X18 Financial Analysis&Valuation Juventus FC

Index
Introduction…………………………………………………………………………….…..………1
Summary…………………………………………………………………………..……1
Current Shareholding…………………..…………………………………………….2
Financial Analysis………………………………………………………………………….……..3
Revenue Analysis………………………………………………………..………...…4
Cost Analysis……………………………………………………………………….....5
Industry Risks………………………………………………………..………….….....6
Financial Risks…………………………………………………………………..…….7
Liquidity Analysis……………………………………………………………..….......7
Return Analysis……………………………………………………………….……....8
Taxes…………………………………………………………………………...............9
Business Valuation………………...………………………………………………….…….......9
Assumptions made for the DCF……………………………………………...…....9
The valuation methods………………………………………………………...…....11
Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………..……....16
References……………………………..………………………………………………………....17
Appendix...…..…………………………………………………………………………………....18
This is not an investment recommendation as we are not accredited to give this type of advice.
Advanced Corporate Finance Prof: BANCEL Frank
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1) Introduction
1.1 Summary
Juventus is a listed professional italian club based in Turin that competes in the Series A, a
professional league competition for the best italian football clubs. Juventus is one of the most
traditional and relevant teams in the world, having achieved 36 scudettos, and is the Italian team with
the most national and international titles added together. Thus, in December 2000, Juventus was
ranked by FIFA's historic ranking as seventh among the best clubs in the world and nine years later
as the second best in europe. The team is a national symbol and has many fans spread all over Italy
and many other countries.
The company organizes games and participates in international and national competitions,
deriving its revenue from the licensing of television and media rights, sponsorships, revenues from
the Allianz Stadium, retail, e-commerce, trademark licensing, marketing of additional services and
revenues from the management of players’ registration rights.
Juventus has two centers for sports, the Allianz Stadium and a sports centre located in Vinovo
that is exclusively for the women’s sector and the youth. The team has had players of excellence such
as Alessandro Del Piero, Fabio Cannavaro, Gianluigi Buffon, and Amauri. Today the main national
team includes Cristiano Ronaldo and Douglas Costa.
Figure 1. Players from the Men's National Team Figure 2. Juventus Women's National Team
The board consists of Andrea Agnelli, chairman, Pavel Nedved, vice chairman and Stefano
Cerrato, CFO and responsible for the relation with investors. Agnelli has served as executive member
and president of the European Club Association (ECA), and has also been appointed to the UEFA
Executive Committee since 2015. Nicknamed “Czech Wizard”, Nedved is known for being one of the
greatest players in the history of his country. Cerrato graduated in business and economics from the
University of Turin and a master’s degree with monetary and financial focus. Stefano joined Juventus
as Chief Financial Officer in January 2021.
1
Figure 3. Board of directors
In the following pages we dive deep into the financial of Juventus and elaborate a valuation
thesis based on the DCF and Comparables approaches. As a result of all our analysis we have
arrived at:
1.2 Current Shareholding
Share capital stands at €

11,406,986.56 divided into 1,330,251,988
ordinary shares with no par value. Ordinary
shares are currently listed on Milan Stock
Exchanges (MTA) managed by Borsa
Italiana S.p.A.
At the last public report on this topic
(24 October 2019) the shareholding
structure of Juventus Football Club S.p.A.
was according to the image [1].
2
2) Financial Analysis
2.1 Revenue Analysis
We can see that Juventus

revenues over the years are highly
noisy. On one part is due to the
“Cristiano Effect” that allows the
club to win more matches than
usual, and on the other side, it’s
due to the pandemic of the Covid
that created losses for the club.
We are going to focus now

on the revenues from 2020/2019
- Revenues from players’ registration rights

The revenues from players’ registration rights have increased thanks to higher capital gains
from definitive disposals of players’ registration rights and a higher bonuses and income accrues in
favor of Juventus due to the sales of players. The difference between the two years is up to € 14,8
million.
- Television and radio rights and media revenues

