Philippine Aeolus Automotive United Corporation v.

NLRC
[G.R. No. 124617, April 28, 2000]
FACTS: 
Private respondent was a company nurse for the Philippine Aelous United
Corporation. A memorandum was issued by the personnel manager of petitioner
corporation to respondent Cortez asking her to explain why no action should be
taken against her for (1) throwing a stapler at plant manager William Chua; (2)
fro losing the amount of Php 1,488 entrusted to her; (3) for asking a co-
employee to punch in her time card one morning when she was not there. She
was then placed on preventive suspension. Another memorandum was sent to
her asking her to explain why she failed to process the ATM applications of her
co-employees. She submitted a written explanation as to the loss of Php 1,488
and the punching in of her time card. A third memorandum was sent to her
informing her of her termination from service for gross and habitual neglect of
duties, serious misconduct, and fraud or willful breach of trust.

ISSUES:
1. W/N petitioner was illegally dismissed.
2. If such dismissal was illegal, W/N petitioner should be entitled to damages.

HELD:
1. Yes. The grounds by which an employer may validly terminate the services of
an employee must be strictly construed. As to the first charge, respondent
claims that plant manager William Chua had been making sexual advances on
her since her first year of employment and that when she would not accede to
his requests, he threatened that he would cause her termination from service.
As to the second charge, the money entrusted to her was not lost, but given to
the personnel-in-charge for proper transmittal as evidence by a receipt signed
by the latter. As to the third charge, she explains that she asked someone to
punch in her card as she was doing an errand for one of the company’s officers
and with the permission of William Chua. As to the fourth charge, she asserts
that she had no knowledge thereof. To constitute serious misconduct to justify
dismissal, the acts must be done in relation to the performance of her duties as
would show her to be unfit to continue working for her employer. The acts of did
not pertain to her duties as a nurse nor did they constitute serious misconduct.
However due to the strained relations, in lieu of reinstatement, she is to be
awarded separation pay of one month for every year of service until finality of
this judgment.

2. Yes. Private respondent admittedly allowed four years to pass before coming
out with her employer’s sexual impositions; but the time to do such varies
depending upon the needs, circumstances and emotional threshold of
the employee. It is clear that respondent has suffered anxiety, sleepless nights,
besmirched reputation and social humiliation by reason of the act complained
of. Thus, she should be entitled to moral and exemplary damages for the
oppressive manner with which petitioner’s effected her dismissal and to serve as
a warming to officers who take advantage of their ascendancy over their
employees.

 the Supreme Court, on April 28, 2000, awarded moral and exemplary damages in favor of a
company nurse who, for 4 years, was subjected to all forms of sexual harassment, and later,
verbal and psychological pressures for refusing to surrender her womanhood to the plant
manager. Her dismissal was declared illegal and her resignation was deemed involuntary. The
court was not moved by the company’s argument that it took her 4 years to complain. Not many
women, especially in this country, are made of stuff that can endure the agony and trauma of a
corporate and public scandal. She was fighting a powerful man and she was alone, trying to
defend her honor. And so, she stretched her patience until a critical incident took place.

No strict time period to file an action

“The gravamen of the offense in sexual harassment is not the violation of the
employee’s sexuality but the abuse of power by the employer. Any employee,
male or female, may rightfully cry ‘foul’ provided the claim is well
substantiated. Strictly speaking, there is no time period within which he or she
is expected to complain through the proper channels. The time to do so may
vary depending upon the needs, circumstances, and more importantly, the
emotional threshold of the employee.” (Philippine Aeolus Automotive United
Corporation v. NLRC, Cortez, G.R. No. 124617, 28 April 2000)

“(The complainant) admittedly allowed four (4) years to pass before finally
coming out with her employer’s sexual impositions. Not many women,
especially in this country, are made of the stuff that can endure the agony and
trauma of a public, even corporate, scandal. If (the respondent) corporation
had not issued the third memorandum that terminated the services of (the
complainant), we could only speculate how much longer she would keep her
silence. Moreover, few persons are privileged indeed to transfer from one
employer to another. The dearth of quality employment has become a daily
‘monster’ roaming the streets that one may not be expected to give up one’s
employment easily but to hang on to it, so to speak, by all tolerable means.
Perhaps, to (the complainant’s) mind, for as long as she could outwit her
employer’s ploys she would continue on herb and consider them as mere
occupational hazards. This uneasiness in her place of work thrived in an
atmosphere of tolerance for four (4) years, and one could only imagine the
prevailing anxiety and resentment, if not bitterness, that beset her all that
time. But (the alleged offender) faced reality soon enough. Since he had no
place in (the complainant’s) heart, so must she have no place in his office. So,
he provoked her, harassed her, and finally dislodged her; and for finally
venting her pent-up anger for years, he ‘found’ the perfect reason to terminate
her.” (Philippine Aeolus Automotive United Corporation v. NLRC, Cortez,
G.R. No. 124617, 28 April 2000)

