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7 Aala v. Uy

1) Petitioners questioned the validity of City Ordinance No. 558, s-2012 which enacted a new schedule of market values and assessment levels of real properties in Tagum City. 2) Oppositors filed an objection with the provincial council asserting that the ordinance violated provisions of the local government code. The provincial council invalidated parts of the ordinance and returned it to the city council. 3) The city council declared the ordinance valid based on the presumption of validity under the local government code. Petitioners filed a case with the Supreme Court to nullify the ordinance.

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
40 views

7 Aala v. Uy

1) Petitioners questioned the validity of City Ordinance No. 558, s-2012 which enacted a new schedule of market values and assessment levels of real properties in Tagum City. 2) Oppositors filed an objection with the provincial council asserting that the ordinance violated provisions of the local government code. The provincial council invalidated parts of the ordinance and returned it to the city council. 3) The city council declared the ordinance valid based on the presumption of validity under the local government code. Petitioners filed a case with the Supreme Court to nullify the ordinance.

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© © All Rights Reserved
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EN BANC

[G.R. No. 202781. January 10, 2017.]

CRISANTO M. AALA, ROBERT N. BALAT, DATU BELARDO M.


BUNGAD, CESAR B. CUNTAPAY, LAURA S. DOMINGO,
GLORIA M. GAZMEN-TAN, and JOCELYN P. SALUDARES-
CADAYONA, petitioners, vs. HON. REY T. UY, in his capacity
as the City Mayor of Tagum City, Davao del Norte, MR.
ALFREDO H. SILAWAN, in his capacity as City Assessor of
Tagum City, HON. DE CARLO L. UY, HON. ALLAN L. RELLON,
HON. MARIA LINA F. BAURA, HON. NICANDRO T.
SUAYBAGUIO, JR., HON. ROBERT L. SO, HON. JOEDEL T.
CAASI, HON. OSCAR M. BERMUDEZ, HON. ALAN D. ZULUETA,
HON. GETERITO T. GEMENTIZA, HON. TRISTAN ROYCE R.
AALA, HON. FRANCISCO C. REMITAR, in their capacity as
City Councilors of Tagum City, Davao del Norte, HON.
ALFREDO R. PAGDILAO, in his capacity as ABC
representative, and HON. MARIE CAMILLE C. MANANSALA,
in her capacity as SKF representative, respondents.

DECISION

LEONEN, J : p

Parties must comply with the doctrines on hierarchy of courts and


exhaustion of administrative remedies. Otherwise, they run the risk of
bringing premature cases before this Court, which may result to protracted
litigation and overclogging of dockets. CTIEac

This resolves the original action for Certiorari, Prohibition, and


Mandamus 1 filed by petitioners Crisanto M. Aala, Robert N. Balat, Datu
Belardo M. Bungad, Cesar B. Cuntapay, Laura S. Domingo, Gloria M. Gazmen-
Tan, and Jocelyn P. Saludares-Cadayona. 2 They question the validity of City
Ordinance No. 558, s-2012 of the City of Tagum, Davao del Norte, which the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Tagum City enacted on March 19, 2012. 3
On July 12, 2011, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Tagum City's
Committee on Finance conducted a public hearing for the approval of a
proposed ordinance. The proposed ordinance sought to adopt a new
schedule of market values and assessment levels of real properties in Tagum
City. 4
On November 3, 2011, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Tagum City
passed City Ordinance No. 516, s-2011, entitled An Ordinance Approving the
New Schedule of Market Values, its Classification, and Assessment Level of
Real Properties in the City of Tagum. 5 The ordinance was approved by
Mayor Rey T. Uy (Mayor Uy) on November 11, 2011 and was immediately
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forwarded to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao del Norte for review. 6
DcHSEa

On February 7, 2012, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao del


Norte's Committee on Ways and Means/Games and Amusement issued a
report dated February 1, 2012 declaring City Ordinance No. 516, s-2011
valid. 7 It also directed the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Tagum City to revise
the ordinance based on the recommendations of the Provincial Assessor's
Office. 8
Consequently, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao del Norte
returned City Ordinance No. 516, s-2011 to the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Tagum City for modification. 9
As a result of the amendments introduced to City Ordinance No. 516, s-
2011, on March 19, 2012, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Tagum City
passed City Ordinance No. 558, s-2012. 10 The new ordinance was approved
by Mayor Uy on April 10, 2012. On the same day, it was transmitted for
review to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao del Norte. The
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao del Norte received the proposed
ordinance on April 12, 2012. 11
On April 30, 2012, Engineer Crisanto M. Aala (Aala) and Colonel Jorge P.
Ferido (Ferido), both residents of Tagum City, filed before the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Davao del Norte an Opposition/Objection to City Ordinance
No. 558, s-2012. 12 The opposition was docketed as Case No. DOCS-12-
000362 and was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means/Games and
Amusement. 13 The Committee conducted a hearing to tackle the matters
raised in the Opposition. 14
Present at the hearing were oppositors Aala and Ferido, their counsel,
Alfredo H. Silawan, City Assessor of Tagum City, and Atty. Rolando Tumanda,
City Legal Officer of Tagum City. 15
In their Opposition/Objection, 16 Aala and Ferido asserted that City
Ordinance No. 558, s-2012 violated Sections 130 (a), 17 198 (a) and (b), 18
199 (b), 19 and 201 20 of the Local Government Code of 1991. 21 They
alleged that Sections III C 1, 2, and 3 as well as Sections III G 1 (b) and 4 (g)
22 of the proposed ordinance divided Tagum City into different zones,

classified real properties per zone, and fixed its market values depending on
where they were situated 23 without taking into account the "distinct and
fundamental differences . . . and elements of value" 24 of each property.
Aala and Ferido asserted that the proposed ordinance classified and
valued those properties located in a predominantly commercial area as
commercial, regardless of the purpose to which they were devoted. 25
According to them, this was erroneous because real property should be
classified, valued, and assessed not according to its location but on the basis
of actual use. 26 Moreover, they pointed out that the proposed ordinance
imposed exorbitant real estate taxes, which the residents of Tagum City
could not afford to pay. 27 SaCIDT

