Blackhat Hacking

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Blackhat Hacking

How to hack and not get caught

Brady Bloxham
Silent Break Security
[email protected]
Overview

▪ What is OpSec?
▪ Methodology
▪ TTPs (Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures)
▪ Conclusion
What is OpSec?
What is OpSec?

▪ First things first


– Examine your activities from
an adversary’s point of view
– Way of life
– NOT a set of rules
– Best of all…it’s free!

▪ Above all  Shut Your Mouth


What is OpSec?

▪ Proactive paranoia
– It doesn’t work retroactively!
What is OpSec?

▪ Stay paranoid…and cover your webcam!


What is OpSec?

▪ Work alone
▪ Avoid being blackmailed
▪ No one is going to jail for you!
Methodology
Methodology

▪ The Old Way


Methodology

▪ The New Way


Methodology

▪ Money trail
– PATRIOT Act

– Various types
▪ Pre-paid credit cards
▪ Pre-paid credit cards + Paypal
▪ Western Union
▪ Bitcoin
– Not truly anonymous!
– Every transaction is publically logged
– So…use bitcoin mixing/eWallet
Methodology

▪ Covert Infrastructure
– VPS
▪ Careful of payment

– TOR
▪ Slow

– VPN
▪ Torguard.net
▪ Btguard.com

– Create your own!


▪ SOHO routers
▪ Hack onto other servers
Methodology

▪ Covert Infrastructure
Methodology

▪ Don’t be a hoarder
– Principle of least use
▪ Don’t collect what you don’t need
▪ Don’t hoard data
▪ Delete it when you’re done

– Be smart about it
▪ Dedicated infrastructure
▪ Truecrypt containers
▪ VMs with snapshots
▪ Qube-OS
TTPs (Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures)
TTPs

▪ Spear phishing
– Click rate ~ 25-35%

▪ Countermeasure
– End user training but…it should reflect
current threat environment.
– Configure spam filter!
– Use proxy to block!
TTPs
TTPs

▪ Pop and pivot!

▪ Be strategic!
– Don’t pop…just to pop
– Find high value targets
▪ Tasklist of remote systems
▪ Net use for remote dir of c:\Users
▪ Query AD for logon events
TTPs

▪ “Work” during the day


– Blend in with the noise
– Harder to filter logins
– Easier to identify key targets

▪ Countermeasures
– Monitor, monitor, monitor…especially
privileged accounts
– Create user accounts for domain
admins
TTPs

▪ Cover your tracks


– Clean the logs
– Watch the prefetch
– Registry MRUs
– Change time stamp!
– Remove tools!

▪ Risk = Threat x Vulnerability x Cost


– The best way to not get caught, is to not leave tracks.
TTPs

▪ MRUs
– HKCU\SW\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVer\Explorer\FindComputerMRU
– HKCU\SW\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVer\Explorer\PrnPortsMRU
– HKCU\SW\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVer\Explorer\RunMRU
– HKCU\SW\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVer\Explorer\StreamMRU

▪ Audit Policy
– HKLM\Security\Policy\PolAdtEv

▪ Clean Logs
– Windows Defender
▪ Binary logs! Check out MPDetection.txt
– McAfee
▪ BufferOverflowProtectionLog.txt
▪ AccessProtectionLog.txt
– Symantec
▪ \Docume~1\AllUse~1\Applic~1\Symantec\Symantec Endpoint Protection\Logs
TTPs

▪ Test, test, test, test, test, test, test, test, test, test, test, test, test
▪ Modifying the target is for n00bs
– Modify your tools instead
– Packers, crypters, modifying the source, etc., etc.
TTPs
TTPs
TTPs
TTPs

▪ Environmental awareness
– Network
▪ SYN vs Connect scan
▪ ping –n 1 <ip>
▪ SSL where possible
– System
▪ Avoid domain accounts
▪ Build a profile

▪ Countermeasures
– Create baselines (SIEM, netflow, etc.)
– Don’t ignore anomalies or alerts
TTPs

▪ Data exfiltration techniques


– Archive files (usually .rar)
– Stage on separate box
▪ Recycle bin
▪ System volume information

▪ Data exfiltration channels


– Compromise server in the DMZ
– Transfer via RDP
– Base64 en/decode to/from target via shell
– HTTP/S

▪ Countermeasures
– Block outbound all, lock down proxy, block outbound SYN in DMZ
TTPs
TTPs
TTPs

▪ Persistence APT style


– Nothing good out there…
▪ Meterpreter – OSS
▪ Core Impact – $$$$$
▪ Poison Ivy – Private
▪ DarkComet – Private
– Who’s going to trust these?

▪ Techniques
– DLL hijacking
– Service
– AppInit registry
– DLL wrapper
TTPs

▪ Go custom or go home…
TTPs
Conclusion
Conclusion

▪ Know your network


– That means monitor the traffic
▪ Netflow, signatures, baselines

▪ Egress Filtering
– Like it is going out of style

▪ Proxy or die!
– Proxy all traffic
– Break & Proxy HTTPS traffic
– Look out for base64 encoding
– If you can’t inspect it…
▪ You just made someone’s b-day 
Conclusion

▪ It’s not the appliance / server /


IDS / IPS / software / device’s
fault…

▪ Expecting your network


devices to identify unknown
traffic is like expecting your
AV to detect a 0-day.
Conclusion

▪ Testing should be modeled after threats


– Vulnerability scans don’t cut it
– Correct practice makes perfect
Conclusion

▪ Offense is sexy, defense is lame


– We need to change the way we think about the problems.
Conclusion

▪ The attackers have them, do you?


The End!

▪ Questions?

▪ Contact Information
– Brady Bloxham
– Silent Break Security
[email protected]
– www.silentbreaksecurity.com
– (801) 855-6599

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