Flight Attendants (F ASAP) v.

PAL SUPRA a second motion for reconsideration authorizes

2018 the filing of the second motion for
reconsideration. Thereby, the second motion for
General Fule: 2nd MR is prohibited reconsideration is no longer a prohibited
Exception: Higher interest of justice pleading, and the Court cannot deny it on such
basis alone.
(Fernandez)
Nonetheless, we should stress that the rule
FACTS; prohibiting the filing of a second motion for
reconsideration is by no means absolute.
Wala nang material facts, direct to the procedural Although Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court
points since this is a Resolution. disallows the filing of a second motion for
reconsideration, 59the Internal Rules of the
Resolving the appeal of F ASAP, the Third Supreme Court (IRSC) allows an exception, to
Division of the Court promulgated its decision on wit:
July 22, 2008 reversing the decision promulgated
on August 23, 2006 by the Court of Appeals (CA) Section 3. Second motion for
and entering a new one finding PAL guilty of reconsideration. - The Court shall not
unlawful retrenchment (labor). entertain a second motion for
reconsideration, and any exception to this
PAL filed MR - Denied through Resolution rule can only be granted in the higher
PAL filed MR on the SC Resolution - Denied interest of justice by the Court en bane
upon a vote of at least two-thirds of its
PAL filed second MR. Meanwhile, J. Ynares- actual membership. There is
Santiago, writer of the resolution retired. Case reconsideration "in the higher interest of
was then raffled to Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, justice" when the assailed decision is not
Jr.. Justice Velasco, Jr. subsequently inhibited only legally erroneous, but is likewise
himself from the case due to personal reasons — patently unjust and potentially capable of
was again re-raffled to Justice Arturo D. Brion. causing unwarranted and irremediable
Eventually, Second Division (Brion) denied with injury or damage to the parties. A second
finality PAL’s Second Motion for Reconsideration. motion for reconsideration can only be
entertained before the ruling sought to be
Thereafter, PAL, through Atty. Estelito P. reconsidered becomes final by operation
Mendoza, its collaborating counsel, sent a series of law or by the Court's declaration.
of letters inquiring into the propriety of the
successive transfers of the case. — (As you may The conditions that must concur in order for the
have already noticed since 1st year, Estelito Court to entertain a second motion for
Mendoza is more supreme than the Supreme reconsideration are the following, namely: 1. The
Court - So the SC EN BANC recalled Brion’s motion should satisfactorily explain why granting
resolution. the same would be in the higher interest of justice;
2. The motion must be made before the ruling
ISSUE: WON the filing of a 2nd MR is proper. sought to be reconsidered attains finality; 3. If the
Yes. ruling sought to be reconsidered was rendered by
the Court through one of its Divisions, at least
HELD: three members of the Division should vote to
elevate the case to the Court En Banc; and 4. The
With the Court’s resolution of January 20, 2010 favorable vote of at least two-thirds of the Court
granting PAL’s motion for leave to file a second En Bane’s actual membership must be mustered
motion for reconsideration, PAL's Second Motion for the second motion for reconsideration to be
for Reconsideration of the Decision of July 22, granted.60
2008 could no longer be challenged as a
prohibited pleading. It is already settled that the PAL maintains that the July 22, 2008 decision
granting of the motion for leave to file and admit contravened prevailing jurisprudence 62that had
recognized its precarious financial condition;63
that the decision focused on PAL’s inability to
prove its financial losses due to its failure to
submit audited financial statements; that the
decision ignored the common findings on the
serious financial losses suffered by PAL made by
the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, the CA and even the
SEC;64 and that the decision and the subsequent
resolution denying PAL’s motion for
reconsideration would negate whatever financial
progress it had achieved during its
rehabilitation.65 These arguments of PAL sufficed
to show that the assailed decision contravened
settled jurisprudence on PAL’s precarious
financial condition. It cannot be gainsaid that
there were other businesses undergoing
rehabilitation that would also be bound or
negatively affected by the July 22, 2008 decision.
This was the higher interest of justice that the
Court sought to address, which the dissent by
Justice Leonen is adamant not to accept. 66Hence,
we deemed it just and prudent to allow PAL’s
Second Motion for Reconsideration of the
Decision of July 22, 2008.

WHEREFORE, CA is Affirmed. Abswelto ang

PAL. Estelito Mendoza is king.
 To recapitulate, a party-litigant may either file his
notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the
Regional Trial Court’s decision or file it within 15
days from receipt of the order (the "final order")
Sumiran v. Spouses Damaso denying his motion for new trial or motion for
2009 reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day
period may be availed of only if either motion is
Re: Neypes Doctrine filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and
executory after the lapse of the original appeal
(Fernandez) period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.6

FACTS: The "fresh period rule" finally eradicates the

confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period
Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money and should be counted from receipt of notice of
damages with prayer for preliminary attachment judgment or from receipt of notice of "final order"
(Civil Case No. 93-2588) against respondents appealed from.
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo
City, Branch 73. Petitioner is also the private With the fresh period rule, the 15-day period
complainant in Criminal Case Nos. 92-8157 and within which to file the notice of appeal was
92-8158 for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 counted from notice of the denial of the therein
with respondent Generoso Damaso as accused. petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Upon motion of respondents, said civil and
criminal cases were consolidated and jointly tried. In First Aqua Sugar Traders, Inc. v. Bank of the
Philippine Islands, we held that a party-litigant
RTC decided in favor of Damasos may now file his notice of appeal either within
fifteen days from receipt of the original decision
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration dated or within fifteen days from the receipt of the
March 4, 2003 - denied order denying the motion for reconsideration.

On May 29, 2003, petitioner filed a Notice of The determinative issue is whether the "fresh
Appeal dated May 28, 2003, stating instead that period" rule announced in Neypes could
he received a copy of the decision dated January retroactively apply in cases where the period for
16, 2003 only on March 8, 2003 and of the Order appeal had lapsed prior to 14 September 2005
dated May 9, 2003 denying his motion for when Neypes was promulgated.
reconsideration on May 19, 2003.
- Denied for having been filed out of time. The "fresh period rule" is a procedural law as it
prescribes a fresh period of 15 days within which
ISSUE: an appeal may be made in the event that the
motion for reconsideration is denied by the lower
WON the appeal was filed on time. YES. court. Following the rule on retroactivity of
procedural laws, the "fresh period rule" should be
HELD: applied to pending actions, such as the present
case.
As early as 2005, the Court categorically declared
in Neypes v. Court of Appeals5 that by virtue of IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is
the power of the Supreme Court to amend, repeal GRANTED. CA reversed.
and create new procedural rules in all courts, the
Court is allowing a fresh period of 15 days within
which to file a notice of appeal in the RTC,
counted from receipt of the order dismissing or
denying a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration
 Section 1. How appeal taken; time for
filing. -- A party desiring to appeal from a
decision of the RTC rendered in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may
file a verified petition for review with the
Court of Appeals, paying at the same
time to the clerk of said court the
corresponding docket and other lawful
Ross Rica Sales Center v. Spouses Ong fees, depositing the amount of ₱500.00 for
2005 costs, and furnishing the Regional Trial
Court and the adverse party with a copy
The [subsequent] filing of the Motion for of the petition. The petition shall be filed
Reconsideration may be deemed as an effective and served within fifteen (15) days from
withdrawal of the defective Notice of Appeal. notice of the decision sought to be
reviewed or of the denial of petitioner’s
(Fernandez) motion for new trial or reconsideration
filed in due time after judgment. Upon
FACTS: proper motion and the payment of the
full amount of the docket and other
The case originated from a complaint for lawful fees and the deposit for costs
ejectment filed by petitioners against respondents. before the expiration of the reglementary
Petitioners alleged the fact of their ownership of period, the Court of Appeals may grant
three (3) parcels of land. Petitioners likewise an additional period of fifteen (15) days
acknowledged respondent Elizabeth Ong’s only within which to file the petition for
ownership of the lots previous to theirs. Ross Rica review. No further extension shall be
Sales Center, Inc. and Juanito King and Sons, Inc. granted except for the most compelling
(petitioners) had acquired the lands from reason and in no case to exceed fifteen
Mandaue Prime Estate Realty. In turn, it appears (15) days.
that Mandaue Prime Estate Realty had acquired
the properties from the respondents through a Since the unlawful detainer case was filed with
Deed of Absolute Sale. this latter deed of sale and the MTC and affirmed by the RTC, petitioners
The transfers of title consequential thereto were should have filed a Petition for Review with the
subsequently sought to be annulled by Court of Appeals and not a Notice of Appeal with
respondents. the RTC. However, we consider this to have been
remedied by the timely filing of the Motion for
MTC ordered respondents to vacate. Reconsideration on the following day. Section 3,
RTC affirmed. Rule 50 of the Rules of Court allows the
On 8 May 1997, respondents filed a notice of withdrawal of appeal at any time, as a matter of
appeal. However, on the following day, they filed right, before the filing of the appellee’s brief.
a motion for reconsideration. Applying this rule contextually, the filing of the
Motion for Reconsideration may be deemed as an
ISSUE: effective withdrawal of the defective Notice of
Appeal.
Was the RTC was correct when it declared that
the Motion for Reconsideration was barred by the Perforce, the period of appeal was tolled by the
filing of the Notice of Appeal, no matter how Motion for Reconsideration and started to run
erroneous the latter mode was? YES. again from the receipt of the order denying the
Motion for Reconsideration. A Motion for
HELD: Additional Time to File the Petition was likewise
filed with the Court of Appeals. Counting fifteen
Rule 42 governs the mode of appeal applicable in (15) days from receipt of the denial of the Motion
this case. Sec. 1 provides: for Reconsideration and the ten (10)-day request
for additional period, it is clear that respondents
filed their Petition for Review on time. RTC affirmed.

In the case at bar, a petition for review before the On June 16, 2011, Intramuros filed its Petition for
Court of Appeals is the proper mode of appeal Review on Certiorari, assailing the April 14, 2011
from a decision of the RTC. Since the filing of the Decision of the Regional Trial Court.
notice of appeal is erroneous, it is considered as if
no appeal was interposed. ISSUE:

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The WON Certiorari was the correct remedy. NO.
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 6 January
1998 is REVERSED HELD:

At the outset, petitioner should have filed a

petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of
Court to assail the Regional Trial Court's ruling
upholding the Metropolitan Trial Court October
Intramuros v. Offshore Construction 19, 2010 Order instead of filing a petition for
2018 review on certiorari under Rule 45 with this
Court.
The remedy from an adverse decision rendered
by a Regional Trial Court exercising its appellate Under Rule 42, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, the
jurisdiction is to file a verified petition for review remedy from an adverse decision rendered by a
with the Court of Appeals. Regional Trial Court exercising its appellate
jurisdiction is to file a verified petition for review
(Fernandez) with the Court of Appeals:

FACTS: Section 1. How appeal taken; time for

filing. -A party desiring to appeal from a
In 1998, Intramuros leased certain real properties decision of the Regional Trial Court
of the national government, which it rendered in the exercise of its appellate
administered to Offshore Construction. During jurisdiction may file a verified petition for
the lease period, Offshore Construction failed to review with the Court of Appeals, paying
pay its utility bills and rental fees, despite several at the same time to the clerk of said court
demand letters. 15Intramuros tolerated the the corresponding docket and other
continuing occupation, hoping that Offshore lawful fees, depositing the amount of
Construction would pay its arrears. Offshore ₱500.00 for costs, and furnishing the
Construction continued to fail to pay its arrears. Regional Trial Court and the adverse
On March 26, 2010, Offshore Construction party with a copy of the petition. The
received Intramuros' latest demand letter. petition shall be filed and served within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the
Intramuros filed a Complaint for Ejectment before decision sought to be reviewed or of the
the Manila Metropolitan Trial Court. denial of petitioner's motion for new trial
or reconsideration filed in due time after
Offshore Construction filed a Very Urgent judgment. Upon proper motion and the
Motion, 21praying that Intramuros' complaint be payment of the full amount of the docket
dismissed on the grounds of violation of the rule and other lawful fees and the deposit for
on non-forum shopping, lack of jurisdiction over costs before the expiration of the
the case, and litis pendentia. reglementary period, the Court of
Appeals may grant an additional period
The Metropolitan Trial Court found that of fifteen (15) days only within which to
Intramuros committed forum shopping and that file the petition for review. No further
it had no jurisdiction over the case extension shall be granted except for the
 most compelling reason and in no case to
exceed fifteen (15) days.

Petitioner puts in issue before this Court the

findings of the Metropolitan Trial Court that it
has no jurisdiction over the ejectment complaint
and that petitioner committed forum shopping
when it failed to disclose two (2) pending cases,
one filed by respondent Offshore Construction
and the other filed by respondent's group of
tenant. Both of these cases raise questions of law,
which are cognizable by the Court of Appeals in a
petition for review under Rule 42.

"A question of law exists when the law applicable

to a particular set of facts is not settled, whereas a
question of fact arises when the truth or falsehood
of alleged facts is in doubt."67 This Court has
ruled that the jurisdiction of a court over the
subject matter of a complaint 68and the existence
of forum shopping 69are questions of law.

A petition for review under Rule 42 may include

questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of
fact and law. This Court has recognized that the
power to hear cases on appeal in which only
questions of law are raised is not vested
exclusively in this Court. 71As provided in Rule
42, Section 2, errors of fact or law, or both,
allegedly committed by the Regional Trial Court
in its decision must be specified in the petition for
review.

Petitioner's direct resort to this Court, instead of

to the Court of Appeals for intermediate review
as sanctioned by the rules, violates the principle
of hierarchy of courts.

Nonetheless, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is

not inviolable, and this Court has provided
several exceptions to the doctrine. One of these
exceptions is the exigency of the situation being
litigated.Here, the controversy between the
parties has been dragging on since 2010, which
should not be the case when the initial dispute-an
ejectment case-is, by nature and design, a
summary procedure and should have been
resolved with expediency.

Thus, petitioner's resort to this Court is proper

and warranted under the circumstances.
 MR - the court denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration for utter lack of merit.

Petitioner filed on October 8, 1998, with the Court

of Appeals a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or
restraining order. - dismissed.

ISSUE:

WON CA GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION

IN RESOLVING ISSUES WHICH ARE PROPER
SUBJECT OF APPEAL (ORDINARY APPEAL)
AND NOT RAISED IN THE PETITION. NO.

HELD:

Suffice it to say that the rule is wellsettled that in

appeals by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, only errors of law may be raised. 20 The
remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually
exclusive and not alternative or successive. 21
Certiorari as a mode of appeal under Rule 45
should be distinguished from certiorari as an
Mackay v. Angeles original action under Rule 65. In an appeal by
(2003) certiorari, the petition is based on questions of
law which the appellant desires the appellate
Suffice it to say that the rule is well settled that in court to resolve. In certiorari as an original action,
appeals by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of the only question that may be raised is whether or
Court, only errors of law may be raised. not the lower court acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. 22
(Fernandez) An allegation of grave abuse of discretion like the
one made by the petitioner here, being beyond
FACTS: the scope of appeals by certiorari, deserves scant
consideration.
Petitioner was appointed as regular administrator
of the intestate estate of deceased Eufrocina G. WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on
Mackay on March 20, 1996. After nearly twenty- certiorari is DENIED
four (24) months following his appointment,
however, petitioner had not submitted the
requisite inventory of estate assets and liabilities,
nor had he paid the taxes due on the estate. This
delay prompted private respondent Antonio G.
Mackay to file an urgent motion on March 10,
1998 for the removal of petitioner as regular
administrator.

Order 9 was issued by Judge Adoracion G.

Angeles on July 15, 1998 relieving petitioner as
administrator of the estate and appointing private
respondent as his substitute.
 On March 2, 2006, petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65. CA dismissed the case
due to formal infirmities. Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was denied. On September 29,
2006, the CA resolution became final and
executory.

Petitioner filed with Supremer Court a petition

for review on certiorari under Rule 45 —> denied.

On May 6, 2008, petitioner filed the instant

petition for relief from judgment interposing the
following grounds:

The Honorable Labor Arbiter committed

a GROSS MISTAKE

ISSUE: Can petitioner avail of a petition for relief

from judgment under Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure from SC resolution denying his
petition for review? NO.

HELD:

We answer in the negative. A petition for relief

from judgment is not an available remedy in the
Supreme Court.

First, although Section 1 of Rule 38 states that

when a judgment or final order is entered
through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
Purcon v. MRM Philippines negligence, a party in any court may file a petition
(2008) for relief from judgment, this rule must be
interpreted in harmony with Rule 56, which
A petition for relief from judgment is not an enumerates the original cases cognizable by the
available remedy in the Supreme Court. Supreme Court.

(Fernandez) In Dela Cruz v. Andres,10 We reiterated Our

pronouncement in Mesina v. Meer,11 that a
FACTS: petition for relief from judgment is not an
available remedy in the Court of Appeals and the
The case stemmed from a complaint filed by Supreme Court. The Court explained that under
petitioner for reimbursement of medical expenses, the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the
sickness allowance and permanent disability petition for relief must be filed within sixty (60)
benefits with prayer for compensatory, moral and days after petitioner learns of the judgment, final
exemplary damages and attorney’s fees before the order or other proceeding to be set aside and
Arbitration Branch of the National Labor must be accompanied with affidavits showing the
Relations Commission (NLRC). fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence
relied upon, and the facts constituting petitioner’s
Labor Arbiter Donato G. Quinto, Jr. rendered its good and substantial cause of action or defense,
decision dismissing the complaint for utter lack of as the case may be. Most importantly, it should be
merit —> MR —> Dismissed. filed with the same court which rendered the
decision.
Second, while Rule 38 uses the phrase "any court,"
it refers only to Municipal/Metropolitan and
Regional Trial Courts. As revised, Rule 38
radically departs from the previous rule as it now
allows the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court
which decided the case or issued the order to hear
the petition for relief. Under the old rule, a
petition for relief from the judgment or final order
of Municipal Trial Courts should be filed with the
Regional Trial Court.

Third, the procedure in the CA and the Supreme

Court are governed by separate provisions of the
Rules of Court.15 It may, from time to time, be
supplemented by additional rules promulgated
by the Supreme Court through resolutions or
circulars. As it stands, neither the Rules of Court
nor the Revised Internal Rules of the CA.

There is no provision in the Rules of Court

making the petition for relief applicable in the CA
or this Court. The procedure in the CA from
Rules 44 to 55, with the exception of Rule 45
which pertains to the Supreme Court, identifies
the remedies available before said Court such as
annulment of judgments or final orders or
resolutions (Rule 47), motion for reconsideration
(Rule 52), and new trial (Rule 53). Nowhere is a
petition for relief under Rule 38 mentioned.

If a petition for relief from judgment is not among

the remedies available in the CA, with more
reason that this remedy cannot be availed of in
the Supreme Court. This Court entertains only
questions of law. A petition for relief raises
questions of facts on fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence, which are beyond the
concerns of this Court.
 The Director of the Bureau of Lands, now Lands
Management Bureau (LMB), Manila issued on
July 13, 1955 Free Patent No. V-16555 in the name
of Marcelino Manipon (Manipon).

On the basis of the free patent, the Register of

Deeds of Oriental Mindoro issued on March 5,
1957 Original Certificate of Title.

An investigation conducted by the

representatives of LMB, Manila on the issuance of
Free Patent No. V-16555 showed that the lot is not
an alienable and disposable land of the public
domain.

Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), through

the Office of the Solicitor General, 1 filed in 1998 a
Complaint2 for "Cancellation of TCT No. T-33730
and Reversion" against Manipon and herein
respondents, as well as the Register of Deeds.

Respondents failed to file their answer to the

complaint despite receipt of summons, hence,
they were declared in defaulT.

RTC in favor of the Republic —> became final

and executory. —> RTC issued writ of execution.

On March 15, 2007, respondents filed a petition

for annulment of judgment of the trial court’s
decision of October 9, 2002 before the Court of
Appeals (CA) on grounds that it did not acquire
jurisdiction over the person of Manipon as he had
been dead when petitioner’s complaint was filed.
- denied.

Respondents maintain that they did not receive a

Republic v. Spouses Castro copy of the trial court’s decision of October 9,
(2011) 2002 and that they came to know of it only on
September 29, 2005 when the trial court’s sheriff
Let it be stressed at the outset that before a party personally served upon them a copy of the writ of
can avail of the reliefs provided for by Rule 47, execution of the decision.
i.e., annulment of judgments, final orders, and
resolutions, it is a condition sine qua non that one ISSUE: WON Annulment of Judgment is a proper
must have failed to move for new trial in, or remedy for Respondents. NO.
appeal from, or file a petition for relief against
said issuances or take other appropriate remedies HELD:
thereon, through no fault attributable to him.
Section 1, Rule 47 of the 1987 Rules of Civil
(Fernandez) Procedure provides that the remedy of annulment
of judgments or final orders/resolutions of a
FACTS: Regional Trial Court in civil actions can only be
availed of where "the ordinary remedies of new
trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available
through no fault of the petitioner." A petition for
annulment of judgment under Rule 47 is a
remedy granted only under exceptional
circumstances where a party, without fault on his
part, has failed to avail of the ordinary or other
appropriate remedies provided by law. Such
action is never resorted to as a substitute for a
party’s own neglect in not promptly availing of
the ordinary or other appropriate remedies.

Upon notice of the writ of execution on, by

respondents’ own information, September 29,
2005, respondents – if indeed they were
completely unaware of the trial court’s decision –
had available remedies to question it. They could
have promptly filed a motion to quash the writ of
execution or, in the alternative, a petition for relief
from judgment under Rule 38. That they had
ample opportunity to do so is gathered from the
fact that the writ of execution of the decision was
not immediately implemented by the sheriff as it
was satisfied only on July 20, 2006. Having failed
to avail of any of the aforesaid remedies without
any justification, respondents are barred from
resorting to the action for annulment of judgment
under Rule 47.

