[G.R.

 No. 225301. June 2, 2020.]

THE DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, represented by its

SECRETARY, the UNDERSECRETARY OF THE CONSUMER PROTECTION
GROUP, MEMBERS OF THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE, and
the DIRECTOR OF LEGAL SERVICE, petitioners, vs. DANILO B.
ENRIQUEZ, respondent.

DECISION

The Facts
Prompted by a news article 3 about corrupt practices in the issuance of importation
clearances by an unnamed high-ranking officer of the Department of Trade and Industry
(DTI), then DTI Secretary Adrian Cristobal, Jr. (Sec. Cristobal) instructed Consumer
Protection Group Undersecretary Victorino Mario Dimagiba (Usec. Dimagiba) to conduct
an investigation thereon. 4
After acting upon said directive, Usec. Dimagiba issued a Memorandum 5 dated
April 14, 2016, reporting his initial findings to Sec. Cristobal, finding unauthorized
issuances of respondent Danilo B. Enriquez (Enriquez), then Fair Trade and Enforcement
Bureau (FTEB) Director, with regard to certain importations. Pursuant to these findings,
Usec. Dimagiba opined that there is sufficient basis to file administrative and/or criminal
complaints against Enriquez, recommending, thus, that a full-blown investigation on all
activities in Enriquez's office be conducted and that the latter be preventively suspended
pending investigation. 6
Thus, Sec. Cristobal issued Department Order (D.O.) No. 16-34 7 dated April 22,
2016, creating a Special Investigation Committee (SIC), mandated to conduct a full
investigation on Enriquez. The D.O. also clothed the SIC the authority to issue a
preventive suspension order, among others.
xxx
On May 5, 2016, Enriquez issued another Memorandum, 10 also addressed to the
SIC individual members, objecting to the proceedings conducted by the latter on the
ground that it is the Office of the Ombudsman which has the disciplinary authority over
him.
On May 6 11 and 12, 12 2016, Enriquez issued separate memoranda, reiterating his
objections to the validity of D.O. No. 16-34 with regard to the authority of the SIC to
conduct investigation upon him and order preventive suspension against him.
On May 12, 2016, the SIC issued a "Show Cause Memorandum," 13 directing
Enriquez to explain in writing, within 48 hours from receipt, why no administrative charges
should be filed against him with regard to Usec. Dimagiba's findings.
In response, Enriquez issued a Memorandum 14 dated May 18, 2016, maintaining
his objections to the SIC's disciplinary authority over him, being a presidential appointee,
holding a career and high-level position with Salary Grade "28."
On May 19, 2016, the SIC issued a Memorandum 15 stating that Enriquez did not
give a responsive answer to the "Show Cause Memorandum" and as such, failed to
present an explanation why no administrative case should be filed against him. Thus, the
SIC found prima facie case against Enriquez and formally charged him with Gross
Insubordination, Gross Misconduct/Gross Neglect of Duty, Grave Abuse of
Authority, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, stating therein
the specific acts constituting the offenses, as well as the laws, rules and regulations
alleged to be violated. Attached with said formal charge were pieces of documentary
evidence substantiating the charges. Enriquez was also ordered to file an answer to the
formal charge within 72 hours. The SIC further placed Enriquez on preventive
suspension for a period of 90 days effective immediately upon receipt of said
Memorandum.
On May 23, 2016, Enriquez filed a Protest and Answer Ex Abudante
Cautelam, 16 specifically denying the charges against him and maintaining his objection to
the SIC's authority to conduct investigations and order his preventive suspension.
Enriquez also filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus with Very
Extreme Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of a Status Quo Ante Order and Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction 17 before the RTC against
