THE END OF EMPIRE

Recent Titles in
Documents in Imperial History

"The Empire of the Bretaignes," 1175-1688: The Foundations of a Colonial System of

Government
Frederick Madden, editor, with David Fieldhouse
The Classical Period of the First British Empire, 1689-1783: The Foundations of a Colonial
System of Government
Frederick Madden, editor, with David Fieldhouse
Imperial Reconstruction, 1763-1840: The Evolution of Alternative Systems of Colonial
Government
Frederick Madden, editor, with David Fieldhouse
Settler Self-Government, 1840-1900: The Development of Representative and Responsible
Government
Frederick Madden, editor, with David Fieldhouse
The Dependent Empire and Ireland, 1840-1890: Advance and Retreat in Representative Self-
Government
Frederick Madden, editor, with David Fieldhouse
The Dominions and India since 1900
Frederick Madden, editor, and John Darwin
The Dependent Empire, 1900-1948: Colonies, Protectorates, and Mandates
Frederick Madden, editor, and John Darwin
THE END OF EMPIRE
Dependencies Since 1948
Part 1: The West Indies, British Honduras,
Hong Kong, Fiji, Cyprus, Gibraltar,
and the Falklands

Select Documents on the Constitutional History

of the British Empire and Commonwealth
Volume VIII

Edited by
FREDERICK MADDEN

Documents in Imperial History, Number 8

Greenwood Press
Westport, Connecticut • London
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publicatiort Data

(Revised for vol. 7)

Select documents on the constitutional history of the
British Empire and Commonwealth.
(Documents in imperial history, ISSN 0749-4831 ; no. 1- )
Vol. 6 also edited by John Darwin.
Vols. 1-5 have imprint: New York : Greenwood Press.
Includes bibliographical references and indexes.
Contents: v. 1. "The Empire of the Bretaignes," 1175-
1688—v. 2. The classical period of the first
British Empire, 1689-1783—[etcl—v. 7. The
Dependent Empire, 1900-1948: colonies, protectorates,
and mandates.
1. Commonwealth countries—Constitutional history—
Sources. 2. Great Britain—Colonies—Constitutional
history—Sources. 3. Great Britain—Constitutional
history—Sources. I. Madden, A. F. II. Fieldhouse,
D. K. (David Kenneth), 1925- . III. Darwin, John.
KD5025.S45 1985 345'.029'09171241 84-21213
342.22909171241
ISBN 0-313-23897-9 (lib. bdg. : v. 1) 0-313-27757-5 (lib. bdg. : v. 5)
0-313-25176-2 (lib. bdg. : v. 2) 0-313-27317-0 (lib. bdg. : v. 6)
0-313-25916-X (lib. bdg. : v. 3) 0-313-27318-9 (lib. bdg. : v. 7)
0-313-27326-X (lib. bdg. : v. 4) 0-313-29072-5 (lib. bdg. : v. 8)
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available.
Copyright © 2000 by Frederick Madden
All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be
reproduced, by any process or technique, without the
express written consent of the publisher.
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 84-21213
ISBN: 0-313-29072-5 (v. 8) 0-313-27326-X (v. 4)
0-313-27318-9 (v. 7) 0-313-25916-X (v. 3)
0-313-27317-0 (v. 6) 0-313-25176-2 (v. 2)
0-313-27757-5 (v. 5) 0-313-23897-9 (v. I)
ISSN: 0749^831
First published in 2000
Greenwood Press, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881
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Printed in the United States of America

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 CONTENTS
Valediction xii
Editor's Note xxxl
Abbreviations xxxiii
Secretaries of State xxxvi

I. THE EFFECTS OF DECOLONISATION ON THE COMMONWEALTH 1

1.(a) D.O. Note: The Structure of the British Commonwealth, 1947 3

(b)Sir Norman Brook: Commonwealth Relationship, 1948 5
(c)Cabinet Committee on Commonwealth Relations, 1948 8
2. Margery Perham: Notes on some general, metropolitan and
procedural aspects of the committee's problems, 1950 10
3.(a) C.R.O./C.O. Working Party: Constitutional development of
Colonial territories, 1951 13
(b) C.R.O. Meeting, 1951 16
(c) Sir Charles Jeffries: Memo., 1951 19
(d) Report of the committee of enquiry into Constitutional develop-
ment in the smaller colonial territories, 1951 22
(e) Ambler Thomas: Minute, 1952 27
(f) C O . : Smaller territories committee: Meeting, 1952 28
4.(a) Viscount Swinton: Draft alternative conclusion to 'The colonial
territories and Commonwealth membership* , 1953 30
(b) Viscount Swinton: Memo., 1954 33
5.(a) Harold Macmillan to the Marquess of Salisbury, 1957 33
(b) Cabinet committee on colonial policy: The future constitutional
development of the colonies, 1957 34
(c) John Chadwick: The problem of the expanding Commonwealth, 1958 43
(d) Sir Norman Brook to Harold Macmillan, 1959 45
(e) Inter-departmental Working Party: Minutes, 1959 45
6.(a) Report of Cabinet's committee of senior officials, 1959 48
(b) Arthur Snelling to Ian Watt, 1959 53
7.(a) Sir Norman Brook to Harold Macmillan, 1960 55
(b) Report by Commonwealth Officials: The constitutional development
of the Commonwealth, 1960 57
8. E.R. Hammer: Minute on constitutional provisions for the entrench-
ment of human rights in colonial territories, 1961 61
9. Sir Norman Brook to Harold Macmillan, 1962 63
10. Sir Norman Brook: Evolution of the Commonwealth, 1962 64
II. CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS IN THE COLONIES AND DEPENDENCIES 68

A. THE BRITISH WEST INDIES 68

(1) GENERAL 68

( a ) THE MAKING AND COLLAPSE OF FEDERATION 68

11. Standing Closer Association Committee: Report, 1949 69
12. Conference on the B r i t i s h Caribbean Federation: Report,1956 79
13. The B r i t i s h Caribbean Federation Act ( 4 * 5 E l i z . I I cap.63), 1956 82
14. West Indies (Federation) Order-in-Council, 1957 83
VI

15. Sir Grantley Adams (P.M.): Speech, 1958 87

16.(a) Summary and recommendations for consideration by the Inter-
Governmental Conference, 1961 87
(b) The West Indies Constitutional Conference: Report, 1961 90
17. Inheritance of treaty rights and obligations, 1961 92
18. Iain Macleod to Harold Macmillan, 1961 93
19. Iain Macleod: Memo, for the Cabinet, 1961 94
20. Ambler Thomas: The future of Federation and the position of
the Leeward and Windward Islands, 1961 95
21. Governor-General Baron Hailes to Reginald Maudling, 1961 96
22.(a) Reginald Maudling: Statement, 1962 97
(b) Meeting of the Federal Delegation with Reginald Maudling;
Minutes, 1962 98
23. The West Indies Act (10 & 11 Eliz. cap 19), 1962 99
24. Conference on East Caribbean Federation: Report, 1962 100
25. Duncan Sandys: Statement, 1963 101
26.(a) Duncan Sandys: Circular despatch to the Governor and
Administrators of East Caribbean Colonies, 1963 102
(b) Governor Sir John Stow to Duncan Sandys, 1963 104
(c) Commission on the Federation of the East Caribbean Territories:
Report, 1963 107
27. Arthur Greenwood: Circular despatch to the Governor and
Administrators of the East Caribbean Colonies, 1965 109
28. Federal Negotiations, 1962-65: A Barbadian review, 1965 110

(b) THE TEMPORARY SOLUTION OF ASSOCIATED STATUS 114

29. Constitutional proposals for the six Leewards and Windwards, 1965 114
30. Antigua Constitutional Conference: Report, 1966 120
31. Windward Islands Constitutional Conference: Report, 1966 122
32. The West Indies Act (15 & 16 Eliz.II cap), 1967 124
33. The Antigua Agreement, 1967 126
34. Herbert Bowden to the Administrator of Antigua, 1967 129
35. West Indies Associated States Supreme Court Agreement, 1967 130
(2) JAMAICA 131-179
36. Governor Sir John Huggins to Harold Beckett, 1950 131
37. Sidney Southgate: Minute, 1950 131
38. Stephen Luke to Sir Thomas Lloyd, 1951 133
39. The Earl of Munster to Oliver Lyttelton, 1951 134
40. Governor Sir Hugh Foot to Stephen Luke, 1951 136
41. H.F. Heinemann: Minute, 1951 138
42.(a) Note by the West Indian Department, 1952 141
(b) Governor Sir Hugh Foot: Speech, 1952 142
(c) Resolution of the House of Representatives, 1952 145
43. Select Committee of the House of Representatives: Interim
Report, 1954 145
44. Sir Charles Jeffries: Minute, 1954 147
45. Sir Charles Jeffries to Governor Sir Hugh Foot, 1954 148
46. Working party of Departmental heads on the diarchy system:
Report, 1955 149
47. Philip Rogers to Governor Sir Hugh Foot, 1956 153
48.(a) Committee of unofficial members of the Legislative Council:
Report, 1957 154
.(b) Select Committee of the House of Representatives: Report, 1957 156
49. Select Committee of the House of Representatives: Report, 1958 158
 vii
50. J.E. Marnham to Governor Sir Kenneth Blackburne, 1958 160
51. Departmental brief on constitutional development: Jamaica, Cayman
and Turks and Caicos Islands, 1959 160
52. Constitution Order-in-Council, 1959 163
53. The Functions of the Governor of Jamaica after independence and
the closing of the Governor's secretary's office: Memo., 1961 166
54. Brief for Reginald Maudling in discussions with Jamaican Government
Delegation, 1961 168
55.(a) London Conference: Report, 1962 169
(b) Constitution 0rder-1n-Counc1l, 1962 172

(3) BARBADOS 179-181

56. Independence 0rder-1n-Council, 1966 179

(4) TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 181-212

57.(a) Cabinet Commonwealth Affairs Committee: Minute, 1948 181

(b) Arthur Creech Jones to Governor Sir John Shaw, 1949 183
(c) Constitution 0rder-in-Counc1l, 1950 187
(d) Government Notice, 1950 188
(e) Stephen Luke to Governor Sir Hugh Foot, 1952 191
(f) Governor Sir Edward Beetham to Alan Lennox-Boyd, 1955 192
(g) Constitution Amendment Order-in-Council, 1956 196
58.(a) Alan Lennox-Boyd: Statement, 1958 197
(b) J.E. WMtelegg: Minute, 1959 200
59.(a) Iain Macleod to Dr. Eric Williams, 1960 202
(b) Democratic Labour Party to Iain Macleod, 1960 203
60.(a) Governor Sir Solomon Hochoy to Ambler Thomas, 1961 204
(b) Legal advice to Reginald Maudling, 1961 205
61. Meeting of the Federal Delegation with Reginald Maudling;
Minutes, 1962 205
62. London Conference: Report, 1962 206
63. Independence Constitution, 1962 207

(5) BRITISH GUIANA 212-281

64. Constitution Commission: Report, 1951 212
65.(a) Constitution 0rder-in-Counc1l, 1953 228
(b) Oliver Lyttelton to Governor Sir Alfred Savage, 1953 230
(c) Resolution of the State Council, 1953 233
(d) Report on the suspension of the Constitution, 1953 234
(e) Oliver Lyttelton: Speech, 1953 236
(f) Temporary Constitution Order-in-Council, 1953 239
66. Royal Instructions to Governor Sir Alfred Savage, 1953 242
67. Constitutional Commission: Report, 1954 243
68. Philip Rogers to Governor Sir Alfred Savage, 1954 250
69. Governor Sir Alfred Savage to Alan Lennox-Boyd, 1955 254
70. Philip Rogers: Note on policy for British Guiana, 1955 255
71.(a) Alan Lennox-Boyd: Statement, 1956 257
(b) Temporary Provision (Amendment) Order-in-Council, 1956 257
72. Alan Lennox-Boyd to Governor Sir Patrick Renlson, 1957 258
73.(a) Ian Watt: Minute, 1959 259
(b) C O . Meeting, 1959 260
.(c) Angus Mackintosh: Minute, 1960 261
74. Constitutional Conference: Report, 1960 261
viii

75. Governor Sir Ralph Grey to Sir Hilton Poynton, 1962 262
76. R.W. Piper: Minute, 1962 265
77. Independence Conference: Report, 1963 267
78. Constitution Order-in-Council, 1964 274
79. The Constitution of Guyana, 1966 274

(6) LEEWARD AND WINDWARD ISLANDS 281-311

80. Leewards: Government notice, 1949 281

81. Windwards: Royal instructions to Governor Sir Robert Arundell,
1951 282
82. Governor Kenneth Blackburne: Address, 1951 283
83. Antigua: Constitution and elections Ordinance, 1951 284
84. Governor Sir Kenneth Blackburne: Address, 1953 287
85. The Leeward and Windwards Constitutional Conference: Report, 1959 287
86. GRENADA: (a) Government Announcement, 1954 289
(b) Reginald Maudling: Statement, 1962 292
(c) Commission of inquiry Into the control of public expenditure,
1921-62: Report, 1962 294
(d) Constitution Order-in-Council, 1962 297
(e) Duncan Sandys to James Lloyd, 1962 300
87. ST. VINCENT: (a) Committee on constitutional reform: Report, 1949 303
(b) Constitutional progress: Report of discussions, 1967 304
(c) Judith Hart: Statement, 1967 306
(d) Electoral provisions Order-in-Council, 1967 307
(e) Constitution amendment Order-in-Council (No.2), 1967 308
(f) Constitution amendment Order-in-Council (No.3), 1967 308

(7) THE BAHAMAS 311-312

88. Constitution Order-in-Council, 1963 311

B. BRITISH HONDURAS 313-325
89. Acting-Governor Evelyn Hone to Oliver Lyttelton, 1952 313
(b) Stephen Luke to Acting-Governor Evelyn Hone, 1952 315
90. Oliver Lyttelton to Governor Sir Patrick Renison, 1953 316
91. Philip Rogers to Sir Thomas Lloyd, 1953 316
92. Governor Sir Patrick Renison to Oliver Lyttelton, 1953 318
93. Governor Sir Patrick Renison to Oliver Lyttelton, 1954 318
94. Governor Sir Colin Thornley: The objectives of constitutional
reform, 1959 320
95. Thomas Vickers: Memo., 1960 321
96. E.R. Hammer: Minute, 1962 322
97. Letters Patent, 1964 323

C. HONG KONG 326-373

98.(a) Governor Sir Alexander Grantham: Speech, 1949 326

(b) Sir Man Kam Lo: Resolutions proposed in the legislative council
1949 327
99. Ernest Bevin and Arthur Creech Jones: Recommendation to the
Cabinet, 1949 330
100. Governor Sir Alexander Grantham: Statement, 1952 330
101. Governor Sir Robert Black: Speech, 1958 331
102. Earl of Perth: Statement, 1960 332
 ix
103. Governor Sir David Trench: Speech, 1966 332
104.(a) Report of the ad hoc committee of the future scope and
operation of the urban council, 1966 334
(b) Working party on local administration: Minority reservation,
1966 337
(c) Governor Sir David Trench: Speech, 1969 339
105. Sir Yuet-Keung Kan: Speech, 1969 341
106. Governor Sir Murray MacLehose; Speech, 1975 343
107.(a) Baron Goronwy-Roberts: Reply, 1976 345
(b) Governor Sir Murray MacLehose; Speech, 1976 345
(c) Dr. Chung: Speech, 1976 347
108. Constitution of The People's Republic of China, 1982 348
109. The further development of representative government, 1984 349
110. Joint declaration of the Government of The United Kingdom and
The Government of The People's Republic of China on the
question of Hong Kong, 1984 350
111. The development of representative government; The Way Forward,
1988 358
112. Douglas Hurd to Qian Qichew, 1990 359
113. The Basic Law of The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of
The People's Republic of China, 1990 360
114. Letters Patent, 1991 365
115. Governor Christopher Patten: Speech, 1992 365
116. Resolution of The National People's Standing Committee, 1994 372
117. Prince Charles' Farewell, 1997 373

D. FIJI 374-419

118. Governor Sir Brian Freeston, 1949 375

119.(a) Governor Sir Ronald Garvey to Sir Thomas Lloyd, 1953 377
(b) Juxton Barton: Minute, 1954 378
(c) Sir Thomas Lloyd to Governor Sir Ronald Garvey, 1956 379
(d) Governor Sir Ronald Garvey: Memo., 1956 382
(e) Ian Watt: Minute, 1956 384
120.(a) Governor Sir Kenneth Maddocks: Political situation and trends,
1959 385
(b) Philip Rogers to Governor Sir Kenneth Maddocks, 1959 389
121. Julian Amery: Note on policy, 1960 391
122.(a) Governor Sir Kenneth Maddocks to Iain Macleod, 1960 395
(b) Government proposals for constitutional reform, 1961 398
(c) Governor Sir Kenneth Maddocks to Sir Hilton Poynton, 1962 401
(d) Duncan Sandys to Governor Sir Kenneth Maddocks, 1962 402
(e) I.S. Wheatley: Minute, 1962 404
123. Report of the constitutional conference, 1965 405
124. Independence Order-in-Council, 1970 410
125. Constitution of the Sovereign Democratic Republic, 1990 413
E. CYPRUS 420-508

126. Archbishop Makarios to Governor Sir Andrew Wright, 1949 420

127. Commons Statement, 1954 422
128.(a) Anthony Nutting: Secret Memo., 1955 424
(b) F.O. Departmental Memo., 1955 426
(c) Eden - Lennox-Boyd Draft statement, 1955 429
129.. Draft 'Possible plan' for Tripartite Conference, 1955 430
130.(a) Cyprus Intelligence Committee: Memo., 1955 431
X

(b) Governor Field Marshal Sir John Harding to Alan Lennox-Boyd,

1956 432
131. Governor Field Marshal Sir John Harding: The Constitutional
problem in Cyprus, 1956 433
132. Governor Field Marshal Sir John Harding to Alan Lennox-Boyd, 1956 436
133. John Weston to John Reddaway, 1956 437
134. Baron Radcliffe: Report on constitutional proposals, 1956 439
135. Governor Field Marshal Sir John Harding: Interview, 1956 447
136. Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee: Cyprus - A Study of Partition,
1957 449
137. D. Smith: Minute on Harding's Memo., 1957 451
138. Harold Macmillan: Commons Statement, 1958 451
139. Sir Roger Allen to Sir Frederick Hover-Millar, 1959 453
140.(a) Zurich Agreement, 1959 455
(b) 'The Gentlemen's Agreements', 1959 461
(c) The Earl of Perth to Alan Lennox-Boyd, 1959 462
(d) F.O. Meeting, 1959 463
(e) F.O. Meeting, 1959 464
(f) C.R.O. Secret telegram to full members of the Commonwealth,
1959 465
141. John Higham, Minute, 1959 467
142. Archbishop Makarios: Statement, 1959 468
143. John Addis: Memo., 1959 468
144.(a) Archbishop Makarios III to Dr. Fazil Kutchuk, 1963 471
(b) Sir Frank Sosklce: Opinion, 1963 474
(c) Sir Arthur Clark (H.C.) to Duncan Sandys, 1963 479
(d) C.R.O. Memo, on Greek demand for constitutional revision, 1963 481
(e) Mervyn Brown: Minute, 1963 483
145. Duncan Sandys: Commons Statement, 1964 484
146. Archbishop Makarios III to Sakari Tuomioja, 1964 485
147. Dr. Galo Plaza: Report to The United Nations Secretary General,
1965 493
148. Agreement between Presidents Makarios and Raouf Denktash, 1977 505
149. Ten-point Agreement, 1979 507
F. GIBRALTAR 509-534

150. O.E.S. Lloyd: Note on the Gibraltar City Council, 1948 509
151. Mary Fisher: Minute, 1948 511
152. Governor Sir Kenneth Anderson to John Martin, 1949 513
153. Arthur Creech Jones to Governor Sir Kenneth Anderson, 1949 515
154. D.M. Smith to William Morris, 1955 516
155. D.M. Smith: Minute, 1955 517
156. Governor Sir Harold Redman to William Morris, 1955 518
157. Political intelligence: Report, 1956 520
158. Governor Sir Harold Redman to Alan Lennox-Boyd, 1956 520
159. William Morris to Darrell Bates, 1956 522
160. Governor Sir Harold Redman to Alan Lennox-Boyd, 1957 523
161. Joshua Hassan to Darrell Bates, 1958 525
162. Governor Sir Charles Keightley to Alan Lennox-Boyd, 1958 526
163. D.M. Smith to John Higham, 1958 527
164. Mediterranean Department: Brief for Lennox-Boyd's visit, 1959 528
165. The Constitutional position: Note for Reginald Maudling, 1961 529
166. Governor Sir Charles Keightley to Duncan Sandys, 1962 531
 xi
G. THE FALKLAND ISLANDS 535-548
167. John Bennett: Minute, 1949 535
168. Governor Sir Miles Clifford to James Griffiths, 1951 536
169. Peter Carter; Minute, 1951 538
170. John Bennett: Minute, 1951 540
171. Revised political instructions for Falkland Islands Dependencies
Survey parties, 1952 542
172. R.H.D. Maunders to Sir Hilton Poynton, 1962 543
173. John Marnham: Minute, 1962 546
Index 549
 VALEDICTION
The long experience of empire - at first Norman, maybe briefly
English but later (with Welsh and considerable Scots contribut-
ions) essentially British, lasted for some 800 years - twice the
span of Roman Britain. Of central and crucial importance was
government - the establishment and maintenance of law and order.
Its record, as these eight Volumes demonstrate, was hardly mono-
lithic, autocratic or dictatorial except insofar that, when
locals could not decide, the metropolis had to step in and act,
though on the frontier could thus interfere of course only with
consent. Nor was the empire, despite the heady unrealistic imper-
ial dreams of a few in the late nineteenth century [C.H.B.E. Ill,
pp.338-54, 397-405] or the absurd post-empire, anti-colonial
stereotypes of the late twentieth century, merely exploitive or
suffocating. The empire was always the passion of the few and
never had the populist following enjoyed by the American West.
The current fin de sidcle fashion - adopted by our historically
illiterate leaders and rulers in their 'cool Britannia' phase -
to raise retrospective guilt and to apologise for it, obscures
the benefits, and trumpets the injuries the empire allegedly made
to human life across the world. The nobility, sacrifice and alt-
ruism, which had been accepted as an honourable national mission
in generations past, have been devalued and dismissed, though in
many ways the Pax Britannica had been undertaking responsibil-
ities which at the end of the twentieth century were shouldered
by the U.N.O. or 'the West'. But now the empire provokes feelings
not of wonder but shame. Left-wing idealogues in the mid-century,
not least in the Army Education Corps during the Second World
War, have brainwashed'the natural consciousness1: empire has cea-
sed to be an honourable personal mission and respectable national
destiny. 'Imperialism' and 'Colonialism' have now become mere
terms of abuse without any informed scrutiny and measured judge-
ment. The opinion formers in press, radio and T.V. (both in
school and adult programmes) litter their scripts with lies and
half truths: no opportunity is missed to drop a contemptuous
aside, even in pieces not mainly concerned with empire. Now that
history itself has become part of the entertainment industry,
scribblers and presenters with no historical training or discip-
line, 'get up' a topic within hours and pontificate without
understanding. In the present climate where empire is rubbished
out of hand, how can a truthful balanced view prevail amid these
journalistic travesties - the smug, abrasive, egocentric state-
ments meted out to an undiscriminating public. In time a more
balanced assessment of the imperial legacy may no doubt be made
on hard documentary evidence (as in these Volumes), but at pre-
sent the Pavlovian salivation of media instant commentators and
historians, specialists on small periods and with narrow focus -
'who know more and more about less and less' - is, from their
profession ignorance or mini-knowledge, to use the imperial past
 xiii

as a scapegoat for all ills and discontents, particularly in the

undeveloped world.
Journalists and mini-historians dismiss careful analysis and
repeat their ready-made conclusions; and public opinion always
prefers the folklore of sensational soundbites to historical
truth. The obsession, politically correct of course, is to
denigrate empire, to pillory the conspiratorial machinations of
empire builders, and to blackwash the whole British experience
of overseas rule. The hopes of many observers in the mid-century,
in the aftermath of the second World War and the polarisation of
the Cold War, was that such sins of empire, as admittedly there
were, would be seen to be redeemed and the record justified, in
colonies emancipated from the British yoke, by the legacy of
thriving democratic institutions and liberal ideas. But such
expectations were disappointed. The optimistic euphoria was short
lived. The post-imperial record of independence in ex-colonies,
British and foreign, proved to be hardly so conclusively posi-
tive. In many cases infant democracies became almost immediately
one-party dictatorships; prosperous economies (e.g. Tanzania)
were turned into wastelands of barely subsistence poverty; and
new states (e.g. Uganda) descended into bloodshed and chaos. New
leaders squirrelled fortunes into Swiss banks while the vast
majority of those newly freed from the chains of empire felt no
benefit, but only loss, from the change of masters.In many ex-
colonies the end of empire meant new instability, both political
and economic, new dangers, injustices and deprivation, new cri-
ses, revived tribal factionalism, an inept pseudo-social ism
accompanied by endemic corruption, and massive abuse of human
rights.
The poor and disappointing record of many ex-colonies, particu-
larly in Africa, may not indeed be a consequence of the experi-
ence of empire so much as of geology, geography, climate and
resources. The colonial past, popularly represented as a massive
burden and a brake on development, had certainly seen European
merchants take away, but also create the means for, wealth. More-
over, the profits, so eagerly sought by adventurers, have so
often proved absent, elusive, negligible, delayed, or grossly
exaggerated by the wishful thinking of the few irresponsible pro-
moters, many of whom lost their investment. Independence often
saw the return of tensions and injustices which had preceded the
Pax Britannica and were not the result of imperial rule: unless
it can be argued that the period of British government, notably
brief in some parts of Africa (where within a single generation
the arrival and departure of the British colonial power were both
completed) was too short to leave much influence, habit or disci-
pline. The scramble for parts of Africa - in Jack Gallagher's
frequent words 'the bottom of any barrel' against the considered
opinion of British governments and officials - had little time
to cast more than a veneer on territories and peoples who remai-
ned poor, divided and suspicious. (This was in marked contrast
with the centuries-old association with India.) Surely it is
worthy of note that within this period (1948-) Britain managed
for the most part to withdraw from her empire without leaving
armed conflict as happened in French Algeria, the Dutch East
Indies, the Spanish Western Sahara and Portuguese Angola and
Mozambique.
XIV
The alleged fall of - indeed the stampede from - empire came
in the second half of the twentieth century, the period covered
by these final Volumes [VIII & IX]. But the end of empire had an
inevitability. From the very beginnings 'decolonisation', a con-
tinuous and coterminous process with empire, had begun: the ac-
ceptance that since direct metropolitan government was not prac-
ticable, some local autonomy was necessary and must be tolerated
[Vol.1, pp.xxiii ff; II, pp.xxvii ff.; Ill, pp.xxiv ff. etc.].
The end of empire was indeed in its beginning, and by the mid-
twentieth century it was far too late to halt the flood and argue
a reasoned case for a few more decades of imperial rule. Given
the overwhelming hostility of Marxists and fellow travellers to
empire, and its relegation to a term of abuse, the relative weak-
ness of a victorious but uncertain, exhausted and penurious Bri-
tain in the cold war, the agreed anti-imperialism of both super
powers, the posturing of national leaders in ex-colonies and the
doubts of many in the Old Dominions, there was in practice, even
if there had been the will, little any British government could
do to withstand the final stages of decolonisation, but to make
a virtue of necessity, to shrug shoulders and to surrender that
'independence' so eagerly demanded, irrespective of the question
whether 'independence' could in the late twentieth century have
the reality it had when the U.S. in the eighteenth century was
able to secure 'splendid isolation' for a century, or Canada or
Australia could forge and round out full self-government in the
nineteenth. But these models proved will o' the wisps for later
colonies, creating a myth of unreal independence.
There was little doubt that to be real, 'independence' demanded
certain prerequisites, resources, manpower and experience. In the
mid-century British ministers, leaders in all the main parties,
civil servants, officials, and academic commentators were fully
agreed on this; but given the combined hostility and jealousy of
the great powers there was no alternative for the U.K. but to
withdraw from empire. Power was transferred with alacrity to
incoming despots - from Nkrumah in the 50s to Mugabe in the 80s.
In the U.K. enthusiasm for the empire had been rare. Its exis-
tence was a fact, a habit, part of the received order, loved or
reviled only by the few extremists. It was incomprehensible to
the many, but it held a nostalgic comfort to those with distant
relations living in the white Dominions or dedicated to the mis-
sions, Christian or administrative, in the tropical colonies and
India. But empire was hardly changeless or permanent. Macaulay
in 1833 had foreseen, and welcomed the ultimate end of British
rule in India [Vol.Ill, p.256] and in 1840 could contemplate a
New Zealand traveller in the future, 'in the midst of a vast
solitude, standing on the broken arch of London Bridge to sketch
the ruins of St. Pauls'. Such visions were clearly not based on
a massive insensitive self-confidence. When the empire appeared
more embarrassing and burdensome than ever and when seemingly
ungrateful subjects misrepresented its record and demanded free-
dom, there was little will to retain it. In the unscrambling of
the final decolonisation, all caution was blown away - with two
consequences. First, in some ex-colonies independence hardly
justified itself. Can anyone with justice claim that Grenada,
Malawi or Kenya have been better governed or that Nigeria, the
Sudan, Uganda or Burma have been as well governed as under imper-
 XV

ial rule? In many new states socialism has been tempered by

dictatorship and corruption. Secondly, the post-imperial associ-
ation itself, the Commonwealth, was not merely changed - that was
essential to the growth and survival of any living organism - but
effectively destroyed. The club of 5 became a sprawl of over 50 -
the end of the 'cosy chats'. When Mozambique, which had never
been a British dependency (colony, protectorate or mandate) but
for five centuries had been (till 1975) a Portuguese possession,
became a full member, the absurdity of the lingering association
was exposed. It was now quite rootless: it lacked the minimum
qualification for membership - a common experience of being once
a British colony. When membership still implied some common prin-
ciples and standards of parliamentary democracy, there had been
during the war an offer of it to France by Churchill, and later
in the '50s some interest in Norway. These, which came to noth-
ing, might possibly have enriched the association. But later when
membership could be granted virtually to countries which had
never had any link with Britain, with Crown or Parliament, nor
shared any common colonial pre-existence, what meaning did the
Commonwealth have any longer? Particularly when Fiji, which had
been notably reluctant (to the surprise of the U.N.) to have
independence thrust upon it, and had remained stubbornly attached
to Britain and the Crown, was being denied re-admittance because
of the entrenchment of indigenous Fijian rights in its constitu-
tion. By the '90s all inner logic, significance and discipline
were diluted and had ebbed away. Any residual influence the asso-
ciation had depended no longer on a collective opinion as a
whole, but solely on the weight of individual members, severally
or regionally, on the U.K., Canada, Australia or India. In inter-
national counsels the Commonwealth as such had little or no
influence. Communiques after Commonwealth Conferences declined
into bland aspirations. Even the makers of U.K. foreign policy
(though nominally the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office)
had by the 1980s ceased to pay more than token respect for the
opinion of fellow Commonwealth members. The F.O., which had had
little respect for C O . traditions and values, found it easy to
demote Commonwealth ties - which indeed had already ceased (as
we have seen) to have much weight in international affairs. The
regular informal meetings of Commonwealth ambassadors in foreign
capitals - even weekly in the mid-century when Sir Oliver Franks
was British ambassador in Washington - had become rare indeed a
dozen years later. This might, in part, be due to the realign-
ment, hardly whole-hearted, of U.K. interest towards Europe, the
European Economic Community, and the European Union which became
a deterrent to the fostering of world-wide links, and an alterna-
tive focus to Commonwealth, while at the same time, part cause
and part effect, the very dilution and decline of the latter and
the lukewarm, even hostile, relations with some new Commonwealth
members, confirmed the conclusion that the ex-imperial associ-
ation would prove no alternative asylum, no Cave of Adullam, to
retreat to. Though after the slump of 1930 and exhaustion after
1945, Britain was tempted to look to the Commonwealth for econo-
mic salvation, it proved a false hope for, despite mercantilist
theory, the empire had never, and could not, be self-sufficient.
The end of imperial preference and the virtual sacrifice of
empire-Commonwealth was a pre-condition for Britain being accep-
XVI

ted in the E.E.C.

But neither the empire nor the Commonwealth had ever, despite
the pipe dreams of the enthusiastic few imperial federalists in
the 1890s, provided a firm, unchanging refuge. Europe had always
involved Britain and thereby its dependencies too, notably in the
two World Wars. The empire itself was fortuitous, a job-lot of
territories seized for the most part without any plan or purpose
'in a fit of absence of mind', many indeed by reckless individ-
uals or groups without any involvement initially by a metropoli-
tan authority and only subsequently and even unwillingly accepted
by Crown and Parliament. Any 'snapping up of unconsidered trif-
les' was indeed largely somnolent, unconscious kleptomania, for
the most part driven on the frontier by expansionists - settler
and aboriginal - who took action before any reluctant metropoli-
tan fiat was given, [e.g. Vol.V, pp.537-8] Those who ascribe to some
overweening ambition or greed on the part of governments in Bri-
tain - Crown, cabinets or parliaments - the motives for imperial
expansion are looking in the wrong place. Such acquisitive ins-
tincts were rife among sub-imperialists, white and black, on the
remote edges of empire far from the metropolis, its crucial
interests and concern for economies.
Similarly as these eight Volumes of documents have demonstra-
ted, the forms of colonial government, the constitutional arran-
gements and framework, were largely intuitive and unplanned.
Precedents were adopted and adapted. If they appeared to work
reasonably, then they became common form with minor differences
adjusted to local need. But the basic problem of imperial gover-
nance to establish law and order at a distance was always how to
balance metropolitan supervision with frontier autonomy. For it
was necessary to govern with local consent and a local supporting
cast. Authority was inevitably stronger at the centre than on the
fringe. It was totally impossible to rule a distant empire direc-
tly from London, so some local authority had to be created - a
moot, a council, an assembly - or to be recognised as agents or
sub-contractors, as the Norman Irish chiefs had been to their own
advantage in the thirteenth century or Angevin senechals a cen-
tury later (and Hindu princes, Nigerian emirs, Malayan sultans
and Baganda chiefs in the later periods): indeed as in the case
of New Zealand [Vol.Ill, pp.873-5] it was assumed that some sove-
reignty pre-existed locally which could be in part given back or
wholly reassigned. Such collaborators were essential to any impe-
rial government: 'indirect rule', reinvented as a gospel by
Lugard, had been in existence and acknowledged for centuries;
[Wi 11 iam Johnson with the Amerinds, Vol . II, p.521 and Arthur Gor-
don with the Fijians, V, pp.590-3 were recognising the obvious].
In the remote palatinate of Durham on the borders of Scotland the
bishop, whom the Crown had to endow with more trust because he
was hundreds of miles away from the court, had also to be granted
more discretionary power - 'the privileges of Saint Cuthbert';
[Vol.1, Nos.99-112]. But in all governments, unitary, federal or
national, such factors have always been present: the central v.
the local, the federal v. the regional. Imperial government has
been different only in degree.
Moreover imperial government has been evolutionary. Though
caricatured by the media as arbitrary, alien, unimaginative, inf-
lexible - the 'bungling of a myopic red tapeworm', or by more
 XV11

kindly critics as 'well-meaning but out of touch', the record by

contrast is of a continuous organic process, responding to sti-
muli of crises and challenge over 900 years. By trial and error
a balance, reasonable, practical and economic, was sought between
authority and justice: imperium must tolerate difference. Out of
ignorance or ill-informed optimism, of course, home-rule leaders
in colonies and their allies in the U.K. under-estimated the com-
plexities and found the pace too slow, though later in excusing
one-party or military rule these enthusiasts came to assert the
irrelevance of parliamentary forms. The seeming delays in trans-
ferring self-government could certainly be justified: the many
could hardly be taken into full partnership in running the comp-
lex apparatus of a modern state. Would it be just to hand over
power to a minority, to the tyranny of a self-seeking glite? In
the latter days of empire, such caution and honest doubt were
deep-seated, whatever the attraction of getting rid of colonial
burdens.
In the event new leaders failed in many ex-colonies to protect
the majority. The evolution of imperial government paralleled
that of the realm. Whereon the frontier of marches and palatin-
ates, authority was eroded and kings had been obliged to delegate
powers locally with hopeful but uncertain supervision from the
metropolitan court; even within their immediate competence, where
power was more effective and their writs ran, the kings found it
prudent to have the support of advisory councils which (like
later colonial councils) were legislative, executive and judici-
ary. In time these functions became divided - and specialised.
Kings found it convenient to be able to demonstrate visible sup-
port: it was desirable, if only ostensibly, to have some show of
consent from those who were going to supply funds. Hence the
election of knights of the shire and burgesses to model Parlia-
ments (cf. the grant of representative government to Canada
(1791) or N.S.W. (1842) or India (1919)). When the representative
body, the Commons, found through the power of the purse that,
though it could not control the executive, it could influence it;
when the King's ministers began to recognise the need to work
with the Commons majority, not always, but substantially; and
when privy councillors discovered that to some degree they had
to accept that they were 'accountable' . at first maybe with their
heads but later and no less effectively with their political
careers and their hold on power, to be 'answerable' to the Com-
mons - then in the realm you had moved into a lengthy period of
'responsive' government (cf. in Canada the first six years after
the Durham report). In 1848 Canada achieved a government in
which, in all internal matters (apart from the tariff), the Cana-
dian executive was responsible to the Canadian parliament. Maybe
Canada achieved a collective responsibility in a sense before
Britain, for the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 had so shattered
parties that the process of political education of Conservatives
and Liberals took two decades or more. Anyway collective cabinet
responsibi1ity was achieved in Britain by 1869 as it had been in
Canada, Australia and New Zealand and within 4 years was to be
at the Cape. Some colonies in America and the West Indies had had
a sort of representative government almost from their beginnings
[e.g. Virginia, 1619; Barbados, 1639; Vol.1, pp.271, 366] but because the
ultimate seat of authority was in Whitehall and the electorate
xviii

was exclusive, it had proved difficult to evolve a bridge to

responsible government - at least in the Westminster or Ottawa
mould. Instead executive committees within the assemblies (not
unlike the Donoughmore constitution later in Ceylon [Vol.VII,
No.63b]) tried and often secured a partial control over important
areas of executive policy [Vol.11, esp. p.372 ff.] - a form of
direct responsibility repudiated by the English Councils in
William Ill's reign. But in the West Indies in the aftermath of
the great social revolution of emancipation, the excessively
limited form of representative rule could not cope and in the end
the local assemblies recognised their inability and surrendered
its so-called representative government to begin again at the
bottom of the ladder with advisory and nominated councils; [Vol.
V, pp. 158-232]. Malta climbed up the ladder and slid down the
snake three times. Again just as the U.K. parliament slowly clai-
med to exercise an influence over the Crown's responsibility for
foreign policy, defence and the empire - all still 'Queen's mat-
ters' to Elizabeth I and Anne, and'King's matters'to the Georges
- so Canada and the internally self-governing colonies won full
control over the tariff, commercial treaty making, participation
in international conferences &c. on the road to Dominion status
and the Statute of Westminster. That process which took more than
two centuries in Britain, took 80 years in Canada, 14 years in
Ceylon, and a few months only in some African states. A constitu-
tion can only succeed (and surely this is a lesson European fede-
ralists will have to learn to our cost) if buttressed by a common
sense and consensus of identity and interest. Indeed in the ulti-
mate phase imperial government, even if good government, collap-
sed because it no longer could command substantial local consent
as well as world support. For centuries it had proved possible
to ensure reasonable stability by a balance between metropolitan
authority and colonial acquiescence. In the days of rival empires
independence had no immediate rationale: it was absurd to seek
to jump out of one metropolitan frying pan into an alternative
metropolitan fire. The failure of the attempt to impose reform
in the 1760s led to the loss of the American colonies - a warn-
ing, if any were needed, that imperial unity did not depend on,
and would be destroyed by, uniformity. And again in the same
period emerged the belief that imperial rule was, in Burke's
words 'in the strictest sense a trust'; [Vol.Ill, p.183]. But
these general lessons were not new. These principles had long
existed. They were based in the essential need over imperial
distances for tolerance - acceptance of difference.
The imperial system had emerged as a practical compromise bet-
ween metropolis and frontier. Centuries before Elizabeth I incor-
porated the East India Company (1600) or James VI and I the Vir-
ginia Company (1906) or granted New Scotland to Sir William
Alexander (1621); [Vol.1, Nos. 158, 159, 152]. Clerks in London
had to seek some such balance; and where precedents lay on their
shelves of devolving government to fiefs, palatinates, guilds,
companies and boroughs [Vol.1, pp.1-259 passim], it was very re-
levant, and comforting - it was simplest, safest and most conve-
nient - to take them down, dust them off, fill in the blanks and
hope that they would prove reasonably appropriate for the new
unknown frontier conditions overseas. Indeed, without realising
that they were tackling any new phenomenon and indeed without any
 xix
new thinking which might have been condemned as novel, non-con-
formist, devious, dangerous, perverse, unorthodox or heretical,
Elizabethan and Jacobean administrators turned inevitably to the
expedients which they had available and had served in the past.
The ostensible task was familiar - to assume, and then to dele-
gate, authority on the frontier where direct rule was not prac-
tical, and, even if possible, would be too expensive; but still
to exercise over patent or charter some supervision in the
interests of unity not uniformity - remote evitably, uncertain
undoubtedly.'
Two well-tried devices were at hand. First, the feudal grant
in fief, which became the proprietary form, to Cabot (1496), to
Gilbert (1578), to Calvert (later Baltimore) in Avalon (1923) and
Maryland (1632), to Carlisle for the Caribbees (1627), to the
Duke of York (1664) or to Penn (1681) [Vol.1, pp.211, 213, 215, 219,
222, 423, 431]: just indeed as the Scots king and Crown had granted
in 1621 to Alexander [pp.218-9]. Now all this had been derived and
copied from (and influenced by) previous experience with marcher
lords on the Welsh border, with seneschals in Gascony, and parti-
cularly and expressly with the bishop palatinate of Durham on the
Scottish border: - dating from the mid-twelfth century at least -
with the bishop's own jurisdiction (internal and external), his
entourage of officials as seigneur, and his shire court of ten-
ants and freemen with legislative and taxative powers [Vol.1, pp.
151-8]. Second, the grant to groups of adventurers: merchants of
the staple at Flanders (1359) or Calais (1363) and the Merchant
Adventurers in 1505; [Vol.1, pp.15-8]. This expedient itself had
been borrowed from that to the guilds, but it became the prece-
dent for company grants to Muscovy (1555), Guinea (1588), the
East Indies (1600), Virginia (1606), New England (1620), Massa-
chusetts Bay (1629), Hudson's Bay (1670) or the Royal African
Company (1672) [Vol.1, pp.203-10, 229-61, 413-31].
So, without much thought, grants were made, precedents taken
off the peg, the form and machinery of colonial government
imposed. Now that can be no surprise: for two assumptions seem
universally current. First, that, through Crown and/or Parlia-
ment, the English/British imperial government has always imposed
constitutions on dependencies. Of course, since the imperial will
was expressed in charter, patent, royal instruction, commission,
order-in-counci1, proclamation, etc. there was evidently some
truth in that assumption. But it is certainly not the whole
truth, for the frontier could shelve, sidestep, lose, procrasti-
nate, evade, bend or frustrate metropolitan intention and mould
its government much to its own wish. A constitution may exist,
but it can be largely disregarded. The second received assumption
is that Britain sought to spawn a brood of Westminster models
across the colonies: this was, however, a brief uncharacteristic
lapse in the mid-twentieth century - as the records of the Board
of Trade, the Privy Council, the law officers, or the Colonial
Office would abundantly and repeatedly prove, or as the evidence
in my contribution to the festschrift to Nicholas Mansergh

1. This following summary is largely taken from an extempore lecture given

(and surprisingly transcribed from a recording) in Edinburgh in July 1987;
(Journ. C.W. and compar. politics, XXVI 2).
XX

shows.. . [Rousseau in Geneva might draft a constitution for Poland, and

Bentham in London might work out those for China and Peru; but no enduring
form of government could be bought off the peg ready-made. A constitution is
a unique product and legacy of an evolutionary process. Constitutions cannot
be exported; if transplanted, they must evolve, adapt and change.[Not for
export in Hillmer and Wigley (eds.) The first British Commonwealth (1980)]
The Westminster model was a wholly inappropriate export, as both
the departments and individual commentators (Carleton, Stephen,
Mill, Gladstone, Morley etc.) asserted. The circumstances in
dependencies - the distance from, and therefore misapprehension
of, the working of government in the metropolis - the plurality
of society (divided by religion, caste, tribe); the variation of
scale and especially the inadequacy of qualified manpower; the
differences of social values and emphases in frontier society;
and later the fashion for federalism or republicanism, and (fol-
lowing the Irish) for bills of rights and written directive prin-
ciples; for one-party states; and for a clean break with the
imperial past, for a self-rooted autochthony - these factors
inevitably changed both need and expectation. Indeed the written
constitution might imply one thing: the unwritten constitution
behind it might work quite differently.
To begin with, of course, having acquired a form of grant as
fief or company, there was a natural instinct on the frontier to
make Those given institutions work as much like those in the
metropolis as colonists wanted or believed was their right. Of
course they were selective, concerned to acquire those rights won
in Britain which curbed the prerogative, but not those which infr-
inged the omnicompetent sovereignty of Westminster. From metropo-
litan authorities colonists withstood a continuous barrage of
criticism and warning that they had no right whatever to assume
the privileges of the Commons or to identify with the British
constitution. Even in the second quarter of the twentieth century
the Simon Commission on India (1930) warned that though the West-
minster model might fit Britain M i k e a well-worn garment', 'it
does not follow it will suit everybody' [Vol.VI, p.714]. In the
same period the Donoughmore Commissioners in Ceylon were making
the very same point [Vol.VII, pp.214, 218] - even indeed (though
Drummond Shiels later denied it) suggesting a metropolitan model
from the south bank of the Thames (the L.C.C.) rather than the
north. Indeed in 1945 when Soulbury recommended [Vol.VII, pp.245-6]
the same decision as Durham had for Canada a century before - the
acceptance of the inevitable - he declared the chance of a suc-
cessful transplant of Westminster to Colombo as 'remote': and
just a few weeks before his assassination, Bandaranaike argued
that the transplant had failed - (or in medical terms was rejec-
ted) - and the Donoughmore Commissioners had been right after
all : [Vol.VII, p.255]
Nevertheless, despite regular imperial denial and warning, it
was upon the metropolitan model itself that those in dependencies
stubbornly moulded their institutions - indeed not least by India
after independence in its 1950 constitution [Vol.VI, pp.791-4].
Remote from London, colonial constitutions developed their own
momentum; from a common foundation, constitutions worked quite
differently in different colonies: Massachusetts quite unlike
Jamaica, which differed from Maryland or New York. Imperial fiat
was disregarded: imperial control was often a figment of imagina-
 XXI

tion, kept alive in a mutual conspiracy of self-interest or con-

venience by metropolis and colony, against external, foreign
powers.
The first stage of evolution was - if subsequently misleading -
not difficult. At first the colonies were granted one of two
forms: either the trinity of proprietor, his council of advice,
and his court (or assembly) of freeholders; or of the chairman,
the councillors (managers, called assistants) and the general
court of shareholders. It was comparatively easy to convert these
forms from Durham or from Calais into the almost ubiquitous trin-
ity of governor, council and assembly of the Old Representative
System and even to suppose them replicas of King, Lords and Com-
mons (especially the Commons) of the metropolitan constitution.
So the forbidden likeness to Westminster was the result of shap-
ing on the frontier, not imposition by the centre. The very
summons of a Virginian assembly in 1619 [Vol.1, p.271] was a
peripheral, a company invention.
There was indeed always a counter-factor: the urge not for
similarity, but for difference. Though there was an instinct for
metropolitan forms, there was also one - stronger of course with
the years and with growing proximity to independence - for colon-
ial constitutions to be ostentatiously self-made and autochthon-
ous. But where the metropolis had made insufficient provision,
colonists would do-it-themselves. So, lacking a royal grant, the
Pilgrim Fathers made their Mayflower Compact for themselves [Vol.
I, pp.278-9]. Similarly, when law and order was necessary in St.
John's (when Newfoundland was officially not a plantation but
only a seasonal migratory 'nursery of seamen' moored in the mouth
of the St. Lawrence), residents established their own rules and
laws (1711) [Vol.11, pp.143-5]; or again as at Canso in 1724 (when
Nova Scotia had anomalously no assembly and its Catholic Acadian
majority was still unassimilated under British rule) [Vol.11, pp.
146, 171, 179-89]. British colonists in Quebec in 1764, deprived of
an assembly, attempted to convert the institution they had (the
grand jury) into a self-made substitute [Vol.Ill, pp.398-9]. Indeed
for a period neither Rhode Island nor Connecticut had a formal
charter, and, when they did, often behaved much as if they had
not. 'This island', said Governor Bernard of Massachusetts 'is
a Republic - an ally not a subject of Great Britain' [Vol.11, p.
136n]; or as the Board of Trade reported in 1740 'it is not ac-
countable to the Crown for any acts of government, legislative
or administrative' [Vol.11, p.215n]. By a skilful and powerfully
symbolic act of legerdemain the Massachusetts Bay Company removed
its first charter to New England; [Vol.1, pp.285-9]: it resolutely
resisted all the slings and arrows thrown at it from London,
rejected the authority equally of Puritan Parliament as of Caval-
ier Crown in the Civil War [Vol.1, pp.343-4, 359] and, even in
submitting to a second charter in 1691 [Vol.11, pp.54-8], that
constitution (with many New England ideas) was certainly not
wholly of British making or metropolis-imposed. Barbados too,
nominally royalist, repudiated all metropolitan rule till Crown
and Parliament had sorted out their differences in the Civil War
in Britain [Vol.1, pp.366-8]. Jamaica, indeed, in 1677-80 effective-
ly prevented the imposition of the form of legislative strait-
jacket (imposed by the Irish Parliament on itself) found in the
Poynings' Act of 1495 [Vol.1, pp.569-80, 582].
XXI1

