POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT

I. What are the powers of the President

A. The Appointing Power

B. The Removal Power
C. The Control Power
D. The Take Care Clause
E. The Military Power
F. Pardoning power
G. The Borrowing Power
H. The Diplomatic Power
I. The Budgetary Power
J. The Informing Power

II. The Appointing Power -

The Constitution vests the appointing power in the president as follows:

Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He
shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The
Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President
alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.

The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the
Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only
until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
Congress.

A. What is the nature of the appointing power?

1. Appointing Power is executive in nature, Government V. Springer, 50

Phil. 259 283 (1927)
2. Although, intrinsically executive and therefore pertaining mainly to the
President, the appointing power may be exercised by the legislature
and by the judiciary, as well as the Constitutional Commission. The
commission is the written evidence of an appointment.

B. What follows from the fact that the appointing power is executive in nature?
1. Since appointment to office is an executive funcetio, the clear
implication is that the legislature may not usurp such function. The
legislature may create an office and prescribe the qualifications of the
 person who may hold the office, but it may neither specify who shall
be appointed to such office nor actually appoint him. The appointing
power is the exclusive prerogative of the President, upon which no
limitations may be imposed by Congress, except those resulting from
limited exercise of power to prescribe the qualifications to a given
appointive office. Manalang V. Quitoriano, 94 phil. 903 911 (1954)
2. Note: The appointing authority of the President, however, should not
be confused with the authority of the legislature to impose additional
duties on existing offices. Thus, under the 1935 Constitution, while it
was clearly the prerogative of the President to appoint the members of
the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the act did not
create a new office nor specify who should hold the office but merely
imposed additional duties and powers upon the Supreme Court and
consequently upon whoever may be the incumbent Chief Justice and
Associate Justices.

C. Does the power to appoint include the power to decide who among various
choices is the best qualified?

1. Yes, provided that the person chosen has the qualifications provided
by law.

D. What appointments need confirmation by the Commission on Appointments

1. Only those enumerated in Section 16.

a) This is different from the law under the 1935 Constitution
where the general rule was that all appointments made by the
President needed confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments unless exempted by Congress from the need for
confirmation Moreover, “ad interim appointments” under the
second paragraph of the Section 16 are immediately effective.

E. When a law creating an office is silent as to who should appoint the

corresponding officer, who should?

1. The president.

F. What are “ad interim appointments?”

1. They are appointments made by the President during the recess of

Congress (during which the Commission on Appointments does not
meet).
2. Is an ad interim appointment temporary?

a) No, Petitioner posits the view that an ad interim appointment

can be withdrawn or revoked by the President at her pleasure,
and can even be disappeared or simply by-passed by the
 commission on Appointments. For this reason, petitioner
claims that an ad interim appointment is temporary in character
and consequently prohibited by the last sentence of Section
1(2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. An ad interim
appointment is permanent. Matibag V Benipayo, G.R. No.
149036, April 2, 2002.

3. What is the effectivity and duration of ad-interim appointments?

a) They are effective immediately, without need for confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments, but the effectivity lasts
only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or
until the next adjournment of the Congress.

4. What is the difference between an ad-interim appointment and an

appointment in an acting capacity?

a) The former refers only to positions which need confirmation by

the Committee on Appointment while the latter is also given to
those which do not need confirmation
b) The former may be given only when Congress is not in session
whereas the latter may be given even when Congress is in
session.
5. The president made appointments of Acting Department Secretaries
while Congress was in session. The appointments were challenged on
the grounds that:
a) The administrative Code says that, in the absence of a
Secretary, the Undersecretary performs his functions;
b) Appointments of acting secretaries need confirmation;
c) For its part, respondent says that since the petitioner senators
are not members of the Commission on Appointment, they
have no standing to challenge the act of the President.

(1) Congress through a law, cannot impose on the

President the obligation to appoint automatically the
undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An alter
ego, whether temporary or permanent, holds a position
of great trust and confidence. Congress, in the guise of
prescribing qualifications to an office, cannot impose on
the president who her alter ego should be.
(2) The office of a department secretary may become
vacant while Congress is in session. Since a
department secretary is the alter ego of the President,
the acting appointee to the office must necessarily have
the president’s confidence. Thus, by the very nature of
the office of a department secretary, the President must
appoint in an acting capacity a personof her choice
even while Congress is in session. That person may or
may not be the permanent appointee, moreover, the
 law expressly allows, the President to make such
acting appointment. Section 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book
III of EO 292 states that “the President may temporarily
designate an officer already in the government service
or any other competent person to perform the functions
of an office in the executive branch.
(3) As to standing, yes, since the Commission on
appointments is independent of the Senate, senators
who are not members of the CA may not act in their
behalf. Pimentel, Jr. v. Ermita, G.R. No. 164978,
October 13, 2005.

6. What is the difference between Permanent appointments and

Temporary appointments?

a) Permanent appointments are those extended to persons

possessing the requisite eligibility and are thus protected by
the constitutional provisionon security of tenure.
b) Temporary appointments, on the other hand, which are given
to persons without such eligibility, are revocable at will and
without the necessity of just cause or a valid investigation.

7. There are now six categories of officials who subject to the appointing
power of the President:

a) The heads of the executive departments.

b) Ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls.
c) Officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain.
d) Those other officers whose appointments vested in him by the
Constitution.
e) All other officers whose appointments are not provided for by
law.
f) Those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.

III. Removal Power

A. From express power of appointment, the president derives the implied power
of removal. However, it is not correct to say that all officials appointed by him
are also removable by himsince the constitution prescribes certain methods
for the separation from the public service of some such officers. For Example:
1. The members of the Supreme Court and Constitutional Commissions
although appointed by the President, may be removed only by
impeachment in accordance with Article XI.
2. Judges of inferior courts, likewise appointed by the President, are
subject to the disciplinary authority of, and may be removed only by,
the Supreme Court.
 3. Moreover, the Ombudsman, who shall also be appointed by the
President under the Constitution, may be removed only by
impeachment.
a) Insofar as the Deputy Ombudsmen are concerned though, the
President’s Authority to appoint them includes, by necessary
implication, the authority to remove them especially so since a
law has expressly conferred upon him said said power, which
he shares with the Ombudsman.
4. The President is without any power to remove elected local officials,
since the power is exclusively vested in the proper courts as expressly
provided for in the last paragraph of Section 60 of the Local
Government Code.
5. In all other cases where the power of removal is lodged in the
President, the same may be exercised him only for cause as may be
provided by law and in accordance with the prescribed administrative
procedure.
6. The exception only is with respect to the members of the Cabinet or to
other executive officials whose term of office is determined at the
pleasure of the President. Legally speaking, their separation is
effected not by the process of removal but by the expiration of their
term.
a) Alajar V Alba - In the case at bar, the term of respondent
alajar as Vice Mayor of the City of Roxas is not fixed by law.
However the latter, in effect, vests in the president the power
to fix such term. When, in November 1955, Petitioner Alba was
designated as Acting Vice-Mayor of said City, the term of
respondent Alba was thereby fixed implicitly by the President,
in the exercise of Alajar expired and his right to hold office was
extinguished, with the same legal effet as if the term had been
fixed by Congress itself. In other words, Alajar was not
removed from office, for to remove an officer is to oust him
from office before the expiration of his term. (Manalang V.
Quitoriano) Alajar merely lost the right to hold the office of Vice
Mayor of the City of Roxas by expiration of his term as such.

IV. The Control Power

Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and
offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

A. What is the power of control?

 1. The power of control has been defined as “the power of an officer to
alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had
done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment
of the former for that of the latter. (Mondano V. Silvosa)

B. What is the Doctrine of “Qualified Political Agency?

1. The Doctrine, recognizing that the Constitution has established a
single and not a plural executive, postulates that “ll executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
Department, the heads of the various executive departments are
assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases
where the Chief Executive are performed by and through the
executive departments, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the
Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the secretaries of such
departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of
business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief
Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. (Villena V.
Secretary of Interior) thus, a decision of a department secretary when
not reprobated by the Executive, is the last step in the process of
“exhausting administrative remedies” E.g., Demaisip V. Court of Tax
appeals
a) Thus too, the Executive Secretary, when acting “by authority of
the President,” may reverse the decision of another
department secretary. (Lacson-magallanes V. Pano)
b) Similarly, the action of the Secretary of the DENR, exercising
the President’s power to reorganize, presumed to be the action
of the President. (DENR V. DENR Employees)

C. Does the power of control include the power to reorganize executive offices?
1. It has been held, moreover, that the express grant of the power of
control to the president justifies an executive action to carry out the
reorganization of an executive office under a broad authority of law.
(Anak Mindanao V. Executive)
2. Reorganization can involve:
a) The reduction of personnel
b) Consolidation of offices,
c) or even abolition of positions by reason of economy or
redundancy of functions (Malaria Employees V. Executive
Secretary G.R. No. 160093)
3. Note: The power of control means his power to reverse the judgment
of an inferior officer. It may also be exercised in his behalf Department
Heads. Thus the Secretary of Justice may reverse the judgment of a
prosecutor and direct him to withdraw an information already filed.
Such action is not directly reviewable by a court. One who disagrees,
however, should appeal to the Office of the President in order to
exhaust administrative remedies prior to bringing it to court. (Orosa V.
Roa G.R Noo. 14047)
 D. Compare the power of control with the disciplinary power of the President.
1. The power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.” This power,
however, merely applies to the exercise of control over the acts of the
subordinate in the performance of his duties . It only means that the
president may set aside the judgment or action taken by a subordinate
in the performance of his duties. (Ang-Angco V. Castillo)

E. Does the President have control over officers of government-owned

corporations?

1. Yes, However, it is submitted that such power over government-

owned corporations comes not from the Constitution but from statute.
Hence, it may also be taken away by statute. (Namarco V Arca)

F. What is the power of supervision?

1. It is the power of a superior officer to “ensure that the laws are
faithfully executed” by inferiors. The power of supervisiondoes not
include the power of control; but the power of control necessarily
includes the power of supervision. (the power of the President over
local governments is only one of general supervision. ART X, sec. 4
and 16)

V. TAKE CARE CLAUSE

A. Power to take care that the laws be faithfully executed makes the president a
dominant figure in the administration of the government. The energy or
indifference with which he discharges this power will determine the measure
of his success as Law Enforcer.
B. The laws he is supposed to enforce includes:
1. The Constitution itself
2. Statutes
3. Judicial Decisions
4. Administrative rules and regulations
5. Municipal Ordinances
6. Treaties entered into by our government.

C. It has been suggested that the President is not under obligation to enforce a
law which in his belief is unconstitutional because it would create no rights
and confer no duties, being totally null and void.
D. Note: It is not for the President to determine the validity of a law since this
question exclusively addressed to the Judiciary.
VI. MILITARY POWER

Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion,
when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under
martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or
in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all
its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension,
which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President,
the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a
period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public
safety requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation
or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its
decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the
functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of
jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to
function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall apply only to persons
judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in, or directly connected with, invasion.

during the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, any person thus arrested
or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.

A. What is the significance of the Commander-in-Chiefship of the President?

1. The net effect of Article II, Section 3, when read with Article VII,
Section 18, is that a civilian President holds supreme military authority
and is ceremonial, legal and administrative head of the armed forces.
The Constitution does not require that the president must be
possessed of military training and talents, but as Commander-in-chief,
he has the power to direct military operations and to determine military
strategy. Normally he would be expected to delegate the actual
command of the armed forces to military experts; but the ultimate
power is his. “As Commander-in-chief, he is authorized to direct the
 movements of the naval and military forces placed by law at his
command, and to employ them in the manner he may deem most
effectual to harass and conquer and subdue the enemy. (Fleming V
Page)

B. What specific military powers are given to the president by the Constitution?

1. The President as Commander-in-Chief, is authorized by section 18

under specified conditions:
a) To call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion, or rebellion.
b) To suspend the privilege of writ of habeas corpus, and
c) To place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.

C. When the President calls out the armed forces, is his action subject to Judicial
review?

1. It may be gathered from the broad grant of power that the actual use
to which the President puts the armed forces is,unlike the suspension
of the privelege of writ of habeas corpus not subject to judicial review.
He is authorized “whenever it becomes necessary, to call out the
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence.” What was said
by the American Supreme Court in Martin V Mott which Lansang V.
Garcia said was not applicable to the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, must be considered applicable to the broad
power to make use of the armed forces “to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, or rebellion.” The authority to
decide whether the exigency has arisen,” declared the American
Court, “belongs exclusively to the President, and his decision is
conclusive upon all other persons. (Martin V Mott).

D. What is a writ of Habeas Corpus? The privilege of writ of habeas corpus?

What is suspended by the president the writ or the privilege?

Section 15. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except
in cases of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it.

1. The writ of habeas corpus - is a writ directed to the person detaining

another, commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner at a
designated time and place, with the day and cause of his caption and
detention to do, to submit to, and receive whatever the court or judge
awarding the writ shall consider in his behalf. It is a high prerogative
common law writ of ancient origin the great object of which is the
liberation of those who may be in prison wihout sufficient cause.

a) It should be stressed that what is permitted to be suspended

by the President is not the writ itself but its privilege.
 2. Suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not
suspend the writ itself, but only its privilege - This means that when
the court receives an application for the writ, and it finds the petition in
proper form, it will issue a writ as a matter of course.

E. To whom does the suspension of privilege apply?

1. “The suspension of the Writ shall apply only to persons judicially

charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with
invasion.

F. What is the duty of the State after arrests and detention on the basis of the
suspension of the privilege?

1. During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus
arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days,
otherwise he shall be released.

G. What is Martial law?

1. Martial law is essentially police power. This is borne out by the

constitutional text which sets down “public safety” as the object of the
exercise of martial law. Public safety is the concern of police power.
Whereas police power is normally a function of the legislature
executed by the civilian executive arm, under martial law, police power
is exercised by the executive with aid of the military and in place of
“certain governmental agencies which for the time being are unable to
cope with existing conditions in a locality which for the time being are
unable to cope with existing conditions in a locality which remains
subject to the sovereignty.”

