1b4-Citizen's Primer On Law Enforcement
1b4-Citizen's Primer On Law Enforcement
1b4-Citizen's Primer On Law Enforcement
A Citizen’s Primer
on
Law Enforcement
MESSAGE
MESSAGE
Let me extend my warmest congratulations to the PNP Human Rights Affairs
Office (HRAO) for yet another successful initiative to promote and protect human
rights, particularly in the production of this Citizen’s Primer.
As the focal point for all PNP human rights initiatives, HRAO has been given
the singular responsibility to introduce capability building measures related
to rights-based policing. Your office is also actively involved in the monitoring
and referral of alleged human rights cases, as well as in various information,
advocacy, and multi-sector work to promote human rights.
Through this citizen-centered project, you have again demonstrated the letter
and spirit of our organizational motto, “To Serve and Protect.” The promotion of
human rights, which is also one of our priority thrusts under the PNP Integrated
Transformation Program, captures the essence of law enforcement. For indeed,
to serve and protect our people is to uphold their rights and freedoms under our
Laws and Constitution.
Therefore, I urge the men and women of the PNP Human Rights Affairs Office
to keep up the good work and continue to do its part in making the PNP a more
capable, effective, credible, and rights-based police organization.
MESSAGE
The promotion of human rights is one of the most important key result areas
in the PNP Integrated Transformation Program. As a reform initiative, human
rights promotion is people-centered and has enormous impact on the daily lives
and welfare of citizens and, as such, deserves our highest priority.
We humbly dedicate this publication to our clientele --- the Filipino People
--- from whom the police derives its authority and reason for being. In this short
but informative work, our aim is to provide basic information that our people
need to know about police operations and their fundamental rights as citizens.
The Philippine National Police truly believes that empowering our citizens
is essential in deterring crime and further promoting professionalism and
competency among our personnel. When our citizens are aware of basic rules in
the conduct of police operations, they become more aware of what they need to
do to help their police maintain peace and order. In other cases, such knowledge
will help our people act in ways that do not impede police actions against crime
and disorder.
Through this primer, our police personnel are also given yet another
opportunity to become true advocates of human rights and protectors of the
Filipino People. It is our hope that we in the PNP would continue to have the
privilege of partnering with the Community in promoting and protecting human
rights in our country.
MESSAGE
The publication of this Citizen’s Primer on Law Enforcement is another
manifestation of the support and commitment of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) towards advancing the cause of human rights, both within and without the
organization. The development of the Primer was in response to the call made
by partners from civil society organizations and local communities to have more
information on basic police operational procedures and rules of engagement
to further strengthen their relationship with police officers especially those
operating on the ground.
PAUL G. SCHÄFER
Resident Representative
FOREWORD
Republic of the Philippines
Department of the Interior and Local Government
National Police Commission
NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF, PNP
PNP HUMAN RIGHTS AFFAIRS OFFICE
Camp Crame, Quezon City
FOREWORD
This Primer is a first of a series of publications that we will issue to provide
basic information that citizens can use to better understand police operations.
In particular, this primer provides information about:
References
The PNP and HSF are providing this Primer as a reference material
for citizens to know their rights and the extent of responsibilities
and authority of the police during law enforcement operations.
• Philippine laws
II. POLICE AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITIES AND YOUR RIGHTS DURING POLICE OPERATIONS
1. ARREST
1.1 When the Police may Make an Arrest ................................................... 4
1.2 Rights of a Person Arrested and the Responsibilities and Authority of a
Police Officer During Arrest............................................................... 5
1.3 Responsibilities and Authority of the Arresting Officer............................... 7
4. CITIZEN CONTACT
4.1 What Is Citizen Contact and What Is It For?............................................ 15
4.2 Police Protocols During Citizen Contact that You Should Know...................... 16
5. SPOT CHECK
5.1 When A Spot Check Is Conducted......................................................... 17
5.2 Police Procedures During Spot Checks that You Should Know........................ 18
1
GENERAL INFORMATION
and the responsibilities that police officers are required to
perform and which they should expect. These operations
are the subject of this Citizen’s Primer.
3
AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITIES
Police officers are prohibited from firing at moving
vehicles, excessive use of force and use of deadly
weapons unless the suspect poses imminent danger of
causing death or serious physical injury to other persons
or the police officers. Our police force is trained on the
rules of the use of force and/or reasonable force and
in determining imminent danger during operations in
accordance with the Police Operational Procedures and
provisions of the Rules of Criminal Procedures.
II
POLICE AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITIES
AND YOUR RIGHTS DURING POLICE
OPERATIONS
1. ARREST
4
AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITIES
b. When an offense has just been committed and he
has probable cause to believe, based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the person
to be arrested has committed it; and
5
AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITIES
cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one shall be provided
to assist you; and that the arresting officer should ask
you if you understand those rights. You have the right
to communicate with your lawyer or your immediate
family. It is the responsibility of the arresting officer
to see to it that these are accomplished.
6
AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITIES
that the waiver be made in writing and signed by you
in the presence of a counsel of your own choice or a
competent and independent counsel provided by the
government.
7
AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITIES
Whenever an officer has entered the building or
enclosure to make an arrest, he may break out from
there in order to liberate himself.
8
AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITIES
b. The arresting officer or investigator, as the case may
be, has the duty to inform you of the following rights,
in a language known to and understood by you:
- That you have the right to remain silent;
- That if you waive your rights to remain silent,
anything you say can be used for or against you in
court;
- That you have the right to counsel of your own
choice;
- That if you cannot afford one, you shall be provided
with an independent and competent counsel; and
- That you have the right to be informed of these
rights.
9
AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITIES
and in the presence of any of your parents, elder
brothers and sisters, spouse, the municipal mayor,
the municipal judge, district school supervisor,
priest, imam or minister of the gospel as you may
choose.
10
AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITIES
Should you opt for a preliminary investigation or
refuse to execute the required waiver, the investigator
proceeds with the inquest by submitting you before the
inquest prosecutor, along with the sworn statements
or affidavits of the complainant, and his witnesses if
any, and other supporting evidence.
11
AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITIES
3. DETENTION AND RELEASE
12
AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITIES
c. Detainee’s case folder; and
13
AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITIES
Your counsel has the right to visit you at any date and
any time of the day subject to existing security rules and
regulations of the detention/custodial center.
3.4 Release
4 CITIZEN CONTACT
15
AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITIES
and not personal in nature and which will support the
police in his conduct of intelligence and investigation.
16
AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITIES
d. The police officer should introduce himself and explain
the reason for making the contact. He/she should act
in a courteous and restrained manner at all times and
avoid stern words that sound like commands.
5. SPOT CHECK
17
AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITIES
if he or she is located in proximate time and place to an
alleged crime; if the officer has knowledge of the person’s
prior criminal record or involvement in criminal activity;
or if the person flees at the sight of the police officer.
18
AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITIES
6. SEARCH AND SEIZURE
19
AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITIES
6.2 Authority of and prohibitions to police officers
during the conduct of search
20
AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITIES
in the same locality, leave a receipt in the place in
which he found the seized property in the absence of
the lawful owner.
21
AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITIES
Seizure of Evidence in Plain View. Objects of evidence
in plain view may be seized and introduced as evidence,
subject to the following requirements:
22
DISCIPLINARY MECHANISMS
III
DISCIPLINARY MECHANISMS IN THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
a. Citizen’s Complaint
b. Internal Discipline
c. Power To Dismiss PNP Personnel
d. Internal Affairs Service (IAS)
23
DISCIPLINARY MECHANISMS
b. Mayors of Cities and Municipalities where the
offense is punishable by: withholding of privileges;
restriction to specified limits; suspension or
forfeiture of salary; or a combination thereof for
a period less than 16 days but not exceeding 30
days.
25
DISCIPLINARY MECHANISMS
may immediately remove or dismiss any respondent
PNP member in any of the following cases:
26
DISCIPLINARY MECHANISMS
b. Incidents where death, serious physical injury,
or any violation of human rights occurred in the
conduct of police operation;
27
DISCIPLINARY MECHANISMS
Aside from the typing in his/her complaint, the text
sender should also send in the complete name and
specific location of the person or place being reported.
The end-user of this service is any individual residing
in the country, has a cell phone, and needs to file a
police-related complaint or report for “text reporting
purposes”. It should be understood, however, that
reporting to PNP TXT 2920 would result to instant
action on these complaints or reports. If the complaint
or reports involves a life and death situation and
other serious emergencies, it is more appropriate to
call 117, which is an emergency hotline under the
jurisdiction of the DILG. Once your report or request
for assistance reaches the 117 Call Center, they will
dispatch the message to the concerned police unit.
