some of the men are unable to afford servants,
then it will be necessary to require that three or four lower-ranking
soldiers join in maintaining one servant. A similar arrangement
should be followed for the pack animals, which may be needed to
carry the coats of mail and the tents.
The fields of the flags in each meros should be of the same color,
and the streamers in each moira should also have their own color, so
that each individual tagma may easily recognize its own standard.
Other distinctive devices known to the soldiers should be imposed
on the fields of the flags, so that they may easily be recognized ac-
cording to meros, moira, and tagma. The standards of the merarchs
should be particularly distinctive and conspicuous, so they may be
recognized by their troops at a great distance. 8
The general must see that his baggage train carries extra arms,
especially bows and arrows, to replace those weapons which are
likely to be lost.
While in winter quarters, the commanders of the tagmas, if they
cannot easily purchase supplies in the country, should ascertain their
needs. They should then let the merarchs know how many horses
and what sort of equipment and arms the troops under their com-
mand need, so that the general may make timely arrangements to
purchase them for the soldiers.
Besides the leather cases for the coats of mail, they should have
light wicker ones. During battle or on raids they may be carried be-
hind the saddle arch by the horse's loins. Then if, as in the case of a
reversal, the men with the spare horses are missing for a day, the
coats of mail will not be left unprotected and ruined and the soldiers
will not be worn out by the constant weight of the armor.
14
s T R A T E G K 0 N
names of the officers, the units, and the other soldiers which form
part of a complete study of tactics. Our intention in doing this is to
give our readers a more accurate knowledge, so that on first hearing
such names they may not find that they do not know what they
mean.
First, the head and leader of the whole army is called the general;
the man who ranks second after him is the lieutenant general (hypo-
strate9os ). The merarch is the one entrusted with the command of a
meros; the moirarch is the commander of a moira and is called
a duke. A meros or division is an assemblage or grouping composed
of three moiras. A moira is made up of tagmas, arithmoi, or bandons.
A count or tribune commands the tagma, arithmos, or bandon. 9 Il-
arch is the term for the first of the hekatontarchs, who is second in
command to the count or tribune. A hekatontarch commands a
hundred men, just as a dekarch is the leader of ten, and the pentarch
of five. The tetrarch, also known as the guard, is the leader of the rear
guard and the last in the file. The standard bearer carries the sym-
bol of the bandon. Next in rank to him is the cape bearer. 10 The
moirarchs of the Optimates are referred to as taxiarchs. 11 The auxil-
iary soldier or shield bearer of one of the Optimates is called man-
at-arms.
Assault troops is the term used for those who move out ahead of
the main line and rush upon the retreating enemy. 12 Defenders are
those who follow them, not charging out or breaking ranks, but
marching in good order as a support for the assault troops if they
should happen to fall back. 13 Medical corpsmen is the name for those
who follow behind the line to rescue and take care of those wounded
in the battle. 14 Quartering parties are those troops who on the march
go ahead of the main column to reconnoiter and look for good roads
and places to pitch camp. Surveyors are those who measure and set
15
M A u R c E s
up the camps. Spies are called scouts. Flank guards are those assigned
to guard the flanks of the first line. Outflankers are those who are
assigned to envelop the enemy wings. The baggage train consists of
the soldiers' supplies and includes servants, pack animals, and other
beasts.
16
s T R A T E G K 0 N
they are, the enemy can easily estimate the size of the army by count-
ing standards. Still, the statement we have made above should be
observed, that is, the tagma should not contain more than four hun-
dred men or less than two hundred.
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M A u R c E s
laws. Otherwise a written copy should be given to the commanding
officer so he can explain them to the men .when they have more
time.IS
( 1) If a soldier disobeys his own pentarch or tetrarch, he shall be
punished. And if a pentarch or tetrarch disobeys his dekarch, or dek-
arch his hekatontarch, they shall likewise be punished.
(2) If any member of the tagma shall dare to do this to his com-
manding officer, the count or the tribune of the tagma, he shall un-
dergo capital punishment.
( 3) If a soldier is unjustly treated by anyone, he shall appeal to the
commanding officer of his tagma, but if unjustly treated by that com-
manding officer himself~ he shall go to the next-higher officer.
(4) If anyone presumes to stay beyond the time of his furlough,
he shall be dismissed from the army and as a civilian handed over to
the civil authorities.
( 5) If any soldiers dare, for any reason whatsoever, to enter into a
conspiracy, sedition, or mutiny against their commanding officer,
they shall undergo capital punishment, in particular the ringleaders
of any such conspiracy or mutiny.
(6) If anyone who has been entrusted with the defense of a city or
fortress shall betray the same or shall desert his post against the
orders of his commanding officer, he shall undergo the extreme
penalty.
(7) If anyone be found guilty of wanting to desert to the enemy,
he shall undergo the extreme penalty, not only he but also anyone
who knew of it, because he knew yet did not report it to the com-
manding officer.
(8) If anyone after hearing the orders of his dekarch does not
carry them out, he shall be punished. But ifhe does not do so out of
ignorance of the orders, the dekarch should be punished for not hav-
ing informed him beforehand.
(9) If anyone finds a stray animal or any other object, small or
large, and does not report it and tum it over to his commanding
officer, he shall be punished, not only he but anyone who knows
about it, as thieves both of them.
( 10) If anyone causes injury to a taxpayer and refuses to make
compensation, he shall repay double the amount of the damage.
( 11) If anyone who receives an allowance for the purpose
18
s T R A T E G K 0 N
neglects his own weapons,' 6 and ifhis dekarch shall not force him to
acquire them or not report him to the commanding officer, then
both the soldier himself and the dekarch shall be punished.
8. Military Punishments
After the organization of the tagmas, the following list of punish-
ments should be read out in Latin and in Greek.
( 16) If during the time when the battle lines are being formed
and during combat a soldier shall abandon his post or his standard
and flee, or if he charges out ahead of the place where he has been
stationed, or if he plunders the dead, or races off to pursue the
16. The text has reparationa, deriving from the Latin reparatio. Leo VI (Tactical
Constitutions, 8, 11) understands this in its usual sense of time for restora-
tion, i.e., vacation. The Ambrosian paraphrase of the Strate9ikon (fol. 126')
equates it with philotimia, a gratuity or allowance.
19
M A u R c E s
enemy, or attacks the baggage train or camp of the enemy, we order
that he be executed, and that all the loot he may have taken be con-
fiscated and given in to the common fund of his tagma, inasmuch as
he has broken ranks and has betrayed his comrades.
( 17) If during a general action or battle the troops who had
formed for combat should tum back-may this never happen-
without a good and manifest cause, we order that the soldiers of the
tagma which first took to flight and turned back from the line of
battle or from their own meros be shot down and decimated by the
other tagmas, inasmuch as they broke their ranks and were to blame
for the rout of the entire meros. But if it should happen that some of
them were wounded in the battle itself, they shall be exempt from
such a judgment.
( 18) If a standard should be captured by the enemy-may this
never happen-without a good and manifest excuse, we order that
those charged with guarding the banner be punished and reduced to
the lowest rank in their unit or the schola in which they are regis-
tered. If it happens that any were wounded in the fighting, they shall
be exempt from such punishment.
( 19) If a meros or the whole formation is routed-may this
never happen-when a camp is nearby, and if the men do not retire
toward the defenders or seek refuge within the camp itself, but care-
lessly run off in some other diredion, we order that those daring to
do this be punished for disregarding their comrades.
(20) If a soldier throws away his arms in battle, we order that he
be punished for disarming himself and arming the enemy.
20
s T R A T E G K 0 N
army should not be brought together in one place because the men
might quickly find themselves starving, the army's size could be
easily estimated by the enemy, and fodder might be hard to obtain.
As they are drawing closer to the enemy, about six, seven, or even
ten days away, the troops should be drawn in closer together and at
the same time set up camp, as is explained in the section on camps.
If the march is in unknown regions or places, surveyors should go
out a day in advance with the duty of surveying the entire location in
which camp is to be made, and to apportion a certain section equita-
bly to each meros. The quartering parties should also ride a day
ahead to reconnoiter for water and forage.
When the troops on campaign encounter very rough, steep, heav-
ily wooded, or other difficult terrain, some soldiers should be sent
ahead to clear and level the land as much as possible, so that the
horses may not be worn out. The men detailed for this should not
belong to a scouting troop or other special unit.
When the army is on the march, the commanding general should
be at its head with his own specially chosen troops preceding him as
an honor guard. With them should be their spare horses and the
bucellary standards. Directly behind him should come the spa-
tharioi, then the bucellary troops, and finally their supply train. 17 The
commanding officer of each meros or moira should arrange his own
column in like manner, whether marching as part of a larger com-
mand or alone.
At river crossings or other difficult places in unknown country,
quartering parties should go ahead and, after first investigating the
area, should inform the general what the country is like, and compe-
tent officers should make dispositions to cover the passage. If the
places are unusually difficult, then the commanding general himself
should leave the column and remain at the place until everyone has
safely crossed over. But the general should do this only if the enemy
is not in the vicinity. For in that case he must not stay about, but the
commanding officer of each meros should perform that duty until all
of his command is safely past. Otherwise everyone will try to get
ahead at once, which would only cause friction and injury.
Cultivated fields must be spared, and troops should not march
through them, and they should cause no damage to taxpayers. But if
it is absolutely necessary to pass through the fields, orders should be
21
M A u R c E s
given for the commanding officer of each moira or meros to remain
until the tagmas under his command have passed through. He should
tum over the fields in good condition to the next unit and then leave
the area. In tum each commanding officer after him is to perform
the same duty, and in this way the good order of the general and the
security of the farmer will be maintained.
If, when the going is expected to be difficult, wild animals are
startled or encountered along the road, chasing them is to be forbid-
den, for this causes noise and confusion and wears out the horses to
no purpose. In time of peace, however, hunting is necessary for the
soldiers.
If the army is small, an effort should be made not to have it march
through inhabited areas, whether friendly or hostile, so that it might
not be observed by spies and the information relayed to the enemy,
but it should advance by other routes.
22
s T R A T E G K 0 N
· B0 0 K I I ·
The Cavalry Battle Formation
23
M A u R c E s
24
s T R A T E G K 0 N
it cannot be brought back into action against the enemy, the second
line, still in good order, will easily join battle with the enemy, even
though, as mentioned, they have routed the first line. For the en-
emy's formation will necessarily be broken up and disordered by the
fighting when it meets a force still in good order, such as the second
line. The most compelling reason of all is that not only is the double
line of battle, as said, appropriate against an enemy force equal in
numbers, but also against superior forces, which is clear from reason
and from a study of the diagram below.
Perhaps some may object that if the first line is thrown into con-
fusi~n or driven back, the second will also easily be pushed back with
it. Our answer is that if victory seems precarious with two lines,
what hope can there be when there is only one line and that one
breaks up? To the further objection that the army's formation is
weakened by dividing it into two battle lines, we would admit this to
be valid if the force were really divided and half of it kept out of
action. But as a matter of fact, we have not divided the force, we have
merely changed its formation. What happened is that the entire
force which was previously deployed in a long and thin straight line,
we have now formed in two lines. We have taken none of it out of
action, but have only modified its disposition and by the methods
described increased its strength.
25
M A u R c E s
26
s T R A T E G K 0 N
6. Depth ef Formation
As far as the depth of the line is concerned, the ancient authorities
wrote that it had formerly been regarded as sufficient to form the
ranks four deep in each tagma, greater depth being viewed as useless
and serving no purpose. For there can be no pressure from the rear
up through the ranks, as happens with an infantry formation, which
may force the men in front to push forward against their will. Horses
cannot use their heads to push people in front of them evenly, as can
infantry. The file leaders, those stationed in front, receive no as-
sistance from additional ranks, whether lancers or archers. The
lances of the ranks behind the fourth cannot reach beyond the front;
the archers are forced to shoot up high because of all the men in
front of them, and the result is that their arrows are ineffectual in
27
M A u R c E s
28
s T R A T E G K 0 N
when they are lined up for inspection spies can easily and quickly
estimate the strength of the whole army by counting the file leaders,
assuming that this is the regulation depth and about the same pro-
portion is maintained. The second line is composed of the remaining
men. It is dear, as explained above, that the men at arms are drawn
up with the tagmas of the Optimates, and with the Federati those
serving boys fit for such service.
7. Squads
Squads should be made up of old and young men in proper pro-
portion. Otherwise the older men, if formed by themselves, may
be weak, and the younger, inexperienced men may turn out
disorganized.
8. Armament
Armament should vary as follows. In the first line the file leader and
the man behind him, the second in the file, and the last man should
all bear lances. All the others, drawn up in the middle, who know
how to shoot, should be archers, and without shields. For it is impos-
sible to draw the bow effectively on horseback while also carrying a
shield on the left arm.
9. Medical Corpsmen
In addition to the above, eight or ten of the less-skilled soldiers in
each tagma should be assigned as medical corpsmen to each bandon,
especially in the first battle line. They should be alert, quick, lightly
clothed, and without weapons. Their duty is to follow about a hun-
dred feet to the rear of their own tagma, 1 to pick up and give aid to
anyone seriously wounded in the battle, or who has fallen off his
horse, or is otherwise out of action, so they may not be trampled by
the second line or die through neglect of their wounds. For each
person so rescued the corpsman should receive from the treasury
one nomisma over and above his pay. Then when the second line has
passed and driven back the enemy, they should collect the spoils
2. The Roman foot, which may still have been in use, was equal to 29.6
centimeters, whereas the standard Byzantine foot came to 31.23 cm.:
E. Schilbach, Byzantinische Metrolo9ie (Munich 1970), 13- 16.
29
M A u R c E s
from the enemy dead left on the field of the first battle, and hand
them over to the dekarchs or file leaders of their own tagma, receiv-
ing a share of it back from the dekarchs as a reward for their work.
For we regard letting them have this as an equitable and suitable
perquisite for the file leaders when they are victorious in combat,
since more than any others they have to do most of the fighting in the
first onslaught, and also they cannot be allowed the chance to dis-
mount and break ranks to collect plunder themselves.
To make it easier for the corpsmen and the wounded or fallen to
mount the rescue horses, they should place both stirrups on the left
side of the saddle, one to the front, as is customary, the other behind
it. When two want to get up on the horse, the corpsman and the
man who is out of action, the first mounts by the regular stirrup to
the front, the other by the one to the back. It is also essential that
they carry flasks of water for men who may be fainting from their
wounds.
1 1. Spies or Scouts
In addition, spies or scouts should be assigned to each tagma of the
Optimates and Federati, and to each meros of the ordinary troops,
two to a tagma, eight or twelve to a meros. They should be sober,
alert, healthy, and good looking. Stationed at intervals, depending on
the nature of the terrain, before the battle and until it is all over, they
should keep both the enemy and their own units under observation
to prevent any attack from ambush or any other hostile trick.
30
s T R A T E G K 0 N
3. A bowshot (flight range, not accurate target range) was about 300 meters:
W. McLeod, "The Range of the Ancient Bow," Phoenix: The journal ef the
Classical Association if Canada 19 ( 1965): 1-14. Schilbach (Byzantinische Metro-
lo9ie, 42) puts it at 328.84 meters. A. Bivar, however ("Cavalry Equipment
and Tactics on the Euphrates Frontier," Dumbarton Oaks Papers 26 [ 1972):
283), measures a bowshot in the Strate9ikon as about 133 meters.
4. The Roman mile, probably still standard in the time of Maurice, was 1,480
meters: Schilbach, Byzantinische Metrolo9ie, 32-36. But in Book IX Maurice
assumes that there are 5,000 or 5,155 Byzantine feet, which should be
31. 23 cm. each, to a mile.
31
M A u R c E s
too close, this second line may attack before the enemy's ranks are
broken up in pursuit of the first line, which will still be in disarray
and unable to cooperate with it. The tagmas stationed on both sides
to the rear of the flanks of the second line should be about a bowshot
behind to guard its rear and should follow at the same distance.
32
s T R A T E G K 0 N
17. Trumpets
We do not consider it desirable that many trumpets be sounded or
blown during battle, for this causes disturbance and confusion, and
commands cannot be properly understood. If the ground is level,
then one trumpet is enough, and it should be sounded in the center
meros in each battle line. If the ground is uneven, or if a violent wind
or the noise of water makes it difficult to hear the orders clearly, then
it may be well to blow one trumpet in each of the other divisions, so
that three will be Sounded in the whole battle line. The better silence
is observed, the less disturbed will the younger men be and the less
excited the horses, and the more fearsome will the battle line appear
to the enemy, and it will be easy to recognize the commands. For
these reasons, any sound at all is out of place after the line has begun
to move into action.
33
M A u R c E s
us) three times as it marches out of camp. 5 As soon as the army leaves
the camp to form for battle, absolute silence should prevail, and no
unnecessary word should be spoken. For this keeps the army in
better order, and the commands of the officers are more readily
understood. The full spirit of the charge is conveyed by the very
circumstances, the necessary closing of ranks, and the presence of
the enemy, and no other sign is needed. But when the army closes
with the enemy, it is not a bad idea for the men to shout and cheer,
especially the rear ranks, to unnerve the enemy and stir up our own
troops.
19. Heralds
The function of the heralds, it seems to us, is a useful one, inasmuch
as before the battle they address the troops to encourage them and
get them to recall their previous victories. When their speech is
finished, each tagma should be formed and drilled.
34
s T R A T E G K 0 N
·BOOK Ill·
Formations ef the Ta9ma
+ The Standard
x Commanding Officer of the Tagma
b Trumpeter
~ Cape bearer
~ Hekatontarch or Ilarch
( Dekarch with lance and shield
R Pentarch with lance and shield
K Third in file, with bow but no shield
~ Fourth in file, rear guard with bow and shield
K Fifth in file, with bow but no shield
K Cavalryman or soldier with whatever weapon he can handle
l. La19icer ambula.
