1b4-Citizen's Primer On Law Enforcement

KNOW YOUR RIGHTS:
A Citizen’s Primer
on
Law Enforcement
MESSAGE
Republic of the Philippines

Department of the Interior ad Local Government
National Police Commission
NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF, PNP
Camp Crame, Quezon City
MESSAGE
Let me extend my warmest congratulations to the PNP Human Rights Affairs
Office (HRAO) for yet another successful initiative to promote and protect human
rights, particularly in the production of this Citizen’s Primer.
As the focal point for all PNP human rights initiatives, HRAO has been given
the singular responsibility to introduce capability building measures related
to rights-based policing. Your office is also actively involved in the monitoring
and referral of alleged human rights cases, as well as in various information,
advocacy, and multi-sector work to promote human rights.
Through this citizen-centered project, you have again demonstrated the letter
and spirit of our organizational motto, “To Serve and Protect.” The promotion of
human rights, which is also one of our priority thrusts under the PNP Integrated
Transformation Program, captures the essence of law enforcement. For indeed,
to serve and protect our people is to uphold their rights and freedoms under our
Laws and Constitution.
Therefore, I urge the men and women of the PNP Human Rights Affairs Office
to keep up the good work and continue to do its part in making the PNP a more
capable, effective, credible, and rights-based police organization.
JESUS A VERZOSA, CEO VI

Police Director General
Chief, Philippine National Police
MESSAGE
Department of the Interior and Local Government
DIRECTORATE FOR INVESTIGATION & DETECTIVE MANAGEMENT
MESSAGE
The promotion of human rights is one of the most important key result areas
in the PNP Integrated Transformation Program. As a reform initiative, human
rights promotion is people-centered and has enormous impact on the daily lives
and welfare of citizens and, as such, deserves our highest priority.
We humbly dedicate this publication to our clientele --- the Filipino People
--- from whom the police derives its authority and reason for being. In this short
but informative work, our aim is to provide basic information that our people
need to know about police operations and their fundamental rights as citizens.
The Philippine National Police truly believes that empowering our citizens
is essential in deterring crime and further promoting professionalism and
competency among our personnel. When our citizens are aware of basic rules in
the conduct of police operations, they become more aware of what they need to
do to help their police maintain peace and order. In other cases, such knowledge
will help our people act in ways that do not impede police actions against crime
and disorder.
Through this primer, our police personnel are also given yet another
opportunity to become true advocates of human rights and protectors of the
Filipino People. It is our hope that we in the PNP would continue to have the
privilege of partnering with the Community in promoting and protecting human
rights in our country.
RAUL M BACALZO, CEO VI

Police Director
The Director for Investigation and
Detective Management and
Executive Director, PNP Program
Management Office
MESSAGE
Hanns
Seidel
Foundation
MESSAGE
The publication of this Citizen’s Primer on Law Enforcement is another
manifestation of the support and commitment of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) towards advancing the cause of human rights, both within and without the
organization. The development of the Primer was in response to the call made
by partners from civil society organizations and local communities to have more
information on basic police operational procedures and rules of engagement
to further strengthen their relationship with police officers especially those
operating on the ground.
The Hanns Seidel Foundation/Germany is pleased to work with the PNP

through its Human Rights Affairs Office (HRAO) in its continuing efforts to
promote and protect human rights in the Philippines. For about two years, our
cooperation in this field has resulted in the accomplishment of major initiatives
leading to a more positive relationship between the PNP and the people and
communities it serves.
We would like to congratulate the PNP HRAO for spearheading the

development of this publication which will be widely disseminated for broader
appreciation of the citizenry. We hope this information material will create
a closer cooperation between the PNP and the community in promoting and
protecting the people’s rights.
PAUL G. SCHÄFER
Resident Representative
FOREWORD
Department of the Interior and Local Government
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF, PNP
PNP HUMAN RIGHTS AFFAIRS OFFICE
FOREWORD
This Primer is a first of a series of publications that we will issue to provide
basic information that citizens can use to better understand police operations.
In particular, this primer provides information about:
• Police operations conducted to combat criminality, protect the people,

and create safe cities and neighborhoods;
• Identifying proper police operational procedures and duly authorized

uniformed police officers; and
• Citizens’ rights during official contacts with PNP personnel.

This primer is a living document that would be updated over time to make
sure the PNP is in stride with developments in our laws and peace and order
situation. We highly encourage the public to give us feedback and suggestions
on how to further enhance the contents of this publication. It is our hope that
this humble contribution would help build safe, responsive, and empowered
communities.
FRANKLIN JESUS B BUCAYU

Police Senior Superintendent
Chief Human Rights Affairs Office
REFERENCES
References
The PNP and HSF are providing this Primer as a reference material
for citizens to know their rights and the extent of responsibilities
and authority of the police during law enforcement operations.
The information and reference materials were sourced from:
• 1987 Philippine Constitution
• Philippine laws
• Rules of Criminal Procedures
• Revised Penal Code
• Republic Act 7438 - An Act Defining Certain Rights

of Persons Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial
Investigation as well as the Duties of the Arresting,
Detaining and Investigating Officers, and Providing
Penalties for Violations Thereof
• Official PNP Handbook on Police Operational

Procedures
• Human Rights and Law Enforcement – A Trainer’s

Guide on Human Rights for the Police, published by
OUNHCHR
• United Nations (UN) Basic Principles in the Use of

Force and Firearms
• United Nations (UN) Code of Conduct for Law

Enforcement Officials
CONTENTS
TABLE CONTENTS
I. GENERAL INFORMATION
1. Operations your Police Force Undertakes to Protect and Serve Communities........... 1

2. Police Operations are Conducted In Accordance with Law to Ensure
that your Rights are Respected and Protected ............................................... 2
3. Basic Requirements of Police Operations that you Should Know........................... 3
II. POLICE AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITIES AND YOUR RIGHTS DURING POLICE OPERATIONS
1. ARREST
1.1 When the Police may Make an Arrest ................................................... 4
1.2 Rights of a Person Arrested and the Responsibilities and Authority of a
Police Officer During Arrest............................................................... 5
1.3 Responsibilities and Authority of the Arresting Officer............................... 7
2. CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION AND INQUEST

2.1 What Is Custodial Investigation?.......................................................... 8
2.2. Rights of a Person Under Custodial Investigation and Responsibilities and
Authority of Arresting Officer or Investigator During Custodial Investigation..... 8
2.3 What are Inquest Proceedings? . ......................................................... 10
3. DETENTION AND RELEASE

3.1 Who May Be Detained...................................................................... 12
3.2 Requirements for Admission............................................................... 12
3.3 Visitation Rights and Rules................................................................ 13
3.4 Release....................................................................................... 14
3.5 Segregation of Detainees.................................................................. 15
3.6 PNP Policy on Non-Presentation of Arrested Suspects to Media..................... 15
4. CITIZEN CONTACT
4.1 What Is Citizen Contact and What Is It For?............................................ 15
4.2 Police Protocols During Citizen Contact that You Should Know...................... 16
5. SPOT CHECK
5.1 When A Spot Check Is Conducted......................................................... 17
5.2 Police Procedures During Spot Checks that You Should Know........................ 18
6. SEARCH AND SEIZURE

6.1 Search Warrant And Warrantless Search................................................. 19
6.2 Authority of and Prohibitions to Officers During the Conduct of Search........... 20
6.3 Warrantless Search and Seizure . ........................................................ 21
III. DISCIPLINARY MECHANISMS IN THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP)
1. Four (4) Disciplinary Mechanisms in the PNP.................................................. 23

2. What is Citizen’s Complaint?..................................................................... 23
3. What is Internal Discipline?...................................................................... 24
4. Power to Dismiss PNP Personnel................................................................. 25
5. Internal Affairs Service............................................................................ 26
6. Other Venues for Citizen’s Complaint.......................................................... 27
6.1 PNP Text 2920...................................................................................... 27
6.2 I-Text Mo Kay TSIP (09178475757................................................................ 28
IV. PNP TELEPHONE DIRECTORY
Telephone Numbers of PNP Offices from National Headquarters to Police

Provincial Offices ……..................................................................................... 29-41
GENERAL INFORMATION
I
GENERAL INFORMATION
1. OPERATIONS YOUR POLICE FORCE UNDERTAKES TO

PROTECT AND SERVE COMMUNITIES
The PNP is mandated to enforce the law, prevent and

control crimes, maintain peace and order, and ensure
public safety and internal security with the active support
of the community.
The PNP provides a range of services and conducts

operations to achieve and maintain peace and order, and
ensures that our communities are safe. These services
range from looking for missing persons, issuing police
clearance and anti-carnapping clearance, assisting
other organizations and victims during emergencies and
disaster, providing community policing through beat
patrols, peacekeeping and counseling, providing security
services during holidays and special occasions, issuing
firearm licenses, to executing court orders.
The PNP also undertakes operations that involve

management of crimes and combat situations that
threaten public order and safety. These operations often
entail citizen-police encounters, such as making arrests,
search and seizures, operating checkpoints, managing
rallies and demonstrations, and implementing demolition
orders, injunctions and other similar orders. During these
encounters, it is important that citizens know their rights
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GENERAL INFORMATION
and the responsibilities that police officers are required to
perform and which they should expect. These operations
are the subject of this Citizen’s Primer.
2. POLICE OPERATIONS ARE CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE

WITH LAW TO ENSURE THAT YOUR RIGHTS ARE
RESPECTED AND PROTECTED
The conduct of PNP operations are governed by rules

of procedures that are anchored on the Bill of Rights
as contained in Article III of the 1987 Constitution
which identifies and defines the fundamental rights of
citizens, to wit:
a. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or

property without due process of law. All persons
shall enjoy equal protection of the law (Section 1).
b. All persons have the right to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures. No search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall be issued except
upon probable cause (Section 2).
c. Any person under investigation shall have the

right to be informed of his rights to remain silent
and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot
afford the services of counsel, he must be provided
with one. These rights cannot be waived except
in writing and in the presence of counsel. (Section
12.1).
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GENERAL INFORMATION
d. There should be no torture, force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means which vitiate
the free will. Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention
are prohibited (Section 12.2) and any confession
or admission obtained through these shall be in
admission in evidence against him (Section 12.3).
e. The accused shall be presumed innocent until

proven guilty (Section 14.2).
3. BASIC REQUIREMENTS OF POLICE OPERATIONS THAT

YOU SHOULD KNOW
The general rule in the conduct of police operations

entails that police officers should be:
a) In complete police uniform with ID and name

plate
b) Led by a Commissioned Officer
c) On-board or using marked PNP vehicle
The use of warning shot is strictly prohibited as this will

pose danger to life and property especially in crowded
areas. They will instead use any peaceful means including
use of whistles and megaphones, or any similar means to
influence, warn the offenders or suspects to stop and/or
peacefully surrender to authority.
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AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITIES
Police officers are prohibited from firing at moving
vehicles, excessive use of force and use of deadly
weapons unless the suspect poses imminent danger of
causing death or serious physical injury to other persons
or the police officers. Our police force is trained on the
rules of the use of force and/or reasonable force and
in determining imminent danger during operations in
accordance with the Police Operational Procedures and
provisions of the Rules of Criminal Procedures.
II
POLICE AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITIES
AND YOUR RIGHTS DURING POLICE
OPERATIONS
1. ARREST
1.1 When the police may make an arrest?
An arrest may be made at any day or any time of day by

virtue of a Warrant of Arrest, issued by the court or by
warrantless arrest. A police officer or a private person
may make an arrest without a warrant under the following
conditions:
a. When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has

committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense;
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b. When an offense has just been committed and he
has probable cause to believe, based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the person
to be arrested has committed it; and
c. When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has

escaped from a penal establishment or place where
he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement area to another.
1.2 Rights of a person arrested, and the responsibilities

and authority of a police officer during arrest
If you are arrested, the arresting officer has the

responsibility to ensure that your rights are protected
and respected, according to Republic Act 7438.
a. The arresting officer has the responsibility of informing

you of the reason for the arrest in a language known
to you.
b. You may require the arresting officer to show you the

Warrant of Arrest.
c. The arresting officer should inform you of your

constitutional right to remain silent and that any
statement you might make could be used for or
against you in any court of the law; that you have
the right to counsel of your own choice, and if you
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cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one shall be provided
to assist you; and that the arresting officer should ask
you if you understand those rights. You have the right
to communicate with your lawyer or your immediate
family. It is the responsibility of the arresting officer
to see to it that these are accomplished.
d. If you are arrested without a warrant (on conditions

in Para 1.1), you will be immediately brought to the
proper police station and kept there for not more than
12 hours for crimes or offenses punishable by light
penalties; 18 hours for crimes or offenses punishable
by correctional penalties; and 36 hours for crimes or
offenses punishable by capital penalties. You must
undergo inquest proceedings in accordance with
Section 7, Rule 112 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
e. You shall not be subjected to torture, force, violence,

threat, intimidation, or any other means which
vitiate the free will. You should not be brought
to secret detention places, solitary confinement
(incommunicado) or other forms of detention.
f. If you have been arrested without a warrant and

you waive your right under the provisions of Article
125 of the Revised Penal Code, the arresting officer
shall ensure that you sign a waiver of detention in
the presence of the counsel of your choice. If you
waive your right against self incrimination and opt to
give your statement, the arresting officer shall ensure
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that the waiver be made in writing and signed by you
in the presence of a counsel of your own choice or a
competent and independent counsel provided by the
government.
g. Immediately after your arrest, you should be subjected

to a physical examination by a medico-legal officer
or, in the absence of such medico-legal officer, by
any government physician in the area. Prior to your
release or any change of custody, you will also be
physically examined.
1.3 Responsibilities and Authority of the Arresting

Officer
The arresting officer has the responsibility to ensure

that warrants of arrest are properly served and he
is vested with certain authority to enable him to
accomplish the task. His authority includes:
a. Right of officer to break into building or enclosure.

An officer in order to make an arrest either by
virtue of a warrant, or without a warrant, may
break into building or enclosure where the person
to be arrested is or is reasonably believed to be, if
he is refused admittance thereto, after announcing
his authority and purpose.
b. Right to break out from building or enclosure.
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Whenever an officer has entered the building or
enclosure to make an arrest, he may break out from
there in order to liberate himself.
c. Arrest after escape or rescue. If a person lawfully

arrested escapes or is rescued by his cohorts, any
person may immediately pursue to retake him
without a warrant at anytime and in any place
within the Philippines.
2. CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION AND INQUEST
2.1 What is custodial investigation?
You are under custodial investigation if you are arrested

and taken into police custody and interrogated for a crime.
Custodial investigation also includes any questioning or
probe of a person “invited” by a law enforcement officer
in connection with an offense he or she is suspected to
have committed in accordance with Republic Act No.
7438.
2.2 Rights of a person under custodial investigation

and responsibilities and authority of arresting officer
or investigator during custodial investigation
a. During custodial investigation you have the right to be

assisted by counsel of your choice at all times and the
arresting officer or investigator has the responsibility
to ensure that this is provided.
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b. The arresting officer or investigator, as the case may
be, has the duty to inform you of the following rights,
in a language known to and understood by you:
- That you have the right to remain silent;
- That if you waive your rights to remain silent,
anything you say can be used for or against you in
court;
- That you have the right to counsel of your own
choice;
- That if you cannot afford one, you shall be provided
with an independent and competent counsel; and
- That you have the right to be informed of these
rights.
c. Should you opt to give a sworn statement, the arresting

officer or investigator must reduce it in writing. He
must also ensure that before you sign or place your
thumb mark (if you cannot read or write) the sworn
statement shall be read and adequately explained to
you by the counsel of your choice, or by the assisting
counsel provided to you, in the language or dialect
known to you.
d. The arresting officer or investigator must ensure that

any extra-judicial confession you may have made
under custodial investigation shall be:
- In writing
- Signed by you in the presence of your counsel
- In the absence of your counsel, upon a valid waiver,
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and in the presence of any of your parents, elder
brothers and sisters, spouse, the municipal mayor,
the municipal judge, district school supervisor,
priest, imam or minister of the gospel as you may
choose.
e. Failure of the arresting officer or investigator to

observe the above procedures renders such extra-
judicial confession inadmissible as evidence in any
proceedings.
f. During custodial investigation the arresting officer

or investigator has the duty to allow you to be
visited by or have conference with any member of
your immediate family, any medical doctor, priest or
religious minister chosen by you or by your immediate
family or by your counsel, or by any Non-Government
Organization (NGO) accredited by the CHR, or by any
international NGO duly accredited by the Office of
the President, your spouse, fiancée, parent or child,
brother or sister, grandparent or grandchild, uncle or
aunt, nephew or niece and guardian or ward.
2.3 What is Inquest Proceedings?
If you have been arrested and taken into custody based

on a warrantless arrest, you will undergo a process called
Inquest Proceedings. It is the informal and summary
investigation conducted by a public prosecutor (called
the inquest prosecutor) for the purpose of determining
whether or not the warrantless arrest is valid.
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Should you opt for a preliminary investigation or
refuse to execute the required waiver, the investigator
proceeds with the inquest by submitting you before the
inquest prosecutor, along with the sworn statements
or affidavits of the complainant, and his witnesses if
any, and other supporting evidence.
Your presence is required during the inquest

proceedings, except if: you are in the hospital, detained
in a place under maximum security, if your presence
will involve maximum security risk or if your presence
is not feasible by reason of age, health, sex, and other
similar factors.
The inquest proceedings commence when the inquest

prosecutor receives from law enforcement authorities
the affidavit of arrest, statements of the complainants,
affidavits of the witnesses, if any, and other supporting
evidence gathered by law enforcement authorities in
the course of their investigation of the criminal incident
wherein you were involved. During the inquest, the
inquest prosecutor, to the extent possible, should have
the documents submitted to be subscribed and sworn
before him by the arresting officer, complainants and
affiants.
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3. DETENTION AND RELEASE
3.1 Who may be detained?
Any person arrested due to the commission of a crime

or offense, arrested suspects when covered by a
Commitment Order and suspects arrested who are under
custodial investigation may be detained.
However, under no circumstances shall the arrested

suspects under custodial investigation be held in the
detention center beyond the prescribed reglementary
period unless, while in custody, appropriate charges have
been filed and commitment order has been issued by the
court concerned.
3.2 Requirements for admission
Before you are admitted for detention, there are

requirements that must be submitted by the arresting
unit to the Chief of the Detention or Custodial Center:
a. Request for custody of the arresting unit or the

commitment order from the court;
b. Proof of your medical examination or medical

certificate to be provided by the arresting unit
requesting for custody;
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c. Detainee’s case folder; and
d. Proof that you were informed of your constitutional

rights as provided under RA 7438 prior to your
detention.
3.3 Visitation rights and rules
While on detention, you will be allowed visits by or

conferences with any members of your immediate family,
or any medical doctor or priest or religious minister
chosen by you or by your immediate family or by your
counsel, or by any Non-Government Organization (NGO)
duly accredited by the Commission on Human Rights or
by any international NGO duly accredited by the Office of
the President.
The Chief of the Detention/Custodial Center or his duly

authorized representative is authorized to apportion the
number of visitors per detainee at any given time as the
space of the visitor’s area may allow.
Visiting family members must present public and/or

pertinent documents to prove their relationship with
you. Visitors wearing the color of the detainee’s uniform
will be advised to wear another color. Conjugal visits
will not be allowed during detention. Cameras, video
equipment, cellular phones and similar devices are not
allowed inside the visiting area.
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Your counsel has the right to visit you at any date and
any time of the day subject to existing security rules and
regulations of the detention/custodial center.
3.4 Release
Detainees can be released only upon issuance of release

order by the court. Upon confirmation of the court order,
the Chief of Detention/Custodial Center will coordinate
with other concerned units/offices to determine if
there are objections to the release or if there are other
pending warrants of arrest for the person who is about to
be released.
If there are objections to the release, the arresting

unit will make a written manifestation containing its
objections. If there are valid grounds to sustain further
detention, the Chief, Detention/Custodial Center in
coordination with the arresting unit prepares appropriate
MANIFESTATION for the court containing therein the
ground/s for objection.
Granting that all documents are legally in order, the Chief,

