Remembering The Future
Remembering The Future
Remembering The Future
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International Journal of Ethiopian Studies
The article proposes a critical interpretation of the Oromo aphorism Kan darbe yaadatani,
isa gara fuula dura itti yaaddui (By remembering the past, the future is remembered). It
argues that the aphorism incubates a non-linear conception of history, a future oriented
understanding of tradition, and a conception of emancipation that embraces political
and economic democracy, social justice and cultural flourishing. The article indicates that
the concepts of “decentring” and “fusion of horizons” facilitate the nurturing of a crucial
idea that gestates in the Oromo aphorism: the idea of emancipation as the means and goal
of Ethiopian modernization.
intimates that the future is available to our activity of remembering. But what
does “remembering” mean in such a use, and what is its site: the past, the
present, the future, or all of these? How does “remembering the past” differ
from a retrospective chronicle of the past? Is “remembering the future” a mere
speculation? How does remembering the future through remembering the past
affect our understanding of the past, of the present, and of the future? How
do these questions, silently brewing in the aphorism, relate to the issue of
emancipation in Ethiopia? To answer these questions, I propose a preliminary
critical interpretation of the aphorism.
The Oromo aphorism displays a non-chronological concept of time. Its
folding of the future into the past through the activity of “remembering”
suggests that time is not a pure and empty form or a mere condition for a
possible experience but rather that it is a network of processes formed through
real experiences, be they social, political, psychological, or economic. As
Braudel, the influential historian, notes, “social time does not flow at one even
rate, but goes at a thousand different paces, swift or slow, which bear almost
no relation to the day-to-day rhythm of a chronicle or of traditional history.”5
These qualitatively different and multiple temporal processes have a historical
thickness or depth that constitutes their individualities and differences as the
present, the past, and the future. At the same time, this historical thickness
networks and makes the past and the future simultaneous with the present.6
Since the double remembering—of the past and of the future—is an activity that
takes place in the present, the aphorism suggests that neither the intelligibility
nor the coherence of the present could be available to us unless we start with
the recognition that the past and the future are incorporated in the present,
the site of the activity of “remembering”. An activity of “remembering” that
latches on to the past and to the future as dimensions of the present gives depth
to the present through which circulate our experiences of the past and the
experiences that actualize themselves in the future. Not only does the aphorism
suggest that the past, the present, and the future are not discrete points along
a line, not only does it suggest that the present is open to the past and to the
future, but it also suggests that the past and the future are open to the present.
It is not difficult to imagine that what we do now becomes part of the past
with every passing moment and that it has consequences for the future that
are more or less predictable. But the Oromo aphorism goes further, as we will
see, and suggests that whatever dimension of the virtual future in the present
eventually actualizes itself changes the past also; that is, the past is subject to
retroactive processes.
This of course does not mean that one could change or undo past events.
Rather, it means that their meanings could change quite radically from the
perspective of the actualized future. Consider how our understanding of the
1943 Woyanne Rebellion has radically changed in light of the 1991 victory
of the TPLF. Once seen as a peasant rebellion whose intent was “to protect a
vanishing world or to restore the past”, the Woyanne rebellion is seen in the
post-1991 period as a precursor of the TPLF and of the new but contested
conception of Ethiopia it instituted with the 1995 Constitution.7 Or consider
the discovery that a person revered as a national hero was in fact an agent of
the enemy all along during the 1936-41 Fascist occupation of Ethiopia. All
the past deeds associated with this person now have the opposite meanings.
Instead of meaning loyalty, they now mean treason. The change of meanings
in the present changes the very nature of the past deeds.
The Oromo aphorism makes “remembering the past” the road through
which we need to go to discover the future, the “not-yet” gestating in the past.8
This “remembering” is not in Plato’s sense of engaging in the recollection of the
past. For Plato, “all enquiry and all learning is but recollection”.9 Remembering
understood as recollection becomes an activity of retro-vision that excludes
the very idea of new knowledge, of a future as a site for creating something
that is novel. Remembering as recollection of the past “makes everything a
gigantic déjà vu” which deprives knowledge of its “shock” value as something
new and “astonishing”.10 The Oromo aphorism— “By remembering the
past, the future is remembered”—is resolutely opposed to the Platonic idea of
“recollection”. It invites Ethiopians, not to recollect the past but to question
it and to undertake the crucial task of investigating the meaning of the future,
the “not-yet”, in its relationship to the past, to the present, and to the future
itself. The thickening of historical time—the folding of the future onto the
past and of the two onto the present—that the Oromo aphorism proposes
creates conditions for bringing to the surface the forgotten, the forbidden, the
occluded, the repressed, the unsaid, the inaudible and the invisible of our
past and present. It gives depth to the present and provides the ground and
the opportunity for eliciting the potential that lies coiled in Ethiopia’s history
for creating a new future. The knowledge about ourselves and Ethiopia that
we acquire through such “remembering” has an “astonishing” and a “shock”
value that no amount of “recollection” of our past and indeed no linear
narrative of Ethiopian history will ever be able to bring about.