2. In the Laurentian manuscript only the central body of troops is indicated.
35
M A u R c E s
The diagram has been expanded to make it reach a strength of 310 men, as
required by the text. For variations in the diagrams in the other manu-
scripts, see G. Dennis, ed., Das S1rate9ikon des Maurikios, Corpus fontium
historiae byzantinae, 17 (Vienna, 1981): 502-509.
3. Ad latus strin9e.
36
s T R A T E G K 0 N
4. Jun9e.
5. Silentium. nemo demittat, nemo antecedat bandum. sic venias vero aequalis Jacies.
bandum capta, ipso seque cum bando milix. talis est comodum miles barbati. si vero
bandum demictes eo modo non vero vices. serva milix ordinem positum. ipsum serve et
37
M A u R c E s
A single tagma should be drilled as follows. At a given signal, ad-
vance and halt either while at attention or on the run. If the com-
mander wants the troops to advance, he shouts out: "March," 6
which would be kineson in Greek. This signal may also be given by
bugle or by motion of the lance pennon. And so the tagma advances.
If he wants it to stop, he shouts the command: "Halt," 7 or he gives
the signal by banging a shield, by a hand motion, or by trumpet. And
so the tagma halts.
In case he first wants them to march in open order, the command
is: "In line. March." 8 To close ranks with the greatest precision by
the flanks and the rear, as illustrated in the above diagrams, the com-
mand is: "By the flank. Close"; the dekarchs: "To the dekarchs"; the
pentarchs: "To the pentarchs." • Then all the troops, side by side,
close in on each other, not to one flank, but from both sides closing
uron the center, that is, uron the standard bearer. This maneuver
should also be practiced by the meros, for in this fashion ranks may
be closed quickly and in good order. Just as the dekarchs align them-
selves, so the tetrarchs or fileclosers should align themselves. For if
they close ranks accurately, they effectively keep the troops in front
of them from abandoning their rosts in combat and fleeing to the
rear.
At the command, "Close ranks," 10 the soldiers close up from the
rear for the charge. With the troops marching in close formation,
particularly after they have closed in tightly from the flank, the arch-
ers open fire, and the command is given: "Charge." 11 The dekarchs
and pentarchs then lean forward, cover their heads and part of their
horses' necks with their shields, hold their lances high as their shoul-
ders in the manner of the fair-haired races, and protected by their
shields they ride on in good order, not too fast but at a trot, to avoid
having the impetus of their charge break up their ranks before com-
ing to blows with the enemy, which is a real risk. All the archers to
the rear should open fire.
tu band!fer. sive pugnas sive seques inimicum sive aequalis facies, nonjorte minare ut
ne sparges tu suum ordinem.
6. Move.
7. Sta.
8. Equaliter ambula.
9. Ad latus stringe. ad decarchas. ad pentarchas.
10. Junge.
11. Percute.
38
s T R A T E G K 0 N
39
M A u R c E s
Drilling the tagma must not be limited to the formations in line
shown in the diagrams, which pertain only to the main charge. But
irregular formations should also be practiced, marching out straight
ahead and in various circular movements, first by falling back and
wheeling about, then by surprise attacks against the enemy, and fi-
nally by giving prompt support to units in trouble. If the tagmas ac-
quire some proficiency in these maneuvers, they will be prepared to
operate in dose or in extended order, and to form for every even-
tuality. When such drills have been properly performed, the soldiers
become very familiar with all or almost all of them, and these nine
maneuvers prepare the tagmas for any emergency, whether they be
detailed to fight in extended order, dosed order, as flank guards, or
as outflankers, for they will have become accustomed to all the for-
mations. It is also essential, of course, that the bandons become used
to drawing up and cooperating with one another, as in the full battle
line, but in such a way as not to divulge all our formations to the
enemy. Apart from actual battle, the army should never draw up in
its full combat formation; that is, when it is just drilling it should not
be formed in a first and second line, with flank guards, outflankers,
troops hiding in irregular formation or in ambushes. These disposi-
tions are matters of strategy rather than of tactics, and they ought
not be made known ahead of time during drill, but should be de-
cided on the spot to meet a specific need.
Whether a single bandon is being drilled, or a moira, a meros, or
the entire front line, it should be drawn up in three parts. If it is a
single bandon to be drilled by itself, most of the men should be
formed in extended order. On the same line with them about ten
horsemen should be drawn up in single file on each flank in dose
order. A few other soldiers, say ten, should take their position on the
opposite front to represent the enemy so our men can give the im-
pression of directing their charge against them. When the advance
begins, the troops in extended order separate from their dose-order
support and move out rapidly as though to combat. After riding
steadily forward for a mile or two, they turn back about half that
distance, make three or four quick charges to the right and to the
left, and then circle back again. After all this they gallop to their
original position in the area between the two dose-order groups, and
together with them they ride as if to encounter a pursuing enemy.
The same sort of drill should also be practiced by the moiras.
40
s T R A T E G K 0 N
41
M A u R c E ' S
42
s T R A T E G K 0 N
flank
9uards, meros ef meros ef meros ef ouiflankers,
1-3 banda Vexillations jederati lllyrikiani 1-2 banda
1<"K1< fAfdd'Ud'clid'Hd'd'+Af fAfoUUeUHd'-i-Af tAfoUUci>UUd'+At KK
KKK KKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKK KKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKK KKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKK KK
KKK KKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKK KKKKKKKKKK ~KKKKKK KKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKK KK
KKf'. KKKKKKKKKKK!'.KKKKK KKKKKKKKKK KKKKKKK KKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKK KK
KKK KKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKK KKKKKKKKKK KKKKKKK KKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKK KK
KKK KKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKK KKKKKKKKKK KKKKKKK KKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKK KK
KKK KKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKK KKKKKKKKKK KKKKKKK KKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKK KK
J J J d J d I d d 4 > d KKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKK
dddddd
A.\ A A.\ A A
Kd K
KKK
KKK TTTTTT A.\AAAAA KKK
KKK TT TT TT A.\ A.\.\ Al KKK
KKK TT TT TT KKK
reserve horses, 2
.\.\.\.\A A A
A.\.\.\.\.\.\
.\A.\.\ A.\ A
43
M A u R c E s
the second line should have two divisions and one clear space ac-
cording to the second following diagram showing a single meros. If
the army is even smaller, five thousand or less, then station one
meros as the second line. The clear spaces in the second line between
the divisions ought to be proportionate to the number of units
drawn up in the first line, so that each space is one-fourth the width.
That is, if the meros in the first line has six hundred cavalrymen
across, the clear space in the second line should be about one hun-
dred and fifty across. As mentioned above, the depth of the tagmas
stationed in those clear spaces should ordinarily be four deep, so
that, if necessary, they may also be available for offensive action. But
if the army is of moderate strength, it suffices for them not to fight,
but to remain and keep the second line intact.
9. A Sin9le Meros
KKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKK
KKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKK
KKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKK
KKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKK K
KKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKK
KKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKK
KKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKK
SECOND LINE
KKKKKK KKKKKK
KKKK KK KKKKKK
KKKKKK KKKKKK
KK KKKK KKKKK K
K KKKKK KKKK
KKKKKKKKKK
44
s T R A T E G K 0 N
SECOND LINE
KKKKK KKKKKKKKK
KKKKK KKKKKKKKK
KKKKKKKKKKKKK K
KKKKKKKKKKKKKK
KKKKKKKKKKKKKK
This plan with the second line consisting of one meros and no
more is appropriate when the army is of moderate strength, that is,
from two to five or six thousand and less. In case of emergency the
first line should race to the ends or flanks of the second line, not to its
front ranks. If the whole army consists of from five to ten or twelve
thousand, the second line must be divided into two divisions with a
clear space between them, as previously explained in the diagram of
a single meros, and if the first line is driven back it can find refuge
there. In dealing with fifteen or twenty thousand and more, the sec-
ond line must consist of four divisions with three clear spaces, as
20. Suscipe.
45
M A u R c E s
explained in the chapter treating of that. This disposition of the line
is essential when the army is exceptionally strong.
Disposition of flank guards and outflankers when the enemy
battle line is longer or shorter than our own.
1uo.if
concealed droun9os
enemy line
front
flank 9uards meros meros meros ouiflankers
46
s T R A T E G K 0 N
<::>
c: one droungos
~ ...<::I iuoif 'a,,
c:.
::s ::s
,.... 0000
....<:!:>c: front "'::.i 000
00
~ 0
---, Y
one droungos
Juoif
front t
::.i
0000
000
00
0
I I . General Instructions
When the Roman forces have been organized and trained, first by
tagma alone and then by meros, the officers of each meros should be
47
M A u R c E s
called together and given the following basic instructions in writing.
If rabbits or other small animals when pursued and hunted do not
abandon themselves completely to headlong flight, but look back to
observe how vigorously their attackers are chasing them and regulate
their running away accordingly, how much more should men pos-
sessing intelligence and fighting for such a cause be careful in making
their pursuits and withdrawals in battle. Like water which flows now
forward now backward, they should not with every little advance
made by the enemy or by themselves lose all control and take need-
less risks. But they should remain steadfast and strive in every con-
ceivable way to defeat the enemy. For to push the enemy back a
short distance and let them go is not a decisive victory, nor is it a
defeat to fall back a bit and then make a stand again. But it is only
when the war is ended that victory and defeat may be determined,
and one must continue fighting toward that goal. To be really certain,
then, that the officers understand the principles of the above forma-
tions and drills which contribute to the execution of these maneu-
vers, after the training of the individual units, the entire battle line
should be formed once or at most twice and the principles illustrated
by the maneuvers themselves.
48
s T R A T E G K 0 N
refuge behind it and filtering through the clear spaces in it, and in the
area between the second and the third lines it should reform and
attack the enemy in irregular formation together with the second
line. If they tum, pursue them relentlessly.
21. £xi.
49
M A u R c E s
then, as said, charge. Now if, while the outflankers are extending
their ranks, the enemy wants to extend theis in like manner, then
they should immediately launch the charge against them while they
are still moving about. For in turning by the flank the enemy will
have to exPose their right, and their formation will be loose. Not
only must the outflankers regulate these circling movements so that
they are not too slow nor too much ahead, but the commander of
the whole meros must time its assault to coincide with the out-
flankers' attacks as they begin to cause confusion among the enemy.
His purrose should be to outflank the opPosing meros if he can do
so, otherwise he should at the very least extend his line to the same
length. If the enemy battle line is longer, then he should aim at en-
abling the outflankers to go about their task properly. It should be
noted that the outflankers are essential because, as said, they can
carry out surprise attacks with impunity even in open country.
50
s T R A T E G K 0 N
What if they hear that the enemy is attacking from some ambush to
the rear? If it is only a small party, the troops in the third line should
be able to deal with it, and they can be sent out against them. But if
these are not strong enough by themselves, the men in the second
line should turn around, the commanding officer with the standard
marching to the rear, and with the line facing both ways they will
easily be able to make their attack. If the enemy retreats, one or two
bandons of the rear guard should attack them. If the enemy is re-
ported to be numerous, give the command: "Countermarch." 22 In
each tagma the dekarchs march to the rear, which then becomes the
new front. Make it a standing order for all troops that nobody dare
charge out in front of the second line even if the first line should
be routed.
51
M A u R c E s
· B0 0 K l v.
Ambushes
52
s T R A T E G K 0 N
emy force is caught in the middle. The Scythian peoples do this all
the time.
53
M A u R c E s
and waged open war against him around Moesia. 2 Up to that time
Decius himself had been ·successfully employing the same strategy,
simulated retreat, in intensive warfare which enabled him to destroy
many of them.
This same kind of trap may be laid for the enemy without a trench
or swamp. At a time when it will not be noticed, iron caltrops can be
scattered or placed in pasition, strung together so they can easily be
collected after being used. They should extend the whole length of
the battle line to a depth of a hundred feet. Four or five passageways
should be left in the middle, about three or four hundred feet wide,
known to our army and clearly marked by large tree branches, spear
heads with odd shapes, heaps of earth or stones, or other obvious
marks. These should be placed not only just at the entrances of the
passages or the front of the area covered by the caltrops, but also in
depth so that after the action begins, when the units feigning flight
have passed through those passageways, the markers may be re-
moved or overturned by riders assigned for this purpose. The sol-
diers in ambush on both sides may then charge out while the enemy
is tripping over the caltrops and finding it difficult to move either
forward or backward.
The same sort of thing can be done without the use of caltrops.
Here and there round pits can be dug, of the type called "horse-
breakers." They should be about one foot in diameter, two or three
feet deep, with sharp stakes set in the bottom. These should be dug
in alternating rows, not in straight lines, about three feet apart in all
directions, and should cover an area of a hundred and fifty feet as
long as the line of battle. When it is time for battle, now, the first line
should draw up about a mile in front of these obstacles, and the sec-
ond line about two or three bowshots behind the obstacles, not along
the whole front but in line with the gaps or clear spaces. In an emer-
gency, then, when the troops in the first line are driven back, they
can safely retreat through those gaps and, if necessary, the second
line may safely advance through the same gaps to attack the enemy. If
the entire battle line is drawn up behind the obstacles, with no units
in front, the line should be about three bowshots behind it. When
the enemy advance gets to the obstacles, then charge out against
them just as their horses are falling into the pits and being destroyed.
2. In A.D. 25 I near the present Razgrad in the Dobrudja region of Rumania:
Zosimus, Historia, I, 23. The text incorrectly has Mysia, which was in
northwest Asia Minor.
54
s T R A T E G K 0 N
When our line is formed behind them, the clear spaces between the
obstacles must not be very wide so that large numbers of the enemy
may not be able to engage in the fighting without danger.
Any of these artifices or stratagems must be prepared secretly by a
small group of reliable men. The work should be done on the very
day of the battle or on the day before late in the evening and, of
course, in that location in which the battle is expected, and there
they should await the enemy. At the proper moment they should
inform the soldiers, especially the standard bearers, so they may
know what to do. In falling back they should not do so in their regu-
lar formation, but the bandons should follow in loose formation one
behind the other according to the location of the clear spaces. All the
soldiers must be ordered to follow their own standards, especially in
falling back, lest, which God forbid, they wander about and them-
selves fall into the traps.
Of all the stratagems described above, it is our opinion that cal-
trops can more easily and with secrecy be employed on all sorts of
ground. One must also, of course, form the battle line in accord with
the terrain. If an assault uPon the enemy line is decided on, as de-
scribed in the previous book, about one or two bandons, even more
depending on the size of the army, should be detailed, good soldiers
under courageous and intelligent officers. Depending on the terrain,
one group should undertake operations against the enemy line on its
own right, and the other should do the same on the left. If the enemy
launches an attack, these units should repulse it and not allow it time
to reach and harass our battle line. If the enemy does not attack, then
they themselves should attack in that sector or they should raid the
enemy's baggage train if it should chance to be within reach, or the
rear or wings of the enemy line. In case the enemy is formed in two
lines or should have units for ambush behind its own line to find and
injure our own ambushing parties, our men who have been detailed
for ambush duty should keep up careful reconnaissance and so be
prepared to meet any move by the enemy.
4. Timing ef Ambushes
The time of the ambush should be carefully arranged. They should
not make their attack too long before the main line for, being less
numerous, they will be crushed by the enemy. Neither should they
delay too long so that they show up after the main battle has begun
55
M A u R c E s
and they accomplish nothing. The units detailed for ambuscades and
the main body of the army should move at the same time, whether
there is to be one ambush or two. Still, it is better to have the main
body move out a bit before the ambush unit. The main battle line
advances in the open and diverts the enemy's attention, while the
other proceeds under cover. They should coordinate their move-
ments by scouts, signals, and estimate. If one happens to get ahead by
a short cut it should slow down and wait for the other one so that, if
passible, both of them, the unit in ambush and the main battle line,
should make contact with the enemy at the same time. Rather, the
ambush unit should attack just a little before. The purpose of this is
that when the enemy starts being thrown into disorder by the am-
bush, then the main line moves in and attacks. For the same reason, if
the ground permits, ambushes should be made from both sides, es-
pecially if the army is large. One party may be used to repel assaults
of the enemy, while the other attacks them. Then if one of them
remains intact, even though their assaults may be unsuccessful or if in
the meantime the main battle line is driven back, they should not for
these reasons give in to the enemy, fall back on the second line and
get mixed in with the fugitives, but they should keep clear and try to
attack the enemy's rear and in this way rally their own men in flight.
3. Irregular formation: droun9os. Vegetius calls it a 9lobus: Ep. rei milit., 3, 19.
56
s T R A T E G K 0 N
sel£ It should be adapted to the size of the detachment and to the lay
of the land. If a very large or even moderate-sized unit of the main
army is to be placed in ambush with the idea of attacking in one
place, it should be formed by dekarchies or pentarchies. But if only a
few troops are involved or the attack is at different points, then the
irregular formation is called for. In other words, the difference be-
tween the two formations is this: the first is for major operations
involving little risk; the other is for quick support, pursuit, sudden
raids, and causing confusion. This latter formation, regarded as ap-
propriate for cavalry, should be learned by constant drill in the man-
ner we have described by the individual bandons. If the skills are
acquired properly, there will be no need for instructions or any other
orders. The formation itself and the drill teach each man what he has
to do.
Some people, overcautious and hesitant to change, might argue
that this formation is rather complicated and variable and is conse-
quently too much trouble. Those people ought to realize that ath-
letes, charioteers, and others who compete in mere amusements do
so only for material success and reward, and a very mediocre one at
that, and the only penalty for failure is their own chagrin, but they
subject themselves to so much hardship and labor. They rigidly re-
strict their diet and never cease training so they might learn various
ways of injuring their adversaries, ways of keeping themselves from
being injured by them, and how to break the holds they might be
caught in. How much the more, then, ought we to practice these
formations and drills tirelessly, with flexibility, and with intelligence?