Detention/Custodial Center prepares the memorandum
addressed to the Chief of Office for the approval of the
release.
Prior to the official release, the detainee will be given

medical examination by the city/municipal health office
or health center (Health Service or Rural Health Unit).
The results form part of the records/case folder of the
detainee.
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All properties seized from the detainee will also be
released to him upon his discharge from detention.
3.5 Segregation of detainees
Detainees will be segregated according to gender and, as

much as possible, classification of crimes committed.
3.6 PNP Policy on non-presentation of arrested suspects

to media
Pursuant to the Memorandum of the Chief, PNP dated

October 7, 2008, suspects arrested for any violation
of the law shall in no case be presented in a “firing
line” to the media. However, the arresting PNP unit/
office may use the media, print and broadcast alike, to
inform the public about the arrest of the suspect/s, the
crime committed, its nature and circumstances, the
time and place of its commission, and other person/s
involved.
4 CITIZEN CONTACT
4.1 What is citizen contact and what is it for?
A citizen contact is when a police officer engages in face-

to-face communication with a citizen. This face-to-face
contact does not mean that the citizen is being suspected
of committing a crime. It is undertaken for purposes of
asking questions or gathering information that is official
15
and not personal in nature and which will support the
police in his conduct of intelligence and investigation.
4.2 Police protocols during citizen contact that you

should know
The PNP imposes stringent rules on its men in order to

ensure the protection of rights of individuals from whom
police officers obtain information.
Police officers may initiate citizen contacts only for

legitimate police-related purposes and to engender
citizen support in solving crimes. They may not use such
contacts on a perpetual basis so as to intimidate, harass
or coerce citizens. Citizen contacts are based on the
presumption that the citizen is not under any reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity.
If you are contacted by any police officer, be aware that

such police officer is bound by the following protocols:
a. He cannot frisk or detain you.
b. He should not use force or coercion to require you

to stop or respond to questions or directions. His
request does not in any way hinder your freedom to
leave him.
c. He cannot create a barrier to your ability to leave

such as keeping your driver’s license or by creating a
physically imposing and intimidating presence.
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d. The police officer should introduce himself and explain
the reason for making the contact. He/she should act
in a courteous and restrained manner at all times and
avoid stern words that sound like commands.
e. He is expected to keep the contact as brief as

possible.
f. When asked whether you must respond to questions,

he should inform you that you need not answer any
question or are free to leave anytime.
5. SPOT CHECK
5.1 When a spot check is conducted
Spot checks are usually conducted in times of heightened

security alerts or in areas where a crime has been
committed and investigation or surveillance is being
conducted and where the police needs to increase its
vigilance.
Police officers may stop an individual for spot check/

accosting when his/her appearance, demeanor or actions
suggest that he or she may be engaged in some criminal
activity; if the hour of day or night is inappropriate
for his presence in the area or his/her presence in the
neighborhood is inappropriate; if he or she is carrying a
suspicious object or if his/her clothes bulge in a manner
that suggests that he/she might be carrying a weapon;
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if he or she is located in proximate time and place to an
alleged crime; if the officer has knowledge of the person’s
prior criminal record or involvement in criminal activity;
or if the person flees at the sight of the police officer.
5.2 Police procedures during spot checks that you

should know
When a police officer approaches an individual to

conduct a spot check, that person is bound by the
following rules:
a. He/She should clearly identify himself/herself as

a police officer, if not in uniform, by announcing
his/her identity and displaying official identification
card and/or badge.
b. He/She should be courteous at all times and confine

his questions regarding your identity, place of
residence, and other inquiries necessary to resolve
his/her suspicions and not hold you longer than is
reasonably necessary.
c. He/She cannot compel you to answer any questions

posed during the spot check/accosting.
d. He/She cannot arrest you on the grounds that you

failed or refused to respond to his questions.
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6. SEARCH AND SEIZURE
6.1 Search warrant and warrantless search
Search and seizures are made through search warrants

and warrantless searches which are allowed by law under
defined conditions.
A search warrant is issued only upon establishment of

probable cause relating to a specific offense. It is an
order in writing issued in the name of the People of the
Philippines, signed by a judge and directed to peace
officers, commanding them to search for personal property
described therein and bring it before the court.
Search warrants cover the following properties:
a. Properties which are the subject of the offense;
b. Stolen, embezzled proceeds, or fruits of the offense;
c. Objects including weapons, equipment, and other

items used or intended to be used as the means of
committing an offense;
Time of Search: The warrant must direct that it be

served in the day time, unless the affidavit asserts that
the property is on the person or in the place ordered to
be searched, in which case a direction may be inserted
that it be served at any time of the day or night.
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6.2 Authority of and prohibitions to police officers
during the conduct of search
a. If after giving notice of his purpose and authority, the

police officer is refused entry to the place of search,
he may break open any outer or inner door or window
or any part of a house or anything therein to execute
the warrant or liberate himself or any person lawfully
assisting him when unlawfully detained therein.
b. Houses, rooms, or other premises shall not be searched

except in the presence of their lawful occupants or any
member of the occupants’ family or, in the absence
of the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses
of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same
locality.
c. Lawful personal properties, papers, and other

valuables not specifically indicated or particularly
described in the search warrant should not be taken.
d. The search warrant shall be valid for ten (10) days

from date of issuance. Thereafter it shall be void.
e. The officer seizing property by virtue of the warrant

shall give a detailed receipt for the same to the
lawful occupant of the premises in whose presence
the search and seizure was made, or in the absence of
such occupant, shall, in the presence of at least two
(2) witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing
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in the same locality, leave a receipt in the place in
which he found the seized property in the absence of
the lawful owner.
6.3 Warrantless search and seizure
Warrantless search and seizure may be conducted on a

person lawfully arrested. The person is searched without
a warrant for dangerous weapons or anything which may
be used or constitute proof in the commission of an
offense. The police officer is also authorized to conduct
search and seizure to the premises or surrounding as an
incident to a lawful arrest.
Seizure of Goods Concealed to Avoid Customs Duties.

Persons exercising police authority under the customs
laws may effect search and seizure without a search
warrant in the enforcement of custom laws. “A search,
seizure and arrest may be made even without a warrant
for the purposes of enforcing Customs and Tariff Laws. (
Papa vs. Mayo, 22 SCRA 857; Rieta vs. People, 436 SCRA
273 - 2004 )
Motor Vehicle Search. When a vehicle is stopped

and subjected to an extensive search, it would be
constitutionally permissible only if the officers conducting
the search had reasonable or probable cause to believe,
before the search, that either the motorist is a law
offender or they will find the instrumentality or evidence
pertaining to a crime in the vehicle to be searched.
21
Seizure of Evidence in Plain View. Objects of evidence
in plain view may be seized and introduced as evidence,
subject to the following requirements:
a. The police and other concerned agencies must have

prior justification for an intrusion (i.e. he/she is not a
trespasser) or, otherwise, must be in a position from
which he/she can view a particular area;
b. The discovery of the evidence in plain view is

inadvertent (discovery by chance);
c. It is immediately apparent to the officer that the item

he observes (i.e. open to the naked eye and hand) may
be evidence of a crime, contraband, or is otherwise
subject to seizure. (PP vs Doria 102 SCA 542, PP VS
SARAP March 26, 2003, PP vs, Alfonso 219 SCRA 102)
When there is waiver of the right or there is consented

search. If a citizen voluntarily surrenders his/her gun,
he/she cannot claim illegality of the seizure. When a
citizen waives his/her right and consents to the search
and seizure, the police officer must ascertain that he/
she, in the first place, knows that he/she has such a right,
before he relinquishes it.
22
DISCIPLINARY MECHANISMS
III
DISCIPLINARY MECHANISMS IN THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
The PNP is bound by a code of ethics that governs behavior

and decorum of everyone in the organization. Violations
of this code of ethics are subject to disciplinary action.
Appropriate sanctions have been set to ensure that offenses
committed by police personnel are dealt with properly.
1. Four (4) Disciplinary Mechanisms in the PNP
a. Citizen’s Complaint
b. Internal Discipline
c. Power To Dismiss PNP Personnel
d. Internal Affairs Service (IAS)
2. What is Citizen’s Complaint?
It is a complaint against any erring member of the

PNP and can be filed before the following disciplinary
authorities:
a. Chief of Police or Directors, City Police Offices

where the offense is punishable by: withholding
of privileges; restriction to specified limits;
suspension or forfeiture of salary; or a combination
thereof for a period not exceeding 15 days.
23
b. Mayors of Cities and Municipalities where the
offense is punishable by: withholding of privileges;
restriction to specified limits; suspension or
forfeiture of salary; or a combination thereof for
a period less than 16 days but not exceeding 30
days.
c. People Law Enforcement Board (PLEB) where the

offense is punishable by: withholding of privileges;
restriction to specified limits; suspension or
forfeiture of salary; or a combination thereof for a
period not exceeding 30 days; or by dismissal.
3. What is Internal Discipline?
It is dealing with a minor offense committed by

any member of the PNP. Minor offense involving
internal discipline includes simple misconduct,
insubordination, frequent absences and tardiness;
habitual drunkenness, and gambling prohibited by
law. The duly designated supervisors and equivalent
officers of the PNP exercise disciplinary powers. A
minor offense can be filed before the following
disciplinary authorities:
a. Chief of Police or equivalent supervisors who may

summarily impose: admonition or reprimand;
restriction to specified limits; withholding of
privileges; forfeiture of salary or suspension; or
any combination of the foregoing, Provided, that
in all cases, the total period shall not exceed 15
days.
24
b. Provincial Directors or equivalent supervisors who
may summarily impose: admonition or reprimand;
restriction to specified limits; withholding of
privileges; forfeiture of salary or suspension; or
any combination of the forgoing, Provided, that
in all cases, the total period shall not exceed 30
days.
c. Police Regional Directors or equivalent supervisors

who may summarily impose: dismissal from the
service; admonition or reprimand; restrictive
custody; withholding of privileges; suspension or
forfeiture of salary; or any combination of the
foregoing provided that, in all cases, the total
period shall not exceed 60 days.
d. The Chief, PNP may summarily impose dismissal

from the service; suspension or forfeiture of salary,
or a combination thereof for a period not exceeding
180 days. The Chief, PNP also has the authority to
place personnel under restrictive custody during
the pendency of a grave administrative case
filed against him/her or even after the filing of a
criminal complaint that is grave in nature against
the erring police personnel.
4. Power to Dismiss PNP Personnel
The NAPOLCOM, the Chief, PNP and Police Regional

Directors, after due notice and summary hearings,
25
may immediately remove or dismiss any respondent
PNP member in any of the following cases:
a. When the charge is serious and the evidence of

guilt is strong;
b. When the respondent is recidivist or has been

repeatedly charged and there are reasonable
grounds to believe that he is guilty of the charges;
and
c. When the respondent is guilty of a serious offense

involving conduct unbecoming of a police officer.
Any member or officer of the PNP who shall go

on absence without official leave (AWOL) for a
continuous period of thirty (30) days or more shall
be dismissed immediately from the service. His
activities and whereabouts during the period shall
be investigated and if found to have committed
crime, he shall be prosecuted accordingly.
5. Internal Affairs Service (IAS)
The IAS conducts motu propio, automatic investigation

of the following cases:
a. Incidents where a police discharges a firearm;
26
b. Incidents where death, serious physical injury,
or any violation of human rights occurred in the
conduct of police operation;
c. Incidents where evidence was compromised,

tampered with, obliterated, or lost while in the
custody of police personnel;
d. Incidents where a suspect in the custody of police

was seriously injured; and
e. Incidents where the established ruled of

engagement have been violated.
6. Other Venues for Citizens’ Complaints
Aside from the Disciplinary Mechanisms within the PNP,

pursuant to Republic Act 8551, the Office of the Chief,
PNP created venues to accommodate complaints from
the citizens:
6.1 PNP-TXT 2920 - Any citizen with a cell phone can

text in complaints or police-related information by
simply typing: PNP (space) Message; then send to
2920. This message will be sent to the CHIKKA server
which in turn will be sent to the Complaints Referral
and Action Center (CRAC). When a text message is
received, CRAC will process the message then pass it
on to the police unit concerned. This text service is
available nationwide, in all places with mobile phone
network coverage.
27
Aside from the typing in his/her complaint, the text
sender should also send in the complete name and
specific location of the person or place being reported.
The end-user of this service is any individual residing
in the country, has a cell phone, and needs to file a
police-related complaint or report for “text reporting
purposes”. It should be understood, however, that
reporting to PNP TXT 2920 would result to instant
action on these complaints or reports. If the complaint
or reports involves a life and death situation and
other serious emergencies, it is more appropriate to
call 117, which is an emergency hotline under the
jurisdiction of the DILG. Once your report or request
for assistance reaches the 117 Call Center, they will
dispatch the message to the concerned police unit.
6.2 I-TEXT MO KAY TSIP (Mobile No. 0917-8475757) - A

new program that complements PNP-TXT 2920 and
helps improve community participation in cleansing
the police ranks and improving the delivery of police
service. With the implementation of the program,
the public can reach the Chief, PNP and the PNP
commanders at all levels and can be assured of
prompt feedback on their complaints through the
latest communication technology like short messaging
system (SMS), or text messaging, and electronic
mails.
28
PNP Telephone Directory
III
PNP TELEPHONE DIRECTORY
NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS
CAMP CRAME, QUEZON CITY
OC, PNP 726-4361 Loc 3106 725-3505 Loc 3022 Email: [email protected]
TDCA 722-5140 Loc 3031 721-1276 Loc 3431 Email: [email protected]
TDCO 722-0830 Loc 3005 722-4085 Loc 3505 Email: [email protected]
TCDS 725-3182 Loc 3025 726-1628 Loc 3425 Email: [email protected]
SDS 722-0894 Loc 3050 724-1287 Loc 3325 Email: [email protected]
DPRM 415-9190 Loc 3001 723-0890 Loc 3301 Email: [email protected]
DI 722-1204 Loc 3002 722-1204 Loc 3102 Email: [email protected]
DO 721-8598 Loc 3003 721-5143 Loc 3583 Email: [email protected]
DL 722-0637 Loc 3004 726-9822 Loc 3434 Email: [email protected]
DPL 724-5220 Loc 3154 724-5220 Loc 3054 Email: [email protected]
DC 722-9588 Loc 3074 722-6275 Loc 3174 Email: [email protected]
DIDM 724-8773 Loc 3080 724-8767 Loc 3108 Email: [email protected]
WCPC 723-0401 Loc 3622 723-0401 Loc 3651
DPCR 721-7831 Loc 3086 721-7831 Loc 3186 Email: [email protected]
DHRDD 725-4046 Loc 3084 725-4046 Loc 3184 Email: [email protected]
DRD 723-0401 Loc 3088 723-0401 Loc 3188 Email: [email protected]
DICTM 723-0401 Loc 3136
DIPO Northern Luzon 723-0401 Loc 3944
DIPO Southern Luzon 723-0401 Loc 5256
DIPO Visayas 723-0401 Loc 3477
DIPO Eastern Mindanao 723-0401 Loc 5345
DIPO Western Mindanao 723-0401 Loc 5375
Chaplain Service 722-0945 Loc 3225 722-0945 Loc 3320
CES 722-9585 Loc 3010 721-8580 Loc 3110 Email: [email protected]
ITMS 725-5108 Loc 3115 721-8585 Loc 4425 Email: [email protected]
ES 722-4097 Loc 5300 722-4097 Loc 3027
Finance Service 725-4971 Loc 3018
HSS 722-4110 Loc 3019
Health Service 722-1201 Loc 3016 722-1201 Loc 3426 Email: [email protected]
29
IAS 722-0835 Loc 3269 723-6427 Loc 3239
Legal Service 722-0959 Loc 3017 722-1314 Loc 3517 Email: [email protected]
LSS 724-8759 Loc 3104 722-1328 Loc 3114 Email: [email protected]
PNPTS 723-0401 Loc 5309 723-0401 Loc 5209
AVSEGROUP 877-1109 Loc 3756
CSG 722-0935 Loc 3023
FED 724-8710 Loc 3178
SAGSD 722-0850 Loc 4318
Crime Lab Grp 723-0401 Loc 3026 723-8836 Loc 3126
CIDG 722-0877 Loc 3012 722-0988
Intelligence Grp 724-2494 Loc 310
Maritime Grp 724-8778 Loc 5431 724-8778 Loc 3021 Email: [email protected]
PCRG 724-9863 Loc 3053 724-9863 Loc 3153 Email: [email protected]
PSPG 725-3224 Loc 3007 724-8751 loc 4207
HPG 722-4103 Loc 3049 721-8593 Loc 4499
AIDSOTF 722-1918 Loc 5671
PACER 723-0401 Loc 4237
Huram Rights Affairs Office
(HRAO) 723-0401 Loc 3668 723-0401 Loc 3678 Email: [email protected]
Public Information Office
(PIO) 723-0401 Loc 3013 723-0401 Loc 3313 Email: [email protected]
Internal Affairs Office
(IAS) 723-0401 Loc 3263 723-0401 Loc 3239 Email: [email protected]
NATIONAL CAPITAL REGIONAL POLICE OFFICE

CAMP BAGONG DIWA, BICUTAN, TAGUIG, METRO MANILA
RD 837-24-71 Loc 755 838-04-34 838-02-51
DRDO 837-24-71 Loc 411
ROPD 837-24-71 Loc 782 838-15-05
RTOC 838-33-54 838-5593 Fax
QUEZON CITY POLICE DISTRICT

CAMP BGEN TOMAS KARINGAL, SIKATUNA VILLAGE, DILIMAN, QUEZON CITY
DD 921-74-74 924-31-11
DDO 924-31-02
30
STATION 1 731-83-41 712-57-57
(Laloma) Mayon corner Malaya Streets, Laloma
STATION 2 372-17-25 415-25-90
(Baler) Baler St corner West Avenue
STATION 3 937-17-03 939-60-70
(Sangandaan) Quirino Highway, Sangandaan
STATION 4 *937-21-77 936-36-24 418-25-40
(Novaliches) Buenamar Avenue, Novaliches
STATION 5 935-49-41 939-95-86 417-66-64
(Fairview) Fairview Market
STATION 6 931-64-70 931-64-79 951-04-66
(Batasan) IBP Road, Batasan Hills
STATION 7 726-26-54 723-02-90
(Cubao) Camp Panopio
STATION 8 913-98-95 913-98-95
(Project 4) P. Tuazon St, Project 4
STATION 9 434-36-87 434-39-42
(Project 2) Anonas St, Project 2
STATION 10 924-10-25 415-53-93 *412-40-13
(Kamuning) EDSA, Kamuning
STATION 11 *715-55-85 415-41-13
(Galas) Luzon Ave corner Unang Hakbang Street, Galas
EASTERN POLICE DISTRICT