In this brief survey of medieval and early modern experience

of imperial government, the relevance of Ireland has temporarily
been overlooked. Only partly conquered, only partly settled when
(on papal instruction) Henry II had invaded Ireland in 1171 (as
far as he was concerned, to ensure that the gains of Strongbow
and the Geraldines must depend on the English Crown) [Vol.1, pp.49-
50], Henry had established his justiciar as his representative
with his own curia regis of officials (becoming more Irish each
year) which developed (as in England) a magnum conci 7 iurn and Par-
liament of landholders and knights of the counties within the
Pale. Nevertheless, only a century later in 1275, it was the Eng-
lish Parliament which taxed Ireland - though Ireland was totally
unrepresented at Westminster; taxation without representation
[Vol.1, pp.3-4]. The Dublin Parliament, moreover, though itself
evolving similarly to that at Westminster, became in 1495 cram-
ped, even disabled by its own Poynings7 Act which froze its ini-
tiative in a posture subservient to the English king and English
Privy Council [Vol.1, p.82]: just indeed at the moment when in
England Parliament was poised to break through and win the initi-
ative, particularly over money, in a new partnership with the
Crown. If this constraint was ostensibly self-imposed, it was not
removed till 1782 [Vol.Ill, pp.97-8]. But the experiment with an
eighteenth-century sort of dominion status with an autonomous
Irish Parliament [Vol.Ill, pp.61, 99-138] lasted only eighteen years.
Ireland suffered from being too close to Britain, a potential
security risk on its western flank. In 1800, though observing the
forms of consent, union with Britain was imposed [Vol.Ill, pp. 138-
43]; fear of its becoming a Jacobin base - just as in 1707 fears
of Scotland as a Jacobite base [Vol.1, pp. 146-51] - had stimulated
union. Again in 1921-2 by terms of the 'treaty' or 'agreement'
imposed (according to de Valera) on Ireland [Vol.VI, pp.560-77],
certain conditions and the wholly inappropriate status of Domin-
ion (for Ireland was a mother country rather than a daughter
nation which had evolved gradually to independence) were thrust
upon Ireland: a category quite alien to its sense of nationality.
To return to the first British Empire: that empire destroyed
in part by the removal of the external threat to Americans who
before 1763 realised that a jump out of the British frying-pan
would be only into the French fire, and in part by a metropolitan
impatience for reform and greater uniformity. Then the Americans
tackled the laborious task of making their own constitution: the
heir of an imperial system in its balance of central and local
powers; a document, in John Quincy Adams' words 'extorted from
the grinding necessity of a reluctant nation', accepted by a
small majority as the only alternative to disruption and anarchy,
and promoted by leaders rightly interested in order, property and
duty as against those who had learned how to control the sources
of patronage. It was not established (despite John Wilson and
others and the preamble to the constitution) by 'the people' (any
more than the Indian constitution of 1950 [Vol.VI, No.191b]). In the
'conspiracy' of the 'dark conclave' some states (Connecticut, New
Hampshire, Pennsylvania, New York) held back, were critical, or
manipulated by force or stratagem. Maybe it began as a constitu-
tion imposed by an 61ite. It became the respected instrument of
growth of national identity.
The legacy for the British empire of American secession was
 xxiii

twofold. On the one hand there were arguments for a more care-
fully disciplined assimilation to the British Constitution with
a proper equipoise of institutions (as Grenville proposed) to
check the imbalance of 'democratical' elements in the assembly
and to shore up the countervailing institutions of governor and
council; though it was a British constitution, it was of similar-
ity not identity for (as Grenville made clear) [Vol.Ill, p.439]
there was recognition of the differences arising in the colony
and, (as Portland sternly reprimanded Simcoe) [Vol.Ill, p.548], it
was 'no perfect image and transcript' of Westminster. Upon the
foundation of representative government imposed in 1791 - a tem-
porary measure, as Pitt told the Commons [Vol.Ill, p.453], but
lasting fifty years - the Canadians secured a 'responsive' gover-
nment under Sydenham and 'responsible' government under Elgin
[Vol.IV, pp.116-28], This was indeed a Canadian achievement in its
collective cabinet responsibility arguably for a period antedat-
ing that in Britain - by Baldwin, Bedard, La Fontaine, Howe and
others: just as later constitutional evolution elsewhere (in the
Commonwealth) owed a great deal to Smuts or Nehru.
The alternative form also derived from Canada: the Quebec Act
imposed by Brit!sh statute in 1774, though largely made in Canada
after lengthy debate between governor and officials as well as
the Board of Trade [Vol.Ill, pp.402-26]. It was a practical answer.
After half a century's failure to anglicise Nova Scotia [Vol.11,
pp.159-90] and in the context of the crisis in the 13 colonies, it
was prudent to accept the facts [Vol.11, pp.508-617]: that, as
Carleton wrote in 1768, 'the British form of government trans-
planted into this continent will never produce the same fruit as
at home, chiefly because it is impossible for the dignity of the
throne or peerage to be represented in the American forests', or
the year before 'Barring catastrophe shocking to think of, this
Country must to the end of time be peopled by the (French) Canad-
ian race' [Vol.Ill, pp.409-10]: so toleration of Catholics, and the
same formula as in the Statute of Wales (1284), ( i.e. indigenous
civil law and English criminal law) [Vol.Ill, pp.424-5; I, p.129]:
but no representative assembly, thus breaking the trinitarian
mould of the Old Representative System. Moreover, in the new con-
quered second empire, collected during the French wars in 'a fit
of absence of mind', the form of conciliar government in the Que-
bec Act with no assembly was applied, by way of San Domingo and
Martinique, to Trinidad, the Cape, Mauritius, Ceylon, Malta, and
even to New South Wales and elsewhere [Vol.Ill, pp.670-879]. To
appease new subjects, to prevent agitation and expense, to secure
order, old pre-existing laws and institutions were accepted - at
least temporarily. After all, the secretaryship of state for war
and the colonies (Stanley said later 'war with the colonies') was
until 1854 a single office and the main task till 1815 was to
defeat Napoleon. It was best therefore to accept with Mr. Podsnap
in Our Mutual Friend that 'other countries' did things different-
ly, and to recognise, as the Malta Commission did in 1812, that
'to graduate our ideas of perfection of government by the ap-
proximation it bears towards our own is a mode of reasoning as
unjust as it is erroneous' [Vol.Ill, pp.710-1]. Therefore, upon
alien roots, with borrowings and adaptions from previous tradi-
tions, Crown Colony Government developed. Even where nominally
the governor had arbitrary powers, he operated within substantial
XXIV

restraints, and his authority depended on, and was eroded by, the
difficulties of fitting indigenous posts, officials and procedure
into a Qi/as7-British system. It was easiest for the metropolis
to pursue a policy of minimum intervention. Long after Napoleon
was defeated, many of those Crown colonies with heterogeneous po-
pulations, with permanent majorities and minorities, were deemed
the least appropriate for the introduction of parliamentary demo-
cracy; moves towards representative government (promised for ex-
ample to Trinidad in 1804 [Vol.Ill, p.732] and even initiated in
1834 [Vol.Ill, pp.751-4] were halted in the context of the social
revolution of slave emancipation. A sense of trusteeship now put
such expectations into deep freeze; the fear was that the major-
ity of ex-slaves would dominate, or alternatively become the
tools, or wage-slaves, of a minority. So, though never intended,
a dichotomy emerged between European settled colonies with assem-
blies moving to responsible government and ultimately to Dominion
Status, and conquered non-European tropical colonies stuck with
conciliar government. The separation was enforced when post-eman-
cipation problems became so acute that some colonies with repre-
sentative institutions (e.g. Jamaica, Antigua) voluntarily sur-
rendered these assemblies in mid-century to secure the paterna-
list benefits of Crown Colony Government [Vol.V, pp.158-66, 177, 196,
215, 217, 224].
As for India, constitutions were imposed certainly, though
after long debate in India among officials, and in Whitehall and
Leadenhal1 Street in the context of British politics and lack of
interest. So the 1773 Act, the 1784 Act and the 1833 Act were all
preceded by inquiry and discussion [Vol.Ill, pp.152-69, 177-91, 246-58]
- and the usual uninformed debate in Parliament. When, after the
Mutiny, the Crown assumed responsibility there were strong warn-
ings from careful, even liberal, observers (Macaulay, Wood,
Ripon, Dufferin) that the councils were not parliaments; that
parliamentary government would hardly be appropriate to the
complex societies of India, nor indeed to primitive communities
in Africa. The likelihood of Hindu majority and Muslim minority
working a Westminster system seemed remote; what was suitable in
Britain or Canada was not necessarily so for India; a fur coat
was all right for a Canadian winter, commented the radical John
Morley, but not for a winter on the Deccan [Vol.V, p. 108; VI, pp.666-
73].
By the mid-nineteenth century the settlement colonies were
virtually making their own constitutions. If that had not been
ostensibly true of the Canadian Union in 1840, it certainly was
of the British North America Act of 1867 [Vol.IV, pp.706-50]. 'A
constitution similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom'
at Canadian request, but also combining responsible cabinet
government and a parliamentary system with federal government;
a constitution not imposed, though to some degree guided in its
last stages, but based firmly on detailed agreements made in
Charlottetown, Quebec and London conferences and dominated by the
desire of John Macdonald, the Dominion's first prime minister,
to have a centralised form totally different from that of the
United States where 'states rights' had so nearly brought schism
through bloodshed. From 1850 the Australian colonies received
constitutions which were virtually only outline drafts with the
details - unicameral or bicameral, elected or nominated upper
 XXV

houses - left blank for them to fill in (unlike the Canadians,

they seemed less interested in responsible government than in
self-government). Later in the making of the Commonwealth Act,
apart from a characteristic mental blockage in the secretary of
state, Chamberlain - held against the unanimous advice of his
Colonial Office officials - over the question of limiting appeals
to the J.C.P.C., the federal constitution of 1900 was enacted at
Westminster in the very terms agreed in inter-colonial conven-
tions of 1897-98 - indeed almost wholly in the very terms of
Samuel Griffith's draft ten years earlier [Vol.IV, pp.766-90], South
Africa, having rejected in the late 1870s the imposition of a
federal constitution by Carnarvon [Vol.IV, pp.804-19], again re-
jected a federal solution for a unitary form (with some devol-
ution) in the South Africa Act of 1909 [Vol.VI, pp.477-90]: Smuts
very much shaping the constitution, even sending emissaries to
the U.S., Canada and Australia to report back on the frictions
and costliness of federal government [Vol.VI, pp.455-6]. Though
there were in the draft many features (e.g. colour franchise)
which worried both liberal and conservative M.P.s in Westminster,
again Parliament was sternly warned it must be accepted without
amendment as a package - the highest common factor of consent
between the Cape, Natal, Orange River and Transvaal: a solemn
agreement made in South Africa and not to be broken in West-
minster [Vol.VI, pp.473-4, 476-7], Nevertheless, while after the
First World War even Indian opinion was regularly consulted (if
not always followed for it was so divided as to give no lead) in
the series of constitutional changes made and after long debate
between Congress, Muslim League, the Princes, etc. (as at the
Round Table Conferences) [Vol.VI, pp.704-54], the imperial govern
ment had (in the final count where opponents would not agree to
a compromise) to exercise its authority and impose a solution:
in that last resort the nature of imperial rule had to be autho-
ritarian - that was the fact of being a dependency. When indepen-
dence was granted, in the remarkable debates in the Constituent
Assembly there was a wealth of illustration used from comparative
government [Vol.VI, pp.791-5]. By contrast with the Canadians who
had little to guide them and only the U.S. constitution to avoid,
or the Australians with little but James Bryce to assist them and
the B.N.A. Act to avoid, Indians revelled in a wide variety of
forms in Europe, America, Asia, Australasia. There was also the
shadow of experience (especially 1937-39) under the Government
of India Act of 1935 [Vol.VI, pp.755-9], and the brooding influence
of Congress; what emerged was a centralised form of federalism
and the elements chosen were those which were most like what
Indians had been used to under the Raj (discounting the apparent
differences between a monarch and a president), a constitution
in federal form very like the British but "made in India' by
Indians.
Africa was different. Of course there was increasingly consul-
tation over constitutional changes, and divisions (not only trib-
al) meant that again an authoritarian imperial government had to
make even hesitant steps appear decisive, and to impose its com-
promise - and in Nigeria, for example, a series of forms of fede-
ral or quasi-federal government resulted as each proved inappro-
priate or was blown off course; [See Vol.IX] But the decades of
African decolonisation coincided with that uncharacteristic mood
XXVI

mentioned earlier, when many in Britain seemed to believe the

Westminster model might be exported. This aberration was the
result of two causes: (1) some African leaders educated in the
British system were conditioned to think British was best and
were resentful of being denied it; anyway, to press for the
British model might secure independence more speedily; and (2)
some British politicians thought that to show a brood of West-
minsters as the imperial legacy would be a good palliative to the
British electorate faced with the end of empire. There was a fur-
ther significant difference. Whereas Americans, Canadians, Aust-
ralians and Indians had all earnestly been concerned to establish
a permanent constitutional framework, which, if not wholly sacro-
sanct as tablets of stone or arks of the covenant, was a reposi-
tory of deep respect and awe, leaders of independence movements
in the mid-twentieth century, in Africa particularly but in some
of the West Indies too, looked at proposed constitutions cyni-
cally, not as permanent and fair terms of growth of nationhood,
but merely as a step to independence, when they could be torn up.
No doubt there was deception, hypocrisy, illusion on both sides,
for the Colonial Office knew well that post-independence there
would be an immediate change; for example, in Ghana where Nkrumah
had been so vociferous about 'one man, one vote1 but, to secure
a people's republican oligarchy, proved he meant only 'once' (and
his enthusiasm vanished - once he was in power). Indeed, these pre-
independence constitutions were often no more than a plausible
gesture to allay the qualms of British liberals. For all sort of
reasons any constraints on the power of the successful 'home-
rule' group (party, tribe, religion) were otiose. The concentra-
tion of power in cabinet government was attractive to those with
a seemingly permanent majority; while the separation of powers
in the U.S. model was distinctly less so, the combination of head
of state with head of government in the U.S. presidency tickled
the fancy of those who had led the drive - the so-called 'strug-
gle' - for independence. (Their question was how best to get
their own way; the British,..was it the best way?). Where perman-
ent social divisions existed within colonial boundaries, it was
difficult enough to strike a fair balance and the metropolis came
to recognise it was best to get out and leave it to the locals.
It was impossible to thrust a form of government on a people and
expect it to work; an imposed constitutional facade never created
a common identity within the Austro-Hungarian empire. Neverthe-
less, there were metropolitan manifestations of a Pygmalion itch.
In the post-1945 period when big seemed beautiful many federa-
tions were mooted: many plausible enough (like the Caribbean)
till you looked closer to find impoverished insular rivals -
economic competitors rather than partners in a wider Common Mar-
ket with no sense of unity (unless the West Indies was playing
a Test Match); or similarly Central Africa, but, with the retros-
pective foresight so common among journalists, one can hardly see
the likelihood of any identity being forged between two ex-
Rhodesias and ex-Nyasaland. Elsewhere it was often some external
threat or ambition which had triggered a shotgun federation: the
U.S. against Britain and subsequently after Monroe contra mundum;
Canada versus the U.S. - and Fenians; Australia to some degree
versus Germany; the German zo11verein moving to staatsverein in
the context of Prussia's bid for the leadership against Austria.
 xxvii

Only groundswell or ground fears can create a sense of unity -

the need to develop a sense of nationhood, different from that
of the imperial metropolis, and by consent (both active and
passive) to achieve a greater purpose. In federations the impulse
to be united, but not too united. These conditions cannot be
imposed; they must be home-made and self-rooted.
In all, then the working of constitutions has been moulded by
influential 'colonial' leaders: Hamilton, Jefferson, Madison;
John Macdonald and George Brown; Henry Parkes, Samuel Griffith
and Edmund Barton; Smuts or Nehru. How far and in what ways have
constitutions been expressions of national identity or how far
the best means of achieving it? The United States constitution
became (as noted above) the source of respect - a nucleus round
which a sense of nationhood cohered. For Lincoln was clearly
guilty of historical error at Gettysburg in 1863: 'four score and
seven years ago our fathers' did not bring forth 'a new nation'.
That had to grow, and be worked for, even in civil war. For deca-
des after 1776 Virginians, New Englanders, and others thought of
themselves as such, not as Americans. 'What is an American, this
new man?' asked Hector de Crevecoeur in 1782, but his answer was
lyrical and prophetic, the substance of things hoped for, as
Henry Adams so ruthlessly demonstrated in his History a century
later. Now an image does not have to be true to have emotive
force; for through the network of sectionalism which dominated
U.S. politics - North, South or West; capitalist versus agrarian;
creditor versus debtor - the image survived and the constitution
made a unique contribution. Canada derived its identity from the
projection not only of one metropolis but of two - British and
French (though in the latter the umbilical cord with Church and
King in France was cut in 1789), but the B.N.A. Act as inter-
preted first by the centralising influence of Macdonald, proved
even in its oscillations between Ottawa and province, a sheet
anchor; though weakened and sapped by the proximate strength of
the U.S., not only in the media as the Massey report showed, its
identity has been tested in its capacity to stand firmly both
against the U.K. and against the U.S., though to its cost not
both together (as over Alaska) [Vol.IV, p.651] at the same time. In
Australia on the basis of the Commonwealth Act the jealousies
between states, cities and universities were eroded by the revo-
lution in communications in the next half-century to the point
where some argued that federal government, always costly, was
also obsolescent, since Australians were now the same from Perth
to Brisbane.
In the creation of national identity the image can be powerful
- even the inaccurate history, the myth. Historical precedents
can be invented (as by Irish or American pamphleteers in the
seventeenth or eighteenth centuries dealing with the medieval
experience) [Vol.1, pp.88-94, 100-2], to create a national folklore,
just as Plantagenet kings (Edward I to Boniface, 1301) [Vol.1, p.
140] claimed links with Troy, or Tudor kings (Statute on Rest-
raints of Appeals, 1533) [Vol.1, pp.7-8] with King Arthur, or Gold
Coasters with 'Ghana' or Maltese inventing a fictional consiglio
popolare granted to them in the eleventh century by Count Roger
of Normandy [Vol.Ill, pp.707-21]. Constitutions can indeed be
instruments of propaganda, projecting the image of the sort of
people we are, or think we are, or would like others to believe
xxviii

we are: hence the mottos in several Francophone ex-colonies, how-

ever silly (in the Miltonian sense, of course) they are; or the
bills of rights and fundamental principles, however misleading
or inexact they can be. (Maybe, most notably, ex-colonists are
under a compulsion to invent a history of a so-called 'struggle
for independence' as a buttress to their new image7even when the
movement towards self-government was straightforward, uninhibited
and evolutionary.) In such circumstances, myth, history, law, all
elements which may have shaped a constitution, become the hand-
maids of national evolution.
It was essentially such nationalism which destroyed the Common-
wealth; maybe mythical, even positively induced, for some new
states had only a synthetic identity, it found a rallying cause
in the global anti-colonialism which made the colonial powers,
including Britain, easy scapegoats. Sober judgement might not
confirm this reaction but it was a sufficient and useful stimu-
lus. So the coherence of the Commonwealth - that label stuck on
a continuing process - Balfour's 'free association', crystal-
lising that unity with diversity at one point - was undermined.
An association which had changed and which indeed had always had
to change to survive, had emerged from two World Wars in which
its members had, often alone, contributed magnificently to vic-
tory disintegrated. In the first World War, though French Canad-
iens and Afrikaners were not whole-hearted, the sacrifices of the
Commonwealth and India had been considerable. In the second,
though Ireland, inevitably the awkward member, proudly abstained
from the conflict with Nazi Germany and South Africa coming to
the aid of the allies only by an astute performance by Smuts -
and Basil Long [Vol.VI, pp.51-3, 154-5] proved her independence
by her own decision, the Commonwealth response had been initially
crucial. But in the aftermath, though for the U.K. the support
of Commonwealth countries could massage her ego, now no longer
a Great Power, and be a comfort, the participation of Dominions
and Colonies in the war had stimulated the sense of national
identity in many colonies and accelerated the moves towards
independence. Though temporarily the existence of Commonwealth
could soften the break and might seem to offer some advantages
to newly independent members, the tide of nationalism was too
strong. Even in Australia the flood of new non-British immigrants
and the urge to impose a radical Australian identity emphasised
the obsolete nature of the British connection. Later came the
British decision to withdraw forces from the East and for the
U.K. the failure of the Dominions to provide a strong enough
commercial alternative to the E.E.C. The U.K. began to turn its
attention hesitantly, but it was calculated needfully, towards
Europe and for that the sacrifice of empire was a precondition
which in the new international climate was a welcome loss. The
association of nation states was being undermined by the attacks
of national leaders, journalists and Marxist historians and was
shrinking to a vague formula without content, shape or conviction
which could be dismissed as 'a millstone', 'a costly farce', 'a
confidence trick', 'an ineffective, smug uplift club', 'a ram-
shackle tumbledown affair', 'the tattered remnant of an imperial
dream' providing 'nothing but delusion'. These phrases are culled
from the broadsheets.
'Independence', which in the eighteenth century could mean
 XXIX

something substantial to the Americans, had always been the end

of the continuing process of decolonisation. But the shrinking
of the world during two subsequent centuries had made the concept
increasingly unreal, even for the great powers - as the mass of
colonies moved towards it in the mid-twentieth century. When it
seemed that internally only the minority of collaborators bene-
fitted from colonial rule the attitude of the majority to alien
government turned sour. Of course in the end one minority was
often just replaced by another, but that was incidental. Men tire
even of good government and prefer self-government, the opportun-
ity to change their rulers, even if that meant less good, even
corrupt, tyrannical government. But the imperial authority no
longer had influence or power. The very existence of previous
colonial ties, save perhaps the lingua franca of English, was
itself an impediment. At the beginning of the twentieth century
the British government was far from satisfied with what it was
required to put into the South Africa Act [Vol.VI, pp.471-7] but
it knew that it would be disastrous and costly to interfere.
If these eight Volumes have any purpose they may serve, it is
hoped, to be a reminder, a memorial maybe, to a period when Ox-
ford history fostered a tradition of comprehensiveness [Vol.Ill,
pp.xxxiii-xxxix]. When Coupland was elected to the Beit chair in
1920 the electors made a very Oxford decision. To give stature
to the new discipline of imperial history and to integrate it
firmly with the School of Modern History, they decided not to
appoint an imperial specialist but to set a fine Greats mind to
the field. A first class scholar was better than a third-rate
expert. He brought breadth to his new assignment. When I was an
undergraduate I remember Sir William Holdsworth at work in the
Codrington Library on his many volumes of the History of English
Law. Then the Admiral, Samuel Eliot Morison himself, wrote the
thousand page volume - the Oxford History of the American people,
a distillation of half a century's scholarship. What indeed re-
mained distinguishing about the Oxford approach was essentially
that whatever their particular interest and specialisation in
period or region^Oxford historians and Oxford imperial historians
were dedicated to familiarising themselves with the wider frame
of reference. Comprehensiveness and continuity were their watch-
words. A long folk memory was essential. It was an approach Smuts
would have recognised as 'holist'. All Beit Professors from Eger-
ton to the polymath Gallagher were thus motivated. Harlow's inau-
gural lecture elevated the concept to a principle of faith: Gal-
lagher's Friday morning sessions on sources in imperial history
gave practical instruction to a generation of young researchers.
We were taught to understand the unfamiliar standards of the pe-
riod studied, not those of today; to know the political and admi-
nistrative background against which the history of a colony or
colonies took place; to learn about other centuries than the most
recent and about other foreign empires; to see our own chosen
period or region in as wide a context as possible', and to seek
beginnings, parallels, contrast and changes: to be aware of
colonial policy in its fullest processes of evolution. In the
middle of the twentieth century the School of Modern History at
Oxford was still firmly committed to teaching undergraduates an
inclusive and continuous knowledge of 2000 years of British
(mainly English) history, and as the series of Oxford Histories
XXX

of England demonstrates this embraced political, economic,

social, religious, military, artistic, cultural and imperial
aspects. Later, when the teaching of imperial history was being
fractured elsewhere, (I noted this 'balkanisation' in Canada, the
U.S. and Australia in the 1970s: see F. Madden in Oxford and the
idea of Commonwealth 1982: pp.27-8; also Journal of Commonwealth
and comparative politics XXV(1)), the team of Oxford imperial
historians had held to this comprehensive principle. Commonwealth
history seminars heard and discussed papers dealing with periods
from the American empire to the near-present and with the colon-
ial (and post-independence) history of the old Dominions, the
Caribbean, India and Africa. Indeed for most of the century impe-
rial history was not regarded as a separate discipline and was
accepted as a part of the British experience. Under Gallagher the
creation of a special African seminar was resisted and African-
ists attended, and made presentations to, the Commonwealth His-
tory seminar: furthermore as Beit Professor he widened his focus
to the comparative history of other empires and to world history.
By contrast with Cambridge, Oxford imperial historians, at least
post the doctrinal inaccuracies of Hobson and the evangelist
vision of Curtis, were liberated from theory, imperial theology
and dogma. Until the mid-80s the rooted conviction persisted that
the widest angled frame of reference and depth of comparative
understanding illuminated and strengthened judgement (F. Madden
etc. op. cit. pp. 24ff: R.E. Robinson, Revision and restatement
from the Fens, pp.30-48).
It would seem that this 'holistic' tradition has now been fin-
ally rejected in the new Oxford (more an Anglo-American) History
of the British Empire. To some of us this impressive exercise
presents a splintered narrative by mini-specialists (Max Beloff,
Journal of imperial and Commonwealth history XXVII (2); his
lecture to the 1995 Anglo-American conference; and an article in
History Today, February 1996). No doubt there is indeed much
freshness, value and even some scholarship. But what it lacks is
a central spine. There is too much distraction and too little
commanding coherence. Nor, to my surprise, any reference to these
eight Volumes in footnotes, and bibliography is rare indeed,
though the editor-ir-chief has a kind reference to me. But as
'Robbie' said when I last saw him, 'All that enormous detailed
work, and you might have saved yourself the trouble for all the
notice taken of it. Even the Journal [of imperial and Commonwealth
history] has reviewed less than half the Volumes'! But it is ob-
vious that this project of mine belongs to a past generation of
scholarship. Maybe the time will come ultimately for a return to
'holism'. As Max Beloff wrote (J.I.CW.Hist. op cit) 'The core of
empire was not profit but governance'. If so, and in that event,
these Volumes may stand and wait as a not irrelevant contribu-
tion.

F.M. November 1995

revised December 1999
 EDITOR'S NOTE
It is now over six years since the previous Volume - The dependent empire
1900-48 - appeared, in a strange binding. The material contained in this
Volume VIII has been awaiting publication for much of that time, but my old
friends, pupils, and colleagues, John Darwin and Robert Holland, who so kindly
offered to assist me in the last part of this exercise, have been beset by
many onerous and distracting demands and have been unable to tackle their
contributions to the final volume of this series on the dependencies since
1948. But, after all, it cannot be denied that this series of documents,
initiated in Sir Kenneth Wheare's study in All Souls in 1953, has been my
lifelong project, not theirs. They have been busy with teaching and administrative
programmes. I have been 'retired' for sixteen years. In no way could this
Volume be regarded by either of them as a priority. Indeed, with the whole
change of fashion, this sort of imperial history belongs to the past where it
was planned. But Greenwood took pity and were prepared to let me see my task
completed. They have now agreed to our joint proposal, that they would go
ahead and publish the substantial materials I have collected and edited (and
indeed cut by some 250 pages) here as Volume VIII and would give John and Rob
more time and space to produce, at their convenience, a companion Volume IX,
covering the same period since 1948, but dealing at more justifiable length
with those dependencies I have been unable to cover: particularly decolonisa-
tion throughout British Africa (surely the main topic in this period and to
omit would be Hamlet without the Prince) and its off-islands, Mauritius and
the Seychelles: the attempt to assimilate (or integrate) Malta in the United
Kingdom; and the vicissitudes of the Malaya-Malaysia federation, and the brief
association with it of Singapore. These territories demand more space than
could have been provided alongside my documents in a single volume and will
effectively, if they appear, constitute Part (2) - a ninth volume - of this
record of the final phase of empire. I can only earnestly hope I live to see
Vol.IX. Neither of these twin Volumes will be much shorter than the first
which I completed over fifteen years ago.
For most of the documents collected here I have to thank, once more, my
grandson, Sebastian (now working in G.C.H.Q.) for his hard work, his intelli-
gent and amusing comments and his sense of the absurd. Over the past six years
I have been deprived of, and have missed, his ready support; and this Volume
lacks his verification of many detailed references. Without him at my beck and
call, to run and fetch, I am lost. I realise how many sections could have been
better rounded out if I still had his help. Rob Holland (who might well have
had a strong claim to do this section had he not been so busy) supplied me
with many more references on Cyprus on which Sebastian's father, my son, had
a very particular interest: I have made mention of all his suggestions but
have not had the mobility to pursue them myself. Christine Hepworth has main-
tained her crucial stalwart role with an admirable resolve over pain, and
reliable intuitive accuracy, seeing my scribble into its camera-ready copy.
She has a shrewd understanding and grasp of the subject matter and of what I
had in mind: she is an intelligent decoder of my hieroglyphs - and of
Sebastian's and the C O . clerks. She has also regularly brought me up-to-date
with relevant cuttings. I owe thanks to my pupil Dr. Steve Tsang for directing
me towards useful Hong Kong material which John Darwin has already - without
attribution - made use of in print. We are grateful as ever to the staff of
Bodley, Rhodes House Library and the P.R.O.; and I am deeply conscious of the
support I have continued to receive from Michael Brock and Robert Blake. By
the same token I miss my old supervisor, Sir Edgar Williams and his stimulat-
ing asides. Indeed he actually proofread the first three Volumes of this
series to the Treaty of Waitangi, on which he remained an authority.
xxxi i
Of course the day of independence would nominally be the terminal date for
colonies in this series, and indeed for many dependencies that has been res-
pected as an appropriate cut-off point. But I have always tried deliberately
in footnotes to look ahead to important future developments. These signposts
litter the earlier Volumes, in case I might never finish, or see the end of
the project. Moveover, I have traced the continuing evolution of the constitu-
tions of the original Dominions well beyond independence [Vol.VI]. So too, in
this Volume, I have not stopped my review in Cyprus at 1961 or in Fiji at
1970. It will, I am afraid, be only too evident that the '30 year rule' has,
in this Volume, deprived us of much of the customary wealth of detailed mater-
ial which we have enjoyed up to 1948 - previously taken for granted. Indeed,
the new techniques of the information revolution, first the telephone, then
the introduction of e-mail, and the demands of governors, high commissioners
and ambassadors to see how their despatches and telegrams have been received
in the F.C.O. (which cramps the blunt and witty comments of departmental
officials) - all deprive future historians of a rich vein and valuable dimen-
sion in their sources. But, as noted in the bibliography to Volume VII, the
project to print the series of British documents on the end of empire has
already put a lot of important materials - additional to green and white
papers and parliamentary debates and papers - into public domain, and there-
fore to a degree made this exercise of mine irrelevant. Moreover, there are
Collections of treaties and other documents affecting the State of Malaysia,
the Malay States and Borneo by J. Allen, A.J. Stockwell, and L.R. Wright, and
another on Constitutional documents of the West Indiesby Ann Spackman, an old
pupil of mine; and recently two volumes on Sources for colonial studies in the
Public Record Office - C O . , D.O., C.R.O., Cabinet Office, Treasury and C O . -
by Ann Thurston. There are still, up to 1962, Documents and speeches on Com-
monwealth affairs edited by Nicholas Mansergh, especially 1952-62 (referred
to as Mansergh III). Over the many centuries the main bulk of our documents
has been supplied by the P.R.O. But now, as will be seen, they dry up in the
late '60s. Some later information could be, and has been, supplied secondhand
from elsewhere; but symptoms of age in sight and limb have restricted my
ability to search them out. Indeed, I am very aware that I have not been able,
as previously, to double check and amplify all references. I am very grateful
to Greenwood for undertaking to publish what I have managed to put together
so that I may see the completion of my work; and to my wife, Margaret, for
enabling me to keep going steadily at my desk.

A.F.M.
December 1999
 ABBREVIATIONS
A.A.C.R. Association for the Advancement of Civil Rights
A.D. Appeals Division
Adv. G. Advocate General
A.G. Attorney General/Agent General
Ann. Annexure
Ass. Assembly
B. & F.S.P. British and Foreign State Papers
B.D.T. British Dependent Territory
B.G. British Guiana
B.H. British Honduras
B.S.A. British Sovereign Area
Cab. P. Cabinet Papers (P.R.O.)
CC Civil/Chief Commissioner
CD.O. City District Officer
CH.B.E. Cambridge History of the British Empire
C.I.G.S. Chief of the Imperial General Staff
CJ. Chief Justice
C.L.V.A. Colonial Laws Validity Act
Cmnd. Command Paper
CO. Colonial Office
C.O.I. Central Office of Information
Col.P. Colonial Paper
Comm. Commons, House of
Conf. Pr. Confidential Print
Coun. P. Council Paper
C.R.O. Commonwealth Relations Office
C.S.A. Civil Service Association
C.S.R. Co. Colonial Sugar Refining Company
Ct. of P. Court of Policy
CW. Commonwealth
D.C District Commissioner
D.L.P. Democratic Labour Party
Deb. Debates
D.O. Dominions Office
E.C European Community
E.E.C European Economic Community
E.O.K.A. National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters
F.C.O. Foreign and Commonwealth Office
F.O. Foreign Office
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Gov. Governor
Govt. Government
Hans. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates
H.C High Commissioner
H.CT. High Commission Territories
H.E. His Excellency
H.H. His Highness
H.K. Hong Kong
H.M.'s G. His Majesty's Government
H.Q. Headquarters
I.CA.C Independent Commission against Corruption
XXXIV

I.CCP.R. International Convention on Civil and Political Rights

I.C.S. Indian Civil Service
I.F.S. Irish Free State
I.L.O. International Labour Office
I.M.F. International Monetary Fund
I.T. Income Tax
I.O. India Office
J. Judge
Jam. Jamaica
J.C.P.C Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
Journ. Journal
J.I.CW.Hist Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History
J.P. Justice of the Peace
L.C Lord Chancellor
L.CC London County Council
L.C.J. Lord Chief Justice
L.I. Leeward Islands
L.O. Law officers
L. of N. League of Nations
L.P. Letters Patent
M.H.A. Member of the House of Assembly
M.Leg.Ass Member of the Legislative Assembly
Min. Minute
M.L.C Member of the Legislative Council
M.O. Medical Officer
M.P. Member of Parliament
N.A.T.O. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
N.F.P. National Federal Party
N.I.P. National Independence Party
N.T. New Territories (H.K.)
N.Z. New Zealand
O.-in-C Order-in-Council
Parl. Deb. Parliamentary Debates
P.C Privy Council
P.M. Prime Minister
P.N.C People's National Congress
P.N.P./M People's National Party/Movement
P.P. Parliamentary Papers
P.P.P. People's Progressive Party
P.R. Proportional Representation
P.R.C People's Republic of China
P.R.O. Public Record Office
Prem. Premier's file (P.R.O.)
Proc. Proceedings
Res. Resolution
R.H.L. Rhodes House Library (Oxford)
S. Afr. South Africa
S.A.R. Special Administrative Region
S.C.A.C Standing Closer Association Committee
S.L. Sierra Leone
S.M.O. Senior Medical Officer
S. R. Statutory Rules and Orders
T.A.N.U. Tanganyika African National Union
T.U. Trades Union
U.F. United Force/Front
U.M.E.L.Co Unofficial Members of the Executive and Legislative Council
 XXXV

U.N. United Nations

U.S. United States
U/S Under-secretary
U.S.S.R. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
V.P. Vice-president
W.F.T.U. World Federation of Trades Unions
W.I. West Indies/Windward Islands
W.O. War Office
 SECRETARIES OF STATE
SECRETARIES OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES
[see aIso Vo1. VI, pp.xxiii-xxv]

October 1946 - February 1950 Arthur Creech Jones

February 1950 - October 1951 James Griffiths
October 1951 - July 1954 Oliver Lyttelton
July 1954 - October 1959 Alan Lennox-Boyd
October 1959 - October 1961 Iain Macleod
October 1961 - July 1962 Reginald Maudling
July 1962 - October 1964 Duncan Sandys (joint with C.R.O.)
October 1964 - December 1965 Arthur Greenwood
December 1965 - April 1966 Earl of Longford
April 1966 - August 1966 Fred Lee (then Dept. for C W . affairs
till abolished 7 January 1967)
C.R.O. merged with F.O. as F.C.O. in October 1968

SECRETARIES OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS

October 1968 - June 1970 Michael Stewart

June 1970 - March 1974 Sir Alex Douglas-Home
March 1974 - April 1976 James Callaghan
April 1976 - February 1977 Anthony Crossland
February 1977 - May 1979 David Owen
May 1979 - April 1982 Lord Carrington
April 1982 - June 1983 Francis Pym
June 1983 - July 1989 Sir Geoffrey Howe
July 1989 - October 1989 John Major
October 1989 - Douglas Hurd

PERMANENT UNDER-SECRETARIES OF STATE AT THE C.O.etc,

CO.
1947 - 1956 Sir Thomas Lloyd
1956 - 1959 Sir John Macpherson
1959 - 1966 Sir Hilton Poynton

C.R.O.
1949 - 1955 Sir Percivale Liesching
1955 - 1959 Sir Gilbert Laithwaite
1959 - 1962 Sir Alexander Clutterbuck
1962 - 1966 Sir Savil Garner

CW Affairs
1966 - 1968 Sir Savil Garner

F.C.O.
1969 - 1973 Sir Dennis Greenhill
1973 - 1975 Sir Thomas Brimelow
1975 - 1982 Sir Michael Palliser
1982 - 1986 Sir Anthony Acland
1986 - 1991 Sir Patrick Wright
1991 - Sir David Gillmore
 I
THE EFFECTS OF DECOLONISATION ON
THE COMMONWEALTH
Bv the mid-centurv the attainment of 'responsible self-qovernment within the
Commonwealth' was the agreed goal for the colonies of the remaining British
Empire bv Conservative, Labour and Liberal parties. But it was still being
argued that dependencies must 'obviously be large enough in population if not
in area, to stand alone, or be close enough geographical!v to some other ter-
ritory to be effectively united to it in a single administration. Secondly,
the colony must possess financial resources and economic stability which would
allow it to pay its way and justify the introduction of capital from overseas,
the latter being an essential factor in the development of all the present
colonial territories. Thirdly, there must be a sufficient number of trust-
worthy and well-educated inhabitants capable of assuming the responsibilities
of administration, and a reasonable level of general education and understand-
ing to ensure that self-government does not merely mean the exploitation of
the masses bv the few behind a facade of democracy. Finally, where racial or
religious minorities exist in a colony, there must be some acceptable method
of protecting these minorities': (Alan Burns, In defence of colonies, p.79;
1957). And Sir Charles Jeffries pointed out that 'the factors in any given
place must obviously differ from those in any other: the question is whether
at a given time they add up to a total which spells the possibility of inde-
pendence' (The Colonial Office, p.39; 1959), while circumstances might in some
cases 'force the people to look outside for defence, for the management of
their external relations for technical and financial assistance'; (ibid.
p.39). There was a warning that independence involved considerable additional
responsibilities: the local revenues must be able to cope with new burdens -
e.g. diplomacy and defence. To be politically viable and truly independent,
leaders must say more than 'Massa dav done'. In the immediate oost-war decade
these factors led to moves to foster closer co-operation, federation, even
union, among Colonies in the Caribbean, in South East Asia, and in the regions
of Africa. But these efforts only served to rouse new prides and prejudices
among adjacent but rival dependencies and to stimulate a new sense of identity
and separate development.
There were indeed some anxieties in colonies about the increasing burdens
of full membership: Grantley Adams, for one. wished that Dominion status of
the 1907, 1914 or 1926 vintage was still on offer, for the additional post-
1945 responsibilities in external policies were forbidding [Vol.VI, p.748].
Again, though most colonial national leaders refused 'to be fobbed off by
anything less than the Westminster model', there were considerable doubts (as
there had long been) in the metropolis whether that was most appropriate in
different circumstances: (see Guy Carleton, George Smith, James Stephen, Mon-
tague-Chelmsford Sic. quoted in F. Madden, Not for export, J.I.C.H. VIII No. 11.
The admission of new full members into the Commonwealth during this post-war
period did indeed change the association radically - not least in the charac-
ter of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers (later, from 1971, with so many presi-
dencies, the Heads of Government) Meetings: these were transformed from an
intimate 'rich man's club' of half a dozen members after the second World War,
to a diverse, even ill-assorted, group of over 50 in the 1990s - predominantly
'Third World' nations, aligned and unaligned and including one new state,
2

Mozambiaue, which had never been within the British empire. The problem of the
small territories which had consumed so much time in the departments and in
the Cabinet Office during the first two decades of this period, with so many
proposals for limiting the total full members by inventing various guises for
a two-tier association - for both Labour and Conservative pamphlets in 1957-8
were agreed that full sovereignty was not possible for the great majority of
British dependencies (even Sierra Leone which gained independence three years
later was considered a borderline case) - was solved by procrastination and
fas ever in British constitutionalism) by evolution. The enumeration of
genera) principles by Burns and Jeffries, however reasonable,worthy, and maybe
right both in prospect and (after decades of troubled unstable independence)
in hindsight, and the creation of a list of written requirements, or creden-
tials for membership, had had, and was to have, no part in the British ethos
nor in Commonwealth experience. There had always been change: and, reluctant
as many were to see Nehru, Malan, Nkrumah or Makarios admitted to Commonwealth
counsels, in the end pragmatism, 'our admirable and efficient ad hoc-erv'
triumphed. The U.N.'s articulate doctrinaire hostility to colonies, the end
of French and Belgian empires in Africa, and fears of violence in East and
Central Africa, left British governments with little alternative but to grant
independence - to 2 more in the 1950s, to 22 in the 60s, to 14 in the 70s and
to 11 since. Ostensibly the 'tiddlers' had inherited the earth: but conversely
the baby had been emptied out with the bathwater. The influence of the asso-
ciation in international affairs diminished. The foreign policies of Common-
wealth countries were only marginally affected by that membership. How differ-
ent from the excellent analysis made in 1958 by Bruce Miller ( The Commonwealth
in the world) of the reasons which made Commonwealth membership desirable when
newly independent states came to choose to be within or without. Outside they
might feel less safe, even poorer by way of trade and aid, certainly less well
informed and fit seemed to them) less important - without 'equality' with the
U.K. The association was flexible: it did not interfere with full indepen-
dence: it was 'independence plus': it imposed no uniformity but presented a
unity: its rich diversity provided a useful bridge for consultation and under-
standing between regions and continents; differences could be lived with: at
its core it still held to the traditions of justice, moderation and balance;
it still fostered common ideals, values and parliamentary institutions. In
promoting goodwi11, it was a valuable, a unique 'concert of convenience', see-
king common purpose. In Nehru's estimation (2 Dec. 1957 quoted Madden, Imper-
ial constitutional documents, 1765-1965, p.101) it was a 'habit', a good habit
not lightly dismissed. But habit was a wasting commodity, and goodwill was im-
paired by strident abuse and anti-colonial, anti-British posturing. All mem-
bers claimed freedom and equality and that seemed to be recognised for a l l -
save the U.K.! Meetings in the 60s and 70s became opportunities to twist the
old lion's tail. In Britain these fashionable criticisms were resented by many
who funded aid. Commonwealth meetings remained popular among leaders for their
social functions - t i l l 1971 in London; but the Commonwealth became increas-
ingly irrelevant as a world association. The Queen, in loyal dedication to her
father's vision, remained its corner stone and indeed its cement, and devoted
much time and thought to personal relations with her P.M.'s and presidents.
But frankly and in confidence U.K. prime ministers and foreign secretaries
found many of their fellow members unsympathetic, brash, ignorant - even
'troublesome' and 'not very easy associates'. In retrospect the association
could be seen as facing the alternatives of being reduced to a Rump of the
original Dominions, or a Sprawl of all the new states; and almost by default
opted for the latter. For a time it seemed it could develop regional meetings
and by its representatives from every continent, enrich world counsels by its
very diversity. But that role proved to be beyond the capacity or corporate
 3
will of what was really a fortuitous collection of states - the tattered
remnants of British imperialism: the Commonwealth, an old boys' club, an empty
durbar, outliving its function, evanescent like the grin on the Cheshire cat -
'dull, stale, unprofitable'. Its only common characteristic now was diversity.
By the end of the century membership was overwhelmingly representative of
mini-states: some 38 had populations of less than one million. Yet in 1958
Bruce Miller had concluded that meetings including such representatives 'would
hardly be taken seriously' (ibid. p.278). Influence could be exercised by
individual members but its effectiveness would depend on their individual
weight, not the corporate consensus of Commonwealth.
Already by the late 60's Commonwealth membership had become, for many of its
members, especially the Old Dominions, largely irrelevant to their external
affairs. Some in Britain now felt it seemed as little more than a whipping boy
for the U.K. at conferences, and there had been reluctant but gradual moves
towards an alternative association in the European Economic Community which
Britain joined (1 January 1973). The imperial and Commonwealth P.M.'s con-
ferences in London had often [1926 was an exception: Vol.VI, No.267] produced
communiques of pious aspirations - 'motherhood and apple pie' - redolent of
bland generalisations and queasy bromides. But from 1971 the Commonwealth
Heads of Government conferences in Singapore bid to outdo them in empty
phrases linked by witless spin doctors - eminently forgettable (e.g. the
Harare declaration of October 1991). Blair's vision of a 'young vibrant Com-
monwealth' in 1997 massaged the truth and the legacy, and was on a par and all
of a piece with a 'moral foreign policy' and 'cool Britain'.

1.(a) D.O. NOTE: The Structure of the British Commonwealth, 21 May 19471
[The note for the Commonwealth Relations Committee quoted the Report

1. Cab.134/117, C.R.(47) 1 [see Vol.VII, pp.52-3]. In July 1947 the Dominions

Office was restyled the Commonwealth Relations Office. This discussion paper
was prepared for the Cabinet's Commonwealth affairs committee, recently estab-
lished by Attlee, primarily to deal with the forthcoming problems of Indian,
Burmese and Ceylonese independence: [Vol. VI, pp.779-94, 850-2: VII, pp.251-
6]. On 9 June it was agreed that the committee of ministers should be assisted
by officials under the secretary of the cabinet who would produce 8 memos. on
various aspects of Commonwealth membership 'to permit more readily of the ad-
hesion to the Commonwealth of self-governing States'. The initial point was
made that 'the present position has indeed grown up out of a long series of
adaptations to meet specific needs'. This had provided 'great flexibility'.
Without formal elaborate prescribed rules the community of sentiment and inte-
rest had grown, rooted in common ideals, traditions and outlook and facilita-
ted by the predominantly British origins in Dominions, apart from S. Africa
and Quebec: the association provided many mutual benefits, and inspired many
sacrifices in a common cause. Mutual trust enabled most secret information to
be exchanged and discussed with complete frankness. That trust was crucial to
the relationship. How could it be established with new members (e.g. India and
Pakistan). The difference of race and colour were not 'insurmountable', for
the ties of a common educational background and long experience of working to-
gether were strong. India must be treated as a complete equal even in defence
and foreign affairs, though initially there might have to be some caution with
information from the U.S., or relating to the U.S.S.R. Risks must be taken to
engender mutual confidence and respect. Modifications should be made only
where this proved 'unavoidable'. The absence of written rules or codified
practice was therefore indeed fortunate: (Rept. of official committee, 15
Sept. C.R.(47) 3, 4 ) .
 4

of 1926 [Vol.VI, 26(b)] and the Statute of Westminster [ibid. No.27(c)],

and emphasised the need for f u l l co-operation and consultation on a l l
matters of common interest, the obligation to consider one another's i n -
terests, and the d e s i r a b i l i t y of 'mutual support where p r a c t i c a b l e ' . ]
The g e n e r a l p i c t u r e t h e r e f o r e i s t h a t o f a group o f s t a t e s s t a n d -
i n g i n a c e r t a i n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e l a t i o n t o one a n o t h e r by reason
o f t h e i r acceptance o f t h e K i n g ' s s o v e r e i g n t y and w o r k i n g t o -
g e t h e r i n an i n f o r m a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g f o r mutual c o - o p e r a t i o n . . . .
[The position of Eire, a republic in external association but neutral
during the war, was an anomaly, now no longer within the general system
of consultation and outside 'the main Commonwealth system', but there
were special considerations - i t s geographical proximity, i t s complete
dependence s t r a t e g i c a l l y and economically on the U.K., the large numbers
of Irishmen in the U.K. and the Dominions, and i t s general support of
western c i v i l i s a t i o n - which j u s t i f i e d i t s treatment of Eire as ' i n some
sense a country of the B r i t i s h Commonwealth'. Elsewhere there were Domin-
ions who desired some change: (1) The word 'Dominion' was not acceptable
now to general opinion in Canada and S. Africa since 'the equality and
independence' of the countries concerned were disguised in a c l a s s i f i c a -
t i o n which set the U.K. apart from the Dominions. (2) Canada considered
the reference in the King's t i t l e to ' B r i t i s h Dominions beyond the Seas'
obsolete: and surely there would be change when India wished for member-
ship. (3) Canada, with f u l l support of other Dominions, desired 'the
complete diplomatic status given to Ambassadors of foreign countries' for
in the past i t was argued that the King could not 'accredit in one capa-
c i t y a representative to himself in another capacity': so they had been
granted a lower precedence as High Commissioners - on a level with a l l
U.K. cabinet ministers. In future Canada would press for precise t r e a t -
ment with foreign ambassadors or even a superior position to them.]
As r e g a r d s t h e i n c l u s i o n o f o t h e r c o u n t r i e s i n membershi p o f
t h e Commonwealth on an equal b a s i s w i t h t h e e x i s t i n g members, t h e
s i m p l e s t s o l u t i o n would c l e a r l y be t h a t t h e y s h o u l d q u a l i f y f o r
membership under t h e same c o n d i t i o n s as t h e e x i s t i n g members,
i.e. they should recognise the K i n g ' s s o v e r e i g n t y , they should
have c o m p l e t e autonomy ( w h i c h c o u l d be secured by t h e g r a n t t o
them o f powers e q u i v a l e n t t o t h o s e c o n f e r r e d by t h e S t a t u t e o f
W e s t m i n s t e r and need n o t i n v o l v e amendment o f t h e S t a t u t e f o r t h e
p u r p o s e ) and t h e y s h o u l d u n d e r t a k e t h e g e n e r a l o b l i g a t i o n s o f
c o n s u l t a t i o n and mutual c o - o p e r a t i o n which t h e e x i s t i n g members
r e c o g n i s e . As a m a t t e r o f f o r m , i t would be a p p r o p r i a t e t h a t
acceptance o f new c o u n t r i e s as equal members o f t h e Commonwealth
on t h i s b a s i s s h o u l d be agreed t o by a l l t h e e x i s t i n g members.
But t h e r e i s no reason t o doubt t h a t such a s s e n t c o u l d r e a d i l y
be g r a n t e d p r o v i d e d t h a t t h e above c o n d i t i o n s were f u l f i l l e d . The
q u e s t i o n o f a c c e p t i n g some l e s s e r f o r m o f a s s o c i a t i o n 1 would

1. Such a t w o - t i e r membership was rejected by the o f f i c i a l committee under the

Cabinet s e c r e t a r y . 'Our view i s t h a t i t i s wiser to proceed in t h i s way [ i . e .
to e s t a b l i s h the e x i s t i n g Commonwealth r e l a t i o n s h i p s with India without modi-
f i c a t i o n s t i l l they prove unavoidable] than to attempt to devise in advance
some new and possibly i n f e r i o r form of Commonwealth r e l a t i o n s h i p unless and
u n t i l i t has been shown by experience t h a t the present form of t h a t r e l a t i o n -
ship cannot be adopted in any p a r t i c u l a r case. We believe t h a t any attempt to
create an i n f e r i o r form of r e l a t i o n s h i p before i t had been shown to be neces-
sary might well be resented by the older members of the Commonwealth. Further,
 5

c l e a r l y r a i s e d i f f i c u l t i e s w h i c h w o u l d h a v e t o be d i s c u s s e d w i t h
t h e e x i s t i n g members a n d m i g h t i n d e e d r e a c t u n f a v o u r a b l y on t h e i r
own a t t i t u d e . I t w o u l d seem n e c e s s a r y a t l e a s t t o show t h a t t h e r e
were special grounds for accepting such association similar to
t h o s e which l e d t o t h e acceptance o f E i r e i n 1937.