In this case failure means swift death or flight, which is worse than
death, whereas success brings gratification, material gain, fame, eter-
nal memory. We should not rely on just one formation, since one
accidental mistake means the lives of so many men. The one respon-
sible may never be known, but for the mistake of one man all must
suffer. Since there is no need to write about this at length, even list-
ing the reasons would make the book too long. It is much more work
to read about these drills than to do them.
57
M A u R c E s
·BOOK Y·
On Ba99a9e Trains
2. Reserve Horses
The reserve horses should also be left with the baggage train. We
cannot think of any reason why the soldiers have their servants lead
along all the reserve horses on the day of battle. For whether the
army wins or loses, there is so much tension, disorder, and confusion
58
s T R A T E G K 0 N
that in such a mob nobody could recognize his reserve horse and
hope to mount it. This was one of the good reasons we had in pro-
viding for the medical corpsmen to aid in such circumstances. In
small raiding or scouting parties the soldiers must have spare horses,
which must be kept healthy and in good condition up to the very day
of battle. But once the battle begins, it is our considered judgment
that there is no need to have the reserve horses near the battle line;
instead, they should be left in the camp. For they can easily become
very confused when handled only by young boys.
3. Unnecessary Ba99a9e
If the infantry is present, and if battle appears imminent, whether in
our own country, a friendly one, or right on the frontier, and there is
no chance of delay, then in a strong place about thirty or fifty miles
away where grass and water are sufficient, leave the greater non-
essential part of the baggage train and the extra horses, tools, and the
rest of the equipment which is not needed on the day of battle. It
should be guarded by one or two bandons, and they should be or-
dered to gather forage for four or five days, and to guard the horses
within the enclosure until the battle is over. A few good men whom
everyone knows should be chosen and stationed at intervals between
this place and the front. They should report to the one in charge
of the baggage train. Depending on how the battle goes, they should
advise the troops in the train to remain in the same place where
they were left, to move to another suitable place, or to rejoin the
main army.
4. Intermediate Camps
Troops moving from that base camp up to combat should take with
them their spare horses, small tents or a couple of heavy cloaks, the
one for covering if needed and the other as a tent or shelter, also
twenty or thirty pounds of hardtack, flour1 or some other provisions
of that sort, especially if they are going to fight the Scythians. They
should also set up a suitable camp closer to the enemy. Fortifications
should be constructed about this camp, even though the army might
stay there only for a day. Each bandon should store there a day's
supply of forage or hay. In case the army suffers a reverse in battle
and has to beat a hasty retreat, it will have the option of staying in the
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M A u R c E s
camp itself, whether there be one or two of them, and it will have a
day's provisions for its horses and not be forced to search for fodder
and grass in the midst of such confusion and run the risk of being
hurt if it searches about for provisions with the enemy all about or be
forced to march on without provisions. Still, in case the army should
move on without using the supplies, some men should be assigned to
bum the fodder and then rejoin the main body.
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s T R A T E G K 0 N
·BOOK VI·
Various Tactics and Drills
I. The Life of St. Anastasius the Persian (Acta S. Anastasii Persae, ed. H. Usener,
61
M A u R c E s
62
s T R A T E G K 0 N
63
M A u R c E s
·BOOK VII·
Strate9y. The Points Which the
General Must Consider
A ship cannot cross the sea without a helmsman, nor can one defeat
an enemy without tactics and strategy. With these and the aid of
God it is possible to overcome not only an enemy force of equal
strength but even one greatly superior in numbers. For it is not true,
as some inexperienced people believe, that wars are decided by cour-
age and numbers of troops, but, along with God's favor, by tactics
and generalship, and our concern should be with these rather than
wasting our time in mobilizing large numbers of men. The former
provide security and advantage to men who know how to use them
well, whereas the other brings trouble and financial ruin.
The leader must take advantage of favorable times and places in
fighting against the enemy. First, he must guard against hostile at-
tacks which can injure our men, and then he must attempt to launch
the same against the enemy. Above all he must look for enemy am-
bushes, sending out frequent and far-ranging patrols in all directions
in the area around the battlefield. He must avoid disordered and un-
coordinated pursuits. We would not allow the general to take part
personally in raids or other reckless attacks. These should be en-
trusted to other competent officers. For if one of the subordinate
officers blunders or fails, the situation may be quickly straightened
out. But if the leader of the whole army fails, his fall can open the way
to complete disorder.
That general is wise who before entering into war carefully stud-
ies the enemy, and can guard against his strong points and take ad-
vantage of his weaknesses. For example, the enemy is superior in
cavalry; he should destroy his forage. He is superior in number of
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s T R A T E G K 0 N
troops; cut off their supplies. His army is composed of diverse peo-
ples; corrupt them with gifts, favors, promises. 1here is dissension
among them; deal with their leaders. 1his people relies on the spear;
lead them into difficult terrain. 1his people relies on the bow; line up
in the open and force them into close, hand-to-hand fighting. Against
Scythians or Huns launch your assault in February or March when
their horses are in wretched condition after suffering through the
winter, and proceed as just suggested for attacking archers. If they
march or make camp without proper precautions, make unexpected
raids on them by night and by day. If they are reckless and un-
disciplined in combat and not inured to hardship, make believe you
are going to attack, but delay and drag things out until their ardor
cools, and when they begin to hesitate, then make your attack on
them. The foe is superior in infantry; entice him into the open, not
too close, but from a safe distance hit him with javelins.
Warfare is like hunting. Wild animals are taken by scouting, by
nets, by lying in wait, by stalking, by circling around, and by other
such stratagems rather than by sheer force. In waging war we should
proceed in the same way, whether the enemy be many or few. To try
simply to overpower the enemy in the open, hand to hand and face
to face, even though you might appear to win, is an enterprise which
is very risky and can result in serious harm. Apart from extreme
emergency, it is ridiculous to try to gain a victory which is so costly
and brings only empty glory.
65
M A u R c E s
information about the enemy's movements, their strength and or-
ganization, and thus be in a p<>sition to prevent being surprised by
them.
6. Punishment ef Qfjenders
In the vicinity of the enemy and with a pitched battle imminent, the
commanding officers of the tagmas should be ordered to guard
against punishing soldiers who have committed offenses for those
few days and not to deal harshly with the soldiers at all. Instead, they
should be careful in dealing with those who are suspected of harbor-
ing some grievance. But if they prove intractable, then use some
plausible pretext to send them off to some other place for a while
until after the battle so they will not go over to the enemy and pro-
vide him with some information he should not have. Men of the
same race as the enemy should be sent away long before and should
not be brought into battle against their own people.
66
s T R A T E G K 0 N
adverse effects. In particular, food for a few days for both men and
horses should be collected. Fortified camps should be constructed in
suitable places, according to the plan given below, in which water
may be safely stored for emergencies.
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M A u R c E s
morale will pick up, and they will gradually become used to fighting
against them.
68
s T R A T E G K 0 N
POINTS TO BE OBSERVED
ON THE DAY OF BATTLE
2. Enemy Archers
In combat against archers every effort should be made to guard
against positioning our troops on the lower slopes of mountains and
difficult terrain. Our troops should form high up in the hills or else
come down from the mountains all the way and draw up on level,
open ground. Otherwise, they may be suddenly overcome by hostile
detachments lying in ambush under cover of the heights.
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M A u R c E s
6. The Wounded
After the battle the general should give prompt attention to the
wounded and see to burying the dead. Not only is this a religious
duty, but it greatly helps the morale of the living.
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s T R A T E G K 0 N
ground where they will not see the enemy or be seen by them. When
the enemy approaches to about a mile or half a mile, then the army
should move to high ground, so that the troops will not have time to
lose confidence before the battle begins. But if the terrain will not
allow this strategy, and the enemy can be clearly seen from a dis-
tance, then spread the report beforehand along the battle line that
the opposing force consists mostly of horses and baggage trains, not
of men.
I 0. Gatherin9 Fodder
If it has not been possible to gather a supply of fodder beforehand, as
recommended, then, on the day of battle, as the young men, that is,
the soldiers are moving into formation, the servants should go out to
collect it in the area to the rear of the battle line or of the camp. They
should be accompanied by a few patrols taken from the troops left
71
M A u R c E s
behind to guard the camp. While the battle is in progress they should
be able to gather enough fodder. The servants should also be in-
structed that they are to watch for a signal given from certain high
and conspicuous places to let them know that some of the enemy
may be approaching. This may be a smoke signal or the blowing of a
trumpet, that is, the signal for recall. When it is given, they are to
return as fast as they can and take refuge in the camp, so they may
not be cut off outside.
All this is essential because the outcome of the action is uncertain.
In case of defeat, if the soldiers have provisions for themselves and
their horses, they can choose to hold their pasition, to renew the
fighting, or to retreat immediately in good order, as long as their
horses are still in good condition, before the men lose their spirit or
the horses their strength. But if provisions are not kept in readiness,
then after a defeat nobody dares go out to gather fodder, with the
result that the horses lose strength and the soldiers their spirit. Hun-
ger and fear crush any ability to plan to improve the situation. It is
absolutely essential to plan ahead and keep on hand food for the
horses for one or two days, or more if it can be done, even if there
should be good grazing near the camp.
I I. After a Defeat
If the first day of battle ends in a defeat, it is, in our opinion, abso-
lutely undesirable and useless to try to get those same troops who
have been beaten in the field to go back into actual combat around
the same time or within the next few days. We strongly advise any
general against even thinking of doing this. It is an extremely difficult
thing for anyone to bring off. Nobody makes a habit of immediately
retrieving a defeat, except the Scythians, and it is particularly foreign
to the Romans. Fo.r even if the general understands the mistake he
has made and hopes to remedy it by means of a second battle, the
soldiers as a whole are unable to grasp the reason for deliberately
going right back into the fighting. They are more likely to look upan
what happened as God's will and completely lose heart. So then,
unless it is absolutely necessary, for a few days after a defeat in battle
no attempt should be made to line up again and resume the offen-
sive. It is better to rely on stratagems, deception, carefully timed
surprise moves, and the so-called fighting while fleeing, until the
72
s T R A T E G K 0 N
73
M A u R c E s
13. Reconnaissance
On the day of battle, the patrols, mentioned above, which should be
doubled, ought to head out early in the morning for two or three
miles in every direction from the place where the fighting is ex-
pected to occur. They should have orders not only to observe the
movements of the enemy and to report them, but also to stop any of
1. This proverb is quoted by Leo (Tactical Constitutions, 14, 25)and by Attaliotes
as a well-known one: Michaelis Attaliotae Historia, ed. I. Bekker (Bonn, 1853),
26, 17. But its source is unknown.
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s T R A T E G K 0 N
our men trying to desert to the enemy. For out there they can easily
intercept deserters from our army. Also in case any enemy soldiers
with their possessions are coming over to our side, the patrols can
provide them with safe conduct and keep them from being waylaid
by any hoodlums who may be around.
The patrols covering the area in front of our main body should
work their way to a bowshot from the enemy line opposite ours and
see whether the enemy is secretly digging any ditches or planning
some other trap, and so keep our own men from unexpected disas-
ter. In unfavorable ground or in critical moments a single patrol must
never be sent, but a second should cover the same ground. Then, in
case one is captured, the other following behind will know about it.
If our lines are ready and the terrain suitable, we should not wait for
the enemy, allowing them time to adapt their formation to deal with
ours, but the safest thing is to launch our attack immediately.
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M A u R c E s
mail coats, and their cloaks should be thrown back over the shoul-
der pieces of the mail coat until the proper time. The points of their
lances should also be hidden. In this way, then, from a distance our
army will not shine at all. Finally, by presenting such an appearance,
something our foes also make use of, they will be impressed and even
before the battle, will lose confidence.
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s T R A T E G K 0 N
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M A u R c E s
A competent orator should be chosen.
One experienced, well-disciplined soldier should be put in charge
of guarding the baggage trains.
In the large tagmas two standards should be displayed before the
battle, one being that of the commander of the tagma, the other that
of the senior hekatontarch, also called ilarch. The young men or files
should be divided evenly between them. On the day of battle, how-
ever, the two standards should not be raised, but only that of the
commanding officer.
On the day of battle, each soldier should carry in his saddlebags a
flask of water and a measure or two of biscuit or meal.
Before the end of the battle while the fighting is still going on, no
soldier should be allowed to plunder the enemy, and this order
should be frequently proclaimed.
The tagma should be formed according to the symbols and dia-
grams given above.
On the march the soldiers should not get mixed in with the bag-
gage trains, especially if contact with the enemy is expected. Each
bandon should march ahead by itself, and the trains to the rear or in
such other pasition as the situation dictates.
Drills should be done according to the movements explained ear-
lier and, if an officer does not know them, details of the nine exer-
cises described should be given him in writing.
It is essential that the horses become accustomed not only to
rapid maneuvering in open, level country, but also over hilly, thick,
and rough ground, and in quick ascending and descending of slopes.
If they get used to these different kinds of terrain, then neither the
men nor the horses will be surprised or troubled by any sort of land.
Even in hot weather care should be taken not to water the horses too
much, and for this reason it is helpful not to camp near rivers. For
maneuvers, then, the horses should be brought to difficult country
and drilled there, or the bandon should be drawn up in regular for-
mation on rough ground, and each man should gallop over the
ground such as he finds it before him and then return the same way.
The men who spare their horses and neglect drills of this sort are
really planning their own defeat. It is also a good idea for the troops
to become used to doing this work in hot weather, for nobody knows
what situations may arise.
The end of the seventh book.
78
s T R A T E G K 0 N
·BOOK VIII·
[General Instructions and Maxims]
79
M A u R c E s
plans, and once you come to a decision to carry it out right away
without any hesitation or timidity. Timidity after all is not caution,
but the invention of wickedness.
(6) A healthy mind is not unduly elated by success nor overly
depressed when things are not going well.
(7) It is safer and more advantageous to overcome the enemy by
planning and generalship than by sheer force; in the one case the
results are achieved without loss to oneself, while in the other some
price has to be paid.
(8) It is very important to spread rumors among the enemy that
you are planning one thing; then go and do something else. Your
plans about major operations should not be made known to many,
but to just a few and those very close to you.
(9) One must not always use the same modes of operation against
the enemy, even though they seem to be working out successfully.
Often enough the enemy will become used to them, adapt to them,
and inflict disaster on us.
( 10) Alarming rumors of traps or treachery, whether on the part
of the enemy or our own, ought not be neglected or action deferred,
but steps should be taken to deal with them and put a stop to them
before they become realities.
( 11) The enemy should be deceived by false reports of our plans
brought to them by deserters from us.
( 12) Courage should be roused in our troops by fabricating a re-
port of a victory over the enemy won by our men someplace else.
(13) News about reverses suffered by us should be kept secret,
and reports stating just the opposite should be circulated about.
( 14) Defeated troops should not be allowed to fall into despair,
but they should be dealt with by stirring up hope and by various
other means.
(15) During combat one has to overlook offenses committed by
the soldiers, but afterward get rid of men guilty of sedition.
( 16) Our own dead should be buried secretly at night, but the
enemy's should be left out there as a means of making them lose
courage.
( 17) When a delegation comes from the enemy, inquire about the
leaders of the group, and on their arrival treat them very friendly, so
their own people will come to suspect them.
( 18) Acts of cowardice on the part of our soldiers should be kept
80
s T R A T E G K 0 N
quiet and not publicly condemned, since this may make them even
worse.
( 19) To cross a river unhindered simply dig a deep trench on the
riverbank, fill it with wood, have most of the troops cross the river,
then the remaining men should set the wood in the trench on fire,
and while it is burning they can cross over without trouble.
(20) A way of arousing discord and suspicion among the enemy is
to refrain from burning or plundering the estates of certain promi-
nent men on their side and of them alone.
( 21) One way of getting a besieged city to submit is by sending
letters tied to arrows promising freedom and immunity; this can also
be done by releasing prisoners.
(22) Great caution must be observed in pursuing the enemy over
ground suited for ambushes. A good general will turn back at the
right time, so he can come back later to attack more effectively.
( 2 3) Do not be deceived by humane act5 of the enemy or by their
pretending to retreat.
(24) Cowardly officers are recognized by their hesitation and pal-
lor; during combat they should be assigned to the auxiliary forces.
(25) When a populous city is taken, it is important to leave the
gates open, so that the inhabitants may escape and not be driven to
utter desperation. The same holds when an enemy's fortified camp is
taken.
(26) Even in friendly territory a fortified camp should be set up;
a general should never have to say: "I did not expect it."'
( 27) For a safe retreat build a fire in one place and quietly go off
to another; the enemy will head for the fire.
(28) Letters ought to be sent to deserters from our side who have
joined the enemy in such a way that the letters will fall into the
enemy's hands. These letters should remind the deserters of the pre-
arranged time for their treachery, so that the enemy will become
suspicious of them, and they will have to flee.
(29) When it comes to dangerous or surprise operations, cow-
ards could be weeded out if all men who are sick or whose horses are
too weak are ordered to fall out. The cowards will then claim to be
1. This and similar expressions are found in several authors, Polybius, Poly-
aenus, Cicero, the anonymous On Strate9y: see G. Dennis, ed., Das Strate9i-
kon des Maurikios, Corpus fontium historiae byzantinae, 17 (Vienna, 1981 ):
274.
81
M A u R c E s
sick, and so they can be separated from the others. They can be as-
signed to guard fortresses or to some other duty involving little
danger.
