Remrev Digest Mod1

module 1
general principles
jurisdiction
rules 1-4
4C REMREV DIGESTS
REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGEST
TOPIC Prospective Effect of the Rules of Court/ Retroactive Application of Rules of Court
CASE TITLE IN THE MATTER TO DECLARE IN CONTEMPT OF COURT HON. SIMEON A.
DATUMANONG
GR NO. 150274 DATE: August 4, 2006
DOCTRINE
Well-settled is the rule that procedural laws are construed to be applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage, and are deemed retroactive in that sense and to that extent. As a
general rule, the retroactive application of procedural laws cannot be considered violative of any personal
rights because no vested right may attach to nor arise therefrom.
FACTS
The Ombudsman Task Force on Public Works and Highways filed with the Office of the Ombudsman an
administrative complaint for dishonesty, falsification of official documents, grave misconduct, gross neglect of
duty, violation of office rules and regulations, and conduct prejudicial to the service against petitioner Tel-
Equen and several others, relative to the anomalous payment of P553,900.00 of the bailey bridge components
owned by the government.
The Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman found respondents guilty of
dishonesty, falsification of public documents, misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service and ordered their dismissal from the service with accessory penalties pursuant to Section 23 of Rule
XIV, Book V of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Revised Administrative Code of 1987.
After the denial of the motions for reconsideration, three petitions were filed before this Court which were
consolidated and referred to the Court of Appeals. CA affirmed with modification the decision of the AAB-OMB.
Petitioner, together with his two co-accused, appealed. Meanwhile, while appeal was still pending, Secretary
Datumanong issued the assailed Memorandum Order dated October 5, 2001 (petitioners were ordered to be
DROPPED/DISMISSED from the service). Hence, the instant petition to cite Sec. Datumanong in
contempt of court. Petitioner contends that in issuing the Memorandum Order despite knowledge of
the pendency of G.R. No. 144694, Sec.Datumanong committed a contumacious act, a gross and blatant
display of abuse of discretion and an unlawful interference with the proceedings before the Court.
Under Section 27 of RA 6770 and Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman,
the punishment imposed upon petitioner, i.e. suspension without pay for one year, is not among those listed
as final and unappealable, hence, immediately executory. An appeal timely filed, such as the one filed in the
instant case, will stay the immediate implementation of the decision
ISSUE
Whether or not Sec. Datumanong should be cited for contempt of court
HELD
NO. The issuance of the Memorandum Order by Secretary Datumanong was not a contumacious conduct
tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice. The remedy of the
petitioner is not to file a petition to cite him in contempt of court but to elevate the error to the higher court for
review and correction. At most, it may be considered only an error of judgment or a result of confusion
considering the different rules regarding execution of decisions pending appeal.
However, two events supervened since the filing of this petition that would support its dismissal. First, on
March 28, 2005, the Court in G.R. No. 144694 affirmed the decisions of the Court of Appeals and
Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman ordering petitioner dismissed from the
service for dishonesty, falsification of public documents, misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service. Second, Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman
was amended by Administrative Order No. 17 wherein the pertinent provision on the execution of decisions
pending appeal is now essentially similar to Section 47 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service and other related laws.
Section 7. Finality and execution of decision. - Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and in
case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than
one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final, executory and
unappealable. In all other cases, the decision may be appealed to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition
for review under the requirements and conditions set forth in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, within fifteen (15)
days from receipt of the written Notice of the Decision or Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration. x x x
―
Well-settled is the rule that procedural laws are construed to be applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage, and are deemed retroactive in that sense and to that extent.
As a general rule, the retroactive application of procedural laws cannot be considered violative of any
personal rights because no vested right may attach to nor arise therefrom.
In the case at bar, the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman are clearly procedural and no
vested right of the petitioner is violated as he is considered preventively suspended while his case is on appeal.
Moreover, in the event he wins on appeal, he shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did
not receive by reason of the suspension or removal. Besides, there is no such thing as a vested interest in an
office, or even an absolute right to hold office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special
immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office.
NOTES
The petition to cite former Secretary Simeon A. Datumanong of the Department of Public Works and
Highways in contempt of court for issuing Memorandum Order dated October 5, 2001 dismissing petitioner
Jimmie F. Tel-Equen from the service is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
4C (2020 – 2021)
TOPIC Power of the Supreme Court to Suspend the Rules of Court
CASE TITLE Gliceria SARMIENTO v. Emerita ZARATAN
GR NO. 167471 DATE: February 7, 2005
DOCTRINE
There are, indeed, reasons which would warrant the suspension of the Rules: (a) the existence of special or
compelling circumstances, b) the merits of the case, (c) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the suspension of rules, (d) a lack of any showing that the review sought
is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (e) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.
FACTS
petitioner Gliceria Sarmiento filed an ejectment case against respondent Emerita Zaratan, in the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City. The court ruled in favor of Sarmiento. Respondent
thennfiled her notice of appeal. In the Notice of Appeal, the RTC directed respondent to submit her and
petitioner to file a reply memorandum within 15 days from receipt.
Respondent's counsel having received the notice on 19 May 2003, had until 3 June 2003 within which to file
the requisite memorandum. On 3 June 2003, he filed a Motion for Extension of Time of five days due to his
failure to finish the draft of the said Memorandum. He cited as reasons for the delay of filing his illness for
one week, lack of staff to do the work due to storm and flood compounded by the grounding of the
computers because the wirings got wet. The motion remained unacted.
On 9 June 2003, respondent filed her Memorandum. The appeal was dismissed by the court. The Record
shows that defendant-appellant received the Notice of Appealed Case, through counsel, on May 19, 2003,
thus she had 15 days or until June 3, 2003 within which to submit a memorandum on appeal. As further
appears on record, however, the required Memorandum was filed by defendant-appellant only on June 9,
2003, six (6) days beyond the expiration of the required period. The RTC posits that while the rules should
be liberally construed, the provisions on reglemenatry periods are strictly applied as they are deemed
indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and necessary to the orderly and speedy discharge of
judicial business. Based on the dismissal, the petitioner filed a Motion for Immediate Execution, while
respondent moved for the Reconsideration. RTC granted the motion for execution and denied the motion of
the respondent.
Aggrieved, respondent filed Petition for Certiorari in the Court of Appeals. The appellate court nullified and
set aside orders of the RTC and ordered the reinstatement of respondent's appeal. Respondent’s appeal
memorandum was admitted and the case remanded to the RTC for further proceedings. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration but was denied.
ISSUE
Did the RTC err in dismissing respondent's appeal for failure to file the required Memorandum within
the period provided by law?
HELD
YES. It must be noted that respondent's appeal in the RTC was dismissed for failure to file the required
memorandum within the period allowed by law, as the Motion for Extension of Time to file Memorandum was
not acted upon for failure to attach a notice of hearing. From the said dismissal, respondent filed a Petition
for Certiorari in the Court of Appeals. Respondent correctly filed said petition pursuant to Section 41 of the
Rules of Court.
Corollary to the dismissal of the appeal by the RTC is the question of whether the lack of notice of hearing in
the Motion for Extension of Time to file Memorandum on Appeal is fatal, such that the filing of the motion is a
worthless piece of paper.
Petitioner avers that, because of the failure of respondent to include a Notice of Hearing in her Motion for
Extension of Time to file Memorandum on Appeal in the RTC, the latter's motion is a worthless piece of
paper with no legal effect.
It is not disputed that respondent perfected her appeal with the filing of her Notice of Appeal and payment of
the required docket fees. However, before the expiration of time to file the Memorandum, she filed a Motion
for Extension of Time seeking an additional period of five days.
The notice requirement in a motion is mandatory. As a rule, a motion without a Notice of Hearing is
considered pro forma and does not affect the reglementary period for the appeal or the filing of the requisite
pleading . As a general rule, notice of motion is required where a party has a right to resist the relief sought
by the motion and principles of natural justice demand that his right be not affected without an opportunity to
be heard. The three-day notice required by law is intended not for the benefit of the movant but to avoid
surprises upon the adverse party and to give the latter time to study and meet the arguments of the motion.
Principles of natural justice demand that the right of a party should not be affected without giving it an
opportunity to be heard.
The test is the presence of the opportunity to be heard, as well as to have time to study the motion and
meaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds upon which it is based Considering the circumstances of the
present case, we believe that procedural due process was substantially complied with.
There are, indeed, reasons which would warrant the suspension of the Rules: (a) the existence of special or
compelling circumstances, b) the merits of the case, (c) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the suspension of rules, (d) a lack of any showing that the review sought
is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (e) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. Elements or
circumstances (c), (d) and (e) exist in the present case.
The suspension of the Rules is warranted in this case. The motion in question does not affect the
substantive rights of petitioner as it merely seeks to extend the period to file Memorandum. The required
extension was due to respondent's counsel's illness, lack of staff to do the work due to storm and flood,
compounded by the grounding of the computers. There is no claim likewise that said motion was interposed
to delay the appeal. As it appears, respondent sought extension prior to the expiration of the time to do so
and the memorandum was subsequently filed within the requested extended period. Under the
circumstances, substantial justice requires that we go into the merits of the case to resolve the issue of who
is entitled to the possession of the land in question.
Further, it has been held that a "motion for extension of time . . . is not a litigated motion where notice to the
adverse party is necessary to afford the latter an opportunity to resist the application, but an ex parte motion
made to the court in behalf of one or the other of the parties to the action, in the absence and usually without
the knowledge of the other party or parties." As a general rule, notice of motion is required where a party has
a right to resist the relief sought by the motion and principles of natural justice demand that his rights be not
affected without an opportunity to be heard. It has been said that "ex parte motions are frequently
permissible in procedural matters, and also in situations and under circumstances of emergency; and an
exception to a rule requiring notice is sometimes made where notice or the resulting delay might tend to
defeat the objective of the motion."
It is well to remember that this Court, in not a few cases, has consistently held that cases shall be
determined on the merits, after full opportunity to all parties for ventilation of their causes and defense, rather
than on technicality or some procedural imperfections. In so doing, the ends of justice would be better
served. Furthermore, this Court emphasized its policy that technical rules should accede to the demands of
substantial justice because there is no vested right in technicalities. Litigations, should, as much as possible,
be decided on their merits and not on technicality. Dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is
frowned upon, and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they are
adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice, and thereby defeat their very aims.
NOTES
4C (2020 – 2021)
TOPIC Power of the Supreme Court to Suspend the Rules of Court
CASE TITLE Labao vs. Flores
GR NO. 187984 DATE: November 15, 2010
DOCTRINE
While procedural rules are liberally construed, the provisions on reglementary periods are strictly applied, indispensable
as they are to the prevention of needless delays, and are necessary to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial
business.
FACTS
The petitioner is the proprietor of San Miguel Protective Security Agency (SMPSA) while the respondents are SMPSA
security guards assigned to the National Power Corporation in Iligan City. The respondents were dismissed for failure
to submit personal data files and other requirements.
In April 2005, the respondents filed a case in the NLRC for illegal dismissal and money claims. The LA ruled that there
is a valid dismissal and it was affirmed by the NLRC on July 31, 2006. The respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration but it was denied on September 29, 2006. Respondent’s counsel received the resolution on October
13, 2006. 88 days later or on January 9, 2007, the respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. The CA ruled in
favor of the respondents. The petitioner appealed in the Supreme Court arguing that the petition for certiorari was filed
28 days late.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA erred in giving due course to the petition despite its late filing.
HELD
YES. Under Section 4 of Rules 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, certiorari must be filed within a period of 60
days from the notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed. The 60-day period cannot be extended
to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their
case.
While procedural rules are liberally construed, the provisions on reglementary periods are strictly applied, indispensable
as they are to the prevention of needless delays, and are necessary to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial
business.
The respondents’ petition for certiorari was filed 28 days late from Atty. Plando’s October 13, 2006 receipt of the
September 29, 2006 resolution. The respondents insist that they should not suffer for Atty. Plando’s negligence in
failing to inform them of the September 29, 2006 resolution, and the reckoning date for the 60-day period should be
their December 6, 2006 notice. This argument is not tenable. The client is bound by the acts of his counsel except
when the negligence of the counsel is so gross and inexcusable that the client is deprived of his day in court. However,
this case does not fall within such an exception.
NOTES
In this case, the Supreme Court explained that while procedural rules are generally liberally construed, the provisions
regarding reglementary periods are strictly applied because it affects the fundamental rights of the parties to a speedy
disposition of their case.
4C (2020 – 2021)
TOPIC Power of the Supreme Court to suspend the Rules of Court
CASE TITLE GIOS-SAMAR, INC., REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRPERSON GERARDO M. MALINAO,
PETITIONER, VS. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS AND
CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
GR NO. 217158 DATE: March 12, 2019
DOCTRINE
While under the Special Rules, litigants are allowed to seek direct relief from this Court, regardless of the presence of
questions which are heavily factual in nature. In the same vein, judgments in petitions for writ of amparo, writ of habeas
data, and writ of kalikasan rendered by lower-ranked courts can be appealed to the Supreme Court on questions of
fact, or law, or both, via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court. In practice,
however, petitions for writ of amparo, writ of habeas data, and writ of kalikasan which were originally filed before the SC
invariably found their way to the CA for hearing and decision, with the CA's decision to be later on brought before us on
appeal.
Supreme Court referral of the case to the CA for hearing, reception of evidence, and decision is in consonance with
Section 2, Rule 3 of our Internal Rules which states that if the Court, in the exercise of its discretion, decides to receive
evidence, it may delegate the same to one of the appellate courts for report and recommendation.
FACTS
The Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) and its attached agency, the Civil Aviation Authority of
the Philippines (CAAP), posted an Invitation to Pre-qualify and Bid (Invitation) on the airport development, operations,
and maintenance of the Bacolod-Silay, Davao, Iloilo, Laguindingan, New Bohol (Panglao), and Puerto Princesa Airports
(collectively, Projects).
Petitioner GIOS-SAMAR, Inc., suing as a taxpayer and invoking the transcendental importance of the issue, filed a
petition for prohibition directly to the Supreme Court. It assails the constitutionality of the bundling of the Projects and
seeks to enjoin the DOTC and the CAAP from proceeding with the bidding of the same.
The CAAP asserts that the petition violated the basic fundamental principle of hierarchy of courts. Petitioner had not
alleged any special and compelling reason to allow it to seek relief directly from the Court. The case should have been
filed with the trial court, because it raises factual issues which need to be threshed out in a full-blown trial.The CAAP
also maintains that petitioner has neither legal capacity nor authority to file the suit and that the petition has no cause of
action.
Petitioner argues that it need not wait for the conduct of the bidding to file the suit because doing so would render
useless the very purpose for filing the petition for prohibition. Petitioner also submits that direct recourse to the Supreme
Court is justified as the "matter of prohibiting the bidding process of the x x x illegally bundled projects are matters of
public interest and transcendental importance. It further insists that it has legal standing to file the suit through Malinao,
its duly authorized representative.
ISSUE
Whether or not direct recourse, in this case, to the Supreme Court is justified
HELD
No. The Petition was dismissed for failure to sufficiently plead a cause of action. Even assuming that petitioner's causes
of action were properly alleged, the resolution of said issues would still require the determination of factual issues which
this Court simply cannot undertake.
The only circumstance when the SC may take cognizance of a case in the first instance, despite the presence of factual
issues, is in the exercise of our constitutionally-expressed task to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
President's proclamation of martial law under Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.The instant case does not
fall under this exception.
NOTES
The Decision is more on Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts.
DISCUSSION ON THE ENHANCED RULE-MAKING POWER OF THE SC

the Supreme Court's rule-making power was enhanced under the new Constitution, to wit:
xxxx
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxxxxxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by
the Supreme Court.
For the first time, the Court was granted with the following: (1) the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection
and enforcement of constitutional rights; and (2) the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and
quasi-judicial bodies. The 1987 Constitution also took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure.
Pursuant to its constitutional rule-making power, the Court promulgated new sets of rules which effectively increased its
original and concurrent jurisdiction with the RTC and the CA: (1) A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC or the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo; (2) A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC or the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data;and (3) A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC or the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases.
Under these Rules, litigants are allowed to seek direct relief from this Court, regardless of the presence of questions
which are heavily factual in nature. In the same vein, judgments in petitions for writ of amparo, writ of habeas data, and
writ of kalikasan rendered by lower-ranked courts can be appealed to the Supreme Court on questions of fact, or law,
or both, via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court.
In practice, however, petitions for writ of amparo, writ of habeas data, and writ of kalikasan which were originally filed
before the SC invariably found their way to the CA for hearing and decision, with the CA's decision to be later on
brought before us on appeal. Thus, in Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, the first ever amparo petition,the SC
ordered the remand of the case to the CA for the conduct of hearing, reception of evidence, and decision. The SC also
did the same in: (1) Rodriguez v. Macapagal-Arroyo;[131] (2) Saez v. Macapagal-Arroyo;[132] and (3) International
Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc., v. Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Philippines). The
consistent practice of the Court in these cases (that is, referring such petitions to the CA for the reception of evidence)
is a tacit recognition by the Court itself that it is not equipped to be a trier of facts.
Notably, the Supreme Court referral of the case to the CA for hearing, reception of evidence, and decision is in
consonance with Section 2, Rule 3 of our Internal Rules which states that if the Court, in the exercise of its
discretion, decides to receive evidence, it may delegate the same to one of the appellate courts for report and
recommendation.
4C (2020 – 2021)
TOPIC Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
CASE TITLE Spouses Gonzales v. Marmaine Realty Corporation
GR NO. 214241 DATE: January 13, 2016
DOCTRINE
In view of this doctrine, jurisprudence instructs that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the courts, it is a
pre-condition that he avail himself of all administrative processes afforded him. The premature resort to the court is fatal
to one's cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel, the case may be dismissed for lack of
cause of action. However, it must be clarified that the aforementioned doctrine is not absolute as it is subject to certain
exceptions, one of which is when the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts
of justice.
FACTS
The instant case arose from a Complaint 4 dated October 30, 1997 for Recognition as Tenant with Damages and
Temporary Restraining Order filed by Sps. Gonzales against herein respondent Marmaine Realty Corporation
(Marmaine) before the Office of the Provincial Adjudicator, Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB),
Region IV. After due proceedings, the PARAD issued a Decision 9 dated June 27, 2002 in the Tenancy Case, dismissing
Sps. Gonzales' complaint for lack of merit. Sps. Gonzales moved for reconsideration, which was, however, denied in an
Order dated August 7, 2002. Aggrieved, they appealed to the DARAB, but the latter affirmed the PARAD ruling in a
Decision 13 dated October 17, 2008. Due to the failure on the part of Sps. Gonzales to further appeal, the DARAB
Decision became final and executory
In view of the finality of the ruling in the Tenancy Case, Marmaine filed a Motion for Cancellation of Notice of Lis Pendens
dated January 31, 2012. In an Order dated May 15, 2012, the PARAD initially denied Marmaine's motion on the ground
of, inter alia, prematurity because a civil case involving the same parties is still pending before the Regional Trial Court
of Rosario, Batangas, Branch 87, However, on Marmaine's motion for reconsideration, 19 the PARAD issued an Order
20 dated December 4, 2012 setting aside its earlier Order and, accordingly, directed the Register of Deeds of Batangas
to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated on Marmaine's certificates of title.
Sps. Gonzales moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied in a Resolution dated October 16, 2013.
Dissatisfied, petitioners went straight to the CA via a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. In a
Resolution dated April 24, 2014, the CA dismissed the petition on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies. It held that Sps. Gonzales improperly elevated the case to it via a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules
of Court, pointing out that the proper remedy from a PARAD's denial of a motion for reconsideration is an appeal to the
DARAB, and not a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition for review before it due to petitioners' failure to exhaust
administrative remedies
HELD
YES. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of our judicial system. The thrust of the rule
is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the
specialized areas of their respective competence. The rationale for this doctrine is obvious. It entails lesser expenses
and provides for the speedier resolution of controversies. Comity and convenience also impel courts of justice to shy
away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed.
In view of this doctrine, jurisprudence instructs that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the courts, it is a
pre-condition that he avail himself of all administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the
administrative machinery can be resorted to by giving the administrative officer every opportunity to decide on a matter
that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy must be exhausted first before the court's power of judicial review
can be sought. The premature resort to the court is fatal to one's cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of
waiver or estoppel, the case may be dismissed for lack of cause of action.
However, it must be clarified that the aforementioned doctrine is not absolute as it is subject to certain exceptions, one
of which is when the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice. In
the case at bar, Sps. Gonzales correctly pointed out that the issue they raised before the CA, i.e., the propriety of the
cancellation of the Notice of Lis Pendens, falls within the aforesaid exception as the same is a purely legal question,
considering that the resolution of the same would not involve an examination of the probative value presented by the
litigants and must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances.
Verily, the CA erred in dismissing Sps. Gonzales' petition for review before it, considering that the matter at issue — a
question of law — falls within the known exceptions of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
NOTES
4C (2020 – 2021)
TOPIC Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction
CASE TITLE Hernani Fabia vs. CA
DOCTRINE
The Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction bars the Office of the Prosecutor from taking cognizance of a case involving
intra-corporate controversy which falls under the jurisdiction of the SEC.
FACTS
Fabia was the former President of MTCP (Maritime Training Center of the Philippines). He was also a director and
stockholder thereof. MTCP, through its new President, filed a complaint for estafa against Fabia alleging that he drew
cash advances covered by cash vouchers amounting to PHP1,291,376.61 from the company which he failed to liquidate
despite repeated demands. The Office of the Prosecutor dismissed the complaint on the ground that it was SEC who had
jurisdiction over the same. It also denied their MR adding that the advances and vouchers had not been examined by an
independent CPA hence there was no probable cause found. This was affirmed by the DOJ.
The CA however, upon a petition for certiorari, granted the same and directed the filing of the information for estafa which
the Office of the Prosecutor complied with. Fabia questioned the jurisdiction of the trial court arguing that the case
involves an intra-corporate controversy primary cognizable by the SEC and as such, the prosecutor had no authority to
rule on the preliminary investigation of the complaint for estafa since he was barred under the Doctrine of Primary
Jurisdiction from exercising jurisdiction over the criminal case without prior resolution of the SEC.
ISSUE
Who has jurisdiction over the case?
HELD
The SEC. Section 6 of PD 902-A confines the jurisdiction of the SEC to intra-corporate disputes. Based on the allegations
in the complaint, petitioner’s act of misappropriating or diverting the funds of MTCP after having failed to liquidate the cash
advances he received, in his capacity as President, director and stockholder of the company, constitutes fraud committed
by an officer of a corporation hence, an intra-corporate controversy. As such, the action is removed from the jurisdiction of
the regular courts to the SEC. The fact that a complaint for estafa under the RPC has been filed against the petitioner
does not negate and nullify the intra-corporate nature of the cause of action nor does it transform the controversy from
intra-corporate to criminal.
However, in conformity with RA 8799 or the Securities and Regulation Code, which amended PD 902-A transferring the
jurisdiction of the SEC on cases under Sec. 5 thereof to courts of general jurisdiction, The SC ordered the transfer of the
case to RTC Manila to be raffled among the branches designated and empowered to try the cases formerly cognizable by
the SEC.
NOTES
In this case, an intra-corporate controversy was defined as any act / omission of the Board of Directors / Trustees of
Corporations, or of partnerships, or of other associations, or of their stockholders, officers, or partners, including any
fraudulent devices, schemes or representations, in violation of any law or rules and regulations administered and enforced
by the Commission. This underscores the relationship of the party-litigants with each other, and indicates that the nature
of the cause of action should be limited to fraudulent devices, schemes or representations, in violation of any law, rules
and/or regulations administered and enforced by the Commission.
4C (2020 – 2021)
TOPIC Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction
CASE TITLE Lihaylihay v. Treasurer of the Republic of the Philippines
GR NO. : 192223 DATE: 28 July 2018
DOCTRINE
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, recourse through court action cannot prosper until after all
such administrative remedies have first been exhausted. If remedy is available within the administrative machinery, this
should be resorted to before resort can be made to courts. It is settled that non-observance of the doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies results in lack of cause of action, which is one of the grounds in the Rules of Court justifying
the dismissal of the complaint.
FACTS
Lihaylihay identified himself as a "Confidential Informant of the State (CIS) pursuant to Republic Act No. 2338,... duly
accredited and registered as such with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG)."
Lihaylihay particularly recalled sending two (2) letters, both dated March 11, 1987, to Atty. Eliseo Pitargue, the former
head of the Bureau of Internal Revenue-Presidential Commission on Good Government Task Force, concerning
information on former President Marcos' ill-gotten wealth.
Almost 20 years later, on November 29, 2006, Lihaylihay wrote to then Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Jose Mario
C. Buñag, demanding payment of 25% informer's reward on the P118,270,243,259.00 supposedly recovered by the
Philippine government through compromise agreements with the Marcoses. He also insisted on the need for the
government to collect Fortune Tobacco Corporation's tax deficiencies
On January 10, 2008, Lihaylihay wrote to then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, insisting on the need to recover the
Marcos' wealth that he identified and his corresponding entitlement to an informer's reward.
Lihaylihay wrote to then Department of Finance Secretary Teves on August 11, 2009, reiterating his entitlement to an
informer's reward.
On May 31, 2010, without waiting for Secretary Teves' and Treasurer Tan's official actions on his letters, Lihaylihay filed
the present Petition, dubbed a Petition for "Mandamus and Damages, with a Prayer for a Writ of Garnishment." Insisting
on his entitlement to informer's rewards, he prays that Treasurer Tan and Secretary Teves be ordered to deliver to him
the amount of P11,875,000,000,000.00; that the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources be ordered to transfer
to him several government lands; and that the Governor of Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas be ordered to garnish in his favor
P50,000,000,000.00 worth of jewelry recovered from Imelda Romualdez Marcos.
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioner Danilo A. Lihaylihay is entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel respondents to deliver to him
proceeds and properties representing 25% informer's reward pursuant to Section 1 of Republic Act No. 2338.
HELD
No, writ of mandamus is not proper. The need for petitioner to have previously exhausted administrative remedies is
congruous with the Bureau of Internal Revenue's and the Finance Secretary's preeminent competence to consider the
merits of his claims. Indeed, between this Court on the one hand, and the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Department
of Finance on the other, the latter are in a better position to ascertain whether or not the information supplied by an
informer has actually been pivotal to the discovery of tax offenses, and the conviction and punishment of offenders.
Having direct access to their own records, they are in the best position to know if the information supplied to them is
novel, not having been previously within their knowledge or not otherwise having been the subject of previous
proceedings. Petitioner's direct recourse to this Court is an invitation for it to run afoul with the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction:
In cases involving specialized disputes, the practice has been to refer the same to an administrative agency
of special competence in observance of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The Court has ratiocinated that
it cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the
administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the
question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge,
experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact,
and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the premises of the regulatory statute administered.
The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide a court in determining whether it should
refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined some question or
some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the court. It applies where claim is originally
cognizable in the courts and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of
issues which, under a regulatory scheme, has been placed within the special competence of an
administrative body; in such case, the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the
administrative body for its view.
NOTES
4C (2020 – 2021)
TOPIC Doctrine of non-interference or doctrine of judicial stability
CASE TITLE TERESITA TAN vs. JOVENCIO F. CINCO, ET AL.
GR NO. 213054 DATE: June 15, 2016
DOCTRINE
The doctrine of judicial stability or noninterference in the regular courts or judgments of a coequal court is an elementary
principle in the administration of justice: no court can interfere by injunction with the judgments or orders of another court
of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief sought by the injunction.
FACTS
Respondents extended a loan to Dante Tan (Dante) in the amount of P50M which was facilitated by PentaCapital. When
Dante failed to pay the loan upon maturity and despite demands, he proposed to settle the same by selling his shares in
BWRC and assigning the proceeds the respondents. However, when he was due to execute the corresponding deeds of
assignment, Dante disappeared, leaving his obligations unpaid. The respondents then filed an action for sum of money
against him before Makati RTC which ordered Dante to pay respondents P100,000.00 with legal interest. Due to Dante’s
failure to reverse the decision, a writ of execution was issued.
In order to enforce the writ, Deputy Sheriff Ignacio (Sheriff Ignacio) levied on a property covered by TCT No. 126981
registered in Dante's name (subject property). An auction sale was then conducted on March 29, 2005. Consequently,
Dante sought the quashal of the writ by presenting an affidavit executed by his wife, herein petitioner Teresita Tan
(Teresita) attesting to the conjugal nature of the subject property. Meanwhile, the period to redeem the subject property
lapsed without redemption having been made; hence, a Sheriff's Final Deed of Sale was issued in favor of respondents.
Dante then filed an Omnibus Motion before Makati RTC arguing that the property was a conjugal property and a family
home so it cannot be executed. Makati RTC denied ruling that the issue was belatedly raised, and that the obligation was
contracted while he was engaged in business so the conjugal partnership was benefited. With the MR being denied,
Makati RTC’s decision became final.
The petitioner then filed before RTC Paranaque a complaint against respondents, respondent Sheriff Ignacio, and the
Register of Deeds of Paranaque City, for the nullification of the auction sale and the cancellation of the certificate of sale
issued in favor of respondents. Paranaque RTC initially dismissed the complaint due to res judicata as the issues were
already passed upon in Makati RTC. However, in petitioner’s MR, Paranaque RTC reversed ruling that petitioner is a
third party in the Makati RTC case as she was not impleaded therein and the affidavit executed by her did not make her
a party in the case. Also, she had not waived her right to institute a separate action to recover the property. Respondents’
MR was denied.
Intending to file a petition for certiorari before the CA, they filed a Motion for Extension of Time which was later on
withdrawn, unaware that the CA had already denied the same. Instead, respondents simultaneously filed a Notice of
Appeal before RTC Paranaque. Unfortunately, it was filed ten (10) days late.
However, CA granted the petition and directed the Parañaque RTC to allow respondents' Notice of Appeal. While
conceding that the perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period is mandatory and jurisdictional, the CA
nonetheless found meritorious and sound reasons for the exceptional allowance of respondents' appeal. CA invoked the
doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or judgments of a co-equal court and stated that the
affirmance of the Parañaque RTC's assailed issuances would allow Dante, to continue to evade his obligations which
was already finally adjudicated by the Makati RTC, a co-equal court and the first one to take cognizance of the
controversy, on the basis of technicality.
ISSUE
W/N the Parañaque RTC violated the doctrine of judicial stability when it took cognizance of the nullification case filed by
Teresita and declared as null and void the auction sale, the certificate of sale, and the Final Deed of Sale in favor of
respondents.
HELD
YES. In Barroso v. Omelio, the Court explained the doctrine of judicial stability as follows:
“The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or judgments of a co-equal court is an elementary
principle in the administration of justice: no court can interfere by injunction with the judgments or orders of another court
of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief sought by the injunction. The rationale for the rule is founded
on the concept of jurisdiction: a court that acquires jurisdiction over the case and renders judgment therein has jurisdiction
over its judgment, to the exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its execution and over all its incidents, and to control,
in furtherance of justice, the conduct of ministerial officers acting in connection with this judgment.”
To summarize, the various branches of the RTCs of a province or city, having as they do the same or equal authority and
exercising as they do concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction, should not, cannot, and are not permitted to interfere with
their respective cases, much less with their orders or judgments. A contrary rule would obviously lead to confusion and
seriously hamper the administration of justice.
In this case, the Court finds that the Parañaque RTC violated the doctrine of judicial stability when it took cognizance of
Teresita's nullification case despite the fact that the collection case from which it emanated falls within the jurisdiction of
the Makati RTC. Verily, the nullification case ought to have been dismissed at the outset for lack of jurisdiction, as the
Parañaque RTC is bereft of authority to nullify the levy and sale of the subject property that was legitimately ordered by
the Makati RTC, a coordinate and co-equal court.
To reiterate, the determination of whether or not the levy and sale of a property in the execution of a judgment was valid
properly falls within the jurisdiction of the court that rendered the judgment and issued the writ of execution.
Thus, Teresita's nullification case filed before the Parañaque RTC was improper and in glaring violation of the doctrine
of judicial stability. The judgment rendered by the Makati RTC in the collection case, as well as the execution thereof,
and all other incidents arising therefrom, may not be interfered with by the Parañaque RTC, a court of concurrent
jurisdiction, for the simple reason that the power to open, modify, or vacate the said judgment or order is not only
possessed but is restricted to the court in which the judgment or order is rendered or issued. Consequently, the
Parañaque RTC lacked jurisdiction over the same, rendering all the proceedings therein, as well as the Decision and
other orders issued thereon, void for lack of jurisdiction.
NOTES
A judgment rendered by a court without jurisdiction is null and void and may be attacked anytime. It creates no rights
and produces no effect. It remains a basic fact in law that the choice of the proper forum is crucial, as the decision of a
court or tribunal without jurisdiction is a total nullity. A void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. All acts
performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect.
4C (2020 – 2021)
TOPIC Doctrine of non-interference or doctrine of judicial stability
CASE TITLE Specified Contractors vs Pobocan
GR NO. 212014-15 DATE: 6 December 2016
DOCTRINE
Non-interference in the Ombudsman's determination of the existence of probable cause, provided there is no
grave abuse in the exercise of such discretion. (Courts do not interfere in the Ombudsman's exercise of
discretion in determining probable cause unless there are compelling reasons. The Ombudsman's finding of
probable cause, or lack of it, is entitled to great respect absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion.)
FACTS
1. Petitioners Senator Ramon "Bong" Revilla, Jr. (Sen. Revilla), Richard A. Cambe (Cambe), Janet Lim
Napoles (Napoles or Janet Napoles), John Raymund De Asis (De Asis), and Ronald John Lim (Lim) are all
charged as co-conspirators for their respective participations in the illegal pillaging of public funds sourced
from the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) of Sen. Revilla for the years 2006 to 2010 in the
total amount of P517,000,000.00.
2. The charges are contained in two (2) complaints, namely: 1) a Complaint for Plunder filed by the NBI; and
2) a Complaint for Plunder and violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 [Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act]
filed by the Field Investigation Office of the Ombudsman.
3. Petitioners were implicated for the following acts:
a) Sen. Revilla, Sen. Revilla, as Senator of the Republic of the Philippines, for authorizing the illegal
utilization, diversion, and disbursement of his allocated PDAF through his endorsement of fraudulent Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) created and controlled by Napoles's JLN (Janet Lim Napoles)
Corporation 19 19 in relation to "ghost" PDAF-funded projects and for receiving significant portions of the
diverted PDAF funds as his "commission" or "kickback";
b) Cambe, as Chief of Staff of Sen. Revilla, for processing the utilization, diversion, and disbursement of
Sen. Revilla's PDAF, and for personally receiving his own "commission" or "kickback" from the diverted
funds;
c) Napoles, as the mastermind of the entire PDAF scam, for facilitating the illegal utilization, diversion, and
disbursement of Sen. Revilla's PDAF through: (1) the commencement via "business propositions" with the
legislator regarding his allocated PDAF; (2) the creation and operation of JLN-controlled NGOs to serve as
"conduits" for "ghost" PDAF-funded projects; (3) the use of spurious receipts and liquidation documents to
make it appear that the projects were implemented by her NGOs; (4) the falsification and machinations used
in securing funds from the various implementing agencies (IAs) and in liquidating disbursements; and (5) the
remittance of Sen. Revilla's PDAF for misappropriation;
d) Lim Lim and De Asis, De Asis, as staff employees of Napoles, for assisting in the fraudulent processing
and releasing of the PDAF funds to the JLN-controlled NGOs;
e) Relampagos, Nuñez, Paule, Relampagos, Nuñez, Paule, and Bare Bare (Relampagos, e t al. ), as employees
of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM), for participating in the misuse or diversion of Sen.
Revilla's PDAF , by acting as "contacts" of Napoles within the DBM, and thereby, assisting in the release of
the Special Allotment Release Orders (SAROs) and Notices of Cash Allocation (NCAs) covering Sen.
Revilla's PDAF.
In a Joint Resolution, the Ombudsman found probable cause to indict, among others, petitioners Sen. Revilla,
Cambe, Napoles, De Asis, and Lim of 1 count of Plunder, and all the petitioners, except Lim, of 16 counts of
violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. The Ombudsman held that probable cause exists against Sen. Revilla,
Cambe, Napoles, De Asis, and Lim for Plunder, considering
that: (a) Sen. Revilla was a public officer at the time material to the charges; (b) with the help of his co-
accused, who are public officers and private individuals, Sen. Revilla amassed, accumulated, or acquired ill-
gotten wealth through their intricate modus operandi as described above; and (c) such ill-gotten wealth
amounted to at least P224,512,500.00, 72 72 way more than the threshold amount of P50,000,000.00 required
in the crime of Plunder. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not the findings of the Ombudsman of probable cause against all petitioners should be upheld?
HELD
YES. Time and again, this Court's consistent policy has been to maintain non-interference in the
Ombudsman's determination of the existence of probable cause, provided there is no grave abuse in the
exercise of such discretion. This observed policy is based not only in respect for the investigatory and
prosecutory powers granted by the 1987 Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman, but upon practicality
as well.
Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of
jurisdiction. The Ombudsman's exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner
which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform
the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. Probable cause simply means "such facts as are
sufficient to engender a well founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent is probably
guilty thereof. The term does not mean 'actual and positive cause' nor does it import absolute certainty. It is
merely based on opinion and reasonable belief." It should be borne in mind that probable cause is determined
during the context of a preliminary investigation which is merely an inquisitorial mode of discovering
whether or not there is reasonable basis to believe that a crime has been committed and that the person
charged should be held responsible for it. It is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the
prosecution's evidence. Therefore, the validity and merits of a party's defense or accusation, as well as the
admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary
investigation level.
Guided by these considerations, the Court finds that the Ombudsman did not gravely abuse its discretion in
finding probable cause to indict Sen. Revilla, Cambe, Napoles, De Asis, and Lim of one (1) count of Plunder,
and all the petitioners, except Lim, of sixteen (16) counts of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.
In the review of the Ombudsman's determination of probable cause, we are guided by this Court's
pronouncement in Vergara , where it was ruled that: Courts do not interfere in the Ombudsman's exercise of
discretion in determining probable cause unless there are compelling reasons. The Ombudsman's finding of
probable cause, or lack of it, is entitled to great respect absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion. In this
case, the Ombudsman (and the Sandiganbayan as to Relampagos, et al) did not err in finding probable cause
against all the petitioners. Their findings are fully supported by the evidence on record and no semblance of
misapprehension taints the same. Moreover, this Court cannot tag key documentary evidence as forgeries and
bar testimonies as hearsay at this stage of the proceedings; otherwise, it would defy established principles and
norms followed during preliminary investigation.
NOTES
4C (2020 – 2021)
TOPIC Jurisdiction – Statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action
CASE TITLE CANG vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 105308 September 25, 1998
DOCTRINE
Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of the court.
FACTS
Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano begot three children. Upon learning of her husband's alleged
illicit liaison, Anna Marie filed a petition for legal separation. The spouses agreed that their children shall be
entitled to a monthly support of P1,000.00. Petitioner then left for the United States and while in the United
States, petitioner worked in a Medical Clinic. A portion of his earnings was remitted to the Philippines for his
children's expenses.
In 1987, private respondents filed a special proceedings for the adoption of the 3 minor children. Anna Marie
likewise filed an affidavit of consent alleging that her husband had "evaded his legal obligation to support" his
children; that her brothers and sisters had been helping her in taking care of the children; and that her husband
had "long forfeited his parental rights" over the children.
Upon learning of the petitioner for adoption, petitioner immediately returned to the Philippines and filed an
opposition thereto, alleging that, although private respondents were financially capable of supporting the
children while his finances were "too meager" compared to theirs, he could not "in conscience, allow anybody
to strip him of his parental authority over his beloved children."
In 1990, the Regional Trial Court issued a decree of adoption in favor of private respondents. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decree of adoption. Hence, this petition alleging that the petition for adoption was fatally
defective as it did not have his written consent as a natural father as required by Article 31 (2) of Presidential
Decree No. 603, the Child and Youth Welfare Code, and Article 188 (2) of the Family Code.
During the pendency of the petition for adoption, the Family Code which amended the Child and Youth Welfare
Code took effect.
ISSUE
Whether or not the applicable law is the Child and Youth Welfare Code?
HELD
Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of the court. As such, when private respondents filed
the petition for adoption on September 25, 1987, the applicable law was the Child and Youth Welfare Code,
as amended by Executive Order No. 91.
During the pendency of the petition for adoption, the Family Code which amended the Child and Youth Welfare
Code took effect. Article 256 of the Family Code provides for its retroactivity "insofar as it does not prejudice
or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." Under the Family Code,
the written consent of the natural parent to the adoption has remained a requisite for its validity.
As clearly inferred from the foregoing provisions of law, the written consent of the natural parent is
indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption. Nevertheless, the requirement of written consent can
be dispensed with if the parent has abandoned the child or that such parent is "insane or hopelessly
intemperate." In the instant case, only the affidavit of consent of the natural mother was attached to the petition
for adoption. Petitioner's consent, as the natural father is lacking. Nonetheless, the petition sufficiently alleged
the fact of abandonment of the minors for adoption by the natural father.
The allegations of abandonment in the petition for adoption, even absent the written consent of petitioner,
sufficiently vested the lower court with jurisdiction since abandonment of the child by his natural parents is one
of the circumstances under which our statutes and jurisprudence dispense with the requirement of written
consent to the adoption of their minor children. However, in cases where the father opposes the adoption
primarily because his consent thereto was not sought, the matter of whether he had abandoned his child
becomes a proper issue for determination.
This Court finds that both the lower court and the Court of Appeals failed to appreciate facts and circumstances
that should have elicited a different conclusion on the issue of whether petitioner has so abandoned his
children. In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner's conduct did not manifest a settled purpose to
forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to, constitute abandonment.
Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment.
While admittedly, petitioner was physically absent as he was then in the United States, he was not remiss in
his natural and legal obligations of love, care and support for his children. He maintained regular
communication with his wife and children through letters and telephone. He used to send packages by mail
and catered to their whims.
NOTES
4C (2020 – 2021)
TOPIC Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts
CASE TITLE Gios-Samar, Inc. v. DOTC,
GR NO. 217158 DATE: 12 March 2019
DOCTRINE
The doctrine of hierarchy of courts dictates that direct recourse to the Supreme Court is allowed only to resolve
questions of law, notwithstanding the invocation of paramount or transcendental importance of the action. This
doctrine is not mere policy, rather, it is a constitutional filtering mechanism designed to enable the Court to focus on
the more fundamental and essential tasks assigned to it by the highest law of the land.
FACTS
Bidding
On December 15, 2014, DOTC and its attached agency, CAAP, posted an Invitation to Pre-qualify and Bid on the
airport development, operations, and maintenance of the Bacolod-Silay, Davao, Iloilo, Laguindingan, New Bohol
(Panglao), and Puerto Princesa Airports (collectively, Projects).
Petition for Prohibition filed before the Supreme Court