Television and media revenues have decreased by € 39,2 million. Indeed, due to the
pandemic, a lower number of games have been played over the year, and thus it has brought less
money to the club.
- Revenues from sponsorship and advertising

These revenues have increased by an important number of € 20 million, due to the
reinforcement of the sponsorship contract with JEEP. This evolution takes part of a global trend since
five years : the club earned more and more money thanks to sponsoring and advertising.
- Ticket Sales
These amounted to €49, 2 million and fell by €21,5 million. This decrease is, like media
revenues, mainly due to the Covid pandemic. Indeed, over the year 2020, some of the UEFA
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Championship games have been played with no spectators in the stadium. This effect has been
limited by higher fees for friendly matches and Italian cup matches.
- Revenues from Sales of Products and Licenses

Like the others, this item has decreased this year : €31,7 million versus €44,0 million last
year. Again, it is due to the pandemics, for obvious reasons.
- Other Revenues
This item amounted to € 24.5 million (€ 34.1 million in the previous year) and mainly includes
income from the “Membership”, “Stadium Tour & Museum” and “Camp” sales initiatives, income from
non-sporting activities carried out at the Juventus Stadium and insurance payments. Losses can be
explained by the Covid.
All these figures can be sum up in this graphic:
Despite the pandemic, the different weights of the revenues have not evolved too much, and
the club managed to keep a stability in its revenues.
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2.2 Costs Analysis
Operating costs for the 2019/2020 financial year totaled € 414.1 million, down by 9.7%
compared to € 458.5 million for the previous year, and are composed of:
If we compare the cost structure of Juventus to its principal peers, we will arrive at the
following table. Where we segment each part of our cost previously mentioned and analyze the
change during the last financial year.
In this table we can see that, when compared to Manchester and Borussia (clubs of
comparable size and popularity), Juventus was ahead of Borussia in cutting costs this last year but
was behind Manchester.
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Diving deep into each of the parts of our cost structure:
- Players wages and technical staff costs

Players’ wages and technical staff costs amounted to € 259.2 million, marking a decrease of
€ 42.1 million compared to € 301.3 million in the previous year, deriving primarily from lower fees for
players’ wages (€ -30.5 million), as a result of the waiving of four months of players’ wages and
technical staff costs, lower expenses incurred for the voluntary redundancy incentive (€ -9.9 million)
and lower variable bonuses (€ -2.9 million).
- Expenses from players’ registrations rights

These expenses amounted to € 31.1 million (€ 15.5 million in the previous year); the increase
derives from higher auxiliary expenses on disposals of players’ registration rights (€ +14.9 million),
higher bonuses and costs accrued in favour of other teams in relation to the acquisitions of players in
previous years (€ +2.7 million), partially offset by lower expenses from temporary acquisitions of
players (€ -1.8 million) and lower capital losses from the disposal of players’ registration rights (€ -0.3
million).
- Purchase of products for sale

This item totalled € 12.1 million (€ 17.5 million in the previous financial year) and refers to the
cost of products held for sale at stores directly managed by the Company, and through its on-line
outlet.
- Covid - Comparison to other clubs

Compared with one of its main public competitors (The Manchester United) due to the
influence of covid, it has similar change patterns. Some of the activities were cut down and same as
the operating costs, for all kinds of costs, they have dropped slightly by around 10 percent, and the
most important part was the player’s wages and transfer sales, as Borussia Dortmund has realized a
great increase in transfer deals, and also the sales-related costs for players like Maximilian Philipp,
Abdou Diallo and Alexander Isak [2].
2.3 Industry Risks
- Risks connected with the general economic conditions

The spread of the Covid-19 pandemic and the restrictions imposed by the competent
Authorities to protect public health, have had a negative impact on stadium revenues (e.g. revenues
from ticket sales, from events’ organisation , from sponsor PR rights), as well as on the commercial
activities targeted at fans on the audio-visual rights market. Despite the main revenue items deriving
mainly from long-term contracts, this situation of weakness and uncertainty could negatively impact
the business, prospects and
economic, equity and financial position of the Company.
- Increase in competition from the top european club