After the hearing, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao del Norte's


Committee on Ways and Means/Games and Amusement issued Committee
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Report No. 5 dated May 4, 2012, which returned City Ordinance No. 558, s-
2012 to the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Tagum City. 28 The Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Davao del Norte also directed the Sangguniang Panlungsod
of Tagum City to give attention and due course to the oppositors' concerns.
29

On May 22, 2012, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Tagum City issued


Resolution No. 808, s-2012 dated May 14, 2012, requesting the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Davao del Norte to reconsider its position on City Ordinance
No. 558, s-2012. 30
On June 18, 2012, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao del Norte
issued Resolution No. 428 31 declaring as invalid Sections III C 1, 2, and 3,
Sections III D (1) and (2), and Sections G 1 (b) and 4 (g) of City Ordinance No.
558, s-2012. 32
However, on July 9, 2012, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Tagum City
passed Resolution No. 874, s-2012 declaring City Ordinance No. 558, s-2012
as valid. 33 The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Tagum City cited as its basis
Section 56 (d) 34 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and Department of
the Interior and Local Government Opinion No. 151 dated November 25,
2010. 35 It argued that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao del Norte
failed to take action on City Ordinance No. 558, s-2012 within 30 days from
its receipt on April 12, 2012. 36 Hence, under Section 56 (d) of the Local
Government Code of 1991, City Ordinance No. 558, s-2012 enjoys the
presumption of validity. 37
On July 13, 2012, City Ordinance No. 558, s-2012 was published in the
July 13-19, 2012 issue of Trends and Time, 38 a newspaper of general
circulation in Tagum City. 39
Alarmed by the impending implementation of City Ordinance No. 558,
s-2012, petitioners filed before this Court an original action for Certiorari,
Prohibition, and Mandamus on August 13, 2012. 40 The Petition included a
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of
preliminary injunction. 41
In their Petition, petitioners seek to nullify the ordinance on the ground
that respondents enacted it with grave abuse of discretion. 42 Petitioners
invoke this Court's original jurisdiction under Article VIII, Section 5 (1) of the
Constitution 43 in view of the need to immediately resolve the issues they
have raised. 44
Petitioners allege that there is an urgent need to restrain the
implementation of City Ordinance No. 558, s-2012. 45 Otherwise, the City
Government of Tagum would proceed with "the collection of exorbitant real
property taxes to the great damage and prejudice of . . . petitioners and the
thousands of taxpayers inhabiting Tagum City[.]" 46 SCaITA

On October 16, 2012, respondent Geterito T. Gementiza (Gementiza)


filed a Motion 47 praying that he be dropped as a respondent in the case.
According to respondent Gementiza, he had opposed the passage of City
Ordinance No. 558, s-2012 during the deliberations of the Sangguniang
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Panlungsod of Tagum City. 48 In the Resolution 49 dated October 23, 2012,
this Court required the parties to file a comment on respondent Gementiza's
Motion.
On October 31, 2012, respondents filed a Comment 50 on the Petition.
In the Resolution 51 dated December 4, 2012, this Court noted the Comment
and required petitioners to file a reply to the Comment.
Meanwhile, on February 20, 2013, respondents filed a Manifestation 52
stating that the implementation of City Ordinance No. 558, s-2012 had been
deferred due to the wide extent of damage caused by Typhoon Pablo in
Tagum City. 53
On February 25, 2013, petitioners and respondents filed their
respective Comments 54 on respondent Gementiza's Motion. Petitioners
argued that the passage of the questioned ordinance was a collegial act of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Tagum City, of which respondent Gementiza
was a member. Hence, respondent Gementiza should still be impleaded in
the case regardless of whether or not he opposed the passage of the
ordinance. 55
On March 6, 2013, petitioners filed a Reply 56 to the Comment dated
October 18, 2012.
In the Resolution 57 dated March 19, 2013, this Court gave due course
to the Petition, treated respondents' Comment as an answer, and required
the parties to submit their memoranda. On July 10, 2013, petitioners filed
their Memorandum 58 dated June 20, 2013. On September 6, 2013,
respondents filed their Memorandum 59 dated August 2, 2013.
Petitioners allege that Tagum City is predominantly agricultural. 60
Although it boasts of expansive highways "lined with tall palm trees" and a
state-of-the-art city hall, Tagum City still has an outstanding debt of P450
million. 61 The income level of its 240,000 inhabitants remains constant, and
due to unreasonable business taxes, most businesses have either scaled
down or closed. 62
Set against this factual backdrop, petitioners assail the validity of City
Ordinance No. 558, s-2012. They claim that the ordinance imposes
exorbitant real estate taxes because of the Sangguniang Panlungsod's
erroneous classification and valuation of real properties. 63
cHECAS