In stating that the “future is remembered” in “remembering the past”,
the Oromo aphorism suggests that the Ethiopian past is neither monolithic
nor homogeneous. When we explore this past from our present time, we
discover that it is a sedimentation of accepted and repressed practices and
beliefs, a reservoir of dissatisfactions, and a bearer of potentialities of multiple
futures. Our past is thus complex and heterogeneous. Some of it is part of the
hegemonic narrative and other parts belong to subaltern narratives; some of it
is not narratable within the parameters of the discourse of the existing order
but exists as a non-removable bone stuck in the throat of Ethiopia’s history,
reminding the existing order that it is just one actual alternative whose depth
teems with “virtual” alternatives that are real even if they are not visible.11
Aspects of the past exist as a historical phase that pre-exists the present period,
others have permeated Ethiopian social practices, ideas and beliefs; and some
are immanent in the past and in the present as anticipations of an alternative
Ethiopian future. From the perspective of “remembering”, all these aspects of
the past are related to each other, co-exist with the present, and have relations
of “reciprocal determination”.12
In claiming that the “future is remembered” in “remembering the past”,
the Oromo aphorism intimates that if we perceive the past as co-existing with
the present, we perceive the virtual potential that inhabits it but also exceeds it.
The past, seen as a virtual co-presence with the present, has no sequentiality
and directionality; the past is more than what appears as the past; it is a virtual
past that embraces the present and gestates the future in its depth. The virtual
in the past is the reality of change curled in it, embodying new potentialities.13
The future, in being remembered, marshals the whole past and yet discontinues
itself from it. In becoming the future, it bears an emancipatory potential that
could bring about an alternative future that diverges from the “unremembered”
future—the future that prolongs the existing order—that has now actualized
itself as the present. “Remembering” brings forth the subversive idea that the
past is also what it is not, for the statement that “the future is remembered”
points to non-realized potentialities that lurked in the past, to a repressed
potentiality of a future different from what emerged as the present from the
past. The latter, that is, the existing social order, is, from the perspective of the
Oromo aphorism, the “unremembered future” in that it reproduces the social
order as if it were a natural order, immune to the critical and reflective power
of “remembering”. The “remembering” of the Oromo aphorism awakens the
repressed alternative future that gestates in the past.
One cannot overemphasize that “remembering” the past is an active
critical appropriation of the past and the future and not an indulgence in the
comforts of nostalgia and daydreaming. The emphasis is on what the past
failed to realize in order to throw light on the potential this failure silenced.
This failure is not simply a fact, but it is also a challenge and a question. In
being remembered, this failure forces us to recognize that our ancestors, who
bore the burden of this failure, not only transmit the burden to us but they
also challenge us to share it. This failure questions our view of our ancestors
as dead and buried in the past. The “remembering” of the Oromo aphorism
requires us to recognize our ancestors’ refusal to “die” and to be forgotten and
their resolve to continue bearing the burden of this failure as a light that shines
the possible paths into the future, transforming their failure into a demand that
we redeem their sacrifices. As long as this “remembering” does not bear its
emancipatory fruit, our ancestors failures will continue to haunt us as an open
historical wound bleeding in the present.
that open up a new space governed by the demand to try repeatedly and, if
victory is not achieved, to “fail better”18 so that the “remembered future”,
which is the emancipated Ethiopia-to-come, will eventually become the actual
present. That is, the Oromo aphorism is a call for a theoretical and practical
critique of our failures in order to bring out the virtual but real emancipatory
dimensions of these failures and thus go beyond them.