( b ) SIR NORMAN BROOK: COMMONWEALTH RELATIONSHIP, 3 A p r i l 19481

. . . I f M i n i s t e r s a g r e e t h a t we s h o u l d be r e a d y w i t h an a l t e r n a -
tive line of policy they have, as we see it, three possible
c h o i c e s : - ( a ) To s e e k means o f d i l u t i n g t h e q u a l i t y o f t h e c o n s -
t i t u t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p t o a p o i n t a t w h i c h i t c o u l d be a c c e p t e d
by a l l , i n c l u d i n g t h o s e who w i s h t o a d o p t a r e p u b l i c a n f o r m o f
independence, (b) To confine membership of the Commonwealth to.
t h o s e who a r e p r e p a r e d t o a c c e p t t h e e x i s t i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p a s i t
s t a n d s , l e a v i n g t h o s e who a r e u n a b l e t o a c c e p t i t t o s e c e d e f r o m
the Commonwealth and become friendly foreign States in close
t r e a t y r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h us on t h e Burma m o d e l , ( c ) To d e v i s e a
new 'Commonwealth of British and Associated Nations' comprising
(i) as the British Nations those self-governing States which
accept the common allegiance to the Crown and of course the
d e p e n d e n t t e r r i t o r i e s , and ( i i ) as t h e A s s o c i a t e d N a t i o n s , t h o s e
S t a t e s w h i c h s e e k a p o s i t i o n o f ' i n d e p e n d e n c e w i t h i n t h e Common-
w e a l t h ' but f e e l compelled t o adopt a form of c o n s t i t u t i o n which
i s i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h a l l e g i a n c e t o t h e Crown.
The f i r s t o f t h e s e c o u r s e s s h o u l d , we t h i n k , be r e j e c t e d e n t i -
rely. Those who hesitate to accept the existing constitutional
r e l a t i o n s h i p w i l l do s o b e c a u s e o f r e l u c t a n c e t o u n d e r t a k e f o r m a l
a l l e g i a n c e t o t h e C r o w n . B u t t h e Crown i s now t h e o n l y f o r m a l
l i n k u n i t i n g t h e C o m m o n w e a l t h ; a n d t h e r e w o u l d be g r a v e d a n g e r s
i n a t t e m p t i n g t o weaken t h e q u a l i t y o f t h a t b o n d . E x p e r i e n c e w i t h
E i r e a f f o r d s no e n c o u r a g e m e n t f o r s u p p o s i n g t h a t a s o l u t i o n c a n

only experience can show in what respects i t may be necessary to modify the
e x i s t i n g form of r e l a t i o n s h i p ' . On two c r u c i a l i s s u e s , i t was argued [e.g. by
Malcolm MacDonald, governor-general of Malaya, 27 June] t h a t if the common
a l l e g i a n c e to the Crown proved ' t h e only s t i c k i n g p o i n t ' in the a s s o c i a t i o n ,
i t s d i l u t i o n as the only formal link should be considered, though some of the
older Dominions might resent t h a t ; and on the r e l a t e d issue of n a t i o n a l i t y ,
members would, under the new B r i t i s h Nationality Act [Vol.VI, No.35], be able
to define t h e i r own c i t i z e n s h i p and to r e t a i n B r i t i s h sub/jecthood too if they
wished. Professor Coupland, or some expert with knowledge of Commonwealth
history and r e l a t i o n s , might advise: (C.R. (37) 3 ) . The Indian government
suggested 'Commonwealth c i t i z e n ' r a t h e r than ' B r i t i s h s u b j e c t ' : (C.R. (48) 1 ) .
1. Cab.134/118: C.R. (48) 1, top s e c r e t . Brook had succeeded Sir Edward Brid-
ges as cabinet s e c r e t a r y . As chairman of the committee of o f f i c i a l s , he was
reporting on the memo, to the cabinet committee on Commonwealth r e l a t i o n s .
Given t h a t they had been i n s t r u c t e d t h a t policy was to persuade India and
Pakistan to remain within the Commonwealth, they now indicated what a l t e r n a -
t i v e l i n e s would be a v a i l a b l e if t h a t primary objective were not a t t a i n e d .
Burma had decided to secede: India was l i k e l y to e s t a b l i s h a republic and to
r e j e c t allegiance to the Crown and membership of a B r i t i s h Commonwealth as
' p o l i t i c a l s u b o r d i n a t i o n ' : Eire seemed l i k e l y to repeal the External Relations
Act [Vol.VI, No.139(b)]. Therefore h i s committee made fresh suggestions,
having taken account of views submitted by P.J. Stent of the I.C.S. and
Professor Mansergh.
6

be found on these lines.

The main arguments in favour of the second course may be summa-
rised as follows. If India or any other Dominion is unable to
accept the existing form of Dominion status, the wiser course
would be to allow her to withdraw completely from the Common-
wealth and to establish close treaty relations with her as a
friendly State, on the Burma model. The essence of the existing
Commonwealth relationship is to be found in a common outlook on
current world problems, based on the inheritance of a common
cultural tradition and, in the older Dominions, on origin from
a common stock. The emblem of this unity of mind is the recogni-
tion of the Crown and, if a nation is not prepared to recognise
this emblem, the assumption is that it does not share the common
heritage of belief and feeling which alone make the Commonwealth
an effective reality. If the United Kingdom Government took the
initiative in proposing a new form of Commonwealth association,
they might endanger the cohesion of the older Dominions by en-
couraging centrifugal tendencies which are at present dormant.
The secession of some parts of the Commonwealth ought to be
regarded as a signal for the older members to draw more closely
together into a smaller, but more compact, union under the Crown.
On the other side, however, it can be argued that the cohesion
of the older members of the Commonwealth should not be taken
wholly for granted. The argument of common origin does not apply
to the French population of Canada or the Dutch population of
South Africa; and current influences, both political and econo-
mic, are tending to draw some of the older Dominions in an oppo-
site direction. A policy of preserving at all costs the constitu-
tional character of the Commonwealth as it existed before 15th
August, 1947, might defeat its own ends, since the withdrawal of
India might so diminish the prestige and weaken the influence of
the Commonwealth as to stimulate the influences working for
separati on.
It should also be borne in mind that the declared aim of our
Colonial policy is the ultimate attainment by the dependent
territories of responsible self-government within the British
Commonwealth. Some of the non-European peoples within the Common-
wealth have a strong royalist tradition, and the principle of a
common allegiance to the Crown is a powerful factor in maintain-
ing close relations with those peoples. With them our aim should
be to build on this foundation that common mind and outlook which
will enable them to work with us in close partnership. There are,
however, other non-European peoples who may not understand or
find acceptable the form of Dominion status which has been
evolved to meet the aspirations of communities originating from
Europe. Some of these may regard allegiance to the Crown as
incompatible wi th political freedom, or may desire a more precise
definition of the rights and obligations of membership of the
Commonwealth. It would be inconsistent with our Colonial policy
to regard the Commonwealth as a 'white man's club', to which non-
European nations may only be admitted if they accept all the
rules and conventions created for a different type of member.
Nor can this question be considered without reference to the
general aims of our foreign policy. The policy of Western Union
implies a determination to establish the political and economic
independence of Western Europe by associating with it, not only
 7
the overseas dependent territories of the participating States,
but also those countries outside the orbits of the Soviet Union
and the United States which share the Western political outlook
and beliefs. If it is our aim to achieve the leadership of a Wes-
tern Union sufficiently powerful to be independent, both politi-
cally and economically, of both the Soviet and the American
blocs, our Commonwealth of nations must be as large and as power—
ful as we can make it. From that angle, this is no time at which
to allow the Commonwealth to shrink in size in the hope of great-
er 'cohesion'.
These arguments against the second course are the main consi-
derations in favour of contemplating the thi rd. This would aim
at maintaining unchanged the existing relationship between those
States which now accept the common allegiance to the Crown (and
others who would similarly accept it on attaining self-government
in the future), but setting this close circle within a wider
framework by designing a 'Commonwealth' which could also include
'associated States' which cannot accept that allegiance. For the
older Dominions (other than Eire) this would involve no constitu-
tional change; but for peoples seeking a position of 'indepen-
dence within the Commonwealth' with a form of domestic constitu-
tion incompatible with allegiance to the Crown there would be a
new opportunity of continuing membership of the Commonwealth as
an 'associated State'.
The relations of these 'associated' States with the British
members of the Commonwealth might admit of definition in terms
of the basic principles and objectives of the association and the
rights and obligations involved in associate membership. It must
be admitted that the difficulties of such definition would be
formidable.
[This third option was not really inconsistent with the U.N. charter,
though some foreign countries might think it a bid to rival the U.N. -
a criticism, much more forcible against 'our policy of building a union
of Western Europe'. It was unlikely that older Dominions would prefer the
status of 'associated State' and weaken the inner group of British
nations, by grouping themselves with those only recently independent.]
It would, of course, be disastrous if the creation of such a
'Commonwealth of British and Associated Nations' resulted in a
sharp distinction between the European and the non-European
nations of the Commonwealth. The value of this new conception
would be gravely prejudiced if it came to be understood that the
British members of the group would consist wholly of European
peoples, and that the non-European peoples could qualify for
admission only as 'associated States'. We doubt, however, whether
in practice a distinction need develop on these lines. For the
status of an 'associated State' might be preferred by Eire, as
providing a solution for her peculiar difficulties, as well as
by India. And, on the other hand, it seems likely that Ceylon and
in due course the West Indies and many of the other Colonial ter-
ritories, would prefer to join the group of independent British
nations owing a common allegiance to the Crown....
[Definition of the relationship between any 'associated State' and the
rest of the Commonwealth would be a formidable task: involving the style
and title of the new Commonwealth; a new form of associated citizenship,
and its rights and obligations; the new processes of consultation; and
the nature of inter-governmental and economic and defence collaboration
 8
of 'associated States' with other Commonwealth members. It should be
possible to evolve a common form of agreement between each associated
State and each other Commonwealth member 'which would be capable of
adaptation to the varying needs of each'. 1 ]

(c) CABINET COMMITTEE ON COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS, 29 July 1948 2

[The committee of ministers had on 31 May asked the committee of of-
ficials under Sir N. Brook to examine in detail the proposal for creating
a new Commonwealth of British and Associated Nations, and their fourth
report had been received. The officials claimed that this new formula
would make it possible to retain unchanged the existing Commonwealth
membership with common allegiance to the Crown and to enlarge it with a
close circle of associates which could not accept that allegiance. It
would be necessary to replace informality by written agreements defining
the principles and objectives of the association and the rights and
obligations of associate members, which would be difficult. Indeed this
brought discussion back to the proposal for redefining the existing
Commonwealth relationship in their second option (C.R. (48) 2) - prescrib-

1. The cabinet committee on 12 April considered these options and rejected the
second. It was attracted by a redefinition of the existing Commonwealth rela-
tionship to meet the special needs of individual members: 'republicanism was
alien to the Indian tradition' and the relationship between the Crown and
India might be expressed in such a way as to command general acceptance in
India. There was even then no complete uniformity in the relationships of the
Crown with individual Dominions. The cabinet asked for detailed proposals on
the third option: (Cab. 134/18: 12 April 1948).
2. Cab.134/118, C.R.(48) 3rd. Attlee had warned the cabinet committee that the
Indian constituent assembly's intention to prepare a republican constitution
raised the question of Commonwealth membership in an acute form (12 April,
ibid.) and the officials' committee should intensify their study of a two-tier
Commonwealth but with no implication that 'the associates' would be inferior.
Meanwhile on 26 July the cabinet committee had to consider Gibraltar's demand
for a legislative council with an unofficial majority instead of rule by the
governor-in-council and a mixed city council. Creech Jones granted this re-
quest (29 Oct.) but Attlee and others doubted whether it was necessary for
Gibraltar to have two representative bodies [see Vol.VII, p.6431: the normal
steps towards self-government were not appropriate for smaller territories:
perhaps the Donoughmore system [ibid. p.213] of a single 'State Council' or
the earlier European model of a City State might be adopted. An inquiry into
the way the promise of self-government might be fulfilled in small colonies
was now required. The C O . was instructed to hold a special inquiry: (C.R. (48)
1; 26 July, 29 Oct. 1948; Cab. 134/118). Indeed when the issue of India's
membership was being resolved, Attlee in presenting the three options to the
cabinet committee - [as above: an associate state, a foreign country with
close treaty relations, or modification of the Commonwealth to admit a repub-
lic to full equal membership] reported the unanimous support of Commonwealth
governments for search for a satisfactory solution and stated 'other colonial
peoples would be gravely affected by a failure of the Commonwealth to adjust
itself (C.R.(49) 1; 7 Jan. 1949), a failure in statesmanship might have 'a
corroding and disintegrating effect' on the Commonwealth; (C.R.(49); 1, 8
Feb.). On 9 Feb. the cabinet committee accepted Gordon-Walker's ideas on
simultaneous declarations by all members but in the event a single London
declaration was passed by the Commonwealth P.M.'s meeting on 29 April 1949;
Vol.VI, No.37(c)].
 9

ing the minimum formal t i e s to which a member must subscribe. On t h i s

Attlee would have preliminary discussions with the Commonwealth P.M.S.]
I n f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n , t h e f o l l o w i n g p o i n t s were made -
( a ) Some M i n i s t e r s were s t i l l d o u b t f u l about t h e a d v i s a b i l i t y o f
s u p p o r t i n g t h e s u g g e s t i o n t e n t a t i v e l y made i n p a r a g r a p h 8 ( a ) o f
C . R . ( 4 8 ) 2 t h a t t h e B r i t i s h Commonwealth s h o u l d i n f u t u r e be
d e s c r i b e d as ' t h e Commonwealth o f N a t i o n s ' . Such a p r o p o s a l would
arouse c r i t i c i s m b o t h i n t h i s c o u n t r y and i n some o f t h e o l d e r
Commonwealth c o u n t r i e s ; and i t was n o t c l e a r t h a t i t s a d o p t i o n
would a f f e c t t h e u l t i m a t e d e c i s i o n o f I n d i a o r P a k i s t a n whether
t o remain i n t h e Commonwealth. The s u g g e s t i o n was made t h a t t h i s
d i f f i c u l t y m i g h t be a v o i d e d by t h e a d o p t i o n o f t h e t i t l e 'Common-
w e a l t h o f B r i t i s h and A s s o c i a t e d N a t i o n s ' f o r t h e e x i s t i n g s t r u c -
t u r e o f t h e Commonwealth. I t was p o i n t e d o u t , however, t h a t t h e
a d o p t i o n o f t h i s t i t l e would suggest t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a f o r m a l
d i v i s i o n between two groups w i t h i n t h e Commonwealth and s e r i o u s
embarrassment m i g h t r e s u l t f r o m t h e n e c e s s i t y o f d e f i n i n g t h e
membership o f each g r o u p . I t s e f f e c t would i n f a c t be t o empha-
s i s e d i f f e r e n c e s o f s t a t u s w i t h i n t h e Commonwealth r a t h e r t h a n
i t s u n d e r l y i n g u n i t y . Moreover, i t would be d i f f i c u l t t o a v o i d
t h e i m p r e s s i o n t h a t t h e ' a s s o c i a t e d ' S t a t e s were i n f a c t s u b -
o r d i n a t e i n s t a t u s ; and t h i s i n t u r n m i g h t a c c e n t u a t e t h e r a c i a l
d i f f e r e n c e s between t h e o l d e r and t h e new Commonwealth c o u n t r i e s .
The C o l o n i a l p e o p l e s would c e r t a i n l y r e s e n t any i m p l i c a t i o n t h a t
i t was n o t open t o them t o a t t a i n e q u a l i t y o f s t a t u s w i t h t h e
o l d e r Commonwealth c o u n t r i e s . . . . [(b) The discussions with India were
complicated at t h i s moment by moves in Eire. Other Commonwealth members
had regarded Eire as a fellow member despite 'the very limited recogni-
tion accorded by that government to the King'. I t would be d i f f i c u l t to
rebut the argument that India should not be excluded from the Common-
wealth for adopting a similar relationship, (c) But the Eire foreign
minister was now saying that Eire was not a member1, contrary to De

1. [Vol.VI, p.608] Eire was severing i t s link with Crown and Commonwealth at
the very time when ' e x t e r n a l a s s o c i a t i o n ' was being contemplated as a possible
precedent for India: see R. Hyam, British documents...Labour Government IV,
pp.161-9, 174-7. The nature of I n d i a ' s r e l a t i o n s h i p as a f u l l and equal mem-
ber, not 'Dominion', of the Commonwealth of Nations [Vol.VI, p.179] emerged
when i t was evident t h a t Attlee and Nehru were determined to find a formula
to accommodate republican membership with the personal symbol of the Sovereign
not the Crown as 'Head of the Commonwealth'; (one suggestion curiously was for
'Lord P r o t e c t o r ' (D.O.121/28 Gordon-Walker, Mins. 7 Feb. 1949).Krishna Menon
was opposed to a t w o - t i e r s o l u t i o n : 'two c i r c l e s of membership': ' I n d i a did
not want to get into the same position as Ireland: i t wanted to be c l e a r l y in
or out [VI, p.569n]. He favoured a link through 'Commonwealth c i t i z e n s h i p '
which the parliamentary under-secretary Gordon-Walker, having consulted the
parliamentary counsel Sir John Rowlatt, thought 'too f u r t i v e and t e n u o u s ' ;
(Min. 31 Dec. Annex B). Stafford Cripps believed if there were agreement on
a sufficient number of points and none alone were sufficient, 'the aggre-
gate. . .might add up to a genuine r e l a t i o n s h i p ' : (Meeting at No. 10 of the P.M. ,
Cripps, Gordon-Walker and Krishna Menon, 22 Dec. Annex A: 3 Jan. C.R.(49) 1:
Cab. 134/119). Dr. Evatt of Australia was quoted as saying t h a t ' t e n times
nought is still nought'; (Gordon-Walker, Annex C. The Link with India, Cab.
134/119). Gordon-Walker, convinced t h a t a l l e f f o r t must be made to obtain
I n d i a ' s membership, ( ' a s long as there i s a chance whatever of devising a
 10
Valera's line that it was a member 'so long as the other members regarded
her as such'. The ministers therefore endorsed the conclusions of the
Brook Committee (C.R.(48) 4 and agreed that the P.M.'s of Canada, Aust-
ralia and N.Z. should be consulted.] with a view to preparing the
way for discussions at the October meeting of Commonwealth Prime
Ministers on the question what minimum formal ties a particular
country must be willing to accept if it was to remain a member
of the Commonwealth.

2. MARGERY PERHAM: NOTES ON SOME GENERAL, METROPOLITAN AND PROCEDURAL

ASPECTS OF THE COMMITTEE'S PROBLEMS, 18 September 19501
[There was need for the Committee to consider the constitutional prob-

satisfactory Crown link we must continue to try with all our might') wrote a
paper on the minimum that would be acceptable. He believed that alternative
forms of relationship would be a confession of failure as India wanted 'to
remain inside*. So 'we must start again from the fact that India wants to be
in the Commonwealth and all the other members want to accept her into member-
ship. Could we not base ourselves on a Commonwealth relationship resting upon
the will and intent of all its members? This would give us a real link to
start from? If so, by accumulating 'embellishments' (citizenship, honours
etc.) the substantial link could be illustrated, if vaguely; or by consenting
to the removal of the Crown as an absolutely crucial link, a non-monarchial
Dominion which genuinely desired membership could fit alongside Crown Domini-
ons with the King as head of the Commonwealth. There might be international
legal objection, but politically the Commonwealth with U.S. support would be
strong. 'I tentatively put this idea forward because I feel that there is
hardly anything more important for us than to keep India in the Commonwealth
and because I feel that it would be a tragedy, if, given India's goodwill, we
fail'. (Annex C. The Link with India).
1. D.0.35/2218, S.T.C.(50) 42. Notes submitted to her fellow members of the
committee of enquiry into constitutional development in the smaller colonial
territories, set up following Creech Jones outline to the cabinet Commonwealth
affairs committee (19 Jan. 1949: C.R,(49) 1st; Cab.134/156) that 3 categories
of colonies existed - those potentially capable of independence; those which
might combine with others for independence; and those outside either category.
Attlee deplored the absence of an accepted body of principles and defined con-
stitutional objectives and the tendency to resort to ad hoc concessions. He
felt it too readily assumed that Westminster was the most appropriate model
(and thought India should have followed the U.S. form): the fashion for inter-
national closer co-operation should discourage the creation of many small
political entities which might technically be independent but in reality
isolated and feeble. He favoured the development of principles of association
or integration. The committee was established under the chairmanship of Sir
Frederick Rees (who had been on the Soulbury commission) and included Sir John
Maude, 2 M.P.s with colonial service, 2 C O . officials (Sir Charles Jeffries,
and Sir Kenneth Roberts-Wray from the legal dept.) and 2 Oxford dons, Profes-
sor Vincent Harlow and Margery Perhara. Jeffries had proposed that some (Falk-
lands, Malta, Gibraltar, St. Helena) might be incorporated in the U.K. under
the Home Office; others (Barbados, Bermuda, Gold Coast, Kenya, Malaya, Mauri-
tius, Nigeria, N. Rhodesia, S.L., Singapore, Tanganyika and the W.I. federa-
tion) should have a new satellite status; and elsewhere the Crown Colony sys-
tem should continue (Note, 27 April, S.T.C.(50) 20). Margery Perham found this
'rather revolutionary' and this was her reply. She was Reader in Colonial
Administration at Oxford.
 11
lems of smaller t e r r i t o r i e s in a wider context i f 'the sphere of p o l i t i -
cal psychology and imperial organisation' for a constitution could work
only i f i t accorded with p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t y and accompanied 'by education-
al and social compensations'. Sir Charles Jeffries had pointed to the
need to give the 21 small t e r r i t o r i e s some sense of belonging to the Com-
monwealth: she agreed with him that the CO. and C.R.O. should be integ-
rated once more. But to deny Dominion status to any of those 21 on the
3 grounds alleged by Creech Jones in his inaugural address to them on 25
Oct. - strategic importance to the rest of the Commonwealth, too slender
resources to support self-government, or too great weakness for s e l f -
defence - would be a departure from the declared principles of B r i t i s h
colonial policy. The strategic argument concerned 'our own i n t e r e s t s ' :
i t was crucial in Cyprus, H.K. and Gibraltar but no t e r r i t o r y could be
excluded ' e n t i r e l y from strategic p o t e n t i a l i t i e s ' . The other two grounds
depended on 'our own opinion with regard to them' and both could be ques-
tioned. On self-defence] i t m i g h t be r e t o r t e d t h a t no n a t i o n s ,
e x c e p t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and R u s s i a , are c a p a b l e o f d e f e n d i n g
themselves s i n g l e - h a n d e d . There are many weak s t a t e s , some as
s m a l l and weak as s e v e r a l o f our t w e n t y - o n e , which e n j o y complete
o r a l m o s t complete independence r e l y i n g upon t h e i n t e r e s t which
some n e i g h b o u r i n g power o r group o f powers, has i n d e f e n d i n g
them. The development o f l a r g e ' w e s t e r n ' o r A t l a n t i c o r g a n i s a -
t i o n s f o r defence may, i n d e e d , s e r v e t o undermine f u r t h e r t h e
need f o r an e x c l u s i v e dependence upon one n a t i o n .
Much t h e same a p p l i e s t o t h e argument about t h e r e s o u r c e s f o r
independence. T,here a r e governments - E t h i o p i a f o r example -
which p r e f e r p o v e r t y o r v e r y slow development w i t h independence
t o a more r a p i d economic g r o w t h w i t h some danger o f dependence.
The c o n t i n u e d e x i s t e n c e o f L i b e r i a , H a i t i and t h e Dominican
R e p u b l i c w i t h , t o say t h e l e a s t , a much h i g h e r degree o f s e l f -
government t h a n a n y t h i n g we propose f o r our t e r r i t o r i e s , r e p r e -
s e n t s a s t a n d i n g q u e s t i o n t o t h e o p i n i o n upon which our d e c i s i o n
i s based. Nor i s t h e s i t u a t i o n here s t a t i c . World o p i n i o n o r , a t
l e a s t , an amount o f o p i n i o n which i s a b l e t o make U n i t e d N a t i o n s
d e c i s i o n s and r a i s e w i d e s p r e a d hopes, has decreed t h a t I t a l i a n
Somali l a n d i s t o be independent i n t e n y e a r s and L i b y a i n t h r e e .
F i n a l l y , i n complement t o what was s a i d o f more g e n e r a l i s e d d e -
f e n c e , t h e o f f e r o f f i n a n c e and o t h e r a s s i s t a n c e f r o m t h e U n i t e d
N a t i o n s o r f r o m t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and f r o m o r g a n i s a t i o n s s u p p o r -
t e d by t h a t c o u n t r y , compete w i t h t h e a s s i s t a n c e which t h i s c o u n -
t r y i n i t s p r e s e n t economic c o n d i t i o n , can o f f e r , and so weaken
t h i s argument i n f a v o u r o f our c o n t i n u e d e x c l u s i v e ' p o s s e s s i o n '
o f t h e s e s m a l l and needy t e r r i t o r i e s . . . . The o n l y s a t i s f a c t o r y
answer t o a l l t h e s e d o u b t s and d i f f i c u l t i e s i s t o prove t h a t t h i s
c o u n t r y can make t h e c o l o n i e s ' i n t e r e s t harmonise w i t h her own
because one c o u n t r y can o f f e r p o l i t i c a l and e d u c a t i o n a l i n f l u -
ences which cannot be s y n d i c a t e d - UNESCO has s t i l l t o d e v i s e an
Esperanto o f c u l t u r e - and t h a t B r i t a i n has t h e b e s t goods t o o f -
f e r . But i n a c t i n g upon t h i s b e l i e f we have more t h a n one c i r c l e
t o s q u a r e . . . . [Since B r i t a i n had taken the risk of, and could not retract
from, the processes of decolonisation, i t had to earn or retain the
loyalty of the peoples in the d i f f i c u l t constitutional compromise which
t h i s situation forced her to devise and at a time when the assumptions
on which colonial rule were being widely and e f f e c t i v e l y questioned.]
P o n d e r i n g over t h i s dilemma i n t h e r e l a t i v e calm o f t h e v a c a -
t i o n I am d r i v e n t o t h r e e p r a c t i c a l c o n c l u s i o n s : - (a) I n a l l c o n -
12

s t i t u t i o n s we s h o u l d f r a n k l y and e x p l i c i t l y r e s e r v e d e f e n c e and
f o r e i g n a f f a i r s , ( b ) I n e v e r y o t h e r sphere we s h o u l d make on
paper and i n f a c t t h e f u l l e s t d e l e g a t i o n o f power t o t h e p e o p l e
( c ) To compensate f o r t h e d e n i a l o f complete s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t 1 we
s h o u l d o f f e r f u l l y and a c t i v e l y t h e g r e a t e s t p o s s i b l e degree o f
economic, s o c i a l and e d u c a t i o n a l s e r v i c e and c o n t a c t w i t h t h i s
c o u n t r y . I n t h i s way t h e s e p e o p l e s may d e v e l o p a sense o f a s s o -
c i a t i o n w i t h us and a t t a i n as i n d i v i d u a l s ( o r i n t h e i r p r o f e s -
sions, societies etc.) a civic dignity and equality in relation
w i t h t h e p e o p l e o f t h e U n i t e d Kingdom and o t h e r Commonwealth
n a t i o n s w h i c h i s d e n i e d t o them i n t h e i r c o r p o r a t e c a p a c i t y as
s t a t e s o r n a t i o n s . But i f t h i s l a s t sentence o r something l i k e
i t i s n o t t o remain an i m p r e s s i v e and c o m f o r t i n g c o n c l u s i o n t o
our r e p o r t we must t h i n k o u t p r a c t i c a l ways by w h i c h , even a t
c o n s i d e r a b l e expense a l i k e i n e f f o r t , i n money and i n a d m i n i s t r a -
tive reorganisation at the metropolitan end, it can be expressed
i n action....
[She acknowledged Roberts-Wray's objection to the previous paragraph
and the d i f f i c u l t y in legally defining 'defence' not least in the
drafting of the Letters Patent for Malta (§23). But i t was best to be
honest and show where H.M.'s G. meant to go on standing.] T h i s r e s t -
r i c t i o n w i l l i n a l m o s t e v e r y t e r r i t o r y be f r e e l y a c c e p t e d now
whereas i f t h e r e i s any a m b i g u i t y about i t and t h e whole r e s p o n -
s i b i l i t y i s l e f t t o t h e G o v e r n o r , t h e r e m i g h t be awkward s i t u a -
t i o n s a t a l a t e r s t a g e when we m i g h t n o t u n f a i r l y be accused by
t h e p e o p l e o f h a v i n g m i s l e d them as t o t h e e x t e n t o f t h e i r s e l f -
government. . . . [Any immediate inconvenience from t h i s novel r e s t r i c t i o n
might lessen with experience; and i t should be noted that t h i s reserva-
tion was made in a constitution ' i n a l l other parts...extremely l i b e r a l
in i t s delegation of powers'. She agreed with J e f f r i e s and Professor Har-
low2 in advocating a reorganisation in Whitehall in regard to the rela-
tions with Empire and Commonwealth: i t would be unfortunate to leave 'our
unhappy twenty-one' l i k e 'dregs' to suffer 'the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of perma-
nent subjection'. Indeed, there might be some s e n s i t i v i t y about the com-
pany some colonies would keep in the new categories - Europeans with
coloureds, or substantial t e r r i t o r i e s ( l i k e Nigeria) alongside Ascension
and Tristan da Cunha. In time, as non-European units became 'more c i v i l i -
sed and prosperous', the colour sense would wear o f f , but i n i t i a l l y i t
was important to put the main emphasis on the new relationship with the
U.K. in the new category of Island and City States. Moreover i t might be
desirable to i n v i t e some of the larger units to enter i t f i r s t and extend
i t to the smaller t e r r i t o r i e s only after the former had settled down and
appreciated i t s advantages. She wondered about some island federation,
more p a r t i c u l a r l y in the Pacific.
Presentation of the new proposed categories would be important: not
perhaps in small 'white' colonies (e.g. Falklands) or in H.K.3 or Aden

1. I.e. internal and external self-government. The external dimension (defence

and foreign a f f a i r s ) associated with sovereign independence would be denied
to the new proposed category of ' s a t e l l i t e ' or City and island s t a t e s which
would have f u l l i n t e r n a l self-government only. 2. On 19 Oct. he proposed a
Commonwealth Affairs Office, with Commonwealth Relations dealing with the
self-governing, Commonwealth Services dealing with education, health and
social services, and Overseas Territories for colonies, protectorates etc.;
( S . T . C 5 0 ( 4 7 ) ) . 3. Margery dissented from the r e s t on H.K. which did not
 13

where the majorities would be unaware or unaffected by them, but in most

of the t e r r i t o r i e s . Any appearance of imposing new constitutional catego-
ries ready-made must be avoided.] On t h e c o n t r a r y i t would be
wise t o announce t h e i d e a o f t h e new c a t e g o r y o f I s l a n d and C i t y
S t a t e s as one o f d i g n i t y and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , i n d i c a t i n g perhaps
t h e main f e a t u r e s and i n v i t i n g t h e e l i g i b l e t e r r i t o r i e s t o c o n -
s i d e r t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f e n t e r i n g i t and o f w o r k i n g o u t f o r them-
s e l v e s t h e e x a c t d e t a i l s o f t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l changes i t w i l l
i n v o l v e . I t would c e r t a i n l y be wise t o ask them t o c o n s i d e r whe-
t h e r t h e y would be p r e p a r e d i m m e d i a t e l y ( o r i f t h e y w i s h , by
s t a g e s ) t o t a k e up new and heavy l e g i s l a t i v e , f i n a n c i a l and a d m i -
n i s t r a t i v e r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , r a t h e r than p o i n t out t h a t t h i s
means t h e end o f any f a l s e hopes o f Dominion s t a t u s t h e y may have
c h e r i s h e d . That w i l l be o b v i o u s - t h e n o v e l t y w i l l be i n t h e i m -
mediate and l a r g e advance i n t h e i r powers and s t a t u s . The sooner
t h i s can be done, b e f o r e more c o l o n i e s g r a d u a t e i n t o Dominion
s t a t u s , t h e b e t t e r . . . . [Furthermore, i f the new states were to have
dignity and permanence, no unit l i k e l y within a brief period to break
away, should be included: that would only weaken the new states. The
p o s s i b i l i t y of additional relationships - co-operative in economic or
defence associations in a wider ' c i r c l e of friends and helpers' - should
be kept open.]
I t s h o u l d a l s o be remembered t h a t t h e t u t e l a r y power w i l l be
o b l i g e d , on her s i d e , t o t a k e an ever g r o w i n g number o f i n t e r n a -
t i o n a l o b l i g a t i o n s on b e h a l f o f t h e s e permanent w a r d s . . . .
[ F i n a l l y , the new constitutions must be 'as democratic as possible';
even H.K. which might prove a bad example of B r i t i s h democracy in the
East, and bad company for the rest of our Island and City States.
Constitutions should not c r y s t a l l i s e the domination of any ruler (the
Sultan of Zanzibar) or minority (the Arab group there, the merchants of
Aden, or the white caste in Bermuda or the Bahamas). Where (as in
Somali land) the great majority was unready to undertake democratic
r i g h t s , i t would be best not to include such a t e r r i t o r y in a class of
states which, 'as t h e i r chief merit and d i g n i t y ' , would carry 'a large
and immediate advance in self-government'.]
3. (a) C.R.O./CO. WORKING PARTY: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF COLONIAL
TERRITORIES, 28 February 1951 1
[Events i n the Gold Coast had emphasised the need t o consider ' t h e
terminus o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change' i n the c o l o n i e s . H.M.'s G.'s declared
p o l i c y had been t o lead them t o 'self-government i n s i d e the Commonwealth'
but d i d t h a t mean 'Membership o f the Commonwealth as now understood'? I n
which c o l o n i e s and when would such Membership become a ' l i v e i s s u e ' ? Why
s h o u l d , or should n o t , c o l o n i e s become Members? Or was t h e r e another

offer any b a s i s for a democratic c o n s t i t u t i o n . The majority, Chinese and

European, was a fluid population, intent on making a l i v i n g . There was l i t t l e
i n t e r e s t in democracy and i t would be 'almost impossible' ' t o define an
e f f e c t i v e e l e c t o r a t e ' (p.28).
1. D.0.35/2217: C.635/5, s e c r e t . A ' f i r s t very provisional document' prepared
by the s e c r e t a r i e s following the f i r s t e l e c t i o n s in an African colony, the
Gold Coast, on universal suffrage. Sir Charles J e f f r i e s and Andrew Cohn r e p r e -
sented the C O . ; and Sir Cecil Syers, Sir Charles Dixon, C.H. Baxter, R.R.
Sedgwick the C.R.O.; with Roberts-Wray as legal adviser. Five months before
the Rees committee reported t h i s p a r a l l e l inquiry by o f f i c i a l s was at work.
 14

Commonwealth relationship?1]
1) The first question can be answered with some confidence, thus:
the Gold Coast, Nigeria, the Federation of Malaya, the prospec-
tive Caribbean Federation. Of these territories the West Indian
group is probably best fitted for constitutional advance, but is
aware that it cannot hope to make it until after federation. It
is very probable that the Gold Coast will be the first to aspire
to Membership of the Commonwealth. East and Central Africa may
later be candidates, as one territory or two, if federation can
be achieved.
2) What happened in the case of Ceylon suggests that the movement
towards complete independence, once begun, is liable rapidly to
accelerate. Whether it is possible for the United Kingdom to put
a political brake on the movement depends in the last resort on
whether the people concerned will use violence to assert their
claims. It may not be necessary for some time (perhaps five
years, perhaps much more) to face up to a demand for full Member-
ship of the Commonwealth. But the problem of the relationship
between the colonial territories and the Members is already im-
minent in so far as the Gold Coast, for instance, considers that
its status should at once be raised, perhaps to something approx-
imating to that of Southern Rhodesia.
3) The formal measures for the initiation of a new Member of the
Commonwealth present no great difficulty. There are plenty of
precedents. The very considerable political difficulties are
dealt with in 4) below.
4) The Prime Minister of South Africa is reported to have said
in a public speech on the 23rd February: 'The Commonwealth is a
closed group, all free and all equal, and consequently one would
expect that in admitting a new Member all would have an equal
say, because it may affect the whole complexion and character of
the group. But what do we find? Acting on her own, and without
consultation with or the approval of other Commonwealth Members,
Britain recently admitted India, Pakistan and Ceylon to the Com-
monwealth, and now intends to continue the process with out rest-
riction and in the same way.' There is no justification for Dr.
Malan's complaint. It is in any case quite clear that it would
be completely impossible further to add to the Membership of the
Commonwealth without the consent of the other Members. Would that
consent be forthcoming? It is extremely doubtful whether it
would. If the United Kingdom were to sponsor the admission of a
new Member it might perhaps carry Australia and New Zealand
along. Dr. Malan's recent speech has made it clear that the ad-
mission of colonial territories, particularly African territor-
ies, would be anathema so far as the present Government of South
Africa is concerned; and it is by no means certain that an alter-
native government would take a very different view. Although
there is no formal or binding provision for meetings of Common-
wealth Prime Ministers, they have come to be looked upon as an
essential feature of Commonwealth Membership, perhaps even more

1. In another draft (CD.C(51), 5-6 March 1951) full self-government without.

Membership of the Commonwealth was called 'Limbo': a crucial testing mark of
existing membership was the right to be summoned to the meeting of Common-
wealth P.M.s.
 15
important than allegiance to the Crown, in view of India's having
become a Republic. It is difficult to imagine the Commonwealth
as we now know it continuing in being without these periodic mee-
tings. The question which therefore arises is: would the Govern-
ments of the Members of the Commonwealth and of Southern Rhodesia
be willing that their Prime Ministers should sit round a table
in conference with the Prime Minister of, for example, the Gold
Coast? Australia and New Zealand might perhaps agree, though they
would certainly do so without any enthusiasm. South Africa would
almost certainly not agree; Southern Rhodesia likewise. India,
Pakistan and Ceylon might find themselves in a dilemma. As long
as they are not called upon to accept any share of responsibility
they will applaud the end of 'colonialism' and will be highly
critical of Dr. Malan's attitude. But if the accession of, for
instance, the Gold Coast to Membership of the Commonwealth became
a practical possibility, they might take the view that the Com-
monwealth was developing into an association that had less of
tangible benefit to offer them than formerly, and might be less
interested in continuing to belong to it. It would be easy for
them to dress up their coolness toward the colonial territories
in some more respectable guise; India and Pakistan, for instance,
might announce that they had decided on mature reflection that
what they wanted was 100% republicanism, which was not compatible
with Membership of the Commonwealth. Canada might give a half-
hearted blessing to the promotion of a colony to Membership, then
proceed to become yet more retracted within herself, yet more
disinclined to take part in anything savouring of centralised
consultation. Canada is in fact unlikely to be either a great
help or a great hindrance in dealing with the problem. As happen-
ed when India and Pakistan became Dominions, she is likely to
make it clear that she is not really very anxious to be consulted
at all. The possible objections of the four former old Dominions
to the admission of new Members will be heightened by their cons-
ciousness of the possibility that the day might not be far dis-
tant when the old original Members would be in a minority in the
councils of the Commonwealth.
To put the problem quite bluntly, the Commonwealth may have to
choose between the admission of some of the Colonies as new
Members and the secession of some existing Members, notably South
Africa....
[The possibilities should be considered of Commonwealth relationships
through regional groupings e.g. a Secretary of State for Africa; a
reorganisation of the C.R.O; a Colonial Council (to which colonies would
send representatives, irrespective of their varied stages of advance);
a two-tier Commonwealth which would not satisfy the Colonies, antagonise
S. Africa and make S. Rhodesians angry at being outstripped by other
African colonies, and the conception of a 'Commonwealth of British and
Associated States' had been rejected by SirN. Brook's statement in April
1948 [No.1(b)]]
The objective of Commonwealth policy must, therefore, be to
retain the independent Members within a single group even though
their constitutional relations inter se may not all follow pre-
cisely the same pattern. It is not necessary to change the cons-
titutional relations of all the independent Members of the Com-
monwealth merely because one or two of them insist upon a form
of relationship which is rather less close than that preferred
16
by t h e m a j o r i t y . There can be scope f o r some v a r i e t y i n t h e
r e l a t i o n s between t h e d i f f e r e n t p a r t s o f t h e Commonwealth.
The 2 - t i e r Commonwealth, t h e i d e a o f which was t h u s r e j e c t e d ,
would have been based on a d i f f e r e n t a t t i t u d e t o w a r d s t h e Crown
i n d i f f e r e n t p a r t s o f t h e Commonwealth. The o b j e c t i o n s t o a t w o -
t i e r Commonwealth m i g h t be even g r e a t e r i f t h e l i n e o f demarka-
t i o n between t h e t w o - t i e r s were t h e s t a g e o f s o c i a l and economic
development r e a c h e d . A l l e g i a n c e t o t h e Crown would p r o b a b l y n o t
be an i s s u e o f f i r s t i m p o r t a n c e . Dr. Malan, who has a l r e a d y s e t
h i m s e l f up as a d e f e n d e r o f t h e Commonwealth a g a i n s t a U n i t e d
Kingdom bent on i t s d i s i n t e g r a t i o n , would p r o b a b l y become more
l o y a l t h a n t h e King i f he t h o u g h t t h a t by so d o i n g he c o u l d
f u r t h e r h i s p o l i c y o f e x c l u d i n g C o l o n i e s f r o m Membership. I t does
n o t seem l i k e l y t h a t t h e Gold C o a s t , by showing r e p u b l i c a n t e n -
d e n c i e s , w i l l make such t a c t i c s n e c e s s a r y .
( v ) One f o r m o f t h e t w o - t i e r Commonwealth m i g h t be as f o l l o w s :
t h e e i g h t p r e s e n t Members would c o n t i n u e t o be t h e permanent
n u c l e u s o f t h e c o u n c i l s o f t h e Commonwealth (Prime M i n i s t e r s '
m e e t i n g s ) , w h i l s t t h e newly a d m i t t e d Members would f o r m a panel
f r o m w h i c h r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s would be chosen i n r o t a t i o n t o t a k e
p a r t i n t h e d e l i b e r a t i o n s o f t h e f u l l assembly.
(vi) I t may be t h a t t h e problem o f f u l l Membership w i l l n o t b e -
come acute in the near future, since the Gold Coast, etc. might
f o r some t i m e be c o n t e n t w i t h p r o m o t i o n t o t h e s t a t u s o f S o u t h e r n
R h o d e s i a . I t may, t h e r e f o r e , be u s e f u l t o c o n s i d e r how f a r S o u t h -
e r n Rhodesia has t r a v e l l e d on t h e road t o w a r d s f u l l Membership
of the Commonwealth....
[The c r i t e r i a for Membership were acceptance of the provisions of the
Statute of Westminster, direct access to the King, representations at
P.M.'s meetings and on Commonwealth bodies, appointment of High Commis-
sioners to other Commonwealth countries, obligation to consult on matters
of common concern, right of secession, separate citizenship; and repre-
sentation in the U.N., right to conclude t r e a t i e s , appointment of ambas-
sadors and consuls, the conduct of foreign policy. S. Rhodesia, an
'intermediate t e r r i t o r y ' , had achieved only a few of these 1 , so the Gold
Coast had only a short way to go before overhauling S. Rhodesia, and East
and Central Africa would soon be in the same position.]
The United Kingdom Government will shortly have to decide
whether t o i n v i t e t h e views o f t h e Members o f t h e Commonwealth,
or o f any o f them. So f a r as South A f r i c a i s c o n c e r n e d , t h e
q u e s t i o n i s academic. Dr. Malan i s f o r c i n g t h e pace and has made
c l e a r what he does n o t w a n t . I t i s d o u b t f u l whether he would have
any c o n s t r u c t i v e s u g g e s t i o n s t o make.

( b ) C.R.O. MEETING, 28 May 19512

[A CO. committee had been concerned to work out some special status
for small t e r r i t o r i e s which could not expect to come to f u l l independent
sovereign status, either alone or in federation with others (Gibraltar,
Malta, Cyprus, the Seychelles, the Falklands, Mauritius, possibly

1. Representation at P.M.'s meetings, the exchange of H.C's with the U.K.,

and the right to conclude purely local treaties with foreign colonial
governments, some trade agreements on the treatment of goods, and full
autonomy for external commercial relations under G.A.T.T.
2. D.0.35/2218.
 17

Bermuda, Bahamas, Zanzibar, the Gambia and Borneo t e r r i t o r i e s were

examples) - Full internal self-government with the U.K. responsible for
international and defence matters as 'City and Island States' ' t o mark
status and satisfy local opinion' would be the target. This concept would
need f u l l p u b l i c i t y . But bigger colonies with eyes set 'on a larger goal'
~ Intermediate Territories - would also expect a simultaneous public
declaration about t h e i r precise future (these might include a possible
Central Africa federation, East Africa federation, West Indies feder-
ation, the Gold Coast, Nigeria, Malaya).]
In r e l a t i o n t o these t e r r i t o r i e s the governing d o c t r i n e i s t h a t
t h e U n i t e d Kingdom Government's aim i s t o l e a d them t o r e s p o n -
s i b l e s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t w i t h i n t h e Commonwealth. What does t h i s
mean? As the [joint C.R.O./CO.] Working Party pointed out, it is
w i t h i n t h e competence o f t h e U n i t e d Kingdom Government t o deal
w i t h i t s C o l o n i e s as i t p l e a s e s and t h e r e f o r e t o c o n f e r s e l f -
government on them; b u t a d m i s s i o n t o t h e i n n e r C o u n c i l s o f t h e
Commonwealth (i.e. the Prime Ministers' Meeting) has hitherto
been, and must presumably r e m a i n , a m a t t e r f o r agreement between
a l l t h e e x i s t i n g Members. There i s t h u s t h e dilemma t o which t h e
Working P a r t y have c a l l e d a t t e n t i o n . W h i l e i t may be presumed
t h a t t h e day w i l l come when t h e s e t e r r i t o r i e s w i l l have reached
f u l l n a t i o n h o o d (as Ceylon d i d t h r e e years ago) and may e x p e c t
n o t o n l y s o v e r e i g n independence b u t a l l t h a t s o v e r e i g n i n d e p e n -
dence has h i t h e r t o meant i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e Members o f t h e
Commonwealth, i t i s c e r t a i n t h a t one Member (South A f r i c a ) w i l l
r e f u s e t o s i t round a Conference t a b l e w i t h them and i t is
p o s s i b l e t h a t o t h e r Members may w i t h d r a w r a t h e r t h a n see t h e
Conference t a b l e e n l a r g e d . A l t h o u g h i t does n o t f o l l o w t h a t a
c o u n t r y which w i t h d r e w f r o m t h e Prime M i n i s t e r s ' Meeting would
weaken her l i n k s b i l a t e r a l l y w i t h t h i s c o u n t r y and w i t h some o r
a l l o f t h e o t h e r Members o f t h e Commonwealth, t h e u l t i m a t e e f f e c t
would be the d e s t r u c t i o n of the Prime M i n i s t e r s ' Meeting, which
i s - as i t were - t h e outward embodiment o f what i s a t present
meant by 'Membership of the Commonwealth'. Moreover, it is not
i m p o s s i b l e t h a t South A f r i c a would w i t h d r a w f r o m t h e Commonwealth
on such an i s s u e . Could we w i t h e q u a n i m i t y f a c e t h i s as a p r i c e
o f b r i n g i n g t h e Gold Coast t o t h e Conference t a b l e ? . . . .
[To meet t h i s d i f f i c u l t y the C.R.O./CO. Working Party suggested a
special intermediate status as enjoyed by S. Rhodesia: i f not acceptable
i n d e f i n i t e l y , t h i s status might be satisfactory temporarily and would
postpone the problem t i l l , with the passage of time, i t might prove
easier to solve.]
At our m e e t i n g doubt was expressed whether t h i s would be s o ,
s i n c e e x p e r i e n c e shows t h a t aggrandizement o f s t a t u s g e n e r a l l y
leads t o f u r t h e r demands and t h a t what was p r e p a r e d as an advan-
ced p o s i t i o n f o r r e t e n t i o n f o r some t i m e has soon been o v e r - r u n
by progressive nationalism (e.g. the Soulbury Constitution in
C e y l o n ) . Would such t e r r i t o r i e s as t h e Gold Coast i n f a c t be
s a t i s f i e d by a h a l f - w a y house? M i g h t n o t M i n i s t e r s who had p l e d -
ged t h e m s e l v e s t o t h e whole road e i t h e r have t o l e a d t h e i r people
t o t h e end o r g i v e way t o o t h e r s who would? Moreover t h e r e i s (as
indeed t h e Working P a r t y r e c o g n i s e d ) an anomaly i n t h a t Southern
Rhodesia has a l r e a d y been a d m i t t e d t o t h e i n n e r C o u n c i l s on
s e v e r a l o c c a s i o n s ; t r u e t h e r e were s p e c i a l reasons f o r t h i s b u t
they would not appeal to nationalists in e.g. the Gold Coast.
En passant there was a brief discussion at this point about the
18

effect of the adoption (if they were adopted) of the Central

African Closer Association proposals. Southern Rhodesia would
presumably expect that the special position enjoyed by Sir
Godfrey Huggins would continue. Would this mean that the Prime
Minister of Southern Rhodesia would expect to be invited to Prime
Ministers' Meetings? Or the Prime Minister of the Federation?
Obviously, difficult questions arise here.
We then discussed the question of solving the dilemma by some
special arrangements for associating intermediate territories in
the Councils of London. We rejected as impracticable the idea of
some selective representation at the Prime Ministers' Meetings:
this would require the full agreement of all other Members, which
would not be obtainable. We wondered whether it would be possible
to hold the position - (a) by crystallising the present arrange-
ments in the form of a Prime Ministers' Conference with a special
Central Secretariat, and (b) by arranging for special Conferences
with those intermediate territories which came to full self-
government.
The Colonial Office representatives pointed out that, apart
from the obvious difficulties, there are special difficulties
here under (b) by virtue of the fact that there is really very
little in common between e.g. East Africa and West Africa; when
the Colonial Office held an African Conference they in fact had
to break into separate huddles. If this happened the system could
hardly be defended as a satisfactory substitute, in the eyes of
ardent nationalists, for attendance at the Prime Ministers'
Meeting.
(As regards the smaller territories no question would arise of
even selective representation at the Prime Ministers' Meeting.
The Colonial Office Committee had rejected the idea of a Standing
Conference in London for these territories and would probably
recommend some intermittent form of consultation in London,
possibly by way of an occasional Smaller Territories Conference. )
Beyond examining all the difficulties of this side of the
question we found ourselves unable to reach any conclusions.
We also considered what in fact 'responsible self-government
within the Commonwealth' in relation to the intermediate terri-
tories would mean. Since it would imply abolition of all reserved
powers, it would mean from the United Kingdom point of view comp-
lete absence of control - balanced no doubt by absence of obliga-
tions. In the international and defence spheres the United King-
dom might have rights to consul tation etc.; but in the last anal-
ysis there was nothing (short of force - which was unthinkable)
to prevent such territories from gaining full control of their
destinies if they had the finance and manpower necessary (and in
the case of e.g. the Gold Coast or Nigeria the day might well
come when they had). We could not therefore argue that they could
be excluded from Prime Ministers' Meetings on the grounds e.g.
that they were unable to look after their own defence or that
they were incapable of running their own international affairs
with those countries with which they were especially concerned
by the appointment of their own diplomatic staffs....1

1. A side note by Percivale Liesching (2 Jan. 1952) questioned whether there

would be commitment to treaties, e.g. N.A.T.O.
 19
[The interim report of the Smaller Territories Committee suggested a
Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs and one for Colonial Affairs
and a Minister for Commonwealth Service - 2 new departments, 2 new
permanent secretaries and subordinate staff - and at least 2 cabinet
ministers. This would be unacceptable on political and manpower grounds.]
Nor, if our analysis of the aspirations of the intermediate
territories was right, would the proposals meet one of the objec-
tives of the Smaller Territories Committee - that of keeping the
intermediate territories under the same umbrella ( i.e. the Colon-
ial Affairs Department) as the smaller territories. The intermed-
iate territories would presumably expect to come eventually under
the Commonwealth Affairs Department. . . . [There was a strong case for
a Commonwealth Service organisation which could form a focus in London
for the Colombo Plan, for example: a Crown Services office not under a
Minister but a Director-General (cf. CO.I.) under a minister.]