H. Is the scope of “Martial Law” powers a fixed concept?

1. What emerges from the above observations on martial law as police
power as well as from the text of the Constitution is that martial law is
a flexible concept. Martial law depends on two factual bases:
a) The existence of actual invasion or rebellion and
b) The requirements of public safety

2. Powers that can be exercised by the President as Commander-in-

chief In David V. Arroyo The Supreme Court acknowledge in David
statements made before the Senate Committee on Justice to the
effect that:
a) Arrests and seizures without judicial warrants;
b) Ban on public assemblies;
c) Take-over of news media and agencies and press censorship
d) Issuance of Presidential Decrees
3. Limitations on the power to suspend the privilege and the power to
impose martial law have been formulatedi n the new Constiitution?

a) In general, the limits that have been imposed are:

(1) A time limit of sixty days
(2) Review and possible revocation by congress;
(3) Review and possible nullification by the Supreme Court

4. Specifically, what are these limits?

a) In case of rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may
for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part
thereof under martial law.
b) Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law, or
the suspension of the privilege of the writof habeas corpus, the
President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the
Congress.
c) The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of
all its members in regular or special session, may revoke such
proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set
aside by the President.
d) Upon initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the
same manner, extend such proclamationor suspension for a
period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or
rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
e) The Congress if not in session, shall within twenty-four hours
following such proclamation or suspension, convene in
accordance with its rules without need of a call.
f) The Supreme court may review, in an appropriate proceeding
filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege
of the writ or the extension thereof and must promulgate its
decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

5. How does Congress vote when deciding whether to revoke or extend

the suspension of the privilege or the imposition of martial law?
a) The Senate and House of Representatives vote “jointly.” this is
a departure from general rule that the two Houses wote
separately when deciding an issue. The purpose of the
departure from the general rule is to facilitate the override of
the suspension or the imposition.
b) Petitioners argue that the declaration of a state of rebellion by
President Arroyo is violative of the Doctrine of separation of
powers, being an encroachment on the domainof the judiciary
which has the constitutional prerogative to “determine or
interpret” what took place in EDSA III on May 1, 2001, and that
the declaration of a state of rebellion cannot be an exception to
 the general rule on the allocation of the governmental powers.
Decide.
(1) Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution expressly
provides that “the president shall be the Commander
-in-chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and
whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion, or rebellion” It was held in Integrated Bar of
the Philippines V Hon. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284 that
the factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is
something that is for the president to decide. He has
intelligence network to gather information, some of
which may be classified as highly confidential or
affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the
power to call, on-the spot decisions may be
imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert
great loss of human lives and mass destruction of
property. Although the court in a proper case, may look
into the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise
of this power, on the basis of its power to determine
grave abuse of discretion this is no longer feasible
when the proclamation has already been lifted. (Lacson
V. Perez G.R No. 147780; Sanlakas V. Executive
Secretary G.R. No. 159085.)
(2) When the president exercises the option to call on the
armed forces does he thereby acquire new powers
including emergency powers?
(a) No, it simply means that he is calling on the
armed forces to assist the police. But this does
not give her additional powers. (Lacson V.
Perez G.R No. 147780; Sanlakas V. Executive
Secretary G.R. No. 159085.)

6. What powers does he have over the military?

a) Since the President is commander-in-chief of the armed forces

she can demand obedience from military officers.
b) Military officers who disobey or ignore her command can be
subjected to court martial proceeding.

VII. Pardoning power

Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution,

the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the
Members of the Congress.
A. The exercise of pardoning power is discretionary in the president and may not
be controlled by the legislature ore reversed by the courts, save only when it
contravenes the limitations.
1. Thus, it is incompetent for the Congress to condition the grant of a
pardon by the president upon a previous clearance or approval by a
board of Pardons Neither would it be justified for the judiciary to order
the grant of a pardon in favor, say, of a reformed criminal.

B. What are the forms of executive clemency?

1. They are reprieves, commutations, pardons remission of fines and
forfeitures, amnesty.
C. May the president extend executive clemency for administrative penalties?

1. Yes . the Constitution makes no distinction with regard to the extent of

the pardoning power except with respect to impeachment. Llamas V.
Orbos. G.R. No. 99031

D. Define pardon
1. United States V. Wilson, 7 Pet (US 1833) defines it thus:
a) A pardon is an act of grace, proceeding from the power
entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the
individual on whom it is bestowed from the punishment the law
inflicts for a crime he has committed.
E. Commutation

1. Is a reduction or mitigation of the penalty e.g., when the death

sentence is reduced to life imprisonment.

F. Reprieve

1. A reprieve is merely a postponement of a sentence to a date certain,

or a stay of execution. It may be ordered to enable the government to
secure additional evidence to ascertain the guilt of the convict or, in
the case of the execution of the death sentence upon a preganant
woman, to prevent the killing of her unborn child.

G. Limitaions
1. Pardon cannot be granted in cases of impeachment.
2. No pardon can be granted for the violation of any election law, rule or
regulation without the favorable recommnedation of the Commission
on Elections.
3. Pardon can be granted only after final judgement.

H. 3 Kinds of Pardon

1. Absolute - one extended without any strings attached

 2. Conditional - one under which the convict is required to comply with
certain requirements.
3. Plenary or partial - extinguishes all the penalties imposed upon the
offender, including accessory disabilities, whereas a partial pardon
does not.
4. Where the pardon is conditional, the offender has the right to reject it
since he may feel that the condition imposed is more onerous than the
penalty sought to be remitted. But in no case of an absolute pardon,
the pardonee has no option at all and must accept it whether he likes
it or not, in this sense an absolute pardon is similar to commutation
which is also not subject to acceptance by the offender.

I. Effects of pardon

1. The legal effect of pardon is to restore not only the offender’s liberty
but also his civil and political rights. (Pelobello V Palatino)

J. Distinctions between pardon and Parole

1. Pardon must be distinguished from parole in that the latter involves

only a release of the convict from imprisonment but not a restoration
of his liberty.
2. A parole must also be distinguished from probation in that former is
executive whereas the latter is judicial.

K. Amnesty

1. The constitution itself provides that it can be granted by the president

only with the concurrence of the Congress. This concurrence must be
given by a majority of all the members of the Congress.
2. It was the rule before that admission of a guilt was not necessary to
the enjoyment of amnesty, upon the theory that amnesty looks
backward and obliterates not only the penalty but the offense itself.
a) Vera V. people of the Philippines - the previous doctrine ws
reversed , since a person would not need the benefit of
amnesty unless he were, to begin with, guilty of the offense.
3. Distinctions between amnesty and pardon:
a) Amnesty is usually addressed to crimes against the
sovereignty of the State, to political offenses, forgiveness
being deemed more expedient for the public welfare than
prosecution and punishment; pardon condones infractions of
the peace of state.
b) Amnesty is usually generally addressed to classes or even
communities of persons; Pardon is usually addressed to an
individual.
c) In amnesty, there may or may not bedistinct acts or
acceptance, so that if other rights are dependent upon it and
are asserted, there is affirmative evidence of acceptance.
 d) Pardon does not require the concurrence of the Congress;
amnesty requires such concurrence.
e) Pardon is a private act of the President which must be pleaded
and proved by the person pardoned because the courts do not
take judicial notice of it; amnesty is a public act of which the
courts take judicial notice.
f) Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the
consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted;
while amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into
oblivion the offense itself; it so over looks and obliterates the
offense with which he is charged that the person released by
amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had
committed no offense.

VIII. THE BORROWING POWER

Section 20. The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Republic
of the Philippines with the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, and subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law. The Monetary Board shall, within thirty days from the
end of every quarter of the calendar year, submit to the Congress a complete report of its
decision on applications for loans to be contracted or guaranteed by the Government or
government-owned and controlled corporations which would have the effect of increasing
the foreign debt, and containing other matters as may be provided by law.

A. The language of the Constitution is simple and clear as it is broad. It allows

the president to contract and guarantee foreign loans. It makes no prohibition
on the issuance of certain kinds of loans or distinctions as to which inds of
debt instruments are more onerous than others. This court may not ascribe to
the Constitution meanings of the President. The plain, clear and unambiguous
language of the Constitutionshould be construed in a sense that will allow the
full exercise of the power provided therein. It would be the worst kind of
judicial legislation if the curts were to misconstrue and change the meaning of
the organic act. Spouses Constantino V. Cuisia G.R. No. 106064
B. According to the Supreme court the fact that tis power is subject to the
concurrence of another entity does not make such power less executive.
C. May the president contract foreign loans?
1. Yes, but only with the prior concurrence of the monetary Board, and
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

IX. The Diplomatic Power

Section 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

A. The conduct of external affairs, according to Jefferson, “is executive

altogether.” Chief Justice marshall described the president of the United
 States as “the sole organ of the nation in its external relations and its sole
representative with foreign nations.”
B. What are some of the foreign relations powers of the President?
1. The power to negotiate treaties and international agreements;
2. The power to appoint ambassadors and other public ministers , and
consuls;
3. The oweer to receive ambassadors and other public ministers
accredited to the Philippines
4. The power to contract and guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the
republic
5. The power to deport aliens
C. What norm may be followed for determining whether an agreement needs
concurrence of the Senate or not?
1. In general it can be said that agreements that are permanent and
original should be embodied in a treaty and need Senate concurrence.
Agreements, however, which are temporary or are merely
implementations of treaties or statutes do ot need concurrence.

D. The treaty making power is exclusive to the President. Congress, while

possessing vast legislative powers may not interfere in the field of treaty
negotiation. While in Article VII, Section 21 provides for Senate concurrence
such perrtains only to the validity of the treaty under consideration, not to
conduct of negotiations attendant to its conclusion.
1. Moreover, it is not even the Congress as a whole that has been given
the authority to concur as a means of checking the treaty making
power of the President, but only the Senate.
E. Treaties and other international agreements concluded by the President are
also subject to check by the Supreme Court, which has the ower to declare
them unconstitutional.

X. BUDGETARY POWER

Section 22. The President shall submit to the Congress, within thirty days from the opening
of every regular session as the basis of the general appropriations bill, a budget of
expenditures and sources of financing, including receipts from existing and proposed
revenue measures.

A. This power is properly entrusted to the executive department as it is the

President who, as chief administrator and enforcer of the laws, is in the best
position to determine the needs of the government and propose the
corresponding appropriations on the basisof existing or expected sources of
revenue.
B. What is the basis for general appropriations bill passed by the Congress?
1. The budget of receipts and expenditures prepared by the President.
C. What is significance of the phrase sources of financing?
1. The phrase implies that financing can come from sources other than
revenue measures.
 D. The congress may not increase the appropriations recommended by the
President for the operation of the Government as specified in the budget.

XI. THE INFORMING POWER

Section 23. The President shall address the Congress at the opening of its regular session.
He may also appear before it at any other time.

A. Although couched in mandatory language, the first sentence of this provision

does not as a rule impose a compellable duty on the President. In his
discretion, he may or may not give information to the legislature, although he
will usually choose to do so for practical reasons.
B. The requested information may be needed as basis of the legislation he is
recommending and he knows that lacking such basis the legislature would be
justified in not acting on his proposals.

CASES

1. Marcos v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211

FACTS:
In February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-
violent "people power" revolution and forced into exile. Now, Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed,
has signified his wish to return to the Philipppines to die. But Mrs. Aquino, considering the
dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of government is
threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move
forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family.

This petition for mandamus and prohibition asks the Courts to order the respondents to issue
travel documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the
implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.

ISSUES:

The issue is basically one of power: whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by
the Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

RULING:
It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the
Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel
would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved is the right to return to one's country,
a totally distinct right under international law, independent from although related to the right
to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Humans Rights and the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the
territory of a state, the right to leave a country, and the right to enter one's country as
separate and distinct rights. The Declaration speaks of the "right to freedom of movement
and residence within the borders of each state" [Art. 13(l)] separately from the "right to leave
any country, including his own, and to return to his country." [Art. 13(2).] On the other hand,
the Covenant guarantees the "right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his
residence" [Art. 12(l)] and the right to "be free to leave any country, including his own." [Art.
12(2)] which rights may be restricted by such laws as "are necessary to protect national
security, public order, public health or morals or enter qqqs own country" of which one
cannot be "arbitrarily deprived." [Art. 12(4).] It would therefore be inappropriate to construe
the limitations to the right to return to one's country in the same context as those pertaining
to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.

2. Laurel v. Garcia, G.R. No. 92013, July 25, 1990 (EB)

Facts:
The subject property in this case is one of the 4 properties in Japan acquired by the
Philippine government under the Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan, the
Roppongi property. The said property was acquired from the Japanese government through
Reparations Contract No. 300. It consists of the land and building for the Chancery of the
Philippine Embassy. As intended, it became the site of the Philippine Embassy until the latter
was transferred to Nampeidai when the Roppongi building needed major repairs. President
Aquino created a committee to study the disposition/utilization of Philippine government
properties in Tokyo and Kobe, Japan. The President issued EO 296 entitling non-Filipino
citizens or entities to avail of separations' capital goods and services in the event of sale,
lease or disposition.

Issues: Whether or not the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, have the authority and
jurisdiction, to sell the Roppongi property.

Ruling: It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the government on his
or her own sole will. Any such conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law
enacted by the Congress. It requires executive and legislative concurrence. It is indeed true
that the Roppongi property is valuable not so much because of the inflated prices fetched by
real property in Tokyo but more so because of its symbolic value to all Filipinos, veterans
and civilians alike. Whether or not the Roppongi and related properties will eventually be
sold is a policy determination where both the President and Congress must concur.
Considering the properties' importance and value, the laws on conversion and disposition of
property of public dominion must be faithfully followed.

3. Domingo v. Zamora, G.R. No. 142283, February 6, 2003

Facts: President Estrada issued EO entitled Transferring the Sports Programs and Activities
of the DECS to the Philippine Sports Commission in School-Based Sports. Pursuant to EO
81, former DECS Secretary Gonzales issued a Memorandum which temporarily reassigned,
in the exigency of the service, all remaining BPESS Staff to other divisions or bureaus of the
DECS.
Issue: Whether or not the reassignment valid?

