Guekeko V Santos

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6. JOSE GUEKEKO, petitioner, vs. TEOFILO C. SANTOS, respondent.

G.R. No. L-128. March 2, 1946

FACTS: Petitioner was elected Mayor of Malabon in the general election held on December 10, 1940,
and qualified as such in January of 1941. Respondent, however, filed an election protest against petitioner
in the Court of First Instance of Pasig, Rizal, which was decided against respondent, whereupon he
appealed to the Court of Appeals. The decision of the Court of Appeals has not been promulgated to date.
For the purpose of deciding the petition in this case, we may assume that the petitioner was definitely
elected Mayor of Malabon in the said general election.

Thus, petitioner held the office of Mayor of Malabon throughout the Japanese occupation and
after the reoccupation until the official restoration of the Commonwealth Government on February 27,
1945, when all government officials were directed to vacate their posts, and in compliance with said order
petitioner vacated his office of Mayor. On November 5, 1945, respondent was appointed Acting Mayor of
Malabon, Rizal, by the President, and qualified on November 9, 1945.

Petitioner seeks to oust respondent from the office of Mayor of Malabon, Rizal, on the ground
that the former, and not the latter, is entitled to hold said office. Petitioner bases his claim on three main
grounds: First, that his term of office has not yet expired, inasmuch as the period of Japanese occupation
during which he continued to serve as Mayor should not be taken into account in fixing the term of his
office. Secondly, that, assuming that his term of office had already expired, the Chief Executive should
have exercised his appointing power in accordance with section 16 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 357,
and appointed the petitioner instead of the respondent, because the latter does not belong officially to the
Nacionalista political party of which petitioner is a member. And thirdly, that petitioner should have been
appointed to the office, on democratic principles and in accordance with the announced policy of the
President to reinstate officials elected in the 1940 election, unless there be strong reasons for not doing so.

ISSUE: 1. W/N petitioner’s term of office has expired.


2. W/N petitioner has the right to holdover.
3. W/N the policy of recall announced by the President confers legal right.

HELD: 1. Yes. The term of an office must be distinguished from the tenure of the incumbent. The term
means the time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval
after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the term during
which the incumbent actually holds the office. The term of office is not affected by the hold over. The
tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent. There is no
principle, law or doctrine by which the term of an office may be extended by reason of war. This ruling
holds true a fortiori in the present case, for petitioner continued to discharge the duties of his office during
the occupation, although not under the legitimate government.

2. No. Provincial, city and municipal officers are not entitled to hold over. In fact, petitioner
himself does not claim to have the right to holdover. Therefore, inasmuch as respondent was appointed to
fill the office left vacant after the term of office of the petitioner had expired on December 31, 1943, the
provisions of subsection (b), section 16, of Commonwealth Act No. 357 do not apply to the case at bar,
because this subsection refers to vacancies resulting from the death, resignation, removal or cessation of
the incumbent during the term of office.

3. No. The announced policy of the President to re-instate or recall pre-war elected officials
except for strong reasons, does not confer a legal right on said officials to appointment, since the policy
does not impose upon the President a legal obligation to make such appointment. It is within the exclusive
province and discretion of the President to follow strictly or not such policy, and therefore this court
cannot declare petitioner entitled to the office.

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