ARTICLE IN PRESS

Global Environmental Change 18 (2008) 501– 507

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Global Environmental Change

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/gloenvcha

Understanding policy change: Multiple streams and emissions

trading in Germany
Steffen Brunner
Department of Geography and Environment, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK

a r t i c l e in fo abstract

Article history: This paper employs John Kingdon’s [1984. Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies. Little Brown,
Received 13 December 2007 Boston] ‘‘multiple streams’’ framework to analyse the sudden move from overgenerous grandfathering
Received in revised form to tight caps and auctioning within the German emissions trading regime in the first half of 2007. By
29 May 2008
bringing together empirical evidence from interviews and official documents the following question is
Accepted 30 May 2008
addressed: how completely does Kingdon’s framework explain this political turn? The opening of a
‘‘policy window’’ can be demonstrated and Kingdon’s theory concisely captures important aspects of
Keywords: this process. At the same time, however, the findings imply that a number of relevant factors are not
Political science sufficiently considered by the theory, most notably the influence of multi-level governance structures,
Climate policy
learning processes, and networks. This demonstrates that the multiple streams approach on its own is
Policy change
not sufficient to fully understand the case study example. Hence, for a better understanding of policy
Multiple streams
Emissions trading change it is suggested that scholars need to evaluate the potential for amending and combining
Kingdon’s model with other explanatory approaches.
& 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction captures a fundamental reality about irresistible movement that

sweeps over our politics and our society pushing aside everything
Environmental policy often conflicts with dominant business that might stand in its path’’. His objective is to move the analysis
and producer interests, resulting in policy stability and inertia. At from the usual political science preoccupation with power and
times, however, major disruptions to the policy equilibrium occur influence (possibly a critique of network analysis) on to the world
and regulations fundamentally change. The interesting question of ideas (Parsons, 1995). In contrast to authors who see the policy
to ask is what factors cause these shifts. In other words: why do process as mainly incremental (Lindblom, 1959), change in this
policies change? To answer this question, political scientists model may be radical and eruptive.
developed numerous analytical frameworks, which seek to Drawing upon the ‘‘garbage can model’’ of organisational
integrate the interests, ideas, resources, and constraints of choice (Cohen et al., 1972), Kingdon deals with how issues come to
relevant actors.One theory that has generated considerable be issues. For understanding processes within organisations, one
attention among researchers is Kingdon’s (1984) ‘‘multiple can view a ‘‘choice opportunity as a garbage can into which
streams’’ framework. This perspective emphasises the role of various kinds of problems and solutions are dumped by
ideas and agenda-setting in the policy process. Change occurs participants as they are generated’’ (Cohen et al., 1972, p. 2). In
when advantageous developments in three different streams this model, four distinctive streams determine the decision-
(problem, policy, and politics) converge in a ‘‘policy window’’. In process: problems, solutions, participants, and choice opportu-
this view, change partly relies on exogenous factors and is fairly nities. Using a revised version of the garbage can model, Kingdon
random. While studies have supported the framework’s useful- (1984) analyses the policy process as a function of only three
ness in explaining policy change in North America, only few streams: problems, policies, and politics.
applications to a European context exist. The problem stream embodies the issue of concern itself. There
are three mechanisms that serve to bring problems to the
attention of policy makers: first, indicators such as data and
2. Kingdon’s multiple streams model reports; second, focusing events such as disasters and symbols;
and third, other feedback channels such as media and public
Kingdon (1984, p. 1) suggests in his analysis of Agendas,
deliberation.
Alternatives and Public Policies that an ‘‘idea whose time has come,
The policy stream is conceptualised as a ‘‘primeval soup’’
in which ideas float around, confront one another and combine.
E-mail address: [email protected] The ‘‘soup’’ changes in a process of natural selection and