Petitioners are concerned residents of Tagum City who would be


directly affected by the implementation of the questioned ordinance. 64 Well-
aware of the doctrines on the hierarchy of courts and exhaustion of
administrative remedies, they beg this Court's indulgence to allow
immediate and direct resort to it. 65 According to petitioners, this case is
exempt from the application of the doctrine on hierarchy of courts. They
anchor their claim on the ground that the redress they desire cannot be
obtained in the appropriate courts. 66 Furthermore, petitioners assert that
the issue they have raised is purely legal and that the case involves
paramount public interest, which warrants the relaxation of the rule on
exhaustion of administrative remedies. 67
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Petitioners believe that compliance with Section 187 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 would harm the taxpayers of Tagum City. 68 They
argue that the cited provision hardly constitutes an efficacious remedy that
can provide the redress they urgently seek. 69 According to petitioners, there
is nothing that would prevent the City Government of Tagum from collecting
exorbitant real property taxes since the Secretary of Justice does not have
the power to suspend the implementation of the questioned ordinance. 70
Moreover, the 60-day period given to the Secretary of Justice within which to
render a decision would merely constitute delay and give the City
Government of Tagum enough time to assess and collect exorbitant real
property taxes. 71
Petitioners also believe that upon receipt of an assessment, they would
be precluded from questioning the excessiveness of the real property tax
imposed by way of protest. 72 Under the Local Government Code of 1991,
the amount of real property tax assessed must first be paid before a protest
may be entertained. 73 However, petitioners contend that the taxpayers of
Tagum City would not be able to comply with this rule due to lack of money.
74 Petitioners justify immediate resort to this Court due to this impasse. 75

In their Comment, 76 respondents attack the propriety of the remedy of


which petitioners have availed themselves. Respondents point out that the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari is only directed against judicial and quasi-
judicial acts. 77 According to respondents, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Tagum City exercised a legislative function in enacting the questioned
ordinance and is, thus, beyond the scope of a petition for certiorari. 78
Moreover, there is a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available to
petitioners under the law. 79 Citing Section 187 of the Local Government
Code of 1991, respondents argue that petitioners should have exhausted
administrative remedies by filing an appeal before the Secretary of Justice.
80

Respondents further argue that in directly filing their Petition before


this Court, petitioners violated the doctrine on hierarchy of courts. 81 They
stress that the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, and the Regional Trial
Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus. 82
Respondents also allege that the Petition raises factual issues, which
warrants the dismissal of the Petition. 83aTHCSE

Going into the substantive aspect of the case, petitioners contend that
the ordinance created only two (2) categories of real properties. Petitioners
point out that Sections III C and D, which pertain to the classification of
commercial and industrial lands, list all the streets and barrios in Tagum City.
84 Because of this, petitioners argue that the ordinance effectively

categorized all lands in Tagum City either into commercial or industrial


lands, regardless of the purpose to which they were devoted and the extent
of their development. 85
Petitioners further contend that since all lands in Tagum City had been
classified as commercial or industrial, all buildings and improvements would
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likewise be classified as commercial or industrial. Otherwise, an absurd
situation would arise where the building and the land on which it stands
would have a different classification. 86
In other words, petitioners claim that the ordinance created a blanket
classification of real properties without regard to the principle of actual use.
To the mind of petitioners, this blanket classification "does not conform to
the reality that Tagum City is not that far advanced and commercially
developed like Ayala Avenue [in] Makati City where [almost all] of the
properties fronting the entire breadth of Ayala Avenue are . . . used for
commercial purposes." 87
In classifying real properties based on location, petitioners argue that
the ordinance contravenes Section 217 of the Local Government Code of
1991, which provides that "[r]eal property shall be classified, valued and
assessed on the basis of its actual use regardless of where located, whoever
owns it, and whoever uses it." 88 Petitioners highlight the necessity in
properly classifying real properties based on actual use because the
classification of real property determines the assessment level that would be
applied in computing the real property tax due. 89
Petitioners add that because all real properties in Tagum City were
classified into commercial or industrial properties, their valuation would then
correspond to that of commercial or industrial properties as the case may
be. 90 In effect, the ordinance provided a uniform market value for all real
properties without regard to the principle of actual use. 91 According to
petitioners, this is erroneous. They further add that the schedule of fair
market values was arbitrarily prepared by those who do not know the basic
principles of property valuation. 92
By way of example, petitioners point out that the market values of
residential lands, which were reclassified under the ordinance as
commercial, increased from P600.00 per square meter to P5,000.00 per
square meter, or by 833% in a span of only three (3) years. 93 According to
petitioners, this violates Section 191 of the Local Government Code of 1991.
94

Petitioners allege that the ordinance equated the market values of


unused and undeveloped lands to that of fully developed lands. 95 Hence,
the ordinance discriminates against poor land owners who do not have the
means to pay the increased amount of real property taxes. 96 Petitioners
claim that what the Sangguniang Panlungsod had actually determined were
the zonal values of real properties in Tagum City and not the market values.
97 AHDacC