(30) We should campaign against the enemy when the grain is
ripe, so that our troops will not lack provisions and the expedition
will cause the enemy more damage.
( 31) We should not furnish arms to those who promise to fight
on our side because their real intentions are not clear.
(32) After a victory we must not become careless, but be on our
guard all the more against surprise attacks by the vanquished.
(33) Envoys from the enemy must not be treated disrespectfully,
even when our forces are much stronger.
( 34) An army, no matter how strong, besieging a city must never
leave its own camp unguarded, nor should it think that fortifications
are sufficient to assure its safety, but it should keep sending out
patrols.
( 3 5) Suspected defectors should be told the opposite of what we
intend to do, so that we may use them to deceive the enemy, and
treachery must be guarded against even during periods of truce or
temporary peace.
(36) By no means should we believe reports that come from de-
serters or defectors alone, but their reports should be checked
against statements made by prisoners taken in raids, and in this way
the truth may be discerned.
( 37) In no way should a sworn agreement made with the enemy
be broken.
( 38) After God, we should place our hopes of safety in our weap-
ons, not in our fortifications alone.
(39) Orders should be given to the soldiers that they should be
ready to march out on a holiday, in the rain, day or night. For this
reason they should not be told the time or the day beforehand, so
they may always be prepared.
(40) Risks should not be taken without necessity or real hope of
gain. To do so is the same as fishing with gold as bait.
(41 ) Inhabitants of the area who seek refuge should not be re-
ceived indiscriminately. Often enough they have been sent by the
enemy deceitfully to plot against their hosts.
(42) We should also be on our guard against deserters who ap-
proach a besieged city. Often enough they are sent by the enemy to
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s T R A T E G K 0 N
set fires so that while the defenders are busy putting them out, the
enemy may attack.
(4 3) Troops defeated in open battle should not be pampered or,
even if it seems like a good idea, take refuge in a fortified camp or
some other strong place, but while their fear is still fresh, they should
attack again. By not indulging them they may with greater assurance
renew the fighting.
(44) If the general thinks he is ready to meet the enemy in battle,
he should get set to carry on the fighting in the enemy's country
instead of his own. Men waging war in a foreign land become more
aggressive. They will also feel that the war in which they are engaged
is not only being fought on behalf of their country but also their own
personal safety. This is not necessarily the case if the war is fought in
their own land in which the existence of fortresses eliminates the
risks to the men, since in case of flight they may easily take refuge
in them.
2. Maxims
( 1) Before getting into danger, the general should worship God.
When he does get into danger, then, he can with confidence pray to
God as a friend.
( 2) The man who spends more sleepless nights with his army and
who works harder in drilling his troops runs the fewest risks in fight-
ing the foe.
( 3) Never lead soldiers into combat before having made sufficient
trial of their courage.
(4) It is well to hurt the enemy by deceit, by raids, or by hunger,
and never be enticed into a pitched battle, which is a demonstration
more of luck than of bravery.
(5) Only those battle plans are successful which the enemy does
not suspect before we put them into action.
(6) Deception is often helpful in warfare. An enemy soldier who
deserts to us, apart from some plot, is of the greatest advantage, for
the enemy is hurt by deserters more than if the same men were killed
in action.
(7) He who does not carefully compare his own forces with those
of the enemy will come to a disastrous end.
(8) Courage and discipline are able to accomplish more than a
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M A u R c E s
large number of warriors. Often enough the lay of the land has been
helpful in making the weaker force come out on top.
(9) Nature produces but few brave men, whereas care and train-
ing make efficient soldiers. Soldiers who are kept working improve
in courage, while too much leisure makes them weak and lazy. Care
should be taken to keep them busy.
( l 0) Things which are unexpected or sudden frighten the en-
emy, but they pay little attention to things to which they are
accustomed.
( 11) After gaining a victory the general who pursues the enemy
with a scattered and disorganized army gives away his victory to
the foe.
( 12) The cause of war must be just.
( 13) A good general is one who utilizes his own skills to fit the
opportunities he gets and the quality of the enemy.
( 14) It does not help to assemble the whole army in council, or to
keep sending for men when they are off duty. These things only
cause discord in the army.
(15) The soldiers must always be doing something, even if no en-
emy is bothering us. Habitual idleness spells trouble for an army.
( 16) A prudent commander will not lead an allied force into his
own country if it is larger than his own army. Otherwise it might
mutiny, drive out the native troops, and take over the country.
( 17) When possible, an allied force should be composed of vari-
ous nationalities to reduce the danger of its men uniting for some evil
purpose.
(18) We should draw up our forces in the same manner as those
of the enemy, infantry against infantry, and so with light-armed
troops, cavalry, heavy infantry, and so forth.
(19) The commander who fails to provide his army with neces-
sary food and other supplies is making arrangements for his own
defeat, even with no enemy present.
(20) The commander who relies on his own cavalry, especially
the lancers, should seek out broad plains favorable to such troops and
there force the battle.
(21) If, on the other hand, he relies more on his infantry, he
should take care to choose uneven, thick, and rugged terrain for the
fighting.
(22) If we hear that our plans have been betrayed to the enemy,
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s T R A T E G K 0 N
then we ought to change all our passwords and other signals and the
shape of our battle formation.
(23) For what should be done seek the advice of many; for what
you will actually do take council with only a few trustworthy people;
then off by yourself alone decide on the best and most helpful plan to
follow, and stick to it.
(24) Either the army must be assembled near its supplies, or
those supplies must be transported to it.
(25) Do not rely only on scouts to reconnoiter the roads, but let
the general carefully observe them with his own eyes.
(26) Scouts must be chosen who are steady, keen-eyed, reliable,
serious, and fonder of their reputation than of money; such men
make accurate reports. But those who are light-headed, cowardly,
and excited by the prospect of material gain are likely not to tell the
truth, and so may easily endanger both the general and his army.
( 27) In time of peace, fear and the punishing of offenses keep the
troops in line, but on active campaign great expectations and re-
wards get even better results.
(28) The general achieves the most who tries to destroy the en-
emy's army more by hunger than by force of arms.
(29) If an enemy spy is captured while observing our forces, then
it may be well to release him unharmed if all our forces are strong
and in good shape. The enemy will be absolutely dismayed by such
reports. On the other hand, if our forces are weak, the spy should be
treated roughly, forced to divulge enemy secrets, and finally either be
put to death or sent off elsewhere under guard.
(30) If the soldiers show signs of cowardice, various skills should
be used to restore their courage.
( 31) "Take your time in planning, but when you have made your
decision be fast in putting it into action." 2 In war opportunity is
fleeting and cannot be put off at all.
(32) Let the army see that you are not unduly elated over suc-
cesses nor utterly cast down by failures.
( 3 3) It is not the general whose words are frightening but the one
who gets things done who is feared by the enemy.
(34) Plan what you have to do at night and carry out your deci-
sion during the day. One cannot plan and act at the same time.
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M A u R c E s
(35) The general who is overly harsh with his subordinates and
the one who is too indulgent are both unfit for command. Fear leads
to great hatred, and giving in too much results in being despised. It is
best to take the middle course.
(36) After agreeing upon a treaty or a truce with the enemy,
the commander should make sure that his camp is guarded more
strongly and more closely. If the enemy chooses to break the agree-
ment, they will only gain a reputation for faithlessness and the dis-
favor of God, while we shall remain in safety and be true to our word.
A general should not have to say: "I did not expect it."
(37) For smaller forces we should select a place with a narrow
front, whose width corresponds to the size of our army. The supe-
rior numbers of the enemy are useless in such a place since there is
no room for them. By studying the place where they are, the general
can form a fair estimate of the enemy's strength, for he should know
from experience how much space is required for a given number of
troops.
(38) If we want to keep the enemy from finding out the strength
of our forces, we should order them to march on foot and in dose
formation. This can be deceptive and prevent the enemy from form-
ing a dear estimate of our numbers.
(39) It is a good idea to maneuver so that the sun, wind, and dust
are behind our men and in the face of the enemy. By so obscuring
his vision and making his breathing difficult, we should quickly be
victorious.
(40) We should line up our troops for battle before the enemy
gets ready. This puts us in a position to do what we wish, and barely
allows the enemy time to arm.
(41 ) If we are all set for the charge first, then we can attack the
enemy in safety with our men full of confidence, and the enemy's
very worried.
(4 2) When the battle line has been drawn up, the first rule is for
the soldiers to maintain the formation and the intervals between the
lines.
(4 3) It is right to be very concerned about the wounded. If we
neglect them, we will find that the rest of the troops will deliberately
not fight well, and our remissness will cause us to lose some who
could have been saved.
(44) If the enemy is put to flight, our soldiers must be restrained
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s T R A T E G K 0 N
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M A u R c E s
move, remains secure and always in circumstances of his own
choosing.
(57) An avaricious general can be the ruin of his own people and
an object of contempt to the enemy.
( 58) A general who loves luxury can destroy the whole army.
( 59) The best commander is the one who can instill courage at
the right time and can hold back the headlong flight of frightened
soldiers.
(60) A general who desires peace must be prepared for war, for
the barbarians become very nervous when they face an adversary all
set to fight.
(61) Mistakes made in ordinary affairs can generally be remedied
in a short while, but errors made in war cause lasting harm.
(62) Those whose performance is consistently poor should not
be entrusted even with just ordinary responsibilities.
(63) The sharp general takes into account not only probable dan-
gers, but also those which may be totally unexpected.
(64) Make peace a time of training for war, and battle an exhibi-
tion of bravery.
(65) The general should not go to sleep before reflecting on what
he should have done that he might have neglected and on what he
has to do the next day.
(66) It is well for the general to exercise self-control at all times,
but especially during war.
(67) The general should not be hasty in placing confidence in
people who promise to do something; if he does, almost everyone
will think he is light headed.
(68) Long and careful deliberation promises great safety in war,
whereas hasty and impetuous generals usually commit serious
blunders.
(69) The general should set an example of how things ought to
be done for his subordinates, training himself in the highest ideals,
doing what is right and refraining from those things his soldiers
should refrain from.
(70) The general should make sure of the good disposition of his
troops by an oath.
(71) If the general knows the inclinations and tendencies of each
officer and soldier, he will know better what duties should be as-
signed to each one.
(72) The general who wants to keep his plans concealed from the
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enemy should never take the rank and file of his own troops into his
confidence.
(73) When both sides are equally well armed, the better tactician
will win.
(74) The general who possesses some skill in public speaking is
able, as in the past, to rouse the weak-hearted to battle and restore
courage to a defeated army.
(75) The general should know the country well, whether it is
healthy and safe or unhealthy for his troops and inhospitable, and
whether the necessities such as water, wood, and forage are nearby.
For if these are at a distance, then their procurement is difficult and
dangerous, especially in the presence of the enemy. It is also good to
occupy any hills in the area before the enemy has a chance to do so.
(76) As in the past, misleading moves taken by the general can be
very advantageous. For example, if he makes it look as though he is
going to set up camp, the enemy may be lured into doing the same
thing; then while they are scattered about getting things ready, he
may secretly draw up his troops and attack, or he may quietly with-
draw his army if the terrain is unfavorable.
(77) In his movements the general should act like a good
wrestler; he should feint in one direction to try to deceive his adver-
sary and then make good use of the opportunities he finds, and in
this way he will overpower the enemy.
(78) In battles and in every action against the enemy the wise
general, even the most courageous, will keep in mind the possibility
of failure and defeat and will plan for them as actually occurring.
(79) The spirit of the commander is naturally communicated to
the troops, and there is an ancient saying that it is better to have an
army of deer commanded by a lion than an army of lions com-
manded by a deer. 4
(80) Allied forces should not be mixed in with our own troops.
They should set up camp and march separately. It is most important
that we hide our formations and methods of warfare from them, for
if they ever tum against us, they may use their knowledge of these to
hurt us.
(81) In time of war the best way of finding what is advantageous
is this: what is advantageous to you is disadvantageous to the enemy,
and what is beneficial for them will be just the opposite for your
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M A u R c E s
troops. It is in our interest to do nothing or avoid nothing that the
enemy would do or avoid. There is only one thing we should do:
whatever we think will be to our advantage. If you imitate the enemy
and do what he is doing for his own benefit, you only harm yourself.
Conversely, if you do something which is to your advantage, in trying
to imitate you the enemy will injure himself.
(82) The troops should be drawn up in several lines, and a number
of charges made against the enemy, recalling the words of the poet:
"You who are not tired could easily drive men weary with battle
back toward the city." 5
(8 3) For many reasons, and serious ones at that, it is dangerous to
extend the battle line indefinitely.
(84) An army of equal strength is necessary if our aim is merely
to defeat the enemy, but it has to be larger if we intend to occupy the
conquered territory.
(85) The general would be well advised to have more cavalry
than infantry. The latter is set only for close combat, while the for-
mer is easily able to pursue or to retreat, and when dismounted the
men are all set to fight on foot.
(86) A wise conunander will not engage the enemy in a pitched
battle unless a truly exceptional opportunity or advantage presents
itself.
(87) Change your appearance often so that you look different
while forming the battle line, before the charge, in meeting with the
enemy, when eating and when sleeping. By so doing you will not be
easily captured by the enemy or by some conspirators. Hannibal the
Carthaginian used wigs and varied styles of beards, so that the bar-
barians thought he was a supernatural being. 6
(88) We should choose the terrain not only to suit our arma-
ment, but also with a view to the various peoples. Parthians and
Gauls handle themselves well on the plains. The Spanish and Liguri-
ans fight better in the mountains and the hills, and the Britons in the
woods, while the Germans are more at home in the swamps. 7
(89) Whatever terrain the general chooses, he should make his
troops familiar with it. They will then be able to avoid rough spots
and because of their knowledge of the area will fight the enemy with
confidence.
5. Homer, Iliad, 11, 802-803; 16, 44-45.
6. Cf. Polybius, Hist., 3, 78, 1-4; Livy, 22, I.
7. I have not found the source of this.
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s T R A T E G K 0 N
(90) When the general leads his men out to battle, he should
present a cheerful appearance, avoiding any gloomy look. Soldiers
usually estimate their prospects by the appearance of the general.
(91) After a victory the general should not allow the men to
break ranks right away. For it has happened often enough that the
enemy, on noticing that our men have let down their guard in their
rejoicing and have broken ranks, have regained their courage, come
back to fight and turned our victory into defeat.
(92) When the enemy is surrounded, it is well to leave a gap in
our lines to give them an oppartunity to flee, in case they judge that
flight is better than remaining and taking their chances in battle.
(93) An army is judged by the spirit of its general. Hannibal the
Carthaginian understood this well, for when he learned that Scipio
was commanding the Romans, he spoke highly of the dispasition of
their army. Some then criticized him for being so slow to march out
and fight against those whom he had often defeated. He defended
himself by saying: "I would prefer to deal with a troop oflions com-
manded by a deer than with a herd of deer under the leadership of
a lion." 8
(94) The state benefits more from a lucky general than from a
brave one. The first achieves his results with little effort, whereas the
other does so at some risk.
(95) It is better to avoid a tricky oppanent than one who never
lets up. The latter makes no secret of what he is doing, whereas it is
difficult to find out what the other is up to.
(96) The commander should be severe and thorough in inves-
tigating charges against his men, but merciful in punishing them.
This will gain him their good will.
(97) The general should be calm in emergencies, prudent in
counsel, courteous to his associates. He will be most successful in
battle if he charges against the enemy, not like a wild beast, but in a
calculated manner.
(98) The general should be ignorant of none of the situations
likely to occur in war. Who can attempt to accomplish what he does
not understand? Who is able to furnish assistance in situations whose
dangers he does not understand?
(99) The general must make plans to defeat the enemy not only
8. The same expression is used by Ouranos: J. A. de Foucault, "Douze chapi-
tres inedits de la Tactique de Nicephore Ouranos," Travaux et Memoires 5
( 1973): 311. Its source remains unknown.
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M A u R c E s
by arms but also through their food and drink, making the water
unfit to drink and paisoning the grain. He must also know how we
can protect ourselves against such measures and how we can avoid
falling victim to them.
( 100) The general should always have a body of chosen troops
about him, whom he can send to the suppart of sections of the army
which are hard pressed. He should not advance too precipitously
against the enemy, for if some mishap occurs, the whole army could
be destroyed.
( 101) When the general gives a public speech he ought also to say
something in praise of the enemy. This will convince our men, even
when you are praising others, that you will never deprive us of the
praise we might receive from others and adorn them with our
honors.
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· B0 0 K I X ·
Surprise Attacks
I. Surprise Attacks
It is of course an ancient maxim that teaches us to try to assault the
enemy without ourselves suffering any injury, and intelligent gener-
als will keep this in mind and always give it high priority. This goal
can be attained if the assaults on the enemy are carefully planned and
swiftly carried out. These assaults can be shown to be very effective
not only against forces of equal strength, but also against vastly supe-
rior ones. For this reason it is wise to be always on the watch for the
right opportunities and pretexts and to strike at the enemy before
they can get themselves ready, especially if there is reason to believe
that their forces are stronger than ours. In such cases it is better, as
has been said, to try to employ different surprises and tricks as much
as possible rather than engage in a pitched battle which involves
dangers which could prove fatal.
Some commanders have welcomed embassies from the enemy
and replied in gentle and flattering terms, sent them on their way
with honors, and then immediately followed along and attacked
them unexpectedly. Some have themselves sent embassies with fa-
vorable proposals and then suddenly launched an attack. Some have
gone after the enemy in their camps by getting information about
how securely they set up camp, and then on a moonlit night two or
three hours before daybreak they would make their attack. Archers
are essential for an operation of this sort. On learning that the enemy
was marching along in disorder and allowing their troops to straggle,
some commanders have attacked them in the middle of their march
and inflicted serious injury. Others hiding in ambush have suddenly
charged out to attack the enemy. Some have pretended to withdraw
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M A u R c E s
from the scene of the action, then wheeled around all of a sudden
and charged into the enemy. Some others have driven herds of ani-
mals ahead of them, so the enemy would tum aside to round them
up and then, when they saw the enemy disordered and scattered
about, they would fall upon them.
