CELESTIAL, Aprilyn A. - PFR Finals Exam

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Celestial, Aprilyn A.

Atty, I apologize po, I wasn’t able to put all my answers into a word file.

I.

. No. The sale of Tomcrooz is not valid because he did not consent for the said sale.
Since ToomCrooz and Jorjina were married in 2009, and there appears to be no
marriage settlement, the regime of absolute community property shall govern their
property, in accordance with the Family Code. Tomcrooz's property then belongs to
the community property, which needs consent from the other spouse before it can be
encumbered. The only exception would be if there is legal separation, abandonment
or absence, in which case a judicial order is needed. Also, the fact that Jorjina is
living with another man does not establish absence or abandonment since it was not
shown that she failed to communicate her whereabouts.

II.

a. I would award the lot to Starlett because their child, Tomlett is only four years old
and thus must be with the mother. Under the Title V of the Family Code, in case of
liquidation, the family dwelling is adjudicated in favor of the spouse with whom
majority of the children decides to stay. Article 309 of the Civil Code dictates that
children who are under the age of seven are presumed to have chosen the mother.
Hence, the family dwelling should go to Starlett who will have the custody of Tomlett.

b. No. The property would be awarded to the community property with the
legitimate, other spouse. Since the marriage of Starlett and Toomhankz is void ab
initio due to concubinage, their cohabitation would fall under Article 148. This article
pertains to cohabitation between parties not capacitated to marry, whose property
regime is governed by limited co-ownership. Any property acquired by Toomhanks is
presumed to belong to the community property of the subsisting marriage. Hence,
the only remedy for Starlette would be to show proof of any contribution to the
property, after liquidation.

III.

The father of Menaris is Menardo because the spouses were able to comply with the
requirements to make Menaris a legitimate child. Under Title V of the Family Code,
children borne from artificial insemination are legitimate provided that the spouses
gave consent to the procedure. Here, Menardo gave consent to use the sperm of his
brother. There is nothing in the provision of the law which states that spouses may
use only the sperm of the husband. What is left to do is to register said consent
together with the certificate of birth in the civil registry.
IV.

Yes, the trial court is correct because in the present case, joint adoption of spouses
is mandatory. First, under the Domestic Adoption Law of 1997, the only exemptions
from joint adoption would be if the adoptee is a natural child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, of one of the spouses. The children at the present case are not natural
children of Emmawat. Moreover, her contention that the children are already of age
bears no significance for age is considered only if the children to be adopted are not
continously considered as legitimate children of the spouse since minority.

V.

a)

b)

VI.

No, the defense is not tenable because Matt is still living with his parents. Under
Article 247 of the Family Code, even if a person attains majority, it does not affect
the liability of parents for damages incurred by said person provided that he or she is
under 21 years old and still living with the parents and under their parental authority.
Since Matt is only 20 years old and still living with his parents, then his parents may
still be civilly liable.

VII.

No. The petition should not be granted because it might lead to confusion with
regards to the paternity of the child. As the Supreme Court held in the case of
Emelita Basilio Gan, a change of name should not affect filial relationships or
prejudice third persons. If Harnaaz would change her name into Filipino, it would
give the impression that Alpacheeno is her father, which is not the case. The
contention that it is for the benefit of Harnaaz has no bearing if such change would
prejudice the rights of other persons. The much better recourse would be for
Alpacheeno to adopt Harnaaz.

VIII.

Gal Harot, as the legitimate spouse, will have custody of the body. As the Supreme
Court held in Valino v Adriano, separation-in-fact does not affect the right of the
spouses in the conduct of the funeral of the other spouse. The provision in Article
305 of the Civil Code is clear that common-law wives are not included in the order of
preference. The fact that the act is done in goodwill does not have bearing.
Moreover, the fact that Denjel wants to be interred in the Washingmachine
musoelum should be given priority in the order of preference.

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