7 Aala v. Uy
7 Aala v. Uy
DECISION
LEONEN, J : p
classified real properties per zone, and fixed its market values depending on
where they were situated 23 without taking into account the "distinct and
fundamental differences . . . and elements of value" 24 of each property.
Aala and Ferido asserted that the proposed ordinance classified and
valued those properties located in a predominantly commercial area as
commercial, regardless of the purpose to which they were devoted. 25
According to them, this was erroneous because real property should be
classified, valued, and assessed not according to its location but on the basis
of actual use. 26 Moreover, they pointed out that the proposed ordinance
imposed exorbitant real estate taxes, which the residents of Tagum City
could not afford to pay. 27 SaCIDT
Going into the substantive aspect of the case, petitioners contend that
the ordinance created only two (2) categories of real properties. Petitioners
point out that Sections III C and D, which pertain to the classification of
commercial and industrial lands, list all the streets and barrios in Tagum City.
84 Because of this, petitioners argue that the ordinance effectively
I
The doctrine on hierarchy of courts is a practical judicial policy
designed to restrain parties from directly resorting to this Court when relief
may be obtained before the lower courts. 115 The logic behind this policy is
grounded on the need to prevent "inordinate demands upon the Court's time
and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive
jurisdiction," as well as to prevent the congestion of the Court's dockets. 116
Hence, for this Court to be able to "satisfactorily perform the functions
assigned to it by the fundamental charter[,]" it must remain as a "court of
last resort." 117 This can be achieved by relieving the Court of the "task of
dealing with causes in the first instance." 118
As expressly provided in the Constitution, this Court has original
jurisdiction "over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus. " 119 However, this Court has emphasized in
People v. Cuaresma 120 that the power to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus does not exclusively pertain to this Court. 121 Rather, it is
shared with the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts. 122
Nevertheless, "this concurrence of jurisdiction" does not give parties
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unfettered discretion as to the choice of forum. The doctrine on hierarchy of
courts is determinative of the appropriate venue where petitions for
extraordinary writs should be filed. 123 Parties cannot randomly select the
court or forum to which their actions will be directed.
There is another reason why this Court enjoins strict adherence to the
doctrine on hierarchy of courts. As explained in Diocese of Bacolod v.
Commission on Elections, 124 "[t]he doctrine that requires respect for the
hierarchy of courts was created by this court to ensure that every level of
the judiciary performs its designated roles in an effective and efficient
manner." 125 Thus:
Trial courts do not only determine the facts from the evaluation of the
evidence presented before them. They are likewise competent to
determine issues of law which may include the validity of an
ordinance, statute, or even an executive issuance in relation to the
Constitution. To effectively perform these functions, they are
territorially organized into regions and then into branches. Their writs
generally reach within those territorial boundaries. Necessarily, they
mostly perform the all-important task of inferring the facts from the
evidence as these are physically presented before them. In many
instances, the facts occur within their territorial jurisdiction, which
properly present the 'actual case' that makes ripe a determination of
the constitutionality of such action. The consequences, of course,
would be national in scope. There are, however, some cases where
resort to courts at their level would not be practical considering their
decisions could still be appealed before the higher courts, such as the
Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals is primarily designed as an appellate court
that reviews the determination of facts and law made by the trial
courts. It is collegiate in nature. This nature ensures more
standpoints in the review of the actions of the trial court. But the
Court of Appeals also has original jurisdiction over most special civil
actions. Unlike the trial courts, its writs can have a nationwide scope.
It is competent to determine facts and, ideally, should act on
constitutional issues that may not necessarily be novel unless there
are factual questions to determine. HCaDIS
In this case, however, the issues involved are not purely legal. There
are factual issues that need to be addressed for the proper disposition of the
case. In other words, this case is still not ripe for adjudication.
To question the validity of the ordinance, petitioners should have first
filed an appeal before the Secretary of Justice. However, petitioners justify
direct resort to this Court on the ground that they are entangled in a "catch-
22 situation." 151 They believe that filing an appeal before the Secretary of
Justice would merely delay the process and give the City Government of
Tagum ample time to collect real property taxes. 152
The questioned ordinance was published in July 2012. 153 Had
petitioners immediately filed an appeal, the Secretary of Justice would have
had enough time to render a decision. Section 187 of the Local Government
Code of 1991 gives the Secretary of Justice 60 days to act on the appeal.
Within 30 days from receipt of an unfavorable decision or upon inaction by
the Secretary of Justice within the time prescribed, aggrieved taxpayers may
opt to lodge the appropriate proceeding before the regular courts. 154
The "catch-22 situation" petitioners allude to does not exist. Under
Section 166 of the Local Government Code of 1991, local taxes "shall accrue
on the first (1st) day of January of each year." 155 When the questioned
ordinance was published in July 2012, the City Government of Tagum could
not have immediately issued real property tax assessments. Hence,
petitioners had ample time within which to question the validity of the tax
ordinance.