Sec. Cristobal, Usec. Dimagiba, and the members of the SIC (collectively, petitioners).
In the main, Enriquez's petition was grounded upon the lack of disciplinary
jurisdiction of Sec. Cristobal, and consequently the SIC as well, over him, being a
presidential appointee occupying a high-ranking position with Salary Grade "28." Enriquez
averred that it is the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) which has the authority
and jurisdiction to investigate, hear, and decide administrative cases against a presidential
appointee occupying a director position with Salary Grade "28." Enriquez
invoked Executive Order (E.O.) No. 12, as amended by E.O. No. 531 and E.O. Nos. 531-
A and 531-B.
xxx
Hence, Enriquez prayed that D.O. No. 16-34 and all the Memoranda issued by
Usec. Dimagiba and the SIC relative to the investigation/s against him, be nullified; that
petitioners be ordered to restrain from further continuing with the administrative disciplinary
proceedings against him; and that a memorandum be issued stating that petitioners do not
have jurisdiction over administrative cases involving presidential appointees and the
proper remedy or referral of the case to the appropriate authority. 18
Petitioners, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), countered that the
RTC has no jurisdiction over the petition. Petitioners argued that the petition involves the
DTI Secretary's exercise of its quasi-judicial function in an administrative disciplinary
proceeding. Hence, according to the petitioners, a review thereof is within the jurisdiction
of the Court of Appeals (CA) pursuant to Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioners further argued that they have disciplinary jurisdiction over Enriquez, which
include the authority to investigate and designate a committee to conduct such
investigation, invoking Section 7 (5), as well as Section 47 (2) and (3), Chapter 2, Book IV
and Section 51, Chapter 6, Book V of E.O. No. 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987.
Petitioners further averred that due process was observed in the exercise of their
disciplinary authority over Enriquez. 19
In its June 27, 2016 Decision, the RTC ruled in favor of Enriquez as follows:
WHEREFORE:
1. The instant petition is granted in part.
2. The Formal Charge with Preventive Suspension dated May 19, 2016 is
nullified and set aside.
3. The Special Investigation Committee is prohibited from hearing and
adjudicating the Formal Charge with Preventive Suspension dated May 19, 2016.
4. The [petitioners] are commanded to restore [Enriquez] to his post as
Director of the Fair Trade Enforcement Bureau of the Department of Trade and
Industry, unless his term of office has already expired and he can no longer resume
such post under the present Administration.
SO ORDERED. 20 (Italics in the original)
Meanwhile, the DTI, through its then newly-appointed Secretary, Ramon M. Lopez,
issued D.O. No. 16-63 dated July 4, 2016, which designated Assistant Director Ferdinand
L. Manfoste as Officer-In-Charge of the FTEB in concurrent capacity, effectively implying
the expiration of Enriquez's term of office.
 Petitioner’s Contention:
This Petition was then filed. Petitioners argue, in the main, that the DTI Secretary
has disciplinary jurisdiction, which includes the authority to investigate and to designate a
committee for such purpose, over subordinates though they may be presidential
appointees such as Enriquez. xxx
xxx
xxx On the other hand, in his Memorandum, Enriquez argues that his right to due
process of law was violated when he was investigated upon by a committee which
has no authority to investigate, hear, and decide administrative cases over him, who is a
presidential appointee with Salary Grade "28." Enriquez insists that it is the PAGC, not the
DTI Secretary or the committee he designated, which has disciplinary authority over him
pursuant to E.O. No. 12, as amended.
Issue:
 Does the Department Secretary have disciplinary jurisdiction over a presidential
appointee?