(c) SIR CHARLES JEFFRIES: MEMORANDUM, 7 August 19511

One of the most important problems to be solved in the Colonial
Office during the next year or two is that of associating Colo-
nial peoples not only in the management of their own affairs but
in the general affairs of the Commonwealth and the democratic
world. Apart from any other consideration, it is obviously essen-
tial to British interests that the Colonial peoples should remain
contented members of our family, and that Britain should retain
their support and sympathy in conducting her external affairs.
It is not inconsistent with this assertion to hold the sincere
belief that the best interests of the Colonial peoples themselves
are also served by the maintenance of the British connection.
There is a real risk that preoccupation with constitutional and
economic development may obscure recognition of the fact that
money and effort expended on these objects will be wasted from
every point of view unless the Colonies remain on the democratic
side and more particularly on the side of Britain and the Common-
wealth. It is not enough, in these days, to assume that this will
be so, that gratitude for material help and appreciation of con-
stitutional concessions will of themselves secure the desired
result. Such an assumption involves an altogether too optimistic
view of human nature and gravely underestimates the strength of
propaganda - not necessarily only from actively hostile sources -
directed against the maintenance of the British connection.
The requisites are two:- first, to put the 'British case' to
the Colonial peoples in order to enlist their support; secondly,
to dispel the idea that there is a whole range of matters of deep
concern to them, which are dealt with over their heads, without
their being given any opportunity to express their views or being
listened to if they do express them. This idea is already being
voiced in several Colonial quarters. At the moment, it is a no-
velty, and there are relatively few people in the Colonies who
have any genuine interests outside their own parochial affairs.
But the idea is there and will undoubtedly gain force - and being
on the whole justified it will give a lot of trouble if not taken
in time.

1. C O . 967/147. Jeffries had served throughout his career in the C O . and was
/joint deputy under-secretary of state (1947-56).
20

In the past, the essential key point in meeting both requisites

has been the Governor. But in the field of internal affairs, the
Governor is becoming daily less an agent of the British Govern-
ment and more a constitutional ruler acting on the advice of lo-
cal popular representatives. Today, in all but the most backward
Colonies, government is conducted on the principle that legislat-
ive and financial power is vested in the unofficial members of
the legislature. Barring the exceptional use of reserved powers,
if a Governor wishes to secure acceptance of a policy of which
he is personally in favour, or which His Majesty's Government
considers desirable, he has to do it not by putting formal machi-
nery into motion but by persuasion and influence. In fact, Gover-
nors today spend much more time presenting the case of their Co-
lonies to His Majesty's Government than vice versa; and this must
clearly be a growing tendency. The Governor cannot be spokesman
for both sides. If he is to continue to be a spokesman at all,
he must speak for the Colony which pays him and the people
appointed to advise him.
If this is true in the case of a Colony's internal affairs, and
its individual relationship with His Majesty's Government in
regard to those affairs, it is surely unrealistic to suppose that
the Governor can be expected at the same time to be the sole
channel for expounding to the Colonial people British policies
and interests in international affairs and persuading the Colon-
ial people to accept and support the British line. The difficulty
becomes most acute when there is an apparent or real conflict
between the immediate interests of the Colony and the broader
interests of Britain and her associates.
I do not suggest that the Governor has ceased or should cease
to be in a key position. What I mean to suggest is that he should
be enabled to play his part as mediator and counsellor more
effectively by being enabled to do it behind the scenes, instead
of being thrust, as is the tendency at present in many colonies,
into the political limelight. This means that new methods of con-
sultation and communication have to be worked out. Some are in
fact already being tried; some are discussed in the report of the
Smaller Territories Committee. Before, however, coming to discuss
such methods in detail, I wish to place a general consideration
in the foreground.
For tactical purposes, the work of the Colonial Office is ne-
cessarily broken down into a number of separate functions. Part
of the organisation is concerned with administrative and cons-
titutional questions; part with financial and economic matters;
part with staffing of the Colonial Service; part with the dis-
semination of information about and to the Colonies; part with
the development of social services; part with defence questions;
part with the welfare of Colonial students etc. in this country;
part with international relations; and so on. Within the Office
all these parts are or should be working together in pursuance
of a general strategy, the main object of which may be defined
as the conduct of our relationship with the Colonies along such
lines as will secure that the Colonial peoples, as they become
mature, will not only stand on their own feet in reasonable
conditions, but will continue to co-operate with Britain and the
Commonwealth....
[The allocation of manpower to these many functions was within the C O . 's
 21

discretion, but the balance of p r i o r i t y for spending B r i t i s h taxpayers

money must be governed by the relative value of schemes selected and
others not. Moreover there was l i t t l e pretence of co-ordination between
other departments - the Stationery Office, the Central Office of Informa-
t i o n , the Government Hospitality Vote, the Ministry of Works, the B r i t i s h
Council, the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, the B.B.C The Go-
vernment must decide what i t was prepared to spend upon that objective
and to work out a reasoned plan for allocating available money according
to current requirements: to cut the vote on broadcasting, for example,
to increase the number of colonial v i s i t o r s , or to send out fewer magaz-
ines and more CO. o f f i c i a l s . But at present 'a cut in one vote is not
accepted as an argument for a higher allocation from another'. ( I t i s ,
o f c o u r s e , a w e l l - k n o w n weakness o f t h e e x i s t i n g system o f Gover-
nment f i n a n c e t h a t n o t h i n g once s t a r t e d ever s t o p s , even though
i t may l o n g have o u t l i v e d i t s u s e f u l n e s s ; and t h e r e f o r e Govern-
ment e x p e n d i t u r e c o n t i n u a l l y i n c r e a s e s . We m i g h t a t l e a s t s t r i k e
a blow f o r g e t t i n g away f r o m t h i s p e r n i c i o u s system i n t h e C o l o n -
i a l O f f i c e f i e l d . ) [ J e f f r i e s l i s t e d the need for more overseas v i s i t s by
CO. s t a f f , more administrative s t a f f to stand in for those absentees,
for higher expenses to enable o f f i c i a l s to be more independent of local
h o s p i t a l i t y , for assistance for expenses for colonial unofficials to
v i s i t B r i t a i n and reimbursement of private entertainment given by CO.
s t a f f , for increased grants to the B r i t i s h Council &c. to provide such
u n o f f i c i a l s with courses, and for increased provision for conferences.
Indeed the organisation of such conferences, for summer schools and
courses was becoming a f u l l - t i m e development. The development of an
informed and friendly public opinion in the Colonies required a co-
ordinated Information Department; and inter-government communication
required the appointment by more advanced colonies of London representa-
tives in constant touch with the C O . , relieving the governors of openly
acting as spokesmen both for the U.K. and colonial governments, and of
CO. representatives in the colonial capitals. There would be pressure
to economise, but reduction must be resisted. 'A new deal' was required
in the p o l i t i c a l sphere comparable to that in the economic sphere opened
by the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts.]
At t h e same t i m e , i t would be improper t o propose c o n s i d e r a b l e
expansions w i t h o u t e x a m i n i n g t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f s e t t i n g them o f f
by a t l e a s t some d i s c a r d i n g o f e x i s t i n g commitments. I t h i n k t h a t
i t can f a i r l y be argued t h a t we s h o u l d r e v i e w t h e whole range o f
f r e e s e r v i c e s which t h e O f f i c e r e n d e r s t o t h e C o l o n i e s . T h e i r
c o s t i s i n f a c t a s u b s t a n t i a l h i d d e n supplement t o t h e a i d g i v e n
under t h e C o l o n i a l Development and W e l f a r e A c t s , b u t we g e t
l i t t l e p u b l i c c r e d i t f o r i t , which i s a p i t y . . . .
[Such services were those as recommended by the Rees committee. There
would be a strong case for charging some to CD. & W. funds where
parliamentary support would be easier to secure than for additional CO.
s t a f f and expenditure. But, i f H.M.'s G. p o l i t i c a l objectives were to be
realised, i t would have ' t o spend more rather than less' so i t would be
prudent ' t o rearrange financial provisions so as to present the picture
in a more r e a l i s t i c and palatable l i g h t and to secure the maximum public
credit for our c o n t r i b u t i o n ' . ]
22
(d) REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF ENQUIRY INTO CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN
THE SMALLER COLONIAL TERRITORIES, August 19511
[Their terms of reference in 1949 had, in relation to the present and
future 21 smaller territories, to examine the suitability of various
models and to consider how desirable or practicable it would be to define
ultimate objectives or general principles; to examine individual rela-
tionships of territories with each other and the U.K., and how far the
parochial ism of small isolated communities could be mitigated and a genu-
ine sense of partnership in the Commonwealth be strengthened; and to con-
sider how far healthy political growth could be facilitated by adopting
simpler forms of government (on a municipal rather than a Parliamentary
model) which might avoid extravagance, increase efficacy and make combi-
nation easier. The 21 territories named were Malta, Gibraltar, Cyprus;
St. Helena-Ascension-Tristan da Cunha, the Falklands, Bahamas, Bermuda;
Gambia, S.L., Zanzibar, British Somaliland; Aden colony and protectorate,
Mauritius, Seychelles; H.K., Fiji, and the W. Pacific H.C. Territories
(Solomons, Gilbert and Ellice, N. Hebrides condominium, Pitcairn and
Tonga).
These territories were diverse in character, race, religion and
development: some became dependencies because their inhabitants
petitioned for inclusion; others taken over from European competitors in
war; others, almost involuntarily, by pressure from trades and mission-
aries. Some were useful for defence or securing sea routes: some were
left economically dependent on Britain for subvention (St. Helena),
others for employment (Malta). All but four were islands. The Common-
wealth was the only common denominator.
The forms of government varied: old colonial; Crown colony; nomination
and election &c,, but the conclusion which has been drawn from imperial
constitutional history was that the Westminster model led to indepen-
dence. But Creech Jones' invitation to the committee members stated that,
while some could aspire to Dominion status and others could combine to
secure responsible government, 'a fairly large number of territories fall
outside these categories'. While in the course of time some of the larger
colonies would achieve independence, that would be 'a very long period
even for the few' and the majority, too small and poor, would never 'be
able to maintain true independence'. The committee had tried to avoid the
frustration of asserting 'thus far and no further along the familiar
path' to those who would not be eligible for Dominion status.] We have
assumed, rather, our task to be concerned with long-term consi-
derations and that we should aim at devising a new status, short
of full independence, but one which would satisfy the legitimate
pride and aspirations of the inhabitants of those territories... .
[But there were great expectations, and some 'on our list' had already
advanced so far along the path that there seemed little scope for sugges-
tions of a radically different goal. Some backward and under-developed
territories outside the Commonwealth cherished their independence and saw
no benefit in associating with the Commonwealth. Therefore smaller terri-
tories must be convinced that their interests were 'in harmony with
ours', and that the Commonwealth provided all the freedom and scope for
development they need.
The Committee named 7 guiding principles in securing the w i l l i n g assent
of territories which would remain with the Commonwealth but would not
become 'full members'. (1) H.M.'s G. as 'the centre of the Commonwealth'

1. C.0.976/146.
 h
would retain total control of external defence and foreign affairs: colo-
nies would limit their aspiration for complete independence just as the
U.K. might surrender a degree of sovereignty in the interests of the U.N.
and the free world. (2) Increasingly the people of these territories must
be granted the fullest delegation of power and as much internal responsi-
bility as possible. (3) Government must be as simple and inexpensive as
was compatible with efficiency. (4) H.M.'s G. must provide the greatest
amount of economic, social and educational aid to local resources. (5)
A sense of belonging to a larger entity as partners in the Commonwealth
must be created. (6) Especially in plural societies a sense of local
patriotism must be fostered. (7) The distinction between dependent and
independent membership must be lessened.
The possible association of colonies in regional federal unions or with
common services was considered, but the prospects of federation were
insufficient to provide immediate solutions and must grow naturally from
within and not be imposed. Incorporation in the metropolis - the U.K. -
on the French model would place additional burdens on a territory and
would be impracticable, even in regard to Gibraltar and Malta.
Independence indeed could not always be the appropriate target: some
territories should not become sovereign states. The committee had con-
sidered the precedent of Tonga - a fully autonomous country in a treaty
relationship where Britain undertook external security, but decided that
in many small territories Britain must also be involved to some degree
in internal matters.] To hand over unrestricted control in in-
ternal a f f a i r s in small t e r r i t o r i e s where the bulk of the popula-
tion is e c o n o m i c a l l y weak and politically immature might, in
p r a c t i c e , involve the a b a n d o n m e n t of the people to the dictation
of a dominant group which would be free to indulge in tyranny and
corruption without let or h i n d r a n c e . . . . [What was needed was a new
status less than independence but which must avoid the stigma of 'colon-
ialism'. So they suggested a status of Island or City State: with 3 cate-
gories:- one (Falklands, Gibraltar, St. Helena) so small that local and
central government could merge (a single State Council with executive and
legislative functions; a second (Aden colony, Fiji, Gambia, Zanzibar)
where urban and district councils would elect members of the State Coun-
cil and the governor would have an advisory Privy Council; and the third
(Mauritius, Seychelles) with greater complexity requiring a Privy Coun-
cil, an executive Council of Government and a legislative State Council.
(The mixed function of the State Council in the first two categories
would seek to associate representatives of the people, elected directly
or indirectly, with day-to-day administration and to avoid the tension
in Crown colony government between the elected legislature and the non-
responsible executive. The State Council could resolve itself in to 'a
Committee of the Whole' for executive purposes and cross examine and
instruct officials. The Council of Government (as in Mauritius) would
include unofficials elected by and from the legislature with the title
of 'ministers'). In addition there were territories which would not
qualify for Island and City status (the Aden protectorate, British
Somali land, the New Hebrides condominium, Pitcairn and Sierra Leone) and
those well might qualify in time (the Bahamas, Bermuda, Solomons, Cyprus,
Gilbert and Ell ice, Hong Kong, Malta and Tonga). The committee suggested
that a new Consultative Committee for the new states should be set up to
foster a sense of 'belonging' to the Commonwealth.1

1. On 28 Feb. 1950 the interim recommendation for such a Colonial/Commonwealth

 24

The committee worked through the l i s t of the 21 smaller t e r r i t o r i e s

assigning them the prospect of constitutions of Island or State Class I
with a mixed State Council (executive and l e g i s l a t i v e ) , Class I I with
Privy Council, mixed State Council and local councils; or Class I I I with
Privy Council, Council of Government and l e g i s l a t i v e State Council and
local councils. The comments were interesting. For example, the committee
noted that reform had already been promised to Gibraltar - par excellence
a candidate for Class I , but now i t was too late for that. In F i j i the
Indian birthrate had long exceed the F i j i a n and the elimination of
communialsm and pol i t i c a l integration between Indians, F i j i a n s , Europeans
and Chinese would have to be 'gradual' u n t i l the Indian-Fijian population
r a t i o had become 'comparatively s t a b i l i s e d ' . The constitutional future
of Cyprus was so very uncertain and reform on the lines proposed would
hardly be 'openly welcome'. Hong Kong 'assuming i t w i l l be retained as
a B r i t i s h colony', would be a l i k e l y candidate as a Class I I City State,
but 'under present conditions' that was an impracticable reform, though
the Committee (M. Perham dissenting as there was ' l i t t l e interest in
democratic experience') f e l t development should be on a City State model
rather than the Young Municipal Authority lines. When time came for
reforms in Malta, 'dyarchy' with 'reserved subjects' in the hands of the
governor should be avoided (App.3).
Special care must be taken in introducing the new status gradually or
announcing i t as a new departure: indeed the committee favoured i t s
promulgation as a novel, positive, imaginative break with the past
mould. 1 Their main recommendations were:-]
165. A new c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s t a t u s s h o u l d be e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e
c r e a t i o n o f I s l a n d S t a t e s and C i t y S t a t e s o f t h e Commonwealth and
t h i s s t a t u s s h o u l d be between t h a t o f a dependency and an
i n d e p e n d e n t member o f t h e Commonwealth.
166. W h i l e t h e r e would be d i f f e r e n t c l a s s e s o f I s l a n d and C i t y
S t a t e s , t h e y s h o u l d a l l be g i v e n t h e g r e a t e s t p o s s i b l e degree o f
i n t e r n a l s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t and t h a t government s h o u l d be v e s t e d i n
a State Counci1.
167. The b a s i s o f membership o f t h e S t a t e C o u n c i l s h o u l d be
e l e c t i o n e i t h e r d i r e c t l y o r by l o c a l government b o d i e s .
168. I n t h e s i m p l e r t y p e o f C i t y or I s l a n d S t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n ,
t h e S t a t e C o u n c i l s h o u l d a d m i n i s t e r l o c a l government as w e l l as
c e n t r a l government s e r v i c e s . I n o t h e r t y p e s , t h e r e s h o u l d be
s e p a r a t e l o c a l government b o d i e s , b u t s i n c e t h e s e would have t h e
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f e l e c t i n g t h e S t a t e C o u n c i l , t h e r e would be
i n t i m a t e a s s o c i a t i o n between l o c a l and c e n t r a l government.
169. Except i n t h e more complex t y p e o f I s l a n d or C i t y S t a t e
( C l a s s I I I ) , t h e S t a t e C o u n c i l s h o u l d combine e x e c u t i v e and
legislative functions.
170. As f a r as p o s s i b l e t h e S t a t e C o u n c i l s h o u l d be r e g a r d e d as
t h e e x e c u t i v e and s h o u l d f u n c t i o n as s u c h . For e x e c u t i v e m a t t e r s
which must remain v e s t e d i n t h e Governor he s h o u l d be a s s i s t e d
by one o r more c o n s u l t a t i v e b o d i e s , which would be p u r e l y
a d v i s o r y and f o r s p e c i f i e d s u b j e c t s .
1 7 1 . I n l a r g e r and more complex t e r r i t o r i e s t h e r e s h o u l d be a

c o n s u l t a t i v e council was submitted to James G r i f f i t h s (App.4). 1. Local pride

might be recognised by s t a t e flags and emblems; personal r e l a t i o n s with the
Sovereign could be marked by using the prefix 'Royal' and colonial t i t l e s
awarded in the honours l i s t .
 25
small executive body, selected from and responsible to the State
Council, to be termed a Council of Government.
172. Members of the Council of Government would be termed
Ministers and would assume responsibility for one or more
functions of government.
173. The Council of Government should be primarily an executive
body, but should also, to a limited extent, carry out the
functions of a second Chamber.
174. Civil Servants, with the exception of the holders of the
three State Offices of State Secretary, Attorney General and
Financial Secretary, should, in practice, be the servants of the
State Council, and their position should be analogous to that of
the staff of a local authority.
175. Financial responsibility should be vested in the State
Council and the delegation of financial power to the Council
should be as complete as possible.
176. Territories which are solvent should not be required to
submit their annual estimates to the Secretary of State for
approval, and territories which are insolvent owing to unavoid-
able causes should receive assistance in the form of a block
grant covering a period of years.
177. A Colonial Consultative Council should be created, asso-
ciated in conception with the Privy Council. Such a purely
advisory body should, in any case, be set up for Island and City
States and, if limited to these territories should be designated
His Majesty's Council of Island and City States, but, in the view
of the majority of us such a Council should include representa-
tives from all non-self-governing territories of the Common-
wealth.
178. The smaller territories should be encouraged to follow the
practice of some of the larger territories in appointing
accredited representatives in this country.
179. Potential leaders of the new City and Island States should
be brought to this country in greater numbers than at present for
training, and a special department in the Colonial Office should
co-ordinate all matters connected with Colonial visitors.
180. The Commonwealth Relations Office and the Colonial Office
should be reorganised so as to form three departments under one
Minister for Commonwealth Affairs. The three departments to be
the Commonwealth Relations Office, the Commonwealth Services
Office and the Commonwealth Territories Office. The Commonwealth
Services Office would take over and develop on a Commonwealth
scale the advisory, research, and recruitment organisations now
included in the Colonial Office. The Commonwealth Territories
Office would carry on the remaining responsibility of the present
Colonial Office, but the change of title should denote a
genuinely new departure in relationships.
181. There should be a special division within the Commonwealth
Territories Offices (or the Colonial Office if the proposal for
metropolitan reorganisation is not accepted) to deal with Island
and City States.
182. The conversion of the smaller colonial territories into
Island and City States if decided on should not be done piece-
meal. It should be announced as a new departure and, after the
necessary instruments had been prepared and the offer of the new
status had been explained to and accepted by the peoples
26
concerned, it should be conferred simultaneously on several
territories by His Majesty the King. 1

1. The report was to be kept secret, but the Rees committee's recommendations
were submitted to a comprehensive survey by the C.O, officials in consultation
with governors. In five appendices to the report comments were summarised:
(C.O.976/149). (1) the Island and City State concept was 'attractive
intellectually but academic, un-English and not to be recommended' but 'might
be borne in mind': such a strait.iacket of 3 categories should not be imposed
by London when local conditions must determine progress: to tell certain
colonies that they could never achieve independence would cause gloom, might
well prove fallible and would reneage on British promises for self-government;
the term 'City State' founded on slavery, had 'an archaic flavour", might be
resented more than 'colony' and would hardly impress international circles:
the Westminster model was not necessarily too elaborate, 'City State' would
be 'no cheaper or more efficient' and assumed a demand and capacity for more
self-government for which few were ready. The need was economic stability
rather than constitutional progress. 'The real problem of the smaller colonial
territories is one of resources and to neglect this in favour of experiment
with political forms is to build on sand'. There must be local consultation.
The report might be 'a guide in framing constitutions to suit local circum-
stances. .. not necessarily .. .on the Westminster model'. (2) The municipal model
was one which should be considered, and might have value in Gibraltar or St.
Helena but not in Gambia, Zanzibar and Aden: it would be unwelcome as a shift
away from parliamentary models and as a diminution of the status of colonial
government: it was 'too late to change' and it would be a 'retrograde and
unpopular step' to substitute indirect for direct election. The system of
executive committees had proved 'cumbrous and dilatory' in Ceylon [Vol.VII,
Nos. 63(b), 69(a)], was not the only alternative to the Westminster model, but.
might work where parties and policies had not emerged. (3) Though the report
would rightly transfer executive authority to the elected representatives
where the unofficial majorities in a constitution were weak, the combination
of executive and legislative functions in a single State Council would be
unsound (save in Gibraltar): it might give the elected representatives more
power than they were ready for. Few people would have the ability for, or be
able to afford unpaid executive work. Executive authority must be concentrated
to be efficient, not spread through a State Council and officials should not
be directed by such Councils. Responsibility must be transferred gradually.
'It is not clear what the Committee mean when they urge placing executive
responsibility in the hands of representatives of the people, since the
examples given refer to the least important of the executive powers. But
certainly in the conduct of day-to-day business executive responsibility must
rest with the Governor and Heads of Departments and not with a Political
Committee of general composition'. (4) Generally opinion was opposed to the
creation of a central council for these colonies', there was no such demand:
it would be distasteful and invidious to those approaching self-government it
would be too diverse and its only common factor irritation at H.M.'s G: 'a
mere talking shop' soon recognised as a 'sham' - without sufficient agenda and
expensive and inconvenient to send representatives. (5) There was a little
support for some metropolitan reorganisation: it was doubtful whether many
territories disliked being handled by the C.O. and would resent being deprived
of separate cabinet representation by a super-minister for Commonwealth
affairs - an enormous task: 'Just as the Colonies are subject to change so is
the Commonwealth itself; some Dominions behave almost like foreign countries
at times. The whole Commonwealth system needs reviewing'. The incoming
 27
(e) AMBLER THOMAS: MINUTE, 1 January 19521
[The Smaller T e r r i t o r i e s Committee had tackled an important question
in a bold and imaginative way. From his knowledge of Aden,2 he warned
that demands would grow and seek to oust us from the Colony where B r i t a i n
had major commercial and strategic interests. He did not, however l i k e
t h e i r concept of Island and City States: a false nee-Hellenic, even G i l -
bertian, proposal. ' I t is true that Shirley Baker succeeded 100 years ago
in setting up a complete Gilbert and Sullivan constitution in Tonga [Vol.
IV, p.677, V, p.565] which appears to have worked w e l l , but I do not
think that H.M. 's G. could get away with that today without being laughed
a t ' . The status would bring 'a half apologetic smile on the l i p s and this
would be f a t a l to the scheme'. Moreover to impose a uniform pattern - a
s t r a i t j a c k e t - on the diversity of t e r r i t o r i e s would lead to a breakdown
soon. To create mixed hybrid councils, both executive and l e g i s l a t i v e ,
would be d i f f i c u l t to set up in small t e r r i t o r i e s . The report was 'too
apologetic in tone' as i f i t were out of question to continue to run an
empire for many inhabitants took pride in l i v i n g in a B r i t i s h colony: he
did not see why to meet U.N. c r i t i c i s m s , i t would help to c a l l colonies
Island and City States. I t would be l i k e t e l l i n g someone who wanted a
Rolls Royce, that he would be given a motor bike with special pennants
on i t and annual i n v i t a t i o n to a r a l l y where cars would also be present.]
. . . I t h i n k t h a t t h e answer may be found on t h e f o l l o w i n g l i n e s .
I t s h o u l d be f r a n k l y acknowledged and on some s u i t a b l e o c c a s i o n
a u t h o r i t a t i v e l y s t a t e d t h a t t h e d e c l a r e d p o l i c y o f H.M.G. on
d e v e l o p i n g t e r r i t o r i e s t o t h e p o i n t o f s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t cannot be
a p p l i e d t o c e r t a i n s m a l l e r t e r r i t o r i e s where H.M.G. has v i t a l
s t r a t e g i c and commercial i n t e r e s t s which i t proposes t o m a i n t a i n
t o t h e p r o s p e r i t y o f t h e t e r r i t o r y and t h e Commonwealth as a
whole and where t h e economic and o t h e r r e s o u r c e s o f t h e t e r r i -
t o r i e s do n o t a d m i t o f t h e i r becoming ' v i a b l e ' s t a t e s . W i t h i n
these l i m i t s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r self-government i n local matters
w i l l be encouraged and each t e r r i t o r y and c o n s t i t u t i o n w i l l be
c o n s i d e r e d on i t s m e r i t s . I n some cases a l i m i t e d f o r m o f L e g i s -
l a t i v e C o u n c i l development may be p r o p e r , in o t h e r s , t h e emphasis
s h o u l d perhaps be on m u n i c i p a l development. There may be one o r
two where t h e S t a t e C o u n c i l i d e a may be f r u i t f u l b u t t h e f u n d a -
mental assumption i n a l l t h e s e cases - and H.M.G. s h o u l d be q u i t e
r e a l i s t i c and hard b o i l e d i n s a y i n g i t and I b e l i e v e t h a t t h e y
would e l i c i t a s i m i l a r l y r e a l i s t i c response among l o c a l i n h a b i t -

s e c r e t a r y of s t a t e , Oliver L y t t e l t o n , was also very doubtful about the Rees

proposals and the report was shelved. Soon however the demand of Nkrumah for
Dominion s t a t u s for the Gold Coast (12 Feb. 1951) had t h r u s t to the fore
consideration of the c r i t e r i a for Commonwealth membership - the terminus for
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l reform: Dr. Malan in S. Africa saw Gold Coast demands as a
t h r e a t to the a s s o c i a t i o n . Indeed on 16 Feb. Lyttelton established a j o i n t
CO./C.R.O. body to study whether the Commonwealth 'could not stand d i l u t i o n
if i t were to remain a force in world a f f a i r s ' .
1. C O . 976/149. A.R. Thomas was a s s i s t a n t s e c r e t a r y of s t a t e at the C O .
(1952-64) and was minuting on the report of the smaller t e r r i t o r i e s committee
as establishment o f f i c e r :• the s e c r e t a r i a t to the colonial council, a separate
Commonwealth services o f f i c e , and a special division for the Island and City
S t a t e s . These would mean a considerable increase in expenditure: not easy to
get permission for in present circumstances.
2. He had been chief s e c r e t a r y there (1947-9).
28

ants - is that these territories cannot look to attaining full

self-government.
Up t o a p o i n t I a g r e e w i t h t h e p r o p o s a l s o f t h e C o m m i t t e e f o r
f o s t e r i n g l o c a l p a t r i o t i s m by s y m b o l i s m . I t h i n k i t i s i m p o r t a n t ,
however, n o t t o c a r r y t h i s t o t h e p o i n t a t which t h e G i l b e r t i a n
c r i t i c i s m may a p p l y . The R o y a l F a m i l y a n d B r i t i s h w a r s h i p s a r e
an a b s o l u t e s a f e b e t f o r a r o u s i n g a n d f o c u s i n g t h e l o y a l t i e s o f
C o l o n i a l p e o p l e s . A n y t h i n g e l s e s u c h a s l o c a l f l a g s may a n s w e r
a n d s h o u l d be c o n s i d e r e d i n t h e l i g h t o f t h e l o c a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s
of each territory, but it should not be assumed that they will
have t h e d e s i r e d a f f e c t .
I cannot support with enthusiasm the proposal t h a t there should
be f u r t h e r c o n f e r e n c e s i n L o n d o n o f r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f t h e s m a l -
l e r t e r r i t o r i e s . I f r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s a r e t o come a s i n d i v i d u a l u n -
o f f i c i a l members o f L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l a n d n o t a s M i n i s t e r s o f
a self-governing country there is the danger of embarrassment
vis-a-vis the Governor and the local Government. I do not believe
t h a t t h e r e i s , or c o u l d be m a n u f a c t u r e d , a s u f f i c i e n t b a s i s o f
common i n t e r e s t a n d t o p i c s t o k e e p a c o n f e r e n c e o f many w i d e l y
s e p a r a t e d C o l o n i e s g o i n g . T h i r d l y , t h e r e c o u l d i n my v i e w be no
question of c a l l i n g t h i s Council into consultation before execu-
t i v e d e c i s i o n s w e r e t a k e n i f t h e r e w e r e t o be a n y c o n t i n u e d s p e e d
and efficiency in our Colonial administration....
[He thought t h a t t h e r e was much t o approve i n t h e i r proposals f o r
m e t r o p o l i t a n o r g a n i s a t i o n but i t would be e s s e n t i a l t o see i f t h e Old
w h i t e Dominions and Ceylon and I n d i a would use the Commonwealth Services
O f f i c e . Again i f i t meant t r a n s f e r r i n g t h e ' w o o l l y f r i n g e ' o f t h e O f f i c e
( t h e a d v i s o r y & C . D J W. s e r v i c e s ) t h e r e must be a small but t a u t and
h i g h l y e f f i c i e n t team o f a d m i n i s t r a t i v e o f f i c e r s i n e x e c u t i v e c o n t r o l or
the O f f i c e would degenerate i n what t h e B r i t i s h Council and the M i n i s t r y
o f I n f o r m a t i o n used t o b e . 1 ]

(f) C O . SMALLER TERRITORIES COMMITTEE: MEETING, 2 January 1952 2

[The C.R.O. r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s were present t o give t h e i r o p i n i o n s on t h e
Rees r e p o r t e s p e c i a l l y on t h e proposals f o r m e t r o p o l i t a n r e o r g a n i s a t i o n .
I t was agreed t h a t t h e r e p o r t would have t o be submitted t o Cabinet; t h a t
the e x i s t i n g Dominions would make l i t t l e use o f the proposed Commonwealth
Services O f f i c e , headed probably by a D i r e c t o r - G e n e r a l 3 ; and t h a t none

1. In a d d i t i o n to the Rees committee, and the p a r a l l e l inquiry i n t o c o l o n i a l

c o n s t i t u t i o n a l development, A t t l e e had e s t a b l i s h e d a cabinet o f f i c e study of
Commonwealth co-operation under S i r N. Brook. When the Conservative s e c r e t a r y
of s t a t e , Oliver L y t t e l t o n , in Feb. 1952 proposed a P.M. and cabinet for the
Gold Coast, he foresaw t h a t t h i s would have repercussions elsewhere in the em-
p i r e and, though he i n s i s t e d t h a t Nkrumah should not have the r i g h t to attend
Commonwealth P.M.s' meetings, i t was necessary to consider t h i s c a r e f u l l y . In
November with a p o s s i b l e further request for Commonwealth membership from the
Sudan (which did not materialise) he set up a committee to review the criteria
for such membership (6 Nov. 1952). 2. CO.976/149 s e c r e t : held in Lloyd's
room. Sir P e r c i v a l e Liesching, permanent u n d e r - s e c r e t a r y of the C.R.O. (1949-
55) and Richard Sedgwick, a s s i s t a n t u n d e r - s e c r e t a r y a t the C.R.O. (1949-54)
and editor of The History of Parliament, attended this meeting with Sir Thomas
Lloyd, permanent u n d e r - s e c r e t a r y a t the C O . (1947-56), and S i r Charles Jeff-
r i e s , deputy u n d e r - s e c r e t a r y a t the C O . (1947-56), who had been on the Rees
committee. 3. Following the Commonwealth conference of June 1964 a Common -
 29

of the Dominions would accept the loss of a separate Cabinet seat for the
Dominions Secretary.]
In paragraph 121 of their Report the Committee rightly doubt
whether the Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers could be
enlarged1 to admit ex-colonial members such as the Gold Coast.
It is true that the Commonwealth has been run for the past 18
months on a two-tier basis, a distinction being drawn between the
'old' and 'new' Dominions - otherwise, the pace and content of
Commonwealth consultation would be limited to that suited to the
slowest or least secure member: [cf. 1962 No.10]. So far there
has been no great difficulty in arranging that detailed dis-
cussions on certain subjects, for example, Defence, should be
restricted to the 'old' Dominions. The 'new' members do not and
cannot object because for their part they are unwilling to share
in any commitments. They can, of course, air their views on
general policy on such occasions as meetings of the Commonwealth
Prime Ministers. But the problem would be greatly aggravated by
the 'promotion' of more new Members who, even if willing, could
not be sufficiently potent to make a significant contribution.
Ceylon at present is an example of the last category and we do
not want any more.
As regards the Gold Coast, it might be possible to satisfy
local aspirations by creating 'H.M. Government in the Gold Coast'
which would be solely responsible for advising The King on Gold
Coast affair but would not possess international status and so
would not qualify for Membership of the Commonwealth. The Gold
Coast might find it difficult to provide the trained personnel
required for separate diplomatic and consular representation all
over the world which was involved by the acquisition of interna-
tional status. This difficulty is one of the reasons why Southern
Rhodesia has refrained from seeking full Commonwealth Membership.
But experience shows that considerations of this kind are not in
themselves sufficient to arrest countries which have been bitten
by the nationalistic bug. . . . [It was possible 'to get by for many years
by having Commonwealth conferences only for ad hoc purposes when need
arose' and this might deal with the refusal of S. Africa to co-operate
with African territories. Eire had been handled bilaterally; so too might
S. Africa.] A form of words might have to be devised to
distinguish between sovereign independent members of the
Commonwealth, having international status, and territories which,
though fully self-governing, did not possess that status.
As regards the general problem of keeping together a Common-
wealth of old and new members (the latter in increasing numbers)
Sir P. Liesching, expressing a personal view, thought that the
United Kingdom might in time be forced to enter into a kind of
Treaty or quas/-Treaty relationship on the lines of N.A.T.O. with
members who were willing and qualified to form an inner circle
of Commonwealth countries. This special relationship would extend
only to members who could undertake definite commitments, milit-
ary and other, in the interests of the Commonwealth as a whole.

wealth Secretariat was established with Arnold Smith, a Canadian Rhodes

scholar and diplomat, as Secretary General and its own civil servants, secon-
ded from Commonwealth governments. 1. This would become seen as the 'hall
mark' of membership.
30
Membership of the Commonwealth would become largely honorific and
would not admit automatically to the inner circle. For example,
Pakistan might come to be included w h i l e India was left out -
because she could or would not undertake definite commitments....
[He was merely thinking aloud since it was impossible to foresee future
developments. Given good w i l l they could be dealt with as they came.]

4. (a) VISCOUNT SWINTON: DRAFT ALTERNATIVE CONCLUSION TO 'THE COLONIAL

TERRITORIES AND COMMONWEALTH MEMBERSHIP' , 16 March 19531
I have tried in the latter part of this paper to devise some
means by which the African and West Indian Territories could be
induced to accept something short of full Membership of the
Commonwealth, by which I mean, something short of equal status
with the major Commonwealth countries and being entitled to
participate as f u l l y as the others in Commonwealth conferences
and discussions. I have attempted this because I must assume that

1. D.0.35/5056. Swjn_ton (Philip Cun] iffe-Lister) formerly secretary of state

at the C.O. (1931-5) was now secretary of state for Commonwealth Relations
(1952-5). He sent this alternative draft to Sir Percivale Lieschirig because
he (and Salisbury) were 'far from satisfied' that the memo., as it stood, did
not 'face up to the ultimate possibi 1 it.i es of the choice between the realities
of the old Commonwealth and some new unreal evolution that would make the
worst of both worlds'. He was stil] perns ins; the concept of a two-tier Common-
wealth - though he realised that no longer likely, given the acceptance of the
1949 London declaration on India [Vol.VI, No.37(c)], a.republic and a neutral:
'I doubt whether we shall ever escape the unhappy results of that fata.1 decis-
ion': (Min. 16 Feb. 1953). However he did not 'entirely despair" of being able
to establish some sort of 'mezzanine status' or second class membership. . . ' to
some at least of the colonial territories' ; (Jeffries to R. Sedgwick, 31 Mar.,
enclosing a further revision of the concluding paragraphs of The Colonial
Territories. ..emphasising the need, with such serious issues at stake, to do
the utmost to get some colonies to accept something short of full membership.
If choice had to be made and the three Asian members threatened to withdraw,
he had no doubt 'we should seek to preserve the solidarity of the old Domin-
ions and ourselves at any cost'.) Indeed, in the discussions on Commonwealth
membership and the pledges on self-government for the Colonies, it is clear
there were different departmental emphases. If Attlee (and later Macmillan)
was interested in maintaining the Commonwealth and increasing its membership,
the P.O. was concerned with Britain's role in the world particularly in rela-
tion to the U.S., the U.S.S.R. and the U.N. and the strategic thinkings of the
chiefs of staff particularly in India, the Middle East, Kenya and Central
Africa: the C.R.O. was defensive of the proven loyalties of the old Dominions,
wary of the new Afrikaner posturing in S. Africa and protective of the hyper-
sensitivity of the newly independent members; while the C.O. had a dedicated
commitment to the administrative and new development needs of some dozens of
dependencies and their relative unpreparedness for the self-government they
were now promised. Indeed, given the general tone of the debate on smaller
territories, there should be no surprise that the minister of state in the
C.O. , Henry Hopkinson, on 28 July 1954 should have fallen in the t.rap laid by
the previous colonial secretary, who knew from his own experience what had
been contemplated, and asserted that there could be "no question of any change
of sovereignty in Cyprus'. There were 'certain territories...which owing to
their particular circumstances can never expect to be fully independent'. He
would not go as far as that: (Hans. H.C. 531 504-11). [No.127]
 31

t h e s e l e s s e r c o u n t r i e s would c o n t i n u e i n t h e i r p r o g r e s s towards
' i n d e p e n d e n c e ' ( t h o u g h I would hope a t a l e s s r a p i d r a t e t h a n
under t h e S o c i a l i s t Government), however l i t t l e t h e y a r e r e a l l y
f i t t e d f o r independence or c a p a b l e o f s u s t a i n i n g t h e r e s p o n s i b i l -
i t i e s and d u t i e s which s h o u l d a t t a c h t o Commonwealth s t a t u s . I
must admit that I see great difficulty in getting the lesser
c o u n t r i e s t o agree t o t h i s t w o - t i e r s y s t e m , p a r t i c u l a r l y i f t h e
A s i a t i c c o u n t r i e s urge them t h e o t h e r way.
B u t , i f we cannot g e t something l i k e t h i s we may be f a c e d w i t h
a g r a v e r a l t e r n a t i v e . The B r i t i s h commonwealth i s a g r e a t f o r c e
i n t h e w o r l d today and a p o w e r f u l a l l y i n t h e American p a r t n e r -
s h i p and N.A.T.O. because o f t h e s t r e n g t h and u n i t y o f purpose
o f t h e U n i t e d Kingdom and t h e Old Dominions. That i s t h e r e a l i t y ,
j u s t as i n U.N.O., when i t comes t o t h e p o i n t , i t i s t h e Great
Powers which guard t h e s e c u r i t y o f t h e f r e e w o r l d . I n t h e Common-
w e a l t h we may reach a p o i n t when we and t h e o l d Dominions have
t o choose between w h i t t l i n g away t h e r e a l i t y o f t h e Commonwealth
p a r t n e r s h i p t o v a n i s h i n g p o i n t or r i s k i n g the d e f e c t i o n of the
lesser countries.1 If it should come to that I have no doubt
where our i n t e r e s t s would l i e . I n d e e d , i f we l e t i t come t o t h a t
w i t h o u t h a v i n g t r i e d t o agree a s o l u t i o n s e c r e t l y w i t h t h e o l d
D o m i n i o n s , 2 we m i g h t g e t t h e w o r s t o f both w o r l d s and l o s e both

1. In such a serious dilemma, they would be confronted by two 'almost equally

disagreeable and indeed d i s a s t r o u s a l t e r n a t i v e s ' - the admission of a l l former
dependencies at the cost of S. Africa's withdrawal and ' t h e d i s s o l u t i o n for
a l l p r a c t i c a l purposes of the e x i s t i n g s t r u c t u r e of the Commonwealth'; or the
withdrawal of the 3 Asian members. An intermediate s t a t u s ' a t any r a t e for
some considerable time' whereby the Gold Coast and Nigeria, for example, might
on 'independence' v o l u n t a r i l y surrender control over foreign r e l a t i o n s and
defence; or a 'Membership' which did not automatically include presence at
P.M.s' meetings - h i t h e r t o the touchstone of membership - but a 'club
committee' of permanent members (the e x i s t i n g Dominions) and j u n i o r s on an
e l e c t i v e or r o t a t i o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n on the model of the Security Council;
(enclos. to Sedgwick, 31 March ibid.). Swinton had shown the draft to the
Marquess of Salisbury. An undated note by Salisbury (the Lord President,
previously Commonwealth s e c r e t a r y 1952, Dominions s e c r e t a r y 1940-2, 43-5)
commented t h a t none of the t e r r i t o r i e s were ' f i t for independence: they are
not in fact adult n a t i o n s ' : they would destroy the Club and destroy ' t h e whole
influence for good which i t exercises in the world'. The three new Asian
members had completely destroyed the previous atmosphere of confidence. ' I f
we allow ourselves to be hustled, not only s h a l l we lose the black countries
but the white as w e l l ' : (D.O.35/5056).
2. But even in the euphoria of the coming Coronation in 1953, there was l i t t l e
support among the old Dominions, for t h i s fear of d i l u t i n g the Commonwealth
and for t h i s loyalty to the past a s s o c i a t i o n . The B r i t i s h element was s t i l l
strong therein and communications with Britain s t i l l important: t h e i r contacts
with other members unimportant in comparison. But India was a key member and
was a leader among the non-aligned. The new fashion in the U.N. was for t o t a l
r e j e c t i o n of a l l the remnants of old colonialism, and the U.S. was e n t h u s i -
a s t i c a l l y committed to the break up of the B r i t i s h empire. So in three years
time (1956) Eisenhower's s h o r t - s i g h t e d policy on the eve of a p r e s i d e n t i a l
e l e c t i o n , U.S. financial pressure on the B r i t i s h economy and the £, and the
t h r e a t of U.S.S.R. intervention undermined the B r i t i s h response to Nasser over
Suez when armed by the U.S.S.R. Nasser seemed to have h i s grip on B r i t i s h o i l
32
the old Dominions and the new.1

supplies and the imperial lifeline. Here was the outbreak of a new'forest fire 1
- the advent, even in Gaitskill's terms (but he was opposed to any action save
under U.N. approval), of another Hitler. After 3 months delay an efficient,
if reluctant, expedition was launched by British and French forces, but - with
a minimum of casualties - within hours of securing the whole canal zone, in
face of liberal international opinion and U.S. and U.S.S.R. threats, was
forced into humiliating withdrawal which proved a turning point in Common-
wealth relations. There was indeed much division of opinion in Britain as in
other member countries, but with hindsight it is possible to argue that the
victory for new Arab revolutionary nationalism, supported by the U.S. and the
U.S.S.R., created a dangerous legacy. If Nasser's ambition had been halted
would there have been the O.P.E.C. oil price hype of 1973, the revolutions in
Iran, Libya and Iraq, the scuttle from Aden, the civil war in Sudan and the
ferment of Islamic fundamentalism in the next, 40 years? Even in the U.S.
government there were soon doubts about its policy to enforce the U.K. scuttle
at Suez. In 1958 Eisenhower, without rousing comparable reaction, despatched
18,000 men on a similar expedition to control Lebanon.
1. The final draft (Cab.129/60: C(53) 122) was presented to Cabinet (8 A p r i l
1953). It noted that attendance at P.M.s' meetings had become 'the hallmark
for membership; and that declared policy involved (i) an assurance that the
U.K. would be prepared, 'when the necessary conditions are fulfilled', to
grant a territory independence and (ii) a hope that then the territory would
wish to remain in the Commonwealth and be accepted as a fellow Member by the
existing Members. The prospects for a two-tier Commonwealth were slender!
Territories governed by Africans would undoubtedly assume that they were being
kept down on grounds of race. The only safe assumption is that the offer of
anything short of full Membership would be unacceptable. But this did not
prevent (even as now) 'differences in practice between the treatment of
different Members' on e.g. the exchange of secret information; nor the
establishment of some halfway status (access to the Sovereign, the appointment
of representatives in London and other Commonwealth capitals &c, ) for
territories unable to assume the full burden of independence. Colonial
politicians were not 'over anxious to assume the responsibilities as well as
the privileges of external independence'. Unfortunately the precedent of
Ceylon's admission weakened the case of a lesser status. It was necessary to
avoid any territory becoming 'a test case of our future intentions'. The need
was to preserve Commonwealth solidarity and to defer as long as possible the
necessity to choose between the existing association and a new one. The
colonial and foreign secretaries fully agreed; (Swinton, 8 April), To
Churchill, the P.M., Swint.on noted 'I recognise that this policy [the need to
admit 'a succession of small colonies' to Membership] may be unpalatable to
you.... However much we may sigh for the past, we have to live in the
present'; (Prem.il/1726F). At cabinet on 4 May (Cab. 134/786) Churchill set
up a Ca,binet committee of Swinton, Salisbury, Lyttelton, Selwyn-Lloyd and
Moncton,advised by Sir N. Brook and the permanent secretaries of the C.O.,
C.R.O. and C.O. to consider 'whether it would be practicable and expedi-
ent... to enable independent Commonwealth countries to remain within the
Commonwealth without enjoying all the present rights and privileges of full
membership'. The committee reviewed the precedents set by the 3 Asian Members;
the intermediate status long en,joyed by S. Rhodesia, and the need for decision
in the Centra] African federation, Sudan, Malta (Cmd. 7014 of 1947 had
declared it inappropriate to transfer its responsibility from the C.O. to the
D.O.), Gold Coast and Nigeria.
 33

(b) VISCOUNT SWINTON: MEMORANDUM, 21 September 1954 1

However uncomfortable it may be to have some of the emergent
territories as full Commonwealth partners, we are quite clear
that the wiser course is to admit them to a status of nominal
equality, and seek from the start to ensure that, though sharing
in that intimate exchange of v i e w s and information on foreign
policy which marks relations between Members of the Commonwealth,
they w i l l remain w i t h i n our own sphere of i n f l u e n c e . . . . The
existence of a Commonwealth of like-minded independent and freely
associating Members, drawn from every continent, is a source of
strength and prestige for the United Kingdom.

5. (a) HAROLD MACMILLAN TO THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY, 28 January 1957 2

[He would like a comprehensive report from the Colonial Policy

1. Cab.134/786: CCM ( 5 4 ) 8. With Governor Arden-Clarke adamant that Nkrumab

would not accept a two-tier system and the Gold Coast's relegation to an
inferior status, and that it would readily welcome independence outside the
Commonwealth in 1957, the possibility of such a system faded. The new Central
A f r i c a n federation could expect hardly less than f u l l membership. But from
Commonwealth capitals there had come c o n f l i c t i n g advice. Menzies in Canberra
attached l i t t l e importance to I n d i a ' s membership; no Asian state would stay
in long' and the allegiance to the Crown must not be f o r f e i t e d : the H . C . there
thought it arguable that, the second-tier members,who would have no o b l i g a t i o n
to consult or be consul ted,would not be i n f e r i o r , but superior: an unsigned
marginal comment p e n c i l l e d 'Independence m i n u s ' ; (Holmes to Sedgwick, 19 Oct.
1953. G.303/1: D . O . 3 5 / 5 0 5 6 ) . Pretoria accepted ' t h e discreet d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n '
already existing was ' t o l e r a b l e ' , , but Malari would reject the prospect, of an
A f r i c a n Dominion. Ottawa would be prepared to let S. A f r i c a depart rather than
lose new members. Sir N. Brook reported to C h u r c h i l l (1 Dec, 1 9 5 4 ) : Prem.
11/1726F): the paper on membership was an important one for the f u t u r e of the
Commonwealth: ' t h i s is the o n l y policy w h i c h can preserve the strength and
influence of the Commonwealth in the world of the f u t u r e . The a l t e r n a t i v e is
to allow each of B r i t a i n ' s colonial territories to pass out of the Common-
wealth as it a t t a i n s independence; and this would spell for the f u t u r e a
Commonwealth of d w i n d l i n g power - it would condemn the Empire to 'death by a
1000 cuts'! The Cabinet agreed and decided on informal discussions w i t h the
P . M . ' s of the inner circle - Canada, Australia, and N . Z . d u r i n g the 1955
Commonwealth conference. Lennox-Boyd, the new colonial secretary, found
A u s t r a l i a ( M e n z i e s ) and N . Z . ( H o l l a n d ) d i s l i k e d enlargement, of the conference,
wanted a continuation of the separate arrangements w i t h the "old F o u r ' , but
accepted the Gold Coast should become a member. Liesching (now H . C . in
Pretoria) consulted the S. A f r i c a n P . M . Eden spoke to the Asian P . M . S . The
decision was made to accept Ghana as a f u l l member.
2. Cab. 134/1555: CPc ( 5 7 ) 6 . It might have seemed that the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of
a dual "Commonwealth and Associated states' had been realised by the end of
1954 [No.4b] but some M . P . s on both sides of the House became enthusiastic for
a much larger Commonwealth w i t h M a l t a , Cyprus, Sudan, Somalia, and Singapore
as members and w i t h Borneo and E i r e , even Israel and Norway, j o i n i n g : they
demanded the publication of the Rees report. In Sept. 1955 a revised version
including a new concept of Statehood ( i . e . ' n e i t h e r integration [ w i t h the
U . K . ] nor Dominion status' but 'a sort of d i a r c h y ' w i t h continuing U . K . res-
p o n s i b i l i t y in defence and external a f f a i r s ) was produced for the select com-
m i t t e e considering the proposal for M a l t a ' s integration w i t h B r i t a i n ; but
Statehood was rejected in May 1956 when the Singapore chief m i n i s t e r , David
 34

Committee on t h e probable course o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l development i n t h e

Colonies over the years ahead which could be considered by Cabinet i n a
whole session w i t h o u t o t h e r b u s i n e s s . ]
It would be good if Ministers could know more clearly which
t e r r i t o r i e s a r e l i k e l y t o become r i p e f o r i n d e p e n d e n c e o v e r t h e
next few years - or, even if they are not really ready for it,
w i l l demand i t s o i n s i s t e n t l y t h a t t h e i r c l a i m s c a n n o t be d e n i e d
- a n d a t w h a t d a t e t h a t s t a g e i s l i k e l y t o be r e a c h e d i n e a c h
case.
It would also be helpful if this study would distinguish those
C o l o n i e s w h i c h w o u l d q u a l i f y f o r f u l l m e m b e r s h i p o f t h e Common-
wealth, and would indicate what constitutional future there is
for the others which may attain independence but cannot aspire
t o f u l l Commonwealth m e m b e r s h i p .
I s h o u l d a l s o l i k e t o see s o m e t h i n g l i k e a p r o f i t and l o s s
a c c o u n t f o r e a c h o f o u r C o l o n i a l p o s s e s s i o n s , s o t h a t we may be
better able to gauge whether,' from the financial and economic
p o i n t o f v i e w , we a r e l i k e l y t o g a i n o r t o l o s e by i t s d e p a r t u r e .
T h i s w o u l d n e e d , o f c o u r s e , t o be w e i g h e d a g a i n s t t h e p o l i t i c a l
a n d s t r a t e g i c c o n s i d e r a t i o n s i n v o l v e d i n e a c h c a s e . And i t m i g h t
p e r h a p s be b e t t e r t o a t t e m p t an e s t i m a t e o f t h e b a l a n c e o f a d v a n -
tage, t a k i n g a l l these considerations i n t o account, of losing or
keeping each particular territory. There are presumably places
w h e r e i t i s o f v i t a l i n t e r e s t t o u s t h a t we s h o u l d m a i n t a i n o u r
influence, and others where there is no United Kingdom interest
in resisting constitutional change even if it seems likely to
l e a d e v e n t u a l l y t o s e c e s s i o n f r o m t h e Commonwealth.