Some attacks can be made out in the open, for example, if there is
a river in the area between us and the enemy which is difficult to
cross, especially for cavalry. A bridge can be constructed there, either
with wooden crossbeams as most of them are usually built, or on
pontoons, and with towers erected at both ends, either of wood, dry
masonry, or earth. When necessary, then, this bridge may be used to
cross over safely or to withdraw, and it leaves it up to the general to
decide how long to remain in that place, whether to attack in safety
or to retreat and destroy the bridge. In operations of this sort, how-
ever, and in incursions into the enemy's territory we ought not bum
or destroy supplies in those regions through which we hope to re-
turn, or our own men will suffer. We think it essential to have such
bridges also in case of a pitched battle when the camps are set up
close to a river. If crossing proves to be difficult at any point along the
river bank, especially in the area where the enemy are stationed, on
the day of battle the army may still be led out without hindrance and
without crowding. In case of a reverse they can remain safely in the
protection of the camp, and they will not be forced against their will
to cross the bridge under hostile fire. For these reasons the camp
should be set up on the enemy's side of the river.
2. Attacks at Night
The conduct of night attacks has varied among commanders. Some
have pitched camp about a day's march from the enemy, and have
sent a deputation or two to offer proposals for peace. When the en-
emy have reason to hope that an agreement is being reached, and
they become careless, then these generals march their army at night
and attack unexpectedly before dawn. This was done by the Roman
general Lusius in the time of Trajan.' Others have drawn up in com-
bat formation for several days near their own camp as if for a pitched
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s T R A T E G K 0 N
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M A u R c E s
formation. When the army gets close to the enemy, then they should
rest under cover, straighten out their line and, depending on the ter-
rain, launch their attack from two or three sides. It should not be
made from all four sides, for then the enemy finding themselves
completely surrounded will be forced to close ranks and fight, but
one side should be left open so those who want to flee may do so. At
that time, if the attacking army is large, one or two trumpets should
be blown; if it is small more should be blown to make them think it
is larger.
Some units of the army should always be held in reserve, taking
no part in the action at that time, but standing by until needed to
provide cover for their own men who might be fleeing. Attacks of
this sort, especially if against cavalry, must be made very carefully
and with a good deal of preparation, just as for a pitched battle.
Then, if it should not proceed according to plan, but the enemy has
been warned and lines up in formation to meet us, our army may
find itself unprepared and be routed in the ensuing battle. If the op-
posing force consists of infantry, and our attack is made with cavalry,
then it is obvious that they will cause serious harm to the enemy, or
they themselves will be able to retire without injury, for the infantry
will not be able to pursue them. Whether the attack is made at night
against a fortified· camp or in the daytime or against troops on the
march or against their baggage train, certain units must be clearly
designated to seize supplies and such. Otherwise, if all or most of the
soldiers become engaged in this, the enemy might attack and endan-
ger the whole army.
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s T R A T E G K 0 N
the army when it enters enemy territory. He must see that these are
transported in common baggage wagons, by the individual soldier, or
in some other way. For if the enemy should destroy the local provi-
sions, the army might suddenly find itself in critical straits in the
middle of a hostile land. Marches should generally not be made at
night in hostile territory, unless, of course, it is done to maintain
secrecy. For example, it may be absolutely necessary to avoid detec-
tion by the enemy, to seize difficult ground quickly or to pass over it
without the enemy finding out. But before setting out on any such
march, great care must taken to reconnoiter the roads.
Serious efforts should be made to capture inhabitants of the coun-
try alive in order to obtain information from them about the strength
and the plans of the enemy. Interrogation of prisoners should be
done by the general in person and not by someone else. Frequently
very important and completely unsuspected information has been
revealed by such questioning. Do not, however, put much trust in
statements of deserters or defectors, certainly not as much as in men
captured in surprise attacks. For it is not uncommon for deserters
and captives to give false information deliberately. Do not pay atten-
tion to statements made by one person, and do not believe anything
unless it is corroborated by several others, especially, as mentioned,
in the case of prisoners taken in raids or deserters. Deserters from
the enemy who claim to have some secret information should be
placed in confinement or securely held in some other way and told
that if their statements prove true they will be rewarded but if false
they will be put to death.
If the enemy army is concentrated someplace outside their for-
tifications, none of our soldiers should be allowed to go off to plun-
der and loot, but they should first advance against the enemy. If the
result of the battle is favorable, they should not put off the oppor-
tunity but, while the enemy is still very frightened and confused,
they should keep after them until their forces are completely broken
up and scattered or until favorable peace terms with unequivocal
guarantees are made. If the enemy is indeed concentrated but avoids
getting into action, then our troops, while remaining united, must
ride about and trample everything under foot. But if we plan on
returning by the same route and are not well provided with food or
forage, then we should spare the local supplies and destroy them
only on our return journey. The vanguard should place some signs at
forks in the road and other places where mistakes can be made. If it is
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M A u R c E s
a wooded area, they can be put on the trees; if barren, piles of rocks
or mounds of earth will do. These will be recognized by the troops
marching along behind, and the army will not get lost.
Troops sent out to pillage should not all be involved in the plun-
dering, but divided into two groups, the first to do the pillaging and
the other more numerous group to follow along to guard them. This
should be observed whether the expedition is directed against a re-
gion, a fortified enemy camp, a herd of cattle, a baggage train, or
anything else. The same procedure should be followed if the whole
army joins together in a pillaging expedition. All the men should not
engage in pillaging, but if the opportunity for collecting supplies
presents itself, some should go out gathering them, and others
should follow along in regular formation. If all the soldiers are busy
with plundering and collecting provisions, they might be caught by a
surprise attack or an ambush before they can get themselves back in
formation.
Except in an emergency, we think it is more advantageous not to
pick a few men from different units and detail them for an expedi-
tion, .a scouting party, or some other military duty. It is better to
detail an entire tagma or bandon or one of their subdivisions under
an ilarch or dekarch. It may become necessary to form a special detail
in certain circumstances, for example, if most of the soldiers are
reluctant for whatever reason to do the job or if the horses are in
poor condition. In such circumstances, then, the detail should be
composed of men whose morale is high and whose horses are in
good condition. In general, though, taking a few men at random
from each tagma for some duty is dangerous. The men so detailed
cannot be used to the best advantage since they miss the support of
their friends and they do not know one another. Furthermore, the
units left behind are deprived of their best soldiers.
When the general plans to seize a fortress or height or some other
place, he should not let his men know about it until they are actually
on the site and he orders them to begin the task. If it is really neces-
sary for the army to encamp or to pass close by a fortified position of
the enemy, one of the officers with some light armed troops should
be stationed near the entrance ways of the fortification to prevent
any sudden sally by the enemy. The same precautions should be
taken in passing through defiles. A bivouac or camp should not be set
up in the vicinity of an enemy fortification or a wooded area. But if it
is absolutely necessary to camp there, careful attention should be
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s T R A T E G K 0 N
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M A u R c E s
before it has been tested by giving it to prisoners. Water from the
wells should not be drunk for it will often have been poisoned. We
ourselves recall that in the Persian wars even the barley was spoiled
by some poison, and a number of horses perished. 3 Since there was
no fodder about, the soldiers were forced to give the local barley to
their horses.
Instructions should be given to the men that in the event of an
unexpected disturbance while on the march, they should not race
about and get in each other's way, but everyone should hurry to that
section in which the disturbance occurs. By following this procedure
they will be prepared for the enemy, better able to concentrate their
forces and to avoid confusion. Not only should effective patrols al-
ways be maintained to the front in case of attack, but a fairly strong
force, well armed but without much equipment, called a rear guard,
under a competent officer, should be stationed about fifteen or
twenty miles to the rear. It should set up good patrols in case there
are stragglers from the army who fall behind because of illness or
some other reason, or in case of sudden enemy attacks. The best time
for such attacks is when the troops are marching along carelessly and
when those up ahead cannot easily come to the support of the troops
behind them. It is not a bad idea to do this even in our own country
to deal with soldiers wandering about without permission of their
commanders and acting disorderly, and to identify men disregarding
their military obligations.
3. Chronique de jean eveque de Nikiou, ed. and trans. H. Zotenberg (Paris 1883),
c. 96, p. 408.
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s T R A T E G K 0 N
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M A u R c E s
passes, and cannot withdraw without real danger, then it is better to
come to an agreement with the enemy, relinquishing a part or all of
the plunder. Thus the army can extricate itself safely instead of
taking unnecessary risks. But if they do not want to make such an
agreement, then the prisoners should be put to death before the eyes
of the enemy. The army may then either remain in that country and
ravage it without mercy or, as best they can, maintain formation and
concentrate on escape. The major concern of the general who is
caught in such a defile, especially a long one, should be not to try to
force his way through, particularly in summer when the dense fo-
liage enables the enemy to cause more trouble, before all enemy
forces have been driven off, or his own troops have seized the com-
manding heights of the passage.
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s T R A T E G K 0 N
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M A u R c E s
bravery. While the enemy is still reported to be far off, only the
scouts should be sent out when the general wants to gather infor-
mation about the enemy's movements, the nature of the roads, or
fortified places. When a raid is planned for the purpose of taking
prisoners, the scouts should join up with the patrols, but should go
ahead of them to observe from concealed positions, and the patrols
should follow along the route they indicate.
In hazardous circumstances more than one patrol should be sent
out and in more than one direction. They should vary and be con-
stantly changing according to the nature of the ground. They should
be far enough apart so that if the enemy stays at a good distance from
our men and manages to elude one of the patrols, they will run into
others and be discovered. The most advanced patrol need not consist
of many men. The next one in should have more, and the third still
more. The patrols must be inspected to see how they are doing. Very
reliable officers should be sent to make unexpected visits to observe
how things are going. Anyone found negligent should be punished
for seriously endangering the whole army. An experienced scout,
even before the enemy comes in view, should be able to estimate the
strength of their army from certain signs, such as the extent of
ground trampled by their horses and the size of their camp. He
should be able to estimate the time when they passed through the
area from the droppings of men and horses and from their tracks.
If the camp is fortified by a ditch or a regular stone wall and the
mounted troops have been allowed to go inside the fortifications,
then the patrols should not be sent too far off to avoid unnecessarily
wearing out the horses. But if the cavalry is bivouacked outside, the
patrols should be carefully organized.
Soldiers sent out on patrol duty should be instructed to take pris-
oners. They should be trained for this just as for hunting, stalking
them unseen and undetected. A few should show themselves and
then draw back while others circle around as unseen and concealed
as the ground allows. Individuals should show themselves in several
places while the main body heads for another place where they can
hide themselves through the night. The best time for this is when the
enemy is reported to be far off and would not suspect such activity.
Patrol assignments should be kept secret not only from the enemy,
but also from the rank and file of our army. If this is observed,
soldiers who want to desert will unexpectedly fall right into their
hands.
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s T R A T E G K 0 N
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M A u R c E s
BOOK X·
[Sie9es]
I. This probably refers to the Roman siege of the fortress of Aqbas in Ar-
zanene, a region of Armenia, in 583: Theophylact of Simocatta, History,
I, 12.
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s T R A T E G K 0 N
harsh to the besieged. If the terms are too severe the defenders may
think that the risk of fighting is the lesser of two evils and may be-
come desperate and united. But try to make terms lighter and more
acceptable, such as the surrender of their horses, weaPons, or some
other possessions. Such a moderate approach with its hopes of safety
may lead them to differences of opinion, and they may become more
hesitant to resist and face danger. In case of a lengthy siege make sure
all your supplies are arranged for ahead of time. Estimate the number
of men required for each duty and type of work, and be sure to assign
each man to his task.
The whole army must not be brought out every day to assault the
walls. This would leave them all exhausted at once. Rather, the army
should be divided into various sections and a certain number of
troops assigned to work so many hours each day. Some should be
scheduled to work at night, others during the day. For not only must
the besieged be harassed by constant attacks during the day, but they
should be kept on edge all night by troops designated for this pur-
Pose. In order that the soldiers in our army should not be bothered
and disturbed by the shouts of men or the clash of arms, the camp
should be pitched a mile or two from the enemy fortifications, be-
yond earshot of the noise and confusion of the siege. Assaults should
not be made recklessly and without purrose. Some losses will occur
which will only discourage our troops and encourage the besieged. If
the besieged fort is small and a direct assault appears risky and costly,
and the besieged are well supplied, then work at harassing them con-
stantly, night and day, until they are exhausted. If there are houses of
inflammable material within the walls, fire-bearing arrows should be
shot from various directions, especially if there is a strong wind
blowing. Also catapults should be used to hurl the so-called incendi-
ary bombs. While the enemy is kept busy trying to extinguish the
fires, set up ladders, if the ground permits, and climb up. In almost all
sieges catapults are useful, especially if it is difficult to get close by
digging or piling up earth or to get a battering ram in Position.
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M A u R c E s
there is to be an attack, it is more effective to make it as the enemy is
returning and leaving our country, when they are encumbered with
plunder, tired out, and getting closer to their own people. If you do
want to engage them in battle, that is the time to attack. For a person
operating in his own country is less inclined to fight; he has many
ways of saving himself and does not want to take unnecessary risks.
One marching through enemy country, on the other hand, would
out of desperation prefer fighting and would regard any retreat as
hazardous.
It is most impartant to keep the army unharmed and intact. By
concentrating on this, the enemy will not find it easy to besiege
the fortifications or disperse his forces to ravage the country, for he
will be under observation and will have to reckon with a concen-
trated army.
Even though the general decides against a pitched battle, he
should still make preparations for one. He should make it appear that
he plans on one and convey the impression to all his troops that he
will definitely attack the enemy. This will cause trouble for the en-
emy when it comes to their knowledge.
If the nature of the ground and the situation of the enemy's coun-
try are favorable, make plans to send a force there by another route
as a diversionary tactic. Of course, as already noted, it is necessary to
study the situation and the distances, so that if the enemy learns of
the raid and moves against our force, they can safely leave the coun-
try by another route and avoid being trapped there by the enemy
movement.
All essential supplies must be collected in very strong fortresses,
and the country should be cleared of animals. If the enemy should lay
siege to one of our fortified places, we should destroy provisions in
the vicinity and ambush men sent out to gather supplies, and so
make it very tight for the enemy.
Forts which are not in a strong natural setting should be made
more secure. Part of the army, depending on the progress of the
fighting, should be assigned to their defense. Preparations should be
made to transfer the inhabitants of weaker places to more strongly
fortified ones.
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s T R A T E G K 0 N
are well supplied with the necessary provisions, fine, otherwise be-
fore the enemy approaches evacuate all those who will be useless,
such as the women, the elderly, the infirm, and the children, so that
what provisions you have may be reserved for the able fighting men.
Devices to defend against stone-throwing artillery should be pro-
cured. As protection against these, heavy mats can be hung over the
walls along the battlements, or bundles, coils of rope, loose logs.
Brick facing can also be built onto the ramparts. Against battering
rams, cushions or sacks filled with grain husks and sand are effective.
To ward off the swinging or beaked rams, use grappling irons, pitch,
fire, or heavy, sharpened stones held by ropes or chains which can be
suddenly dropped from machines and then hauled up again by other
counterweights.
If they move up siege towers, hurl fire bombs or stones at them. If
this does not stop them, build towers inside the walls opposite them.
It is necessary that the towers of the wall which are most exposed to
attack should be without roofs, so the soldiers stationed there can
fight without any obstacles, and so that artillery can be easily mounted
there and operated. Small, narrow doors should be cut into these
towers opening to the side toward the right of the siege engines
drawn up by the enemy, so that our infantry can go out through
these side doors and attack while safely covered by their shields and
supported by the troops on top of the wall; in this way they will be
able to force the enemy to pull back their equipment. These small
doors should have gates so they can be secured when necessary and
not remain open.
The garrison should be distributed all along the wall, and a suit-
able force should be taken from the other troops and held in reserve
to support a threatened sector when necessary. In an emergency,
then, the troops defending the wall will not have to dash from place
to place, leaving certain spots wide open, a very dangerous thing to
do. If the civil population stays in the city, they too must join with the
men distributed along the wall to help the soldiers. This keeps them
too busy to plan an uprising, and it also entrusts them with some
responsibility for the defense of the city and makes them ashamed
to rebel.
The gates of the city should be entrusted to reliable men. No sol-
diers or civilians should be permitted, especially at the beginning of
the siege, to go outside the walls to fight even though the garrison
may be very strong and courageous. Direct contact with the enemy
could be allowed if it becomes necessary to force some siege engine
109
M A u R c E s
which is causing severe damage to pull back from the wall. But in
general, the defense should be carried on from the top of the wall
and not by having men risk their lives outside in hand-to-hand fight-
ing. For when that sort of thing happens, the best soldiers are killed
or wounded, and the rest of the troops become so discouraged that
they are easily defeated by the enemy. It is obvious that as long as
there are enough men the wall will be secure, but if one point is given
up, all the rest will be endangered. If the fortification has an outer
wall, it is a good idea to post sentries there, especially at night, when
some might think of deserting to the enemy or secretly plan treach-
erous acts against the defense of the wall. Missiles should be thrown
from the wall only when they will be effective.
If the supply of drinking water comes from cisterns or from the
ground, its use should be restricted to a certain extent. No individual
should have the authority to use as much as he wants. The sentries
and their reliefs should be carefully scheduled, especially at night.