This does not mean that there are no anti-emancipatory social practices,
ideas and beliefs from the past which inhabit the present and will continue
to contaminate the future. The point is that these dimensions of the past
are recognized through our activity of “remembering” as the obstacles that
blocked the emancipatory struggles of the past, hobble the present, and
have the potential to trip the future. “By remembering the past, the future
is remembered” involves then a “remembering” that actively works against
these obstacles in order to allow the “remembered” future to activate the
emancipatory dimensions of our collective memory, of present conditions,
and of the alternative future. Where such an active “remembering” is absent,
“repetition” steps in, and as Freud argues, when “repetition” replaces
“remembering”, our past failures replicate themselves and incapacitate our
emancipatory efforts.19 We are then caught in a cycle of repetition of our
failures—1960, 1974, 1977, 1987, 1991, and 2005— making our failures
themselves a closed loop whose pursuit becomes a source of “enjoyment”.20
Since the collapse of the 1960 movement to overthrow the Imperial regime,
the absence of “remembering” has condemned Ethiopians to repeatedly
recreate in new forms (1975, 1987, 1991, and 2005) the very phenomena of
oppression and exploitation they have sought to banish, making things worse
with each effort. Doesn’t the Oromo aphorism encapsulate a historical truth
when it suggests that reforms and revolutions in Ethiopia have turned out to
prolong the violence, the suffering and the oppression they set out to abolish
precisely because, inter alia, we lack “remembering”?
What may be hard to grasp in the Oromo aphorism is the idea of “the
future is remembered”. A brief detour through what Ernst Bloch calls the
“future in the past” could throw some light on it 21. Bloch points out the
existence in the past of surplus meanings, or “cultural surplus”, that express
utopian impulses for a better future. 22 These surplus meanings express the
“Not-Yet-Conscious” and “Not-Yet-Become”.23 These gestate in the social
practices and cultural creations of the given era as concrete potentialities
of an alternative society that posits the dignity, equality, and autonomy of
the members of the given society. The “future in the past” points to the real
possibility for human liberation that exists in the surplus meanings. These
cultural surpluses express utopian impulses that inhabit the past and subsist
in the present as emancipatory latencies and tendencies to which human
agency could give concrete historical forms. Though “Not-Yet-Conscious”
and “Not-Yet-Become”, these surplus meanings are nevertheless real and bear
emancipatory anticipations of a different future. This alternative future is in
the virtual but real realm of the “Not-Yet-Conscious” and “Not-Yet-Become”
precisely because they are not actualized. But it is the task of Ethiopians to
actualize them. The “remembered future” as the “future in the past” reveals
to us the presence of the “Not-Yet-Conscious” and “Not-Yet-Become”
in Ethiopian history; it thus invites us to engage in a critical reflection on
Ethiopian conditions, needs and aspirations and bring to consciousness the
form and content of the emancipatory paths and goals that we must concretize
as well as why we Ethiopians have the obligation to do so. It is the “fidelity”
to the event of our conscious awakening to the potential for emancipation,
which throbs in the very heart of Ethiopian “remembering”, that transforms
the “Not-Yet-Become” into a historical “becoming”, that is, into the concrete
emergence of a new society that aims to overcome the conditions in which
Ethiopians are oppressed and exploited beings.
We can say that the Oromo aphorism intimates the presence of utopian
surpluses in the past, which, in being remembered, direct us to a future that, to
become actual, require our critical reflection and action on the emancipatory
potential that is in the realm of the “Not-Yet”. In the current Ethiopian
context, a point has to be added in order to avoid a deformation of the Oromo
aphorism. “Remembering the past” does not mean relating to an authenticity
that would exist in the past or that would be an expression of an already-
formed identity that must be preserved and re-enacted. Nor is “remembering
the past” a path that leads to the experience of victimhood and resentment and
to a hunger for revenge for past injustices. Rather, “remembering the past” is
a radical openness to the future; it is the site where the utopian surplus of the
Ethiopian history—its surplus history, one could say—unfolds and enables us
to embark on a critical reflection that gives emancipatory formulations and
implementations in as yet unimagined ways to the “Not-Yet-Conscious” and
“Not-Yet-Become” of Ethiopian history. “Remembering” the past becomes
remembering the future only when the past and the present are challenged
by that which they failed to achieve—the alternative Ethiopia. The process
of challenging the past through what it could have become but did not is also
a process of challenging the present as the embodiment of the failures of the
past and of its unfulfilled emancipatory anticipations.