Let it be stressed at the outset that before a party

can avail of the reliefs provided for by Rule 47,
i.e., annulment of judgments, final orders, and
resolutions, it is a condition sine qua non that one
must have failed to move for new trial in, or
appeal from, or file a petition for relief against Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. v. Court of
said issuances or take other appropriate remedies Appeals
thereon, through no fault attributable to him. If he G.R. No. 137122, November 15, 2000
failed to avail of those cited remedies without
sufficient justification, he cannot resort to the A motion contesting a late appeal may be filed
action for annulment provided in Rule 47, for before the appellate court even after the
otherwise he would benefit from his own inaction transmittal of the records therein—the legality
or negligence of the appeal may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings in the appellate court, and the
In the instant case, not only did petitioner fail to latter is not precluded from dismissing the
avail of the ordinary and appropriate remedies in petition on the ground of its being out of time.
assailing the questioned judgments of the trial
court, but he also failed to show to the satisfaction  Respondents filed an action for
of this Court that he could not have availed of the reconveyance and recovery of parcels of
ordinary and appropriate remedies under the land against petitioner Manila Memorial
Rules. Park Cemetery, Inc., and its co-defendants
United Housing Corporation, Victorino
Hernandez, heirs of Aurelio de Leon, and
heirs of Nicolas Gatchalian.
 The trial court dismissed the complaint for that it was barred from assailing the
lack of merit and having been barred by the timeliness of the appeal and in granting
statute of limitations and by laches. respondent's motion for new trial long
 Respondents received a copy of the after the decision of the trial court had
decision on 04 July 1983. On 19 July 1983, already become final and executory.
the last day of the prescribed fifteen-day  The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition
period for appeal, private respondents filed on the ground that petitioner was estopped
a motion for new trial and/or by laches from assailing the notice of
reconsideration. The motion was denied by appeal which had meanwhile been given
the trial court in its order of 03 October due course by the trial court.
1989. A copy of the order was received by
respondents on 28 November 1989. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals
 On 07 December 1989, respondents filed a erred in disregarding the well-entrenched rule
notice of appeal and, on 11 December in this jurisdiction that the perfection of an
1989, the trial court gave due course to the appeal within the time prescribed by law is
appeal and directed the transmittal of the jurisdictional and as such it can be assailed at
records of the case to the Court of Appeals. anytime.
The records of the case were not
transmitted to the appellate court due to HELD:
missing transcript of stenographic notes.
On 23 April 1996, the trial court required
 Petitioner maintains that compliance with
the parties to appear in conference. Almost
the reglementary period for perfecting an
a year had lapsed but the missing
appeal is not merely mandatory but
stenographic notes were still not submitted
jurisdictional, and it is never too late to
to the trial court.
assail the timeliness of an appeal.
 On 28 February 1997, respondents filed a
Respondents urges the Court to sustain the
motion for new trial for the retaking and
assailed decision asseverating that in view
presentation of testimonial and
of the meritorious character of their
documentary evidence on the ground that
appeal, a stringent application of the rules
the reconstitution of the missing
would defeat substantial justice.
stenographic notes was no longer possible
considering that the court stenographers
 This rule has been substantially
who had transcribed the testimony of
reproduced in Section 3, Rule 41 of the
witnesses by then since retired from the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; thus: "Sec. 3.
service, their whereabouts unknown.
Period of Ordinary Appeal - The appeal
 On 22 April 1997, petitioner filed a motion
shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from
to dismiss the appeal and an opposition to
notice of the judgment or final order
the motion for new trial filed by
appealed from. Where a record on appeal is
respondents contending that the appeal
required, the appellant shall file a notice of
was filed out of time and that the remedy
appeal and a record on appeal within thirty
for new trial could not be availed of since it
(30) days from notice of the judgment or
was filed long after the reglementary
final order."The period of appeal shall be
period to appeal had lapsed.
interrupted by a timely motion for new
 The trial court granted the Motion for New
trial or reconsideration. No motion for
Trial of plaintiffs being based on
extension of time to file a motion for
meritorious grounds. the Motion to Dismiss
new trial or reconsideration shall be
Appeal filed by defendant Manila Memorial
allowed."
Park is hereby DENIED.
 Petitioner elevated the matter via a petition
 Accordingly, when respondents filed their
for certiorari to the Court of Appeals
motion for reconsideration on the last day
insisting that the trial court had acted
of the fifteen day prescribed period for
capriciously and whimsically, as well as
taking an appeal, which motion was
with grave abuse of discretion amounting
subsequently denied, they only had one (1)
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in holding
day from receipt of a copy of the order
 denying the motion for reconsideration, constitute a waiver on his part to interpose
within which to perfect their appeal, i.e., such objection.
excluding the day of receipt and including
the next day. Since respondents had ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner be now held
received a copy of the order denying estopped from assailing the timeliness of the appeal
their motion for reconsideration on 28 after the lapse of almost eight years from the time
November 1989, the filing of the notice the notice of appeal was approved by the trial court
of appeal on 07 December 1989 came on 11 December 1989?
much too late for by then the judgment
had already become final and executory. HELD:
 The perfection of an appeal in the manner
 In Dequito, defendant-appellees moved to
and within the period prescribed by law is
dismiss the appeal after plaintiff-appellant
not only mandatory but jurisdictional upon
Dequito had filed his appeal brief with the
the court a quo, and the failure to perfect
appellate court and solely on the ground
that appeal renders its judgment final and
that the record on appeal did not disclose
executory. A fundamental precept is that
on its face that the appeal was timely
the reglementary periods under the Rules
perfected. Similarly, in Carillo, petitioners
are to be strictly observed for being
had already submitted their brief when the
considered indispensable interdictions
respondents tried to question the
against needless delays and an orderly
timeliness of the appeal, and there was no
discharge of judicial business. The strict
showing that the appeal was interposed
compliance with such periods has more
beyond the reglementary period for its
than once been held to be imperative,
filing. In the instant case, respondents
particularly and most significantly in
had not once denied that their appeal
respect to the perfection of appeals. The
was, in fact, interposed beyond the
finality of a judgment becomes a fact upon
prescribed period.
the lapse of the reglementary period to
appeal if no appeal is perfected, and the  The doctrine of estoppel is predicated on,
court loses all jurisdiction over the case, and has its origin in equity which, broadly
and it becomes the ministerial duty of the defined, is justice according to natural law
court concerned to order execution of the and right. It is a principle intended to avoid
judgment.  After the judgment has become a clear case of injustice. The term is hardly
final and executory, vested rights are distinguishable from a waiver of right.
acquired by the winning party. Just as the Estoppel, like its counterpart, must be
losing party has the right to file an appeal unequivocal and intentional for, when
within the prescribed period, so also the misapplied, it can easily become a
winning party has the correlative right to convenient and effective means of injustice.
enjoy the finality of the resolution of the Estoppel is not understood to be a principle
case. that, as a rule, should prevalently apply but,
as it concededly is, a mere exception from
 The Court is not unmindful of highly
the standard legal norms of general
exceptional cases where it has allowed a
application that can be invoked only in
relaxation of the rules on the application of
highly exceptional and justifiable cases.
the reglementary periods of appeal.
 Petitioner could not be faulted for its
 Not being a natural right or a part of due
failure to move for the dismissal of the
process, but merely a statutory privelege,
appeal at an earlier time acting upon the
the right to appeal may be exercised only in
assumption, albeit erroneously, that the
the manner and in accordance with rules
appeal was filed on time relying on the
provided therefor. A failure to perfect an
order, dated 11 December 1989, of the
appeal within the prescribed period has the
trial court declaring that the notice of
effect of rendering final the judgment of a
appeal had been filed within the
court, and an appellee's failure to file a
reglementary period. Neither can the
motion for dismissal of appeal in the court
conduct of petitioner's counsel during
of origin before the transmittal of the
the conference called by and held before
record to the appellate court does not
 the trial court be regarded as a waiver The Execution of the Lease
of its right to contest the seasonableness Contract is not a Supervening
of the appeal. A motion contesting a late Event
appeal may be filed before the appellate
court even after the transmittal of the FACTS:
records therein. The legality of the
appeal may be raised at any stage of the  Respondent Mena Ravanes (Mena),
proceedings in the appellate court, and married to Roberto Ravanes (Roberto)
the latter is not precluded from (collectively, the respondent-spouses), is
dismissing the petition on the ground of the registered owner of a parcel of land. On
its being out of time. A recognition of the about thirty-five (35) square meters of the
merit of the petition does not property stands the two-storey residential
necessarily carry with it any assumption house of petitioners. Petitioners' father,
or conclusion that it has been timely Gamaliel Albano, purchased the house in
filed. Strangely, respondents did not 1986 from a certain Mary Ong Dee.
attempt to explain the reason for the Petitioners leased the property from Mena
delay and would, instead, lay the blame with the agreement that they will vacate it,
on petitioner for its failure to assail the regardless of their rental payments, when
timeliness of the appeal. the latter and her family would need to use
it.
CONCLUSION: the instant petition is GRANTED, and  In March 2000, respondent-spouses
the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is SET informed petitioners that their daughter,
ASIDE. Rowena, is getting married and would need
the property to build her house. However,
petitioners refused to vacate the property.
 On September 14, 2000, respondent-
spouses filed a Complaint for Ejectment
against petitioners in the MeTC of Pasig
City.
 In their Answer dated October 4,
2000, they countered that respondent-
spouses and their predecessors-in-interest
assured them that they can stay in the
property for as long as they are paying the
agreed monthly rentals.
 MeTC - judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of plaintiffs and against defendants
who are hereby ordered to vacate.
 RTC -decision is
hereby RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE on
the ground of denial of due process, and
this Court is now tasked to look into the
issue of whether or not the plaintiffs have
met the following requirements of Section
5, (c). Such owner or immediate family
member does not own any other available
residential unit within the city or
municipality. Respondent-spouses
Heirs of Albano v. Spouses Ravanes appealed to the CA.
G.R. No. 183645, July 20, 2016  In its Decision dated August 29, 2007, the
CA set aside the Decision of the RTC and
The CA Decision is already reinstated the Decision of the MeTC.
Final and Executory  On September 19, 2007, petitioners filed a
Manifestation and Motion to Stay the
 Execution of Judgment dated August 29, HELD: PETITION IS DENIED.
2007. They manifested that respondent
Roberto entered into a lease contract with  On September 4, 2007, petitioners received
petitioner Alexander Albano (Alexander) notice of the CA Decision. On September 19,
on September 10, 2007, which meant that 2007, they filed a Manifestation and Motion
petitioners are now in lawful occupation of to Stay the Execution of Judgment, which
the property. The execution of the CA's the CA denied in its February 20, 2008
Decision is no longer necessary because the Resolution. The petitioners received a copy
judgment was mooted by a supervening of this Resolution on February 22, 2008.
event. Petitioners averred that with the  Thereafter, on March 7, 2008, petitioners
renewal of the expired lease contract, the filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
ground for judicial ejectment relied upon February 20, 2008 Resolution of the CA.
by the CA no longer exists. The CA also denied this motion in its July 7,
2008 Resolution, a copy of which was
 Mena filed a comment  to petitioners’ received by the petitioners on July 14,
manifestation and motion. Mena assailed 2008.
the validity of the lease contract between  Subsequently, petitioners filed before us a
her husband, Roberto, and Alexander. She Motion for Additional Period to File
claimed that Roberto has no personality to Petition for Review, which we granted.
unilaterally enter into a lease contract with They prayed that they be given additional
Alexander because the property is her 30 days within which to file their petition
paraphernal property. or from July 29, 2008 to August 28, 2008.
 In its Resolution dated February 20, Petitioners filed the petition for review on
2008, the CA denied petitioners' August 28, 2008.
manifestation and motion. The CA held that  The above narration of material dates gives
its Decision dated August 29, 2007 attained a semblance that the present petition was
finality on September 19, 2007. It found seasonably filed. However, the records
that the lease contract did not operate as a show that petitioners should have
novation of its Decision because it was reckoned the 15-day period to appeal
entered into without the express consent of from the receipt of the denial of the
Mena. Manifestation and Motion to Stay
 On March 7, 2008, petitioners filed a Execution of Judgment, and not from
Motion for Reconsideration. The CA denied their receipt of the denial of the Motion
the Motion for Reconsideration in its for Reconsideration. Having failed to do
Resolution dated July 7, 2008. Hence, this so, petitioners' right to appeal
petition for review. by certiorari lapsed as early as March 9,
 In their Comment, respondent-spouses 2008 when the assailed CA Decision
argue that the CA Decision became final became final and executory.
and executory on September 20, 2007  Petitioners' Manifestation and Motion to
because petitioners neither filed a Stay Execution of Judgment is, in actuality,
motion for reconsideration nor filed an a motion for reconsideration of the CA
appeal before us. Accordingly, Decision. The said manifestation and
respondent-spouses plead that motion so alleged:10. In light of the
petitioners' right to file this petition foregoing, respondents are constrained
before us had already lapsed. to bring the matter of supervening event
to the attention of this Honorable Court
ISSUES: and likewise in the manner of a motion
for reconsideration, by way of
1. Whether the CA Decision is already final and modification of the DECISION.
executory;  Hence, contrary to the allegation of
respondent-spouses and the finding of the
CA, petitioners filed a motion for
2. Whether the execution of the lease contract is a
reconsideration of the CA Decision, albeit in
supervening event that will justily the stay of
the guise of a "Manifestation and Motion to
execution of the CA Decision; and
 Stay Execution of Judgment." In fact, the absurd situation where the courts will
relief prayed for by petitioners in this be obliged to issue orders or resolutions
manifestation and motion is the same relief denying a prohibited pleading in the
obtained once a motion for reconsideration first place.
is filed on time. Rule 52, Section 4 of the  An appeal is not a matter of right, but is one
Rules of Court provides that generally, a of sound judicial discretion. It may only be
motion for reconsideration filed on time availed of in the manner provided by the
stays the execution of the judgment sought law and the rules. A party who fails to
to be reconsidered. It thus baffles us why question an adverse decision by not filing
petitioners captioned their motion as a the proper remedy within the period
"Manifestation and Motion to Suspend prescribed by law loses the right to do so as
Execution of Judgment" when the effect the decision, as to him, becomes final and
sought is one and the same -to stay the binding. Considering that petitioners
execution of judgment. This carelessness reckoned the period to appeal on the
only brought confusion to respondent- date of notice of the denial of the second
spouses and the CA. motion for reconsideration on July 7,
 Since the Manifestation and Motion to Stay 2008, instead of the date of notice of the
Execution of Judgment is a motion for denial of the first motion for
reconsideration of the CA Decision, reconsideration on February 22, 2008,
petitioners' receipt of the resolution the present petition filed only on August
denying it triggers the running of the 15- 28, 2008 is evidently filed out of time.
day period within which to file an appeal. The petition, being 173 clays late,
Petitioners received a copy of the February renders the CA Decision final and
20, 2008 Resolution on February 22, 2008. executory. Thus, we do not have
Thus, counting 15 days from receipt, jurisdiction to pass upon the petition.
petitioners had only until March 8, 2008 to  While there are instances when we relax
file a petition for review. the application of procedural rules, the
 On March 7, 2008, however, petitioners present petition is not one of them. Liberal
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the application of the rules is an exception
February 20, 2008 Resolution instead. This rather than the rule. In this case,
motion for reconsideration partakes of the petitioners failed to address the issue of
nature of a second motion for finality of the CA Decision when it was
reconsideration. Here, petitioners’ Motion raised in respondent Mena's Comment
for Reconsideration is just that-a mere to the Manifestation and Motion to Stay
rehash of the arguments raised in their Execution in the CA. Upon the denial of
earlier Manifestation and Motion to Stay the manifestation and motion clue to
Execution of Judgment, which we found finality of the CA Decision, petitioners again
previously to be their (first) motion for ignored the issue of finality in their Motion
reconsideration. for Reconsideration. Up until respondent-
 The filing of a second motion for spouses' Comment before us, which again
reconsideration is prohibited under Rule alleged the finality of the CA Decision,
52, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil petitioners continued to be mum on the
Procedure, as amended and the prevailing issue. Petitioners' silence as to the
1999 Internal Rules of the Procedure of the timeliness of their appeal is suspect. Thus,
CA (IRCA). Being a prohibited pleading, a in the absence of exceptional
second motion for reconsideration does circumstances and effort on the part of
not have any legal effect and does not toll petitioners to justify the liberal application
the running of the period to appeal. of the rules, we are constrained to deny the
 The same principle is likewise petition.
applicable by analogy in the  Petitioners' contentions are untenable. A
determination of the correct period to supervening event refers to facts which
appeal. Reckoning the period from the transpire after judgment has become final
denial of the second motion for and executory or to new circumstances
reconsideration will result in the same which developed after the judgment has
acquired finality, including matters which
 the parties were not aware of prior to or in the execution of the lease contract, the
during the trial as they were not yet in compromise is not binding on her.
existence at that time. Here, the lease  In addition, the compromise is also not
contract was executed after the CA valid even between petitioners and
Decision was promulgated but before it Roberto because the records show that the
attained finality. In fact, petitioners land in question is indeed a paraphernal
executed the lease contract just six days property of Mena. Without an
after they received the adverse ruling of the authorization showing that Roberto is
CA. acting on behalf of Mena, he has no right
 To our mind, instead of a supervening and power to enter into a lease contract
event, the execution of the lease contract involving Mena's exclusive
partakes of the nature of a compromise. A property.Besides, even assuming that the
compromise is a contract whereby the property is conjugally owned by
parties, by making reciprocal concessions, respondent-spouses, this does not bestow
avoid litigation or put an end to one upon Roberto the power to enter into a
already commenced. It is an agreement lease contract without the consent of his
between two or more persons, who, for the wife. We have explained in Roxas v. Court of
purpose of preventing or putting an end to Appeals, that consent of the wife is required
a lawsuit, adjust their difficulties by mutual for lease of a conjugal realty for a period of
consent in the manner which they agree on, more than one year, such lease being
and which each party prefers over the hope considered a conveyance and encumbrance
of gaining but balanced by the danger of under the provisions of the Civil Code.
losing. In the case before us, petitioners
claim that they executed the lease contract WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision
before notice of the CA Decision as an and Resolution of the Court of Appeals elated
"amicable settlement of the issues with August 29, 2007 and July 7, 2008, respectively, are
reference to occupancy of the subject hereby AFFIRMED.
property. Thus, petitioners' intention to
end the litigation by virtue of a
compromise is evident.
 A compromise may be entered into at any
stage of the case-pending trial, on appeal
and even after finality of judgment. Hence,
petitioners may enter into a compromise
with the respondent-spouses, even after
the CA Decision was rendered. However,
the validity of the agreement is determined
by compliance with the requisites and the
principles of contracts, not by when it was
entered into. Unfortunately for petitioners,
the compromise that they effected is
wanting of one of the essential requisites of
a valid and binding compromise--consent
of all the parties in the case. We have
consistently ruled that a compromise
agreement cannot bind a party who did not
voluntarily take part in the settlement itself
and gave specific individual consent.
 It is undisputed that only Roberto entered
into a lease contract with petitioners. Mena
did not sign it, but on the contrary,
denounces its execution as being done in
evident bad faith and without authority
from her as the sole owner of the property.
Considering that Mena did not participate
 the required docket and other lawful fees,
the instant Appeal is hereby DISMISSED
pursuant to Section [1](c) Rule 50 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.Also assailed
is the CA’s Resolution dated July 27, 2006
which denied the Motion for
Reconsideration thereto.
 Petitioner seeks to reverse the aforesaid
Resolutions of the CA and direct the latter
to admit the payment for the docket fees
enclosed in his Motion for
Reconsideration5 so that his appeal may be
given due course, or, in the alternative, to
remand the case to the court a quo for
further proceedings.
 This case stemmed from a Real Estate
Mortgage executed by Thelma Julian
(Thelma), mother of herein petitioner
Samuel Julian. Thelma obtained a housing
loan from respondent DBP. To secure
payment of the loan, she executed in favor
of the respondent a Real Estate Mortgage
on the aforementioned parcel of land
registered under her name. A Special
Power of Attorney (SPA) appointing the
respondent and its personnel to sell the
property in the event of extrajudicial
foreclosure was inserted and made an
integral part of the mortgage contract.
Subsequently, Thelma died on January 8,
1982. Because of arrearages in the monthly
amortizations, respondent foreclose the
mortgaged property.
 Thereafter, the actual occupants of the
mortgaged property who is likewise
petitioner’s sibling,(spouses De la Cruz),
offered to purchase the property.
Respondent accepted the offer and
executed a Deed of Conditional Sale.
Julian v. DBP, G.R. No. 174193 However, spouses De la Cruz failed to pay
7 December 2011 72 monthly amortizations resulting in the
rescission of the said deed.
The requirement of an appeal fee is not a mere Notwithstanding, spouses De la Cruz
technicality of law or procedure and should not refused to vacate the premises compelling
be disregarded without the most compelling of respondent to file an "Unlawful Detainer"
reasons. case against them. Judgment was rendered
in favor of respondent on July 29, 1993.
FACTS: However, before the Writ of Execution
could be carried out, petitioner filed Civil
Case No. 6387before the RTC of Roxas City
 Petition for Review on Certiorari of the
on October 27, 1993, for the cancellation of
Resolution of the Court of Appeals which
respondent’s TCT No. T-19303. He
dismissed petitioner’s appeal as follows:
contended that the SPA which was used to
Considering that per JRD Report dated
sell the mortgaged property at public
March 30, 2005, the appellant failed to pay
 auction in 1983 was no longer effective in required fees was due to oversight and
view of Thelma’s death in 1982. non-cognizance of the necessity to pay
 During the course of the proceedings, a the said fees since his counsel did not
series of postponements were made at the inform him of such requirement to pay.
instance of both parties due to an Petitioner prayed for liberal application
impending amicable settlement. Eventually, of the Rules as according to him, a strict
the parties were able to reach a settlement. enforcement would be tantamount to
Thus, in an Order dated October 28, 1998, imposing a penalty not commensurate
the RTC directed both parties to submit a to his thoughtlessness or oversight in
joint motion to dismiss the case. However, not adhering to the procedural
almost two years passed without the requisite.
parties complying with the said Order.  Petitioner’s submission did not move the
 Consequently, in an Order dated October CA, the Motion for Reconsideration is
11, 2000, the RTC dismissed the case for hereby DENIED.
failure of the parties to comply for an
unreasonable length of time. The dismissal, ISSUE: Whether the CA was correct in strictly
however, was set aside in an Order dated applying the rules on the payment of docket fees.
February 12, 2003 in consideration of
petitioner’s payment of ten percent (10%) HELD:
of respondent’s claim. The parties were
then given 15 days from notice within
 Payment of full docket fees within the
which to submit their compromise
prescribed period for taking an appeal is
agreement, which was subsequently
mandatory.
extended for 30 days from notice. Despite
the extensions, however, no compromise  It is well-established that "[t]he right to
agreement was filed in court. As a result, in appeal is a statutory privilege and must be
an Orderdated July 24, 2003, the trial court exercised only in the manner and in
directed the parties to show cause within accordance with the provisions of the law.
15 days from notice why the case should Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to
not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. appeal must strictly comply with the
Meanwhile, with petitioner’s conformity, requirements of the rules, and failure to do
his counsel withdrew her appearance on so leads to the loss of the right to appeal.
August 13, 2003.  The applicable rule for appeals from
 Ruling of the Regional Trial Court-on judgments issued by the RTC in the
January 28, 2004 or six months from the exercise of its original jurisdiction is Rule
issuance of the show cause Order, the trial 41 of the Rules of Court, Section 4 of which
court dismissed the case for failure of the provides:Section 4. Appellate court docket
parties thru counsel to comply with the and other lawful fees. - Within the period
Order dated July 24, 2003. for taking an appeal, the appellant shall pay
to the clerk of the court which rendered the
 Petitioner, through his new counsel,
judgment or final order appealed from, the
timely filed a Notice of Appeal on April
full amount of the appellate court docket
26, 2004 but failed to pay the docket
and other lawful fees. Proof of payment of
and other lawful fees.
said fees shall be transmitted to the
 CA dismissed the appeal for non-
appellate court together with the original
payment of the required docket and
record or the record on appeal.The Rules
other lawful fees pursuant to Section
also provide that failure of the appellant to
1(c), Rule 50 of the Rules of Court.
pay the docket and other lawful fees is a
Seeking reconsideration, petitioner
ground for dismissal of the appeal.
attached to his motion Postal Money
 The Court has consistently ruled in a
Order Nos. A-0620000276, B-
number of cases that the payment of the
0610000283 and J065000566 in the
full amount of docket fees within the
aggregate amount of ₱3,020.00 as
prescribed period is both mandatory and
payment for the docket fees. He
jurisdictional. It is a condition sine qua non
explained that his failure to pay the
for the appeal to be perfected and only then
 can a court acquire jurisdiction over the informed of the progress of his case.
case. The requirement of an appeal fee is Moreover, the counsel’s negligence binds
not a mere technicality of law or procedure petitioner and, for that reason alone the
and should not be undermined except for loss of his remedy was caused by his own
the most persuasive of reasons. Non- negligence. Consequently, a relaxation of
observance would be tantamount to no the rule cannot be granted. The bitter
appeal being filed thereby rendering the consequence of such grave inadvertence is
challenged decision, resolution or order to render the trial court’s order final and
final and executory. executory.
 Admittedly, this rule is not without  Further, the Court notes that petitioner
recognized qualifications. The Court has only attempted to perfect his appeal on
declared that in appealed cases, failure to May 6, 2005 by appending the postal
pay the appellate court docket fee within money orders to his Motion for
the prescribed period warrants only Reconsideration, or one year and nine days
discretionary as opposed to automatic too late. By that time, the challenged
dismissal of the appeal and that the court  Order has long become final and no longer
shall exercise its power to dismiss in open to an appeal. Petitioner’s reliance on
accordance with the tenets of justice and the policy espoused in the case of Yambao
fair play and with great deal of is likewise unavailing. The pertinent
circumspection considering all attendant portion relied on by petitioner reads:Thus,
circumstances. the appellate court may extend the time for
 In the case at bench, the justifications the payment of the docket fees if appellant
presented by petitioner for the non- is able to show that there is a justifiable
payment of the docket fees are oversight reason for his failure to pay
and the lack of advice from his counsel. the correct amount of docket fees within
Unfortunately, the reasons presented are the prescribed period, like fraud, accident,
neither convincing nor adequate to merit mistake, excusable negligence, or a similar
leniency. Petitioner submits that he only supervening casualty, without fault on the
found out about the requirement to pay the part of the appellant.
docket fees when he received the CA  Clearly, the case applies to a situation
Resolution denying his appeal on April 22, where payment of the docket fees was
2005 or three days short of one year from made albeit incomplete. In the instant case,
filing of the said appeal. This Court finds no payment was made by petitioner at all.
this not to be logically true to human  Likewise assuming for the sake of
experience. It is unusual for petitioner’s argument that consideration be given to
counsel not to advice him of the required petitioner’s willingness to comply with the
docket fees. More often than not, counsels rules since he attached postal money
are aware of the docket fees required to be orders to his motion for reconsideration,
paid to the courts, and will ask clients for the broader interest of justice will still not
the said amount prior to filing pleadings in be served if petitioner’s appeal is
court. This is so because counsels are not reinstated. Petitioner and his sister Ruth
expected to shoulder or advance payment Julian de la Cruz (Ruth) know that their
for their clients. Assuming arguendo that mother Thelma has already lost ownership
petitioner’s counsel did not inform him of rights to the property in question when the
the requirement to pay the docket fees to latter defaulted in her payment to
perfect the appeal, what we find incredible respondent and none of her successors-in-
is that petitioner apparently failed to interest redeemed the property within the
communicate with his counsel after the prescribed period. This is the reason why
filing of said appeal. This Court has Ruth and her husband offered to purchase
repeatedly held that "litigants, represented the property from respondent. However,
by counsel, should not expect that all they when the said spouses De la Cruz defaulted
need to do is sit back, relax and await the in their payment, they refused to surrender
outcome of their case. "It is the duty of a the property to respondent. For his part,
party-litigant to be in contact with his petitioner reinforces such refusal to
counsel from time to time in order to be
 surrender by questioning the validity of the
public auction sale. Now petitioner comes
before this Court praying for leniency in
the interest of justice. It must be stressed,
however, that it is only when persuasive
reasons exist that the Rules may be relaxed
to spare a litigant of an injustice not
commensurate with his failure to comply
with the prescribed procedure. Here, the
Court finds that petitioner is under no
threat of suffering an injustice. On the
contrary, it will be the height of injustice if
the Court accords petitioner leniency and
reinstates his appeal as this would mean
further waiting on the part of the
respondent which has long been deprived
of its right to possess the property it owns.