Petitioners contend that respondents committed grave abuse of


discretion in fixing the new schedule of market values by usurping or
arrogating unto itself the City Assessor's authority to fix the schedule of
market values. 98 Being "personally acquainted with the nature, condition,
and value of the said real properties" in a given locality, the City Assessor is
in the best position to fix the schedule of market values. 99 However,
petitioners believe that the schedule of market values was prepared by the
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Sangguniang Panlungsod of Tagum City, and not by the City Assessor. 100
They also believe that the City Assessor abdicated his duty and unlawfully
neglected to perform what was mandated under Section 212 of the Local
Government Code of 1991. 101
Petitioners conclude that what the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Tagum
City had undertaken was a general revision of real property assessments and
property classification under Section 212 of the Local Government Code of
1 9 9 1 . 102 They argue that "the general revision of [real property]
assessments and property classification cannot be made simultaneously with
the ordinance adopting [a new] schedule of fair market values." 103
Petitioners raise the sole substantive issue of whether respondents
committed grave abuse of discretion in preparing, enacting, and approving
City Ordinance No. 558, s-2012, which imposes exorbitant real property
taxes in violation of the equal protection clause, due process clause, and the
rule on uniformity in taxation. 104
On the other hand, respondents argue that petitioners misconstrued
the ordinance. 105 They claim that a careful reading of the provisions would
reveal that there were four (4) categories by which real properties were to
be classified, valued, and assessed, namely: agricultural, residential,
commercial, and industrial. 106 Although the ordinance lists specific roads
and areas in Tagum City classified as commercial and industrial, this does
not mean that all properties located in commercial and industrial areas
would automatically be classified as such. 107
Respondents stress that the principle of actual use still plays an
important role in the classification and assessment of real properties. 108 For
the proper computation of the real property tax due, real properties located
in commercial and industrial areas will be assessed depending on how they
are used. 109 To illustrate, if a parcel of land located along a commercial
area is used partly for commercial purposes and partly for agricultural
purposes, then the fair market value of the portion used for commercial
purposes will correspond to that of commercial lands, while the fair market
value of the portion used for agricultural purposes will correspond to that of
agricultural lands. 110 cAaDHT

Respondents reiterate their claim that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan


of Davao del Norte acted beyond the 30-day reglementary period under
Section 56 (d) of the Local Government Code of 1991. 111 Citing Department
of the Interior and Local Government's Opinion No. 151 dated November 25,
2010, respondents argue that the phrase "take action" means that the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, within 30 days from receipt of the ordinance or
resolution, "should have issued their legislative action in the form of a
[r]esolution containing their disapproval in whole or in part [of] any
ordinance or resolution submitted to them for review[.]" 112 Since the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao del Norte received the questioned
ordinance on April 12, 2012, it had until May 12, 2012 to take action. 113
However, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao del Norte only issued
Resolution No. 428 on June 18, 2012. 114
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For this Court's resolution are the following issues:
Procedural
First, whether this case falls under the exceptions to the doctrine on
hierarchy of courts;
Second, whether this case falls under the exceptions to the rule on
exhaustion of administrative remedies;
Third, whether petitioners correctly availed themselves of the
extraordinary remedies of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus; and
Lastly, whether respondent Gementiza should be dropped as a
respondent in the case.
Substantive
First, whether respondents committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in preparing, enacting, and
approving City Ordinance No. 558, s-2012;
Second, whether City Ordinance No. 558, s-2012 classifies all real
properties in Tagum City into commercial or industrial properties only;
Third, whether the schedule market values conform to the principle
that real properties shall be valued on the basis of actual use;
Fourth, whether City Ordinance No. 558, s-2012 imposes exorbitant
real property taxes; and
Lastly, whether City Ordinance No. 558, s-2012 is unconstitutional for
violation of the equal protection clause, due process clause, and the rule on
uniformity in taxation.
We deny the Petition for serious procedural errors. IDSEAH

I
The doctrine on hierarchy of courts is a practical judicial policy
designed to restrain parties from directly resorting to this Court when relief
may be obtained before the lower courts. 115 The logic behind this policy is
grounded on the need to prevent "inordinate demands upon the Court's time
and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive
jurisdiction," as well as to prevent the congestion of the Court's dockets. 116
Hence, for this Court to be able to "satisfactorily perform the functions
assigned to it by the fundamental charter[,]" it must remain as a "court of
last resort." 117 This can be achieved by relieving the Court of the "task of
dealing with causes in the first instance." 118
As expressly provided in the Constitution, this Court has original
jurisdiction "over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus. " 119 However, this Court has emphasized in
People v. Cuaresma 120 that the power to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus does not exclusively pertain to this Court. 121 Rather, it is
shared with the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts. 122
Nevertheless, "this concurrence of jurisdiction" does not give parties
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unfettered discretion as to the choice of forum. The doctrine on hierarchy of
courts is determinative of the appropriate venue where petitions for
extraordinary writs should be filed. 123 Parties cannot randomly select the
court or forum to which their actions will be directed.
There is another reason why this Court enjoins strict adherence to the
doctrine on hierarchy of courts. As explained in Diocese of Bacolod v.
Commission on Elections, 124 "[t]he doctrine that requires respect for the
hierarchy of courts was created by this court to ensure that every level of
the judiciary performs its designated roles in an effective and efficient
manner." 125 Thus:
Trial courts do not only determine the facts from the evaluation of the
evidence presented before them. They are likewise competent to
determine issues of law which may include the validity of an
ordinance, statute, or even an executive issuance in relation to the
Constitution. To effectively perform these functions, they are
territorially organized into regions and then into branches. Their writs
generally reach within those territorial boundaries. Necessarily, they
mostly perform the all-important task of inferring the facts from the
evidence as these are physically presented before them. In many
instances, the facts occur within their territorial jurisdiction, which
properly present the 'actual case' that makes ripe a determination of
the constitutionality of such action. The consequences, of course,
would be national in scope. There are, however, some cases where
resort to courts at their level would not be practical considering their
decisions could still be appealed before the higher courts, such as the
Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals is primarily designed as an appellate court
that reviews the determination of facts and law made by the trial
courts. It is collegiate in nature. This nature ensures more
standpoints in the review of the actions of the trial court. But the
Court of Appeals also has original jurisdiction over most special civil
actions. Unlike the trial courts, its writs can have a nationwide scope.
It is competent to determine facts and, ideally, should act on
constitutional issues that may not necessarily be novel unless there
are factual questions to determine. HCaDIS