The significant increase in the value of transfer market deals and average wages, especially
of the top players, accentuates the polarisation of the best talents to the top European clubs. Should
this trend persist, it could be more difficult to maintain the balance between the team’s
competitiveness at the highest European level, profitability and debt; a balance that Juventus
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nonetheless pursues through dynamic management of its playing assets, as well as with growth in its
turnover, also achieved through the diversification of sources of revenue.
- Risk connected to the sponsorship market and to commercial agreements

The situation of weakness and economic uncertainty also due to the spread of the Covid-19
pandemic can also affect the sponsorship market, reducing the time frame of promotional and
advertising investments. This market scenario has led to a lower level of short-term sponsorship
revenues and, if this situation continues, growth in sponsorship revenues may fall below expectations,
with the result that Juventus’ financial position, income statement and cash flows may be impacted.
2.4 Financial Risks
- Risk connected to funding requirements

Numerous factors affect Juventus’ financial position. In particular, these include the fulfilment
of sports and business objectives, as well as trends in general economic conditions and in the
markets in which the Company operates. In order to finance its requirements, in February 2019, the
company issued a non-convertible bond expiring in five years, and the share capital increase was
completed in December 2019. In addition, Juventus, in keeping with its own risk management policy,
maintains credit facilities granted by leading banks at a level sufficient to prevent cash flow
shortages, also in relation to short- and medium-term maturities. However, the growing investments
needed to guarantee sporting success such as that achieved recently, have required and could call
for greater financial leverage in the near future. We cannot rule out situations of financial tension
deriving from any changes to the money or financial markets, or an increase in the cost of borrowing
for Juventus.
- Risk connected to fluctuations in interest rates and exchange rates

Juventus uses various forms of funding to assure the cash flow needed for its business: these
include credit lines for cash advances and credit commitments, factoring, finance leases, lines of
credit and medium-long term loans. Changes in interest rates can raise or lower the cost of servicing
these loans. Sudden changes in interest rates could potentially have an adverse impact on the
Company’s financial position and income due to higher financial expenses on short-term borrowing.
- Risk connected to Last Year’s negative profits
According to the European Legislation on public football clubs, these clubs can’t have more
than 3 years of negative profits in a row without the backing of major investors. In our provisions we
expect a loss during this year, which may represent a problem for Juventus regarding this legislation,
if exceptions aren’t made regarding the current Covid situations.
2.5 Liquidity Analysis
- For the current ratio, Juventus has a ratio below 0.5 in 2019, but it has increased to 0.64
while Manchester has dropped from 0.91 to 0.56 which means that Juventus has better
7
liquidity than Manchester. Same for the quick ratio, Juventus gets better in the quick ratio
which means that it has better capability to pay for the liabilities than Manchester.
- For the Net Debt/EBITDA, Juventus also has a better performance, the time it uses to pay
back all the debt went down from 3.10 years to 2.69 years, and the situation for Manchester
has taken a turn for the worse, the time to pay back the debt went up from 1.10 year to 3.59
years.
- But for the EBIT/Interest expense, as Juventus has a negative operating profit, this ratio is
always negative for Juventus while Manchester has a great ratio at this time as it has quite
little interest expense to pay and it has realized an amount of EBIT.
2.6 Return Analysis (ROE, ROIC, Creation of Value for Shareholders)
Analyzing the returns of Juventus, we found the company had a negative net profit in the past
3 years, especially in 2019, the ROE was -128.7%. The fact is that the company didn't make profit
for the past years. With others unchanged, if the revenues from TV rights and ticket sales are the
same as last period, the company could make a balance. So, with these revenue drops continuing,
profitability will still be a problem.
All the expense is high for this amount of revenue, they account for around 80% of the
revenue. When we compare to its peers, like Manchester United or Dortmund, we find that this
“dilemma” happens in nearly all the famous football clubs (except a few special ones like Bayern
Munich).
The profitability of the club seems weak if we compare to other industries like traditional
manufacturers or retail corporates, but when the industry (football teams) shows the same situation,
it may be a sign that clubs in general have a hard time in delivering value to shareholders (looking
at the EPS for example which is often negative or close to zero). Another remarkable fact is that this
8
kind of company seldom claim dividends. These combined aspects often always lead to sensitivity
on the loans interest rates, this is consistent with what we have discussed in the Financial Risk part.
In terms of ROIC, Juventus has a -17.8% ratio which is far behind the WACC, which indicates
that the operation of the company is decreasing the value of the shareholders. The other mentioned
clubs which also show negative operating profits share similar indicators.
2.7 Taxes
In Italy, the corporate tax is mainly divided in two parts: IRES, common corporate tax (24%
for our club), and the IRAP (3,9% to 5%), which is a regional tax asked to enterprises based on their
locations.
Therefore, to assess the amount of tax to be paid in the next few years, we had to dive deep
into the tax legislation and analyze the losses recorded in the last years to arrive at the current NOL
amount (Net Operating Losses). This amount can be used to carry forward to deduct future IRES
taxes to be paid, as long as this deduction doesn’t overpass 80% of the total IRES. (The IRAP even
if losses are recorded).
Following this reasoning the expected NOLs and taxes to be paid are:
2018/2019 2019/2020 2020/2021 2021/2022 2022/2023 2023/2024 2024/2025
NOL (11,98) (29,02) (95,77) (172,34) (203,91) (230,48) (217,05)
IRAP (5%) (7,21) (7,26) (4,40) (6,65) (6,90) (8,90) (10,50)