CONCLUSION: the petition is DENIED. The

Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 00240 dated April 12, 2005 and July 27, 2006
are AFFIRMED.
 (Anderson) because the certification
against forum shopping attached thereto
was signed by counsel on her behalf
without the proper authority. Likewise
assailed is the CA’s May 4, 2006
Resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration thereof.
  Anderson filed a complaint for ejectment
against Ho for allegedly possessing her
parcel of land in Quezon City unlawfully. Ho
denied the allegations, and presented a
written consent from Anderson allowing
him to stay on the property as payment for
his various services. The MeTC dismissed
the complaint for lack of cause of action, as
it gave weight to Ho's evidence. On appeal,
the RTC found that the evidence of the
parties stood upon balance, and
considered the dismissal of the complaint
without prejudice depending on the
determination of the genuineness of
Anderson's written consent. On petition for
review, with the CA, Anderson's counsel
twice requested for extension of time to file
the petition. Upon filing of the petition, the
CA found that the certification against
forum shopping was signed by Anderson's
counsel on her behalf, without any
accompanying authority to do so. The CA
dismissed the petition for review. The SC
affirmed the CA's decision to dismiss.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for review on

certiorari will be granted. NO

HELD: The need to abide by the Rules of Court and

the procedural requirements it imposes has been
Anderson v. Ho constantly underscored by this Court. One of these
G.R. No. 172590, 7 January 2013 procedural requirements is the certificate of non-
forum shopping which, time and again, has been
No justifiable reason exists in this case declared as basic, necessary and mandatory for
as to relax the rule on certification procedural orderliness.31
against forum shopping.
In Vda. De Formoso v. Philippine National
FACTS: Bank,32 the Court reiterated the guidelines
respecting non-compliance with or submission of a
defective certificate of non-forum shopping, the
 As her petition for review was dismissed by
relevant portions of which are as follows:
the Court of Appeals (CA) on a technical
ground, petitioner now invokes the liberal
application of the rules of procedure. 4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-
 Assailed in this Petition for Review on compliance therewith or a defect therein, x x x, is
Certiorari is the Resolution of the CA generally not curable by its subsequent submission
which dismissed the petition for review of or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax
petitioner Mary Louise R. Anderson the Rule on the ground of ‘substantial compliance’
or presence of ‘special circumstances or compelling In Donato, the CA dismissed therein petitioner’s
reasons’.x x x x Petition for Review on the ground, among others,
that the certification against forum shopping was
6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping signed by his counsel. In filing a motion for
must be executed by the party-pleader, not by his reconsideration, petitioner submitted a certification
counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable duly signed by himself. However, the CA ruled that
reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must his subsequent compliance did not cure the defect
execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his of the instant petition and denied his Motion for
counsel of record to sign on his behalf. Reconsideration. When the case reached this Court,
it was held, viz:
The requirement that it is the petitioner, not her
counsel, who should sign the certificate of non- The petition for review filed before the CA contains
forum shopping is due to the fact that a a certification against forum shopping but said
"certification is a peculiar personal representation certification was signed by petitioner’s counsel. In
on the part of the principal party, an assurance submitting the certification of non-forum shopping
given to the court or other tribunal that there are duly signed by himself in his motion for
no other pending cases involving basically the same reconsideration, petitioner has aptly drawn the
parties, issues and causes of action." 34 "Obviously, it Court’s attention to the physical impossibility of
is the petitioner, and not always the counsel whose filing the petition for review within the 15-day
professional services have been retained for a reglementary period to appeal considering that he
particular case, who is in the best position to know is a resident of 1125 South Jefferson Street,
whether sheactually filed or caused the filing of a Roanoke, Virginia, U.S.A. where he needs to
petition in that case."35 Per the above guidelines, personally accomplish and sign the verification.
however, if a petitioner is unable to sign a
certification for reasonable or justifiable reasons, We fully agree with petitioner that it was physically
she must execute an SPA designating her counsel of impossible for the petition to have been prepared
record to sign on her behalf. "A certification which and sent to the petitioner in the United States, for
had been signed by counsel without the proper him to travel from Virginia, U.S.A. to the nearest
authorization is defective and constitutes a valid Philippine Consulate in Washington, D.C., U.S.A. in
cause for the dismissal of the petition."36 order to sign the certification before the Philippine
Consul, and for him to send back the petition to the
In this light, the Court finds that the CA correctly Philippines within the 15-day reglementary period.
dismissed Anderson’s Petition for Review on the Thus, we find that petitioner has adequately
ground that the certificate of non-forum shopping explained his failure to personally sign the
attached thereto was signed by Atty. Oliva on her certification which justifies relaxation of the rule.
behalf sans any authority to do so. While the Court
notes that Anderson tried to correct this error by We have stressed that the rules on forum shopping,
later submitting an SPA and by explaining her which were precisely designed to promote and
failure to execute one prior to the filing of the facilitate the orderly administration of justice,
petition, this does not automatically denote should not be interpreted with such absolute
substantial compliance. It must be remembered literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and
that a defective certification is generally not curable legitimate objective which is simply to prohibit and
by its subsequent correction. And while it is true penalize the evils of forum-shopping. The
that in some cases the Court considered such a subsequent filing of the certification duly signed by
belated submission as substantial compliance, it the petitioner himself should thus be deemed
"did so only on sufficient and justifiable grounds substantial compliance, pro hac vice.
that compelled a liberal approach while avoiding
the effective negation of the intent of the rule on While at first blush Donato appears to be similar
non-forum shopping." with the case at bench, a deeper and meticulous
comparison of the two cases reveals essential
Unlike in Donato and the other cases cited by differences. In Donato, the Court held that it was
Anderson, no sufficient and justifiable grounds exist impossible for the petition to have been prepared
in this case as to relax the rules on certification and sent to the therein petitioner in the USA; for
against forum shopping. him to travel from Virginia to the nearest Philippine
Consulate in Washington D.C.; and for the petition rules are designed to facilitate the adjudication of
to be sent back to the Philippines within the 15-day cases. Courts and litigants alike are enjoined to
reglementary period. The same could not, however, abide strictly by the rules. While in certain
be said in this case. It must be remembered that on instances, we allow a relaxation in the application of
top of the 15-day reglementary period to file the the rules, we never intend to forge a weapon for
petition, Atty. Oliva sought and was granted a total erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity.
extension of 30 days to file the same. Hence, The liberal interpretation and application of rules
Anderson had a total of 45 days to comply with the apply only in proper cases of demonstrable merit
requirements of a Petition for Review as against the and under justifiable causes and circumstances.
15 days afforded to the petitioner in Donato. To this While it is true that litigation is not a game of
Court, the said period is more than enough time for technicalities, it is equally true that every case must
Anderson to execute an SPA before the nearest be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed
Philippine Consulate, which again unlike in Donato, procedure to ensure an orderly and speedy
was located in the same state where Anderson was administration of justice. Party litigants and their
(Hawaii), and thereafter to send it to the counsels are well advised to abide by rather than
Philippines. Anent her allegation that her health flaunt, procedural rules for these rules illumine the
condition at that time hindered her from going to path of the law and rationalize the pursuit of justice.
the proper authorities to execute an SPA, the same
deserves scant consideration as no medical CONCLUSION: the Petition for Review on
certificate was submitted to support this. "Indeed, Certiorari is DENIED. The assailed Resolution dated
the age-old but familiar rule is that he who alleges July 14, 2005 and May 4, 2006 of the Court of
must prove his allegations." Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 89793 are AFFIRMED.

Moreover, simultaneous with the filing of a Motion

for Reconsideration, the proper certificate of non-
forum shopping was submitted by the petitioner in
Donato. Notably in this case, the SPA was submitted
two months after the filing of Anderson’s Motion for
Reconsideration. It took that long because instead
of executing an SPA before the proper authorities in
Hawaii and sending the same to the Philippines,
Anderson still waited until she came back to the
country and only then did she execute one. It thus
puzzles the Court why Anderson opted not to
immediately submit the SPA despite her awareness
that the same should have been submitted
simultaneously with the Petition for Review. Hence,
it cannot help but conclude that the delay in the
submission of the SPA is nothing but a product of
Anderson’s sheer laxity and indifference in
complying with the rules. It is well to stress that
"rules are laid down for the benefit of all and should
not be made dependent upon a suitor’s sweet time
and own bidding." They should be faithfully
complied with and may not simply be ignored to
suit the convenience of a party. 43 Although they are
liberally construed in some situations, there must,
however, be a showing of justifiable reasons and at
least a reasonable attempt at compliance therewith,
which unfortunately are not obtaining in this case.
Maza v. Turla
G.R. No. 187094, February 15, 2017
In view of the foregoing, this Court affirms the CA’s
dismissal of Anderson’s Petition for Review. As a
FACTS:
final note, the Court reiterates that:x x x procedural
 This is a Petition for Certiorari and  Judge Turla REMANDED the case to the
Prohibition with a Prayer for the Issuance prosecutor.
of a Temporary Restraining Order ;and/or  On July 18, 2008, Presiding Judge Evelyn A.
Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Petitioners Atienza-Turla (Judge Turla) issued an
seek to have the Orders of the Regional Order on the Palayan cases. Judge Turla
Trial Court in Criminal Cases nullified and held that "the proper procedure in the
set aside and the criminal cases against conduct of the preliminary investigation
them dismissed. was not followed in [the Palayan] cases.
 Petitioners Liza L. Maza, Saturnino C.  There is no dispute that the two (2)
Ocampo, Teodoro A. Casiñ o, and Rafael V. Informations for murder were filed without
Mariano (petitioners) are former members first affording the movants their right to
of the House of Representatives. Liza file a motion for reconsideration. The
represented Gabriela Women's Party denial thereof is tantamount to a denial of
(Gabriela), Saturnino and Teodoro the right itself to a preliminary
represented Bayan Muna Party-List (Bayan investigation. This fact alone already
Muna), while Rafael represented renders preliminary investigation
Anakpawis Party-List (Anakpawis). conducted in this case incomplete. The
 Inspector Palomo named 19 individuals, inevitable conclusion is that the movants
including Petitioners, who were allegedly were not only effectively denied the
responsible for the death of Carlito opportunity to file a "Motion for
Bayudang, Jimmy Peralta, and Danilo Reconsideration" of the "Joint Resolution"
Felipe. His findings show that the named dated April 11, 2008 issued by the panel of
individuals conspired, planned, and prosecutors assigned in these cases, but
implemented the killing of the supporters were also deprived of their right to a full
of AKBAYAN Party List (AKBAYAN), a rival preliminary investigation preparatory to
of Bayan Muna and Gabriela.Carlito the filing of the Information against them.
Bayudang and Danilo Felipe were  Judge Turla added that her order of
AKBAYAN community organizers, whereas remanding the Palayan cases back to the
Jimmy Peralta was mistaken for a certain provincial prosecutors "for a complete
Ricardo Peralta, an AKBAYAN supporter. preliminary investigation is not a
 Inspector Palomo recommended that a manifestation of ignorance of law or a
preliminary investigation be conducted and willful abdication of a duty imposed by law
that an Information for each count of but due, to the peculiar circumstances
murder be filed against the 19 individuals. obtaining in [the cases] and not just
 The panel of prosecutors issued on April 'passing the buck' to the panel of
11, 2008 a Joint Resolution, reviewed and prosecutors.
approved by Officer-in-charge Provincial  ORDER the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor Floro F. Florendo (Prosecutor Prosecutor of Nueva Ecija to conduct the
Florendo). The panel found probable cause preliminary investigation on the incidents
for murder in the killing of Carlito subject matter hereof in accordance with
Bayudang and Jimmy Peralta, and for the mandates of Rule 112 of the Rules of
kidnapping with murder in the killing of Court.
Danilo Felipe, against the nineteen 19  Petitioners pray that the July 18, 2008 and
suspects. However, the panel considered December 2, 2008 Orders of Judge Turla be
one of the suspects, Julie Flores Sinohin, as set aside and annulled and that the murder
a state witness. The panel recommended cases against them be dismissed for failure
that the corresponding Informations be to show probable cause. They also ask for
filed against the remaining suspects. On the the issuance of a temporary restraining
same day, two (2) Informations for murder order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
were filed before the Regional Trial Court to enjoin Judge Turla from remanding the
of Palayan City, Branch 40 in Nueva Ecija, cases to the provincial prosecutors, and
(Palayan cases) and an Information for "the respondent prosecutors from
kidnapping with murder was filed in conducting further preliminary
Guimba, Nueva Ecija (Guimba case). investigation [on] these cases."
  Petitioners claim that Judge Turla's order They are likewise competent to determine issues of
of remanding the case back to the law which may include the validity of an ordinance,
prosecutors had no basis in law, statute, or even an executive issuance in relation to
jurisprudence, or the rules. Since she had the Constitution. To effectively perform these
already evaluated the evidence submitted functions, they are territorially organized into
by the prosecutors along with the regions and then into branches. Their writs
Informations, she should have determined generally reach within those territorial boundaries.
the existence of probable cause for the Necessarily, they mostly perform the all-important
issuance of arrest warrants or the dismissal task of inferring the facts from the evidence as these
of the Palayan cases. are physically presented before them. In many
 Respondents claim that the petition before instances, the facts occur within their territorial
this Court violates the principle of jurisdiction, which properly present the 'actual
hierarchy of courts. case' that makes ripe a determination of the
 Respondents also allege that respondent constitutionality of such action. The consequences,
Secretary Gonzalez was wrongly of course, would be national in scope. There are,
impleaded. however, some cases where resort to courts at their
 On the allegation that Judge Turla reneged level would not be practical considering their
on her constitutional duty to determine decisions could still be appealed before the higher
probable cause, respondents counter that courts, such as the Court of Appeals.
she did not abandon her mandate.
Furthermore, respondent prosecutors' The Court of Appeals is primarily designed as an
finding of probable cause is correct since appellate court that reviews the determination of
evidence against petitioners show that facts and law made by the trial courts. It is
more likely than not, they participated in collegiate in nature. This nature ensures more
the murder of the alleged victims. standpoints in the review of the actions of the trial
 Petitioners' Reply court. But the Court of Appeals also has original
Aside from reiterating their allegations and jurisdiction over most special civil actions. Unlike
arguments in the petition, they added that the trial courts, its writs can have a nationwide
direct invocation of this Court's original scope. It is competent to determine facts and,
jurisdiction was allowed as their petition ideally, should act on constitutional issues that may
involved legal questions. not necessarily be novel unless there are factual
questions to determine.
ISSUE:
This court, on the other hand, leads the judiciary by
1. Whether or not the petitioners violated the breaking new ground or further reiterating - in the
principle of hierarchy of courts in bringing their light of new circumstances or in the light of some
petition directly before this Court. confusions of bench or bar - existing precedents.
Rather than a court of first instance or as a
HELD: repetition of the actions of the Court of Appeals, this
court promulgates these doctrinal devices in order
that it truly performs that role.
This petition is an exception to the principle of
hierarchy of courts.
In other words, the Supreme Court's role to
interpret the Constitution and act in order to
This Court thoroughly explained the doctrine of protect constitutional rights when these become
hierarchy of courts in The Diocese of Bacolod v. exigent should not be emasculated by the doctrine
Commission on Elections: in respect of the hierarchy of courts. That has never
been the purpose of such doctrine.
The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy
of courts was created by this court to ensure that Thus, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an
every level of the judiciary performs its designated iron-clad rule. This court has "full discretionary
roles in an effective and efficient manner. Trial power to take cognizance and assume jurisdiction
courts do not only determine the facts from the [over] special civil actions for certiorari ... filed
evaluation of the evidence presented before them. directly with it for exceptionally compelling reasons
or if warranted by the nature of the issues clearly Sixth, the filed petition reviews the act of a
and specifically raised in the petition." As correctly constitutional organ ...
pointed out by petitioners, we have provided
exceptions to this doctrine: Seventh, [there is] no other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law[.]
First, a direct resort to this court is allowed when
there are genuine issues of constitutionality that ... The lack of other sufficient remedies in the course
must be addressed at the most immediate time. A of law alone is sufficient ground to allow direct
direct resort to this court includes availing of the resort to this court.
remedies of certiorari and prohibition to assail the
constitutionality of actions of both legislative and Eighth, the petition includes questions that are
executive branches of the government. "dictated by public welfare and the advancement of
public policy, or demanded by the broader interest
A second exception is when the issues involved are of justice, or the orders complained of were found to
of transcendental importance. In these cases, the be patent nullities, or the appeal was considered as
imminence and clarity of the threat to fundamental clearly an inappropriate remedy." In the past,
constitutional rights outweigh the necessity for questions similar to these which this court ruled on
prudence. The doctrine relating to constitutional immediately despite the doctrine of hierarchy of
issues of transcendental importance prevents courts included citizens' right to bear arms,
courts from the paralysis of procedural niceties government contracts involving modernization of
when clearly faced with the need for substantial voters' registration lists, and the status and
protection. existence of a public office.

Third, cases of first impression warrant a direct It is not, however, necessary that all of these
resort to this court. In cases of first impression, no exceptions must occur at the same time to justify a
jurisprudence yet exists that will guide the lower direct resort to this court.
courts on this matter. In Government of the United
States v. Purganan, this court took cognizance of the In First United Constructors Corp. v. Poro Point
case as a matter of first impression that may guide Management Corp. (PPMC), et al., this Court
the lower courts: reiterated that it "will not entertain a direct
invocation of its jurisdiction unless the redress
In the interest of justice and to settle once and for desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate
all the important issue of bail in extradition lower courts, and exceptional and compelling
proceedings, we deem it best to take cognizance of circumstances justify the resort to the
the present case. Such proceedings constitute a extraordinary remedy of a writ of certiorari.
matter of first impression over which there is, as
yet, no local jurisprudence to guide lower courts. In this case, the presence of compelling
circumstances warrants the exercise of this Court's
Fourth, the constitutional issues raised are better jurisdiction. At the time the petition was filed,
decided by this court. In Drilon v. Lim, this court petitioners were incumbent party-list
held that: representatives. The possibility of their arrest and
incarceration should the assailed Orders be
... it will be prudent for such courts, if only out of a affirmed, would affect their representation of their
becoming modesty, to defer to the higher judgment constituents in Congress.
of this Court in the consideration of its validity,
which is better determined after a thorough WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY
deliberation by a collegiate body and with the GRANTED. The assailed Orders dated July 18, 2008
concurrence of the majority of those who and December 2, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court,
participated in its discussion. Palayan City, Branch 40 in Criminal Case Nos. 1879-
P and 1880-P are SET ASIDE. The case is remanded
Fifth, . . . Exigency in certain situations would to the Regional Trial Court, Palayan City, Branch 40
qualify as an exception for direct resort to this for further proceedings with due and deliberate
court. dispatch in accordance with this Decision.
St. Martin Funeral Homes vs. National Labor
Relations Commission and Bienvenido Arcayos

G.R. No. 130866; September 16, 1998

All references in the amended Section 9 of B.P.

No. 129 to supposed appeals from the NLRC to
the Supreme Court are inter-preted and hereby
declared to mean and refer to petitions for “It held that there is an underlying power of the
certiorari under Rule 65. courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on
questions of law and jurisdiction even though no
Facts: right of review is given by statute; that the purpose
of judicial review is to keep the administrative
agency within its jurisdiction and protect the
 Respondent (Arcayos) was summarily
substantial rights of the parties; and that it is that
dismissed by St. Martin Funeral Homes for
part of the checks and balances which restricts the
misappropriating funds worth Php 38,000
separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and
which was supposed to be taxes paid to the
unjust adjudications.”
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). Alleging
that the dismissal was illegal, respondent
filed a case against St. Martin Funeral The petitioners rightfully filed a motion for
Homes in the National Labor Relations reconsideration, but the appeal or certiorari should
Commission (NLRC). have been filed initially to the Court of Appeals – as
 Petitioner’s (St. Martin Funeral Homes) consistent with the principle of hierarchy of courts.
contention is that the respondent is not an As such, the Supreme Court remanded the case to
employee due to the lack of an employer- the Court of Appeals.
employee contract. In addition, respondent
is not listed on St. Martin’s monthly payroll.
 The labor arbiter ruled in favor of The Court is of the considered opinion that ever
petitioner, confirming that indeed, there since appeals from the NLRC to the SC were
was no employer-employee relationship eliminated, the legislative intendment was that the
between the two and hence, there could be special civil action for certiorari was and still is the
no illegal dismissal in such a situation. proper vehicle for judicial review of decisions of the
 The respondent appealed to the secretary NLRC. The use of the word appeal in relation
of NLRC who set aside the decision and thereto and in the instances we have noted could
remanded the case to the labor arbiter. have been a lapsus plumae because appeals by
Petitioner filed a motion for certiorari and the original action for certiorari are
reconsideration, but was denied by the both modes of judicial review addressed to the
NLRC. Now, petitioners appealed to the appellate courts. The important distinction between
Supreme Court – alleging that the NLRC them, however, and with which the Court is
committed grave abuse of discretion. particularly concerned here is that the special civil
action for certiorari is within the concurrent
original jurisdiction of this Court and the Court of
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner’s Appeals; whereas to indulge in the assumption that
appeal/petition for certiorari was properly filed in appeals by certiorari to the SC are allowed would
the Supreme Court. NO not subserve, but would subvert, the intention of
the Congress as expressed in the sponsorship
speech on Senate Bill No. 1495.
HELD: Historically, decisions from the NLRC were
appealable to the Secretary of Labor, whose While we do not wish to intrude into the
decisions are then appealable to the Office of the Congressional sphere on the matter of the wisdom
President. However, the new rules do not anymore of a law, on this score we add the further
provide provisions regarding appellate review for observations that there is a growing number of
decisions rendered by the NLRC. labor cases being elevated to this Court which, not
being a trier of fact, has at times been constrained
However in this case, the Supreme Court took it to remand the case to the NLRC for resolution of
upon themselves to review such decisions from the unclear or ambiguous factual findings; that the
NLRC by virtue of their role under the check and Court of Appeals is procedurally equipped for that
balance system and the perceived intention of the purpose, aside from the increased number of its
legislative body who enacted the new rules. component divisions; and that there is undeniably
an imperative need for expeditious action on labor
cases as a major aspect of constitutional protection
to labor St. Martin Funeral Home vs. NLRC, 295 March 1996 between a bus owned by
SCRA 494, G.R. No. 130866 September 16, 1998 petitioner Victory Liner, Inc. and an Isuzu
Truck used by respondent Michael
Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 Malinias. Nobody died, but both vehicles
of B.P No. 129 to supposed appeals from the NLRC were damaged from the accident.
to the Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby  A complaint for sum of money and
declared to mean and refer to petitions for damages was instituted by respondent
certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such against petitioner and the bus driver,
petitions should henceforth be initially filed in the Leoncio Bulaong, alleging pecuniary
Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine damage to the truck in the amount of
on the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate forum P47,180.00, representing lost income for
for the relief desired. the non-use of the truck as it underwent
repairs in the amount of P15,000.00.
Claims for exemplary damages and
attorney's fees were also lodged in the
complaint,which was filed with the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of La Trinidad,
Benguet. After pre-trial, the bus driver was
dropped as defendant in the case after
summons could not be served on him and
respondent agreed to waive his cause of
action against said driver.