CARUNCHO AVENUE, PASIG CITY
DD 643-63-31 643-63-37 643-60-46
DDO 643-04-51
STATION 1 *646-61-51 646-16-31
(Marikina City) Jacamar Street, Sta Elena
STATION 2 641-14-33 641-04-33
(Pasig City) Jose Parancillo Park
STATION 3 532-23-18 532-21-45
(Mandaluyong City) 2nd Floor PNP Bldg, Maysilo Circle
STATION 4 744-24-80 724-37-44
(San Juan) Santolan Road
31
NORTHERN POLICE DISTRICT
TANIGUE ST, KAUNLARAN VILLAGE, DAGAT-DAGATAN, CALOOCAN CITY
DD 287-34-41 287-38-16
DDO
STATION 1 362-27-14 324-65-28
(Caloocan City) Samson Road , Sangandaan, CC
STATION 2 281-11-33 281-99-99 281-11-39
( Malabon City ) F. Sevilla Boulevard
STATION 3 281-90-99 281-91-05
(Navotas) Naval Street
STATION 4 292-05-18 294-06-56 292-02-11 Loc 212
(Valenzuela City) Maysan Road
MANILA POLICE DISTRICT

UNITED NATIONS AVENUE , ERMITA, MANILA
DD 521-02-09 523-13-67
DDO 524-68-67
STATION 1 252-68-08 252-30-93
(Balut) Raxabago Street , Balut, Tondo
STATION 2 245-50-02 245-45-51 245-50-02
(Moriones) Morga corner Nolasco Streets, Moriones, Tondo
STATION 3 735-02-68 735-02-69
(Sta Cruz) Old Bilibid Compound, Quezon Blvd
STATION 4 781-30-49 749-91-90
(Sampaloc) G. Tuazon corner Algeriras Streets
STATION 5 528-02-42 523-98-04
(Ermita) United Nations Avenue
STATION 6 420-21-51 563-46-91 563-10-15
(Sta Ana) Plaza Hugo
STATION 7 252-84-50 252-79-04
(Tondo) Jose Abad Santos Ave
STATION 8 716-50-22 715-41-24
(Sta Mesa) Old Sta Mesa Street
STATION 9 *536-35-37` 524-94-35
(Malate) A. Mabini Street
32
STATION 10 562-51-05 564-05-65 563-90-18
(Pandacan) Pandacan Street
STATION 11 244-30-79 244-30-80
(Binondo) Felipe II Street
SOUTHERN POLICE DISTRICT

FORT ANDRES BONIFACIO, MAKATI CITY
DD *817-21-28 817-20-65
DDO
STATION 1 831-73-22 833-37-34 831-97-02
831-50-54 (Pasay City) F.B Harison Street
STATION 2 899-90-14 899-90-15 899-89-91
(Makati City) F. Zobel Street
STATION 3 826-28-77 826-81-82 826-81-21
(Parañaque City) General Aguinaldo Highway , La Huerta
STATION 4 871-82-21 874-09-04 874-92-01
(Las Piñas Cty) Las Piñas City Hall Quadrangle
STATION 5 862-26-11 862-27-21
(Muntinlupa City) Muntinlupa City Hall Quadrangle
STATION 6 642-35-82 642-20-60
(Taguig) Taguig Mpl Hall Quadrangle
STATION 7 642-33-91 642-82-35
(Pateros) Pateros Mpl Hall Quadrangle
POLICE REGIONAL OFFICE 1 : ILOCOS REGION

PRO 1 Local 3901 (072) 242-6092 (Operator)
Camp BGen Oscar Florendo Parian, San Fernando City
LA UNION
RD (072) 242-55-15 Local 3018
DRDO (072) 700-57-03 Local 3019
ROPD (072) 242-60-92 700-53-75
0919-414-6296 0910-210-2918
ILOCOS NORTE (077) 772-07-82 772-07-88
Brgy 23, Camp Juan, Laoag City
ILOCOS SUR (077) 722-36-89 722-35-29
Camp Elpidio Quirino, Brgy BulagBantay, Ilocos Sur
33
LA UNION (072) 242-51-66 700-51-00
Camp Diego Silang, San Fernando City
PANGASINAN (075) 542-71-85 542-42-86
Brgy Libsong West, Lingayen Pangasinan
POLICE REGIONAL OFFICE 2 : CAGAYAN VALLEY

PRO 2 Local 3902 (078) 844-6644 (Operator)
Camp Adduru Alimanao, Tuguegarao City, Cagayan
RD (078) 844-15-96
DRDO (078) 844-13-76
ROPD (078) 844-70-49 844-28-97
BATANES (078)
National Road, Brgy Kayvuhokan, Basco
CAGAYAN (078) 844-14-69 844-66-80
Lecaros St , Brgy Centro 5 Camp Tirso Gador, Tuguegarao City
ISABELA (078) 624-21-38 622-29-52
Brgy Baligatan, Ilagan, Isabela
NUEVA VIZCAYA (078) *321-24-71
Brgy District IV, Bayongbong, NV
QUIRINO (078) 541-15-72
Brgy San Leonardo, Aglipay, Quirino
POLICE REGIONAL OFFICE 3 : CENTRAL LUZON

PRO 3 Local 3903 045-961-2617 (Operator)
Camp Olivas, City of San Fernando, Pampanga
RD (045) 961-29-80 860-29-43
Pcs Quirino D Dela Torre 0918-938-1828
DRDO (045) 860-2945 Loc 6302
ROPD (045) 860-29-40 860-29-41
RTOC 963-6822 860-2940
AURORA (042) 209-42-28
Camp Victor Ravina, Brgy Sabang Baler
BATAAN (047) 791-3645 791-26-18 237-17`-01
Camp Tolentino, Balanga City
34
BULACAN (044) 791-03-98 791-68-39
Brgy Mojon, Malolos City, Bulacan
NUEVA ECIJA (044) 600-10-16 600-48-09
Burgos Ave, Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija
PAMPANGA (045) 961-35-87 860-56-67
PEO Compd, Brgy Sindalan, San Fernando City, Pampanga
TARLAC (045) 982-29-49 982-95-00
Camp Macabulos, Brgy San Vicente, Tarlac
ZAMBALES (047) 811-28-85 811-27-44
Camp Conrado Yap, Iba, Zambales
POLICE REGIONAL OFFICE 4A - CALABARZON

RD (049) 531-44-70 834-16-00 Local 6000
DRDO (049) 834-20-54 Local 6023
ROPD (049) 531-22-93 531-72-67
BATANGAS (043) 300-96-62 300-29-13
Camp Malvar, Bgy Kumintang Ilaya, Batangas
CAVITE (046) 875-43-22 471-74-74
Camp Pantaleon Garcia, Imus, Cavite
LAGUNA (049) 810-12-25 808-55-05
Brgy Bagumbayan, Sta Cruz, Laguna
RIZAL (02) 669-84-67 665-22-38
Cabrera Road, Hilltop, Taytay, Rizal
QUEZON (042) 373-70-51 660-86-56
Camp Nakar, Lucena City, Quezon
POLICE REGIONAL OFFICE 4B - MIMAROPA

RD (049) 834-16-01 531-70-11
DRDO (049) 834-60-02
ROPD (O49) 834-60-05 531-70-12
MARINDUQUE (042) 332-16-76
Camp Maximo Abad, Brgy Bangbangalon, Boac
OCCIDENTAL MINDORO (043) 491-41-44 491-24-68
Airport Road, Brgy San Roque, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro
ORRIENTAL MINDORO (043) 288-87-33 288-39-90
Brgy Suqui, Calapan City, Orriental Mindoro
35
PALAWAN (048) 434-70-53 *433-43-63
Brgy Tiniguiban, Puerto Princesa City, Palawan
ROMBLON (054) 472-82-18 Loc. 2160
Brgy Capaclan, Romblon, Romblon
POLICE REGIONAL OFFICE 5 : BICOL REGION

PRO 5 Local - 3905 052-481-1811 (Operator)
CAMP GENERAL SIMEON A. OLA, LEGASPI CITY
RD (052) 820-46-02
DRDO (052) 820-20-12
ROPD (052) 820-64-60
ALBAY (052) 820-64-74 820-40-32
Camp Ola, Legaspi City, Albay
CAMARINES NORTE (054) 721-50-40
Camp Dogongan Sr, Daet, Camarines Norte
CAMARINES SUR (054) 811-18-96 811-18-80
Concepcion Grande, Naga City, Camarines Sur
CATANDUANES (052) 811-15-71 811-08-23
San Isidro Viilage, Virac, Catanduanes
MASBATE (056) 333-57-89
Camp Serrano, Masbate City, Masbate
SORSOGON (056) 211-48-24 211-36-38
Camp Escudero Sr, Sorsogon City
POLICE REGIONAL OFFICE 6 : WESTERN VISAYAS

PRO 6 Local 3906 (Optr) 033-337-5511
CAMP MARTIN DELGADO, ILOILO CITY
RD (033) 335-09-70 337-12-28
DRDO (033) 336-94-07
ROPD (033) 337-93-00 337-81-82
RTOC 337-9300
ANTIQUE (036) 320-16-75 320-1675
Buganti Point, San Jose, Antique
AKLAN (036) 268-40-06 268-44-31
Camp Martelino, Kalibo, Aklan
36
CAPIZ (036) 621-12-49
Camp Apil, Roxas City, Capiz
ILOILO (033) 523-94-56 523-95-21
Camp Sumagaysay Sr, Sta Barbara Iloilo
GUIMARAS (033) 237-14-01
Brgy Alaguisoc , Jordan, Guimaras
NEGROS OCCIDENTAL (034) 433-12-24 434-91-97
Camp Montelibano, Bacolod City
BACOLOD (034) 434-14-12 434-66-94
Magsaysay Ave , Brgy Taculing, Bacolod City
POLICE REGIONAL OFFICE 7 : CENTRAL VISAYAS

PRO 7 Local 3907 032-253-2171
CAMP SERGIO OSMENA SR, OSMEÑA BOULEVARD, CEBU CITY
RD (032) 415-58-94
DRDO (032) 415-59-02
ROPD (032) 415-59-01 415-58-98
RTOC 254-1113
BOHOL (038) 411-59-11 411-43-43
Camp Dagohoy, Tagbilaran City, Bohol
CEBU (032) 414-79-92
Doña M. Gaisano St, Brgy Sudlon, Cebu
NEGROS ORRIENTAL (035) *225-28-19 419-60-65
Camp Fernandez , Agan-an, Sibulan, Negros Orriental
SIQUIJOR (035) 480-33-71
Caipilan, Siquijor
POLICE REGIONAL OFFICE 8 : EASTERN VISAYAS

PRO 8 Local 3908 (Optr) 053-323-3024
CAMP SEC ROBERTO K. KANGLEON, BRGY CAMPETIC, PALO, LEYTE
RD (053) 323-38-00 323-30-36
DRDO (053) 323-82-59
ROPD (053) 323-72-67 323-30-23
FAX - (053) 323-7267
BILIRAN (053) 500-90-92
Brgy Larrazabal, Naval, Biliran
37
NORTHERN LEYTE (053) 321-33-77
Brgy San Jose, Tacloban City
SOUTHERN LEYTE (053) 381-30-46 381-23-42
Brgy Canturing, Maasin City, Southern Leyte
EASTERN SAMAR (055) 261-23-35
Camp Asidllo, Borongan, E. Samar
NORTHERN SAMAR (055) 354-10-35 354-12-76
Camp Delgado, Catarman, N. Samar
WESTERN SAMAR (055) *251-27-22
Camp Lukban, Catbalogan City, WS
POLICE REGIONAL OFFICE 9: WESTERN MINDANAO

PRO 9 Local 3909 062-991-3000 (Operator)
CAMP COLONEL ROMEO ABENDAN, BRGY MERCEDES,
ZAMBOANGA CITY
RD (062) 991-30-01 991-30-02
DRDO (062) 991-30-01
ROPD (062) 991-30-00
ZAMBO DEL NORTE (065) 212-46-78 212-48-54
Camp Hamac, Brgy Sicayab, Dipolog City
ZAMBO DEL SUR (062) 214-13-25 *214-23-49
Camp Abellon, Rizal Ave, Lumbia Dist, Pagadian City
ZAMBO SIBUGAY (062) 333-55-14 333-53-06
National Highway, Brgy Sanito, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay
POLICE REGIONAL OFFICE 10 : NORTHERN MINDANAO

PRO 10 Local 3910 08-872-6670 711-136
CAMP ALAGAR, BRGY LAPASAN, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY
RD (088) 856-31-83
DRDO (08822) 722-268
ROPD (088) 856-50-49 856-50-83
BUKIDNON (088) 813-42-63
Camp Onahon , Brgy 7, Malaybalay City
CAMIGUIN (088) 387-10-52
Bldg I, Camp Bonifacio , Brgy Baylao, Mambajao
MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL (088) 531-21-55 531-20-28
Lower Lamac, Oroquieta City, Misamis Occidental
38
MISAMIS ORRIENTAL (08822) 740-003 *740-000
San Martin, Villanueva, Misamis Oriental
LANAO DEL NORTE (063) 341-54-60
Camp Galleco , Brgy Pigcarangan, Tubod
POLICE REGIONAL OFFICE 11 : SOUTHERN MINDANAO

PRO 11 Local 3911 (Optr) 082-235-2570
CAMP CATITIPAN, DAVAO CITY
RD (082) 234-25-14 234-25-15
PCS SIMEON P DIZON 0920-900-1613
DRDO (082) 235-25-70 Loc 103
ROPD (082) 235-25-14
DAVAO DEL SUR (082) 570-02-42 553-85-95
Brgy San Agustin, Digos City, Davao del Sur
DAVAO DEL NORTE (084) 370-1679 370-1675
Nat’l Hwy, Visayan Village, Tagum City
DAVAO ORRIENTAL (087) 811-14-00 388-48-96
Brgy Dalahican, Mati, Davao Oriental
COMPOSTELA VALLEY (084) 376-05-66 376-00-21
Pob. Nabunturan, Compostela Valley
POLICE REGIONAL OFFICE 12 : CENTRAL MINDANAO

PRO 12 Optr 083-555-16-54
BRGY TAMBLER, GENERAL SANTOS CITY
RD (083) 302-50-96
DRDO (083)
ROPD (083) 302-50-83
NORTH COTABATO (064) 278-70-11 278-41-94
Brgy Amas, Kidapawan City, North Cotabato
SOUTH COTABATO (083) 228-95-64 228-27-04
Pob. Koronadal City, South Cotabato
SARANGANI (083) 555-22-16
Brgy Kawas, Alabel, Sarangani
SULTAN KUDARAT (064) 201-39-25
Camp Dumlao, Isulan, Sultan Kudarat
39
POLICE REGIONAL OFFICE 13 : CARAGA
PRO13 (085) 342-85-49 (Operator)
(CARAGA) CAMP RAFAEL RODRIQUEZ, LIBERTAD, BUTUAN CITY
RD (085) 342-13-67 226-47-57
DRDO (085) 226-44-33
ROPD (085) 342-19-38 815-23-76
AGUSAN DEL NORTE (085) 341-24-20 815-03-58
Libertad St, Butuan City, Agusan del Norte
AGUSAN DEL SUR (085) 343-73-36 343-79-29
Brgy Patin-ay, Prosperidad, Agusan Sur
SURIGAO DEL NORTE (086) 826-85-68 826-35-49
Borromeo St, Brgy Taft, Surigao City Surigao Del Norte
SURIGAO DEL SUR (086) 211-30-56
Brgy Telaje, Tandag, Surigao del Sur
AUTONOMOUS REGION OF MUSLIM MINDANAO POLICE OFFICE

PRO ARMM (064) 425-00-77 (Operator)
CAMP BG SALIPADA K PENDATUN, PARANG, MAGUINDANAO
RD (064) *425-00-78
Fax: 063-221-5015 Qtr: 425-00-79
DRDO (064)
ROPD (064) *425-00-77 723-16-46 425-00-80
RTOC 425-00-80
LANAO DEL SUR (063) 352-00-76
Camp Bagong Amai, Pakpak, Marawi City
BASILAN (062) 200-37-88 200-74-90
Menzi, Isabela City, Basilan
MAGUINDANAO (064) 489-09-97
Camp Datu Akilan, Bgy Limpongo, Shariff Aguak
SULU (062) 412-28-71 412-23-92
Camp Asturias, Jolo, Sulu
TAWI-TAWI (062) 449-27-66
Camp Suarez, Bongao, Tawi-Tawi
40
POLICE REGIONAL OFFICE : CORDILLERA ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
PRO CAR Local 3915 (074) 422-3207 (Operator)
CAMP BADO DANGWA, LA TRINIDAD, BENGUET
RD (074) 422-19-77
DRDO (074) 422-67-71
ROPD (074) 422-55-15
ABRA (074) 752-56-39
Camp Juan Villamor, Bangued
APAYAO (074)
Poblacion Kabugao
BENGUET (074) 442-32-O8 422-65-15
Camp Bado Dangwa, La Trinidad
IFUGAO (074) 382-20-61
Poblacion North, Lagawe
KALINGA (074)
Camp Juan Duyan, Tabuk
MT PROVINCE (074) 606-81-86
Poblacion Bontoc
41
Journal of Current
Southeast Asian Affairs
Jensen, Steffen, and Karl Hapal (2018),

Police Violence and Corruption in the Philippines: Violent Exchange and the War
on Drugs, in: Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 37, 2, 39–62.
URN: http://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:gbv:18-4-11264
ISSN: 1868-4882 (online), ISSN: 1868-1034 (print)
The online version of this article can be found at:

<www.CurrentSoutheastAsianAffairs.org>
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GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Institute of Asian Studies and
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Police Violence and Corruption in the Philippines 41
When Rodrigo Duterte took over the Philippine presidency in June 2016
he ushered in a war on drugs, as he had promised to do in the campaign.
He drew on his alleged successes in curbing petty crime and fighting
drugs in his hometown of Davao City on the island of Mindanao (Altez
and Caday 2017; Quimpo 2017; Curato 2017). While he proudly claimed
ownership for hundreds of deaths, he managed to avoid legal responsi-
bility. Human rights groups in the Philippines and abroad were aghast as
the consequences of the nationwide war on drugs began to show in the
death toll. By late 2016, approximately 9,000 casualties, mostly from the
poorest areas of urban Manila, had been ascribed to the war on drugs
(Human Rights Watch 2017). While critiques are mounting abroad and at
home, the Philippine government has denied responsibility and claimed
that their campaign of Tokhang1 was not a strategy of extrajudicial kill-
ings, but rather, as the name indicates, a policy of registering, talking to,
and rehabilitating drug addicts. The government also tried to skirt re-
sponsibility for the many killings by referring to criminal infighting and
unsolved murders rather than police killings. However, evidence is
mounting that Tokhang watchlists have in fact been turned into kill lists
(Human Rights Watch 2017). This has raised academic and political
debates about the shocking return to authoritarian rule and the produc-
tion of a deadly sovereignty (Reyes 2016) where those deemed “disposa-
ble” (Tadiar 2013) can be killed without sanction (Agamben 1998).
While we agree with these criticisms, from our vantage point in ur-
ban Manila where we and our partners have undertaken fieldwork and
human rights work since 2008, two issues seem to warrant further con-
sideration. First, while Duterte’s war on drugs and the killing of Filipinos
represent a radicalisation and mark a new deadly phase, the Philippine
state is no stranger to killing its own people (McCoy 2009). The second
issue is that the focus on sovereignty and the production of authority
through fear obscures the fact that police violence is and always has been
animated by extortion rackets, radicalised in the present as “Tokhang for
ransom” (Coronel 2017). However, rather than taking the practice of
extortion at face value, we propose viewing these practices as part of
intricate exchange relations where violence, or the threat of it, is key
(Jensen et al. 2017). Drawing on anthropologist David Graeber’s (2011)
contribution, we suggest that violence is the means through which hu-
man relations are transformed into human economies of equivalence –
that is, violence and the threat of violence produce relations and ex-
1 Tokhang means “knock and plead” and refers to local officials doing the rounds
by alerting drug addicts and telling them to join drug rehabilitation programmes.
42 Steffen Jensen and Karl Hapal
changes in which human life is price-tagged in ways that the police and
even residents (sometimes) believe are legitimate and useful: violence, or
the threat of violence, is what propels people to pay.2 This, in turn, es-
tablishes a set of complicated exchange relations understood as intense
negotiations and exchanges of material and symbolic resources between
police and the policed.3
We ask in this article,
How are violence and exchange relations connected in policing
the Metro Manila district of Bagong Silang, and how have these
exchange relations transformed in relation to the war on drugs as
ushered in by President Duterte?
In answering these questions, we propose two related arguments: First,
exchange relations constitute precarious encounters that need to be
managed with the utmost care by both police and those they are extort-
ing within a parallel, corrupt, and often violent system that mirrors the
official criminal justice system. Second, the war on drugs, even if it was
also couched in an anti-corruption language, has transformed the param-
eters of violent exchange in ways that made the system even more ex-
pensive, expansive, and unstable.
In order to conceptualise policing relations as exchange relations,
we draw on Janet Roitman’s important insight that the focus should not
be limited to regulation or authority as such; rather, we must also take
into account the relationships that are called forth and produced by regu-
lation (Roitman 2004). In her analysis of illegality and social relations in
the Chad Basin, she illustrates the prominence of social relations over
institutional concerns of sovereignty and state power in the Agambean
sense. Two caveats are necessary at this stage: First, when we employ
Roitman’s notion of regulation, we do not mean regulation as expressed
in normative frameworks of how regulation should be (in terms of what
is laid out in the laws and what institutions should do). Rather, we must
understand regulation as existing policies and practices such as, in our
case, the drug war, the over-burdened prison system, and the extortion
of money by police in exchange for release. These are not necessarily
2 Graeber says, “It is only by the threat of sticks, ropes, spears and guns that one
can tear people out of those endlessly complicated webs of relationship with
others (sisters, friends, rivals…) that render them unique, and thus reduce them
to something that can be traded” (Graeber 2011: 208).
3 In talking about exchange relations, we draw on anthropological understand-
ings of exchange relations as pioneered by, for instance, Marcel Mauss (1966)
and as developed by Pierre Bourdieu (1977).
indications of state failure; they are constitutive of state control. Second,

when we evoke exchange relations from economic anthropology, we do
not suggest that reciprocity involves equality or mutual consensus. Ra-
ther, following Anette Weiner (1992) and Marilyn Strathern (1988), ex-
change relations are always unequal and often coerced.
Empirically, the article draws on data from a long-term engagement
in the form of research and human rights intervention in Bagong Silang.
This data consists of ethnographic material from different periods of
fieldwork (Jensen, 2015), quantitative data from a victimisation survey
(Jensen, Hapal and Modvig 2013), interviews with the police and policing
agencies both before and after the introduction of the Tokhang (Hapal
and Jensen 2017), and interventionist human rights reporting and docu-
mentation of the Balay Rehabilitation Centre. While this constitutes a
strong data set, the war on drugs is evolving and ever-shifting. In a sense,
we are trying to pin down a moving target. However, we think it is im-
perative to engage with the consequences of the war – even if some of
the conclusions can only be tentative. A reader would also be warranted
in asking to what extent we can generalise from our account of Bagong
Silang, the largest barangay, or district, in the Philippines in terms of both
area and population. The drug war has disproportionately hit poor areas
of Manila and we are quite certain that we can at least ask similar ques-
tions in similar areas of the city. The borders of the drug war also explain
why Duterte’s popularity remains high, as most people are correct in
assuming that the war is on someone else. In this way, the drug war puts
into stark relief the class distinctions of Philippine society.
We organise our argument chronologically and begin by outlining
policing in Bagong Silang before the war on drugs as caught between
sovereignty and exchange. This analysis will equip us to ask a different
set of questions in the section about Tokhang as violent exchange and
the art of making money during the drug war. We end by discussing
reconfigurations of the relationship between exchange and violence to
suggest that residents are dealing with a constant sense of unease and
unpredictability, as they draw on experiential tactics that used to work
but increasingly seem overwhelmed by the transformation to their social
world introduced by the drug war.
Policing Bagong Silang: Between “Ok lang” and

Excessive Violence
Since its inception as a relocation site in 1986, Bagong Silang has been
perceived as a security threat – a hotbed of criminality and political mo-
bilisation.4 The relocation site, a pet project of former first lady and for-
mer governor of Metro Manila Imelda Marcos, was established both to
address the perceived overflow of people in the centres of Manila and as
a counter-insurgency strategy to break up political organisation elsewhere
in the city. In time, Bagong Silang grew more peaceful while not neces-
sarily being perceived in less stigmatising ways as a violent and drug-
infested place. As we show below, this created fertile ground for Duter-
te’s war on drugs. Policing was eventually slightly demilitarised and much
order-giving was delegated to the hands of the so-called Barangay Justice
System, which was established within the jurisdiction of the barangay
government (the lowest tier of governance in the Philippines). In this
system, the chairman nominates so-called purok (area) leaders who then
choose a number of tanods (guards). Purok leaders and tanods are respon-
sible for the local peace. Only when they cannot resolve conflicts locally
through mediation or if the transgression carries fines above PHP 5,000
or more than one year in prison will the case be referred to the Philip-
pine National Police (PNP). In 2010 the PNP had only 70 officers in
Bagong Silang – a number that has increased to approximately 100 since
the war on drugs began, compared to more than 1,000 purok leaders and
tanods.
In a survey carried out in 2010, 65 per cent of respondents charac-
terised police performance as “normal” (Jensen, Hapal, and Modvig
2013). Given the rather notorious reputation of the police in Bagong
Silang, this response appeared contradictory. In the vernacular of every-
day life, the police are referred to as buwaya (crocodiles) or linta (leeches),
both concepts that point to the extortionist inclinations of the police.
The police’s capacity to extort money is based on their ability to threaten
and ultimately use violence, including unlawful arrest. However, a more
complex picture emerged once we began to explore the numbers in more
detail. In follow-up interviews, we asked what respondents had meant by
“normal.” The majority replied in Tagalog “ok lang,” which translates
into “just OK,” which suggests that the police’s performance was “as
expected.” “Ok lang” meant that the behaviour of the police was as antic-
4 Almost all quotes from interviewees in this paper were originally in Tagalog; all
translations into English were done by the authors.
ipated and, through diskarte (the ability to survive through cunning and
wits), connections, money, or a combination of the three, it may be man-
aged. Let us provide some more ethnographic flesh to this argument by
looking at the case of Emiliyo’s son Karl.
Emiliyo’s son Karl had been arrested by the police one night in
2010, as he and friends of his had been drinking in the street and, as the
night progressed, fights broke out. A woman whose son was involved in
the fighting had called the police to get them to stop the fighting. How-
ever, the police came and arrested them all rather harshly, including her
son, and brought them to the police station. Karl had asked the police,
who were in civilian clothes, to show their police ID to identify them-
selves. The police took offence, thinking him maangas (arrogant) and
grabbed him violently. Panic spread among the families of those arrest-
ed. At the beginning, Emiliyo did not know where Karl and his friend
(plus two others) had been taken, so he had contacted the local purok
leader, who was his relative, to ask if he could help find Karl. The purok
leader and his tanods went first to a substation but found it empty be-
cause all the police had gone to the hospital in relation to a police shoot-
ing! Karl was finally located in the central police station. Emiliyo, who
was quite worried, then sent one of his relatives, Inday, to stay near the
police station in case something should happen to Karl.
Emiliyo called Inday because he knew that she was matapang (coura-
geous) and that she had relatives working within the police. The police
told Inday that one policeman had lost a phone while breaking up the
fight that night and that Emiliyo’s family would need to pay PHP 7,000
for it. The phone was supposedly worth PHP 14,000 but because it was
used the police demanded only PHP 7,000. At this point in relating the
tale to us, Inday uttered the word “extortion.” The police told her if the
family did not pay, they would inquest them. “What are the charges?”,
she asked. The police said it was a case of public scandal and assaulting a
police officer. Inday said, “We are not paying. Go ahead and inquest
them!” She called her cousin, a senior police officer. She told the cousin
that a godchild of hers had been arrested and what the circumstances
were. Her cousin promised that he would call the station and instructed
her to wait. In the meantime, Inday and Karl’s brother went to the baran-
gay office to report the case. “This was done to protect Karl,” she said,
indicating that the more reports there were on the whereabouts of Karl,
the safer he would be.
Back at the station, Inday’s police officer cousin called the station.
She could hear her cousin (a superior) telling something to the officer in
the station. After the phone call, the officer told his colleague that they
must release the boys, but the colleague was contesting the release. He
was one of those who felt that Karl had been maangas when he asked the
police to identify themselves: “He should know that we are police when
the van was outside and we introduced ourselves as police.” Inday quiet-
ly said, “But isn’t it the right of people to ask for the ID, especially when
the police are in civilian clothes?!” The officer continued, “But there are
also the costs. Who will pay for the bullets we used when firing warning
shots [they had shot into the ground]? Who will pay for petrol?” Inday
then asked, “So, if we cannot pay, you will not release them?” “Not
exactly,” he answered. Then Inday said, “OK, thank you,” and left. Out-
side the police station, she called her police officer cousin again and
explained the situation. He promised to take care of it.
Karl’s brother remained at the police station. Also there were the
mothers of the two other young men, including the woman who had
called the police in the first place. One of the mothers was already
known to the police as the wife of an Overseas Filipino Worker (OFW)
and, therefore, as someone with money. The police had had earlier en-
counters with her son, who was apparently a drug addict. Inside the cell,
one of the police officers told Karl that the reason why it was taking
such a long time for them to be released was because the police were
waiting for the payment from this particular woman. Negotiations went
ahead. In the end, the mother who called the police paid PHP 2,000 for
the release, whereas the mother of a third young man paid PHP 500.
Afterwards, the mother who paid PHP 500 told Inday, “I just wanted it
to be over so [my son] would get out of the cells and be safe. That’s why
I paid.” After this, the four young men involved were released.
The case illustrates both that corruption is systemic and the extent
to which some officers are complicit in the system. It is routinised to the
point that release almost has a price tag attached to it. The term for this
kind of police behaviour is hulidap. Hulidap combines the verbs huli (ar-
rest) and hold up. It designates the practice of police holding up people
through the threat of arrest. More importantly, however, it illustrates
what people meant when they said “ok lang” – that is, people can manage
the extortive tendencies of the police by employing intimate relation-
ships, money or other resources, and/or a combination of diskarte and
luck. This is what allows some people to negotiate successfully with the
police. However, it is these same relationships that the police prey on or
capitalise on in their practices of extortion. While the police seclude
people and threaten them with prison and violence, channels of commu-
nication must be open in order for those on the inside to activate their
networks and relationships on the outside. The task of the police is to
manage these connections, of which some can be beneficial for the po-
lice and others can be problematic.
While hulidap is potentially viewed as “ok lang,” or to some extent
manageable, this practice inherently relies on violence to extract money.
However, the relative manageability of practices like hulidap vanishes
when the police use violence considered as excessive. These excessive
forms of violence relate to “salvaging,” a term meaning extrajudicial
police killings. In Bagong Silang, the image of extreme forms of police
violence persists in the minds of people (Jensen, Hapal, and Modvig
2013). This perception has been enforced and reproduced by the violent
policing and extrajudicial killings that occurred before the drug war.
Hence, we might distinguish heuristically between two forms of state
violence – the “ok lang” and the excessively violent. As an example of the
excessive side of policing, take the following example, pieced together
through interviews, police and media reports, and documentation by
human rights observers.
At around 8 p.m. one night, José, Jay, and Renato went to a man
who owed José money. José brought a gun and asked Jay and Renato to
be his “backup.” While walking to the man’s house, the three young men
encountered a police officer. The police searched them and discovered
José’s gun. Jay and Renato ran, while José was detained by the police
officer, who called him a holdaper (robber) out loud. Consequently, on the
way to the police station, people on the street attacked José.5 When he
arrived at the police station, he was allegedly beaten up repeatedly. The
police presented him with a paper with names on it and asked where
those people were staying. The next morning, José, weak from the beat-
ings, was taken to the main police station where a case was filed against
him. While inside the jail, he considered filing a torture case against the
police who maltreated him. However, as he feared reprisals against his
family, he could not make up his mind. José’s two companions were later
found dead. A news article that took notice of the incident referred to
the murder of the two a drug deal gone wrong. However, suspicions
lingered that they had died at the hands of the police.
5 This contradicts the conclusions from the victimisation survey we conducted in

2010 (Jensen, Hapal, and Modvig 2013), where people indicated that it was not
OK for the police to beat up suspects. We tend to think that respondents in the
survey probably thought it was the right thing to oppose police violence rather
than speak their minds regarding the victimisation of robbers. Hence, one
woman noted in conversation, “It’s OK they are beaten up. They are bad peo-
ple.”
The case of José is revealing in several ways. First, the fact that José
was involved in criminal activity made him victimisable in the eyes of
both the police and the public. While this clearly does not exonerate the
state officials or legitimise their actions, José’s actions made him an easy
target. Another factor exacerbated José’s fate: law enforcement agents
are generally not allowed to arrest people under the age of 18, as José
was, but have to release them into the care of parents and social work-
ers.6 This sense of impotence felt by officers of the law arguably entices
them to engage in extralegal activities that are legitimised in the name of
protecting law-abiding citizens from people like José. 7 José’s case was
hardly an isolated incident. One law enforcement officer confirmed the
practice of violently and extrajudicially dealing with young people. In an
interview in 2010 the officer said, “I won’t lie about it. We do kill people.
I myself have killed a lot of people in Bagong Silang.” According to him,
these practices are known and sanctioned by their superiors: “Let’s just
put it this way. Every action that we take, our superior knows about it.”
While these statements are truly worrying, we need to be careful not
to take them at face value. The officer seems to be casting the police and
himself as powerful and vengeful agents, organised in strict hierarchies
of death. In this way, the narrative resembles the image of a strong, ef-
fective but gruesome military organisation. The statements are therefore
arguably part of a narrative structure of strength and nocturnal secrets.
While killings and torture also happened before the war on drugs, they
were not always carried out in the ordered, disciplined, and effective
manner in which the law enforcement agent narrates them. But why do
law enforcement officials need to carry out these acts of violence and
render them intelligible through the narrative of the effective but grue-
some policing structure? Another law enforcement officer explained this
in 2010 by evoking a sacred and epic fight between good and evil that
has been actualised during the war on drugs:
The people we put down are not people anymore. They are de-
mons that need to be removed from the face of the earth. We the
police are like angels that battle those demons. We know what is
right and we know that what those criminals do is not right. I am
6 This is due to a Republic Act (RA 9344) also called the Juvenile Justice Act of
2006 that stipulates that minors under the age of 18 cannot be detained in jail
but must be put into youth shelters. However, as those shelters are often full,
the youngsters are often simply released.
7 This echoes police complaints about human rights across the world. They use
almost identical words to describe their opposition to human rights. For South
Africa, see Marks 2005 and Hornberger 2011.
not afraid to die today. If I die today, I have the courage to justify
to my God that I have done the right thing. I will even wish to be
put on the front lines of his army to battle those demons. If He
wishes that I be in hell, I have no problem with that. I have no re-
grets about the things that I did.
From this perspective, society is composed of “good” people and de-
mons (demonyo). The role of the police is, predictably, like avenging an-
gels, to eliminate the demons to protect society – in other words, to keep
the integrity of the “thin blue line.” While some might be dismissive of
the police’s justification of the use of (excessive) violence and the ac-
companying assertion that it is meted out in a predictable, effective, and
almost scientific way, we believe that it is reflective of a rather compli-
cated and difficult policing situation. The police’s narrative is one that
stresses that justice will prevail, through the nocturnal death of the crim-
inals, by the hands of secret and strong forces of order. Yet, before the
war on drugs it was not uncommon for law enforcement agents in Ba-
gong Silang to despondently talk about their difficulties with “criminals”
seeming to disappear in the maze of houses and life. What accounts for
the discrepancy between the narrative of the strong, nocturnal force and
the sense of impotence? Given the police’s institutional capacities and
resources, law enforcement in Bagong Silang is at best challenging and at
worst compromised. It is in this light that protecting order from chaos
would seem stretched and porous.8 The epic battle against evil therefore
signifies a rationalisation of violence in the light of a sense of impotence.
Nonetheless, the image of the vengeful angel continues to animate polic-
ing. It is in this way that we must understand the term “salvaging” or
extrajudicial killing – the hard and dirty job of saving the nation. This
narrative, as we shall see later, provided a fertile ground for Duterte’s
war on drugs five years later.
Violent Exchange
While some policing practices are “ok lang” and others are “excessive,”
this does not mean that the two are unrelated. On the contrary, they
exist in and through each other. Through the epic narrative of vengeful
angels, the practices of the crocodile are rendered at least partially invisi-
ble and its actions legitimatised. In the case above, Emiliyo was very
8 The idea of the thin blue line is shared in many policing organisations across
the world, as is the notion that violence is necessary to carry out what they see
as their duty (Hornberger 2011; Steinberg 2008; Jensen 2008).
aware of the connection between salvaging and the troubles in which

Karl found himself. In this way, violence – its history as salvaging and
the concrete experiences of people – is central for the practices of the
crocodile. The crocodile is successful only because of the fear of salvag-
ing. Violence is the lubricant that allows the corrupt practices of the
crocodile to continue.
While invoking the concept of corruption is surely one way of ap-
proaching the relations between the police and the policed, the interac-
tion is more complex than that. Let us revisit some of the central ele-
ments of Karl’s ordeals. First, the identities of the police and the policed
are inherently blurred and complex; second, much more than money is
being exchanged. The blurred and complex relationship is illustrated by
the presence of Inday’s cousin, a senior police officer in Bagong Silang.
Inday is indeed fortunate to have such relations, but such relations are
not unique. Emiliyo also uses his connections to the local purok leader
and his associates (the tanods); others would employ whatever relations
they can muster. Hence, while Inday found it deplorable that the police
acted as they did, she also cherishes her relations with officialdom and
wants them to function when she needs them. Emiliyo is also fully aware
of the value of such relations and even tried to enter into a debt relation
with the police officer. Hence, the buwaya is used to describe the negative
side of a relational economy; as Olivier de Sardan notes in relation to the
moral economy of corruption (de Sardan 1999), this relational economy
is also highly cherished and people will go far to protect their relations.
The case also hints at a more benevolent relationship between of-
ficers and residents. As we describe elsewhere (Hapal and Jensen 2017),
police officers understand their admittedly corrupt relationship with
residents in terms of help – tulong or ayuda in Tagalog. While we can see
this aspect when one officer assures the brother of Karl that they will
still be released, it is more explicit in other cases. In one interview, one
police officer admits that she received a bit of money to settle a case
between a husband and a wife, suggesting that she helped the wife by
setting the husband straight while keeping him out of prison so that he
could provide for the family. Hence, the overburdened justice system
provides an important reason for people wanting to engage in the rela-
tional economy. Drawing on Janet Roitman’s (2004) insights, we might
say that it is exactly the non-functioning justice system that sets in mo-
tion and structures the relational economy.
To conclude this section, in all these cases, the relational economy
between the police and the policed is highly complex and defies neat
binary distinctions. These incidents suggest the simultaneity and coexist-
ence of the angel and the crocodile in the minds of people, who want the
police to apprehend criminals, protect the innocent, and keep law and
order (the angel) while at the same time being open to the relational
economy of connections (the positive side of the crocodile). It was
against the backdrop of this relational economy that Duterte’s drug war
hit Bagong Silang.
Violent Exchange and the War on Drugs