This court, on the other hand, leads the judiciary by breaking


new ground or further reiterating — in the light of new circumstances
or in the light of some confusions of bench or bar — existing
precedents. Rather than a court of first instance or as a repetition of
the actions of the Court of Appeals, this court promulgates these
doctrinal devices in order that it truly performs that role. 126 (Citation
omitted)
Consequently, this Court will not entertain direct resort to it when relief
can be obtained in the lower Courts. 127 This holds especially true when
questions of fact are raised. 128 Unlike this Court, trial courts and the Court of
Appeals are better equipped to resolve questions of fact. 129 They are in the
best position to deal with causes in the first instance.
However, the doctrine on hierarchy of courts is not an inflexible rule.
130 In Spouses Chua v. Ang, 131 this Court held that "[a] strict application of
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this rule may be excused when the reason behind the rule is not present in a
case[.]" 132 This Court has recognized that a direct invocation of its original
jurisdiction may be warranted in exceptional cases as when there are
compelling reasons clearly set forth in the petition, 133 or when what is
raised is a pure question of law. 134
In a fairly recent case, we summarized other well-defined exceptions to
the doctrine on hierarchy of courts. Immediate resort to this Court may be
allowed when any of the following grounds are present: (1) when genuine
issues of constitutionality are raised that must be addressed immediately;
(2) when the case involves transcendental importance; (3) when the case is
novel; (4) when the constitutional issues raised are better decided by this
Court; (5) when time is of the essence; (6) when the subject of review
involves acts of a constitutional organ; (7) when there is no other plain,
speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; (8) when the
petition includes questions that may affect public welfare, public policy, or
demanded by the broader interest of justice; (9) when the order complained
of was a patent nullity; and (10) when the appeal was considered as an
inappropriate remedy. 135
None of the exceptions to the doctrine on hierarchy of courts are
present in this case. Significantly, although petitioners raise questions of
law, other interrelated factual issues have emerged from the parties'
arguments, which this Court deems indispensable for the proper disposition
of this case.
In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 136 this Court explained that a question
of fact exists: aCIHcD

when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of


facts or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence
considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and
relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as well as their
relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the
situation. 137 (Citations omitted)
The resolution of the first substantive issue of whether respondents
committed grave abuse of discretion in preparing, enacting, and approving
City Ordinance No. 558, s-2012 requires the presentation of evidence on the
procedure undertaken by the City Government of Tagum.
The second substantive issue, which involves the alleged blanket
classification of real properties, is likewise factual in nature. There is still a
dispute on whether the questioned ordinance truly limited the classification
of real properties into two (2) categories. This Court cannot resolve this issue
without further evidence from the parties, particularly from the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Tagum City.
The third and fourth issues, which are essential for the proper
disposition of this case, are questions of fact. To determine whether the
schedule of fair market values conforms to the principle of actual use
requires evidence from the person or persons who prepared it. These
individuals must show the process and method they employed in arriving at
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the schedule of market values.
It is worth mentioning that several of petitioners' assertions, on which
their arguments are based, are purely speculative. For instance, petitioners
claim that the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Tagum City usurped the City
Assessor's authority in fixing the schedule of fair market values. 138 Yet, they
offer no evidence to support their allegation. They merely rely on a
comparison between the new schedule of market values and the schedule of
market values in a previous ordinance. 139
With regard to the fourth issue, petitioners invite this Court to compare
the new schedule of fair market values with the old schedule of fair market
values and determine whether the increase was exorbitant. In the absence of
any evidence, this Court does not have the technical expertise to make such
determination. We cannot simply rely on bare numbers.
In order to resolve these factual issues, we will be tasked to receive
evidence from both parties. However, the initial reception and appreciation
of evidence are functions that this Court cannot perform. These functions are
best left to the trial courts. This Court is not a trier of facts. 140 The factual
issues in this case should have been raised and ventilated in the proper
forum.
II
Parties are generally precluded from immediately seeking the
intervention of courts when "the law provides for remedies against the action
of an administrative board, body, or officer." 141 The practical purpose
behind the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is to provide
an orderly procedure by giving the administrative agency an "opportunity to
decide the matter by itself correctly [and] to prevent unnecessary and
premature resort to the courts." 142 AHCETa