(b) CABINET COMMITTEE ON COLONIAL POLICY: THE FUTURE CONSTITUTIONAL

DEVELOPMENT OF THE COLONIES, 30 May 1957 1
Gibraltar:- (i) Spain is bound to continue with its claim to

Marshall, demanded full Dominion s t a t u s . In the aftermath of the Suez c r i s i s

when Eden avoided consultation with u n r e l i a b l e a l l i e s , Holland, N . Z . ' s P.M.
feared t h a t the old 'hard c o r e ' members would be 'drowned' by the new and
proposed an inner advisory council to keep the old members together; ( J . Chad-
wick, Min. , 9 Jan. 1957: D.O.35/5011). Macmillan, here,within 3 weeks of suc-
ceeding Eden as P.M., was launching another comprehensive review of the Empire
and Commonwealth. His close confidant, the Earl of Home, now a t the C.R.O.,
had a few months before (to Macmillan a t the Exchequer, 20 June 1956: C O . 1032
/51) in h i s c r y s t a l gazing on the future Commonwealth, foreseen serious conf-
l i c t s over race. Salisbury was lord president of the council. 1. Cab. 134/1551
s e c r e t (also Conf. Pr: Gen. 174/012). A 76 page report by the committee of of-
f i c i a l s which worked i t s way though a l l the dependencies, providing data on
each e x i s t i n g (and l i k e l y future) c o n s t i t u t i o n ; s t r a t e g i c importance; economic
dependence on the s t e r l i n g area and U.K. t r a d e ; and B r i t i s h o b l i g a t i o n s . These
e x t r a c t s are examples only. By 1957 India, Pakistan and Ceylon (1947-8) had
joined the old Dominions (Canada, A u s t r a l i a , N.Z. and S. Africa): the Central
African Federation inherited the intermediate s t a t u s enjoyed previously by S.
Rhodesia a t P.M. ' s meetings: Ghana and Malaya in 1957 and the West Indies
federation in 1958 obtained f u l l membership. Within ten years of t h i s review
Nigeria (1960), Cyprus, S i e r r a Leone and Tanganyika (1961), Jamaica, Trinidad
and Uganda (1962), Kenya and Zanzibar (1963), Zambia, Malta and Malawi (1964),
the Gambia and Singapore (1965) and Botswana, Guyana, Lesotho and Barbados
(1966); another 27 between 1968 and 1990.
 35

Gibraltar. [Following the royal v i s i t in 1954, Spanish agitation had

increased.] But any p r o p o s a l t o concede i t would run c o u n t e r t o
s t r o n g l o y a l i s t f e e l i n g s i n G i b r a l t a r and here and would have a
d i s a s t r o u s e f f e c t on B r i t i s h p r e s t i g e : (ii) Constitutional
demands i n G i b r a l t a r [by the principal party, the Association for the
Advancement of C i v i l r i g h t s , with i t s close T.U. links] are n o t l i k e l y t o
be f o r more t h a n g r a d u a l e x t e n s i o n o f l o c a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , e.g.
p o s s i b l y by t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f a l i m i t e d M i n i s t e r i a l s y s t e m . . . .
[The A.A.C.R. party regarded Singapore, not Malta as a model; there was
no demand for 'independence'. Spanish 'pinpricks' cause Gibraltarians to
feel H.M.'s G. too 'inclined to neglect t h e i r interests and not to take
a tough enough line with Spain'. The original inhabitants had fled to San
Roque when the Rock was captured: the inhabitants originated from N.
Africa and I t a l y : many Jews and a few Spaniards, now some refugees from
the Franco regime.] ( i i i ) G i b r a l t a r i s s t r a t e g i c a l l y i m p o r t a n t
s i n c e i t h e l p s t o ensure t h e s e c u r i t y o f v i t a l Commonwealth sea
and a i r c o m m u n i c a t i o n s . P r o v i d e d Spain remains i n f r i e n d l y
r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , G i b r a l t a r i s n o t o f equal
s t r a t e g i c i m p o r t a n c e t o N.A.T.O. as i t i s t o Her M a j e s t y ' s
Government, ( i v ) Her M a j e s t y ' s Government r e q u i r e s t o m a i n t a i n
a naval and m a r i t i m e a i r base i n G i b r a l t a r t o g e t h e r with
r e f u e l l i n g f a c i l i t i e s , a h e a d q u a r t e r s and a w i r e l e s s s t a t i o n , ( v )
Though Spain has o f f e r e d t o lease G i b r a l t a r as a base t o Her
M a j e s t y ' s Government, and our s t r a t e g i c requirements could
t h e o r e t i c a l l y be m a i n t a i n e d w i t h o u t r e t a i n i n g s o v e r e i g n t y , such
an arrangement i n so s m a l l a t e r r i t o r y would p r e s e n t s e r i o u s
p r a c t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s and would become i m p o s s i b l e i f Spain
s u b s e q u e n t l y became u n f r i e n d l y , ( v i ) The d i r e c t e f f e c t on t h e
Exchequer o f independence would be l i m i t e d t o t h e c u t t i n g o u t o f
C o l o n i a l Development and W e l f a r e s u b v e n t i o n s t o G i b r a l t a r , ( v i i )
The e f f e c t on t h e s t e r l i n g area would be a s m a l l d o l l a r - e a r n i n g
l o s s , ( v i i i ) The e f f e c t s on t h e i n t e r e s t s o f t h e U n i t e d Kingdom
i n terms o f t r a d e a r e u n l i k e l y t o be s i g n i f i c a n t , [about 0.1% of
U.K. exports], ( i x ) W i t h d r a w a l o f U n i t e d Kingdom j u r i s d i c t i o n
e x c e p t i n g i n some such terms as G i b r a l t a r becoming a ' C i t y S t a t e '
would have u n f o r t u n a t e e f f e c t s on t h e p o l i t i c a l , economic and
s o c i a l development o f t h e Colony [becoming *a slum very rapidly l i k e
parts of Southern Spain'], ( x ) Independence i n t h e f o r m o f a ' C i t y
S t a t e ' would be u n l i k e l y t o have much e f f e c t on t h e U n i t e d K i n g -
dom's p r e s t i g e or i n f l u e n c e , ( x i ) Premature w i t h d r a w a l o f j u r i s -
d i c t i o n would l e a v e a vacuum which would be f i l l e d by S p a i n , . , .
Malta:- [The present constitution was a diarchy - internal self-government
save matters reserved to the imperial government - with amending powers
only by two-thirds majorities. There were negligible external p o l i t i c a l
pressures: internally the Labour party wanted 'integration on i t s own
terms with the U.K.' against the Nationalist and anti-Labour element who
desired Dominion status and independence. All wanted the optimum amount
of aid from the U.K. or elsewhere. The R.C. Church was concerned about
the social effects of closer association with the U.K. and the power of
Dom Mintoff. Strategically Malta was essential to the U.K. and N.A.T.O.
and the U.K. must retain control of defence and foreign policy. Full
independence would relieve the U.K. of over £6m. annually, but i f H.M.'s
G.s strategic needs were maintained, the Maltese would expect maybe
greater sums as rent &c. B r i t a i n ' s departure would have serious effects
on Malta's p o l i t i c a l , economic and social condition - even ruin unless
r
a highest bidder', maybe I t a l y , stepped i n . I t was unlikely the European
 36

and Catholic people of Malta would turn to an unfriendly power e.g. in

N. A f r i c a . ]
Cyprus:- [At present since the disturbances of 1931 the government had been
by the governor and an executive council ( i n c l . 3 u n o f f i c i a l s but 2 Greek
Cypriots had resigned). Radcliffe's proposals envisaged a legislature
with Greek majority and a ministerial system. The Greek Cypriots commit-
ment to Enosis varied from p o l i t i c a l union with Greece to a mere Hellenic
sentimental ism: they were divided by the Right control on the Ethnarchy
and the Left on the trades unions. As w i t h i n , so without the pressure is
between Greece and Turkey whether ' t h i s offshore island of Turkey' should
come under Greek sovereignty. The Turkish Cypriots were content with the
status quo, the vocal Greeks only in Enosis; but moderates on both sides
might see that p a r t i t i o n would be the only result of the pursuit of s e l f -
determination rather than orderly constitutional reform. Independence
might mean a l i t t l e saving to the U.K. Exchequer but H.M.'s G. might be
involved in new defence i n s t a l l a t i o n s ( i f Dehkelia and Episcope were
written o f f ) and in aid for transferring populations. I t might greatly
reduce Cyprus' prosperity but would not much affect U.K. trade.]
The vacuum would be f i l l e d i n t h e f i r s t p l a c e by Greece a n d / o r
T u r k e y . The f o r m e r cannot be r e l i e d upon f o r s u p p o r t i n t h e
M i d d l e East so l o n g as she can be b l a c k m a i l e d by Egypt t h r o u g h
t h e l a r g e Greek p o p u l a t i o n o f A l e x a n d r i a , and t o s u r r e n d e r Cyprus
t o Greece a l o n e would hence be p a r t i c u l a r l y damaging. I t may be
t h a t under t h e Eisenhower p l a n B r i t i s h w i t h d r a w a l would l e a d t o
g r e a t e r U n i t e d S t a t e s i n f l u e n c e on an independent C y p r u s . Most
likely there would be attempts by Russia to keep internal affairs
in Cyprus in a ferment through A.K.E.L., the local Communist
P a r t y . I t i s n o t i n c o n c e i v a b l e t h a t Nasser m i g h t f i n d an o u t l e t
f o r E g y p t i a n i m p e r i a l i s m i n Cyprus - t h e r e a r e s t r o n g t r a d e l i n k s
w i t h E g y p t , and Nasser has g i v e n c o v e r t s u p p o r t t o E . O . K . A . . . .
Hong Kong:- [About 75% of the Chinese were not British subjects. There was
a colonial government and an urban council. The common law and statutes
of England as on 5 April 1843 applied. The present Chinese communist (as
i t s Nationalist predecessor) government was determined on i t s incorpor-
ation with the 'motherland' and lost no opportunity in building up i t s
influence in the Colony. The majority of the population were p o l i t i c a l l y
inactive with survival t h e i r main aim in l i f e : there was a strong desire
to j o i n the winning side.]
The p r e s s u r e s d e s c r i b e d above have so f a r been r e f l e c t e d n o t
a t a l l i n demands f o r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change. N e i t h e r t h e Peking
Government nor t h e N a t i o n a l i s t a u t h o r i t i e s [now in Formosa] have
any i n t e r e s t i n t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l development o f t h e C o l o n y ,
o n l y i n i t s r e t u r n t o ' C h i n a ' . Such demands f o r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
development as t h e r e have been have come f r o m s m a l l and u n r e p r e -
s e n t a t i v e groups o r g a n i s e d by Europeans or W e s t e r n i s e d l o c a l
C h i n e s e . The g r e a t m a j o r i t y o f t h e p o p u l a t i o n t a k e no i n t e r e s t
i n them.
The Colony i s q u i t e u n s u i t e d f o r any f o r m o f s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t .
I t i s t o o s m a l l i n area and r e s o u r c e s t o s t a n d a l o n e and t h e r e
a r e no o t h e r t e r r i t o r i e s w i t h which i t c o u l d combine. The o n l y
a l t e r n a t i v e t o B r i t i s h r u l e i s r e t u r n t o C h i n a . I n any case most
o f t h e C o l o n y ' s water s u p p l i e s , most o f i t s a g r i c u l t u r a l l a n d and
most o f i t s i n d u s t r y are i n t h e 'New T e r r i t o r i e s ' , t h e l e a s e o f
which e x p i r e s i n 1997. There i s v i r t u a l l y no p r o s p e c t o f any
Chinese Government renewing t h e l e a s e , and w i t h o u t t h e l e a s e d
area the Colony would be neither economically viable nor
 37
militarily defensible....
[In 'cold war' terms, its retention was of great importance to British
strategically but it would not be possible to hold it for long, given its
proximity to China. H.K. paid its own way: its loss might save £5m p.a.
on the garrison and additional sums on resettlement and CD. & W.
project: its departure from the sterling area would be c. £26m p.a.:
there would be a significant loss in trade and in U.K. prestige.]
The Colony provides a demonstration adjacent to a Communist
country of what can be done by good administration combined with
intelligent private enterprise. It is an example of the rule of
law and respect for individual freedom. It has, largely at its
own expense, done outstanding work in absorbing and resettling
the flood of refugees who have confidently turned to it for
asylum. It is a valuable asset in the 'cold war' and its loss
would in many ways be as serious to the Western cause as the loss
of the Western sectors in Berlin. While few Asian Governments
would be prepared openly to support our colonial position, and
none to do anything to prevent the reincorporation of Hong Kong
into China, its loss would certainly be widely regretted, and
would be a serious blow to our prestige and influence in the
area. . . . [In conclusion]
By ordinary colonial standards Hong Kong is both tractable and
useful. No trouble is to be expected from pressure for constitu-
tional development, and economically the Colony makes few de-
mands. Owing to its position vis-a-vis China it stands, however,
in much greater danger from external pressure than any other
colony, and this danger is accentuated by the composition of its
population and the inevitable struggle for the latter's alle-
gi ance.
Short of the collapse of the Chinese Communist regime and a
disintegration of government within China it must be accepted
that in due course the Colony must return to China, at least when
the lease of the 'New Territories' expires in 1997. There is
likely, however, to be Chinese pressure for its return before
then and this pressure is likely both to increase and to meet
with a readier response from the population if there is any
serious setback to the Colony's well-being, or any failure of
confidence in the determination and capacity of Her Majesty's
Government to maintain their position. If the Chinese were to
force us out of the Colony this would be a sever blow to Western
prestige in the Far East and a substantial practical loss in
terms of British capital investment and communications facil-
ities. We cannot be sure how long we may be able to maintain our
position if the Chinese seek to force the issue, but any actions
on our part which diminish the Colony's economic well-being and
the confidence of the population in Her Majesty's Government can
serve only to encourage Chinese pressure and to create conditions
in which it will no longer be possible to resist it.
Bahajpajs:" [Tne constitution based on the early XVIIIth century pattern
allocated government to the governor and his executive officials and
legislative and financial power to the wholly elected lower house.]
Power is mainly in the hands of a small commercial group of
whites, largely through manipulation of the restricted franchise.
The withholding of concessions to the largely disfranchised
coloured population, who form five-sixths of the colony, could,
if continued, lead to the rise of extremists and the elements of
38

serious racial trouble exist. Unfortunately there is no disposi-

tion among those at present in power to widen the franchise.
There are no external political pressures as such, but the
Bahamas are strongly affected by United States cultural influ-
ences.
There is comparatively little demand for constitutional change,
vis-&-vis Her Majesty's Government. The principal demand for
change comes from the largely coloured political party, at
present only small in number, which is pressing for reforms in
the franchise. There is some slight pressure from the white group
for the institution of a greater degree of responsibility for
Government to be transferred to them. . . . [The islands were not
dependent on the Exchequer, but were substantial do!lar earners. But if
Britain granted independence and withdrew there might be disturbances as
the disorderly and extreme elements tried to assume power. Any vacuum
would be quickly filled by the U.S.]
Bermuda:- [The constitution was similar to that of the Bahamas: the
franchise was open to both sexes and to whites and coloureds but there
was a considerable property qualification.]
With a high standard of living and a flourishing tourist trade,
political pressures in the colony are negligible. Externally the
main influences come from the United States and, to a slightly
less extent, from Canada, but a strong element of loyalty to and
cultural contact with the United Kingdom remains.
The future looks little different from the present, at any rate
while the present level of prosperity is maintained. The colony
is not of a size to make independent status possible. In so far
as a change of affiliation is ever contemplated, it is to Canada,
as the nearest Commonwealth member, that Bermuda tends to
look1
[Bermuda was a substantial dollar earner; i t s independence could prove
a net loss to the s t e r l i n g area but i t could well continue a favourable
market for high quality U.K products which appealed to the t o u r i s t
market. Withdrawal of B r i t i s h j u r i s d i c t i o n would have s l i g h t e f f e c t ,
given the already high degree of internal self-government.]
The e f f e c t on U n i t e d Kingdom p r e s t i g e o f w i t h d r a w a l f r o m t h e
c o l o n y would depend on t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f t h e w i t h d r a w a l . There
i s s t r o n g adherence t o t h e U n i t e d Kingdom c o n n e c t i o n b u t t r a n s f e r
o f adherence t o Canada, w h i c h i s a remote b u t n o t i m p o s s i b l e
contingency, would not necessarily have a strongly adverse
e f f e c t . T r a n s f e r t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s would be u n l i k e l y t o appeal
t o l o c a l o p i n i o n , b u t would p r o b a b l y have a c o n s i d e r a b l e adverse
e f f e c t on B r i t i s h p r e s t i g e .
The l i k e l i h o o d o f t h e c o l o n y f a l l i n g under h o s t i l e i n f l u e n c e s
is in the present d i s p o s i t i o n of world a l l i a n c e s slight.
Communism i s v i r t u a l l y n o n - e x i s t e n t i n t h e c o l o n y and t h e p r e s e n t
p r o s p e r o u s c o n d i t i o n s do n o t f a v o u r i t s development. I f Canada
d i d n o t t a k e t h e c o l o n y under i t s p r o t e c t i o n , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s
would be l i k e l y t o do s o . . . .
British Honduras:- [The present constitution was representative
government by universal adult suffrage with an elected majority in the
Legislative Assembly but an ex officio and nominated majority on the

1. In August 1995 a referendum showed conclusively t h a t the Bermudans did not

d e s i r e independence.
 39

Executive.]
I n t e r n a l p o l i t i c s a r e l a r g e l y based on p e r s o n a l i t i e s , t h e main
d i v i s i o n b e i n g between t h o s e , a t p r e s e n t a m i n o r i t y , who look t o
a c l o s e r a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h t h e West I n d i a n F e d e r a t i o n and t h o s e
who l o o k t o a s e p a r a t e f u t u r e p r i m a r i l y i d e n t i f i e d w i t h C e n t r a l
America. E x t e r n a l l y t h e r e i s p e r s i s t e n t pressure from the
n e i g h b o u r i n g r e p u b l i c o f Guatemala which c l a i m s t i t l e t o t h e
territory.
I n t h e immediate f u t u r e t h e r e w i l l be p r e s s u r e f o r the
i n s t i t u t i o n of a f u l l m i n i s t e r i a l s y s t e m . . . .
[The t e r r i t o r y had no strategic value. Independence would save the
Exchequer in CD. & W. funds and grants-in-aid some £625,000. I t mattered
l i t t l e i f i t l e f t the s t e r l i n g area and i t s trade with the U.K. was
i n s i g n i f i c a n t . On B r i t i s h obligations and repercussions - ]
The t e r r i t o r y i s n o t a v i a b l e economic u n i t , nor i s t h e r e
s u f f i c i e n t i n t e r n a l s t a b i l i t y f o r an e f f e c t i v e Government t o
remain w i t h o u t e x t e r n a l b a c k i n g and u l t i m a t e c o n t r o l from
o u t s i d e . The Maya I n d i a n m i n o r i t y among o t h e r s would a l m o s t
c e r t a i n l y be e x p l o i t e d . S o c i a l and economic development c o u l d
b r o a d l y be e x p e c t e d t o cease a l t o g e t h e r and t h e r e m i g h t w e l l be
complete a d m i n i s t r a t i v e chaos.
W i t h d r a w a l a t t h i s s t a g e m i g h t n o t o f i t s e l f have any e f f e c t
on w o r l d o p i n i o n , b u t i t would g i v e r i s e t o g r e a t b i t t e r n e s s i n
t h e West I n d i e s which would r e g a r d such a s t e p as d e s e r t i o n o f
f e l l o w West I n d i a n s by t h e U n i t e d Kingdom Government.
I n t h e e v e n t o f t h e w i t h d r a w a l o f U n i t e d Kingdom a d m i n i s t r a t i o n
and consequent r a p i d d e t e r i o r a t i o n o f i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s , the
R e p u b l i c o f Guatemala would a l m o s t c e r t a i n l y a t t e m p t t o t a k e over
t h e t e r r i t o r y and m i g h t i n consequence become i n v o l v e d i n a
s e r i o u s c o n f l i c t w i t h M e x i c o , which has f r e q u e n t l y m a i n t a i n e d
t h a t i t has p r i o r c l a i m s . The Communist regime i n Guatemala was
o v e r t h r o w n i n 1954, b u t i t i s n o t i m p o s s i b l e t h a t i t m i g h t
r e a s s e r t i t s e l f , a l t h o u g h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s would p r o b a b l y t a k e
strong a c t i o n to prevent t h i s . . . .
[The Virgins had an elected majority in the Legislative Council and an
unofficial majority in the Executive. They had declined to form the W.I.
federation partly because there was no common link with the federating
islands and partly because t h e i r economic and social connections were
with the American Virgins, for union with which there was some i n t e r n a l ,
but no external, pressure by the younger generation. Independence would
relieve the B r i t i s h Exchequer of $300,000 p.a. and improve the s t e r l i n g
area's dollar trade by $150,000. There was l i t t l e trade between the U.K.
and the Virgins. I f Britain withdrew they would unite with the American
Virgins and any power vacuum would be f i l l e d by the U.S.
The Falklands had an o f f i c i a l majority on the Executive and an unofficial
but not an elected majority in the Legislative Council. There were minor
external pressures, 'but a c l a i m . . . i s sometimes voiced by Argentina'.
There was no demand for constitutional change. Primarily strategic
importance was a base to support Commonwealth interests in the Antarctic.
Surrender of sovereignty would have no direct effect on the Exchequer and
l i t t l e on the s t e r l i n g area. CD. & W. money was only £50,000 p.a. The
main product was wool, a l l of which would (as now) probably go to the
U.K. On obligations and repercussions - ]
The p o p u l a t i o n i s a l m o s t e n t i r e l y o f U n i t e d Kingdom o r i g i n w i t h
a h i g h p e r c e n t a g e o f persons born i n t h e U n i t e d Kingdom. An i n d e -
pendent Government would be e n t i r e l y B r i t i s h and would i n v o l v e
40

no l o s s o f U n i t e d Kingdom p r e s t i g e o r i n f l u e n c e . P r o v i d e d t h e
w i t h d r a w a l o f U n i t e d Kingdom j u r i s d i c t i o n d i d n o t a l s o i n v o l v e
w i t h d r a w a l o f U n i t e d Kingdom p r o t e c t i o n , t h e r e would be no vacuum
t o be f i l l e d by an o u t s i d e r . I f , however, p r o t e c t i o n were a l s o
w i t h d r a w n , t h e F a l k l a n d I s l a n d s would be i n danger o f o c c u p a t i o n
by A r g e n t i n a , and t h e abandonment o f a r a c i a l l y B r i t i s h p o p u l a -
t i o n t o such a f a t e would be d i s c r e d i t a b l e and s e v e r e l y damaging
t o p r e s t i g e . . . . [The Falkland Island dependencies had no permanent
population, was governed by the Governor of the Falklands and his
o f f i c i a l s , and the only value - apart from i t s strategic importance in
U.K. hands - was the p o s s i b i l i t y of mineral discoveries. Indeed that
strategic value was largely negative - i.e. i t s importance to the
Commonwealth today was ' t o deny i t as a base to a potentia'lly hostile
power'1 Withdrawal would save the Exchequer about £200,000 p.a., but
would mean a loss of influence especially in s c i e n t i f i c c i r c l e s .
Argentina and/or Chile would probably move i n .
In St. Helena with Tristan da Cunha, Gough Island and Ascension Island
government was by o f f i c i a l s : there were no internal nor external pres-
sures nor demands for constitutional change. Only St. Helena had annual
grants (£80,000 + £140,000) though Tristan and Ascension had CD. & W.
funds of £10,000 p.a. each. Trade was i n s i g n i f i c a n t . ]
There a r e no i n d i g e n o u s p e o p l e s on any o f t h e s e i s l a n d s , b u t
l o n g r e s i d e n c e i n t h e case o f T r i s t a n and long p o p u l a t i o n o f S t .
Helena f i r s t by s l a v e s and t h e n by t h e i r d e s c e n d a n t s , c o n s t i t u t e
a moral c l a i m on t h e U n i t e d Kingdom which cannot be d i s m i s s e d .
Gough and Ascension I s l a n d s have no s e t t l e d p o p u l a t i o n b u t a
number o f employees o f Cable and W i r e l e s s l i v e on t h e l a t t e r .
U n i t e d Kingdom w i t h d r a w a l would c e r t a i n l y leave a vacuum i n
t h e s e i s l a n d s . T h i s m i g h t w e l l be f i l l e d by t h e Union o f South
A f r i c a i n t h e case o f T r i s t a n da Cunha and Gough I s l a n d s . T h i s
would be hard on t h e T r i s t a n i s l a n d e r s who a r e c o l o u r e d w i t h i n
the meaning of the South African apartheid policy. It is unlikely
t h a t t h e r e would be an immediate c l a i m a n t t o S t . Helena b u t
abandonment o f t h i s poor and l o y a l community would be d e g r a d i n g .
The Americans m i g h t t a k e over Ascension I s l a n d . . . .
[In the Indian Ocean Seychelles was governed by an Executive (3 ex
officioand 3 unofficials) and a Legislative Council (6 officials and 6
u n o f f i c i a l s of which 4 were elected) and only limited reforms were l i k e l y
in the next few years. The colony had some naval importance but none for
theR.A.F. Independence might save about £35,000 p. a. Trade was of l i t t l e
significance. On obligations and repercussions - ]
The Colony i s t o o poor i n human and m a t e r i a l r e s o u r c e s t o s t a n d
s a t i s f a c t o r i l y on i t s own and would p r o b a b l y d e c l i n e i n t o a
t r o p i c a l slum i f U n i t e d Kingdom j u r i s d i c t i o n were w i t h d r a w n . The
s m a l l p r o p e r t y owning c l a s s o f French o r i g i n would have t o come
t o terms w i t h t h e m a j o r i t y , which i s o f m a i n l y A f r i c a n o r i g i n .
W i t h d r a w a l f r o m S e y c h e l l e s would a f f e c t t h e p r e s t i g e and i n f l u -
ence o f t h e U n i t e d Kingdom o n l y i n so f a r as i t would be r e g a r d e d
as an a b d i c a t i o n o f moral r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . I n g e n e r a l t h e Sey-
c h e l l e s a r e A f r i c a n r a t h e r t h a n I n d i a n i n atmosphere and o u t l o o k .
I f t h e U n i t e d Kingdom w i t h d r e w f r o m d i r e c t c o n t r o l some a s s o c i -
a t i o n w i t h Kenya m i g h t be f a v o u r e d u n l e s s a n o t h e r Power i n t h e
I n d i a n Ocean t o o k o v e r , as i t w e l l m i g h t .

1. cf. Nelson on M a l t a [ V o l . I l l , p.706],

 41

Mauritius:- A new constitution to be introduced in 1958 will

p r o v i d e f o r a m i n i s t e r i a l c o a l i t i o n o f p o l i t i c a l groups and a
Legislative Council with a larger elected majority than at
present. Internal political pressures depend on the present
bitter division between the Hindus (just under 50 per cent, of
t h e p o p u l a t i o n ) and t h e remainder - Franco M a u r i t i a n s , Coloured
and Moslem. There a r e no e x t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l p r e s s u r e s a t p r e s e n t
b u t I n d i a n p r e s s u r e may become s i g n i f i c a n t i n t h e f u t u r e . There
i s s t r o n g and i n c r e a s i n g p r e s s u r e by t h e Hindus f o r c o n s t i t u -
tional advance based on majority party rule. It is doubtful if
t h e t e r r i t o r y i s l a r g e enough ever t o s t a n d a l o n e , b u t i t c o u l d
a t t a i n self-government in internal a f f a i r s . . . .
[The colony provided f a c i l i t i e s to protect communications in the Indian
Ocean and probably required U.K. j u r i s d i c t i o n in some form to secure
them. Independence might save about £140,000 p.a. under CD. & W. and
£535,000 p.a. in respect of the B r i t i s h garrison. I t earned about £3m.
p.a. and was a dollar saver because of sugar production. The U.K.
supplied over 40% of Mauritius imports and 50% to 75% of Mauritius
exports, mainly sugar.]
U n i t e d Kingdom w i t h d r a w a l under p r e s e n t c o n d i t i o n s would l e a d
t o a v i o l e n t upheaval i n M a u r i t i u s w i t h u n p r e d i c t a b l e r e s u l t s .
The amount o f bloodshed m i g h t be l i m i t e d b u t t h e e f f e c t on t h e
economic and social development of the territory would be likely
t o be v e r y s e r i o u s , and p r o l o n g e d . . . . [Withdrawal leading to violence
would appear internationally as 'moral abdication'. India might
ultimately enter into some association with Mauritius. But policy must
be to f i t the colony for f u l l internal self-government. Withdrawal could
not be recommended.
[In the Pacific Fiji. Here effective power was still in official hands:
the Legislative Council had some elected members, but an o f f i c i a l
majority.]
The community i s m u l t i - r a c i a l , p r i m a r i l y n a t i v e F i j i a n s and
I n d i a n s , t h e l a t t e r a l r e a d y l a r g e s t i n numbers and m u l t i p l y i n g
more r a p i d l y . Most o f t h e l a n d belongs t o t h e n a t i v e F i j i a n s and
t h e r e i s i n t h e l a n d / p o p u l a t i o n problem a p o t e n t source o f c o n f -
l i c t , though t h e r e s u l t a n t p r e s s u r e s a r e n o t l i k e l y y e t t o r e v e a l
themselves i n an a c u t e f o r m . There are no e x t e r n a l p r e s s u r e s f o r
p o l i t i c a l change. 1 [ I n t e r n a l l y ] t h e r e i s no s u b s t a n t i a l demand f o r
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l advance, M i n i s t e r i a l government i s n o t i n s i g h t
and the prospects of internal self-government are still more
remote. The Indians are the group most likely to press for
advance....
[ F i j i had considerable strategic importance on the a i r route from
Canada and p a r t i c u l a r l y to N.Z. which gave advice on defence, provided
some aid and helped to t r a i n and administer the local forces. I t was
unlikely to become self-governing soon. Economically i t was s e l f -
supporting and independence would only relieve the Exchequer of about
£140,000 p.a. from CD. & W. funds. I t was a net dollar earner (c. £1m.
p.a.) mostly sugar to Canada. Some 35% - 40% of exports came to the U.K.
and the U.K. supplied about 30% of imports. I f B r i t a i n withdrew and N.Z.
did not take over, there would be racial s t r i f e and chaos.]
To l e a v e t h e F i j i a n s and I n d i a n s t o f i g h t i t o u t among them-

1. But the U.S.S.R. and the a n t i - c o l o n i a l ex-colonies in the U.N. were

beginning to a g i t a t e .
42

s e l v e s , when i t was we who i n t r o d u c e d t h e r a c i a l problem by im-

p o r t i n g I n d i a n l a b o u r , would have a d e p l o r a b l e e f f e c t . The F i j i -
ans a r e i n t e n s e l y p r o - B r i t i s h and our d e p a r t u r e would f o r them
mean b e t r a y a l . No h o s t i l e c o u n t r y i s l i k e l y t o r e p l a c e t h e U n i t e d
Kingdom, a l t h o u g h t h e l a r g e I n d i a n p o p u l a t i o n m i g h t lead I n d i a
to assert an interest.... [Pitcairn had no trade, and lived on invest-
ments and revenue from stamp issues: i t received £2,000 p.a. from CD.
& W. Independence would have l i t t l e effect save to delay development
which anyway was 'severely l i m i t e d ' . Withdrawal might cause a l i t t l e s t i r
for the islanders were of B r i t i s h blood, but would have l i t t l e e f f e c t .
'No other country would have reason to move i n ' . ]
Tonga:- Tonga i s i n a d i f f e r e n t p o s i t i o n f r o m t h e o t h e r P a c i f i c
t e r r i t o r i e s i n t h a t i t i s a s e l f - g o v e r n i n g monarchy under t h e
United Kingdom protection provided under the 1900 Treaty of
F r i e n d s h i p . Her M a j e s t y ' s Government i s r e p r e s e n t e d on t h e i s l a n d
by an Agent and Consul. There are no significant internal or
e x t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l p r e s s u r e s and no demands f o r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
change.
Tonga i s o f no s t r a t e g i c i m p o r t a n c e so long as F i j i i s a v a i l -
a b l e . I t has an a i r f i e l d . I t i s w i t h i n t h e New Zealand Naval S t a -
t i o n and has a defence agreement w i t h New Zealand under which t h e
Government o f t h e l a t t e r a d v i s e s on defence and h e l p s t o a d m i n i s -
t e r and t r a i n t h e l o c a l defence f o r c e . . . . [ I t was e n t i r e l y self-sup-
porting, not a dollar earner and l i t t l e value to the s t e r l i n g area. 90%
of i t s imports (mainly copra) went to the U.K. which supplied about 25%
of imports. The U.K.'s withdrawal would have l i t t l e e f f e c t . B r i t a i n had
no obligation in perpetuity. No hostile power was l i k e l y to take over but
the present Crown Prince might seek links with the U.S.
In the Western Pacific the British Solomon Islands protectorate had
only an advisory council of o f f i c i a l s . U.S. occupation in the war had
caused some upset, but there were no demands nor external pressures for
constitutional change. The protectorate had strategic importance for
Australia. Withdrawal would save the B r i t i s h Exchequer a grant-in-aid of
£250,000 p.a. and CD. & W. money at £46,000 p.a. Australia provided 60%
of imports while the U.K. took two-thirds of i t s exports. I f Australia
did not replace the U.K. withdrawal would mean reversion to a primitive
existence without prospect for advance. To permit such a ' s l i d e into
anarchy' would be ' d i s c r e d i t a b l e ' . I t was unlikely that a hostile country
would take over. Australia might be reluctant to do so 'at an early date'
because of i t s own commitments in Papua/New Guinea which demanded money
and s t a f f . Gilbert and El 1 ice were governed by o f f i c i a l s . ] Canton and
Enderbury I s l a n d s a r e a d m i n i s t e r e d j o i n t l y by t h e U.K. and t h e
U.S. and t h e U.S. d i s p u t e s s o v e r e i g n t y o f some o f t h e o t h e r
i s l a n d s i n t h e Colony and t h e C e n t r a l and Southern L i n e group
( i n c l u d i n g C h r i s t m a s and Maiden I s l a n d s ) . Most o f t h e I s l a n d s
have no permanent i n h a b i t a n t s . The o n l y source o f i n t e r n a l f r i c -
t i o n i s over l a n d which i s s c a r c e and t h e r e a r e no i n t e r n a l d e -
mands o r e x t e r n a l p r e s s u r e s f o r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change. The A n g l o -
American d i s p u t e s over s o v e r e i g n t y o f some o f t h e I s l a n d s do n o t
d i s t u r b t h e n a t i v e p o p u l a t i o n . . . . [Strategically with several harbours
they would have importance i f the A l l i e s lost control in the North
Pacific: H.C. for the Western Pacific was advised by the N.Z. government
on defence of the colony. B r i t i s h withdrawal would mean U.S. or Australia
or N.Z. taking over: i t would save the Exchequer about £20,000 p. a. Aust-
r a l i a and N.Z. bought the phosphate, U.K. the copra. But otherwise the
U.K. trade was very small. But to permit a 'relapse into savagery' would
 43

be ' d e g r a d i n g ' . N.Z., the U.S., even Japan might u l t i m a t e l y assume r e s -

p o n s i b i l i t y f o r ' t h i s s c a t t e r e d and h a r d - t o - a d m i n i s t e r c o l o n y ' . I n Sou-
thern Africa were the High Commission Territories- the colony of Basuto-
land and p r o t e c t o r a t e s o f Bechuanaland and Swaziland - w i t h the H.C. f o r
South A f r i c a r e s p o n s i b l e t o the Secretary of State o f Commonwealth Rela-
tions. Some Europeans, mainly of Afrikaner extraction favour transfer to
the Union, but 100 times t h a t number, A f r i c a n s , were b i t t e r l y opposed.
B r i t i s h p o l i c y favoured the growth o f r e p r e s e n t a t i v e government but s e l f -
government was not l i k e l y ' i n the foreseeable f u t u r e ' - any suggestion
t h a t t h a t was the B r i t i s h aim would be b i t t e r l y resented i n S. A f r i c a .
They had no s t r a t e g i c value t o the U.K. Transfer would save the Exchequer
£3m. from C D . & W. funds and a g r a n t - i n - a i d t o Bechuanaland o f £1.5m.]
If we were to agree to transfer the Territories in present
circumstances i t would improve our r e l a t i o n s w i t h the Union of
South Africa, but we should be regarded by many people in the
United Kingdom and overseas as having betrayed our trust. Our
p r e s t i g e a n d m o r a l s t a n d i n g w o u l d be d a m a g e d , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t h e
e y e s o f t h e p e o p l e s o f t h e C o l o n i e s and o f t h e A s i a n and A f r i c a n
s e l f - g o v e r n i n g members o f t h e C o m m o n w e a l t h .
B e c a u s e o f t h e damage t o o u r p r e s t i g e w h i c h w o u l d r e s u l t a n d
b e c a u s e i t w o u l d , i n f a c t , be a b e t r a y a l o f o u r t r u s t , we c a n n o t
agree to the transfer of the Territories to the Union until the
two conditions to which we are pledged have been f ulf i 1 led, i.e.,
until the United Kingdom Parliament has had an opportunity of
expressing its views and the African inhabitants have been
consulted. Feeling among the African inhabitants and in the
United Kingdom about the native policies of the Union of South
Africa is such that we are unlikely to be able successfully to
fulfil these conditions in the foreseeable futu

(c) JOHN CHADWICK: THE PROBLEM OF THE EXPANDING COMMONWEALTH,

11 December 19582
[He agreed t h a t the s i z e o f a t e r r i t o r y was not the main c r i t e r i o n f o r

1. In a l l another 14 t e r r i t o r i e s could be expected to a t t a i n i n t e r n a l self-

government in the next ten years (in fact the t a l l y was 20 more full members
by 1966). In a revised report (6 Sept. 1957: C.P.C.(57)30 Cab.134/1556) the
conclusion was t h a t the economic i n t e r e s t s of the U.K. were ' u n l i k e l y ' to be
'decisive* in determining whether or not a t e r r i t o r y should become indepen-
dent. Premature withdrawal would cause d i s l o c a t i o n , discontent and s t r e s s and
might prejudice s t r a t e g i c or foreign policy. B r i t a i n had so long been
connected with these colonial possessions to sever t i e s too abruptly:
decolonisation would spread bewilderment and diminish B r i t i s h s t a t u s and
s t a t u r e by an abandonment which would be ' d i s c r e d i t a b l e and dangerous':
Macmillan did not wish to preside over the l i q u i d a t i o n of the empire, but he
knew B r i t a i n was ' s t i l l t r y i n g to do more' than her resources provided. Having
l o s t her pre-eminence in material s t r e n g t h , she must l i v e by her wits as in
e a r l i e r periods and exert influence in other ways, if no longer by a u t h o r i t y .
The Commonwealth was 'not breaking up, i t was growing u p ' ; (Macmillan speech,
Singapore, 20 Jan. 1958: Prem. 11/2219 noted by Sir N. Brook). But
decolonisation did a c c e l e r a t e under Iain Macleod as h i s colonial s e c r e t a r y
(1959-61) with Cyprus seemingly the c a t a l y s t . 'The wind of change' [Vol.VII,
p. 190] was blowing not only in the continent of Africa but throughout the
dependent world.
2. D.0.35/7873. Arthur Snelling, a s s i s t a n t under-secretary at the C.R.O., had
 44

e l i g i b i l i t y for f u l l Commonwealth membership.] I t seems t o me t h a t

the problem is rather one of viability in the political and
economic sense and of the stage reached in the territory's
civilisation.
Coming more t o t h e r o o t o f t h e problem r a i s e d i n Mr. Snel l i n g ' s
n o t e s , I suggest t h a t what we f i r s t need i s an a n a l y s i s o f t h e
territories likely to throw up in the foreseeable future the
p a r t i c u l a r problems which we now have i n m i n d . I n t h e s h o r t t i m e
a v a i l a b l e I have t r i e d my hand a t such an a n a l y s i s which i s
attached below.1
W i t h r e s p e c t I t h i n k i t shows t h a t our problem i s f a r more
l i m i t e d t h a n t h e n o t e s m i g h t s u g g e s t . I n f a c t , i t would seem a t
t h e o u t s i d e t h a t some h a l f dozen t e r r i t o r i e s a r e l i k e l y t o cause
us d i f f i c u l t i e s over t h e n e x t decade. I n r e g a r d t o t h e r e m a i n d e r ,
p r o v i d e d we p l a y our c a r d s p r o p e r l y , i t s h o u l d be p o s s i b l e t o
persuade the ruling groups2 that they have other alternatives
open t o them, e i t h e r t h r o u g h F e d e r a t i o n , amalgamation w i t h o t h e r
Commonwealth countries, or through secession, to satisfy their
a s p i r a t i o n s f o r freedom.

commented t h a t the admission of 'small fry' with populations of under 5m.

would dilute the Commonwealth (Min. , 10 Dec. 1958 ibid.), though the CO. was
moving towards a s i n g l e equal full s t a t u s . This had provoked a reminder
(Allen, Min., 10 Dec.) t h a t N.Z. had only 2m. and smaller c o u n t r i e s ( I r e l a n d ,
Luxembourg, Iceland) were members of both the U.N. and N.A.T.O. G.W. St. John
Chadwick, also a s s i s t a n t under-secretary at the C.R.O., here revived the two-
tier idea. 1. In the enclosed draft Analysis of Constitutional future for re-
maining dependent territories he revived the two-tier concept, Cyprus was 'an
i n t e r n a t i o n a l not a purely colonial problem'; but otherwise dependencies f e l l
into 6 c a t e g o r i e s : those already promised independence soon (Nigeria, the
Caribbean and Central Africa f e d e r a t i o n s ) ; those obviously qualifying l a t e r
(East Africa, p a r t i c u l a r l y Tanganyika); those never a s p i r i n g (St. Helena,
Ascension, G i b r a l t a r , Falklands, Seychelles); those possibly federating (Sin-
gapore, Borneo, Sarawak with Malaya; the Bahamas and Bermuda with Canada; B.H.
and B.G. with the W. I n d i e s ; Zanzibar with E. Africa; the Solomons &c. with
A u s t r a l i a or N.Z.); those probably seceding (Somaliland, and Aden, colony and
p r o t e c t o r a t e ) ; and those continuing to pose problems (Malta, the Gambia, S.L.
Mauritius and H.K, - though the Gambia and S.L. might /join a W. African fede-
r a t i o n and Mauritius an E. African one. H.K. was 'merely held by the grace of
Mao se Tung'). A marginal note suggested F i j i might federate with N.Z.
2. Chadwick was c e r t a i n l y o p t i m i s t i c , given the reluctance of many to
federate. Moreover he argued t h a t p a r t i c u l a r colonies could be told frankly
they could not a s p i r e to full Membership but, while they might contemplate
full autonomy save in foreign a f f a i r s and defence 'we are anxious to give them
maximum independence short of Membership' as Associate S t a t e s of the
Commonwealth. Their p r e s t i g e should be safeguarded by meetings in London of
' t h e Council of Associated S t a t e s ' where t h e i r chief ministers could be kept
informed of U.K. and Commonwealth thinking, subject to necessary s e c u r i t y
s a f e g u a r d s ' . These might take place in a l t e r n a t e years when there were no
Commonwealth P.M.'s meetings and thereby avoid the suggestion t h a t a 'second
c l a s s Commonwealth' was being c r e a t e d . A marginal comment echoed one in 1953
on Holmes' (H.C. in Canberra) suggestion t h a t the absence of any o b l i g a t i o n
to consult might be a superior s t a t u s - notes 'Independence minus' (Holmes to
Sedgwick, G.303/1, 19 Oct. 1953: D.0,35/5056) but here 'Dominion p l u s ' .
 45

(d) SIR NORMAN BROOK TO HAROLD MACMILLAN, 17 February, 19591

[Since the Labour party had produced 'a rather specious solution' for
the problem of 'some status short of full Commonwealth membership', it
would be useful if the Government could have an alternative and 'more
viable' proposal.]
Fresh urgency is given to this by the suggestion that an
independent Cyprus might be willing to remain within the
Commonwealth. I cannot myself believe that it would be wise to
try to admit this little Republic into full Commonwealth
membership - on terms of equality with Canada and India. But I
see the advantages of allowing it to remain, if it so desires,
within the Commonwealth on some basis short of full membership.
The Commonwealth, though we often use the phrase in reference
only to the countries which are full members, comprises the
independent countries and the dependent territories; and it is
arguable that our present constitutional theory draws the
distinction too sharply between the two. It would suit the
circumstances of today if there were a third middle category of
countries which, while they can no longer be administered under
a paternal Colonial rule, are not (and in many cases never will
be) fully independent sovereign nations. It would be convenient
if we could now develop a middle category of 'associated States'
lying between the full members on the one hand and the Colonial
territories on the other. The test of eligibility for 'statehood'
would need to be self-government rather than full independence;
and we should have to find a definition which would embrace such
territories as Singapore (where the United Kingdom is to retain
responsibility for external relations and defence), as well as
a Cyprus whose independence, though more apparent, will be less
real because of the influence which Greece and Turkey will have
in her af f ai rs - external as wel 1 as internal ... . [The Earl of Home,
the Commonwealth secretary, agreed 'we should try again at definition'.
He asked permission to assemble a working party of officials from the
C.R.O., the CO. and the F.O.]