0959-3780/$ - see front matter & 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2008.05.003
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502 S. Brunner / Global Environmental Change 18 (2008) 501–507

recombination. Some ideas float to the top of the agenda and 2005). The case study presented below deals with the German
others fall to the bottom. The environment of this soup is implementation of the EU ETS. Germany was chosen for two
composed of policy communities. Some are closed, whilst others reasons: first, the success of the entire EU ETS crucially depends
are more open and fragmented. Swimming in this soup are policy on Germany as it is the largest participant in the scheme. Second,
entrepreneurs ‘‘who are willing to invest resources of various its recent move from grandfathering to auctioning represents an
kinds in hopes of a future return in the form of policies they illustrative and insightful example of radical policy change.
favour’’ (Kingdon, 1984, p. 151). They are crucial to the survival of
an idea and open up policy communities to gain acceptability for a
policy. The idea itself has to satisfy some criteria if it is to survive 3.1. EU ETS implementation
and get to the top. It must be technically feasible, fit the
community’s dominant values, and be able to anticipate potential Emissions trading entered the German debate in the 1970s
constraints under which this might operate. The final output of (Sandhövel, 1994) after the US was the first country to introduce a
this struggle is a list of alternatives to the governing agenda. tradable permits scheme (Ellerman et al., 2000). Though German
The political stream operates quite separately from the other scholars and politicians closely watched the development in the
two and crucially determines the status of the agenda item. It is US, industry resistance assured that the idea remained restricted
composed of a number of elements: to academic agendas only (Wurzel et al., 2003). In particular, the
chemical industry argued that there is no need for the adoption of
 National mood, public opinion. emissions trading as a new environmental policy instrument since
 Organized political forces: parties, legislative politics, pressure voluntary agreements had worked well on the national level
groups. (Wurzel et al., 2003). Three decades later, in December 2000, the
 Government: change in personnel and jurisdiction. Government was able to make a first step on the issue by setting
 Consensus-building: bargaining, band wagons, and tipping. up a working group on tradable permits. Unlike in the UK,
Germany never succeeded to install a national emissions trading
When those three streams join they temporarily create scheme. Rather, the introduction of this policy instrument was
advantageous choice opportunities which Kingdon terms ‘‘policy dependent on developments on the European level which
windows’’ or ‘‘windows of opportunity’’ (both terms are used culminated in the establishment of the EU ETS in January 2005.
interchangeably); a situation where a‘‘problem is recognised, a Within the EU ETS, each Member State specifies a cap on
solution is developed and available in the policy community, a overall CO2 emissions, along with a method of how to allocate
political change makes the right time for policy change, and emission allowances to its individual industrial facilities. Each
potential constraints are not severe’’ (Kingdon, 1984, p. 174). large point source gets a maximum amount of emission
Kingdon uses the metaphor of a launch window in a space flight allowances for a particular period. To comply, facilities can either
mission. If the window is lost, then the launch has to wait until reduce their emissions or purchase allowances from facilities with
alignments become appropriate again. The successful launch of a an excess of allowances. The envisaged allocation must be