Under Section 187 of the Local Government Code of 1991, aggrieved


taxpayers who question the validity or legality of a tax ordinance are
required to file an appeal before the Secretary of Justice before they seek
intervention from the regular courts. Section 187 of the Local Government
Code of 1991 provides:
SECTION 187. Procedure for Approval and Effectivity of Tax
Ordinances and Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings . —
The procedure for approval of local tax ordinances and revenue
measures shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Code:
Provided, That public hearings shall be conducted for the purpose
prior to the enactment thereof: Provided, further, That any question
on the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue
measures may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the
effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a
decision within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the appeal:
Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have the effect of
suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and
payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied therein: Provided, finally,
That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse
of the sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon
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the appeal, the aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings with
a court of competent jurisdiction.
I n Reyes v. Court of Appeals , 143 this Court declared the mandatory
nature of Section 187 of the Local Government Code of 1991:
[T]he law requires that the dissatisfied taxpayer who questions the
validity or legality of a tax ordinance must file his appeal to the
Secretary of Justice, within 30 days from effectivity thereof. In case
the Secretary decides the appeal, a period also of 30 days is allowed
for an aggrieved party to go to court. But if the Secretary does not act
thereon, after the lapse of 60 days, a party could already proceed to
seek relief in court.
These three separate periods are clearly given for compliance as a
prerequisite before seeking redress in a competent court. Such
statutory periods are set to prevent delays as well as enhance the
orderly and speedy discharge of judicial functions. For this reason the
courts construe these provisions of statutes as mandatory . 144
(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
The same principle was reiterated in Jardine Davies Insurance Brokers,
Inc. v. Aliposa. 145
I n Jardine, the then Sangguniang Bayan of Makati enacted Municipal
Ordinance No. 92-072, otherwise known as the Makati Revenue Code, which
provided for the schedule of "real estate, business, and franchise taxes . . .
at rates higher than those in the Metro Manila Revenue Code." Under this
ordinance, Jardine Davies Insurance Brokers, Inc. (Jardine) was assessed
taxes, fees, and charges. Jardine believed that the ordinance was void. It
filed before the Regional Trial Court a case seeking a refund for alleged
overpayment of taxes. The trial court dismissed the complaint. Aggrieved,
Jardine filed before this Court a Petition for review raising pure questions of
law. Ruling on the Petition, this Court observed that Jardine essentially
questioned the validity of the tax ordinance without filing an appeal before
the Secretary of Justice, in violation of Section 187 of the Local Government
Code of 1991: cHaCAS

In this case, petitioner, relying on the resolution of the


Secretary of Justice in The Philippine Racing Club, Inc. v. Municipality
of Makati case, posited in its complaint that the ordinance which was
the basis of respondent Makati for the collection of taxes from
petitioner was null and void. However, the Court agrees with the
contention of respondents that petitioner was proscribed from filing
its complaint with the RTC of Makati for the reason that petitioner
failed to appeal to the Secretary of Justice within 30 days from the
effectivity date of the ordinance as mandated by Section 187 of the
Local Government Code[.] 146
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, like the doctrine
on hierarchy of courts, is not an iron-clad rule. It admits of several well-
defined exceptions. Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. Court of Appeals 147
has held that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies may be
dispensed in the following instances:
(1) [W]hen there is a violation of due process; (2) when the issue
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involved is purely a legal question; (3) when the administrative action
is patently illegal and amounts to lack or excess of jurisdiction; (4)
when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency
concerned; (5) when there is irreparable injury; (6) when the
respondent is a department secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of
the President, bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter;
(7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be
unreasonable; (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim;
(9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case
proceedings; (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy; (11) when there are circumstances indicating the
urgency of judicial intervention; and unreasonable delay would
greatly prejudice the complainant; (12) when no administrative
review is provided by law; (13) where the rule of qualified political
agency applies; and (14) when the issue of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies has been rendered moot. 148
Thus, in Alta Vista Golf and Country Club v. City of Cebu, 149 this Court
excluded the case from the strict application of the principle on exhaustion
of administrative remedies, particularly for non-compliance with Section 187
of the Local Government Code of 1991, on the ground that the issue raised
in the Petition was purely legal. 150 ScHADI

In this case, however, the issues involved are not purely legal. There
are factual issues that need to be addressed for the proper disposition of the
case. In other words, this case is still not ripe for adjudication.
To question the validity of the ordinance, petitioners should have first
filed an appeal before the Secretary of Justice. However, petitioners justify
direct resort to this Court on the ground that they are entangled in a "catch-
22 situation." 151 They believe that filing an appeal before the Secretary of
Justice would merely delay the process and give the City Government of
Tagum ample time to collect real property taxes. 152
The questioned ordinance was published in July 2012. 153 Had
petitioners immediately filed an appeal, the Secretary of Justice would have
had enough time to render a decision. Section 187 of the Local Government
Code of 1991 gives the Secretary of Justice 60 days to act on the appeal.
Within 30 days from receipt of an unfavorable decision or upon inaction by
the Secretary of Justice within the time prescribed, aggrieved taxpayers may
opt to lodge the appropriate proceeding before the regular courts. 154
The "catch-22 situation" petitioners allude to does not exist. Under
Section 166 of the Local Government Code of 1991, local taxes "shall accrue
on the first (1st) day of January of each year." 155 When the questioned
ordinance was published in July 2012, the City Government of Tagum could
not have immediately issued real property tax assessments. Hence,
petitioners had ample time within which to question the validity of the tax
ordinance.
In cases where the validity or legality of a tax ordinance is questioned,
the rule that real property taxes must first be paid before a protest is lodged
does not apply. Taxpayers must first receive an assessment before this rule
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is triggered. 156 In Jardine, this Court ruled that prior payment under protest
is not required when the taxpayer is questioning the very authority of the
assessor to impose taxes:
Hence, if a taxpayer disputes the reasonableness of an increase in a
real estate tax assessment, he is required to "first pay the tax" under
protest. Otherwise, the city or municipal treasurer will not act on his
protest. In the case at bench, however, the petitioners are
questioning the very authority and power of the assessor, acting
solely and independently, to impose the assessment and of the
treasurer to collect the tax. These are not questions merely of
amounts of the increase in the tax but attacks on the very validity of
any increase. 157 (Emphasis and citation omitted)
Given the serious procedural errors committed by petitioners, we find
no genuine reason to dwell on and resolve the other issues presented in this
case. The factual issues raised by petitioners could have been properly
addressed by the lower courts had they adhered to the doctrines of hierarchy
of courts and exhaustion of administrative remedies. These rules were
established for a reason. While petitioners' enthusiasm in their advocacy
may be admirable, their overzealousness has further delayed their cause. DACcIH