On March 27, 2015, petitioner GIOS-SAMAR, Inc., suing as a taxpayer and invoking the transcendental importance
of the issue, filed the present petition for prohibition [before the Supreme Court]. Petitioner alleges that it is a
non-governmental organization composed of subsistence farmers and fisherfolk from Samar, who are among the
victims of Typhoon Yolanda relying on government assistance for the rehabilitation of their industry and livelihood. It
assails the constitutionality of the bundling of the Projects and seeks to enjoin the DOTC and the CAAP from
proceeding with the bidding of the same.
CAAP’s Comment
CAAP asserts that the petition violated the basic fundamental principle of hierarchy of courts. Petitioner had not
alleged any special and compelling reason to allow it to seek relief directly from the Court. The case should have
been filed with the trial court, because it raises factual issues which need to be threshed out in a full-blown trial.
Petitioner’s Reply
Petitioner also submits that direct recourse to this Court is justified as the "matter of prohibiting the bidding process of
the x x x illegally bundled projects are matters of public interest and transcendental importance."
ISSUE
Whether or not direct recourse, in this case, to the Supreme Court is justified - NO. The Supreme Court dismissed
the petition.
HELD
“The Policy”
This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
corpus and injunction) is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts and Court of Appeals.
This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an
absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a
hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general
determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial
hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level courts should
be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of
the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and
important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy.
Transcendental Importance Doctrine

We take this opportunity to clarify that the presence of one or more of the so-called "special and important reasons"
is not the decisive factor considered by the Court in deciding whether to permit the invocation, at the first instance, of
its original jurisdiction over the issuance of extraordinary writs. Rather, it is the nature of the question raised by the
parties in those "exceptions" that enabled us to allow the direct action before us. To be clear, the transcendental
importance doctrine does not clothe us with the power to tackle factual questions and play the role of a trial court.
The only circumstance when we may take cognizance of a case in the first instance, despite the presence of factual
issues, is in the exercise of our constitutionally-expressed task to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
President's proclamation of martial law under Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. The case before us
does not fall under this exception.
NOTES
Strict observance of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts should not be a matter of mere policy. It is a constitutional
imperative given (1) the structure of our judicial system and (2) the requirements of due process.
First case that directly invoked SC’s original jurisdiction - Direct invocation of the Court's original jurisdiction
over the issuance of extraordinary writs started in 1936 with Angara v. Electoral Commission. It is the
quintessential example of a valid direct recourse to this Court on constitutional questions. Angara was an original
petition for prohibition seeking to restrain the Electoral Commission from taking further cognizance of an election
contest led against an elected (and confirmed) member of the National Assembly. The main issue before the Court
involved the question of whether the Supreme Court had jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject
matter of the controversy. We took cognizance of the petition, ruling foremost that the Court has jurisdiction over the
case by virtue of its "power of judicial review under the Constitution"
Purpose of Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts

The doctrine of hierarchy of courts operates to: (1) prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention
which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction; (2) prevent further overcrowding of the
Court's docket; and (3) prevent the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases
which often have to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or
as the court better equipped to resolve factual questions.
4C (2020 – 2021)
TOPIC KATARUNGANG PAMBARANGAY
CASE TITLE LANSANGAN v. CAISIP
DOCTRINE
Ordinarily, non-compliance with the condition could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff's cause of action and make his
complaint vulnerable to dismissal on the ground of lack of cause of action or prematurity; but the same would not prevent
a court of competent jurisdiction from exercising its power of adjudication over the case before it, where the defendants,
as in this case, failed to object to such exercise of jurisdiction in their answer and even during the entire proceedings a
quo.
FACTS
A Complaint for Sum of Money and Damages was filed before the 2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Capas-Bamban-
Concepcion, Tarlac by petitioner Lansangan against respondent Antonio Caisip.
Lansangan, a resident of Camanse Street, Purok 4, Rose Park, Concepcion, Tarlac, alleged that respondent, a resident
of Barangay Sto. Niño, Concepcion, Tarlac, executed a promissory note in her favor. As respondent defaulted in his
obligation under the promissory note and refused to heed petitioner's demands to comply therewith, the latter was
constrained to file the said complaint.
As Caisip failed to file any responsive pleading, petitioner moved to declare him in default and for the MCTC to render
judgment, which was granted.
The MCTC motu proprio dismissed without prejudice the complaint for failure to comply with the prior referral of the
dispute for barangay conciliation proceedings before the filing of a case in court. Aggrieved, she filed a petition for
certiorari before the RTC.
The RTC, but the latter upheld the dismissal of the complaint.
The CA affirmed the RTC Ruling, holding that since the party-litigants are both residents of Concepcion Tarlac, petitioner's
complaint should have undergone the mandatory barangay conciliation proceedings before raising the matter before the
courts.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the motu proprio dismissal of the petitioner’s complaint.
HELD
YES. Section 1 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court provides for the grounds that may be raised in a motion to dismiss a
complaint.
As a general rule, the listed grounds must be invoked by the party-litigant at the earliest opportunity, as in a motion to
dismiss or in the answer; otherwise, such grounds are deemed waived. As an exception, however, the courts may order
the motu proprio dismissal of a case on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, litis pendentia, res
judicata, and prescription of action, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.
In this case, the motu proprio dismissal of the complaint was anchored on petitioner's failure to refer the matter for
barangay conciliation proceedings which in certain instances, is a condition precedent before filing a case in court.
As Section 412 (a) of RA 7160 provides, the conduct of barangay conciliation proceedings is a pre-condition to the filing
of a complaint involving any matter within the authority of the lupon.
Notably, in Aquino v. Aure, the Court clarified that such conciliation process is not a jurisdictional requirement, such that
non-compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the court has otherwise acquired over the subject matter or
over the person of the defendant, viz.: Ordinarily, non-compliance with the condition precedent [of prior barangay
conciliation] could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff's cause of action and make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal
on [the] ground of lack of cause of action or prematurity; but the same would not prevent a court of competent jurisdiction
from exercising its power of adjudication over the case before it, where the defendants, as in this case, failed to object to
such exercise of jurisdiction in their answer and even during the entire proceedings a quo.
Similarly, in Banares II v. Balising, it was mentioned that the non-referral of a case for barangay conciliation when so
required under the law is not jurisdictional in nature and may therefore be deemed waived if not raised seasonably in a
motion to dismiss or in a responsive pleading.
Here, the ground of non-compliance with a condition precedent, i.e., undergoing prior barangay conciliation proceedings,
was not invoked at the earliest opportunity, as in fact, respondent was declared in default for failure to file a responsive
pleading despite due notice.
Therefore, it was grave error for the courts a quo to order the adismissal of petitioner's complaint on said ground. Hence,
in order to rectify the situation, the Court finds it proper that the case be reinstated and remanded to the MCTC, which is
the court of origin, for its resolution on the merits.
NOTES
Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court provides for the grounds that may be raised in a motion to dismiss a complaint,
to wit:
Section 1. Grounds. – Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a
motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds:
(a) That the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defending party;
(b) That the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim;
(c) That venue is improperly laid;
(d) That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue;
(e) That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause;
(f) That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or by the statute of limitations;
(g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action;
(h) That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff's pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise
extinguished;
(i) That the claim on which the action is founded is unenforceable under the provisions of the statute of frauds; and
(j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. — Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss
or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the
court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same parties for the
same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.
4C (2020 – 2021)
TOPIC Jurisdiction of various Philippine Courts
CASE TITLE JOSIE AUDIE ABAGATNAN, ET. AL., petitioners vs SPOUSES JONATHAN CLARITO AND
ELSA CLARITO, respondents
DOCTRINE
The express statutory requirement of actual residency in the LGC pertains specifically to the real parties in interest in the
case. It further explained that said requirement cannot be construed to apply to the attorney-in-fact of the party-plaintiff,
as doing so would abrogate the meaning of a "real party in interest" as defined in Section 2, in relation to Section 3, of
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
FACTS
Wenceslao Abagatnan and his late wife Lydia Capote acquired a parcel of land designated as Lot 1472-B located at
Brgy. Cogon, Roxas City. In 1990, respondents allegedly asked for Wenceslao‘s permission to allow them to construct a
residential house to which the latter agreed but subject to the condition that respondents will vacate the subject property
should he need the same for his own use.When Lydia died in 1999, her children (co-petitioners in this case) succeeded
into the ownership of her conjugal share of said property.
In 2006, the petitioners decided to sell portions of Lot 1472B including the subject property which was then still being
occupied by respondents. Said portion was first offered to the respondents, but the latter declined. Thereafter, a Demand
letter was sent to the respondents requiring them to vacate the subject property within 15 days from receipt.
For failure to heed such demand, petitioners filed a Complaint for Unlawful detainer and Damages before the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 2, Roxas City. Notably, the Complaint alleged that prior barangay conciliation
proceedings are not required as a pre-condition for the filing of the case given that not all petitioners are resident of Roxas
City (Jimmy resided in Laguna; Jenalyn resided in Pasig).
In their answer with counterclaim, respondents argued that prior barangay conciliation is mandatory requirement that
cannot be dispensed with considering that Jimmy and Jenalyn had already executed a SPA in favor of co-petitioner and
sister Josephine, who is a resident of Roxas City.
MTCC: Rendered judgement in favor of petitioners and ordered respondents to remove structures they erected and to
vacate the same. The RTC denied respondent‘s appeal ruling that since the parties raised the issue of ownership to
justify their claims of possession, and the evidence of ownership is preponderant on petitioners, the MTCC was justified
in ruling the case in the latter's favor. CA: Granted respondent‘s Petition for Review for lack of prior referral to the
Katarungang Pambarangay. CA also denied petitioner‘s MR. Hence, this present Petition for Review on Certiorari.
ISSUE
Is there a need to comply for a prior barangay conciliation requirement under the Local Government Code, despite the
fact that not all real parties in interest resided in the same city or municipality?
HELD
No. Section 412 of the LGC requires the parties to undergo a conciliation process before the Lupon Chairman as a
precondition to the filing of a complaint. Also, the LGC further provides that the ―lupon of each barangay shall have
authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all
disputes‖. One exception would be in cases where the dispute involves parties who actually reside in barangays of
different cities or municipalities, unless said barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to submit to
their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon.”
In the present case, the Complaint filed before the MTCC specifically alleged that not all the real parties in interest in the
case actually reside in Roxas City. As such, the lupon has no jurisdiction over their dispute, and prior referral of the case
for barangay conciliation is not a pre-condition to its filing in court.
This is true regardless of the fact that Jimmy and Jenalyn had already authorized their sister and co-petitioner, Josephine,
to act as their attorney-in-fact in the ejectment proceedings before the MTCC.
In Pascual v. Pascual, the Court ruled that the express statutory requirement of actual residency in the LGC pertains
specifically to the real parties in interest in the case. It further explained that said requirement cannot be construed to
apply to the attorney-in-fact of the party-plaintiff, as doing so would abrogate the meaning of a "real party in interest" as
defined in Section 2, in relation to Section 3, of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
NOTES
4C (2020 – 2021)
TOPIC Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law
CASE TITLE Chavez v CA
GR NO. 159411 DATE: March 18, 2005
DOCTRINE
The Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law provides for a two-tiered mode of enforcement of an
amicable settlement, to wit: (a) by execution by the Punong Barangay which is quasi-judicial and summary
in nature on mere motion of the party entitled thereto; and (b) an action in regular form, which remedy is
judicial. However, the mode of enforcement does not rule out the right of rescission under Art. 2041 of the
Civil Code. The availability of the right of rescission is apparent from the wording of Sec. 417 itself which
provides that the amicable settlement "may" be enforced by execution by the lupon within six (6) months
from its date or by action in the appropriate city or municipal court, if beyond that period. The use of the word
"may" clearly makes the procedure provided in the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law directory or
merely optional in nature.
FACTS
In October 1994, petitioner Teodoro Chavez and respondent Jacinto Trillana entered into a contract of lease
whereby the former leased to the latter his fishpond at Sitio Pariahan, Taliptip, Bulacan, for a term of six (6)
years. The contract provided that respondent shall undertake all construction and preservation of
improvements in the fishpond that may be destroyed during the period of the lease, at his expense, without
reimbursement from petitioner.
In August 1996, a powerful typhoon hit the country which damaged the subject fishpond. Respondent did
not immediately undertake the necessary repairs as the water level was still high. Three (3) weeks later,
respondent was informed by a barangay councilor that major repairs were being undertaken in the fishpond
with the use of a crane. Respondent found out that the repairs were at the instance of petitioner who had
grown impatient with his delay in commencing the work.
With this, respondent filed a complaint before the Office of the Barangay Captain of Taliptip, Bulacan, Bulacan.
He complained about the unauthorized repairs undertaken by petitioner, the ouster of his personnel from
the leased premises and its unlawful taking by petitioner despite their valid and subsisting lease contract.
After conciliation proceedings, an agreement was reached.
Alleging non-compliance by petitioner with their lease contract and the foregoing "Kasunduan," respondent
filed a complaint against petitioner before the RTC of Valenzuela City. A decision was rendered in favor of
respondent. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which modified the decision of the trial court.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition for review.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the RTC of Valenzuela City had jurisdiction
over the action filed by respondent considering that the subject matter thereof, his alleged violation of the lease
contract with respondent, was already amicably settled before the Office of the Barangay Captain of Taliptip,
Bulacan. Petitioner argued that respondent should have followed the procedure for enforcement of the
amicable settlement as provided for in the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law.
ISSUE
Whether or not the RTC of Valenzuela City has jurisdiction over the action filed by respondent despite the
subject matter thereof, petitioner’s alleged violation of the lease contract with respondent, having already
been amicably settled.
HELD
Yes. Indeed, the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law provides that an amicable settlement reached
after barangay conciliation proceedings has the force and effect of a final judgment of a court if not repudiated
or a petition to nullify the same is filed before the proper city or municipal court within ten (10) days from its
date. It further provides that the settlement may be enforced by execution by the lupong tagapamayapa within
six (6) months from its date, or by action in the appropriate city or municipal court, if beyond the six-month
period. This special provision follows the general precept enunciated in Article 2037 of the Civil Code, viz.:
A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata; but there shall be no
execution except in compliance with a judicial compromise.
Thus, we have held that a compromise agreement which is not contrary to law, public order, public policy,
morals or good customs is a valid contract which is the law between the parties themselves. It has upon them
the effect and authority of res judicata even if not judicially approved, and cannot be lightly set aside or
disturbed except for vices of consent and forgery.
However, in Heirs of Zari, et al. v. Santos, the Court clarified that the broad precept enunciated in Art. 2037
is qualified by Art. 2041 of the same Code, which provides:
If one of the parties fails or refuses to abide by the compromise, the other party may either enforce
the compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand.
In exercising the second option under Art. 2041, the aggrieved party may, if he chooses, bring the suit
contemplated or involved in his original demand, as if there had never been any compromise agreement,
without bringing an action for rescission. This is because he may regard the compromise as already rescinded
by the breach thereof of the other party.
In the case at bar, the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law provides for a two-tiered mode of
enforcement of an amicable settlement, to wit: (a) by execution by the Punong Barangay which is quasi-judicial
and summary in nature on mere motion of the party entitled thereto; and (b) an action in regular form, which
remedy is judicial. However, the mode of enforcement does not rule out the right of rescission under Art. 2041
of the Civil Code. The availability of the right of rescission is apparent from the wording of Sec. 417 itself which
provides that the amicable settlement "may" be enforced by execution by the lupon within six (6) months from
its date or by action in the appropriate city or municipal court, if beyond that period. The use of the word "may"
clearly makes the procedure provided in the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law directory or merely
optional in nature.
Thus, although the "Kasunduan" executed by petitioner and respondent before the Office of the Barangay
Captain had the force and effect of a final judgment of a court, petitioner’s non-compliance paved the way
for the application of Art. 2041 under which respondent may either enforce the compromise, following the
procedure laid out in the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law, or regard it as rescinded and insist upon
his original demand. Respondent chose the latter option when he instituted a civil case for recovery of
unrealized profits and reimbursement of advance rentals, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.
Respondent was not limited to claiming ₱150,000.00 because although he agreed to the amount in the
"Kasunduan," it is axiomatic that a compromise settlement is not an admission of liability but merely a
recognition that there is a dispute and an impending litigation which the parties hope to prevent by making
reciprocal concessions, adjusting their respective positions in the hope of gaining balanced by the danger
of losing. Under the "Kasunduan," respondent was only required to execute a waiver of all possible claims
arising from the lease contract if petitioner fully complies with his obligations thereunder. It is undisputed
that hereinpetitioner did not.
NOTES
4C (2020 – 2021)
TOPIC Jurisdiction of Petitions for Revival of Judgment
CASE TITLE Anama vs. Citibank
GR NO. 192048 DATE: December 13, 2017
DOCTRINE
As an action for revival of judgment is a new action with a new cause of action, the rules on instituting and commencing
actions apply, including the rules on jurisdiction. Its jurisdictional requirements are not dependent on the previous action
and the petition does not necessarily have to be filed in the same court which rendered judgment.
FACTS
In consideration for a loan obtained from respondent Citibank, petitioner Anama executed a promissory note in the
amount of P418,000.00 in favor of Citibank. To secure payment of the obligation, Anama also executed in favor of Citibank
a chattel mortgage over various industrial machineries and equipment.
For Anama's failure to pay the monthly installments due on the promissory note, Citibank filed a complaint for sum of
money and replevin with the CFI of Manila (now RTC).
Anama alleged that his failure to pay the monthly installments was due to the fault of Citibank as it refused to receive the
checks he issued, and that the chattel mortgage was defective and void.
RTC: upon proof of default of Anama in the payment of his loan, issued an Order of Replevin over the machineries and
equipment covered by the chattel mortgage
Citibank prayed that an alias writ of seizure be issued directing the Sheriff to seize the properties and to dispose them in
accordance with Section 6, Rule 60 of the Revised Rules of Court. RTC granted the motion. Anama filed a motion for
reconsideration but this was denied by the RTC
Anama then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction with the CA on the ground that
the above resolutions of the trial court were issued in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion because
of the lack of evidence proving Citibank's right to possession over the properties subject of the chattel mortgage .
CA rendered a Decision granting Anama's petition for certiorari and prohibition and nullifying the RTC's orders of seizure
Citibank filed its petition for review on certiorari with this Court assailing the Decision of the CA. We promulgated a
Decision dismissing Citibank's petition for lack of merit and affirming the Decision of the CA. An Entry of Judgment was
subsequently issued
Anama filed a petition for revival of judgment with the CA. Anama sought to revive the CA's Decision and argued that
Citibank's failure to file an action for the reconstitution of the records in the RTC constituted abandonment of its cause of
action and complaint against Anama. In addition to the revival of the CA's Decision, Anama sought to remand the case
to the RTC for further proceedings particularly his counterclaims against Citibank.
Citibank argued that the petition should be dismissed as an action for revival of judgment is within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the RTC. It also argued that laches has set in against Anama for having slept on his rights for almost 10
years. Lastly, Citibank claimed that it did not abandon its money claim against Anama when it did not initiate the
reconstitution proceedings in the RTC. CA denied the petition for lack of jurisdiction. Anama filed this petition and argued
that his petition for revival of judgment should be filed in the court that issued the judgment sought to be revived, the CA
in this case.
ISSUE
Whether CA has the jurisdiction to hear the petition for revival of judgment
HELD
NO.
An action to revive a judgment is an action whose exclusive purpose is to enforce a judgment which could no longer be
enforced by mere motion. Section 6 is clear. Once a judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing party can
have it executed as a matter of right by mere motion within five years from the date of entry of judgment. If the
prevailing party fails to have the decision enforced by a motion after the lapse of five years, the said judgment is
reduced to a right of action which must be enforced by the institution of a complaint in a regular court within 10 years
from the time the judgment becomes final.
Further, a revival suit is a new action. It is different and distinct from the original decision itself and not the merits of the
action upon which the judgment sought to be enforced is rendered. Revival of judgment is premised on the assumption
that the decision to be revived is already final and executory.
BP 129 is the law which confers jurisdiction to the courts. Section 19 of BP129 as amended, provides that RTC has
exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions in which the subject of litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation. In
determining the jurisdiction of an action whose subject is incapable of pecuniary estimation, the nature of the principal
action or remedy sought must first be ascertained. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is
considered capable of pecuniary estimation and the jurisdiction of the court depends on the amount of the claim. But,
where the primary issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely
incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, such are actions whose subjects are incapable of
pecuniary estimation, hence cognizable by the RTCs.
As an action to revive judgment raises issues of whether the petitioner has a right to have the final and executory
judgment revived and to have that judgment enforced and does not involve recovery of a sum of money, we rule that
jurisdiction over a petition to revive judgment is properly with the RTCs. Thus, the CA is correct in holding that it does
not have jurisdiction to hear and decide Anama's action for revival of judgment. An action for revival of judgment is
outside the scope of jurisdiction of the CA.
NOTES
4C (2020 – 2021)
TOPIC B.P. Blg. 129 - Judicial Reorganization Act of 1980
CASE TITLE Sps. Trayvilla vs. Sejas
DOCTRINE
FACTS
Petitioner spouses claimed that Sejas was the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by TCT No.
T8337, and by virtue of a private handwritten document, Sejas sold the parcel of land to them. The
spouses took possession of the land and constructed a house in which they resided. However, Sejas
reasserted his ownership over the land, and petitioners alleged that respondent is guilty of fraud and
deceit in doing so.Spouses instituted a civil case, praying that Sejas be ordered to execute a final deed
of sale over the property and transfer the same to them. In an Amended Complaint, petitioners claimed
that Sejas sold the property to Paglinawan, and prayed that the TCT be cancelled and the property be
reconveyed to them. On the other hand, respondent moved for dismissal on the grounds of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter and prescription. Respondents argue that the case was not for
specific performance but a real action involving title and possession of real property. Thus, respondents
argued that the value of the property should be alleged in the complaint to properly compute the filing
fee.Respondents further argued that since not alleged in the Amended Complaint, the filing fee was not
paid, and the case should be dismissed. They also argued that it is already barred by prescription since
the 10-year period, counted from the purchase in 1992, to sue a handwritten contract had already
elapsed.
ISSUE
Whether the trial court retained its jurisdiction by virtue of the amended complaint (Issue pertinent to
the topic)
HELD
NO. The CA failed to consider that in determining jurisdiction, it could rely on the declaration made in
the Amended Complaint that the property is valued at P6,000.00. The handwritten document sued upon
and the pleadings indicate that the property was purchased by petitioners for the price of P6,000.00.
For purposes of filing the civil case against respondents, this amount should be the stated value of the
property in the absence of a current tax declaration or zonal valuation of the BIR.. Since the value of
the subject property as stated in the Amended Complaint is just P6,000.00, then the RTC did not have
jurisdiction over petitioners' case in the first instance; it should have dismissed Civil Case. But it did not.
In continuing to take cognizance of the case, the trial court clearly committed grave abuse of discretion.
NOTES
Certain facts were taken from the digests made by THIRD YEAR LAW STUDENTS, S.Y. 20-21. Credit given where
credit is due.
4C (2020 – 2021)
TOPIC BP 129: Judicial Reorganization Act of 1980
CASE TITLE HEIRS OF SPOUSES TEOFILO M. RETERTA and ELISA RETERTA, namely: EDUARDO M.
RETERTA, CONSUELO M. RETERTA, and AVELINA M. RETERTA, Petitioners, vs.
SPOUSES LORENZO MORES and VIRGINIA LOPEZ, Respondents.
DOCTRINE
The original and exclusive jurisdiction over a complaint for quieting of title and reconveyance involving friar land belongs
to either the RTC or the MTC. Hence, the dismissal of such a complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction due to the
land in litigation being friar land under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Land Management Bureau (LMB) amounts to
manifest grave abuse of discretion that can be corrected through certiorari.
FACTS
The petitioners commenced an action for quieting of title and reconveyance in the RTC in Trece Martires City (Civil Case),
averring that they were the true and real owners of the parcel of land situated in Trez Cruzes, Tanza, Cavite, having
inherited the land from their father who had died; that their late father had been the grantee of the land by virtue of his
occupation and cultivation; that their late father and his predecessors in interest had been in open, exclusive, notorious,
and continuous possession of the land for more than 30 years; that they had discovered in 1999 an affidavit that their
father had purportedly executed whereby he had waived his rights, interests, and participation in the land; that by virtue of
the affidavit, Sales Certificate had been issued in favor of respondent Lorenzo Mores by the then Department of
Agriculture and Natural Resources; and that Transfer Certificate of Title had later issued to the respondents.
Respondents, as defendants, filed a motion to dismiss, insisting that the RTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of
Civil Case due to the land being friar land, and that the petitioners had no legal personality to commence Civil Case. RTC
granted the motion to dismiss, holding that:
Act No. 1120 is the law prevailing on the matter which gives to the Director of Lands the exclusive
administration and disposition of Friar Lands, considering that plaintiffs in this case sought the review of
the propriety of the grant of lot of the Sta. Cruz de Malabon Friar Lands Estate by the Lands Management
Bureau of the defendant Lorenzo Mores through the use of the forged Affidavit and Sales Certificate which
eventually led to the issuance of T.C.T. to defendant Lorenzo Mores and wife Virginia Mores, and
considering further that the land is a friar land and not land of the public domain. The determination
whether or not fraud had been committed in the procurement of the sales certificate rests to the exclusive
power of the Director of Lands.
RTC denied petitioner’s MR. Petitioner assailed the dismissal via petition for certiorari, but the CA dismissed the petition,
holding that the remedy of the petitioners was to have appealed the same to CA. But petitioners did not. Instead they filed
the present special civil action for certiorari after the decision of the court a quo has become final. CA denied the
petitioners’ MR. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE
W/N petitioners’ action for reconveyance within the jurisdiction of the regular court
HELD
Yes. Section 19 (2) of BP 129, as amended by RA. 7691, provides that:

RTC shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: x x x (2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved
exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value
exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of
lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the MTC;
Exclusive original jurisdiction over an action for reconveyance or to remove a cloud on one’s title involves the title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein pertained to the RTC, unless the assessed value of the property did
not exceed ₱20,000.00 (in which instance the MTC having territorial jurisdiction would have jurisdiction). Determinative of
which regular court had jurisdiction would be the allegations of the complaint (on the assessed value of the property) and
the principal relief thereby sought. The respondents’ reliance on Section 12 and Section 18 of Act No. 1120 to sustain
their position that the Bureau of Public Lands (now LMB) instead had exclusive jurisdiction was without basis. The
authority of LMB under Act No. 1120, being limited to the administration and disposition of friar lands, did not include the
petitioners’ action for reconveyance. LMB ceases to have jurisdiction once the friar land is disposed of in favor of a private
person and title duly issues in the latter’s name. By ignoring the petitioners’ showing of its plain error in dismissing Civil
Case No. TM-983, and by disregarding the allegations of the complaint, the RTC acted whimsically and capriciously.
4C (2020 – 2021)
TOPIC RA 7691 – expanding the jurisdiction of MTC, MeTC, MCTC
CASE TITLE Supapo v. Spouses De Jesus
GR NO. 198356 DATE: April 20, 2015
DOCTRINE
Under Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, the jurisdiction of the RTC over actions involving title to or possession of real property
is plenary. RA No. 7691, however, divested the RTC of a portion of its jurisdiction and granted the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts the exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear actions
where the assessed value of the property does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20, 000.00), or Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00), if the property is located in Metro Manila.
FACTS
The Spouses Supapo filed a complaint for accion publiciana against Roberto and Susan de Jesus (Spouses de Jesus),
Macario Bernardo (Macario), and persons claiming rights under them (collectively, the respondents), with the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC) of Caloocan City. The complaint sought to compel the respondents to vacate a piece of land located
in Novaliches, Quezon City, described as Lot 40, Block 5 (subject lot). The subject lot is covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. C-28441 registered and titled under the Spouses Supapo's names. The land has an assessed value
of thirty-nine thousand nine hundred eighty pesos (P39,980.00) as shown in the Declaration of Real Property Value (tax
declaration) issued by the Office of the City Assessor of Caloocan.
The Spouses Supapo then filed a criminal case against the respondents for violation of Presidential Decree No. 772 or
the Anti-Squatting Law. The trial court convicted the respondents. Thereafter, Congress enacted Republic Act (RA) No.
8368, otherwise known as "An Act Repealing Presidential Decree No. 772 ," which resulted to the dismissal of the criminal
case.
The Spouses Supapo thus filed the complaint for accion publiciana. Respondents argued that the complaint for accion
publiciana is barred by statute of limitations, and that it is barred by prior judgment. The MeTC denied the motion.
Respondents filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC, which it granted, ruling that accion publiciana falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. It held that in cases where the only issue involved is possession, the MeTC has
jurisdiction if the action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer is filed within one (1) year from the time to demand to vacate
was made. Otherwise, the complaint for recovery of possession should be filed before the RTC.
In the main, petitioners argue that the MeTC exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over accion publiciana where the
assessed value of the property does not exceed P20,000.00, or P50,000.00 if the property is located in Metro Manila.
The respondents argue that the complaint for accion publiciana was (1) filed in the wrong court; (2) barred by prescription;
and (3) barred by res judicata.
ISSUE
Whether the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction
HELD
YES. The MTC acquired jurisdiction over the case.
Accion publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independent of title.
It refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the
unlawful withholding of possession of the realty.
Having thus determined that the dispute involves possession over a real property, we now resolve which court has the
jurisdiction to hear the case. Under Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, the jurisdiction of the RTC over actions involving title to
or possession of real property is plenary. RA No. 7691, however, divested the RTC of a portion of its jurisdiction and
granted the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts the exclusive and original
jurisdiction to hear actions where the assessed value
of the property does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20, 000.00), or Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), if the
property is located in Metro Manila.
Section 1 of RA No. 7691 states:

Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980," is
hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value
of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value
exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) . . . .
Section 3 of the same law provides:

Section 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases . —
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall
exercise:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein
where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil
actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs . . . .
In view of these amendments, jurisdiction over actions involving title to or possession of real property is now determined
by its assessed value. The assessed value of real property is its fair market value multiplied by the assessment level. It
is synonymous to taxable value.
In this regard, the complaint must allege the assessed value of the real property subject of the complaint or the interest
thereon to determine which court has jurisdiction over the action. This is required because the nature of the action and
the court with original and exclusive jurisdiction over the same is determined by the material allegations of the complaint,
the type of relief prayed for by the plaintiff, and the law in effect when the action is filed, irrespective of whether the
plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of the claims asserted therein.
In the present case, the Spouses Supapo alleged that the assessed value of the subject lot, located in Metro Manila, is
P39,980.00. Given that the Spouses Supapo duly complied with the jurisdictional requirements, we hold that the MeTC
of Caloocan properly acquired jurisdiction over the complaint for accion publiciana.
NOTES
4C (2020 – 2021)
TOPIC Aspects of Jurisdiction – Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter
CASE TITLE SPS. HERMINIO and EDITHA ERORITA vs. SPS. LIGAYA and ANTONIO DUMLAO
GR NO. G.R. No. 195477; DATE: January 25, 2016
DOCTRINE
Jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any time. As a general rule, lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter may be raised at any time, or even for the first time on appeal. An exception to this rule is the principle of
estoppel by laches.
FACTS
Sps. Antonio and Ligaya Dumlao (Sps. Dumlao) are the registered owners of a parcel of land where the San Mariano
Academy structures are built thereon. They bought the property in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale because the former
owners, Sps. Herminio and Editha Erorita (Sps. Erorita), failed to redeem it and the title was consolidated in the buyers’
name. Sps. Dumlao agreed to allow Sps. Erorita to continue to operate the school on the property. Sps. Dumlao
alleged that the Sps. Erorita agreed on a monthly rent of P20,000.00, but had failed to pay rentals since 1990. The Sps.
Erorita countered that the Sps. Dumlao allowed them to continue to run the school without rental out of goodwill and
friendship.
Sps. Dumlao then asked the Sps. Erorita to vacate the property. Although the Sps. Erorita wanted to comply, they could
not immediately close the school without clearance from the Department of Education, Culture, and Sports to whom
they are accountable. Sps. Dumlao filed a complaint for recovery of possession before the RTC against Sps. Erorita.
Sps. Erorita argued that they cannot be forced to vacate and to pay the rentals under their factual circumstances.
During pre-trial, Sps. Erorita failed to appear so they were declared in default. RTC then ordered Sps. Dumlao to
present evidence ex parte. RTC ruled in the Sps. Dumlao’s favor. It ordered the Sps. Erorita (1) to immediately vacate
the property and turn it over to the Sps. Dumlao, and (2) to pay accumulated rentals, damages, and attorney’s fees.
The RTC also prohibited the defendants from accepting enrollees to the San Mariano Academy. Sps. Erorita appealed
to the CA arguing that the complaint patently shows a case for unlawful detainer. Thus, the RTC had no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the case.
CA affirmed the jurisdiction of the RTC stating that in a recovery of possession case, if the assessed value of the
property exceeds P20,000 (which is the case here based on the property’s tax declaration) then the RTC has
jurisdiction.
ISSUE
Whether or not the issue on jurisdiction was timely raised.
HELD
YES.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any time. As a general rule, lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter may be raised at any time, or even for the first time on appeal. An exception to this rule is the principle of
estoppel by laches. Estoppel by laches may only be invoked to bar the defense of lack of jurisdiction if the factual milieu
is analogous to Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. In that case, lack of jurisdiction was raised for the first time after almost fifteen
(15) years after the questioned ruling had been rendered and after the movant actively participated in several stages of
the proceedings. It was only invoked, too, after the CA rendered a decision adverse to the movant.
In Figueroa v. People, we ruled that the failure to assail jurisdiction during trial is not sufficient for estoppel by laches to
apply. When lack of jurisdiction is raised before the appellate court, no considerable length of time had elapsed for
laches to apply.16 Laches refers to the "negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable length of time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it."
The factual setting of this present case is not similar to Tijam so as to trigger the application of the estoppel by laches
doctrine. As in Figueroa, the present petitioners assailed the RTC’s jurisdiction in their appeal before the CA. Asserting
lack of jurisdiction on appeal before the CA does not constitute laches. Furthermore, the filing of an answer and the
failure to attend the pre- trial do not constitute the active participation in judicial proceedings contemplated in Tijam.
Thus, the general rule should apply. The petitioners timely questioned the RTC's jurisdiction.
NOTES
Another issue in this case is whether or not RTC has jurisdiction. Supreme Court ruled NO. Jurisdiction is based on the
allegations in the complaint. The allegations in the complaint determine the nature of an action and jurisdiction over the
case. Jurisdiction does not depend on the complaint’s caption. Nor is jurisdiction changed by the defenses in the
answer.
To make a case for unlawful detainer, the complaint must allege that: (a) initially, the defendant lawfully possessed the
property, either by contract or by plaintiff’s tolerance; (b) the plaintiff notified the defendant that his right of possession is
terminated; (c) the defendant remained in possession and deprived plaintiff of its enjoyment; and (d) the plaintiff filed a
complaint within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property. A complaint for accion publiciana
or recovery of possession of real property will not be considered as an action for unlawful detainer if any of these
special jurisdictional facts is omitted.
In this case, the complaint showed that: (a) the owners, Sps. Dumlao, agreed to allow the Sps. Erorita to continue
operating the school on the disputed property; (b) in a demand letter, the Sps. Dumlao told the Sps. Erorita to pay
and/or vacate the property; (c) the Sps. Erorita refused to vacate the property; and (d) the Sps. Dumlao filed the
complaint within a year from the last demand to vacate. So, although the complaint bears the caption "recovery of
possession," its allegations contain the jurisdictional facts for an unlawful detainer case. Under RA 7691, an action for
unlawful detainer is within the MTC’s exclusive jurisdiction regardless of the property’s assessed value. The complaint
clearly contained the elements of an unlawful detainer case. Thus, the case should have been filed with the MTC. The
RTC had no jurisdiction over this case.
4C (2020 – 2021)
TOPIC Aspects of Jurisdiction; Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter
CASE TITLE RIVERA v. CATALO
AM No. RTJ-15-2422 DATE: July 20, 2015
DOCTRINE
The court may modify or alter a judgment even after the same has become executory whenever circumstances transpire
rendering its execution unjust and inequitable, as where certain facts and circumstances justifying or requiring such
modification or alteration transpired after the judgment has become final and executory.
FACTS
On 1 February 2012, Flor Gilbuena Rivera filed her Amended Petition before the RTC praying for the issuance of new
owner’s duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3460.
The case was raffled to the branch presided by Judge Leandro C. Catalo. The Amended Petition alleged that complainant
was one of the heirs of Juan Gilbuena; that TCT No. 3460 was registered under the name of Gilbuena; and that the
owner’s duplicate copy of the said title had remained missing despite their diligent efforts to locate the same. When the
case was called for hearing, no oppositor appeared before the RTC.
Judge Catalo granted the petition for issuance of new owner’s duplicate copy on the basis of the evidence presented by
complainant. The RTC decision became final and executory on 3 July 2012 and the Certificate of Finality was issued on
6 July 2012.
In a Letter, dated August 16, 2012, the RD informed complainant that the Affidavit of Loss, annotated on TCT No. 3460,
was being recalled considering that the said title was already cancelled and being a cancelled title, it could no longer be
a subject of any transaction.
Acting thereon, Respondent Judge issued an order requiring the complainant and all the parties concerned to attend a
hearing on November 7, 2012 on the Manifestation filed by Dacanay. Despite being given 15 days to give his side, the
complainant did not appear in court. In the Order, dated June 21, 2013, Judge Catalo recalled and set aside the May 18,
2012 decision of the RTC. Aggrieved, complainant filed the subject administrative complaint before the Court alleging
that Judge Catalo committed gross misconduct for recalling a final and executory judgment.
ISSUE
Whether or not Judge Catalo’s order to recall the decision is proper
HELD
Yes, Judge Catalo’s order to recall the decision is proper.
Under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment, a decision that has acquired finality becomes
immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect. Like any other rule, however, there are
recognized exceptions to this general rule such as (1) the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc entries
which cause no prejudice to any party, (2) void judgments, and (3) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of
the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.
Under the second exception, a void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It neither is a source of any
right nor the creator of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal
effect. Hence, it can never become final and any writ of execution based on it is void. It may be said to be a lawless thing
which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head.
In the case of Abalos v. Philex Mining Corporation, the Court reiterated the third exception, concerning unjust and
inequitable judgments. Under the law, the court may modify or alter a judgment even after the same has become
executory whenever circumstances transpire rendering its execution unjust and inequitable, as where certain facts and
circumstances justifying or requiring such modification or alteration transpired after the judgment has become final and
executory.
In other words, if there are facts and circumstances that would render a judgment void or unjust after its finality, and
render its execution a complete nullity, such judgment cannot exude immutability.
In this case, the Court is of the considered view that Judge Catalo correctly recalled the judgment because the second
and third exceptions on the doctrine of finality of judgments were squarely applicable. After the finality of the RTC decision
on July 3, 2012, it was discovered that TCT No. 3460 had been cancelled as early as April 2, 1924. Complainant, when
later asked to present his stand, failed to contradict the allegation that he falsified his affidavit of loss. Clearly, these
subsequent events raised a red flag and placed the Respondent Judge on his toes. Judge Catalo realized an execution
of such judgment would definitely be unjust and inequitable as it would be sanctioning fraud and irregularity. It would
judicially permit the issuance of a new owner's duplicate copy of a title which was no longer in existence.
Where there is no original, there can be no duplicate. Judge Catalo was correct in stating that the judgment was void and
could not have attained finality. Citing the case of New Durawood Co., Inc. v. CA, he stressed that a court had no
jurisdiction to order the issuance of a new owner's duplicate copy of a certificate of title when it was, in fact, not lost. Here,
the original title was not lost but officially cancelled. Hence, Judge Catalo correctly exercised his judicial prerogative to
amend and control his factually and legally infirm decision.
NOTES
4C (2020 – 2021)
TOPIC Aspects of Jurisdiction -- Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter
CASE TITLE Heirs of Bautista v. Lindo
GR NO. 208232 DATE: March 10, 2014
DOCTRINE
It is a well-settled rule that jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of
the relief sought.
FACTS
Alfredo R. Bautista (Bautista for brevity), petitioner’s predecessor, inherited in 1983 a free-patent land located in
Poblacion, Lupon, Davao Oriental. A few years later, he subdivided the property and sold it to several vendees, herein
respondents, via a notarized deed of absolute sale. Three years after the sale, Bautista filed a complaint for repurchase
against respondents before RTC anchoring his cause of action on Section 119 of Public Land Act which reads:
SECTION 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions, when
proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs, within a period of five years from the
date of the conveyance.
Respondents, in their Answer, raised lack of cause of action, estoppel, prescription, and laches, as defenses.
Meanwhile, during the pendency of the case, Bautista died and was substituted by petitioner Epifania Bautista.
Respondents Francisco and Welhilmina Lindo later entered into a compromise agreement with petitioners which was
approved by the RTC, whereby they agreed to cede to Epifania a 3,230 sq.m. portion of the property as well as to
waive, abandon, surrender, and withdraw all claims and counterclaims against each other.
The other respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the complaint failed to state the value of the property
sought to be recovered. Moreover, they asserted that the total selling price of all the properties is PhP 16,500 and the
selling price or market value of a property is always higher than its assessed value. Since BP Blg. 129, as amended,
grants jurisdiction to the RTCs over civil actions involving title to or possession of real property or interest therein where
the assessed value is more than PhP 20,000, then the RTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint in question since the
property which Bautista seeks to repurchase is below the PhP 20,000 jurisdictional ceiling.
ISSUE
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case
HELD
YES. The Court finds that the instant cause of action to redeem the land is one for specific performance.
It is a well-settled rule that jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character
of the relief sought. In Russell v. Vestil, the Court wrote that "in determining whether an action is one the subject matter
of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the
principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable
of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the RTCs would depend on the amount
of the claim." But where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money
claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as
cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and, hence, are incapable of
pecuniary estimation. These cases are cognizable exclusively by RTCs.
In this case, Bautista sold to respondents his lots which were covered by a free patent. While the deeds of sale do not
explicitly contain the stipulation that the sale is subject to repurchase by the applicant within a period of five (5) years
from the date of conveyance pursuant to Sec. 119 of CA 141, still, such legal provision is deemed integrated and made
part of the deed of sale as prescribed by law. It is basic that the law is deemed written into every contract. Although a
contract is the law between the parties, the provisions of positive law which regulate contracts are deemed written
therein and shall limit and govern the relations between the parties. Thus, it is a binding prestation in favor of Bautista
which he may seek to enforce. That is precisely what he did. He filed a complaint to enforce his right granted by law to
recover the lot subject of free patent. Ergo, it is clear that his action is for specific performance, or if not strictly such
action, then it is akin or analogous to one of specific performance. Such being the case, his action for specific
performance is incapable of pecuniary estimation and cognizable by the RTC.
Respondents argue that Bautista’s action is one involving title to or possession of real property or any interests therein
and since the selling price is less than PhP 20,000, then jurisdiction is lodged with the MTC. This proposition is
incorrect for the re-acquisition of the lots by Bautista or herein successors-in-interests is but incidental to and an
offshoot of the exercise of the right by the latter to redeem said lots pursuant to Sec. 119 of CA 141. The reconveyance
of the title to petitioners is solely dependent on the exercise of such right to repurchase the lots in question and is not
the principal or main relief or remedy sought. Thus, the action of petitioners is, in reality, incapable of pecuniary
estimation, and the reconveyance of the lot is merely the outcome of the performance of the obligation to return the
property conformably to the express provision of CA 141.
Even if the present action is to be treated as one involving title to real property or an interest therein which falls under
the jurisdiction of the first level court under Sec. 33 of BP 129, as the total selling price is only PhP 16,000 way below
the PhP 20,000 ceiling, still, the postulation of respondents that MTC has jurisdiction will not hold water. This is
because respondents have actually participated in the proceedings before the RTC and aggressively defended their
position, and by virtue of which they are already barred to question the jurisdiction of the RTC followin g the principle of
jurisdiction by estoppel.
NOTES
4C (2020 – 2021)
TOPIC Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter
CASE TITLE HEIRS OF TELESFORO JULAO vs SPOUSES DE JESUS

