Journal of Indian Philosophy

https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-021-09473-2(0123456789().,-volV)(0123456789().,-volV)

The Concept of Manopavicāra in Vasubandhu’s Exposition

of Pratītyasamutpāda in Chapter Three
of the Abhidharmakośabhās.ya

Maxim Voroshilov1

© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. 2021

Abstract This paper examines the concept of manopavicāra, found within the
exposition of dependent arising (pratītyasamutpāda) in chapter three of the Com-
mentary on the Treasury of Abhidharma (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya) of Vasubandhu.
According to Vasubandhu, the feeling (vedanā) link in the chain of dependent
arising consists of body-related feeling and mind-related feeling. Mind-related
feeling is divided into eighteen manopavicāras. Manopavicāras are the three
modalities of feeling: satisfaction, dissatisfaction, equanimity. They are said to rely
on the objects or to direct the mind toward the objects, which, in the case of the
meditations (samāpatti) of the formless realm, are not the objects of the senses but
the objects of mind. The article will explore the definitions, characteristics, and
functions of mental evaluations, their distribution in the three realms of existence,
and its rationale.

Keywords Buddhism · Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma · Dependent arising ·

Pratītyasamutpāda · The twelve limbs · Feeling (vedanā) · Manopavicāra

Introduction

The concept of pratītyasamutpāda (PS) or dependent arising is a pivotal teaching of

the entire Buddhist tradition. A detailed exposition of the doctrine as taught by the
Sarvāstivāda school is found in Vasubandhu’s Treasury of Abhidharma, and its

& Maxim Voroshilov

maxim_voroshilov@mail.ru;
maxim.voroshilov108@gmail.com;
ishvarapratyabhijna@gmail.com
1
Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, Mahidol University, Salaya, 999 Phutthamonthon
Sai 4 Rd., 73170, Nakhon Pathom, Thailand

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 M. Voroshilov

commentary the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (AKBh), one of the most influential post-

canonical Buddhist texts, composed around the 5th century CE. The doctrine of PS
is discussed in AKBh 3.18–38 in the Exposition of the World (Lokanirdeśa). The
exposition of dependent arising is an invaluable source elucidating the Vaibhāṣika
understanding of the concept. The Vaibhāṣika concept of dependent arising as
presented in the AKBh is related to its exposition in the canonic Sarvāstivāda
Abhidharma treatises and the Great Commentary, the Mahāvibhāṣā.
Among many topics discussed by Vasubandhu in this portion of the text, one
comparatively less known topic deserves scholarly attention: the discussion of
mental evaluations, or manopavicāras, in verses 3.32cd–3.35. Manopavicāras are
the three modes of feeling—satisfaction, dissatisfaction, and equanimity—arising in
an individual as a reaction to the objects of senses or mind. Though the three
evaluations (upavicāra), related to the three modes of feeling, are mentioned in
several Pali sources (see footnote 7), it remains to be explored whether the concept
has been developed in Pali sources to a degree comparable to what is found within
the Sarvāstivāda tradition. Although the Sarvāstivāda concept of manopavicāras has
not attracted significant scholarly attention, the very fact that the concept has been
given significant consideration in the Sarvāstivāda tradition makes an in-depth
investigation of the doctrine worthwhile. Indeed, the study of the concept of mental
evaluations promises to reveal a unique understanding of the feeling link in the
chain of dependent arising.
I will here explore the concept of mental evaluations, as it is discussed in
section 3.32–35 of the third chapter of the AKBh. I will study the definitions of the
term, its etymology, the characteristics of mental evaluations, their distribution in
the three realms of existence, and the rationale behind the distribution. The last
section of the article will focus on a tentative examination of the concept of
manovyabhicāras, as presented in the Saddharmasmṛtyupasthānasūtra. The concept
of manovyabhicāra has very much in common with the concept of manopavicāra
and might suggest us new ways of looking at and interpreting the concept of
manopavicāras.
I will mostly rely on the Abhidharmakośakārikā, the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya
(which will be referred to as the auto-commentary), as well as the Sphuṭārthā, a sub-
commentary by Yaśomitra (which will be referred to as the sub-commentary), and
the Saddharmasmṛtyupasthānasūtra (SDSUS).

What Mental Evaluations Are

The concept of “evaluative approaches of the mind” (manaḥ + upavicāra) regards a

class of feelings that determines further mental attitudes towards their objects and
appears in the broader context of Vasubandhu’s exposition of dependent arising. It
figures as a significant, if slightly tangential, zooming in into specific features of one
of the stages of the causal process that gives rise to the whole of saṃsāra.
In the context of the chain of dependent arising, manopavicāras are related to the
limb of feeling. In AKBh 3.32, Vasubandhu presents the limb of feeling as being
two-fold, body-related (bodily), and mind-related (mental):

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The five feelings born by contact with the eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body are
known as bodily feelings because they rely for support on the faculties that
have form. On the other hand, feeling born from contact with the mind is
called mental, because it relies for support on mind only.1
Mental feeling is further subdivided into eighteen. These eighteen subdivisions are
known as manopavicāras, or “mental evaluations.” Essentially, manopavicāras are
mind-based evaluations of the objects of the senses and of the mind, in terms of the
three modalities of feeling: satisfaction, dissatisfaction, and equanimity.
AKBh 3.32cd offers the following definition:
What are the mental evaluations? Indeed (kila):2 having relied on mind,
feelings of satisfaction, dissatisfaction, and equanimity attend to (or, evaluate)
the objects (viṣayān upavicaranti). Or, according to others, they make the
mind attend repeatedly to the objects.3,4
Commenting on this verse, Yaśomitra renders the verb upavicaranti as ālambante
(take as objects, depend on, rely on), and the causative form upavicārayanti (“direct
towards”) is explained as “set in motion, send towards” (pravartayanti). The prefix
upa, that usually means near or close, here, according to Yaśomitra, implies “again
and again.”5
In his sub-commentary, Yaśomitra brings more detail to this explanation:
The six evaluations (upavicāra) of satisfaction, and so forth: having seen
forms by eye, one attends to forms producing satisfaction. Having heard
sounds, one attends to sounds producing satisfaction. In this way, until
“having known the dharmas by mind,” one attends to the dharmas producing
satisfaction. In the same manner, seeing forms by eye, [one attends to forms]
producing dissatisfaction, and equanimity, and so on. In this manner, it should
be applied (yojya). There will be three, because of their triple nature:
satisfaction, dissatisfaction, and equanimity.6,7