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus is


DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro, Peralta,
Bersamin, Del Castillo, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, Jardeleza and
Caguioa, JJ. , concur.
Footnotes

1. Rollo , pp. 3-55.


2. Id. at 3.

3. Id. at 6-7.

4. Id. at 236, Comment.


5. Id. at 237.

6. Id.
7. Id.

8. Id.

9. Id. at 238.
10. Id.

11. Id.
12. Id. at 20.

13. Id.

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14. Id.

15. Id.

16. Id. at 126-135.


17. LOCAL GOVT. CODE, sec. 130 (a) provides:

SECTION 130. Fundamental Principles . — The following fundamental


principles shall govern the exercise of the taxing and other revenue-raising
powers of local government units:
(a) Taxation shall be uniform in each local government unit[.]
18. LOCAL GOVT. CODE, sec. 198 (a) and (b) provide:

SECTION 198. Fundamental Principles . — The appraisal, assessment, levy


and collection of real property tax shall be guided by the following
fundamental principles:
(a) Real property shall be appraised at its current and fair market value;
(b) Real property shall be classified for assessment purposes on the basis
of its actual use[.]

19. LOCAL GOVT. CODE, sec. 199 (b) provides:

SECTION 199. Definition of Terms. — When used in this Title, the term:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) "Actual Use" refers to the purpose for which the property is principally
or predominantly utilized by the person in possession thereof[.]

20. LOCAL GOVT. CODE, sec. 201 provides:

SECTION 201. Appraisal of Real Property. — All real property, whether


taxable or exempt, shall be appraised at the current and fair market value
prevailing in the locality where the property is situated. The Department of
Finance shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations for the
classification, appraisal, and assessment of real property pursuant to the
provisions of this Code.

21. Rollo , pp. 130-134.


22. Id. at 141, Supplement to Opposition/Objection.

23. Id. at 131 and 133.


24. Id. at 131.

25. Id. at 140.

26. Id. at 141.


27. Id. at 142.

28. Id. at 145.


29. Id.

30. Id. at 22.


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31. Id. at 155-157.
32. Id. at 23.

33. Id.

34. LOCAL GOVT. CODE, sec. 56 (d) provides:


SECTION 56. Review of Component City and Municipal Ordinances or
Resolutions by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. —
xxx xxx xxx
(d) If no action has been taken by the sangguniang panlalawigan within
thirty (30) days after submission of such an ordinance or resolution, the
same shall be presumed consistent with law and therefore valid.
35. Id. at 240-241.

36. Id. at 241.

37. Id.
38. Id. at 166-173, Trends and Time the Newspaper, pp. 10-14.

39. Id. at 23-24.


40. Id. at 3. The Petition was filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

41. Id. at 3-55.

42. Id. at 6.
43. Id. at 8.

CONST., art. VIII, sec. 5 provides:


SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus , quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
44. Id. at 7-8.

45. Id.
46. Id. at 47.

47. Id. at 176-181.

48. Id. at 177.


49. Id. at 222.

50. Id. at 230-256.


51. Id. at 294.

52. Id. at 296-297.

53. Id. at 297.


54. Id. at 303-305 and 307-308.
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55. Id. at 308.

56. Id. at 311-320.


57. Id. at 330-A, Resolution.

58. Id. at 331-393.

59. Id. at 410-432.


60. Id. at 4.

61. Id.
62. Id. at 4 and 25.

63. Id. at 30.

64. Id. at 7.
65. Id. at 8-9.

66. Id. at 9.
67. Id. at 14.

68. Id. at 9.

69. Id. at 10.


70. Id.

71. Id. at 9-10.

72. Id. at 11.


73. Id.

74. Id.
75. Id. at 10-12.

76. Id. at 230-256.

77. Id. at 231.


78. Id.

79. Id. at 232.


80. Id. at 231-234.

81. Id. at 233-234.

82. Id.
83. Id. at 251-252.

84. Id. at 24-25.


85. Id.

86. Id. at 26.


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87. Id. at 25-26.
88. Id. at 27.

89. Id.
90. Id. at 312.

91. Id. at 28.

92. Id. at 33.


93. Id. at 43.

94. Id.
95. Id. at 28.

96. Id. at 28-29.

97. Id. at 35.


98. Id. at 34.

99. Id. at 32.


100. Id. at 32-34.

101. Id. at 45-46.

102. Rep. Act No. 7160 (1991), sec. 212 provides:


SECTION 212. Preparation of Schedule of Fair Market Values . — Before any
general revision of property assessment is made pursuant to the
provisions of this Title, there shall be prepared a schedule of fair market
values by the provincial, city and municipal assessors of the municipalities
within the Metropolitan Manila Area for the different classes of real
property situated in their respective local government units for enactment
by ordinance of the sanggunian concerned. The schedule of fair market
values shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province, city or municipality concerned, or in the absence thereof, shall be
posted in the provincial capitol, city or municipal hall and in two (2) other
conspicuous public places therein.