The DTI Secretary has authority to investigate, as well as to designate a

committee or an officer for such purpose, a bureau director who is a presidential
appointee such as Enriquez.

In ruling against the authority of the DTI Secretary to proceed in the administrative
investigation of Enriquez, the RTC reasoned as follows:

xxx

In brief, the court a quo ratiocinated that the heads of the departments, agencies
and other instrumentalities have no disciplinary jurisdiction over presidential appointees
since their decision thereon cannot be appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC),
thereby leaving a void in the appeal process. Moreover, according to the RTC, the
President, pursuant to its power of control over the executive branch, has directly assumed
the investigatory functions of the department heads over presidential appointees,
through E.O. No. 13 "and its allied E.O.s." The RTC then theorized that such assumption
of function, done pursuant to a Constitutional mandate, cannot be ignored by the
President's mere alter egos by invocation of the Administrative Code provisions.

The Court cannot subscribe to this interpretation.

Disciplinary Authority of the

Department Secretary under the
Administrative Code
xxx
Section 7, Chapter 2, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code further provides
for the powers and functions of the Department Secretary, viz.:
SEC. 7. Powers and Functions of the Secretary. — The Secretary shall:
(1) Advise the President in issuing executive orders, regulations,
proclamations and other issuances, the promulgation of which is expressly vested by
law in the President relative to matters under the jurisdiction of the Department;
 (2) Establish the policies and standards for the operation of the Department
pursuant to the approved programs of government;
(3) Promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry out department
objectives, policies, functions, plans, programs and projects;
(4) Promulgate administrative issuances necessary for the efficient
administration of the offices under the Secretary and for proper execution of the laws
relative thereto. These issuances shall not prescribe penalties for their violation,
except when expressly authorized by law;
(5) Exercise disciplinary powers over officers and employees under the
Secretary in accordance with law, including their investigation and the
designation of a committee or officer to conduct such investigation;
(6) Appoint all officers and employees of the Department except those whose
appointments are vested in the President or in some other appointing authority;
Provided, However, that where the Department is regionalized on a department-wide
basis, the Secretary shall appoint employees to positions in the second level in the
regional offices as defined in this Code;
(7) Exercise jurisdiction over all bureaus, offices, agencies and
corporations under the Department as are provided by law, and in accordance
with the applicable relationships as specified in Chapters 7, 8, and 9 of this
Book;
(8) Delegate authority to officers and employees under the Secretary's
direction in accordance with this Code; and
(9) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law. (Emphases
supplied)

Corollary, Section 47 (2) and (3), Chapter 6, Title I-A, Book V of the Administrative
Code provides:
SEC. 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. —
xxx xxx xxx
(2) The Secretaries and heads of agencies and instrumentalities, provinces,
cities and municipalities shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters
involving disciplinary action against officers and employees under their
jurisdiction. Their decisions shall be final in case the penalty imposed is
suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty
days' salary. In case the decision rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable
to the Commission, the same may be initially appealed to the department and finally
to the Commission and pending appeal, the same shall be executory except when
the penalty is removal, in which case the same shall be executory only after
confirmation by the Secretary concerned.
(3) An investigation may be entrusted to regional director or similar
officials who shall make the necessary report and recommendation to the
chief of bureau or office or department within the period specified in Paragraph (4)
of the following Section. (Emphases supplied)

The foregoing provisions of the Administrative Code unambiguously provide for the

Department Secretary's disciplinary jurisdiction over officers and employees under him in
accordance with law. Clearly, thus, a bureau director, which heads a mere subdivision
of a department, is under the Department Secretary's disciplinary supervision. It is
important to emphasize that the aforequoted provisions made no distinction between
presidential and non-presidential appointees with regard to the Secretary's disciplinary
jurisdiction.

Power to Impose Penalty vis-à-vis

Power to Investigate
 The distinction between presidential and non-presidential appointees becomes
relevant only with respect to the Department Secretary's "power to impose penalties" and
"power to investigate."

The Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS), 28 as

well as the 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RACCS) 29 which
superseded the RRACCS, provide the distinction for the disciplinary jurisdiction of the
department heads and secretaries. Said rules provide for the disciplinary powers that the
CSC and the department heads and secretaries have over non-presidential appointees.
Section 9 of the RRACCS, the applicable rules during Enriquez's service, provides
that the department secretaries have original concurrent jurisdiction with the CSC over
cases cognizable by the latter, viz.:
SEC. 9. Jurisdiction of Heads of Agencies. — The Secretaries and heads of
agencies, and other instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities shall have
original concurrent jurisdiction with the Commission over their respective officers and
employees. They shall take cognizance of complaints involving their respective
personnel. Their decisions shall be final in case the penalty imposed is suspension
for not more than thirty (30) days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty (30) days
salary. In case the decision rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable to the
Commission, the same may be initially appealed to the department and finally to the
Commission and pending appeal, the same shall be executory except when the
penalty is removal, in which case the same shall be executory only after confirmation
by the Secretary concerned.
Notably, the RRACCS limited the CSC's jurisdiction to those enumerated in
the rules. Sections 7 and 8 of the RRACCS provide:
SEC. 7. Cases Cognizable by the Civil Service Commission. — The Civil
Service Commission shall take cognizance of the following cases:
A. Disciplinary
1. Decisions of Civil Service Commission Regional Offices brought before it on appeal
or petition for review;
2. Decisions of heads of agencies imposing penalties exceeding thirty (30) days
suspension or fine in an amount exceeding thirty (30) days salary brought
before it on appeal;
3. Complaints brought against Civil Service Commission personnel;
4. Complaints against officials who are not presidential appointees;
5. Decisions of heads of agencies imposing penalties not exceeding 30 days
suspension or fine equivalent thereto but violating due process;
6. Requests for transfer of venue of hearing on cases being heard by Civil Service
Commission Regional Offices;
7. Appeals from the order of preventive suspension; and
8. Such other actions or requests involving issues arising out of or in connection with
the foregoing enumeration.
B. Non-Disciplinary
1. Decisions of heads of agencies on personnel actions;
2. Decisions of Civil Service Commission Regional Offices;
3. Requests for favorable recommendation on petition for the removal of
administrative penalties or disabilities;
4. Protests against appointments, or other personnel actions, involving non-
presidential appointees;
5. Requests for Extension of Service;
 6. Reassignment of public health workers and public social workers brought before it
on appeal;
7. Request for correction of personal information in the records of the Commission
within five (5) years before mandatory retirement; and
8. Such other analogous actions or petitions arising out of or in relation with the
foregoing enumeration.