28
PNP Telephone Directory
III
PNP TELEPHONE DIRECTORY
NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS
CAMP CRAME, QUEZON CITY
OC, PNP 726-4361 Loc 3106 725-3505 Loc 3022 Email: [email protected]
TDCA 722-5140 Loc 3031 721-1276 Loc 3431 Email: [email protected]
TDCO 722-0830 Loc 3005 722-4085 Loc 3505 Email: [email protected]
TCDS 725-3182 Loc 3025 726-1628 Loc 3425 Email: [email protected]
SDS 722-0894 Loc 3050 724-1287 Loc 3325 Email: [email protected]
DPRM 415-9190 Loc 3001 723-0890 Loc 3301 Email: [email protected]
DI 722-1204 Loc 3002 722-1204 Loc 3102 Email: [email protected]
DO 721-8598 Loc 3003 721-5143 Loc 3583 Email: [email protected]
DL 722-0637 Loc 3004 726-9822 Loc 3434 Email: [email protected]
DPL 724-5220 Loc 3154 724-5220 Loc 3054 Email: [email protected]
DC 722-9588 Loc 3074 722-6275 Loc 3174 Email: [email protected]
DIDM 724-8773 Loc 3080 724-8767 Loc 3108 Email: [email protected]
WCPC 723-0401 Loc 3622 723-0401 Loc 3651
DPCR 721-7831 Loc 3086 721-7831 Loc 3186 Email: [email protected]
DHRDD 725-4046 Loc 3084 725-4046 Loc 3184 Email: [email protected]
DRD 723-0401 Loc 3088 723-0401 Loc 3188 Email: [email protected]
DICTM 723-0401 Loc 3136
DIPO Northern Luzon 723-0401 Loc 3944
DIPO Southern Luzon 723-0401 Loc 5256
DIPO Visayas 723-0401 Loc 3477
DIPO Eastern Mindanao 723-0401 Loc 5345
DIPO Western Mindanao 723-0401 Loc 5375
Chaplain Service 722-0945 Loc 3225 722-0945 Loc 3320
CES 722-9585 Loc 3010 721-8580 Loc 3110 Email: [email protected]
ITMS 725-5108 Loc 3115 721-8585 Loc 4425 Email: [email protected]
ES 722-4097 Loc 5300 722-4097 Loc 3027
Finance Service 725-4971 Loc 3018
HSS 722-4110 Loc 3019
Health Service 722-1201 Loc 3016 722-1201 Loc 3426 Email: [email protected]
29
PNP Telephone Directory
IAS 722-0835 Loc 3269 723-6427 Loc 3239
Legal Service 722-0959 Loc 3017 722-1314 Loc 3517 Email: [email protected]
LSS 724-8759 Loc 3104 722-1328 Loc 3114 Email: [email protected]
PNPTS 723-0401 Loc 5309 723-0401 Loc 5209
AVSEGROUP 877-1109 Loc 3756
CSG 722-0935 Loc 3023
FED 724-8710 Loc 3178
SAGSD 722-0850 Loc 4318
Crime Lab Grp 723-0401 Loc 3026 723-8836 Loc 3126
CIDG 722-0877 Loc 3012 722-0988
Intelligence Grp 724-2494 Loc 310
Maritime Grp 724-8778 Loc 5431 724-8778 Loc 3021 Email: [email protected]
PCRG 724-9863 Loc 3053 724-9863 Loc 3153 Email: [email protected]
PSPG 725-3224 Loc 3007 724-8751 loc 4207
HPG 722-4103 Loc 3049 721-8593 Loc 4499
AIDSOTF 722-1918 Loc 5671
PACER 723-0401 Loc 4237
Huram Rights Affairs Office
(HRAO) 723-0401 Loc 3668 723-0401 Loc 3678 Email: [email protected]
Public Information Office
(PIO) 723-0401 Loc 3013 723-0401 Loc 3313 Email: [email protected]
Internal Affairs Office
(IAS) 723-0401 Loc 3263 723-0401 Loc 3239 Email: [email protected]
30
PNP Telephone Directory
STATION 1 731-83-41 712-57-57
(Laloma) Mayon corner Malaya Streets, Laloma
STATION 2 372-17-25 415-25-90
(Baler) Baler St corner West Avenue
STATION 3 937-17-03 939-60-70
(Sangandaan) Quirino Highway, Sangandaan
STATION 4 *937-21-77 936-36-24 418-25-40
(Novaliches) Buenamar Avenue, Novaliches
STATION 5 935-49-41 939-95-86 417-66-64
(Fairview) Fairview Market
STATION 6 931-64-70 931-64-79 951-04-66
(Batasan) IBP Road, Batasan Hills
STATION 7 726-26-54 723-02-90
(Cubao) Camp Panopio
STATION 8 913-98-95 913-98-95
(Project 4) P. Tuazon St, Project 4
STATION 9 434-36-87 434-39-42
(Project 2) Anonas St, Project 2
STATION 10 924-10-25 415-53-93 *412-40-13
(Kamuning) EDSA, Kamuning
STATION 11 *715-55-85 415-41-13
(Galas) Luzon Ave corner Unang Hakbang Street, Galas
31
PNP Telephone Directory
NORTHERN POLICE DISTRICT
TANIGUE ST, KAUNLARAN VILLAGE, DAGAT-DAGATAN, CALOOCAN CITY
DD 287-34-41 287-38-16
DDO
STATION 1 362-27-14 324-65-28
(Caloocan City) Samson Road , Sangandaan, CC
STATION 2 281-11-33 281-99-99 281-11-39
( Malabon City ) F. Sevilla Boulevard
STATION 3 281-90-99 281-91-05
(Navotas) Naval Street
STATION 4 292-05-18 294-06-56 292-02-11 Loc 212
(Valenzuela City) Maysan Road
32
PNP Telephone Directory
STATION 10 562-51-05 564-05-65 563-90-18
(Pandacan) Pandacan Street
STATION 11 244-30-79 244-30-80
(Binondo) Felipe II Street
33
PNP Telephone Directory
LA UNION (072) 242-51-66 700-51-00
Camp Diego Silang, San Fernando City
PANGASINAN (075) 542-71-85 542-42-86
Brgy Libsong West, Lingayen Pangasinan
34
PNP Telephone Directory
BULACAN (044) 791-03-98 791-68-39
Brgy Mojon, Malolos City, Bulacan
NUEVA ECIJA (044) 600-10-16 600-48-09
Burgos Ave, Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija
PAMPANGA (045) 961-35-87 860-56-67
PEO Compd, Brgy Sindalan, San Fernando City, Pampanga
TARLAC (045) 982-29-49 982-95-00
Camp Macabulos, Brgy San Vicente, Tarlac
ZAMBALES (047) 811-28-85 811-27-44
Camp Conrado Yap, Iba, Zambales
35
PNP Telephone Directory
PALAWAN (048) 434-70-53 *433-43-63
Brgy Tiniguiban, Puerto Princesa City, Palawan
ROMBLON (054) 472-82-18 Loc. 2160
Brgy Capaclan, Romblon, Romblon
36
PNP Telephone Directory
CAPIZ (036) 621-12-49
Camp Apil, Roxas City, Capiz
ILOILO (033) 523-94-56 523-95-21
Camp Sumagaysay Sr, Sta Barbara Iloilo
GUIMARAS (033) 237-14-01
Brgy Alaguisoc , Jordan, Guimaras
NEGROS OCCIDENTAL (034) 433-12-24 434-91-97
Camp Montelibano, Bacolod City
BACOLOD (034) 434-14-12 434-66-94
Magsaysay Ave , Brgy Taculing, Bacolod City
37
PNP Telephone Directory
NORTHERN LEYTE (053) 321-33-77
Brgy San Jose, Tacloban City
SOUTHERN LEYTE (053) 381-30-46 381-23-42
Brgy Canturing, Maasin City, Southern Leyte
EASTERN SAMAR (055) 261-23-35
Camp Asidllo, Borongan, E. Samar
NORTHERN SAMAR (055) 354-10-35 354-12-76
Camp Delgado, Catarman, N. Samar
WESTERN SAMAR (055) *251-27-22
Camp Lukban, Catbalogan City, WS
39
PNP Telephone Directory
POLICE REGIONAL OFFICE 13 : CARAGA
PRO13 (085) 342-85-49 (Operator)
(CARAGA) CAMP RAFAEL RODRIQUEZ, LIBERTAD, BUTUAN CITY
RD (085) 342-13-67 226-47-57
DRDO (085) 226-44-33
ROPD (085) 342-19-38 815-23-76
AGUSAN DEL NORTE (085) 341-24-20 815-03-58
Libertad St, Butuan City, Agusan del Norte
AGUSAN DEL SUR (085) 343-73-36 343-79-29
Brgy Patin-ay, Prosperidad, Agusan Sur
SURIGAO DEL NORTE (086) 826-85-68 826-35-49
Borromeo St, Brgy Taft, Surigao City Surigao Del Norte
SURIGAO DEL SUR (086) 211-30-56
Brgy Telaje, Tandag, Surigao del Sur
40
PNP Telephone Directory
POLICE REGIONAL OFFICE : CORDILLERA ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
PRO CAR Local 3915 (074) 422-3207 (Operator)
CAMP BADO DANGWA, LA TRINIDAD, BENGUET
RD (074) 422-19-77
DRDO (074) 422-67-71
ROPD (074) 422-55-15
ABRA (074) 752-56-39
Camp Juan Villamor, Bangued
APAYAO (074)
Poblacion Kabugao
BENGUET (074) 442-32-O8 422-65-15
Camp Bado Dangwa, La Trinidad
IFUGAO (074) 382-20-61
Poblacion North, Lagawe
KALINGA (074)
Camp Juan Duyan, Tabuk
MT PROVINCE (074) 606-81-86
Poblacion Bontoc
41
Journal of Current
Southeast Asian Affairs
URN: http://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:gbv:18-4-11264
ISSN: 1868-4882 (online), ISSN: 1868-1034 (print)
Published by
GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Institute of Asian Studies and
Hamburg University Press.
The Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs is part of the GIGA Journal Family, which
also includes Africa Spectrum, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs and Journal of Politics
in Latin America: <www.giga-journal-family.org>.
Police Violence and Corruption in the Philippines 41
When Rodrigo Duterte took over the Philippine presidency in June 2016
he ushered in a war on drugs, as he had promised to do in the campaign.
He drew on his alleged successes in curbing petty crime and fighting
drugs in his hometown of Davao City on the island of Mindanao (Altez
and Caday 2017; Quimpo 2017; Curato 2017). While he proudly claimed
ownership for hundreds of deaths, he managed to avoid legal responsi-
bility. Human rights groups in the Philippines and abroad were aghast as
the consequences of the nationwide war on drugs began to show in the
death toll. By late 2016, approximately 9,000 casualties, mostly from the
poorest areas of urban Manila, had been ascribed to the war on drugs
(Human Rights Watch 2017). While critiques are mounting abroad and at
home, the Philippine government has denied responsibility and claimed
that their campaign of Tokhang1 was not a strategy of extrajudicial kill-
ings, but rather, as the name indicates, a policy of registering, talking to,
and rehabilitating drug addicts. The government also tried to skirt re-
sponsibility for the many killings by referring to criminal infighting and
unsolved murders rather than police killings. However, evidence is
mounting that Tokhang watchlists have in fact been turned into kill lists
(Human Rights Watch 2017). This has raised academic and political
debates about the shocking return to authoritarian rule and the produc-
tion of a deadly sovereignty (Reyes 2016) where those deemed “disposa-
ble” (Tadiar 2013) can be killed without sanction (Agamben 1998).
While we agree with these criticisms, from our vantage point in ur-
ban Manila where we and our partners have undertaken fieldwork and
human rights work since 2008, two issues seem to warrant further con-
sideration. First, while Duterte’s war on drugs and the killing of Filipinos
represent a radicalisation and mark a new deadly phase, the Philippine
state is no stranger to killing its own people (McCoy 2009). The second
issue is that the focus on sovereignty and the production of authority
through fear obscures the fact that police violence is and always has been
animated by extortion rackets, radicalised in the present as “Tokhang for
ransom” (Coronel 2017). However, rather than taking the practice of
extortion at face value, we propose viewing these practices as part of
intricate exchange relations where violence, or the threat of it, is key
(Jensen et al. 2017). Drawing on anthropologist David Graeber’s (2011)
contribution, we suggest that violence is the means through which hu-
man relations are transformed into human economies of equivalence –
that is, violence and the threat of violence produce relations and ex-
1 Tokhang means “knock and plead” and refers to local officials doing the rounds
by alerting drug addicts and telling them to join drug rehabilitation programmes.