(e) INTER-DEPARTMENTAL WORKING PARTY: MINUTES, 24 March 19592

[They had before them a C.R.O. memo. (S.C.T.(59) 3) and a note from the
secretaries (S.C.T.(59) 6) on a CO. memo, suggesting a status of
'Commonwealth State', a membership short of full membership suitable for

1. Prem.11/2910. The cabinet secretary again raised the question of 'Associate

States'.
2. Cab.134/2505: S.C.T.(59) 2nd meeting. The party consisted of a Treasury and
a F.O. representative (A.D. Peck, P.E. Ramsbotham); A.W. Snelling and St. John
Chadwick from the C.R.O. and Henry Bourdillon and I.M. Watt from the CO.:
Cyprus was giving new urgency to the problem: Brook argued it would hardly be
wise 'to admit this little Republic into full Commonwealth membership': the
character of the association would be destroyed if an island with a population
hardly larger than Leeds led a string of new aspirants into the 'club': (17,
18 Feb. 1959: Prem.11/2910). Macmillan instructed this working party to
investigate the concept of Associate Statehood - a constitutional goal for
small colonies - and not to produce a formula simply to accommodate Cyprus:
(11 March 1959: 1st meeting: Cab.134/2505). He had already recognised that
even with 'enormous force' Cyprus could not be held: as de Gaulle realised in
Algeria.
 46

small t e r r i t o r i e s attaining an advanced stage of self-government. 1 I t

was agreed to leave for subsequent discussion the question of representa-
t i o n at P.M.'s meetings, the p o s s i b i l i t y of f i t t i n g Cyprus into any
general solution, which department would be responsible for these States,
and the method of announcing the new agreed p o l i c y . ]
The C.R.O. and C O . were agreed t h a t : -
( a ) The u l t i m a t e s t a t u s o f t h e s m a l l e r c o l o n i a l t e r r i t o r i e s under
c o n s i d e r a t i o n must be one t h a t f e l l s h o r t o f f u l l membership o f
t h e Commonwealth, b u t a t t h e same t i m e went as f a r as p o s s i b l e
t o w a r d s s a t i s f y i n g t h e a s p i r a t i o n s o f t h e more advanced t e r r i -
t o r i e s . . . . [(b) Commonwealth States would be e l i g i b l e to retain membership
of the Sterling Area and Imperial Preferences on a reciprocal basis.]
( c ) Some degree o f U n i t e d Kingdom f i n a n c i a l a s s i s t a n c e to
Commonwealth S t a t e s would have t o be a v a i l a b l e , b u t t h e c o n d i -
t i o n s and t h e degree o f c o n t r o l which t h e U n i t e d Kingdom
Government would need t o impose i n r e l a t i o n t o t h a t a s s i s t a n c e
would need f u r t h e r e x a m i n a t i o n . On t h e one hand i t was i m p o r t a n t
t h a t adequate arrangements s h o u l d be made t o s a t i s f y P a r l i a m e n -
t a r y and p u b l i c o p i n i o n i n t h i s c o u n t r y t h a t any sums g i v e n o r
l e n t t o Commonwealth S t a t e s were a p p l i e d on a sound f i n a n c i a l and
economic b a s i s , and on t h e o t h e r hand i t was e q u a l l y i m p o r t a n t
t o a v o i d c a r r y i n g t h e degree of U n i t e d Kingdom c o n t r o l t o t h e
e x t e n t t h a t Commonwealth S t a t e s r e g a r d e d i t as an i n t e r f e r e n c e
w i t h t h e i r r i g h t s o f i n t e r n a l s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t . . . . [(d) Such States
could pass t h e i r own citizenship law and retain B r i t i s h subjecthood. (e)
They could attend functional Commonwealth conferences, ( f ) The U.K. would
retain overriding defence powers in key bases. On some points there was
an apparent divergence of view, (g) 'Commonwealth State' was preferable
to 'Associate State of the Commonwealth' which the C.R.O. had suggested,
(h) The C.R.O. considered a diarchy 2 to be the form of government not

1. cf. Island and City States (1951) Associate members (1951-2) and
Commonwealth States (1955-9).
2. The C O . was keen to revive diarchy. It also felt attendance at Common-
wealth P.M.'s meetings crucial, and exclusion would result in prolonged
agitation against an inferior status; though some discussions among full
members might be necessary, there might be occasions, even formal, when all
met together, or colonies/Commonwealth States would press for a total
independence they were unsuited for and could not maintain. Chief ministers
of Commonwealth States could participate as advisers of the British P.M. 'In
exchange for the worthless (in their case) ornament of independence they would
have control of their domestic affairs, they would have U.K. protection, they
would have a safeguard against economic ruin and the consequent collapse of
the standard of living, and above all they would have an honourable and even
perhaps an influential place in the 'world-wide family of nations'. But the
C.R.O. dismissed this: Chadwick described it as 'muddled': diarchy was not an
attractive terminus: it was 'either the last station but one...thereby
implying a further stage of advance; or a pisaller as in the case of Malta
where it is offered as all that Malta can hope for, given their unwanted
strategic importance': (Min., 23 March: D.0.35/7870). As for Cyprus, the
Zurich-London settlements in Feb. 1959 provided for the island to become a
sovereign independent republic in 1960. But the question of its relationship
with the Commonwealth had to be decided by the Commonwealth and probably on
the basis of alternative options put forward by the C.R.O. and the C O . , and
these departments disagreed. Bourdillon (CO. ) wanted a generous gesture of
 47

for all but only for territories which the U.K. needed to retain defence
powers (e.g. Malta, Singapore) and elsewhere the conventions of request
and consent for the exercise of U.K. Parliamentary power (as in the
Statute of Westminster) should prevail: 'diarchy' had implied in the
Indian context [Vol.V, No.160] a stage in constitutional advance not a
permanent terminus. It was important to make a clear distinction between
the status of this new Commonwealth State and the penultimate stage of
development towards full membership.]
( i ) The Colonial O f f i c e considered that the United Kingdom
Government should retain the power to suspend the constitution
in all Commonwealth States; f i r s t because it might otherwise be
v e r y d i f f i c u l t to retain that power in States where the United
Kingdom had a defence interest; secondly, to prevent the
emergence of a Communist controlled government; and thirdly to
provide the element of s t a b i l i t y which would be important in
maintaining the confidence of outside investors. The Commonwealth
Relations O f f i c e on the other hand considered that the right to
suspend the constitution should be retained only where there was
a direct United Kingdom defence interest. They f e l t that it would
be unrealistic to suppose that the United Kingdom could suspend
the constitution of a Commonwealth State against its w i l l without
the use of force, and that it would be d i f f i c u l t to j u s t i f y the
use of force unless vital United Kingdom interests were at stake.
Furthermore, the retention by the United Kingdom of the power to
suspend the constitution would be a source of irritation in
Commonwealth States, and it might also lead to d i f f i c u l t i e s in
persuading other Commonwealth countries to recognise the enhanced
status which it was hoped that Commonwealth States would be
accorded. There would of course be no d i f f i c u l t y in the United
Kingdom resuming direct control of the t e r r i t o r y by invitation,
as had been done in Newfoundland in 1 9 3 2 . The whole question was
fundamentally one of Colonial p o l i c y , and further consideration
should be g i v e n to the question whether the possible advantages
of retaining power to suspend the constitution in all cases were
worth the political disadvantages. In such consideration regard
should be paid to the possible need to include in the constitu-
tion of some Commonwealth States reservations to safeguard race
di scrimi nation.
( j ) The Commonwealth Relations O f f i c e proposed that one of the
p r i v i l e g e s to be accorded to Commonwealth States should be that
they would be free to conduct their own external r e l a t i o n s w i t h

representation a,t P . M . ' s meetings to capture the imagination of the l i k e l y

Commonwealth States; L i n t o t t ( C . R . O . ) deplored the consequent r u i n of
Commonwealth meetings, f i l l e d w i t h those from c o u n t r i e s of no standing or
i n f l u e n c e . Indeed the working party agreed that Cyprus would neither fit in
as a Commonwealth State, nor be suitable for f u l l m e m b e r s h i p , though l i k e
Burma or Ireland it might be e x t e r n a l l y associated: ( S . C . T . ( 5 9 ) 4, 24 A p r i l
1959: Cab.134/2505). In the event it came to be recognised in both depart-
ments, if r e l u c t a n t l y , that in practice, though f u l l membership would not be
suitable (Makarios was not f l u e n t in E n g l i s h ) , nothing short of that would
appease the Cypriots. The goal, posts had to be moved - indeed r e g u l a r l y . As
for the Commonwealth i t s e l f , the opening of the flood gates to so many small
t e r r i t o r i e s meant that the a s s o c i a t i o n , w i t h these i n f l a t e d demands for mem-
b e r s h i p , was not so much ' b r e a k i n g up, as blowing u p ' .
48

o t h e r members o f t h e Commonwealth ( b u t n o t w i t h f o r e i g n c o u n -
t r i e s ) on t h e g e n e r a l l i n e s o f t h e p r e s e n t arrangement f o r t h e
F e d e r a t i o n o f Rhodesia and N y a s a l a n d . The C o l o n i a l O f f i c e doubted
however whether t h i s was a w o r k a b l e p r o p o s i t i o n and t h e y foresaw
d i f f i c u l t i e s i n cases w h e r e , f o r i n s t a n c e , t h r e e - c o r n e r e d n e g o t i -
a t i o n s between an i n d e p e n d e n t member o f t h e Commonwealth, a
Commonwealth S t a t e and a f o r e i g n c o u n t r y were c o n c e r n e d . The
problem m i g h t , however, be reduced by w r i t i n g i n t o t h e c o n s t i t u -
t i o n o f Commonwealth S t a t e s a p r o v i s i o n t h a t any commitment
e n t e r e d i n t o w i t h a n o t h e r Commonwealth Government s h o u l d n o t
c o n f l i c t w i t h t h e U n i t e d Kingdom's e x t e r n a l p o l i c i e s . The whole
c o n c e p t o f Commonwealth S t a t e s would need t h e c o n c u r r e n c e o f
o t h e r independent Commonwealth c o u n t r i e s , and i n t h e c o u r s e o f
t h e c o n s u l t a t i o n s i t m i g h t be p o s s i b l e t o agree on a p r o c e d u r e
whereby o t h e r independent Commonwealth Governments c o u l d appeal
t o t h e U n i t e d Kingdom Government i f t h e y f e l t d i s s a t i s f i e d w i t h
the way in which a Commonwealth State was conducting its
n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h them. T h i s m a t t e r s h o u l d be f u r t h e r examined
by t h e Commonwealth R e l a t i o n s O f f i c e . . . .
[The U.K. government would cease to transmit information about
Commonwealth States as i t did (under Art. 13(e) of the U.N. charter) about
Colonies: the question of the continued employment of expatriate s t a f f
in Commonwealth States, and the responsibility for pensions, could be
discussed. Provided that the Queen was accepted as Head of the Common-
wealth, i t was not impossible for a Commonwealth State to become a
republic. The question whether such a State could amend i t s constitution
without U.K. permission was referred back for further consideration by
the CO. Following correspondence between Sir Keith Hancock and Sir
Norman Brook, a memo, would be drafted on possible forms of association
i f Cyprus wished to remain in the Commonwealth: the status of a Common-
wealth State might be suitably adapted, or a special relationship be
devised perhaps on the precedent of the I r i s h republic. 1 ]

6. ( a ) REPORT OF CABINET'S COMMITTEE OF SENIOR OFFICIALS, 12 June 19592

The c o n s t i t u t i o n a l f u t u r e o f t h e s m a l l e r C o l o n i a l t e r r i t o r i e s
has been examined s e v e r a l t i m e s s i n c e t h e war. I n t h e most r e c e n t
o f t h e s e r e v i e w s , i n 1955-56, an a t t e m p t was made t o d e v i s e a

1. [See Nos. 126ff]. Options previously considered by the colonial policy

committee (11 March, 1958: C.P.C.(58) 4: Cab.134/1557) had included the status
quo with the retention of U.K sovereignty: a tri-dominium of the U.K., Greece
and Turkey; independence guaranteed for a fixed period by N.A.T.O.; even
Enosis with r e t e n t i o n of the B.S.A. - or f u l l membership, which the CO.
seemed increasingly to favour.
2. Cab.134/2505, C.P.C.(59) 7. The issue of the smaller t e r r i t o r i e s had been
debated in the Commons (17 April 1959: Hans.391 1289-1369 see F. Madden op.
cit. pp.103-5: Mansergh III p.285-90). The working p a r t y ' s report [No.5ej was
presented to a committee of senior o f f i c i a l s chaired by the cabinet s e c r e t a r y ,
Sir N. Brook: i t consisted of the permanent s e c r e t a r i e s of the C O .
(Macpherson), the C.R.O. (Laithwaite), the F.O. (Ross), the Treasury
(Padmore), the H.O. (Cunningham) and Defence (Powell). They were to examine
the p o s s i b i l i t y of a new form of Commonwealth a s s o c i a t i o n , short of full
membership, s u i t a b l e for smaller t e r i ' i t o r i e s and with p a r t i c u l a r reference to
Cyprus. The proposed final s t a t u s must f u l f i l ' a destiny appropriate to t h e i r
circumstances'.
 49
concept of 'Statehood' for territories which, while remaining
indefinitely dependent on the United Kingdom for defence and
external relations, would be self-governing in domestic affairs.
It was intended that this status should be the ultimate constitu-
tional goal for territories which were unlikely ever to be able
by themselves to stand on their own feet internationally. At that
time, however, it was concluded that the distinguishing marks of
Statehood as then envisaged did not differentiate that status
sufficiently from the penultimate stage of constitutional
development of a territory on the road to full self-government
and Commonwealth membership; and that for this reason progress
towards Statehood could not be held out as a distinct alternative
line of constitutional development. It was recognised that what
was needed was some general formula which would do for the
'Colonies' what the Balfour formula adopted by the Imperial
Conference of 1926 did for the 'Dominions', and it was recom-
mended that the search for such a Formula should be continued.
Since 1956 political and constitutional developments, and
public and parliamentary interest, have made this issue even more
urgent. The attainment of independence within the Commonwealth
by Ghana and Malaya, shortly to be followed by Nigeria; the
changes which are still taking place in the constitutional
relations between France and her territories in Africa; the
announcement on the future of the Belgian Congo and the rapid
growth of African nationalism as exhibited at the two Accra con-
ferences; and lastly the recent Zurich and London Agreements on
Cyprus, have all contributed to a growing awareness of the impor-
tance of this problem. .. [which was] to present to the smaller ter-
ritories, as a positive aim, a constitutional status within the
Commonwealth which will be sufficiently attractive to satisfy the
natural aspirations of their Governments and people.... [Cyprus
was an exception impossible to fit in with any general solution for the
rest of the smaller territories. Though circumscribed by treaty
obligations with the U.K., Greece and Turkey, it was to become 'a
sovereign independent republic' whereas the other smaller territories
were 'not to be regarded, for our purpose, as achieving full sovereig-
nty'.]
We are convinced that the solution for the smaller territories
does not lie in admitting them to full membership of the
Commonwealth on an equal footing with such countries as Canada
or India. If any one of them were to be so admitted we should
within a short space of time be faced with an irresistible demand
for similar treatment from a number of others. Such a development
would change the whole character of the Commonwealth and lead to
a dilution and weakening of the relationship between the United
Kingdom and the other existing independent members. Moreover, it
would probably be unpalatable to those larger Colonial terri-
tories which may legitimately expect to achieve independence and
membership of the Commonwealth in due course. Nor in our view
does the solution lie in a status indistinguishable from the
penultimate constitutional stage of larger territories on their
way to independence. The smaller territories could hardly be
expected to accept this as their final constitutional status. The
final status proposed for the smaller territories should be
demonstrably different from this. It should be such that the
peoples of those territories can feel that in adopting it they
50

w i l l be f u l f i l l i n g a destiny appropriate to their circum-

stances . . . .
[Current terminology and the division of responsibilities between the
C . R . O . and the C . O . emphasised too sharply the artificial distinction
between independent and dependent countries in the Commonwealth. But
indeed such countries did not fall neatly into two groups: they were 'a
collection of countries in various stages of constitutional development'.
The committee had tried to define] a new category of countries
w i t h i n the Commonwealth which, w h i l e they no longer need to be
administered under Colonial r u l e , can never attain complete
independence. They would l i e between f u l l members on the one hand
and the Colonial t e r r i t o r i e s on the other. They might be known
as Commonwealth States. The test for e l i g i b i l i t y f u l l s e l f -
government as distinct from full independence. The u n d e r l y i n g
conception is that at a certain stage the t e r r i t o r i e s concerned
would be able not only to govern themselves i n t e r n a l l y , but to
broaden their e x i s t i n g e x c l u s i v e relationship w i t h the United
Kingdom into one w i t h all other Commonwealth countries. Though
their relations w i t h f o r e i g n countries and the conduct of their
external defence would be carried out by the United Kingdom on
their behalf, they would be able to conduct their own relations
w i t h the independent members of the Commonwealth and to j o i n in
their own right in some, but not a l l , of the c o l l e c t i v e and
communal a c t i v i t i e s of the Commonwealth. This assumption of some
degree of international p e r s o n a l i t y , added to the m a t e r i a l
benefits, might be s u f f i c i e n t l y a t t r a c t i v e to the smaller
t e r r i t o r i e s to induce them to accept this status as the f i n a l
stage of their constitutional d e v e l o p m e n t . . . .
[The proposed attributes for these States would be (i) the acceptance
of the Queen as their Sovereign - possibly only as Head of the Common-
wealth: there might be a limited right of access on coins, stamps,
patronage etc. and a local representative of the Crown appointed on
advice of the U . K . cabinet after local consultation: (ii) Attendance at
Commonwealth meetings other than P . M . ' s : (iii) full internal self-
government with no legislation or supervision by Westminster, even on
amendment (save entrenched clauses): ( i v ) entrenched clauses (not
treaties which would imply they were independent with treaty-making
powers) where as in 'key base' States, the U . K . needed defence powers,
(either defence enclaves or - as in Singapore - even the right to suspend
the constitution and resume direct rule): (v) a U.K. Commissioner with
executive powers internally only where the U . K . retained responsibility,
otherwise a diplomatic role, but foreign relations would remain a U . K .
responsibility - the capacity of Commonwealth States internationally
would not be enshrined in their constitutions, but as in the Central
African federation and Singapore be 'entrustments' spelt out by
despatches: ( v i ) ineligibi1ity for U.N. membership, though possibly
associate membership of U.N. special agencies: ( v i i ) the right to enact
its own citizenship law in addition to Commonwealth citizenship or
British subjecthood: ( v i i i ) continuing membership of the Sterling Area
and right to imperial preference and to C . D . & W. aid. On the U.K.
retention of the power to suspend their constitution and on attendance
at Commonwealth P . M . ' s meetings the Working Party did not reach agreement
but in 'key base' States they agreed the U.K. must reserve power in the
last resort to suspend both. The C.O listed its reasons for retaining the
overriding power of syrensijpn:-]
(i) Commonwealth States would be ultimately dependent on the
 51

United Kingdom and the United Kingdom Government would, both in

the eyes of the people of the States concerned and international-
ly, carry implicit responsibility for matters going beyond the
defence and external affairs of those territories, and extending
to their general political and financial wellbeing. The United
Kingdom Government would be unlikely to be absolved from respon-
sibility in the forum of world opinion if the Government of a
Commonwealth State deteriorated into a petty dictatorship or
adopted a policy of racial intolerance or faced a breakdown in
its administrative or financial machinery, (ii) It would not be
enough to seek to prevent the exploitation of minorities or
inter-racial conflict by means of entrenched provisions in the
constitution; and unless the United Kingdom retained ultimate
suspensory powers there would be territories, for example, Mauri-
tius, whose emergence as a Commonwealth State would be appreciab-
ly delayed, if not altogether prevented, (iii) The retention by
the United Kingdom of overriding powers in key base States would
be less unpalatable to their peoples if this was a characteristic
extending to all Commonwealth States. If the power were retained
in only a few cases the pressure for abandoning it would be inc-
reased, with a greater likelihood of interference with our de-
fence facilities, (iv) Existing United Kingdom investment would
be better protected and future investment encouraged if there
were provision for the United Kingdom to take over in the event
of financial crisis, (v) We should not be taking anything away
which the States already possess; indeed we should be surrender-
ing a very considerable field of other reserve powers....
[The C.R.O. reasons for retaining suspensionary powers only in 'key
base' States were that:-]
(i) Emergent Colonial territories which are large and powerful
enough to stand on their own feet internationally are granted
full independence. The whole purpose of formulating the new
status of Commonwealth State is to find a final constitutional
status within the Commonwealth for the smaller territories which,
while otherwise eligible for self-government, are not large
enough to conduct their own defence and external affairs. It
would not be consistent with this concept if, in addition to
conducting those affairs on behalf of Commonwealth States, the
United Kingdom Government were to retain the right to intervene
in their internal affairs by suspending the constitution. The
fact that we accepted responsibility for the conduct of a State's
defence and external affairs would not of itself imply that we
retained any other responsibility. If a country's political
affairs deteriorated to a stage where they became a public
scandal we might find it necessary to cease to regard the State
concerned as a Commonwealth State, but this would be quite
different from accepting a responsibility to set about putting
things right....
[(ii) There would be considerable political difficulty in deciding
whether to exercise these powers, the fewer the cases in which they were
reserved the less likely our embarrassment, (iii) Retention would
irritate and become the focus for agitation, its exercise would be
generally difficult to justify to British and U.N. opinion; and as a
permanent feature it would detract from the advantages of Commonwealth
status, (iv) A State in difficulties, as Newfoundland in 1933 [Vol.VI,
No.149], could always request U.K. resumption of control. (v)
 52

Reimposition of direct U.K. control against the wish of a Government

would require m i l i t a r y forces, administrative staff and police and t h i s
would be impracticable and worthless in non-key base States.
On representation at Commonwealth P.M.'s meetings i t had been argued
that a 'strong and positive counter-attraction' was necessary to prevent
Commonwealth States continuing with resentment to pursue an independence
they could not sustain and H.M.'s. G. would be reluctant to grant - e.g.
i n v i t i n g chief ministers as advisers to the U.K. P.M., as advisers to
some P.M.'s meetings; but the majority of the Working Party opposed t h i s
because]
( i ) M e e t i n g s o f Commonwealth Prime M i n i s t e r s a r e m e e t i n g s between
t h e Heads o f Governments o f i n d e p e n d e n t c o u n t r i e s w i t h a s t a n d i n g
i n t h e w o r l d e x c e e d i n g a n y t h i n g which a Commonwealth S t a t e would
p o s s e s s , ( i i ) The aim i s t o draw up a s t a t u s f o r s m a l l e r C o l o n i a l
t e r r i t o r i e s which i s d i s t i n c t f r o m f u l l membership o f t h e Common-
w e a l t h . The most d i s c e r n i b l e a t t r i b u t e o f f u l l membership i s t h e
r i g h t t o a t t e n d m e e t i n g s o f Commonwealth Prime M i n i s t e r s ; it
would o n l y s e r v e t o b l u r t h e d i s t i n c t i o n w i t h consequent damage
t o t h e s t a t u s b o t h o f t h e independent members and o f Commonwealth
S t a t e s , i f C h i e f M i n i s t e r s o f Commonwealth S t a t e s were a l s o a l -
lowed t o a t t e n d t h e s e m e e t i n g s . . . .
[ ( i i i ) where the main subjects were defence and international a f f a i r s
(for which they would not be responsible), not intra-Commonwea1th r e l a t -
ions (over which they would have some c o n t r o l ) , ( i v ) Moreover t h e i r pre-
sence there would encourage them to feel competent to handle external
a f f a i r s and to press for independence, (v) As advisers to the B r i t i s h
P.M. t h e i r dependence would be emphasised, though the outside world would
probably not distinguish between members and advisers, ( v i ) Other Common-
wealth members, who must be consulted, would oppose any suggestion that
Commonwealth States were 'on something l i k e an equal f o o t i n g ' . 1 ( v i i )
The intimate nature of the discussions would be impaired. Indeed]
The m a j o r i t y o f t h e Working P a r t y s u g g e s t t h a t t h e a s p i r a t i o n s
o f Commonwealth S t a t e s would be s u f f i c i e n t l y met i f t h e y became
e l i g i b l e t o a t t e n d i n t h e i r own r i g h t 7ntra-Commonwealth m e e t i n g s
o t h e r t h a n t h o s e o f Prime M i n i s t e r s , and t h a t t h e r e m i g h t a l s o
be a case f o r b r i n g i n g t h e C h i e f M i n i s t e r s o f Commonwealth S t a t e s
t o s e p a r a t e meetings w i t h t h e U n i t e d Kingdom Prime M i n i s t e r when
a s u f f i c i e n t number o f Commonwealth S t a t e s had been c r e a t e d .
The Working P a r t y would be opposed t o any s u g g e s t i o n t h a t t h e
new s t a t u s s h o u l d be p r o c l a i m e d i n t h e a b s t r a c t and t h e n a p p l i e d
t o a m i s c e l l a n e o u s c o l l e c t i o n o f t e r r i t o r i e s on a g i v e n d a t e .
Such a method would be o u t o f k e e p i n g w i t h t h e t r a d i t i o n a l
B r i t i s h approach and would a l s o i g n o r e t h e f a c t t h a t t h e s m a l l e r
t e r r i t o r i e s a r e a t v a r y i n g s t a g e s o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l development
and t h a t i t w i l l n o t i n any case be p o s s i b l e t o f i t them i n t o an
e x a c t l y s i m i l a r p a t t e r n . They recommend t h a t t h e new s t a t u s
s h o u l d be a l l o w e d t o d e v e l o p by t h e same s o r t o f e v o l u t i o n a r y

1. In f a c t , the f u l l members were divided: A u s t r a l i a , S. Africa, India and

Pakistan would favour the I r i s h model of external a s s o c i a t i o n , while Canada,
N.Z., Ghana and Malaya deplored the acceptance of a two-tier Commonwealth. At
f i r s t the Cypriots seemed to accept a s p e c i a l s t a t u s , but any such formula
would only add 'one more anomaly' to an a s s o c i a t i o n 'already hard enough to
d e f i n e ' : an appropriate compromise was e l u s i v e : (Brook to Macmillan, 7 Dec.
1959: Prem.11/2910).
 53

p r o c e s s by which Commonwealth r e l a t i o n s g e n e r a l l y have d e v e l -

o p e d . 1 I t would be necessary t o d e f i n e i n g e n e r a l terms t h e
essential attributes of Commonwealth S t a t e s on t h e lines
i n d i c a t e d above, perhaps p o i n t i n g t o Singapore as a p r a c t i c a l
example, b u t l e a v i n g t h e d e t a i l e d arrangements t o be s e t t l e d i n
r e l a t i o n t o t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f p a r t i c u l a r t e r r i t o r i e s . I t would
be necessary t o c o n s u l t o t h e r Commonwealth Governments about t h e
proposed s t a t u s b e f o r e any announcement was m a d e . . . .
[Whether i t would be the C.R.O. or the CO. which would be responsible
was yet undecided. The report then tabled specific cases: Singapore
suitable 'now'; S.L. in 1962; Gibraltar, Mauritius, Aden in 5 years;
Gambia and Zanzibar in 10 years; Bermuda and Bahamas, 10 years i f
suitable at a l l ; F i j i , N. Borneo, Sarawak over 10 years; Brunei, B.G. and
B.H. ' u n c e r t a i n ' ; H.K. 'unsuitable' and Malta a special case (one party
wanting independence inside, the other outside, the Commonwealth.2]

( b ) ARTHUR SNELLING TO IAN WATT, 4 August, 19593

[Any blurring of the distinction between dependent colonies and
independent members of the Commonwealth would be strongly resisted by the
latter because their history consisted 'largely of winning independence
from Whitehall', sometimes peacefully, sometimes just in time to avoid
bloodshed.] All newly independent countries seem to feel a
psychological necessity to demonstrate to the world at large that
they really are independent. For this purpose they must dissoci-
ate themselves entirely from other territories not yet fully
independent, and they must be continually on the watch and indeed

1. Cyprus was not listed. Since independence had already been conceded, some
form of special association would have to be negotiated: the F.O., making it
clear that the Cyprus settlement would be in jeopardy, if anything less than
full membership was granted, while the C.R.O. argued strongly that, since
Greece and Turkey were involved, external association on the Irish model would
be the most appropriate and would follow a precedent: (Brook to Laithwaite,
3 July; Laithwaite to Brook, 22 July: D.O.35/7870). However months before
Cyprus became independent (16 Aug. 1960) the Cypriot leaders (Makarios and
Kutchuk) meeting in London (15 Jan. 1960) made it evident that, nothing less
than equality with other existing members would be acceptable. Home warned
Macmillan in S. Africa [Vol.VI, No.41a] that though the admission of Cyprus
would change the Commonwealth 'out of all recognition' Cypriots would not
accept 'a place in the 2nd XI': (14 March, Prem.11/3220). At the Commonwealth
P.M.'s meeting in May 1960 both Australia (Menzies) and India (Nehru) were
concerned about the implications of the decision for full membership on the
association: as a C.R.O. briefing note suggested there was a danger of the
Commonwealth being diluted 'by a flock of small and insignificant Members':
(30 March 1960: Ann.A CP.(60) 1, Cab. 134/1552) [see p.3],
2. Snelling's 'admirable and efficient ad ftoc-ery' [see No.6b]
3. D.O. 35/7870. SnjeJJ^ing was assistant under-secretary in the C.R.O. before
being posted as H.C. to Ghana in 1959. Watt was an assistant secretary. These
were Snelling's reactions to Christopher Eastwood's 'musings' in the C O . 'not
for the file' - the contrast between the desire for independence and
incapacity 'to stand on own feet', and his belief that since even independent
members were inter-dependent, the distinction should not be between
independence and dependence - but an emphasis should be placed on one
community and loyalty, though with diversity of interests - like a village of
many classes uniting against a new road: (Min. 13 July, ibid.).
54
niggling about anything the former Colonial power does or says
that might conceivably be held to imply that that power still
regards them as not fully independent. This is not just a post-
war phenomenon in relation to tropical Commonwealth countries.
It was a large part of the story of our relations with Canada and
South Africa in the 1920's and '30's.
Against this background, it is futile to think that Common-
wealth countries will acquiesce in any arrangements we try to
devise which appear to lump them in with Colonies not yet fully
independent. The independent countries will feel, rightly or
wrongly, that such a step would cast doubts upon the reality of
their own independence. This I believe to be true not only of the
newest independent countries (Ghana's attitude to Nigeria in the
last two years is typical) but even of the oldest and most grown
up Commonwealth countries such as Canada. There is the very
greatest danger that if we try to bring in, as though they were
full members of the Commonwealth, Colonies which are not yet
fully independent, we shall extrude from the other end of the
scale countries like Canada, whose loss to the Commonwealth might
be far greater than the gains at the lower end of the scale.
Thi s situation will, to my mind, become intensified rather than
diminished if we insist on retaining 'snatch-back' powers in
perpetuity in Commonwealth States, thereby demonstrating to them
and to the world at large that they are not really free and that
we never intend them to be so. I cannot conceive of any Common-
wealth country being willing to treat as an equal a territory
whose constitution can be suspended against its will by White-
hall. For this reason, I believe all attempts to be ill-founded
which try to secure 'parity of esteem' for Colonies without
granting them full control over their own destinies.
The particular circumstances of Sierra Leone and the West
Indies (and perhaps Malta too) is apparently that they want full
control over their own external affairs whilst being unable or
unwilling to pay the full cost of either their own defence or
social services. I question whether it is true to say that
countries in this category really want something a little less
than independence. They surely want full independence, but with
the U.K. still paying part of the bill. (Perhaps their attitude
might be regarded as similar to that of British Universities
towards the Exchequer.) I do not despair of our being able to
fudge up something when the time comes to meet this situation,
but I do not believe we should try to lay down hard and fast
rules in advance. This is a situation in which we can best play
by ear as we go along. . . . [Indeed independence in Ghana and Malaya had
not meant a cessation of the money provided by the U.K., even from CD.
& W. funds: Nigeria still received a large Commonwealth Assistance Loan.
In Cyprus the best device would be 'the defence ticket' as in Malaya. If
Sierra Leone could not pay for defence and preferred to be defenceless,
then the U.K. could help under a Defence Agreement; similarly for the
West Indies. In all these territories he would hate to lay down in
advance any general rules because the U.K. would become a prisoner of
them and we would frighten the Treasury. 'Let us continue with our
admirable and efficient ad hoc-ery'.]
 55

7 . (a) SIR NORMAN BROOK TO HAROLD MACMILLAN, 26 April I960 1

[The first assumption had been that 'the independent Commonwealth'
would grow by the accession of 'a relatively small number of relatively
large units' - Nigeria ( 3 6 m ) , Central A f r i c a ( 8 m . ) , West Indies (3.1m),
Tanganyika ( 8 . 8 m ) , Kenya ( 6 . 4 m ) , Uganda (5.7m) - so that it would 'over
the years' consist of 16 members] all of them s i g n i f i c a n t coun-
t r i e s w h i c h could expect to e x e r c i s e some influence in w o r l d
counsels, to be v i a b l e e c o n o m i c a l l y , and to be w o r t h - w h i l e part-
ners in some regional defence system. So constituted, the Common-
w e a l t h could continue to e x e r t a powerful influence in the w o r l d .
The Commonwealth Prime M i n i s t e r s , at their meetings, w o u l d confer
as equals and would together have substantial a u t h o r i t y . S i x t e e n
is not too large a number to do business much as they have done
in the past. . . . [The second assumption was that the smaller territories
(Malta, Mauritius, Singapore) could not carry this kind of weight, so
their final goal would be 'full internal self-government w i t h the U . K .
or some other independent Commonwealth country responsible for foreign
relations and defence.1 Two types of territory would qualify for this
status - 'fortress colonies', where the U.K. was unwilling to concede
control of external a f f a i r s (Singapore, Malta, Gibraltar) and those too
small for true independence (Mauritius, Fiji, Gambia and Seychelles).]
These assumptions have now been c a l l e d in question by arguments
over the future of Cyprus. For (a) the C y p r i o t leaders have re-
jected the special form of Commonwealth a s s o c i a t i o n w h i c h was
devised for C y p r u s , c l a i m i n g f u l l Commonwealth membership or
nothing; and (b) some of the independent Commonwealth c o u n t r i e s
have indicated distaste for any status between dependence and
f u l l Commonwealth membership. The concept of the ' C o m m o n w e a l t h
S t a t e ' , . . . h a s s u f f e r e d in the eyes of other Commonwealth Gover-
nments by being put f o r w a r d i n i t i a l l y in a s p e c i a l f o r m adapted
to the unique circumstances of Cyprus and has evoked the old pre-
judices against the concept of the ' t w o - t i e r ' C o m m o n w e a l t h . . . .
[Some argued that thereafter no State would be w i l l i n g to accept 'a
second class status': internal self-government without responsibi1ity for
conduct of foreign relations 'because we were unwilling that they should
do so or because they were incapable of doing s o ' . Would other colonies
insist, as Cyprus had, on 'full membership or nothing'?] If we think
that no-one w i l l accept it (though Singapore has done s o ) , it is
useless to put it forward as a 'model' for the smaller terri-
tori es.
Of course, if we concede full membership to Cyprus, we have
v i r t u a l l y no chance of persuading other small t e r r i t o r i e s to
accept l e s s . Perhaps, t h e r e f o r e , we should f i r s t consider whether
it is practical politics now to refuse full membership to
Cyprus . . . .
[The arguments for and against were set out in C . P . C . ( 6 0 ) 10. His view
was that 'we should do our utmost to avoid conceding full Membership to
Cyprus, both because it is an unsuitable member and even more because its

1. Prem.11/3220 for C . P . O . ( 6 0 ) 9. The future development of the Commonwealth.

A Commonwealth P . M . ' s meeting was to take place on 3 M a y . The c a b i n e t
secretary thought the P . M . s should have i n f o r m a l ta.lks w i t h the P . M . s of
Canada ( D i e f e n b a k e r ) , A u s t r a l i a ( M e n z i e s ) , I n d i a ( N e h r u ) and Ghana ( N k n i m a h ) -
one from eacli continent - even p r e l i m i n a r y d i s c u s s i o n by t h e i r senior
o f f i c i a l s before any debate in plenary session.
 56

admission is bound to disrupt the Commonwealth association as we know

i t ' . In the committee of o f f i c i a l s on Colonial policy, some of his 'more
robust colleagues' in F.O. and CO. agreed, but those involved in the
Cyprus negotiations took the other view, believing that the U.K. was
already committed ' i n s p i r i t i f not in form' to conceding f u l l Member-
ship, and the Colonial and Commonwealth secretaries, probably with the
Foreign secretary's support, were commending t h i s to cabinet in C.P.C.
(60) 10.]
T h i s b e i n g s o , a l l I s h o u l d say now i s t h a t , i f we a r e t o
a c c e p t Cyprus as a f u l l member o f t h e Commonwealth, we s h o u l d do
so w i t h our eyes open t o t h e consequences. And we s h o u l d a l s o see
t h a t o t h e r Commonwealth Prime M i n i s t e r s are e q u a l l y aware o f
t h o s e consequences. I t i s p e r f e c t l y t r u e t h a t some o f t h e o t h e r
Commonwealth Governments - p a r t i c u l a r l y Canada, New Z e a l a n d ,
Ghana and Malaya - were uneasy about t h e s p e c i a l f o r m o f a s s o -
c i a t i o n which we o r i g i n a l l y suggested f o r C y p r u s . But t h a t was
because t h e y d i s l i k e d t h a t anomalous s t a t u s . I am n o t s u r e t h a t
i t f o l l o w s t h a t t h e y would welcome t h e g r a n t o f f u l l membership
t o C y p r u s . We must a t l e a s t make s u r e , when t h e y a r e h e r e , t h a t
t h i s i s what t h e y r e a l l y want - i n s p i t e o f i t s consequences.
I f we have t o a d m i t Cyprus t o f u l l membership, we s h a l l n o t be
a b l e t o argue i n f u t u r e t h a t s m a l l c o u n t r i e s cannot a s p i r e t o
f u l l membership. We must a c c e p t t h a t , as t i m e goes on, a number
o f t h e s e w i l l become f u l l members - and t h e concept o f t h e i n d e -
pendent Commonwealth, [as outlined under the f i r s t assumption] w i l l
d i s a p p e a r . To me, t h i s i s a b l e a k p r o s p e c t . Perhaps we c o u l d work
f o r an arrangement by which t h e Prime M i n i s t e r s o f t h e c o u n t r i e s
which r e a l l y m a t t e r e d would c o n t i n u e t o meet a l o n e , w i t h o u t t h e
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f t h e s m a l l e r c o u n t r i e s , and c o n d u c t t h e k i n d
o f b u s i n e s s t o which we have become accustomed. T h i s , i t i s t r u e ,
would be something l i k e a ' t w o - t i e r ' system. But i t i s w o r t h
remembering t h a t t h i s g o t i t s bad name a t a t i m e when t h e t o p
t i e r would have been r e s e r v e d f o r ' w h i t e ' D o m i n i o n s . . . .
These a r e m a t t e r s o f such i m p o r t a n c e t o t h e f u t u r e o f t h e Com-
monwealth t h a t some o f t h e o t h e r Prime M i n i s t e r s s h o u l d be asked
t o share i n t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r c o n s i d e r i n g t h e m . . . . [ I t was
crucial for the P.M. to have preliminary informal talks with Menzies,
Diefenbaker and Nehru before the formal sessions of the P.M.'s meeting
began. A l l Commonwealth governments would have to be consulted before any
decision was made. Other P.M.s could be brought in when the i n i t i a l work
had been done. 1 ]

1. The Commonwealth P.M.s agreed (13 May) t h a t a group of senior o f f i c i a l s

from the U.K., Canada, A u s t r a l i a and India and in addition from N.Z. and
Ghana, would review the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l development of the Commonwealth with
special reference to the future of the smaller dependent t e r r i t o r i e s and make
an a n a l y s i s , with a l t e r n a t i v e suggestions for consideration by a l l the
Commonwealth governments. Brook, R.B. Byce (Canada), Sir Allen Brown (Aust-
r a l i a ) . A.S. Macintosh (N.Z.), M.J. Desai (India) and A.L. Adu (Ghana) met at
Chequers (17-23 July) with Poynton ( C O . ) and L i n t o t t (C.R.O.). Meanwhile, a
C.R.O. paper (31 May) defined the Commonwealth as f a free a s s o c i a t i o n of
independent sovereign S t a t e s ' with c e r t a i n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s in common to a
varying degree. The present Singapore solution and the Tonga t r e a t y
r e l a t i o n s h i p were considered b r i e f l y : t h e r e was some hope in f e d e r a t i o n s , but
the t w o - t i e r association was dropped. The dilemma was, if small colonies
 57
(b) REPORT BY COMMONWEALTH OFFICIALS: THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE
COMMONWEALTH, 23 June I9601
[The definition of the Commonwealth, given in the C.R.O. briefing paper
(31 May), was clearly accepted for it constituted the second paragraph
of the report 'a free association of independent sovereign States1 with
the following characteristics in common to a varying degree 'a certain
weight of population; political, financial and economic viability, the
ability to play a role in world affairs and to carry weight in world
councils, and the capacity for self-defence - at least against local acts
of aggression'.... 'a relatively small group of relatively large count-
ries'. Both severally and jointly, members had found the association of
considerable value, enhancing importance and influence. Commonwealth
P.M.'s meetings were highly valued as the centre of the network of con-
sultation: they had always been characterised by a frankness and intimacy
unparalleled in international meetings. That would most likely be impai-
red by any large increase in numbers.
The report then went through the list of member countries with popula-
tion numbers. 11 full members (incl. the U.K.) by the end of 1960: and
another 5 in the next few years (S.L. in 1961, the West Indies feder-
ation, Tanganyika, Kenya and Uganda). The federation of Rhodesia and
Nyasaland, inheriting the place of S. Rhodesia, was represented at P.M.'s
meetings but could not be a member until it attained independence. Among
the smaller dependencies pace of advance would accelerate and internal
self-government would not content all for long. Among those promised
independence soon, there was Cyprus.(in August 1960) - anomalous by its
small size and close relationships with Greece and Turkey; Western Samoa,
a N.Z. trust territory (in Jan. 1962), probably not an applicant for mem-
bership of the Commonwealth2 or the U.N.; and British Guiana probably
in 1963.3 By 1970 it was likely that Singapore; Malta; B.H., with no de-

seceded, the Commonwealth would be damaged; if they obtained full membership

the Commonwealth was drastically changed; (C.S.G.(60) 2: Cab.133/200). Again
Brook held an inter-department meeting of officials (8 July) which accepted
that a two-tier solution was a non-starter (CS.G.(60) 6: Cab. 133/200) and
Macmillan discussed the problem with Home, Macleod and Brook (13 July): if
Cyprus was accepted not as a Commonwealth State or Treaty State but a full
member, then 'all the other tiddlers' would demand similar treatment: but if
the object of the association was to persuade member countries of the
superiority of the Western approach over the Russian then the doors must be
open wide. As Macmillan said: 'is it to be the R.A.C or Boodles?' If the club
was too large, then P.M.s from the larger countries might be reluctant to
speak freely. Anyway if in the next decade there were only 3 new members, the
P.M.'s meeting would still be smaller than the British cabinet. Macmillan
thought conferences would be better if 'there were more dinners and fewer-
meetings': (Bligh, Min., Prem.11/3649).
1. Cab.133/200: much of the factual evidence and statistics derived from the
C.R.O. briefing paper (CS.0.(60) 2: 31 May ibid,). The group of senior
Commonwealth officials meeting at Chequers for 6 days reported to the P.M.'s
of Commonwealth countries through the U.K. government: they reviewed the
probable growth of members, the effect of the accession of new members and
alternative means of preserving the value of the association. In fact they
reviewed the forecast for the next decade with ecpianimity.
2. It was treated as a member, but not formally till Aug. 1970, as an
indigenous monarchy (like Tonga in 1970).
3. In fact in May 1966 as Guyana, - a republic in 1970.
 58
sire to join the W. Indies federation nor to be swallowed up by Guatemala
and Aden protectorate. So with a Central African federation in some form
the total in the next decade would rise from 11 full members to 17-24,
though there might be hope that mergers or federations would reduce the
number.1
They had examined five possible ways of preserving the intimate charac-
ter of P.M.'s meetings; (1) special Commonwealth Statehood short of
independence; (2) arbitrary exclusion by size from P.M.'s meetings; (3)
on the Security Council analogy, meeting of permanent members and others
chosen by rotation; (4) special regional meetings in which the small
countries would participate; (5) changes in procedure at P.M.'s meetings
to preserve their essential character.
(1) But Commonwealth Statehood, maybe modelled on Internal self-govern-
ment in Singapore or on treaty relationship with the U.K. as in Tonga,
would not be suitable to those territories likely to seek independence
in the next decade (e.g. Cyprus, W. Samoa). Whatever commissions, increa-
sed recognition, and privileges were deliberately granted to make anony-
mous Statehood more attractive would be represented as 'nothing more than
'Colonial' status under another name' and resented as a device to delay
constitutional advance contrary to the promises of successive U.K. gover-
nments. It might also confuse world opinion about the independence of
full members and the nature of the Commonwealth. It would attract the
criticisms usually levelled at a 'two-tier' system. Moreover many of the
characteristics of permanent Commonwealth States would be applicable to
other territories 'in the penultimate stage' of advance to full indepen-
dence.
(2) The limitation of members with the right to attend Commonwealth
P.M.'s meetings - perhaps only those over 1m. population - would restrict
the P.M.'s meetings to 18 - a simple, understandable objective rule. But
these smaller territories might be U.N. members and in Commonwealth rela-
tions all have equal rights and privileges, regardless of size. Cypriot
leaders would not accept such a status: if Cyprus were admitted then that
would demonstrate that the smallness of territories was no ground for
exclusion.
(3) The Security Council analogy of permanent and rotation members would
not avoid the 'two-tier' exclusions, would introduce a rigid formula into
Commonwealth procedure, and would suppose an executive, instead of the
existing deliberative function. Moreover it would probably in ten years
only reduce the total from 24 to 20 and N.Z. and Malaya, having smaller
populations, might lose permanent representation. On the other hand it
might satisfy the aspirations of some and keep P.M.'s meetings manage-
able.
(4) Regional meetings might be valuable but important matters would have
to be communicated to P.M.'s meetings (N. and Central America and the W.
Indies; Africa; Asia and Aden; Australasia and Pacific). Would the U.K.
be in a region with Malta and Cyprus or belong to all regions? Would
larger countries attend regional meetings devised primarily for smaller
territories? Would not regional interests be better discussed by all re-
gional, not merely Commonwealth countries? 'The real value of the Common-
wealth lies not in its regionalism but in its transcendence over region-
alism'. There were already many opportunities for regional co-operation

1. Actually there were 33 by the end of 1970, 46 by 1980 and 57 by 1996. S.

Africa (1961-94), Pakistan (1972-89) and Fiji (1987-95) had lapses of
membership and Nigeria's was suspended as was Pakistan's in 1999.
 59
(e.g. Caribbean commission, the Colombo plan, U.N. specialised agencies).
None of these four methods of restricting membership of the P.M.'s
meetings would suit the circumstances likely to arise in the next decade,
and would be more appropriate to a Commonwealth in which a large number
of the smaller territories had become members,1 but by 1970 these latter
would be less than one-third.
(5) On the possible procedural changes at P.M.'s meetings to retain the
elements of essential value at such gatherings, they had concluded]
An increase i n membership on t h i s scale should not s e r i o u s l y
a f f e c t the value of much of the day-to-day Commonwealth co-
operation 2 - mutual c o n s u l t a t i o n , economic and other s i m i l a r
conferences, and the multitudinous a c t i v i t i e s of private
a s s o c i a t i o n s . Indeed, in many economic and other f u n c t i o n a l
meetings i t i s already the p r a c t i c e f o r a number of the more
advanced dependent t e r r i t o r i e s t o be represented under the wing
of the United Kingdom d e l e g a t i o n , and the increase in t o t a l
numbers should be manageable.
The serious problem i s t h a t of the Prime M i n i s t e r s ' Meetings.
These Meetings are a unique element i n the Commonwealth associ-
a t i o n , and t h e i r value derives very l a r g e l y from the personal
r e l a t i o n s between the Prime M i n i s t e r s and the frankness and
i n f o r m a l i t y of t h e i r discussions. Without some procedural changes
i t w i l l be d i f f i c u l t t o maintain t h i s essential character of the
Meetings i f there i s a s u b s t a n t i a l increase i n the number of
Prime M i n i s t e r s a t t e n d i n g .
C e r t a i n l y , w i t h a membership of 20 or more, Meetings on the
present model, where most of the discussion takes place i n
plenary session w i t h three advisers attending each M i n i s t e r ,
would become unwieldy; there would be something l i k e 100 people
i n the conference room. Indeed, i t may be t h a t , w i t h the e x i s t i n g
and immediately prospective membership, the plenary sessions are
already in some danger of losing t h e i r intimate character.
As the membership of the Commonwealth increases, various
changes i n the organisation and procedure of the Meetings w i l l
need t o be adopted i f t h e i r special q u a l i t y i s t o be preserved.
The f o l l o w i n g suggestions are submitted f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n : (a)
There might be fewer plenary sessions, and more meetings of a
l i m i t e d number of Prime M i n i s t e r s on p a r t i c u l a r subjects,
(b) At c e r t a i n plenary sessions in 1960 the Prime M i n i s t e r s alone

1. By the mid-1980s the association consisted predominantly of smaller

t e r r i t o r i e s : 29 with populations under 3m. - the population of N.Z.; and 19
( i n c l . N.Z. and the U.K.) with 3m. or over. By the mid-90s there were 3 new
smaller members, and two of the l a r g e r members (Pakistan in 1989 and S. Africa
in 1994) had been readmitted, and i t seemed l i k e l y once the objection to the
1990 c o n s t i t u t i o n , as discriminatory both in i n t e n t i o n and p r a c t i c e in i t s
legal and e l e c t o r a l systems and contrary to human r i g h t s , was overcome, t h a t
F i j i ' s r e - a p p l i c a t i o n would be approved. A c o n s t i t u t i o n a l review commission
was s e t up in 1995: India was invited to reopen i t s mission in Suva, but both
I n d i a ' s reply and F i j i ' s re-admission to membership, which India p a r t i c u l a r l y
blocked, was deferred t i l l the commission had reported.
2. Indeed, the point had been made (13 July 1960 in B l i g h ' s Min., 20 July;
Prem. 11/3649) t h a t if only 3 new members were admitted in the next decade the
P.M.'s meetings would s t i l l be smaller than B r i t i s h cabinets - 19 in 1960, 21
in 1970, 22 in 1980s to 1990s: ( c / . V I , p.212).
60

sat at the table, with all advisers behind (normally one adviser
sits with each Prime Minister). This practice might be extended.
(c) Prime Ministers have on occasion met without advisers. They
might wish to do so more frequently; the arrangements at Marl-
borough House would facilitate this.
(d) As the number of Prime Ministers increases, they might wish
to reserve more 'free' time for informal contacts outside the
Meeti ngs.
We have also considered whether, as the numbers grow, some
modification in the general nature of the agenda would contribute
to the maintenance of the character and efficacy of the dis-
cussions. It is the convention of these Meetings that there is
no fixed agenda in the sense of a rigid programme, and we should
not wish to suggest that this conception should be abandoned or
that the existing freedom of discussion should be curtailed. It
may be, however, that the content of the agenda as accepted at
recent Meetings will in future, as the number of Prime Ministers
increases, prove somewhat too wide and general for effective and
fruitful discussions. The constitutional items are, of course,
precise and obligatory. But in the discussion of foreign affairs,
instead of a general review of the international situation at
large, it might help if consideration could more often be focused
on specific subjects of special and current interest. It might
on occasion be appropriate to remit such subjects for preliminary
discussion to smaller groups of Prime Ministers as envis-
aged ... above . In the discussion of economic matters, Prime
Ministers might wish to concentrate attention on those problems
which have a direct political content, since there are now
opportunities for full consideration of economic questions at the
regular meetings of Finance Ministers.
If these suggestions were adopted, they would call for a some-
what more detailed advance preparation of the agenda and the
programme of Meetings than hitherto...
[In conclusion] In our examination of the problem remitted to us we
have throughout assumed that it is a major objective of policy
to find a place in the Commonwealth for the smaller dependent
territories if and when they attain independence. It would be a
frustration of much that the Commonwealth stands for if, on at-
taining independence, a small country, however warm its Common-
wealth sentiments, found the terms on which it could remain in
the Commonwealth unacceptable and preferred to leave it. In such
circumstances these countries would proceed to independence out-
side the Commonwealth, would be accepted for membership of the
United Nations, and would start their international life without
the help and support that Commonwealth association can give them,
and possibly with resentment against the Commonwealth which had
rejected them. It would seem paradoxical if the Commonwealth,
whose members have held out independence as the goal for their
dependent territories, were more restrictive in its requirements
for membership than the United Nations,
The suggestions that we have examined in this report under the
headings of 'Statehood' and 'Limitation of Privileges' all con-
tain the danger that, presented with the alternatives of remain-
ing in the Commonwealth with something less than the full privi-
leges of membership or of leaving the Commonwealth to become an
independent foreign State, most of the possible aspirants for
 61

independence within the Commonwealth might opt for the latter-

course.
The only sure way of avoiding this danger would be to grant
f u l l Commonwealth membership t o a l l t e r r i t o r i e s , i r r e s p e c t i v e o f
size, on their attainment of independence. This is also the
solution which, in principle, is most consistent both with the
a s p i r a t i o n s o f t h e new n a t i o n s a n d w i t h t h e g e n e r a l e t h o s o f t h e
Commonwealth. It would, however, be a weighty argument against
this course if the consequent enlargement of Commonwealth
membership made it impossible in practice to maintain the
essential value of the Commonwealth association as we know it.
To j u d g e how f a r t h e g r o w t h i n m e m b e r s h i p i s l i k e l y t o e n d a n g e r
t h e c h a r a c t e r o f Commonwealth c o - o p e r a t i o n r e q u i r e s a f o r e c a s t
o f t h e e x t e n t a n d n a t u r e o f t h a t g r o w t h . . . [over the next 10 y e a r s ] .
We limited our analysis to this period because we felt that it
was t h e l o n g e s t f o r w h i c h i t i s p r o f i t a b l e t o p l a n o r f o r w h i c h
i t i s p o s s i b l e t o make o t h e r t h a n p u r e l y s p e c u l a t i v e g u e s s e s . Our
own c o n c l u s i o n i s t h a t , o v e r t h a t p e r i o d a t any r a t e , t h e i n c -
r e a s e i n n u m b e r s may n o t be u n m a n a g e a b l e . I f t h a t c o n c l u s i o n w e r e
a c c e p t e d by G o v e r n m e n t s i t s h o u l d be p o s s i b l e t o m a i n t a i n t h e
essential character of the Commonwealth association and at the
same t i m e t o c o n t i n u e t o a c c o r d t h e f u l l p r i v i l e g e s o f m e m b e r s h i p
t o d e p e n d e n t t e r r i t o r i e s w h i c h , on a t t a i n i n g i n d e p e n d e n c e , d e s i r e
to claim them.1

8 . E.R. HAMMER: MINUTE ON CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS FOR THE ENTRENCHMENT

OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN COLONIAL TERRITORIES, 20 December 1961 2
[The Earl of P e r t h , m i n i s t e r o f s t a t e at the C O . , had pointed out t h a t
the p r o v i s i o n f o r human r i g h t s were not entrenched i n the independence

1. The report went not only via Macmillan to the Commonwealth P.M.s, but also
to high commissioners in the c a p i t a l s of full members. The Cyprus demand for
full membership was approved unanimously. At the P.M.'s meeting; on 13 March
1961 Makarios was invited to attend {communique), but Verwoerd announced t h a t
S. Africa would withdraw from membership of 'what i s now becoming a pressure
group'; [Vol.VI, p.194]. Three years l a t e r the P.M.'s meeting cautiously
committed themselves to ' m u l t i - r a c i a l i s m ' as 'an objective of policy' and
condemned apartheid. South African citizens continued to be treated
p r e f e r e n t i a l l y (as the I r i s h had been) and given time to decide whether to
apply for B r i t i s h c i t i z e n s h i p . In 1994 a f t e r the A.N.C. victory i t rejoined
the Commonwealth.
2. CO.1036/612, Gen.174/476/01. Hammer was the p r i n c i p a l o f f i c e r in the
general department of the CO. (which d e a l t with colonial c o n s t i t u t i o n s , the
cabinet committee on colonial policy, p r i v i l e g e s , war graves, bishops,
p a s s p o r t s , immigration, f l a g s , drugs &c.) and sent copies of his minute to a l l
heads of geographical departments and to the legal advisers (McPetrie,
Rushford) and the F.O. (Peck) and C.R.O. (Dawson, Morgan). Even at the
beginning of the rush towards independence and surrender to the force of
individual colonial nationalisms, the CO. s t i l l held to i t s b e l i e f (and
t r u s t ) t h a t the c o n s t i t u t i o n s should p r o t e c t human r i g h t s and p a r t i c u l a r l y
those of m i n o r i t i e s . Following S.L. (27 April 1961), Tanganyika was the f i r s t
E. African t e r r i t o r y to secure independence (9 Dec. 1961). In 1962 following
the break-up of the W. Indies federation, Jamaica (6 Aug.) and Trinidad and
Tobago (31 Aug.) became independent and full members. Kenya's was delayed, due
to Mau-mau violence and s e t t l e r truculence, t i l l 12 Dec. 1963.
 62

constitution for Tanganyika and could be amended (as indeed were a l l

sections) by a two-thirds majority. He asked that certain provisions
(esp. those dealing with human rights) should be entrenched in a l l the
remaining African t e r r i t o r i e s in any future constitutions and in colonies
generally in an e a r l i e r stage than independence. Hammer reviewed the
provision in Commonwealth countries - India, Malaya and Nigeria on the
recommendations of the Minorities commission (1957-8):-] P r o v i s i o n s o f
this kind in the Constitution are difficult to enforce and
sometimes d i f f i c u l t t o i n t e r p r e t . N e v e r t h e l e s s , we t h i n k , they
s h o u l d be i n s e r t e d . T h e i r presence d e f i n e s b e l i e f s w i d e s p r e a d
among d e m o c r a t i c c o u n t r i e s and p r o v i d e s a s t a n d a r d t o which
appeal may be made by t h o s e whose r i g h t s a r e i n f r i n g e d . A
Government d e t e r m i n e d t o abandon d e m o c r a t i c c o u r s e s w i l l f i n d
ways o f v i o l a t i n g them b u t t h e y a r e o f g r e a t v a l u e i n p r e v e n t i n g
a s t e a d y d e t e r i o r a t i o n i n s t a n d a r d s o f freedom and t h e u n o b t r u s -
i v e encroachment o f a Government on i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s . We have
t h e r e f o r e c o n s i d e r e d what p r o v i s i o n m i g h t s u i t a b l y be i n s e r t e d
i n t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n and have g i v e n p a r t i c u l a r a t t e n t i o n t o t h e
C o n v e n t i o n on Human R i g h t s t o w h i c h , we u n d e r s t a n d , Her M a j e s t y ' s
Government has adhered on b e h a l f o f t h e N i g e r i a n Government.
Where t h e m a t t e r which we t h i n k needs e x p r e s s i o n has a l r e a d y been
p r o v i d e d f o r i n t h e C o n v e n t i o n o f Human R i g h t s , we s i m p l y p l a c e
below t h e r e l e v a n t p r o v i s i o n i n t h a t C o n v e n t i o n b u t we do n o t
n e c e s s a r i l y recommend t h e e x a c t w o r d i n g o f t h e C o n v e n t i o n and i t
may be that constitutional lawyers will wish to draft in
different terms1....
[That Nigerian model had been followed since in S.L. at independence
(1960) and in B.G., Malta, Kenya, S. Rhodesia with internal s e l f -
government: in Cyprus the European Human Rights Convention had been
followed; and in Uganda, Trinidad, Zanzibar, Nyasaland, N. Rhodesia,
Basutoland, the Central African federation and Swaziland provision had
been contemplated or agreed. Though the Moncton commission had recom-
mended the Canadian model of 1960 [Vol.VI, p.251] for the federations of
Rhodesia and Nyasaland, that precedent had been heavily c r i t i c i s e d and
should be avoided.]
I n g e n e r a l i t may perhaps be agreed t h a t u n l e s s t h e r e a r e
overriding local objections in a particular territory it is
d e s i r a b l e t h a t an independence c o n s t i t u t i o n s h o u l d i n c l u d e human
r i g h t s p r o v i s i o n s , and t h a t t h i s o b j e c t i s l i k e l y t o be more
e a s i l y a c h i e v e d i f t h e i r i n c l u s i o n can be i n i t i a l l y secured a t
t h e i n t e r n a l s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t s t a g e , o r perhaps even e a r l i e r i n
t h e case o f t e r r i t o r i e s such as Kenya where i t i s p a r t i c u l a r l y
i m p o r t a n t t o t r y t o s a f e g u a r d t h e i n t e r e s t s o f m i n o r i t i e s . On t h e
o t h e r hand, i t may be c o n s i d e r e d unnecessary and indeed i n a p p r o p -
r i a t e t o i n t r o d u c e such p r o v i s i o n s a t t o o e a r l y a s t a g e o f c o n s -
t i t u t i o n a l d e v e l o p m e n t . S i n c e t h e U n i t e d Kingdom, which i s a
p a r t y t o t h e European Human R i g h t s C o n v e n t i o n , has extended t h a t
C o n v e n t i o n t o a l m o s t a l l o f i t s c o l o n i a l t e r r i t o r i e s , H.M.G. i s
bound t o s e c u r e t h e observance o f t h e C o n v e n t i o n i n t h o s e t e r r i -
t o r i e s a n d , up t o independence, has t h e means t o do s o . I t i s
t h e r e f o r e s t r i c t l y o t i o s e f o r t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n o f such a t e r r i -

1. Until the l a s t years of the century there was no provision and l i t t l e

support for a b i l l of r i g h t s in the U.K. Common lawyers saw i t as an a l i e n ,
European, imposition.
 63
tory to cover the same ground as the Convention. But it must be
recognised that, when a territory has reached an advanced stage
of self-government, it may be very difficult for H.M.G. to inter-
vene in order to compel the local government to comply with the
Convention, and constitutional provisions that are enforceable
in the courts may in practice afford a better protection to the
individual....
[Entrenchment really only arose in independent constitutions since
amendment was normally by orders-in-council for dependent territories.
But C O . opinion strongly opposed amendment by a simple majority and
supported entrenchment on fundamental (Including human rights) issues.
In the final negotiations for independence, however, it was often too
late to insist. It was of course better for provision to be embodied in
the constitution, not in the preamble (as in the proposal for Tanganyika)
but in the context of independence, it was a question of persuasion not
insistence. He would like comment from the geographical departments
whether this had been considered or secured.]