The distribution of provisions must be strictly regulated, and they
should be kept safely under guard, so they cannot easily be stolen by
anyone passing by.
110
s T R A T E G K 0 N
the whole army into the original location, set up secure outposts,
have the infantry pitch camp around the fortification and dig a deep
ditch if the ground permits. If there are stones or bricks in the area,
build a dry wall braced securely along its length with logs. If wood is
the only available building material, use some of it, but make the
fortified area much smaller.
After enclosing the ch-ea in this manner, if the enemy move up to
attack the place and the general knows he cannot confront them in a
pitched battle, he should withdraw before their approach and ar-
range to camp nearby. In this way he will not be so close to the
enemy that he will be forced to do battle, nor too far from the men in
the fortification to prevent the enemy from putting excessive pres-
sure on them. Signals should be arranged, some for the day and some
for the night, by means of which the garrison may communicate its
situation to the force outside, so that they can come to their assis-
tance when necessary. If circumstances are favorable and the infantry
is able to drive off the enemy by fighting, they must not delay at all,
so as not to endanger the garrison. As soon as the situation becomes
more secure, the fortifications should be built up into a regular, solid
construction, made stronger with mortar, and all other details or-
ganized. Against a people depending largely on horses, an expedition
of this sort can best be undertaken about July, August, or September.
During those months the grass is dry and burns easily, and the en-
emy cavalry find it difficult to stay in one place for any length of time.
If the site has no water supply, no streams or wells, then it is
necessary to arrange for large earthenware jars or well-built barrels.
They should be filled with water and some clean gravel from a
riverbed dropped in. Enough water should be stored to last until
winter, and until regular cisterns to hold the rainwater are built. To
prevent the water stored in the casks from becoming stagnant and
fetid, peg holes should be drilled in them and receptacles placed be-
low, so the water may flow into them drop by drop and kept in mo-
tion. When the small receptacles are full, they should be emptied
back into the jars or barrels. By this constant movement the water is
aerated and does not become foul. It helps to pour some vinegar into
water which has started to tum bad, for this quickly lessens or gets
rid of the odor. Good thick planks can be prepared, placed in a
trench, and fastened together like a box. The seams and joints should
be sealed with pitch and tow or wicker, and in this way a regular,
moderate-sized cistern is prepared. One or more may be built, mea-
111
M A u R c E s
suring twenty by ten feet wide and eight or ten feet high. These will
do until cement cisterns can be built. For it is well known that water
keeps better in large containers. Wooden ties should be placed in the
middle of the cisterns, and the planks should be thick, so they will
not give way because of the water pressure, and the water will not
spill out.
112
s T R A T E G K 0 N
·80 0 K XI·
Characteristics and Tactics
ef
Various Peoples
INTRODUCTION
1. John Wiita, "The Ethnika in Byzantine Military Treatises" (Ph.D. diss., Uni-
versity of Minnesota, 1977), provides a very detailed commentary on Book
XI.
113
M A u R c E s
They are intractable in negotiations. They will not initiate any pro-
posal, even one they regard as vitally important for themselves, but
will wait until the proposal is made by their opponents.
They wear body armor and mail, and are armed with bows and
swords. They are more practiced in rapid, although not powerful
archery, than all other warlike nations. Going to war, they encamp
within fortifications. When the time of battle draws near they sur-
round themselves with a ditch and a sharpened palisade. They do not
leave the baggage train within, but make a ditch for the purpose of
refuge in case of a reverse in battle. They do not allow their horses to
graze, but gather the forage by hand.
They draw up for battle in three equal bodies, center, right, left,
with the center having up to four or five hundred additional picked
troops. The depth of the formation is not uniform, but they try to
draw up the cavalrymen in each company in the first and second line
or phalanx and keep the front of the formation even and dense. The
spare horses and the baggage train are stationed a short distance be-
hind the main line. In fighting against lancers they hasten to form
their battle line in the roughest terrain, and to use their bows, so that
the charges of the lancers against them will be dissipated and broken
up by the rough ground. Before the day of battle a favorite ploy of
theirs is to camp in rugged country and to postpone the fighting,
especially when they know their opponents are well prepared and
ready for combat. When it does come to battle, moreover, especially
during the summer, they make their attack at the hottest hour of the
day. They hope that the heat of the sun and the delay in beginning the
action will dampen the courage and spirit of their adversaries. They
then join battle with calmness and determination, marching step by
step in even and dense formation.
They are really bothered by cold weather, rain, and the south
wind, all of which loosen their bow strings. They are also disturbed
by a very carefully drawn-up formation of infantry, by an even field
with no obstacles to the charge of lancers, by hand-to-hand combat
and fighting because volleys of arrows are ineffective at dose quar-
ters, and because they themselves do not make use of lances and
shields. Charging against them is effective because they are prompted
to rapid flight and do not know how to wheel about suddenly against
their attackers, as do the Scythian nations. They are vulnerable to
attacks and encirclements from an outflanking position against the
114
s T R A T E G K 0 N
flanks and rear of their formation because they do not station suffi-
cient flank guards in their battle line to withstand a major flank at-
tack. Often, too, unexpected attacks at night against their camp are
effective because they pitch their tents indiscriminately and without
order inside their fortifications.
To do battle against them our forces should be drawn up as pre-
scribed in the book on formations. Select open, smooth, and level
terrain, if you can do so, without any swamps, ditches, or brush
which could break up the formation. When the army is prepared
and lined up for battle, do not delay the attack if you have really
decided to fight a pitched battle on that day. Once ·you get within
bowshot make the attack or charge in even, dense, regular order, and
do it quickly, for any delay in closing with the enemy means that
their steady rate of fire will enable them to discharge more missiles
against our soldiers and horses.
If it is necessary to fight a battle on very rough ground, it is better
not to have the whole battle line on horseback in such places, but to
draw some up in infantry formation while others remain mounted.
When lancers attack archers, as we have said, unless they maintain
an even, unbroken front, they sustain serious damage from the ar-
rows and fail to come to close quarters. Because of this they require
more even ground for such fighting. If the army is not really ready
for combat, it must not engage in a pitched battle. Instead, employ it
safely in skirmishes and raids against the enemy, which can be done
smoothly on favorable terrain. Neither the enemy nor our own
troops should be allowed to discover the reason for putting off a
pitched battle, since it would embolden the one and make cowards
out of the other. Wheeling or turning around in withdrawals should
not be directed against the enemy's front, but to turn up their flanks
and take their rear. For the Persians pressing on in pursuits, make an
effort not to break up their formation, f~r this would easily expose
their rear to forces wheeling around against them. By the same
token, if a force withdrawing before them wants to turn about and
attack the front lines of the pursuing Persians, it will suffer injury on
running into their well-ordered ranks. For the Persians do not attack
in a disorderly fashion as the Scythians do in pursuing, but cautiously
and in good order. For this reason, as has been said, forces wheeling
about should not attack their front, but should be sure to go by the
flanks against their rear.
115
M A u R c E s
2. Dealing with the Scythians, That Is, Avars, Turks, and Others
Whose Way ef Life Resembles That ef the Hunnish Peoples
The Scythian nations are one, so to speak, in their mode oflife and in
their organization, which is primitive and includes many peoples. 2 Of
these peoples only the Turks and the Avars concern themselves with
military organization, and this makes them stronger than the other
Scythian nations when it comes to pitched battles. The nation of the
Turks is very numerous and independent. 3 They are not versatile or
skilled in most human endeavors, nor have they trained themselves
for anything else except to conduct themselves bravely against their
enemies. The Avars, for their part, are scoundrels, devious, and very
experienced in military matters.
These nations have a monarchical form of government, and their
rulers subject them to cruel punishments for their mistakes. Gov-
erned not by love but by fear, they steadfastly bear labors and hard-
ships. They endure heat and cold, and the want of many necessities,
since they are nomadic peoples. They are very superstitious, treach-
erous, foul, faithless, possessed by an insatiate desire for riches. They
scorn their oath, do not observe agreements, and are not satisfied by
gifts. Even before they accept the gift, they are making plans for
treachery and betrayal of their agreements. They are clever at esti-
mating suitable opportunities to do this and taking prompt advan-
tage of them. They prefer to prevail over their enemies not so much
by force as by deceit, surprise attacks, and cutting off supplies.
They are armed with mail, swords, bows, and lances. In combat
most of them attack doubly armed; lances slung over their shoulders
and holding bows in their hands, they make use of both as need re-
quires. Not only do they wear armor themselves, but in addition the
horses of their illustrious men are covered in front with iron or felt.
They give special attention to training in archery on horseback.
A vast herd of male and female horses follows them, both to pro-
vide nourishment and to give the impression of a huge army. They
116
s T R A T E G K 0 N
117
M A u R c E s
owing to their lack of exercise they simply cannot walk about on
their own feet. Level, unobstructed ground should be chosen, and a
cavalry force should advance against them in a dense, unbroken mass
to engage them in hand-to-hand fighting. Night attacks are also
effective, with part of our force maintaining its formation while the
other lies in ambush. They are seriously hurt by defections and de-
sertions. They are very fickle, avaricious and, composed of so many
tribes as they are, they have no sense of kinship or unity with one
another. If a few begin to desert and are well received, many more
will follow.
When they are moving up for battle, the first thing to do is have
your scouts on the alert, stationed at regular intervals. Then make
your plans and actual preparations in case the battle should not turn
out well. Look for a good defensive position for use in an emergency,
collect whatever provisions are available, enough for a few days for
the horses as well as for the men, especially have plenty of water.
Then make arrangements for the baggage train as explained in the
book treating of that subject. If an infantry force is present, it should
be stationed in the front line in the customary manner of the nation
to which it belongs. The force should be drawn up according to the
method shown in the diagram of the convex line of battle, that is,
with the cavalry posted behind the infantry. If only the cavalry is
ready for combat, draw them up according to the manner set down
in the book on formations. Post a numerous and capable force on the
flanks. In the rear the defenders are sufficient. When pursuing, the
assault troops should not get more than three or four bowshots away
from the formation of defenders, nor should they become carried
away in the charge. When possible seek a dear and unobstructed
area to form the battle line, where no woods, marshes, or hollows
might serve as a screen for enemy ambushes. Post scouts at some
distance from all four sides of the formation. If at all possible, it is
helpful to have an unfordable river, marshes, or a lake behind the
battle line, so that the rear is securely defended. If the battle turns
out well, do not be hasty in pursuing the enemy or behave carelessly.
For this nation does not, as do the others, give up the struggle when
worsted in the first battle. But until their strength gives out, they try
all sorts of ways to assail their enemies. If the formation is mixed,
with most of it being infantry, it is still necessary to make provision
for forage for the horses. When the enemy is approaching, by no
means should the cavalry be allowed to send out foraging parties.
118
s T R A T E G K 0 N
119
M A u R c E s
things and ruin their opportunities. Pretend to come to agreements
with them. Aim at reducing their boldness and zeal by shortage of
provisions or the discomforts of heat or cold. This can be done when
our army has pitched camp on rugged and difficult ground. On such
terrain this enemy cannot attack successfully because they are using
lances. But if a favorable opportunity for a regular battle occurs, line
up the army as set forth in the book on formations.
4. The author is undoubtedly writing of the Slavs bordering the Byzantine Em-
pire along the lower Danube. The Antes lived to their northeast. What the
Strategikon records about both peoples is confirmed by other sources: Wiita,
"Ethnika," 259ff. See also Zisterova, Les Avares et Jes Slaves.
5. It seems clear that the first Greek word, kenchros, means common millet
(panicum miliaceum ), but some scholars would translate the second word,
e?fmos, as barley or buckwheat. Wiita believes that a less robust grain called
Italian millet (setaria italica) is meant: "Ethnika," 279-81.
120
s T R A T E G K 0 N
121
M A u R c E s
it in a feigned panic and run for the woods. When their assailants
disperse after the plunder, they calmly come back and cause them
injury. They are ready to do this sort of thing to bait their adversaries
eagerly and in a variety of ways.
They are completely faithless and have no regard for treaties,
which they agree to more out of fear than by gifts. When a difference
of opinion prevails among them, either they come to no agreement
at all or when some of them do come to an agreement, the others
quickly go against what was decided. They are always at odds with
each other, and nobody is willing to yield to another. ·
In combat they are hurt by volleys of arrows, sudden attacks
launched against them from different directions, hand-to-hand fight-
ing with infantry, especially light-armed troops, and having to fight
on open and unobstructed ground. Our army, therefore, should
comprise both cavalry and infantry, especially light-armed troops or
javelin throwers, and should carry a large amount of missiles, not
only arrows, but also other throwing weapons. Bring materials for
building bridges, the kind called floating, if possible. In this way you
may cross without effort the numerous and unfordable rivers in their
country. Build them in Scythian manner, some men erecting the
framework, others laying down the planks. You should also have ox-
hide or goatskin bags to make rafts, and for use in helping the soldiers
swim across for surprise attacks against the enemy in the summer.
Still, it is preferable to launch our attacks against them in the win-
ter when they cannot easily hide among the bare trees, when the
tracks of fugitives can be discerned in the snow, when their house-
hold is miserable from exposure, and when it is easy to cross over the
rivers on the ice. Most of the animals and superfluous equipment
should be left behind in a very safe place with a suitable guard and
officer in charge. The dromons should be anchored at strategic loca-
tions. A moira of cavalry under outstanding officers should be sta-
tioned in the area as a protection so that the army on the march shall
not be distracted in the event of hostile ambushes, and also to spread
rumors that an attack against the enemy is being planned in some
other location. By means of such a rumor and the anxiety of their
chiefs, each of whom will be worried about his own problems, they
will not have the opportunity to get together and cause trouble for
our army. Do not station these troops close to the Danube, for the
enemy would find out how few they are and consider them unim-
122
s T R A T E G K 0 N
portant. Nor should they be very far away, so their will be no delay, if
it becomes necessary, to have them join the invading army. They
should stay about a day's march from the Danube. This army should
cross over into enemy territory suddenly and make its invasion on
clear and level ground. Immediately a competent officer should ride
ahead with some picked men to take captives from whom it will be
possible to get information about the enemy. As far as possible, avoid
marching through rough or wooded terrain during summer until
thorough reconnaissance has been made, and, in case the enemy is
present in force, until they have been driven away by our infantry or
cavalry. If we have to march through a narrow pass, and if we expect
to return by the same route, measures must be taken, as explained in
the book dealing with this matter, to clear the way, widen the road,
or to leave a relatively strong force behind in the area to prevent the
enemy from hiding and making surprise attacks which could over-
whelm our army on its return when it is likely to be encumbered
with plunder.
As much as possible, avoid making camp in thickly wooded areas
or pitching your tents near such places. For they can easily serve as a
base for launching attacks or for rustling horses. The infantry force
should encamp in order and within the fortification. The cavalry
should encamp outside, with sentinels posted in a wide circle around
the grazing horses, unless it is possible to bring in forage for the
horses, so they can stay inside day and night.
If an opportunity for battle occurs, do not make your battle line
against them too deep. Do not concentrate only on frontal attacks,
but on the other sectors as well. Suppose that the enemy occupy a
fairly strong position and have their rear well covered so that they do
not allow us an opportunity to encircle them or to attack their flanks
or their rear. In that event it is necessary to post some troops in
concealment, have others simulate a flight before their front, so that,
lured by the hope of pursuit, they may abandon their good defensive
position, and then our men will turn back against them, while those
in hiding come out and attack them.
Since there are many kings among them always at odds with one
another, it is not difficult to win over some of them by persuasion or
by gifts, especially those in areas closer to the border, and then to
attack the others, so that their common hostility will not make them
united or bring them together under one ruler. The so-called refu-
123
M A u R c E s
gees who are ordered to point out the roads and furnish certain in-
formation must be very closely watched. 6 Even some Romans have
given in to the times, forget their own people, and prefer to gain the
good will of the enemy. Those who remain loyal ought to be re-
warded, and the evildoers punished. Provisions found in the sur-
rounding countryside should not simply be wasted, but use pack
animals and boats to transport them to our own country. The
rivers there flow into the Danube, which makes transportation by
boat easy.
Infantry are necessary not only in narrow passes and fortified
places, but also in rough country and along rivers. Even in the face of
the enemy it is then possible to bridge over them. When a small force
of infantry, both heavy and light, has been secretly brought across at
night or during the day and immediately drawn up in formation,
keeping their backs to the river, they provide enough security to put
a bridge across the river. In cramped river crossings or in defiles it is
necessary for the rear guard to be ready for action at all times, dis-
posed according to the terrain. For one may expect attacks to occur
whenever the force is divided, and the troops who are advancing
cannot aid those in the rear. Surprise attacks against the enemy
should be carried out ¥cording to standard procedure. One detach-
ment approaches their front and provokes them, while another de-
tachment, infantry or cavalry, is posted secretly in the rear on the
route by which they are expected to flee. The enemy then who
avoided action or who flee from the first attacking force will unex-
pectedly run right into the other detachment. In summer there must
be no letup in hurting them. During that time of year we can pillage
the more open and bare areas and aim at entrenching ourselves in
their land. This will aid the Romans who are captives among them to
gain their freedom, after escaping from them. The thick foliage of
summer makes it fairly easy for prisoners to escape without fear.
The procedures of the march, the invasion, and the pillaging of
the country, and other more or less related matters, are dealt with in
the book on invading hostile territory. Here the subject will be sum-
marized as best as possible. The settlements of the Slavs and Antes lie
in a row along the rivers very close to one another. In fact, there is
6. During the reign of Heraclius refugees from the Danube regions, Pannonia,
Dacia, and Dardania sought safety in Thessalonica: Les plus anciens recueils
des miracles de Saint Demetrius et la penetration des slaves dans Jes &lkans, ed.