SEC. 8. Cases Cognizable by Regional Offices. — Except as otherwise

directed by the Commission, the Civil Service Commission Regional Offices shall
take cognizance of the following cases:
A. Disciplinary
1. Cases initiated by, or brought before, the Civil Service Commission Regional
Offices provided that the alleged acts or omissions were committed within the
jurisdiction of the Regional Office, including Civil Service examination
anomalies or irregularities and/or the persons complained of are rank-and-file
employees of agencies, local or national, within said geographical areas;
2. Complaints involving Civil Service Regional Office personnel who are appointees of
said office; and
3. Petitions to place respondent under preventive suspension.
B. Non-Disciplinary
1. Disapproval/Recall of Approval/Invalidation of appointments brought before it on
appeal;
2. Decisions of heads of agencies, except those of the department secretaries and
bureau heads within their geographical boundaries relative to protests and
other personnel actions and other non-disciplinary actions brought before it on
appeal;
3. Requests for accreditation of services; and
4. Requests for correction of personal information in the records of the Commission
not falling under Section 7(B) Item 7 of this Rules. (Emphases supplied)

Relatedly, Section 48 of the Administrative Code provides for the manner of initiation

of cases within the disciplinary jurisdiction of the CSC:
SEC. 48. Procedure in Administrative Cases Against Non-Presidential
Appointees. — x x x
(1) Administrative proceedings may be commenced against a subordinate
officer or employee by the Secretary or head of office of equivalent rank, or head of
local government, or chiefs of agencies, or regional directors, or upon sworn, written
complaint of any other person. (Emphasis supplied)

It is also noteworthy that RRACCS, as well as the RACCS, define a "disciplining

authority" to be the person or body "duly authorized to impose the penalty" provided for
by law or rules. 30 Hence, read in conjunction with the relevant provisions of
the Administrative Code above-quoted, the disciplinary authority, i.e., the power to
impose penalty, of the CSC and department secretaries are limited to non-
presidential appointees.

For presidential appointees, the power to impose penalty resides with the
President pursuant to his power of control under the Constitution 31 and the Administrative
Code. 32 Likewise, the Ombudsman, under the Constitution 33 and Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6770, 34 was given such power to impose penalties. Certainly, concomitant
to such disciplinary authority is the power to investigate and to designate a committee or
officer to conduct such investigation pursuant to Section 7 (5), Chapter 2, Title III, Book IV
of the Administrative Code above-cited, as well as the relevant provisions of R.A. No.
6770. In fine, the power to impose penalty necessarily includes the power to
investigate. Contrarily, the power to investigate does not necessarily include the
power to impose penalty.

While the power to impose penalty remains with the President or the Ombudsman,
the power to investigate, as well as to designate a committee or officer to
investigate, and thereafter to report its findings and make recommendations, may
be delegated to and exercised by subordinates or a special commission or
committee specifically created for such purpose. Stated more specifically, while it is
the President as the Chief Executive, or the Ombudsman as mandated by law, who
has the authority to impose penalty upon erring presidential appointees, it does not
preclude said disciplining authorities from utilizing, as a matter of practical
administrative procedure, the aid of subordinates to investigate and report to them
the facts, on the basis of which the President or the Ombudsman, as the case may
be, make their decision. It is sufficient that the judgment and discretion finally
exercised are those of the officer authorized by law. 35

Such delegation of the power to investigate presidential appointees is precisely what

was accomplished when E.O. No. 292 or the Administrative Code was signed into law by
then revolutionary government President Corazon C. Aquino using her transitory powers,
as well as when E.O. Nos. 151, 268, 12, as amended, 13, and 43 were issued by the
respective subsequent Chief Executives.