9. SIR NORMAN BROOK TO HAROLD MACMILLAN, 16 May 19621

[He doubted whether the secretaries of state need wade through the long
report of the Chadwick committee in detail. Briefly it] shows that,
over the years ahead, the number of independent Commonwealth
members will grow very rapidly; and we shall soon have an
association too large to be managed by the methods appropriate
to the smaller and more homogeneous body to which we have been
accustomed. . . . [Since the report was a revision of that of July 1960 by
Commonwealth officials, it would be difficult to avoid sending those
governments at least a summary of our findings. He hoped the P.M. would
raise the problem of small territories with Menzies, but at the P.M.'s
Meetings in September he would advise against formal discussion in
plenary sessions and for informal talk with selected representatives.2
Since discouragement of applications for membership would not reduce the
ultimate total by much, for there were not many in that category, was it
worth the effort? Should some alternative new status or title be pursued
further?3 The words 'sponsor* and 'colonial1 should be avoided.]

1. Prem. 11/3649. Brook, the P.M., the secretaries of state at the C O . (Maudl-
ing) and C.R.O. (Sandys) - the offices were amalgamated in July 1962 - and the
Earl of Home (previously at the C.R.O., now foreign secretary) were to meet
on 18 May. 2. Macmillan had indeed confessed to Menzies that 'I now shrink
from any Commonwealth meeting because I know how troublesome it will be*: he
thought 'the only reason' for keeping the association together was because it
might still be used occasionally to exert some gradual influence: (8 Feb. 1962
secret: Prem.11/3649). Wilson too resented fellow PMs treating the U.K. as
just fa bloody colony': (12 Sept. 1966 SG 131/6/3 Marl.Ho.Arch)
3. Home in the 18 May meeting still wondered whether there was a valid test
to limit membership: had the admission of Cyprus, Jamaica and Trinidad made
membership *automatic'? Chequers weekends would have to be forfeited and all
representatives should not have to attend all meetings. The C.R.O. brief for
the P.M.'s September meeting, however, recognised that aiming at independence
within the Commonwealth was the constitutional goal for our dependent
territories. Given the climate of opinion in the Afro-Asian Commonwealth the
difficulty of not admitting to the Commonwealth States which would inevitably
be accepted as members of the U.N., and *our moral obligation to launch our
dependencies into independence with the support that can be given by the
64

The rest of my note (paragraphs 3-6) discusses in general terms

what common purposes, and common links, the new Commonwealth w i l l
have. The outlook is not very encouraging. But I am inclined
myself to think that we should concentrate, over the next period,
on finding means of strengthening the consultation between those
members of the Commonwealth which are like-minded and intei—
nationally significant - especially by devising new procedures
for ensuring that we can still have practical discussions, in
limited groups,1 at Meetings of Commonwealth Prime Ministers.
10. SIR NORMAN BROOK: EVOLUTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH, 24 April 19622
[The forecasts made in 1960 had been overtaken by events. A new working

Commonwealth association, we cannot hope to avoid a considerable influx of new

Commonwealth members in the next decade'. But their conclusion was positive.
The P.M.s of Canada, Australia and N.Z. should be warned that to stop the
clock would put the existence of the Commonwealth in jeopardy. The queue of
aspirants should be seen as a trump card in the Cold War: 'far from diluting
the Commonwealth to the point at which it becomes valueless, the prospective
increase in numbers also increases the numbers of independent countries open
to Commonwealth and Western influence': the Russians must 'envy our
opportunities': (Cab. 133/263: P.M.M. (U.K.M62) Al: 27 Aug. 1962).
1. De facto an inner Commonwealth [see also Nos.3e,f. Jan. 1952]. Indeed
informal preliminary discussions took place (U.K. , Canada, Australia and N.Z. )
before the P.M.'s meeting in July 1964, following a suggestion that practical
measures were needed to enhance the usefulness of the Commonwealth (20 May
1964: D.0.(64) 30, Cab. 133/201), and The Way Ahead on these lines was put to
the P.M."s meeting. But by then the 'crisis' in Commonwealth was seen as less
due to the rush for new membership than 'the fact that we have some difficult
partners' who were hardly 'very easy associates'. At that 1964 meeting a
Commonwealth Secretariat with civil servants seconded from Commonwealth
governments was established in London - at the request of Uganda (Obote),
Trinidad (Williams) and Ghana (Nkrumah) and under Arnold Smith (Canada) took
over the responsibilities of Commonwealth co-ordination and the P.M. 's meeting
from the C.R.O. and the cabinet office in 1965. The P.O. and C.R.O. were
amalgamated on 17 Oct. 1968 and on 14 Jan, 1971 the first Commonwealth Heads
of Government meetings (replacing the P.M.'s meetings) met in Singapore; and
only one thereafter met in London (14 Jan. 1977). Since 1971, indeed, with
Bangladesh (seceding from Pakistan, 18 Apr. 1972) 22 new members were
admitted; and Pakistan (1989) and S. Africa (1994) rejoined. Somewhat
radically Cameroons (part French, part British mandate and with a poor post-
independence record on human rights) and Mozambique (never a British colony
nor mandate, but a Portuguese colony (1498-1975) where Samora Machel
frightened the Portuguese away and with them all the skills to run the
country) also were granted full membership in Nov. 1995 as the 52nd and 53rd
states. So much for the remnants of a continuing 'British1 identity and
ideals. Mozambique was elected, it seems, because all its neighbours (and
particularly Mandela and Mugabe - who had given their Europeans some
reassurance and supported its admission - were all members. (Uganda's
sponsorship of Ruanda failed.) There was some likelihood after 1994 when
Rabuka won his second victory under the 1990 constitution that Fiji, with Mara
as president, would rejoin - which it did.
2. Prem.11/3649. Brook had warned Macmillan (6 Feb 1962 ibid.) that since the
1962 report the 'rush of candidates for full membership' had become more rapid
than 'anything we had envisaged'. With the collapse of the Caribbean federa-
 65

party of officials now put the estimate for 1965 as 18-24 and for 1970
as 30-35. They had considered various methods of restricting membership
but concluded none was acceptable. He drew the attention of ministers to
the need for new procedures and techniques of consultation to preserve,
some of the valued intimacy and to the possibility not of rejecting but
of discouraging appl ications for membership (e.g. Somaliland, the Gambia,
perhaps B.G. and B.H. because they would weaken the Commonwealth or
benefit from affiliations elsewhere). He objected to the assumption that
the U.K. would 'sponsor' applications, for H.M.'s G.'s obligation was to
present applications not support them, regardless of merit. On Cyprus
H.M.'s G. set out the arguments for and against quite neutrally and did
not support t i l l the general view in favour emerged. The model of Western
Samoa which accepted independence but refrained from seeking membership
of the U.N. or the Commonwealth might be followed.1 To avoid obloquy arid

tion, Jamaica a,nd Trinidad were urgently .joining the queue and prospects for
other federations had lessened. By 1970 the total might be between 31 and 35,
not 17-24: (in fact there were 33). A new working party under John Chadwick
then considered possibilities of dissuading some territories from applying and
of urging others to unite with existing members, to retain the essential inti-
macy of Commonwealth relations. A few might, like W. Samoa, decide not to
request membership. But perhaps the advantages of accepting all who wanted to
join outweighed the many disadvantages including a radical change in the na-
ture of P.M.'s meetings. On 2 April Brook sent him a 'gloomy note' on the Com-
monwealth's future. When independence within the Commonwealth was proclaimed
as the aim of colonial policy 'we did not fully consider the shape and charac-
ter of the Commonwealth which this would create": conversion of empire into
new Commonwealth required more forethought: admission to full membership
should happen 'not as a matter of course which we take no steps to influence,
but as a matter of conscious and deliberate thought on our part'. British
colonial policy had been recklessly at fault: it was 'the tail which was wag-
ging so uncomfortably the dog'. 'In the beginning the flag followed trade;
now, as the flag is lowered, it is followed by aid'. 'Dr. Jagan may now seem
as bitter a pill to swallow as Archbishop Makarios, but in 1947 many good
imperialists doubtless felt the same about Mr. Nehru': (Work points - after-
Lawrence Durrell ihid.}. Now Brook put this paper as 'a note to the cabinet'
to be circulated at Macmillan's direction. . Western_Sainoa, previously a N.Z.
trust territory, became • fully independent state on 1 Jan. 1962 and in 1963
Halietoa Tanjumafi1i I] bocame head of state for life: the P.M. held six port-
folios. In 1970 it applied for membership which was granted. The Cook Islands
achieved full internal self-government in free association with N.Z. on 4 Aug.
1965, as did Niue on 19 Oct.. 1974: N.Z. retained control of foreign affairs
and defence. Islanders reta.ined N.Z. citizenship, Nau_rjJi a.n Australian trust
territory, became a republic on independence on 1 Feb. 1968 and a 'special
member',not a full member, of the Commonwealth in Nov. 1968. In some of the
smaller West Indies a solution of associated status with the U.K. temporarily
responsible for foreign affairs and defence - a. solution s i m i l a r to that, for
the Cook Islands - was tried but was short lived. Grenada opted for full mem-
bership on 7 Feb. 1974; Dominica on 3 Nov. 1978; _St. Luc.ia and St. Vincent on
27 Oct. 1979; AiiUgua and Barbuda on 1 Nov. 1981; St. Kitts and Nevis on 19
Sept. 1983. (In 1996 Nevis threatened to secede from St. Kitts.) In a referen-
dum in a hurricane (Aug. 1995) Bermuda voted 3 to 1 against independence and
membership - the vote being largely on a white/black division, and in Feb.
1997 Tuvalu restored the Union Jack to its flag in response to a wide protest
against republican moves and an assertion of loyalty to the Queen and the U.K.
 66

facilitate a merger of C O . and C.R.O. 'colony' should be replaced by

'territory'. But what would be the significance, purpose and value of the
Commonwealth in the future?]
What are the links which will bind its members together? There
was a time when they were united by their allegiance to a common
Crown. In the 'thirties, after the Ottawa Conference, there was
a period when it seemed possible that they could form an interde-
pendent economic unit; but this possibility has been progressive-
ly eroded, not by the United Kingdom, but by the economic deve-
lopment of the other members. Later, it could be said for a time
that they all had in common a way of life based on Parliamentary
democracy and the common law; but the logic of events in Pakistan
and in Ghana and the possible course of constitutional develop-
ment elsewhere have made it necessary to mute this claim. Now,
it is difficult to find any factor common to them all save the
use of the English language and the fact that all were once part
of the British Empire. Of these two attributes, the first at
least can have a constructive promise. It means that all the
peoples of the Commonwealth are at least open to influence by the
ideas, and ideals, of the English-speaking peoples. This may be
a foundation on which we can build for the future.
If we turn from common links to common purposes, the future
seems again to be very different from the past. The Commonwealth
was, until recently, an association of a relatively small number
of relatively large countries. Its influence in world affairs de-
rived very largely from the fact that, through its processes of
consultation (including the Meetings of Commonwealth Prime Minis-
ters), its Governments - though admitting no collective responsi-
bility and eschewing any suggestion of 'a Commonwealth policy'1
- were able severally to pursue and advocate consistent policies
on many international matters of common concern. We are now pass-
ing out of this phase. With the members we already have, and with
those to which we are irrevocably committed, we shall increasing-
ly become a relatively large association including a number of
relatively small countries. The Commonwealth will soon include
a majority of countries which are small in international signifi-
cance, and each of these will have an equal voice - and an equal
veto - with the others. Moreover, some of them will be neutral,
or non-aligned in the secular struggle of East versus West; and
some of them will be sympathetic to the fanti-Col onial ' cause.
In the years ahead, therefore, it will be more difficult to
find, for the Commonwealth ideal, any positive or constructive
purpose. It may be that, in admitting new members, we can hope
for no more than that they are willing to join us rather than go
over to the other side. On that basis numbers alone would afford
some comfort. We should not need to consider whether the adhesion
of any particular country would 'strengthen' our association or
'weaken' it. It would be enough to reckon that a Dr. Jagan would
be better within the Commonwealth than outside it. And this may
well be true. But it means that we shall have to take a very
different view of Commonwealth meetings - and especially of
Meetings of Commonwealth Prime Ministers - from that which we
have taken hitherto.

1. [See Vol.VI. pp.82, 85-111]

 67

Despite the difficulties, we still have three assets. First,

t h e r e i s t h e common l i n k o f t h e E n g l i s h language. S e c o n d l y , t h e r e
i s t h e f a c t t h a t new members, on a t t a i n i n g independence, a r e c h o -
o s i n g v o l u n t a r i l y t o p r e s e r v e t h e Commonwealth connexion and,
though t h e y may n o t be a c t i v e l y w i t h us i n t h e East-West s t r u g -
g l e , are at l e a s t r e f r a i n i n g from j o i n i n g the other s i d e . T h i r d -
l y , t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t we succeed i n h o l d i n g t h i s new Common-
w e a l t h t o g e t h e r , we s h a l l d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t peoples o f d i f f e r e n t
races can c o - o p e r a t e i n a m u l t i - r a c i a l a s s o c i a t i o n i n an atmos-
phere o f mutual t o l e r a n c e ; and i n a w o r l d o f i n c r e a s i n g r a c i a l
t e n s i o n t h i s , i f we can a c h i e v e i t , w i l l be a v a l u a b l e c o n t r i b u -
t i o n t o peace. We may have t o a l t e r t h e aim o f Commonwealth c o -
o p e r a t i o n , and t o s e t our s i g h t s l o w e r . We s h a l l c e r t a i n l y have
t o d e v i s e new methods and p r o c e d u r e s f o r Commonwealth c o n s u l t a -
t i o n . B u t , i f we a r e q u i c k t o a d j u s t o u r s e l v e s t o t h e new s i t u a -
t i o n , we may s t i l l be a b l e t o d i s t i l f r o m t h e Commonwealth c o n -
n e x i o n some e s s e n t i a l v a l u e s - f o r o u r s e l v e s and f o r t h e w o r l d . 1

1. But very soon Commonwealth membership had become largely i r r e l e v a n t to a l l

but the smallest ex-colonies and, with the admission of Mozambique, had l o s t
i t s meaning. In 1999, under some pressure from the E.U., the remaining
colonies were i n s t r u c t e d , under t h r e a t of imposition by Orders-in-Council, to
comply with B r i t i s h human r i g h t s l e g i s l a t i o n - the a b o l i t i o n of c a p i t a l and
corporal punishment, and of homosexuality as a, criminal offence: a d i r e c t i v e
which was c r i t i c i s e d as a new example of metropolitan colonialism. (Indeed in
Jamaica and Trinidad the wish to r e t a i n c a p i t a l punishment - though in fact
death sentences were commuted in Jamaica - prompted c a l l s for the a b o l i t i o n
of appeals to the J.C.P.C. which was accused of being too influenced by E.U.
demands for legal harmonisation). Stringent f i n a n c i a l regulations and
modernisation of banking supervision would also seek to prevent money-
laundering and curb t h e i r s t a t u s as off-shore tax havens. In r e t u r n , and in
conformity with the p r a c t i c e of France, Portugal and Holland towards r e s i d e n t s
of t h e i r former colonies ( i n h a b i t a n t s of French Martinique have, for example,
a r i g h t via the E.U. to live in Britain not enjoyed by t h e i r Anguilla
neighbours), t h e remaining B r i t i s h Dependent T e r r i t o r i e s , now with a council
of t h e i r chief ministers under a newly created Minister for the T e r r i t o r i e s
(Baroness Symons), were to be granted full c i t i z e n s h i p ( i n c l . the r i g h t of
abode in the U.K.) - which (apart from Gibraltar and the Falklands) the others
had l o s t in the B r i t i s h Nationality Acts of 1962 and 1981. Thus Anguilla,
Bermuda, the B r i t i s h Virgins, Caymans and Turks, Montserrat, P i t c a i r n , Tristan
da Cunha, St. Helena and Ascension regained t h e i r s t a t u s . This move removed
a seeming discrimination: the mainly black r e s i d e n t s of St. Helena,
campaigning hard for s t a t u s l o s t in 1981 ./thus acquired the same r i g h t s as
enjoyed by the white i n h a b i t a n t s of G i b r a l t a r and the Falklands.
 II
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS IN THE
COLONIES AND DEPENDENCIES
A. THE BRITISH WEST INDIES
( 1 ) GENERAL (a) THE MAKING AND COLLAPSE OF FEDERATION

In the aftermath of the second World War, in the context of the publication
of the report of the (Moyne) royal commission [Vol. VII, Nos. 23, 241, and the
establishment of the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission in 1942 (France and
the Netherlands joining in 1945), the prospect of a federation of the British
West Indies had been strongly supported both in London and in the islands, but
only with the assurance that the advance towards greater responsibility in the
several colonies should not be assigned to a subordinate place. Both closer
union and responsible government were to be pursued in parallel. The idea of
closer union in the Caribbean was not new. There had been a curious loose
'federation' of the Leewards [Vol.1 pp.540-1: II pp.119-25: III pp.338-51]
between 1681 and 1798, and a federation without Barbados had been established
in 1871 with the vain hope that the Windwards would follow that lead: [Vol.
V pp. 239-651. However the resolutions at the Montego Bay conference (Cmnd.
7291) in September 1947 [see also VII, No. 24c] had (B.G. dissenting) accepted
the principle of federation but in a loose form in which 'each constituent
unit retains complete control over all matters except those specifically as-
signed to the federal government' and affirmed that 'an increasing measure of
responsible government should be extended to the several units of the British
Caribbean territories, whose political development must be pursued as an aim
in itself without prejudice and in no way subordinate to progress towards
federation'. These two principles Creech Jones had accepted. A Standing Closer
Association committee of members of the colonial legislatures was approved to
consult and report on inter alia the unification of the public services and
that form of federal government 'most likely to give effect to the aspira-
tions' of the people of the British West Indies. Barbados was designated as
the headquarters, but the weight of the rest of the resolutions (Res.7) empha-
sised a customs union as an urgent first step, even if there were no federa-
tion or it was delayed, and the need of some permanent financial provision
(not just annual contributions) from customs duties as the sole initial
source. In Hall's despatch to the governors of the Leewards and Windwards in
the preceding year (14 March 1946 and approved the following month: L.I.
Gazette A April), in urging not federation but 'complete amalgamation' of the
two groups with a 'strong central government' and the local legislatures being
reduced to island councils for local matters only, he had recognised the need
for financial arrangements which would 'prevent the weaker units from becoming
a burden on the stronger'. Sir Hubert Ranee was appointed chairman of the
S.C.A. Committee paid for and staffed by the U.K. Sir John Macpherson in his
last report on development and welfare in the West Indies pointed out that he
had had to deal with matters which were neither entirely advisory nor economic
and it was urgent to have some representative West Indian body to make politi-
cal decisions. A Regional Economic Committee established belatedly in 1951,
as a result of another Montego Bay resolution7proved more ostensibly political
thaneconomic but thereby a useful training for inter-island debate and accom-
modation, if not co-operation; while the Caribbean Labour Congress founded in
1945 and the University College of the West Indies in 1948 were other strong
influences for federation. However since the Colonies all suffered from chro-
 69

nic deficits and adverse balance of trade, only offset by generous Colonial
Development and Welfare grants ($8,391,000 in 1953), the fear that federation
might deprive them of British aid and that the more prosperous would have to
bear, and be dragged down by, the burden of the poorer Colonies, strengthened
anti-federal insularity. At Montego Bay the acceptance of the general desira-
bility of moves towards a loose federation was made among a diverse babel of
opinions 6n priorities - the need for economic and financial stability, for
advance to responsible self-government in the islands, and for the two to go
in tandem. Grantley Adams favoured federation with immediate Dominion status
but significantly for the evolution of the concept of associated status [see
§1 and IIA(1)b] - Dominion status as it was prior to 1931 without the burdens
of defence and external affairs. So following Montego Bay eleven years of dis-
cussion - 4 constitutional conferences, 2 standing committees and 6 commis-
sions - took place before a federation was established in 1958: sometimes
decisions were reversed; there were special interests, ambitions and fears;
while the possible benefits of federation attracted less attention than the
price to be paid. In the end the federation disintegrated because the fear of
central government made it severely limited and virtually powerless and the
leaders were too timidly concerned with their power bases in their islands:
it had no customs union nor a common currency; and its budget was minute. When
Jamaicans voted in September 1961 in a referendum against federation and
Trinidad too opted to secede, the federation was formally dissolved on 31 May
1962.
Then began a process towards a possible federation of the remaining islands
to salvage something, led by Barbados and with U.K. support in the background,
believing closer association was still 'the best future prospect' though
recognising it must be 'a matter for local decision'; but it was a difficult
and wayward mob to corral. The U.K. government was reluctant to be seen to be
forcing the pace or to be imposing a solution. A federation must come as a
result of the declared and unanimous resolve of the units themselves: there
were many inter-island rivalries, jealousies and fears and it was convenient
to blame Britain for the failure of islands to be convinced of the merits of
such a closer association - especially where the U.K. government, resolved in
its neutrality to the proposal and fearing to see grants represented as
bribes, refused to make known what continuing aid it would make available.
Though such assistance was necessary and some would be given, Britain had no
desire to bribe the colonies of the Eastern Caribbean into such a closer as-
sociation where the original and comprehensive model had so signally failed.
But the colonies, uncertain of their financial survival if they lost their
identity in a union of poor states and forfeited their grant-aided status as
colonies, quarrelled over detail and did not make a commitment to a closer
association, the merits of which were not seen. So by August 1965, with Gren-
ada withdrawn (1962)-and Antigua (1965) too,~even Barbados in 1966 opted to
pursue its own independence and brought the process to a halt.

11. STANDING CLOSER ASSOCIATION COMMITTEE: REPORT, 21 October, 19491

The Federal Structure
In this Chapter, we discuss certain of the underlying prin-
ciples which have guided us in framing our more detailed propo-
sals. Certain principles were provided in our terms of reference,

1. Col.P. 255 of 1950 [see VII, No.24]. The committee consisted of delegates
from the colonial legislatures under Sir Hubert Ranee. A very weak federation
was realistically seen as the optimum possible: it was hoped that future
change would gradually with evolution remedy the want of central authority.
70
notably that a Federal constitution should follow the Australian
pattern, with residual powers remaining with the constituent
units, and we have naturally been much influenced by the records
of the discussions at Montego Bay....
We start from the assumption that the main underlying purpose
of our task is to seek the shortest path towards a real political
independence for the British peoples of the region, within the
framework of the British Commonwealth - what is meant in fact by
'Dominion Status'. We assume further that we have been charged
with this task because there is general agreement that this ob-
ject cannot be attained without some form of federal association
between the territories concerned, but that with Federation its
attainment becomes practicable. We are aware that in some circles
there is a demand for full independence, or for self-government,
either in advance of or simultaneously with Federation, on the
basis of existing political units. While we reaffirm the view
expressed at the Montego Bay Conference that the political deve-
lopment of the units must be pursued as an aim in itself, we are
satisfied that the sheer force of circumstances of the modern
world makes independence on a unit basis a mirage. Independence
or self-government as a Federation is however a practical possi-
bility, and we have framed our proposals with this specific ob-
jective in view.
This categorical statement requires elaboration. We do not imp-
ly any reflection on the political capacity, or the public spir-
it, of the peoples of the territories as they stand today. If we
did, we should not be justified in putting forward a scheme for
a larger political unit, which, together with the existing terri-
torial political structures, cannot fail to make even greater
demands on the political resources of the region than are made
today. Our reasons for this view lie in the fields of economics,
public finance and administration, but particularly economics,
the basis of all the rest.
It is now a truism to say that political independence is unreal
unless it is based on financial stability which, in turn, must
rest on a solid foundation of economic productivity - i.e., on
an adequate 'national income'. It is true that there are many
states in the world today which are legally sovereign and inde-
pendent, but it can be asserted that of those only those which
can pay their way can really be said to enjoy full independence.
From this point of view it does not matter what form is taken by
outside financial support. Grants from United Kingdom public
funds are familiar to this region, whether in the form of grant-
aid with its concomitant of Treasury control of estimates, or of
grants under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act, which do
not involve Treasury control of estimates. Other states, though
nominally independent, have been assisted in other ways, e.g.,
by private banks or firms, and their history shows that their
real, though not perhaps their apparent independence, is no less
curbed by this form of assistance than it is by the overt and
acknowledged receipt of assistance as from one Government to
another.
The way to real political independence is, in short, through
economic stability and solvency. By this we do not mean economic
self-sufficiency. Whatever may be done to produce in this region
a wider range of the goods consumed there - and in our view much
 71
can and should be done - it would be foolish to shut our eyes to
the fact that the West Indies and the mainland territories live
by world trade. If economic stability and financial solvency are
the necessary foundations for political independence, any propo-
sals for attaining the latter must be judged, among other things,
by the extent to which they promote the former. From this point
of view, various questions arise, e.g.: (a) Are the West Indies
economically stable and solvent now? (b) Can they become so on
the existing political basis, 7.e. the basis of a comparatively
large number of separate political units? (c) If not, can Federa-
tion led to stability and solvency, either immediately or in the
long run? These questions demand an answer, and upon those ans-
wers will depend in large measure the nature of the proposals
which we shall make.
Taking the first of these questions, it is the case that, over
the region as a whole, broadly speaking, public revenues cover
public expenditures at the present time. If that were a permanent
condition the future could be regarded with some equanimity: it
might even be argued that there was little needed for adding a
further political superstructure in the form of a Federal cons-
titution. But on closer examination the picture is not so reassu-
ring. In the first place several territories are at present in
receipt of grant-aid and are likely to continue to require it.
Some others may at any time come to require it. Secondly, there
is scarcely a territory, even among the largest, whose finances
do not give some cause for concern, and which might not, as a
result of some by no means unprecedented misfortune or disaster,
be brought to insolvency. Thirdly, there is a basic instability
about even the present apparently satisfactory state of the pub-
lic finances.... [The increased post war revenues, due to higher prices
and to U.K. and U.S. wartime expenditure producing temporarily larger ad
valorem customs duties which were likely to fall,1 were not based on
greater productivity which indeed had declined, while expenditure which
could not quickly be reduced given greater expectations of living stan-
dards, had grown. The West Indies did not constitute a richly endowed
area but scientific advances in agriculture might provide reasonable
standards! ...we recognize that the not-too-abundant resources
of the region will require to be freely fertilized with brains,
skill and hard work. This can undoubtedly be done, provided al-
ways that the political and administrative arrangements of the
region are such as to enable modern knowledge to be particularly
and confidently applied where it is most needed, and to ensure
that value is received for value created.... [The question was whe-
ther real independence from external aid and political interference could
be achieved on an insular, rather than a regional basis. In many cases
the answer must be 'No'. I Some of the units, particularly the
smaller ones, have no evident prospect, as units, of moving very
far from the margin of subsistence in public finance; and, while
that is so, genuine independence must reman unrealized and its
pursuit an occupation doomed to failure and frustration. No one
unit is large enough, or rich enough, to be able to maintain by
itself the range of scientists and others to whom, as we have
suggested above, the region must look for a real improvement in

1. But, as the secretary noted, this antedated the revaluation of sterling.

72
its productivity and economic stability. Further, all experience
shows that on the basis of independent units, the joint action
in external economic and related matters, which daily becomes
more and more important, is rendered infinitely slow and diffi-
cult and consequently much less effective than it should be.
There is much more to be said on this topic, but we do not con-
sider it necessary to labour it, since we believe that it is
perhaps one of the few on which there is fairly general unanim-
ity. We are satisfied the region will not achieve economic sta-
bility while it consists of a large number of quite separate
political units, and consequently that the hopes of such units
of achieving real political independence as such, are slight.
This said, we may place on record our considered and emphatic
view that Federation, and only Federation, affords a reasonable
prospect of achieving economic stability and through it that po-
litical independence which is our constant object. We have chosen
these words with care. We do not claim that Federation will imme-
diately and automatically solve the economic and fiscal problems
of the region, or that it cannot fail. We do claim that it will
put in the hands of men responsible to the region as a whole,
powers and opportunities, particularly in respect to the place
of the region in world trade, which do not exist at present and
which these men according to their abilities and inclinations can
use for the betterment of the region. Federation as such will not
solve our problems, but will provide the conditions in which they
can be dealt with.
We desire here to emphasize this point. There is in some quar-
ters a disposition to imagine that immediately a Federation is
established certain difficulties will cease to exist. Conversely,
others appear to hold that, because the establishment of a Fede-
ration will of itself only mean another legislature and adminis-
tration, and consequent expense, in addition to those already
existing (which is true so far as it goes) it will not help the
region. Both views are false, because problems are never solved
automatically by new constitutions but only by the efforts of men
to whom new constitutions may give appropriate powers and respon-
sibilities which did not exist before. These two apparently cont-
radictory views are thus closely akin, in that they rest on the
fallacy that results are or should be achieved by adjustments of
political and administrative machinery, instead of by the efforts
of men who may be helped or hindered by the machinery but who
cannot thereby be absolved from effort. Federation will not ab-
solve the region from the necessity for physical and mental and
moral effort - it may, if successful, help that effort to issue
in greater productivity, more security and higher standards of
living, than can the same effort exercised within the present
political framework.
Briefly, the services that Federation can render and which can
be adequately rendered in no other way, can be summarized as
prompt, effective action in the economic field on behalf of the
region as a whole. There is a clamant necessity for some single
agency which can speak and act with authority, full knowledge and
at short notice, for the region in a wide field of activities,
of which trade negotiations are only the most prominent example.
This necessitates an agency which can act in its own right, and
not by delegation from other agencies and subject to their con-
 73
firmation. This in turn required a fully representative deliber-
ative organization from which to derive the necessary authority -
that is to say, a legislature in which the directly elected rep-
resentatives of the people of the region have a preponderant
voice.
We are conscious that much of the foregoing is a restatement
of what is already accepted, and that, strictly speaking, it is
not incumbent upon us to argue the pros and cons of Federation.
But we have in our deliberations had an unusual opportunity of
discussing the matter in much greater detail than was possible
at the Montego Bay Conference, or in the discussions in the vari-
ous legislatures of the recommendations of that Conference; and
we feel that there is advantage in setting out at length some of
the basic considerations which have largely guided us in our more
detailed recommendations. In summary, we believe that the attain-
ment of independence within the British Commonwealth is the legi-
timate political objective of the region. Since a state has a
real as distinct from a purely formal independence only to the
extent of its independence of external financial assistance, it
is clear that the economic stability of the region must be impro-
ved as rapidly as possible. It is our considered judgement that
this can only be done by setting up a federal government and ent-
rusting to it important powers and responsibilities particularly,
though not exclusively, in the economic field....
[On the relations between the federation and the constituent territories:
the division of powers the committee agreed that] . . .Federal Govern-
ment should have only such powers as are specifically made over
to it, and that all others - the 'residual powers' - should re-
main where they are, with the territorial Governments.... Geog-
raphy alone suggests the wisdom of not attempting too close or
all-bracing a Federation for this widely scattered region....
More important reasons, at this stage, for adhering to the Aust-
ralian pattern, and to a relatively limited list of 'Federal'
functions, are the social and economic diversity of the region,
and the strength of local political and other traditions....
these local traditions are not lightly to be cast aside. They
form a valuable bond among the peoples who hold to them, and in
many respects uniformity is not an unqualified good. The region
has not so many human resources that we can afford unnecessarily
to weaken traditions which hold people together in local pride
and self-respect. One is by no means the worse West Indian for
being a good Vincentian.
Under Federation, except in respect of the powers which are
explicitly assigned to it, the Federal Government is in no sense
'over' the territorial Governments and their actions are not
subject to Federal sanction or review. The territories will keep
all their powers except in so far as they specifically surrender
them. Conversely, the Federal Government, in the exercise of the
Federal powers conferred upon it, is not obliged to seek the app-
roval of confirmation of territorial Governments.
We recommend...that the subjects on which Federation may legis-
late should be divided into two classes - those on which only the
Federation may legislate (the 'exclusive' list), and those on
which both the Federation and the Constituent territories may
legislate, but where Federal law will automatically prevail (the
'concurrent' list). The former will be short, and include only
74
those subjects on which, under Federation, there can be no room
for variation, and which are essential to the existence of the
Federation as such.
It will be seen that the main emphasis is on external rela-
tions, of all kinds, and matters connected therewith - e.g. the
power to implement such agreements. We propose also that the Fe-
deration should be empowered to deal with communications (of all
kinds) between the territories as well as externally, but that
it should be concerned with purely internal communications mat-
ters only in so far as federal commitments in respect of external
or inter-territorial communications make this necessary....
To summarise the argument and proposals in this Chapter, we
endorse the principle that the Federation should have its own
source of revenue in its sole control; that this should in the
first instance consist of Customs revenues; that not less than
75% of the net receipts from Customs revenues should be returned
automatically to the territories in proportion to the units of
final consumption of the goods on which the import duties were
levied; that, as soon as the Federal Government assumes control
of postal services and revenues, grants in lieu of postal profits
should for a period of five years be made to those territories
which apply for them; that the Unit Governments should be free
to float loans within the region; but that external loans should
be floated only by the Federal Government, whether on its own be-
half or on behalf of Unit Governments; that for an initial period
His Majesty's Government should make to the Federal Government
an annual grant in lieu of grant-aid to Unit Governments, this
grant to be employed solely for re-issue to such Governments and
to be supplemented as required from Federal funds; that provision
be made for financial agreements between the Federation and Unit
Governments; and that Federal finances and financial relations
with Unit Governments should be subject to review after five
years....
[On the financial relations with H.M.'s G. in the U.K.] Until the
economic situation of the region materially improves, so long
will His Majesty's Government, in fact, though perhaps not in
law, have to stand behind the region and be ready to render fi-
nancial assistance when required. So long as His Majesty's Gover-
nment is in the position of ultimate guarantor it follows ines-
capably that His Majesty's Government will expect to exercise
control in some form over general economic and financial policy.
While that is the case, the region cannot claim to have attained
full political independence. It is of the first importance that
the peoples of the region should realise that, if they are to be
free to control their destiny without political supervision on
the part of His Majesty's Government, they must be prepared to
conduct their economic and financial affairs in such a way as to
reduce to a minimum the necessity for applying to His Majesty's
Government for financial aid.... To sum up the argument of this
Chapter, the position of His Majesty's Government as ultimate and
formal guarantor is recognised; that in relation to grant-aid
certain controls are inevitable; that in relation to loans safe-
guards may be imposed; that, nevertheless, there must be no di-
rect and general control of the economic and financial affairs
of the Federation....
[On the Federal legislature and legislative process] We start with the
 75
assumption, that the preponderant voice in the Legislature should
be that of persons elected by the people on as wide a franchise
as possible.... [Certain questions arose] First, whether the rep-
resentatives should be directly elected or chosen by territorial
legislatures.... We have no doubt whatsoever but that the prin-
ciple of direct election should be followed. The world is not
without experience of other procedures, and it is safe to say
that an assembly consisting of the nominees of other legislatures
cannot but remain subordinate to those legislatures, which stri-
kes at the root of the federal principle.... Secondly, franchise.
Here again we have no difficulty nor doubt. We consider that el-
ections should be by universal, adult suffrage.... We are thus
led to the third of the fundamental points...whether the Federal
Legislature should consist of one Chamber or two.... It is of the
essence of a Federation that there shall be a balance, throughout
its organisation, between unity and diversity; that the territor-
ies, merged for some purposes, should retain their identities for
others. Now a single chamber, with numbers proportioned to popu-
lations, would adequately represent the Federation as a single
unit but it would not reflect the fact that the constituent ter-
ritories enter upon Federation as equals. Moreover, it is not
apparent how this could be done while retaining the unicameral
principle.... We reject the idea of adding nominated members to
the elective Chamber, since the expedient of mixing nominated and
elected members in a single legislative body is not viewed with
favour and is on the whole on the way out. Whatever may be the
reasons for adhering to it where it already exists, we see no
reasons for introducing it into an entirely new Constitution. We
were led therefore to the conclusion that, as in other Federa-
tions, there is no option but to set up a separate Second Chamber
if only that these may be adequately reflected and represent the
equality of the constituent units....
...in a bicameral legislature the 'originative' and dominant
chamber - which we may henceforth call the House of Assembly -
should be directly elected.... It is therefore necessary to con-
sider on what basis the members of the second or revisionary
chamber - which we suggest be styled the Senate - should be
appointed....
If the Senate were also to be elected by popular vote, and
there should be a divergence of view between the Assembly and the
Senate, each could claim equally that it spoke with popular sanc-
tion. However it would be difficult, in such a situation, to
place the Senate, as we shall propose, in a position of definite
constitutional subordination to the Assembly, since the primacy
accorded to the one, on grounds of popular election, could hardly
be denied to the other if it were also to be elected. Nor do we
consider it desirable that the two Houses should be constitu-
tionally equal, on the ground that they derive their authority
from the same popular source. It is important that the two Houses
of a bicameral legislature should have somewhat different func-
tions and powers if they are not to be a mere duplication of each
other. If each is to play its proper part in the legislative pro-
cess, each should have its clearly recognised place in the cons-
titutional pattern, and there should be no doubt, on any ground,
which is the dominant partner. For these reasons, which we be-
lieve to be of general application, we have come to the conclu-
76
sion that, in recognition of its subordinate though nonetheless
important role in the legislature, the Senate should be nominated
and not elected....
Taking first the House of Assembly, we had great difficulty in
devising a system of distribution of seats which at the same time
adequately reflects the relative populations of the respective
territories, is not too large and does not overweight a small
number of the territories in relation to the rest. To take the
last point first, it is obvious that to allot seats strictly in
accordance with population would involve giving one territory,
Jamaica, half of the entire membership, and thus open up the pos-
sibility that the representatives of that one territory, with the
co-operation of only one or two other representatives, could
dominate the Assembly. We are confident that in practice this
danger is unreal, in that it is improbable that the representati-
ves of any single territory will in fact be sufficiently of one
mind invariably to act and vote as a single block. We consider
it more probable that party divisions will emerge which will cut
across territorial divisions. Nevertheless, even the appearance
of such a possibility is to be avoided, and we agreed therefore
that the larger units, while rightly receiving greater represen-
tation than the smaller, should not do so in strict proportion
to their populations, but in a diminishing proportion. Turning
to the other end of the scale, we came to the conclusion that the
minimum number of elected representatives from each territory
should be two, subject to the proviso that where a territory had
a population of less than 15,000 the number should be one. The
greatest difficulty was experienced in deciding upon a suitable
representation for the intermediate territories, and in fixing
numbers, we found it necessary to take into account not numbers
only, but such matters as economic development and productivity,
financial stability and so on while at the same time recognising
that these features might change from time to time. The result
is that our proposed allocation of seats defies reduction to even
the most complicated mathematical formula relating it to popula-
tion figures. We cannot pretend that the allocation is wholly
satisfactory. . . . [but proposed for consideration: Barbados 4, B.G. 6, B.H.
2, Jamaica 16; in the Leewards, Antigua 2, St. Kitts 2, Montserrat 1;
Trinidad 9; and in the Windwards, Grenada 2, St. Vincent 2, St. Lucia 2,
Dominica 2; a total of 50.]1
Turning to the Senate, we found that the question of the dist-
ribution of seats presented little difficulty, since one of the
functions of a Second Chamber in a federal constitution is to
reflect the position of the territories as equal partners, popu-
lation differences being reflected in the other House. The only
question therefore was whether there should in respect of each
territory be two Senators or one. In order to guard against
unavoidable absences, we decided to recommend that the number
should be two, subject only to the qualification that no terri-

1. The 1953 London conference modified these figures in the light of the
refusal of B.G. and B.H. to be involved: Jamaica, Barbados and Trinidad were
given an additional member each in a house of 45. The conference also reversed
the S.C.A.C. recommendation that island legislators should be ineligible for
the federal houses: this was itself reversed in turn at the 1956 conference.
 77
tory should be represented by more Senators than it has members
of the House Assembly....
We now come to the important question of the respective powers
of the Assembjy and the Senate in relation to legislation. The
normal practice is that all legislation shall require the assent
of both Chambers before submission to the Head of the State. But
to ensure the primacy of the House of Assembly, and in accordance
with current British constitutional practice, we consider that
the constitution should provide: (a) that Money Bills (that is,
shortly, Bills containing only clauses dealing with taxation or
the expenditure of public money) may only originate in the House
of Assembly, on the motion of the Government; (b) that the Se-
nate's powers in relation to Money Bills should be very strictly
limited; (c) that the certification that a Bi11 is a Money Bill
(in accordance with a definition to be included in the Constitu-
tion) shall be a matter for the Speaker of the House of Assembly,
after consultation with a Law Officer; (d) that in the case of
Bills other than Money Bills, the Senate shall have a delaying
power of twelve months only. Except as otherwise provided, it
should be permissible for any measure, whether private or Govern-
mentally-sponsored, to be introduced for the first time in either
Chamber as convenience may dictate....
The last stage in the legislative process is the granting of
assent on behalf of His Majesty to Bills passed by both Chambers,
or otherwise constitutionally appropriate for each assent. This
will be the duty of the Head of the State, in accordance with
common practice; and we recommend that he should in his discre-
tion be empowered to assent or to withhold assent from any Bill,
but that in respect only of defined categories of Bills he should
have discretion to reserve such Bills for the significance of His
Majesty's pleasure....
Having regard to the inescapable responsibilities of His Majes-
ty's Government arising out of problems of defence, international
relations and ultimate financial stability of the Federation in
its external relationships, it has been thought necessary to pro-
vide that, in certain carefully defined circumstances related to
the foregoing, His Majesty in Council should have certain over-
riding powers of legislation sufficient to enable those responsi-
bilities to be discharged. These powers...relate to defence, the
regulation of the relations between the Federation and foreign
countries, securing and maintaining financial stability and, in
certain emergencies, securing and maintaining public order and
suppl ies and services. . . [but they recommended the reservation of no power
of disallowance save in regard to the Federal Government's desire for its
stock to be listed as U.K. trustee security, as required by Treasury re-
gulations.1 Moreover they recommended no amending procedure, since an
Order-in-Council was amendable by the Privy Council.] We recommend
however that it be provided that no amendment diminishing the
proportionate representation of any Unit in either Chamber of the
Federal Legislature, or the number of representatives of a Unit
in the House of Assembly, or increasing, diminishing or otherwise

1. In his despatch relating to the Leewards and Windwards amalgamation, George

Hall (the under-secretary) had confirmed that Treasury assistance would not
mean Treasury control (14 March 1946).
78

a l t e r i n g t h e l i m i t s o f a U n i t , s h o u l d have e f f e c t u n l e s s a m a j o r -
i t y o f t h e e l e c t o r s v o t i n g i n any U n i t concerned approve such an
a m e n d m e n t . . . . We n e x t c o n s i d e r t h e n a t u r e o f t h e Government -
t h a t i s t o s a y , t h e agency t h r o u g h which t h e powers o f t h e S t a t e ,
f o r m a l l y and c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y c o n c e n t r a t e d i n t h e G o v e r n o r -
G e n e r a l , a r e a c t u a l l y e x e r c i s e d . At t h i s p o i n t we s h o u l d l i k e t o
emphasise t h e p r a c t i c a l i m p o r t a n c e o f t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between
Government and L e g i s l a t u r e . I t i s t h e d u t y o f t h e Government t o
g o v e r n , and t h e a c t u a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r i t s s p e c i f i c e x e c u t i v e
a c t i o n s c a n n o t be s h a r e d w i t h any o t h e r agency, e.g. t h e L e g i s -
l a t u r e , e x c e p t a t t h e r i s k o f c o n f u s i o n and d e l a y and consequent
p r e j u d i c e t o t h e p u b l i c i n t e r e s t . The u l t i m a t e c o n t r o l o f G o v e r n -
ment by t h e e l e c t o r a t e i s , a c c o r d i n g t o B r i t i s h p r a c t i c e and e x -
p e r i e n c e , b e s t p r e s e r v e d by t h e d e v i c e o f e n s u r i n g t h a t t h e L e g i -
s l a t u r e i n e f f e c t chooses, and can change, by w i t h h o l d i n g s u p p o r t
f r o m , a p r e p o n d e r a n t element i n t h e E x e c u t i v e i t s e l f . I n G r e a t
B r i t a i n , t h e E x e c u t i v e i s H i s M a j e s t y ' s Government, c o n s i s t i n g
o f t h e K i n g ' s M i n i s t e r s , who d e r i v e t h e i r e x e c u t i v e a u t h o r i t y
f r o m H i s M a j e s t y as Head o f t h e S t a t e and n o t f r o m t h e L e g i s l a -
t u r e . But t h e L e g i s l a t u r e can and does e x e r c i s e c o n t r o l o v e r t h e
p o l i c y o f t h e Government by v i r t u e o f i t s power t o pass or r e f u s e
t o pass b i l l s t o c a r r y o u t t h a t p o l i c y , and p a r t i c u l a r l y by i t s
power t o v o t e o r w i t h h o l d f i n a n c i a l s u p p l i e s . By t h e use o f t h e s e
powers, t h e L e g i s l a t u r e can ensure t h a t t h e p o l i c y and p r a c t i c e
o f t h e Government i s under i t s own g e n e r a l c o n t r o l , w i t h o u t how-
e v e r i t s e l f assuming d i r e c t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r more t h a n t h e
n a t u r e and c o m p o s i t i o n o f t h e Government. T h i s does n o t mean t h a t
t h e L e g i s l a t u r e may n o t q u e s t i o n and d i s c u s s t h e d e t a i l e d a c t s
o f Government. Such q u e s t i o n i n g s c o n s t i t u t e a l a r g e p r o p o r t i o n
o f t h e work o f t h e P a r l i a m e n t o f G r e a t B r i t a i n , and Governments
i n p r a c t i c e show t h e m s e l v e s most s e n s i t i v e t o t h e view o f t h e
Legislature in such m a t t e r s , in view of their dependence on the
L e g i s l a t u r e f o r t h e i r continued e x i s t e n c e . In b r i e f , the L e g i s l a -
t u r e can t h r o w o u t t h e Government, whereupon a n o t h e r emerges
which can c o u n t upon t h e s u p p o r t o f t h e L e g i s l a t u r e o r , i f t h a t
p r o v e s i m p o s s i b l e , f r e s h e l e c t i o n s can be h e l d a t any t i m e t o
o b t a i n a c l e a r e x p r e s s i o n o f t h e views o f t h e e l e c t o r a t e on
c u r r e n t major i s s u e s . . . . 1