 In the course of trial, respondent finished

presenting his evidence and rested his case.
In the meantime, counsel for petitioner
filed a motion to withdraw as counsel, but
the same was denied by the MTC in an
Order dated 15 September 1997 as the
motion did not bear any signature of
conformity from the petitioner. When the
case was called for the reception of
VICTORY LINER, INC. vs. MICHAEL MALINIASG.R. petitioner's evidence on the previously
No. 151170; May 29, 2007 scheduled date of 27 October 1997, no
appearance was made for the bus company.
A motion without a notice of hearing is pro Respondent thus immediately moved that
forma, a mere scrap of paper that does not toll petitioner be declared to have waived its
the period to appeal and upon the expiration of right to adduce evidence in its favor and
the 15-day period, the questioned order or that the case be deemed submitted for
decision becomes final and executory. judgment.

The Rules mandate that an appeal by notice of  The MTC found merit in respondent's
appeal is deemed perfected upon the filing of contention, and ordered the case be
the notice of appeal in due time, due time being deemed submitted for decision as of 27
within fifteen (15) days after notice to the October 1997. On 13 January 1998, the
appellant of the judgment or final order MTC rendered judgment in favor of
appealed from. respondent.

 Through its new counsel, petitioner filed a

Motion for Reconsideration. The Notice of
FACTS: Hearing therein stated: "Please submit the
foregoing Motion for Reconsideration for
hearing before the Honorable Court at a
 This case finds its origin from a vehicular
schedule and time convenient to this
collision that occurred in La Union on 19
 Honorable Court and the parties. The MTC ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals is
ruled in an Order dated 23 February 1998 correct in dismissing outright the petition for
that the notice did not conform with the annulment of judgment.
mandatory requirements of Section 5, Rule
15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, 2. Whether or not the abuse of discretion
and that the motion was thus a mere scrap on the part of the RTC in directing the issuance of
of paper which did not suspend the period the writ of execution even without resolving
to appeal. Accordingly, the MTC declared petitioner's motion for reconsideration is correct.
that its earlier judgment dated 13 January
1998 had become final and executory. In HELD:
the same order and upon the same
predicates, the MTC also granted the  It is of importance that, as borne by the
Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution Certificate of Authority executed by
filed by respondent. petitioner’s Corporate Secretary,
counsel for petitioner had been
 Petitioner responded to the foregoing authorized by petitioner’s Board of
developments by filing a Notice of Appeal, Directors to prepare and file with the
as well as a motion for the inhibition by the Court of Appeals the petition herself as
MTC judge which motion was immediately of 10 July 2001, or seven (7) days before
granted. The case was assigned to a new the petition was indeed filed. We fail to
MTC judge, who was then tasked with understand the significance attached by
ruling on the Notice of Appeal. It was only the Court of Appeals on the prior
on 28 September 1999, or eighteen (18) authority of the Baguio station manager
months after the Notice of Appeal was filed, to perform the same acts. The
that the MTC acted on the same and ruled impression left by the disquisition of the
that it had been filed beyond the appellate court is that such prior
reglementary period. Again, the MTC authority was beyond recall by
reiterated that the Judgment dated 13 petitioner’s Board of Directors, and that
January 1998 had long become final and no new person could be similarly
executory since the fatally defective Motion authorized by the corporation to
for Reconsideration did not toll the perform such acts. The fact that the
reglementary period for appeal. previous authority may have been
misplaced or lost, thus causing
 What then followed was a series of petitioner to authorize a new person to
unsuccessful attempts by petitioner to have file the necessary pleadings or petitions
the lower courts set aside or stay the now- in the case involving the respondent, is
final judgment against it. First, petitioner of no consequence if the new authority
filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment is issued before the filing of the pleading
with the MTC on 25 October 1999. This was that requires verification or
denied by the MTC in an Order dated 13 certification against forum shopping.
March 2000 on the ground that it had been The circumstance is similar to a
filed out of time. The MTC explained that situation where the previously
the petition for relief from judgment must authorized person had died or severed
have been filed either within sixty (60) his or her connection with the corporate
days from the date petitioner's new litigant. Juridical persons appearing
counsel learned of the judgment, or sixty before the courts are not perpetually
(60) days after learning that the Motion for bound to maintain the same authorized
Reconsideration had been denied for representatives in the preparation and
having been filed out of time. Neither certification of pleadings.
circumstance was met by petitioner.  While the lack of certification against
Subsequently, the MTC likewise denied a forum shopping is generally not cured
Motion for Reconsideration filed by by its submission after the filing of the
petitioner. petition, and the submission of a
certificate against forum shopping is
 deemed obligatory, the requirement has discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
been relaxed under justifiable on the part of the MTC in denying the
circumstances under the rule on motion. If that remedy were successful, the
substantial compliance. In any event, effect would have been to void the MTC’s
the observation of the Court of Appeals denial of the Motion for Reconsideration,
that substantial compliance “will not thus allowing petitioner to again pursue
suffice in the matter involving strict such motion as a means towards the filing
observance” of the certification of a timely appeal. 
requirement on non-forum shopping  Another remedy for the petitioner is found
contradicts our recent jurisprudence under Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
which holds that “[t]he rule of Procedure, which governs petitions for
substantial compliance may be availed relief from judgment. Indeed, Section 2,
of with respect to the contents of the Rule 38 finds specific application in this
certification [against forum shopping].” case, as it provides that "[w]hen a
While the lack of certification against judgment or final order is rendered by any
forum shopping is generally not cured court in a case, and a party thereto, by
by its submission after the filing of the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
petition, and the submission of a negligence, has been prevented from taking
certificate against forum shopping is an appeal, he may file a petition [for relief
deemed obligatory, the requirement has from denial of appeal] in such court and in
been relaxed under justifiable the same case praying that the appeal be
circumstances under the rule on given due course." Such petition should be
substantial compliance. The same filed within sixty (60) days after the
characteristics hold true as to the petitioner learns of the judgment or final
verification requirement. order, and not more than six (6) months
 Not only did the defect render the after such judgment or final order was
motion for reconsideration itself entered. The facts of this case indicate that
unworthy of consideration, it more petitioner could have timely resorted to
crucially failed to toll the period to this remedy.
appeal. A motion without a notice of  What the petitioner undertook instead
hearing is pro forma, a mere scrap of was to pursue the notice of appeal,
paper that does not toll the period to despite the unequivocal statement in
appeal, and upon the expiration of the the MTC Order of 23 February 1998 that
15-day period, the questioned order or “the Judgment [sought to be
decision becomes final and executory. reconsidered] has now become final and
The rationale behind this rule is plain: executory.” The Rules mandate that an
unless the movant sets the time and appeal by notice of appeal is deemed
place of hearing, the court will be perfected upon the filing of the notice of
unable to determine whether the appeal in due time, due time being
adverse party agrees or objects to the within fifteen (15) days after notice to
motion, and if he objects, to hear him on the appellant of the judgment or final
his objection, since the rules themselves order appealed from. While the period
do not fix any period within which he of appeal shall be interrupted by a
may file his reply or opposition. timely motion for reconsideration, the
 Thus, the MTC judgment became final and MTC deemed, with legal basis, that the
executory despite the filing of the Motion motion interposed by petitioner could
for Reconsideration thereto, as said motion not have been deemed filed and should
did not toll the period for filing an appeal instead be treated as “a mere scrap of
therefrom. Yet that did not mean that paper.”
petitioner was left bereft of further  If the consequences for pursuing the
remedies under our Rules. For one, wrong remedial tack in this case seem
petitioner could have assailed the MTC’s harsh, it should be remembered that
denial of the Motion for Reconsideration there is no innate right to appeal.
through a special civil action for certiorari Appeal is a statutory right which may be
under Rule 65 alleging grave abuse of exercised within the prescribed limits.
 The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
provides for a rational and orderly
method by which appeal can be
pursued, and even contingency
remedial measures if appeal could no
longer be timely pursued. The failure of
petitioner to undertake a timely appeal,
or to engage in the available modes of
relief even if appeal was no longer
possible, simply has to bear
consequence. The lower court rulings
germane to this case were, consistently
cognizant of this fact, transformed to
legal conclusion, and we are hard-
pressed to find any cause for annulment
of any of those judgments. The dismissal
of the petition by the Court of Appeals is
ultimately correct.

CONCLUSION: the petition is DENIED. Costs against

petitioner.
G.R. No. 116100             February 9, 1996 affirmative relief other than what was granted in the
decision of the lower court. The appellee can only
SPOUSES CRISTINO and BRIGIDA CUSTODIO and advance any argument that he may deem necessary to
SPOUSES LITO and MARIA CRISTINA defeat the appellant's claim or to uphold the decision
SANTOS, petitioners, that is being disputed, and he can assign errors in his
vs. brief if such is required to strengthen the views
COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF PACIFICO C. expressed by the court a quo. These assigned errors,
MABASA and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, in turn, may be considered by the appellate court solely
METRO MANILA, BRANCH 181, respondents. to maintain the appealed decision on other grounds, but
not for the purpose of reversing or modifying the
judgment in the appellee's favor and giving him other
Issues to be raised on appeal affirmative reliefs.

Sanchez WHEREFORE, under the compulsion of the foregoing

premises, the appealed decision of respondent Court of
FACTS: Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
the judgment of the trial court is correspondingly
REINSTATED.
 Civil Case for the grant of an easement of right
of way was filed by (petitioners) Pacifico
Mabasa against Cristino Custodio, Brigida R.
Custodio, Rosalina R. Morato, Lito Santos and
Maria Cristina C. Santos before the RTC.

 The (mabasa) plaintiff owns a parcel of land

with a two-door apartment. The plaintiff was
able to acquire said property through a
contract of sale with spouses Mamerto Rayos
and Teodora Quintero as vendors. Said
property may be described to be surrounded
by other immovables pertaining to defendants
herein.

 When said property was purchased by

Mabasa, there were tenants occupying the
remises and who were acknowledged by
plaintiff Mabasa as tenants. 

ISSUE: whether or not the grant of right of way to

herein private respondents is proper

RULING: Petitioners are already barred from raising

the same. Petitioners did not appeal from the decision
of the court a quo granting private respondents the right
of way, hence they are presumed to be satisfied with
the adjudication therein. With the finality of the
judgment of the trial court as to petitioners, the issue of
propriety of the grant of right of way has already been
laid to rest.

For failure to appeal the decision of the trial court to the

Court of Appeals, petitioners cannot obtain any
affirmative relief other than those granted in the
decision of the trial court. That decision of the court
below has become final as against them and can no
longer be reviewed, much less reversed, by this Court.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that whenever an appeal
is taken in a civil case, an appellee who has not himself
appealed may not obtain from the appellate court any
G.R. No. 142534             June 27, 2006 ISSUE: WON the appeal was not perfected within the
reglementary period.
DONATO SUMAWAY, JOSEPH ALVERO, ASIA
GOLD COAST CORPORATION, AKIGONZ RULING: NO. Petitioners’ notice of appeal was filed on
CORPORATION, RAUL F. REYES, LEOME G. GATA, May 3, 1996. At that time the applicable law was
ANTONIO HICAP, DOLORES YANGA, IMELDA Section 39 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (B.P. 129) or
MAGAT, HONORIO GUEVARRA, EDGEWATER the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981, which
ENTERTAINMENT CORPORATION , CAROLINA provides:
YUTUC, OSIPHIL, INC. RENATO LAUCHENGCO,
ALEXANDER ANGULO and JOSEPH Sec. 39. Appeals. – The period for appeal from final
JAMBOY, Petitioners, orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of
vs. URBAN BANK, INC. ISABELA SUGAR any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted
COMPANY, INC., MAGDALENO M. PEÑA AND from the notice of the final order, resolution, award
ERNESTO OCHOA, Respondents. judgment, or decision appealed from: Provided,
however, That in habeas corpus cases, the period for
Period of appeal appeal shall be forty-eight (48) hours from the notice of
the judgment appealed from.
Sanchez
Particularly, Section 20 of the Implementing Rules and
FACTS: Guidelines of B.P. 129 provides for the manner in which
the appeal may be taken, to wit:

 Petitioners filed an action for Reformation of

Contract, Specific Performance, Damages, 20. Procedure for taking appeal. – An appeal from the
Consignation with Injunction, with Restraining metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts or
Order, with the RTC of Pasay City. municipal circuit trial courts to the regional trial courts,
and from the regional trial courts to the Intermediate
Appellate Court in actions or proceedings originally filed
 Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss the in the former shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal
complaint on the grounds that the complaint with the court that rendered the judgment or order
states no cause of action; the claim is appealed from.
unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds;
the action has prescribed; and the pendency
The 15-day period within which to appeal, counted from
of another action.
notice of the final order, resolution, award judgment, or
decision appealed from, under B.P. 129 was
 The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, reproduced in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
stating that: "it appearing that the contract of amended by A.M. No. 01-1-03-SC, which reads:
lease sought to be amended and/or reformed
has expired as early as November 29, 1994
SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal; appeal in habeas
and in view of the motion to dismiss filed by
corpus cases. – The appeal shall be taken within fifteen
several of the party-plaintiffs, this case is
(15) days from notice of the judgment or final order
hereby ordered dismissed.
appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required,
the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record
 Petitioners’ counsel filed a Notice of Appeal, on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the
which was given due course by the trial court. judgment or final order. However, an appeal in habeas
Consequently, the trial court ordered the corpus cases shall be taken within forty-eight (48)
transmittal of the records of the case to the hours from notice of the judgment or final order
CA. appealed from.

 Respondent Urban Bank filed a Motion to The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely
Dismiss Appeal on the ground that the appeal motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion of
was not perfected within the reglementary extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
period. Respondent contended that reconsideration shall be allowed.
petitioners’ notice of appeal was filed five days
late, as it should have been filed on April 28, Jurisprudence is consistent in ruling that the perfection
1997, and not May 3, 1997. of an appeal in the manner and within the period
prescribed by law is not only mandatory but
 The CA found merit in respondent’s contention jurisdictional, and failure to perfect an appeal has the
and granted the motion to dismiss. effect of rendering the judgment final and
executory, although the Court, in exceptional
circumstances,15 allowed the filing of a belated notice of
appeal. Thus, if the Court were to strictly apply the
jurisprudence in petitioners’ case, the inevitable
conclusion is that the CA was correct in dismissing their
appeal. It does not matter whether respondents’ motion
to dismiss was filed after the trial court already
approved their notice of appeal, or that they have
already paid the docket fees and filed their appellants’
brief. It should be borne in mind that the legality of an
appeal may be raised at any stage of the proceedings
in the appellate court, and the latter is not precluded
from dismissing the same on the ground of its being out
of time.

Fortunately, however, for petitioners, the Court recently

modified the rule on the counting of the 15-day period
within which to appeal. In the precedent-setting case of
Neypes v. Court of Appeals,17 the Court categorically
set a fresh period of 15 days from a denial of a
motion for reconsideration within which to appeal,
thus:

The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules

in all courts. It has the sole prerogative to amend,
repeal or even establish new rules for a more simplified
and inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of
cases. In the rules governing appeals to it and to the
Court of Appeals, particularly Rules 42, 43 and 45, the
Court allows extensions of time, based on justifiable
and compelling reasons, for parties to file their appeals.
These extensions may consist of 15 days or more.

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the

Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal
their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a
fresh period of 15 days within which to file the
notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court,
counted from receipt of the order dismissing a
motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.

The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal

period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order
denying the motion for new trial, motion for
reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final
order or resolution.18 (Emphasis supplied)

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed

Resolutions dated September 17, 1999 and March 17,
2000 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 53270 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the
records of this case be remanded to the Court of
Appeals for further proceedings.
G.R. No. 190660               April 11, 2011 of Regional Trial Courts sitting as SACs is by petition
for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court and not
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, through an ordinary appeal under Rule 41.
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ELIZABETH DIAZ, First, there is no conflict between Section[s] 60 and 61
represented by FRANCISCA P. DE GUZMAN as of RA 6657 inasmuch as the Rules of Court do not at all
Attorney-in-Fact, Respondents. prescribe the procedure for ordinary appeals as the
proper mode of appeal for decisions of Special Agrarian
Appeal from judgments or final orders of the Courts.
Metropolitan Trial Courts/Municipal Trial
Courts/Municipal Trial Courts in Cities/Municipal Circuit Second, the failure to mention Special Agrarian Courts
Trial Courts (RULES 40 to 41) in Section 1 of Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure cannot be construed to mean that a petition
Appeal from judgments or final orders of the Regional for review is not permissible for decisions of the said
Trial Courts (RULE 42) special courts. Section 1 of Rule 43 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure merely mentions the
Court of Tax Appeals and the other different quasi-
Sanchez judicial agencies without exclusivity in its phraseology.

FACTS: What is indisputable is that Section 60 expressly

regards a petition for review as the proper way of
 Private respondent Elizabeth was the appealing decisions of agrarian courts. So far, there is
registered owner of a parcel of agricultural no rule prescribed by this Court expressly disallowing
land. Ten hectares of the land were the said procedure.
expropriated by the Department of Agrarian
Reform Third,considering that RA 6657 cannot and does not
provide the details on how the petition for review shall
 Not satisfied with the valuation DAR, be conducted, a suppletory application of the pertinent
Elizabeth, through her attorney-in-fact provisions of the Rules of Court is necessary. In fact,
Francisca, filed a complaint against the Land Section 61 uses the word "review" to designate the
Bank and the DAR before the RTC. mode by which the appeal is to be effected. The
reference therefore by Section 61 to the Rules of Court
only means that the procedure under Rule 42 for
 The SAC, adopted the DAR’s valuation. petitions for review is to be followed for appeals in
Elizabeth’s motion for reconsideration was agrarian cases.13 (italics in the original; emphasis and
denied. underscoring supplied)

 Land Bank and the DAR failed to file their The adoption of a petition for review as the mode of
appellees’ brief. During the pendency of the appeal is justified in order to "hasten" the resolution of
appeal, Land Bank filed a Motion for Leave to cases involving issues on just compensation of
Admit Defendant-Appellee[’s] Motion to expropriated lands under RA 6657. Thus the Court, still
Dismiss Appeal,6 maintaining that the appeal in the immediately cited Land Bank case, pronounced:
should be dismissed because an ordinary
appeal is the wrong remedy, the proper mode
being by way of a petition for review, citing The reason why it is permissible to adopt a petition for
Section 60 of Republic Act No. 6657 or the review when appealing cases decided by the Special
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Hence, Agrarian Courts in eminent domain case is the need for
Land Bank concluded that the appellate court absolute dispatch in the determination of just
had no jurisdiction over the case, the SAC compensation. Just compensation means not only
decision having attained finality following Land paying the correct amount but also paying for the land
Bank of the Philippines v. De Leon7 which held within a reasonable time from its acquisition. Without
that failure of a party to file the proper remedy prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered
within fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice "just" for the property owner is made to suffer the
of the assailed decision renders it final. consequences of being immediately deprived of his
land while being made to wait for a decade or more
before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope
ISSUE: WON ordinary appeal is a wrong remedy? Yes. with his loss. Such objective is more in keeping with the
nature of a petition for review.
RULING: Yes. Following Land Bank of the Philippines
v. De Leon, the proper mode of appeal from decisions
Unlike an ordinary appeal, a petition for review
dispenses with the filing of a notice of appeal or
completion of records as requisites before any pleading
is submitted. A petition for review hastens the award of
fair recompense to deprived landowners for the
government-acquired property, an end not foreseeable
in an ordinary appeal. . . .

Following then the same Land Bank case, resort by

Elizabeth to a wrong mode of appeal was fatal to her
cause as it resulted in rendering the decision appealed
from final and executory. Her notice of appeal did not, it
bears emphasis, stop the running of the reglementary
period to file a petition for review.

Thus, the perfection of an appeal in the manner and

within the period prescribed by law is not only
mandatory but also jurisdictional and failure of a party
to conform to the rules regarding appeal will render the
judgment final and executory. Once a decision attains
finality, it becomes the law of the case irrespective of
whether the decision is erroneous or not and no court -
not even the Supreme Court - has the power to revise,
review, change or alter the same. The basic rule of
finality of judgment is grounded on the fundamental
principle of public policy and sound practice that, at the
risk of occasional error, the judgment of courts and the
award of quasi-judicial agencies must become final at
some definite date fixed by law.15 (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The

Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated June 2, 2009
is SET ASIDE.

The Decision dated June 21, 2006 of the Regional Trial

Court of Guimba, Nueva Ecija, Branch 33 sitting as a
Special Agrarian Court in Agr. Case No. 1194-G is
deemed final and executory.
G.R. No. 186027               December 8, 2010 The OSG timely interposed an appeal praying for the
reversal and setting aside of the RTC decision. It
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, mainly anchored its appeal on the availment of
vs. Mercadera of the remedy and procedure under Rule
MERLYN MERCADERA through her Attorney-in- 108. In its Brief9 filed with the CA, the OSG argued that
Fact, EVELYN M. OGA, Respondent. the lower court erred (1) in granting the prayer for
change of name in a petition for correction of entries;
and (2) in admitting the photocopies of documentary
Appeal from judgments or final orders of the Court of evidence and hearsay testimony of Oga.
Appeals
For the OSG, the correction in the spelling of
Sanchez Mercadera’s given name might seem innocuous
enough to grant but "it is in truth a material correction
FACTS: as it would modify or increase substantive rights." What
the lower court actually allowed was a change of
Mercadera represented by her sister and duly Mercadera’s given name, which would have been
constituted Attorney-in-Fact, Oga,, sought the proper had she filed a petition under Rule 103 and
correction of her given name as it appeared in her proved any of the grounds therefor. Further, because
Certificate of Live Birth - from Marilyn L. Mercadera failed to invoke a specific ground
Mercadera to Merlyn L. Mercadera before the Office of recognized by the Rules, the lower court’s order in
the Local Civil Registrar. effect allowed the change of one’s name in the civil
registry without basis.

Under R.A. No. 9048, the city or municipal civil registrar

or consul general, as the case may be, is now The CA assessed the controversy in this wise:
authorized to effect the change of first name or
nickname and the correction of clerical or typographical Appellant’s insistence that the petition should have
errors in civil registry entries. The law now excludes been filed under Rule 103 and not Rule 108 of the
the change of first name from the coverage of Rules Rules of Court is off the mark. This Court does not
103 until and unless an administrative petition for entertain any doubt that the petition before the trial
change of name is first filed and subsequently court was one for the correction on an entry in
denied"3 and removes "correction or changing of petitioner’s Certificate of Live Birth and not one in which
clerical errors in entries of the civil register from the she sought to change her name.
ambit of Rule 108." Hence, what is left for the scope of
operation of the rules are substantial changes and To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to
corrections in entries of the civil register.4 remove the faults or error from." To change means "to
replace something with something else of the same
The Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City, kind or with something that serves as a substitute.
however, refused to effect the correction unless a court Article 412 of the New Civil Code does not qualify as to
order was obtained "because the Civil Registrar therein the kind of entry to be changed or corrected or
is not yet equipped with a permanent appointment distinguished on the basis of the effect that the
before he can validly act on petitions for corrections correction or change may be. Such entries include not
filed before their office as mandated by Republic Act only those clerical in nature but also substantial errors.
9048."5 After all, the role of the Court under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court is to ascertain the truths about the facts
Mercadera was then constrained to file a Petition For recorded therein.
Correction of Some Entries as Appearing in the
Certificate of Live Birth under Rule 108 before RTC.  ISSUE: THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A
QUESTION OF LAW IN GRANTING THE CHANGE IN
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. RESPONDENT’S NAME UNDER RULE 103.
–  (o) changes of name. 
RULING: No.
The RTC ruled that the documentary evidence
presented by Mercadera sufficiently supported the The "change of name" contemplated under Article 376
circumstances alleged in her petition. Considering that and Rule 103 must not be confused with Article 412
she had used "Merlyn" as her given name since and Rule 108. A change of one’s name under Rule 103
childhood until she discovered the discrepancy in her can be granted, only on grounds provided by law. In
Certificate of Live Birth, the RTC was convinced that order to justify a request for change of name, there
the correction was justified. must be a proper and compelling reason for the change
and proof that the person requesting will be prejudiced The CA did not allow Mercadera the change of her
by the use of his official name. To assess the name. What it did allow was the correction of her
sufficiency of the grounds invoked therefor, there must misspelled given name which she had been using ever
be adversarial proceedings.33 since she could remember.