1
cakṣuḥśrotraghrāṇajihvākāyasaṃsparśajāḥ pañca vedanāḥ kāyikī vedanety ucyate | rūpīndriyāśritatvāt |
manaḥsaṃsparśajā punar vedanā caitasikīty ucyate | cittamātrāśritatvāt (Pradhan, 1967, pp. 145. 2–3).
2
Vasubandhu often uses the particle kila to introduce a Vaibhāṣika perspective that he does not support.
3
Cp. the translation by Bhikkhu Bodhi who, following Yaśomitra’s hint, emphasizes that the process
occurs repeatedly: “Because satisfaction, dissatisfaction and equanimity cause the mental faculty to be
preoccupied with or re-ponder” (Bodhi, 2012, p. 1023).
4
manopavicārā iti ko 'rthaḥ | manaḥ kila pratītyaite saumanasyādayo viṣayān upavicarantīti | viṣayeṣu vā
mana upavicārayantīty apare | vedanāvaśena manaso viṣayeṣu punaḥ punar vicaraṇāt (Pradhan, 1967,
pp. 147. 5–7).
5
vedanāvaśena manaso viṣayeṣu punaḥ punar vicāraṇād ity upaśabdasyārthaḥ (Wogihara, 1932,
pp. 310. 31–32).
6
ṣaṭ saumanasyopavicārā iti vistaraḥ. cakṣuṣā rūpāṇi dṛṣṭvā saumanasyasthānīyāni rūpāṇi upavicarati.
śrotreṇa śabdān śrutvā saumanasyasthānīyāṃ śabdān upavicarati. evaṃ yāvan manasā dharmān vijñāya
saumanasyasthānīyān dharmān upavicarati. evaṃ cakṣuṣā rūpāṇi dṛṣṭvā daurmanasyasthānīyāny
upekṣāsthānīyāni ceti vistareṇa yojyam. trayo bhaviṣyantīti. saumanasyadaurmanasyopekṣāsvabhāva-
traividhyāt (Wogihara, 1932, pp. 310. 11–16).
7
Cp. Aṅguttara Nikāya (A III, 61), where the eighteen evaluations (upavicāra) are explained in the
following way: “When it was said: ’“These are the eighteen mental examinations”: this, bhikkhus, is the

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The manopavicāras do not lend themselves easily to being categorised: though

they are considered to be feelings, the manopavicāras assume a role and function
more active than those assigned to bodily feeling. As we have seen above, they are
the factors that make the mind attend to or approach the objects. This active role is
emphasized by the fact that the three manopavicāras, or the three modalities of
feeling—satisfaction, dissatisfaction, and equanimity—are also included among the
faculties (Pradhan, 1967, pp. 37. 7–11). Vasubandhu gives an etymological
explanation of faculties as ādhipatyārtha “having dominance as its meaning”
(Pradhan, 1967, pp. 38. 4). Dominance here should be understood in the sense of
power, or a state of dominance over a certain sphere or function, like the eye faculty
has causal dominance over seeing visual forms.

Mental Evaluations vs Bodily Feelings

Vasubandhu clearly distinguishes manopavicāras from the bodily feelings. In

response to an opponent who raises the question of why bodily feelings are not
counted as manopavicāras, Vasubandhu reasons that it is because neither the bodily
feelings rely on the mind, nor are they conceptual (˚āvikalpakatvāt), nor do
they actually evaluate (upavicārika).8 Yaśomitra adds that bodily feeling is not
evaluative (asantīrika).9

Footnote 7 continued
Dhamma taught by me, unrefuted … uncensured by wise ascetics and brahmins,’ for what reason was this
said? Having seen a form with the eye, one examines a form that is a basis for joy; one examines a form
that is a basis for dejection, one examines a form that is a basis for equanimity. Having heard a sound with
the ear … Having smelled an odour with the nose … Having tasted a taste with the tongue … Having felt
a tactile object with the body … Having cognized a mental phenomenon with the mind, one examines a
mental phenomenon which is a basis for joy; one examines a mental phenomenon which is a basis for
dejection; one examines a mental phenomenon which is a basis for equanimity. When it was said: ’“These
are the eighteen mental examinations”: this, bhikkhus, is the Dhamma taught by me, unrefuted …
uncensured by wise ascetics and brahmins,’ it is because of this that this was said (Bodhi, 2012, pp. 268–
269). Similar passages are found in the Dhātuvibhaṅgasutta (M 140), in the Saḷāyatanavibhaṅgasutta (M
137), and in the Titthāyatanādisutta (Aṇguttaranikāya 137). De La Vallée Poussin quotes the Pali sources
which talk about somanassūpavicāra, domanassūpavicāra, and upekkhūpavicāra but mentions they don’t
know the term mana-upavicāra: “Les sources pâlies connaissent les six somanassūpavicāras, dom-
manassūpavicāras, upekkūpavicāras (Dı̄gha, iii. 244, Majjhima, iii. 218, Vibhaṅga, 381, etc.): cakkhunā
rūpaṃ disvā somanassaṭṭhāniyaṃ rūpam upavicarati domanassaṭṭhāniyaṃ rūpaṃ upavicarati manasā
dhammaṃ viññāya somanassaṭṭhāniyaṃ dhammaṃ upavicarati, mais elles ignorent le mot mana-upavi-
cāra, comme aussi la Mahāvyutpatti.” (La Vallée Poussin, 1971, pp. v. II, 107, n.3).
8
kasmāt kāyikī vedanā na manopavicāraḥ | naiva hy asau mana evāśritā nāpy upavicārikā 'vikalpakatvād
ity ayogaḥ (Pradhan, 1967, pp. 7–8).
9
nāpy upavicāriketi. asantīrikety arthaḥ (Wogihara, 1932, 310. 33). S. Stalker translates it this way: “It is
not connected with judgement” (Stalker, 1987, p. 233).