Delay, however, must be justified

“While, as this Court stated in Philippine Aelous, there is, strictly speaking, no
fixed period within which an alleged victim of sexual harassment may file a
complaint, it does not mean that she or he is at liberty to file one anytime she
or he wants to. Surely, any delay in filing a complaint must be justifiable or
reasonable as not to cast doubt on its merits… At all events, it is settled that
the only test of whether an alleged fact or circumstance is worthy of credence
is the common experience, knowledge and observation of ordinary men.”
(Digitel Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. v. Soriano, G.R. No. 166039, 26
June 2006)
BACSIN VS. WAHIMAN
NOVEMBER 17, 2013  ~ VBDIAZ

G.R. No. 146053, April 30, 2008

DIOSCORO F. BACSIN, petitioner,
vs.
EDUARDO O. WAHIMAN, respondent.
FACTS: Petitioner is a public school teacher of Pandan Elementary School.
Respondent Eduardo O. Wahiman is the father of AAA, an elementary school student
of the petitioner.
AAA claimed that on August 16, 1995, petitioner asked her to be at his office to do an
errand. Once inside, she saw him get a folder from one of the cartons on the floor near
his table, and place it on his table. He then asked her to come closer, and when she
did, held her hand, then touched and fondled her breast. She stated that he fondled her
breast five times, and that she felt afraid. A classmate of hers, one Vincent B.
Sorrabas, claiming to have witnessed the incident, testified that the fondling incident
did happen just as AAA related it.

In his defense, petitioner claimed that the touching incident happened by accident, just
as he was handing AAA a lesson book.6 He further stated that the incident happened
in about two or three seconds, and that the girl left his office without any complaint.

CSC found petitioner guilty of Grave Misconduct (Acts of Sexual Harassment), and
dismissed him from the service. Specifically, the CSC found the petitioner to have
committed an act constituting sexual harassment, as defined in Sec. 3 of Republic Act
No. (RA) 7877, the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995.

CA determined that the issue revolved around petitioner’s right to due process, and
based on its finding that petitioner had the opportunity to be heard, found that there
was no violation of that right. The CA ruled that, even if petitioner was formally
charged with “disgraceful and immoral conduct and misconduct,” the CSC found that
the allegations and evidence sufficiently proved petitioner’s guilt of grave
misconduct, punishable by dismissal from the service.

Petitioner argues that the CSC cannot validly adjudge him guilty of an offense, such
as “Grave Misconduct (Acts of Sexual Harassment),” different from that specified in
the formal charge which was “Misconduct.” He further argues that the offense of
“Misconduct” does not include the graver offense of “Grave Misconduct.”

ISSUE: WON petitioner is guilty of Sexual Harassment

HELD: The formal charge, while not specifically mentioning RA 7877, The Anti-
Sexual Harassment Act of 1995, imputes on the petitioner acts covered and penalized
by said law.
Contrary to the argument of petitioner, the demand of a sexual favor need not be
explicit or stated. In Domingo v. Rayala, it was held, “It is true that this provision
calls for a ‘demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor.’ But it is not necessary
that the demand, request, or requirement of a sexual favor be articulated in a
categorical oral or written statement. It may be discerned, with equal certitude, from
the acts of the offender.”
The CSC found, as did the CA, that even without an explicit demand from petitioner
his act of mashing the breast of AAA was sufficient to constitute sexual harassment.
Moreover, under Section 3 (b) (4) of RA 7877, sexual harassment in an education or
training environment is committed “(w)hen the sexual advances result in an
intimidating, hostile or offensive environment for the student, trainee or apprentice.”
AAA even testified that she felt fear at the time petitioner touched her.

In grave misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or
flagrant disregard of established rule must be manifest.14 The act of petitioner of
fondling one of his students is against a law, RA 7877, and is doubtless inexcusable.
The particular act of petitioner cannot in any way be construed as a case of simple
misconduct.
He is dismissed from service

Petitioner was not denied due process of law, contrary to his claims. The essence of
due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or, as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek for a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. It is clear that petitioner was
sufficiently informed of the basis of the charge against him, which was his act of
improperly touching one of his students. Thus informed, he defended himself from
such charge. The failure to designate the offense specifically and with precision is of
no moment in this administrative case.