The Oromo aphorism has thus revolutionary meanings. It is resolutely
opposed to a fetishization that tries to use the past to sugar-coat present
oppression and exploitation. A fetishization of the past is in fact an act that
tries to erase the future in the past and close the door to a critical appropriation
of the “remembered future”. It is the enemy of “remembering”; it effaces
the emancipatory yearning that comes from the past, haunts our present,
and beckons us from the future. Second, unlike the fetishization of the past,
the aphorism connects with the emancipatory aspiration for change that one
finds in all human societies. Marx argues, for example, that the quest for a
society free from unnecessary sufferings is rooted in the past of humanity and
therefore “our task is not to draw a sharp mental line between past and future
but to complete the thought of the past”, and adds, “mankind will not begin any
new work, but will consciously bring about the completion of its old work”.24
The Oromo aphorism encapsulates this revolutionary idea. The “remembered
future” embodies the age-old quest for emancipation.
The quest for a society where human beings are free from domination,
encapsulated in the Oromo aphorism, is thus not a new task, either in Ethiopia
or in other parts of the world. It is as old as the organized domination of man-
by-man. The Oromo aphorism, which probably precedes Marx’s insight, and,
in any case, is of indigenous origin, reminds us that our task is not to segregate
the past from the future, or custom from modernity, or tradition from social
transformation, but to ensure that the seeds of emancipation planted in the
past will grow and blossom into something new. To be sure, the” future in the
past” that we remember is watered and fertilized by the new emancipatory
demands of the present, responding to the new modes of domination that
development and modernization are inflicting on Ethiopians. As such, it will
produce flowers and yield fruits that the past never dreamt of. The “remembered
future” is an open future.
What prevents the full deployment of the emancipatory meanings that
gestate in the idea of “remembering” is the conventional understanding of
remembering as having a picture of what happened in the past. Such an
understanding of remembering makes a fetish of the past, and is dangerously
widespread among Ethiopians. Nationalists remember Ethiopia as an
“ancient” nation that escaped colonization by defeating a European army in
1896. Ethnie-centered intellectuals and politicians remember the past glories
of their ethnies and their “victimhood” as the “colonized” of “Abyssinians”.25
The fetishization of Ethiopia or ethnies enables us, like all fetishes, to close our
eyes to the irrefutable fact that the distressing realities of Ethiopia are of our
own making; it enables us to live as if our appalling material and intellectual
dependence on external powers and our political fragmentations do not
matter.26 From the perspective of the Oromo aphorism, the fetishization of
Ethiopia and ethnicity is the opposite of “remembering”. Not only it breeds
cynicism, it is also loaded with the perils of repetition, in the Freudian sense.
The unnecessary suffering Ethiopians endure will never be alleviated by either
Ethiopia’s “ancientness” or the Adwa victory, or by ethnic identity, or by
the claims of victimhood. The fetishization of Ethiopia and ethnicity gives
primacy to mortality over what Arendt calls “natality” or the act of giving birth
to a new Ethiopia.27 The fetishization of Ethiopia and ethnicity inevitably
dissipate our energies in the obsession to settle accounts for past wounds and
to recreate what we have already overcome in the past, i.e., hermetically sealed
and territorialized identities.