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The Concept of manopavicāra

The Etymology and Renderings of the Term Manopavicāra

The word manopavicāra itself is a tatpuruṣa10 compound made of the two members:
manas (mind, thought) and upavicāra which some translate as a sphere or evaluation
but which, following the meaning of the root and the prefix, could be translated as
“approximation,” in the sense of approaching, coming closer. The commentary calls
out attention to the formation of the compound. The formation is worth considering
because of the apparently “wrong” sandhi: if the rule of sandhi is duly applied between
the two members of the compound: manas and upavicāra, the resulting compound
should read as mana-upavicāra. The auto-commentary does not explain the formation
while the sub-commentary mentions Pānini’s sūtra 8.2.1. This sūtra which reads
˙
pūrvātrāsiddham presents an adhikāra, or a rule, that refers to what was taught until the
end of the eighth book. According to the commentary (vṛtti), this sūtra prescribes that
rules mentioned from here until the end of chapter eight should be treated as if they
were not established in relation to what was taught in the seven previous books, or if
those subsequent rules had not happened.
WithregardtowhateverhasbeentaughtintheprecedingSevenBooksandaquarter,the
rules contained in these three last chapters are considered as asiddha. And further, in
these three chapters, a subsequent rule is, as if it had not taken effect, so far as any
preceding rule is concerned. The word asiddham = asiddhavad bhavati,
siddhakāryaṃ na karoti || The rule is “as if non-effective, does not produce an
operation of a siddha or effective rule”. This rule of non-effectiveness is for the
sake of prohibiting the operation of an ādeśa rule, and establishing the operation
of an utsarga or general rule.” (Vasu, 1988 vol. 2, p. 1532).
Yaśomitra adds here that the suffix a (nañ) here should be understood in the sense of
“little, slightly,” therefore, the word asiddha, “not established, not proven, not
effective” should be understood as īṣatsiddha, partially established, or optionally
established.11 Thus, this comment ingeniously explains the irregularity of the
formation of the word manopavicāra.
The term manopavicāra does not lend itself easily to being translated. De La Vallée
Poussin, for example, leaves it untranslated; S. Stalker translates it as “mental
spheres” (Stalker, 1987, pp. 231–242). L. Pruden, following De La Vallée-Poussin,
does not translate manopavicāra. L. Sangpo translates the term as “pondering,” and
“mental-faculty-pondering,” perhaps, to emphasize manopavicāras being included
among the faculties (indriyas) (Sangpo, 2012, pp. 1022–1029). Rudoy and
Ostrovskaya translate the term into Russian as otsenochniye otnosheniya, “evaluative
attitudes” (Rudoy & Ostrovskaya, 2001, pp. 234–240). Bhikkhu Bodhi translates the
corresponding Pali term as “mental examinations” (Bodhi, 2012, pp. 1011–1029).

10
Tatpuruṣa is a technical term of the Sanskrit grammar that describes a definitive compound in which
the relation between the main and dependent member is defined through one of the grammatical cases.
The word tatpuruṣa (literally, “that-man”) itself demonstrates such a relation: tatpuruṣa means tasya
puruṣa: that [person’s] man, a servant.
11
punaḥsandhikaraṇaṃ cātra draṣṭavyam iti. pūrvatrāsiddham iti sakāralopasyāsiddhatvād guṇo na
prāpnoti. parihāras tu. īṣadarthe 'yaṃ nañ draṣṭavyaḥ. īṣatsiddham asiddham ity ataḥ siddhatvāt
sakāralopasya guṇo bhavati. saiṣa dāśarathī rāma iti yathā (Wogihara, 1932, pp. 310. 7–10).

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 M. Voroshilov

Characteristics of Mental Evaluations

AKBh 3.32cd examines the manopavicāras from different angles. In terms of their
nature (svabhāvataḥ), they are said to be three modalities of feeling: satisfaction,
dissatisfaction, equanimity. In terms of their association, there is only one, because all
of them are associated with the mind, which, according to Yaśomitra’s explanation, here
refers specifically to mental consciousness (manovijñāna). Then, according to their
object, there are six, because they rely on the six objects—visible form and so forth. In
terms of their object, fifteen manopavicāras of form and so on, are known as having
“uncombined” or “non-mingled” objects (asaṃbhinnālambana) because they rely on
“uncombined” objects—visible form and so forth. What is meant by “uncombined”
(asaṃbhinna)? Yaśomitra explains “uncombined” as non-mingled, or not mixed. The
auto-commentary explains that they have “uncombined” objects because their objects
are “defined” or “fixed”—as visible form and so forth—in each case (pratiniy-
atarūpālambanatvāt). It means that a particular type of manopavicāra can take only one
specific type of object.12 About the three dharmopavicāras, evaluations of mental
objects, it is said that they are both; it means they can have both “uncombined” and
“combined” objects (saṃbhinnālambana): they can take both the sense data and mental
objects (dharmas) as their supports.13

Mental Evaluations and the Senses

The relation of mental evaluations and the senses is discussed in AKBh 3.32cd. An
opponent asks: “If mental evaluations belong to the mind range (manobhūmika),
why does a sūtra state: ‘Having seen forms with the eye, one perceives forms
producing satisfaction,’ etc.?” The answer is that “it was said after having
deliberated that manopavicāras had been produced (abhinirhṛta) by the five groups
of consciousness, therefore they are mental evaluations.”14
The statement is exemplified by meditation on the impure (aśubhā bhāvanā),
which is said to be “produced by the eye-consciousness” and to belong to the
mind.15

12
De La Vallée Poussin translates from Tibetan as follows: “Parmi ces dix-huit, quinze sont les
upavicāras des objets visibles, audibles, etc. leur objet est nécessairement et respectivement rūpa etc.; il
n’y a pas variété dans leur objet. Trois sont upavicāras, des dharmas; ils sont de deuze espèces [: tantôt
leur objet est constant, quand ils portent sur les dharmas distincts de rūpa, etc.; tantôt variable quand ils
portent sur le rūpa, etc.]” (De La Vallée Poussin 1914–1918, p. 56).
13
katham eṣāṃ vyavasthānam | yadi svabhāvatas trayo bhaviṣyanti | saumanasyadaurmanasy-
opekṣopavicārāḥ | atha saṃprayogata eko bhaviṣyati | sarveṣāṃ manaḥsaṃprayuktatvāt |
athālambanataḥ ṣaḍ bhaviṣyanti | rūpādiṣaḍviṣayālambanatvāt | tribhir api sthāpanā | teṣāṃ pañcadaśa
rūpādyupavicārā asaṃbhinnālambanāḥ pratiniyatarūpādyālambanatvāt | trayo dharmopavicārā ubhay-
athā (Pradhan, 1967, pp. 147. 1–5).
14
yadi manobhūmikā evaite | yat tarhi sūtra uktaṃ cakṣuṣā rūpāṇi dṛṣṭvā saumanasyasthānīyāni rūpāṇy
upavicarantīty evamādiḥ | katham | pañcavijñānakāyābhinirhṛtatvam abhisaṃdhāyaitad uktaṃ manob-
hūmikā hy ete (Pradhan, 1967, pp. 147. 10–12).
15
tadyathāśubhā cakṣurvijñānābhinirhṛtā ca manobhūmikā ceti (Pradhan, 1967, pp. 147. 12–15).