policy change is the result of the opening of such a ‘‘window of documented in the National Allocation Plan (NAP), which is
opportunity’’ in the interplay of multiple streams. In this view, subject to approval by the Commission. Even though under
agendas are not just a reflection of power but also depend on certain circumstances the Commission has the power to challenge
chance. the NAP, the principal driver of allocation decisions still remains
Although Kingdon’s approach emerged as an influential within national politics.
perspective on the public policy process in the US, little attention Developments in phase I of the EU ETS (2005–2007) demon-
has been paid to extending its logic across countries (Baumgartner strate that this peripheral distribution of competencies has
et al., 2006). So far, empirical studies using Kingdon’s model have become the Achilles heel of the entire scheme (Grubb et al.,
been conducted for Canada (Howlett, 1998), Great Britain and 2005). In 2005, emitters included in the scheme obtained ca. 80
France (Zahariadis, 1995), and Great Britain and Germany million tons or 4% more permits than they actually needed
(Zahariadis and Allen, 1995). Nill (2002) combined the multiple (Ellerman and Buchner, 2006). The largest over-allocation hap-
streams approach with the electoral cycle view put forward by the pened in Germany, where industry received 21 million certificates
economic theory of democracy to analyse environmental innova- more than required. Since the trading system requires scarcity not
tion policies in Germany. The following discussion applies the affluence in order to give carbon a price, this over-allocation
multiple streams approach to the relatively new domain of resulted in serious destabilising effects on the market for
climate policy in Europe. It shall be investigated how well European Emission Allowances.
Kingdon’s approach explains the drivers of policy change in the Lessons learned from phase I largely influenced the allocation
case study example. process for phase II (2008–2012). In November 2006, the EU
Commission rejected Germany’s NAP II on the grounds that it was
over-generous again (EUC, 2006). The Commission asked the
3. Emissions trading in Germany Ministry for the Environment (BMU), which is responsible for the
allocation process, to scale back the amount of emission permits.
For students of policy change, the European climate policy German industry officials, however, urged the Government to
regime offers a compelling case study field. The subject is resist. In a letter to Chancellor Merkel, the officials from large
comparatively dynamic, although stakes are high and distribu- power firms alleged that if the Government agreed to the
tional impacts considerable. Usually, powerful producer groups Commission’s demands, the additional costs would force industry
tend to oppose the introduction of climate regulations because to re-think planned investment in German energy capacity
they fear additional costs and losses in international competitive- (VDEW, 2006). Also, potential losses in international competitive-
ness. In spite of this opposition, the world’s largest ever market for ness could seriously harm the economy. The Ministry for the
greenhouse gases, the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), was Economy (BMWi) therefore maintained in December 2006 that
established in 2005. The EU ETS today is Europe’s most important the Government would ignore the Commission’s demands (ENDS,
instrument to encourage the transition to a low-carbon economy 2006). Three months later, in March 2007, Germany stopped
(Peeters and Deketelaere, 2006; Michaelowa and Butzengeiger, resisting and accepted the new cap. As a result, German facilities
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S. Brunner / Global Environmental Change 18 (2008) 501–507 503