P. Lemerle (Paris 1979), 1: 20-21, 185.
124
s T R A T E G K 0 N
125
M A u R c E s
tance. The lieutenant general should continue his advance rapidly,
while still carrying out the same procedure at the rest of the settle-
ments along the way as long as there are enough tagmas under his
command. The lieutenant general himself ought to stay clear of all
these actions. He should retain for himself three or four bandons, up
to a thousand capable men, until the invasion is completely finished,
so he can see to reconnaissance and security for the rest of the troops.
While the lieutenant general is discharging these duties, the gen-
eral should follow along, have the pillaging troops join him, and keep
moving up toward the lieutenant general. For his part, the lieutenant
general should turn back and gather up the pillagers along his line of
march. In the place where the two encounter each other they should
set up camp together that same day. These surprise incursions made
by the two units should not advance more than fifteen or twenty
miles, so that both may get there, do their pillaging, and pitch camp
on the same day. In these expeditions those of the enemy able to put
up resistance need not be taken alive, but kill everyone you encoun-
ter and move on. When you are marching along do not let them
delay you, but take advantage of the opportunity.
Now then, we have reflected on these topics to the best of our ability,
drawing on our own experience and on the authorities of the past,
and we have written down these reflections for the benefit of who-
ever may read them. All the other topics which one is likely to en-
counter and which are not written about in the present book must
be examined in the light of what we have written, of the teachings of
experience, and· of the very nature of things, and, as far as possible,
applied to problems as they arise. For how would it be possible for us
or for anyone else to Write about everything that might come up in
the future? How write about what the enemy will try next or will
always do? Who can tell how many things the future will bring? They
do not all campaign according to the same school of thought. General-
ship is a very diversified art; many different methods of combat are
employed. This means that one must devote some time imploring
God for the ability to use his talents to outwit the enemy. Human
nature is very cunning and beyond comprehension; it is able to con-
ceive many plans and to act in devious ways.
126
s T R A T E G K 0 N
·BOOK XII·
[Mixed Formations, Irifantry,
Camps, and Huntin9]
127
M A u R c E s
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128
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M A u R c E s
6. Formation in a Column
't" T 't"
't" T 't"
't' T 't"
.. 't" 't"
't" . ...
't" 't" 't"
. 't' 't'
't" T T
1: T 't"
132
s T R A T E G K 0 N
133
M A u R c E s
on both sides, so they can support them in case of need. Also, if all
the cavalry in the force move out in pursuit of the enemy, they too
may gallop out and get close to the cavalry flanks, but to the rear,
forming themselves into flank guards for it. The infantry, as noted, is
already covering the rear. In the event that neither the horsemen
who first rode up ahead nor those in the second group are able to
check an enemy countercharge and retreat through the rear of the
line of infantry, then these flank guards come and station themselves
abreast of the line of infantry, but not along the front to avoid disor-
der and confusion. Then the infantry comes out of the deep forma-
tion of the files it had gone into, and the force again fills the gaps in
the line and stands to resist the enemy. If the enemy advances to
within bowshot and attempts to charge and break up our phalanx, a
very dangerous move for them, the infantry should close ranks in the
regular way. The first, second, and third men in each file form a
foulkon,' interlocking their shields, fix their spears firmly in the
ground, holding them inclined forward and straight outside their
shields, so that anyone who dares come too close will quickly experi-
ence them. They also lean their shoulders and put their weight
against the shields to resist any pressure from the enemy. The third
man, who is standing nearly upright, and the fourth man hold their
spears like javelins, so when the foe gets close they can use them
either for thrusting or for throwing and then draw their swords. The
light-armed infantry and the cavalry use the bow. If the enemy
should try to move against the cavalry from the rear, something they
generally attempt, the infantry divides into a double phalanx. Every
second file drops out to the rear, passing between the cavalry units,
and the cavalry stays there in the middle. The light-armed infantry
are also divided, half of them go with the forward phalanx, and half
with the phalanx to the rear. The squares also provide support for
the rear.
To prevent the formation from being too closely observed by the
enemy before the battle, a thin screen of cavalry may be deployed in
front of the infantry phalanx until the enemy gets close. When they
are about four or five bowshots from the battle line, this cavalry
screen leaves the infantry files to rejoin the rest of the cavalry at its
place back in the line, and this group forms as the front rank of the
I. Foulkon, related to German Volk, is a very close formation like the old Roman
testudo: see H. Mihaescu, "Les termes de commandement militaires latins
clans le Strategicon de Maurice," Rerne de lin9uistique 14 (1969): 261-72.
134
s T R A T E G K 0 N
cavalry, as shown in the attached diagram. The results are that the
line is securely protected, and that the enemy will approach very
boldly, thinking they have to do with cavalry only, and they will
be easily beaten as the infantry all of a sudden charge out in the way
we have explained. This sort of formation requires constant practice
for both men and horses to get accustomed to doing it. It must be
understood just how far afield the cavalry can go in their pursuits
riding fast and without confusion, and not letting the infantry forma-
tion become tinduly disordered or thinned out. This formation is
basic when infantry accompany a cavalry force, with or without
wagons,.or for cavalry by themselves. Should the cavalry find them-
selves in a critical situation because of difficult terrain or a reverse in
battle and become very nervous, then some of them can pick up the
shields of the heavy infantry, if they have lost their own, and line up
in formation on foot, while others remain mounted in the manner
explained above, and in this way the danger may be averted.
135
M A u R c E s
DIAGRAM OF A MIXED FORMATION, THE CONVEX ONE,
CONTAINING BOTH HORSE AND FOOT, WHICH JS
ESSENTIAL JN CRITICAL SITUATIONS
phalanx
TTTTTTTTT TT TTTT TTTTTT T TTT TT TT TTTTTTTTT
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1-000000000 00 00 00 0000 00 000000 00 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 o....
1-000000000 00000000000000000000 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 o....
i-000000000 00 00 0000 0000 00 00 00 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 o....
>-000000000 00 00 00 0000 00 00 00 00 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 o....
1-000000000 00000000000000000000 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 o....
1-0000000-- I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I --0000000 ....
1-0000000-- I I I I !'I I I I I I I I I I I --0000000 ....
1-0000000-- -- 0 0 0 0 0 0 o....
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ll
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'=':> ~
-QC 1-0000000-- - - 0 0 0 0 0 0 o.... er::.
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a.
1-0000000-- - - 0 0 0 0 0 0 o....
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>-0000000-- - - 0 0 0 0 0 0 o....
>-0000000-- --000000·0 ....
1-0000000-- - - 0 0 Q0 0 0 o....
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1- 0 ·O 0 0 0 0 0 - - -- 0 0 0 0 0 0 o....
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KKKKKKKKKK KKKKKKKKKK
KKKKKKKKKK KKKKKKKKKK
KKKKKKKKKK KKKKKKKKKK
KKKKKKKKKK KKKKKKKKKK
KKKKKKKKKK KKKKKKKKKK
136
s T R A T E G K 0 N
B. INFANTRY FORMATIONS
137
M A u R c E s
18. Arrangement of the Wagons and the Baggage Train
19. Method of Marching with the Enemy Nearby
20. Traversing of Wooded Areas, Rough Terrain, and Narrow
Passes by Infantry
21. River Transpartation. Crossing Rivers in the Face of the
Enemy
22. Setting Up Fortified Camps
23. Matters to Be Considered by the Infantry General on the Day
of Battle
24. Synopsis of the Above Drills Which Should Be Known by the
Tribunes or Commanders of Infantry Tagmas
138
s T R A T E G K 0 N
139
M A u R c E s
Ten or even twenty others should carry flour or biscuits, arrows, and
spare bows.
3. Drill master: campiductor or campidoctor: Vegetius, Ep. rei. mi/it., 1, 13; 2, 23.
Draconarius is the bearer of the dragon symbol, which seems to have
disappeared from the Roman armies by the sixth century. It is not clear
whether the draconarius here is anachronistic or still had some function;
R. Grosse, "Die Fahnen in der romisch-byzantinischen Armee des 4.-10.
Jahrhunderts," Byzantinische Zeitschrift 24 (1924 ): 359- 72.
4. Eagle bearer, ornithoboras, literally "bird bearer," with bird perhaps evolving
as did the American military slang of bird colonel from the eagle insignia of
rank. This probably derives from the old Roman aquilifer, the soldier who
bore the eagle-topped standard of the legion. Plutarch renders it as aetopho-
ros. Other spellings (e.g. orniboras) and interpretations do not make much
sense. The Ambrosian paraphrase calls the soldier an ordinator. His duties
were probably those of an aide-de-camp or orderly, and he was supposed to
be unarmed.
140
s T R A T E G K 0 N
panies into four equal contingents, right, left, left center, right cen-
ter, and the cavalry into two groups. But since our present units are
not even equal in strength, it is not easy to fix a definite number for a
company. It could end up with men in excess of 256 having nothing
to do or, if made to serve with soldiers whom they did not know,
they might become disoriented. It seems better to make the numeri-
cal strength of the unit flexible. Depending on the manpawer avail-
able, make one large unit or two smaller ones. Each tagma should
have its own standard and commanding officer. Ordinarily he should
be a tribune, respected, intelligent, and good at hand-to-hand fight-
ing, but he may also be a lieutenant or drill master. At any rate, make
sure that the files of each tagma are always sixteen deep, organized
according to their duties. Make the battle line in propartion to the
strength of the whole army. Divide this line, all the tagmas and files
present, into four equal contingents, right under the command of
the right merarch or stratelates, left under the command of the left
merarch or stratelates, left center under the command of the left
center merarch or stratelates, right center under the command of
the right center merarch or stratelates. A few soldiers, both heavy
and light infantry with their own officers, not really needed in the
battle line, should be held in reserve to provide quick assistance in
emergencies either on the flanks of the line beyond the cavalry, or by
the wagons, or in other places. If the army consists of less than
24,000 foot soldiers, divide it into three, not four, contingents. In the
center meros raise the general's standard, which all the others should
use as a guide.
141
M A u R c E s
Of the sixteen, the eight most competent are stationed in the front
and in the rear of the file, that is, positions one, two, three, four, and
sixteen, fifteen, fourteen, thirteen. In this way even if the depth of
the file is reduced to four, its front and rear will still be strong. The
remaining men, the weaker ones, should be stationed in the center of
the file.
Of these sixteen, every other man should be listed as primi or
secundi. Two should bear a double listing, that is, the first should be
called file leader and primus, the other dekarch and secundus. From
these the rest will then be designated as primi and secundi. To make
it easier to command them and get them to operate more harmo-
niously as a unit, it is necessary to divide them into two squads. The
primi go with the file leader, the secundi with the dekarch. In this
manner, even though they may be temporarily divided, nonetheless
in formation these sixteen soldiers are unified and subject to the de-
cisions and will of the file leader. As a result, good order and disci-
pline are easily maintained.
All of the heavy- and light-armed troops should be divided and
drawn up in four equal contingents. If practicable, it is helpful to
arrange the sixteen men in each heavy infantry file not only accord-
ing to their qualifications, but also according to stature. By stationing
the taller men in front, the whole line will look much better ordered
and impressive. But if they cannot be ranked according to stature
and manliness, then the better soldiers in each file should, as we have
said, be stationed to the front and to the rear, with the weaker ones
in the middle in the manner described.
For good reasons, then, our predecessors fixed the depths of the
files for combat at sixteen. It provides an adequate number of troops,
which should not be exceeded, and when necessary it can be divided
quickly and in an orderly fashion and reduced to only one man.
142
s T R A T E G K 0 N
143
M A u R c E s
be one archer behind it. Sometimes they are placed within the files,
alternating one heavy-armed infantryman with one archer. Some-
times they are placed among the files and on the flanks of the line,
that is, on the inside of the cavalry. Frequently, if there is a large
number of them, they are placed a short distance to the outside of
the cavalry, along with a few heavy-armed infantry as a flank guard
for the cavalry stationed there. The troops with the small javelins or
darts should be either behind the heavy infantry files or on the flanks
of the line, not in the middle. At present we form the archers and
others with missiles behind the files for drill.
144
s T R A T E G K 0 N
I 5. A Second Drill
They should divide into a double phalanx and then resume normal
formation, face to the right and the left, march to the flank and then
back to their original position, change their front to the right and to
the left, broaden and thin their formation, deepen or double the
depth of the files, change their front to the rear and then back again.
6. Silentium. mandata captate. non vos turbatis. ordinem servate. bando sequute. nemo
demittat bandum et inimicos seque.
7. See Book XII, n. I .
8. Ad octo. exi.
145
M A u R c E s
man stepping out of line, and the depth of the files is reduced. The
width of the battle line is extended, and the depth becomes eight
men. If he wants to make it four deep, he again orders: "March
out." 9 As above, they all step to one side, either right or left. Make
sure that all step in or out to one side.
They should march evenly in close order. So, when some men in
the line step out in front and the whole line becomes uneven, the
command is given: "Straighten out the front." 10 And the front is
made even.
They tighten up or close ranks when the line gets to about two or
three bowshots from the enemy's line and they are getting set to
charge. The command is: "Close ranks." 11 Joining together, they
close in toward the center, both to each side and to front and back,
until the shields of the men in the front rank are touching each other
and those lined up behind them are almost glued to one another.
This maneuver may be executed either while the army is marching
or while it is standing still. The file closers should order those in the
rear to close in forcefully on those to the front and to keep. the line
straight, if necessary, to prevent some from hesitating and even hold-
ing back.
They move in a foulkon when the two lines, ours and the enemy's,
are getting close, and the archers are about to open fire, and the
front-rank men are not wearing coats of mail or knee guards. The
command is: "Form foulkon." 12 The men in the front ranks close in
until their shields are touching, completely covering their midsec-
tions almost to their ankles. The men standing behind them hold
their shields above their heads, interlocking them with those of the
men in front of them, covering their breasts and faces, and in this
way move to attack.
When ranks have been properly closed, and the line is about one
bowshot from the enemy, and the fighting is just about to begin, the
command is given: "Ready." 13 Right after this another officer shouts:
"Help us." In unison everyone resPonds loudly and clearly: "O
God." 14 The light-armed troops start shooting their arrows over-
9. Exi.
10. Diri9e Jrontem.
11. Jun9e.
12. Ad julcon.
13. Parati.
14. Adiuta . . . Deus. Silver coins of Heraclius for the year 615 bear the inscrip-
146
s T R A T E G K 0 N
head. The heavy infantry, who are drawn up in the front line,
advance still closer to the enemy. If the men have darts or missile
weapons, they throw them, resting their lances on the ground. If
without such weapons, they advance more closely, then hurl their
lances like javelins, take out their swords and fight, each man re-
maining in his proper position and not pursuing the enemy if they
tum to retreat. The men to the rear keep their heads covered with
their shields and with their lances support those in the front. Ob-
viously, it is essential for the soldiers in the first line to keep them-
selves protected until they come to blows with the enemy. Other-
wise, they might be hit by enemy arrows, especially if they do not
have coats of mail or greaves.
They are divided into a double phalanx when the line is advanc-
ing straight ahead and hostile forces appear both in front and to
their rear. Assuming that the files are sixteen men deep, if the en-
emy approaching the front is getting very close and about to begin
fighting, give the command: "Divide in the middle. Form double
phalanx." 15 The first eight men halt. The other eight face about and
move back, thus forming a double phalanx. If the files are eight
deep or even four, then the command is: "Primi halt, secundi
march out. Form double phalanx." 16 The secundi, those under the
dekarch, face about and march out a distance of three hundred
paces or feet, far enough so the enemy's arrows will not cause
harm to the rear of either phalanx but will fall in the clear space
between them. "Return." 17 They again tum around, if the need
arises, and return to their previous formation. If, as may occur, the
larger hostile force approaches the rear of our line and the wagons
are not following behind, then the secundi halt and the primi
march out. The double-phalanx formation is appropriate when the
wagons are not following or have been seized by the enemy.
Facing to the right or the left is called for when the commander
wants to move the line by the flank to one side either, as would be
likely, to extend the line and outflank the enemy, to avoid being
outflanked by them, to obtain more favorable ground, or to pass a
defile. If he wants to march it to the right, he orders: "To the lance,
tion: Deus adiuta Romanis: H. Goodacre, A Handbook cf the Coina9e cf the By-
zantine Empire (London, 1957), 95-99.
15. Medii partitis ad d!fallan9iam.
16. Primi state, secundi ad d!fallan9iam exite.
17. Reverte.
147
M A u R c E s
face." 18 Each soldier, then, remaining in place, turns. "March." 19
And they move to the designated place. "Return." 20 And they re-
sume their original front. If he wants them to go to the left, he or-
ders: "To the shield, face. March." 21 And the rest is observed as
above. The two-faced line is called for in the event that the enemy
suddenly circles around both front and rear before our battle line
has time to divide into the double phalanx. Give the command:
"Face in all directions." 22 Half of the troops stand fast to meet the
enemy attacking from the front. The other half turns about to the
rear. The middle ranks remain in place with their heads covered by
their shields.
They change front to the right or the left when the commander
wants to bring our battle line to the right or left to meet some
emergency which might arise. The command for this is: "Change
to the right, or the left." 23 By one tagma at a time changing front,
the whole line is quickly brought over to the designated ftont.
The line can be made more open or broadened. When the sol-
diers are in close order and the commander wants, as he might on
occasion, to divide or thin out the files and extend the width of the
battle line or give it more slack, he gives the command: "Move out
to both sides." 24 And they broaden out. This maneuver can be exe-
cuted while the line is marching or has come to a halt, with both
flanks heading to the outside, and can be done by a single meros or
the whole line.