In the previous sections, we showed that the Philippine police are no
strangers to killing their own citizens as part of what is termed salvaging
– a term that goes back to the period of martial law between 1972 and
1986 and the counter-insurgency wars against Maoist, Moro, and Islamic
uprisings into the 1990s and first decade of the 2000s (McCoy 2009;
Altez and Caday 2017). As part of an emic cosmology, police officers
constructed a binary world of angels and demons as part of a moral
legitimisation of extreme forms of violence that people were rather am-
bivalent about: while civilians identified salvaging as the worst danger,
they also condoned and even participated in violence – for instance,
against José. When the police officer, evoking the notions of demons
and angles, insisted that he would want to fight crime regardless of the
price he has to pay, he speaks of the danger of prosecution that he would
face should he be caught in the act. This threat, however, was exactly
what Duterte’s war on drugs did away with, at least unofficially.
The war on drugs was organised as what is called the “Double Bar-
rel” campaign, consisting of two different operations: Oplan Tokhang,
literally “Operation Knock and Plead,” entails police and local authori-
ties going around to identified houses of what are referred to as known
addicts and dealers, registering them, pleading for them to turn them-
selves in, and warning them of the dangers they are facing should they
not heed. The second element of Double Barrel is Project HVT (High-
Value Targets), which targets drug lords, drug protectors, and drug fi-
nanciers in order to reach the higher echelons of the drug syndicates
(Lamchek 2017). Often it seems that it has been difficult to separate the
two strategies. In discourse, however, the administration and the police
have denied that they kill people extrajudicially and insisted that most of
the killings have been drug-on-drug killings, cases of police acting in self-
defence, or murders by still unknown perpetrators. While this cannot be
completely disregarded, in spite of mounting evidence to the contrary,9

the perception among our informants in Bagong Silang is that the killings
are associated with Tokhang. By being seen to have unleashed the police
and promising to protect individual officers, Duterte seems to have legit-
imised, from the highest level of government, the extrajudicial killing of
people like José. We might say that the angel was given licence to be an
avenging angel.
However, as before the war, the police oscillated between the angel
and the crocodile, where the former enabled and partly “invisibilised”
the latter. While the crocodile thrived exactly on the potentiality of angel-
ic violence, the corrupt practices were never out of view for the policed.
They knew and sometimes tapped into the relational economy of the
violent exchange to an extent where it was “ok lang,” manageable! The
question, then, is what happened to this relational economy of violence
with the declaration of the war on drugs? One answer is that it did not
disappear – almost the opposite occurred, as Sheila Coronel (2017) illus-
trates in her insightful and well-documented essay “Murder as Enter-
prise.” Coronel tells the story of South Korean businessman Jee Ick Joo,
who was kidnapped by police officers only a few months into the war on
drugs, brought to the National Police Headquarters, and strangled to
death. Police officers proceeded to extort money from his wife, who
paid PHP 5 million for his safe release, not knowing he was already dead.
Only one month later, after several payments, was it revealed that Jee
had died; his remains had been flushed down the toilet just doors down
from the office of the national police chief. This practice – the ultimate
cashing in on the mandate to use violence – came to be known as “To-
khang for ransom.” This represents a much more sinister incarnation of
the buwaya – one that steals and robs but with whom you cannot talk or
negotiate.
The death of Jee forced the administration to suspend the war on
drugs for one month in January and February 2017 until the police were
9 See reports by Human Rights Watch (2017) and by the UN Special Rapporteur
for Extrajudicial Executions, Agnes Calamard. While our own analysis from
Bagong Silang backs up the reports, the government might be correct in sug-
gesting that the UN and international organisations have been single-minded in
identifying the police as the ultimate perpetrators. Our material suggests that
there is great uncertainty about perpetrators. Hence, it cannot be ruled out that
other violent networks are involved, taking advantage of the war on drugs to
settle other scores.
“cleansed” of corrupt elements.10 The Jee fiasco led President Duterte to

accuse the police force of being “corrupt to the core” and even to claim
that at least 40 per cent of the police force was engaged in illegal activi-
ties.11 Despite drawing flak from the president, there have been persis-
tent reports of continued corrupt practices. One rather blatant example
was the discovery of secret detention centres, where suspects would be
held until their families paid up.12 What this suggests is that while there
have been attempts to root out corruption, they have not worked. In
fact, it seems that the more the angel is allowed to be an angel, the better
the conditions are for the crocodile. In the remainder of this paper, we
will present empirical material from Bagong Silang that allows for tenta-
tive conclusions to be drawn on the relationship between violence and
money in the war on drugs. We begin by exploring how one makes
money on the war on drugs. A good place to start is the notorious area
known as Phase 12.
Making Money on the War on Drugs

The drug trade and the production of shabu (methamphetamine) in Ba-
gong Silang have always been closely connected to the area called Phase
12, about one kilometre from the eastern border of Bagong Silang and
part of another barangay. During fieldwork between 2009 and before the
onset of the war on drugs, we never succeeded in going there. People
would flatly refuse to accompany us or connect us with anyone in the
area, as it was deemed to be very dangerous. Apart from the relations to
the drug trade, the area was also feared because the majority of its inhab-
itants were Muslims from Mindanao, a population that, for most people
in the Christian Philippines, not least in Manila, was seen as the incarna-
tion of danger and violence. 13 However, after the war on drugs had
10 See <www.manilatimes.net/pnp-stops-tokhang-starts-cleanup/309811/> and

<www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2017/02/28/Duterte-resumes-poli
ces-war-on-drugs-in-Philippines/5181488297974/>.
11 See <http://news.abs-cbn.com/focus/01/30/17/you-are-corrupt-to-the-core-
duterte-tells-cops>.
12 See <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/895871/chr-asks-ombudsman-to-probe-ton
do-secret-detention-cell>.
13 This has a very long history, going back to the Spanish period (Abinales 2000).
Muslim–Christian relations are deeply fraught in the Philippines, and Bagong
Silang is no exception. In Bagong Silang, Muslims have been associated with
the drug trade and informal street trading. Street trading has also been seriously
curbed in recent years. Whereas Muslims used to dominate the trade, they are
all but gone now. In this way, two of the main economic activities undertaken
commenced, people said it was no longer so dangerous and we could go.

Some residents of Phase 12 said that “those big-timers” had left their
houses and gone back to Mindanao. When we finally went, the adventure
– none of us had been before – was facilitated by Bondo. A few months
into the war, he had been asked by a resident in Phase 12, a Muslim drug
dealer, to take care of his house while he and his family went to Minda-
nao, probably in fear of their lives. Asked when they would return,
Bondo laughed and said “after six years,” indicating the end of Duterte’s
term. However, he was not sure they would ever return.
Bondo knew the drug dealer because he had been coming regularly
to Phase 12 to collect garbage for reselling. Bondo and his family were
dirt-poor, staying in what are known as excess lots near the creek. As it is
a particularly unhealthy environment, they had jumped at the chance of
actually inhabiting a house with a television and sanitation. Bondo ex-
plained that this was far from the only house where this had happened: it
has occurred at “many houses,” he said. His benefactor had approached
him one day as he was coming through with his cart, saying that he
would like Bondo to stay in his house while he was gone, just out of
pakikisama, a Tagalog term that has deep roots in Philippine culture. One
mid-twentieth-century anthropologist translated it as “smooth interper-
sonal relationships” (Lynch 1963). Elsewhere, we have described it as
characteristic of reciprocity or mutual obligations between people of
relatively equal status (Jensen and Hapal 2014). However, it is something
of a rarity between rich and poor, where utang na loob (lit. “inner debt”),
constituting vertical debt relations, is much more common.
Bondo indicated other houses abandoned by the owners. He said
that the police went to these houses and emptied them out, allegedly
bringing the contents of the houses to the police station. Bondo pointed
to a big house and said, “They come at night. You could see the lights
there and cars outside and then they would be gone along with all the
things in the house.” When asked if anybody said anything about it,
Bondo shrugged, “What can you say? It’s the police.”
We asked if there had been any killings in Phase 12. “No,” said
Bondo, “but, there have been arrests (huli).” He explained,
Some of them pay piyansa [bail] and they come back. Others have
not paid so they are there now in the jail […]. The [amount of] pi-
by Muslims have been blocked. According to informants, police had told peo-
ple in Phase 12 that they must leave or else they would turn Phase 12 into a
cemetery – that is, they would go around killing Muslims.
yansa differs. It is higher for Muslims, maybe 50,000 pisos. For

Christians it is lower.
Piyansa is, of course, a formal practice within the justice system. However,
it is not uncommon for its formality to be circumvented by corrupt prac-
tices at the precinct level. We tried to assess whether the arrests were
part of the formal system. Bondo and the others present laughed,
No, there are no judges there. The people stay in jail for three
weeks, and if they can pay, they pay the police officers there. No-
body knows about it. After three weeks they have to go to the real
prison [the official criminal justice system].
Going to jail and being booked in the formal system is no laughing mat-
ter, as one might never get out – both because of the threats of the war
on drugs and because the criminal justice system is absolutely overbur-
dened and, for all intents and purposes, has collapsed (Hapal and Jensen
2017).
In Bondo’s narrative, there are several issues at stake that are im-
portant to our understanding of how the war on drugs is capitalised
upon. First, the war on drugs not only impacts the relationship between
the police and people in poor neighbourhoods, but potentially trans-
forms other social relations as well. Bondo got really lucky and the life of
his family may have transformed for good. He had something to ex-
change – his ability to stay put – which he translated into livelihood.
Bondo is far from the only lucky one. At the onset of the drug war, Jay, a
tricycle driver from Bagong Silang, had seen better days. He had been
the personal bodyguard of a barangay chairman, who was later killed. He
had also been a security guard at a local hospital, a job he lost in 2012,
and a member of the Special Community Action Network (SCAN), the
private security organisation of the Iglesia ni Christo (Church of Christ,
INC).14 The four-year lull ended with the initiation of the war on drugs.
14 The INC has rightly been called a state within the state. It has its own schools
and housing areas, and the church is known to command millions of votes to
the effect that it often determines elections. Hence, endorsement can mean the
difference between being elected and not being elected. Furthermore, as Jay in-
dicates, the church also has its own security organisation, SCAN. SCAN has a
reputation of violence beyond its mandate of maintaining order around INC
functions. Allegedly, SCAN is often called in to intervene, violently, in INC
members’ conflicts with neighbours. It is also rumoured to be composed of
hired guns and goons of those willing to pay. According to several informants
in Bagong Silang, SCAN was also rumoured to be involved in vigilante killings
as part of the war on drugs. As such, the very name struck fear into people’s
hearts to an extent where all conversations about the practices of SCAN were
Through connections he had with local political networks, Jay was nom-
inated as a local tanod and then became part of what is called the Com-
munity Investigative Services (CIS). The CIS was established as a nation-
al programme of surveillance in relation to the war on drugs, under the
command of a retired army general.
Jay showed us with pride his badge and his ID with a photo of him-
self and the general. In Jay’s account, this was all very secret, a system
outside the other surveillance system organised around the barangay,
purok leaders, and tanods (guards). He was also to be remunerated rela-
tively handsomely for his efforts. Asked why he joined, he said, “For the
connections, of course!” He further explained, “It’s a good connection
to have.” Jay’s case illustrates that resources cannot be reduced to a ques-
tion of money only. Like Bondo’s case, social relations – both vertical
and hierarchical – are absolutely central to survival and to improving
one’s life. The war on drugs has radically reconfigured the possibilities of
connectivity. While much focus has been on the negative relations to the
state and the toll on human life, it is necessary to recognise that people
like Bondo and Jay have benefitted quite literally from the war.
Furthermore, Jay talked at length about more direct benefits, saying
that members of the CIS were paid money for all good information
about drug addicts and pushers. All over Bagong Silang, stories of pay-
ments to the police and the CIS for killings abounded. Amounts as high
(or as low, depending on one’s point of view) as PHP 10,000 were fre-
quently cited – Jay said those in the CIS were promised PHP 7,000 – and
fed into popular narratives explaining the motives behind police killings.
In “Murder as Enterprise,” Sheila Coronel explores these rumours and
finds them credible. Needless to say, if true this would provide a very
strong motive for engaging in the killings and, just as important, it would
provide residents in Bagong Silang with an explanatory model for under-
standing the killings – although not one that is likely to improve the
relationship between themselves and the police. In this way, Phase 12
and the other cases presented here illustrate that the war on drugs is not
only about killing but also about getting paid! While the case of Phase 12
suggests a certain spatial ordering, both Bondo’s and Jay’s cases suggest
that monetary exchange constitutes social relations that people manage
or move into – or out of.
carried out in hushed tones. In this way, SCAN and the INC took centre stage
in some rather uncompromising narratives and conspiracy theories.
Revisiting Reconfigured Relationships and

Violence in the War on Drugs
It is clear from the analysis above that money can be made from the war
on drugs in direct ways as well as in terms of reconfigured relationships.
In this final section, we will explore in more detailed ways the quality and
significance of these reconfigured relationships. As the story of the pi-
yansa suggests, we can identify something akin to a parallel system mir-
roring the formal criminal justice system where one gets out on bail. If
we think along this heuristic idea of a parallel system, we might say that
the emptying of houses represents civil forfeiture. As we show above in
this article and elsewhere (Hapal and Jensen 2017), in the parallel system
one can also pay fees for licences or fines for smaller transgressions, or
to have the police discipline one’s children or, indeed, carry out a murder.
Except for the latter, these practices are couched in an ambivalent lan-
guage of assistance (tulong) and violence. Money, violence, and exchange
are central to this system. Police practices constantly oscillate between
those of the avenging angels of Duterte’s war on drugs and those of the
crocodile with whom one can negotiate.
How do we think more theoretically about this? As mentioned ear-
lier, the war on drugs lends itself to analyses of a state of exception and
the production of bare life. However, such analyses fail to account for all
the negotiations and exchange relations that go on. Hence, we find it
useful to think through our material in more economic, relational terms.
Here, Janet Roitman (2004) might offer some insights. She suggests that
we must understand the relationships that are produced by state regula-
tion – of, in our case, criminal justice, prisons, anti-corruption, and the
war on drugs – rather than state regulation as such. This might seem like
a small detail. However, it moves our focus away from the policies –
whether informal or formal – to focusing on what happens when they
hit the ground and become part of residents’ and police’s attempts to
survive or thrive based on relationships. It is these relationships that are
central to how people engage with the system. If that is the case, it is
important to understand what relationships are produced by, say, prison
conditions – for instance, the need to get out of or, more importantly,
stay out of prison. These relationships and the negotiations they lead to
were incredibly complex even before the war. However, as captured in
the notion of “ok lang,” there was a certain predictability to them – not
always leading to good results but at least with a promise of resolution.
The war on drugs has, we argue, radically reconfigured the parameters of
these relationships and how residents may negotiate them through mon-
ey, relationships, and diskarte.
The first element in these reconfigured relationships is that the price
of survival seems to have gone up significantly. If we compare the
amounts that we registered before the beginning of the war on drugs,
they are significantly lower than the amounts we and others (Coronel
2017; Lamchek 2017) have collected since the onset of the war. This
information is, of course, very difficult to establish with any certainty,
not least because narratives, rumours, and forms of gossip per definition
are unreliable sources. With this caveat in mind, the data from Bagong
Silang and Phase 12 indicate that those related to the drug economy have
had to pay substantial amounts of money to avoid violence being perpe-
trated against them. It is also clear that many people decided to run ra-
ther than pay the price of survival. This was especially true for Muslim
residents in Phase 12, suggesting that the war on drugs is not only about
drugs but also part of larger political struggles.15 It suggests that while
money is important, we cannot reduce the war on drugs and policing
practices to money alone. Rather, the relationships and exchange rela-
tions are animated by political categories as well.
While we cannot be sure whether Muslims fled because it was cer-
tain they would either be killed or have to pay exorbitant amounts to
avoid violence or death, it is fair to assume that this was a question they
asked themselves, if we compare the Philippines with other contexts of
violence where wars on crime and drugs have been fought. Studies in
South Africa and Bolivia16 suggest that the unpredictability of violence is
in fact constitutive for social relations. The studies illustrate how vio-
lence is particularly problematic when people are not certain from where
and by whose hand it will come. Exploring the civil wars in Northern
Ireland and Guinea Bissau, Henrik Vigh (2009) usefully suggests that
during conflict the social terrain is fundamentally shifting, unstable, and
illegible. Hence, people invest great efforts in rendering violence predict-
15 The fieldwork took place during the siege of the city of Marawi, stronghold of
the Maute brothers, who had affiliated themselves to the so-called Islamic State
(see <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/899789/afp-44-combatants-killed-in-mara
wi-clashes>). This produced yet more hostile narratives about Muslims
amongst most of our informants in Bagong Silang.
16 Elsewhere, we have explored how the war on drugs and gangs in Cape Town
produced constant attempts to “read” the social terrain (Jensen 1999). Helene
Risør (2010), working in Bolivia, shows how people are constantly looking for
clues to be able to protect themselves from criminal activity. White cars on the
road or stones in particular patterns might be indications of criminal intent that
people try to assess to stay safe.
able and knowable. While some human rights organisations exert much
effort to pin all deaths on the police via a chain of command (e.g. Hu-
man Rights Watch 2017), realities are often much more complicated. In
one case, where seven were killed in a shoot-out, we recorded three dif-
ferent potential perpetrators – the police, competing Muslim drug deal-
ers, and the Iglesia ni Cristo acting as a vigilante group. With each of
these perpetrators or violent social networks, to paraphrase Arias (2006),
different chains of events emerge and with them different dangers.
Hence, as the event had not been stabilised, violence remained unpre-
dictable (Jensen 1999). The lack of certainty and the plurality of perpetra-
tors remain some of the important sources of the unstable terrain. This
is compounded by the presence of competing police units and the con-
stant shuffling of police officers.
Duterte has made it policy to shift around police officers to root
out corruption. Hence, most police officers in Bagong Silang have been
shifted to and from other places. In the time between the onset of the
war in June 2016 and May 2017, four different station commanders had
been assigned to Bagong Silang. Mindanao seems to play a particular role
in this. We mentioned above how corrupt police officers are sent to
Mindanao for “re-education” and punishment. Obviously and logically,
there is a reverse movement from Mindanao to Bagong Silang. This has
two possible implications for the war on drugs – one in terms of policing
strategy and one in relation to relationships between police and residents.
According to a barangay employee and long-term friend of one of
the authors, the station commander made a speech at the SOBA (State
of the Barangay Address) in April 2017 where he complained about the
lack of collaboration from the barangay. According to the informant, he
said, “If you do not want to collaborate with me, I am more than willing
to bring the hell from Mindanao to Bagong Silang.” This opens up the
possibility of counter-insurgency tactics being employed by the police
rather than the usual local policing strategies. While this uncertainty is
palpable, perhaps what matters for our present analysis is that residents
will be hard-pressed to know what kind of policing will prevail in their
next encounter with the police. Will the police be the avenging angels
saving the nation or will they be approachable crocodiles?
The sheer number of replacements and the circulation of officers
compound this question. Dealing with the police in the past in a manner
that was “ok lang” has been premised on money, connections, and
diskarte. This also entails knowing someone on the police force who
might know the police officers in question. However, the circulation of
officers renders these relations potentially more difficult and less simple
to access. In this way, unpredictability increases because relations are