included in the scheme receive permits to emit 453 million tons argument, may in the long term lead to private and public benefits
CO2 yearly from 2008–2012. That is 29 million tons less than in the form of technological innovation and global warming
orginally requested. mitigation. Hence, the Stern Review helped supporters of tighter
emissions trading policies to ‘‘back up their rhetoric against
3.2. Shift from grandfathering to auctioning objections from business’’ (interview). It should be noted,
however, that neither Stern nor auctioning represents a big topic
in the broader public debate. Both issues are confined to smaller
In light of this fierce resistance to lower the cap it came as a
circles of experts and interested people because they require a
surprise to many when Germany voluntarily introduced auction-
certain amount of preliminary knowledge and economic under-
ing in the national allocation process in June 2007. The new
standing. Nevertheless, Stern helped to inform elites of the
Zuteilungsgesetz (allocation law) envisages that, from 2008, 8.8% of
economic necessity of tighter climate policies.
all permits should be sold instead of given out for free, further
The key findings of the IPCC report, in contrast, were
reducing the number of freely available emissions allowances by
recognised by broader circles of society (interview). The publica-
40 million tons (Bundestag, 2007). This voluntary reduction is in
tion in April 2007 was a big event in itself and the resulting media
addition and is about 11 million tons larger than the vigorously
coverage in Germany was substantial. As Grundmann (2007)
opposed previous budget on the cap. As a result, power generators
argues the German press tends to pay relatively high attention to
now have to purchase certificates for 40 million tons or 17% of
IPCC reports when compared to other countries such as the US.
their allocation, which will cost the sector about h900 million
This is even more true for the fourth assessment report, which
(given the current market price of European Emission Allowances
resulted in an unusually extensive coverage by German media. In
of h22). Compared to other participants in the scheme, Germany
addition, the publication of the fourth assessment report mattered
now assigns the highest share for auctioning in both absolute and
as a focusing event in a more subtle way—by establishing a
relative terms. Before the German Government changed its policy,
scientific link between climate change and recent ‘‘natural’’ events
Britain had with 7% the highest auctioning share of all Member
such as Hurricane Katrina. Natural disasters very powerfully focus
States.
public attention on the vulnerability of human society and the
importance of preventative environmental policies (Birkland,
1997). In linking natural disasters of the recent past with global
4. Discussion
warming, the fourth IPCC report contributed to the public’s
perception of climate change as a truly pressing problem.
Why did Germany change its emissions trading policy so
Al Gore’s movie ‘‘An inconvenient truth’’ also contributed to
radically? To answer this question the following discussion
increased global warming awareness (interview). The movie was
combines Kingdon’s framework with the information derived
released in German cinemas in October 2006, but in contrast to
from interviews and documents. The findings are organised
Stern and IPCC, the content is framed in non-technical, very
around the three streams: problem, policy, and politics. The
accessible terms. Many viewers were moved by the cartoon scene
discussion focuses on developments between December 2006,
in which a polar bear drowned in the Arctic because all the ice had
when Germany openly resisted adjustments to the cap of NAP II,
melted. Charismatic mega fauna is widely known as being a high-
and June 2007 when the country introduced auctioning as an
impact, emotional messenger of environmental issues. This links
allocation method. Events prior to December 2006 were con-
to a recent phenomenon in the German public debate on climate
sidered where respondents emphasised their importance for the
change: Knut the polar bear.
decision-making process.
Born shortly before Christmas 2006 in the Berlin Zoo, Knut
quickly came to embody an international symbol of climate
4.1. Problem stream change vulnerability. The German environment minister Sigmar
Gabriel claimed that there is ‘‘no other animal that better
In Kingdon’s model, for a policy to change, people must first be symbolises global warming’’ (cited in Guardian, 2007). In a very
convinced that there exists a problem and that something needs emotional way Knut combined the two issues of global warming
be done about it. It can be argued that the public debate on and animal rights. Such issue linkage can provide significant
climate change entered a hot phase in early 2007. Several opportunities for policy entrepreneurs (Howlett, 1998). According
indicators, focusing events, and other attention drawing factors to Kingdon (1984, p. 173) the key element in conflict expansion is
were identified in the problem stream, which supported this the way an issue is framed. Following this logic, environmentalists
heightened issue attention. used Knut to expand the reach of global warming to the
The belief that climate change represents a problem is a controversy on animal rights.
function of relevant personal experiences and messages from It is difficult, however, to assess Knut’s specific influence on
informants such as scientists and politicians (Krosnick et al., German climate policy. As noted above, emissions trading is an
2006). Interviewees stressed that two scientific publications in expert instrument whose connection to global warming mitiga-
particular influenced the public’s perception of climate change as tion is not widely understood. It is likely, however, that Knut
a political problem during this time period: the Stern Review contributed to facilitating tougher climate regulations by elevat-
(October 2006) and the IPCC’s fourth assessment report (April ing the problem on the public’s agenda. Even if it sounds cynical in
2007). the light of humanitarian climate catastrophes such as Darfur and
Stern’s report on the economics of climate change shaped the New Orleans: for the animal-loving German public, cute Knut
public debate worldwide to a considerable extent. Especially in became the key courier of ‘‘a stern review’’.
economically prosperous and capitalistic societies such as The influence of Stern, IPCC, Gore, Knut, and others culminated
Germany, Stern’s key message found many open ears: fighting in a peak of general global warming awareness in the first half of
global warming, although costly, pays in the long run (Stern, 2007. When asked in March to name the nation’s most pressing
2007). Among politicians and business representatives, economic problem, 16% of all Germans expressed their concern about
rents are a powerful argument. Auctioning emission permits climate change (Politbarometer, 2007, see Fig. 1). This is second
instead of giving them out for free may impose short-term costs after the all-time top issue in German politics, namely unemploy-
on business. But the economic incentives they create, goes the ment. After a temporary downturn in April and May, climate
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504 S. Brunner / Global Environmental Change 18 (2008) 501–507