In petitions for correction, only clerical, spelling, Besides, granting that Rule 103 applies to this case and
typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil that compliance with the procedural requirements under
registry may be raised. Considering that the Rule 108 falls short of what is mandated, it still cannot
enumeration in Section 2, Rule 10834 also includes be denied that Mercadera complied with the
"changes of name," the correction of a patently requirement for an adversarial proceeding before the
misspelled name is covered by Rule 108. Suffice it to lower court. The publication and posting of the notice of
say, not all alterations allowed in one’s name are hearing in a newspaper of general circulation and the
confined under Rule 103. Corrections for clerical errors notices sent to the OSG and the Local Civil Registry
may be set right under Rule 108. are sufficient indicia of an adverse proceeding. The fact
that no one opposed the petition, including the OSG,
This rule in "names," however, does not operate to did not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to hear the
entirely limit Rule 108 to the correction of clerical errors same and did not make the proceeding less adversarial
in civil registry entries by way of a summary in nature. Considering that the OSG did not oppose the
proceeding. As explained, Republic v. Valencia is the petition and the motion to present its evidence ex
authority for allowing substantial errors in other entries parte when it had the opportunity to do so, it cannot
like citizenship, civil status, and paternity, to be now complain that the proceedings in the lower court
corrected using Rule 108 provided there is an were procedurally defective. Indeed, it has become
adversary proceeding. "After all, the role of the Court unnecessary to further discuss the reasons why the CA
under Rule 108 is to ascertain the truths about the facts correctly affirmed the findings of the lower court
recorded therein."35 especially in admitting and according probative value to
the evidence presented by Mercadera.
A serious scrutiny of this petition reveals a glaring lack
of support to the OSG’s assumption that Mercadera WHEREFORE, the December 9, 2008 Decision of the
intended to change her name under Rule 103. All that Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 00568-MIN is
the petition propounded are swift arguments on the AFFIRMED.
alleged procedural flaws of Mercadera’s petition before
the RTC. In the same vein, no concrete contention was
brought up to convince this Court that the dangers
sought to be prevented by the adversarial proceedings
prescribed in Rule 103 are attendant in this case.
Instead, the RTC found the documents presented by
Mercadera to have satisfactorily shown that she had
been known as MERLYN ever since, discounting the
possibility that confusion, or a modification of
substantive rights might arise. Truth be told, not a
single oppositor appeared to contest the petition
despite full compliance with the publication
requirement.

Thus, the petition filed by Mercadera before the RTC

correctly falls under Rule 108 as it simply sought a
correction of a misspelled given name. To correct
simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the
faults or error from." To change means "to replace
something with something else of the same kind or with
something that serves as a substitute."36 From the
allegations in her petition, Mercadera clearly prayed for
the lower court "to remove the faults or error" from her
registered given name "MARILYN," and "to make or set
aright" the same to conform to the one she grew up to,
"MERLYN." It does not take a complex assessment of
said petition to learn of its intention to simply correct the
clerical error in spelling.
G.R. No. 129742 September 16, 1998
 Petitioner points out that under Section 7, Rule
TERESITA G. FABIAN, petitioner, III of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of
vs. Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman), 
HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as when a respondent is absolved of the charges
Ombudsman; HON. JESUS F. GUERRERO, in his in an administrative proceeding the decision of
capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon; and the Ombudsman is final and unappealable.
NESTOR V. AGUSTIN, respondents. She accordingly submits that the Office of the
Ombudsman has no authority under the law to
restrict, in the manner provided in its aforesaid
Review of final judgments or final orders of quasi- Rules, the right of appeal allowed by Republic
judicial agencies Act No. 6770, nor to limit the power of review
of this Court. Because of the aforecited
Sanchez provision in those Rules of Procedure, she
claims that she found it "necessary to take an
FACTS: alternative recourse under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, because of the doubt it creates
 Petitioner Fabian was the major stockholder on the availability of appeal under Rule 45 of
and president of PROMAT Construction the Rules of Court.
Development Corporation. Private respondent.
Agustin was the incumbent District Engineer of
the First Metro Manila Engineering District  Respondents filed their respective comments
when he allegedly committed the offenses for and rejoined that the Office of the
which he was administratively charged in the Ombudsman is empowered by the
Office of the Ombudsman. Constitution and the law to promulgate its own
rules of procedure. Section 13(8), Article XI of
 PROMAT participated in the bidding for the 1987 Constitution provides, among others,
government construction projects including that the Office of the Ombudsman can
those under the FMED, and private "(p)romulgate its rules of procedure and
respondent, reportedly taking advantage of his exercise such other powers or perform such
official position, inveigled petitioner into an functions or duties as may be provided by
amorous relationship. law."
 Respondents consequently contend that,
petitioner cannot assail the validity of the rules
 Later, misunderstandings and unpleasant of procedure formulated by the Office of the
incidents developed between the parties and Ombudsman governing the conduct of
when petitioner tried to terminate their proceedings before it, including those rules
relationship, private respondent refused and with respect to the availability or non-
resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of availability of appeal in administrative cases,
employing acts of harassment, intimidation such as Section 7, Rule III of Administrative
and threats. She eventually filed the Order No. 07.
aforementioned administrative case against
him in a letter-complaint.  Respondents also question the propriety of
petitioner's proposition that, although she
 Graft Investigator issued a resolution finding definitely prefaced her petition by categorizing
private respondent guilty of grave misconduct the same as "an appeal by certiorari under
and ordering his dismissal from the service Rule 45 of the Rules of Court," she makes the
with forfeiture of all benefits under the law. aforequoted ambivalent statement which in
effect asks that, should the remedy under Rule
45 be unavailable, her petition be treated in
 Herein respondent Ombudsman, approved the the alternative as an original action
aforesaid resolution with modifications, by for certiorari under Rule 65.
finding private respondent guilty of misconduct
and meting out the penalty of suspension ISSUE: Whether or not administrative disciplinary
without pay for one year. The case was cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of
transferred to respondent Deputy Ombudsman the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme
Guerrero who set aside the Order of Court.
respondent Ombudsman and exonerated
private respondent from the administrative
charges. RULING: No. As correctly observed by private
respondent, the revised Rules of Civil
Procedure preclude appeals from quasi-judicial "acquiescence" or "acceptance" by it of the appellate
agencies to the Supreme Court via a petition for review jurisdiction contemplated in said Section 27, is
on certiorari under Rule 45. In the 1997 Rules of Civil unfortunately too tenuous. The jurisdiction of a court is
Procedure, Section 1 of Rule 45, on "Appeal not a question of acquiescence as a matter of fact but
by Certiorari to the Supreme Court," explicitly states: an issue of conferment as a matter of law.

Sec. 1. Filing of petition with Private respondent invokes the rule that courts
Supreme Court. — A person desiring generally avoid having to decide a constitutional
to appeal by certiorari from a question, especially when the case can be decided on
judgment or final order or resolution other grounds. As a general proposition that is correct.
of the Court of Appeals, the Here, however, there is an actual case susceptible of
Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial judicial determination. Also, the constitutional question,
Court or other courts whenever at the instance of this Court, was raised by the proper
authorized by law, may file with the parties, although there was even no need for that
Supreme Court a verified petition for because the Court can rule on the matter sua
review on certiorari. The petition shall sponte when its appellate jurisdiction is involved. The
raise only questions of law which constitutional question was timely raised, although it
must be distinctly set forth. could even be raised any time likewise by reason of the
(Emphasis ours). jurisdictional issue confronting the Court. Finally, the
resolution of the constitutional issue here is obviously
Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought necessary for the resolution of the present case. 22
through a petition for review on certiorari but only from
judgments and final orders of the courts enumerated in The Court appreciate the ratiocination of private
Section 1 thereof. Appeals from judgments and final respondent but regret that It must reject the same. That
orders of quasi-judicial agencies  are now required to private respondent could be absolved of the charge
be brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition because the decision exonerating him is final and
for review, under the requirements and conditions in unappealable assumes that Section 7, Rule III of
Rule 43 which was precisely formulated and adopted to Administrative Order No. 07 is valid, but that is
provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for precisely one of the issues here. The prevailing rule
quasi-judicial agencies. 21 that the Court should not interfere with the discretion of
the Ombudsman in prosecuting or dismissing a
It is suggested, however, that the provisions of Rule 43 complaint is not applicable in this administrative case.
should apply only to "ordinary" quasi-judicial agencies, That two decisions rendered by this Court supposedly
but not to the Office of the Ombudsman which is a imply the validity of the aforementioned Section 7 of
"high constitutional body." We see no reason for this Rule III is precisely under review here because of some
distinction for, if hierarchical rank should be a criterion, statements therein somewhat at odds with settled rules
that proposition thereby disregards the fact that Rule 43 and the decisions of this Court on the same issues,
even includes the Office of the President and the Civil hence to invoke the same would be to beg the
Service Commission, although the latter is even an question.
independent constitutional commission, unlike the
Office of the Ombudsman which is a constitutionally- Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act
mandated but statutorily created body. of 1989) pertinently provides that:

Regarding the misgiving that the review of the decision In all administrative diciplinary cases, orders, directives
of the Office of the Ombudsman by the Court of or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be
Appeals would cover questions of law, of fact or of appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for
both, we do not perceive that as an objectionable certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written
feature. After all, factual controversies are usually notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the
involved in administrative disciplinary actions, just like motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45
those coming from the Civil Service Commission, and of the Rules of Court.
the Court of Appeals as a trier of fact is better prepared
than this Court to resolve the same. On the other hand, It cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from
we cannot have this situation covered by Rule 45 since decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
it now applies only to appeals from the regular courts. administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently
Neither can we place it under Rule 65 since the review violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the
therein is limited to jurisdictional questions. * Constitution against a law which increases the
Appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing
The submission that because this Court has taken argument has been cogently presented to justify such
cognizance of cases involving Section 27 of Republic disregard of the constitutional prohibition which, as
Act No. 6770, that fact may be viewed as correctly explained in First Leparto Ceramics, Inc. vs.
The Court of Appeals, et al. was intended to give this thereover, relates to procedure only.[33] This is so
Court a measure of control over cases placed under its because it is not the right to appeal of an aggrieved
appellate Jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate party which is affected by the law. That right has been
enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate preserved. Only the procedure by which the appeal is
jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court. to be made or decided has been changed. The
rationale for this is that litigant has a vested right in a
As a consequence of our ratiocination that Section 27 particular remedy, which may be changed by
of Republic Act No. 6770 should be struck down as substitution without impairing vested rights, hence he
unconstitutional, and in line with the regulatory can have none in rules of procedure which relate to the
philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial remedy.
agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure,
appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman Furthermore, it cannot be said that transfer of appellate
in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals in this case is an act
the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43. of creating a new right of appeal because such power
of the Supreme Court to transfer appeals to
There is an intimation in the pleadings, however, that subordinate appellate courts is purely a procedural and
said Section 27 refers to appellate jurisdiction which, not a substantive power. Neither can we consider such
being substantive in nature, cannot be disregarded by transfer as impairing a vested right because the parties
this Court under its rule-making power, especially if it have still a remedy and still a competent tribunal to
results in a diminution, increase or modification of administer that remedy.
substantive rights. Obviously, however, where the law
is procedural in essence and purpose, the foregoing Thus, it has been generally held that rules or statutes
consideration would not pose a proscriptive issue involving a transfer of cases from one court to another,
against the exercise of the rule-making power of this are procedural and remedial merely and that, as such,
Court. This brings to fore the question of whether they are applicable to actions pending at the time the
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 is substantive or statute went into effect[36] or, in the case at bar, when
procedural. its invalidity was declared. Accordingly, even from the
standpoint of jurisdiction ex hypothesi the validity of the
It will be noted that no definitive line can be drawn transfer of appeals in said cases to the Court of
between those rules or statutes which are procedural, Appeals can be sustained.
hence within the scope of this Court's rule-making
power, and those which are substantive. In fact, a WHEREFORE, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770
particular rule may be procedural in one context and (Ombudsman Act of 1989), together with Section 7,
substantive in another.[29] It is admitted that what is Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of
procedural and what is substantive is frequently a Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman), and any
question of great difficulty.[30] It is not, however, an other provision of law or issuance implementing the
insurmountable problem if a rational and pragmatic aforesaid Act and insofar as they provide for appeals in
approach is taken within the context of our own administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the
procedural and jurisdictional system. Ombudsman to the Supreme Court, are hereby
declared INVALID and of no further force and effect.
In determining whether a rule prescribed by the
Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the The instant petition is hereby referred and transferred
lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any to the Court of Appeals for final disposition, with said
substantive right, the test is whether the rule really petition to be considered by the Court of Appeals pro
regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for hoc vice as a petition for review under Rule 43, without
enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive prejudice to its requiring the parties to submit such
law and for justly administering remedy and redress for amended or supplemental pleadings and additional
a disregard or infraction of them.[31] If the rule takes documents or records as it may deem necessary and
away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule proper.
creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be
classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a
means o implementing an existing right then the rule
deals merely with procedure.[32]

In the situation under consideration, a transfer by the

Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making
power, of pending cases involving a review of decisions
of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary actions to the Court of Appeals which shall
now be vested with exclusive appellate jurisdiction
G.R. No. 119118      February 19, 2001 In their Comment, private respondents averred that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
RUFINO VALENCIA, petitioner, motion to execute pending appeal and deferring its
vs. action on the petition for relief. They claimed petitioner
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF was forum-shopping when he filed a complaint for
BO. STA. CRUZ, PAOMBONG, annulment of judgment. They insisted that the trial
BULACAN, respondent. court's dismissal of the counterclaim was correct.10

Relief from judgments, orders and other proceedings Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in denying the motion for execution
pending appeal. According to the appellate court, it is
Sanchez clear from Section 2 Rule 39 of the Rules of Court that
it is discretionary for the trial court to grant or deny a
FACTS: motion for execution. Thus, it cannot be compelled to
allow execution, after finding that there was no cogent
Petitioner Valencia entered into a lease agreement with and good reason for it.
the Roman Catholic Bishop of Malolos (RCBM)
involving a fishpond, registered in the latter's ISSUES:

Private respondents alleged that they were the true 1) Was private respondents' appeal already
owners of the fishpond and that RCBM was a mere perfected when petitioner filed a motion for
trustee. execution? Yes.

After presentation of evidence and submission of the 2) Was there forum-shopping when petitioner
case for decision, Judge Masadao dismissed it motu filed a complaint for annulment of judgment
propio  for lack of jurisdiction, opining that the case was with the Court of Appeals? Yes.
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board. Both parties moved to reconsider, 3) Should execution pending appeal be
which Judge Masadao granted, and the case was allowed?
scheduled anew for pre-trial. Petitioner was not
informed thereof, hence he failed to attend the pre-trial.
On that day, Judge Masadao issued an order stating 1. Yes. We find no merit in petitioner's argument. A
that the parties adopted the evidence already petition for relief under Rule 38 is only available against
presented and considered the case submitted for a final and executory judgment.18 In this case, the trial
decision. Petitioner's former counsel received a copy of court's judgment subject of the petition for relief has not
the order but failed to inform petitioner.Judge Masadao yet attained finality because of the timely appeal by
rendered judgment upholding the validity of RCBM's private respondents. Therefore, petitioner cannot
title and its lease contract with petitioner. require the judge to follow the procedure laid down in
Rule 38. The judge did not err nor abuse his discretion
when he deferred action on the petition.
Upon belatedly learning of said judgment, petitioner
moved for execution pending appeal, contending that
since the trial court found him entitled to possession of Corollarily, the Court of Appeals did not err in failing to
the fishpond, it is unfair to deprive him annul the portion of the trial court's judgment dismissing
thereof. Meanwhile, he filed a petition for relief from the petitioner's counterclaim for lack of due process. This
portion of the judgment dismissing his counterclaim, can well be settled in the petition for relief before the
where he alleged that his failure to move for trial court. Section 1, Rule 47 of the Rules of
reconsideration of or appeal from said judgment was Court19 provides that parties can avail of the action for
due to a mistaken belief of his former counsel that he annulment of judgment when a petition for relief is no
was no longer interested to pursue the counterclaim. longer available through no fault of the petitioner. In the
present case, the latter remedy was still available.
Petitioner avers that the trial court abused its discretion
when it denied the motion on the ground that the 2. Yes. On the issue of forum-shopping, the rule is,
portion of the decision sought to be executed had been there is forum-shopping when as a result of an adverse
vacated by private respondents' timely appeal. opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion
Petitioner avers that he received the trial court's (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another20 and that
decision on July 23, 1993, and he filed the motion on the actions that were filed involve the same
August 5, 1993, well within the 15-day period for transactions and the same essential facts and
appeal. Private respondents do not dispute these circumstances.21 There must also be identical causes of
averments.
action, subject matter and issues in the cases before petitioner offered no convincing proof. His insistence –
the two fora. that the trial court's decision upholding the lease
agreement between him and RCBM already entitled
The petition for relief in the trial court and the petition him to possession of the fishponds even without a writ
for annulment of judgment in the Court of Appeals and despite appeal – is premature. It is not enough for
emanate from the same transaction, which is the lease him to claim he needed a writ of execution without
contract between petitioner and the Roman Catholic detailing cogent and good reasons therefor. The trial
Bishop of Malolos (RCBM). They also involve the same court was within its bounds when it considered his
facts and circumstances. Recall that upon the imagined fears of a bloody confrontation not enough
execution of the aforecited contract, petitioner occupied reason to issue the writ.
the fishpond where he invested considerable amount of
money. When private respondents filed their complaint On the prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, there
for cancellation of RCBM's title over the fispond, its are three requisites for the grant of the same: 1) The
possession was removed from petitioner, who invasion of the right is material and substantial; 2) The
consequently filed an answer in intervention, with right of complainant is clear and unmistakable; 3) There
counterclaim for the damages he incurred. The trial is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to
court disposed the complaint upholding the RCBM's prevent serious damage.22 Petitioner merely alleged the
title. However, the same court dismissed petitioner's presence of these elements, but did not substantiate
counterclaim. As petitioner failed to move for the same with convincing evidence. Consequently, we
reconsideration or appeal the portion of the decision find no meritorious reason for the issuance of said writ.
adverse to him, he filed the petition for relief with the
trial court, which in turn deferred action thereto. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision
Consequently, petitioner filed the petition for certiorari and resolution of the Court of Appeals dated October
with annulment of judgment with the Court of Appeals. 28, 1994 and February 10, 1995, respectively, are
Clearly, the two actions resulted from the same facts hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
and circumstances. The two petitions also
involve identical cause of action. Both were for the
setting aside or annulment of that portion of the trial
court's judgment dismissing petitioner's counterclaim on
the ground of fraud. The two petitions also involve
the same subject matter or issue of whether petitioner
has meritorious counterclaim which, for alleged lack of
notice for the pre-trial conference, he failed to prove.
Clearly, there is forum-shopping and the Court of
Appeals did not err when it declared so in its resolution.

3. No. Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court,

provides that upon motion, the court may, in its
discretion, order execution to issue even before the
expiration of the time to appeal, upon good reasons to
be stated in a special order. Petitioner, citing Echauz
vs. CA, et al., 199 SCRA 381, 386 (1991), states that
generally, execution is allowed when superior
circumstances demanding urgency outweigh the
damages that may result from the issuance of the writ.
Consequently, petitioner says that a writ of execution
should be issued in his favor not only because he is
entitled, under the law, to the possession of the
fishpond, such that he can take possession of the same
without a writ of execution, but also because the
issuance of such writ will prevent a bloody confrontation
between the parties.

Private respondents respond that the trial court did not

abuse its discretion since appreciation of the reasons
for execution pending appeal lies within its sound
discretion.

We agree with private respondents. Other than his self-

serving claim that he would suffer damage with private
respondents' continued possession of the fishpond,
G.R. No. 151170             May 29, 2007  Petitioner responded to the foregoing
developments by filing a Notice of Appeal, as
VICTORY LINER, INC., Petitioner, well as a motion for the inhibition by the MTC
vs. judge which motion was immediately granted.
MICHAEL MALINIAS, Respondent. It was only on 28 September 1999, or
eighteen (18) months after the Notice of
Appeal was filed, that the MTC acted on the
Annulment of Judgments or final orders and resolutions same and ruled that it had been filed beyond
the reglementary period. Again, the MTC
Sanchez reiterated that the Judgment dated 13 January
1998 had long become final and executory
FACTS: since the fatally defective Motion for
Reconsideration did not toll the reglementary
period for appeal.
 This case finds its origin from a vehicular
collision that occurred in La Union between a
bus owned by petitioner Victory Liner, Inc. and  The MTC explained that the petition for relief
an Isuzu Truck used by respondent Michael from judgment must have been filed either
Malinias. within sixty (60) days from the date petitioner’s
new counsel learned of the judgment, or sixty
(60) days after learning that the Motion for
 A complaint for sum of money and damages Reconsideration had been denied for having
was instituted by respondent against petitioner been filed out of time. Neither circumstance
and the bus driver alleging pecuniary damage was met by petitioner. Subsequently, the MTC
to the truck. likewise denied a Motion for Reconsideration
filed by petitioner.9
 In the course of trial, respondent finished
presenting his evidence and rested his case.  The RTC agreed with the MTC that the
In the meantime, counsel for petitioner filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment had been
motion to withdraw as counsel, but the same belatedly filed.
was denied by the MTC in an as the motion
did not bear any signature of conformity from
the petitioner. When the case was called for  Petitioner with the Court of Appeals a "Petition
the reception of petitioner’s evidence on the for Certiorari to Annul Judgment" under the
previously scheduled date of 27 October 1997, aegis of Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
no appearance was made for the bus Procedure. Interestingly, based on the first
company. Respondent thus immediately paragraph and the express relief prayed for in
moved that petitioner be declared to have this petition, the "judgment" sought to be
waived its right to adduce evidence in its favor annulled was not the final and executory
and that the case be deemed submitted for judgment of the MTC, but rather, the two
judgment. orders of the RTC which successively
dismissed the special civil action for certiorari,
and directed the issuance of a writ of
 The MTC found merit in respondent’s execution in favor of respondent.14 However,
contention, and ordered the case be deemed in explaining the "nature of the petition,"
submitted for decision as of 27 October 1997. petitioner claimed that it was seeking to annul
On 13 January 1998, the MTC rendered the judgment and orders of both the RTC and
judgment in favor of respondent. the MTC,15 although the issues identified in the
petition pertain only to "serious errors" and
 Through its new counsel, petitioner filed a "grave abuse of discretion" on the part of the
Motion for Reconsideration. The MTC ruled RTC.16 There is a general allegation that the
that the notice did not conform with the acts of the RTC in granting the motion for
mandatory requirements of Section 5, Rule 15 execution even before petitioner’s motion for
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and that reconsideration was acted upon constituted an
the motion was thus a mere scrap of paper extrinsic fraud,17 but no particular arguments
which did not suspend the period to appeal. were offered to explain why that was so.
Accordingly, the MTC declared that its earlier
judgment dated 13 January 1998 had become  The petition for annulment of judgment was
final and executory. accompanied by a Verification and
Certification Against Forum Shopping which
was signed by counsel for petitioner. On that
 basis, the Court of Appeals dismissed the ordinary appeal to the Court of Appeals under Section
petition outright in a Resolution18 dated 26 July 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, since
2001, stressing the rule that it should be the such dismissals partake of a final order that completely
petitioner, not its counsel, which should disposed of the original petition filed with the RTC. It
execute the verification and certification may have been that petitioner was threatened by the
against forum shopping impending execution of the adverse MTC decision,
despite the fact that it had a pending motion for
 Two sets of arguments are raised. The first reconsideration of the RTC’s dismissal of its certiorari
concerns the errors ascribed to the Court of petition. That notwithstanding, annulment of judgment
Appeals in dismissing outright the petition for still stands as a most incongruous remedy if such
annulment of judgment. The second concerns impending execution did impel an active recourse on
the alleged grave abuse of discretion on the the part of the petitioner.
part of the RTC in directing the issuance of the
writ of execution even without resolving More fundamentally, the annulment of the RTC
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. decision dismissing the special civil action for certiorari
would not properly engender the annulment of the
ISSUE: WON CA erred in dismissing the petition for adverse MTC judgment. In fact, the annulment of such
annulment of judgment RTC decision would not give rise to any viable or useful
right or benefit to the petitioner, since it would not stay
in any way the MTC judgment or its execution. At most,
RULING: No. the only possible implication of the annulment of the
RTC decision is that relief still existed to extenuate the
As indicated in the Resolution of the Court of Appeals, MTC rulings dismissing the petition for relief from
the two main grounds relied upon for dismissing the judgment, the same rulings which were timely assailed
petition for annulment of judgment were petitioner’s in the petition for certiorari.
failure to comply with the requirements in the execution
of the verification and certification against forum- We do have to offer some clarification regarding the
shopping, and the petition’s reliance on the ground of citation by the Court of Appeals as ground for
extrinsic fraud which could have been raised or availed dismissing the petition for annulment the fact that "the
of in a motion for new trial or petition for relief. ground raised by petitioner is extrinsic fraud, which
ground petitioner has already availed of in its petition
Petitioner filed a petition for annulment of judgment with for relief from judgment in the Municipal Trial Court."
the Court of Appeals. One might presume that the Section 2 of Rule 47 does disqualify extrinsic fraud as a
judgment sought for annulment would have been that valid ground "if it was availed of, or could have been
rendered by the MTC. Yet what petitioner expressly availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for
sought to be nullified were mainly the RTC rulings relief," and such provision would have found
dismissing the petition for certiorari. The sense of this incontestable relevance had the clear object of the
remedial action is lost on the Court. petition for annulment been the MTC judgment. But
petitioner’s action for annulment of judgment did not
provide clarity in that regard, and in fact does devote
Admittedly, there appears to have been a half-hearted
considerable effort in imputing errors on the part of the
or incomplete attempt to have the MTC rulings annulled
RTC with the objective of annulling, in particular, the
as well.43 Disregarding for the nonce the merits of the
RTC decision. If that were so, reliance on Section 2 of
annulment of the MTC decisions, Section 10 of Rule 48
Rule 47 would have been misplaced, since the
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure makes it clear that
judgment subject of the petition for relief was different
"[a]n action to annul a judgment or final order of a
from the decision subject of the action for annulment of
Municipal Trial Court shall be filed in the Regional Trial
judgment. Still, given the confused nature of the petition
Court having jurisdiction over the former,"44 and not with
for annulment of judgment, blame could hardly be
the Court of Appeals. Considering the periods
attributed to the RTC.
prescribed under Rule 47 for the filing of an action for
annulment of judgment are quite broad or capable of
discretionary appreciation,45 the petitioner could have All told, even if we were to hold that the Court of
filed such action for annulment of the MTC’s judgment Appeals erred in dismissing the petition on the
with the RTC which would not have been lightly perceived defect in the verification and certification
disregarded with timeliness as premise. requirements, the appellate court would have been left
with an action stigmatized by error upon error
interminably. Most frustratingly, for every procedural
Still, it was the RTC rulings which were subject of the
misstep committed by petitioner, there existed a
petition for annulment filed with the Court of Appeals
corresponding viable alternative which would have
which had jurisdiction over such actions. This recourse
necessitated a ruling on the merits, and which petitioner
was ill-advised, to say the least, for varied reasons. For
could have chosen with ease. Instead of filing a Notice
one, the RTC rulings dismissing petitioner’s special civil
of Appeal, it could have instead filed a special civil
action for certiorari could have been the subject of an
action for certiorari or a petition for relief from judgment. against petitioner Citytrust Banking
Instead of filing the no longer timely petition for relief Corporation and a foreign bank, Marine
from judgment, it could have instead by then filed a
petition for annulment of judgment. When it did file a Midland Bank, N.A.
petition for annulment with the Court of Appeals, it
could have instead filed a more feasible petition for  Samara purchased from Citytrust Bank Draft
annulment with the RTC. (bill of exchange) Number 23681 for $40,000,
the payee being Thai International Airways
If the consequences for pursuing the wrong remedial
tack in this case seem harsh, it should be remembered and the corresponding drawee bank is
that there is no innate right to appeal. Appeal is a defendant Marine Midland.
statutory right which may be exercised within the
prescribed limits. The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure  On Dec. 23, 1980, Samara executed a stop-
provides for a rational and orderly method by which
appeal can be pursued, and even contingency remedial payment order of the bank draft instructing
measures if appeal could no longer be timely pursued. Citytrust to inform Marine Midland about the
The failure of petitioner to undertake a timely appeal, or order through telex. Citytrust transmitted the
to engage in the available modes of relief even if message the next day and followed it up with
appeal was no longer possible, simply has to bear
consequence. The lower court rulings germane to this a cable. The bank acknowledged to have
case were, consistently cognizant of this fact, received stating that it has noted the stop-
transformed to legal conclusion, and we are hard- payment order and has not paid the bank
pressed to find any cause for annulment of any of those
draft. Citytrust re-debited Samara’s account
judgments. The dismissal of the petition by the Court of
Appeals is ultimately correct. for $40 upon discovering that Marine
Midland had already debited Citytrust’s own
All the errors could have been avoided had petitioner, account for the same amount.
at the onset, recognized that the judicial system
deemed the original MTC Judgment dated 13 January
 TC ruled in favor of plaintiff and adjudged the
1998 as having become final and executory after no
valid motion for reconsideration was filed thereto. On two defendants to be jointly and severally
many levels, there existed ample remedies to undo liable as judgment debtors to pay plaintiff
such deleterious consequence, yet petitioner ended up
each time selecting the wrong answer among the
 Marine Midland filed a MR of the decision
varied options. In the end, all petitioner accomplished
was to persistently water a dead plant. but was denied. On the other hand,
petitioner only moved for the
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against reconsideration of the order of execution of
petitioner. the judgment against it, which was granted.
The two defendants then filed separate
appeals.