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The Concept of manopavicāra

Yaśomitra further clarifies Vasubandhu’s explanation:

For example, the concentration on the impure is produced by the eye-
consciousness, in terms of previously seeing a blue corpse and so forth; but it
also belongs to the mental sphere, due to the state of concentration.16
The following statement shows that the act of sensual perception is considered to be
the cause of the subsequent mental evaluation:
If we state: “Having seen a form with the eye,” and so on—up to “having felt
tangibles with the body,” it cannot be criticized. Had it been said: “Seeing the
forms with the eye, one attends to the forms producing satisfaction” up to
“touching the tangibles by the body,” etc., it could have been criticized. But
since it was not thus said, it cannot be criticized.17
The following statement clarifies that manopavicāras do not always need a physical
object:
Those that “without having seen” … up to “without having touched,” attend to
the corresponding objects, are, indeed, mental evaluations.18
Yaśomitra adds:
As also for someone who hears something from someone else, and then
attends to [it], takes [it] as an object, with the mind, those too are
manopavicāras belonging to that person.19
It is further emphasized: due to their mental nature, manopavicāras are allowed
access to the other realms. It is said that if it was not the case, “in the realm of
desires, there would not be the mental evaluations that take the form realm as their
object, and, in the form realm there would not be mental evaluations taking the
smells and tastes of the desire realm as their objects.”20 Yaśomitra explains the
statement in greater detail:
Because, otherwise, and so on. A being born in the realm of desires would not
be able to directly perceive form and other objects of the realm of form, and
also a being born in the realm of form would not be able to evaluate smell and

16
tadyathā aśubhā. cakṣurvijñānābhinirhṛtā ca pūrvaṃ vinīlakādidarśanāt. manobhūmikā ca samāhi-
tatvāt (Wogihara, 1932, pp. 311. 10–12).
17
cakṣuṣā rūpāṇi dṛṣṭvā yāvat kāyena spraṣṭavyāni spṛṣṭveti vacanād acodyam etat. yadi cakṣuṣā rūpāṇi
paśyan saumanasyasthānīyāni rūpāṇy upavicaratīty uktaṃ syāt. yāvat kāyena spraṣṭavyāni spṛśann iti.
syāc codyaṃ. na tv evam uktam ity acodyam evaitat (Wogihara, 1932, pp. 311. 12–15).
18
ye 'py adṛṣṭvā yāvad aspṛṣṭvopavicaranti te 'pi manopavicārāḥ (Pradhan, 1967, pp. 147. 14).
19
yo 'pi śrutvā parato manasopavicaraty ālambate. te 'pi tasya manopavicārāḥ (Wogihara, 1932,
pp. 311. 16).
20
itarathā hi kāmadhātau rūpadhātvālambanā rūpādyupavicārā na syuḥ kāmadhātvālambanāś ca
rūpadhātau gandharasaspraṣṭavyopavicārāḥ (Pradhan, 1967, pp. 147. 14–16).

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taste, taking the desire realm as its object—because one does not have smell
and taste as objects [in the realm of form].21
In the concluding part of the section, it is shown that mental evaluations can also
evaluate objects which have not been perceived.
As also for someone that, having seen forms, attends to the sounds
accompanying those forms, this too is a manopavicāra belonging to that
person.22
Although an object of mental evaluation does not have to be present, nevertheless
mental evaluations which take as their support the objects that have been perceived,
are clearer (vyaktataratvāt). Yaśomitra concludes that the sūtra explains the action
of manopavicāras based on the division of objects and faculties for the sake of
clarity.

Not All Feelings Should be Considered Mental Evaluations

In the conclusion to the section on manopavicāras, Vasubandhu argues that not all
feelings are mental evaluations. Yaśomitra illustrates this idea with the example of an
arhat in whom, when he takes mental factors, or the sphere of mental factors
(dharmāyatana), or the factors of attainment (adhigamadharma) as objects, there
arises worldly, wholesome satisfaction endowed with outflows (āsrava). It is
emphasized that in the arhat, who directly perceives the qualities pertaining to
Buddha’s continuum, wholesome satisfaction, which is not a mental evaluation, does
arise.23 Therefore, it is concluded that—even being endowed with outflows—not all
feelings like satisfaction and so forth should be considered mental evaluations.

Mental Evaluations and the Pleasant State of the Third Meditation

An opponent raises an objection regarding the connection between satisfaction

(saumanasya) and happiness (sukha) present in the third meditation (dhyāna),
asking why the happiness of the third meditation is not considered a mental
evaluation.

21
itarathā hīti vistaraḥ. rūpadhātvālambanā rūpādyupavicārā na syuḥ. kāmadhātūpapannena rūpāva-
carāṇāṃ rūpādīnām apratyakṣīkṛtatvāt. kāmadhātvālambanāś ca gandharasaspraṣṭavyopavicārā
rūpadhātūpannasya na syuḥ. tasya gandhādīnām aviṣayatvāt (Wogihara, 1932, pp. 311. 17–20).
22
yo 'pi rūpāṇi dṛṣṭvā tatsahacarāñ chabdān upavicarati. so 'pi tasya manopavicāraḥ (Law, 1949, ch. III,
pp. 68. 19–20). Here, I prefer Law’s reading śabdān, supported by the Chinese and Tibetan translations,
over Wogihara’s reading chandān (Wogihara, 1932, pp. 311. 22).
23
arhato laukikaṃ kuśalaṃ sāsravaṃ dharmālambanaṃ dharmāyatanālambanam adhigamadharmālam-
banaṃ vā saumanasyam asti. tasya hi buddhasāntānikāṃ [read: °kān] guṇān saṃmukhīkurvataḥ kuśalam
saumanasyam utpadyate (Wogihara, 1932, pp. 315. 4–7).

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The Concept of manopavicāra

In response, Vasubandhu explains:

Because, indeed (kila) from the very beginning, the faculty of happiness
(sukhendriya) of the mind range (manobhūmi) is not found in the desire realm,
and, because the evaluation (upavicāra) of suffering is not found [in the third
meditation] due to being its opposite.24
Generally, the faculty of happiness is related to the body; but it is said that in the
case of the third meditation, the feeling of happiness is mental, not bodily. AKBh
2.7cd says that “this happy feeling in the third concentration is the mental faculty of
happiness; it is not bodily feeling because the five groups of cognitions are absent.”
AKBh 2.8a states that in the desire realm and lower meditations, this mental happy
feeling is satisfaction (saumanasya). And, because in the third meditation the desire
for joy is gone, it is called the faculty of “happiness”—not the faculty of
“satisfaction.”25

The Distribution of Manopavicāras in the Three Realms26 and its

rationale

Sentient beings may come to possess a maximum of eighteen types of mental

evaluations (not simultaneously, as each of them happen to arise at one time, being
caittas). These eighteen manopavicāras are present in the desire realm only. In it,
there are the six manopavicāras of satisfaction, the six manopavicāras of
dissatisfaction, and the six manopavicāras of equanimity, all related to the five
senses and mind. Only the living beings belonging to the desire realm can