As above-stated, the Administrative Code expressly provides for the Department

Secretary's power to investigate and to designate a committee or officer for such purpose.
xxx In 2010, under President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III's administration, the PAGC
was abolished and its investigative, adjudicatory, and recommendatory functions were
transferred to the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA)
through E.O. No. 13. 39

At present, President Rodrigo R. Duterte issued E.O. No. 43 40 in 2017, creating the

Presidential Anti-Corruption Commission (PACC) "to directly assist the President in
investigating and/or hearing administrative cases primarily involving graft and corruption
against all presidential appointees classified as Salary Grade '26' and higher." 41 The
powers, duties, and functions of the ODESLA were effectively transferred to PACC. PACC
also has the authority to recommend to the President the issuance of an order of
preventive suspension under the circumstances provided in E.O. No. 43. 42 Notably, its
investigative and adjudicatory authority over said class of employees is concurrent with the
Ombudsman. 43

In sum, it bears stressing that the disciplinary jurisdiction of the department

secretary over presidential appointees is limited. As above-stated, the power to
investigate does not include the power to impose penalty. It has long been settled
that the power to decide on such disciplinary matters and impose penalty upon said
category of officers remains with the appointing authority.

As held in Baculi v. Office of the President, 44 while the Administrative Code has

vested the Department Secretary with the authority to investigate matters involving a
presidential appointee, Section 38 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 807 45 or the Civil
Service Decree of the Philippines, which was exactly echoed in Section 48, Chapter 7,
Title I-A, Book V of the Administrative Code, has drawn a definite distinction between
subordinate officers or employees who are presidential appointees and those who are
non-presidential appointees with regard to the authority to decide on the disciplinary
matter. Said provisions speak of the procedure in administrative cases against non-
presidential appointees before the CSC as the latter has no disciplinary authority over
presidential appointees. The Court explained that this is so because substantial
distinctions set presidential appointees apart from non-presidential appointees. One of
such distinctions is that presidential appointees come under the direct disciplining
authority of the President pursuant to the well-settled principle that, in the absence
of a contrary law, the power to remove or to discipline is lodged in the same
authority in whom the power to appoint is vested. 46

The principle finds basis in the Constitutional grant of power upon the President to
appoint such officials as provided in the Constitution and laws. 47 Full discretion is,
therefore, given to the President to remove his appointees. Unless otherwise provided by
the Constitution, such concomitant power of the appointing authority to remove cannot be
attenuated by allowing even his alter ego to discipline and worse, to remove the former's
appointee, lest the executive department would be put into a precarious situation where
the very person particularly chosen by the President will be removed by his own
subordinate without his prior express conformity. Thus, even the doctrine of qualified
political agency cannot be used to grant the department heads the power to impose
penalty upon erring subordinates who are presidential appointees without prior
approval of the President.

xxx

Precisely, this explains the necessity of forwarding the Department Secretary's

findings and recommendation to the President with regard to administrative cases against
presidential appointees. Granting the Department Secretary the power to impose penalty
without the President's prior express conformity would result to a circuitous situation
wherein the removal or any action effected by the Department Secretary may later on be
countermanded by the President at any time.

Then again, to be clear, this does not prevent the Department Secretary from
conducting investigations and forwarding their findings and recommendations to
the President for approval. In the alternative, their findings may also be forwarded to
the PACC for further investigation and recommendation to the President, or to the
Ombudsman in applicable cases.

At this juncture, it is imperative to note that the present case merely involves
the DTI Secretary's act of ordering the conduct of an initial investigation on the
issues raised against Enriquez; creating and authorizing the SIC to conduct a full
investigation thereon; and, of filing a formal charge against Enriquez upon its
finding of a prima facie case against the latter. There is no imposition of penalty, much
less order of dismissal, from the DTI Secretary involved in this case. Hence, as Sec.
Cristobal merely exercised his power to investigate and designate an officer and/or
committee to investigate his subordinate pursuant to the Administrative Code, his actions,
as well as the resulting report from such investigation should be validly sustained absent
any finding of irregularity in the conduct thereof.
E.O. No. 151 and the subsequent
E.O.s vis-à-vis the Administrative
Code

Inasmuch as such power to investigate was given to the aforesaid Commissions, the
power given to the Department Secretary to investigate and to designate a committee or
officer to investigate a subordinate, who may be a presidential or non-presidential
appointee, cannot likewise be denied. 51 The investigative and recommendatory authority
of the fact-finding Commissions under the above-cited executive orders are by  no means
exclusive and, thus, can be shared with any officer or agency likewise tasked to
investigate and recommend findings and conclusions.