Ruling: Yes. Since EO 81 is based on the Presidents continuing authority under Section 31
(2) and (3) of EO 292, it is a valid exercise of the Presidents delegated power to reorganize
the Office of the President. The law grants the President this power in recognition of the
recurring need of every President to reorganize his office to achieve simplicity, economy and
efficiency. The Office of the President is the nerve center of the Executive Branch. To remain
effective and efficient, the Office of the President must be capable of being shaped and
reshaped by the President in the manner he deems fit to carry out his directives and policies.
After all, the Office of the President is the command post of the President. This is the
rationale behind the Presidents continuing authority to reorganize the administrative
structure of the Office of the President.

4. Binamira v. Garrucho, G.R. No. 92008, July 30, 1990 (EB)

Facts:
Ramon P. Binamira seeks reinstatement to the office of General Manager of the Philippine
Tourism Authority from which he claims to have been removed without just cause in violation
of his security of tenure. Binamira claims that since assuming office, he had discharged the
duties of PTA General Manager and Vice-Chairman of its Board of Directors and had been
acknowledged as such by various government offices, including the Office of the President.
He complains, though, that on January 2, 1990, his resignation was demanded by
respondent Garrucho as the new Secretary of Tourism. Binamira’s demurrer led to an
unpleasant exchange that led to his filing of a complaint against the Secretary with the
Commission on Human Rights.

Section 23-A of P.D. 564, which created the Philippine Tourism Authority, provides
as follows:

SECTION 23-A. General Manager-Appointment and Tenure. — The General Manager shall
be appointed by the President of the Philippines and shall serve for a term of six (6) years
unless sooner removed for cause; Provided, That upon the expiration of his term, he shall
serve as such until his successor shall have been appointed and qualified. (As amended by
P.D. 1400)

Issue:
Whether Binamira was appointed as General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority
or merely designated

Held:
Petitioner was not appointed by the President of the Philippines but only designated by the
Minister of Tourism. There is a clear distinction between appointment and designation that
the petitioner has failed to consider. Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the
authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given
office. When completed, usually with its confirmation, the appointment results in security of
tenure for the person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of
his office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the imposition by law of
additional duties on an incumbent official, as where, in the case before us, the Secretary of
Tourism is designated Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Tourism
Authority, or where, under the Constitution, three Justices of the Supreme Court are
designated by the Chief Justice to sit in the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of
Representatives. It is said that appointment is essentially executive while designation is
legislative in nature.

Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment because it likewise involves the
naming of a particular person to a specified public office. That is the common understanding
of the term. However, where the person is merely designated and not appointed, the
implication is that he shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced
at will by the appointing authority. In this sense, the designation is considered only an acting
or temporary appointment, which does not confer security of tenure on the person named.

Even if so understood, that is, as an appointment, the designation of the petitioner

cannot sustain his claim that he has been illegally removed. The reason is that the decree
clearly provides that the appointment of the General Manager of the Philippine Tourism
Authority shall be made by the President of the Philippines, not by any other officer.
Appointment involves the exercise of discretion, which because of its nature cannot be
delegated. Legally speaking, it was not possible for Minister Gonzales to assume the
exercise of that discretion as an alter ego of the President. The appointment (or designation)
of the petitioner was not a merely mechanical or ministerial act that could be validly
performed by a subordinate even if he happened as in this case to be

5. Valencia v. Peralta, G.R. No. L-20864, August 23, 1963 (EB)

Facts: Valencia was designated Acting Chairman of the board of directors of the National
Waterworks and Sewerage Authority by the then Pres. Garcia. Allegedly upon information
that the then Pres. Garcia had extended him as an ad interim appointment, petitioner took an
oath of office to the position of Chairman Ad Interim of said Authority of which the
Commission on Appointments confirmed and specified the expiration date of his term of
office. However, Pres. Macapagal appointed respondent as ad interim to the same position.
Thereafter, the petitioner ceased to attend any board meeting and eventually instituted the
present petition.

Issue: Whether or not the appointment of Valencia is valid.

Ruling: No. The designation of petitioner as Acting Chairman of the NAWASA Board of
Directors is of revocable and temporary character which could not ripen into a permanent
appointment, even if it was subsequently confirmed by the Commission on Appointments,
because confirmation presupposes a valid nomination or recess appointment, of which there
is no trace. Neither does the fact that petitioner Valencia subscribed an oath of office as ad
interim appointee to the position help his case, since the oath clearly does not correspond to
the temporary designation as Acting Chairman that was accorded him. There is on record
only one written designation of petitioner, a mere Acting Chairman, that was not a
permanent appointment, was revocable at any time by the Chief Executive, and actually
revoked by the subsequent designation of respondent Peralta.
 6. Sarmiento v. Mison, G.R. No. 79974, December 17, 1987 (EB)

FACTS:

In 1987, then President Corazon Aquino appointed Salvador Mison as Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs without submitting his nomination to the Commission on Appointments.
Herein petitioners, both of whom happened to be lawyers and professors of constitutional
law, filed the instant petition for prohibition on the ground that the aforementioned
appointment violated Section 16, Art. VII of the1987 Constitution. Petitioners argued that the
appointment of a bureau head should be subject to the approval of the Commission on
Appointments.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appointment of bureau heads should be subject to the approval of the
Commission on Appointments.

HELD:

No, construing Section 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution would show that the President is
well within her authority to appoint bureau heads without submitting such nominations before
the Commission on Appointments. In its ruling, the SC traced the history of the confirmatory
powers of the Commission on Appointments (which is part of the legislative department) vis-
a-vis the appointment powers of the President.

Under Section 10, Art. VII of the 1935 Constitution, almost all presidential appointments
required the consent or confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. As a result, the
Commission became very powerful, eventually transforming into a venue for horse-trading
and similar malpractices.
On the other hand, consistent with the authoritarian pattern in which it was molded and
remolded by successive amendments, the 1973 Constitution placed the absolute power of
appointment in the President with hardly any check on the part of the legislature.

Under the current constitution, the Court held that the framers intended to strike a "middle
ground" in order to reconcile the extreme set-ups in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.
As such, while the President may make appointments to positions that require confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments, the 1987 Constitution also grants her the power to
make appointments on her own without the need for confirmation by the legislature.

Section 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution enumerates four groups of public officers:

heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers
whose appointments are vested in him in this constitution;
all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by
law;
those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and
 officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President
alone.

7. Calderon v. Carale, G.R. No. 91636, April 23, 1992 (EB)

FACTS:
In 1989, RA 6715 was passed. This law amended PD 442 or the Labor Code. RA 6715
provides that the Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and other Commissioners
[of the NLRC] shall all be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the CoA.
Appointments to any vacancy shall come from the nominees of the sector which nominated
the predecessor. Pursuant to the law, Cory assigned Carale et al as the Chairman and the
Commissioners respectively of the NLRC, the appointment was not submitted to the CoA for
its confirmation. Calderon questioned the appointment saying that w/o the confirmation by
the CoA, such an appointment is in violation of RA 6715. Calderon asserted that RA 6715 is
not an encroachment on the appointing power of the executive contained in Sec16, Art. 7, of
the Constitution, as Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of other officers appointed by the President additional to those mentioned in
the first sentence of Sec 16 of Article 7 of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the CoA of appointments
extended by the President to government officers additional to those expressly mentioned in
the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. 7 of the Constitution whose appointments require
confirmation by the CoA.

RULING:
The SC agreed with the Sol-Gen, confirmation by the CoA is required exclusively for the
heads of executive departments, ambassadors, public ministers, consuls, officers of the
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution, such as the members of the
various Constitutional Commissions. With respect to the other officers whose appointments
are not otherwise provided for by the law and to those whom the President may be
authorized by law to appoint, no confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is
required.

Jurisprudence established the following in interpreting Sec 16, Art 7 of the Constitution
1. Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required only for presidential
appointees mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII, including, those officers
whose appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution itself in the president (like
sectoral representatives to Congress and members of the constitutional commissions of
Audit, Civil Service and Election).

2. Confirmation is not required when the President appoints other government officers
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law or those officers whom he may
be authorized by law to appoint (like the Chairman and Members of the Commission on
Human Rights).

8. Lacson v. Romero, G.R. No. L-3081, October 14, 1949 (EB)

Facts:

In July 25, 1946, the Petitioner, Antonio Lacson, was appointed by the President as
provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental which was affirmed by Commission on Appointment. He
took the office and, thereafter, performed his duties. In May 17, 1949, upon recommendation
by Secretary of Justice, the President nominated him to the post of provincial fiscal in Tarlac
and, simultaneously, the President nominated the Respondent, Honorio Romero, to his
position as provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental. Both of them were confirmed by the
Commission on Appointment. The Petitioner neither accepted the appointment nor assumed
the office of fiscal of Tarlac but respondent Romero took his oath of office of the post of fiscal
of Negros Oriental, notified the Solicitor General and, thereafter, proceeded to his station.
Commotion started between the parties as both of them appeared in the hearings of Judge
Narvasa and Judge Ocampo where the latter judges favors the Respondent. When the
Petitioner requested payment for his salary as provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental, it was
turned down and instead paid Respondent Romero.

Issue:

Whether or not the confirmation Commission on Appointment alone, without the acceptance
of the nomination by the Petitioner, can create a vacancy in the post of provincial fiscal of
Negro Oriental.

Ruling:

No, the appointment to a government post like that of provincial fiscal to be complete
involves several steps. First, comes the nomination by the President. Then to make that
nomination valid and permanent, the Commission on Appointments of the Legislature has to
confirm said nomination. The last step is the acceptance thereof by the appointee by his
assumption of office. The first two steps, nomination and confirmation, constitute a mere
offer of a post. They are acts of the Executive and Legislative departments of the
Government. But the last necessary step to make the appointment complete and effective
rests solely with the appointee himself. He may or he may not accept the appointment or
nomination.

As held in the case of Borromeo vs. Mariano, “there is no Power in this country which can
compel a man to accept an office.” Consequently, since Lacson has declined to accept his
appointment as provincial fiscal of Tarlac and no one can compel him to do so, then he
continues as provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental and no vacancy in said office was created,
unless Lacson had been lawfully removed as Such fiscal of Negros Oriental.

9. Javier v. Reyes, G.R. No. 39451, February 20, 1989

PRINCIPLES: 1.) Acceptance is indispensable to complete appointment.

2.) Acts amounting to acceptance; vested rights to the office in appointee’s favour .
Challenging a contested appointment by bringing a suit for mandamus, when coupled
with a previous oath of office, amounts to an acceptance and gave a vested right to
said office in appointee’s favor.

FACTS: Petitioner allegedly was the duly appointed Chief of Police of Malolos, Bulacan, on
November 7, 1967 by the then Mayor Victorino B. Aldaba, which appointment was confirmed
and approved by the Municipal Council of the said municipality on the same date as per
Resolution No. 210, Series of 1967. The following day, petitioner took his oath of office and
thereafter assumed and discharged the rights, prerogatives and duties of the office. On
January 3, 1968, pending approval and attestation of his appointment by the Civil Service
Commission, respondent, who had then assumed the office of Municipal Mayor, recalled
petitioner's appointment from the Civil Service Commission in her letter of said date. Not
satisfied with her letter of recall, respondent summarily, arbitrarily and illegally ousted and
relieved petitioner as Chief of Police and at the same time, designated Police Lt. Romualdo
F. Clements, a non-eligible, as Officer-in-Charge of the Police Department. On May 2, 1968,
the Civil Service Commission attested and approved the appointment of petitioner as such
Chief of Police. The mayor, on the other hand, quickly installed Bayani Bernardo as Chief of
Police of Malolos. For lack of the mandatory requirement of confirmation by the municipal
council under Sec. 1 of Rep. Act No. 1551, the Civil Service Commission pronounced the
appointment of the replacement null and void and directed respondent "that steps be taken
immediately to install Mr. Javier as Chief of Police of that Municipality (Malolos)".
Notwithstanding the aforementioned ruling and directive, respondent neglected and refused
to reinstate petitioner to tile position of Chief of Police of Malolos which act is specifically
enjoined upon her as Municipal Mayor and public officer, in Sec. 19, Article IV of Rep. Act
2260 otherwise known as the Civil Service Act of 1959.

ISSUE:

Between two appointees, the first complying with all the legal requirements to hold office,
and the second one

RULING:

The first appointee which complies with all the legal requisites for appointment prevails.
Bernardo never

made by the incumbent appointing power but without assuming office or taking his oath of
office, which one prevails?

assumed office or took his oath. It cannot be said, then, that he had accepted his
appointment. Such an appointment being ineffective, we hold that the petitioner's
appointment prevails. Acceptance is indispensable to complete an appointment. The fact
that Bernardo's appointment was confirmed by the Civil Service Commission does not
complete it since confirmation or attestation by the Commission, although an essential part
of the appointing process, serves merely to assure the eligibility of the appointee.
Furthermore, Bernardo never contested the petitioner's right to office. In the case at bar,
Bayani Bernardo never undertook steps that would have convinced us that he was
interested in, or had accepted, the appointment. He did, of course, intervene in the
mandamus suit, but it was a belated effort to assert his alleged rights. It is not indicative of
an interested party. It was too little and too late. On the other hand, we cannot say the same
thing as far as the petitioner is concerned. The records show that he was appointed on
November 7, 1967, and the following day, November 8, 1967, he took his oath of office and
discharged the duties appurtenant thereto until January 13, 1968, when the succeeding
mayor, the herein respondent Purificacion Reyes, recalled his appointment and appointed
another. Thereupon, the petitioner went to the Civil Service Commission to ask for
reinstatement. Finally, he brought suit for mandamus. These acts amounted to acceptance
and gave rise to a vested right to the office in his favor. Respondent Mayor is ORDERED to
REINSTATE the petitioner to office of Chief of Police, Malolos, Bulacan, or its equivalent, or
to any position equivalent in rank and pay, subject to the requirements of age and fitness,
and to PAY him back salaries equivalent to five (5) years without qualification or deduction.

10. Aytona v. Castillo, G.R. No. L-19313, January 19, 1962 (EB)

FACTS:
On Dec 29, 1961, incumbent Pres. Garcia issued mass ad interim “midnight” or “last minute”
appointments amounting to about 350 all in all. Among the appointees was petitioner Aytona
as ad interim Governor of Central Bank. Aytona qualified for the appointment in the same
day. The next day, at noon, President-elect Macapagal assumed office. He issued AO 2
which withdrew and cancelled all the said midnight ad interim appointments by his
predecessor. On Jan 1, 1962, respondent Castillo was appointed by Pres. Macapagal in
place of Aytona. Insisting he validly holds the position of Governor, Aytona instituted this
original action.