IRES (up to 24%) 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 (0,64) (2,18)
Operating taxes
(IRAP + IRES + Adj) (13,00) (8,03) (4,40) (6,65) (6,90) (9,54) (12,68)
To calculate the NOLs, we have added the operating losses of the last fiscal years.
3) Business Valuation
To better grasp the value of Juventus we have chosen to analyze 3 methods of valuation.
First a DCF regarding the discount of FCFF of the firm to its WACC, based on three main scenarios
(An optimistic, a normal and a pessimistic one). Secondly, we have used the multiples approach
analyzing similar football clubs on which data was available. And finally we have taken a look at
how the transaction comparables method would value our club, and if it made sense to use it.
3.1 Assumptions Made for the DCF
- For the “Normal Scenario” considered as the most probable, the following
assumptions were made:
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1. We predict that with the vaccination campaign starting in the main countries in the world,
the sanitary crisis will end in the jane this year, which happens to be the end of an accounting period.
2. Even if the covid-19 crisis is a past, the economic downward caused by the shutdown and
curfews is inevitable, but the government will take some measures to facilitate the economic
recovery.
3. We checked the general cycle of the economy and found out it would be more reasonable
to give it 2 years to reach the same level before the crisis.
4. The trading of players in the following 5 years will be stable as in 2019/2020. Because On
the one hand Juventus bought Ronaldo in the last 2 years, they won't buy another huge star in a
short time, on the other hand, the revenue decrease will make the club tighter on the budget.
5. As the following 5 year is tough, we assume that Juventus just want to recover itself from
the crisis to the same level in 2018/2019 and they won’t have energy left to expand the company
and grow sharply.
- For the “Optimistic Scenario”:

The club will endure a tiny economic downward in the first year and then take a year to
recover from the crisis, but they won't expand the club aggressively either because they just passed
a crisis.
- And for the “Pessimistic Scenario”:

The club will endure a larger economic downward trend in the first year and then take almost
the whole 5 year to recover.
The forecasting of indicators in the following 5 years:

- Sales
As seen previously, this part consists mainly of
a. Ticket sales
b. Television and radio right and media revenues
c. Revenues from sponsorship and advertising
d. Revenues from sales of product and licenses
e. Revenues from players’ registration right
f. Other
The ticket sales will keep decreasing in the following year but will grow up to the same in
2018/2019 with the pandemic getting much better.
Television and radio right and media revenues are decreasing in the first year by 25%, and
gradually recovering to 2018/2019 in 2 years and then keeps the same.
For the Revenues from sponsorship and advertising, the sponsorship usually signed the
contract for a few years, so this may not change. But for advertising, with the downward economic
situation, the demand for advertising may reduce, but things may recover to the level in 2018/2019
in the last 3 years. In total, we say the Television and radio right and media revenues decreases by
10% in the first 3 years and recovers to the same level in 2018/2019 to 2019/2020.
Revenues from sales of product and licenses shows almost the same trend as Revenues
from sponsorship and advertising.
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For the following 5 years, we assume that the registration right mainly depends on the player
it has, not by the economic situation, which keeps around 190,000,000.
For a more detailed version of the revenue assumptions, please refer to the appendix.
- COGS
As this is not a traditional company that produces goods and sells or profits by gaining the
spread. So, the main inventory they have is in their mortar shop selling souvenirs and authorized
products like sports clothes the sports stars are wearing. And we can see that the COGS is of little
magnitude. And as the pandemic will directly affect tourism. The business in mortar and brick shops
will reduce, so the COGS will decrease with the sales in the shop going down in the following year
and then keep around 10,000,000 for 2020/2021and the rest 15,000,000.
- Operating Expenses
Form the annual report in 2019/2020, we find that what changes significantly in the expenses
are:
a. Players’ wages and technical staff cost
b. External service
c. Purchases of products for sales
As the business kind of cooled down during the half of the period 2019/2020. So, the service
need goes down, while the wages and technical cost goes down due to the same problem probably.
Because the league shutdown completely for several months. like what we said in COGS, tourism
is reversely impacted by the pandemic, so the purchase of products for sales will decrease.
According to the magnitude themself we can make a prediction. For the coming following
year the number will decrease but the amount is not that large because those entries which play
important roles in the expenses didn’t change much even if there exists a pandemic. And the
sanitary crisis passes, the operating expenses will go up with the business growing.
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- Depreciation and Amortization (D&A)
The D&A seems to be quite constant over the years, and roughly equals to 20% of our total
assets. Thus, we took the hypothesis that the D&A will remain stable and we have used the mean
of the last years, as the team doesn’t provide data on what’s expected on this aspect for the coming
years.
- Changes in WC
We assume that inventory will increase faster due to the Covid and then will keep the previous
trend We made three scenarios:
1) in the optimistic one, inventory and receivable decrease over years after the Covid
whereas payable increase.
2) in the normal one, figures follow the trend
3) In the pessimistic one, inventory and receivable increase whereas payable decrease.
- CAPEX
We can see that the past capex was somewhat difficult to predict. In the reports available, no
data regarding this evolution was presented for the coming years. Therefore, we decided to take
the mean of past capex to compute the future ones, and we have checked that it stays close to the
same level of D&A (around 25% of our total Assets).
3.2 The valuation methods