more tenuous and need to be stabilised repeatedly. This does not mean
that establishing relations cannot happen. When asked about this, one
key interlocutor suggested, “But you know, they maybe be strangers one
day, but it will not take them long to establish contacts again – maybe
only two days [laughing]!” The humour aside, our friend’s comment
indicates that while the circulation does create the intended alienation of
police officers from their communities (producing de facto barrack-style
policing), there is a willingness on the part of both police officers and
residents to establish these contacts. They are imperative for the survival
of residents as well as the thriving of officers.
While this willingness to (re)create relations arguably exists on both
sides, the sheer number of circulated officers, the different potential
perpetrators, and the different strategies and objectives of police officers
all contribute to heightening the unpredictability and illegibility of the
encounters. Together with the increasing amounts of money necessary
for survival, residents are right to ask with trepidation, “Who and what
will I meet next time? What will it cost, and will I even be allowed to
pay?!” In this way, the point is not that the war on drugs has introduced
new tactics necessary for surviving a violent and corrupt turn in policing.
The point is that strategies employed by residents of Bagong Silang to
cope with violent and corrupt policing – money, relations, and diskarte –
have been undermined to the extent that people are right to doubt their
effectiveness.
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Law Enforcement in the Philippines
Law enforcement is a term used to define the act of enforcing the law; and a law
enforcement officer is a government employee who is responsible for the prevention,
investigation, apprehension, or detention of individuals suspected or convicted of
offenses against the criminal laws, including an employee engaged in this activity who is
transferred to a supervisory or administrative position; or serving as a probation or
pretrial services officer (UsLegal.com).
In the Philippines, a country located in Asia, law enforcement has been mainly
entrusted to the main law enforcement group, the Philippine National Police, in
collaboration to other law enforcement agencies like the Natonal Bureau of
Investigation, Bureau of Corrections, Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, Bureau
of Fire Protection; and the auxiliary groups like the Barangay Tanod, Traffic
Management Groups, Security agencies and the like.
The list of laws in the Philippines is actually good. One of the law on climate
change adaptation (CCA) and disaster risk reduction (DRR) was even mentioned by the
UN special envoy Margareta Washlstrom in 2012 as the best in the world. However,
even if how good the law is, if its enforcement is weak, then the law will be of no use.
Philippine law is one of the best there is, but how about the law enforcement
group that is supposed to enforce it? Can the law enforcement group live up to the
expectation? According to Roque, H. (2010), a human rights lawyer, there is something
wrong with the national police. It is viewed more as a source of livelihood for the
policemen rather than an institution to protect law and order, Roque said one of the
force's biggest problems was corruption. There have been many accounts of
prospective recruits paying bribes to join the service, and paying again to get important
posts with the express intention of using their positions to make money.
The statement of Roque was actually seen during the bus hostage crisis that
occurred last 2010 in Manila, when eight (8) Hong Kong nationals were killed. According
to reporter Chick, K. (2010), the incident exposed how corrupt the law enforcement
agency is. During this crisis situation, the Philippine National Police displayed the lack of
training of the officers who responded to the situation, the lack of equipments and poor
communication problem among the organization. According to the report, the bullets
that were discovered on the victim’s body were also investigated as it was suspected to
have come from the police officers who were supposed to save them.
According to the report of the Center for Police Management and Development in
2005, the police force could not function properly because of the lack budget allocation,
which in turn caused the lack of equipment for the police force to properly enforce the
law, the number of police officers were less than the required number in the society, and
the police offices and lock-up cells were poorly made.
This situation of the police force, tasked to enforce the law, resulted to the poor
law enforcement system of the country. If we try to analyse it, the root cause for the
poor law enforcement in the country is neither the lack of budget, nor the lack of
equipments and force, the real cause of the problem is the corruption in the system and
the lack of cooperation from the Filipino people.
Like what Attorney Roque said, there have been many accounts of recruits
paying bribes just to enter the police force, and their purpose is for gain. If that is the
kind of law enforcement officers that they have, then they cannot expect a good service.
If those unqualified individuals enter the police force through bribery, then what will
happen to the law enforcement system of the country?
Another problem to the law enforcement system, aside from corruption, is the
lack of cooperation from the people. Sewell, E. (2013), stated that Filipino do not care
enough to take a stand against corruption. He further said that Filipinos have no one to
blame but their own apathy. This, I believe, is true. If only the people or the Filipino
people themselves would be more involved in what is happening around them, then the
issue on corruption would have been minimized, and the law enforcement system would
have improved.
The point is, the people themselves should be the first to make a stand to have a
change because they are the most powerful people in a nation; and until the people
could have their stand, only then will there be a change in the system, including law
enforcement.
References
Ubac, M. (May 4, 2012). UN laud Philippines’ climate change laws ‘world’s best’.
Philippine Daily Inquirer. Retrieved November 27, 2013.
http://globalnation.inquirer.net/35695/un-lauds-philippines%E2%80%99-climate-
change-laws-%E2%80%98world%E2%80%99s-best%E2%80%99
Law Enforcement Officer Law & Legal Definition. http://definitions.uslegal.com/l/law-

enforcement-officer/
Corruption by Country/ Territory. Retrieved November 27, 2013. http://www.

transparency.org/country#PHL
Chick, K. (August 25, 2010). Philippines hostage crisis exposes police corruption,
ineptitude. Retrieved November 27, 2013. http://www.csmonitor.com/
World/terrorism-security/2010/0825/Philippines-hostage-crisis-exposes-police-
corruption-ineptitude
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 46 | Issue 1 Article 14
1955
Philippine Police Systems

M. Ladd Thomas
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Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
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Recommended Citation
M. Ladd Thomas, Philippine Police Systems, 46 J. Crim. L. Criminology & Police Sci. 116 (1955-1956)
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PILIPPINE POLICE SYSTEMS
M. LADD THOMAS
When the author prepared this article, he was a research fellow at the Institute of
Public Administration, University of the Philippines, Manila, under an eighteen
months appointment from the University of Michigan. Mr. Thomas holds both bach-
elor's and master's degrees in the field of political science from the University of Utah
and at present is a teaching assistant in the Political Science Department of North-
western University. He is coauthor of Tie Organizationof the ManilaPolice Department
and A Survey of Local Government in the Philippines, both of which were published
by the Institute of Public Administration.-EDrrOR.
There are several police systems in the Philippines. On the national level are the
National Bureau of Investigation and the Philippine Constabulary; at the local level
each political entity has its own police force.
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
The National Bureau of Investigation, which is under the Department of Justice,

is modelled closely along the lines of the United States Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion. It is a small, moderately equipped organization which essentially serves the
metropolitan area of Manila. Its investigators seldom are able to actively participate
in investigations held in the provinces. Reasons for this are twofold: the Bureau has
insufficient travel funds; furthermore, the lack of transportation facilities is extremely
acute, particularly in the more remote areas of the islands.
Duties of the Bureau include investigation of national crimes and of serious local
crimes which the local police are unable to solve. In the latter instance, it will enter
the investigation at the express request of the local officials or the President of the
Philippines. As indicated, transportation considerations restrict considerably the
scope of its activities outside the Manila area. However, some of the larger cities and
municipalities, regardless of their location, do utilize its laboratory facilities. These
larger municipal units usually have at least one individual on each of their police
forces who is trained in the techniques of gathering physical evidence. This evidence
is then submitted to the Bureau laboratory in Manila for analysis. By and large, lab-
oratory analysis is the only significant Bureau service provided the local police forces.
Tnx CONSTABULARY
In contrast to the Bureau, the Philippine Constabulary is a semi-military organiza-
tion which functions as a national police force. It is equipped and trained to handle
insurrections, mass disturbances, and large-scale banditry. It is not trained for crime
detection, traffic control, and the other every day aspects of regular police work.
Constabulary units are stationed throughout the islands and are charged with the
responsibility of maintaining peace and order. The Constabulary normally accom-
plishes this task indirectly by supervising the local police forces. When the local
forces prove incapable of handling a situation or crime, the Constabulary then steps
116
PHILIPPINEPOLICE SYSTEMS
in and attempts, itself, to handle the problem. Since it has police jurisdiction every-
where in the Philippines, it can assume direct control of any local police unit upon
the request of the local officials, the head of the Constabulary, or the President of the
Philippines, even if such act is contrary to the expressed wishes of the local citizenry.
This power has only too frequently been abused for political purposes. It can also
enter chartered cities and municipalities in the pursuit of a criminal, or in the inves-
tigation of a crime, without first securing the permission of, or notifying, the local
police force and officials. Naturally, actions of this sort tend to antagonize the local
police, officials, and citizens, and to confuse the status of local peace and order. The
relationship of the Constabulary to the Manila Police Department, in particular, has
proved potentially explosive. Many jurists claim that the national law which gives to
the Constabulary police jurisdiction throughout the Philippines conflicts with the
national law which seemingly grants the Manila Police Department police jurisdiction
over the City of Manila.' On several occasions when the Constabulary has officially
entered Manila there has been a real danger of serious conflict with the Manila police.
Just prior to the national elections of 1953, units of the Constabulary and the Manila
2
Police Department were on the verge of an open clash.
The Constabulary gives in-service training to city and municipal police forces. The
value of this training, however, is questionable, since it consists mainly of military
drills.
Philippine Constabulary effectiveness, then, is not adequate for at least two of the
functions it is supposed to perform. Being trained in military, not police, methods, it
is unable to cope with the everyday needs of local police work. Moreover, it is un-
qualified to train local police forces. The extremely military character of the Con-
stabulary qualifies that organization only for the function of discouraging, or if need
be crushing, insurrections and large scale banditry.
CrrY POLICE
There are twenty-seven chartered cities in the Philippines, ranging in size from
cities like Tagaytay, with a few thousand population and no business or urban district
(poblacion), to Manila with an estimated population of two million. The majority of
chartered cities are almost exclusively rural areas.3
The effectiveness of the city police is seriously limited by poor organization, inade-
quate equipment, and lack of prior police training or experience among force person-
nel. With respect to their organizational structures, these departments are fashioned
along lines set by the early twentieth-century American military government in the
Philippines. Two line divisions-uniformed and secret service-attempt to cope with
IAVELINO TENDERO and M. LAnD THommrS, THE ORGANIZATION OF THE MANIA POLICE DE-
PARTmENT (Institute of Public Administration, University of Philippines, Manila, 1953), p. 63.
2The so-called "Shellborne Hotel incident" featured a near clash of arms between the Philip-
pine Constabulary and the Manila Police Department. Both police forces rushed heavily armed
men to the Shellborne Hotel in Manila at the separate requests of the Mayor of Manila and the
Secretary of Defense, two political antagonists each of whom was in the hotel and felt that he was
in danger of assassination, or at best, arrest by the other. Fortunately, cooler heads among the
two police units dispatched to the scene prevailed, and the threatened clash was averted.
3Chartered cities are politically, financially, and administratively independent of the provinces.
M. LADD THOMAS [Vol. 46
all the modern complexities of police work without the aid of staff units or specialized
line and auxiliary branches, such as traffic and communications.4 Furthernore, ad-
ministrative control over the police department is shared by the mayor and the
President-the latter exercising his supervision through the Philippine Constabulary.
A chief of police is thus forced to serve several masters, the administrative policies
of whom sometimes conflict. His position is further weakened by his inability to
control the secret service (detective) division. Since the chief of the secret service
divisionis also appointed by the President and the detectives appointed by the mayor,
the division is virtually independent of the administrative control of the chief of
police. 5
Having limited funds, chartered cities are faced with the choice of maintaining a
large, unequipped police force or a smaller, well-equipped force. In the past nearly
every city has chosen the former alternative, largely because political considerations
necessitate providing jobs on the police department for politically deserving citizens.
In any event, police departments work without the aid of laboratory, transportation,
and communication facilities (despite the enormous area of some cities like Davao),
with insufficient and faulty ammunition, mismatched firearms, and often no fire-
arms at all.'
The average city policeman receives no police training prior to his appointment. It
is particularly noteworthy that the chiefs of police and chiefs of the secret service are
often the least experienced officers on the force. These two police officials are nor-
mally local politicians or former army officers, neither type knowing anything about
modern police administrative and operational techniques.
MANILA POLICE
Most of these generalizations about the police forces of the chartered cities hold
true for Manila. However, the size of Manila in terms of both area and population
creates complex police problems and needs which differ markedly from the other
chartered cities. In many respects, the Manila Police Department compares favorably
to the police departments in large American cities. For instance, it consists of approxi-
mately 2400 men, all of whom are equipped with uniforms and weapons. The members
of the force receive pre-service and in-service training in police techniques. There is
an extensive precinct system. Communication and transportation facilities, while
not up to normal American standards, are among the best in Asia and are being
gradually improved.7 Furthermore, the United States Army has bequeathed con-
siderable police laboratory equipment to the Department, and police officers have
subsequently been trained in the use of this equipment.
Some reorganization has been undertaken by the Department, but it still shows
4 Many city police departments have no communication personnel or facilities whatsoever.
This type of administrative independence was carried a step further in Zamboanga City where
the city warden was taken out from under the supervision of the police chief and given depart-
mental status.
• Firearms used by city police are often borrowed from the Philippine Constabulary which from
time to time recalls these arms thereby leaving the city police weaponless. It is an actual fact that
many policemen are untrained in the use of firearms.
SRecenty the Manila Police Department acquired 30 plus new police cars to supplement their
old vehicle equipment, which consists mainly of ancient jeeps.
PHILIPPINE POLICE SYSTEMS
evidence of the individual and uncoordinated attempts of various American provosts

marshal to shape its administrative practices and framework in the image of their
own police experiences in the United States. These men chiefly were police officers,
not trained police administrators.
Like his counterparts in the other chartered cities, the Chief of the Manila Police
Department is responsible to two masters-the President and the Mayor of Manila. 8
The Manila City Charter gives the President the power of appointment and removal
of the Police Chief while concurrently charging the Mayor with overall control and
supervision of the Police Department. When the President and Mayor belong to op-
posite political parties, as is often the case, the dichotomy of administrative authority
creates uncertainty, confusion, and often outright chaos in police affairs. The Presi-
dent may use his powers of appointment and removal to exercise control over the
decisions of policy in police organization and administration. This power and the
locally established precedent of consulting Malacafiang (the Philippine White House)
before making even minor shifts of department personnel are in conflict with the
control of the department vested in the Mayor by the city charter.
The Mayor, however, is able to maintain at least partial control over the force.
He is an instigating factor in suspension proceedings aimed against the Chief of
Police, and through his influence on the city council he can usually effect slashes or
increases in the departmental budget. In addition he commands the personal alle-
giance of a sizeable portion of the force, especially among the detectives, all of whom
he appoints, with, again, the exception of the Chief of Detectives, an appointee of the
President.
Hopelessly bound by circumstances over which he has no control, the Chief tries
to "straddle the fence" and follow orders from both the Mayor and the President.
Eventually, however, he becomes a victim of conflicting policies emanating from his
two superiors. When this time arrives he is doomed. Regardless of which order he
chooses to obey, the Chief becomes "persona non grata" to either the Mayor or the
President, and his usefulness is at an end.9
PROVINCIAL POLICE
The province is an administrative subdivision of the national government, perform-
ing such functions as are conferred upon it by the national government. 10 Provincial
police functions are performed by two quasi-police forces-the special agents of the
governor, and the provincial guard.
The governor of each province has a number of special agents on the provincial
payroll who serve as a police force insofar as they are concerned with helping the
municipal police to maintain law and order. The governor shares with the Philip-
pine Constabulary the responsibility for maintaining law and order in his province.
8TENfDERo and T-omAS, op. cit., p. 10.
9Department history bears witness to the untenable position of the Chief of the Manila Police
Department. There have been eight different Police Chiefs within the past eight years.
10 jomi H. RorumI and M. LADD THoMAs, A SuxvEn Or LocAL GOVERNmENT IN THE PHLip-
PnTEs (Institute of Public Administration, University of the Philippines, Manila, 1954), p. 46.
" These special agents have other duties which include a variety of administrative tasks as-
signed to them by the governor. Normally, however, the agents spend a large portion of their time
engaged in political activities in behalf of the governor.
M. LADD THOMAS [Vol. 46
His special agents perform liaison duties in this respect with the municipal police. In
addition, these agents are frequently assigned by the governor to solve criminal cases
which the municipal police are unable to solve.
Since the special agents are largely political followers of the governor and secure
their jobs through political patronage, and since they are seldom, if ever, trained for
police work, their effectiveness as a police force is practically nil.
A second provincial police force is the provincial guard-a small unit in each prov-
ince. This unit is used chiefly to guard the provincial jail.' Infrequently, guards are
dispatched to the municipalities to transfer prisoners from the municipal jails to the
provincial jail, although this is usually done by the municipal police. Even more in-
frequently, provincial guards are used to actively combat criminal activities in the
province. This latter function is performed only at rare intervals because: The guards
are not trained in police techniques (their only traifning is a series of military drills);
they are generally without sufficient numbers of firearms; the unit has no transporta-
tion, nor are the guards provided a transportation allowance; and finally, the small
size of the average guard force prevents the detachment of part of the unit for police
work other than guard duty.
MUNICIPAL POLICE
The municipality is an administrative subdivision of the province." It is composed
of several barrios and a poblacion. 14 The mayor of the municipality has direct re-
sponsibility for the supervision of the municipal police force. He, in turn, is account-
able to the provincial governor and the Philippine Constabulary for the maintenance
of law and order in his municipality.
The police chief and policemen of a municipality are appointed by the mayor with
the approval of the municipal council. The size of the force is determined by the
municipal council with the consent of the provincial board."5
Considerable control over the municipal police is exercised by the Philippine Con-
stabulary. It issues regulations covering the general conduct, duties, and weapons of
the municipal police. The municipal council may issue supplementary regulations,
but these must not conflict with those issued by the Constabulary. Inspectors from
the Constabulary make periodic inspections of municipal police forces. If deficiencies
are noted by the inspector, the Constabulary must oversee their correction. A report
of inspections is filed with the mayor, the provincial governor, and the President.
Municipalities are supposed to equip their police forces with arms and ammunition,
but their weak financial condition frequently makes this impossible. Constabulary
firearms are sometimes loaned those municipalities which cannot afford to buy
weapons. However, from time to time the Constabulary recalls these firearms, thereby
leaving the municipal police defenseless against possible armed criminal activities.
12 Only convicted criminals serving sentences of one year or less and prisoners awaiting trial or
sentencing are confined in the provincial jail.