ISSUE:
Does the new President have the power to issue the order of cancellation of the ad interim
appointments made by the past President, even after the appointees have already qualified?

RULING:
Yes. Such mass midnight ad interim appointments may be regarded as an abuse of
presidential prerogatives for apparently mere partisan considerations. When the President
makes ad interim appointments, he exercises a special prerogative and is bound to be
prudent to insure approval of his selection either by previous consultation with the members
of the Commission on Appointments (CA) or by thereafter explaining to them the reason for
such selection.* Where, however, as in this case, the CA that will consider the appointees is
different from that existing at the time of the appointment (for the 4th Congress expired at
midnight Dec 29, 1961) and where the names are to be submitted by his successor, who
may not wholly approve of the selections, the President should be doubly careful. Now, it is
hard to believe that in signing 350 appointments in one night, Pres. Garcia exercised such
“double care”; and therefore, it seems to be tenable that these appointments fall beyond the
intent and spirit of the constitutional provision granting to the Executive authority to issue ad
interim appointments. Moreover, the underlying reason for denying the power to revoke after
the appointee has qualified is the latter’s equitable rights. Yet it is doubtful if such equity
might be set up as in the present case, considering the hurried maneuvers detracting from
that degree of good faith, morality and propriety which form the basic foundation of claims to
equitable relief. Action dismissed.

Normally, the President has the benefit of the advice of CA when he makes appointments
with their consent (Aytona v. Castillo, et al., 4 SCRA 1, 10)

11. Soriano v. Lista, G.R. No. 153881. March 24, 2003

Facts:

President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed public respondents to different positions in the

Philippine Coast Guard (PCG). Petitioner questioned the said appointments for failure to
undergo the confirmation process in the Commission on Appointments.

Issues:

1. Does petitioner have any legal personality to file the instant petition?

2. Do the appointments of respondents required confirmation of the CA?

Held:

1. No. A private citizen is allowed to raise constitutional questions only if he can show that he
has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal
conduct of the government, the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action and the
injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. In the case at bar, petitioner has failed
to clearly demonstrate that he has personally suffered actual or threatened injury. It should
be emphasized that a party bringing a suit challenging the constitutionality of an act or
statute must show not only that the law or act is invalid, but also that he has sustained or is
in immediate, or imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its
enforcement and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way.

The instant petition cannot even be classified as a taxpayers suit because petitioner has no
interest as such and this case does not involve the exercise by Congress of its taxing power.

2. No. The PCG used to be administered and maintained as a separate unit of the Philippine
Navy under Section 4 of RA 5173. It was subsequently placed under the direct supervision
and control of the Secretary of the Department of National Defense (DND) pursuant to
Section 4 of PD 601. Eventually, it was integrated into the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) as a major subordinate unit of the Philippine Navy under Section 54 of Chapter 8,
Sub-title II, Title VIII, Book IV of EO 292, as amended.

However, on March 30, 1998, after the aforesaid changes in the charter of the PCG, then
President Fidel V. Ramos, in the exercise of his statutory authority to reorganize the Office of
the President, issued EO 475 transferring the PCG from the DND to the Office of the
President. He later on again transferred the PCG from the Office of the President to the
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC).

12. Velacaria-Garafil v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 203372, June 16, 2015 (EB)

Facts:

His dissent holds that an appointment is void if the appointment is made before the ban but
the transmittal and acceptance are made after the ban. However, the dissent holds that an
appointment is... valid, or “efficacious,” if the appointment and transmittal are made before
the ban even if the acceptance is made after the ban. In short, the dissent allows an
appointment to take effect during the ban, as long as the President signed and transmitted
the appointment before the... ban, even if the appointee never received the appointment
paper before the ban and accepted the appointment only during the ban.

Issues:

(1) whether petitioners’ appointments violate Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution

(2) whether EO 2 is constitutional.

Ruling:

Allowing the dissent’s proposal that an appointment is complete merely upon the signing of
an appointment paper and its transmittal, excluding the appointee’s acceptance from the
appointment process, will lead to the absurdity... that, in case of non-acceptance, the
position is considered occupied and nobody else may be appointed to it.

ven worse, a President who is unhappy with an incumbent public official can simply appoint
him to another public office, effectively removing him from his first office without due
process. The mere transmittal of his appointment paper will remove the public official from
office... without due process and even without cause, in violation of the Constitution.

only during the prohibited period is selective and time-based, and ignores well-settled
jurisprudence.

Principles:

Based on prevailing jurisprudence, appointment to a government post is a process that takes

several steps to complete. Any valid appointment, including one made under the exception
provided in Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, must consist of the President,
signing an appointee’s appointment paper to a vacant office, the official transmittal of the
appointment paper (preferably through the MRO), receipt of the appointment paper by the
appointee, and acceptance of the appointment by the appointee evidenced by his or her
oath of... office or his or her assumption to office.

The President exercises only one kind of appointing power. There is no need to differentiate
the exercise of the President’s appointing power outside, just before, or during the
appointment ban he following elements should always concur in the making of a valid (which
should be understood as both complete and effective) appointment: (1) authority to appoint
and evidence of the exercise of the authority; (2) transmittal of the appointment paper and...
evidence of the transmittal; (3) a vacant position at the time of appointment; and (4) receipt
of the appointment paper and acceptance of the appointment by the appointee who
possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. The concurrence of all
these elements should always apply, regardless of when the appointment is made, whether
outside, just before, or during the appointment ban.

13. De Castro v. Judicial Bar Council, G.R. No. 191002, April 20, 2010 (EB)

FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010
occurs just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.

These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming
compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the
presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that “vacancy
shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof” from a “list of at least three
nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.” Also considering that
Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or
Acting President from making appointments within two months immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety.

The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the
process of filling up the position of Chief Justice.

Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC “automatically considered” for the position of
Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate
Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita
Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio
Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two declined their nomination through letters dated
January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice,
because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to
appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must
be filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the
Constitution; that had the framers intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court
appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so in the Constitution, which explains
why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive Department) was not written in Article VIII
(Judicial Department); and that the framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions
or limitations on the President’s power to appoint members of the Supreme Court to ensure
its independence from “political vicissitudes” and its “insulation from political pressures,”
such as stringent qualifications for the positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified
period within which the President shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice.
A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly initiated the
process, there being an insistence from some of the oppositors-intervenors that the JBC
could only do so once the vacancy has occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010). Another part
is, of course, whether the JBC may resume its process until the short list is prepared, in view
of the provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the President to
appoint one from the short list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief
Justice or an Associate Justice) within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.

ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno
upon his retirement.

HELD:

Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in
the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.

Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.

The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two months
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President
or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety.

The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The
Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may
sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall
be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They
could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily
and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally
applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most
likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the
prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months
before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting
President’s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They
could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily
and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally
applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most
likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the
prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months
before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting
President’s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they
affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer
only to appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15
also applies only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule
that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every
part must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general
intent of the whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated
Section 15 between Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds
of presidential appointments. If that was their intention in respect of appointments to the
Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar
prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.

14. Provincial Government of Aurora v. Marco, G.R. No. 202331, April 22, 2015

FACTS:
Marco was appointed as Cooperative Development Specialist II by outgoing Governor Ong,
five (5) days prior to the election, together with other 25 appointees. However, during the
assumption of office of the subsequent Governor Castillo, the provincial budget manifested
that they did not have enough funds to cover the 26 appointees made by Ong, which
included Marco. This was a deviation from the prior certification issued by the same that
funds were available. Proceedings were then instituted on the issue on whether or not the
subsequent withdrawal of the certification of funds was a valid ground to make the
appointment void before the Civil Service Commission Regional Office, then to the National
Office. However, on appeal to the Court of Appeals, the provincial government averred that
the appointment was void because the appointment was a midnight appointment. The
provincial government of Aurora averred that the ruling by the Court in Nazareno, et.al. vs.
City of Dumaguete should apply, when in that case, the Court declared that the 89
appointments made were void in violation the prohibition on midnight appointments, and
CSC Resolution No. 010988 which prohibited mass appointments made by an outgoing
Local Chief Executive without no apparent need for their immediate issuance.

ISSUE: Is the appointment of Marco in violation of the rules on Midnight Appointment?

RULING: No. The appointment of Marco is not violative of the rules on Midnight
Appointment, and the application of Nazareno is misplaced. First, it must be noted that the
prohibition of Midnight Appointments under Sec. 15 of Art. VII of the Constitution only applies
to presidential appointments. However, the Civil Service Commission, as the central
personnel

agency of the government, may establish rules to promote efficiency and professionalism in
the civil service. Second, Nazareno was decided on the basis of CSC Resolution No.
101988, which was superseded by CSC Resolution No. 030918, the applicable rule in this
case. The rule applicable in this case provides that appointments covered by the rule in
Midnight Appoints should be disapproved, except if the appointee is fully qualified for the
position and had undergone regular screening processes before the Election Ban as shown
in the Promotion and Selection Board (PSB) report or minutes of meeting. In this case,
records show that Marco was fully qualified for the position, and had undergone regular
screening processes before the election ban, unlike in Nazareno where there was no
showing that the appointees possessed such qualification and undergone regular screening
processes. Moreover, the fact that the appointments were in bulk does not invalidate the
appointments, unlike the previous CSC Resolution.

15. Alba v. Evangelista, G.R. Nos. L-10360 and L-10433, January 17, 1957

Facts: Vivencio Alajar was appointed by the President as the Vice Mayor of Roxas City,
oathed, assumed office and was confirmed by COA in 1954. The following year, he was
asked to turn over his office to Juliano Alba who was designated by the President as the
Acting Vice Mayor of Roxas City. The Court of First Instance held that he is entitled to
remain in office and thereafter granted the motion for immediate execution of judgment
notwithstanding the appeal filed by Alba. However, such was not executed as Alba brought
the matter to the Supreme Court praying for an issuance of preliminary writ of injunction
pending resolution and rendering the lower court’s order null and void. The Solicitor General
intervened defending the constitutionality of RA 603. The act of Congress in creating a public
office, defining its powers, functions and fixing the "term" or the period during which the
officer may claim to hold the office as of right and the "tenure" or the term during which the
incumbent actually holds the office, is a valid and constitutional exercise of legislative power.
Section 8 of Republic Act No. 603 creating the city of Roxas provides that the Vice-Mayor
shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments and shall hold office at the pleasure of the President. It creates an office and
the tenure of such office, which has been made expressly dependent upon the pleasure of
the President. The replacement of respondent Alajar is not removal, but an expiration of its
tenure, which is one of the ordinary modes of terminating official relations. Even assuming
for the moment that the act of replacing Alajar constitutes removal, the act itself is valid and
lawful, for under section 8 of Republic Act No. 603, no fixity of tenure has been provided for,
and the pleasure of the President has been exercised in accordance with the policy laid
down by Congress therein. It is an established rule that when the law authorizes a superior
officer to remove a subordinate at pleasure his discretion in the exercise of the power of
removal is absolute. As long as the removal is effected in accordance with the procedure
prescribed by law, it may not be declared invalid by the courts, no matter how reprehensible
and unjust the motives of the removal might be.

Issue: WON Sec 8 of RA 603 is constitutional

Held:
Yes. Order of the lower court is null and void and the writ of preliminary injunction is made
permanent. The court presumes that every statute is valid. This presumption is based upon
the theory of separation of powers which makes the enactment and repeal of laws
exclusively a legislative function. As Chief Justice Marshall said: "It is but a decent respect
due to the wisdom, the integrity, and the patriotism of the legislative body, by which any law
is passed, to presume in favor of its validity, until its violation of the constitution is proved
beyond all reasonable doubt. That before a legislature passes a bill, it is presumed that it
has decided the measure to be constitutional; and when the executive approves that bill it is
also presumed that he has been convinced of its validity. Under these conditions, therefore,
if a

statute is reasonably susceptible of two interpretations, one making it unconstitutional and

other valid, it is the duty of the court to adopt the second construction in order to save the
measure. (STATCON doctrine)

16. Aparri v. CA, G.R. No. L-30057, January 31, 1984

Facts:

On January 15, 1960, private respondent approved the following resolution # 13, hereby
appointing Mr. Bruno Aparri, as general manager of NARRA, with all the rights, prerogatives
and compensations to take effect on January 116, 1960.
On March 15, 1962, the board of directors approved resolution # 24 which stating thereat
that the incumbent general manager shall perform his duty up to the close of office hour on
March 31, 1962. In accordance with the provisions of section 8, sub-section 2 of RA 1160. It
hereby fixes the term of office of the incumbent general manager until march 31, 1962.
Petitioner file a mandamus with preliminary injunction with the first instance court. The
petition pray for the annulment of the resolution of NARRA board.

Issue:

Whether or not board resolution No. 24 was a removal or dismissal of petitioner without
cause.

Held:

It was affirmed that the term of office of petitioner expired on March 31, 1962. It is necessary
in each case to interpret the word "Term" with the purview of the statutes so as to effectuate
the statutory scheme pertaining to the office under examination. In the case at bar, the term
of office is not fixed by law. However, the power to fix the term is rested in the board of
directors subject to the recommendation of the office of economic coordination and the
approval of the president of the philippines. Resolution No. 24 speaks of no removal but an
expiration of the term of office of the petitioner. The statute is undeniably clear. "It is the rule
in statutory construction that if the words and phrases of a statute are not obscure or
ambiguous. Its meaning and intention of the legislative must be determined from the
language employed and where there is no ambiguity in words, there is no room for
construction.