GR NO. 176020 DATE: September 29, 2014
DOCTRINE
In an action for recovery of possession, the assessed value of the property sought to be recovered determines
the court's jurisdiction.
FACTS
In 1960, Telesforo Julao filed before DENR two Townsite Sales Applications. Upon his death on June 1, 1971,
his applications were transferred to his heirs. On April 30, 1979, Solito Julao (Solito) executed a Deed of
Transfer of Rights, transferring his hereditary share in the property covered by TSA No. V-6667 to respondent
spouses Alejandro and Morenita De Jesus. In 1983, respondent spouses constructed a house on the property
they acquired from Solito. In 1986, Solito went missing.
On December 21, 1998, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-2446, covering a 641- square meter property,
was issued in favor of the heirs of Telesforo.
On March 2, 1999, petitioners representing themselves to be the heirs of Telesforo, filed before the RTC of
Baguio City, a Complaint or Recovery of Possession of Real Property against respondent spouses. Petitioners
alleged that they are the true and lawful owners of a 641- square meter parcel of land located at Naguilian
Road, Baguio City, covered by OCT No. P- 2446; that the subject property originated from TSA No. V-2132;
that respondent spouses’ house encroached on 70 square meters of the subject property, among others.
RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. CA reversed the decision on two grounds: (1) failure on the part of petitioners
to identify the property sought to be recovered; and (2) lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE
Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the complaint.
HELD
NO. The Court held that in an action for recovery of possession, the assessed value of the property sought to
be recovered determines the court’s jurisdiction.
In this case, for the RTC to exercise jurisdiction, the assessed value of the subject property must exceed
P20,000.00. Since petitioners failed to allege in their Complaint the assessed value of the subject property, the
CA correctly dismissed the Complaint as petitioners failed to establish that the RTC had jurisdiction over it. In
fact, since the assessed value of the property was not alleged, it cannot be determined which trial court had
original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case.
In an action to recover, the property must be identified. Moreover, Article 434 of the Civil Code states that “in
an action to recover, the property must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and
not on the weakness of the defendant’s claim.” The plaintiff, therefore, is duty-bound to clearly identify the land
sought to be recovered, in accordance with the title on which he anchors his right of ownership.66 It bears
stressing that the failure of the plaintiff to establish the identity of the property claimed is fatal to his case.
In this case, petitioners failed to identify the property they seek to recover as they failed to describe the
location, the area, as well as the boundaries thereof. In fact, as aptly pointed out by the CA, no survey plan
was presented by petitioners to prove that respondent spouses actually encroached upon the 70-square meter
portion of petitioners’ property. Failing to prove their allegation, petitioners are not entitled to the relief prayed
for in their Complaint.
NOTES
4C (2020 – 2021)
TOPIC ASPECTS OF JURISDICTION – Jurisdiction Over the Parties
CASE TITLE DAVID vs AGBAY
GR NO. 199113 DATE: 18 MARCH 2015
DOCTRINE
 In criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files
any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court
by impugning such jurisdiction over his person.
 Distinction between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person: Custody of the law is required before
the court can act upon the application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by
the defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the accused. Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender,
while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance.
FACTS
Petitioner migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen by naturalization. Upon retirement, petitioner and
his wife returned to the Philippines and purchased a lot along the beach in Oriental Mindoro where they constructed a
residential house. However, the portion where they built their house is public land and part of the salvage zone.
Petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application (MLA) over the subject land with the DENR. In the said application,
petitioner indicated that he is a Filipino citizen.
Private respondent Editha Agbay opposed the application on the ground that petitioner, a Canadian citizen, is
disqualified to own land. She also filed a criminal complaint for falsification of public documents under Article 172 of the
RPC against the petitioner.
In his defense, petitioner averred that at the time he filed his application, he had intended to re-acquire Philippine
citizenship and that he had been assured by a CENRO officer that he could declare himself as a Filipino. He further
alleged that he bought the property from the Agbays who misrepresented to him that the subject property was titled
land and they have the right and authority to convey the same. The dispute had in fact led to the institution of civil and
criminal suits between him and private respondent’s family.
Meanwhile, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the provisions of Republic Act No. 9225. The CENRO
rejected petitioner’s MLA, ruling that petitioner’s subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship did not cure the
defect in his MLA which was void ab initio.
January 8, 2008 - Office of the Provincial Prosecutor found probable cause to indict petitioner for violation of Article
172 of the RPC and recommending the filing of the corresponding information in court. Petitioner challenged the said
resolution in a petition for review he filed before the Department of Justice (DOJ).
July 26, 2010 - the petition for review filed by petitioner was denied by the DOJ which held that the presence of the
elements of the crime of falsification of public document suffices to warrant indictment of the petitioner notwithstanding
the absence of any proof that he gained or intended to injure a third person in committing the act of falsification.
Consequently, an information for Falsification of Public Document was filed before the MTC and a warrant of
arrest was issued against the petitioner.
February 11, 2011 - after the filing of the Information and before his arrest, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for
Re-Determination of Probable Cause in the MTC. The MTC DENIED the motion for lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the accused, and for lack of merit.
Dissatisfied, petitioner elevated the case to the RTC via a petition15 for certiorari under Rule 65, alleging grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the MTC. He asserted that first, jurisdiction over the person of an accused cannot be a pre-
condition for the re-determination of probable cause by the court that issues a warrant of arrest; and second, the March
22, 2011 Order disregarded the legal fiction that once a natural-born Filipino citizen who had been naturalized in
another country re-acquires his citizenship under R.A. 9225, his Filipino citizenship is thus deemed not to have been
lost on account of said naturalization.
ISSUE
Whether or not MTC properly denied petitioner’s motion for re-determination of probable cause on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the accused (petitioner).
HELD
No. As a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.
As we held in the aforecited case of Santiago, seeking an affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or criminal
proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance.
In criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any
pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by
impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving special appearances, an accused can
invoke the processes of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law.
However, if a person invoking the special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the
custody of the law.
Considering that petitioner sought affirmative relief in filing his motion for re-determination of probable cause, the MTC
clearly erred in stating that it lacked jurisdiction over his person.
NOTES
In arguing that jurisdiction over their person was already acquired by their filing of the above Urgent Motion, petitioners
invoke our pronouncement, through Justice Florenz D. Regalado, in Santiago v. Vasquez:
The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished
either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the
court’s jurisdiction thereover, appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the
same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot be posted before custody of
the accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.
Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person.
Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the application for bail, but is not required for the
adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the
defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused. Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or
voluntary surrender, while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary
appearance. One can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person,
such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the
other hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in the custody of the law,
such as when an accused escapes custody after his trial has commenced. Being in the custody of the law signifies
restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will of
the law. Custody of the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It includes, but is not limited to, detention.
4C (2020 – 2021)
TOPIC Jurisdiction over the Parties
CASE TITLE Miranda vs Tuliao
GR NO. 158763 DATE: March 31, 2006
DOCTRINE
As a general rule, one who seeks affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the
court. As the SC held in the case of Santiago, seeking affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or criminal
proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance. There is, however, an exception to the rule that filing
pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent submission of
one‘s person to the jurisdiction of the court. This is in the case of pleadings whose prayer is precisely for the
avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court, which only leads to a special appearance. These pleadings are: (1)
in civil cases, motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant,
whether or not other grounds for dismissal are included; (2) in criminal cases, motions to quash a complaint
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused; and (3) motions to quash a warrant of
arrest.
FACTS
.On March 8, 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Isabela which later identified as the dead bodies
of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of private respondent Virgilio Tuliao. Two informations for murder
were filed against 6 police officers and were convicted and sentenced them to two counts of reclusion
perpetua by the RTC of Manila except SPO2 Rodel Maderal who remained at large. The case was appealed
on automatic review where the Supreme Court acquitted the accused therein on the ground of reasonable
doubt.
Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested. He executed a sworn confession and identified
petitioners as the persons responsible for the deaths of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao.
Respondent Tuliao then filed a criminal complaint for murder against the petitioners. Acting Presiding Judge
Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal. Subsequently the petitioners
filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the
warrants of arrest.
The judge originally handling the case, Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of the petitioners and issued
a Joint Order denying said urgent motion on the ground that, since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over
their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the court.
The judge who replaced the earlier judge, Judge Anghad, reversed the previous judge’s order and dismissed
the case against petitioners. Upon appeal, the CA reinstated the order of Judge Tumaliuan and ordered the
criminal cases of murder against the petitioners to be reinstated.
ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioners can seek affirmative relief even if they do not voluntarily appear and submit
themselves to the jurisdiction of the court.
HELD
No. As a general rule, one who seeks affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the
court. As the SC held in the case of Santiago, seeking affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or criminal
proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance. There is, however, an exception to the rule that filing
pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent
submission of one’s person to the jurisdiction of the court. This is in the case of pleadings whose
prayer is precisely for the avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court, which only leads to a special
appearance. These pleadings are: (1) in civil cases, motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant, whether or not other grounds for dismissal are included; (2) in criminal
cases, motions to quash a complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused;
and (3) motions to quash a warrant of arrest. The first two are consequences of the fact that failure to file
them would constitute a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person. The third is a
consequence of the fact that it is the very legality of the court process forcing the submission of the person
of the accused that is the very issue in a motion to quash a warrant of arrest. In criminal cases, jurisdiction
over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an
affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such
jurisdiction over his person.
Therefore, in narrow cases involving special appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of the court
even though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law. However, if a person
invoking the special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the
law. The SC holds that the circumstances forcing them to require custody of the law in applications for bail
are not present in motions to quash the warrant of arrest. If the Court allow the granting of bail to persons
not in the custody of the law, it is foreseeable that many persons who can afford the bail will remain at large,
and could elude being held to answer for the commission of the offense if ever he is proven guilty. On the
other hand, if the Court allow the quashal of warrants of arrest to persons not in the custody of the law, it
would be very rare that a person not genuinely entitled to liberty would remain scot-free. In fine, as much as
it is incongruous to grant bail to one who is free, it is likewise incongruous to require on to surrender his
freedom before asserting it. Human rights enjoy a higher preference in the hierarchy of rights than property
rights, demanding that due process in the deprivation of liberty must come before its taking and not after.
NOTES
DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that the criminal cases be transferred to and raffled in
the Regional Trial Court of the City of Manila.
4C (2020 – 2021)
TOPIC Jurisdiction of Parties
CASE TITLE ATTY. FE Q. PALMIANO-SALVADOR v. CONSTANTINO ANGELES
DOCTRINE
Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint, and to be bound by a decision,
a party should first be subjected to the court's jurisdiction.
FACTS
Respondent Angles is the registered owner of a parcel of land in Sampaloc, Manila. Jelly Galiga, the lessee
of the said property, represented himself as the owner and sold the same to Salvador. Due to Savlador’s
failure to heed to the demand to vacate, Angeles, through one Rosauro Diaz, filed a complaint for ejectment
before MeTC Manila. MeTC ruled in favor or Angeles.
In the appeal filed by Salvador, she alleged that DIAZ, who filed the complaint for ejectment, had no
authority whatsoever from respondent-appellee ANGELES at the time of filing of the suit. However, the
appeal was denied by the RTC and affirmed by CA.
ISSUE
Whether the MeTC has acquired jurisdiction over the parties despite the lack of proof of authority to file of
the complainant
HELD
NO. The complaint before the MeTC was filed in the name of respondent, but it was one Rosauro Diaz who
executed the verification and certification dated October 12, 1994, alleging therein that he was respondent's
attorney-in-fact. There was, however, no copy of any document attached to the complaint to prove Diaz's
allegation regarding the authority supposedly granted to him. Furthermore, the SPA subsequently presented
was issued more than a month after the complaint was filed.
What then, is the effect of a complaint filed by one who has not proven his authority to represent a plaintiff in
filing an action?
In Tamondong v. Court of Appeals, the Court categorically stated that "[i]f a complaint is filed for and in
behalf of the plaintiff [by one] who is not authorized to do so, the complaint is not deemed filed. An
unauthorized complaint does not produce any legal effect. Hence, the court should dismiss the complaint on
the ground that it has no jurisdiction over the complaint and the plaintiff."
This ruling was reiterated in Cosco Philippines Shipping, Inc. v. Kemper Insurance Company, where the
Court went on to say that "[i]n order for the court to have authority to dispose of the case on the merits, it
must acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. Courts acquire jurisdiction over the
plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint, and to be bound by a decision, a party should first be
subjected to the court's jurisdiction. Clearly, since no valid complaint was ever filed with the [MeTC], the
same did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of respondent [plaintiff before the lower court]."
Pursuant to the foregoing rulings, therefore, the MeTC never acquired jurisdiction over this case and all
proceedings before it were null and void. The courts could not have delved into the very merits of the case,
because legally, there was no complaint to speak of. The court's jurisdiction cannot be deemed to have been
invoked at all.
NOTES
4C (2020 – 2021)
TOPIC Jurisdiction over the issues
CASE TITLE Bernabe vs. Vergara
GR NO. L-48652 DATE:September 16, 1942
DOCTRINE
Jurisdiction over the issue, unlike jurisdiction over the subject-matter, may be conferred by consent either express or
implied of the parties.
FACTS
This case is an action for partition of an inheritance left by the deceased Victoriano Zafra. He was survived by
three children: Benito Apolonia and Dominga, all surnamed Zafra. Benito and Apolonia died, the first
leaving a daughter named Irinea, and the second, three children named Lucia, Hipolito, and Barbara.
The plaintiff in the action for partition were the heirs of Benito and Apolonia Zafra and the defendants
were Dominga Zafra and the persons to whom she had sold her share in the common property; namely,
Brigida Martinez, Amadeo Landicho and Marcelina Landicho. Dominga pleaded a counterclaim, alleging
that she had paid certain debts contracted by Apolonia Zafra. The trial court awarded the plaintiffs the
property but at the same time ordered them to pay the debts of their deceased mother in the amount of
350 pesos.
ISSUE
Whether or not the trial court have jurisdiction to order payment of money
HELD
YES. The trial court had jurisdiction not only because there was a counterclaim wherein the amount adjudged was
within the amount pleaded but also because the proceeding was in the nature of one for liquidation and partition of
inheritance wherein debts left by the deceased ancestors may be determined and ordered paid if the creditors are
parties, as was the case.
Also, the question of jurisdiction attempted to be raised in this case is not the kind of question which confers jurisdiction
upon this Court. What is involved here is not jurisdiction over the subject matter but over the issue.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by the law while jurisdiction over the issue is determined by the
pleadings. Also, jurisdiction over the issue may be conferred by consent of the parties unlike jurisdiction over the
subject matter. This means that although an issue is not duly pleaded, it can still be tried if there is no objection made
by the parties.
Therefore, the kind of jurisdictional issue raised in this case is not the kind which would deprive the courts of their
jurisdiction to try the case.
NOTES
In this case, the petitioners tried to secure a dismissal of the case in the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction.
However, the Supreme Court ruled that the jurisdictional issue in this case is about the issue only which is not enough
to divest a court of its jurisdiction.
4C (2020 – 2021)
TOPIC Jurisdiction over the Res
CASE TITLE De Joya V. Marquez
G.R. No. 162416 DATE: January 31, 2006
DOCTRINE
Jurisdiction over the res (or the property or thing which is the subject of the litigation). This is acquired by the actual or
constructive seizure by the court of the thing in question, thus placing it in custodia legis, as in attachment or
garnishment; or by provision of law which recognizes in the court the power to deal with the property or subject matter
within its territorial jurisdiction, as in land registration proceedings or suits involving civil status or real property in the
Philippines of a non-resident defendant.
The court acquires jurisdiction to try the case, even if it has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of a nonresident
defendant, as long as it has jurisdiction over the res, as when the action involves the personal status of the plaintiff or
property in the Philippines in which the defendant claims an interest. In such cases, the service of summons by
publication and notice to the defendant is merely to comply with due process requirements.
FACTS
A petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed by Petitioner Chester De Joya that seeks the Court to nullify and set
aside the warrant of arrest issued by respondent judge against petitioner in Criminal Case No. 03-219952 for violation
of Article 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1689. Petitioner asserts
that the respondent judge erred in finding the existence of probable cause that justifies the issuance of a warrant of
arrest against him and his co-accused.
Petitioner asserts that respondent Judge Placido C. Marquez erred in finding the existence of probable cause that
justifies the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him and his co-accused.
He likewise continuously refuses to submit to the court’s jurisdiction.
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioner may be allowed to obtain relief from the courts without submitting to its jurisdiction.
HELD
No. The petitioner is not entitled to seek relief from the Supreme Court nor from the trial court as he continuously
refuses to surrender and submit to the court’s jurisdiction. Justice Florenz D. Regalado explains the requisites for the
exercise of jurisdiction and how the court acquires such jurisdiction, thus:
x x x Requisites for the exercise of jurisdiction and how the court acquires such jurisdiction:
a. Jurisdiction over the plaintiff or petitioner: This is acquired by the filing of the complaint, petition or initiatory
pleading before the court by the plaintiff or petitioner.
b. Jurisdiction over the defendant or respondent: This is acquired by the voluntary appearance or
submission by the defendant or respondent to the court or by coercive process issued by the court to
him, generally by the service of summons.
c. Jurisdiction over the subject matter: This is conferred by law and, unlike jurisdiction over the parties, cannot
be conferred on the court by the voluntary act or agreement of the parties.
d. Jurisdiction over the issues of the case: This is determined and conferred by the pleadings filed in the case by
the parties, or by their agreement in a pre-trial order or stipulation, or, at times by their implied consent as by the
failure of a party to object to evidence on an issue not covered by the pleadings, as provided in Sec. 5, Rule 10.
e. Jurisdiction over the res (or the property or thing which is the subject of the litigation). This is acquired by the
actual or constructive seizure by the court of the thing in question, thus placing it in custodia legis, as in
attachment or garnishment; or by provision of law which recognizes in the court the power to deal with the
property or subject matter within its territorial jurisdiction, as in land registration proceedings or suits involving
civil status or real property in the Philippines of a non-resident defendant.
Justice Regalado continues to explain:

In two cases, the court acquires jurisdiction to try the case, even if it has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of a
nonresident defendant, as long as it has jurisdiction over the res, as when the action involves the personal status of the
plaintiff or property in the Philippines in which the defendant claims an interest. In such cases, the service of summons
by publication and notice to the defendant is merely to comply with due process requirements. Under Sec. 133 of the
Corporation Code, while a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines without a license cannot sue or
intervene in any action here, it may be sued or proceeded against before our courts or administrative tribunals.
Here in this case, there is no exceptional reason to allow petitioner to obtain relief from the courts without
submitting to its jurisdiction. On the contrary, his continued refusal to submit to the court’s jurisdiction should
give this Court more reason to uphold the action of the respondent judge. The purpose of a warrant of arrest is
to place the accused under the custody of the law to hold him for trial of the charges against him. His evasive
stance shows an intent to circumvent and frustrate the object of this legal process. It should be remembered
that he who invokes the court’s jurisdiction must first submit to its jurisdiction.
NOTES
4C (2020 – 2021)
TOPIC Jurisdiction over the Res
CASE TITLE Gomez v. CA
GR NO. 127692 DATE: March 10, 2004
DOCTRINE
In actions in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction
on the court provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res, although summons must be served upon the
defendant in order to satisfy the due process requirements.
FACTS
An action for specific performance and/or rescission filed by herein petitioners, spouses Fortunato and Aurora Gomez,
against the heirs of Jesus J. Trocino, Sr., which include herein respondents and their mother Caridad Trocino. The
spouses Jesus and Caridad Trocino mortgaged two parcels of land. The mortgage was subsequently foreclosed and the
properties sold at public auction on July 11, 1988, and before the expiry of the redemption period, the spouses Trocino
sold the property to petitioners on December 12, 1989, who in turn, redeemed the same from Dr. Yujuico. The spouses
Trocino, however, refused to convey ownership of the properties to petitioners, hence, the complaint.
The defendants, through their counsel Atty. Expedito P. Bugarin, filed their Answer. Defendant Caridad A. Trocino,
respondents' mother, verified said pleading. RTC rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiffs.
Respondents Adolfo and Mariano Trocino filed with the Court of Appeals, a petition for the annulment of the judgment
rendered by the RTC-Cebu. Private respondents alleged that the trial court's decision is null and void on the ground that
it did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons as they were not validly served with a copy of the summons and the
complaint. According to them, at the time summons was served on them, Adolfo Trocino was already in Ohio, U.S.A.,
and has been residing there for 25 years, while Mariano Trocino was in Talibon, Bohol, and has been residing there since
1986.
The Court of Appeals issued the assailed Decision granting the petition and annulling the decision of the RTC-Cebu.
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Court of Appeals, petitioners filed the present petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not the trial court had validly acquired jurisdiction over their persons
HELD
YES, but only with regard to Caridad Trocino.
To resolve whether there was valid service of summons on respondents, the nature of the action filed against them must
first be determined.
In actions in personam, summons on the defendant must be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person,
or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him. This is specifically provided in Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court. If efforts to find defendant personally makes prompt service impossible, substituted service may be effected by
leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's dwelling house or residence with some person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein, or by leaving the copies at the defendant's office or regular place of business with some
competent person in charge thereof. When the defendant in an action in personam is a non-resident who does not
voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court, personal service of summons within the State is essential to the
acquisition of jurisdiction over his person. This cannot be done if the defendant is not physically present in the country,
and thus, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over his person and therefore cannot validly try and decide the case against
him.
Meanwhile, in actions in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer
jurisdiction on the court provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res, although summons must be served
upon the defendant in order to satisfy the due process requirements.
The complaint they filed for specific performance and/or rescission is not an action in rem. An action in personam is an
action against a person on the basis of his personal liability, while an action in rem is an action against the thing itself,
instead of against the person. Hence, a real action may at the same time be an action in personam and not necessarily
an action in rem. Civil Case No. CEB-11103 is an action in personam because it is an action against persons, namely,
herein respondents, on the basis of their personal liability. As such, personal service of summons upon the defendants
is essential in order for the court to acquire of jurisdiction over their persons.
A distinction, however, must be made with regard to service of summons on respondents Adolfo Trocino and Mariano
Trocino. Adolfo Trocino, as records show, is already a resident of Ohio, U.S.A. for 25 years. Being a non-resident, the
court cannot acquire jurisdiction over his person and validly try and decide the case against him.
Consequently, the judgment sought to be executed against respondents were rendered without jurisdiction as there was
neither a proper service of summons nor was there any waiver or voluntary submission to the trial court's jurisdiction.
Hence, the same is void, with regard to private respondents except Caridad Trocino. When the proces server personally
served the summons on Caridad Trocino, the trial court validly acquired jurisdiction over her person alone. Hence, the
trial court’s decision is valid and binding with regard to her, but only in proportion to Caridad Trocino's share.
NOTES
While under the syllabus, this case is under jurisdiction over the RES, the case talks about jurisdiction over the persons, and very
little about over the res. (see doctrine)
4C (2020 – 2021)
TOPIC Jurisdiction over the Res – Estoppel Jurisdiction
CASE TITLE Serafin Tijam vs. Magdaleno Sibonghanoy
GR NO. L-21450 DATE: April 15, 1968
DOCTRINE
Estoppel by laches means the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which,
by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. Hence, a party who has invoked the jurisdiction of
the court in a particular matter, to seek an affirmative relief, cannot afterwards deny the same jurisdiction to escape a
penalty.
FACTS
Spouses Tijam and Tagalog filed an action to recover the sum of PHP1,1908 from Spouses Sibonghanoy and Baguio
in the CFI. A writ of attachment was issued against defendant’s property but was later on dissolved when the latter filed a
counter-bond with Manila Surety. The court rendered judgement in favor of Tijam and a writ of execution was issued but
was returned unsatisfied hence petitioners proceeded against Manila Surety who then filed an opposition thereto citing
failure to prosecute and absence of demand. It also prayed that they be relieved of their liability.
The Court denied the motion for execution. Spouses Tijam made the necessary demand and upon failure of Manila
Surety to satisfy the same, they again moved for execution of the bond. The surety moved to quash the same for non-
compliance with the summary hearing required under Sec. 17, Rule 59 but was denied by the RTC and affirmed by the
CA on appeal. Their MR was likewise denied by the CA.
Manila Surety filed a motion asking for extension of time within which to file a motion for reconsideration, which was
granted, but instead, they filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the CFI had no jurisdiction over the case since the
amount to be recovered (PHP1,908) was under the jurisdiction of the inferior courts. This was by virtue of the Judiciary
Act of 1948 which took effect a month before the filing of the action in the CFI.
ISSUE
WON the jurisdiction of the CFI over the case can still be assailed.
HELD
Negative. The surety is barred by laches from assailing the jurisdiction of the CFI. True enough, the jurisdiction
should have been with the MTC by virtue of the Judiciary Act of 1948 which placed civil actions where the amount sought
is PHP2,000 and below to the jurisdiction of the inferior courts. However, it is to be noted that the action was commenced
on 1948 but only after 15 years did Manila Surety question the lack of jurisdiction of the CFI for the first time when it could
have opposed the same when the first writ of execution was issued by the court. Instead, it asked for an affirmative relief.
Estoppel by laches means the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which,
by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. Hence, a party who has invoked the jurisdiction of
the court in a particular matter, to seek an affirmative relief, cannot afterwards deny the same jurisdiction to escape a
penalty.
NOTES
4C (2020 – 2021)
TOPIC Estoppel Jurisdiction
CASE TITLE FIGUEROA v. PEOPLE
GR NO. 147406 DATE: 4 July 2008
DOCTRINE
The ruling in Sibonghanoy on the matter of jurisdiction is, however, the exception rather than the rule. Estoppel by laches
may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which the factual milieu is analogous to that in the
cited case. The general rule is that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on
appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.
FACTS
On August 19, 1998, RTC convicted the petitioner of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. In his appeal before the
CA, the petitioner questioned for the first time the RTC’s jurisdiction.
CA, however, considered the petitioner to have actively participated in the trial and to have belatedly attacked the
jurisdiction of RTC; thus, he was already estopped by laches from asserting the RTC’s lack of jurisdiction.
CA affirmed RTC’s decision.
Petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari. While both the appellate court and the Solicitor General
acknowledge the fact that RTC did not have jurisdiction, they nevertheless are of the position that the principle of estoppel
by laches has already precluded the petitioner from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC, the trial went on for 4 years
with the petitioner actively participating therein and without him ever raising the jurisdictional infirmity. The petitioner, for
his part, counters that the lack of jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter may be raised at any time even for the
first time on appeal. As undue delay is further absent herein, the principle of laches will not be applicable.
ISSUE
Whether or not the case should be dismissed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC, notwithstanding
the fact that the petitioner failed to raise the issue during the trial and the alleged laches in relation to the doctrine in Tijam
v. Sibonghanoy.
HELD
Yes case should be dismissed, SC dismissed the case without prejudice.
The ruling in Sibonghanoy on the matter of jurisdiction is the exception rather than the general rule. For it to be invoked,
laches should clearly be present; that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to warrant the
presumption that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it.
SC clarified that in its past decisions concerning the same issue, it wavered on when to apply the exceptional
circumstance in Sibonghanoy and on when to apply the general rule enunciated as early as in De La Santa and
expounded at length in Calimlim. The general rule should, however, be, as it has always been, that the issue of jurisdiction
may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. Estoppel by
laches, to bar a litigant from asserting the courts absence or lack of jurisdiction, only supervenes in exceptional cases
similar to the factual milieu of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. Indeed, the fact that a person attempts to invoke unauthorized
jurisdiction of a court does not estop him from thereafter challenging its jurisdiction over the subject matter, since such
jurisdiction must arise by law and not by mere consent of the parties. This is especially true where the person seeking to
invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of the court does not thereby secure any advantage or the adverse party does not suffer
any harm.
Applying the said doctrine to the instant case, the petitioner is in no way estopped by laches in assailing the jurisdiction
of the RTC, considering that he raised the lack thereof in his appeal before the appellate court. At that time, no
considerable period had yet elapsed for laches to attach. True, delay alone, though unreasonable, will not sustain the
defense of estoppel by laches unless it further appears that the party, knowing his rights, has not sought to enforce them
until the condition of the party pleading laches has in good faith become so changed that he cannot be restored to his
former state, if the rights be then enforced, due to loss of evidence, change of title, intervention of equities, and other
causes. In applying the principle of estoppel by laches in the exceptional case of Sibonghanoy, the Court therein
considered the patent and revolting inequity and unfairness of having the judgment creditors go up their Calvary once
more after more or less 15 years. The same, however, does not obtain in the instant case.
NOTES
4C (2020 – 2021)
TOPIC B.P . 129 – Judicial Reorganization Act of 1980
CASE TITLE SPOUSES CLAUDIO and CARMENCITA TRAYVILLA vs. BERNARDO SEJAS and JUVY
PAGLINAWAN, represented by JESSIE PAGLINAWAN, respondents.
DOCTRINE
The nature of an action is not determined by what is stated in the caption of the complaint but by the allegations of the
complaint and the reliefs prayed for. Where the ultimate objective of the plaintiffs, like petitioners herein, is to obtain title
to real property, it should be filed in the proper court having jurisdiction over the assessed value of the property subject
thereof.
FACTS
In 2005, petitioners Claudio and Carmencita Trayvilla instituted before the RTC a complaint against respondent Bernardo
Sejas (Sejas). In their Complaint for specific performance and damages, petitioners claimed among others that Sejas
was the registered owner of a 434-square meter parcel of land in Tukuran, Zamboanga del Sur covered by TCT-T83337;
that by virtue of a private handwritten document, Sejas sold said parcel of land to them in 1982; that thereafter, they took
possession of the land and constructed a house thereon; that they resided in said house and continued to reside therein.
Sejas later reasserted his ownership over said land and was thus guilty of fraud and deceit in so doing and that they
caused the annotation of an adverse claim.
In an Amended Complaint, this time for specific performance, reconveyance, and damages, petitioners impleaded
respondent Juvy Paglinawan (Paglinawan) as additional defendant, claiming that Sejas subsequently sold the subject
property to her, after which she caused the cancellation of TCT and the issuance of a new title in her name. Petitioners
prayed that Sejas be ordered to execute a final deed of sale in their favor and transfer the property to them and that
Paglinawan's title be canceled and the property be reconveyed to them.
However, the additional docket fees for the moral damages prayed for in the Amended Complaint were not paid. Likewise,
for the additional causes of action, no docket fees were charged and paid. Respondents moved for dismissal of the case,
claiming lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and prescription. The RTC denied the motion in a September 3, 2007
Order.
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that petitioners' case was not for specific performance but was
in reality a real action or one involving title to and possession of real property, in which case the value of the property
should be alleged in the complaint in order that the proper filing fee may be computed and paid; that since the value of
the land was not alleged in the Amended Complaint, the proper filing fee was not paid, and for this reason the case should
be dismissed; and that petitioners' cause of action is barred by prescription since the 10-year period to sue upon the
handwritten contract — counted from their purchase of the land in 1982 — had already lapsed when they filed the case
in 2005. However, in a February 21, 2008 Order, the RTC denied the motion, stating among others that petitioners' case
is not a real action but indeed one for specific performance and thus one which is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
ISSUE
Whether or not the RTC lost its jurisdiction when petitioners failed to pay the additional docket fees in their Amended
Complaint
HELD
Yes. Consistent with Section 1, Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides that the prescribed fees shall be
paid in full "upon the filing of the pleading or other application which initiates an action or proceeding", the well-entrenched
rule is to the effect that a court acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon the payment of the prescribed filing and docket
fees. Since the Amended Complaint of the petitioners alleged new causes of action, the non-payment of additional docket
fees for these new allegations divested and ousted the RTC of its jurisdiction over the case.
As correctly ruled by the CA, while petitioners' Amended Complaint was denominated as one mainly for specific
performance, they additionally prayed for reconveyance of the property, as well as the cancellation of Paglinawan's. In
other words, petitioners' aim in filing the civil case was to secure their claimed ownership and title to the subject property,
which qualifies their case as a real action. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a real
action is one that affects title to or possession of real property, or an interest therein.
Since the civil case is a real action made so by the Amended Complaint later filed, petitioners should have observed the
requirement relative to declaring the fair market value of the property as stated in the current tax declaration or zonal
valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). Since no such allegation was made in the Amended Complaint, then
the value of the subject property as stated in the handwritten document sued upon and restated in the Amended
Complaint should be the basis for determining jurisdiction and the amount of docket fees to be paid.
The CA is correct in its general observation that in the absence of the required declaration of the fair market value as
stated in the current tax declaration or zonal valuation of the property, it cannot be determined whether the RTC or first
level court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioners' action, since the jurisdiction of these courts is
determined on the basis of the value of the property. Under applicable rules, Jurisdiction of RTCs, as may be relevant to
the instant petition, is provided in Sec. 19 of BP 129, which reads:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: 1) In all civil
actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;
2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed
value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where
such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of
lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts,
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
In fine, the Court rules and so holds that the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over the case, hence, its act of taking
cognizance of the subject Complaint was tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Grave abuse of discretion is defined as capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.
NOTES
4C (2020 – 2021)
TOPIC BP.129 – Judicial Reorganization Act of 1980
CASE TITLE Heirs of Reterta v. Sps. Lopez
GR NO. 159941 DATE: 17 August 2011
DOCTRINE
The settled rule precluding certiorari as a remedy against the final order when appeal is available
notwithstanding, the Court rules that the CA should have given due course to and granted the petition for
certiorari for two exceptional reasons, namely: (a) the broader interest of justice demanded that certiorari be
given due course to avoid the undeserved grossly unjust result that would befall the petitioners otherwise; and
(b) the order of the RTC granting the motion to dismiss on ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter evidently constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.
FACTS
● On May 2, 2000, the petitioners commenced an action for quieting of title and reconveyance in the RTC in
Trece Martires City (Civil Case No. TM-983) contending that they were the true and real owners of the
parcel of land (47,708sqm) situated in Trez Cruzes, Tanza, Cavite, having inherited the land from their father
who had died on July 11, 1983; that their late father had been the grantee of the land by virtue of his
occupation and cultivation; that their late father and his predecessors in interest had been in open, exclusive,
notorious, and continuous possession of the land for more than 30 years.
● Petitioners discovered in 1999 an affidavit dated March 1, 1966 that their father had purportedly executed
whereby he had waived his rights, interests, and participation in the land; that by virtue of the affidavit, Sales
Certificate No. V-769 had been issued in favor of respondent Lorenzo Mores by the then Department of
Agriculture and Natural Resources; and that Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-64071 had later issued to the
respondents. ● On August 1, 2000, the respondents, as defendants, filed a motion to dismiss, insisting that the
RTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of Civil Case No. TM-983 due to the land being friar land, and
that the petitioners had no legal personality to commence Civil Case No. TM-983. ● RTC (Trece Martires)
Ruling: The RTC granted the motion to dismiss. Court is of the opinion that it has no jurisdiction over the
nature of this action. The petitioners then timely filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied.
Thus, petitioners assailed the dismissal via petition for certiorari, but the CA dismissed the petition on April
25, 2003.
● CA Ruling: Thus, the basic requisite for the special civil action of certiorari to lie is that there is no appeal,
nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In the case at bench, when the court
rendered the assailed decision, the remedy of the petitioners was to have appealed the same to this Court. But
petitioners did not. Instead they filed the present special civil action for certiorari on May 15, 2002 after the
decision of the court a quo has become final. On September 9, 2003, the CA denied the petitioners' motion
for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioners' action for reconveyance within the jurisdiction of the regular court?
HELD
The law governing jurisdiction is Section 19 (2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7691, which provides: Section 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. -- Regional Trial Courts
shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where
the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions
in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible
entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; Conformably with the
provision, because an action for reconveyance or to remove a cloud on one's title involves the title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein, exclusive original jurisdiction over such action pertained
to the RTC, unless the assessed value of the property did not exceed P20,000.00 (in which instance the MTC
having territorial jurisdiction would have exclusive original jurisdiction). Determinative of which regular
court had jurisdiction would be the allegations of the complaint (on the assessed value of the property) and
the principal relief thereby sought. The respondents' reliance on Section 12 and Section 18 of Act No. 1120 to
sustain their position that the Bureau of Public Lands (now LMB) instead had exclusive jurisdiction was
without basis. The provisions read: Section 12. xxx the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands shall give the
said settler and occupant a certificate which shall set forth in detail that the Government has agreed to sell to
such settler and occupant the amount of land so held by him, at the price so fixed, payable as provided in this
Act at the office of the Chief of Bureau of Public Lands xxx and that upon the payment of the final
installment together with all accrued interest the Government will convey to such settler and occupant the
said land so held by him by proper instrument of conveyance, which shall be issued and become effective in
the manner provided in section one hundred and twenty-two of the Land Registration Act. Section 18. No
lease or sale made by Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands under the provisions of this Act shall be valid until
approved by the Secretary of the Interior. As the provisions indicate, the authority of LMB under Act No.
1120, being limited to the administration and disposition of friar lands, did not include the petitioners' action
for reconveyance. LMB ceases to have jurisdiction once the friar land is disposed of in favor of a private
person and title duly issues in the latter's name. By ignoring the petitioners' showing of its plain error in
dismissing Civil Case No. TM-983, and by disregarding the allegations of the complaint, the RTC acted
whimsically and capriciously. Given all the foregoing, the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The term grave abuse of discretion connotes whimsical and capricious
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to excess, or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse must be so patent and gross
as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to
act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion or hostility.
The dismissal of Civil Case No. TM-983, unless undone, would leave the petitioners bereft of any remedy to
protect their substantial rights or interests in the land. As such, they would suffer grave injustice and
irreparable damage. In that situation, the RTC‘s dismissal should be annulled through certiorari, for the task
of the remedy was to do justice to the unjustly aggrieved.
NOTES
4C (2020 – 2021)
TOPIC RULE 2. CAUSE OF ACTION – Meaning of Cause of Action
CASE TITLE Heirs of Dolleton vs. Fil-Estate Management, Inc.
G.R. No. 170175 April 7, 2009