42 Steffen Jensen and Karl Hapal
changes in which human life is price-tagged in ways that the police and
even residents (sometimes) believe are legitimate and useful: violence, or
the threat of violence, is what propels people to pay.2 This, in turn, es-
tablishes a set of complicated exchange relations understood as intense
negotiations and exchanges of material and symbolic resources between
police and the policed.3
We ask in this article,
How are violence and exchange relations connected in policing
the Metro Manila district of Bagong Silang, and how have these
exchange relations transformed in relation to the war on drugs as
ushered in by President Duterte?
In answering these questions, we propose two related arguments: First,
exchange relations constitute precarious encounters that need to be
managed with the utmost care by both police and those they are extort-
ing within a parallel, corrupt, and often violent system that mirrors the
official criminal justice system. Second, the war on drugs, even if it was
also couched in an anti-corruption language, has transformed the param-
eters of violent exchange in ways that made the system even more ex-
pensive, expansive, and unstable.
In order to conceptualise policing relations as exchange relations,
we draw on Janet Roitman’s important insight that the focus should not
be limited to regulation or authority as such; rather, we must also take
into account the relationships that are called forth and produced by regu-
lation (Roitman 2004). In her analysis of illegality and social relations in
the Chad Basin, she illustrates the prominence of social relations over
institutional concerns of sovereignty and state power in the Agambean
sense. Two caveats are necessary at this stage: First, when we employ
Roitman’s notion of regulation, we do not mean regulation as expressed
in normative frameworks of how regulation should be (in terms of what
is laid out in the laws and what institutions should do). Rather, we must
understand regulation as existing policies and practices such as, in our
case, the drug war, the over-burdened prison system, and the extortion
of money by police in exchange for release. These are not necessarily
2 Graeber says, “It is only by the threat of sticks, ropes, spears and guns that one
can tear people out of those endlessly complicated webs of relationship with
others (sisters, friends, rivals…) that render them unique, and thus reduce them
to something that can be traded” (Graeber 2011: 208).
3 In talking about exchange relations, we draw on anthropological understand-
ings of exchange relations as pioneered by, for instance, Marcel Mauss (1966)
and as developed by Pierre Bourdieu (1977).
Police Violence and Corruption in the Philippines 43
4 Almost all quotes from interviewees in this paper were originally in Tagalog; all
translations into English were done by the authors.
Police Violence and Corruption in the Philippines 45
ipated and, through diskarte (the ability to survive through cunning and
wits), connections, money, or a combination of the three, it may be man-
aged. Let us provide some more ethnographic flesh to this argument by
looking at the case of Emiliyo’s son Karl.
Emiliyo’s son Karl had been arrested by the police one night in
2010, as he and friends of his had been drinking in the street and, as the
night progressed, fights broke out. A woman whose son was involved in
the fighting had called the police to get them to stop the fighting. How-
ever, the police came and arrested them all rather harshly, including her
son, and brought them to the police station. Karl had asked the police,
who were in civilian clothes, to show their police ID to identify them-
selves. The police took offence, thinking him maangas (arrogant) and
grabbed him violently. Panic spread among the families of those arrest-
ed. At the beginning, Emiliyo did not know where Karl and his friend
(plus two others) had been taken, so he had contacted the local purok
leader, who was his relative, to ask if he could help find Karl. The purok
leader and his tanods went first to a substation but found it empty be-
cause all the police had gone to the hospital in relation to a police shoot-
ing! Karl was finally located in the central police station. Emiliyo, who
was quite worried, then sent one of his relatives, Inday, to stay near the
police station in case something should happen to Karl.
Emiliyo called Inday because he knew that she was matapang (coura-
geous) and that she had relatives working within the police. The police
told Inday that one policeman had lost a phone while breaking up the
fight that night and that Emiliyo’s family would need to pay PHP 7,000
for it. The phone was supposedly worth PHP 14,000 but because it was
used the police demanded only PHP 7,000. At this point in relating the
tale to us, Inday uttered the word “extortion.” The police told her if the
family did not pay, they would inquest them. “What are the charges?”,
she asked. The police said it was a case of public scandal and assaulting a
police officer. Inday said, “We are not paying. Go ahead and inquest
them!” She called her cousin, a senior police officer. She told the cousin
that a godchild of hers had been arrested and what the circumstances
were. Her cousin promised that he would call the station and instructed
her to wait. In the meantime, Inday and Karl’s brother went to the baran-
gay office to report the case. “This was done to protect Karl,” she said,
indicating that the more reports there were on the whereabouts of Karl,
the safer he would be.
Back at the station, Inday’s police officer cousin called the station.
She could hear her cousin (a superior) telling something to the officer in
the station. After the phone call, the officer told his colleague that they
46 Steffen Jensen and Karl Hapal
must release the boys, but the colleague was contesting the release. He
was one of those who felt that Karl had been maangas when he asked the
police to identify themselves: “He should know that we are police when
the van was outside and we introduced ourselves as police.” Inday quiet-
ly said, “But isn’t it the right of people to ask for the ID, especially when
the police are in civilian clothes?!” The officer continued, “But there are
also the costs. Who will pay for the bullets we used when firing warning
shots [they had shot into the ground]? Who will pay for petrol?” Inday
then asked, “So, if we cannot pay, you will not release them?” “Not
exactly,” he answered. Then Inday said, “OK, thank you,” and left. Out-
side the police station, she called her police officer cousin again and
explained the situation. He promised to take care of it.
Karl’s brother remained at the police station. Also there were the
mothers of the two other young men, including the woman who had
called the police in the first place. One of the mothers was already
known to the police as the wife of an Overseas Filipino Worker (OFW)
and, therefore, as someone with money. The police had had earlier en-
counters with her son, who was apparently a drug addict. Inside the cell,
one of the police officers told Karl that the reason why it was taking
such a long time for them to be released was because the police were
waiting for the payment from this particular woman. Negotiations went
ahead. In the end, the mother who called the police paid PHP 2,000 for
the release, whereas the mother of a third young man paid PHP 500.
Afterwards, the mother who paid PHP 500 told Inday, “I just wanted it
to be over so [my son] would get out of the cells and be safe. That’s why
I paid.” After this, the four young men involved were released.
The case illustrates both that corruption is systemic and the extent
to which some officers are complicit in the system. It is routinised to the
point that release almost has a price tag attached to it. The term for this
kind of police behaviour is hulidap. Hulidap combines the verbs huli (ar-
rest) and hold up. It designates the practice of police holding up people
through the threat of arrest. More importantly, however, it illustrates
what people meant when they said “ok lang” – that is, people can manage
the extortive tendencies of the police by employing intimate relation-
ships, money or other resources, and/or a combination of diskarte and
luck. This is what allows some people to negotiate successfully with the
police. However, it is these same relationships that the police prey on or
capitalise on in their practices of extortion. While the police seclude
people and threaten them with prison and violence, channels of commu-
nication must be open in order for those on the inside to activate their
networks and relationships on the outside. The task of the police is to
Police Violence and Corruption in the Philippines 47
manage these connections, of which some can be beneficial for the po-
lice and others can be problematic.
While hulidap is potentially viewed as “ok lang,” or to some extent
manageable, this practice inherently relies on violence to extract money.
However, the relative manageability of practices like hulidap vanishes
when the police use violence considered as excessive. These excessive
forms of violence relate to “salvaging,” a term meaning extrajudicial
police killings. In Bagong Silang, the image of extreme forms of police
violence persists in the minds of people (Jensen, Hapal, and Modvig
2013). This perception has been enforced and reproduced by the violent
policing and extrajudicial killings that occurred before the drug war.
Hence, we might distinguish heuristically between two forms of state
violence – the “ok lang” and the excessively violent. As an example of the
excessive side of policing, take the following example, pieced together
through interviews, police and media reports, and documentation by
human rights observers.
At around 8 p.m. one night, José, Jay, and Renato went to a man
who owed José money. José brought a gun and asked Jay and Renato to
be his “backup.” While walking to the man’s house, the three young men
encountered a police officer. The police searched them and discovered
José’s gun. Jay and Renato ran, while José was detained by the police
officer, who called him a holdaper (robber) out loud. Consequently, on the
way to the police station, people on the street attacked José.5 When he
arrived at the police station, he was allegedly beaten up repeatedly. The
police presented him with a paper with names on it and asked where
those people were staying. The next morning, José, weak from the beat-
ings, was taken to the main police station where a case was filed against
him. While inside the jail, he considered filing a torture case against the
police who maltreated him. However, as he feared reprisals against his
family, he could not make up his mind. José’s two companions were later
found dead. A news article that took notice of the incident referred to
the murder of the two a drug deal gone wrong. However, suspicions
lingered that they had died at the hands of the police.
The case of José is revealing in several ways. First, the fact that José
was involved in criminal activity made him victimisable in the eyes of
both the police and the public. While this clearly does not exonerate the
state officials or legitimise their actions, José’s actions made him an easy
target. Another factor exacerbated José’s fate: law enforcement agents
are generally not allowed to arrest people under the age of 18, as José
was, but have to release them into the care of parents and social work-
ers.6 This sense of impotence felt by officers of the law arguably entices
them to engage in extralegal activities that are legitimised in the name of
protecting law-abiding citizens from people like José. 7 José’s case was
hardly an isolated incident. One law enforcement officer confirmed the
practice of violently and extrajudicially dealing with young people. In an
interview in 2010 the officer said, “I won’t lie about it. We do kill people.
I myself have killed a lot of people in Bagong Silang.” According to him,
these practices are known and sanctioned by their superiors: “Let’s just
put it this way. Every action that we take, our superior knows about it.”
While these statements are truly worrying, we need to be careful not
to take them at face value. The officer seems to be casting the police and
himself as powerful and vengeful agents, organised in strict hierarchies
of death. In this way, the narrative resembles the image of a strong, ef-
fective but gruesome military organisation. The statements are therefore
arguably part of a narrative structure of strength and nocturnal secrets.