change became the second most-important political issue again tougher emissions trading policies quickly floated to the top of
in June. Both peaks correspond with developments in the politi- the agenda. It is difficult to say, however, when exactly the idea of
cal stream discussed below: the German EU Presidency secured auctioning first entered the ‘‘soup’’. Kingdon (1984, p. 77) cites
an important climate policy deal in March and in June the 2007 one of his (US) respondents saying ‘‘This is not like a river. There is
G8 summit in Germany put climate change on the top of its no point of origin’’. What interviewees could identify, however,
agenda. was what the main instrument-related reasons in favour of
Although this temporary climax in public attention is remark- auctioning were: political economy considerations and public
able, it stays in line with longer-term trends in German concern about windfall profits.
Umweltbewusstsein (environmental awareness). A national survey Grandfathering leads to increased lobbying activities because
conducted on behalf of the Environment Ministry in 2006 emission allowances, which have a monetary value, are given out
revealed that a grand majority of 67% want the country to take for free. Who does not want to have as much as possible from
a leading role in international climate policy (BMU, 2006, see something which is gratis but precious? German industry very
Fig. 2). This is a substantial increase compared to the past (2002: successfully lobbied for an overgenerous allocation of emission
47%, 2004: 56%). In summary, this suggests that seldom before did allowances in phase I (Ellerman and Buchner, 2006). This was
climate change appear that high on the public agenda in Germany. partly possible due to resource dependencies between govern-
One could argue that global warming awareness was pushed ment and industry. Since the latter holds necessary information
beyond a tipping point, creating favourable conditions for climate such as technology specifications and emissions data, the
policy entrepreneurs. government is dependent on its cooperation. Producers, however,
have an economic incentive to inflate their emission numbers as
well as their compliance costs because that may augment
4.2. Policy stream allocation quantity (Bailey et al., 2002). When producers have to
pay for permits, however, they will use the information they hold
When a problem is identified, the search for a solution begins. and only buy as many certificates as they need. Thus, auctioning
Out of the many ideas floating in the ‘‘policy primeval soup’’ could make the allocation process more transparent and efficient
(Kingdon, 1984, pp. 19, 121–131) the ones that are technically and (Hepburn et al., 2006).
financially feasible swim to the top. As Europe’s most important A possibility to introduce auctioning in the allocation process
instrument to efficiently induce greenhouse gas abatement, opened when the Commission rejected Germany’s NAP II on the
grounds that it was overgenerous again. Following the logic ‘‘new
cap, new plan’’ the Government sought to ‘‘guard its face by
20 abandoning the old draft of the allocation law and opening a new
debate’’ (interview). Proponents of auctioning seized this oppor-
tunity. Kingdon (1984, p. 179) calls these people ‘‘policy-
15 entrepreneurs’’, people ‘‘who are trying to advocate change are
like surfers waiting for the big wave’’. The spur-of-the-moment
10 renegotiation of the Zuteilungsgesetz was their ‘‘big wave’’.
However, as one interviewee pointed out, politicians find little
vote payoff in those rather technical issues. The expert question of
5
auctioning vs. grandfathering promises ‘‘a lot of debate and little
public reward’’ (interview) and was therefore not sufficient on its
0 own to overcome industry resistance. This suggests that in order
Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug to increase the political acceptability of a new allocation method,
06 07 more popular arguments than transparency considerations were
needed. The significant income emissions trading created for the
power sector represented such an issue of considerable public
attention.
The large windfall profits generated by grandfathering turn out
Fig. 1. Percentage of voters who consider climate change as most important
problem (source: Politbarometer, 2007, several issues). to be a major political argument in favour of auctioning (inter-
view). It is estimated that between 2005 and 2007 the windfall
profits of German power producers accrue to h5 billion yearly
(FAZ, 2007). Although all emission permits are allocated for free in
phase I, utilities managed to raise the price for electricity. Industry
23% spokesmen put forward the ‘‘cost’’ of emission allowances as one
reason for soaring prices. Including emission allowances in price
10% should lead calculation makes economic sense because they do represent an
should adopt opportunity cost (Tietenberg, 2006). The sector’s ability, however,
pace of other to entirely pass on those ‘‘costs’’ to consumers hints to
countries
oligopolistic structures. Indeed, the German market authority as
don't know
67% well as the EU Commission maintains cartel investigations against
German power companies.
As a result of the sector’s huge profits and simultaneously
raising electricity prices, power utilities fell in public disgrace. The
industry’s bad image made it highly unpopular for politicians to
safeguard their interests. Instead, it became ‘‘politically opportune
to beat down on energy corporations’’ (interview). Hence, one
Fig. 2. Voters’ preference for Germany’s role in international climate policy major reason the idea of auctioning became politically accepted
(source: BMU, 2006). was not because it strengthens economic incentives for CO2
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S. Brunner / Global Environmental Change 18 (2008) 501–507 505