DOCTRINE
 Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Civil Procedure defines a cause of action as the act or omission by which a party
violates the right of another. Its essential elements are as follows:
(1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created;
(2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and
(3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of
the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff, for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages or
other appropriate relief.
 The elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the complaint alleges facts which if true would
justify the relief demanded. The inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity of the material allegations.
FACTS
In October 1997, petitioners Heirs of Tomas Dolleton, et al., filed before the RTC separate Complaints for Quieting of
Title and/or Recovery of Ownership and Possession with Preliminary Injunction/Restraining Order and Damages against
respondents Fil-Estate Management Inc., Spouses Arturo E. Dy and Susan Dy, Megatop Realty Development, Inc., and
the Register of Deeds of Las Pinas.
The eight Complaints were similarly worded and contained substantially identical allegations claiming that (1)
petitioners had been in continuous, open, and exclusive possession of the afore-described parcels of land (subject
properties) for more than 90 years until they were forcibly ousted by armed men hired by respondents in 1991; (2) they
had cultivated the subject properties and religiously paid the real estate taxes for the same; (3) respondents cannot rely
on Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) No. 9176, No. 9177, No. 9178, No. 9179, No. 9180, No. 9181 and No. 9182,12
issued by the Registry of Deeds of Las Pinas in their names, to support their claim over the subject properties since,
petitioners averred, the subject properties were not covered by said certificates.
Respondents filed before the RTC a Motion to Dismiss and Opposition to APpliction fora Temporary Restraining
Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction. They moved for the dismissal of the 8 complaints on the grounds of (1) prescription;
(2) laches; (3) lack of cause of action; and (4) res judicata.
The RTC granted the respondents' Motion to Dismiss. The trial court determined that the subject properties were
already registered in the names of respondents, and that petitioners were unable to prove by clear and convincing
evidence their title to the said properties.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioners' appeal and affirmed the RTC Resolutions dated 8 September 2000 and
30 June 2003. The appellate court found that respondents' titles to the subject properties were indefeasible because they
were registered under the Torrens system. Thus, petitioners could not say that any claim on the subject properties casts
a cloud on their title when they failed to demonstrate a legal or an equitable title to the same. The Court of Appeals also
ruled that petitioners' actions had already prescribed. Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 requires that an action
assailing a certificate of title should be filed within one year after its issuance. Moreover, actions assailing fraudulent titles
should be filed within 10 years after the said titles were issued. The appellate court further decreed that the cases for
quieting of title should be dismissed based on the allegation of petitioners themselves that the parcels of land covered by
respondents' certificates of title were not the subject properties which petitioners claimed as their own.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not the RTC properly granted respondent's motion to dismiss.
HELD
No. Respondents mistakenly construe the allegations in petitioners' Complaints. What petitioners alleged in their
Complaints was that while the subject properties were not covered by respondents' certificates of title, nevertheless,
respondents forcibly evicted petitioners therefrom. Hence, it is not simply a question of whether petitioners' possession
can defeat respondents' title to registered land. Instead, an initial determination has to be made on whether the subject
properties were in fact covered by respondents' certificates of title.
Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Civil Procedure defines a cause of action as the act or omission by which a
party violates the right of another. Its essential elements are as follows:
(1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created;
(2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and
(3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the
obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff, for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages or other
appropriate relief.
The elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the complaint alleges facts which if true would
justify the relief demanded. The inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material allegations. If the allegations
in the complaint furnish sufficient basis on which it can be maintained, it should not be dismissed regardless of the
defense that may be presented by the defendant.
This Court is convinced that each of the Complaints filed by petitioners sufficiently stated a cause of action. The
Complaints alleged that petitioners are the owners of the subject properties by acquisitive prescription. As owners thereof,
they have the right to remain in peaceful possession of the said properties and, if deprived thereof, they may recover the
same. Section 428 of the Civil Code provides that:
Article 428. The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing without other limitations than those
established by law.
The owner has also a right of action against the holder and possessor of the thing in order to recover it.
Petitioners averred that respondents had violated their rights as owner of the subject properties by evicting the
former therefrom by means of force and intimidation. Respondents allegedly retained possession of the subject properties
by invoking certificates of title covering other parcels of land. Resultantly, petitioners filed the cases before the RTC in
order to recover possession of the subject properties, to prevent respondents from using their TCTs to defeat petitioners'
rights of ownership and possession over said subject properties, and to claim damages and other reliefs that the court
may deem just and equitable.
The Court notes that petitioners' prayer for the cancellation of respondents' certificates of title are inconsistent
with their allegations. Petitioners prayed for in their Complaints that, among other reliefs, judgment be rendered so that
"Transfer Certificate of Title Numbers 9176, 9177, 9178, 9179, 9180, 9181, and 9182 be cancelled by the Register of
Deeds for Las PiÃ±as, Metro Manila, insofar as they are or may be utilized to deprive plaintiffs of possession and
ownership of said lot." Yet, petitioners also made it plain that the subject properties, of which respondents unlawfully
deprived them, were not covered by respondents' certificates of title. It is apparent that the main concern of petitioners is
to prevent respondents from using or invoking their certificates of title to deprive petitioners of their ownership and
possession over the subject properties; and not to assert a superior right to the land covered by respondents' certificates
of title. Admittedly, while petitioners can seek the recovery of the subject properties, they cannot ask for the cancellation
of respondents' TCTs since petitioners failed to allege any interest in the land covered thereby. Still, the other reliefs
sought by petitioners, i.e., recovery of the possession of the subject properties and compensation for the damages
resulting from respondents' forcible taking of their property, are still proper.
Petitioners' Complaints should not have been dismissed despite the seeming error made by petitioners in their
prayer. To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must show that the claim for relief does
not exist, rather than that a claim has been defectively stated, or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain.
NOTES
4C (2020 – 2021)
TOPIC Cause of Action; Right of Action
CASE TITLE Multi-Realty Development Corp. v. Condominium Corp
GR NO. 146726 DATE: 16 June 2006
DOCTRINE
The term "right of action" is the right to commence and maintain an action. In the law of pleadings, right of action is
distinguished from a cause of action in that the former is a remedial right belonging to some persons while the latter
is a formal statement of the operational facts that give rise to such remedial right. The former is a matter of right and
depends on the substantive law while the latter is a matter of statute and is governed by the law of procedure. The
right of action springs from the cause of action, but does not accrue until all the facts which constitute the cause of
action have occurred.
FACTS
In the 1970s, Multi-Realty constructed Makati Tuscany. Pursuant to the Condominium Act, the Makati Tuscany
Condominium Corporation (MATUSCO) was organized and established to manage the condominium units.
Parking Lots and Common Areas

Multi-Realty executed a Deed of Transfer in favor of MATUSCO over these common areas. However, the Master
Deed and the Deed of Transfer did not reflect or specify the ownership of the 98 parking slots. Nevertheless,
Multi-Realty sold 26 of them in 1977 to 1986 to condominium unit buyers who needed additional parking slots.
MATUSCO did not object, and certificates of title were later issued by the Register of Deeds in favor of the buyers.
MATUSCO issued Certificates of Management covering the condominium units and parking slots which Multi-Realty
had sold.
Sometime in Sept. 1989, Multi-Realty, through its President, Henry Sy, who was also a member of the Board of
Directors of MATUSCO, requested that two Multi-Realty executives be allowed to park their cars in two of Makati
Tuscany’s remaining 72 unallocated parking slots. In a letter, through its counsel, MATUSCO denied the request,
asserting, for the first time, that the remaining unallocated parking slots were common areas owned by it. In another
letter, MATUSCO offered, by way of goodwill gesture, to allow Multi-Realty to use two unallocated parking slots,
which offer was rejected by the latter.
Complaint for Damages and/or Reformation of Instrument

On April 26, 1990, Multi-Realty filed a complaint against MATUSCO for Damages and/or Reformation of Instrument
with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction alleging that it had retained ownership of the
98 unassigned parking slots.
MATUSCO’s Answer
MATUSCO alleged that Multi-Realty had no cause of action against it for reformation of their contract.
RTC, who ruled in favor of MATUSCO, did not rule on the issue re: cause of action. CA dismissed Multi-Realty’s
appeal on the ground that its action had already prescribed.
Petitioner’s Argument before SC

Under Article 1150 in relation to Article 1144 of the New Civil Code, its action for reformation of the Master Deed
accrued only in 1989, when respondent, by overt acts, made known its intention not to abide by their true agreement;
since the complaint below was filed in 1990, the action was filed within the prescriptive period therefor.
ISSUE
Whether or not the action has prescribed - No.
HELD
Right of Action v. Cause of Action
The term "right of action" is the right to commence and maintain an action. In the law of pleadings, right of action is
distinguished from a cause of action in that the former is a remedial right belonging to some persons while the latter
is a formal statement of the operational facts that give rise to such remedial right. The former is a matter of right and
depends on the substantive law while the latter is a matter of statute and is governed by the law of procedure. The
right of action springs from the cause of action, but does not accrue until all the facts which constitute the cause of
action have occurred.
On Cause of Action
To determine when all the facts which constitute a cause of action for reformation of an instrument may be brought
and when the right of the petitioner to file such action accrues, the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63, must be
considered. The concept and meaning of the term cause of action in proceedings for declaratory relief, vis-à-vis an
ordinary civil action, is broadened. It is not, as in ordinary civil action, the wrong or delict by which the plaintiff’s rights
are violated, but it is extended to a mere denial, refusal or challenge raising at least an uncertainty or insecurity
which is injurious to plaintiff’s rights.
One has a right of action to file a complaint/petition for reformation of an instrument when his legal right is denied,
challenged or refused by another; or when there is an antagonistic assertion of his legal right and the denial thereof
by another concerning a real question or issue; when there is a real, definitive and substantive controversy between
the parties touching on their legal relations having adverse legal interests. This may occur shortly after the execution
of the instrument or much later.
A party to an instrument is under no obligation to seek a reformation of an instrument while he is unaware that any
opposition will be made to carry out the actual agreement. The statute of limitations does not begin to run against an
equitable cause of action for the reformation of an instrument because of mistake until the mistake has been
discovered or ought to have been discovered. The mere recording of a deed does not charge the grantor with
constructive notice of a mistake therein, but is to be considered with other facts and circumstances in determining
whether the grantor be charged with notice actual or constructive.
In this case, before petitioner became aware of respondent’s denial of its right under their true contract, petitioner
could not be expected to file an action for the reformation of the Master Deed. Petitioner executed the Master Deed
in 1975. However, petitioner had no doubt about its ownership of the unassigned parking lots, and even sold some of
them. Respondent did not even object to these sales, and even offered to buy some of the parking slots. Respondent
assailed petitioner’s ownership only in 1989 and claimed ownership of the unassigned parking slots, and it was then
that petitioner discovered the error in the Master Deed; the dispute over the ownership of the parking slots thereafter
ensued. It was only then that petitioner’s cause of action for a reformation of the Master Deed accrued. Since
petitioner filed its complaint in 1990, the prescriptive period had not yet elapsed.
NOTES
Elements of Cause of Action
A cause of action must always consist of two elements: (1) the plaintiff’s primary right and the defendant’s
corresponding primary duty, whatever may be the subject to which they relate – person, character, property or
contract; and (2) the delict or wrongful act or omission of the defendant, by which the primary right and duty have
been violated.
4C (2020 – 2021)
TOPIC CAUSE OF ACTION
CASE TITLE CONSULAR AREA RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION v. CASANOVA
GR NO. 202618 DATE: April 12, 2016
DOCTRINE
Jurisprudence teaches that in order for a writ of injunction to issue, the petitioner should be able to establish: (a) a right
in esse or a clear and unmistakable right to be protected; (b) a violation of that right; and (c) that there is an urgent and
permanent act and urgent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. In the absence of a clear legal right, the writ
must not issue. A restraining order or an injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting substantial rights and
interests, and it is not designed to protect contingent or future rights. Verily, the possibility of irreparable damage without
proof of adequate existing rights is not a ground for injunction.
FACTS
"Prohibition with plea for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Injunction" was filed by petitioner Consular
Area Residents Association, Inc. against respondents Arnel Paciano D. Casanova (Casanova), President and Chief
Executive Officer of the Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA), Engr. Macrohon, as well as the Local
Housing Board of Taguig City, and the City Government of Taguig seeking that the BCDA be enjoined from demolishing
what it claims as the remaining structures in the Joint US Military Army Group (JUSMAG) Area in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig
City.
The JUSMAG Area is a 34.5-hectare area located along Lawton Avenue where military officers, both in the active and
retired services, and their respective families, had occupied housing units and facilities originally constructed by the
Armed Forces of the Philippines.
On July 18, 2012, the Local Housing Board of Taguig City issued a Certificate of Compliance on Demolition[13] declaring
that the BCDA had complied with the requirement of "Just and Humane Demolition and Eviction," prescribed under
Section 28 of RA 7279,[14] otherwise known as the "Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992," for the demolition of
structures within the JUSMAG Area. Consequently, respondent Casanova, as President and Chief Executive Officer of
the BCDA, send a letter, informing the petitioner and its members that they should within 7 days coordinate with the
BCDA officials should they choose to either accept the relocation package being offered to them, or voluntarily dismantle
their structures and peacefully vacate the property.
Petitioner filed the present case to enjoin the demolition of their structures which they claimed are within the Diplomatic
and Consular Area, and not the JUSMAG Area. They averred that the BCDA itself declared in its own website that the
Diplomatic and Consular Area is not its property,[16] and that its members are occupying the Diplomatic and Consular
Area with the consent of the Republic of the Philippines given at the time of their assignments in the military service,[17]
and hence, cannot be demolished, especially in the absence of a court order... respondents Casanova and Engr.
Macrohon maintained that the clearing operations undertaken by the BCDA covered only the JUSMAG area, on which
the structures possessed by petitioner's members are located.[21] They also argued that under Section 28 (b) of RA
7279, eviction or demolition is allowed when government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be
implemented, even in the absence of a court order.
ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioner have cause of action against the respondents in enjoining the demolition.
HELD
No. petitioner ultimately seeks the issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin the demolition of the structures which
they — as opposed to respondents' version — claim to be located in the Diplomatic and Consular Area, and hence,
outside of the JUSMAG Area.
Jurisprudence teaches that in order for a writ of injunction to issue, the petitioner should be able to establish: (a)
a right in esse or a clear and unmistakable right to be protected; (b) a violation of that right; and (c) that there is an urgent
and permanent act and urgent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. In the absence of a clear legal right, the
writ must not issue. A restraining order or an injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting substantial rights
and interests, and it is not designed to protect contingent or future rights. Verily, the possibility of irreparable damage
without proof of adequate existing rights is not a ground for injunction.
In this case, the Court finds that petitioner has failed to prove that the structures for which they seek protection
against demolition fall within the Diplomatic and Consular Area. Its supposition is anchored on two (2) documents, namely:
(a) a printed copy of BCDA's declaration in its website that the Diplomatic and Consular Area is a non-BCDA property;
and (b) a map of the South Bonifacio Properties showing the metes and bounds of the properties of the BCDA as well as
the properties contiguous to them. However, none of these documents substantiate petitioner's claim: the website posting
is a mere statement that the Diplomatic Consular Area is supposedly a non-BCDA property, whereas the map only depicts
the metes and bounds of the BCDA's properties.
Plainly, none of them show whether or not the structures to be demolished are indeed within the Diplomatic and
Consular Area as petitioner claims. On the other hand, records show that on the basis of Relocation Survey Plan Rel-00-
001297 42 approved by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), the BCDA came up.
Thus, since petitioner's purported right in esse is hinged on the premise that the structures do not fall within the
JUSMAG but within the Diplomatic and Consular Area, the petition should already fail.
NOTES
4C (2020 – 2021)
TOPIC Test of sufficiency of cause of action
CASE TITLE MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL II COOPERATIVE, INC., petitioner, vs .
VIRGILIO S. DAVID, respondent
DOCTRINE
To determine the existence of a cause of action, only the statements in the complaint may be properly considered. The
test of sufficiency of facts alleged in the complaint as constituting a cause of action is whether or not admitting the facts
alleged, the court could render a valid verdict in accordance with the prayer of said complaint.
FACTS
Private respondent Virgilio S. David, a supplier of electrical hardware, filed a case for specific performance and damages
against Misamis Occidental II Electric Cooperative, Inc. (MOELCI II), a rural electric cooperative in Misamis Occidental
predicated on a document attached as Annex ―A‖ to the Amended Complaint that according to David is the contract
pursuant to which he sold to MOELCI II one (1) unit of 10 MVA Transformer.
MOELCI II filed its Answer to Amended Complaint which pleaded, among others, affirmative defenses which also
constitute grounds for dismissal of the complaint due to lack of cause of action, there being allegedly no enforceable
contract between David and MOELCI II.
In accordance with Section 6, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, MOELCI II filed with the trial court a Motion
(For Preliminary Hearing of Affirmative Defenses and Deferment of Pre-Trial Conference) that the document
attached as Annex "A" to the Amended Complaint was only a quotation letter and not a contract as alleged by
David. Thus, it contends that David's Amended Complaint is dismissible for failure to state a cause of action.
In his opposition to MOELCI II's Motion, David contended that because a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to
state a cause of action is required to be based only on the allegations of the complaint, the "quotation letter," being merely
an attachment to the complaint and not part of its allegations, cannot be inquired into. MOELCI II asserted that a complaint
cannot be separated from its annexes; hence, the trial court in resolving a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to
state a cause of action must consider the complaint's annexes.
ISSUE
Is MOELCI II correct?
HELD
No. A preliminary hearing permitted under Section 6, Rule 16, is not mandatory even when the same is prayed for. It
rests largely on the sound discretion of the court.
To determine the existence of a cause of action, only the statements in the complaint may be properly considered. It is
error for the court to take cognizance of external facts or hold preliminary hearings to determine their existence. If the
allegations in a complaint furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be
dismissed regardless of the defenses that may be averred by the defendants.The test of sufficiency of facts alleged in
the complaint as constituting a cause of action is whether or not admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid
verdict in accordance with the prayer of said complaint.
In the case at bar, it has been hypothetically admitted that the parties had entered into a contract sale David bound
himself to supply MOELCI II (1) unit 10 MVA Power transformer with accessories for a total price of P5,200,000.00 plus
69 KV Line Accessories for a total price of P2,169,500.00; that despite written and verbal demands, MOELCI II has failed
to pay the price thereof plus the custom duties and incidental expenses of P272,722.27; and that apart from the previously
stated contract of sale, David regularly delivered various electrical hardware to MOELCI II which, despite demands, has
an outstanding balance of P281,939.76. We believe all the foregoing sufficiently lay out a cause of action. Even
extending our scrutiny to Annex "A," which is after all deemed a part of the Amended Complaint, will not result to a change
in our conclusion. The presence of the signatures of both the General Manager and the Chairman of the Committee of
Management immediately below the word "CONFORME" appearing on the document s last page lends credulity to
David‘s contention that there was, or might have been, a meeting of minds on the terms embodied therein.
In fact, the ambiguity of the import and nature of Annex "A" which necessitates a resort to its proper interpretation, fortifies
the propriety of the trial court's denial of MOELCI II's Motion. The interpretation of a document requires introduction of
evidence which is precisely disallowed in determining whether or not a complaint states a cause of action. CA therefore
correctly dismissed MOELCI II's petition and upheld the trial court's ruling.
NOTES
4C (2020 – 2021)
TOPIC Splitting of a single cause of action and its effects
CASE TITLE Marilag v Martinez
GR NO. 201892 DATE: July 22, 2015
DOCTRINE
In loan contracts secured by a real estate mortgage, the rule is that the creditor-mortgagee has a single
cause of action against the debtor-mortgagor, i.e., to recover the debt, through the filing of a personal action
for collection of sum of money or the institution of a real action to foreclose on the mortgage security. The
two remedies are alternative, not cumulative or successive, and each remedy is complete by itself.
FACTS
On July 30, 1992, Rafael Martinez, respondent's father, obtained a loan from the petitioner secured by a
real estate mortgage. Rafael failed to settle his obligation upon maturity despite repeated demands,
prompting petitioner to file a Complaint for Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage before the RTC of
Imus, Cavite, Branch 90.
Rafael failed to file his answer and, upon petitioner's motion, was declared in default. After an ex
parte presentation of petitioner's evidence, the RTC-Imus ruled in favor of the petitioner. Accordingly, it
ordered Rafael to pay petitioner the amount of P229,200.00. Records did not show that this Decision had
already attained finality.
Prior to knowledge of the above decision, the respondent bound himself with the petitioner to pay for the
debt of his father. After paying P400,000.00, apparently due to calculation of interests incurred, he promised
to pay the remaining P229,000.00 with a promissory note. Upon learning of the decision, the respondent
refused to pay, which then prompted the petitioner to file suit for collection of sum of money from the
promissory note. Respondent averred that the petitioner had no cause of action against him and that he
actually overpaid.
Initially, the court a quo ruled in favor of the respondent by claiming that the extinguishment of the debt of
his father to the petitioner was to his favor. But the same court reversed its decision following the motion for
reconsideration of the petitioner, declaring that the foreclosure suit was distinct and separate from the
collection suit. Respondent’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the court a quo, and later denied the motion for
reconsideration of the respondent. It held that the doctrine of res judicata finds application in the instant
case, considering that both the judicial foreclosure and collection cases were filed as a consequence of the
non-payment of Rafael's loan, which was the principal obligation secured by the real estate mortgage and
the primary consideration for the execution of the subject promissory note.
ISSUE
Whether or not the foreclosure suit was distinct and separate from the collection suit and hence, there is no
splitting of causes of action.
HELD
NO. Petitioner's contention that the judicial foreclosure and collection cases enforce independent rights must,
fail because the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage and the subject PN both refer to one and the same
obligation, i.e., Rafael's loan obligation. As such, there exists only one cause of action for a single breach of
that obligation. Petitioner cannot split her cause of action on Rafael's unpaid loan obligation by filing a petition
for the judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage covering the said loan, and, thereafter, a personal action
for the collection of the unpaid balance of said obligation not comprising a deficiency arising from foreclosure,
without violating the proscription against splitting a single cause of action, where the ground for dismissal is
either res judicata or litis pendentia, as in this case.
In loan contracts secured by a real estate mortgage, the rule is that the creditor-mortgagee has a single cause
of action against the debtor-mortgagor, i.e., to recover the debt, through the filing of a personal action for
collection of sum of money or the institution of a real action to foreclose on the mortgage security. The two
remedies are alternative, not cumulative or successive, and each remedy is complete by itself. Thus, if the
creditor-mortgagee opts to foreclose the real estate mortgage, he waives the action for the collection of the
unpaid debt, except only for the recovery of whatever deficiency may remain in the outstanding obligation of
the debtor-mortgagor after deducting the bid price in the public auction sale of the mortgaged
properties. Accordingly, a deficiency judgment shall only issue after it is established that the mortgaged
property was sold at public auction for an amount less than the outstanding obligation.
In the present case, records show that petitioner, as creditor-mortgagee, instituted an action for judicial
foreclosure pursuant to the provisions of Rule 68 of the Rules of Court in order to recover on Rafael's debt. In
light of the foregoing discussion, the availment of such remedy thus bars recourse to the subsequent filing of
a personal action for collection of the same debt, in this case, under the principle of litis pendentia, considering
that the foreclosure case only remains pending as it was not shown to have attained finality.
While the ensuing collection case was anchored on the promissory note executed by respondent who was not
the original debtor, the same does not constitute a separate and distinct contract of loan which would have
given rise to a separate cause of action upon breach. Notably, records are bereft of any indication that
respondent's agreement to pay Rafael's loan obligation and the execution of the subject PN extinguished by
novation the contract of loan between Rafael and petitioner, in the absence of express agreement or any act
of equal import. Well-settled is the rule that novation is never presumed, but must be clearly and unequivocally
shown. Thus, in order for a new agreement to supersede the old one, the parties to a contract must expressly
agree that they are abrogating their old contract in favor of a new one, which was not shown here.
NOTES
4C (2020 – 2021)
TOPIC Splitting of a single cause of action
CASE TITLE Yap vs. First E-bank Corporation
DOCTRINE
A creditor who obtains a personal judgment against the debtor on a loan waives his right to foreclose on the
mortgage securing loan. Otherwise, the creditor becomes guilty of splitting a single cause of action.
FACTS
August 30, 1990, Sammy Yap obtained a P2M loan from PDCP Development bank. As security, Sammy's parents,
petitioners Simon Yap and Milagros Guevarra, executed a third-party mortgage on their land and warehouse standing
on it. The mortgage agreement provided that PDCP may extrajudicially foreclose the property in case Sammy failed to
pay the loan.
November 7, 1990, Sammy issued a promissory note and six postdated checks in favor of PDCP as additional security
of the loan.
When Sammy defaulted on the payment of his loan, PDCP presented the six checks the drawee bank but the said checks
were dishonored.
On February 8, 1993, PDCP filed a complaint against Sammy for six counts of violation of BP 22 (Bouncing Checks Law).
On December 16, 1993, the BP 22 cases were provisionally dismissed.
On October 26, 1994, pursuant to the petition of PDCP for extrajudicial foreclosure, the extrajudicial sale was set on
December 28, 1994.
December 20, 1994, petitioners filed in the RTC of San Carlos City a complaint of injunction, damages and accounting
of payments against PDCP. Petitioner‘s complaint sought to stop the foreclosure sale on the ground that PDCP waived
its right to foreclose the mortgage on their property when it filed the BP22 cases against Sammy.
On April 2, 1997, RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. The RTC ruled that the remedies available for PDCP were alternative
and the choice of one excluded the others. Thus, PDCP was deemed to have waived its right to foreclose on the property
of the petitioners when it elected to sue Sammy for violation of BP 22.
On February 8, 2005, the CA reversed the RTC. It opined that PDCP was not barred from exercising its right to foreclose
on the property of petitioners despite suing Sammy for violation of BP22. The purpose of BP22 was to punish the act of
issuing a worthless check, not to force a debtor to pay his debt.
ISSUE
Whether PDCP is barred to foreclose the property
HELD
No. Circular 57-97 (and, it goes without saying, Section 1(b), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court) was not yet in force when
PDCP sued Sammy for violation of BP 22 and when it filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure on the mortgaged
property of petitioners on February 8, 1993 and May 3, 1993, respectively. Thus, prior to the effectivity of Circular 57-97,
the alternative remedies of foreclosure of mortgage and collection suit were not barred even if a suit for BP 22 had been
filed earlier, unless a judgment of conviction had already been rendered in the BP 22 case finding the accused debtor
criminally liable and ordering him to pay the amount of the check(s)
In this case, no judgment of conviction (which could have declared the criminal and civil liability of Sammy) was rendered
because Sammy moved for the provisional dismissal of the case. Hence, PDCP could have still foreclosed on the
mortgage or filed a collection suit.
Nonetheless, records show that, during the pendency of the BP 22 case, Sammy had already paid PDCP the total amount
of P1,783,582.14 Thus, to prevent unjust enrichment on the part of the creditor, any foreclosure by PDCP should only be
for the unpaid balance.
we state the rule at present: If the debtor fails (or unjustly refuses) to pay his debt when it falls due and the debt is secured
by a mortgage and by a check, the creditor has three options against the debtor and the exercise of one will bar the
exercise of the others. He may pursue either of the three but not all or a combination of them.
First, the creditor may file a collection suit against the debtor. This will open up all the properties of the debtor to
attachment and execution, even the mortgaged property itself. Second, the creditor may opt to foreclose on the
mortgaged property. In case the debt is not fully satisfied, he may sue the debtor for deficiency judgment (not a collection
case for the whole indebtedness), in which case, all the properties of the debtor, other than the mortgaged property, are
again opened up for the satisfaction of the deficiency.20 Lastly, the creditor may opt to sue the debtor for violation of BP
22 if the checks securing the obligation bounce. Circular 57-97 and Section 1(b), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court both
provide that the criminal action for violation of BP 22 shall be deemed to necessarily include the corresponding civil
action, i.e., a collection suit. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed or recognized.
NOTES
4C (2020 – 2021)
TOPIC RULE 2- Splitting of a single cause of action and its effects
CASE TITLE Umale v. Canoga Park Development Corp.
GR NO. 167246 DATE:July 20, 2011
DOCTRINE
Litis pendentia exists when the following requisites are present:
1. identity of the parties in the two actions;
2. substantial identity in the causes of action and in the reliefs sought by the parties; and
3. the identity between the two actions should be such that any judgment that may be rendered in one
case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.
FACTS
The parties entered into a Contract of Lease whereby the petitioner agreed to lease, for a period of two
(2) years starting from January 16, 2000, an eight hundred sixty (860)-square-meter prime lot located
in Ortigas Center, Pasig City owned by the respondent. The respondent acquired the subject lot from
Ortigas & Co. Ltd. Partnership through a Deed of Absolute Sale, subject to the following conditions: (1)
that no shopping arcades or retail stores, restaurants, etc. shall be allowed to be established on the
property, except with the prior written consent from Ortigas & Co. Ltd. Partnership and (2) that the
respondent and/or its successors-in-interest shall become member/s of the Ortigas Center Association,
Inc. (Association), and shall abide by its rules and regulations.
On October 10, 2000, before the lease contract expired, the respondent filed an unlawful detainer case
against the petitioner before the Metropolitan Trial Court citing as a ground for ejectment the
petitioner’s violation of stipulations in the lease contract regarding the use of the property. Under this
contract, the petitioner shall use the leased lot as a parking space for light vehicles and as a site for a
small drivers’ canteen, and may not utilize the subject premises for other purposes without the
respondent’s prior written consent. The petitioner, however, constructed restaurant buildings and other
commercial establishments on the lot, without first securing the required written consent from the
respondent, and the necessary permits from the Association and the Ortigas & Co. Ltd. Partnership. The
petitioner also subleased the property to various merchants-tenants in violation of the lease contract.
The MTC Ruled in favor of respondent and the RTC affirmed the MTC’s decision. However, the case was
re-raffled to another RTC upon inhibition by the previous presiding judge. During the pendency of the
Petition for Review of the case, respondent filed another case with another MTC resulting in two
unlawful detainer cases filed before separate courts. Respondent filed a Petition for Review claiming that
there was no litis pendentia between the two civil cases as the two cases involved different grounds for
ejectment—the first case was filed because of violations of the lease contract, while the second case
was filed due to the expiration of the lease contract.
ISSUE
Whether litis pendentia existed between the two subject cases