While killings and torture also happened before the war on drugs, they
were not always carried out in the ordered, disciplined, and effective
manner in which the law enforcement agent narrates them. But why do
law enforcement officials need to carry out these acts of violence and
render them intelligible through the narrative of the effective but grue-
some policing structure? Another law enforcement officer explained this
in 2010 by evoking a sacred and epic fight between good and evil that
has been actualised during the war on drugs:
The people we put down are not people anymore. They are de-
mons that need to be removed from the face of the earth. We the
police are like angels that battle those demons. We know what is
right and we know that what those criminals do is not right. I am
6 This is due to a Republic Act (RA 9344) also called the Juvenile Justice Act of
2006 that stipulates that minors under the age of 18 cannot be detained in jail
but must be put into youth shelters. However, as those shelters are often full,
the youngsters are often simply released.
7 This echoes police complaints about human rights across the world. They use
almost identical words to describe their opposition to human rights. For South
Africa, see Marks 2005 and Hornberger 2011.
Police Violence and Corruption in the Philippines 49
not afraid to die today. If I die today, I have the courage to justify
to my God that I have done the right thing. I will even wish to be
put on the front lines of his army to battle those demons. If He
wishes that I be in hell, I have no problem with that. I have no re-
grets about the things that I did.
From this perspective, society is composed of “good” people and de-
mons (demonyo). The role of the police is, predictably, like avenging an-
gels, to eliminate the demons to protect society – in other words, to keep
the integrity of the “thin blue line.” While some might be dismissive of
the police’s justification of the use of (excessive) violence and the ac-
companying assertion that it is meted out in a predictable, effective, and
almost scientific way, we believe that it is reflective of a rather compli-
cated and difficult policing situation. The police’s narrative is one that
stresses that justice will prevail, through the nocturnal death of the crim-
inals, by the hands of secret and strong forces of order. Yet, before the
war on drugs it was not uncommon for law enforcement agents in Ba-
gong Silang to despondently talk about their difficulties with “criminals”
seeming to disappear in the maze of houses and life. What accounts for
the discrepancy between the narrative of the strong, nocturnal force and
the sense of impotence? Given the police’s institutional capacities and
resources, law enforcement in Bagong Silang is at best challenging and at
worst compromised. It is in this light that protecting order from chaos
would seem stretched and porous.8 The epic battle against evil therefore
signifies a rationalisation of violence in the light of a sense of impotence.
Nonetheless, the image of the vengeful angel continues to animate polic-
ing. It is in this way that we must understand the term “salvaging” or
extrajudicial killing – the hard and dirty job of saving the nation. This
narrative, as we shall see later, provided a fertile ground for Duterte’s
war on drugs five years later.
Violent Exchange
While some policing practices are “ok lang” and others are “excessive,”
this does not mean that the two are unrelated. On the contrary, they
exist in and through each other. Through the epic narrative of vengeful
angels, the practices of the crocodile are rendered at least partially invisi-
ble and its actions legitimatised. In the case above, Emiliyo was very
8 The idea of the thin blue line is shared in many policing organisations across
the world, as is the notion that violence is necessary to carry out what they see
as their duty (Hornberger 2011; Steinberg 2008; Jensen 2008).
50 Steffen Jensen and Karl Hapal
ence of the angel and the crocodile in the minds of people, who want the
police to apprehend criminals, protect the innocent, and keep law and
order (the angel) while at the same time being open to the relational
economy of connections (the positive side of the crocodile). It was
against the backdrop of this relational economy that Duterte’s drug war
hit Bagong Silang.
9 See reports by Human Rights Watch (2017) and by the UN Special Rapporteur
for Extrajudicial Executions, Agnes Calamard. While our own analysis from
Bagong Silang backs up the reports, the government might be correct in sug-
gesting that the UN and international organisations have been single-minded in
identifying the police as the ultimate perpetrators. Our material suggests that
there is great uncertainty about perpetrators. Hence, it cannot be ruled out that
other violent networks are involved, taking advantage of the war on drugs to
settle other scores.
Police Violence and Corruption in the Philippines 53
by Muslims have been blocked. According to informants, police had told peo-
ple in Phase 12 that they must leave or else they would turn Phase 12 into a
cemetery – that is, they would go around killing Muslims.
Police Violence and Corruption in the Philippines 55
14 The INC has rightly been called a state within the state. It has its own schools
and housing areas, and the church is known to command millions of votes to
the effect that it often determines elections. Hence, endorsement can mean the
difference between being elected and not being elected. Furthermore, as Jay in-
dicates, the church also has its own security organisation, SCAN. SCAN has a
reputation of violence beyond its mandate of maintaining order around INC
functions. Allegedly, SCAN is often called in to intervene, violently, in INC
members’ conflicts with neighbours. It is also rumoured to be composed of
hired guns and goons of those willing to pay. According to several informants
in Bagong Silang, SCAN was also rumoured to be involved in vigilante killings
as part of the war on drugs. As such, the very name struck fear into people’s
hearts to an extent where all conversations about the practices of SCAN were
56 Steffen Jensen and Karl Hapal
Through connections he had with local political networks, Jay was nom-
inated as a local tanod and then became part of what is called the Com-
munity Investigative Services (CIS). The CIS was established as a nation-
al programme of surveillance in relation to the war on drugs, under the
command of a retired army general.
Jay showed us with pride his badge and his ID with a photo of him-
self and the general. In Jay’s account, this was all very secret, a system
outside the other surveillance system organised around the barangay,
purok leaders, and tanods (guards). He was also to be remunerated rela-
tively handsomely for his efforts. Asked why he joined, he said, “For the
connections, of course!” He further explained, “It’s a good connection
to have.” Jay’s case illustrates that resources cannot be reduced to a ques-
tion of money only. Like Bondo’s case, social relations – both vertical
and hierarchical – are absolutely central to survival and to improving
one’s life. The war on drugs has radically reconfigured the possibilities of
connectivity. While much focus has been on the negative relations to the
state and the toll on human life, it is necessary to recognise that people
like Bondo and Jay have benefitted quite literally from the war.
Furthermore, Jay talked at length about more direct benefits, saying
that members of the CIS were paid money for all good information
about drug addicts and pushers. All over Bagong Silang, stories of pay-
ments to the police and the CIS for killings abounded. Amounts as high
(or as low, depending on one’s point of view) as PHP 10,000 were fre-
quently cited – Jay said those in the CIS were promised PHP 7,000 – and
fed into popular narratives explaining the motives behind police killings.
In “Murder as Enterprise,” Sheila Coronel explores these rumours and
finds them credible. Needless to say, if true this would provide a very
strong motive for engaging in the killings and, just as important, it would
provide residents in Bagong Silang with an explanatory model for under-
standing the killings – although not one that is likely to improve the
relationship between themselves and the police. In this way, Phase 12
and the other cases presented here illustrate that the war on drugs is not
only about killing but also about getting paid! While the case of Phase 12
suggests a certain spatial ordering, both Bondo’s and Jay’s cases suggest
that monetary exchange constitutes social relations that people manage
or move into – or out of.
carried out in hushed tones. In this way, SCAN and the INC took centre stage
in some rather uncompromising narratives and conspiracy theories.
Police Violence and Corruption in the Philippines 57
these relationships and how residents may negotiate them through mon-
ey, relationships, and diskarte.
The first element in these reconfigured relationships is that the price
of survival seems to have gone up significantly. If we compare the
amounts that we registered before the beginning of the war on drugs,
they are significantly lower than the amounts we and others (Coronel
2017; Lamchek 2017) have collected since the onset of the war. This
information is, of course, very difficult to establish with any certainty,
not least because narratives, rumours, and forms of gossip per definition
are unreliable sources. With this caveat in mind, the data from Bagong
Silang and Phase 12 indicate that those related to the drug economy have
had to pay substantial amounts of money to avoid violence being perpe-
trated against them. It is also clear that many people decided to run ra-
ther than pay the price of survival. This was especially true for Muslim
residents in Phase 12, suggesting that the war on drugs is not only about
drugs but also part of larger political struggles.15 It suggests that while
money is important, we cannot reduce the war on drugs and policing
practices to money alone. Rather, the relationships and exchange rela-
tions are animated by political categories as well.
While we cannot be sure whether Muslims fled because it was cer-
tain they would either be killed or have to pay exorbitant amounts to
avoid violence or death, it is fair to assume that this was a question they
asked themselves, if we compare the Philippines with other contexts of
violence where wars on crime and drugs have been fought. Studies in
South Africa and Bolivia16 suggest that the unpredictability of violence is
in fact constitutive for social relations. The studies illustrate how vio-
lence is particularly problematic when people are not certain from where
and by whose hand it will come. Exploring the civil wars in Northern
Ireland and Guinea Bissau, Henrik Vigh (2009) usefully suggests that
during conflict the social terrain is fundamentally shifting, unstable, and
illegible. Hence, people invest great efforts in rendering violence predict-
15 The fieldwork took place during the siege of the city of Marawi, stronghold of
the Maute brothers, who had affiliated themselves to the so-called Islamic State
(see <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/899789/afp-44-combatants-killed-in-mara
wi-clashes>). This produced yet more hostile narratives about Muslims
amongst most of our informants in Bagong Silang.
16 Elsewhere, we have explored how the war on drugs and gangs in Cape Town
produced constant attempts to “read” the social terrain (Jensen 1999). Helene
Risør (2010), working in Bolivia, shows how people are constantly looking for
clues to be able to protect themselves from criminal activity. White cars on the
road or stones in particular patterns might be indications of criminal intent that
people try to assess to stay safe.
Police Violence and Corruption in the Philippines 59
able and knowable. While some human rights organisations exert much
effort to pin all deaths on the police via a chain of command (e.g. Hu-
man Rights Watch 2017), realities are often much more complicated. In
one case, where seven were killed in a shoot-out, we recorded three dif-
ferent potential perpetrators – the police, competing Muslim drug deal-
ers, and the Iglesia ni Cristo acting as a vigilante group. With each of
these perpetrators or violent social networks, to paraphrase Arias (2006),
different chains of events emerge and with them different dangers.
Hence, as the event had not been stabilised, violence remained unpre-
dictable (Jensen 1999). The lack of certainty and the plurality of perpetra-
tors remain some of the important sources of the unstable terrain. This
is compounded by the presence of competing police units and the con-
stant shuffling of police officers.