The petitioner in this case was not removed before the expiration of his term rather, his right
to hold office ceased by the expiration on March 31, 1962, of his term to hold such office.
 17. Philippine Institute for Development Studies v. COA, G.R. No. 212022, August
20, 2019 (EB)

Facts:

On June 11, 1978, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos) issued Presidential
Decree No. 1597,[4] which provided, among others, that government employees may be
granted allowances, honoraria, and other fringe benefits, subject to the approval of the
President. It read:

Pursuant to this provision, former President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No.
402,[6] which authorized government agencies and government-owned and controlled
corporations to establish an annual medical checkup program:

Sometime in 1999, the Philippine Institute for Development Studies, through its former
Acting President Mario B. Lambarte, wrote then Health Secretary Alberto G. Romualdez
(Health Secretary Romualdez) and PhilHealth. It requested that it be authorized to establish
a health maintenance program in the form of a free annual medical checkup through their
membership in a private health maintenance organization, in lieu of the annual medical
checkup under Administrative Order No. 402.[10

Health Secretary Romualdez sought the Department of Budget and Management's opinion
on whether the Philippine Institute for Development Studies may be exempted from the
coverage of Joint Circular No. 01-98. He expressed in the lette

PhilHealth, through Senior Vice President Reynaldo N. Dalma, Jr., informed the Philippine
Institute for Development Studies that, like the Department of Health, it had no objection to
the request.

Issues:

resolution is whether or not respondent Commission on Audit erred in upholding the validity
of Notice of Disallowance No. 11-001-(6-10).

Ruling:

Here, unlike in Province of Negros, petitioner is not a local government unit, but a
government-owned and controlled corporation which sought the President's approval before
establishing its annual medical checkup program. It likewise sought the Office of the
President's approval to continue the annual medical checkup program's implementation after
Notice of Disallowance No. 2006-01 had been issued, which the petitioner in Province of
Negros never did.

Likewise misplaced is the invocation of Commission on Audit Decision No. 2002-072, which
petitioner uses to argue that respondent's failure to decide its case in a similar manner
violates its constitutional right to equal protection.
ruled that the agreement petitioner entered into with PhilamCare could not be allowed
because it was considered an irregular expenditure.[75]

In his July 23, 2007 letter, Executive Secretary Ermita, acting by authority of the President,
wrote: Upon the recommendation of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) and
Department of Health (DOH), please be informed that the request of the Philippine Institute
for Development Studies (PIDS) for grant of authority for the continued implementation of
their Annual Medical Check-Up Program thru enrollment with duly accredited Health
Maintenance Organizations (HMO) from 2005 onwards, in lieu of the Annual Medical Health
Program authorized under Administrative Order No. 402, dated 02 June 1998, as
implemented by DOH-DBMPHIC Joint Circular No. 01, dated 09 September 1998, is hereby
approved, subject to the usual accounting and auditing rules and regulations.[77] (Emphasis
supplied)

Article VII, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution explicitly states: "The President shall have
control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws
be faithfully executed."

But, in the same case, this Court expressly set limitations to the delegations of authority that
can be properly covered by the doctrine of qualified political agency:

Hence, in this case, then Executive Secretary Ermita, as the President's alter ego, had the
authority to let petitioner continue implementing its annual medical checkup program through
enrollment with health maintenance organizations. Consequently, the exemption granted by
Executive Secretary Ermita, as the President's alter ego, is valid. It will remain so, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the President.[140]

Principles:

The doctrine of qualified political agency acknowledges the multifarious executive

responsibilities that demand a president's attention, such that the delegation of control power
to his or her Cabinet becomes a necessity. Unless the Constitution or law provides
otherwise, Cabinet members have the president's imprimatur to exercise control over the
offices and departments under their respective jurisdictions, which authority nonetheless
remains subject to the president's disapproval or reversal

18. Drilon v. Lim, G.R. No. 112497, August 4, 1994 (EB)

FACTS:

Pursuant to Section 187 of the Local Government Code or the Procedure For Approval And
Effectivity Of Tax Ordinances And Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings,
Secretary of Justice had, on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer, declared
Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise known as the Manila Revenue Code, null and void for non-
compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for
containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy.
In a petition, the Regional Trial Court of Manila revoked the Secretary's resolution and
sustained the ordinance, holding inter alia that the procedural requirements had been
observed. Instead, it declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code as
unconstitutional because of its vesture in the Secretary of Justice of the power of control
over local governments in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the
Constitution and of the specific provision therein conferring on the President of the
Philippines only the power of supervision over local governments. By citing the distinction
between control and supervision, the lower court’s concluded that the challenged section
gave the Secretary the power of control and not of supervision only as vested by the
Constitution in the President of the Philippines. This was, in his view, a violation not only of
Article X, specifically Section 4 thereof, 7 and of Section 5 on the taxing powers of local
governments, 8 and the policy of local autonomy in general.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 187 of the Local Government Code is unconstitutional.

HELD:

The judgment of the Regional Trial Court is reversed insofar as it declared Section 187 of
the Local Government Code unconstitutional and affirmed the findings of the procedural
requirements in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code have been observed.

Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or legality
of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When
he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his
own judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted the measure. Secretary
Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version
of what the Code should be. He did not pronounce the ordinance unwise or unreasonable as
a basis for its annulment. He did not say that in his judgment it was a bad law. What he
found only was that it was illegal. All he did in reviewing the said measure was determine if
the petitioners were performing their functions in accordance with law, that is, with the
prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city
government under the Local Government Code.

The Court finds that Secretary Drilon had performed an act not of control but of mere
supervision. An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not
followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he
may even decide to do it himself. While in supervision, it merely sees to it that the rules are
followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to
modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or re-
done but only to conform to the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his own manner for
the doing of the act. He has no judgment on this matter except to see to it that the rules are
followed.
 19. Villena v. Secretary of the Interior, G.R. No. L-46570, April 21, 1939 (EB)

FACTS:
Division of Investigation of the DOJ, upon the request of the Secretary of the Interior,
conducted an inquiry into the conduct of the Villena, mayor of Makati, Rizal, as a result of
which the latter was found to have committed bribery, extortion, malicious abuse of authority
ad unauthorized practice of the law profession. The respondent recommended the
suspension of Villena to the President of the Philippines, in which it was verbally granted.
The Secretary then suspended Villena from office. Villena filed a petition for preliminary
injunction against the Sec. to restrain him and his agents from proceeding with the
investigation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Secretary of the Interior has jurisdiction or authority to suspend and order
investigation over Villena.

RULING:
The Secretary of Interior has the power to order investigation and to suspend Mayor Villena.
As to the power to order investigation, it was provided in Section 79 (C) of RAC that
Department of Interior was given the authority to supervise bureaus and offices under its
jurisdiction. This was interpreted in relation to Section 86 of the same Code which granted
the said Department of executive supervision over administration of provinces, municipalities
and other political subdivisions. This supervision covers the power to order investigation
because supervision “implies authority to inquire into facts and conditions in order to render
power real and effective.”However, unlike this power to order investigation, the power to
suspend a mayor was not provided in any law. There was no express grant of authority to
the Secretary of Interior to suspend a Mayor. Nevertheless, Section 2188 of the
Administrative Code granted the provincial governor the power of suspension. Yet this did
not mean that the grant precluded the Secretary of Interior.

The Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency which provides that “the acts of the department
secretaries, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the President, presumptively the acts of the President.” The
power to suspend may be exercised by the President. It follows that the heads of the
Department under her may also exercise the same, unless the law required the President to
act personally or that situation demanded him so, because the heads of the departments are
assistants and agents of the President.

20. Araneta v. Gatmaitan, G.R. Nos. L-8895 and L-9191, April 30, 1957 (EB)

Facts:
Sometime in 1950, trawl operators from Malabon, Navotas and other places migrated to this
region most of them settling at Sabang, Calabanga, Camarines Sur, for the purpose of using
this particular method of fishing in said bay. On account of the belief of sustenance
fishermen that the operation of this kind of gear caused the depletion of the marine
resources of that area, there arose a general clamor among the majority of the inhabitants of
coastal towns to prohibit the operation of trawls in San Miguel Bay. In response to these
pleas, the President issued Executive Order prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay.
A group of Otter trawl operators took the matter to the court by filing a complaint for
injunction and/or declaratory relief with preliminary injunction with the Court of First Instance
praying that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to restrain the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources and the Director of Fisheries from enforcing said executive order; to
declare the same null and void, and for such other relief as may be just and equitable in the
premises. The CFI declared the Executive Order invalid; the injunction prayed for is ordered
to issue;

Issue: Whether the EO Executive Orders are valid and does not encroach the authority of
the Legislature in the said Prohibition.

Held:
Yes, EO Executive Orders are valid for having been issued by authority of the Constitution,
the Revised Administrative Code and the Fisheries Act. The opinion of the SC that with or
without said Executive Orders, the restriction and banning of trawl fishing from all Philippine
waters come, under the law, within the powers of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, who in compliance with his duties may even cause the criminal prosecution of
those who in violation of his instructions, regulations or orders are caught fishing with trawls
in the Philippine waters.

Under the law the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has authority to regulate
or ban the fishing by trawl which, it is claimed. The President of the Philippines exercise that
same power and authority according to Section 10(1), Article VII of the Constitution of the
Philippines which states that The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus or offices, exercises general supervision over all local governments as
may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed, and according to
Section 63 of the Revised Administrative Code which states that Administrative acts and
commands of the President of the Philippines touching the organization or mode of operation
of the Government or rearranging or readjusting any of the district, divisions, parts or ports of
the Philippines, and all acts and commands governing the general performance of duties by
public employees or disposing of issues of general concern shall be made in executive
orders, and Section 74 of the Revised Administrative Code also provides that all executive
functions of the government of the Republic of the Philippines shall be directly under the
Executive Departments subject to the supervision and control of the President of the
Philippines in matters of general policy. The Departments are established for the proper
distribution of the work of the Executive, for the performance of the functions expressly
assigned to them by law, and in order that each branch of the administration may have a
chief responsible for its direction and policy. Each Department Secretary shall assume the
burden of, and responsibility for, all activities of the Government under his control and
supervision.

For administrative purposes the President of the Philippines shall be considered the
Department Head of the Executive Office.
 21. Gascon v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 78389, October 16, 1989 (EB)

FACTS:
The Lopez family owned 2 television stations. When martial law was declared, the stations
were seized. After the Marcos regime was toppled, the Presidential Committee on Good
Governance (PCGG) sequestered said stations. Mr Lopez requested the return of the
stations. An agreement to arbitrate was entered into regarding this matter. Thereupon,
petitioners as taxpayers sought to set aside the agreement to arbitrate.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioners as taxpayers have legal standing to sue

RULING:
No. Petitioners have not shown that they have a legal interest in the TV stations and that
they would be adversely affected if and when the station is returned to the Lopez family. The
present case is not an action to question the constitutionality or validity of a law.

22. Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. v. Paño, G.R. No. L-27811, November 17, 1967 (EB)

FACTS:

In 1932, Jose Magallanes was a permittee and actual occupant of a 1,103-hectare pasture
land situated in Tamlangon, Municipality of Bansalan, Province of Davao. On January 9,
1953, Magallanes ceded his rights and interests to a portion (392,7569 hectares) of the
above public land to Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc., and, on April 13, 1954, the portion
Magallanes ceded to plaintiff was officially released from the forest zone as pasture land and
declared agricultural land. On January 26, 1955, Jose Paño and nineteen other claimants
applied for the purchase of ninety hectares of the released area. Lacson-Magallanes Co.,
Inc., in turn filed its own sales application covering the entire released area. This was
protested by Jose Paño and his nineteen companions upon the averment that they are
actual occupants of the part thereof covered by their own sales application. The Director of
Lands, following an investigation of the conflict, rendered a decision giving due course to the
application of plaintiff corporation, and dismissing the claim of Jose Paño and his
companions. A move to reconsider failed. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources — on appeal by Jose Paño for himself and his companions — held that the
appeal was without merit and dismissed the same. The case was elevated to the President
of the Philippines, and, the Executive Secretary Juan Pajo, "by authority of the President"
decided the controversy, modified the decision of the Director of Lands as affirmed by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and (1) declared that "it would be for the
public interest that appellants, who are mostly landless farmers who depend on the land for
their existence, be allocated that portion on which they have made improvements;" and (2)
directed that the controverted land (northern portion of Block I, LC Map 1749, Project No. 27,
of Bansalan, Davao, with Latian River as the dividing line) "should be subdivided into lots of
convenient sizes and allocated to actual occupants, without prejudice to the corporation's
right to reimbursement for the cost of surveying this portion." Plaintiff corporation took the
foregoing decision to the Court of First Instance praying that judgment be rendered
declaring: (1) that the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has full
force and effect; and (2) that the decision of the Executive Secretary is contrary to law and of
no legal force and effect.

ISSUES:
1. Whether decisions of the Director of Lands "as to questions of facts shall be conclusive
when approved" by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, is controlling not
only upon courts but also upon the President.
2. Whether the decision of the Executive Secretary herein is an undue delegation of power
(It is argued that it is the constitutional duty of the President to act personally upon the
matter) 3. Whether one department head, on the pretext that he is an alter ego of the
President, cannot intrude into the zone of action allocated to another department secretary

HELD:

1. NO. The President can rule on the correctness of a decision of a department Secretary.
The President's duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. So, too, is his control of all
executive departments. Thus it is, that department heads are men of his confidence. His is
the power to appoint them; his, too, is the privilege to dismiss them at pleasure. Naturally, he
controls and directs their acts. Implicit then is his authority to go over, confirm, modify or
reverse the action taken by his department secretaries. Parenthetically, it may be stated that
the right to appeal to the President reposes upon the President's power of control over the
executive departments. And control simply means "the power of an officer to alter or modify
or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties
and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter."

2. NO. the Chief Executive may delegate to his Executive Secretary acts which the
Constitution does not command that he perform in person. The President is not expected to
perform in person all the multifarious executive and administrative functions. The Office of
the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary unit which assists the President. The rule which has
thus gained recognition is that "under our constitutional setup the Executive Secretary who
acts for and in behalf and by authority of the President has an undisputed jurisdiction to
affirm, modify, or even reverse any order" that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, including the Director of Lands, may issue.

3. NO. The Executive Secretary acts "by authority of the President," his decision is that of
the President's. Such decision is to be given full faith and credit by our courts. The assumed
authority of the Executive Secretary is to be accepted. For, only the President may rightfully
say that the Executive Secretary is not authorized to do so. Therefore, unless the action
taken is "disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive," that remains the act of the
Chief Executive, and cannot be successfully assailed.