abatement but because it recovers windfall profits from the making in Europe is characterised by multi-level governance
despised energy cartel. structures, which tend to impede the sovereignty of national
parliaments (Knill and Lenschow, 2000). At times, national
parliaments consider themselves neglected in the EU policy
4.3. Political stream process and a ‘‘mere secretary who just has to sign the law on
the dotted line’’ (interview). Hence, the Parliament saw the
In early 2007 conditions in the problem and policy stream inclusion of auctioning as an ‘‘opportunity to give the draft an
were favourable for a change on allocation method and quantity. individual touch’’ (interview) in the interplay of Commission,
This alone, however, is not sufficient to initiate policy change. Government, and Parliament.
According to Kingdon (1984) a policy stream can be triggered to The G8 summit of June 2007 represents a second occasion
converge with a problem stream by a change in the political when German climate policy became exposed to international
stream. For instance, institutionalised procedural events may scrutiny (interview). As host of the Heiligendamm summit,
initiate such a development. In contrast to Baumgartner and Jones Germany put climate change on top of the agenda. The national
(1993) who describe agenda-setting as a purely random process, mood was such that Merkel’s domestic popularity could gain from
Kingdon (1984) allows for the existence of ‘‘institutional win- reaching a relevant agreement on global climate policy. Yet, some
dows’’ such as elections or periodical rotations in governing participants, in particular the US, did not share the host’s opinion
bodies. Interviewees identified two important institutionalised that a global emission trading regime with fixed caps must be
windows in the political stream: Germany’s EU Presidency in the established in order to combat climate change. Thus, similarly to
first half of 2007 and the Heiligendamm G8 summit in June. Germany’s role in prior EU climate negotiations, the Government
A first institutional window opened when Germany took over was encouraged to demonstrate international leadership by
the rotating Presidency of the Council of the European Union from supporting tougher climate policies at home.
Finland in January 2007. When German Chancellor Merkel led Overall, the influence of these international political events on
Europe to adopt the ambitious ‘‘3*20 deal’’ of March, not every domestic politics should not be underestimated. A Government
Member State was convinced of the targets’ necessity: by 2020, report of July 2007 directly links the EU Presidency, the G8
union-wide CO2 emissions shall fall by 20% (compared to 1990 summit, and national efforts to further tighten the emissions
levels), energy efficiency shall rise by 20%, and the share of trading regime (Kanzleramt, 2007). By focusing on climate change
renewable energy sources shall go up to 20% (CEU, 2007). Since it these international high-profile events encouraged a ‘‘powerful
held the Presidency, Germany was in charge of bringing the comeback of environmental policy in German politics’’ (inter-
divergent interests to agree on this ambitious plan. Obviously, a view). One major profiteer of this development was the Ministry
‘‘lax position on national climate policy would have damaged the for the Environment itself.
Presidency’s credibility’’ (interview). This finding is in accordance There exists a classic rivalry between economic and environ-
with Wurzel (1996) who contends that the EU Presidency exerts a mental interests and the ministries that safeguard them. The
substantial influence on Member States’ environmental policy and administrative fragmentation within government reinforces a
behaviour. Yet, in early 2007, the German Ministry for the special-interest approach to public policy in which each ministry
Economy in particular was still at unease with NAP II negotiations tends to act as a sponsor of the key stakeholders within its policy