Therefore, in the absence of a law or legal justification prohibiting the

Department Secretary to conduct its own investigation on its subordinates, such
power of the Department Secretary to investigate, even a presidential appointee,
under the Administrative Code, should then be upheld.

Furthermore, E.O. No. 151 and the subsequent E.O.s above-cited, or "E.O. No.

13 and its allied E.O.s" as referred to by the RTC in its assailed Decision, could not have
repealed the Administrative Code, contrary to the RTC's conclusion.
xxx
A careful perusal of the invoked executive orders clearly reveals no incongruity with
the Administrative Code. As discussed above, the creation and reorganization of the
investigative and recommendatory Commissions/Office through said executive orders, do
not indicate any intention to totally remove the Department Secretary's power to
investigate over his subordinates who are presidential appointees. None of the executive
orders provides for an express exclusionary provision that removes such power to
investigate from the Department Secretary as provided under the Administrative Code.
Thus, said executive orders neither supersede nor conflict with the Administrative
Code which allows the Department Secretary to investigate his subordinates, may they be
presidential appointees or non-presidential appointees. It is, therefore, flawed to argue and
conclude that said executive orders granted the investigative Commissions the exclusive
jurisdiction to investigate presidential appointees.

The Unavailability of Appeal from the

Department Secretary's Exercise of its
Investigative and Recommendatory
Function
The fact that no appeal can be made to the CSC from the findings of the
Department Secretary and/or the committee which was designated to conduct the
investigation on a presidential appointee, cannot be validly used as a ground to divest the
Department Secretary of his statutory authority to exercise such power to investigate,
contrary to the RTC's conclusion.

Indeed, as discussed above, the CSC has no disciplinary authority over

presidential appointees. Hence, it has neither original nor appellate jurisdiction over
disciplinary cases against presidential appointees. xxx
xxx

The Power to Investigate Includes the

Power to Preventively Suspend
 The power of the Department Secretary to investigate his subordinates being
established, such power necessarily includes the authority to impose preventive
suspension.
Preventive suspension is authorized under the Administrative Code, viz.:
SEC. 51. Preventive Suspension. — The proper disciplining authority may
preventively suspend any subordinate officer or employee under his authority
pending an investigation, if the charge against such officer or employee involves
dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty,
or if there are reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges which
would warrant his removal from the service. 56
Inasmuch as the Department Secretary was given the power to investigate his
subordinates by authority of the President, his power to impose preventive suspension
also by authority of the President, cannot likewise be denied. It is well to point out that
preventive suspension pending investigation is not punitive in nature. In the early
case of Nera v. Garcia, 57 the Court explained that suspension is a preliminary step in an
administrative investigation. The need for the preventive suspension may arise from
several causes, such as the danger of tampering or destruction of evidence in the
possession of the person being investigated and the intimidation of witnesses, among
others. Thus, to enable an effective and unhampered investigation, and to foreclose any
threat to the success of the same, the authority conducting the same should be given the
discretion to decide when the person facing administrative charges should be preventively
suspended. 58

xxx

Conclusion
xxx In this case, pursuant to the foregoing legal considerations, it is established that
the Department Secretary's exercise of the power to investigate and to designate a
committee or officer for such purpose, a subordinate, whether the latter be a non-
presidential or presidential appointee, is well-founded in law and jurisprudence.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the

Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 77, in Civil Case No. R-QZN-16-05101 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Department of Trade and Industry
is ORDERED to proceed with dispatch with its investigation on Danilo B. Enriquez's
administrative case. Thereafter, the Secretary of the Department of Trade and Industry
may forward his findings and recommendations to the Office of the President for the
imposition of the proper penalties, as may be warranted.
SO ORDERED.
|||  (Department of Trade and Industry v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 225301, [June 2, 2020])