Unlike the fetishization of Ethiopia and of ethnicity, “remembering the
past” opens the door to a “remembered future” of transethnicity ushered in by
Ahmad who, with his conquest (1529-43) of the Christian kingdoms of
the North, rendered porous and fluid the ethnic, cultural and religious frontiers
that previously separated the North from the South.28 Ahmad has a
crucial role in the “remembered future” in that his deeds, however violent and
destructive they may have been, opened a real “Not-Yet-Conscious” and a
“Not-Yet-Become” future that embraces Ethiopian ethnicities and religions as
a people sharing a common destiny whose “future in the past” expresses an
anticipatory consciousness of shared struggles for shared emancipation.29 The
Oromo aphorism, by making the “future remembered” the center of gravity
of “remembering”, intimates that Ethiopians need a dose of what Nietzsche
calls “active forgetfulness” of memories and resentments that subvert their
powers to liberate the potential for emancipation that gestates in their history
as the “Not-Yet-Conscious” and a “Not-Yet-Become”. Only such an “active
forgetfulness” can enable Ethiopians to “make room for new things” and for
“nobler functions”: the creation of an Ethiopian society infused with “hope”
and “happiness”.30
The conventional understanding of remembering as having a picture of
what happened in the past creates a major obstacle to the application of the
Oromo aphorism in another sense. It generates the spontaneous historical
consciousness that dominates contemporary Ethiopian political thinking and
practice. Not only does spontaneous historical consciousness treat historical
becoming as a linear process from one state of affairs to another, it also
expresses a naïve and sentimental understanding of the Ethiopian past. It
effaces the creative plurality and the critical subversion of oppression and
exploitation that “remembering” calls for and narrows the past to a one-
sided narrative, be it that of the Ethiopian nation or of the ethnie. But the
aphorism, in articulating the future through the past and the past through
the future, rejects such a one-sided narrative. Such a narrative occludes
the potentialities of a new beginning that, in “remembering” the future in
the past through what differentiates it from the actual past, loads it with
emancipatory anticipations that change the past by expanding it to embrace
the emancipatory potentials it repressed. “Remembering” makes us recognize
that we are not born to die for the past but to begin a new future whose
symptoms are in the “remembered future”; it enables us to transvaluate our
values and produce from within our own history the new values and ideas
that lead to the democratization of political, economic, social and cultural
relations and institutions.
It is one of the conundrums of modern Ethiopia that the effort to escape the
distorted understanding that flows from the mono-vocal, “nationalist” narrative
of the Ethiopian past has given birth to a new form of spontaneous historical
consciousness that once more develops a one-sided, mono-vocal narrative of
Ethiopian history, but this time with the ethnie as the organizing principle of the
discourse. The ethnie-centered narrative has the same effect as the nationalist
narrative in that it also blocks off “remembering” in the emancipatory sense of
the Oromo aphorism. Both thus undercut the emergence of a critical historical
consciousness, because both nationalist and ethnie-centered consciousnesses
are constituted by the interests and not by the elimination of domination,
trapping Ethiopians within the horizon of exploitation and oppression.
The nationalist narrative perpetuates the myth that Ethiopian emperors are
the makers of Ethiopian history and thus projects the future of Ethiopia in
terms of the interests of the “national” elites. The ethnie-centered narrative
dons the mantle of ethnic self-determination which, though it gets rid of the
empire-centered narrative of the Ethiopian past, replaces it with an ethnie-
centered description that occludes the oppression and exploitation internal to
each ethnie. It thus raises a thick ideological curtain that hides the common
adversities Ethiopians faced and still face, and the shared solidarities they
have experienced in their struggles for “another” Ethiopia. It replaces the
critical historical consciousness of “remembering” with the consciousness
of victimhood that cultivates blindness to the presence of “local tyranny”
within each ethnie as well as to the legacies of shared solidarities against
shared sufferings.
In both the nation-centered and ethnie-centered narratives, we have an
understanding of remembering that homogenizes the past and erases the
historical depth of the past and present and the emancipatory potentials
that pulsate in them. This is an understanding that scotomizes the historical
depth of social practices, ideas and beliefs of the past and the present and
renders invisible and inaudible the emancipatory future that stirs in them.
The consequence is the depletion of a critical historical consciousness
capable of giving form and content to the “Not-Yet-Conscious” and the
“Not-Yet-Become” of Ethiopian emancipation. Thus one could say, from
the perspective of the “remembering” of the Oromo aphorism, that the
emergence of “ethnic federalism” in Ethiopia in 1991 and its constitutional
codification in 1995 does no more than rearrange or ethnicize the Ethiopian
system of class domination and exploitation; it occludes the issue of an
Ethiopia free from unnecessary political, economic and social sufferings as
bluntly as the pre-1991 regimes. It is merely, to speak in “Hegelese,” an internal
negation of previous forms of oppression and exploitation—the Imperial and
Derg regimes—in that it is still situated within the anti-emancipatory horizon
of these past regimes. Is it then surprising that contemporary Ethiopians suffer
from a growing inability to make sense of the changes that have been taking
place since 1974?
The Oromo aphorism is a critique of spontaneous historical consciousness.