1 See RomAm and ThomAs, op. cit., Chapter II.
14 A poblacion is a business center and seat of the municipal government.
15RmAN and ThomAs, op. cit., pp. 53-56. The provincial board is the nominal governing body
of the province. It is composed of the provincial governor, who acts as chairman, and two elected
board members.
1955] PHILIPPINEPOLICE SYSTEMS
Municipal police have very little, if any, transportation or communication facili-

ties. Because of their lack of mobility and communication, they are unable to serve
outside the poblacion and its immediately surrounding area.
RURAL PoLicE
The primary political unit in the rural areas of the Philippines is the barrio, which
is a subdivision of the municipality and the chartered city." Each municipal or city
councilor is placed in charge of a barrio, or a district composed of several barrios. One
of the main duties of the councilor is to ensure the preservation of law and order in
his barrios. Therefore, he is nearly always accredited as a peace officer with the power
to make arrests. 7 A councilor is assisted in his official work with the barrios by the
barrio lieutenants. Each municipal barrio (and some city barrios) is entitled to have
a barrio lieutenant. The barrio lieutenant is the eyes and ears, indeed the very per-
sonification, of the councilor.
For all practical purposes, a barrio lieutenant in the majority of the barrios is the
sole government for that barrio. His main function as the personal representative of
the councilor is to maintain law and order in the barrio. He normally accomplishes this
task with the aid of rural policemen. These policemen are barrio citizens who have
been deputized by the barrio lieutenant. The rural police and the barrio lieutenants
are nearly always unarmed, unpaid, and untrained in police work. Barrio police are
sufficiently competent to handle the ordinary crimes committed in the barrios. More
difficult cases and large scale banditry are dealt with by the Philippine Constabulary.
CONCLUSIONS
The deficiencies in the Philippine police systems are numerous; however, these de-
ficiencies should be measured against the police needs of the Philippines, which are
not so great or complex as those of a mechanized society. Generally speaking, the
existing systems are adequate to handle most of the law and order problems which
arise. Nevertheless, these systems must be continually modified to keep pace with
future technological advances of the Philippines.
16
Barrios, particularly in the municipalities, are rural areas somewhat reminiscent of the mid-
west townships in the United States. See JOsEpH RALSTOx HAYDEN, THE PmirPnqxs: A Sruny
IN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (The Macmillan Co., New York, 1950), p. 263.
17 ARTuxo M. ToLENTio, THE GoVERNmExT or THE Pn=pnqxs (Garcia Publishing Co.,
Manila, 1950), p. 331.
The Evolution of Policing and a Return to Principles
by Stockton Police Chief Eric Jones

as presented at Stanford University at the Stanford
Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR) Forum -
April 21, 2017
Nearly 200 years ago, the forefathers of municipal policing recognized some core
principles that are finding renewed significance for the practitioners of contemporary
policing. These policing principles seem to be circling back to those century-old core
principles—with the help of new technological advancements, science, data,
comprehensive research, and courageous leadership. In many regards, nothing is new;
while in others, the industry of law enforcement has moved light years to meet the rising
complexities of policing.
It is clearer than ever that to reach significant reductions in violent crime, police
trust-building must be a priority. Whether some community members do not report crime
or do not work with police due to apathy, fear, or a lack of confidence, it is data-driven
policing coupled with trust-building that can begin to change that. Whether some
community members do not occupy their public spaces because of perceived or actual
crime, smarter policing and trust-building can ease these fears.
Policing is a noble profession; but as police officers face one of the most difficult
times ever, they are sometimes left feeling vilified. Wellness programs are continually
2
being developed to support these men and women in law enforcement. The most recent
evolution of policing considers all aspects of wellness for both the community and its
members and for the police officers who serve their community. Three significant areas
make up this evolutionary shift: enforcement, relationships, and metrics. Guaranteeing
that these three be operationalized and institutionalized in police departments across
the nation is critical to melding the municipal connections of the past with the
heightened awareness and trust-building of the present.
Police History Lane
To understand where the law enforcement profession is headed, an examination

must first be made of where it has been. In America, by the middle of the nineteenth
century, and after many southern police forces had originated from patrols for escaped
slaves or in other areas across the country as police "Watchmen," there was a
recognition to form professional municipal police departments. This shift is believed to
have originated from Sir Robert Peel's Metropolitan London force. Peel, widely regarded
as the father of modern policing, formed the often-cited nine Peelian Principles. The
Peelian principles mostly relate to the idea of "policing by consent," where police
powers are derived, not from fear, but from public co-operation with the police, and the
idea that policing should be based on the approval and respect of the public. Although
Peel influenced American policing at that time, most police forces did not truly follow all
of the Peelian Principles.
By the 1930s, American policing saw the rise of organized crime and
experienced one of the deadliest decades for law enforcement officers. Graft and
corruption were also concerns, and the "reform era" and "professional model" began to
unfold. This model aimed to distance police from the public, rejecting the alliance
between the public and the police. At that time, no one foresaw the negative
consequences of severing the ties between the officers and the neighborhoods. Then
came the introduction of motorized police units and radios, shifting police units into
being "radio cars" used for preventative patrols and rapid call response. But through the
1960s and 1970s, crime skyrocketed, and riots ensued, and the beginnings of
enforcement crackdowns, the likes of which America had never seen, took place.
Intrusive police practices exacerbated the divide between the community and the police.
Some data collection began during this era, such as the 1972 Kansas City preventive
patrol experiment, which showed visible patrols were not getting results in crime
reduction.
A decade later, another shift in policing began to occur, and this was the shift
back to re-connecting with the community. By the 1980s and early 1990s, many police
departments instituted "community policing," yet most were no more than specific
programs or specific units. "Problem-oriented-policing" and "community-oriented
policing" arose which focused on giving attention to underlying community problems;
this followed the theory that focusing on "broken windows" to address urban disorder
issues in neighborhoods could keep them from falling into deeper disrepair. But many
believe that some use of zero-tolerance enforcement of "broken windows," such as
3
mass stop and frisk tactics, was a misapplication of the original “broken windows”
theory, and it had unintended consequences of even further distancing the community.
In the mid-1990s, computerized statistics and meetings, such as "Compstat,"

became common in policing and were frequently driven by many metrics such as arrest
and citation rates. Positive outcomes of Compstat were that commanders were held
accountable, and police units were forced to communicate with one another, but the
negative consequences of underreporting and also of a high reliance upon dropping
crime rates through arrests overshadowed the success that Compstat brought. The next
often cited shift in policing was a stronger emphasis on the “warrior mindset,” after the
New York City tragedy on September 11, 2001. The attacks ushered in a strong
counterterrorism policing era, with a singular focus on tactics, training, and equipment.
Most experts later agreed that although officers must sometimes be highly tactical and
wear the “warrior” hat, the primary role of law enforcement officers should be that of
“guardian.”
Now, since 2010, police departments are recognizing how essential the
component of building public trust is. There has also been an understanding that law
enforcement cannot arrest their way out of crime and disorder problems. Principled
Policing has come to the forefront, bringing along with it the historical Peelian Principles.
The Evolution of Policing has come full circle, with the added benefit of lessons learned
and the focused awareness needed to apply and activate these fundamental principles.
The Latest Evolution
That there is a tie between trust within the police and crime reporting and crime-
fighting is intuitive, but it is also based on developing data and research (REFERENCE 1).
Violence is highest in neighborhoods with low trust in government and residents can
feel trapped in a cycle of mistrust and violence that self-perpetuates. Data-driven
policing can restore trust because it uses enforcement more strategically while focusing
on the things that threaten communities most.
Police agencies across the country are moving through the latest evolution in
policing which connects trust and crime. Stockton, California, is an example. It is not the
example, but rather is one example. Probably unique, however, is how the City of
Stockton went through the evolution of policing on an accelerated track. This fast track
was not by design necessarily but rather due to a "negative trifecta"—the 2012 filing of
bankruptcy, while simultaneously becoming one of the most understaffed larger police
departments in the nation, while also experiencing one of the highest violent crime
rates. Given these dire straits, the police department needed the community more than
ever. The Stockton Police Department made a shift away from a “call responder”
approach to the latest evolution of policing: Strategic Data-Driven Policing and
Principled Policing. The police department made this shift regardless of staffing or
budget and therefore required a reset of priorities and a new organizational design
under Principled Policing.
4
Principled Policing, although based on comprehensive research, is nothing really

new. It is in a sense returning to the true origins of the Peelian Principles of 1829 to
ensure American Policing stands for an understanding of policing by consent. We can,
though, go even further back in time, to 350 B.C., to show how Principled Policing
should be at the heart of the law enforcement industry. Aristotle held justice as a virtue;
and, in fact, his four cardinal virtues of prudence, courage, temperance, and justice ring
familiarly similar to Procedural Justice's four pillars of voice, neutrality, respect, and
trustworthiness.
Procedural Justice holds that these pillars shape police officer encounters and
that people’s perceptions of the encounter are influenced more by the experience than
the end result of the interaction. That then directly shapes individuals’ feelings of
whether they felt they were treated justly, which translates into whether they view the
police department as a legitimate authority, and perceptions of legitimacy have a major
impact on people’s compliance with the law. Community surveys in the neighborhoods
with the highest levels of distrust and crime have shown some interesting results.
Residents in these neighborhoods mostly and strongly feel they cannot trust the officers
and that the officers do not hold themselves accountable. However, these residents also
want lawful activity within their neighborhoods and want to work with the police. The
survey results show there is much work to be done, but that there is hope for working
together.
Principled and Smarter Policing is what police officers want to do and so often do
on a daily basis. Consider just the City of Stockton alone where police handle on
average 1,000 calls-for-service per day. No one hears of those 1,000 daily calls where
everything goes right, and perhaps law enforcement can do a better job of advertising
that and the fact that so many men and women put their lives on the line daily for the
people in the community. These men and women willingly become the guardians of our
communities.
With the advent of Principled and Smarter Policing, feedback from officers has
been that this is exactly what they signed up to do; it is the core of their job. An
examination of the reasons why police officers sign up to pin the badge on their uniform
in the first place shows the reasons are the same now as they have been for decades:
to serve justice and to help and protect people. Procedural justice courses have been
some of the highest-rated courses within the Department; this is good news that police
officers want to nurture and build community trust. What is new to them is the layered
science and structure behind these principles, and they are more than willing to learn all
the nuances. Along with enthusiasm for increased awareness and education, however,
there also must be an acknowledgment that cynicism is bound to occur in police
officers’ careers due to the many challenges they face and horrendous things they see.
It is critical that police departments openly face cynicism and provide tools to help
combat stress, disillusionment, and even despair. Police departments must concentrate
on training, policy, and trauma-informed care to keep officers committed to their
5
principles. Many departments are doing exactly that through Wellness Programs and
Networks. Officer wellness is more important than ever because of the current climate
generated by certain factions of the media and groups of citizens. Although the vast
majority of citizens approve what police officers do, officers often feel a balanced
evaluation of their service to the community is missing. As perspectives become
broader and encompass more understanding and appreciation of community dynamics,
it is hoped this evolution will include all levels of interaction between the community and
those who protect and serve it.
The Three Evolutionary Shifts
The most recent evolution of law enforcement, of the latest of Principled and
Smarter Policing, has three primary shifts. These shifts are enforcement, relationships,
and metrics.
• Enforcement – Enforcement by police has moved away from blanket, zero-

tolerance enforcement to strategic and data-driven enforcement. Instead of
simply responding to a high crime area and saturating it with zero-tolerance
enforcement for the whole community, police departments are being much more
strategic to focus on the very small percentage of community members
committing the vast majority of crime. Police departments are also focusing on
the crimes that are most important to public safety and well-being. Group
violence interventions and other focused deterrence strategies have proven
successful in many jurisdictions. Operation Ceasefire is an example of such a
strategy.
• Relationships – Relationships are not new, but there is a shift in understanding

the levels of police mistrust and how it can be best addressed through historical
acknowledgments, listening, and recognizing the need for improvements with
collaboration. Relationships have been a component of Peelian Principles as well
as community-oriented policing methods. The newest data and research tells us
now how best to reach out to the most disenfranchised communities. An
understanding of the levels and sources of mistrust, especially in our
communities of color, and how historical acknowledgments and reconciliation can
assist in meaningful dialogue, is a building-block for relationship-building, and
therefore trust-building. Law enforcement agencies are also beginning to
recognize the importance of being trauma-informed.
• Outcomes and Metrics – There is less an emphasis on arrests and citations as

a police report card for success and a stronger focus on trust-building metrics.
Community sentiment and feedback on the policing of our communities is
important for a police department’s gauges of success. Many of these outcomes
and metrics are still being developed, as this is a relatively recent shift for many
police departments. Promising strategies seem to be comprehensive community
6
surveys externally and a shift from traditional Compstat numbers to collective

overviews looking at both crime-fighting and trust-building efforts in Departmental
meetings internally.
Much of the content of these three areas of shift is contained in the California
Attorney General's Principled Policing Subcommittee and Statewide Training, the
National Initiative on Building Community Trust and Justice, and the President's Task
Force on 21st Century Policing, all of which had Stockton involved. All the training and
initiatives have the three shifts—enforcement, relationships, and metrics—in common.
Shift Implementation
The success of Principled Policing and these three evolution shifts relies upon
leadership at all levels, top to bottom, and a culture embracing change. It must be
ingrained into the policing culture, which is the shared set of values and beliefs. The
culture should be one where ideas are evaluated on merits rather than rank or politics,
openness is promoted, people are held accountable, and best practices are sought.
Transparency (body-worn cameras, policies made public, advisory boards, etc.) and
accountability (force review processes, audits, etc.) are at the minimum needed, but
Principled Policing also requires the operationalization at the field level for the most
routine of tasks and institutionalization for department-wide permeation.
• Operationalization
Neighborhood Response—implementing deployment into neighborhoods using

the four pillars of Procedural Justice
Multiple Layers of Community Input—varying layers from public forums, to

neighborhood-based and issue-based meetings, to smaller listening sessions
such as study circles, “Courageous Conversations,” and Reconciliation Sessions,
which include law enforcement acknowledgments of historical past wrongs
Intelligence and Information-led communications and planning meetings for

multiple divisions within police departments—spending equal time on trust-
building strategies with crime-fighting strategies
• Institutionalization
Mission statement—such as with Stockton PD there was a revised mission

statement that focuses on building and maintaining relationships “founded on
trust and mutual respect while reducing crime and improving quality of life”
A Strategic Plan—for example, one created with input from all members of the
police department and a community survey, focusing on two pillars: Smarter
Policing and Principled Policing
7
Not Referencing Principled Policing or Trust-Building as Just Programs or

Projects
Policies and Practices Reflecting the Principles and Tenets of Procedural

Justice—a comprehensive review of all policies and revising and reflecting these
principles and tenets
Training—Procedural Justice, Police Legitimacy and Implicit Bias Training, and

De-escalation Training
Evaluations and Rewards/Awards Reflecting These Principles—rewards and

awards, and police officer performance evaluations focusing on these
principles along with heroic and other outstanding behavior; promotional
examinations also focusing on these principles
The two pillars of Principled and Strategic Policing, like any set of pillars, must
lay on a solid foundation. In this case, the foundation must be made of a healthy culture
and leadership at all levels, from the top of the organization to the line level. Stockton
has had the benefit of the police union buying in and helping shape the Department’s
strategic plan.
Conclusion
Sir Robert Peel was right all along, and American policing in the nineteenth
century saw value in the Peelian Principles, but unfortunately drifted away when it was
determined there should be distance between the public and police. In the 1980s,
American policing made advancements with the "broken windows" theory about the
benefits of order maintenance and addressing tipping-point neighborhoods, but many
departments had not considered the unintended consequences of zero-tolerance
policing. Fortunately, now, police agencies are getting back to understanding the strong
need for public consent policing as Peel outlined.
The evolution of policing continues its process because as with any profession,
law enforcement is a learning organism, all searching for best practices and evolving as
necessary. Although the evolution has brought us back to the core of what police
officers should stand for, there is now research behind this shift of enforcement,
relationships, and metrics. Operationalizing and institutionalizing these shifts are
required to move the noble profession of law enforcement forward.
8
Police officers everywhere must walk

the delicate balance of being vigilant, due to
violent assaults upon them, with also being
approachable and accessible to the public. It
is a difficult balance but is worth the valuable
cause of policing; yet meanwhile, there is
sometimes an unfortunate insistence that
there must be two sides: either pro-police or
anti-police. But the rhetoric of the need for
two sides can be cut through if everyone can
agree on two things: (1) that a safe
community is a desirable outcome; and (2)
that negative police encounters should be
reduced. Our continued, generative evolution
depends on this.
by Stockton Police Chief Eric Jones
Reference 1: Desmond, Papachristos and Kirk, “Police Violence and Citizen Crime Reporting in the
Black Community,” American Sociological Review.
Reference 2: 1829 Sir Robert Peel’s Nine Peelian Principles:

1. To prevent crime and disorder, as an alternative to their repression by military force and severity
of legal punishment.
2. To recognise always that the power of the police to fulfil their functions and duties is dependent
on public approval of their existence, actions and behaviour, and on their ability to secure and
maintain public respect.
3. To recognise always that to secure and maintain the respect and approval of the public means
also the securing of the willing co-operation of the public in the task of securing observance of
laws.
4. To recognise always that the extent to which the co-operation of the public can be secured
diminishes proportionately the necessity of the use of physical force and compulsion for achieving
police objectives.
5. To seek and preserve public favour, not by pandering to public opinion, but by constantly
demonstrating absolutely impartial service to law, in complete independence of policy, and
without regard to the justice or injustice of the substance of individual laws, by ready offering of
individual service and friendship to all members of the public without regard to their wealth or
social standing, by ready exercise of courtesy and friendly good humour, and by ready offering of
individual sacrifice in protecting and preserving life.
6. To use physical force only when the exercise of persuasion, advice and warning is found to be
insufficient to obtain public co-operation to an extent necessary to secure observance of law or to
restore order, and to use only the minimum degree of physical force which is necessary on any
particular occasion for achieving a police objective.
7. To maintain at all times a relationship with the public that gives reality to the historic tradition that
the police are the public and that the public are the police, the police being only members of the
public who are paid to give full-time attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the
interests of community welfare and existence.
9
8. To recognise always the need for strict adherence to police-executive functions, and to refrain
from even seeming to usurp the powers of the judiciary, of avenging individuals or the State, and
of authoritatively judging guilt and punishing the guilty.
9. To recognise always that the test of police efficiency is the absence of crime and disorder, and
not the visible evidence of police action in dealing with them.
If you have issues viewing or accessing this file contact us at NCJRS.gov.
"
U.S. Department of Justice,
National Institute of .Justice /
CRIl~1E JffiJE
Foot Patrol
A study guide written b~':
George L. Kelling, Haf\'ard University
100739
U.S. Department of Justice
National Institute of Justice
d d exactly as receIved from the
ThIS documef't has bee~ repro u~epOlnls of "'ew or OpinIons stated
PerSofl or organlzatlon orlglnatong I d do not necessarll~
. those 01 the authors an
'" thIS oocumert are 1 s of the National Inst,tute of
represent the offICIal posItion or po ICle
JustIce
~~.·"nJo,Jed matenai has been
PermISSIon to reproduce thIS c~
granted by
Public Dornal n
. IN! I J
...
US !)epartrnen~ of JUstl~e
to :he ~~\lOnal Cnmlnal JustIce Reference ServIce ,NCJRS)
. NCJRS svSlem reqUires permts,