24
āditaḥ kila kāmadhātau manobhūmikasukhendriyābhāvāt tatpratidvandvena duḥkhopavicārābhāvāc
ceti (Pradhan, 1967, 147. 10–11).
25
In AKBh 2.7–8a, Vasubandhu examines saumanasyendriya, daurmanasyendriya, upekṣendriya. It is
said that “… in the third meditation, the same happy mental feeling is the faculty of happiness
(sukhendriya) (…) Elsewhere, outside of the third meditation, in the desire realm, or in the first or the
second meditation, this pleasant state of mind is the faculty of satisfaction” (saumanasyendriyam)
(sukhendriyaṃ kāyikī śātā vedanā | śātety anugrāhikā sukhety arthaḥ | dhyāne tṛtīye tu caitasī sā
sukhendriyam [2.7cd] tṛtīye tu dhyāne saiva śātā vedanā caitasī sukhendriyam | nahi tatra kāyikī
vedanāsti | pañcavijñānakāyābhāvāt | anyatra sā saumanasyaṃ [2.8a] tṛtīyād dhyānād anyatra
kāmadhātau prathame dvitīye ca dhyāne sā caitasikī śātā vedanā saumanasyendriyam | tṛtīye tu dhyāne
prītivītarāgatvāt sukhendriyam eva sā na saumanasyendriyam) (Pradhan, 1967, pp. 41. 11–16).
26
Vasubandhu defines the three realms in AKBh 2.14 in the following way: “Due to the predominance
of objects of desire, the desire realm is called “desires”.” (kāmapradhānatvāt kāmadhātuḥ kāmā iti
nirdiśyate); the realm of form, due to predominance of form, is called “forms” (rūpapradhānatvād
rūpadhātū rūpāṇīti) (Pradhan, 1967, pp. 48. 7). Vasubandhu quotes a sūtra to describe the formless realm:
“Those, o bhikṣus, who, having gone beyond “forms”, are calm and liberated, are formless” (ye 'pi te
bhikṣavaḥ śāntā vimokṣā atikramya rūpāṇy ārūpyā iti) (Pradhan, 1967, pp. 48, 8–9). In AKBh 1.22,
the realms are characterised in terms of their association with one of the skandhas: the desire realm is
defined by forms of desired objects of senses; the meditations [in the form realm] are defined by sensation
(vedanā); the three formless are defined by notion (saṃjñā); the peak of existence is defined by saṃskāras
only (dhātuto vā | kāmaguṇarūpaprabhāvito hi kāmadhātuḥ | vedanāprabhāvitāni dhyānāni |
saṃjñāprabhāvitāḥ trayaḥ ārūpyāḥ | saṃskāramātraprabhāvitaṃ bhavāgram) (Pradhan, 1967, pp. 15.
15–17).

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experience three modes of feeling in relation to the objects; only in the desire realm
all the five objects of senses and mind, with the corresponding faculties, are present.
The number of manopavicāras available to living beings is defined (1) by the
sphere living beings belong to, (2) by the realms they can take as their object sphere
—dependent on the adepts’ level of realization, i.e. meditation they mastered, (3) by
the availability of objects in the realm they take as their object: in the case of the
absence of objects of smell and taste in the higher realms, manopavicāras which
would perceive those are also absent. For example, we will not be able to find either
manopavicāras of dissatisfaction in the realms higher than the desire realm, or
mental evaluations of satisfaction above the second meditation. Also, in the realms
higher than the desire realm there are no mental evaluations that would take smell
and taste as their objects, precisely because the objects of smell and taste are absent.

Meditations: “The Meditations Obtained at Birth” and Meditation-

Absorptions

Two kinds of meditations are mentioned in the AKBh: first, the meditational states
living beings obtain at birth (upapattidhyāna), second, meditations that are
absorptions (samāpattidhyāna). The latter is considered a cause while the former
is the effect, because it is caused by the meditative absorption. First, we will discuss
the meditations called “the meditations obtained at birth” (upapattidhyāna),27
starting with the desire realm.

The Desire Realm

Beings in the desire realm possess eighteen manopavicāras when they take the
desire realm as their object (ālambana).
When beings in the desire realm take the first two meditations of the form realm
as their object (ālambana), they possess only twelve manopavicāras. Since the
objects of smell and taste are absent in the form realm, such beings, when taking the
form realm as the object, neither possess the three manopavicāras of satisfaction,
dissatisfaction, and equanimity related to smell nor the three manopavicāras of
satisfaction, dissatisfaction, and equanimity related to taste.
Beings in the desire realm, when they take the formless realm as their object,
possess only three evaluations of mental objects (dharmopavicāras)—
27
AKBh 8.1 introduces two types of meditation distinguished due to the difference between “meditation
which is obtained at birth,” and meditation which is absorption (samāpatti). Meditation which is
absorption (samāpattidhyāna) is defined as follows: “State of one-pointedness of a wholesome mind,
without divisions, is meditation, because its nature is concentration (samādhi).” dvidhā dhyānāni [8.1a1]
samāsato dvividhāni dhyānāny upapattisamāpattidhyānabhedāt (…) samāpattidhyānaṃ tu vaktavyam |
ata ucyate samāpattiḥ śubhai-kāgryaṃ [8.1c] abhedena kuśalacittaikāgratā dhyānam samādhisv-
abhāvatvāt pañcaskandhās tu sānugam [8.1d] saparivāraṃ tu pañcaskandhasvabhāvaṃ veditavyam |
keyam ekāgratā nāma | ekālambanatā | evaṃ tarhi cittāny evaikālambanāni samādhir na caitasikaṃ
dharmāntaram iti prāpnoti | na cittāny eva samādhiḥ | yena tu tāny ekāgrāṇi vartante sa dharmaḥ
samādhiḥ | saiva cittaikāgratā (Pradhan, 1967, pp. 432. 3–16, 433. 1).

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The Concept of manopavicāra

Table 1 Manopavicāras a being in the desire realm possesses

Born in The desire realm

Realms that can be taken as object Desire realm Form realm Formless realm

Manopavicāras
Satisfaction Form x x
Sound x x
Smell x
Taste x
Tangible x x
Dharmas x x x
Dissatisfaction Form x x
Sound x x
Smell x
Taste x
Tangible x x
Dharmas x x x
Equanimity Form x x
Sound x x
Smell x
Taste x
Tangible x x
Dharmas x x x

dharmopavicāra of satisfaction, dharmopavicāra of dissatisfaction, and equanimous

dharmopavicāra (Table 1).