It conveys a critical historical consciousness, and thus a radically different
understanding of the past and the future and of their relations to the present, that
breaks through and goes beyond past glories and past sufferings. It resolutely
faces the alternative future, whose signs it asserts are already present in the past
as the “remembered future”, and conveys an understanding of “remembering”
as an active mobilization of the emancipatory promises of the past and the
present that the actual past and the actual present repress. “Remembering”
then is more than narrating the past as a succession of events. Rather, it is
a reflective activity that replaces the mere knowledge of historical facts with
a critical historical consciousness that retrieves the signals of an alternative
future as living but repressed promises of our history, and links them to our
present life in ways that generate a theoretical and practical commitment to
bring about an Ethiopian society free from both the inherited and the new
economic, political and cultural dispossessions. That is, the “remembering” of
the Oromo aphorism calls for a “unity of intellect and will” that is inherently
transformative. The dominance of spontaneous historical consciousness goes
a long way in explaining why Ethiopian reformist and revolutionary efforts of
the 1960s, 70s, 80s, and 90s have been all abortive.
It is interesting to note that in making both the past and the future the
source of emancipatory impulse, the Oromo aphorism differs markedly from
Marx who advised that we let “the dead bury the dead”. 31 If we follow the
implications of the Oromo aphorism, we cannot let the “the dead bury the dead”
and still be able to engage in a “remembering” that activates a critical historical
consciousness. From the perspective of the Oromo aphorism, “remembering the
past” is meaningful precisely because the “dead” refuse to die; they continue to
live as the architects of the “future remembered”, waiting to see what kind of
“future” the “future remembered” begets. Only when their aspirations of an
alternative Ethiopia are fulfilled could they rest in peace. From the perspective of
the Oromo aphorism, the Ethiopia-to-come—the Ethiopia of freedom, equality,
justice and prosperity—is not an Ethiopia that emerges from a historical tabula
rasa. There is still a part of Ethiopia—our ancestors who struggled for an
alternative Ethiopia—that, though defeated and dead, is not yet buried and
cannot be buried, pace Marx, because it is still agitated by unanswered questions,
unfulfilled promises and aborted hopes. If Ethiopian reforms and revolutions are
to run their full course, they must be rooted in a critical historical consciousness
which, by opening the virtual past through the activity of “remembering”, gives
a historical depth to the alternative society that beckons us from the future as
a promise born in the past. The alternative Ethiopia that the Oromo aphorism
anticipates draws its “poetry” from both the past and the future.
could liberate us from tradition because only tradition showed us how to liberate
ourselves from it.34
To make the point, let us read the well-known Ethiopian tradition, the
Oromo tradition of gada, in light of the dialectic of the past and the future
that the Oromo aphorism proposes. We could say, using the words of the
aphorism, “In remembering gada, the future is remembered.” Formulated
thus, an interpretative confrontation with the gada tradition prevents us from
reifying it. The gada tradition is complex. It classifies young males in terms
of age-sets, those born within an eight-year period, the gada cycle, and gada
grades, that is, age classifications through which each age-set passes. The age-
sets are “deeply involved in day-to-day socialization” but are also the basis for
governance and mobilization for war.35 It is a system of thought, beliefs and
practices that constituted and legitimated a form of governance, production
and reproductions for centuries.36 But in light of the dialectic of the past and
the future that the Oromo aphorism proposes, we need also to look at gada as a
system that in actualizing itself occluded that which in the gada system is more
than gada: its future-oriented emancipatory aspirations.
Asmerom Legesse makes the usual distinction between the “underlying
principles” that inform gada and the structures of governance that characterize
it.37 The structures are part of the actual past, whereas the principles are part
of the virtual past and thus transcend their particular historical contexts in that
they still speak to the unresolved problems of the past and present: how to
create a society wherein members could live a life of dignity, equality, solidarity
and autonomy. Insofar as these principles are not actualized in the structure
and goal of gada governance, they exist only as emancipatory surplus meanings
that are the “remembered future” of gada and are “not yet” thought out and
conceptualized. For example, whereas the “underlying principles” of gada
exude universality, the structures of governance effectively exclude women
from the institutions of governance. The liberation of women is one of the
dimensions of the “Not-Yet-Conscious” and the “Not-Yet-Become” of gada.