Duterte has made it policy to shift around police officers to root
out corruption. Hence, most police officers in Bagong Silang have been
shifted to and from other places. In the time between the onset of the
war in June 2016 and May 2017, four different station commanders had
been assigned to Bagong Silang. Mindanao seems to play a particular role
in this. We mentioned above how corrupt police officers are sent to
Mindanao for “re-education” and punishment. Obviously and logically,
there is a reverse movement from Mindanao to Bagong Silang. This has
two possible implications for the war on drugs – one in terms of policing
strategy and one in relation to relationships between police and residents.
According to a barangay employee and long-term friend of one of
the authors, the station commander made a speech at the SOBA (State
of the Barangay Address) in April 2017 where he complained about the
lack of collaboration from the barangay. According to the informant, he
said, “If you do not want to collaborate with me, I am more than willing
to bring the hell from Mindanao to Bagong Silang.” This opens up the
possibility of counter-insurgency tactics being employed by the police
rather than the usual local policing strategies. While this uncertainty is
palpable, perhaps what matters for our present analysis is that residents
will be hard-pressed to know what kind of policing will prevail in their
next encounter with the police. Will the police be the avenging angels
saving the nation or will they be approachable crocodiles?
The sheer number of replacements and the circulation of officers
compound this question. Dealing with the police in the past in a manner
that was “ok lang” has been premised on money, connections, and
diskarte. This also entails knowing someone on the police force who
might know the police officers in question. However, the circulation of
officers renders these relations potentially more difficult and less simple
60 Steffen Jensen and Karl Hapal
References
Abinales, Patricio (2000), Making Mindanao: Cotabato and Davao in the For-
mation of the Philippine Nation-state, Manila: Ateneo Press.
Agamben, G. (1998), Homo sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, Stanford:
Stanford University Press.
Altez, J., and K. Caday (2017), The Mindanaoan President, in: N. Curato
(ed.), A Duterte Reader: Critical Essays on Rodrigo Duterte’s Early Presi-
dency, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 111–126.
Arias, E. D. (2006), The Dynamics of Criminal Governance: Networks
and Social Order in Rio de Janeiro, in: Journal of Latin American Stud-
ies, 38, 2, 293–325.
Bourdieu, P. (1977), Outline of a Theory of Practice, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Coronel, Sheila (2017), Murder as Enterprise: Police Profiteering in
Duterte’s War on Drugs, in: N. Curato (ed.), A Duterte Reader: Criti-
Police Violence and Corruption in the Philippines 61
Law enforcement is a term used to define the act of enforcing the law; and a law
offenses against the criminal laws, including an employee engaged in this activity who is
In the Philippines, a country located in Asia, law enforcement has been mainly
entrusted to the main law enforcement group, the Philippine National Police, in
of Fire Protection; and the auxiliary groups like the Barangay Tanod, Traffic
The list of laws in the Philippines is actually good. One of the law on climate
change adaptation (CCA) and disaster risk reduction (DRR) was even mentioned by the
UN special envoy Margareta Washlstrom in 2012 as the best in the world. However,
even if how good the law is, if its enforcement is weak, then the law will be of no use.
Philippine law is one of the best there is, but how about the law enforcement
group that is supposed to enforce it? Can the law enforcement group live up to the
wrong with the national police. It is viewed more as a source of livelihood for the
policemen rather than an institution to protect law and order, Roque said one of the
force's biggest problems was corruption. There have been many accounts of
prospective recruits paying bribes to join the service, and paying again to get important
posts with the express intention of using their positions to make money.
The statement of Roque was actually seen during the bus hostage crisis that
occurred last 2010 in Manila, when eight (8) Hong Kong nationals were killed. According
to reporter Chick, K. (2010), the incident exposed how corrupt the law enforcement
agency is. During this crisis situation, the Philippine National Police displayed the lack of
training of the officers who responded to the situation, the lack of equipments and poor
communication problem among the organization. According to the report, the bullets
that were discovered on the victim’s body were also investigated as it was suspected to
have come from the police officers who were supposed to save them.
According to the report of the Center for Police Management and Development in
2005, the police force could not function properly because of the lack budget allocation,
which in turn caused the lack of equipment for the police force to properly enforce the
law, the number of police officers were less than the required number in the society, and
This situation of the police force, tasked to enforce the law, resulted to the poor
law enforcement system of the country. If we try to analyse it, the root cause for the
poor law enforcement in the country is neither the lack of budget, nor the lack of
equipments and force, the real cause of the problem is the corruption in the system and
Like what Attorney Roque said, there have been many accounts of recruits
paying bribes just to enter the police force, and their purpose is for gain. If that is the
kind of law enforcement officers that they have, then they cannot expect a good service.
If those unqualified individuals enter the police force through bribery, then what will
Another problem to the law enforcement system, aside from corruption, is the
lack of cooperation from the people. Sewell, E. (2013), stated that Filipino do not care
enough to take a stand against corruption. He further said that Filipinos have no one to
blame but their own apathy. This, I believe, is true. If only the people or the Filipino
people themselves would be more involved in what is happening around them, then the
issue on corruption would have been minimized, and the law enforcement system would
have improved.
The point is, the people themselves should be the first to make a stand to have a
change because they are the most powerful people in a nation; and until the people
could have their stand, only then will there be a change in the system, including law
enforcement.
References
Ubac, M. (May 4, 2012). UN laud Philippines’ climate change laws ‘world’s best’.
Philippine Daily Inquirer. Retrieved November 27, 2013.
http://globalnation.inquirer.net/35695/un-lauds-philippines%E2%80%99-climate-
change-laws-%E2%80%98world%E2%80%99s-best%E2%80%99
Chick, K. (August 25, 2010). Philippines hostage crisis exposes police corruption,
ineptitude. Retrieved November 27, 2013. http://www.csmonitor.com/
World/terrorism-security/2010/0825/Philippines-hostage-crisis-exposes-police-
corruption-ineptitude
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 46 | Issue 1 Article 14
1955
Recommended Citation
M. Ladd Thomas, Philippine Police Systems, 46 J. Crim. L. Criminology & Police Sci. 116 (1955-1956)
This Criminology is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
PILIPPINE POLICE SYSTEMS
M. LADD THOMAS
When the author prepared this article, he was a research fellow at the Institute of
Public Administration, University of the Philippines, Manila, under an eighteen
months appointment from the University of Michigan. Mr. Thomas holds both bach-
elor's and master's degrees in the field of political science from the University of Utah
and at present is a teaching assistant in the Political Science Department of North-
western University. He is coauthor of Tie Organizationof the ManilaPolice Department
and A Survey of Local Government in the Philippines, both of which were published
by the Institute of Public Administration.-EDrrOR.
There are several police systems in the Philippines. On the national level are the
National Bureau of Investigation and the Philippine Constabulary; at the local level
each political entity has its own police force.
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
in and attempts, itself, to handle the problem. Since it has police jurisdiction every-
where in the Philippines, it can assume direct control of any local police unit upon
the request of the local officials, the head of the Constabulary, or the President of the
Philippines, even if such act is contrary to the expressed wishes of the local citizenry.
This power has only too frequently been abused for political purposes. It can also
enter chartered cities and municipalities in the pursuit of a criminal, or in the inves-
tigation of a crime, without first securing the permission of, or notifying, the local
police force and officials. Naturally, actions of this sort tend to antagonize the local
police, officials, and citizens, and to confuse the status of local peace and order. The
relationship of the Constabulary to the Manila Police Department, in particular, has
proved potentially explosive. Many jurists claim that the national law which gives to
the Constabulary police jurisdiction throughout the Philippines conflicts with the
national law which seemingly grants the Manila Police Department police jurisdiction
over the City of Manila.' On several occasions when the Constabulary has officially
entered Manila there has been a real danger of serious conflict with the Manila police.
Just prior to the national elections of 1953, units of the Constabulary and the Manila
2
Police Department were on the verge of an open clash.
The Constabulary gives in-service training to city and municipal police forces. The
value of this training, however, is questionable, since it consists mainly of military
drills.
Philippine Constabulary effectiveness, then, is not adequate for at least two of the
functions it is supposed to perform. Being trained in military, not police, methods, it
is unable to cope with the everyday needs of local police work. Moreover, it is un-
qualified to train local police forces. The extremely military character of the Con-
stabulary qualifies that organization only for the function of discouraging, or if need
be crushing, insurrections and large scale banditry.
CrrY POLICE
There are twenty-seven chartered cities in the Philippines, ranging in size from
cities like Tagaytay, with a few thousand population and no business or urban district
(poblacion), to Manila with an estimated population of two million. The majority of
chartered cities are almost exclusively rural areas.3
The effectiveness of the city police is seriously limited by poor organization, inade-
quate equipment, and lack of prior police training or experience among force person-
nel. With respect to their organizational structures, these departments are fashioned
along lines set by the early twentieth-century American military government in the
Philippines. Two line divisions-uniformed and secret service-attempt to cope with
IAVELINO TENDERO and M. LAnD THommrS, THE ORGANIZATION OF THE MANIA POLICE DE-
PARTmENT (Institute of Public Administration, University of Philippines, Manila, 1953), p. 63.
2The so-called "Shellborne Hotel incident" featured a near clash of arms between the Philip-
pine Constabulary and the Manila Police Department. Both police forces rushed heavily armed
men to the Shellborne Hotel in Manila at the separate requests of the Mayor of Manila and the
Secretary of Defense, two political antagonists each of whom was in the hotel and felt that he was
in danger of assassination, or at best, arrest by the other. Fortunately, cooler heads among the
two police units dispatched to the scene prevailed, and the threatened clash was averted.
3Chartered cities are politically, financially, and administratively independent of the provinces.
M. LADD THOMAS [Vol. 46
all the modern complexities of police work without the aid of staff units or specialized
line and auxiliary branches, such as traffic and communications.4 Furthernore, ad-
ministrative control over the police department is shared by the mayor and the
President-the latter exercising his supervision through the Philippine Constabulary.
A chief of police is thus forced to serve several masters, the administrative policies
of whom sometimes conflict. His position is further weakened by his inability to
control the secret service (detective) division. Since the chief of the secret service
divisionis also appointed by the President and the detectives appointed by the mayor,
the division is virtually independent of the administrative control of the chief of
police. 5
Having limited funds, chartered cities are faced with the choice of maintaining a
large, unequipped police force or a smaller, well-equipped force. In the past nearly
every city has chosen the former alternative, largely because political considerations
necessitate providing jobs on the police department for politically deserving citizens.