In cases where the validity or legality of a tax ordinance is questioned,
the rule that real property taxes must first be paid before a protest is lodged
does not apply. Taxpayers must first receive an assessment before this rule
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is triggered. 156 In Jardine, this Court ruled that prior payment under protest
is not required when the taxpayer is questioning the very authority of the
assessor to impose taxes:
Hence, if a taxpayer disputes the reasonableness of an increase in a
real estate tax assessment, he is required to "first pay the tax" under
protest. Otherwise, the city or municipal treasurer will not act on his
protest. In the case at bench, however, the petitioners are
questioning the very authority and power of the assessor, acting
solely and independently, to impose the assessment and of the
treasurer to collect the tax. These are not questions merely of
amounts of the increase in the tax but attacks on the very validity of
any increase. 157 (Emphasis and citation omitted)
Given the serious procedural errors committed by petitioners, we find
no genuine reason to dwell on and resolve the other issues presented in this
case. The factual issues raised by petitioners could have been properly
addressed by the lower courts had they adhered to the doctrines of hierarchy
of courts and exhaustion of administrative remedies. These rules were
established for a reason. While petitioners' enthusiasm in their advocacy
may be admirable, their overzealousness has further delayed their cause. DACcIH
3. Id. at 6-7.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 238.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 20.
13. Id.
15. Id.
SECTION 199. Definition of Terms. — When used in this Title, the term:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) "Actual Use" refers to the purpose for which the property is principally
or predominantly utilized by the person in possession thereof[.]
33. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 166-173, Trends and Time the Newspaper, pp. 10-14.
42. Id. at 6.
43. Id. at 8.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 47.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 4 and 25.
64. Id. at 7.
65. Id. at 8-9.
66. Id. at 9.
67. Id. at 14.
68. Id. at 9.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 10-12.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 251-252.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 312.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 28.
115. See De Castro v. Carlos, 709 Phil. 389, 396-397 (2013) [Per C.J. Sereno, En
Banc]; People v. Cuaresma, 254 Phil. 418, 426-428 (1989) [Per J. Narvasa,
First Division]; Bañez, Jr. v. Concepcion, 693 Phil. 399, 411-414 (2012) [Per J.
Bersamin, First Division]; Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap, Inc. v. Robredo,
G.R. No. 200903, July 22, 2014, 730 SCRA 322, 332-333 (2014) [Per J. Brion,
En Banc]; Ouano v. PGTT International Investment Corp., 434 Phil. 28, 34-35
(2002) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, Third Division]; Vergara, Sr. v. Suelto , 240
Phil. 719, 732-733 (1987) [Per J. Narvasa, First Division].
116. People v. Cuaresma, 254 Phil. 418, 427 (1989) [Per J. Narvasa, First Division].
117. Vergara, Sr. v. Suelto , 240 Phil. 719, 732 (1987) [Per J. Narvasa, First
Division].
118. Id.
119. CONST., art. VIII, sec. 5, par. (1).
120. People v. Cuaresma, 254 Phil. 418 (1989) [Per J. Narvasa, First Division].
121. Id. at 427.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015, 747 SCRA 1 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
127. Santiago v. Vasquez, 291 Phil. 664, 683 (1993) [Per J. Regalado, En Banc].
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205728, January 21,
2015, 747 SCRA 1, 44 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
131. 614 Phil. 416 (2009) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
134. Spouses Chua v. Ang, 614 Phil. 416, 426-427 (2009) [Per J. Brion, Second
Division].
135. Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205728, January 21,
2015, 747 SCRA 1, 45-50 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
139. Id.
140. Don Orestes Romualdez Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 377 Phil. 268, 274 (1999) [Per J. Pardo, First Division], citing
Caruncho III v. Commission on Elections , 374 Phil. 308 (1999) [Per J. Ynares-
Santiago, En Banc].
141. Lopez v. City of Manila, 363 Phil. 68, 80 (1999) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second
Division].
142. Antonio v. Tanco, 160 Phil. 467, 474 (1975) [Per J. Aquino, En Banc], citing
Cruz v. Del Rosario , 119 Phil. 63 (1963) [Per J. Regala, En Banc].
143. 378 Phil. 234 (1999). [Per J. Quisumbing, En Banc].
144. Id. at 237-238 (1999) [Per J. Quisumbing, En Banc]. See also Jardine Davies
Insurance Brokers, Inc. v. Aliposa, 446 Phil. 243 (2003) [Per J. Callejo, Sr.,
Second Division].
145. 446 Phil. 243 (2003) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division].
157. Jardine Davies Insurance Brokers, Inc. v. Aliposa, 446 Phil. 243, 253 (2003)
[Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division].