23. Ang-Angco v. Castillo, G.R. No. L-17169, November 30, 1963 (EB)

FACTS:
The Pepsi-Cola Far East Trade requested for special permit to withdraw Pepsi Cola
concentrates from the customs house. Petitioner Collector of Customs Isidro Ang-angco
advised the counsel for Pepsi-Cola to try to secure the necessary release certificate from the
No-dollar Import Office. Aquiles Lopez of said office wrote petitioner, stating that it could not
take action on the request, as the same is not within the jurisdiction of the Office. Following
Secretary of Finance Hernandez’s approval of the release, petitioner authorized release of
the concentrates. When Customs Commissioner Manahan learned of said release, he
ordered the seizure of the goods but only a portion thereof remained in the warehouse.
Thus, he filed an administrative suit against petitioner. After an investigation, respondent
Executive Secretary Natalio Castillo found petitioner guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service and considering him resigned, with prejudice to reinstatement in the
Bureau of Customs. Petitioner wrote Pres. Garcia, asserting that the action taken by
respondent had the effect of depriving him of his statutory right to have his case originally
decided by the CSC, as well as of his right or appeal to the Civil Service Board of Appeals,
whose decision under RA 2260 is final. By authority of the President, respondent denied
reconsideration, as well as the appeal. Hence, this present petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the President has the power to make direct action on the case of petitioner even if
he belongs to the classified service in spite of the provision now in the Civil Service Act of
1959.

HELD:
The action taken by respondent executive Secretary, even with the authority of the President
in taking direct action on the administrative case, petitioner, without submitting the same to
the Commission of Civil Service is contrary to law and should be set aside. The following are
the reasons: 1. Under sec 16 of the Civil Service Act of 1959, it is the Commissioner of Civil
Service who has original and exclusive jurisdiction to decide administrative cases of all
officers and employees in the classified service. The only limitation to this power is the
decision of the Commissioner may be appealed to the Civil service Board of Appeals, in
which case said Board shall decide the appeal within a period of 90 days after the same has
been submitted for decision, whose decision in such cases shall be final. It is therefore clear
that under the present provision of the Civil Service act of 1959, the case of petitioner comes
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil Service, and having been
deprived of the procedure and down therein in connection with the investigation and
disposition of this case, it may be said that he has been deprived of due process guaranteed
by said law. 2. Let us now take up the power of control given to the President by the
Constitution over all offices and employees in the executive department which is not invoked
by respondents as

justification to override the specific provision of the Civil Service Act. The power merely
applies to the exercise of control over the acts of the subordinate and not over the actor or
agent himself of the act. It only means that the President may set aside the judgment of
action taken by the subordinate in the performance of duties. 3. Not the strongest argument
against the theory of respondents is that it would entirely nullify and set aside at naught the
beneficent purpose of the whole Civil Service system as implanted in this jurisdiction which
is to give stability to the tenure of office of those who belong to the classified service, in
derogation of the provision of our Constitution which provides the “No officer or employee in
the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law.” The
power of control of the President may extend to the power to investigate, suspend or remove
officers and employees who belong to the executive department if they are presidential
appointee or do not belong to the classified service for to them that inherent power cannot
be exercised. This is in line with the provision of our constitutional which says; “The
Congress may by law vest the appointment of the inferior officers in the President alone in
the courts or in the heads of department” and with regards to these officers provided by law
for a procedure for their removal precisely in view of this constitutional authority. One such
law is the Civil Service Act of 159.

24. Noblejas v. Teehankee, G.R. No. L-28790, April 29, 1968 (EB)

Facts:

Petitioner Antonio H. Noblejas is the duly appointed, confirmed and qualified Commissioner
of Land Registration, a position created by Republic Act No. 1151.

By the terms of section 2 of said Act, the said Commissioner is declared "entitled to the...
same compensation, emoluments and privileges as those of a Judge of the Court of First
Instance.

On March 7, 1968, respondent Secretary of Justice coursed to the petitioner a letter

requiring him to explain in writing... against petitioner for "approving or recommending
approval of subdivision, consolidation and consolidation-subdivision plans covering areas
greatly in excess of the areas covered by the original titles.

Noblejas answered and apprised the Secretary of Justice that... he could only be suspended
and investigated in the same manner as a Judge of the Courts of First Instance, and...
relative to his case should be submitted to the Supreme Court, for action thereon
conformably to section 61 of the Judiciary

Act (R.Á. No. 296) and Revised Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.

March 17, 1968, petitioner Noblejas received a communication signed by the Executive
Secretary, whereby petitioner was "hereby suspended, upon receipt hereof, pending
investigation of the above charges."

On March 18, 1968, petitioner applied to this Court, claiming lack of jurisdiction and abuse of
discretion, and praying for restraining writs

Issues:

Whether the Commissioner of Land Registration may only be investigated by the Supreme
Court, in view of the conferment upon him by Rep. Act 1151 and Appropriation Laws) of the
rank and privileges of a Judge of the Court of First Instance.
Ruling:

section 67 of the Judiciary Act recites that "No District Judge shall be separated or removed
from office by the President of the

Philippines unless sufficient cause shall exist in the judgment of the Supreme Court . . .

petitioner's theory that the grant of "privileges of a Judge of First Instance" includes by
implication the right to be investigated only by the Supreme Court and to be suspended or
removed upon its recommendation, would necessarily result in the same... right being
possessed by a variety of executive officials upon whom the Legislature had indiscriminately
conferred the same privileges

To adopt petitioner's theory, therefore, would mean... placing upon the Supreme Court the
duty of investigating and disciplining all these officials whose functions are plainly executive,
and the consequent curtailment by mere implication from the Legislative grant, of the
President's power to discipline and remove... administrative officials who are presidential
appointees, and which the Constitution expressly place under the President's supervision
and control (Constitution, Art. VII), sec l0[l]):... if the Legislature had really intended to
include in the general grant of "privileges" or "rank and privileges of Judges of the Court of
First Instance" the right to be investigated by the Supreme

Court, and to be suspended or removed only upon recommendation of that Court, then such
grant of privileges would be unconstitutional, since it would violate the fundamental doctrine
of separation of powers, by charging this court with the administrative function of
supervisory... control over executive officials, and simultaneously reducing pro tanto the
control of the Chief Executive over such officials.

the resolution of a consulta by a Register of Deeds is a judicial function, as contrasted with

administrative process. It will be noted that by specific provision of the section, the decision
of the Land Registration

Commissioner "shall be conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds" alone, and not
upon other parties. This limitation in effect identifies the resolutions of the Land Registration
Commissioner with those of any other bureau director, whose... resolutions or orders bind
his subordinates alone. That the Commissioner's resolutions are appealable does not prove
that they are not administrative

25. Vda De Jacob v. Puno, G.R. No. L-61554-55, July 31, 1984 (EB)

Facts:

Herein petitioner, Tomasa Vda. de Jacob, filed with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of
Camarines Sur two (2) criminal complaints for falsification of public documents which purport
to have been executed by her deceased husband, Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob... private
respondents, namely: Jorge Centenera, Teodoro Alarcon, Pablo Paqueo, Jr., Amelia Lamit,
Alfredo Silva, Jose Cea, Miguel Moll and Olympio Clapis, with falsification of public
documents, petitioner Tomasa Vda. de Jacob who, since January 16, 1979, had... been the
court-appointed guardian of the then incompetent Dr. Alfredo Jacob, claims that respondents
connived and confederated with each other in falsifying the two deeds of absolute sale
aforementioned by making it appear therein that her husband participated in the execution...
thereof as seller when in truth and in fact he never did so participate in any manner as he
was already seriously ill and practically bed ridden on October 20, 1976 and December 2,
1977 when the said documents appeared to have been executed.

After preliminary investigation, Assistant Provincial Fiscal Ceferino P. Goce, on May 15,
1979, issued separate resolutions in I.S. Nos. 1162 and 1163 recommending the filing in
court of the corresponding informations "for falsification of public documents by private
individuals as defined and punished under Article 171, par. 2 in relation to Article 172, par. 1
of the Revised Penal Code."

The private respondents appealed the aforementioned resolutions to the respondent Minister
of Justice, who, on April 15, 1981, directed the Provincial Fiscal to desist from filing in court
the corresponding informations against the respondents

Reasons for this directive are the three medical certificates submitted in evidence... could
not be considered weighty enough to give credence to the claim that Dr. Jacob... could not
have been at Camarines Sur on December 2, 1977 to execute the Deed of Absolute Sale

Issues:

whether respondent Minister of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in directing the
Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Sur "to desist from filing in court the corresponding
informations against respondents

Ruling:

The power of supervision and control by the Minister of Justice over the fiscals cannot be
denied

Section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code defines the extent of a department
secretary's power. The power of control therein... contemplated 'means (the power of the
department head) to alter, modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done
in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the
latter.' 'The power of control … implies the right of... the President (and, naturally, of his alter
ego) to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of
the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers

For, while it is the duty of the fiscal to prosecute persons who,... according to evidence
received from the complainant, are shown to be guilty of a crime, the Minister of Justice is
likewise bound by his oath of office to protect innocent persons from groundless, false or
serious prosecution. He would be committing a serious dereliction of duty... if he orders or
sanctions the filing of an information based upon a complaint where he is not convinced that
the evidence would warrant the filing of the action in court. As he has the power of
supervision and control over prosecuting officers, the Minister of Justice has the... ultimate
power to decide which as between conflicting theories of the complainant and the
respondents should be believed.

26. De Leon v. Carpio, G.R. No. 85243, October 12, 1989 (EB)

FACTS:
Francisco R. Estavillo and Cesar R. De Leon were terminated by then Minister of Justice
Neptali A. Gonzales in separate Orders both dated January 27, 1987. Estavillo was notified
of his dismissal on March 6, 1987, and De Leon on February 6, 1987. Both appealed to the
Review Committee created under EO No. 17, but the body declined to act on their petitions
for reconsideration on the ground that it had lost jurisdiction with the ratification of the new
Constitution on February 2, 1987. They were advised instead to seek relief from the Civil
Service Commission, which they did. In substantially similar orders, the Merit Systems
Protection Board of the Civil Service Commission held that their dismissals were invalid and
unconstitutional, having been done in violation of their security of tenure under the 1987
Constitution, which had already been effective. The Board ordered their reinstatement with
back salaries but without prejudice to the filing of appropriate administrative charges against
them. On September 29, 1987, Undersecretary of Justice Eduardo G. Montenegro referred
the order reinstating Estavillo to the respondent Director of the National Bureau of
Investigation “for his information and appropriate action.” On March 14, 1988,
Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre H. Bello III referred the order reinstating De Leon to the
respondent “for appropriate action” and “immediate implementation.” The reaction of the
respondent was to return the said orders to the Civil Service Commission “without action,”
claiming that they were null and void for having been rendered without jurisdiction. Board
then issued another Order dated June 20, 1988, in which it rejected respondent's contention
and cincluded that “it appearing that the reglementary period to appeal has long expired, the
orders dated August 27, 1987 and March 4, 1988, of this Board have become fial and
executory and therefore, should now be implemented.

On June 29, 1988, the Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoñez wrote a memorandum
directing respondent to implement immediately the Order of the Merit Systems Protection
Board reiterating the reinstatement of De Leon and Estavillo. Instead of complying, the
respondent issued a memorandum directing his subordinates “to disregard and not give any
faith and credence, or otherwise honor or give due course to said illegal and void orders of
the Merit Systems Protection Board. Unable to reutrn to respective positions, Estavillo and
De Leon came to Court in separate petitions for mandamus, which were thus consolidated
having the same issue against the respondent Director of the National Bureau of
Investigation.

ISSUE: WON the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation can disobey and explicit
and diret order issued to him by the Secretary of Justice.

HELD: No. RATIO It is an elemnraty principle of our republican government, enshrined in

the Constitution and honored no in the breach but in the observance, that all executive
departments, bureaus and offices are under the control of the President of the Philippines as
embodied in Article VII, Section 17 of the present Constitution. The President's power of
control is directly exercised by him over the members of the Cabinet who, in turn and by his
authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their respective jurisdictions in the
executive department. The Constitutional vesture of this power in the president os self-
executing and does not require statutory implementation, much less withdrawn, by the
legislature. In this case, there was no question that when Secretary Ordoñez directed
respondent to reinstate the petitioners, the Secretary was acting in regular discharge of his
functions as an alter ego of the President. His acts should therefore have been respected by
the respondent Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, which is in the Department
of Justice under the direct control of its Secretary. As a subordinate in this department, the
respondent was (and is) bound to obey the Secretary's directives, which are presumptively
the acts of the President of the Philippines. RATIO DECIDENDI When a department head
acts in the regular course of business and conformably to a statutory provision, the act shall
be presumed to be the act of the President.

27. Kuroda v. Jalandoni, G.R. No. L-2662, March 26, 1949 (EB)

Facts:
Petitioner Shigenori Kuroda, the Commanding General of the Japanese ImperialForces in
the Philippines during the Japanese occupation, was charged before thePhilippine Military
Commission of war crimes and other atrocities committed againstmilitaries and civilians. The
military commission was establish under Executive OrderNo. 68.The petitioner assails the
validity and constitutionality of E.O. No. 68 that createdthe National War Crimes Office and
prescribed rules on the trial of accused warcriminals. He contended that the Philippines is
not a signatory to the Hague Conventionon Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare
(War Crimes) and therefore he ischarged of crimes not based on law, national and
international. Petitioner likewiseassails that the US is not a party of interest in the case
hence the US prosecutors cannot practice law in the Philippines.

Issues:
Whether or not E.O. No. 68 is constitutional

Held:
Yes. EO 68 is constitutional hence the tribunal has jurisdiction to try Kuroda.
Rationale Executive Order No. 68 which was issued by the President of the Philippines
onthe 29 July 1947 is valid in accordance with Section 3, Article 2 of The Constitution,which
states that, “The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy,and adopts
the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation.” Hence,
its promulgation and enforcement is in accordance with generallyaccepted principles of
international law including the Hague Convention and GenevaConvention, and other
international jurisprudence established by the UN, including theprinciple that all persons
(military or civilian) guilty of plan, preparing, waging a war ofaggression and other offenses in
violation of laws and customs of war. The Philippinesmay not be a signatory to the said
conventions at that time but the rules and regulations

28. Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000
(EB)

Facts: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the
Constitution, President Ejercito Estrada directed the Armed Forces of the Philippines Chief
of Staff and Philippine National Police Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper
deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing
criminal or lawless violence. The President declared that the services of the Marines in the
anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until
such time when the situation shall have improved. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines filed
a petition seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and
unconstitutional. Solicitor General contend that petitioner has no legal standing to assail.