The Form Realm

In the form realm, the number of mental evaluation beings possess depends on
whether they belong to the stage of the first and second meditation or the stage of
the third and fourth meditation.
Beings in the first and second meditations of the form realm, when taking the
desire realm as their object, possess twelve manopavicāras. The number comes
about because of the absence of the mental evaluations related to dissatisfaction in
the form realm.
Beings in the first and second meditations of the form realm, when taking the
form realm as their object, possess only eight manopavicāras. Since any states of
dissatisfaction are absent in the meditations, only manopavicāras of satisfaction and
equanimity, taking forms and so forth as objects, are present. That brings the
number to eight, because the objects of taste and smell are not present in the form
realm.

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Table 2 Manopavicāras a being in the form realm possesses

Born in The form realm (first and The form realm (third and
second meditations) fourth meditations)

Realms that can be Desire realm Form realm Formless Desire Form Formless
taken as object realm realm realm realm

Manopavicāras
Satisfaction Form x x
Sound x x
Smell x
Taste x
Tangible x x
Dharmas x x x
Equanimity Form x x x x
Sound x x x x
Smell x x
Taste x x
Tangible x x x x
Dharmas x x x x x x

Beings in the first and second meditations of the form realm, when taking the
formless realm as their object, possess only two dharmopavicāras of satisfaction
and equanimity.
Beings in the third and fourth meditations possess only equanimous
manopavicāras. Such beings, when taking the desire realm as their object, possess
six manopavicāras related to the six objects of the desire realm perceived only by
the equanimous mind. The same beings, when taking the form realm as their object,
possess only four equanimous manopavicāras. Indeed, there are only equanimous
manopavicāras in the third and fourth meditations, and, since neither taste nor smell
objects are found in the form realm, only four manopavicāras are present—without
the equanimous manopavicāras of taste and smell.
A being in the third and fourth meditations, when taking the formless realm as his
or her object, possesses only one equanimous dharmopavicāra (Table 2).

The Formless Realm

The formless realm is divided into the fundamental meditations (mauladhyāna) and
their thresholds (sāmantaka). The word sāmantaka means a vicinity, neighbour-
hood, threshold, or precincts. Vasubandhu upholds that sāmantakas should also be
considered meditations.28 The first threshold, which is the entry into the first

28
The term fundamental meditation (mauladhyāna) is explained in AKBh 8.5ab1: “The fundamental one,
the substrate of absorption, is of eight types [8.5ab1]; these eight fundamental ones are the substrates of
absorption, namely the four meditations and the four formless.” (iti maulaṃ samāpattidravyam

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The Concept of manopavicāra

Table 3 Manopavicāras a being in the formless realm possesses

Born in Thresholds (sāmantakas) The formless meditation (mūla)
of the formless meditation

Realms that can be taken as object Form realm Formless realm Formless realm

Manopavicāras
Equanimity Form x
Sound x
Smell
Taste
Tangible x
Dharmas x x x

formless meditation, is called anāgamya while the other three, which are the entry
points into the second, the third, and the fourth formless meditations, are not named.
Only equanimous mental evaluations are present in the thresholds.
In the formless realm, four equanimous mental evaluations exist in the sāmantaka
of the first meditation of the formless realm which is also known as the āyatana of
the infinity of space (ākāśānantyāyatana).
Beings in the formless realm, when taking the form realm, or to be precise, the
fourth meditation of the form realm, as the object, possess four equanimous mental
evaluations. The mental evaluations here attend to the following four objects of the
form realm: forms, sounds, tangibles, and mental objects (dharmas) (Table 3).

The Number of Mental Evaluations in Different Realms in the Case

of Beings Endowed with a Wholesome Mind (Kuśalacitta) and Beings
Devoid of a Wholesome Mind

AKBh 3.35d describes living beings born in the desire realm as well as those born in
the meditations. Though the living beings born in the desire realm are not detached,
or, not devoid of passion (vītarāga), they possess a different amount of
manopavicāras depending on whether they are endowed with a wholesome mind
(kuśalacitta), or not. So, the number of mental evaluations one is entitled to depends
not only on the “place of birth,” but on the above criteria which indicate the
individual’s progress.

Footnote 28 continued
aṣtavidham [8.5ab1] ity etāny aṣṭau maulāni samāpattidravyāṇi yaduta catvāri dhyānāni catvāra ārupyā
iti)˙ (Pradhan, 1967, pp. 436. 12–13). The threshold meditations or meditation’s thresholds are first
introduced in AKBh 4.17, when Vasubandhu states that the “dhyāna’s threshold is also understood as and
called meditation: just like the vicinity of the village is also called village” (sāmantakam apy atra
dhyānaṃ kṛtvocyate | yathā grāmasāmantakam api grāma ity ucyate (Pradhan, 1967, pp. 208. 5). AKBh
8.22 mentions eight preliminary meditations. In AKBh 8.22b, the preliminary meditations are charac-
terized as pure and neutral (śuddhāduḥkhāsukhāni hi) (Pradhan, 1967, pp. 447. 19).

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First, let us consider what is meant by a being “endowed with wholesome mind”
(kuśalacitta). The context of wholesome (kuśala), presupposes the state of being
devoid of the three qualities: attachment (lobha), hate (dveṣa), delusion (moha). So,
the implication should be that those in the possession of the wholesome mind,
should not have mental evaluations of dissatisfaction.
As AKBh 5.20 states, there are three roots of unwholesome (akuśala).
Attachment, hatred, delusion are the roots of unwholesome because “that which
is both unwholesome and the root of unwholesome is considered the root of
unwholesome.” It is established that the rest of latent afflictions (anuśaya) are not
the roots of unwholesome.29
Secondly, let us look closer at what is understood as detached, or, devoid of
passion (vītarāga): AKBh 2.18, when examining how many faculties living beings
have in their possession, mentions that people, who are detached from desires, do
not possess the faculty of dissatisfaction.30 Yaśomitra explains it in the following
manner: “Abiding here, or, in the other realms, whether being an ordinary person or
a saint (ārya), he is not endowed with dissatisfaction.”31 The one who is detached
(vītarāga) is not born in the realm of desire.
The passage that I will present below implies that beings with a wholesome mind
of the realm of form are in possession of a greater number of mental evaluations
when compared to beings born in the realm of desire, who are not devoid of passion,
and who do not possess the wholesome mind of the realm of form. Such beings have
only eight mental evaluations, taking the first two meditations as their object: the
four evaluations of satisfaction and the four equanimous evaluations—with the
evaluations of dissatisfaction being absent in the meditations. In the third and fourth
meditations, they have only four evaluations—because both satisfaction and
dissatisfaction are absent, and there are only four equanimous evaluations. And,
since there is no form in the formless realm, there they can have only one
equanimous evaluation. Similarly, beings with a wholesome mind belonging to the
form realm, possess the twelve evaluations belonging to the desire realm. But, in
contrast to the previous type of beings, they possess ten evaluations taking the first
two meditations as their object. It is explained in the following manner: they have
four evaluations of satisfaction belonging to the first two meditations and the six
equanimous evaluations related to the stage of the meditation-threshold called
anāgamya. Perhaps, having reached the state of anāgamya, which is supposed to be
an entry into meditations, the being is still in possession of the lower organs, but at
the same time—since anāgamya is characterized by equanimity—the evaluations of
both satisfaction and dissatisfaction are absent. Thus, having a wholesome mind
belonging to the form realm when one is still connected to the desire realm—due to
not being detached (avītarāga)—entitles one to access the threshold of the first
meditation and, consequently, to possess the additional mental evaluations.
29
trīṇy akuśalamūlāni [5.20c] lobho 'kuśalamūlaṃ dveṣo moho 'kuśalamūlam | yad dhy akuśalaṃ
cākuśalasya ca mūlaṃ tad evākuśalamūlam iṣṭam | śeṣā anuśayā nākuśalamūlānīti siddham (Pradhan,
1967, pp. 291. 7–9).
30
daurmanasyena vītarāgaḥ [na samanvāgataḥ] (Pradhan, 1967, 50. 16).
31
daurmanasyena kāmavītarāga iti. ihastho dhātvantarastho vā pṛthagjano vāryo vā na samanvāgataḥ.
(Wogihara, 1932, pp. 118. 29–30).