Further reproductIon outsIde of tne ,
Slon of the co~t owner
Moderator: James Q. Wilson, Professor of Government,

Harvard University
Guests: George L. Kelling, Harvard University

Hubert Williams, Police Foundation
Crisley Wood, Justice Research Institute,
Neighborhood Crime Pre\'Cntion Network
Your discussion will be assisted by your understanding of

I how foot patrol was used in the past, how its use changed
with the invention of the automobile, and how recent re-
search findings are germane to future patrolling methods.
~ _. - ---- --.-. -~--~

---------- --- -
Introduction
\ Foot Patrol Strengths a means of h.ceping. in touch \\ ith police officer\ to
-"upen'i\e and control them. ~IS \\ ell ;\" to keep them
informed about crime or di\order.
Research Findings
F00! patro I .IS regaining
. . popu Ianty . a~ a po I'ICC tactic.
"-' Policin!.! in such a manner had .,trengths. Because Gi\en ~uch effort~. \\hat empirical e\idcnce i\
In m11l1\ American citie:-.. communit\, and neighbor- police ;egularly patrolled rclati\'el~ ~mall areas. the) <l\ailahle on the impact 01'1'001 patrol'! During the late
hood group~ arc pre~:-.uring reluctant police cI~ief:-. to became ramiliar with them and their citi/ens. Police As time \\ent on. autllmohile\ and radio, incrca~i))gh 1l)7(r~. e\periment~ in foot patrol \\ere conducted
reinstitute neighborhood foot palmb-. In some citie:-.. knew both the good people and the troublemaker:-.. as prO\ided the :llb\\erS to the prohlem of deali))!.! \\1tl; in ;'\le\\ ark. ;'\lew Jer:..e\. and Flint. ~'lichigan. The
political leader~ sen:-.e the popularity of foot patrol well as what local citi/ens expected or them. The) seriou\ crime and III the need to imprme I1lan;ge- finding~ in the t\\ 0 ~tudie, \\ ere remarkabl)~cl)Jl,istent:
with citil,em and endor~e ib increa:-.ed u:-.e. In others. \\ere familiar with local pOlitical leaders (the) might ment'~ ~uper\i~ion of police officers' acti\ itie,~
chief~ of police who belie\'e in the \'alue of foot patrol eyen ha\e been appointed by the politicians III the Theorie~ of pre\enti\c patrol h) automohile became
more elaborate. B) raridl) and unpredict,lbl) dri\ing • When foot patrol j, added in neighhorhood'..
under certain circumstance:-. arc being innO\',lli\e \\ ith police department or beatJ and were in a position to Ie\ el" of fear decrease ,ignific<lntl).
font palnll and other form:-. of com~llliniry-based inform leaders or neighborhood problem:--. Pnlice car~ thmugh cit),treets. police clluld create a I'celing
policing. Wh) i~ thi:-. happening"? What i:-.there about kne\\ Incal mCi"chants and the problems thaI. for llfpoliee lllllnipre~ence· thcreb\ reducin\!.crime al~d • When foot patml i:.. \\ithdru\\n from neighborhollLl,_
fOOl patrolthar makes it so popular with citil.en:-. and example. youths presented when they "hung llut" in fear. I-'a:--t car~ and tWll-\\a\ raLiios redu~ed the time Ic\els of fear increase :..ignific:lntl),
political leader~'! Beyond its popularity. i~ there front of part icular stores. In many respects. pol ici ng it lOok police to gct tll the '~cene of L'rime\. tht:reb\ • Citi/en :":lti\faction \\ ith policc inCrell"e\ \\hen
e\'idence to suggest that foot patrol has promi~e as a in such an i nt imate manner made local plll icc officers creating the hope that f111liee could ,IITI\e at crime' fllot patml i\ added in neighborhoods.
tactic to deal with cri me. di:-.order. and fUlr in modern responsible to. and agents of. local neighborhoods ,cene:-.. \0 Ljuidl) that the) could L'atch crimina" in
action or in flight in the immediatc \ iL'inlt\ In • Police \\ 110 patrnlon foot ha\ e <l gre;Jler llpprccia-
and created the circumstances within which police tion for the \ ,liLIes of neighborhood residenh than
could support communit) enforcement of local norms either ca:--e \\ itii a ··\nHlh.ing gun"' actiun, .
police \\ho patrol the san;e area\ In automobiles.
and \alues.
F(lllt patrol \\as increasingl) denigrated a, a pulicc • Police \\ ho palrol on foot hme greater job ~~Jlis
Earl)l Uses of Foot Patrol tactic. Police departments that h.ept fllLlI patrol·· ,uch faction. le~s fear. and higher morale than llfTieers
as Ho,ton', ~\\ ere rid iculed b) profe,~ional pol icc \\ hll patrol i!1 automobil~\.
Tn an:-. \\ er the:-.e q ue~t illn:-.. :-.OJ1)e backgrou nd in fnrma- }"'ootPatrol Weaknesses orl!ani/ations for being behind the time, and \\ere
(ion abolll the early use:-. of foot patrol is required. ch~lstised for irresplln;ibl) failing to pro\ ide mlldern The Flint C\peril~1Cnt ) ielded t\\O additional important
From their initiation in England and America during Traditional policing aho had problems. Integration pulice sen icc,. Foot patrol ;;,:--ignmenls \\ ere fre- finding:... First. in areas where there \\ as aggressi\'e
(he ILJth century. police nrgani/alinns ha\ e po~itlonel of police into neighborhoods isolated officers from quentl) used as disciplinar) Illeasure:-- while llfTicers foot p~llrnl. calb for sen'ice \ia telephone ~\~erc
police officers in communities for the purpose of other police. It \\'ClS not hard forthem Ill"coop"~to \\'ho perfllrmed \\ cll \\ere a~sigJ1ed to \ chicul~lr pUlrol. reduced 11) more than -W percent. Second. there \\ as
palmll ing predesignated area~ conspicuou:-.I y. The sleep or hide from their supen'isors. Their sYll1path) a modest reduction in crime. (There \\ ere no change\
presence of readil) identifiable police orriccr~ \\a~ \\ith comll1unit\ norll1s and their abilit\ to isolate In ~ome \\a)". automobile patrol \\a, considered In crime Ie\'els in ;'\e\\ ar" as a re\ult (If u~e off'oot
presumed to pre\'ent cri me and disorder and to re- thell1sel\es frolil the police nrgani/atio;l led 1.11 other succcs,ful. Reducing police officer~' intimate conl:Jcts patmh. )
assure citi/ens that. if crimc and disorder did occur. problell1s. including corruption and unequal enforce- \\ ith citi/ens and neighborhood~ hclped police man-
policc \\ould be a\ailable to help them. This position- ment. Both ll1erchants and illegal li'luor operators agers reduL'e L'orruption and pnl\ ide more eLjuitable In sum. fOll! patrol has been ,,110\\ n to reduce citi/en
ing of police in communities has been called patrol. \\ere in a position to pay police nfficers to "Iook the poliL'ing. In addition. thc /"o(/i(J-cli,l/llilc/lCc/ <lutumobile fear. increa:-.e citi/en .,atisfaetion. impnl\ e the altitudes
Although some horse patrols \\}2re used prior to the other way" when unpopular antiliqullJ" laws \\ere ~ometime~ helped police reach the scene orthe L'rimc of police officers. and impro\e the job satisfaction
adoption of automobiles. "patrol" has for the I11mt broken. ~lan\' communities did not \\ant "uutsiders" faster and enabled police headLjuarter~ to reassign ,Imong police officcrs. In addition. foot patml "ho\\s
pan referred to fOOl patrol. (ethnically d(fferent people) to cOll1e into their :"OIllC potential for reducing calls for sen icc \ ia tele-
officer\ on ~hort notice to neighborhoods \\ here
neighborhoods. Often, ynlpathetic to such feelings. the) \\erc mll,t nceded. ' phonc and. although the rinding~ arc not strong.. it has
Foot patrol officers were assigned designated areas-- police (and gangs) prO\'ided the means b\ \\hich such some crime rcduction potential. The question:-. to be
"be,J(S"-and they patrolled the streets and alleys of outsiders were kept out. Local politici~lJ1s interested In other \\a)s. automohile patrol failed to reali/c
asked then arc the 1"0110\\ ing: What arc the public
those beats. Accounts of early policing sugge~t that in maintaining themsel\es in office oftcn recruited pol ic) impl icat ion:-.. of the pol it ical pnpu larity of
police official,' high hope,. The rea~on" arc com-
police officers \\'ere largclv involved in maintaining police assi"tance to e\tend their tenure. foot patrul and the empirical findings ahout its im-
plicated ,lI1d illlpo\Sihle tll di\L'us... in det,lil here. hut
order and were especially 'charged with disciplining pact"? Do the:--e finding:-.. indic,'te that all cities should
the eomple\il~ of criminal e\cnt\. the beha\ior of immediately return to the \\'holesalc usc of foot patrol"!
children and youth. Patrol officers also were expected Ultimately. the increased use of automobiles during criminah. and the n.~'ponses llf\ ietim, and \\ itnes\es
to enforce regulmiom against prostitution and illegal (he early 20th century began to chan!.!e both criminal ~ all played a p;lrt.
sale or consumption of liquor. Arrests for serious beha\'ior and the shape of neighho~·hoods. Before these questions can be ans\\ered directly. the
criminal acts were rare. To make an arrest. an officer rinLiing:-- regarding fear reduction need to be discussed
Automobile p:lIrol also created a \en,e or los\ in hricrl)~. ~ ~
often had to wait for hi!'> replacement and then wrestle cOlllmunities. Many citi/ens claimcd that plllice
the miscreants to district stations where the\' could be patrol by autoillobile ne\'er reall) pl"ll\'ided the sense
jailed. Later. after the introduction of the call box. The Coming of the Automobile of security that fOlH patrol ga\'e them. Graduall). Criminologi:..ts and persons concerned with public
officers would handcuff arrestees to the box and usc it during the ILJ7(l".~. thc demand for more police policy about crime werc perplexed during the I97(l"s
to call fora horse-drawn "paddy wagon"w transport Confronted with problem!> and the need to create a presence in neighborhood:-.. and communities \\ as by the relationship between crime and fear of crime.
the arrestee to jai I. Forthe most pan. howcver. pol icc new professional police image durilH!.the ILJ2(J"s and translated into a demand for foot patrol. In Huston. Thcre were many neidlborhoods in which the levels of
officers were independent agents !,>patially separated ILJ](l"s. pulice leaders quickly perceived the value foot patrol wa\ ~o popular during the mid-I L)70·:..that crime were mOlicst b~tthe Ie\'el nfciti/en fearofcrimc
from supervisors and managers. walking their beats. of automobile patml. The police car was first seen wa~. high: there were many other ncighborhoods in
it wa!'> promi~ed hy successful politicians. Nc\\ Jersey
informally settling disputcs. maintaining order. and as a means of increasing routine foot patrol. An officer passed the Safe and Clean Neighborhood Act. creat- which crime was high hut fear le"els lo\\'.
enforcing regulations. could patrol a beal. cither drive or be driven to another ing a unique program: State-funded Il)cal foot patrol.
area. and then patrol that beal. As one-way (and later Many citie~ in other States hegan to de\'clllp progr:lm~
This program brought to you by tht: National two-way) radim became available. supervi!'lors had (some quite limited) that :-..eiccti\'ely implemcntcd
Institute of Ju~tice. James K. Stcwart. Director. fu!)( pat rol ~.
The serie~ produced by WETACOM through a
grant to thc Police Foundation.
Durinu the carl\' I 98Cr:-,. it \\a:- disco\ered that fear Referellces
oferil~e WCl:- not primarily as:-ociated with crime. al-
though that certainl) \\a:- an important contributorlo Eck. John E. 1983. Soil'illg Crilllc.I: Tile /11 \'C,I ri.t:(/{iOIl
fear le\els. Instead. fear \\'a:- found to relate to di:-- (!{ Bllrglllry lIlId Ro/J/Jcry. Washington. D.C.: Police
order: gang~. di:-,orderly persom. drunb. panhandlers. E,ecut i\'e Re~earch Forum.
street prostitution. and other form~ of beha\ior that
were threatening but nlltnecessarih criminal. These Skouan. Weslc\ G .. and ;\lichael G. ~la,field. 1981.
finding, did not "urprise (iti/em -or police orncials Copill g Wirll (rilll£': /I/(/i\'i<lllul ulld Scigllhorll(lod
who had \\ nrked clo~ely with eiti/en :lntierime group". Rcunioll. He\crl) I-Iii I:,. California: Sage Publi-
The anticrime groups had been emphasi/ing problem" cation:..
of communit\ disorder and tr,inu to con\ince the
;.-: police to do ~omething abol!t "the~ll for some time. 'I'll£' SCII'urk Foor Plilrol 1:'x{J ('(1111 £'11 I , 198/. Wa~.h
ing,ton. D.C.' Police Foundation.
These insights helped anal)sts interpret the finding"
regarding the fear reduction impact of fOOl patrol. It Wilson . .Iame:-- Q .. alld George L. Kelling. 1982.
\\ as I ikel\ that fear was reduced both a:- a result of the "Broken \\·indt)\\:.: The Police and ;-..icighborhoud
felt pre~cnce of policc and nf their aet!\'ities in Safety." 'I'll£' :\llolllie. ~Iarch. pp. 27-3~.
maintaining order during patrlli. Thu". ((l the e\tent
that police dcfinc disorderand citi/en fearas signifi-
cant problems. foot patrol is an important police tactic. Discussioll Questiolls
~loreo\'cr. according to the analyst~. fOOl patrol abo
might ha\c "ome anticrime potential. It may keep
I. Dn )OU bclie\e citi/ens ha\e an nbligation to act
minor disorder" from e"ealminu into more ,"eri(lLl\
C\ ent~: it Illa\ encouraue eiti/e~ns to take action on
themsche" to keep order and pre\ent erimc as \\ell
as ha\ing police act fnr them'!
their \)\\ n behalf: and it certainl) positiom, patrol
officers to reccivc and il1lcrpret information ncce"sary 2. Ha\c you had an opportunit) to obscne police
to sohe crimes. on foot patrol'! 1-1\)\\ ctTeL'ti\e do y ou think the) are?
What then i~ Uk' significancc of :'oot patrol'} Should 3. If wc had more police on fOOl patrol. \\ould \\e
pol icc departnlf~nts in e\CI') cit) il'.1I1lediatci) abandon h,1\e more order and less cri Ille'?
automobile palrol and in!'.wll foul patrol as the primary -L Iffoot patrol!'. LI\) not actuall) reduce crime. should
tactic'! Probably not. The public ycarning for fnOl patrolling continue :--olcl) becausc it make:-- citi/cn.'
patrol and the empirical findings regarding its signifi- i'cel safcr'!
cance suggest that foot patrol is one mnre important
police tactic. In a city like Boston. fore.\:Jmple. \\here 5. If you \\ere a police officer \\mild you like foot
population density is very high. fOOl patrol could be patrol dut)'} Why'!
used on a widespread basi:-. ~'lany areas ofNe\\ York
and Philadelphia have a population den:--ity that makes
them amenable to the usc of foot patrol. In Chicago.
~lilwaukee. and many Olhercities. foot patrol would
be valuable in some areas. Yet in a ramblinu city like
Houston. relativeh' few areas lend themsel~'es to fOOl
patrol. Similarly. "foot patrol may be more or Ie~~
valuable during particular times of the day. Foot
patrol may be \'ery important in neighborhood ~hop
ping centers where merchant~ need help controlling
students who pass through the area after school.
It has become apparent over the past few years that
citizens desire a more intimate and peryasive police
presence in their communities. Citizens. as individuals
and in groups. want police to help them keep order
and prevent crime as well as to have police take action
on their own. This wisdom-that peaceful commu-
n ities come about as the result oflhe social obliuation This ~lUdy guide and rhe videorape. Fom 1'1I1rol.
of all citizens to each other and that the police's-role i\ one of22 in the CRIME FILE ,cries. For infonnarion
is to support. and assist in. that expression of social on how to obtain progr:ul1' 011 other criminal just icc
is~uc" in the ~eric,. contact CRIME FILE. Natiollal
obligation-is perhaps the most important conclusion Iil,tilUte of Justice, NCJRS, Box 6000. R()c~ \'ilk .MD
to be gai ned from pol ice research. not just research 20SS0 or call SOO-HSI-3-120 (30 1-2SI-S500 from
into foot patrol, but almost all of the research that Metropolitan Washingwn. D.C .. and l"'larylandl.
has been conducted by police over the last 20 years.
1 !
i
j J

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KNOW YOUR RIGHTS:

Republic of the Philippines

JESUS A VERZOSA, CEO VI

RAUL M BACALZO, CEO VI

The Hanns Seidel Foundation/Germany is pleased to work with the PNP

We would like to congratulate the PNP HRAO for spearheading the

• Police operations conducted to combat criminality, protect the people,

• Identifying proper police operational procedures and duly authorized

• Citizens’ rights during official contacts with PNP personnel.

FRANKLIN JESUS B BUCAYU

The information and reference materials were sourced from:

• 1987 Philippine Constitution

• Rules of Criminal Procedures

• Revised Penal Code

• Republic Act 7438 - An Act Defining Certain Rights

• Official PNP Handbook on Police Operational

• Human Rights and Law Enforcement – A Trainer’s

• United Nations (UN) Basic Principles in the Use of

• United Nations (UN) Code of Conduct for Law

1. Operations your Police Force Undertakes to Protect and Serve Communities........... 1

2. CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION AND INQUEST

3. DETENTION AND RELEASE

6. SEARCH AND SEIZURE

III. DISCIPLINARY MECHANISMS IN THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP)

1. Four (4) Disciplinary Mechanisms in the PNP.................................................. 23

IV. PNP TELEPHONE DIRECTORY

Telephone Numbers of PNP Offices from National Headquarters to Police

1. OPERATIONS YOUR POLICE FORCE UNDERTAKES TO

The PNP is mandated to enforce the law, prevent and

The PNP provides a range of services and conducts

The PNP also undertakes operations that involve

2. POLICE OPERATIONS ARE CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE

The conduct of PNP operations are governed by rules

a. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or

b. All persons have the right to be secure in their

c. Any person under investigation shall have the

e. The accused shall be presumed innocent until

3. BASIC REQUIREMENTS OF POLICE OPERATIONS THAT

The general rule in the conduct of police operations

a) In complete police uniform with ID and name

The use of warning shot is strictly prohibited as this will

1.1 When the police may make an arrest?

An arrest may be made at any day or any time of day by

a. When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has

c. When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has

1.2 Rights of a person arrested, and the responsibilities

If you are arrested, the arresting officer has the

a. The arresting officer has the responsibility of informing

b. You may require the arresting officer to show you the

c. The arresting officer should inform you of your

d. If you are arrested without a warrant (on conditions

e. You shall not be subjected to torture, force, violence,

f. If you have been arrested without a warrant and

g. Immediately after your arrest, you should be subjected

1.3 Responsibilities and Authority of the Arresting

The arresting officer has the responsibility to ensure

a. Right of officer to break into building or enclosure.

b. Right to break out from building or enclosure.