In any event, police departments work without the aid of laboratory, transportation,
and communication facilities (despite the enormous area of some cities like Davao),
with insufficient and faulty ammunition, mismatched firearms, and often no fire-
arms at all.'
The average city policeman receives no police training prior to his appointment. It
is particularly noteworthy that the chiefs of police and chiefs of the secret service are
often the least experienced officers on the force. These two police officials are nor-
mally local politicians or former army officers, neither type knowing anything about
modern police administrative and operational techniques.
MANILA POLICE
Most of these generalizations about the police forces of the chartered cities hold
true for Manila. However, the size of Manila in terms of both area and population
creates complex police problems and needs which differ markedly from the other
chartered cities. In many respects, the Manila Police Department compares favorably
to the police departments in large American cities. For instance, it consists of approxi-
mately 2400 men, all of whom are equipped with uniforms and weapons. The members
of the force receive pre-service and in-service training in police techniques. There is
an extensive precinct system. Communication and transportation facilities, while
not up to normal American standards, are among the best in Asia and are being
gradually improved.7 Furthermore, the United States Army has bequeathed con-
siderable police laboratory equipment to the Department, and police officers have
subsequently been trained in the use of this equipment.
Some reorganization has been undertaken by the Department, but it still shows
4 Many city police departments have no communication personnel or facilities whatsoever.
This type of administrative independence was carried a step further in Zamboanga City where
the city warden was taken out from under the supervision of the police chief and given depart-
mental status.
• Firearms used by city police are often borrowed from the Philippine Constabulary which from
time to time recalls these arms thereby leaving the city police weaponless. It is an actual fact that
many policemen are untrained in the use of firearms.
SRecenty the Manila Police Department acquired 30 plus new police cars to supplement their
old vehicle equipment, which consists mainly of ancient jeeps.
PHILIPPINE POLICE SYSTEMS
His special agents perform liaison duties in this respect with the municipal police. In
addition, these agents are frequently assigned by the governor to solve criminal cases
which the municipal police are unable to solve.
Since the special agents are largely political followers of the governor and secure
their jobs through political patronage, and since they are seldom, if ever, trained for
police work, their effectiveness as a police force is practically nil.
A second provincial police force is the provincial guard-a small unit in each prov-
ince. This unit is used chiefly to guard the provincial jail.' Infrequently, guards are
dispatched to the municipalities to transfer prisoners from the municipal jails to the
provincial jail, although this is usually done by the municipal police. Even more in-
frequently, provincial guards are used to actively combat criminal activities in the
province. This latter function is performed only at rare intervals because: The guards
are not trained in police techniques (their only traifning is a series of military drills);
they are generally without sufficient numbers of firearms; the unit has no transporta-
tion, nor are the guards provided a transportation allowance; and finally, the small
size of the average guard force prevents the detachment of part of the unit for police
work other than guard duty.
MUNICIPAL POLICE
The municipality is an administrative subdivision of the province." It is composed
of several barrios and a poblacion. 14 The mayor of the municipality has direct re-
sponsibility for the supervision of the municipal police force. He, in turn, is account-
able to the provincial governor and the Philippine Constabulary for the maintenance
of law and order in his municipality.
The police chief and policemen of a municipality are appointed by the mayor with
the approval of the municipal council. The size of the force is determined by the
municipal council with the consent of the provincial board."5
Considerable control over the municipal police is exercised by the Philippine Con-
stabulary. It issues regulations covering the general conduct, duties, and weapons of
the municipal police. The municipal council may issue supplementary regulations,
but these must not conflict with those issued by the Constabulary. Inspectors from
the Constabulary make periodic inspections of municipal police forces. If deficiencies
are noted by the inspector, the Constabulary must oversee their correction. A report
of inspections is filed with the mayor, the provincial governor, and the President.
Municipalities are supposed to equip their police forces with arms and ammunition,
but their weak financial condition frequently makes this impossible. Constabulary
firearms are sometimes loaned those municipalities which cannot afford to buy
weapons. However, from time to time the Constabulary recalls these firearms, thereby
leaving the municipal police defenseless against possible armed criminal activities.
12 Only convicted criminals serving sentences of one year or less and prisoners awaiting trial or
CONCLUSIONS
The deficiencies in the Philippine police systems are numerous; however, these de-
ficiencies should be measured against the police needs of the Philippines, which are
not so great or complex as those of a mechanized society. Generally speaking, the
existing systems are adequate to handle most of the law and order problems which
arise. Nevertheless, these systems must be continually modified to keep pace with
future technological advances of the Philippines.
16
Barrios, particularly in the municipalities, are rural areas somewhat reminiscent of the mid-
west townships in the United States. See JOsEpH RALSTOx HAYDEN, THE PmirPnqxs: A Sruny
IN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (The Macmillan Co., New York, 1950), p. 263.
17 ARTuxo M. ToLENTio, THE GoVERNmExT or THE Pn=pnqxs (Garcia Publishing Co.,
Manila, 1950), p. 331.
The Evolution of Policing and a Return to Principles
Nearly 200 years ago, the forefathers of municipal policing recognized some core
principles that are finding renewed significance for the practitioners of contemporary
policing. These policing principles seem to be circling back to those century-old core
principles—with the help of new technological advancements, science, data,
comprehensive research, and courageous leadership. In many regards, nothing is new;
while in others, the industry of law enforcement has moved light years to meet the rising
complexities of policing.
It is clearer than ever that to reach significant reductions in violent crime, police
trust-building must be a priority. Whether some community members do not report crime
or do not work with police due to apathy, fear, or a lack of confidence, it is data-driven
policing coupled with trust-building that can begin to change that. Whether some
community members do not occupy their public spaces because of perceived or actual
crime, smarter policing and trust-building can ease these fears.
Policing is a noble profession; but as police officers face one of the most difficult
times ever, they are sometimes left feeling vilified. Wellness programs are continually
2
being developed to support these men and women in law enforcement. The most recent
evolution of policing considers all aspects of wellness for both the community and its
members and for the police officers who serve their community. Three significant areas
make up this evolutionary shift: enforcement, relationships, and metrics. Guaranteeing
that these three be operationalized and institutionalized in police departments across
the nation is critical to melding the municipal connections of the past with the
heightened awareness and trust-building of the present.
By the 1930s, American policing saw the rise of organized crime and
experienced one of the deadliest decades for law enforcement officers. Graft and
corruption were also concerns, and the "reform era" and "professional model" began to
unfold. This model aimed to distance police from the public, rejecting the alliance
between the public and the police. At that time, no one foresaw the negative
consequences of severing the ties between the officers and the neighborhoods. Then
came the introduction of motorized police units and radios, shifting police units into
being "radio cars" used for preventative patrols and rapid call response. But through the
1960s and 1970s, crime skyrocketed, and riots ensued, and the beginnings of
enforcement crackdowns, the likes of which America had never seen, took place.
Intrusive police practices exacerbated the divide between the community and the police.
Some data collection began during this era, such as the 1972 Kansas City preventive
patrol experiment, which showed visible patrols were not getting results in crime
reduction.
A decade later, another shift in policing began to occur, and this was the shift
back to re-connecting with the community. By the 1980s and early 1990s, many police
departments instituted "community policing," yet most were no more than specific
programs or specific units. "Problem-oriented-policing" and "community-oriented
policing" arose which focused on giving attention to underlying community problems;
this followed the theory that focusing on "broken windows" to address urban disorder
issues in neighborhoods could keep them from falling into deeper disrepair. But many
believe that some use of zero-tolerance enforcement of "broken windows," such as
3
mass stop and frisk tactics, was a misapplication of the original “broken windows”
theory, and it had unintended consequences of even further distancing the community.
Now, since 2010, police departments are recognizing how essential the
component of building public trust is. There has also been an understanding that law
enforcement cannot arrest their way out of crime and disorder problems. Principled
Policing has come to the forefront, bringing along with it the historical Peelian Principles.
The Evolution of Policing has come full circle, with the added benefit of lessons learned
and the focused awareness needed to apply and activate these fundamental principles.
That there is a tie between trust within the police and crime reporting and crime-
fighting is intuitive, but it is also based on developing data and research (REFERENCE 1).
Violence is highest in neighborhoods with low trust in government and residents can
feel trapped in a cycle of mistrust and violence that self-perpetuates. Data-driven
policing can restore trust because it uses enforcement more strategically while focusing
on the things that threaten communities most.
Police agencies across the country are moving through the latest evolution in
policing which connects trust and crime. Stockton, California, is an example. It is not the
example, but rather is one example. Probably unique, however, is how the City of
Stockton went through the evolution of policing on an accelerated track. This fast track
was not by design necessarily but rather due to a "negative trifecta"—the 2012 filing of
bankruptcy, while simultaneously becoming one of the most understaffed larger police
departments in the nation, while also experiencing one of the highest violent crime
rates. Given these dire straits, the police department needed the community more than
ever. The Stockton Police Department made a shift away from a “call responder”
approach to the latest evolution of policing: Strategic Data-Driven Policing and
Principled Policing. The police department made this shift regardless of staffing or
budget and therefore required a reset of priorities and a new organizational design
under Principled Policing.
4
Procedural Justice holds that these pillars shape police officer encounters and
that people’s perceptions of the encounter are influenced more by the experience than
the end result of the interaction. That then directly shapes individuals’ feelings of
whether they felt they were treated justly, which translates into whether they view the
police department as a legitimate authority, and perceptions of legitimacy have a major
impact on people’s compliance with the law. Community surveys in the neighborhoods
with the highest levels of distrust and crime have shown some interesting results.
Residents in these neighborhoods mostly and strongly feel they cannot trust the officers
and that the officers do not hold themselves accountable. However, these residents also
want lawful activity within their neighborhoods and want to work with the police. The
survey results show there is much work to be done, but that there is hope for working
together.
Principled and Smarter Policing is what police officers want to do and so often do
on a daily basis. Consider just the City of Stockton alone where police handle on
average 1,000 calls-for-service per day. No one hears of those 1,000 daily calls where
everything goes right, and perhaps law enforcement can do a better job of advertising
that and the fact that so many men and women put their lives on the line daily for the
people in the community. These men and women willingly become the guardians of our
communities.