 Petitioner’s appeal, however, was dismissed

CITYTRUST BANKING CORP. V. COURT OF APPEALS for being filed out of time or 51 days (i.e. May
G.R. No. 92591, April 30, 2001 7, 1986) after it received a copy of the TC’s
decision on March 17, 1986. A motion to
CIVIL PROCEDURE reconsider the dismissal was denied by the
R. POST-JUDGMENT REMEDIES CA.
2. Appeals in general
e. issues to be raised on appeal  On Feb. 26, 1988, the petitioner questioned
[Salta] before the SC the dismissal of its appeal.

FACTS:  On Feb 23, 1989, while the petition for

certiorari to review the dismissal of the
 Private respondent William Samara, an
appeal was still pending before the SC, the CA
American who does business in the PH, filed a
affirmed the TC’s decision with modification
complaint for recovery of a sum of money
 consisting of a reduction of the rate of Citytrust's petition for certiorari to review the
interest and attorney’s fees as well as the dismissal of its own appeal. We were so notified
exclusion of the exemplary damages. through Citytrust's motion for reconsideration of our
decision n in G.R. No. 82009. It is a sad fact, however,
 On April 10, 1989, the SC denied the petition that the motion did not present sufficiently compelling
for certiorari for lack of merit. Thus, on Aug 7, grounds to convince the Court to rule otherwise on
the issues presented in G.R. No. 82009 which pertain
1989, the decision became final and
to the validity of the dismissal of the petitioner's
executory.
appeal.
 On Sept 28, 1989, Samara filed a motion for The present petition was given due course in line with
execution which the trial court granted. our settled rule that while a decision has already
become final and executory and can no longer be
 On Nov. 6, 1989, the petitioner assailed the challenged, the manner of its execution can be
Order of Execution before the CA, which was reviewed by proper appeal (Abbot v. National Labor
denied. Relations Commission, 145 SCRA 206 [1986]). It is not
only the difference in the issue raised that makes us
 Private respondent contends that the allow this petition. It is also because of a different
petition is barred by res judicata. Court of Appeals decision (this time in CA- G.R. SP No.
19176) that is the subject of our review. The petitioner
ISSUE: now assails the affirmation of the order of execution
based on the trial court judgment in spite of the
WON the liability of the petitioner should be based on modified judgment which reduced the liability of co-
the original decision of the trial court and not the defendants to pay private respondent. What bothers
modified one. the private respondent is the similarity of the
arguments used by the petitioner in all the pleadings
RULING: filed with this Court in G.R. No. 82009 and in the
present petition.
YES.
The Court reiterates what it has held in
It is our considered opinion that the issue here is the Abbot case:
distinct from the ones raised earlier. In the present x x x           x x x          x x x
petition, the Court is faced with the issue of the In the instant case, however, what is sought to be
propriety of the execution of judgments in favor of reviewed is not the decision itself but the manner of
private respondent Samara who is entitled to recover its execution. There is a big difference. While it is true
on execution: against the petitioner, the amount of US that the decision itself has become final and executory
$40,000.00 plus 12% compounded interest per and so can no longer be challenged, there is no
annum, exemplary damages of P100,000.00 attorney's question either that it must be enforced in accordance
fees of P50,000.00 and costs; and as against Marine with its terms and conditions. Any deviation
Midland, the amount of US $40,000.00 plus 6% simple therefrom can be the subject of a proper appeal. (pp.
interest per annum, and attorney's fees of only 209-210)
P10,000.00.
DISPOSITIVE:
We are less concerned now with the issues of whether
or not a co-defendant's appeal inures to the benefit of WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in
another who failed to appeal on time and on the right CA-G.R. SP No. 19176 dated January 18, 1990 as well
of a judgment creditor to immediate execution of a as the resolution denying reconsideration are hereby
final and executory judgment since such issues have REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The court a quo is ordered
become moot and academic. to effect execution of its judgment subject to the
It is worthy to note that the Court was not apprised of modifications supplied by the Court of Appeals in its
the February 23, 1989 decision of the Court of Appeals judgment on February 23, 1989.
until after we had promulgated a decision denying
SO ORDERED.
 SAN LORENZO RUIZ BUILDERS AND DEVELOPERS 27, 2005. On that date, the 15-day
GROUP, INC. V. BAYANG prescriptive period within which to
G.R. No. 194702, April 20, 2015 file an appeal began to run. Instead
of preparing an appeal,
CIVIL PROCEDURE respondents-appellants opted to file
R. POST-JUDGMENT REMEDIES a Motion for Reconsideration on
2. Appeals in general
August 10, 2005. Their filing of the
f. Period of appeal
said motion interrupted the period
[Salta]
of appeal by that time, however,
FACTS: fourteen (14) days had already
elapsed.
 Peittioner SLR, as seller, and respondent Ma.
Cristina Bayang, as buyer, entered into a On April 17, 2006, respondents-
“contract to sell” of a 60 sqm lot in Violago appellants received the Resolution
Homes Parkwoods Subd., Q.C. denying their Motion for
Reconsideration. Following the
above rules, respondents-appellants
 Upon full payment of the monthly
have only one (1) day left, or until
amortizations on the purchased lot, Cristina April 18, 2006, within which to file
demanded from SLR Builders the execution of their notice of appeal to this Office.
the deed of absolute sale and the lot's Unfortunately, they were able to do
certificate of title but the latter failed to so only on April 27, 2006, or nine (9)
deliver, prompting Cristina to file a complaint days late8 (Emphasis supplied.)
for specific performance and damages
against SLR Builders and its President, Oscar  The petitioners moved to reconsider and
Violago (petitioners) before the Housing and argued that the "fresh period rule"
Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). enunciated in the case of Domingo Neypes,
et at. v. Court of Appeals, et al. should be
 In a decision dated Feb 16, 2004, HLRUB applied to their case.
ruled in Cristina’s favor and ordered SLR,
among others, to execute the Deed of  The OP, in a resolution10 dated July 26, 2007,
Absolute Sale of the subject property and denied the petitioners' motion with finality,
deliver the title thereof. stating that the "fresh period rule" applies
only to judicial appeals and not to
 Petitioner appealed the decision to the administrative appeals, such as in petitioners'
HLURB Board of Commissioners. The Board case. The petitioners then appealed to the CA
dismissed and denied the petitioners’ appeal via petition for review under Rule 43 of the
and subsequent MR. Rules of Court.

 The petitioners then brought their case to the  In its assailed decision, the CA denied the
Office of the President. In a resolution dated petitioners' petition for review. The CA,
Nov. 17, 2006, the OP dismissed the likewise, denied the petitioners' motion for
petitioners’ appeal for having been filed out reconsideration; hence, the filing of the
of time: present petition for review on certiorari with
this Court.
o A review of the records shows that
the HLURB Decision affirming the ISSUE:
Arbiter's decision was received by
the respondents/appellants WON the “fresh period rule” in Neypes applies to
(referring to the petitioners) on July administrative appeals, such as an appeal from a
decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners to the
Office of the President

RULING:

NO.

We DENY the petition. It is settled that the "fresh

period rule" in Neypes applies only to judicial appeals
and not to administrative appeals.

In this case, the subject appeal, i.e., appeal from a

decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners to the
OP, is not judicial but administrative in nature; thus,
the "fresh period rule" in Neypes does not apply.

As aptly pointed out by the OP, the rules and

regulations governing appeals from decisions of the
HLURB Board of Commissioners to the OP are Section
2, Rule XXI of HLURB Resolution No. 765, series of
2004, in relation to Paragraph 2, Section 1 of
Administrative Order No. 18, series of 1987.

DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, we DENY the present petition for review

on certiorari and AFFIRM the decision dated July 23,
2010 and resolution dated December 2, 2010 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100332.
 MACAWIWILI GOLD MINING AND DEVELOPMENT
CO., INC. VS COURT OF APPEALS  Respondent Philex Mining seeks the dismissal
G.R. No. 115104, October 12, 1998 of the petition on the ground that petitioner
should have filed a motion for
CIVIL PROCEDURE reconsideration giving the appellate court an
R. POST-JUDGMENT REMEDIES opportunity to correct itself.
2. Appeals in general
i. Appeal from judgments or final
ISSUE:
orders of the Regional Trial Courts
(RULE 42)
1. WON the petitioner should have first filed a
[Salta]
motion for reconsideration
2. WON the CA committed grave abuse of
FACTS:
discretion when it denied petitioners’ Motion
 On October 16, 1992, respondent Philex to Dismiss Appeal
Mining Corporation filed a complaint for
expropriation against petitioners Macawiwili RULING:
Gold Mining and Development Co., Inc. and
1. NO.
Omico Mining & Industrial Corporation,
before the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet.
It is settled that the writ of certiorari lies only when
petitioner has no other plain, speedy, and adequate
 Based on §53 of P.D. No. 463, Philex Mining remedy in the ordinary course of law. Thus, a motion
sought to expropriate 21.9 hectares of for reconsideration, as a general rule, must be filed
petitioners' mining areas where the latter's before the tribunal, board, or officer against whom
"Macawiwili claims" are located. Philex the writ of certiorari is sought.
Mining likewise moved for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin Ordinarily, certiorari as a special civil action will not lie
petitioners from ejecting it (Philex Mining) unless, motion for reconsideration is first filed before
from the mining areas sought to be the respondent tribunal, to allow it an opportunity to
expropriated. correct its assigned errors.

 Although a TRO was initially issued by the his rule, however, is not without exceptions. In Pajo v.
Ago and Ortiz 5 we held:
RTC, it denied respondent’s application for a
preliminary injunction. On Feb 18, 1993, the
Respondent contends that petitioners should
TC acting on the petitioner’s motion, have filed a motion for reconsideration of the
dismissed the complaint of Philex Mining. order in question, or asked for the dissolution
of the preliminary injunction issued by the
 Philex Mining moved for a reconsideration, trial court, before coming to us.
but this was denied. It then appealed to the
CA. This is not always so. It is only when the
questions are raised for the first time before
 On February 16, 1994, petitioners filed a this Court in certiorari proceeding that the
Motion to Dismiss Appeal on the ground that writ shall not issue unless the lower court had
only questions of law were involved and, first been given the opportunity to pass upon
therefore, the appeal should be to the the same. In fine, when the questions raised
Supreme Court. However, the appellate court before this Court are the same as those
which have been squarely raised in and
denied petitioners' motion in a resolution,
passed upon by, the court below, the filing of
dated April 12, 1994. Without filing a motion
a motion for reconsideration in said court
for reconsideration, petitioners filed the before certiorari can be instituted in this
instant petition for certiorari. Court, is no longer prerequisite.
 Rules so require. In such cases, the record on
The issues raised by petitioners in this petition are appeal shall be filed and served in like
substantially the same as those asserted by them in manner.
their Motion to Dismiss Appeal, dated February 14,
1994, before the Court of Appeals. The argument that (b) Petition for review. — The appeal to the
respondent has no right to expropriate petitioners' Court of Appeals in cases decided by the
mineral areas under Presidential Decree No. 463 has Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its
already been raised, argued, and submitted by appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for
petitioners for resolution by the appellate court in review in accordance with Rule 42.
their Motion to Dismiss Appeal. To further file a
motion for reconsideration before the Court of (c) Appeal by certiorari. — In all cases where
Appeals would simply be to repeat their arguments. only questions of law are raised or involved,
For this reason, we hold that petitioners' failure to file the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by
a motion for reconsideration is not fatal to the petition for review on certiorari in
allowance of their action. accordance with Rule 45.

2. YES. On the other hand, Rule 42 provides that appeals from

judgments of the regional trial courts in the exercise
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals gravely of their appellate jurisdiction must be brought to the
abused its discretion in denying their motion to Court of Appeals, whether the appellant raises
dismiss the appeal. According to petitioners, questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact
respondent's appeal raises only questions of law and, and law.
therefore it should be brought to the Supreme Court
by means of a petition for review on certiorari and The rules on appeals from the judgments of the
not, as Philex Mining did, by bringing an ordinary regional trial courts in civil cases may thus be
appeal to the Court of Appeals. Petitioners argue that summarized as follows:
the question whether respondent has a right to
expropriate petitioners' mining areas under §59 of (1) Original Jurisdiction — In all cases decided
Presidential Decree No. 463 is a question of law. by the regional trial court in the exercise of
their original jurisdiction, appeal may be
On the other hand, Philex Mining maintains that the made to:
issues raised in its appeal are factual and, therefore,
the appellate court is the proper forum for the (a) Court of Appeals — where the appellant
ventilation of such issues. raises questions of fact or mixed questions of
fact and law, by filing a mere notice of
This procedure is now embodied in Rule 41, §2 of the appeal.
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which distinguishes the
different modes of appeal from judgments of regional (b) Supreme Court — where the appellant
trial courts as follows: solely raises questions of law, by filing a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule
Modes of appeal. — 45.

(a) Ordinary appeal. — The appeal to the (2) Appellate Jurisdiction

Court to Appeals in cases decided by the
Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its All appeals from judgments rendered by the regional
original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a trial courts in the exercise of their appellate
notice of appeal with the court which jurisdiction, whether the appellant raises questions of
rendered the judgment or final order fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law, shall
appealed from and serving a copy thereof be by filing a petition for review under Rule 42.
upon the adverse party. No record on appeal
shall be required except in special The respondent's arguments may thus be summarized
proceedings and other cases of multiple or as follows:
separate appeals where the law or these
 (1) Section 59, in relation to Section 53 of hand, its final argument raises the issue of whether
Presidential Decree No. 463, expressly grants the rules on the allegation of alternative causes of
respondent the right to expropriate mining action in one pleading under Rule 8, §1 of the Rules of
claims or lands owned, occupied, or leased by Court are applicable to special civil actions. These are
other persons once the conditions justifying legal questions whose resolution does not require an
expropriation are present. The power of examination of the probative weight of the evidence
eminent domain expressly granted under presented by the parties but a determination of what
Sections 58 and 59 of P.D. No. 463 is not the law is on the given state of facts. These issues
inferior to the possessory right of other raise questions of law which should be the subject of a
claimowners.  petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 filed
directly with this Court. The Court of Appeals
(2) There is nothing absurd in allowing a committed a grave error in ruling otherwise.
mining company to expropriate land
belonging to another mining company. DISPOSITIVE:
Pursuant to the ruling laid down in Benguet
Consolidated, Inc. v. Republic,  land covered WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, the challenged
by mining claims may be the subject of resolution of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE, and
expropriation. Moreover, a general grant of the appeal of respondent Philex Mining is DISMISSED.
the power of eminent domain only means
that the court may inquire into the necessity
of the expropriation. 

(3) Respondent could not be held guilty of

forum-shopping or subverting the Supreme
Court's decision in Poe Mining v.
Garcia.  Forum-shopping, which refers to
filing the same or repetitious suits, is not
resorted to in the present case since
respondent seeks to expropriate petitioners'
mining areas, not as operator of the Poe
mining claims, but as operator of the Nevada
mining claims. 

(4) Respondent's expropriation of the land

will not divide the surface from the
subsurface for the reason that respondent
seeks to expropriate all rights that
petitioners, as well as the Pigoro heirs, have
over the 21.9 hectare area. 
(5) The trial court erred in disregarding
respondent's alternative cause of action,
even on the assumption that respondent
does not have the right to expropriate, for
the reason that an alternative statement in a
pleading, if sufficient, is not vitiated by the
insufficiency of the other alternative
statements. 

