Rule 45 & Rule 65
Rule 45 & Rule 65
Rule 45 & Rule 65
Note that what is being assailed in this original action are the Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan dated 23 February 2006 and 4 August 2006 reversing the
Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause to hold respondent Manlapas liable to stand
trial for violation of Section 3, paragraph (f) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, and
ordering the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 28111. There is no question that these
Resolutions already constitute a final disposition of Criminal Case No. 28111, for after
ordering the dismissal of said case, there is nothing more for the graft court to do
therein. These Resolutions, therefore, are fit to be subjects of an appeal to this
Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
SECTION 1. Petition for Certiorari. – When any tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting
such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
The writ of certiorari issues for the correction of errors of jurisdiction only or grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It cannot be legally used
for any other purpose. Its function is only to keep the inferior court within the bounds
of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It may issue only when the following
requirements are alleged in the petition and established: (1) the writ is directed against a
tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such
tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal
or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Excess of
jurisdiction as distinguished from absence of jurisdiction, means that an act, though
within the general power of a tribunal, a board or an officer is not authorized, and is
invalid with respect to the particular proceeding, because the conditions which alone
authorize the exercise of the general power in respect of it are wanting. “Without
jurisdiction” means lack or want of legal power, right or authority to hear and determine
a cause or causes, considered either in general or with reference to a particular matter. It
means lack of power to exercise authority. [Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals, 456 Phil. 755, 784-785 (2003)]
Contrasting the two remedies, a petition for review is a mode of appeal, while a special
civil action for certiorari is an extraordinary process for the correction of errors of
jurisdiction. It is basic remedial law that the two remedies are distinct, mutually
exclusive, and antithetical. The extraordinary remedy of certiorari is proper if the
tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions acted without or
in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there is no
appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in law. A petition for review, on the
other hand, seeks to correct errors of judgment committed by the court, tribunal, or
officer. When a court, tribunal, or officer has jurisdiction over the person and the
subject matter of the dispute, the decision on all other questions arising from the case is
an exercise of that jurisdiction. Consequently, all errors committed in the exercise of
said jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment. Under prevailing procedural rules and
jurisprudence, errors of judgment are not proper subjects of a special civil action
for certiorari. For if every error committed by the trial court or quasi-judicial agency
were to be the proper subject of review by certiorari, then trial would never end and the
dockets of appellate courts would be clogged beyond measure. [Sebastian v. Hon.
Morales, 445 Phil. 595, 608 (2003)]
SEC. 2. Time for filing; extension. – The petition shall be filed within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution appealed from, or of the denial
of the petitioner’s motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after notice
of the judgment. x x x.
A party litigant wishing to file a petition for review on certiorari must do so within 15
days from receipt of the judgment, final order or resolution sought to be appealed. In
this case, the resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated 23 February 2006, denying the
motions for reconsideration of both petitioner Salvacion and the People, was received by
petitioner Salvacion on 22 August 2006. The instant Petition was filed only on 17
October 2006; thus, at the time of the filing of this Petition, 56 days had already
elapsed, way beyond the 15-day period within which to file a petition for review under
Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Procedure; and even beyond an extended period of 30
days, the maximum period to be granted by this Court had one been actually sought by
petitioner Salvacion. As the facts stand, petitioner Salvacion has already lost the right to
appeal viaRule 45.
Concomitant to a liberal application of the rules of procedure should be an effort on the
part of the party invoking liberality to at least explain its failure to comply with the rules.
[Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Court of Appeals, 389 Phil. 644, 656
(2000)] Herein, petitioner Salvacion’s recourse to this Court is bereft of any
explanation, meritorious or otherwise, as to why she failed to properly observe the rules
of procedure.
Allowing appeals, although filed late in some rare cases, may not be applied to petitioner
Salvacion for this rule is, again, qualified by the requirement that there must be
exceptional circumstances to justify the relaxation of the rules. [Bank of America, NT &
SA v. Gerochi, Jr., G.R. No. 73210, 10 February 1994, 230 SCRA 9, 15 citing Alto Sales
Corp. v. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court, 274 Phil. 914, 925-926 (1991)] We cannot
find any such exceptional circumstances in this case and neither has petitioner
Salvacion endeavored to allude to the existence of any. This being so, another
fundamental rule of procedure applies, and that is the doctrine that perfection of an
appeal within the reglementary period is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional, so
that failure to do so renders the questioned decision final and executory and deprives
the appellate court of jurisdiction to alter the final judgment, more so, to entertain the
appeal. [Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Court of Appeals, 452 Phil. 542,
551 (2003)]
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/november2008/175006.htm#_ftn49
— REMEDIAL LAW —
Petition for Certiorari, Distinctions between Rule 45 and 65, Doctrine of Procedural Void
The following are cases which explain the Distinctions between Rule 45 and 65
GO vs. CA
Where the trial court abuses its discretion by indefinitely suspending summary proceedings involving
ejectment cases, a petition for certiorari may be entertained by the proper court to correct the blunder.