With the advent of Principled and Smarter Policing, feedback from officers has
been that this is exactly what they signed up to do; it is the core of their job. An
examination of the reasons why police officers sign up to pin the badge on their uniform
in the first place shows the reasons are the same now as they have been for decades:
to serve justice and to help and protect people. Procedural justice courses have been
some of the highest-rated courses within the Department; this is good news that police
officers want to nurture and build community trust. What is new to them is the layered
science and structure behind these principles, and they are more than willing to learn all
the nuances. Along with enthusiasm for increased awareness and education, however,
there also must be an acknowledgment that cynicism is bound to occur in police
officers’ careers due to the many challenges they face and horrendous things they see.
It is critical that police departments openly face cynicism and provide tools to help
combat stress, disillusionment, and even despair. Police departments must concentrate
on training, policy, and trauma-informed care to keep officers committed to their
5
principles. Many departments are doing exactly that through Wellness Programs and
Networks. Officer wellness is more important than ever because of the current climate
generated by certain factions of the media and groups of citizens. Although the vast
majority of citizens approve what police officers do, officers often feel a balanced
evaluation of their service to the community is missing. As perspectives become
broader and encompass more understanding and appreciation of community dynamics,
it is hoped this evolution will include all levels of interaction between the community and
those who protect and serve it.
The most recent evolution of law enforcement, of the latest of Principled and
Smarter Policing, has three primary shifts. These shifts are enforcement, relationships,
and metrics.
Much of the content of these three areas of shift is contained in the California
Attorney General's Principled Policing Subcommittee and Statewide Training, the
National Initiative on Building Community Trust and Justice, and the President's Task
Force on 21st Century Policing, all of which had Stockton involved. All the training and
initiatives have the three shifts—enforcement, relationships, and metrics—in common.
Shift Implementation
The success of Principled Policing and these three evolution shifts relies upon
leadership at all levels, top to bottom, and a culture embracing change. It must be
ingrained into the policing culture, which is the shared set of values and beliefs. The
culture should be one where ideas are evaluated on merits rather than rank or politics,
openness is promoted, people are held accountable, and best practices are sought.
Transparency (body-worn cameras, policies made public, advisory boards, etc.) and
accountability (force review processes, audits, etc.) are at the minimum needed, but
Principled Policing also requires the operationalization at the field level for the most
routine of tasks and institutionalization for department-wide permeation.
• Operationalization
• Institutionalization
A Strategic Plan—for example, one created with input from all members of the
police department and a community survey, focusing on two pillars: Smarter
Policing and Principled Policing
7
The two pillars of Principled and Strategic Policing, like any set of pillars, must
lay on a solid foundation. In this case, the foundation must be made of a healthy culture
and leadership at all levels, from the top of the organization to the line level. Stockton
has had the benefit of the police union buying in and helping shape the Department’s
strategic plan.
Conclusion
Sir Robert Peel was right all along, and American policing in the nineteenth
century saw value in the Peelian Principles, but unfortunately drifted away when it was
determined there should be distance between the public and police. In the 1980s,
American policing made advancements with the "broken windows" theory about the
benefits of order maintenance and addressing tipping-point neighborhoods, but many
departments had not considered the unintended consequences of zero-tolerance
policing. Fortunately, now, police agencies are getting back to understanding the strong
need for public consent policing as Peel outlined.
The evolution of policing continues its process because as with any profession,
law enforcement is a learning organism, all searching for best practices and evolving as
necessary. Although the evolution has brought us back to the core of what police
officers should stand for, there is now research behind this shift of enforcement,
relationships, and metrics. Operationalizing and institutionalizing these shifts are
required to move the noble profession of law enforcement forward.
8
Reference 1: Desmond, Papachristos and Kirk, “Police Violence and Citizen Crime Reporting in the
Black Community,” American Sociological Review.
8. To recognise always the need for strict adherence to police-executive functions, and to refrain
from even seeming to usurp the powers of the judiciary, of avenging individuals or the State, and
of authoritatively judging guilt and punishing the guilty.
9. To recognise always that the test of police efficiency is the absence of crime and disorder, and
not the visible evidence of police action in dealing with them.
If you have issues viewing or accessing this file contact us at NCJRS.gov.
"
U.S. Department of Justice,
National Institute of .Justice /
CRIl~1E JffiJE
Foot Patrol
A study guide written b~':
George L. Kelling, Haf\'ard University
100739
U.S. Department of Justice
National Institute of Justice
d d exactly as receIved from the
ThIS documef't has bee~ repro u~epOlnls of "'ew or OpinIons stated
PerSofl or organlzatlon orlglnatong I d do not necessarll~
. those 01 the authors an
'" thIS oocumert are 1 s of the National Inst,tute of
represent the offICIal posItion or po ICle
JustIce
~~.·"nJo,Jed matenai has been
PermISSIon to reproduce thIS c~
granted by
Public Dornal n
. IN! I J
...
US !)epartrnen~ of JUstl~e
to :he ~~\lOnal Cnmlnal JustIce Reference ServIce ,NCJRS)
Introduction
\ Foot Patrol Strengths a means of h.ceping. in touch \\ ith police officer\ to
-"upen'i\e and control them. ~IS \\ ell ;\" to keep them
informed about crime or di\order.
Research Findings
F00! patro I .IS regaining
. . popu Ianty . a~ a po I'ICC tactic.
"-' Policin!.! in such a manner had .,trengths. Because Gi\en ~uch effort~. \\hat empirical e\idcnce i\
In m11l1\ American citie:-.. communit\, and neighbor- police ;egularly patrolled rclati\'el~ ~mall areas. the) <l\ailahle on the impact 01'1'001 patrol'! During the late
hood group~ arc pre~:-.uring reluctant police cI~ief:-. to became ramiliar with them and their citi/ens. Police As time \\ent on. autllmohile\ and radio, incrca~i))gh 1l)7(r~. e\periment~ in foot patrol \\ere conducted
reinstitute neighborhood foot palmb-. In some citie:-.. knew both the good people and the troublemaker:-.. as prO\ided the :llb\\erS to the prohlem of deali))!.! \\1tl; in ;'\le\\ ark. ;'\lew Jer:..e\. and Flint. ~'lichigan. The
political leader~ sen:-.e the popularity of foot patrol well as what local citi/ens expected or them. The) seriou\ crime and III the need to imprme I1lan;ge- finding~ in the t\\ 0 ~tudie, \\ ere remarkabl)~cl)Jl,istent:
with citil,em and endor~e ib increa:-.ed u:-.e. In others. \\ere familiar with local pOlitical leaders (the) might ment'~ ~uper\i~ion of police officers' acti\ itie,~
chief~ of police who belie\'e in the \'alue of foot patrol eyen ha\e been appointed by the politicians III the Theorie~ of pre\enti\c patrol h) automohile became
more elaborate. B) raridl) and unpredict,lbl) dri\ing • When foot patrol j, added in neighhorhood'..
under certain circumstance:-. arc being innO\',lli\e \\ ith police department or beatJ and were in a position to Ie\ el" of fear decrease ,ignific<lntl).
font palnll and other form:-. of com~llliniry-based inform leaders or neighborhood problem:--. Pnlice car~ thmugh cit),treets. police clluld create a I'celing
policing. Wh) i~ thi:-. happening"? What i:-.there about kne\\ Incal mCi"chants and the problems thaI. for llfpoliee lllllnipre~ence· thcreb\ reducin\!.crime al~d • When foot patml i:.. \\ithdru\\n from neighborhollLl,_
fOOl patrolthar makes it so popular with citil.en:-. and example. youths presented when they "hung llut" in fear. I-'a:--t car~ and tWll-\\a\ raLiios redu~ed the time Ic\els of fear increase :..ignific:lntl),
political leader~'! Beyond its popularity. i~ there front of part icular stores. In many respects. pol ici ng it lOok police to gct tll the '~cene of L'rime\. tht:reb\ • Citi/en :":lti\faction \\ ith policc inCrell"e\ \\hen
e\'idence to suggest that foot patrol has promi~e as a in such an i nt imate manner made local plll icc officers creating the hope that f111liee could ,IITI\e at crime' fllot patml i\ added in neighborhoods.
tactic to deal with cri me. di:-.order. and fUlr in modern responsible to. and agents of. local neighborhoods ,cene:-.. \0 Ljuidl) that the) could L'atch crimina" in
action or in flight in the immediatc \ iL'inlt\ In • Police \\ 110 patrnlon foot ha\ e <l gre;Jler llpprccia-
and created the circumstances within which police tion for the \ ,liLIes of neighborhood residenh than
could support communit) enforcement of local norms either ca:--e \\ itii a ··\nHlh.ing gun"' actiun, .
police \\ho patrol the san;e area\ In automobiles.
and \alues.
F(lllt patrol \\as increasingl) denigrated a, a pulicc • Police \\ ho palrol on foot hme greater job ~~Jlis
Earl)l Uses of Foot Patrol tactic. Police departments that h.ept fllLlI patrol·· ,uch faction. le~s fear. and higher morale than llfTieers
as Ho,ton', ~\\ ere rid iculed b) profe,~ional pol icc \\ hll patrol i!1 automobil~\.