The first four arguments advanced by respondent

Philex Mining raise the sole issue of whether it has,
under Presidential Decree No. 463, the right to
expropriate the 21.9 hectare mining areas where
petitioners' mining claims are located. On the other
 Asian Terminals, Inc. v. Simon Enterprises, Inc.
G.R. No. 177116, February 27, 2013  Thus, the respondent filed with the RTC of
Manila an action for damages against the
CIVIL PROCEDURE unknown owner of the vessels M/V “Sea
R. POST-JUDGMENT REMEDIES Dream” and M/V “Tern”, its local agent Inter-
2. Appeals in general Asia Marine Transport, Inc., and petitioner
j. Appeal from judgments or final
ATI alleging that it suffered losses through
orders of the Court of Appeals
the fault or negligence of the defendants.
[Salta]
 In their Answer, the defendants prayed for
FACTS: the dismissal of the complaint alleging lack of
cause of action and prescription.
 On October 25, 1995, Contiquincybunge
Export Company loaded 6,843.700 metric  Meanwhile, Petitioner ATI alleged in its
tons of U.S. Soybean Meal in Bulk on board Answer that it exercised the required
the vessel MN "Sea Dream" at the Port of diligence in the handling of the subject
Darrow, Louisiana, U.S.A., for delivery to the shipment.
Port of Manila to respondent Simon
Enterprises, Inc., as consignee. When the  RTC – held petitioner ATI and its co-
vessel arrived at the South Harbor in Manila, defendants solidarily liable to respondent for
the shipment was discharged to the receiving damages arising from the shortage.
barges of petitioner Asian Terminals, Inc.
(ATI), the arrastre operator. Respondent later  CA – affirmed the decision of the RTC
received the shipment but claimed having
received only 6,825.144 metric tons of U.S.  Petitioner moved for the reconsideration but
Soybean Meal, or short by 18.556 metric this was denied by the CA.
tons, which is estimated to be worth
 Petitioner filed the instant petition raising the
US$7,100.16 or ₱186,743.20.
sole issue of whether the appellate court
 On November 25, 1995, Contiquincybunge erred in affirming the decision of the TC
Export Company made another shipment to holding petitioner ATI solidarily liable with its
respondent and allegedly loaded on board co-defendants for the shortage incurred in
the vessel M/V "Tern" at the Port of Darrow, the shipment of the goods to respondent.
Louisiana, U.S.A. 3,300.000 metric tons of
U.S. Soybean Meal in Bulk for delivery to ISSUE:
respondent at the Port of Manila. 
WON
 On January 25, 1996, the carrier docked at
RULING:
the inner Anchorage, South Harbor, Manila.
The subject shipment was discharged to the YES/NO
receiving barges of petitioner ATI and
received by respondent which, however, We note that the matters raised by petitioner ATI
reported receiving only 3,100.137 metric tons involve questions of fact which are generally not
instead of the manifested 3,300.000 metric reviewable in a petition for review on certiorari under
tons of shipment. Respondent filed against Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
petitioner ATI and the carrier a claim for the amended, as the Court is not a trier of facts. Section 1
shortage of 199.863 metric tons, estimated thereof provides that "the petition x x x shall raise
to be worth US$79,848.86 or ₱2,100,025.00, only questions of law, which must be distinctly set
but its claim was denied. forth."
A question of law exists when the doubt or suffered actual shortage, as there was no competent
controversy concerns the correct application of law or evidence to prove that it actually weighed 3,300
jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the metric tons at the port of origin.
issue does not call for an examination of the probative
value of the evidence presented, the truth or In this case, respondent failed to prove that the
falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of fact subject shipment suffered shortage, for it was not able
exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the to establish that the subject shipment was weighed at
truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites the port of origin at Darrow, Louisiana, U.S.A. and that
calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the actual weight of the said shipment was 3,300
the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and metric tons.
relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as
well as their relation to each other and to the whole, Second, as correctly asserted by petitioner ATI, the
and the probability of the situation. shortage, if any, may have been due to the inherent
nature of the subject shipment or its packaging since
The well-entrenched rule in our jurisdiction is that the subject cargo was shipped in bulk and had a
only questions of law may be entertained by this moisture content of 12.5%.
Court in a petition for review on certiorari.
It should be noted that the shortage being claimed by
This rule, however, is not ironclad and admits certain the respondent is minimal, and is an indication that it
exceptions, such as when : could be due to consolidation or settlement of the
subject shipment, as accurately observed by the
(1) the conclusion is grounded on petitioner.
speculations, surmises or conjectures;
(2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, Third, we agree with the petitioner ATI that
absurd or impossible; respondent has not proven any negligence on the part
(3) there is grave abuse of discretion; of the former.
(4) the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts;
(5) the findings of fact are conflicting; Considering that respondent was not able to establish
(6) there is no citation of specific evidence on conclusively that the subject shipment weighed 3,300
which the factual findings are based; metric tons at the port of loading, and that it cannot
(7) the findings of absence of facts are therefore be concluded that there was a shortage for
contradicted by the presence of evidence on which petitioner should be responsible; bearing in
record; mind that the subject shipment most likely lost weight
(8) the findings of the Court of Appeals are in transit due to the inherent nature of Soya Bean
contrary to those of the trial court; Meal; assuming that the shipment lost weight in
(9) the Court of Appeals manifestly transit due to desorption, the shortage of 199.863
overlooked certain relevant and undisputed metric tons that respondent alleges is a minimal
facts that, if properly considered, would 6.05% of the weight of the entire shipment, which is
justify a different conclusion; within the allowable 10% allowance for loss; and
(10) the findings of the Court of Appeals are noting that the respondent was not able to show
beyond the issues of the case; and negligence on the part of the petitioner and that the
(11) such findings are contrary to the weighing methods which respondent relied upon to
admissions of both parties. establish the shortage it alleges is inaccurate,
respondent cannot fairly claim damages against
After a careful review of the records, we find petitioner for the subject shipment's alleged shortage.
justification to warrant the application of the fourth
exception. The CA misapprehended the following DISPOSITIVE:
facts.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari
First, petitioner ATI is correct in arguing that the is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 27, 2006
respondent failed to prove that the subject shipment and Resolution dated March 23, 2007 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71210 are REVERSED AND
SET ASIDE insofar as petitioner Asian Terminals, Inc. is
concerned. Needless to add, the complaint against
petitioner docketed as RTC Manila Civil Case No. 96-
81101 is ordered DISMISSED.
 LANTING V. OMBUDSMAN certificate and Personnel Data Sheet.
G.R. No. 141426, May 6, 2005 Assuming arguendo that he is a Chinese
citizen, such fact alone would not disqualify
CIVIL PROCEDURE him from being employed in the City of
R. POST-JUDGMENT REMEDIES Manila, there being no law prohibiting a
2. Appeals in general foreigner from being employed as researcher
r. Review of final judgments or final
or consultant in the government.
orders of quasi-judicial agencies
[Salta]
For her part, CSC Director Magalong also
denied the charge against her, contending
FACTS:
that she was not the one who appointed
Percival Magalong.
 Petitioner Zenaida F. Lanting was the
Administrative Officer IV of the City Council
Ernesto Saw, Jr. did not file his counter-
of Manila. She filed with the Office of the affidavit.
Ombudsman an affidavit-complaint againt
respondents, then Manila Vice-Mayor Jose  On April 8, 1999, Oscar P. Ramos, Graft
Atienza Jr., now City Mayor, Emmanuel Sison, Investigator Officer I, issued a Resolution
Secretary to the City Council, and Charito recommending that petitioner’s complaint be
Rumbo, Human Resource Management dismissed. The Resolution7 was reviewed by
Officer III, for violation of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti- Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo L.
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). She alleged Aportadera, Jr. and approved by then
that these city officials unlawfully and Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto on June 25,
feloniously appointed Ernesto Saw Jr., a 1999.
chinse citizen working in Taiwan, and
brother-in-law of Charito Rumbo, to the  Petitioner filed a MR of the resolution on the
position of Researcher in the City Council. ground that Investigator Oscar Ramos
"conveniently and intentionally skirted the
 In the same complaint, petitioner further issue of falsification of public documents
alleged that respondents fraudulently which are crystal clear in my complaint." She
effected the publication of a vacant position then prayed for a re-investigation of her
(Administrative Officer V) in the City Council, complaint by a Special Prosecutor.
in violation of Republic Act No. 7041.
Petitioner also questioned the appointments  The Ombudsman denied petitioner’s motion
of Percival Magalong as Utility I; Atty. Flora for lack of merit.
Aquino-Togonon as Administrative Officer V;
and three relatives of Charito Rumbo,  Dissatisfied, petitioner filed with the CA a
namely: Eduardo Antolin, Arlyn M. Rumbo petition for certiorari and mandamus.
and Maricar V. Antolin as
Researchers/Consultants. Petitioner likewise  CA dismissed the petition on the ground that
denounced Erlinda Magalong, Civil Service it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter
Commission (CSC) Director II, for "employing" of the assailed Ombudsman Resolution.
Percival Magalong, her brother, in her office
at the Civil Service Field Office, GSIS Building,  Petitioner filed an MR but was subsequently
Manila. denied. Petitioner contends that her
complaint before the Ombudsman was not
 Respondents city officials filed their joint limited to violation of the Anti-Graft and
counter-affidavit6 denying petitioner’s Corrupt Practices Act, but likewise includes
charges. They averred that Ernesto Saw, Jr. is “acts constituting ground for administrative
a Filipino citizen as shown by his birth complaint under Sec. 1, Rule III of
 Administrative Order No. 07 of the (of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure)." We
Ombudsman." Thus, the Court of Appeals reiterated this ruling in Namuhe vs. Ombudsman and
should have taken cognizance of her petition, recently in Barata vs. Abalos, Jr. and Coronel vs.
applying this Court’s ruling in Fabian vs. Aniano Desierto, as Ombudsman, and Pedro Sausal, Jr.
Desierto.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals, in issuing its
ISSUE: questioned Resolutions, did not commit grave abuse
WON the CA has jurisdiction over the subject matter of discretion. Clearly, it has no jurisdiction over
of the appeal petitioner’s criminal action. As earlier mentioned,
jurisdiction lies with this Court.
RULING:
DISPOSITIVE:
NO
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is
Petitioner’s complaint-affidavit before the Office of hereby DENIED. Costs against petitioner.
the Ombudsman is for violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Acts. It is not an administrative SO ORDERED.
complaint. Nowhere in her complaint did she allege
administrative offenses, such as dishonesty or
misconduct on the part of respondents.

It bears stressing that the allegations in petitioner’s

complaint describe respondents’ actuations as "willful,
felonious, unlawful, odious and despicable criminal
activities." In her motion for reconsideration of the
Ombudsman’s Resolution, petitioner claimed that
Graft Investigator Ramos "skirted the issue
of falsification of public documents which is crystal
clear in my complaint." Likewise, in her petition in CA-
G.R. SP No. 54274, petitioner sought "to nullify the
resolution of the Honorable Ombudsman dated April
8, 1999 dismissing petitioner’s complaint for anti-graft
and falsification of public documents and to direct
respondent Ombudsman to give due course to the
complaint."

Considering that petitioner’s complaint is criminal in

nature, this Court has the sole authority to review the
Ombudsman’s Resolutions on pure question of law as
expressly mandated in Section 14, 2nd paragraph of
R.A. 6770, which provides:

"Sec. 14. Restrictions. – x x x.
No court shall hear any appeal or application
for remedy against the decision or findings of
the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court
on pure question of law."

In Fabian vs. Desierto, we held that only "appeals from

the decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman
in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to
the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43
 GOMEZ V. MONTALBAN petitioner and that the RTC had no
G.R. No. 174414, 14 March 2008 jurisdiction as the principal amount being
claimed by petitioner was only ₱40,000.00,
CIVIL PROCEDURE an amount falling within the jurisdiction of
R. POST-JUDGMENT REMEDIES the Municipal Trial Court (MTC).
3. Relief from judgments, orders and other
proceedings
 After petitioner filed his Answer to the
a. Grounds for availing of the
Petition for Relief from Judgment and
remedy
respondent her Reply, the said Petition was
b. Time to file petition
c. Contents of petition set for hearing.
[Salta]
 After several dates were set and called for
FACTS: hearing, respondent, thru counsel, failed to
appear despite being duly notified; hence,
 Petitioner Elmer Gomez filed a Complaint for her Petition for Relief was dismissed for her
a sum of money with the RTC of Davao City apparent lack of interest to pursue the
alleging, among others, that respondent Ma. petition.
Lita Montalban obtained a loan from him in
the sum of P40,000 with 15% interest per  Respondent filed a Motion for
month; that upon receipt of the proceeds of Reconsideration of the dismissal of her
the loan, respondent issued in favor of the Petition for Relief, stating that her counsel’s
petitioner, as security, Capitol Bank Check, in failure to appear was not intentional, but due
the sum of P46,000 covering the P40,000 to human shortcomings or frailties,
principal loan amount and P6,000 interest constituting honest mistake or excusable
charges for one month; that when the check negligence.
became due, respondent failed to pay the
loan despite several demands.  On 18 November 2005, the RTC granted
respondent’s motion for reconsideration.
 Respondent failed to file her Answer despite
reciept of the Summons, hence, she was  On 20 June 2006, the RTC granted
declared in default, and upon motion, respondent’s Petition for Relief from
petitioner was allowed to present evidence Judgment and set aside its Decision dated 4
ex-parte. May 2004 on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.
 RTC rendered its decision in favor of the
Petitioner.  Petitioner then filed a MR but the same was
denied by the RTC in another Order.
 On 28 May 2004, respondent filed a Petition
for Relief from Judgment6 alleging that there ISSUE:
was no effective service of summons upon
her since there was no personal service of WON respondent’s relief from judgment is proper
the same. The summons was received by one during the period for filing a motion for
reconsideration and appeal.
Mrs. Alicia dela Torre, who was not
authorized to receive summons or other legal
RULING:
pleadings or documents on respondent’s
behalf. Respondent attributes her failure to NO
file an Answer to fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence. She claimed that she On the propriety of the granting by the RTC of
had good and valid defenses against respondent’s Petition for Relief from Judgment, the
Court finds and so declares that the RTC did indeed in the case at bar, because respondent has in no wise
commit an error in doing so. been prevented from interposing an appeal.
First of all, a petition for relief under Rule 38 of the
Rules of Court is only available against a final and "Fraud," on the other hand, must be extrinsic or
executory judgment. Since respondent allegedly collateral, that is, the kind which prevented the
received a copy of the Decision dated 4 May 2004 on aggrieved party from having a trial or presenting his
14 May 2004, and she filed the Petition for Relief from case to the court, or was used to procure the
Judgment on 28 May 2004, judgment had not attained judgment without fair submission of the controversy.
finality. The 15-day period to file a motion for This is not present in the case at hand as respondent
reconsideration or appeal had not yet lapsed. Hence, was not prevented from securing a fair trial and was
resort by respondent to a petition for relief from given the opportunity to present her case.
judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court was
premature and inappropriate. Negligence to be excusable must be one which
ordinary diligence and prudence could not have
Second, based on respondent’s allegations in her guarded against. Under Section 1, the "negligence"
Petition for Relief before the RTC, she had no cause of must be excusable and generally imputable to the
action for relief from judgment. party because if it is imputable to the counsel, it is
binding on the client. To follow a contrary rule and
Section 1 of Rule 38 provides: allow a party to disown his counsel’s conduct would
SECTION 1. Petition for relief from judgment, render proceedings indefinite, tentative, and subject
order, or other proceedings. – When a to reopening by the mere subterfuge of replacing
judgment or final order is entered, or any counsel. What the aggrieved litigant should do is seek
other proceeding is thereafter taken against a administrative sanctions against the erring counsel
party in any court through fraud, accident, and not ask for the reversal of the court’s ruling.
mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file
a petition in such court and in the same case Third, the certificate of service of the process server of
praying that the judgment, order or the court a quo is prima facie evidence of the facts as
proceeding be set aside. set out therein.37 According to the Sheriff’s Return of
Service, summons was issued and served on
Under Section 1, Rule 38 of the Rules of respondent thru one Mrs. Alicia dela Torre.
Court, the court may grant relief from
judgment only "[w]hen a judgment or final Finally, even assuming arguendo that the RTC had no
order is entered, or any other proceeding is jurisdiction over respondent on account of the non-
taken against a party in any court service upon her of the summons and complaint, the
through fraud, accident, mistake, or remedy of the respondent was to file a motion for the
excusable negligence x x x." reconsideration of the 4 May 2004 Decision by default
or a motion for new trial within 15 days from receipt
In her Petition for Relief from Judgment before the of notice thereof. This is also without prejudice to
RTC, respondent contended that judgment was respondent’s right to file a petition for certiorari under
entered against her through "mistake or fraud," Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for the nullification of
because she was not duly served with summons as it the order of default of the court a quo and the
was received by a Mrs. Alicia dela Torre who was not proceedings thereafter held including the decision, the
authorized to receive summons or other legal writ of execution, and the writ of garnishment issued
processes on her behalf. by the RTC, on the ground that it acted without
jurisdiction. Unfortunately, however, respondent
As used in Section 1, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, opted to file a Petition for Relief from the Judgment of
"mistake" refers to mistake of fact, not of law, which the RTC, which, as the Court earlier determined, was
relates to the case. The word "mistake," which grants the wrong remedy.
relief from judgment, does not apply and was never
intended to apply to a judicial error which the court In the case at bar, there being no fraud, accident,
might have committed in the trial. Such errors may be mistake, or excusable negligence that would have
corrected by means of an appeal. This does not exist prevented petitioner from filing either a motion for
reconsideration or a petition for review on certiorari
of the 4 May 2004 Decision of the RTC, her resort to a
Petition for Relief from Judgment was unwarranted.

DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is herby GRANTED.

Consequently, the Decision dated 4 May 2006 of the
Regional Trial Court of Davao, Branch 13, in Civil Case
No. 29,717-03 is hereby REINSTATED and the Order
dated 20 June 2006 granting the petition for relief
from judgment is hereby SET ASIDE.
 ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES V.  CA issued a TRO enjoining the TC judge from
COURT OF APPEALS hearing civil case for quieting of title until
G.R. No. 80892, September 29, 1989 further orders from the court.

CIVIL PROCEDURE  The Council filed a motion for

R. POST-JUDGMENT REMEDIES reconsideration of this resolution. Later on
4. Annulment of Judgments or final orders
the Council filed a Supplement to Motion for
and resolutions
Reconsideration with Motion to Dismiss
a. Grounds for annulment
b. Period to file action questioning the Court of Appeals' jurisdiction
c. Effects of judgment of annulment to hear the petition for annulment of a
[Salta] judgment that had already been fully
executed. The CA denied the motion for
FACTS: reconsideration.

 On February 15,1984 Freddie and Marconi Da  Petitioner contends the following: first, that
Silva, as mortgagors, and Islamic Da'Wah the Court of Appeals should not continue to
Council of the Philippines (Council for hear the petition for annulment of judgment
brevity), as mortgagee, executed a real estate since it is already fully executed and the
mortgage over a parcel of land located in purpose for which the case for annulment
Cubao, Quezon City as security for the was filed will no longer be served, the parties
payment of a P1M promissory note in favor having already complied with the decision;
of the mortgagee. second, private respondents have no right to
question the validity or legality of the
 The mortgagors were unable to pay their decision rendered foreclosing the mortgage
obligation, hence, the Council instituted since they are foreign to the transaction of
forclosure proceedings with the RTC. mortgage between petitioner and Freddie
and Marconi Da Silva; lastly, petitioner claims
 Subsequently, the parties submitted a that private respondents have another
compromise agreement, which was then remedy in law and that is in Civil Case No. Q-
approved by the RTC. 46196 for Quieting of Title where the
question of ownership may be passed upon.
 Jesus Araneta filed with the RD a notice of lis
pends in connection with the civil case for ISSUE:
ejectment. The complaint was converted into
an action for collection of rentals with Who may properly institute a petition for annulment
damages but was later on withdrawn by the of judgment
Council.
RULING:
 The Council filed with the RTC of QC a
The next issue raised in this petition deals with the
complaint for Quieting of Title, Recovery of
question of who may properly institute a petition for
Possession and Damages with Preliminary
annulment of judgment. It is petitioner's contention
Mandatory Injunction against Araneta. that the remedy is available only to one who is a party
to the case where the judgment sought to be annulled
 While the case was pending, the heirs of is rendered. Private respondents, on the other hand,
Jesus Amado Araneta filed with the CA a allege that "there are sufficient facts and
petition to annul the judgment in the Civil circumstances sufficient to show prima facie that
case for foreclosure. [they] have a substantial interest in the ownership of
the property which had been foreclosed without their
knowledge and consent" [Rollo, p. 90]. In fine, the
question deals with whether or not the heirs of and the Council as would adversely affect them. This
Araneta have a cause of action against the Council. allegation, if fully substantiated by preponderance of
evidence, could be the basis for the annulment of Civil
In Militante v. Edrosolano [G.R. No. L-27940, June 10, Case No. Q-43476.
1971, 39 SCRA 4731, an action for annulment of Finally, the Council asserts that the remedy of
judgment in Civil Case No. 6216 between Edrosolano annulment of judgment applies only to final and
and Belosillo was filed by Militante. The petition executory judgment and not to that which had already
stemmed from a complaint instituted by Militante on been fully executed or implemented.It is the Council's
September 6, 1965 against Edrosolano for damages contention that as the judgment in the foreclosure
arising from a breach of contract of carriage. On case had already been executed evidenced by the fact
January 18,1966 Militante obtained an order of that title to the property in question had been
preliminary attachment on the property of transferred in its name the judgment can no longer be
Edrosolano. Alleging that he purchased all of annulled. The Council's contention is devoid of merit.
Edrosolano's TPU equipment on February 28, 1966, In Garchitorena u. Sotelo, supra, the Court affirmed
Belosillo filed a third-party claim. It appears that on the trial court's annulment of the judgment on
February 25, 1963 Belosillo obtained a judgment by foreclosure notwithstanding the fact that ownership
default against Edrosolano in Civil Case No. 6216 for of the house and lot subject of the mortgage had
collection of amount of P45,000.00, the value of the passed from the mortgagee who foreclosed the
promissory note executed by the latter on February 1, mortgage and purchased the property at public
1960. After a recital of these antecedent facts, auction to a person who bought the same and finally
Militante, in his petition for annulment of judgment to another individual in whose name the Torrens
contended, inter alia, that (1) Civil Case No. 6216 "was certificate of title stood by the time the case reached
based on a fictitious cause of action because [the] this Tribunal.
promissory note was without lawful consideration In view of the foregoing the Court finds that the Court
whatsoever" [at 476]; (2) Edrosolano did not file any of Appeals neither acted without jurisdiction nor
answer to Belosillo's complaint and allowed the latter committed grave abuse of discretion in giving due
to obtain a judgment by default which judgment course to the petition for annulment of judgment as
attained finality without the former appealing would warrant the issuance of the extraordinary writ
therefrom; and, (3) while judgment in Civil Case No. of certiorari in this case.
6216 was promulgated iii 1963 it was "only on January
19, 1966 when . . . Belosillo caused the execution DISPOSITIVE:
thereof after [Militante] had already instituted his civil
case for damages against ... Edrosolano and an order WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED and
for issuance of preliminary attachment issued" [at the orders of the Court of Appeals dated November 10
477]. The trial court however dismissed Militante's and December 2 and 3,1987 are AFFIRMED.
action for annulment on finding that it did not state a
cause of action. Thereafter, Militante filed an appeal
to this Tribunal and in setting aside the trial court's
order of dismissal'.

It is therefore clear from the foregoing that a person

need not be a party to the judgment sought to be
annulled. What is essential is that he can prove his
allegation that the judgment was obtained by the use
of fraud and collusion and he would be adversely
affected thereby.

In this present case it is true that the heirs of Araneta

are not parties to the foreclosure case. Neither are
they principally nor secondarily bound by the
judgment rendered therein. However. their petition
filed with the Court of Appeals they alleged fraud and
connivance perpetuated by and between the Da Silvas
 DINGLASAN V. CA Explicit from the above stated rule that a Motion for New
Post-Judgment Remedies| MNT | When to file Trial should be filed before the judgment of the appellate
Blanza court convicting the accused becomes final.

FACTS: Let it be recalled that Dinglasan's Motion for Leave to File

Second Motion for Reconsideration was denied by this
MOA entered between Elmyra Trading (rep. by petitioner Court as the subject matter thereof is a prohibited
as Pres.) and Antrom Inc. for the latter to extend credit pleading and that the Motion for Reconsideration was
accommodation. Petitioner issued a check to guarantee merely noted without action. This order is issued
but the same bounced (insufficiency of funds). pursuant to En Banc Resolution dated 7 April 1999 which
prohibits any motion for leave to file a second motion for
BP 22 case filed against Dinglasan; convicted. reconsideration and was further emphasized by the
provision of the Revised Rules of Court which provides
that:
MR denied; appeal also denied.

Rule 52. – Motion for Reconsideration.

Petition for Review on Certiorari filed in SC denied; MR
denied. Entry of Judgment issued.
Section 2. Second Motion for Reconsideration. –
No second motion for reconsideration of a
WOA issued for his arrest; Petitioner filed the Petition for
judgment or a final resolution by the same party
New Trial and, in the alternative, for the Reopening of
shall be entertained.
the Case based on newly discovered evidence.

This prohibition is justified by public policy which

Antrom’s contentionthe same is procedurally and
demands that at the risk of occasional errors,
substantially defective. MNT should be filed at any time
judgments of courts must become final at some
after the appeal from the lower court has been perfected
definitive date fixed by law.
and before the judgment of the appellate court
convicting the accused becomes final.
To rule that finality of judgment shall be reckoned from
the receipt of the resolution or order denying the second
OSGthe petition should be dismissed because it was
motion for reconsideration would result to an absurd
filed out of time and Dinglasan's evidence sought to be
situation whereby courts will be obliged to issue orders
admitted is neither material nor newly discovered so as
or resolutions denying what is a prohibited motion in the
to warrant new trial or reopening of the case. The
first place, in order that the period for the finality of
alleged evidence if introduced and admitted, would not
judgments shall run, thereby, prolonging the disposition
in any way alter the judgment.
of cases. Moreover, such a ruling would allow a party to
forestall the running of the period of finality of
Petitionerjudgment attains finality only upon the judgments by virtue of filing a prohibited pleading; such a
receipt of the order or resolution denying his second situation is not only illogical but also unjust to the
motion for reconsideration. winning party.

ISSUE: WON the petition was filed on time? (NO) The finality of decision is a jurisdictional event which
cannot be made to depend on the convenience of the
HELD: party. To rule otherwise would completely negate the
purpose of the rule on completeness of service, which is
Rule 124 – Procedure in the Court of Appeals. to place the date of receipt of pleadings, judgment and
processes beyond the power of the party being served to
Section 14. Motion for New Trial. – At any time after the determine at his pleasure.
appeal from the lower court has been perfected and
before the judgment of the Court of Appeals convicting DISPOSITION:
the accused becomes final, the latter may move for a
new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is
material to his defense. The motion shall conform to the DISMISSED. Costs against the petitioner.
provisions of section 4 Rule 121. (Emphasis supplied.)
NEYPES V. CA
Post-Judgment Remedies| Period of appeal Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
Blanza states:

The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. ― The appeal shall be
of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege and taken within fifteen (15) days from the notice of the
may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record
with the provisions of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of
of the right to appeal must comply with the appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days
requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so often leads from the notice of judgment or final order.
to the loss of the right to appeal. The period to appeal is
fixed by both statute and procedural rules
The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely
motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for
FACTS:
extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration shall be allowed. (emphasis supplied)
Neypes, et, al, (petitioners) filed an action for annulment
of judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance
Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken within
and/or reversion against private respondents.
15 days from the notice of judgment or final order
appealed from. A final judgment or order is one that
In the course of the proceedings, the parties filed various finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the
motions with the trial court. court to do with respect to it. It is an adjudication on the
merits which, considering the evidence presented at the
Later on, RTC dismissed petitioners’ complaint on the trial, declares categorically what the rights and
ground that the action had already prescribed. obligations of the parties are; or it may be an order or
judgment that dismisses an action.
Petitioners filed MR but was denied. After 5 days, they
filed their Notice of Appeal To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules
and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their
RTC denied their NOA (8 days late); MR for this also cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period
denied. of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the
Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order
dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
Petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 filed
reconsideration. 
also dismissed. MR also denied.

Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to

ISSUE: WON petitioners timely filed their NOA? (YES)
Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial
Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions
What should be deemed as the "final order," receipt of for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of
which triggers the start of the 15-day reglementary Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial
period to appeal, the order dismissing the complaint or agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing
the order denying/dismissing the MR? appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule
aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to
HELD: be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion
for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or
Order denying the MR. partial) or any final order or resolution.