- DCF
After having finished the financial analysis of the last five years for Juventus, we kept on with
the assumptions described above to forecast some of the main financial data that will be
fundamental for the Valuation, beginning with the revenues and making predictions for three
scenarios: a pessimistic, a neutral and an optimistic approach, as described above.
On the continuation, we used these forecasts to calculate the NOPAT (Net Operating Profit
After Tax), considering for the following years the effective corporate tax rate as 24% - IRES in Italy.
After adjusting for non-cash items – such as depreciation and amortization, for changes in working
capital and for Capital Expenditure, we finally have the forecasts for the FCFF for each scenario.
The next step for the DCF Valuation is to calculate the discount rate in order to bring the forecasted
cash flows to present value. To do so, we are going to calculate the Weighted Average Cost of
Capital (WACC) of the firm. The formula of the WACC follows:
12
WACC = D/(D+E) * Kd *(1-Tax) + E/(E+D) * Ke
Where D means the value of the debt, E means the value of the Equity (both used are the
book values), Tax is the Italian corporate tax rate of 24% (IRES) and Ke and Kd are respectively
the costs of equity and debt. Kd is calculated based on the financial costs for the last fiscal years in
relation to the total debt. The calculation of the Ke is a bit more complicated, using the CAPM model.
To break the components of the cost of equity, we have a risk free rate (Rf) which in this case
is the interest rate paid by the 10 years german government bond – considered the risk-free
investment across Europe – with a yield value of 0,14%. Furthermore, the Equity Risk Premium is
a premium estimated to the risk of the investment in the country – the value used for the Italian risk
premium was taken from the table of risk premiums by Aswath Damodaran in his page at the NYU
website [3], and its value is 6,85% with rating Baa3. Finally the last information we need for the cost
of equity is the Beta, that is, the value of the correlation between the variations of the Juventus’
stock and the market – this value is 1,35 and was taken from the website Yahoo Finance [4].
With all these data, we calculate the Kd as 4,47%, the Ke as 9,39% and thus the WACC as
5,65%. Having the WACC value, we can bring the future forecasted cash flows to present value
(projections for the next 5 years) and also calculate the terminal value, that is, the value that will be
created by the company after these 5 years considering a constant growth of 1,25%.
We considered the 3 scenarios of forecasts described above and the share target prices
found for them are:
In this case, we note that the optimistic scenario is the one with the closest target price to
the actual market price of the share - on the date of this report, March 3rd 2021, 0,83 euros.
Considering scenario 1 (optimistic) and bringing all this information together, we have the
calculus of the Enterprise Value, which resulted in 1.654,95 million of euros. Now the final part of
the work consists in the bridging between this value and the one we are looking for, the Equity
Value. To do so, we need to add up the Cash (6 Million Euros) and subtract the value of the total
debt (396 million Euros), reaching an Equity Value of 1264,91 million of euros which divided by the
number of shares outstanding gives us a stock target price of 0,95 euros.
To give a better vision of the possible results from our valuation regarding, we have prepared
a sensitivity table for each scenario:
13
- Multiples
After calculating the DCF we believe it is often useful to assess how this club would be valued
when compared to the it’s peers. To do that we have chosen the following list of concurrent clubs
and have used the multiple methods on the following multiples:
(Data from 03/02/2021)
We would like to highlight the fact that the most common multiple (EV/EBITDA) couldn’t be
used as a lot of the clubs currently have a significantly negative EBITDA (even when picking a
weighted mean from the last years). So we’ve opted to go with the similar EV/Revenue, which was
found to be positive in all the clubs we have chosen to analyze.
14
Therefore, using the data from above, we reach the following results with the Mean and the
Median of the chosen multiples:
For the first part, we use the EV/Revenue analysis of all the clubs shown in the previous table
to estimate Juventus' share price. Thus, we arrive at 0.83 and 0.43 using the average and median
of these values. The result is close to the values obtained in the previous valuation in a normal or
optimistic scenario.
In a second moment, we use the clubs that have a positive Price/Book Value with the
objective of bringing our sample closer to the teams that like Juventus have a positive share price
and book value. Thus, taking only these more similar clubs, we obtained share prices of 0.15 and
0.11 for the mean and median respectively, which approximately meets our normal valuation
scenario.
Analyzing now only the 5 biggest clubs regarding their size (Enterprise Value), the clubs to
which Juventus seems to be more alike, we arrive at a slightly better and more optimistic vu.
As we can see we are not that far from what we calculated previously in our DCF. In this
case, for the revenue analysis, the values found were close to the positive scenario for the valuation
presented above.
This suggests that Juventus when compared to the other clubs could have a higher revenue
than what it has. As for the Book Value analysis, the share value was slightly below our normal
scenario, and we can see it doesn’t deviate too much when only picking the 5 bigger clubs.
15
- Comparable Transactions
We have looked for recent transactions among the most important European clubs - during
the last 10 years there were no big transactions. The most important and recent ones are:
1) PSG - bought by Qatar Sports Investments Group for 80 million Euros in 2011;
2) Chelsea - bought by Roman Abramovich for 155 million Euros in 2003;
3) Manchester City - bought by the Royal Prince of Abu Dhabi for 233 million Euros in 2008;
4) Liverpool - bought by the Fenway Sports Group for 333 million Euros in 2010;
5) Manchester United - bought by the Glazer family for 878 million Euros during the 2000's (the
family bought the shares during the years)
In this case, we decided not to calculate Juventus' value based on these transactions
because they are not either recent enough nor are a good representation of the current state of
clubs.
4) Conclusion
The whole world was severely affected by the coronavirus crisis and it was not different for
the football clubs. However, after some studying of the financial of Juventus, we realized that the
club had been already struggling financially during the past years, with negative cash flows and
losses. The club's revenues are somewhat unstable, some of them are heavily dependent on its
performance on the main competitions such as Serie A and UEFA Champions League - and others
have decreased due to empty stadiums throughout 2020. Furthermore, the club also has heavy
costs with wages of players which did not decrease with the pandemic and has a hard time creating
value for its shareholders (ROCE<WACC).
Following on after analyzing some of the financial aspects of the club as risks, liquidity and
returns, the most relevant part of this paper was to determine the Valuation of Juventus, establishing
a target price for its stocks. To do so, the first method we used was the DCF, counting with 3
scenarios of forecasts and some sensitivity analyses for each of them.
The result found for the neutral scenario with the expected growth on perpetuity of 1,25% and
the calculated 5,65% WACC was the stock price of only 0,31 euros, which is much inferior to the
market price of 0,83 euros (march 3rd, 2021). We moved onto the valuation by multiples and found
out that when compared to the EV/EBITDA and the Price/Book Value of the clubs in general,the
value of Juventus doesn’t go far from the values found in our DCF.
Therefore, based on the values found and the incapacity of the club to generate good returns,
our Recommendation is currently “SELL” and we believe that the current Share Price is only a
reflection of Juventus’s popularity and is definitely not based on financial aspects of the club.
16
5) References
[1]https://www.juventus.com/en/club/investor-relations/shareholding-title/current-shareholding
[2] https://www.juventus.com/en/club/investor-relations/statements
[3] http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/datafile/ctryprem.html
[4] https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/JUVE.MI/key-statistics?p=JUVE.MI
17
6) Appendix
Revenues segmented and forecasted for the next 5 years
18