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The Concept of manopavicāra

A being born in the desire realm, who has not obtained the wholesome mind of
the realm of form,32 is endowed with all mental evaluations of the desire
realm, and the eight mental evaluations taking the first and the second
meditations as their object, with the four afflicted mental evaluations related to
the third and fourth meditation, objects of smell and taste being excluded, as
well as with just one only afflicted mental evaluation that takes the formless
realm as its object. One who has obtained the wholesome mind of the form
realm,33 but who is not devoid of passion, is endowed with all the
manopavicāras related to the realm of desire, with the ten [manopavicāras]
related to the first and second meditation: the four afflicted [manopavicāras] of
satisfaction, objects of smell and taste excluded, and the six equanimous
manopavicāras related to the stage of [the preliminary meditation called]
anāgamya. In the case of those who were born in the second, third, fourth
meditations, and the formless realm, it is as has been mentioned before. The
rest should be understood in the same way. But someone who is born in a
meditation should be known as “endowed with one equanimous manopavicāra
of mental objects of the desire realm,” associated with the “mind of magic
creation.”34,35

A Tentative Examination of Manovyabhicāras

in the Saddharmasm.rtyupa-sthānasūtra in the Light
of Manopavicāras in the AKBh

I have decided to incorporate the present section, following a kind suggestion of

Robert Kritzer.
This material may provide a broader context for the concept of manopavicāra,
offering a significant instance of a closely related idea found within a Mahāyāna

32
LVP adds here: “… [en pénétrant dans l’anāgamya …; qui à plus forte ne s’est pas détaché du
Kāmadhātu et n’est pas entré dans les dhyānas] …” (LVP, 1923. 113).
33
Here, Pradhan apparently misreads a daṇḍa for a long ā, making lābhī into alābhī (Pradhan, 1967,
pp. 149. 18).
34
kāmadhātūpapanno rūpāvacarasya kuśalasya cittasyālābhī kāmāvacaraiḥ sarvaiḥ prathamad-
vitīyadhyānabhūmikair aṣṭābhis tṛtīyacaturthadhyānabhūmikaiś caturbhiḥ kliṣṭair gandharasālambanān
paryudasya | arūpyāvacareṇaikena kliṣṭenaiva | lābhī rūpāvacarasya kuśalasya cittasyāvītarāgaḥ sarvaiḥ
kāmāvacaraiḥ prathamadhyānabhūmikair daśabhiḥ | caturbhiḥ saumanasyopavicāraiḥ kliṣṭair gandha-
rasālambanau vyudasya ṣaḍbhir upekṣopavicārair anāgamyabhūmikaiḥ | dvitīyatṛtīyacaturthadhyānārū-
pyajaiḥ pūrvavat | anayā vartanyā śeṣam anugantavyam || dhyānopapannas tu kāmāvacareṇaikenopekṣ-
ādharmopavicāreṇa nirmāṇacittasaṃprayuktena samanvāgato veditavyaḥ | (Pradhan, 1967, pp. 149.
16–23).
35
Vasubandhu describes the “mind of creation” (nirmāṇacitta) in detail in AKBh 7.49–53 (Pradhan,
426.10–427.8). In brief, the nirmāṇacitta is one of the supernormal achievements that allow the meditator
to emanate “magic creations,” or transform oneself into one. This stage is said to come immediately after
the “pure meditation,” or type of meditation called pure (śuddhaka): (śuddhakād dhyānād anantaraṃ
nirmāṇacittam iti) (Pradhan, pp. 427. 2). Yaśomitra, commenting on verse 7.55–58, says that the state of
the mind of creation is achieved because of detachment to a [lower] meditation. (Wogihara, pp. 659. 17).

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Sūtra. The Saddharmasmṛtyupasthānasūtra may not directly bear on the interpre-

tation of Vasubandhu, but it may help in achieving a more telling general picture.
The Saddharmasmṛtyupasthānasūtra (SDSUS),36 the composition of which has
been dated as between the second and fourth centuries CE, teaches, in its second
chapter, the contemplation of the eighteen manovyabhicāras in the context of the
first of the ten stages of development (bhūmi). The way the term manovyabhicāra is
presented suggests either a concept strikingly similar to the eighteen manopavicāras
or the possibility of a textual corruption of the original term manopavicāra in the
course of textual transmission.37
Indeed, even initial acquaintance with these two terms reveals a strong similarity
between them: they are the three modalities of feeling, they are related to the five senses
and the mind, they are decisive factors behind cyclic existence. It is also to be noted that
these two words share the same verbal root and the same number of syllables.
Manovyabhicāra is rendered in Chinese as yì xíng (意行: Stuart, 2015, vol. 1,
p. 318, n.10). This term is attested in Paramārtha’s translation of AKBh 3.32cd (and
several other texts) wherein it is employed as one of the possible renderings of
manopavicāra.38
The Tibetan translation of “the eighteen manovyabhicāras” (āṣṭādaśa manovyab-
hicārāḥ) is yid kyi dpyod pa bco brgyad dag (Stuart, 2015, ibid.). The Tibetan
translation of manopavicāra in the AKBh is yid kyi nye bar rgyu ba. I could not find
any attestation of the Tibetan dpyod pa as a rendering of vyabhicāra. The word
dpyod pa is often employed to translate vicāra, and, in certain contexts, mīmāṃsā.
While the historical relation between the two terms is, admittedly, unclear,39
some overwhelming similarities and some telling differences prompt me to offer a
few preliminary40 comparative observations.
(1) The most remarkable similarity is that both the terms stand for the three mo-
dalities of feeling: satisfaction, dissatisfaction, and equanimity.
(2) The first striking difference is the context within which the concepts are pres-
ented: the sūtra presents the contemplation of the manovyabhicāras as the first