Sec. 39. Appeals. – The period for appeal from final We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their
orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days,
any court in all these cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice
counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, denying their motion for reconsideration). This
award, judgment, or decision appealed from. Provided, pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section
however, that in habeas corpus cases, the period for 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal shall be taken
appeal shall be (48) forty-eight hours from the notice of within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order
judgment appealed from. x x x (BP 129) appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word "or"
signifies disassociation and independence of one thing
from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the Respondents moved to dismiss the appeal claiming that
sense in which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of the NOA failed to state the ground of the appeal and was
"or" in the above provision supposes that the notice of filed beyond the reglementary period
appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of
judgment or within 15 days from notice of the "final RA gave due course to the NOA.
order," which we already determined to refer to the July
1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or
Respondents went to CA insisting that both notices of
reconsideration.
appeal were infirm for failure to state the grounds for an
appeal.
To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice
of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the Regional
CA denied respondents’ petition.
Trial Court’s decision or file it within 15 days from receipt
of the order (the "final order") denying his motion for
new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the Petitioners pray that their Notices of Appeal to the
new 15-day period may be availed of only if either DARAB be given due course on the ground that they have
motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and substantially complied with the rules as set forth in
executory after the lapse of the original appeal period Section 2, Rule XIII of the 1994 DARAB New Rules of
provided in Rule 41, Section 3. Procedure. They posit that their appeal on "questions of
fact and law" should suffice, even if they omitted the
phrase "which if not corrected would cause grave
DISPOSITION:
irreparable damage and injury to them". They argue that
the stringent application of the rules denied them
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the substantial justice.
assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, let the
Respondents reiterate that the notices of appeal are
records of this case be remanded to the Court of Appeals
"mere scraps of paper" for failure to state the grounds
for further proceedings.
relied upon for the appeal and for containing forged
signatures. They insist that giving effect to the Notice of
REGIONAL AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD Appeal would countenance an act which is criminal in
V. CA nature. Respondents maintain that there should be strict
Post-Judgment Remedies| Perfection of appeal adherence to the technical rules of procedure because
Blanza the DARAB rules frown upon frivolous and dilatory
appeals.
Rules of procedure are tools to facilitate a fair and
orderly conduct of proceedings. Strict adherence thereto ISSUE: WON petitioners properly perfected their appeal?
must not get in the way of achieving substantial justice. (YES)
So long as their purpose is sufficiently met and no
violation of due process and fair play takes place, the
HELD:
rules should be liberally construed, especially in
agrarian cases.
The defects found in the two notices of appeal are not of
such nature that would cause a denial of the right to
FACTS:
appeal. Placed in their proper factual context, the defects
are not only excusable but also inconsequential.
Respondents (owners of lands) filed a complaint for
ejectment against petitioners (agri-lessees) for non-
Alleged failure to specify grounds for appeal
payment of rentals before the DARAB, CSFP.
There is nothing sacred about the forms of pleadings or
Regional Adjudicator (RA) ruled in favor of respondents.
processes, their sole purpose being to facilitate the
application of justice to the rival claims of contending
Petitioners filed two separate NOA (both not signed by parties. Hence, pleadings as well as procedural rules
their lawyer). should be construed liberally. Dismissal of appeals purely
on technical grounds is frowned upon because rules of
procedure should not be applied to override substantial
justice. Courts must proceed with caution so as not to
deprive a party of statutory appeal; they must ensure from the receipt of the order, resolution or decision
that all litigants are granted the amplest opportunity for appealed from, and serving a copy thereof on the adverse
the proper and just ventilation of their causes, free from party, if the appeal is in writing.
technical constraints. If the foregoing tenets are followed
in a civil case, their application is made more imperative b) An oral appeal shall be reduced into writing
in an agrarian case where the rules themselves provide by the Adjudicator to be signed by the
for liberal construction, thus: appellant, and a copy thereof shall be served
upon the adverse party within ten (10) days
Rule I from the taking of the oral appeal.
General Provisions
Section 2. Grounds. The aggrieved party may appeal to
Section 2. Construction. These Rules shall be liberally the Board from a final order, resolution or decision of the
construed to carry out the objectives of the agrarian Adjudicator on any of the following grounds:
reform program and to promote just, expeditious, and
inexpensive adjudication and settlement of agrarian a) That errors in the findings of fact or
cases, disputes or controversies. conclusions of laws were committed which, if
not corrected, would cause grave and
xxxx irreparable damage and injury to the appellant;

Section 3. Technical Rules Not Applicable. The Board and b) That there is a grave abuse of discretion on
its Regional and Provincial Adjudicators shall not be the part of the Adjudicator; or
bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence as
prescribed in the Rules of Court, but shall proceed to hear c) That the order, resolution or decision is
and decide all agrarian cases, disputes or controversies in obtained through fraud or coercion.
a most expeditious manner, employing all reasonable
means to ascertain the facts of every case in accordance
xxxx
with justice and equity.
Section 5. Requisites and Perfection of the Appeal. a) The
xxxx
Notice of Appeal shall be filed within the reglementary
period as provided for in Section 1 of this Rule. It shall
Rule VIII state the date when the appellant received the order or
Proceedings before the Adjudicators and the Board judgment appealed from and the proof of service of the
notice to the adverse party; and
Section 1. Nature of Proceedings. The proceedings before
the Board or its Adjudicators shall be non-litigious in b) An appeal fee of Five Hundred Pesos
nature. Subject to the essential requirements of due (₱500.00) shall be paid by the appellant within
process, the technicalities of law and procedure and the the reglementary period to the DAR Cashier
rules governing the admissibility and sufficiency of where the Office of the Adjudicators is situated.
evidence obtained in the courts of law shall not apply. x x xxx
x34
Non-compliance with the above-mentioned requisites
Guided by the foregoing principles, we find that the shall be a ground for dismissal of the appeal.
Notices of Appeal substantially complied with all that is
required under the 1994 DARAB Rules. The following
Both Notices of Appeal stated that the petitioners were
provisions are instructive in making this conclusion:
appealing the decision "on the grounds of questions of
fact and of law," which we find sufficient statement of
Rule XIII the ground for appeal under Section 2(a), Rule XIII of the
APPEALS DARAB Rules. While the notices omitted to state that
"the decision would cause grave and irreparable damage
Section 1. Appeal to the Board. a) An appeal may be and injury to the appellant," we find such punctilious
taken from an order, resolution or decision of the fidelity to the language of the DARAB Rules unnecessary.
Adjudicator to the Board by either of the parties or both, Surely by appealing the Decision of the Regional
orally or in writing, within a period of fifteen (15) days Adjudicator, the petitioners were already manifesting
that they will be damaged by the assailed decision. public market on a substantial portion of his land without
Requiring a literal application of the rules when its his consent
purpose has already been served is oppressive
superfluity. MTC ruled in his favor; MOI filed its NOA but the MTC
denied due course.
It must be stressed that the purpose of the notice of
appeal is not to detail one’s objections regarding the MOI filed petition for certiorari in the RTC to assail the
appealed decision; that is the purpose of the appellants’ denial of due course by the MTCgranted.
memorandum. In the context of a DARAB case, the
notice of appeal serves only to inform the tribunal or
Upon Bueno’s death, petitioners substituted him and
officer that rendered the appealed decision (i.e., the
moved for a reconsiderationdenied.
Regional Adjudicator) of the timeliness of the appeal and
of the general reason for the appeal, and to prepare the
records thereof for transmission to the appellate body Petitioners appealed to the CA by petition for review
(i.e., the DARAB). Petitioners’ Notices of Appeal contain under Rule 42.
everything that is necessary to serve these purposes.
CA dismissed the petition (not being the proper mode of
DISPOSITION: appeal; that the assailed orders had been issued by the
RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction); MR also
denied.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the
assailed June 9, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 79304, which gave no legal effect to Petitioners’ contention Although petition for review
petitioners’ Notices of Appeal, is hereby ANNULLED and under Rule 42 was inappropriate, they substantially
SET ASIDE. The August 5, 2003 Order of the Regional complied with the requirements of an ordinary appeal
Adjudicator giving due course to the two Notices of under Rule 41, and pray that the Court exercise its equity
Appeal is REINSTATED. Let the records of the case be jurisdiction because a stringent application of the Rules
transmitted forthwith to the Adjudication Board which of Court would not serve the demands of substantial
is DIRECTED to proceed to dispose of the appeal with justice.
deliberate dispatch.
ISSUE:
HEIRS OF ARTURO GARCIA V. MUNICIPALITY OF IBA,
ZAMBALES WON the mode of appeal (Rule 42) was proper? (NO)
Appeal from judgments/final orders of the RTCs (Rule 42)
Blanza HELD:

The plea for liberality is unworthy of any sympathy from An appeal brings up for review any error of judgment
the Court. We have' always looked at appeal as not a committed by a court with jurisdiction over the subject of
matter of right but a mere statutory the suit and over the persons of the parties, or any error
privilege.1âwphi1 As the· parties invoking the privilege, committed by the court in the exercise of its jurisdiction
the petitioners should have faithfully complied with the amounting to nothing more than an error of judgment. It
requirements of the Rules of Court. Their failure to do so was, therefore, very crucial for the petitioners and their
forfeited their privilege to appeal. Indeed, any liberality counsel to have been cognizant of the different modes to
in the application of the rules of procedure may be appeal the adverse decision of the RTC in the special civil
properly invoked only in cases of some excusable formal action for certiorari brought by the Municipality of Iba.
deficiency or error in a pleading, but definitely not in Such modes of appeal were well delineated in the Rules
cases like now where a liberal application would directly of Court, and have been expressly stated in Section 2,
subvert the essence of the proceedings or results in the Rule 41 of the Rules of Court since July 1, 1997, to wit:
utter disregard of the Rules of Court. 
Section 2.Modes of appeal.
FACTS:
(a) Ordinary appeal.- The appeal to the Court of
Bueno (tenant-farmer beneficiary) brought an ejectment Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial
suit in the MTC of Iba against the Municipality of Iba Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction
(“MOI”) claiming that the latter had constructed the shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with
 the court which rendered the judgment or final other lawful
order appealed from and serving a copy thereof fees with the
upon the adverse party. No record on appeal RTC.
shall be required except in special proceedings When RTC Upon the upon
and other cases of multiple or separate appeals loses perfection of perfection of
where the law or these Rules so require. In such jurisdiction the appeal the appeal
cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and filed in due AND the
served in like manner. time AND the expiration of
expiration of the time to
(b) Petition for review.- The appeal to the Court the time to appeal of the
of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial appeal of the other parties
Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction other parties
shall be by petition for review in accordance Effect of Ground for dismissal
with Rule 42. non-
payment of
(c) Appeal by certiorari.-In all cases where only docket fees
questions of law are raised or involved, the Immediate Clerk of court Does not arise
appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition transmittal of the RTC is except upon
for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule burdened to order of the
45. immediately CA, when
undertake the deemed
transmittal of necessary. 
Rule 41 Rule 42
the records by
Nature of is a matter of is a matter of
verifying the
the appeal right discretion (aka
correctness
“discretionary
and
appeal”)
completeness
refers to the is taken from
of the records
right to seek the decision or
of the case;
the review by final order
the transmittal
a superior rendered by a
to the CA must
court of the court in the
be made
judgment exercise of its
within 30 days
rendered by primary
from the
the trial court, appellate
perfection of
exists after the jurisdiction,
the appeal.
trial in the first may be
instance disallowed by
DISPOSITION:
the superior
court in its
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the resolutions of the
discretion.  (CA
Court of Appeals promulgated on October 28, 2003 and
has the
February 10, 2004 in C.A. G.R.SP No. 78706; and ORDERS
discretion
the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.
whether to
due course to
the petition for
PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS V. CA
review or not)
Appeal from judgments or final orders of the Court of
How appeal File NOA in the upon the
Appeals| Rule 45 v. Rule 65
is perfected RTC w/in a timely filing of
Blanza
period of 15 the petition for
days from review before
FACTS:
notice of the the CA.
judgment of
the RTC + full Petitioner PBCOM filed for sum of money against private
payment of respondents in the RTC of Makati City.
court docket &
Private respondents moved for the dismissal full aggrieved party is to elevate the matter through a special
payment + RTC had no jurisdiction over the case because civil action under Rule 65. Clearly, contrary to the CA's
PBCOM failed to pay the correct docket fees. finding, PBCOM availed itself of the correct remedy in
questioning the disallowance of its notice of appeal.
RTC ordered PBCOM to pay additional docket fees;
PBCOM paid but its Compliance was filed later thus RTC EXCEPTIONS to the requirement of MR prior filing of the
dismissed the complaint for failure to comply; MR petition under Rule 65:
denied. (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the
court a quo has no jurisdiction; 
PBCOM timely filed a NOARTC denied due course (said (b) where the questions raised in
appeal is not the proper remedy); PBCOM did not file any the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and
MR. passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those
raised and passed upon in the lower court;
(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution
PBCOM filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with
of the question and any further delay would prejudice
the CAdenied (wrong mode of appeal+mandatory
the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or
requirement of a MR)
the subject matter of the action is perishable;
(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for
ISSUE: reconsideration would be useless;
(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and
WON a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper there is extreme urgency for relief;
remedy in the instant case? (YES) (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest
is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court
HELD: is improbable;
(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity
Rule 45 Rule 65 for lack of due process;
Decisions, final orders or Is a special civil action; is (h) where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the
resolutions of the Court of an independent action petitioner had no opportunity to object; and
Appeals in any based on the specific (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where
case, i.e., regardless of the grounds therein public interest is involved. 
nature of the action or provided and, as a
proceedings involved, may be general rule, cannot be The first exception applies in this case.
appealed by filing a petition availed of as a substitute
for review, which would be for the lost remedy of an Rule 41, Section 13 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure
but a continuation of the ordinary appeal, states:
appellate process over the including that under
original case. Rule 45. SEC. 13. Dismissal of appeal. - Prior to the transmittal of
the original record or the record on appeal to the
When a party adopts an improper remedy, his petition appellate court, the trial court may, motu proprio or on
may be dismissed outright. motion, dismiss the appeal for having been taken out of
time or for non-payment of the docket and other lawful
In the assailed Decision, the CA appears to have confused fees within the reglementary period. 
the RTC Order dismissing PBCOM's complaint with the
RTC Order denying PBCOM' s notice of appeal, and In Salvan v. People, this Court held that the power of the
mistakenly ruled that the petition for certiorari and RTC to dismiss an appeal is limited to the instances
mandamus filed by PBCOM was a wrong mode of appeal. specified in the afore-quoted provision. In other words,
the RTC has no jurisdiction to deny a notice of appeal on
Notably, in its petition before the CA, PBCOM assailed an entirely different ground - such as "that an appeal is
the RTC Order denying due course to its notice of appeal. not a proper remedy."
In Neplum, Inc. v. Orbeso, this Court ruled that a trial
court's order disallowing a notice of appeal, which is The authority to dismiss an appeal for being an improper
tantamount to a disallowance or dismissal of the appeal remedy is specifically vested upon the CA and not the
itself, is not a decision or final order from which an RTC. Rule 50, Section 1 of the same Rules states:
appeal may be taken. The suitable remedy for the
SECTION 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. - An appeal Alcaraz filed a petition for review with the City
may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own Prosecutor's Office, DOJSOJ Perez granted and ordered
motion or on that of the appellee, on the following the withdrawal of the information.
grounds:
Gonzalez filed a MRdenied.
xxxx
Gonzalez then filed a petition for review under Rule 43
(i) The fact that [the] order or judgment appealed from claiming that the Secretary acted beyond his authority;
is not appealable. (Emphasis supplied) that by invoking self-defense, Alcaraz thereby admitted
his intention to kill him; the claim of self-defense should
In fine, the assailed RTC Order, denying due course to be ventilated during trial on the merits.
PBCOM's notice of appeal on the ground that it was a
wrong remedy, is a patent nullity. The RTC acted without CA granted the petition reversing the assailed resolutions
or in excess of its jurisdiction. of the SOJ; Alcaraz filed his MR but was denied.

DISPOSITION: Alcaraz’ contentionthe Justice Secretary is not a quasi-

judicial officer within the context of Rule 43 of the ROC;
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Order CA has no appellate jurisdiction to review the assailed
dated June 2, 2011 issued by the Regional Trial Court, resolutions of the Secretary of Justice by way of a
Branch 56 in Makati City and the assailed Decision dated petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court,
July 31, 2014 and Resolution dated May 5, 2015 of the the proper remedy being a petition for certiorari under
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 120884, are Rule 65.
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial
Court, Branch 56 in Makati City is DIRECTED to give due OSGCA erred; the proper remedy from an adverse
course to petitioner's Notice of Appeal dated May 26, resolution issued by the Secretary of Justice is to file a
2011 and to elevate the case records to the Court of petition for certiorari under Ruler 65 of the Rules of
Appeals for the review of petitioner's appeal. No costs. Court, not a petition under Rule 43.

ALCARAZ V. GONZALES
Respondentthe Secretary of Justice acted as a quasi-
Review of final judgments or final orders of quasi-judicial
judicial officer when he reviewed the resolutions of the
agencies
City Prosecutor; hence, the same may be reviewed by the
Blanza
CA via petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
This case involves the collision between Gonzales and
Atty. Alcaraz which resulted in the latter to shoot the car
Whether the petition for review under Rule 43 of the
of Gonzales twice.
Rules of Court was the proper remedy of respondent?
(NO)
Gonzalez filed an attempted homicide against Atty.
Alcaraz
HELD:

Alcaraz moved for the conduct a preliminary

It should be a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
investigationtrial court granted.
It bears stressing that in the determination of probable
After the conduct of PI, investigating prosecutor
cause during the preliminary investigation, the executive
maintained his finding of probable cause of attempted
branch of government has full discretionary authority.
homicide against Alcaraz and to retain the Information.
Thus, the decision whether or not to dismiss the criminal
complaint against the private respondent is necessarily
Alcaraz filed a MR denied. dependent on the sound discretion of the Investigating
Prosecutor and ultimately, that of the Secretary of
Justice. Courts are not empowered to substitute their
own judgment for that of the executive branch.
The resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor is subject If the petition for relief is filed on the ground of
to appeal to the Justice Secretary who, under the Revised excusable negligence of counsel, parties must show that
Administrative Code, exercises the power of control and their counsel’s negligence could not have been
supervision over said Investigating Prosecutor; and who prevented using ordinary diligence and prudence. The
may affirm, nullify, reverse, or modify the ruling of such mere allegation that there is excusable negligence
prosecutor. Thus, while the CA may review the simply because counsel was 80 years old is a prejudicial
resolution of the Justice Secretary, it may do so only in a slur to senior citizens. It is based on an unwarranted
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of stereotype of people in their advanced years. It is as
Court, solely on the ground that the Secretary of Justice empty as the bigotry that supports it.
committed grave abuse of his discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction. FACTS:

It bears stressing that the Resolution of the Justice Sps. Morales filed with the RTC for judicial foreclosure of
Secretary affirming, modifying or reversing the resolution the H & L against Juliet Vitug Madarang, Romeo
of the Investigating Prosecutor is final. Under the 1993 Bartolome, and the Spouses Rodolfo and Ruby Anne
Revised Rules on Appeals (now the 2000 National Bartolome on account of Sps. Bartolome’s failure to pay
Prosecution Service Rules on Appeals), resolutions in their loan secured by the REM. (the spouses who loaned
preliminary investigations or reinvestigations from the died)
Justice Secretary's resolution, except the aggrieved party,
has no more remedy of appeal to file a motion for
Defendants’ answerdefendants assailed the
reconsideration of the said resolution of such motion if it
authenticity of the REM specifically the Spouses
is denied by the said Secretary. The remedy of the
Bartolome’s signatures and that the complaint was
aggrieved party is to file a petition for certiorari under
already barred since it had been dismissed in another
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court since there is no more
branch of the RTC of QC for failure to comply with an
appeal or other remedy available in the ordinary course
order of the trial court.
of law.
RTC ruled for Sps. Morales. MR filed denied.
In the present case, respondent filed a petition for review
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
resolutions of the Justice Secretary. Instead of dismissing NOA filed with RTC but was denied due course for having
the petition, however, the CA gave due course to it and been filed out of time (their lawyer received the copy of
thereafter granted the petition, on its finding that the the order denying the MR on June 24, 2010 thus they
Justice Secretary erred in reversing the resolution of the have (15 days) or until July 9, 2010 to appeal but their
Investigating Prosecutor which found probable cause NOA was filed only on Aug. 11, 2010)
against petitioner for attempted homicide. Patently, the
ruling of the CA is incorrect. September 24, 2010defendants filed a petition for
relief from judgment, blaming their 80-year-old lawyer
DISPOSITION: who failed to file the notice of appeal within the
reglementary period; arguing that their lawyer’s failure
to appeal within the reglementary period was a mistake
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition
and an excusable negligence due to their former lawyer’s
is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the
old age DENIED (filed beyond 60 days from the finality
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 75589 are NULLIFIED.
of the trial court’s decision)

MADARANG V. SPS. MORALES

Madarang, et. al. filed a petition for certiorari with the
Relief from judgments, orders and other proceedings
CA denied, no MR filed prior.
Blanza

A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable relief MR filed also denied.
granted only under exceptional circumstances. To set
aside a judgment through a petition for relief, parties ISSUE: Whether the petition for relief from judgment was
must file the petition within 60 days from notice of the filed out of time? (YES)
judgment and within six (6) months after the judgment
or final order was entered; otherwise, the petition shall HELD:
be dismissed outright.
A petition for relief from judgment must be filed within these periods, which are definitely jurisdictional, must
60 days after petitioner learns of the judgment, final always be observed. (Sps. Reyes v. CA)
order, or proceeding and within six (6) months from
entry of judgment or final order. Thus, the decision became final 15 days after January 29,
2010, or on February 13, 2010. Petitioners had six (6)
HOW TO COUNT THE 60-DAY PERIOD? months from February 13, 2010, or until August 12, 2010,
to file a petition for relief from judgment.
Sec. 3. Time for filing petition; contents and verification.–
A petition provided for in either of the preceding sections Since petitioners filed their petition for relief from
of this Rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days judgment on September 24, 2010, the petition for relief
after petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or from judgment was filed beyond six (6) months from
other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six finality of judgment. The trial court should have denied
(6) months after such judgment or final order was the petition for relief from judgment on this ground.
entered, or such proceeding was taken; and must be
accompanied with affidavits, showing the fraud, accident, ALSO...Even if we assume that petitioners filed their
mistake or excusable negligence relied upon and the facts petition for relief from judgment within the reglementary
constituting the petitioner’s good and substantial cause period, petitioners failed to prove that their former
of action or defense, as the case may be. (Emphasis counsel’s failure to file a timely notice of appeal was due
supplied) to a mistake or excusable negligence.

The double period required under Section 3, Rule 38 is Under Section 1, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
jurisdictional and should be strictly complied with. A Procedure, a petition for relief from judgment may be
petition for relief from judgment filed beyond the filed on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake, or
reglementary period is dismissed outright. This is excusable negligence:
because a petition for relief from judgment is an
exception to the public policy of immutability of final
Section 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order, or
judgments.
other proceedings.

. . . the doctrine of finality of judgments is grounded on

When a judgment or final order is entered, or any other
fundamental considerations of public policy and sound
proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in any
practice that at the risk of occasional error, the
court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
judgments of courts must become final at some definite
negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the
date fixed by law. The law gives an exception or ‘last
same case praying that the judgment, order or
chance’ of a timely petition for relief from judgment
proceeding be set aside.
within the reglementary period (within 60 days from
knowledge and 6 months from entry of judgment) under
Rule 38, supra, but such grave period must be taken as A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable
‘absolutely fixed, in extendible, never interruptedand remedy and is allowed only in exceptional cases. It is not
cannot be subjected to any condition or contingency. available if other remedies exist, such as a motion for
Because the period fixed is itself devised to meet a new trial or appeal.
condition or contingency (fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable neglect), the equitable remedy is an act of To set aside a judgment through a petition for relief, the
grace, as it were, designed to give the aggrieved party negligence must be so gross "that ordinary diligence and
another and last chance’ and failure to avail of such last prudence could not have guarded against." This is to
chance within the grace period fixed by the statute or prevent parties from "reviving] the right to appeal
Rules of Court is fatal . . . (Turqueza v. Hernando) [already] lost through inexcusable negligence."

It should be noted that the 60-day period from Petitioners argue that their former counsel’s failure to
knowledge of the decision, and the 6-month period from file a notice of appeal within the reglementary period
entry of judgment, are both inextendible and was "a mistake and an excusable negligence due to [their
uninterruptible. We have also time and again held that former counsel’s] age." This argument stereotypes and
because relief from a final and executory judgment is demeans senior citizens. It asks this court to assume that
really more of an exception than a rule due to its a person with advanced age is prone to incompetence.
equitable character and nature, strict compliance with This cannot be done.
There is also no showing that the negligence could have
been prevented through ordinary diligence and
prudence. As such, petitioners are bound by their
counsel’s negligence.

DISPOSITION:

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is

DENIED. The Court of Appeals’ resolutions dated July 27,
2011 and November 10, 2011 in CA-G.R. SP No. 120251
are AFFIRMED.