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Index

1.2 Current Shareholding

Share capital stands at €

2.1 Revenue Analysis

We can see that Juventus

We are going to focus now

- Revenues from players’ registration rights

- Television and radio rights and media revenues

- Revenues from sponsorship and advertising

- Revenues from Sales of Products and Licenses

All these figures can be sum up in this graphic:

- Players wages and technical staff costs

- Expenses from players’ registrations rights

- Purchase of products for sale

- Covid - Comparison to other clubs

2.3 Industry Risks

- Risks connected with the general economic conditions

- Increase in competition from the top european club

- Risk connected to the sponsorship market and to commercial agreements

2.4 Financial Risks

- Risk connected to funding requirements

- Risk connected to fluctuations in interest rates and exchange rates

2.5 Liquidity Analysis

2.6 Return Analysis (ROE, ROIC, Creation of Value for Shareholders)

2018/2019 2019/2020 2020/2021 2021/2022 2022/2023 2023/2024 2024/2025

NOL (11,98) (29,02) (95,77) (172,34) (203,91) (230,48) (217,05)

IRAP (5%) (7,21) (7,26) (4,40) (6,65) (6,90) (8,90) (10,50)

3.1 Assumptions Made for the DCF

- For the “Optimistic Scenario”:

- And for the “Pessimistic Scenario”:

The forecasting of indicators in the following 5 years:

3.2 The valuation methods

(Data from 03/02/2021)

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