HELD
NO. Litis pendentia exists when the following requisites are present:
2. identity of the parties in the two actions;
2. substantial identity in the causes of action and in the reliefs sought by the parties; and
3. the identity between the two actions should be such that any judgment that may be rendered in one
case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.
Several tests exist to ascertain whether two suits relate to a single or common cause of action,
1. whether the same evidence would support and sustain both the first and second causes of action or
the "same evidence" test
2. Whether the defenses in one case may be used to substantiate the complaint in the other.
3. Whether the cause of action in the second case existed at the time of the filing of the first complaint.
Of the three tests cited, the third one is especially applicable to the present case, i.e., whether the
cause of action in the second case existed at the time of the filing of the first complaint – and to which
we answer in the negative. The facts clearly show that the filing of the first ejectment case was
grounded on the petitioner’s violation of stipulations in the lease contract, while the filing of the second
case was based on the expiration of the lease contract. At the time the respondent filed the first
ejectment complaint on October 10, 2000, the lease contract between the parties was still in effect. The
lease was fixed for a period of two (2) years, from January 16, 2000, and in the absence of a renewal
agreed upon by the parties, the lease remained effective until January 15, 2002. It was only at the
expiration of the lease contract that the cause of action in the second ejectment complaint accrued and
made available to the respondent as a ground for ejecting the petitioner. Thus, the cause of action in
the second case was not yet in existence at the time of filing of the first ejectment case.
NOTES
credit is due.
4C (2020 – 2021)
TOPIC Splitting a single cause of action and its effects
CASE TITLE CATALINA B. CHU, THEANLYN B. CHU, THEAN CHING LEE B. CHU, THEAN LEEWN B.
CHU, and MARTIN LAWRENCE B. CHU, Petitioners, vs. SPS. FERNANDO C. CUNANAN and
TRINIDAD N. CUNANAN, BENELDA ESTATE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, and SPS.
AMADO E. CARLOS and GLORIA A. CARLOS, Respondents
DOCTRINE
If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits
in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others
FACTS
SPS. CHU executed a deed of sale with assumption of mortgage involving their 5 parcels of land in San Fernando,
Pampanga, registered under TCT of in favor of CUNANAN for the consideration of ₱5M. They executed a side
agreement, whereby they clarified that Cunanan had paid only ₱1M to the Chus despite the Chus having acknowledged
receiving ₱5M; that the amount of ₱1.6M was to be paid directly to Benito Co and to Security Bank and Trust Company in
whose favor the five lots had been mortgaged; and that Cunanan would pay the balance within three months, with a grace
period of one month subject to interest. Parties further stipulated that the ownership of the lots would remain with the
Chus as the vendors and would be transferred to Cunanan only upon complete payment of the total consideration and
compliance with the terms of the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage. The Chus executed a SPA authorizing
Cunanan to borrow ₱5M from any banking institution and to mortgage the five lots as security, and then to deliver the
proceeds to the Chus net of the balance of the mortgage obligation and the downpayment.
Cunanan was able to transfer the title of the 5 lots to her name without the knowledge of the Chus, and to borrow money
with the lots as security without paying the balance of the purchase price to the Chus. She later transferred two of the lots
to SPS. CARLOSES. As a result, the Chus caused the annotation of an unpaid vendor’s lien on three of the lots. Still,
Cunanan assigned the remaining three lots to COOL TOWN REALTY despite the annotation.
[FIRST CIVIL CASE] On 1988, the Chus commenced Civil Case in the RTC to recover the unpaid balance from Sps.
Cuunanans. Five years later, the Chus amended the complaint to seek the annulment of the deed of sale with assumption
of mortgage and of the TCTs issued pursuant to the deed, and to recover damages. They impleaded Cool Town, and the
Registry of Deeds as defendants. Carloses had meanwhile sold the two lots to BENELDA ESTATE, the Chus further
amended the complaint to implead Benelda Estate as additional defendant. Benelda Estate filed its answer with a motion
to dismiss, claiming, among others, that the amended complaint stated no cause of action because it had acted in good
faith in buying the affected lots. After the RTC denied its motion to dismiss, CA upheld the dismissal of Civil Case.
[COMPROMISE AGREEMENT] On 1999, the Chus, the Cunanans, and Cool Town Realty entered into a compromise
agreement, where the Cunanans transferred to the Chus their 50% share in "all the parcels of land " registered in the
name of Cool Town Realty "for and in consideration of the full settlement of their case." The RTC approved the
compromise.
[SECOND CIVL CASE] On 2001, the petitioners brought another suit, Civil Case against the Carloses and Benelda
Estate seeking the cancellation of the TCTs of the two lots in the name of Benelda Estate, and the issuance of new TCTs
in their favor, plus damages. The petitioners impleaded the Cunanans as additional defendants.
The Cunanans moved to dismiss the complaint based on the ff: (a) bar by prior judgment, and (b) the claim or demand
had been paid, waived, and abandoned. Benelda Estate likewise moved to dismiss the amended complaint, citing as
grounds: (a) forum shopping; (b) bar by prior judgment, and (c) failure to state a cause of action. On their part, the
Carloses raised affirmative defenses in their answer, namely: (a) the failure to state a cause of action; (b) res judicata or
bar by prior judgment; and (c) bar by statute of limitations.
RTC denied both motions to dismiss, holding that the action was not barred by res judicata because there was no identity
of parties and subject matter; and that the compromise agreement involved only the three parcels of land registered in the
name of Cool Town Realty. CA did not agree ruling that the compromise agreement had ended the legal controversy
between the parties with respect to the cause of action arising from the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage
covering all the five parcels of land; that both Civil Cases involved the violation by the Cunanans of the same legal right
under the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage; and that the filing of 2nd Civil Case contravened the rule against
splitting of a cause of action, and rendered it subject of a motion to dismiss based on bar by res judicata. Hence, this
appeal.
ISSUE
W/N petitioners were guilty of splitting their single cause of action to enforce or rescind the deed of sale with assumption
of mortgage.
HELD
YES. The compromise agreement indicate that the parties intended to thereby settle all their claims against each other.
Such intent is expressed in the phrase any and all their respective claims against each other as alleged in the pleadings
they respectively filed in connection with this case, which was broad enough to cover whatever claims the petitioners
might assert based on the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage. To limit the compromise agreement only to the three
lots mentioned therein would contravene the avowed objective of Civil Case to enforce or to rescind the entire deed of
sale with assumption of mortgage. Such interpretation is akin to saying that the Cunanans separately sold the five lots,
which is not the truth. For one, Civil Case No. G-1936 did not demand separate amounts for each of the purchased lots.
Also, the compromise agreement did not state that the value being thereby transferred to the petitioners by the Cunanans
corresponded only to that of the three lots.
Apparently, the petitioners were guilty of splitting their single cause of action to enforce or rescind the deed of sale with
assumption of mortgage. Splitting a single cause of action is the act of dividing a single or indivisible cause of action into
several parts or claims and instituting two or more actions upon them. A single cause of action or entire claim or demand
cannot be split up or divided in order to be made the subject of two or more different actions. The petitioners were not at
liberty to split their demand to enforce or rescind the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage and to prosecute
piecemeal or present only a portion of the grounds upon which a special relief was sought under the deed of sale with
assumption of mortgage, and then to leave the rest to be presented in another suit; otherwise, there would be no end to
litigation. Their splitting violated the policy against multiplicity of suits, whose primary objective was to avoid unduly
burdening the dockets of the courts. Their contravention of the policy merited the dismissal of the second Civil Case on
the ground of bar by res judicata.
Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment or decree on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is
conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits and on all points and matters determined in the
previous suit. The foundation principle upon which the doctrine rests is that the parties ought not to be permitted to litigate
the same issue more than once; that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law
or estate.
NOTES
In order that res judicata may bar the institution of a subsequent action, the following requisites must concur:–
(a) the former judgment must be final;
(b) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties;
(c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and
(d) there must be between the first and second actions (i) identity of parties, (ii) identity of the subject matter, and (iii)
identity of cause of action.
In this case,
1. The first Civil Case was already terminated under the compromise agreement, for the judgment, being upon a
compromise, was immediately final and unappealable.
2. RTC had jurisdiction over the cause of action in first Civil Case for the enforcement or rescission of the deed of sale
with assumption of mortgage, which was an action whose subject matter was not capable of pecuniary estimation.
3. the compromise agreement explicitly settled the entirety of Civil Case No. G-1936 by resolving all the claims of the
parties against each other
4. the Chus, on the one hand, and the Cunanans, on the other hand, were the parties in both cases along with their
respective privies. Both actions dealt with the properties involved in the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage;
Both civil cases were rooted in one and the same cause of action – the failure of Cunanan to pay in full the purchase
price of the five lots subject of the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage
Consequently, the Chus could not properly proceed against the respondents in second Civil Case, despite the silence of
the compromise agreement as to the Carloses and Benelda Estate, because there can only be one action where the
contract is entire, and the breach total, and the petitioners must therein recover all their claims and damages. The Chus
could not be permitted to split up a single cause of action and make that single cause of action the basis of several suits.
4C (2020 – 2021)
TOPIC Splitting a single cause of Action
CASE TITLE Riviera Golf Club, Inc v. CCA Holdings
GR NO. 173783 DATE: June 17, 2015
DOCTRINE
A cause of action may give rise to several reliefs, but only one action can be filed. A single cause of action or entire claim
or demand cannot be split up or divided into two or more different actions. The rule on prohibiting the splitting of a single
cause of action is clear as Section 4, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court expressly stated.
FACTS
On October 11, 1996, Riviera Golf entered into a Management Agreement with CCA Holdings, B.V. (CCA Holdings), a
foreign corporation, for the management and operation of the Club. Under this agreement, Riviera Golf would pay CCA
Holdings a monthly Base Management Fee plus an incentive Management Fee of 10% of the Gross Operating Profit.
The parties also entered into a co-terminous Royalty Agreement that would allow Riviera Golf and the Club's developer,
Armed Forces of the Philippines' Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS), to use CCA Holdings' name
and facilities to market the Club's shares. Riviera Golf initially paid the agreed fees, but defaulted in its payment of the
licensing fees and the reimbursement claims in September 1997. Riviera Golf likewise failed to pay the monthly
management and incentive fees in June 1999, prompting CCA Holdings to demand the amounts due under both
agreements.
In April 2001, CCA Holdings filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 146, Makati City, a complaint for sum of
money with damages docketed as Civil Case No. 01-611 (first complaint) against Riviera Golf. During the pendency of
the case, the parties tried to extrajudicially settle their differences and executed a Compromise Agreement. The RTC
then approved the Compromise Settlement.
Subsequently, or on November 22, 2002, CCA Holdings again sent a letter to Riviera Golf, this time, demanding the sum
of US$390,768.00 representing the projected net income or expected business profits it was supposed to derive for the
unexpired two-year term of the Management Agreement. As its demands went unheeded, CCA Holdings filed another
complaint for sum of money and damages docketed as Civil Case No. 03-399 (second complaint) before Branch 57 of
the RTC of Makati City.
Noting that the first and second complaints involve the same parties, the same subject matter, and the same causes of
action, Riviera Golf filed on August 6, 2003, a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of res judicata and violation of the rule
against splitting of causes of action. CCA Holdings opposed the motion contending that there is no splitting of causes of
action since the two cases are entirely independent of each other. CCA Holdings also justified its belated filing of the
second complaint, arguing that the needed financial records were in Riviera Golfs possession.
The RTC, Branch 57, Makati City granted the motion to dismiss, holding that the first and second complaints have
identical causes of action and subject matter. CA set aside the order granting the motion to dismiss, and remanded the
case to the RTC for adjudication on the merits. The CA held that res judicata and splitting of a single cause of action were
not committed.
ISSUE
Whether the CCA Holdings violated the prohibitions against res judicata and splitting a single cause of action when it
filed the claim for damages for unrealized profits
HELD
YES. Under the res judicata rule, a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive
as to the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits, and on all points and matters determined in the former suit.
Res judicata requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) it must have
been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits;
and (4) there must be, between the first and second actions (a) identity of parties, (b) identity of subject matter, and (c)
identity of causes of action.
Note: Only the requisite of identity of causes of action shall be discussed as it is under splitting causes of action.
All the elements of res judicata are present. The Court is also convinced that there is identity of causes of action between
the first and the second complaints.
A cause of action may give rise to several reliefs, but only one action can be filed. A single cause of action or entire claim
or demand cannot be split up or divided into two or more different actions. The rule on prohibiting the splitting of a single
cause of action is clear as Section 4, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court expressly stated.
In both Civil Case No. 01-611 and Civil Case No. 03-399, CCA Holdings imputed the same wrongful act - the alleged
violations of the terms and conditions of the Management and Royalty Agreements. In Civil Case No. 01-611, CCA
Holdings' cause of action rests on Riviera Golfs failure to pay the licensing fees, reimbursement claims, and monthly
management and incentive fees. In Civil Case No. 03-399 on the other hand, CCA Holdings' cause of action hinges on
the damages it allegedly incurred as a result of Riviera Golfs premature termination of the Management and Royalty
Agreements (i.e., the expected business profits it was supposed to derive for the unexpired two-year term of the
Management Agreement). Although differing in form, these two cases are ultimately anchored on Riviera Golfs breach of
the Management and Royalty Agreements. Thus, we conclude that they have identical causes of action.
Re: Stipulation in the Compromise Agreement