To proceed then on the path of analysis that emerges from a critical
interpretation of the Oromo aphorism, we need to go further than Asmerom
Legesse’s mere distinction between practice and principles. We need to
recognize that the importance of gada for the future lies not in its success in the
past as a system of governance but in its failure to see the internal fissures that
prevent its principles to reach the universality that is immanent to it. But it is
precisely through these fissures, located, inter alia, in the exclusion of women
and the place of war-making in the reproduction of the gada system, that the
“remembered future” enters in the process of “remembering the past”. But the
very presence of these fissures point to potentials of immanent critique that
make gada the most dynamic political experiment in Ethiopian history, capable
of raising questions that still speak to us, making the process of answering
them a process that brings to consciousness the existence of a potential for an
alternative future, expressive of emancipation.
This means that “remembering” gada is not remembering it as a collection
of facts but critically enucleating the emancipatory principles it has failed to
universalize and actualize. From the Oromo aphorism’s perspective, we need to
ask: Is the failure of gada to actualize the universality immanent to it a result of
the lack of “remembering” of the emancipatory elements in gada that existed
for it as the “remembered future”? This question pushes aside any temptation
Democracy in the West—the place of its historical origin and the location
of the countries exporting it to other countries by all means including military
intervention—has become so “thin” that it is no longer capable to carry out a
“politics of transformation” that gives substance to “human interdependency”.
That such is the case is what the policies of both left and right wing democratic
governments in Europe and in the United States show in their management
of the financial crisis that started in 2008. These democratic countries pursue
policies that make the “citizens” bear the cost of the economic crisis that
Almost forty years earlier, Frantz Fanon wrote in Les Damnés de la Terre
(1961): “All the elements for a solution to the major problems of humanity
of what they occlude, liberate them from the West’s self-definitions, and
expropriate their emancipatory ideas and practices in terms of the exigencies
we discover from our internal journey. Such a decentring is essential in order to
override the presuppositions and questions of the presently hegemonic social
sciences. Without such a decentring, the application of the social sciences to
Ethiopia falsely and dangerously assumes that Ethiopians share the West’s
“remembered past” and “remembered future”. Such an assumption decentres
Ethiopia from her history and social practices, makes our “remembering” or
our internal journey impossible, and leads to paralysing self-misunderstandings
and long-lasting failures.
The point of de-Westernizing Western knowledge is not to reject the
social sciences but to pry them away from the normative and theoretical
thoughts that are expressive of Western interests and “release into the space
occupied by particular European histories sedimented in them” 57 Ethiopian
normative and theoretical insights and thoughts that we enucleate through our
internal journey, i.e., “In remembering the past, the future is remembered”.
This means that de-Westernizing Western ideas and practices is a process
that simultaneously expands our horizon of understanding without losing
its emancipatory historical moorings. For this process to be productive, de-
Westernizing Western knowledge and practices needs to avoid dehydrating
them. That is, we need to operate a “fusion of horizons” between the Ethiopian
and Western horizons of understanding of emancipation.58
writes:
People are most likely to participate politically in vigorous,
sustained ways when they have a stake in the outcomes.
Paradoxically, while democracy is a public good, self-interest is
critical to its vitality. Open, competitive, and fair participation
within a framework of legitimate, credible institutions enables
citizens and groups to defend their interests, to act on issues they
care about, and to hold officials accountable for their decisions.
Institutions enlivened by contention among socially rooted
interests can moderate conflict, aggregate demands into public
policy backed by a working consensus, and earn legitimacy.
Political parties are among the most crucial institutions in these
processes. Parties embody both participation and institutions,
and they are essential to negotiating a balance between them.
In their many forms, they do not just contest elections, but
also mobilize and organize the social forces that energize
democracy, on a continuing basis.70
gara fuula dura itti yaaddu, enjoins us to engage in a critical examination of the
past, unearth its “valuable things” 73, discover its virtual dimensions and the
potentialities it harbours, and enucleate its remembered future whose truth is
yet to come.
Notes
* I would like to acknowledge the support of Dawson College through its program
of Scholar in Residence during the research and writing of this paper.
1 I put “remembering” in quotes in the rest of the text to remind the reader that I
use it in the sense of the Oromo aphorism.
2 The “Education and Support Groups for Oromo War Trauma and Torture
Survivors, A Manual of Facilitators” uses the aphorism as a lead quote, but does not
offer any interpretation. http://www.healtorture.org/sites/healtorture.org/files. Accessed
23/01/2013; It is also listed in Mengesha Rikitie, Oromo Folk Tales For A New Generation
(London: Tyndale Press,1992).