103. Id. at 39.


104. Id. at 24.

105. Id. at 244.


106. Id.

107. Id. at 242-247.

108. Id. at 244.


109. Id.

110. Id. at 244-246.


111. Id. at 240.
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112. Id. at 240.

113. Id. at 241.


114. Id. at 240.

115. See De Castro v. Carlos, 709 Phil. 389, 396-397 (2013) [Per C.J. Sereno, En
Banc]; People v. Cuaresma, 254 Phil. 418, 426-428 (1989) [Per J. Narvasa,
First Division]; Bañez, Jr. v. Concepcion, 693 Phil. 399, 411-414 (2012) [Per J.
Bersamin, First Division]; Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap, Inc. v. Robredo,
G.R. No. 200903, July 22, 2014, 730 SCRA 322, 332-333 (2014) [Per J. Brion,
En Banc]; Ouano v. PGTT International Investment Corp., 434 Phil. 28, 34-35
(2002) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, Third Division]; Vergara, Sr. v. Suelto , 240
Phil. 719, 732-733 (1987) [Per J. Narvasa, First Division].
116. People v. Cuaresma, 254 Phil. 418, 427 (1989) [Per J. Narvasa, First Division].

117. Vergara, Sr. v. Suelto , 240 Phil. 719, 732 (1987) [Per J. Narvasa, First
Division].

118. Id.
119. CONST., art. VIII, sec. 5, par. (1).

120. People v. Cuaresma, 254 Phil. 418 (1989) [Per J. Narvasa, First Division].
121. Id. at 427.

122. Id.

123. Id.
124. G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015, 747 SCRA 1 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].

125. Id. at 43.


126. Id. at 43-44.

127. Santiago v. Vasquez, 291 Phil. 664, 683 (1993) [Per J. Regalado, En Banc].

128. Id.
129. Id.

130. Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205728, January 21,
2015, 747 SCRA 1, 44 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
131. 614 Phil. 416 (2009) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].

132. Id. at 426.


133. People v. Cuaresma, 254 Phil. 418, 427 (1989) [Per J. Narvasa, First Division].

134. Spouses Chua v. Ang, 614 Phil. 416, 426-427 (2009) [Per J. Brion, Second
Division].

135. Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205728, January 21,
2015, 747 SCRA 1, 45-50 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].

136. 425 Phil. 752 (2002) [Per J. Davide, Jr., En Banc].

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137. Id. at 765-766.

138. Rollo , p. 33.

139. Id.
140. Don Orestes Romualdez Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 377 Phil. 268, 274 (1999) [Per J. Pardo, First Division], citing
Caruncho III v. Commission on Elections , 374 Phil. 308 (1999) [Per J. Ynares-
Santiago, En Banc].
141. Lopez v. City of Manila, 363 Phil. 68, 80 (1999) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second
Division].

142. Antonio v. Tanco, 160 Phil. 467, 474 (1975) [Per J. Aquino, En Banc], citing
Cruz v. Del Rosario , 119 Phil. 63 (1963) [Per J. Regala, En Banc].
143. 378 Phil. 234 (1999). [Per J. Quisumbing, En Banc].

144. Id. at 237-238 (1999) [Per J. Quisumbing, En Banc]. See also Jardine Davies
Insurance Brokers, Inc. v. Aliposa, 446 Phil. 243 (2003) [Per J. Callejo, Sr.,
Second Division].
145. 446 Phil. 243 (2003) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division].

146. Id. at 253-254.


147. 396 Phil. 709 (2000) [Per J. Pardo, First Division].

148. Id. at 718-719.

149. G.R. No. 180235, January 20, 2016


<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
file=/jurisprudence/2016/january2016/180235.pdf> [Per J. Leonardo-de
Castro, First Division].

150. Id. at 10.


151. Rollo , pp. 11-12.

152. Id. at 10.

153. Id. at 23.


154. Rep. Act No. 7160 (1991), sec. 187.

155. Rep. Act No. 7160 (1991), sec. 166.

156. Rep. Act No. 7160 (1991), sec. 195 provides:


SECTION 195. Protest of Assessment. — When the local treasurer or his
duly authorized representative finds that correct taxes, fees, or charges
have not been paid, he shall issue a notice of assessment stating the
nature of the tax, fee, or charge, the amount of deficiency, the surcharges,
interests and penalties. Within sixty (60) days from the receipt of the
notice of assessment, the taxpayer may file a written protest with the local
treasurer contesting the assessment; otherwise, the assessment shall
become final and executory. The local treasurer shall decide the protest
within sixty (60) days from the time of its filing. If the local treasurer finds
the protest to be wholly or partly meritorious, he shall issue a notice
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cancelling wholly or partially the assessment. However, if the local
treasurer finds the assessment to be wholly or partly correct, he shall deny
the protest wholly or partly with notice to the taxpayer. The taxpayer shall
have thirty (30) days from the receipt of the denial of the protest or from
the lapse of the sixty (60)-day period prescribed herein within which to
appeal with the court of competent jurisdiction otherwise the assessment
becomes conclusive and unappealable.

157. Jardine Davies Insurance Brokers, Inc. v. Aliposa, 446 Phil. 243, 253 (2003)
[Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division].

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