In the present case, a reading of paragraph 4 of the Compromise Agreement shows that it allows the filing of
complaints based on the same cause of action (i.e., breach of the Management and Royalty Agreements). Since
paragraph 4 allows the splitting of causes of action and res judicata, this provision of the Compromise Agreement should
be invalidated for being repugnant to our public policy.
Aguila v. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. held that: Public policy is firmly set against unnecessary multiplicity of suits; the
rule of res judicata, like that against splitting causes of action, are all applications of the same policy, that matters
once settled by a Court's final judgment should not thereafter be invoked against. Relitigation of issues already settled
merely burdens the Courts and the taxpayers, creates uneasiness and confusion, and wastes valuable time and energy
that could be devoted to worthier cases. As the Roman maxim goes, Non bis in idem
NOTES
4C (2020 – 2021)
TOPIC Joinder and Misjoinder of causes of action
CASE TITLE Sps. Perez v. Hermano
GR NO. GR No. 147417 DATE: July 8, 2005
DOCTRINE
While joinder of causes of action is largely left to the option of a party litigant, Section 5, Rule 2 of our present Rules
allows causes of action to be joined in one complaint conditioned upon the following requisites: (a) it will not violate the
rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties; and (b) the causes of action arise out of the same contract,
transaction or relation between the parties, or are for demands for money or are of the same nature and character.
Our rule on permissive joinder of causes of action, with the proviso subjecting it to the correlative rules on jurisdiction,
venue and joinder of parties and requiring a conceptual unity in the problems presented, effectively disallows unlimited
joinder.
FACTS
joinder.
FACTS: Petitioners Cristina Agraviador Aviso and spouses Victor and Milagros Perez filed a civil case for Enforcement
of Contract and Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of a TRO and/or Preliminary Injunction against Zescon Land,
Inc. and/or its President Zenie Sales-Contreras, Atty. Perlita Vitan-Ele and against respondent herein Antonio
Hermano. Respondent (then defendant) Hermano filed his Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim simultaneously filed
a Motion with Leave to Dismiss the Complaint or Ordered Severed for Separate Trial which was granted by the trial
court.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration which was denied by the trial court. Petitioners assert that respondent Hermano
should not have been dismissed from the complaint because: (1) He did not file a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of
the Rules of Court and, in fact, his Motion with Leave to Dismiss the Complaint or Ordered Severed for Separate Trial
was filed almost two years after he filed his Answer to the complaint; (2) There was no misjoinder of causes of action in
this case; and (3) There was no misjoinder of parties.
Defendant, on the other hand, alleged that petitioner, having filed a special civil action for judicial foreclosure of
mortgage and now pending before RTC, he should be dropped as one of the defendants in this case and whatever
claims plaintiffs may have against defendant Hermano, they can set it up by way of an answer to said judicial
foreclosure.
ISSUE
Whether or not the public respondent had plainly and manifestly acted with grave abuse of discretion, in excess of
jurisdiction, tantamount to lack of jurisdiction, in dismissing the complaint as against respondent Antonio Hermano in
civil case.
HELD
YES. To better understand the present controversy, it is vital to revisit the rules on joinder of causes of action as
exhaustively discussed in Republic v. Hernandez, thus:
By a joinder of actions, or more properly, a joinder of causes of action, is meant the uniting of two or more demands or
rights of action in one action; the statement of more than one cause of action in a declaration. It is the union of two or
more civil causes of action, each of which could be made the basis of a separate suit, in the same complaint,
declaration or petition. A plaintiff may under certain circumstances join several distinct demands, controversies or rights
of action in one declaration, complaint or petition.
As can easily be inferred from the above definitions, a party is generally not required to join in one suit several distinct
causes of action. The joinder of separate causes of action, where allowable, is permissive and not mandatory in the
absence of a contrary statutory provision, even though the causes of action arose from the same factual setting and
might under applicable joinder rules be joined. Modern statutes and rules governing joinders are intended to avoid a
multiplicity of suits and to promote the efficient administration of justice wherever this may be done without prejudice to
the rights of the litigants. To achieve these ends, they are liberally construed.
joinder.
Section 6, Rule 2 on misjoinder of causes of action provides:
Sec. 6. Misjoinder of causes of action. - Misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal of an action. A
misjoined cause of action may, on motion of a party or on the initiative of the court, be severed and proceeded with
separately.
There is misjoinder of causes of action when the conditions for joinder under Section 5, Rule 2 are not met. Section 5
provides:
Sec. 5. Joinder of causes of action. - A party may in one pleading assert, in the alternative or otherwise, as many
causes of action as he may have against an opposing party, subject to the following conditions:
(a) The party joining the causes of action shall comply with the rules on joinder of parties;
(b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions or actions governed by special rules;
(c) Where the causes of action are between the same parties but pertain to different venues or jurisdictions, the joinder
may be allowed in the Regional Trial Court provided one of the causes of action falls within the jurisdiction of said court
and the venue lies therein; and
(d) Where the claims in all the causes of action are principally for recovery of money, the aggregate amount claimed
shall be the test of jurisdiction.
In herein case, petitioners have adequately alleged in their complaint that after they had already agreed to enter into a
contract to sell with Zescon Land, Inc., through Sales-Contreras, the latter also gave them other documents to sign, to
wit: A Deed of Absolute Sale over the same properties but for a lower consideration, two mortgage deeds over the
same properties in favor of respondent Hermano with accompanying notes and acknowledgment receipts for
P10,000,000 each. Petitioners claim that Zescon Land, Inc., through Sales-Contreras, misled them to mortgage their
properties which they had already agreed to sell to the latter.
The joinder of causes of action should be liberally construed as to effect in one action a complete determination of all
matters in controversy involving one subject matter, we hold that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in
severing from the complaint petitioners cause of action against respondent Hermano.
NOTES
4C (2020 – 2021)
TOPIC Joinder and Misjoinder of Causes of Action
CASE TITLE DANILO v. PEDRO
GR NO. 155736 DATE: March 31, 2005
DOCTRINE
A joinder of causes of action is the uniting of two or more demands or right of action in a complaint. The question of the
joinder of causes of action involves in particular cases a preliminary inquiry as to whether two or more causes of action
are alleged. In declaring whether more than one cause of action is alleged, the main thrust is whether more than one
primary right or subject of controversy is present. Other tests are whether recovery on one ground would bar recovery
on the other, whether the same evidence would support the other different counts and whether separate actions could
be maintained for separate relief; or whether more than one distinct primary right or subject of controversy is alleged for
enforcement or adjudication.
FACTS
The petitioners, Spouses Danilo and Cristina Decena, were the owners of a parcel of land, with a house constructed
thereon, located in Parañaque, Metro Manila (now Parañaque City) covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
134391 issued on February 24, 1998.
On September 7, 1997, the petitioners and the respondents, the Spouses Pedro and Valeria Piquero, executed a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) in which the former sold the property to the latter for the price of P940,250.00 payable
in six (6) installments via postdated checks. The vendees forthwith took possession of the property. It appears in the
MOA that the petitioners obliged themselves to transfer the property to the respondents upon the execution of the MOA
with the condition that if two of the postdated checks would be dishonored by the drawee bank, the latter would be obliged
to reconvey the property to the petitioners.
On May 17, 1999, the petitioners, then residents of Malolos, Bulacan, filed a Complaint against the respondents with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, for the annulment of the sale/MOA, recovery of possession and
damages. The petitioners alleged therein that, they did not transfer the property to and in the names of the respondents
as vendees because the first two checks drawn and issued by them in payment for the purchase price of the property
were dishonored by the drawee bank, and were not replaced with cash despite demands therefor. The petitioners
declared in their complaint that the property subject of the complaint was valued at P6,900,000.00. They appended copies
of the MOA and TCT No. 134391 to their complaint.
The case was eventually raffled to Branch 13 of the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan.
The respondents filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground, inter alia, of improper venue and lack of jurisdiction
over the property subject matter of the action. On the first ground, the respondents averred that the principal action of the
petitioners for the rescission of the MOA, and the recovery of the possession of the property is a real action and not a
personal one; hence, it should have been brought in the RTC of Parañaque City, where the property subject matter of
the action was located, and not in the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, where the petitioners resided. The respondents posited
that the said court had no jurisdiction over the property subject matter of the action because it was located Parañaque
City.
In opposition, the petitioners insisted that their action for damages and attorney's fees is a personal action and not a real
action; hence, it may be filed in the RTC of Bulacan where they reside. They averred that while their second cause of
action for the recovery of the possession of the property is a real action, the same may, nevertheless, be joined with the
rest of their causes of action for damages, conformably with Section 5(c), Rule 2 of the Rules of Court.
By way of reply, the respondents averred that Section 5(c), Rule 2 of the Rules of Court applies only when one or more
of multiple causes of action falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the first level courts, and the other or others are within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC, and the venue lies therein.
On February 9, 2000, the trial court issued an Order denying the motion for lack of merit. It found merit in the petitioner's
contention that Section 5(c), Rule 2 was applicable.
Meanwhile, the case was re-raffled to Branch 10 of the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan. In a Motion dated December 20, 2000,
the respondents prayed for the reconsideration of the trial court's February 9, 2000 Order. On October 16, 2001, the court
issued an Order granting the motion and ordered the dismissal of the complaint. It ruled that the principal action of the
petitioners was a real action and should have been filed in the RTC of Parañaque City where the property subject matter
of the complaint was located. However, since the case was filed in the RTC of Bulacan where the petitioners reside,
which court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, it must be dismissed.
ISSUE
Whether or not venue was properly laid by the petitioners in the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan
HELD
NO, the venue was improperly laid by the petitioners in the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan.
Under Section 5, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, a party may, in one pleading, assert, in the alternative or otherwise, as
many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party subject to the conditions therein enumerated, one of
which is Section 5(c) which reads:
(c) Where the causes of action are between the same parties but pertain to different venues or jurisdiction, the
joinder may be allowed in the Regional Trial Court provided one of the causes of action falls within the jurisdiction
of said court and the venue lies therein;
A joinder of causes of action is the uniting of two or more demands or right of action in a complaint. The question of the
joinder of causes of action involves in particular cases a preliminary inquiry as to whether two or more causes of action
are alleged. In declaring whether more than one cause of action is alleged, the main thrust is whether more than one
primary right or subject of controversy is present. Other tests are whether recovery on one ground would bar recovery on
the other, whether the same evidence would support the other different counts and whether separate actions could be
maintained for separate relief; or whether more than one distinct primary right or subject of controversy is alleged for
enforcement or adjudication.
A cause of action may be single although the plaintiff seeks a variety of remedies. The mere fact that the plaintiff prays
for multiple reliefs does not indicate that he has stated more than one cause of action. The prayer may be an aid in
interpreting the petition and in determining whether or not more than one cause of action is pleaded. If the allegations of
the complaint show one primary right and one wrong, only one cause of action is alleged even though other matters are
incidentally involved, and although different acts, methods, elements of injury, items of claims or theories of recovery are
set forth. Where two or more primary rights and wrongs appear, there is a joinder of causes of action.
Here, Section 5(c), Rule 2 of the Rules of Court does not apply. This is so because the petitioners, as plaintiffs in the
court a quo, had only one cause of action against the respondents, namely, the breach of the MOA upon the latter's
refusal to pay the first two installments in payment of the property as agreed upon, and turn over to the petitioners the
possession of the real property, as well as the house constructed thereon occupied by the respondents. The claim for
damages for reasonable compensation for the respondents' use and occupation of the property, in the interim, as well as
moral and exemplary damages suffered by the petitioners on account of the aforestated breach of contract of the
respondents are merely incidental to the main cause of action, and are not independent or separate causes of action.
The action of the petitioners for the rescission of the MOA on account of the respondents' breach thereof and the latter's
failure to return the premises subject of the complaint to the petitioners, and the respondents' eviction therefrom is a real
action. As such, the action should have been filed in the proper court where the property is located, namely, in Parañaque
City, conformably with Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.
NOTES
4C (2020 – 2021)
TOPIC Joinder & Misjoinder of Causes of Action — Totality Rule
CASE TITLE Flores v. Mallare-Philipps
GR NO. L-66620 DATE: September 24, 1986
DOCTRINE
The totality rule is applied to cases where two or more plaintiffs having separate causes of action against a defendant
join in a single complaint, as well as to cases where a plaintiff has separate causes of action against two or more
defendants joined in a single complaint. However, the causes of action in favor of the two or more plaintiffs or against
the two or more defendants should arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions and there should be a
common question of law or fact, as provided in Section 6 of Rule 3.
FACTS
Petitioner filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City and Benguet Province. The first cause of
action alleged in the complaint was against respondent Binongcal for refusing to pay the amount of P11,643.00
representing cost of truck tires which he purchased on credit from petitioner on various occasions from August to
October, 1981; and the second cause of action was against respondent Fernando Calion for allegedly refusing to pay
the amount of P10,212.00 representing cost of truck tires which he purchased on credit from petitione r on several
occasions from March, 1981 to January, 1982.
The counsel for Binongcal filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the amount of the
demand against said respondent was only P11,643.00, and under Section 19(8) of BP129 the RTC shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction if the amount of the demand is more than twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00). It was
further averred in said motion that although another person (Calion) was allegedly indebted to petitioner in the amount
of P10,212.00, his obligation was separate and distinct from that of the other respondent. At the hearing of said motion,
counsel for respondent Calion joined in moving for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Counsel for petitioner opposed the Motion to Dismiss.
RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE
Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction over the case following the totality rule introduced in Section 33(l) of BP129 and
Section 11 of the Interim Rules
HELD
The court ruled in the negative.
The pertinent portion of Section 33(l) of BP129 reads as follows:
xxx Provided,That where there are several claims or causes of action between the same or different
parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims
in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or
different transactions. xxx
Section 11 of the Interim Rules provides thus:
Application of the totality rule. - In actions where the jurisdiction of the court is dependent on the
amount involved, the test of jurisdiction shall be the aggregate sum of all the money demands,
exclusive only of interest and costs, irrespective of whether or not the separate claims are owned by or
due to different parties. If any demand is for damages in a civil action, the amount thereof must be
specifically alleged.
Under the present law, the totality rule is applied to cases where two or more plaintiffs having separate causes of action
against a defendant join in a single complaint, as well as to cases where a plaintiff has separate causes of action
against two or more defendants joined in a single complaint. However, the causes of action in favor of the two or more
plaintiffs or against the two or more defendants should arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions and
there should be a common question of law or fact. Section 6 of Rule 3 provides that:
Permissive joinder of parties. - All persons in whom or against whom any right to relief in respect to or arising
out of the same transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the
alternative, may, except as otherwise provided in these rules, join as plaintiffs or be joined as defendants in one
complaint, where any question of law or fact common to all such plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise in
the action; but the court may make such orders as may be just to prevent any plaintiff or defendant from being
embarrassed or put to expense in connection with any proceedings in which he may have no interest.
In cases of permissive joinder of parties, whether as plaintiffs or as defendants, under Section 6 of Rule 3, the total of
all the claims shall furnish the jurisdictional test. If instead of joining or being joined in one complaint, separate actions
are filed by or against the parties, the amount demanded in each complaint shall furnish the jurisdictional test .
In the present case, the RTC correctly held that the jurisdictional test is subject to the rules on joinder of parties
pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 2 and Section 6 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. In this case, there is a misjoinder of
parties for the reason that the claims against respondents Binongcal and Calion are separate and distinct and neither of
which falls within its jurisdiction.
NOTES
4C (2020 – 2021)
TOPIC Rule 3- Parties to Civil Actions
CASE TITLE MONSENOR ALFRED VERZOSA vs. ZOSIMO FERNANDEZ, ET AL.
GR NO. L-32276 DATE: November 19, 1930
DOCTRINE
The complaint contained a statement to the effect that the defendants were employing the properties of the
brotherhood in contravention of the spirit and purpose of the trust. Upon this it was held that, in the exercise of
their equitable powers, our courts have undoubted jurisdiction to compel a trustee to account for the trust funds
in his hands and property to perform his trust.
FACTS
This action was originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Laguna, on June 22, 1925,
by Monseñor Alfredo Verzosa, as Roman Catholic Apostolic Bishop for the Diocese of Lipa, constituted as a
unipersonal religious corporation, for the purpose of compelling the defendants Zosimo Fernandez and others
to account for a fund held by them as members of the board of directors, or directorate, of the Brotherhood
(Hermano Mayor y Demas Hermanos de la Mesa de la Archicofradia) of the Most Holy Sacrament, of the town
of Pagsanjan, and for other purposes. The defendants demurred, and the demurer was sustained. From that
decision an appeal was prosecuted to the Supreme Court; and on November 22, 1926, the judgment
sustaining the demurrer was reversed and the cause remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings in
conformity with the opinion of this court.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the foundation.
HELD
YES. The complaint contained a statement to the effect that the defendants were employing the properties of
the brotherhood in contravention of the spirit and purpose of the trust. Upon this it was held that, in the
exercise of their equitable powers, our courts have undoubted jurisdiction to compel a trustee to account for
the trust funds in his hands and property to perform his trust. In this connection we note that, under the terms
of the foundation, the board of directors of the brotherhood was required to account to the gobernadorcillo, for
the time being, of the town of Pagsanjan. But in view of the fact that officials of the civil government have, since
the change of sovereignty in these Islands, ceased to concern themselves with the performance of this trust, it
was observed that in this action the defendants should be required to account to the court.
NOTES
4C (2020 – 2021)
TOPIC RULE 3 (PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS) – Real Parties In Interest
CASE TITLE EVANGELISTA vs. SANTIAGO
GR NO. 157447 DATE: 29 APRIL 2005
DOCTRINE
 Lack of legal capacity to sue means that the plaintiff is not in the exercise of his civil rights, or does not have the
necessary qualification to appear in the case, or does not have the character or representation he claims. On the
other hand, a case is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof that the plaintiff is not the real party-in-
interest, hence grounded on failure to state a cause of action.
 The term "lack of capacity to sue" should not be confused with the term "lack of personality to sue." While the
former refers to a plaintiff's general disability to sue, such as on account of minority, insanity, incompetence, lack of
juridical personality or any other general disqualifications of a party, the latter refers to the fact that the plaintiff is
not the real party- ininterest. Correspondingly, the first can be a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the
ground of lack of legal capacity to sue; whereas the second can be used as a ground for a motion to dismiss based
on the fact that the complaint, on the face thereof, evidently states no cause of action.
FACTS
Petitioners alleged that they occupied and possessed parcels of land, located in Montalban, Rizal by virtue of several
Deeds of Assignment, dated 15 April 1994 and 02 June 1994, executed by a certain Ismael Favila y Rodriguez.
According to the Deeds of Assignment, the subject property formed part of "Hacienda Quibiga," which was awarded to
Don Hermogenes Rodriguez by the Queen of Spain and evidenced by a Spanish title. Ismael Favila claimed to be one
of the heirs and successors-in-interest of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. Acting as Attorney-in-Fact pursuant to a Special
Power of Attorney executed by his "mga kapatid" on 25 February 1965, Ismael Favila signed the aforementioned
Deeds of Assignment, assigning portions of the subject property to the petitioners in exchange for the labor and work
done on the subject property by the petitioners and their predecessors.
Petitioners came by information that respondent was planning to evict them from the subject property. Two of the
petitioners had actually received notices to vacate. Their investigations revealed that the Subject Property was included
in TCTs No. 53028, No. 281660, No. N-39258 and No. 205270, all originating from OCT No. 670, and now in the name
of respondent, which was issued to Isabel Manahan and 3 others. The whole property was then transferred to
Manahan, then to her son respondent Carmelino Santiago by Deed of Donation.
Petitioners filed with the trial court, on 29 April 1996, an action for declaration of nullity of respondent's certificates
of title on the basis that OCT No. 670 was fake and spurious.
As an affirmative defense, respondent claimed that the petitioners had NO LEGAL CAPACITY to file the Complaint,
and thus, the Complaint stated NO CAUSE OF ACTION.
The trial court issued the questioned Order, dated 05 February 1999, dismissing petitioners' Complaint. After the trial
court denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.
The Court of Appeals, affirmed the Order of the trial court, dated 05 February 1999, dismissing petitioners' Complaint.
ISSUE
Whether or not Evangelista, et al. have the legal personality to file the complaint against Santiago.
HELD
No. They were not able to prove their claim of ownership.
According to the respondent, petitioners had no legal capacity to file the Complaint, and thus, the Complaint filed before
the trial court stated no cause of action. Before anything else, it should be clarified that "the plaintiff has no legal
capacity to sue"23 and "the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action" are two different grounds for a
motion to dismiss or are two different affirmative defenses. Failure to distinguish between "the lack of legal capacity to
sue" from "the lack of personality to sue" is a fairly common mistake. The difference between the two is explained by
this Court in Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals:
Lack of legal capacity to sue means that the plaintiff is not in the exercise of his civil rights, or does not have the
necessary qualification to appear in the case, or does not have the character or representation he claims. On the other
hand, a case is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof that the plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest,
hence grounded on failure to state a cause of action. The term "lack of capacity to sue" should not be confused with the
term "lack of personality to sue." While the former refers to a plaintiff’s general disability to sue, such as on account of
minority, insanity, incompetence, lack of juridical personality or any other general disqualifications of a party, the latter
refers to the fact that the plaintiff is not the real party- in-interest. Correspondingly, the first can be a ground for a motion
to dismiss based on the ground of lack of legal capacity to sue; whereas the second can be used as a ground for a
motion to dismiss based on the fact that the complaint, on the face thereof, evidently states no cause of action.
In the present case, this Court may assume that the respondent is raising the affirmative defense that the Complaint
filed by the petitioners before the trial court stated no cause of action because the petitioners lacked the personality to
sue, not being the real party-in-interest. It is the respondent’s contention that only the State can file an action for
annulment of his certificates of title, since such an action will result in the reversion of the ownership of the Subject
Property to the State.
***NOTE: This case has a lengthy discussion of the ruling. But the gist is that, the trial court believed that petitioners’
action was ultimately one for reversion of the Subject Property to the public domain, but the SC said that the trial court
was wrong because petitioners never alleged that the Subject Property was part of the public domain. The SC then
mentioned that petitioners further averred that rather than an action for nullity of respondent’s certificates of title, thei rs
was more appropriately an action to remove a cloud on or to quiet their title over the Subject Property.****
Even as this Court agrees with the petitioners that their action was one for removal of a cloud on or quieting of title, it
does arrive at the same conclusion as the trial court and the Court of Appeals that petitioners had no personality to file
the said action, not being the parties-in-interest, and their Complaint should be dismissed for not stating a cause of
action.
Petitioners failed to allege any other basis for their titles in their Complaint aside from possession of the Subject
Property from time immemorial, which this Court has already controverted; and the Spanish title, which is already
ineffective to prove ownership over the Subject Property.
Therefore, without legal or equitable title to the Subject Property, the petitioners lacked the personality to file an action
for removal of a cloud on, or quieting of, title and their Complaint was properly dismissed for failing to state a cause of
action.
NOTES
4C (2020 – 2021)
TOPIC Representatives as Parties
CASE TITLE V-Gent, Inc. v. Morning Star Travel & Tours, Inc.
GR NO. 186305 DATE: 22 July 2015
DOCTRINE
Rule 3, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides the exception when an agent may sue or be sued without
joining the principal.
Section 3. Representatives as parties. - ―xxxx An agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an
undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without joining the principal except when the contract involves
things belonging to the principal.‖
Thus, an agent may sue or be sued solely in its own name and without joining the principal when the
following elements occur: 1) the agent acted in his own name during the transaction; 2) the agent acted for
the benefit of an undisclosed principal; and 3) the transaction did not involve the property of the principal.
When these elements are present, the agency becomes bound as if the transaction were its own, consistent
with Article 1883 of the Civil Code.
FACTS
Sometime in June and in September 1998, the petitioner V-Gent, Inc. (V-Gent) bought twenty-six (26) two-
way plane tickets (Manila-Europe-Manila) from the respondent Morning Star Travel and Tours, Inc. However,
V-Gent returned a total of 15 unused tickets worth $8,747.50 to respondent. Morning Star refunded only 6
tickets worth $3,445.62 and refused to refund the 9 unused tickets.
In December 2000, V-Gent filed a money claim against Morning Star for payment of the unrefunded tickets.
While, Morning Star countered that V-Gent was not entitled to a refund because the tickets were bought on
the airline company‘s ―buy one, take one promo.
Having refunded more or less 50% of unused tickets, there was nothing else to refund. Morning Star also
questioned V-Gent's personality to file the suit. It asserted that the passengers, in whose names the
tickets were issued, are the real parties-in-interest.
MeTC dismissed the complaint for lack of a cause of action. Citing Rule 3, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, the
MeTC declared that, as agent of the passengers who paid for the tickets, V-Gent stood as the real party-in-
interest. Nevertheless, it still dismissed the complaint because V-Gent failed to prove its claim by a
preponderance of evidence. While the RTC granted the appeal after finding that V-Gent had established its
claim by a preponderance of evidence. It set aside the MeTC's judgment and ordered Morning Star to pay V-
Gent the value of the nine (9) unrefunded tickets plus attorney's fees.
CA held that V-Gent is not a real-party-in-interest because it merely acted as an agent of the passengers who
bought the tickets from Morning Star with their own money. V-Gent moved for reconsideration, which motion
the CA denied, thus clearing the way for the present petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE
Whether or not V-Gent is a real-party-in-interest in filing the complaint; and
HELD
No. Every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest - the party who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit. In suits where an agent represents a party, the
principal is the real party-in-interest; an agent cannot file a suit in his own name on behalf of the principal.
Rule 3, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides the exception when an agent may sue or be sued
without joining the principal.
Section 3. Representatives as parties. - Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted and defended by a
representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the
case and shall be deemed to be the real party-in-interest. A representative may be a trustee of an express
trust, a guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party authorized by law or these Rules. An agent acting
in his own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without joining the
principal except when the contract involves things belonging to the principal.
Thus an agent may sue or be sued solely in its own name and without joining the principal when the
following elements concur: (1) the agent acted in his own name during the transaction; (2) the agent acted
for the benefit of an undisclosed principal; and (3) the transaction did not involve the property of the
principal.
When these elements are present, the agent becomes bound as if the transaction were its own. This rule is
consistent with Article 1883 of the Civil Code which says:
Art. 1883. If an agent acts in his own name, the principal has no right of action against the persons with whom
the agent has contracted; neither have such persons against the principal.
In such case, the agent is the one directly bound in favor of the person with whom he has contracted, as if the
transaction were his own, except when the contract involves things belonging to the principal.
The provisions of this article shall be understood to be without prejudice to the actions between the principal
and agent.=
In the present case, only the first element is present; the purchase order and the receipt were in the
name of V-Gent. However, the remaining elements are absent because: (1) V-Gent disclosed the
names of the passengers to Morning Star — in fact the tickets were in their names; and (2) the
transaction was paid using the passengers' money. Therefore, Rule 3, Section 3 of the Rules of
Court cannot apply.
To define the actual factual situation, V-Gent, the agent, is suing to recover the money of its principals — the
passengers — who are the real parties-in-interest because they stand to be injured or benefited in case
Morning Star refuses or agrees to grant the refund because the money belongs to them. From this
perspective, V-Gent evidently does not have a legal standing to file the complaint.
Finally, V-Gent argues that by making a partial refund, Morning Star was already estopped from refusing to
make a full refund on the ground that V-Gent is not the real party-in-interest to demand reimbursement.
NOTES
Court DENIED the petition for lack of merit.
4C (2020 – 2021)
TOPIC Representatives as Parties
CASE TITLE Resident Marine Mammals vs Reyes
GR NO. 180771 DATE:April 21, 2015
DOCTRINE
In our jurisdiction, persons and entities are recognized both in law and the Rules of Court as having standing
to sue and, therefore, may be properly represented as real parties in interest. The same cannot be said about
animals
FACTS
In this case, the petitioners are toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises and other cetacean species represented
by human beings. The petitioners cited Oposa vs Factoran as basis for their claim, asserting their right to
enforce international and domestic environmental laws. As the representatives of Resident Marine Mammals,
the human petitioners assert that they have the obligation to build awareness among the affected residents of
Tañon Strait as well as to protect the environment, especially in light of the government's failure, as primary
steward, to do its duty under the doctrine of public trust.
ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioners can act as the representatives of the resident marine mammals of Tanon strait
HELD
NO. According to Rule 3 Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Where the action is allowed to be
prosecuted or defended by a representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be
included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real party in interest. A representative may be a
trustee of an express rust, a guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party authorized by law or these
Rules. An agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued
without joining the principal except when the contract involves things belonging to the principal.
Therefore, the Rules of Court expressly enumerate who can be representatives. This also applies to cases
involving the environment. The petitioners must show that the resident mammals are real parties in interest
and that the human petitioners are authorized by law or the Rules to act in a representative capacity.
In our jurisdiction, persons and entities are recognized both in law and the Rules of Court as having standing
to sue and, therefore, may be properly represented as real parties in interest. The same cannot be said about
animals. As humans, we cannot be so arrogant as to argue that we know the suffering of animals and that we
know what remedy they need in the face of an injury.
NOTES
This case also revisits the case of Oposa vs Factoran. That case was significant in that, at that time, there was
a need to call attention to environmental concerns in light of emerging international legal principles. While
"intergenerational responsibility" is a noble principle, it should not be used to obtain judgments that would
preclude future generations from making their own assessment based on their actual concerns. The present
generation must restrain itself from assuming that it can speak best for those who will exist at a different time,
under a different set of circumstances. In essence, the unbridled resort to representative suit will inevitably
result in preventing future generations from protecting their own rights and pursuing their own interests and
decisions. It reduces the autonomy of our children and our children 's children. Even before they are born, we
again restricted their ability to make their own arguments.
It is my opinion that, at best, the use of the Oposa doctrine in environmental cases should be allowed only
when a) there is a clear legal basis for the representative suit; b) there are actual concerns based squarely
upon an existing legal right; c) there is no possibility of any countervailing interests existing within the
population represented or those that are yet to be born; and d) there is an absolute necessity for such standing
because there is a threat of catastrophe so imminent that an immediate protective measure is necessary.
Better still, in the light of its costs and risks, we abandon the precedent all together.
4C (2020 – 2021)
TOPIC Indispensable Parties
CASE TITLE Cerezo v. Tuazon
GR NO. 141538 DATE: March 23, 2004
DOCTRINE
An indispensable party is one whose interest is affected by the court’s action in the litigation, and without whom no final
resolution of the case is possible. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary.
Where there is a solidary obligation on the part of debtors, as in this case, each debtor is liable for the entire obligation.
Hence, each debtor is liable to pay for the entire obligation in full.
FACTS
Around noontime of 26 June 1993, a Country Bus Lines passenger bus with plate number NYA 241 collided with a tricycle
bearing plate number TC RV 126 along Captain M. Palo Street, Sta. Ines, Mabalacat, Pampanga. On 1 October 1993,
tricycle driver Tuazon filed a complaint for damages against Mrs. Cerezo, as owner of the bus line, her husband Attorney
Juan Cerezo ("Atty. Cerezo"), and bus driver Danilo A. Foronda ("Foronda").
Subsequently, the trial court issued summons against Atty. Cerezo and Mrs. Cerezo at the Makati address stated in the
complaint. However, the summons was returned unserved. The alias summons and a copy of the complaint were finally
served on 20 April 1994 at the office of Atty. Cerezo. The records show that the Cerezo spouses participated in the
proceedings before the trial court. The Cerezo spouses filed a comment with motion for bill of particulars. On 27 January
1995, Tuazon filed a motion to declare the Cerezo spouses in default. On 6 February 1995, the trial court issued an order
declaring the Cerezo spouses in default. Subsequently, the trial court ruled in Tuazon's favor.
The Cerezo spouses subsequently filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari which it denied and affirmed
the trial court's order denying the petition for relief from judgment. Undaunted, the Cerezo spouses filed before the Court
of Appeals on 6 July 1999 a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 with prayer for restraining order. The Court
of Appeals denied the petition for annulment of judgment in a resolution dated 21 October 1999.
Mrs. Cerezo, this time with Atty. Daga alone representing her, filed the present petition for review on certiorari before this
Court. Mrs. Cerezo claims that the Court cannot validly make a judgment on her since it did not acquire jurisdiction over
Foronda.
ISSUE
Whether Foronda is an indispensable party in this case
HELD
NO. Tuazon chose to file an action for damages based on a quasi-delict. The responsibility of two or more persons who
are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. Where there is a solidary obligation on the part of debtors, as in this case, each
debtor is liable for the entire obligation.
In his complaint, Tuazon alleged that Mrs. Cerezo, "without exercising due care and diligence in the supervision and
management of her employees and buses," hired Foronda as her driver. Tuazon became disabled because of Foronda’s
"recklessness, gross negligence and imprudence," aggravated by Mrs. Cerezo’s "lack of due care and diligence in the
selection and supervision of her employees, particularly Foronda."
Contrary to Mrs. Cerezo's assertion, Foronda is not an indispensable party to the case. An indispensable party is one
whose interest is affected by the court’s action in the litigation, and without whom no final resolution of the case is possible.
However, Mrs. Cerezo's liability as an employer in an action for a quasi-delict is not only solidary, it is also primary and
direct. Foronda is not an indispensable party to the final resolution of Tuazon’s action for damages against Mrs. Cerezo.
Thus, there is no need in this case for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over Foronda. The trial court’s acquisition of
jurisdiction over Mrs. Cerezo is sufficient to dispose of the present case on the merits. If the present action proceeds from
a delict, then the trial court’s jurisdiction over Foronda is necessary. However, the present action is clearly for the quasi-
delict of Mrs. Cerezo and not for the delict of Foronda.
NOTES
4C (2020 – 2021)
TOPIC Rule 3- Parties to Civil Actions - Indispensable Parties
CASE TITLE In the Matter of the Heirship of the Late Hermogenes Rodriguez
G.R. No. 182645 DATE: December 15, 2010
DOCTRINE
Non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. The remedy is to implead the
non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own
initiative at any stage of the action and/or at such times as are just. If petitioner refuses to implead an indispensable
party despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for the plaintiff's/petitioner's failure to
comply therewith.
FACTS
The petition, docketed as SP No. IR-1110, was filed by Henry F. Rodriguez, Certeza F. Rodriguez, and Rosalina R.
Pellosis. The three sought that they be declared the sole and surviving heirs of the late Antonio Rodriguez and
Hermogenes Rodriguez. They alleged that they are the great grandchildren of Antonio based on the following
genealogy: that Henry and Certeza are the surviving children of Delfin M. Rodriguez, while Rosalina is the surviving
heir of Consuelo M. Rodriguez; that Delfin and Consuelo were the heirs of Macario J. Rodriguez; that Macario and
Flora Rodriguez were the heirs of Antonio; that Flora died without an issue leaving Macario as her sole heir.
Petitioner's claim to the intestate estate of the late Hermogenes Rodriguez is based on the following lineage: that
Antonio and Hermogenes were brothers and the latter died in 1910 without issue, leaving Antonio as his sole heir.
Having no oppositors to the petition, the RTC entered a general default against the whole world, except the Rep. of the
Philippines. Thereafter, the commissioner found that Henry, Certeza and Rosalina are the grandchildren in the direct
line of Antonio. The RTC then rendered a Partial Judgment declaring them as heirs in the direct descending line of the
late Antonio, Macario and Delfin and appointing Henry as regular administrator of the estate of the decedents Delfin,
Macario and Antonio, and as special administrator to the estate of Hermogenes.
Subsequently, 6 groups of oppositors entered their appearances either as a group or individually, namely: (1) The
group of Judith Rodriguez; (2) The group of Carola Favila-Santos; (3) Jaime Robles; (4) Florencia Rodriguez; (5)
Victoria Rodriguez; and(6) Bienvenido Rodriguez
In his opposition, Jamie Robles prayed that he be appointed regular administrator to the estates of Antonio and
Hermogenes and be allowed to sell a certain portion of land included in the estate of Hermogenes.The RTC issued an
Order declaring Jamie Robles to be an heir and next of kin of decedent Hermogenes and thus qualified to be the
administrator. The RTC also declared Carola Favila-Santos and her co-heirs as heirs in the direct descending line of
Hermogenes and reiterated its ruling in the partial judgment declaring Henry, Certeza and Rosalina as heirs of Antonio.
On 13 August 1999, the RTC issued an Amended Decision reversing its earlier finding as to Carola Favila-Santos. This
time, the RTC found Carola Favila-Santos and company not related to the decedent Hermogenes.
Robles then appealed the August 13, 1999 Decision of the RTC, but the same was denied by the trial court for Robles'
failure to file a record on appeal.
Robles filed a petition for review on certiorari with the SC.The Court referred the petition to the CA. CA rendered
judgment annulling the August 13, 1999 Amended Decision of the RTC.
Robles filed an appeal with the SC assailing a portion of the CA Decision. SC issued a Resolution denying the petition
of Robles and, the said Resolution became final and executory.
On May 13, 2008, the instant petition was filed. On December 4, 2009, the petition was denied for failure to perfect an
Appeal within the reglementary period.
Robles’ contention: He is a party-in-interest who stands to be adversely affected or injured or benefited by the
judgment in the instant case. He also argues that the failure of service upon him of a copy of the instant petition as well
as petitioner's memorandum, and the fact that he was not required or given the opportunity to file his comment or
answer to the said petition nor served with any order, resolution or any other process issued by the Court in the instant
petition, is a clear denial of his right to due process.
Petitioner’s contention: Robles has no legal standing to participate in the instant petition. Petitioner argues that in an
original action for certiorari, the parties are the aggrieved party against the lower court and the prevailing party.
Petitioner claims, however, that Robles was never impleaded, because he was not the prevailing party in the assailed
Decision of the CA as well as the questioned Order of the RTC. Petitioner further avers that the inclusion of Robles'
name as respondent in the caption of the instant petition was a result of a clerical error which was probably brought
about by numerous cases filed with this Court involving Robles and the subject estate.
ISSUE
Whether or not Robles is an indispensable party;
Whether or not Petitioner committed a mistake in failing to implead Robles as Respondent and thus the action should
be dismissed.
HELD
Yes, Robles is an indispensable party. He stands to be injured or benefited by the outcome of the petition. He has an
interest in the controversy that a final decree would necessarily affect his rights, such that the courts cannot proceed
without his presence.Moreover, as provided for under Sec 5, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, Robles is interested in
sustaining the assailed CA Decision, considering that he would benefit from such judgment. As such, his non-inclusion
would render the petition for certiorari defective.
While Petitioner, committed a mistake in failing to implead Robles as respondent, the action should not be dismissed.
The rule is settled that the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. The
remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the court on motion
of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or at such times as are just. If petitioner refuses to
implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for the
plaintiff's/petitioner's failure to comply therewith.Thus, the Court finds it proper to set aside its decision and allow Robles
to file his comment on the petition.
NOTES
4C (2020 – 2021)
TOPIC Indispensable Parties
CASE TITLE Bernabe Foster-Gallego vs Spouses Galang
GR NO. 130228 DATE: July 27, 2004
DOCTRINE
An indispensable party is a party who has such an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a final adjudication
cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest.
FACTS
Vive Realty Corporation (VRC) acquired several properties, including a 330 sqm. parcel of land, in a public auction.
Spouses Galang purchased the 330sqm land from VRC through a Deed of Absolute Sale. Later, they found that a fence
had been constructed by Gallego along the perimeter of the property. According to Gallego, he was the caretaker of the
property which belonged to his brother, Bernabe Foster-Gallego (petitioner). He asserted that the latter was never late in
the payment of RPT and had never received a notice of delinquency or public action or the cancellation of his TCT.
Spouses Galang filed a complaint for Quieting of Title with Damages against Gallego and was allowed to present
their evidence ex parte after Gallego was declared in default for failing to appear during the pre-trial conference. Foster-
Gallego then filed a motion for intervention. The RTC denied the motion of Gallego to lift the order of default but admitted
petitioner's motion to intervene. The latter then filed a motion to admit a 3rd party complaint against VRC.
Spouses Galang started presenting their evidence ex parte which was opposed by petitioner on the ground that not
all 3rd party defendants had filed their answers and pre-trial briefs. This was denied by the RTC who ruled in favor of the
Spouses Galang. Meanwhile, the hearing on the issue of whether trial on the merits should proceed on petitioner's
intervention and third-party complaint was also denied by the RTC.
Petitioner filed a notice that he was appealing the order to the CA but instead of filing his own brief, he joined in
Gallego's appeal. The CA held that the former had no personality to join the appeal due to the denial of his motion for
intervention.
ISSUE
WON petitioner is an indispensable party to the action for quieting of title.
HELD
Negative. An indispensable party is a party who has such an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a final
adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest. A person is not an indispensable
party if:
1.) His interest in the controversy or subject matter is separable from the interest of the other parties, so that he will not
necessarily be injuriously affected by a decree that does complete justice between the other parties;
2.) His presence would merely permit complete relief between him and those already parties to the action;
3.) His presence would simply avoid multiple litigations
In this case, the decision quieting title in favor of the Spouses Galang has no appreciable effect on petitioner's title as
the same could still be cancelled with or without the trial court's declaration that the Spouses Galang are the owners of the
Property "at this time." Further, the assailed decision does not bind petitioner. The rules on quieting of title expressly
provide that any declaration in a suit to quiet title shall not prejudice persons who are not parties to the action. Given that
the trial court denied petitioner's intervention and struck it off from the records, petitioner is not a party to the instant case.
NOTES
4C (2020 – 2021)
TOPIC Necessary Parties
CASE TITLE CARAVAN TRAVEL AND TOURS v. ABEJAR
GR NO. 170631 DATE: 10 February 2016
DOCTRINE
An indispensable party is a party who has such an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a final adjudication
cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest, a party who has not only an interest in the
subject matter of the controversy, but also has an interest of such nature that a final decree cannot be made without
affecting his interest or leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final determination may be wholly inconsistent
with equity and good conscience. While a necessary party is not an indispensable party, however, if his interest in the
controversy or subject matter is separable from the interest of the other parties, so that it will not necessarily be directly
or injuriously affected by a decree which does complete justice between them. Also, a person is not an indispensable
party if his presence would merely permit complete relief between him and those already parties to the action, or if he
has no interest in the subject matter of the action. It is not a sufficient reason to declare a person to be an indispensable
party that his presence will avoid multiple litigation.
FACTS
Reyes was walking along the west-bound lane in Parañaque City. A Mitsubishi L-300 van was travelling along the east-
bound lane, opposite Reyes.To avoid an incoming vehicle, the van swerved to its left and hit Reyes. Upon investigation,
it was found that the registered owner of the van was Caravan.Bautista(driver) was Caravan's employee assigned to
drive the van as its service driver. Despite medical attendance, Reyes died two (2) days after the accident.
Respondent Ermilinda R. Abejar (Abejar), Reyes' paternal aunt and the person who raised her since she was nine (9)
years old, filed before the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque a Complaint for damages against Bautista and Caravan.
Summons could not be served on Bautista. Thus, Abejar moved to drop Bautista as a defendant. Regional Trial Court
found that Bautista was grossly negligent in driving the vehicle. It awarded damages in favor of Abejar.
Caravan argues that Abejar has no personality to bring this suit because she is not a real party in interest. According to
Caravan, Abejar does not exercise legal or substitute parental authority. She is also not the judicially appointed guardian
or the only living relative of the deceased. She is also not "the executor or administrator of the estate of the deceased.
According to Caravan, only the victim herself or her heirs can enforce an action based on culpa aquiliana such as Abejar's
action for damages.
Furthermore, Caravan argues that since Bautista, the driver, was dropped out of the case, him being an indispensable
party, the court cannot render judgement without him being joined in the action.
ISSUE
Whether or not Bautista is a necessary party.
HELD
YES. Bautista, the driver, was not an indispensable party under Rule 3, Section 7 118 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. Rather, he was a necessary party under Rule 3, Section 8. Instead of insisting that Bautista — who was
nothing more than a necessary party — should not have been dropped as a defendant, or that petitioner, along with
Bautista, should have been dropped, petitioner (as a co-defendant insisting that the action must proceed with Bautista
as party) could have opted to le a cross- claim against Bautista as its remedy.
The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure spell out the rules on joinder of indispensable and necessary parties. These are
intended to afford "a complete determination of all possible issues, not only between the parties themselves but also as
regards to other persons who may be affected by the judgment." However, while an exhaustive resolution of disputes is
desired in every case, the distinction between indispensable parties and necessary parties delineates a court's capacity
to render effective judgment. As dened by Rule 3, Section 7, indispensable parties are "parties in interest without whom
no final determination can be had of an action." Thus, their non-inclusion is debilitating: "the presence of indispensable
parties is a condition for the exercise of juridical power and when an indispensable party is not before the court, the action
should be dismissed."
In contrast, a necessary party's presence is not imperative, and his or her absence is not debilitating. Nevertheless, it is
preferred that they be included in order that relief may be complete.
Petitioner's interest and liability is distinct from that of its driver. Regardless of petitioner's employer-employee relationship
with Bautista, liability attaches to petitioner on account of its being the registered owner of a vehicle that figures in a
mishap. This alone suffices. A determination of its liability as owner can proceed independently of a consideration of how
Bautista conducted himself as a driver. While certainly it is desirable that a determination of Bautista's liability be made
alongside that of the owner of the van he was driving, his non-inclusion in these proceedings
NOTES
4C (2020 – 2021)
TOPIC Rule 3: Parties to a Civil Action – Indigent Parties
CASE TITLE Spouses Antonio Algura and Lorencita Algura vs. The Local Government Unit Of The
City Of Naga
GR NO. G.R. No. 150135 DATE: October 30, 2006
DOCTRINE
If the trial court finds that the application meets the income and property requirements, the authority to litigate as indigent
is automatically granted and the grant is a matter of right, but if the trial court finds that one or both requirements have
not been met, then it would set a hearing to enable the applicant to prove that he has “no money or property sufficient
and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family.”
FACTS
Spouses Antonio F. Algura and Lorencita S.J. Algura filed a Verified Complaint dated August 30, 1999 for damages
against the Naga City Government and its officers, arising from the alleged illegal demolition of their residence and
boarding house and for payment of lost income derived from fees paid by their boarders amounting to PhP 7,000.00
monthly.
Simultaneously, petitioners filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Litigate as Indigent Litigants, to which petitioner Antonio Alguras’s
Pay Slip was appended, showing a gross monthly income of PhP 10,474.00 and a net pay PhP 3,616.99 for the month
of July 1999. Also attached was a certification by the Office of the City Assessor of Naga City, stating that petitioners had
no property declared in their names for taxation purposes.
Finding that petitioners' motion to litigate as indigent litigants was meritorious, Executive Judge Jose T. Atienza of the
Naga City RTC, in the September 1, 1999 Order, granted petitioners' plea for exemption from filing fees.
The city government filed a Motion to Disqualify the spouses for nonpayment of filing fees. Respondents had asserted
that in addition to the net income of Antonio, who was a member of the Philippine National Police, Lorencita had a
ministore and a computer shop on the ground floor of their residence. Allegedly, petitioners were not indigent litigants, as
they also derived additional income from several boarders who paid them rentals, according to respondents. On April 14,
2000, the Naga City RTC issued an Order disqualifying petitioners from being recognized as indigent litigants. They had
allegedly failed to substantiate their claim for exemption from payment of legal fees and from compliance with the third
paragraph of Section 18 of Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court, directing them to pay the requisite filing fees.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
On May 5, 2000, the trial court issued an Order giving them the opportunity to comply with Section 18 of Rule 141, which
had laid down the requisites for qualifying as an indigent litigant. Petitioners subsequently submitted their Compliance, to
which was attached the Affidavits of Petitioner Lorencita Algura and one Erlinda Bangate. In her Affidavit, Lorencita
claimed that the demolition of their small dwelling deprived them of a monthly income amounting to P7,000. This situation
forced them, including their six minor children, to rely mainly on her husband’s P3,500 monthly salary as a policeman.
She said that the family’s basic necessities could not be covered sufficiently by this salary, the meager income from her
small sari-sari store, and the rentals from some boarders. Furthermore, they did not own any real property, as certified
by the Naga City assessor’s office. On the other hand, Erlinda Bangate attested under oath that she personally knew the
Algura spouses, who were her neighbors. She corroborated Lorencita’s statements. Petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration was denied by the Naga City RTC. The lower court held that the gross income or total earnings of the
Alguras amounted to P10,474, which was over and above the amount of P3,000 a month set under Rule 141, Section
18, for pauper litigants residing outside Metro Manila. Nowhere in her Affidavit did Lorencita deny that she and her
immediate family earned a gross income of P3,000.
ISSUE
W/N the Petitioners are indigent litigants qualified for exemption for payment of filing fees.
HELD
(Please read the note)
On March 1, 2000, there were two existing rules on pauper litigants; namely, Rule 3, Section 21 and Rule 141, Section
18. Recapitulating the rules on indigent litigants, therefore, if the applicant for exemption meets the salary and property
requirements under Section 19 of Rule 141, then the grant of the application is mandatory.
On the other hand, when the application does not satisfy one or both requirements, then the application should not be
denied outright; instead, the court should apply the indigency test under Section 21 of Rule 3 and use its sound
discretion in determining the merits of the prayer for exemption.
In the case at bar, petitioners Alguras submitted the Affidavits of petitioner Lorencita Algura and neighbor Erlinda
Bangate, the pay slip of petitioner Antonio F. Algura showing a gross monthly income of PhP 10,474.00, and a
Certification of the Naga City assessor stating that petitioners do not have property declared in their names for taxation.
Undoubtedly, petitioners do not own real property as shown by the Certification of the Naga City assessor and so the
property requirement is met.
However with respect to the income requirement, it is clear that the gross monthly income of PhP 10,474.00 of
petitioner Antonio F. Algura and the PhP 3,000.00 income of Lorencita Algura when combined, were above the PhP
1,500.00 monthly income threshold prescribed by then Rule 141, Section 16 and therefore, the income requirement
was not satisfied.
The Court opts to reconcile Rule 3, Section 21 and Rule 141, Section 19 because it is a settled principle that when
conflicts are seen between two provisions, all efforts must be made to harmonize them.
The High Court, through Justice Presbitero J. Velasco Jr. clarified the pertinent rules as follows:
1. When an application to litigate as an indigent party is filed, the court shall scrutinize the affidavits and supporting
documents submitted, in order to determine if the income and property standards prescribed in the present Section 19
of Rule 141 have been met. The court must determine if: (1) the applicant‘s gross income and that of the immediate
family do not exceed an amount double the monthly minimum wage of an employee; and (2) the applicant does not
own real property with a fair market value of more than P300,000. If the trial court finds that these income and property
requirements have been met, it automatically grants the applicant the authority to litigate as an indigent litigant, and the
grant is a matter of right.
2. If the trial court finds that one or both requirements have not been met, it shall set a hearing to enable the
presentation of proof that the applicant has ―no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic
necessities for himself and his family.ǁ In that hearing, the adverse party may adduce countervailing evidence to
disprove the evidence presented by the applicant. Afterwards, the trial court will rule on the application, depending on
these presentations.
NOTES
Because of the failure of the RTC to set a hearing for the Motion of the spouses to litigate as paupers, its Orders
disqualifying them from doing so were set aside by the Supreme Court.
4C (2020 – 2021)
TOPIC Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties
CASE TITLE Divinagracia v. Parilla
GR NO. 196750 DATE: 11 March 2015
DOCTRINE
The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. The remedy is to
implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable.
FACTS
● Conrado Nobleza, Sr. owned the subject land, a 313-sq.m. parcel of land in Iloilo City covered by TCT No.
12255. During Nobleza‘s lifetime, he contracted two marriages. His first marriage was with Lolita Palermo
with whom he had two children, namely, Cresencio and Conrado, Jr. His second marriage was with Eusela
Niangar with whom he had seven children, namely, Mateo Sr., Coronacion, Cecilia, Celestial, Celedonio,
Ceruleo, and Cebeleo Sr.
● According to Santiago, some of Conrado Sr.‘s heirs, including Felcon (in representation of his father and
siblings) sold their interests over the subject land to him for P447,695.66 as embodied in the subject
document, a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement or Adjudication with Deed of Sale dated November 22, 1989.
However, said document was not signed by the other heirs who did not sell their respective shares.
● On Dec. 22, 1989, the vendor-heirs and Santiago executed a Supplemental Contract whereby they agreed
that out of the whole price of the lot, only P109,807.93 will be paid up front, and that Santiago will only pay
the remaining balance of P337,887.73 upon partition of the subject land. However, Santiago was not able to
have the TCT No. T-12255 to the said lot cancelled and the subject document registered because of the
refusal of the remaining heirs who did not sell their interest to surrender the said title. Furthermore, said
heirs’ failure to partition the subject land prompted Santiago to file a Complaint for judicial partition and for
receivership.
● The remaining heirs contend that Santiago had no legal right to file an action for judicial partition nor to
compel them to surrender TCT No T-12255 because the full purchase price of the shares sold to him was not
yet paid and that the subject land is a conjugal asset of Conrado Sr. and Niangar, and thus, only their
legitimate issues may validly inherit the lot.
● The RTC ruled in favor of Santiago and ordered, among others, the partition of the subject lot between
Santiago and the remaining heirs. The RTC also ordered the cancellation of TCT No. T-12255 and the
issuance of a new owner‘s duplicate certificate in favor of Santiago and the remaining heirs. It was held that
Santiago became a co-owner of the subject land, with the exception of Felcon‘s share, through the subject
document.
● On reconsideration, the RTC ordered Santiago to pay the remaining amount upon partition of the subject
land.
● The CA set aside the RTC‘s rulings and dismissed Santiago‘s complaint for judicial partition. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE
A. WON Felcon‘s siblings and Cebeleo, Sr. and Maude‘s children are indispensable parties to Santiago‘s
complaint for judicial partition? Yes.
B. WON the CA erred in dismissing Santiago’s complaint for his failure to implead said omitted heirs? Yes.
HELD
a. Yes, they are indispensable parties. An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the
court‘s action in the litigation, and without whom no final determination of the case can be had. The
absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void, for want of
authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.
With regard to actions for partition, Sec. 1, Rule 69 of the ROC requires that all persons interested in the
property shall be joined as defendants. Thus, all the co-heirs and persons having an interest in the property
are indispensable parties; as such, an action for partition will not lie without the joinder of the said parties.
In this case, records reveal that Conrado, Sr. has the following heirs, legitimate and illegitimate, who are
entitled to a pro-indiviso share in the subject land, namely: Conrado, Jr., Cresencio, Mateo, Sr., Coronacion,
Cecilia, Celestial, Celedonio, Ceruleo, Cebeleo, Sr., Eduardo, Rogelio, and Ricardo. However, both Mateo,
Sr. and Cebeleo, Sr. pre-deceased Conrado, Sr. and, thus, pursuant to the rules on representation under the
Civil Code, their respective interests shall be represented by their children, namely: (a) for Mateo, Sr.:
Felcon, Landelin, Eusela, Giovanni, Mateo, Jr., Tito, and Gaylord; and (b) for Cebeleo, Sr.: Cebeleo, Jr. and
Neobel.
The aforementioned heirs – whether in their own capacity or in representation of their direct ascendant – have
vested rights over the subject land and, as such, should be impleaded as indispensable parties in an action for
partition thereof.
However, a reading of Santiago‘s complaint shows that as regards Mateo, Sr.‘s interest, only Felcon was
impleaded, excluding therefrom his siblings and co-representatives. Similarly, with regard to Cebeleo, Sr.‘s
interest over the subject land, the complaint impleaded his wife, Maude, when pursuant to Article 972 of the
Civil Code, the proper representatives to his interest should have been his children, Cebeleo, Jr. and Neobel.
Verily, Santiago’s omission of the aforesaid heirs renders his complaint for partition defective.
In fine, the absence of the aforementioned indispensable parties in the instant complaint for judicial partition
renders all subsequent actions of the RTC null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent
parties, but even as to those present.
b. Yes, the CA erred in ordering the dismissal of the complaint on account of Santiago‘s failure to implead all
the indispensable parties in his complaint.
In Heirs of Mesina v. Heirs of Fian, Sr., the Court definitively explained that in instances of non-joinder of
indispensable parties, the proper remedy is to implead them and not to dismiss the case, to wit:
―The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. At any stage of a
judicial proceeding and/or at such times as are just, parties may be added on the motion of a party or on the
initiative of the tribunal concerned. If the plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order
of the court, that court may dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff‘s failure to comply with the order. The
remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable.‖
Therefore, the correct course of action in the instant case is to order its remand to the RTC for the inclusion
of those indispensable parties who were not impleaded and for the disposition of the case on the merits.
NOTES
4C (2020 – 2021)
TOPIC Effect of death of party litigant
CASE TITLE Spouses De la Cruz vs. Joaquin
July 28, 2005
DOCTRINE
When a party to a pending action dies and the claim is not extinguished, the Rules of Court require a substitution of the
deceased. The procedure is specifically governed by Section 16 of Rule 3.
FACTS
The case originated from a Complaint for the recovery of possession and ownership, the cancellation of title, and
damages, filed by Pedro Joaquin against petitioners in the RTC. The RTC ruled in favor of respondent ordering herein
petitioners to reconvey the property upon his payment. Petitioners assert that the RTC’s Decision was invalid for lack of
jurisdiction claiming that respondent died during the pendency of the case and there being no substitution by the heirs,
the trial court allegedly lacked jurisdiction over the litigation.
ISSUE
WON the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case upon the death of Pedro Joaquin?
HELD
NO. When a party to a pending action dies and the claim is not extinguished, the Rules of Court require a substitution
of the deceased. The procedure is specifically governed by Section 16 of Rule 3 - Section 16. Death of a party; duty of
counsel. –Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of
his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and
address of his legal representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with this duty shall be a ground for
disciplinary action.
The rule on the substitution of parties was crafted to protect every party’s right to due process. The estate of the
deceased party will continue to be properly represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal representative. A
formal substitution by heirs is not necessary when as in the present case, they themselves voluntarily appear,
participate in the case, and present evidence in defense of the deceased. These actions negate any claim that the right
to due process was violated. The records of the present case contain a “Motion for Substitution of Party Plaintiff” filed
before the CA. The rule on the substitution by heirs is not a matter of jurisdiction, but a requirement of due
process. Thus, when due process is not violated, as when the right of the representative or heir is recognized and
protected, noncompliance or belated formal compliance with the Rules cannot affect the validity of a promulgated
decision. Mere failure to substitute for a deceased plaintiff is not a sufficient ground to nullify a trial court’s
decision. The alleging party must prove that there was an undeniable violation of due process.
NOTES
4C (2020 – 2021)
TOPIC Effect of Death of Party Litigant
CASE TITLE Gaffney v. Butler
GR NO. 219408 DATE: November 08, 2017
DOCTRINE
A deceased person does not have the capacity to be sued and may not be made a defendant in a civil action.
Section 1, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court unequivocally states that "[o]nly natural or juridical persons, or
entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action”. Hence, there can be no doubt that a deceased person or
his estate may not be impleaded as defendant in a civil action as they lack legal personality.
FACTS
Investment in ActiveFun
Gina Butler invited Donald Gaffney to invest in ActiveFun Corporation , an entity engaged in the construction,
operation and management of children's play and party facilities. Petitioner advanced the approximate amount of
PhP12,500,000.00 representing his initial investment in ActiveFun.However, respondent’s husband passed away
sometime in December 2009. Consequently, the proposed investment agreement did not materialize. Gaffney then
demanded the return of his investments from petitioner. Respondent was only able to pay private respondent an
initial amount of PhP1,000,000.00. Several demands through phone calls and e-mails were made to petitioner for her
to comply with her undertaking to return the investments of private respondent but to no avail.
Complaint was filed