3 I use development and modernization interchangeably since both refer to the
same process of capitalist transformation that brings in its wake the various institutions
that are present in their “mature” forms in the “developed” countries, to wit, electocracy,
the free market economy and social exclusions, and civil society and the depoliticization of
the economy.
4 A New Aristotle Reader,
1988), p.206
5 Fernand Braudel, On History, trans. Sarah Matthews (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1980), p.12., 1980
6 In this and following sections, I draw on Deleuze’s philosophy of time. It is of
interest to note that the Oromo aphorism intimates an understanding of time that in some
respects could be elucidated through the approach to time that Deleuze suggests. “The past
and the future do not designate instants distinct from a supposed present instant, but rather
the dimensions of the present itself insofar as it is a contraction of instants.” Gilles Deleuze,
Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton, (New York: Columbia, 1994), pp.71; Deleuze
notes that “‘…if the new present is always endowed with a supplementary dimension, this
is because it is reflected in the element of the pure past in general, whereas it is only through
this element that we focus upon the former present as a particular”, p.82, emphasis added.
By this he means that the present has to be conceived in relation to all that constitutes its
historical depth.
7 Gebru Tareke, Ethiopia: Power and Protest ( Cambridge University Press, New York
1991), p.3; Gerard Prunier, “The 943 Woyanne Revolt: A Modern Reassessment” Journal
of the Middle East and Africa, 1,2, (2010) pp. 187-195; Constitution of the Federal Democratic
Republic of Ethiopia, http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b5a84.html, accessed 04/09/2010.
TPLF stands for Tigrean People’s Liberation Front. On how a new event in the present
changes the meaning of the past, see, Slavoj Zizek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, (London:
Verso, 1989), pp. 131-149.
24 Karl Marx: Early Writings, (New York: Vintage Books, Random House, 1975), 209.
Italics in text.
25 Bonnie K.Holcomb and Sisai Ibssa, The Invention of Ethiopia (Trenton: The Red
Sea Press, 1990)
26 Freud, Sigmund. “Fetishism” Vol. 5, Collected Papers, vol 5, ( London: Hogarth
and Institute of Psycho-Analysis) , pp. 198-204. My thanks to Genevieve Marcoul for the
reference.
27 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1958), pp. 9, 177
L’Islam en Ethiopie : des origines au XVI siècle, Paris : Nouvelles
Éditions Latines, 1981), pp.131-76
29 On Ahmad Gr ñ’s crucial role in the creation of Ethiopia, see, “Critique of
Ethio-centrism”, forthcoming.
30 Friedrich Nietzsche, “On the Genealogy of Morals” , Basic Writings of Nietzsche,
ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann, (New York: the Modern Library, 1968), p.494
31 Karl Marx, The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte , (New York: International
Publishers, 1969), p.18. Marx seems to contradict himself, for, as seen earlier, he claims that
“mankind will not begin any new work, but will consciously bring about the completion of
its old work”. Karl Marx: Early Writings, p.209
32 Donald N Levine, Wax and Gold: Tradition and Innovation in Ethiopian Culture ,
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1972), pp. 11-14
33 Alasdair MacIntyre speaks of an “epistemological crisis” in a tradition when
that tradition confronts problems from within that the tradition lacks resources for solving
them. Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice, Which rationality? (London: Duckworth, 1988),
pp. 361-2
the past showed us how to liberate ourselves from it.” Quoted in Craig Lundy, History
and Becoming: Deleuze’s Philosophy of Creativity, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,
2012), p. 36. There are Ethiopian traditions that are simultaneously traditional and anti-
traditional, i.e., shiftanët and heretic movements.
35 Asmarom Legesse, Oromo Democracy: An Indigenous African Political System,
(Trenton: The Red Sea Press, 2006), pp.48-9, 66-78, 193-238
36 Asmarom Legesse, Oromo Democracy, ibid.
37 Asmarom Legesse, Oromo Democracy, p. 196
38 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth
Century, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).
39 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, (London: Hamish
Hamilton, 1992), pp.42-3
40 Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, op.cit, Art.40 # 3
41 “Indian Investors are forcing Ethiopians off their land, “ The Guardian, (7 February
2013); The Oakland Institute, Understanding Land Investment Deals in Africa: Country Report:
Ethiopia, (Oakland: The Oakland Institute, 2011)
Democracy: A History, (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2006).