36
For the detailed analysis of the SDSUS dating and its unique character, please see Stuart (2015), vol. I,
pp. 42–47.
37
“The text is full of corruptions—orthographical, grammatical, conceptual and otherwise” (Stuart,
2015, p. 40).
38
The other renderings attested in Paramārtha are 心分別行, 分別行, 意分別行, 意分別, 十八意行; in
Xuan Zang: 意近行, 意近行異, 近行.
39
I thank Daniel Stuart for the following clarification regarding manovyabhicāra in the SDSUS codex
unicus: “The term repeats enough times and is consistently and clearly rendered as such in the manuscript
in most cases. There is, of course, no telling when this usage might have come into vogue.” He also adds
that “it is worth noting that here is every possibility that over many years of manuscript transmission, the
term manovyabhicāra might have been transfigured from an original manopavicāra. But the manuscript
as we have it certainly does not provide evidence of such a process.” (Personal written communication).
40
A thorough investigation of all the problems related to the term manovyabhicāra—the cause of its
emergence as a term, and whether it is a replacement of manopavicāra, the traditional term associated
with the concept of the three feeling modalities—is beyond the scope of the present research.

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The Concept of manopavicāra

stage (bhūmi) of the process of liberation: getting rid of the unwholesome.41

According to the sūtra, the manovyabhicāras are to be examined and analyzed.
In the AKBh, the detailed description of manopavicāras stands aside and is
tangential to the main discussion. The practical implications of the concept of
manopavicāras are neither mentioned nor examined. Manopavicāras are not
explicitly connected to a particular stage of development and practice—only a
thorough understanding of the whole range of concepts and methods taught in
the AKBh might reveal how they fit in the system and shed light on the practical
benefits their knowledge is meant to offer.
(3) Vasubandhu’s treatment of the manopavicāras suggests that they are one of the
main factors conducive to the generation and perpetuation of saṃsāra. This
resonates well with the sūtra:
Thus, it is by the eighteen manovyabhicāras, which have three maturations,
that death and birth occur in the world.42
(4) The eighteen manovyabhicāras are made into objects of meditation. They are to
be studied and pondered upon. In the AKBh, on the other hand, the manopa-
vicāras are described as independent factors, which either rely on the objects or
make the mind approach the objects. At the same time, the AKBh describes
manopavicāras in great detail, and in a broader context: for example, we are
informed of how they are distributed among the different meditations.
(5) In the AKBh, the following three modes of experiencing the world—feelings of
satisfaction, dissatisfaction, and equanimity—are all considered afflicted (sā-
ṃkleśika). In the SDSUS, on the other hand, the dissatisfying experience is
considered to result in a purifying (vyavadānika) wholesome maturation, while
the satisfying experience results in afflicted unwholesome maturation. It is ex-
plained that satisfaction results in unwholesome maturation, because it does not
cause detachment, while dissatisfaction results in wholesome maturation, bec-
ause it makes one dispassionate.
Only an extensive scrutiny of textual sources will clarify the relation between
manovyabhicāra and manopavicāra. At present, it is possible to say that the two
concepts (if these are, indeed, different concepts) must be related. It is highly
improbable that, considering their contexts, these two concepts are completely
different and only misleadingly similar. If it can be established that the two terms
are related to the same theoretical background, the evidence of the SDSUS can
further support the idea that the examination of manopavicāras, besides being a
theoretical construct, also has practical implications.

41
“How does a monk, while gradually abandoning the fluxes, first abandon the unwholesome dharma-s
…?” (Stuart, 2015, vol.1, p. 317). katham anukrameṇāsravān prajahamānasya bhikṣoḥ prathamam
akuśalān dharmān prajahati (Stuart, 2015, p. 316).
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evam aṣṭādaśamanovyabhicārais trivipākaiḥ saṃsāre cyutyutpattir bhavati (Stuart, 2015, vol. 1,
pp. 324. 1–2).

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 M. Voroshilov

Conclusion

My purpose has been to introduce and examine the concept of mental evaluations,
or manopavicāras. Vasubandhu clearly states that what makes mental evaluations
different from bodily feelings is that, since they belong to the sphere of mind, they
are considered to be conceptual and endowed with outflows (āsrava). Unlike bodily
feelings, mental evaluations are capable of perceiving not only the objects of the
realm they belong to but also the objects belonging to higher or lower realms.
The most striking difference between mental and bodily feelings is that, in the
case of the former, it is not that the objects trap the mind; rather, mental evaluations
belonging to a particular continuum (santāna) are said to either rely on the objects
as their support or repeatedly direct the mind towards them. It has been stated that
the continuum, i.e. the mind of an individual, is a necessary condition for the arising
of the three modalities of feeling, as the objects by themselves are not capable of
causing these feelings to arise. As emphasized in AKBh 3.28 and 3.32, what matters
is the state of the individual: feeling is the limb in which the saṃsāra-conducive
tendency to grasp the objects is either generated, acted upon, and perpetuated, in the
case of a non-liberated being; or ignored, in the case of an Arhat. Arhats can
experience feelings of satisfaction regarding the qualities of the Buddha’s
continuum, yet those feelings are not considered mental evaluations.
Vasubandhu’s analysis implies that the tendency to perpetuate cyclic existence,
while further realized and strengthened in the following two links of craving and
clinging, is generated by the mental evaluations that, as we have seen, turn the mind
towards the objects to be grasped.

Acknowledgements I would like to thank my advisors Mattia Salvini and Torsten Gerloff for always
being there and providing non-failing inspiration as well as encouraging me to do my best in course of my
Ph.D. studies. I should credit Mattia Salvini with my return to the Academia and becoming a Buddhist
scholar. I owe huge thanks to Torsten Gerloff for guiding me through the maze of the manuscript and
making sure I am growing into a textual scholar who can use manuscripts and translations into other
Buddhist languages. I am very grateful to Natalia Yanchevskaya, Princeton University, for proofreading
the present paper. Last but not least, I owe big thanks to the Khyentse Foundation and Byoma Kusuma for
their financial support that made the burden of self-supported Ph.D. studies significantly lighter.

Declarations

Conflict of interest The author declares that there is no conflict of interest.

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