The depth of the files may be increased or doubled. Assume that
the troops are standing four deep and the commander wants to
double that to correspond to the depth of the enemy's line and to
make his own stronger in preparation for the charge. The com-
mand for this is: "Enter." 25 And the files become eight deep. If he
wants to make them sixteen deep, he gives the same command:
"Enter." One by one they return to their own position, and the
files are doubled, resuming their original depth as one unit of six-
teen men. Although this is generally not advisable, still, in case the
148
s T R A T E G K 0 N
149
M A u R c E s
battle and provide support for each other. They should be in-
structed to use the center meros as a guide, for it is there that the
standard of the general is posted. It was for this reason that military
men in the past referred to the center of the battle line as the
mouth or the navel, because the rest of the formation followed its
lead.
Since it is quicker and safer to close or tighten ranks than to open
or broaden them, the initial formation of the files need not be sixteen
deep, but only four. This makes our battle line look more impressive
to the enemy, and it also makes our soldiers more relaxed while
marching, especially if it is for some distance. If the need should arise
to make the line eight or sixteen deep, this type of closing can be
done quickly on the march. On the other hand, if the formation is
already tight and close and the need arises to extend its width, many
hours are required for this. It is not wise, moreover, to extend the
line when the enemy is close.
The standard bearers, mounted, should remain with their com-
manders until the battle line has been formed, then they take their
position in the formation on foot. No matter how deep or how shal-
low the enemy's files are, the depth of our own files should not ex-
ceed sixteen men, nor should it be less than four. More than sixteen
is useless, and less than four is weak. The middle ranks consist of
eight heavily armed infantry. Absolute silence must be observed in
the army. The file closers of each file should be instructed that if they
hear so much as a whisper from one of their men, they should prod
him with the butt of their lance. In combat, also, they should
push forward the men in front of them, so that none of the soldiers
will become hesitant and hold back. The foot soldiers should not be
expected to march long distances in full armor. In case their adver-
saries delay matters, and the battle line has to wait around, they
should not be forced to stand for many hours. If they do, by the time
the fighting begins, they will be already worn out because of the
weight of their armament. They should, instead, be made to sit down
and rest. Only when the enemy gets close should they be called to
attention, and they will be fresh and in good condition. Nobody
should march out in front of the battle line except the merarchs,
mounted, each accompanied by two heralds, two drill masters, one
strator, one spatharios, and two eagle bearers. They should stay there
until the enemy gets close, then each should take position in his own
meros.
150
s T R A T E G K 0 N
Bear in mind that it is very good and practical to have the infantry
force or its individual units become accustomed to the signs or com-
mands used in their drills, for it makes the soldiers more obedient
and ready for action. In battle it is not necessary for the whole line to
maneuver at one signal. For the terrain or the situation does not
always permit this, especially since the line is composed of so many
men and extends such a distance. The signals which have to be given
in certain situations would not be dear to all the troops. Besides, the
movements of the enemy are not uniform. Suppose, for example,
that one unit in the line is shallow and is being pushed back by the
enemy. Other units, whose ranks are deeper, may be able to assist.
If one unit is surrounded by the enemy, the others may form on a
double front and help it out. For these reasons each unit must adapt
the movements described earlier to the formations of the force
which is attacking it and not wait for some other signal. In fact, for all
to halt or to march uniformly in obedience to a single command is
necessary only up to the moment of contact. Because of this our
predecessors divided large armies into various units and tagmas.
151
M A u R c E s
caltrops. In that case, though, be careful that the army does not
return by the same route, but by another, so it will not be injured
by them.
152
s T R A T E G K 0 N
153
M A u R c E s
a time pass, lining itself up in one column by the flank, and the rest
following, always, of course, keeping the light-armed troops out in
front. After passing the narrow place, they reswne their original for-
mation of four units or divisions marching by the flank.
If a strong enemy force appears in front of them or off to the side,
they must form the front of the battle line in that section which is
threatened. If, for example, the enemy appears to the left of the col-
wnn, the meros on that flank halts in Position, and the other three
come and line up in their proper Positions relative to it. If the enemy
appears to the right, the corresPonding maneuver is made and the
front formed in that direction. If they appear in front of either one or
both of the center divisions, the other two head toward the right,
deploying from a column into a line, and form for battle with their
flank as the front. If the terrain permits our troops to march in close
order against the enemy, then the light-armed infantry and cavalry
should circle around the enemy. But if the dose-order formation is
not practicable, then line up the heavy infantry files more in depth
and with wider gaps between them, so they can easily make their
way through wooded areas and, if need be, reswne close order. If
even this is not feasible, the main body should halt while the light
infantry, closely supPorted by a few heavy-armed men and cavalry,
should be sent out against the enemy.
Instructions should be given to the army that in the event that
while it is marching along an alarm is sounded that the enemy is
nearby, the whole army should not become excited and race toward
that section. The heavy-armed troops should maintain their forma-
tion, while the light infantry dashes toward the man who gave the
alarm. The troops in front should not hastily move to the flanks, nor
those on the flank to the front except as ordered by their command-
ing officer. Each meros should support its own troops in times of
alarm, as each situation demands. In the event that the troops are
being hard pressed, they should hurry back to the main body of
heavy infantry, so they will not be overwhelmed by the enemy. Infan-
try, therefore, is able to undertake a march in safety and good order,
as we have said, in thickly wooded and difficult country if they march
by the flank, either in four divisions or two, depending on the ter-
rain, and in more open country using a formation with the front on
the flank if they keep their files fairly wide and deep.
It should be borne in mind that in thickly wooded country, javelin
throwers are needed more than archers or slingers. For this reason,
154
s T R A T E G K 0 N
most of the light infantry should be trained in using javelins and short
spears. Archers, rather, are needed in close connection with the main
battle line and in rough, steep, narrow, and open country. Javelin
throwers, for their part, should be stationed away from the main line
and are particularly needed in thickly wooded areas.
The security of our entrenchments and camps is important. If
possible, the tents should be pitched in open country, but if this can-
not be done, we cannot become careless. Our camps should be
tightly guarded and strong. Avoid those places which have higher
ground dose by. Do not dismiss the main body of troops until every-
one has pitched his tent, and the camp is properly fortified, and pa-
trols have been sent out. Everyone must remember that the blast of
the bugle is the signal to halt and the blast of the trumpet the signal
to march.
We have appended some sketches for a clearer understanding of
the formations described in this chapter.
155
M A u R c E s
front
156
s T R A T E G K 0 N
Formation in line using four phalanxes, which is basic when the in-
fantry force is very large, and the ground is favorable and in case we
want to traverse an area more quickly and it also makes it easier to
change front to flank.
157
M A u R c E s
time. They should encamp and set sail at the same time as the war-
ships. The heavier ships should sail along behind the warships, and
behind them should be a few other ships to protect them. If it is
necessary to encamp on land when the enemy is nearby, be sure to
make a solid entrenchment to ward off any surprise attacks the en-
emy is likely to attempt at night. If a naval battle is imminent, and the
enemy appears lined up to fight, then draw up our fighting ships in a
single line abreast and have them sail ahead evenly just far enough
apart to avoid getting in one another's way, colliding, or banging their
oars together. This line should be long enough to occupy the whole
navigable width of the river safely. The ships, to repeat, should
be formed on a broad front, and any other ships present should be
posted in a second and a third line about a bowshot to the rear.
In the event that we should have to seize the opposite bank on
which the enemy is drawn up, then we would have to bridge it, that
is, construct a bridge. We have to begin on our bank by collecting
the materials required, including large skiffs, and then put down the
beams to construct a deck, presuming, of course, that everything,
beams and pontoons, has been gotten ready. As the bridge being
constructed gets to within a bowshot of the opposite bank, move out
the ballistae-carrying warships or all the vessels equipped with bal-
listae and use them to clear out the enemy. In this way, the building
of the bridge may be completed safely section by section until dry
land is reached. After it has been secured to the shores on both sides,
then, especially on the side where the enemy is, for further defense
of the bridge put up towers of wood, brick, or dry stone. First,
though, dig strong entrenchments to be occupied by infantry with
ballistae, so that the building of the towers can be completed without
hindrance. The army can then cross over, including cavalry or bag-
gage trains.
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how much space they will require and how they are to be quartered
if the situation should demand that they come inside the camp.
When the enemy is near, they should. join the infantry and should
camp together with them in fixed sections. Around the time of com-
bat, care should be taken to locate the camp in a strong position and
to pay attention to supplies for a few days, not only provisions for the
men but, if possible, also for the animals, for the outcome of battle is
uncertain. Above all, give special thought to ways of defending the
water supply against the enemy in case the camp is needed for
support.
If the site of the battle is a wide, open place, always try to have a
river, a lake, or some other natural obstacle to protect your rear.
Make a strong camp and have the wagons follow the troops in order.
If the ground is difficult and uneven, leave the trains and the rest of
the baggage in the camp with a few wagon drivers as a guard, and
form the battle line near the camp in a suitable place. If the ground is
difficult, especially when the enemy is mounted, the difficult ground
by itself is a good protection for our main body. If the wagons ac-
company the troops in that sort of country, not only will they be
useless, but they will be very much in the way.
Care must be taken with the oxen pulling the wagons, so that
while they are accompanying the army, and the wagons have to halt,
they may not be frightened by the noise made by the enemy or by the
arrows flying about and panic and throw the line into confusion.
They should be hobbled or tied, so that, as mentioned, if some of
them are wounded by arrows, they may not cause confusion among
the infantry. For this reason they should not be stationed very close
to them.
When the need arises to relieve a position under attack or to seize
a place quickly, and the wagons would not arrive in time and would
only slow things down, they should be left in a strong place, and the
foot soldiers should go on ahead with their provisions; arrangements
should be made to have them carried in packs on camels or on horses
requisitioned for this purpose. They should also bring a supply of
caltrops along with them. When the time comes to set up camp,
they dig the entrenchments in the usual way, scatter the caltrops
about, and to the inside build a wall or wooden palisade all around.
This will provide as much protection as the wagon train did, and it
will not slow them down or cause any of the other problems which
it often does.
If there is a very large proportion of cavalry in the army and only a
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few infantry, and it is decided to have the baggage train remain in the
camp, do not have all the infantry stay inside the camp. Some should
be kept on guard duty there, while others should be posted in forma-
tion outside the gates and the entrenchments. Then, in case the cav-
alry should be driven back without having infantry with them, these
infantry can cover them and give them the opportunity to turn back
against the enemy or at least to enter the camp in good order and not
be dangerously crowded together at the gates.
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s T R A T E G K 0 N
helmets and get some air. On such occasions they must not carry
wine with them, for it will only make them warm and dull their
minds. Water, however, should be carried in the wagons and given to
each individual who needs it as they remain in formation.
SECOND DRILL
29. The Laurentian manuscript gives these orders in Greek, while the others
give them in Latin. The following orders simply repeat those given above.
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M A u R c E s
Written regulations regarding these maneuvers should be given
to the tribunes, and the merarchs should also know the purpose of
the movements.
It should be noted that the line outside the wagon train indicates a
trench. Caltrops are shown by the letter lambda, and the signs in the
middle stand for the tents. The cross-shaped main streets should be
fifty feet wide, the space around the wagons two hundred. A ditch
should be dug outside the caltrops, so that animals or men in the
camp may not unknowingly be entangled in them.
f\ f\ f\ ...,
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/\ /\ /\ A ..., f\ /\ A "/f
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s T R A T E G K 0 N
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M A u R c E s
reports from the scouts as they come in. The tagma commanders
should maintain the alignment of their own tagmas.
On the day of the hunt, then, before the second hour, the army
moves out to the hunt. The men should be equipped with light
weapons such as bows and, for those who are not experienced in
archery, spears. Some of the scouts go on ahead to observe the game,
while others guide the army. When the game is close, about three or
four miles away, begin to form in line in a suitable, protected loca-
tion. Do not do it any closer for fear that because of the blowing of
the wind and the movement of the army, the animals, whose senses
are sharp, will very quickly catch the scent of the soldiers and will
run away. The army should be drawn up in phalanx formation in
three sections, center, right, and left, with flank guards stationed a
little behind, but close to the flanks of the line. The depth of the files,
as we have noted, will depend on the strength of the army, the na-
ture of the ground, and the distance to be covered. They could be
four, two, or even one horseman deep. The scouts arrive and lead the
flanks of the line, whose duty it is to circle around the game to sur-
round it completely. The line begins to move in the normal phalanx
formation, but as the game gets closer and comes into view, the
flanks begin to move out ahead, and the line assumes a crescent
shape, the horns gradually getting closer to each other until they link
up and the game is inside the line completely surrounded.
If there is a strong wind blowing, the horn on the windward side
should ride by at a good distance from the game, or its scent might
make the animal aware of its approach, and before it can be sur-
rounded, the game will slip away. If the game becomes alarmed be-
fore the horns have had time to link up and should make a dash to
avoid capture and escape through the gap between the horns, then
the flank guards on both sides of the horns should move up more
rapidly in column until they make contact. That is, they advance to
the tips of the horns and fill up the gap between them, so that the
game is caught back within the line of horsemen. After cutting off
the game's escape route, the horns of the line make contact and then
ride past one another, the right flank keeping to the inside and the
left to the outside. With both flanks continuing their spiral move-
ment, the game is gradually forced to the center, and that place, now
surrounded by the line of horsemen, is constricted until after four or
more full circles have been made the whole circumference is one or
two miles. The game can then be quickly reached, and the space will
be large enough for the archers to fire without hurting one another.
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s T R A T E G K 0 N
When the circle has been closed in the manner described, some
foot soldiers, if they are present, carrying shields, should be brought
inside that closed circle on foot and stationed with their shields
joined together in front of the horsemen. This should prevent
smaller animals likely to be surrounded from taking advantage of the
cramped quarters and slipping away through the legs of the horses. If
there are no infantry present, take some horsemen from the outer
circle of the formation and have them line up as just described.
After that, the general should appoint suitable officers or soldiers
to shoot the game from horseback. Outside of those appointed by
the general, nobody should dare ride in on the game. If the hour is
late, the space inside the circle may be further reduced by having the
foot soldiers link shield to shield to a certain height, so the game can
almost be dispatched by hand.
When everything has been completed as described, if the catch is
worthwhile, it should be distributed equally among the tagmas, so
that the morale of the whole army may pick up as the men enjoy the
fruits of their common labor. If the catch is not worth anything, dis-
tribute it by lot. Some reward should be given to the scouts, or spies,
if their work was carefully done.
This formation may be used by an army moving out from its camp
expressly for this purpose and then returning, or it may be used
while on the march. For it is suitable not only when the animals have
been well observed beforehand, but even when, as is likely, they have
been startled unexpectedly by the army marching along. It resembles
the battle formation which the Scythians like to use, but it is a little
slower and more drawn out. In fact, troops trying to use this forma-
tion for the first time should not put it to the test right away in an
actual hunt. Owing to their probable inexperience, the resultant
mistakes, toil, and fatigue will tend to discredit this formation as use-
less. Instead, first designate a few cavalrymen to represent the game,
so that the main body may use them to judge their distances and
easily come to learn the circling movements.
There is another method of conducting a hunt which we believe is
quicker and easier, and which can be done even by a small contingent
of horsemen, especially if the animals have been marked out before-
hand. The day before the hunt the army is divided into five contin-
gents, a third, a fourth, and a twelfth of the force. The third becomes
the center contingent, the two fourths the flank contingents, and the
two twelfths the flank guards. As the army, now, approaches the
selected point, as already described, the scouts, acting as guides, and
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M A u R c E s
doing their best in the time allotted, work to bring the game around
to opposite the center contingent and not to the sides. The center
division is first drawn up in phalanx form, that is, along the mouth or
front. Behind it comes the left division with its flank guards on its left
flank a little to the rear. Following it is the right contingent likewise
with its flank guards on its right and to the rear. The scouts go on
ahead, taking position on the edges of the flank divisions, where the
flank guards are drawn up. The center division halts in line, while the
others pass by its flanks evenly toward the game. As soon as the other
divisions have moved up, the center goes along without a break. The
result is that the whole formation becomes like one of the regular
orders of battle, the one with flanks advanced. They continue march-
ing to the point where the horns pass the game, which is now
on their inside. With the game now almost surrounded, the flank
guards move in from both sides in a column, increase their gait, and
make contact with each other, closing the fourth side, so that the
whole formation now becomes like a rectangular brick. With the
game completely surrounded, the horsemen on all four sides tighten
or close in. The horsemen on the flanks close in on the flank guards,
with those of the center following along. In like manner the flank
guards tighten their own ranks, and the men on the flanks maneuver,
so that in their section there will be no gap through which the game
might escape. When the lines have been properly closed, a suitable
place is selected where the game thus surrounded may be shot down.
Maintaining good, close order, two sides then halt. The other two
close in or increase depth, advancing toward one another until they
are three or four bowshots apart. The other sides adapt their move-
ments, as we have several times remarked, and close in with them on
their flanks. As the place where the game is becomes more con-
stricted, they then proceed, as mentioned above, to shooting it. This
formation can be organized immediately upon leaving camp. The
center contingent marches in front, as noted, and the other two fol-
low along behind until near the game. When the army finds a pro-
tected place about three or four miles from the game, the maneuver
described above may begin.
There is one other method which can be carried out by an even
smaller number of horsemen, one which the Scythians like to use.
The horsemen are divided into squads of five or ten men each,
mostly archers. These divide up among themselves the territory out-
side where the game is. When the game is started, the men in their
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s T R A T E G K 0 N
own areas advance and on getting close to it, as best they can, they
begin shooting. This method, however, although providing more ex-
citement and training for the individual because of all the riding
about can be dangerous for the younger soldiers, can tire out the
horses, and can lead to mistakes.
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n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n
·GLOSSJlRY·
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