Tn an:-. \\ er the:-.e q ue~t illn:-.. :-.OJ1)e backgrou nd in fnrma- }"'ootPatrol Weaknesses orl!ani/ations for being behind the time, and \\ere
(ion abolll the early use:-. of foot patrol is required. ch~lstised for irresplln;ibl) failing to pro\ ide mlldern The Flint C\peril~1Cnt ) ielded t\\O additional important
From their initiation in England and America during Traditional policing aho had problems. Integration pulice sen icc,. Foot patrol ;;,:--ignmenls \\ ere fre- finding:... First. in areas where there \\ as aggressi\'e
(he ILJth century. police nrgani/alinns ha\ e po~itlonel of police into neighborhoods isolated officers from quentl) used as disciplinar) Illeasure:-- while llfTicers foot p~llrnl. calb for sen'ice \ia telephone ~\~erc
police officers in communities for the purpose of other police. It \\'ClS not hard forthem Ill"coop"~to \\'ho perfllrmed \\ cll \\ere a~sigJ1ed to \ chicul~lr pUlrol. reduced 11) more than -W percent. Second. there \\ as
palmll ing predesignated area~ conspicuou:-.I y. The sleep or hide from their supen'isors. Their sYll1path) a modest reduction in crime. (There \\ ere no change\
presence of readil) identifiable police orriccr~ \\a~ \\ith comll1unit\ norll1s and their abilit\ to isolate In ~ome \\a)". automobile patrol \\a, considered In crime Ie\'els in ;'\e\\ ar" as a re\ult (If u~e off'oot
presumed to pre\'ent cri me and disorder and to re- thell1sel\es frolil the police nrgani/atio;l led 1.11 other succcs,ful. Reducing police officer~' intimate conl:Jcts patmh. )
assure citi/ens that. if crimc and disorder did occur. problell1s. including corruption and unequal enforce- \\ ith citi/ens and neighborhood~ hclped police man-
policc \\ould be a\ailable to help them. This position- ment. Both ll1erchants and illegal li'luor operators agers reduL'e L'orruption and pnl\ ide more eLjuitable In sum. fOll! patrol has been ,,110\\ n to reduce citi/en
ing of police in communities has been called patrol. \\ere in a position to pay police nfficers to "Iook the poliL'ing. In addition. thc /"o(/i(J-cli,l/llilc/lCc/ <lutumobile fear. increa:-.e citi/en .,atisfaetion. impnl\ e the altitudes
Although some horse patrols \\}2re used prior to the other way" when unpopular antiliqullJ" laws \\ere ~ometime~ helped police reach the scene orthe L'rimc of police officers. and impro\e the job satisfaction
adoption of automobiles. "patrol" has for the I11mt broken. ~lan\' communities did not \\ant "uutsiders" faster and enabled police headLjuarter~ to reassign ,Imong police officcrs. In addition. foot patml "ho\\s
pan referred to fOOl patrol. (ethnically d(fferent people) to cOll1e into their :"OIllC potential for reducing calls for sen icc \ ia tele-
officer\ on ~hort notice to neighborhoods \\ here
neighborhoods. Often, ynlpathetic to such feelings. the) \\erc mll,t nceded. ' phonc and. although the rinding~ arc not strong.. it has
Foot patrol officers were assigned designated areas-- police (and gangs) prO\'ided the means b\ \\hich such some crime rcduction potential. The question:-. to be
"be,J(S"-and they patrolled the streets and alleys of outsiders were kept out. Local politici~lJ1s interested In other \\a)s. automohile patrol failed to reali/c
asked then arc the 1"0110\\ ing: What arc the public
those beats. Accounts of early policing sugge~t that in maintaining themsel\es in office oftcn recruited pol ic) impl icat ion:-.. of the pol it ical pnpu larity of
police official,' high hope,. The rea~on" arc com-
police officers \\'ere largclv involved in maintaining police assi"tance to e\tend their tenure. foot patrul and the empirical findings ahout its im-
plicated ,lI1d illlpo\Sihle tll di\L'us... in det,lil here. hut
order and were especially 'charged with disciplining pact"? Do the:--e finding:-.. indic,'te that all cities should
the eomple\il~ of criminal e\cnt\. the beha\ior of immediately return to the \\'holesalc usc of foot patrol"!
children and youth. Patrol officers also were expected Ultimately. the increased use of automobiles during criminah. and the n.~'ponses llf\ ietim, and \\ itnes\es
to enforce regulmiom against prostitution and illegal (he early 20th century began to chan!.!e both criminal ~ all played a p;lrt.
sale or consumption of liquor. Arrests for serious beha\'ior and the shape of neighho~·hoods. Before these questions can be ans\\ered directly. the
criminal acts were rare. To make an arrest. an officer rinLiing:-- regarding fear reduction need to be discussed
Automobile p:lIrol also created a \en,e or los\ in hricrl)~. ~ ~
often had to wait for hi!'> replacement and then wrestle cOlllmunities. Many citi/ens claimcd that plllice
the miscreants to district stations where the\' could be patrol by autoillobile ne\'er reall) pl"ll\'ided the sense
jailed. Later. after the introduction of the call box. The Coming of the Automobile of security that fOlH patrol ga\'e them. Graduall). Criminologi:..ts and persons concerned with public
officers would handcuff arrestees to the box and usc it during the ILJ7(l".~. thc demand for more police policy about crime werc perplexed during the I97(l"s
to call fora horse-drawn "paddy wagon"w transport Confronted with problem!> and the need to create a presence in neighborhood:-.. and communities \\ as by the relationship between crime and fear of crime.
the arrestee to jai I. Forthe most pan. howcver. pol icc new professional police image durilH!.the ILJ2(J"s and translated into a demand for foot patrol. In Huston. Thcre were many neidlborhoods in which the levels of
officers were independent agents !,>patially separated ILJ](l"s. pulice leaders quickly perceived the value foot patrol wa\ ~o popular during the mid-I L)70·:..that crime were mOlicst b~tthe Ie\'el nfciti/en fearofcrimc
from supervisors and managers. walking their beats. of automobile patml. The police car was first seen wa~. high: there were many other ncighborhoods in
it wa!'> promi~ed hy successful politicians. Nc\\ Jersey
informally settling disputcs. maintaining order. and as a means of increasing routine foot patrol. An officer passed the Safe and Clean Neighborhood Act. creat- which crime was high hut fear le"els lo\\'.
enforcing regulations. could patrol a beal. cither drive or be driven to another ing a unique program: State-funded Il)cal foot patrol.
area. and then patrol that beal. As one-way (and later Many citie~ in other States hegan to de\'clllp progr:lm~
This program brought to you by tht: National two-way) radim became available. supervi!'lors had (some quite limited) that :-..eiccti\'ely implemcntcd
Institute of Ju~tice. James K. Stcwart. Director. fu!)( pat rol ~.
The serie~ produced by WETACOM through a
grant to thc Police Foundation.
Durinu the carl\' I 98Cr:-,. it \\a:- disco\ered that fear Referellces
oferil~e WCl:- not primarily as:-ociated with crime. al-
though that certainl) \\a:- an important contributorlo Eck. John E. 1983. Soil'illg Crilllc.I: Tile /11 \'C,I ri.t:(/{iOIl
fear le\els. Instead. fear \\'a:- found to relate to di:-- (!{ Bllrglllry lIlId Ro/J/Jcry. Washington. D.C.: Police
order: gang~. di:-,orderly persom. drunb. panhandlers. E,ecut i\'e Re~earch Forum.
street prostitution. and other form~ of beha\ior that
were threatening but nlltnecessarih criminal. These Skouan. Weslc\ G .. and ;\lichael G. ~la,field. 1981.
finding, did not "urprise (iti/em -or police orncials Copill g Wirll (rilll£': /I/(/i\'i<lllul ulld Scigllhorll(lod
who had \\ nrked clo~ely with eiti/en :lntierime group". Rcunioll. He\crl) I-Iii I:,. California: Sage Publi-
The anticrime groups had been emphasi/ing problem" cation:..
of communit\ disorder and tr,inu to con\ince the
;.-: police to do ~omething abol!t "the~ll for some time. 'I'll£' SCII'urk Foor Plilrol 1:'x{J ('(1111 £'11 I , 198/. Wa~.h
ing,ton. D.C.' Police Foundation.
These insights helped anal)sts interpret the finding"
regarding the fear reduction impact of fOOl patrol. It Wilson . .Iame:-- Q .. alld George L. Kelling. 1982.
\\ as I ikel\ that fear was reduced both a:- a result of the "Broken \\·indt)\\:.: The Police and ;-..icighborhoud
felt pre~cnce of policc and nf their aet!\'ities in Safety." 'I'll£' :\llolllie. ~Iarch. pp. 27-3~.
maintaining order during patrlli. Thu". ((l the e\tent
that police dcfinc disorderand citi/en fearas signifi-
cant problems. foot patrol is an important police tactic. Discussioll Questiolls
~loreo\'cr. according to the analyst~. fOOl patrol abo
might ha\c "ome anticrime potential. It may keep
I. Dn )OU bclie\e citi/ens ha\e an nbligation to act
minor disorder" from e"ealminu into more ,"eri(lLl\
C\ ent~: it Illa\ encouraue eiti/e~ns to take action on
themsche" to keep order and pre\ent erimc as \\ell
as ha\ing police act fnr them'!
their \)\\ n behalf: and it certainl) positiom, patrol
officers to reccivc and il1lcrpret information ncce"sary 2. Ha\c you had an opportunit) to obscne police
to sohe crimes. on foot patrol'! 1-1\)\\ ctTeL'ti\e do y ou think the) are?
What then i~ Uk' significancc of :'oot patrol'} Should 3. If wc had more police on fOOl patrol. \\ould \\e
pol icc departnlf~nts in e\CI') cit) il'.1I1lediatci) abandon h,1\e more order and less cri Ille'?
automobile palrol and in!'.wll foul patrol as the primary -L Iffoot patrol!'. LI\) not actuall) reduce crime. should
tactic'! Probably not. The public ycarning for fnOl patrolling continue :--olcl) becausc it make:-- citi/cn.'
patrol and the empirical findings regarding its signifi- i'cel safcr'!
cance suggest that foot patrol is one mnre important
police tactic. In a city like Boston. fore.\:Jmple. \\here 5. If you \\ere a police officer \\mild you like foot
population density is very high. fOOl patrol could be patrol dut)'} Why'!
used on a widespread basi:-. ~'lany areas ofNe\\ York
and Philadelphia have a population den:--ity that makes
them amenable to the usc of foot patrol. In Chicago.
~lilwaukee. and many Olhercities. foot patrol would
be valuable in some areas. Yet in a ramblinu city like
Houston. relativeh' few areas lend themsel~'es to fOOl
patrol. Similarly. "foot patrol may be more or Ie~~
valuable during particular times of the day. Foot
patrol may be \'ery important in neighborhood ~hop
ping centers where merchant~ need help controlling
students who pass through the area after school.
It has become apparent over the past few years that
citizens desire a more intimate and peryasive police
presence in their communities. Citizens. as individuals
and in groups. want police to help them keep order
and prevent crime as well as to have police take action
on their own. This wisdom-that peaceful commu-
n ities come about as the result oflhe social obliuation This ~lUdy guide and rhe videorape. Fom 1'1I1rol.
of all citizens to each other and that the police's-role i\ one of22 in the CRIME FILE ,cries. For infonnarion
is to support. and assist in. that expression of social on how to obtain progr:ul1' 011 other criminal just icc
is~uc" in the ~eric,. contact CRIME FILE. Natiollal
obligation-is perhaps the most important conclusion Iil,tilUte of Justice, NCJRS, Box 6000. R()c~ \'ilk .MD
to be gai ned from pol ice research. not just research 20SS0 or call SOO-HSI-3-120 (30 1-2SI-S500 from
into foot patrol, but almost all of the research that Metropolitan Washingwn. D.C .. and l"'larylandl.
has been conducted by police over the last 20 years.
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