Issue: Whether or not IBP has legal standing to assail constitutionality of calling the AFP to
assist PNP to suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion?

Held: IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law
and the Constitution. Apart from this declaration the IBP asserts no other basis in support of
its locus standi. While undoubtedly true it is not sufficient to merit standing. However, when
the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the Court may brush aside
technicalities of procedure. The Court relaxed the rules on standing and resolved the issue
now.

29. Lacson v. Perez, G.R. No. 147780, May 10, 2001 (EB)

Facts:
President Macapagal-Arroyo declared a State of Rebellion (Proclamation No. 38) on May 1,
2001 as well as General Order No. 1 ordering the AFP and the PNP to suppress the
rebellion in the NCR. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the
“rebellion” were thereafter effected. Petitioner filed for prohibition, injunction, mandamus and
habeas corpus with an application for the issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ
of preliminary injunction. Petitioners assail the declaration of Proc. No. 38 and the
warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof. Petitioners furthermore pray that the
appropriate court, wherein the information against them were filed, would desist arraignment
and trial until this instant petition is resolved. They also contend that they are allegedly faced
with impending warrantless arrests and unlawful restraint being that hold departure orders
were issued against them.

Issue:
Whether or Not Proclamation No. 38 is valid, along with the warrantless arrests and hold
departure orders allegedly effected by the same.

Held:
President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of Proc. No. 38 on May 6, 2006, accordingly
the instant petition has been rendered moot and academic. Respondents have declared that
the Justice Department and the police authorities intend to obtain regular warrants of arrests
from the courts for all acts committed prior to and until May 1, 2001. Under Section 5, Rule
113 of the Rules of Court, authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons
suspected of rebellion in suppressing the rebellion if the circumstances so warrant, thus the
warrantless arrests are not based on Proc. No. 38. Petitioner’s prayer for mandamus and
prohibition is improper at this time because an individual warrantlessly arrested has
adequate remedies in law: Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, providing for preliminary
investigation, Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, providing for the period in which a
warrantlessly arrested person must be delivered to the proper judicial authorities, otherwise
the officer responsible for such may be penalized for the delay of the same. If the detention
should have no legal ground, the arresting officer can be charged with arbitrary detention,
not prejudicial to claim of damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Petitioners were
neither assailing the validity of the subject hold departure orders, nor were they expressing
any intention to leave the country in the near future. To declare the hold departure orders
null and void ab initio must be made in the proper proceedings initiated for that purpose.
Petitioners’ prayer for relief regarding their alleged impending warrantless arrests is
premature being that no complaints have been filed against them for any crime, furthermore,
the writ of habeas corpus is uncalled for since its purpose is to relieve unlawful restraint
which Petitioners are not subjected to.

Petition is dismissed. Respondents, consistent and congruent with their undertaking earlier
adverted to, together with their agents, representatives, and all persons acting in their behalf,
are hereby enjoined from arresting Petitioners without the required judicial warrants for all
acts committed in relation to or in connection with the May 1, 2001 siege of Malacañang.

30. SANLAKAS v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004 (EB)

Facts:
In the wee hours of 27 July 203 some 300 junior officers and enlisted men of AFP, heavily
armed stormed the Oakwood Premiere in Makati demanding for the resignation of the
President, Secretary of Defence and Chief of the PNP. By virtue of Proclamation 427 dated
27 July 2003, state of rebellion was declared and General Order No 4 of the same date, the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police were directed to
suppress and quell the rebellion pursuant to Section 18 Article VII of the Constitution. The
soldiers returned to barracks on the same night and the declaration of state of rebellion was
lifted on 1 August 2003 by virtue of Proclamation No 435. In the interim, several petitions
were filed before the Court challenging the validity of Proclamation No. 427 and General
Order No. 4. Sanlakas contend that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution does not
require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the armed forces. Because of the
cessation of the Oakwood occupation, there exists no sufficient factual basis for the
proclamation by the President of a state of rebellion for an indefinite period. Solicitor General
argues that the petitions have been rendered moot by the lifting of the declaration.

Issue:
Whether or not declaring state of rebellion is needed to declare General order No 4?

Held:
Petitions dismissed. The state of rebellion has ceased to exist and has rendered the case
moot.

Nevertheless, courts will decide a question, otherwise moot, if it is capable of repetition yet
evading review. The case at bar is one such case. The mere declaration of a state of
rebellion cannot diminish or violate constitutionally protected rights. Indeed, if a state of
martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution or automatically suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, then it is with more reason that a simple declaration of
a state of rebellion could not bring about these conditions. The presidential issuances
themselves call for the suppression of the rebellion with due regard to constitutional rights

31. Lagman v. Pimentel, G.R. No. 235935, February 6, 2018

FACTS:
The President asked both the Senate and the House of Representatives to further extend
the proclamation of martial lawand the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year, from January 1, 2018 toDecember 31, 2018, or
for such period as the Congress may determine. On December 13, 2017, the Senate and the
House ofRepresentatives, in a joint session, adopted Resolution of Both Houses No. 4
further extending the period of martial law andsuspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year, from January 1, 2018 to December
31,2018. Petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of both the extension and suspension.
The manner that the Congress approvedthe extension of martial law in Mindanao is being
put into a question and characterized the same as done with undue haste.

ISSUE: Did the President and the Congress had sufficient factual basis to extend Proc. No.
216?

Held: YES. Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution requires two factual bases for the
extension of the proclamation ofmartial law or of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus: (a) the invasion or rebellion persists; and (b) publicsafety requires the
extension. A review of the facts in the case at bar similarly leads the Court to conclude that
the President, inissuing Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient factual bases tending to show
that actual rebellion exists. Events and circumstancesdisclosed by the President in the
present case strongly indicate that the continued implementation of martial law in Mindanao
isnecessary to protect public safety.

32. Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017

FACTS:
Proclamation No. 216 was issued by President Rodrigo Roa Duterte, declaring a state
ofmartial law and suspending the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao, effective May 23, 2017
for a period not exceeding 60 days.The Report submitted by the President to Congress on
May 25, 2017 pointed out that fordecades, Mindanao has been plagued with rebellion and
lawless violence which only escalatedand worsened with the passing of time. It also
highlighted the strategic location of Marawi Cityand the crucial and significant role it plays in
Mindanao, and the Philippines as a whole. TheReport also pointed out the possible tragic
repercussions once Marawi City falls under thecontrol of the lawless groups.After
submission of the Report and the briefings, the Senate issued a resolutionexpressing full
support to the declaration of martial law, finding Proclamation No. 216 to be “satisfactory,
constitutional and in accordance with the law”. In the same Resolution, the Senatedeclared
that it found “no compelling reason to revoke the same”. The House of Representatives
likewise issued a resolution expressing its full support to the President, as it finds no reason
torevoke Proclamation No. 216.Various concerned citizens filed several petitions, seeking to
nullify Proclamation No.216 for being unconstitutional because it lacks sufficient factual
basis, essentially invoking the
Court’s specific and special jurisdiction to review the sufficiency
of the factual basis of the sameProclamation.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the petitions are the “appropriate proceedings” covered by Article
VII,Section 18 (3), of the Constitution.
2. Whether or not there was sufficient factual basis for the proclamation of martial law
orsuspension of the writ of habeas corpus.

HELD:
1. YES. Article VII, Section 18 of the Constitution clearly indicate that it should be
treatedas sui generis. The jurisdiction of the Court is not restricted to the cases
enumerated toSections 1 and 5 of Article VIII. The only requisite for standing to
challenge the validityof the suspension is that the challenger be a citizen.Under
Section 18 of Article VII, a petition filed pursuant therewith will follow adifferent rule
on standing as any citizen may file it. The provision also limits the issue tothe
sufficiency of factual basis of the exercise of the Chief Executive of his emergency
powers.Cullamat, et al. claim to be “suing in their capacities as citizens of the
Republic.” Similarly, in the Mohamad, et al. all claim to be "Filipino citizens, all
women, all of legalage, and residents of Marawi City." However, Lagman, et al. did
not categoricallymention that they are suing as citizens but merely referred to
themselves as duly electedRepresentatives. That they are suing in their official
capacities as Members of Congress.In any case, the Court can take judicial
cognizance of the fact that Lagman, et al. are allcitizens of the Philippines since
Philippine citizenship is a requirement for them to beelected as representatives.
Therefore, they are considered as suing in their own behalf ascitizens of this country
2. YES. A plain reading of Section 18, Article VII reveals that it specifically grants
authority to the Court to determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. This is completely independent from Congress’ duty to review.

It is meant to provide an additional safeguard against possible abuse by the

President in the exercise of his power to declare martial law or suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus.

The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation in an appropriate

proceeding filed by any citizen on the ground of lack of sufficient factual basis. On the
other hand, Congress may revoke the proclamation or suspension, such a revocation
shall not be set aside by the President.
 The Court is not allowed to “undertake an independent investigation beyond the
pleadings.” On the other hand, Congress may take into consideration not only data
available prior to, but likewise events supervening the declaration. Unlike the Court,
Congress could probe deeper and further; it can delve into the accuracy of the facts
presented before it.

The Court’s review power is only passive; it is only initiated by the filing of a petition
“in an appropriate proceeding” by a citizen. On the other hand, Congress’ review
mechanism is automatic in the sense that it may be activated by Congress itself at
any time after the proclamation or suspension was made.

The court held that it can simultaneously exercise its power of review with, and
independently from, the power to revoke by Congress. Corollary, any perceived
inaction or default on the part of Congress does not deprive or deny the Court of its
power to review.

33. Aquino v. Enrile, G.R. No. L-35546, September 17, 1974 (EB)

FACTS:
Enrile (then Minister of National Defense), pursuant to the order of Marcos issued and
ordered the arrest of a number of individuals including Benigno Aquino Jr even without any
charge against them. Hence, Aquino and some others filed for habeas corpus against Juan
Ponce Enrile. Enrile answered that the arrest is valid pursuant to Marcos’ declaration of
Martial Law.

ISSUE: Whether or not Aquino’s detention is legal in accordance to the declaration of Martial
Law.

HELD: The Constitution provides that in case of invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or

imminent danger against the state, when public safety requires it, the President may
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part therein
under Martial Law. In the case at bar, the SC ruled that the state of rebellion plaguing the
country has not yet disappeared, therefore, there is a clear and imminent danger against the
state. The arrest is then a valid exercise pursuant to the President’s order.

34. People v. Salle, G.R. No. 103567, December 04, 1995 (EB)

FACTS:
Francisco Salle, Jr. and Ricky Mengote were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt and
each issentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay an indemnity. The
appellantsseasonably filed their Notice of Appeal. On 24 March 1993, the Court accepted
the appeal. On 6 January1994, however, appellant Francisco Salle, Jr. filed an Urgent
Motion to Withdraw Appeal. They weregranted a conditional pardon that with their
acceptance of the conditional pardon, the appellants will bereleased from confinement, the
appellants impliedly admitted their guilt and accepted their sentence,and hence, the appeal
should be dismissed. They were discharged from the New Bilibid Prison on 28
December 1993. Atty. La’o further in
formed the Court that appellant Ricky Mengote left for his provincewithout consulting her.
She then prays that the Court grant Salle's motion to withdraw his appeal andconsider it
withdrawn upon his acceptance of the conditional pardon. Mengote has not filed a motion
towithdraw his appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Mengote’s conditional pardon is valid?

RULING:
No. Since pardon is given only to one whose conviction is final, pardon has no effect until
theperson withdraws his appeal and thereby allows his conviction to be final and Mengote
has not filed amotion to withdraw his appeal.

35. People v. Casido, G.R. No. 116512, March 7, 1997

Facts:
In an effort to seek their release at the soonest possible time, accused-appellants William
Casido and Franklin Alcorin applied for pardon before the Presidential Committee on the
Grant of Bail, Release or Pardon (PCGBRP), as well as for amnesty before the National
Amnesty Commission (NAC). The PCGBRP was constituted in line with the confidence-
building measures of the government. Thereafter, accused-appellants were granted
conditional pardon. But the Court ruled in resolution that the conditional pardon granted to
accused-appellants is void for having been extended during the pendency of their appeal.
Prior to the resolution, the NAC favorably acted on the applications for amnesty of accused-
appellants.

Issue: Whether or not the release of accused-appellants is valid

Held:
The release of accused-appellants was valid solely on the ground of the amnesty granted
them and not by the pardon.

Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be
pleaded and proved by the person pardoned because the courts take no notice thereof;
while amnesty by the Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress,
and it is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one
after conviction; while amnesty is to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of
political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and
sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the
consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives
the punishment, and for that reason it does not work the restoration of the rights to hold
public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of
the pardon, and it in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity
imposed upon him by the sentence. While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts
into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is
charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he
had committed no offense.

While the pardon in this case was void for having been extended during the pendency of the
appeal or before conviction by final judgment and, therefore, in violation of the first
paragraph of Sec. 19, Art. VII of the Constitution, the grant of amnesty, for which accused-
appellants voluntarily applied under Proclamation No. 347 was valid. This Proclamation was
concurred in by both Houses of Congress.

36. Infante v. Provincial Warden of Negros Occidental, G.R. No. L-4164 December
12, 1952

FACTS:
Antonio Infante (petitioner), herein, was convicted of murder and was sentenced to 17
years, 4 months and 1 day. After serving 15 years, 7 months, and 11 days of his sentence,
he was granted a conditional pardon and released from imprisonment. The period of the
sentence remaining to be served was 1 year and 11 days. The condition of the pardon was
that “he shall not again violate any of the penal law of the Philippines”. After 10 years on the
date he was released from imprisonment, Antonio Infante was convicted of a violation of the
Revised Motor Vehicle Law for driving a jeep without a license and was sentenced to pay
P10 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Infante can be re-arrested and serve the unexpired term or period of his
sentence for breach of the conditions of the aforesaid pardon

HELD:
A conditional pardon delivered and accepted has been said to constitute a contract between
the sovereign power or the executive and the criminal that the former will release the latter
upon compliance with the conditions.