In the interest of justice and in view of the procedural void on the subject, an appeal may be treated as a
petition for certiorari for this purpose and only in this instance, pro hac vice.
At the outset, clarification on petitioners mode of appeal is in order. Petitioners and counsel confuse
their petition as one Petition for Review under Rule 45 with a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. For
while they treat it as one for Review on Certiorari, they manifest that it is filed pursuant to Rule 65 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in relation to Rule 45 of the New Rules of Court.
In Ligon v. Court of Appeals where the therein petitioner described her petition as an appeal under Rule
45 and at the same time as a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, this
Court, in frowning over what it described as a chimera, reiterated that the remedies of appeal and
certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative nor successive.
To be sure, the distinctions between Rules 45 and 65 are far and wide. However, the most apparent is
that errors of jurisdiction are best reviewed in a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 while
errors of judgment can only be corrected by appeal in a petition for review under Rule 45.
This Court, however, in accordance with the liberal spirit which pervades the Rules of Court and in the
interest of justice may treat a petition for certiorari as having filed under Rule 45, more so if the same
was filed within the reglementary period for filing a petition for review.
The records show that the petition was filed on time both under Rules 45 and 65. Following Delsan
Transport, the petition, stripped of allegations of grave abuse of discretion, actually avers errors of
judgment which are the subject of a petition for review.
In certiorari proceedings under Rule 65, judicial review is limited to correcting errors of jurisdiction,
including grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Rule 65 cannot be more
explicit on this point. It reads:
Section.1. Petition for certiorari.- When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of its or his jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in
the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law
and justice may require.
For a writ of certiorari to issue, a petitioner must not only prove that the tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. He must also
show that he has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law against what he
perceives to be a legitimate grievance. A recourse affording prompt relief from the injurious effects of
the judgment or acts of a lower court or tribunal is considered “plain, speedy and adequate” remedy.
But errors of judgment not relating to jurisdiction are, as a rule, correctable only by appeal, not by the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari. For, as long as a court acts within its jurisdiction, any supposed error
committed in the exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than an error of judgment reviewable
and may be corrected by a timely appeal.
With the view we take of this case, petitioners interposed the present special civil action of certiorari as
an afterthought. They did so not because it is the speedy and adequate remedy, but to make up for the
loss, through sheer negligence or oversight, of the right of ordinary appeal. It cannot be
overemphasized, however, that the presence of a speedy and adequate remedy forbids recourse to
certiorari under Rule 65. Stated a bit differently, certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an
appeal, where the latter remedy is available. Here, there can be no denying the fact that the challenged
decision and resolution of the CA were not mere interlocutory orders but a final disposition on the
merits of the main case. Under the circumstances, petitioners’ remedy was by way of a petition for
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, under which only questions of law may be raised.
For obvious reason, the Rules precludes recourse to the special civil action of certiorari if appeal by way
of a petition for review is available, as the remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and
not alternative or successive.
At any rate, an appeal by petition for review under Rule 45, assuming its availability, is now lost for the
petitioners. An appeal is a mere statutory right to be exercised in the manner and according to
procedures laid down by law, and its timely perfection within the statutory period is mandatory and
jurisdictional.
At the outset, we note that, while Riviera alleges that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the instant petition is, as it should be, treated as a
petition for review under Rule 45 and not as a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court, now the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
The distinctions between Rule 45 and 65 are far and wide, the most notable of which is that errors of
jurisdiction are best reviewed in a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, while errors of
judgment are correctible only by appeal in a petition for review under Rule 45. The rationale for the
distinction is simple. When a court exercises its jurisdiction an error committed while so engaged does
not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error
committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void
judgment. This cannot be allowed. The administration of justice would not countenance such a rule.
Thus, an error of judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correctible
through the original special civil action of certiorari. Appeal from a final disposition of the Court of
Appeals, as in the case at bar, is by way of a petition for review under Rule 45.