and the Commission’s demands to budget on the cap. As one domain (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992). Usually the Ministry for the
ministry official put it: ‘‘Had we not had the Presidency we would Economy (BMWi) dominates in this struggle. Interviewees,
have gone to court against the Commission’’ (interview). To however, identified two processes in the political stream, which
maintain her credibility, however, the Chancellor ‘‘held the BMWi allowed the Environment Ministry (BMU) to temporarily surpass
on a short leash’’ (interview) and accepted the lower cap. In the BMWi in domestic politics.
addition, it needs to be pointed out that Ms. Merkel is the first First, a ‘‘vertical’’ issue shift onto the EU level raised the BMU’s
German Chancellor ever who also served as an Environment political profile. As one interviewee emphasised, this process can
Minister and, as a trained physicists, probably has a good be well captured by the notion of ‘‘venue shopping’’ (Baumgartner
understanding of climate change and related threats. All factors and Jones, 1993). Radical policy change often occurs when actors
combined helped to open the door for more progressive climate succeed in shifting debates to new venues, which are prone to
policies where the introduction of auctioning can be seen as yet different arguments than the venue that originally dealt with the
another mean to demonstrate leadership. In this process, the issue. Baumgartner and Jones (1993) focus on venues within the
Parliament played a crucial part. US, but a similar argument can be made about the choice between
When the Bundestag, the German parliament, started to debate national and European institutions (Princen, 2007). This suggests
the Government’s draft of the Zuteilungsgesetz in June, a that the BMU may have sought to shift the debate on auctioning
significant target for auctioning had not yet been included. The from the national to the more favourable European (or even
Parliament, however, supported the idea of auctioning. Aside from global, see G8 above) level. And indeed, in an informal EU meeting
considering this a mere reaction to encouraging conditions in the Environment Minister Gabriel argued that if ‘‘you really take this
problem and policy stream, political considerations play a role in instrument seriously you have to auction 100% [of allowances] at
here. First, there is a ‘‘tendency that the Parliament pushes some point in time’’ (ENDS, 2007).
environmental legislation more strongly than the Government’’ Second, a ‘‘horizontal’’ issue shift occurred when the BMU used
does (interview). More often than not, government serves as a the Presidency to ‘‘expand the reach of climate policy into the
patron of privileged producer interests where the major corpora- BMWi-sphere of industrial policy via the notion of ecological
tist actors share the common goal of unchallenged economic industrial policy’’ (interview). In February 2007 the European
expansion (Hukkinen, 1995). The Parliament, in contrast, is less Parliament published a strategy paper advocating the establish-
exposed to industry lobbying and tends to support environmental ment of a ‘‘green hydrogen economy and a third industrial
regulations. The first half of 2007 was an opportune moment to revolution in Europe’’ including a ‘‘decentralised bottom-up
stand up against the government, also because it was half way hydrogen infrastructure’’ (EUP, 2007, p. 2). Similarly, under the
between the prior (2005) and the next general elections (2009). German Presidency the Council of European Environment Minis-
This is usually the time when ‘‘parliaments wish to place their ters discussed in its June 2007 meeting the ‘‘Elements of a
own political fragrance’’, as one interviewee put it. Second, policy- European Ecological Industrial Policy’’ concluding that ‘‘nothing
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506 S. Brunner / Global Environmental Change 18 (2008) 501–507