According to article 93 of the Revised Penal Code the period of prescription of penalties
commences to run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence.
It is evident from the provision that evasion of the sentence is an essential element of
prescription. There has no such evasion in this case.
The condition of the pardon which the prisoner was charged with having breached was no
longer operative when he committed a violation of Motor Vehicle Law.

37. Culanag v. Director of Prisons, G.R. No. L-27206, August 26, 1967 (EB)

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the issue of constitutionality was not raised at the earliest possible
opportunity?
2. Whether or not RA 9262 is violative of the equal protection clause?

3. Whether or not RA 9262 is violative of the due process clause of the constitution?

4. Whether or not the law is violative of the policy to protect the family as a basic social
institution?

5. Whether or not the law is an undue delegation of judicial power to the barangay officials?

HELD:
Petition for Review is denied. Before delving into the arguments propounded by petitioner
against the constitutionality of R.A. 9262, we shall first tackle the propriety of the dismissal
by the appellate court of the petition for prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698) filed by
petitioner.

38. Espuelas v. Provincial Warden of Bohol, G.R. No. L-13223, May 30, 1960 (EB)

Facts:

On June 9 and June 24, 1947, both dates inclusive, in the town of Tagbilaran, Bohol, Oscar
Espuelas y Mendoza had his picture taken, making it to appear as if he were hanging lifeless
at the end of a piece of rope suspended form the limb of the tree, when in truth and in fact,
he was merely standing on a barrel. After securing copies of his photograph, Espuelas sent
copies of same to Free Press, the Evening News, the Bisayas, Lamdang of general
circulation and other local periodicals in the Province of Bohol but also throughout the
Philippines and abroad, for their publication with a suicide note or letter, wherein he made to
appear that it was written by a fictitious suicide, Alberto Reveniera and addressed to the
latter's supposed wife translation of which letter or note, stating his dismay and
administration of President Roxas, pointing out the situation in Central Luzon and Leyte, and
directing his wife his dear wife to write to President Truman and Churchill of US and tell them
that in the Philippines the government is infested with many Hitlers and Mussolinis.

Issue:

Whether the accused is liable of seditious libel under Art. 142 of the RPC against the
Government of the Philippines?

Held:

Yes. The accused must therefore be found guilty as charged. And there being no question
as to the legality of the penalty imposed on him, the decision will be affirmed with costs.

Analyzed for meaning and weighed in its consequences, the article written bybthe accused,
cannot fail to impress thinking persons that it seeks to sow the seeds of sedition and strife.
The infuriating language is not a sincere effort to persuade, what with the writer's simulated
suicide and false claim to martyrdom and what with is failure to particularize. When the use
irritating language centers not on persuading the readers but on creating disturbances, the
rationable of free speech cannot apply and the speaker or writer is removed from the
protection of the constitutional guaranty.

If it be argued that the article does not discredit the entire governmental structure but only
President Roxas and his men, the reply is that article 142 punishes not only all libels against
the Government but also "libels against any of the duly constituted authorities thereof." The
"Roxas people" in the Government obviously refer of least to the President, his Cabinet and
the majority of legislators to whom the adjectives dirty, Hitlers and Mussolinis were naturally
directed. On this score alone the conviction could be upheld.

Regarding the publication, it suggests or incites rebellious conspiracies or riots and tends to
stir up people against the constituted authorities, or to provoke violence from opposition who
may seek to silence the writer. Which is the sum and substance of the offense under
consideration.

The essence of seditious libel may be said to its immediate tendency to stir up general
discontent to the pitch of illegal courses; that is to say to induce people to resort to illegal
methods other than those provided by the Constitution, in order to repress the evils which
press upon their minds.

39. Torres v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 76872, July 23, 1987 (EB)

FACTS:
1978, Torres was convicted of estafa. In 1979, he was pardoned by the president w/ the
condition that he shall not violate any penal laws again. Should this condition be violated, he
will be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law. Petitioner accepted the
conditional pardon and was consequently released from confinement. In 1982, Torres was
charged with multiple crimes of estafa. In 1986, Gonzales petitioned for the cancellation of
Torres’ pardon. Hence, the president cancelled the pardon. Torres appealed the issue
before the SC averring that the Exec Dep’t erred in convicting him for violating the conditions
of his pardon because the estafa charges against him were not yet final and executory as
they were still on appeal.

ISSUE: whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before
the petitioner can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his
conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence.

HELD: In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is
alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two
options: (1) Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, a purely executive act, not
subject to judicial scrutiny, or (2) Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code, a judicial act
consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon.

Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative
Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less
conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended
for the violation of his conditional pardon.
Under art. 159 of the RPC, parolee or convict who is regarded as having violated the
provisions thereof must be charged, prosecuted and convicted by final judgment before he
can be made to suffer the penalty prescribed.
In the case at bar, President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64
(i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the President’s
executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny.

*Who determines if violated? The PRESIDENT. When the person was conditionally
pardoned it was a generous exercise by the Chief Executive of his constitutional prerogative.
The acceptance thereof by the convict or prisoner carrie[d] with it the authority or power of
the Executive to determine whether a condition or conditions of the pardon has or have been
violated. To no other department of the Government [has] such power been intrusted.

40. Pelobello v. Palatino, G.R. No. L-48100, June 20, 1941 (EB)

FACTS:

Gregorio Palatino was convicted of atendado contra la autoridad y sus agentes in 1912 and
was sentenced to imprisonment for two years, four months, and one day of prision
correccional. In 1915, he was granted conditional pardon by the Governor-General.

Thereafter he exercised his right of suffrage, getting elected as councilor of Torrijos,

Marinduque from 1918 to 1921, municipal president of the same municipality for three
successive terms from 1922 to 1931, and finally as mayor in December 1940.

After having been elected as mayor but before assuming such post, Pelobello was granted
absolute pardon by the President of the Philippines, restoring the former's enjoyment of his
full civil and
political rights.

Quo warranto proceedings were instituted by Florencio Pelobello, who claimed that having
been convicted of a prior offense, Palatino did not have the right to vote and be voted upon,
and that such disqualification had not been removed by the plenary pardon. This contention
was pursuant to Section 167, in relation with Section 94 (a) of the Omnibus Election Code
(CA No. 357).

ISSUE:

Whether or not Palatino is disqualified from voting and being voted upon.

HELD:
No, the Court held that the President's pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by
legislative action. An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed but removes all
disabilities resulting from the conviction. The Court also held that when absolute pardon is
granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, it effectively removes all that is left of the
consequences of such conviction.
 41. Pelobello v. Palatino, G.R. No. L-48100, June 20, 1941 (EB)

Facts:
The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner and three other accused, of the complex crime of
estafa thru falsification of public document. Petitioner appealed her conviction to the
Supreme Court which subsequently affirmed the same. She then filed a motion for
reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she was by then President Marcos
absolute pardon. By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City treasurer
requesting that she be restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer since the same
was still vacant. Petitioner's letter-request was referred to the Ministry of Finance for
resolution in view of the provision of the Local Government Code transferring the power of
appointment of treasurers from the city governments to the said Ministry. The Finance
Ministry ruled that petitioner may be reinstated to her position without the necessity of a new
appointment not earlier than the date she was extended the absolute pardon. Seeking
reconsideration of the foregoing ruling, petitioner wrote the Ministry stressing that the full
pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the crime which implies that her service in the
government has never been interrupted and therefore the date of her reinstatement should
correspond to the date of her preventive suspension; that she is entitled to back pay for the
entire period of her suspension; and that she should not be required to pay the proportionate
share of the amount of P4, 892.50. The Ministry of Finance, however, referred petitioner's
letter to the Office of the President for further review and action. Through Deputy Executive
Secretary Fulgenio S. Factoran, Jr. held that acquittal, not absolute pardon, of a former
public officer is the only ground for reinstatement to his former position and entitlement to
payment of his salaries, benefits and emoluments due to him during the period of his
suspension pendente lite and that petitioner is not entitled to an automatic reinstatement on
the basis of the absolute pardon granted her but must secure an appointment to her former
position and that, notwithstanding said absolute pardon, she is liable for the civil liability
concomitant to her previous conviction.

Issue:
Whether or not a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief
Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new
appointment.

Ruling:
There is a need to apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment.
The absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public office forms part of the punishment
prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for estafa thru falsification of public documents. It is
clear from the authorities referred to that when her guilt and punishment were expunged by
her pardon; this particular disability was likewise removed. Henceforth, petitioner may apply
for reappointment to the office which was forfeited by reason of her conviction. And in
considering her qualifications and suitability for the public post, the facts constituting her
offense must be and should be evaluated and taken into account to determine ultimately
whether she can once again be entrusted with public funds. Stated differently, the pardon
granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public
employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant city
treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new
appointment.

42. Vera v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-18184, January 31, 1963 (EB)

Facts:
Vera and 96 others were charged with the complex crime of kidnapping with murder before
CFI of Quezon. They invoked the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation No. 8 of the
President; thus, the case was referred to the 8th Guerilla Amnesty Commission which tried
the case. During the hearing, none of the petitioners admitted having committed the crime.
Vera was the only one who took the witness stand and denied having killed Lozanes. The
Commission said it could not take cognizance of the case because the benefits of amnesty
could only be invoked by defendants in a criminal case who, admitting commission of the
crime, plead that the said crime was committed in pursuance of the resistance movement
and perpetrated against persons who aided the enemy during the Japanese occupation. The
Commission ordered that the case be remanded to the court of origin for trial.

The CA affirmed the decision of the Commission. Vera appealed to the SC, contending that
to be entitled to the benefits of Amnesty Proclamation it is not necessary for them to admit
the commission of the crime charged, citing the case of Barrioquinto vs. Fernandez, etc.

Issue:
Should persons invoking the benefit of amnesty first admit having committed the crime of
which they were accused?

Held:
Yes. It is rank inconsistency for appellant to justify an act, or seek forgiveness for an act
which, according to him, he has not committed. Amnesty presupposes the commission of a
crime, and when an accused maintains that he has not committed a crime, he cannot have
any use for amnesty. Where an amnesty proclamation imposes certain conditions, as in this
case, it is incumbent upon the accused to prove the existence of such conditions. The
invocation of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance, which means
that the pleader admits the allegations against him but disclaims liability therefor on account
of intervening facts which, if proved, would being the crime charged within the scope of the
amnesty proclamation.

43. People v. Patriarca, G.R. No. 135457, September 29, 2000

Facts:
Patriarca, a member of the NPA, was charged with the crime of murder for the death of
Alfredo Arevalo docketed as Criminal Case No. 2773. He was also charged with murder for
the killing of one Rudy de Borja and a certain Elmer Cadag under Informations docketed as
Criminal Cases Nos. 2665 and 2672, respectively. In 1998, the RTC found him guilty in
Criminal Case No. 2773 and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Patriarca appealed the decision to the SC.

Patriarca applied for amnesty under Proclamation No. 724 granting amnesty to rebels and
admitted his participation in the liquidation of Arevalo, De Borja and Cadag. In 1999, his
application was favorably granted by the National Amnesty Board concluding that his
activities were done in pursuit of his political beliefs.

Issue:
What is the effect of the grant of amnesty to the conviction of the accused-appellant?

Held:
Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or other high
political offenses, or the forgiveness which one sovereign grants to the subjects of another,
who have offended, by some breach, the law of nations. Amnesty looks backward, and
abolishes and puts into oblivion, the offense itself; it so overlooks and obliterates the offense
with which he is charged, that the person released by amnesty stands before the law
precisely as though he had committed no offense.

Paragraph 3 of Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally
extinguished by amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects.

44. People v. Patriarca, G.R. No. 135457, September 29, 2000

Facts:
In view of the impending expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement in 1991, the
Philippines and the United States negotiated for a possible extension of the military bases
agreement. On September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the proposed RP-US
Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security which, in effect, would have extended the
presence of US military bases in the Philippines.

On July 18, 1997, the United States panel met with the Philippine panel to exchange notes
on the complementing strategic interests of the United States and the Philippines in the Asia-
Pacific region.” Both sides discussed, among other things, the possible elements of the
Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA for brevity).

On October 5, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada, through respondent Secretary of Foreign

Affairs, ratified the VFA.

Petitioners went to the Supreme Court to question the validity of the VFA as it allege the
following:

Issue:
Whether the VFA constitute an abdication of Philippine sovereignty and deprived Philippine
courts of their jurisdiction to hear and try offenses committed by US military personnel?
Held:
No, the VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of United States troops and
personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits of
military personnel, and further defines the rights of the United States and the Philippine
government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft,
importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies. Philippine authorities shall
have jurisdiction over United States personnel with respect to offenses committed within the
Philippines and punishable under the law of the Philippines.

45. Dadole v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 125350, December 3, 2002 (EB)

FACTS:
Acting on the DBM's Local Budget Circular No. 55, the Mandaue City Auditor issued notices
of disallowances to RTC and MTC Judges, in excess of the amount (maximum of P1000 and
P700 in provinces and cities and municipalities, respectively) authorized by said circular. The
additional monthly allowances of the judges shall be reduced to P1000 each. They were also
asked to reimbursed the amount they received in excess of P1000 from the last six months.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Local Budget Circular No. 55 void for going beyond the supervisory powers
of the President.

RULING:
Yes. Although the Constitution guarantees autonomy to local government units, the exercise
of local autonomy remains subject to the power of control by Congress and the power of
supervision by the President. Sec 4 Art X of 1987 Constitution: "The President of the
Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. x x x" The said
provision has been interpreted to exclude the power of control.

The members of the Cabinet and other executive officials are merely alter egos of the
President. As such, they are subject to the power of control of the President; he will see to it
that the local governments or their officials were performing their duties as provided by the
Constitution and by statutes, at whose will and behest they can be removed from office; or
their actions and decisions changed, suspended or reversed. They are subject to the
President's supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are exercised within the
sphere of their legitimate powers. The President can only interfere in the affairs and activities
of a LGU if he or she finds that the latter has acted contrary to law. This is the scope of the
President's supervisory powers over LGUs