On September 21, 2011, petitioner filed a Complaint against respondent for sum of money.
Impleading the Estate of the Deceased

Because no full relief can be had against the Estate/heirs of Anthony Richard Butler under the original Complaint,
petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Complaint for the purpose of impleading the estate or the heirs
of the late Anthony Richard Butler as additional party-defendant, allegedly represented by respondent as his
surviving spouse.
Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss Ad-Cautelam arguing that a claim against an estate of a deceased person
cannot be consolidated with an ordinary civil action in which only natural or juridical persons may be parties pursuant
to Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. Consequently, the service of summons intended for the estate of the late
Anthony Richard Butler was improperly served.
RTC
On the Motion to Dismiss, the RTC ruled that the inclusion of the estate of the late Anthony Richard Butler (Anthony),
represented by his surviving spouse Gina, is necessary for a complete relief on the determination or settlement of the
controversy raised in the case.
CA
The CA ruled that dismissal of the case against Anthony's estate is warranted under Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court which states that "only natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil
action."
ISSUES
Whether or not the Estate of Anthony may be impleaded as a party-defendant in a civil action - No.
Whether or not the summons served to Gina, as a representative of her husband’s estate, was proper - No.
HELD
As to the Estate of Anthony as Party-Defendant
The Court ruled that a deceased person does not have the capacity to be sued and may not be made a defendant in
a case. Section 1, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court unequivocally states that "[o]nly natural or juridical persons,
or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action."
Neither a dead person nor his estate may be a party plaintiff in a court action. A deceased person does not have
such legal entity as is necessary to bring action so much so that a motion to substitute cannot lie and should be
denied by the court. An action begun by a decedent's estate cannot be said to have been begun by a legal person,
since an estate is not a legal entity; such an action is a nullity and a motion to amend the party plaintiff will not
likewise lie, there being nothing before the court to amend. Considering that capacity to be sued is a correlative of
the capacity to sue, to the same extent, a decedent does not have the capacity to be sued and may not be named a
party defendant in a court action.
Hence, there can be no doubt that a deceased person or his estate may not be impleaded as defendant in a civil
action as they lack legal personality. Thus, when Anthony died, his legal personality ceased and he could no longer
be impleaded as respondent in the present ordinary civil suit for collection. As such, the complaint against him should
be dismissed on the ground that the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action or for failure to state a
cause of action pursuant to Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, because a complaint cannot possibly state a
cause of action against one who cannot be a party to a civil action.
As to the Summons Served to Gina

In Ventura, the factual milieu of which is similar to the present case, the original complaint named the "estate of
Carlos Ngo as represented by surviving spouse Ms. Sulpicia Ventura." The Court held that as the deceased was
dead at the time the complaint was filed and no special proceeding to settle his estate had been filed in court, the
trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over either the deceased or his estate. In the case at bench, the Alias Summons
served upon Gina purportedly as the representative of her late husband was thus invalid.
In sum, impleading the deceased Anthony or his estate in the present petition was improper. The action against him
must be dismissed and the same may just be filed as a claim against his estate in a proper proceeding. The CA thus
did not err in reversing the trial court.
NOTES
4C (2020 – 2021)
TOPIC Effect of Death of Party Litigant
CASE TITLE San Juan v. Cruz
GR NO. 167321 DATE: July 31, 2006
DOCTRINE
The heirs may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased without requiring the appointment of an administrator or
executor. However, if within the specified period a legal representative fails to appear, the court may order the opposing
counsel, within a specified period, to process the appointment of an administrator or executor who shall immediately
appear for the estate of the deceased.
FACTS
Loreto Samia San Juan executed a Last Will and Testament naming Oscar Casa as one of the devisees therein. On 25
October 1988, Loreto died, and Atty. Teodorico Aquino filed a petition for the probate of the will in the RTC of Quezon
City. While the petition was pending, Oscar Casa died intestate on May 24, 1999. The firm of Aquino, Galang, Lucas,
Espinoza, Miranda and Associates entered theirs appearance as counsel of Federico Casa, Jr., who claimed to be one
of Oscar’s heirs and their representative.
The probate court issued an Order denying the entry of appearance of the said law firm, considering that Federico was
not the executor or administrator of the estate of the devisee, hence, cannot be substituted for the deceased as his
representative as required by Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. On November 22, 2002, the court issued an order
directing Aquino to secure the appointment of an administrator or executor of the estate of Oscar Casa in order that the
appointee be substituted in lieu of the said deceased.
On February 26, 2003, Aquino filed a pleading entitled "Appointment of Administrator" signed by Candelaria, Jesus, Arlyn,
Nestor, Edna, Benhur, Federico, Rafael and Ma. Eden, all surnamed Casa, on February 24, 2003, praying that one of
them, Federico Casa, Jr., be designated as administrator of the estate of the deceased and that he be substituted for the
deceased.
In compliance with the order of the court, Epifanio San Juan filed a "Motion to Declare Appointment of Administrator As
Inadequate or Insufficient."4 He maintained that the heirs should present an administrator of the estate of Oscar Casa as
the representative of the estate in the case.
In his reply, Aquino stated that, under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the heirs of Oscar Casa may be substituted
for the deceased without need for appointment of an administrator or executor of the estate. He also claimed that the
court is enjoined to require the representative to appear before the court and be substituted within the prescribed period.
On December 2, 2003, the RTC issued an Order denying the motion of San Juan. Contrary to its Order dated November
22, 2002, the court held that there was, after all, no need for the appointment of an administrator or executor as substitute
for the deceased devisee. It is enough, the court declared, that a representative be appointed as provided in Section 16,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
On May 7, 2004,
ISSUE
Whether or not the heirs of the deceased devisee or legatee need to secure the appointment of an administrator of the
estate of the deceased in order to be substituted in the place of the deceased devisee or legatee.
HELD
No, the heirs of the deceased devisee or legatee does not need to secure the appointment of an administrator of
the estate in order to be substituted in the place of the deceased devisee or legatee.
Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure reads: Sec. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. –
Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel
to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and address of his
legal representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with this duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment
of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be substituted within a
period of thirty (30) days from notice.
If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the one so named shall fail to
appear within the specified period, the court may order the opposing party, within a specified time, to procure the
appointment of an executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased and the latter shall immediately appear for
and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may
be recovered as costs.
The second paragraph of the rule is plain and explicit: the heirs may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased
without requiring the appointment of an administrator or executor. However, if within the specified period a legal
representative fails to appear, the court may order the opposing counsel, within a specified period, to process the
appointment of an administrator or executor who shall immediately appear for the estate of the deceased. The
pronouncement of this Court in Lawas v. Court of Appeals (relied upon by petitioner), that priority is given to the legal
representative of the deceased (the executor or administrator) and that it is only in case of unreasonable delay in the
appointment of an executor or administrator, or in cases where the heirs resort to an extrajudicial settlement of the estate
that the court may adopt the alternative of allowing the heirs of the deceased to be substituted for the deceased, is no
longer true.
In Gochan v. Young, a case of fairly recent vintage, the Court ruled as follows: The above-quoted rules,
while permitting an executor or administrator to represent or to bring suits on behalf of the deceased, do not prohibit the
heirs from representing the deceased. These rules are easily applicable to cases in which an administrator has already
been appointed. But no rule categorically addresses the situation in which special proceedings for the settlement of an
estate have already been instituted, yet no administrator has been appointed. In such instances, the heirs cannot be
expected to wait for the appointment of an administrator; then wait further to see if the administrator appointed would
care enough to file a suit to protect the rights and the interests of the deceased; and in the meantime do nothing while
the rights and the properties of the decedent are violated or dissipated.
The Rules are to be interpreted liberally in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. They cannot be interpreted in such a way as to unnecessarily
put undue hardships on litigants. For the protection of the interests of the decedent, this Court has in previous instances
recognized the heirs as proper representatives of the decedent, even when there is already an administrator appointed
by the court. When no administrator has been appointed, as in this case, there is all the more reason to recognize the
heirs as the proper representatives of the deceased. Since the Rules do not specifically prohibit them from representing
the deceased, and since no administrator had as yet been appointed at the time of the institution of the Complaint with
the SEC, we see nothing wrong with the fact that it was the heirs of John D. Young, Sr. who represented his estate in the
case filed before the SEC.
The heirs of the estate of Oscar Casa do not need to first secure the appointment of an administrator of his
estate, because from the very moment of his death, they stepped into his shoes and acquired his rights as devisee/legatee
of the deceased Loreto San Juan. Thus, a prior appointment of an administrator or executor of the estate of Oscar Casa
is not necessary for his heirs to acquire legal capacity to be substituted as representatives of the estate. Said heirs may
designate one or some of them as their representative before the trial court.
NOTES
4C (2020 – 2021)
TOPIC Venue vs. Jurisdiction
CASE TITLE Nocum vs. Lucio Tan
DOCTRINE
(1) Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a case; venue is the place where the case is to be heard or tried;
(2) Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law; venue, of procedural law;
(3) Jurisdiction establishes a relation between the court and the subject matter; venue, a relation between plaintiff and
defendant, or petitioner and respondent; and
(4) Jurisdiction is fixed by law and cannot be conferred by the parties; venue may be conferred by the act or agreement
of the parties.
FACTS
Respondent Lucio Tan filed a complaint against reporter Armand Nocum, Capt. Florendo Umali, ALPAP and Inquirer with
the RTC for the alleged malicious and defamatory imputations contained in a news article.
INQUIRER and NOCUM filed their joint answer alleging that (1) the complaint failed to state a cause of action; (2) the
defamatory statements alleged in the complaint were general conclusions without factual premises; (3) the questioned
news report constituted fair and true report on the matters of public interest concerning a public figure and therefore, was
privileged in nature; and (4) malice on their part was negated by the publication in the same article of plaintiff‘s or PAL‘s
side of the dispute with the pilot‘s union.
ALPAP and UMALI likewise filed their joint answer alleging that (1) the complaint stated no cause of action; (2) venue
was improperly laid; and (3) plaintiff Lucio Tan was not a real party in interest. It appeared that the complaint failed to
state the residence of the complainant at the time of the alleged commission of the offense and the place where the
libelous article was printed and first published.
Thus, RTC of Makati issued an order dismissing the complaint without prejudice on the ground of improper venue.
Aggrieved, respondent filed an Omnibus Motion seeking reconsideration alleging that "This article was printed and first
published in the City of Makati".
ISSUE
Did the lower court acquire jurisdiction over the civil case upon the filing of the original complaint for damages?
HELD
Yes. It is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alleged in the complaint since the latter comprises
a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's causes of action. In the case at bar, after examining
the original complaint, we find that the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case when the case was filed before it. From
the allegations thereof, respondent’s cause of action is for damages arising from libel, the jurisdiction of which is vested
with the RTC. Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code provides that it is a Court of First Instance that is specifically
designated to try a libel case.
The additional allegations that the article and the caricature were printed and first published in the City of Makati referred
only to the question of venue and not jurisdiction. These would neither confer jurisdiction on the RTC nor would
respondent‘s failure to include the same in the original complaint divest the lower court of its jurisdiction over the case.
Respondent‘s failure to allege these allegations gave the lower court the power, upon motion by a party, to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that venue was not properly laid. By dismissing the case on the ground of improper venue, the
lower court had jurisdiction over the case.
NOTES
We note that the amended complaint or amendment to the complaint was not intended to vest jurisdiction to the lower
court, where originally it had none. The amendment was merely to establish the proper venue for the action. It is a well-
established rule that venue has nothing to do with jurisdiction, except in criminal actions. Assuming that venue were
properly laid in the court where the action was instituted, that would be procedural, not a jurisdictional impediment. In
fact, in civil cases, venue may be waived.
4C (2020 – 2021)
TOPIC Venue in civil cases vs. Criminal cases
CASE TITLE Nocum v Tan
DOCTRINE
It is elementary that objections to venue in CIVIL ACTIONS arising from libel may be waived since they do not
involve a question of jurisdiction. In contrast, in CRIMINAL ACTIONS, it is fundamental that venue is
jurisdictional it being an essential element of jurisdiction.
FACTS
On September 27, 1998, Lucio Tan filed a complaint against reporter Armand Nocum, Capt. Florendo Umali,
Airline Pilots Association of the Philippines, Inc. ALPAP and Inquirer with the RTC of Makati, seeking moral
and exemplary damages for the alleged malicious and defamatory imputations contained in a news article.
ALPAP and UMALI filed their joint answer and alleged therein that venue was improperly laid. It appeared that
the complaint failed to state the residence of the complainant at the time of the alleged commission of the
offense and the place where the libelous article was printed and first published. They argued that failure of
the original complaint to contain such information would be fatal because this fact involves the issue of venue
which goes into the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
Thus, the RTC of Makati issued an Order dismissing the complaint without prejudice on the ground of
improper venue. Aggrived, respondent Lucio Tan filed an Omnibus Motion seeking reconsideration of the
dismissal and admission of the amended complaint. The lower court, after having the case dismissed for
improper venue, admitted the amended complaint and deemed set aside the previous order of dismissal.
Dissatisfied, petitioners, together with defendants Capt. Florendo Umali and ALPAP, appealed the RTC
decision to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals rendered its decision and denied the petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not venue is jurisdictional in civil cases.
HELD
NO. It is elementary that objections to venue in CIVIL ACTIONS arising from libel may be waived since they
do not involve a question of jurisdiction. The laying of venue is procedural rather than substantive, relating as
it does to jurisdiction of the court over the person rather than the subject matter. Venue relates to trial and not
to jurisdiction. It is a procedural, not a jurisdictional, matter. It relates to the place of trial or geographical
location in which an action or proceeding should be brought and not to the jurisdiction of the court. It is meant
to provide convenience to the parties, rather than restrict their access to the courts as it relates to the place
of trial. In contrast, in CRIMINAL ACTIONS, it is fundamental that venue is jurisdictional it being an essential
element of jurisdiction.
Petitioners' argument that the lower court has no jurisdiction over the case because respondent failed to allege
the place where the libelous articles were printed and first published would have been tenable if the case filed
were a criminal case. The failure of the original complaint to contain such information would be fatal because
this fact involves the issue of venue which goes into the territorial jurisdiction of the court. This is not to be
because the case before us is a civil action where venue is not jurisdictional.
NOTES
4C (2020 – 2021)
TOPIC When rules on venue not applicable
CASE TITLE Ley Construction & Development Corporation vs. Sedano
DOCTRINE
Although generally, the venue for personal actions lie with the court which has jurisdiction where the plaintiff or defendant
resides, parties may, through a written instrument, restrict the filing of said actions in a certain exclusive venue.
FACTS
Petitioner Ley Construction & Development Corp. filed a complaint for collection of sum of money and damages against
respondent Marvin Medel Sedano, doing business under the name and style, ―Lola Taba Lolo Pato Palengke at Paluto
sa Seasideǁ before the Valenzuela RTC.
Ley Construction alleged that on 14 January 2005, it leased a 50,000-sq.m. parcel of land located at Financial Center
Area, Pasay City, from respondent third-party defendant, Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC).
On 11 September 2006, petitioner subleased a 14,659.80-sq.m. portion thereof to Sedano for a term of 10 years.
Sedano allegedly failed to pay the rent due for the period of August 2011 to December 2011, amounting to a total of
₱8,828,025.46, and despite demands, refused to settle his obligations.
In his Answer with Third-Party Complaint, Sedano argued, among others, that the venue was improperly laid since
Section 21 of the lease contract provides that all actions in connection with the contract shall be filed with the Pasay RTC,
exclusive of all others. Hence, according to Sedano, the complaint should be dismissed on the grounds of improper
venue.
In its Comment/Opposition to Sedano‘s affirmative defense of improper venue, Ley Construction argued that Section 21
of the lease contract is not a stipulation as to venue, but a stipulation on jurisdiction which is void. Such a stipulation
deprives other courts, i.e., the MTC, of jurisdiction over cases, which under the law, are within its exclusive original
jurisdiction, such as an action for unlawful detainer. Besides, as Ley Construction asserts, Sedano had already submitted
himself to Valenzuela RTC‘s jurisdiction and had waived any objections on venue by seeking affirmative reliefs from the
court when he asked several times for additional time to file his pleadings.
The Valenzuela RTC dismissed the complaint on the grounds of improper venue. It held that Section 21 of the lease
contract is void insofar as it limits the filing of cases with the Pasay RTC, even when the subject matter jurisdiction over
the case is with the MTC. But it nevertheless found Section 21 to be a valid limitation of the venue with the Pasay RTC,
with respect to cases cognizable by RTCs. The Valenzuela RTC also disagreed with Ley Construction‘s assertion that
Sedano had waived his right to question the venue, as improper venue has been raised as one of the defenses in the
Answer. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE
Whether the venue should not have been laid in RTC Valenzuela
HELD
Yes.
Rule 4 Section 2 of the Rules of Court state: All other actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of
the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-
resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff. However, Section 4 of the same rule states
that the Rule shall not apply where the parties have validly agreed in writing before the filing of the action on the exclusive
venue thereof.
Based on these provisions, the venue for personal actions shall - as a general rule - lie with the court which has jurisdiction
where the plaintiff or the defendant resides, at the election of the plaintiff. As an exception, parties may, through a written
instrument, restrict the filing of said actions in a certain exclusive venue. x x x
In Pilipino Telephone Corporation v. Tecson, the Court held that an exclusive venue stipulation is valid and binding,
provided that:
(a) the stipulation on the chosen venue is exclusive in nature or in intent;
(b) it is expressed in writing by the parties thereto; and
(c) it is entered into before the filing of the suit.
After a thorough study of the case, the Court is convinced that all these elements are present and that
the questioned stipulation in the lease contract, i.e., Section 21 thereof, is a valid venue stipulation that limits the venue
of the cases to the courts of Pasay City. It states:
21. Should any of the party (sic) renege or violate any terms and conditions of this lease contract, it shall be liable for
damages. All actions or case[s] filed in connection with this lease shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City, exclusive of all others. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
The above provision clearly shows the parties' intention to limit the place where actions or cases arising from a violation
of the terms and conditions of the contract of lease may be instituted. This is evident from the use of the phrase "exclusive
of all others" and the specification of the locality of Pasay City as the place where such cases may be filed.
NOTES
4C (2020 – 2021)
TOPIC When the Rules on Venue do not apply
CASE TITLE Unimasters Conglomeration Inc vs. CA
DOCTRINE
Agreements on venue are explicitly allowed. "By written agreement of the parties the venue of an action
may be changed or transferred from one province to another." Parties may by stipulation waive the
legal venue and such waiver is valid and effective being merely a personal privilege, which is not
contrary to public policy or prejudicial to third persons. Written stipulations as to venue may be
restrictive in the sense that the suit may be filed only in the place agreed upon, or merely permissive in
that the parties may file their suit not only in the place agreed upon but also in the places fixed by law
(Rule 4, specifically).
FACTS
On October 28, 1988 Kubota Agri-Machinery Philippines, Inc. (hereafter, simply KUBOTA) and
Unimasters Conglomeration, Inc. (hereafter, simply UNIMASTERS) entered into a "Dealership
Agreement for Sales and Services" of the former's products in Samar and Leyte Provinces.
The contract contained, among others:
1) a stipulation reading: "** All suits arising out of this Agreement shall be filed with / in the proper
Courts of Quezon City," and
2) a provision binding UNIMASTERS to obtain (as it did in fact obtain) a credit line with Metropolitan
Bank and Trust Co.-Tacloban Branch in the amount of P2,000,000.00 to answer for its obligations to
KUBOTA.
5 years later, UNIMASTERS filed an action in the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City against KUBOTA,
a certain Reynaldo Go, and Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company-Tacloban Branch (hereafter, simply
METROBANK) for damages for breach of contract, and injunction with prayer for temporary restraining
order.On January 4, 1994 KUBOTA filed two motions. One prayed for dismissal of the case on the
ground of improper venue (said motion being set for hearing on January 11, 1994). The other prayed
for the transfer of the injunction hearing to January 11, 1994 because its counsel was not available on
January 10 due to a prior commitment before another court.
On January 13, 1994, the Trial Court handed down an Order authorizing the issuance of the preliminary
injunction prayed for, upon a bond of P2,000,000.00. And on February 3, 1994, the same Court
promulgated an Order denying KUBOTA's motion to dismiss. Said the Court:
"The plaintiff UNIMASTERS Conglomeration is holding its principal place of business in the City of
Tacloban while the defendant ** (KUBOTA) is holding its principal place of business in Quezon City. The
proper venue therefore pursuant to Rules of Court would either be Quezon City or Tacloban City at the
election of the plaintiff. Quezon City and Manila (sic), as agreed upon by the parties in the Dealership
Agreement, are additional places other than the place stated in the Rules of Court. The filing, therefore,
of this complaint in the Regional Trial Court in Tacloban City is proper."
The Appellate Court agreed with KUBOTA that — in line with the Rules of Court and this Court's relevant
rulings — the stipulation respecting venue in its Dealership Agreement with UNIMASTERS did in truth
limit the venue of all suits arising thereunder only and exclusively to "the proper courts of Quezon City."
The Court also held that the participation of KUBOTA's counsel at the hearing on the injunction incident
did not in the premises operate as a waiver or abandonment of its objection to venue; that assuming
that KUBOTA's standard printed invoices provided that the venue of actions thereunder should be laid at
the Court of the City of Manila, this was inconsequential since such provision would govern "suits or
legal actions between petitioner and its buyers" but not actions under the Dealership Agreement
between KUBOTA and UNIMASTERS, the venue of which was controlled by paragraph No. 7 thereof.
ISSUE
Whether the venue for any actions between the parties is limited to courts within Quezon City exclusively
HELD
NO. Rule 4 of the Rules of Court sets forth the principles generally governing the venue of actions,
whether real or personal, or involving persons who neither reside nor are found in the Philippines or
otherwise.
Agreements on venue are explicitly allowed. "By written agreement of the parties the venue of an action
may be changed or transferred from one province to another." Parties may by stipulation waive the
legal venue and such waiver is valid and effective being merely a personal privilege, which is not
contrary to public policy or prejudicial to third persons. Written stipulations as to venue may be
restrictive in the sense that the suit may be filed only in the place agreed upon, or merely permissive in
that the parties may file their suit not only in the place agreed upon but also in the places fixed by law
(Rule 4, specifically).
As in any other agreement, what is essential is the ascertainment of the intention of the parties
respecting the matter. Since convenience is the raison d'etre of the rules of venue, it is easy to accept
the proposition that normally, venue stipulations should be deemed permissive merely, and that
interpretation should be adopted which most serves the parties' convenience. In other words,
stipulations designating venues other than those assigned by Rule 4 should be interpreted as designed
to make it more convenient for the parties to institute actions arising from or in relation to their
agreements; that is to say, as simply adding to or expanding the venues indicated in said Rule 4.
The record of the case at bar discloses that UNIMASTERS has its principal place of business in Tacloban
City, and KUBOTA, in Quezon City. Under Rule 4, the venue of any personal action between them is
"where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of
the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff." In other words, Rule 4 gives UNIMASTERS the
option to sue KUBOTA for breach of contract in the Regional Trial Court of either Tacloban City or
Quezon City. But the contract between them provides that " . . . All suits arising out of this Agreement
shall be filed with/in the proper Courts of Quezon City," without mention of Tacloban City. The question
is whether this stipulation had the effect of effectively eliminating the latter as an optional venue and
limiting litigation between UNIMASTERS and KUBOTA only and exclusively to Quezon City.
In light of all the cases above surveyed, and the general postulates distilled therefrom, the question
should receive a negative answer. Absent additional words and expressions definitely and unmistakably
denoting the parties' desire and intention that actions between them should be ventilated only at the
place selected by them, Quezon City — or other contractual provisions clearly evincing the same desire
and intention — the stipulation should be construed, not as confining suits between the parties only to
that one place, Quezon City, but as allowing suits either in Quezon City or Tacloban City, at the option
of the plaintiff (UNIMASTERS in this case).
NOTES
credit is due.
4C (2020 – 2021)

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module 1

The Decision is more on Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts.

DISCUSSION ON THE ENHANCED RULE-MAKING POWER OF THE SC

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

3. Petitioners were implicated for the following acts:

Petition for Prohibition filed before the Supreme Court

Transcendental Importance Doctrine

Purpose of Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts

Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, which reads:

Yes. Section 19 (2) of BP 129, as amended by RA. 7691, provides that:

Section 1 of RA No. 7691 states:

Section 3 of the same law provides:

Yes, Judge Catalo’s order to recall the decision is proper.

CASE TITLE HEIRS OF TELESFORO JULAO vs SPOUSES DE JESUS

He likewise continuously refuses to submit to the court’s jurisdiction.

Justice Regalado continues to explain:

Yes case should be dismissed, SC dismissed the case without prejudice.

shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:

G.R. No. 170175 April 7, 2009

Parking Lots and Common Areas

Complaint for Damages and/or Reformation of Instrument

Petitioner’s Argument before SC

Whether litis pendentia existed between the two subject cases

Re: Stipulation in the Compromise Agreement

Section 6, Rule 2 on misjoinder of causes of action provides:

RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

The court ruled in the negative.

The pertinent portion of Section 33(l) of BP129 reads as follows:

Section 11 of the Interim Rules provides thus:

CASE TITLE MONSENOR ALFRED VERZOSA vs. ZOSIMO FERNANDEZ, ET AL.

GR NO. L-32276 DATE: November 19, 1930

TOPIC Representatives as Parties

CASE TITLE Resident Marine Mammals vs Reyes

GR NO. 180771 DATE:April 21, 2015

TOPIC Rule 3- Parties to Civil Actions - Indispensable Parties

G.R. No. 182645 DATE: December 15, 2010

Whether or not Robles is an indispensable party;

WON petitioner is an indispensable party to the action for quieting of title.

Whether or not Bautista is a necessary party.

Complaint was filed

Impleading the Estate of the Deceased

As to the Summons Served to Gina

The contract contained, among others:

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