less than a third industrial revolution’’ is needed (BMU, 2007a, 5. Conclusion

p. 18).1 By reframing climate policy in terms of innovation and
industrial policy and by highlighting the growth potential Summing up, it can be argued that Kingdon’s theory of
embedded in this ‘‘third industrial revolution’’ the BMU success- multiple streams accurately captures several processes which
fully ‘‘took the wind out of the BMWi’s sail’’ (interview) and gave contributed to the radical change in Germany’s position on
tougher climate regulations higher political acceptability, even emissions trading.
within business circles. First, the analysis of the problem stream revealed that the
climate issue was unusually high on the national and interna-
4.4. Explanatory shortcomings tional public agenda during the first half of 2007. Several focusing
events and scientific publications fall in this time. The temporal
culmination of these attention-drawing factors led to a peak in
The previous discussion suggests that the multiple streams
public perception of climate change as a pressing problem.
approach, by and large, provides a good framework for analysing
Second, a window opened in the policy stream when
Germany’s sudden policy change in regard to auctioning. At
modifications of allocation quantity and method were renego-
the same time, however, interviewees highlighted important
tiated by the Government. Evidence was found that policy
factors that could not be predicted by Kingdon’s theory. The
entrepreneurs seized this opportunity to bring the idea of
degree to which this is applicable varies considerably from
auctioning into the debate. In particular, the avoidance of windfall
stream to stream. Whereas findings in the problem stream
profits could be used as an argument in support of auctioning.
largely confirm the theory, several factors in the policy and, to
Third, the high-profile events of the German EU Presidency and
an even larger extent, in the political stream, were only partly
the G8 summit in Heiligendamm opened an institutional window
captured.
in the political stream. The national mood was such that the
First, the impact of multi-level games on national politics, in
introduction of tougher climate regulations became politically
particular within the European Union, is underrepresented in
advantageous.
Kingdon’s model. This is not surprising, as it was developed
At the same time, however, interviewees emphasised causal
in a US context where relevant multi-level governance struc-
relationships the framework is less able to capture, most notably
tures beyond the nation state are absent. Nevertheless, Richardson
the role of multi-level governance structures, learning processes,
(1996) contends that Kingdon’s primeval soup well matches
and the influence of networks. The lack of several potentially
EU agenda-setting with its many actors, levels, and ideas.
insightful perspectives in the framework recommends the
This, however, refers to the emergence of ideas in the EU’s
employment of more than one analytical model. This finding is
policy stream. The national political stream and the influence
in line with Cairney (2007) who argues that studies which rely on
of EU institutions on it are overlooked by this notion. For
several frameworks give a more complete explanation of policy
instance, the finding that the German Parliament’s attempt to
change and its drivers. Needless to say that the enhanced
demonstrate sovereignty vis-à-vis EU Parliament and Commission
explanatory power of a ‘‘multi-lenses’’ (Cairney, 2007) approach
was a driver for policy change cannot be predicted by Kingdon’s
may, on the downside, increase the complexity of the analysis.
theory.
Nevertheless, Kingdon’s model represents a powerful framework
Second, some interviewees stressed the notion of learning for
and its fruitful combination and extension with other potentially
explaining the policy shift towards auctioning. Both (Sabatier,
insightful analytical approaches promises to be an interesting area
1988; Hall, 1993) argue that policy change is dependent on a
for further research and debate.
process of social learning by government, business, and wider
society. In understanding policy change, analysts also need to
focus on elite opinion and the factors that encourage shifts in
Appendix. Interviewees
belief systems over long periods of time. Kingdon’s theory,
however, lacks a distinctive consideration of learning processes.
It does not pay sufficient attention to the way previous policies Name Organisation Date
affect current debates and, ultimately, instrument choice.
As a result, it has been criticised as being ‘‘ahistorical’’ (Weir, 1 Christoph Bals Germanwatch 20.08.07
1992). 2 Hans-Josef Fell Member of Parliament (Green Party) 16.08.07
3 Eric Heymann Deutsche Bank Research 31.07.07
Third, with its emphasis on ideas and their role in agenda- 4 Klaus Jacob Environmental Policy Research Centre, FU Berlin 24.07.07
setting, Kingdon’s model probably underestimates the importance 5 Felix Matthes Öko-Institut 23.08.07
of interests and networks. Especially in connection with policy- 6 Martin Ruhberg VDEW (Association of German Energy Producers) 25.07.07
oriented learning, networks of experts contribute to agenda- 7 Reinhard Schultz Member of Parliament (Social Democratic Party) 23.08.07
8 Matthias Seiche BUND (Friends of the Earth Germany) 08.08.07
setting and policy change (Bennett and Howlett, 1992). ‘‘Epistemic
9 Erich Wallenwein Federal Ministry for the Economy 06.08.07
communities’’ (Haas, 1992), for example, exert substantial 10 Dirk Weinreich Federal Ministry for the Environment 21.08.07
influence on policy choice, especially during the establishment
of climate regimes where the issue’s complex nature requires All interviews were conducted by phone.
specific expertise and knowledge (Boehmer-Christiansen, 2002).
Zahariadis and Allen (1995) seek to ameliorate this deficiency in
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