1. Eventually by 1953 t h i s report was accepted in p r i n c i p l e by a l l save B.G.,

B.H. and the Virgins. The S.C.A.C recommendations were not a f i n a l d r a f t but
were intended ' t o be c l e a r and unambiguous d r a f t i n g i n s t r u c t i o n s to the ex-
p e r t s on whom...will f a l l the onerous task of preparing the actual instrument
i t s e l f , A conference in London in April 1953 (P.P.1952-3 VIII (8837), XXIII
(8895) proposed c e r t a i n modifications: i t suggested t h a t the preamble should
s e t out the objects of federation, e s p e c i a l l y * the g r e a t e s t possible freedom
of movement for persons and goods' within i t ; the omission of references to
B.G. and B.H. as they had decided to keep out of the federation; the assembly
to be renamed the 'House of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ' ; c e r t a i n a l t e r a t i o n s to the exc-
lusive and concurrent l i s t s (loans for unit purposes to be raised by the u n i t s
and put therefore on the concurrent l i s t ) ; immigration, emigration and depor-
t a t i o n to be t r a n s f e r r e d to the exclusive l i s t ; the need for the consent of
u n i t l e g i s l a t u r e s for Federal law on divorce and matrimonial matters to come
into force in any u n i t ; the addition of ' a g r i c u l t u r a l education and advisory
s e r v i c e s ' to the concurrent l i s t ; the levying of income tax to be added to the
 79
12. CONFERENCE ON THE BRITISH CARIBBEAN FEDERATION: REPORT,
23 February 19561
[There had been 11 years of discussion on closer political association
since Stanley's despatch (19 March 1945: [Vol.VII, No.24a]). The Montego
Bay conference had recorded the desirability of a political federation.
The S.C.A.C. report had stated its faith in 'its economic and political
necessity' and had drafted a provisional scheme on the Australian pattern
with residual powers remaining with the constituent units, which had been
accepted by the Legislatures of Barbados, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago,
the Leewards and Windwards and was the basis of the Plan drawn up at the
London conference of 1953 and subsequently adopted by those same Legisla-
tures. On 2 February 1955 H.M.'s G. announced that it would implement the
federation as approved and set up commissions on the fiscal aspects (un-
der Sir Sydney Caine), on the civil service (under Sir Hilary Blood) and

concurrent list and the prohibition of any Federal income tax within the first
5 years (when it might assume, with Unit Government approval, additional func-
tions); unit legislative or executive councillors not to be disqualified from
appointment as senators within the first 5 years; adjustment of the distribu-
tion of seats in the lower house with additional seats for Barbados, Jamaica
and Trinidad, and Montserrat's single member to have a deputy elected in case
of his illness or absence by leave; a reduction of the federal share of cus-
toms duties from 25% to a maximum of 15% for the first 5 years; a provision
for amendment by a Federal Act by a 2/3rd majority and the assent of 6 or more
unit legislatives (with 2/.3rd majorities if unicameral, and 2/3rd majorities
in the lower house if bicameral and majority assent in the upper) and no amen-
dment until the review by a special conference at the end of 5 years unless
the bill had been previously approved in the unit legislatures with similar
majorities; and the federal government to be based not in Trinidad but in
Grenada. No alteration in the distribution of elected seats without majority
approval by the electors in a unit would be lawful, though a unit could decide
whether such an alteration would be other than by special reference to its el-
ectorate. This London plan was accepted in the colonial legislatures but with-
out much enthusiasm: for example in Trinidad where the Indians feared that
federation would marginalise them as a permanent minority,and 6 elected mem-
bers (incl. 2 of Butler's followers) voted against 5 elected, 3 ministers and
4 nominees. In 1955 a Port-of-Spain conference on freedom of movement (Col.
P. 315) on which Barbadians were keen and Trinidadians hesitant, seemed to re-
solve the issue in the favour of Barbados, for intransigence would have threa-
tened any closer union. So immigration restrictions would be based on health
and security precautions and in the power of unit governments: other restric-
tions would be dealt with under concurrent power: and after the initial 5
years the federal legislature could veto unit immigration laws.
1. P.P.1955-6 XII (9733) pp.817-31. The reports of Sir Sydney Caine's fiscal
commission (9618), Sir Hilary Blood's civil service commission (9619) and Sir
Allan Smith's judicial commission (9620) were published in the same volume.
These reports were of course only tentative for it was not certain till the
federation operated whether the central government would legislate in all the
field of concurrent powers. At this final London conference Lennox-Boyd said
that financial assistance would continue to the federation for a period and
(to the resentment of Jamaica particularly) that Dominion status was still
beyond any W.I. colony alone. Freedom of movement seemed to have been dealt
with, but the customs union, the federal capital site, and the degree of
independence f<rom the C O . while financial aid continued, were live issues.
Manley urged the removal of all ex officio members from the council of state.
 80

the judiciary (under Sir Allan Smith) which had reported (9618, 9619, and
9620 of 1956 respectively). A conference in Trinidad under Baron Lloyd,
the parliamentary under-secretary of state, had in March 1955 urged 'the
greatest possible speed' in establishing the federation and had agreed
measures to f a c i l i t a t e and control the movement of persons within i t
(Col.P. 315) which a l l the Legislatures had again approved. Now Alan
Lennox-Boyd had convened a f i n a l conference to decide major outstanding
issues in the l i g h t of the 1953 Plan, the 1953 London and the 1955 T r i n i -
dad conferences and the Commission reports. Delegates from Antigua,
Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. K i t t s , Nevis and
Anguilla, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Trinidad and Tobago and the U.K. atten-
ded: B.G. and B.H. sent observers. Lennox-Boyd was prepared, i f the Con-
ference agreed on a l l substantial points, to introduce a b i l l which would
be enacted by the summer of 1956.]
Mr. Lennox-Boyd went on t o r e f e r t o t h e f u t u r e o f t h e F e d e r a -
t i o n . P o i n t i n g o u t how F e d e r a t i o n would f a c i l i t a t e t h e e v e n t u a l
achievement o f s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t w i t h i n t h e Commonwealth, he drew
a t t e n t i o n t o the i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h a t s t a t u s . Self-government
meant something more t h a n t h e f o r m a l r e l i n q u i s h m e n t by Her M a j e s -
t y ' s Government i n t h e U n i t e d Kingdom o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l powers
o f c o n t r o l . I t meant t h a t a c o u n t r y must be a b l e t o s t a n d on i t s
own f e e t e c o n o m i c a l l y and f i n a n c i a l l y , t h a t i t c o u l d f i n a n c e i t s
own a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and t h a t i t was a b l e and p r e p a r e d t o assume
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r i t s own defence and i t s own i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e -
l a t i o n s t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t e i t h e r was i n v o l v e d by i t s g e o g r a p h i -
c a l o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l s t a n d i n g . On t h e o t h e r hand, i n t h e s e days
no c o u n t r y was independent i n t h e sense o f b e i n g e n t i r e l y s e l f -
c o n t a i n e d and s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t . Mutual h e l p was one o f t h e g r e a t
p r i n c i p l e s o f t h e Commonwealth and t h e r e was no reason why one
member o r group o f members s h o u l d n o t h e l p o t h e r members w i t h
t h e i r economic d e v e l o p m e n t , perhaps on t h e l i n e s o f t h e Colombo
Plan. Nor would self-government preclude arrangements for intra-
Commonwealth commerce o f which t h e Commonwealth Sugar Agreement
was an example. U n l i k e t h e s i t u a t i o n where a s t a t e r e l i e d f o r i t s
e x i s t e n c e on o u t s i d e h e l p , t h e r e was n o t h i n g d e r o g a t o r y t o a
c o u n t r y ' s d i g n i t y i n accepting the help of other p a r t n e r s t o im-
prove i t s economic s i t u a t i o n and d e v e l o p i t s r e s o u r c e s t o t h e g e -
n e r a l advantage o f t h e p a r t n e r s h i p . The Commonwealth was an a s s o -
c i a t i o n o f f r e e n a t i o n s , each o f which was i n d e p e n d e n t i n t h e
sense o u t l i n e d . Membership o f t h e Commonwealth was a m a t t e r f o r
a l l members t o c o n s i d e r , b u t d e l e g a t e s c o u l d be a s s u r e d t h a t when
t h e B r i t i s h Caribbean F e d e r a t i o n Government f e l t i n due c o u r s e
ready t o assume t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s and o b l i g a t i o n s i n v o l v e d ,
i t would f i n d Her M a j e s t y ' s Government i n t h e U n i t e d Kingdom g l a d
t o sponsor i t s a d m i s s i o n t o f u l l Commonwealth m e m b e r s h i p . . . . [Ca-
ribbean delegates and observers thanked H.M.'s G. for i t s support for
federation and expressed t h e i r resolve to bring the Conference to a
successful conclusion. They regretted the delays and hoped that the 11
years ( i n which the Units had a l l made remarkable constitutional prog-
ress) had not been wasted and that the Federation would be laid on sound
p o l i t i c a l and economic foundations.
After discussion, the Conference agreed, on the basis of the 1953 Plan,
a constitution for a B r i t i s h Caribbean Federation. The preamble should
guarantee a l l persons the free exercise of t h e i r respective modes of re-
ligious worship and provision for a Customs Union with a review of any
powers to impose income tax; the regulation of advisory Federal agencies
 81

should be placed on the exclusive L i s t ; a referendum should replace the

1953 provision for constitutional amendment; the possible accession of
new l i m i t s (e.g. B.G. and B.H.) should be provided f o r ; the ban on dual
membership of Unit and Federal l e g i s l a t i v e and executive bodies should
be reinstated; where Unit Governments had powers to legislate on non-
revenue producing services (e.g. in regard to defence, immigration, emig-
ration) on the Exclusive L i s t , they should be deemed to be included on
the Concurrent List u n t i l transferred by the Governor-general's notice
in the Gazette of the Unit; the University College of the West Indies,
student services in the U.K., U.S. and Canada, and intra-regional ship-
ping should be co-ordinated by the Federal government, though higher
education would be on the Concurrent L i s t ; and external a f f a i r s and mem-
bership of international organisations would be federal matters. But] I n
order to clarify the meaning of the item 'External Affairs' in
t h e E x c l u s i v e L e g i s l a t i v e L i s t , we agree t h a t t h i s i t e m s h a l l be
expanded t o read as f o l l o w s : - ' E x t e r n a l a f f a i r s , t h a t i s t o say
such e x t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s ( n o t b e i n g r e l a t i o n s between t h e U n i t e d
Kingdom and any U n i t ) as may f r o m t i m e t o t i m e be e n t r u s t e d t o
t h e F e d e r a t i o n by Her M a j e s t y ' s Government i n t h e U n i t e d K i n g -
d o m ' . We f u r t h e r agree t h a t , though t h e Federal L e g i s l a t u r e s h a l l
be a b l e t o e n a c t l e g i s l a t i o n f o r i m p l e m e n t i n g t r e a t i e s on any
m a t t e r , i t may be v e r y i n c o n v e n i e n t i f U n i t L e g i s l a t u r e s a r e u n -
a b l e t o pass l e g i s l a t i o n f o r i m p l e m e n t i n g t r e a t i e s i n r e g a r d t o
c o n c u r r e n t and r e s i d u a l m a t t e r s . We a c c o r d i n g l y agree t h a t a
c l a u s e s h a l l be i n s e r t e d i n t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n s t r u m e n t e n a b l -
i n g t h i s U n i t L e g i s l a t u r e s t o do t h i s . . . .
C°n Financial and Fiscal matters, the conference had discussed the Caine
reportT(Cmnd.9618) and agreed that] There s h a l l be i n c l u d e d i n t h e p r e -
amble t o t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n a r e c i t a l t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t i t i s e s -
s e n t i a l f o r t h e economic s t r e n g t h o f t h e area t h a t t h e r e s h o u l d
be an i n t e g r a t e d t r a d e p o l i c y f o r t h e F e d e r a t i o n , and t h a t t h e r e
s h o u l d be i n t r o d u c e d , as f a r and as q u i c k l y as p r a c t i c a b l e , a
Customs U n i o n , i n c l u d i n g i n t e r n a l f r e e t r a d e . . . . [A Commission on
Trade and T a r i f f s should be set up at once to devise a scheme for a Cus-
toms Union to be implemented i f necessary by stages and to anticipate the
possible accession of B.G. and B.H. During the f i r s t 5 years Federal re-
venues would derive from p r o f i t s on currency issue, and a mandatory levy
on unit governments calculated on the percentage incidence of Federal du-
t i e s . The Federal Government would have a concurrent power to raise reve-
nue by excise and customs duties 'provided that any revenue so raised in
any year during the f i r s t f i v e years...shal1 reduce pro tanto the amount
in that year of the mandatory levy. The review at the end of 5 years
would consider in the l i g h t of progress towards a Customs Union the po-
wers conferred on the Federal Government to impose income tax. H.M.'s G.
would increase t h e i r contribution to the cost of the federal capital from
££m. to a maximum of film.1]
We a l s o d i s c u s s e d two more g e n e r a l m a t t e r s , n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y
d e a l t w i t h i n t h e Report o f t h e F i s c a l C o m m i s s i o n e r : - ( i ) We
agree i n p r i n c i p l e t o t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f a Loans C o u n c i l , w i t h
t h e t a s k o f c o - o r d i n a t i n g b o r r o w i n g by t h e U n i t s and t h e Federa-
t i o n , t o be s e t up by a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a c t i o n , s u b j e c t t o whatever
l e g i s l a t i v e s a n c t i o n may be r e q u i r e d by U n i t l e g i s l a t u r e s and

1. G r a n t s - i n - a i d to smaller t e r r i t o r i e s would continue, and s i m i l a r l y a s s i s -

tance, under the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts.
82

w i t h terms o f r e f e r e n c e t o be worked o u t between t h e U n i t Govern-

ments and t h e Federal Government. We a l s o agree t h a t t h e F e d e r a -
t i o n s h a l l have t h e power t o g u a r a n t e e a l o a n r a i s e d by a U n i t
Government, ( i i ) We d i s c u s s e d p r o p o s a l s p u t f o r w a r d by t h e West
I n d i a n d e l e g a t i o n s i n regard t o o u t s i d e assistance towards the
economic and s o c i a l development o f t h e Caribbean a r e a . Her M a j e s -
t y ' s Government welcome t h e i n i t i a t i v e t a k e n by t h e West I n d i a n
d e l e g a t i o n s i n r a i s i n g t h i s m a t t e r and u n d e r t a k e t o c o n s i d e r t h e
n e x t s t e p t o be t a k e n on i t , and t o c o n s u l t f u r t h e r w i t h t h e West
I n d i a n Governments c o n c e r n e d , as soon as p o s s i b l e a f t e r t h e c o n c -
l u s i o n of the C o n f e r e n c e . . . . 1

13. THE BRITISH CARIBBEAN FEDERATION ACT (4 & 5 E l i z . I I cap.63),

2 August 19562
1 . ( 1 ) Her M a j e s t y may, by an O r d e r - i n - C o u n c i l , - ( a ) p r o v i d e f o r
t h e f e d e r a t i o n o f t h e c o l o n i e s s p e c i f i e d i n t h e Schedule t o t h i s
A c t ( w i t h t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e d e p e n d e n c i e s , i f any) a n d , i n t h a t
c o n n e c t i o n , - ( i ) p r o v i d e f o r t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f a F e d e r a l Go-
v e r n m e n t , a F e d e r a l L e g i s l a t u r e , a Federal Supreme C o u r t and such
o t h e r F e d e r a l a u t h o r i t i e s as may appear t o Her M a j e s t y t o be n e -
c e s s a r y o r e x p e d i e n t ; ( i i ) c o n f e r , o r p r o v i d e f o r c o n f e r r i n g , on
t h e s a i d Government, L e g i s l a t u r e , C o u r t and a u t h o r i t i e s , and on
any o t h e r Governments, L e g i s l a t u r e s , C o u r t s and a u t h o r i t i e s (whe-
t h e r w i t h i n t h o s e c o l o n i e s o r e l s e w h e r e ) such powers and d u t i e s
as may be s p e c i f i e d by o r under t h e O r d e r , i n c l u d i n g ( i n t h e case
o f any L e g i s l a t u r e ) power t o make laws h a v i n g e x t r a - t e r r i t o r i a l
o p e r a t i o n ; ( b ) amend, i n such manner as may appear t o Her M a j e s t y
t o be necessary o r e x p e d i e n t , h a v i n g r e g a r d t o t h e f e d e r a t i o n ,
the enactments, L e t t e r s Patent, Orders-in-Counci1 or o t h e r i n s t -
ruments r e l a t i n g t o t h e government o f t h o s e c o l o n i e s r e s p e c t i v e l y
and t h e i r d e p e n d e n c i e s . . . .
3. The S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e may make t o t h e Government o f t h e f e d e -
r a t i o n e s t a b l i s h e d by O r d e r - i n - C o u n c i 1 under s e c t i o n one o f t h i s

1. On behalf of the s e c r e t a r y of s t a t e Lennox-Boyd, Hare the parliamentary

u n d e r - s e c r e t a r y , reported agreement to the Commons on 29 Feb. 1956 (Hans. 549
1183-4) noting changes in the federal l i s t and the composition of the federal
executive, the simpler process for amendment, and the compromise between
Caine's proposals., the 1953 Plan for federal revenue and the commission on
customs union. A federal supreme court would be s e t up but the question of the
federal c a p i t a l was deferred. A standing operation committee under the compt-
r o l l e r for development and welfare, then as adviser to the governor-general,
would be in charge of the necessary preliminary c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and administra-
tive work. The ex officio officials in the council of state would be replaced
by nominated o f f i c i a l s as advisers without a vote; the P.M. would nominate the
3 senators on t h a t council; and in nominating senators to the senate the
governor-general would consult with the unit legislatures. The impasse between
Trinidad only marginally dependent on customs d u t i e s for income and therefore
s t r o n g l y favouring free t r a d e , and Jamaica strongly dependent on t a r i f f s and
equally committed to p r o t e c t i o n , was only d e a l t with by agreement on p r i n c i p l e
but postponement of implementation. An enabling Act would pave the way for the
o r d e r - i n - c o u n c i l embodying the c o n s t i t u t i o n .
2. A s t a t u t e enabling the Crown to e s t a b l i s h a federation. Local nationalism
succeeded in removing the designation * B r i t i s h Caribbean* in favour of ' t h e
West I n d i e s ' .
 83

Act ( i n t h i s s e c t i o n r e f e r r e d t o as ' t h e Federal Government') -

( a ) g r a n t s , o f amounts n o t e x c e e d i n g i n t h e a g g r e g a t e one m i l l i o n
pounds, t o w a r d s d e f r a y i n g t h e c o s t o f e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e s e a t o f
t h e F e d e r a l Government; ( b ) i n r e s p e c t o f t h e p e r i o d o f t w e l v e
months b e g i n n i n g w i t h t h e f i r s t day o f January n e x t a f t e r t h e
e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f t h e s a i d f e d e r a t i o n and o f each o f t h e n i n e n e x t
s u c c e e d i n g p e r i o d s o f t w e l v e months b e g i n n i n g w i t h t h e a n n i v e r -
s a r y o f t h a t day, a g r a n t o f such amount as he may, w i t h t h e app-
r o v a l o f t h e T r e a s u r y , d e t e r m i n e , f o r t h e purpose o f e n a b l i n g t h e
Federal Government t o make g r a n t s t o t h e governments o r c o l o n i e s
f o r t h e t i m e b e i n g i n c l u d e d i n t h e s a i d f e d e r a t i o n whose r e s o u r -
ces a r e , i n t h e o p i n i o n o f t h e Federal Government, i n s u f f i c i e n t
t o e n a b l e them t o d e f r a y t h e i r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e e x p e n s e s . . . .
[Expenses under §3 would be paid by the U.K. Parliament and an increase
attributable to the Order-in-Council under §1 would be defrayed from the
U.K. Consolidated Fund. The Schedule l i s t e d the units in the Federation:
Barbados, Jamaica, Antigua, Montserrat, St. Christopher-Nevis-Anguilla,
Trinidad and Tobago, Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia ad St. Vincent.]

14. WEST INDIES (FEDERATION) ORDER-IN-COUNCIL, 31 July 19571

Whereas t h e p e o p l e s o f The West I n d i e s c o n s i d e r i t e s s e n t i a l
t o t h e i r f u t u r e w e l l - b e i n g t h a t t h e C o l o n i e s o f A n t i g u a , Barba-
d o s , D o m i n i c a , Grenada, Jamaica, M o n t s e r r a t , S a i n t C h r i s t o p h e r
Nevis and A n g u i l l a , S a i n t L u c i a , S a i n t V i n c e n t and T r i n i d a d and
Tobago s h o u l d be a s s o c i a t e d i n a F e d e r a t i o n ; And Whereas a l l i n -
h a b i t a n t s o f t h e s e C o l o n i e s s h o u l d c o n t i n u e , under such a Federa-
t i o n , t o e n j o y t h e f r e e e x e r c i s e o f t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e modes o f
r e l i g i o u s w o r s h i p ; And Whereas t h e r e s h o u l d be t h e g r e a t e s t p o s -
s i b l e freedom o f movement f o r persons and goods w i t h i n such a
F e d e r a t i o n ; And Whereas i t i s e s s e n t i a l f o r t h e economic s t r e n g t h
o f t h e area t h a t t h e r e s h o u l d be an i n t e g r a t e d t r a d e p o l i c y f o r
t h e F e d e r a t i o n and t h a t t h e r e s h o u l d be i n t r o d u c e d i n t h e Federa-
t i o n , as f a r and as q u i c k l y as p r a c t i c a b l e , a customs u n i o n , i n c -
l u d i n g i n t e r n a l f r e e t r a d e ; Now, t h e r e f o r e , t h e s a i d C o l o n i e s

1. Stat.R. 1957 I No.1364. The characteristics of this federation were tenta-

t i v e and provisional and the finances for the federal government were r e l u c -
t a n t and meagre. I t was indeed unique among modern federations in beginning
with n e i t h e r a common currency nor a customs union. There was no sense of com-
mon i d e n t i t y save among a few in the educated middle c l a s s : i n t e r - i s l a n d orga-
n i s a t i o n s and a s s o c i a t i o n s were loose and there was l i t t l e i n t e r n a l t r a d e ;
economic development s t r e s s e d differences; and there was no external t h r e a t
as in other federations to stimulate c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n . The federal a u t h o r i t y
was so limited and i t s budget so minute t h a t i t appeared to involve additional
expenditure for no e f f e c t i v e benefit and Manley and Williams chose to remain
premiers of t h e i r own islands r a t h e r than go into federal p o l i t i c s (Jamaica
too was under-represented in regard to i t s population), and to press for more
rapid c o n s t i t u t i o n a l reform in the islands which l e f t the federation by compa-
rison backward and a brake on the progress to independence. Dr Williams for
Trinidad argued for a much stronger federal government (Speech, Revision of
the federal constitution, Trinidad, 1959) while Jamaica more pragmatically ac-
cepted minimal c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t y s u f f i c i e n t for i n t e r n a t i o n a l recognition and
sought only gradual growth in federal powers protecting i t s own successful de-
velopment programme (Ministry paper, West Indies federation, reprinted The
Nation, 11 March 1960; also Statement by the Jamaican delegation, Lond. 1960).
84

s h a l l be a s s o c i a t e d i n a F e d e r a t i o n i n accordance w i t h t h e f o l l o -
wing p r o v i s i o n s : . . . . [with the Governor-General empowered to declare any
land in Trinidad as the seat of the Federal Government,1 with the con-
sent of the Trinidad Governor i f such land were not vested in the Crown.
The Federal Legislature would legislate for such an area, irrespective
of whether the matter was exclusive or concurrent and the Trinidad Legi-
slature could also legislate in matters not exclusive (§2). As for the
Federal Legislature]
7. The l e g i s l a t i v e power o f t h e F e d e r a t i o n s h a l l be v e s t e d i n a
F e d e r a l L e g i s l a t u r e c o n s i s t i n g o f Her M a j e s t y , a Senate and a
House o f R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . . . . [The Senate would normally consist of 19
Senators, appointed by the Governor-General with 2 from each Territory
except Montserrat which would have one. The Governor-General in nomina-
t i n g Senators would act on his discretion after consulting with the Go-
vernor of each T e r r i t o r y . A Senator must vacate his seat in any l e g i s l a -
ture or executive council within 21 days or he could not take part in
Senate proceedings. As for the House of Representatives]
15. . . . t h e House o f R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s s h a l l c o n s i s t o f f o r t y - f i v e
members o f whom f i v e s h a l l be e l e c t e d i n Barbados, seventeen i n
J a m a i c a , t e n i n T r i n i d a d and Tobago, one i n M o n t s e r r a t and two
i n each o f t h e o t h e r T e r r i t o r i e s . . . . [For Montserrat an ^alternate
member' would be elected as deputy.]
22. I f a t t h e t i m e o f h i s e l e c t i o n as a member o f t h e House o f
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s a person i s a member o f t h e L e g i s l a t u r e or o f t h e
E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l o f any T e r r i t o r y - ( a ) he s h a l l n o t t a k e p a r t
i n t h e p r o c e e d i n g s o f t h e House u n t i l he has ceased t o be a mem-
ber o f t h a t L e g i s l a t u r e o r E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l ; and ( b ) i f he has
n o t ceased t o be such a member a t t h e e x p i r a t i o n o f a p e r i o d o f
t w e n t y - o n e days a f t e r t h e d a t e o f h i s e l e c t i o n as a member o f t h e
House he s h a l l t h e r e u p o n v a c a t e h i s s e a t i n t h e H o u s e . . . .
[As for the d i s t r i b u t i o n of Legislative Powers within the Federation
(Chap.Ill)]
4 3 . ( 1 ) S u b j e c t t o t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h i s C o n s t i t u t i o n , t h e Feder-
a l L e g i s l a t u r e s h a l l have power t o make laws f o r t h e peace, o r d e r
and good government o f t h e F e d e r a t i o n w i t h r e s p e c t t o any m a t t e r
t h a t i s i n c l u d e d i n t h e E x c l u s i v e L e g i s l a t i v e L i s t o r t h e Concur-
r e n t L e g i s l a t i v e L i s t and w i t h r e s p e c t t o any m a t t e r i n c i d e n t a l
t o any m a t t e r t o i n c l u d e d o r i n c i d e n t a l t o any power c o n f e r r e d
by or under t h i s C o n s t i t u t i o n on t h e G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l , t h e Feder-
a l J u d i c a t u r e o r any d e p a r t m e n t , o f f i c e r o r o t h e r a u t h o r i t y o f
t h e F e d e r a l Government. ( 2 ) S u b j e c t t o t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h i s

1. The s i t e commission of non-West Indians (Col.P. 328 of 1956) had preferred

Barbados; but annoyed many by t h e i r references to Trinidad p o l i t i c s , Indian
communal ism, and t r o p i c a l heat. The standing federation committee in 1957
opted for Trinidad, the commission's t h i r d choice. Baron Hailes , previously
a government chief whip, was appointed governor-general on 1 October 1957.
Jamaica continued to d i s t r u s t the federal l e g i s l a t i v e power ( e s p e c i a l l y to
infringe or override island law) r e l a t e d to the r i g h t of the governor to
reserve b i l l s which might impede the federal government for i t s consideration:
(Rogers to Hailes, 12 Feb 1959: CO. 1031/2263) i t seemed to t h r e a t e n i n t e r -
vention by H.M.'s G. in matters which should be worked out between the federa-
tion and the islands. (Kittcatt to Marnham, 4 March ibid.). The section was
then dropped (11 March). An o r d e r - i n - c o u n c i l was made (13 May 1959) and royal
i n s t r u c t i o n s issued (19 May).
 85
Constitution, the Legislature of a Territory shall not have power
to make laws with respect to any matter that is included in the
Exclusive Legislative Lists: Provided that, where immediately be-
fore the coming into force of this article the Legislature of any
Territory had power to make laws with respect to any matter inc-
luded in the Exclusive Legislative List, that power shall not
cease with respect to that matter until such date as the Gover-
nor-General may, by proclamation published in the Gazette, ap-
point, and until that date that matter shall in relation to that
Territory be deemed to be included in the Concurrent Legislative
List. (3) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and of
the constitution of the Territory, the Legislature of any Terri-
tory (as well as the Federal Legislature) shall have power to
make laws for that Territory with respect to any matter included
in the Government Legislative List....
44.(1) The Federal Legislature may by law confer on the Legisla-
ture of a Territory authority to make laws for that Territory
with respect to any matter included in the Exclusive Legislative
List. . . . [Similarly a Legislature of a Territory might authorise the Federal
Legislature to legislate, either generally or conditionally for a period,
on any matter normally within its competence.]
45. (1 ) If any law of the Legislature of a Territory is inconsist-
ent with any law of the Federal Legislature which the Federal
Legislature was competent to enact, whether the Federal law was
made before or after the Territorial law, then the Federal law
shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, prevail over the Ter-
ritorial law; and a law of the Federal Legislature with respect
to any matter for the time being within the legislative compet-
ence of that Legislature may amend or repeal, or provide for the
amendment or repeal of, any law of the Legislature of a Territory
with respect to that matter....
46. Nothing in this Constitution shall be construed as precluding
the Federal Legislature or the Legislature of a Territory from
making provision by law for the appropriation of the public funds
of the Federation or of that Territory, as the case may be, for
a purpose for which that Legislature has no other power to make
laws.
47.(1) A law of the Federal Legislature may make provision for
the implementation in relation to the Federation or any one or
more of the Territories of agreements with and other obligations
towards or arrangements relating to countries outside the Federa-
tion or international organisations with respect to any matter,
whether or not that matter is included in the Exclusive Legislat-
ive List or the Concurrent Legislative List. (2) A law of the
Legislature of a Territory may make provision for the implementa-
tion in relation to that Territory of agreements with and other
obligations towards or arrangements relating to countries outside
the Federation or international organisations with respect to any
matter that is not included in the Exclusive Legislative Lists.
[There was provision for Federal emergency legislation on matters not
included in either the Exclusive or Concurrent Lists, and for Territorial
emergency laws on matters in the Exclusive List but these would have ef-
fect only during the emergency (§48). There followed provisions regarding
Territorial laws to control the movement of people, requiring a review
at the end of the first 5 years of all Territorial legislation on this
matter and for its repeal unless justified on the grounds of public
 86

health and s e c u r i t y . ]
Chapter V. J u r i s d i c t i o n o f t h e Federal Supreme C o u r t
8 0 . ( 1 ) The Federal Supreme C o u r t s h a l l , t o t h e e x c l u s i o n o f any
o t h e r c o u r t , have o r i g i n a l j u r i s d i c t i o n - ( a ) i n p r o c e e d i n g s b e t -
ween t h e F e d e r a t i o n and a T e r r i t o r y o r between one T e r r i t o r y and
a n o t h e r T e r r i t o r y ; ( b ) i n any p r o c e e d i n g s i n which a w r i t o r o r -
der o r mandamus o r p r o h i b i t i o n or an i n j u n c t i o n i s s o u g h t by t h e
F e d e r a t i o n a g a i n s t an o f f i c e or a u t h o r i t y o f a T e r r i t o r y o r by
a T e r r i t o r y a g a i n s t an o f f i c e r o r a u t h o r i t y o f t h e F e d e r a t i o n ; . . .
8 1 . ( 1 ) The Federal Supreme C o u r t s h a l l , t o t h e e x c l u s i o n o f any
o t h e r c o u r t , have o r i g i n a l j u r i s d i c t i o n t o d e t e r m i n e any q u e s t i o n
as t o t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h i s C o n s t i t u t i o n which i s r e f e r r e d
t o i t . . . [ f r o m a superior court in a Territory or from any court with the
consent of a superior court.]

Chapter V I . Finance
9 3 . ( 1 ) The Governments o f t h e T e r r i t o r i e s s h a l l , i n r e s p e c t o f
each o f t h e f i r s t f i v e f i n a n c i a l y e a r s , t o g e t h e r pay t o t h e Fe-
d e r a l Government f o r t h e purposes o f t h a t Government such sum o r
sums as t h e G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l may demand f r o m t h e T e r r i t o r i e s i n
respect of that year: Provided that (i) the total amount demanded
f r o m t h e T e r r i t o r i e s i n r e s p e c t o f any year s h a l l n o t exceed n i n e
m i l l i o n one hundred and t w e n t y thousand d o l 1 a r s ; . . . [and i f customs
and excise revenues exceeded $9,120,000, then the Federal Government
would pay to the T e r r i t o r i a l Governments a share of that excess propor-
tionate to the amount of such duties derived from that Territory (§94).
Moreover i f the Federal Legislature levied such a duty higher than the
scheduled rate, then i t must pay to the T e r r i t o r i a l Governments t h e i r
proportionate share of the revenues attributable to the difference bet-
ween the higher and the scheduled rate: similarly in regard to duties
levied on other than scheduled commodities (§95) or deriving from 'spe-
c i a l revenues' under §53 (§96) or from postal revenues (§97). In the Mis-
cellaneous Chapter V I I , H.M.-in-Council could amend or revoke any provis-
ion in t h i s constitutional order-in-council; any reducing of the numbers
of Representatives allocated to any Territory or a l t e r i n g the proportion
of seats for Senators or Representatives would however require a resolu-
t i o n by the T e r r i t o r i a l Legislatures (bicameral or unicameral) signifying
that such alteration was acceptable; though additional seats required by
the accession of B.G. or B.H. would not require such resolutions (§117).]
118. Not l a t e r t h a n t h e f i f t h a n n i v e r s a r y o f t h e d a t e on which
t h i s C o n s t i t u t i o n comes i n t o f o r c e t h e r e s h a l l be convened a c o n -
f e r e n c e c o n s i s t i n g o f d e l e g a t e s f r o m t h e F e d e r a t i o n , f r o m each
of the Colonies r e f e r r e d t o i n paragraph ( 1 ) of a r t i c l e 1 of t h i s
C o n s t i t u t i o n and f r o m t h e U n i t e d Kingdom, chosen by t h e i r r e s p e c -
t i v e Governments, f o r t h e purpose o f r e v i e w i n g t h i s C o n s t i t u -
t i o n ; 1 and t h a t c o n f e r e n c e s h a l l , among o t h e r t h i n g s , r e v i e w , i n
t h e l i g h t o f p r o g r e s s made t o w a r d s e s t a b l i s h i n g a customs u n i o n

1. A s e r i e s of inter-government n e g o t i a t i o n s indeed began in 1959 and culmi-

nated in a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l review conference in 1961. Since i t seemed c l e a r
t h a t without Jamaica no federation would be v i a b l e , concessions were made on
many issues in the d i r e c t i o n of d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n : a Jamaican veto on the t r a n -
sfer of d i r e c t taxation and control of economic development to the federation;
the phasing of a customs union over nine years; an increase in Jamaican r e p r e -
 87

w i t h i n the Federation and other relevant factors, the powers con-

ferred by this Constitution on the Federal Legislature to make
provision for the levying of taxes on income and profits.

15. SIR GRANTLEY ADAMS (P.M.): SPEECH, 16 June 19581

[He rehearsed the evolution of the existing Federation from the days
of the Montego Bay Conference and the S . C . A . C . report. They had grown
weary of the lengthy discussions aimed at securing Unit approval and of
the review as in 1953 when Mr. A. Gomes protested regularly that Trinidad
was being called on 'every two months to pull out its cheque book' and
'thundered' also against the proposal that the Federal Government in
Chapter V should have 25% of the customs revenues. Gomes had objected
that the Federal Government would not properly have legitimate objects
to spend that money (calculated at $20m.) on. To avoid the agony of
further discussion, the percentage was reduced to 15%. Now he accused the
Federal Government 'of putting the Federation in a strait-jacket'. No
delegate had then objected to the compromise. They had determined that
1956 should be the final conference, but Caine had recommended not 25%
nor 15%,but duties on specific commoditieSjand Gomes had refused to face
the Trinidad electorate with 4 cents more on rum and on tobacco. The 1956
conference accepted that when the U.K. Treasury was granting subsidies
and grants-in-aid to islands (e.g. St. Lucia) it was appropriate that
supervision should not be only by the Federal Government but that the
Governor-General should have a right to reserve whatever might affect the
financial stability of the West Indies. This was denounced as tampering
with the constitution. He quoted §94 of the Order-in-Counci 1 - the
'mandatory levy on the Unit Governments calculated on the percentage
incidence of the Federal duties as calculated in Caine's report. Gomes
criticisms were 'unfounded' and his attitude 'disgraceful'. The 1956
Conference] realised it was essential - and I am not speaking
from an insular point of view - as it affected Jamaica and Barba-
dos with surplus populations, it is essential that we make use
of all the Territories in the Caribbean area.
Who would be such a fool if British Honduras and British Guiana
would come in, not to welcome them with both hands? The hon. Mem-
ber from Jamaica - and we know how much Jamaicans are loved in
British Honduras -
Mr. Hill: I cannot hear.
The Prime Minister: That is your fault. I am shouting loud en-
ough, God knows. It would be a pity to go out from this room and
not go out wiser than when you came in. I would like the Member
from Jamaica to go and have a heart to heart talk w i t h George
Price and come back and tell us, but he must not tell us in a
room where there are ladies. British Honduras has no more inten-
tion of joining the Federation than I have of going aloft in a
Sputni k . . . .

16. (a) SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE INTER-GOVERN-

MENTAL CONFERENCE, 2 May 19612
On June 26th 1958, a Resolution was passed unanimously by the
House of Representatives, urging that 'the Conference envisaged

sentatives. I. West Indies H. of R. Deb. 1st (1958) 433-62. Adams, the P . M .

of the federation, was speaking in the lower house. 2. The review of the
Federal Constitution ( p u b l . Federal House, Port of Spain, T r i n i d a d ) .
88
by §118 of the Constitution be convened not later than June 1959
in order to achieve the goal of self-government and Dominion Sta-
tus within the Commonwealth at the earliest possible moment'. The
Federal and Unit Governments subsequently agreed that...the Con-
ference. . .should be preceded by a preliminary Conference at which
representatives of West Indian Governments would consider matters
arising from the working of the existing Constitution and would
formulate a pattern of proposals to be submitted to H.M.G. at the
Conference under Article 118....
The Conference found difficulty in reaching agreement on the
main issues discussed and decided that joint detailed research
and study of a wide range of subjects was essential before effec-
tive agreement could be achieved. The Conference therefore set
up two Inter-Governmental Committees comprising Ministers of the
Federal and Unit Governments, to examine and report on the detai-
led implications of Independence for the West Indies:....
[One Ministerial Committee would examine and report on constitutional
matters, the structure of the Federation with regard to financial, eco-
nomic, defence, international representation, freedom of internal move-
ment; the other the most effective means of achieving a Customs Union,
internal free trade, taxation and incentives to industry. The first set
up a working party on federal representation and another of officials
(ALPHA) to examine other matters while the second set up a working party
of officials (ORION) on the details of Customs Union.]
In recent months the Federal and Unit Governments and H.M.G.
in considering the timing and arrangements for resumption of the
Inter-Governmental Conference and convening the London Conference
envisaged in Article 118 and other necessary steps towards inde-
pendence, have all expressed their firm resolve that independence
be achieved with the least possible delay....
[Summary and Recommendations to be considered]
(i )' Essential At.tr i bu tes of Soyerei gn ty . The 'Minimum criteria'
which were defined by H.M.G. and endorsed by Committee I as or-
thodox and reasonable. They have been regarded as necessary to
sustain sovereignty, and necessarily existing in the Federation
before H.M.G. could sponsor it for independent membership of the
Commonwealth:
(a) the possession of a defence force, capable of keeping the
peace within the Federation's boundaries and posing at least a
deterrent to any minor incursion by an outside aggressor; (b) a
diplomatic organisation, capable of maintaining the external
relations of the Federation with the United Nations and the more
important friendly neighbourly countries, especially of course
the Commonwealth; (c) an effective central administration capable
of executing the policy of the Federal Government within the
field of activity given it by the constitution; (d) adequate fi-
nancial resources, based on independent taxing and loan-raising
powers sufficient to enable it to finance its own recurrent ex-
penditure and obligations as those develop; (e) the start of a
workable programme for a Customs Union; (f) central control of
the currency; (g) freedom of movement of peoples within its boun-
daries; (h) the constitutional right and ability to negotiate and
implement international treaties and agreements in the principal
fields in which sovereign states normally negotiate with one
another....
(ii ) ?3SA^y 9l Constitutional Powers. That prior to or at Inde-
 89

pendence al 1 Unit Territories should enjoy full internal-govern-

ment.
(iii) Accession of new Units. That provision should be made in
the Constitution for the accession to the Federation of new
Units....
(iv) Unit powers over matters on Exclusive List. That the Consti-
tution should provide, as in the present Article 43(2), for Ter-
ritorial Legislatures to legislate on matters on the Exclusive
Legislative List until the Governor-General, by proclamation,
declares otherwise.
(v) Reserve List. The proposal agreed on by Committee I of the
Inter-Governmental Conference, that the Federal Constitution
should provide for a Reserve List, in addition to the Exclusive
and Concurrent Legislative Lists, on which the subjects of Income
Tax and Development of Industries would be placed for a period
to be agreed.
It was agreed that while Income Tax and Industrial Development
were fields in which the Federal Government should have a direct
interest it was not at present proposed that the Federal Govern-
ment should enter these fields, in view of the possibility that
the economy of one or more Territories might be hampered or en-
dangered should these subjects be brought under Federal control
during the early years of Independence. . . . [ALPHA had considered the
procedure for transferring items from the Reserve List and proposed that] (a)
If there is a prohibition against any such transfer for 10 years
then at the end of that period the proposed amending law must be
passed by each House of the Federal Legislature by an absolute
majority and must then be approved by absolute majorities in a
majority of the representatives, Houses of the Legislatures of
the Territories representing a majority of the electors in the
Federation qualified to vote as electors at Federal elections
[or] (b) If there is no prohibition for any given period, the
proposed amending law must be passed by each House of the Federal
Legislature by a two-thirds majority and must then be approved
by absolute majorities in a majority of the representative Houses
of the Territorial Legislatures representing not less than two-
thirds of the population of the Federation.
(yi) Residual Powers. That the power to legislate on matters
which are not included in either the Exclusive or Concurrent
Lists should, as at present, remain with Unit Governments....
[It was recommended by the first Ministerial Committee that for formal
consultation between the Federal and Unit Governments (ix) that there
should be a Regional Council of Ministers of the Unit Premiers and Chief
Ministers with the Federal P.M. as chairman to meet at least once a year,
but any member could request a meeting and propose an item on the agenda,
and whenever the Federal Government proposed to assume responsibilities
on the Concurrent List hitherto within jurisdiction of the Units there
must be a meeting.]
(x"i) Representation, ijn the Federal Legislature. The recommenda-
tion of Committee I of (a) A Formula for Representation, embody-
ing (i) the principle of representation by population; (ii) pro-
vision of a basic seat for each of the ten Units, thus ensuring
that each Territory is represented regardless of size or popula-
tion; (iii) provision for an additional seat for every complete
population unit of 55,000 in each Territory making up a total
House of 64, based on 1958 estimated population figures; (iv)
90

provision for each Unit to retain its present number of seats,

e x c e p t J a m a i c a ( t o be i n c r e a s e d t o 3 1 ) a n d T r i n i d a d ( t o be i n c -
reased to 15) whose percentages of the total seats would still
be less than their respective percentages of the total population
of the Federating Territories....
[There should be a c e i l i n g of 70 f o r the seats i n the Lower House r e p r e -
s e n t i n g the e x i s t i n g U n i t s ( b ) ; a quinquennial review by a s t a n d i n g com-
m i t t e e o f the Lower House t o consider d i s t r i b u t i o n o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n
the l i g h t o f p o p u l a t i o n changes ( c ) and t o preserve the p r i n c i p l e of Ter-
r i t o r i a l E q u a l i t y i n the Senate; Montserrat should have 2 Senators ( d ) . ]
( x i i ) Common C i t i z e n s h i p and F r e e d o m o f M o v e m e n t . The r e c o m m e n d a -
t i o n o f C o m m i t t e e I t h a t t h e p r i n c i p l e o f common c i t i z e n s h i p a n d
freedom of movement of citizens of the Federation within its
b o r d e r s s h o u l d be w r i t t e n i n t o t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n . . . .
After study of the matter, ALPHA has presented to the Inter-
Governmental Conference, conclusions summarised as follows: (a)
That the problems of i n t e r - t e r r i t o r i a l m i g r a t i o n are not confined
t o T r i n i d a d and Tobago. B a r b a d o s and t o a l e s s e x t e n t A n t i g u a a r e
also receivers of immigration, (b) That this migration induces
and sustains deepseated short and longterm effects which are
h a r m f u l and hampers m a t e r i a l l y t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e e x p o r t i n g
T e r r i t o r i e s and t h e F e d e r a t i o n g e n e r a l l y , ( c ) T r i n i d a d and Tobago
i s h o w e v e r by f a r t h e l a r g e s t r e c e i v e r o f i m m i g r a t i o n a n d t h e v o -
l u m e . . . i m p o s e s a s p e c i a l 1y i n t e n s i v e b u r d e n on t h a t T e r r i t o r y . . . .
[ALPHA considered t h a t the s o l u t i o n lay i n economic and s o c i a l means and
recommended as reasonable] t h a t a p e r i o d f o r i n t e n s e p l a n n i n g a n d a d -
j u s t m e n t s h o u l d be a l l o w e d t o e n s u r e t h a t t h e e c o n o m i c a n d s o c i a l
p r o b l e m s r e l a t i n g t o an i n c r e a s e d i n f l o w o f m i g r a n t s t o T r i n i d a d
(and perhaps o t h e r r e c e i v i n g T e r r i t o r i e s ) f o l l o w i n g complete r e -
m o v a l o f r e s t r i c t i o n s , c o u l d be r e s o l v e d . . . , [ A c c o r d i n g l y i t sub-
m i t t e d f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n the f o l l o w i n g formula f o r freedom o f movement w i t h i n
the Federation upon Independence.]
( a ) The i t e m ' c o n t r o l o f movement o f p e r s o n s b e t w e e n t h e T e r r i -
tories' would be included on the Exclusive Legislative List at
Independence (as recommended by Committee I, para. 58 of its
r e p o r t o f November 1 9 6 0 ) . ( b ) H o w e v e r , u n t i l 3 1 s t December 1 9 6 6 ,
t h e T e r r i t o r i a l L e g i s l a t u r e s w o u l d r e t a i n a c o n c u r r e n t power t o
l e g i s l a t e w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h i s s u b j e c t and t h u s t h o s e T e r r i t o r i e s
that wished to do so could impose restrictions upon the entry of
p e r s o n s f r o m o t h e r T e r r i t o r i e s . Those powers s h o u l d s u b s i s t d u r -
i n g t h e p e r i o d , by n o n - a c t i o n by t h e G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l by P r o c l a -
m a t i o n t o d e c l a r e t h e s u b j e c t e x c l u s i v e . P r e s e n t A r t i c l e 44 w h i c h
i s t o be r e t a i n e d w o u l d g i v e t h e n e c e s s a r y T e r r i t o r i a l p o w e r t o
l e g i s l a t e u n t i l 3 1 s t D e c e m b e r 1 9 6 6 . ( c ) T h o s e U n i t s who w i s h e d
to legislate to establish, by arrangement, freedom of movement
w i t h o t h e r T e r r i t o r i e s , w o u l d be e n t i t l e d t o d o s o . ( d ) On t h e
1st January, 1967, the power to legislate with respect to this
matter would automatically become exclusively federal....

(b) THE WEST INDIES CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE: REPORT, 16 June 1961 1

[There had been 'agreement (on some questions on a m a j o r i t y b a s i s ) on

1. P . P . 1 9 6 0 - 1 XIII (1417) p p . 3 3 3 - 6 9 . The i n t e r - g o v e r n m e n t a L c o n f e r e n c e r e c o n -

vened a t L a n c a s t e r House on 2-16 May; H.M. ' s G. b e i n g r e p r e s e n t e d o n l y by C O .
observers.
 91
a wide range of questions' but 'certain important issues' remained out-
standing including a review of the details of the existing Federal Con-
stitution. But the Conference made the following proposals for the new
Federal Constitution:]
11. The first House of Representatives will consist of 64 members
of whom five will be elected in Barbados, 30 in Jamaica, 16 in
Trinidad and Tobago, one in Montserrat and two in each of the
other Territories. This is the result, based on the 1960 esti-
mated population figures, of the formula contained in the Inter-
Governmental Conference Decision No. 10....
20. Development of Industries. Taxes in income and profits. Any
proposal that the Federal Government should assume powers to
legislate on the subjects 'Development of Industries' and 'Taxes
on Income and Profits' will not come into force until the propo-
sal has been approved by a majority of each House of the Federal
Legislature and by an absolute majority of the Representative
House of each Unit Legislature. There will be a review of this
arrangement at the end of nine years at which, if no earlier de-
cision has been taken to allow the Federal Legislature to exer-
cise its powers in this matter, the Federal and Unit Governments
will consider together whether any change should be made in these
arrangements; provided that in the absence of agreement by all
Governments there arrangements will continue. Further reviews
will take place under arrangements to be agreed.
21 . Freedom of Movement. Amendment of the provisions of the Fede-
ral Constitution dealing with this matter will be subject to spe-
cial arrangements. It is accepted that the aim of the Federation
should be to move, as quickly as possible, to a position whereby
all inhabitants of the Federation will be able to move freely
from Territory to Territory subject to no controls or impedi-
ments, other than those required in the general public interest
(e.g. by public health requirements). Bearing in mind, however,
that an immediate withdrawal of all existing migration controls
throughout the Federation would cause serious social and economic
stresses to certain Territories, the following arrangements have
been agreed:- (i) the Federal Constitution will contain a decla-
ration of intention that freedom of movement is to be the ulti-
mate objective; (ii) this declaration will not invalidate laws
reasonably necessary in the public interest of the Federation of
any Unit; (iii) control of the movement of persons will appear
on the Exclusive Legislative List; (iv) during a period of nine
years after Independence the exclusive powers of the Federal Go-
vernment will not be exercised except with the concurrence of the
Unit Governments; (v) the question of shortening this period will
be reviewed at the end of the fourth year by the Federal Govern-
ment in conjunction with all Territorial Governments; (vi) during
this period, no Unit Territory will legislate to increase or ex-
pand any restrictions upon migration now obtaining without the
consent of the Federal Government; and (vii) after the expiration
of this period, each Territorial Government will have the right
to determine, with the concurrence of the Federal Government, the
appropriate remedial measures required to deal with any economic
disruption that results in a Territory from inter-Territorial
migration....
[A Cabinet with a Prime Minister was provided: a Federal Supreme Court;
and an A.-G. appointed on the P.M.'s advice - a political not official
 92

appointment.]
26. Gystgms U n j o n . The Customs Union Plan p r o v i d e s f o r t h e phased
i n t r o d u c t i o n o f i n t e r n a l f r e e t r a d e and t h e a d o p t i o n o f a common
e x t e r n a l t a r i f f t o be c o m p l e t e d w i t h i n a maximum p e r i o d o f n i n e
y e a r s . The s u p e r v i s i o n o f t h e Plan w i l l be c a r r i e d o u t by a s p e -
c i a l I n t e r - G o v e r n m e n t a l Committee o f M i n i s t e r s , under t h e c h a i r -
manship o f t h e Federal M i n i s t e r o f Trade and I n d u s t r y . . . .
2 7 . F e d e r a l R e v e n u e s . The m a n d a t o r y l e v y w i l l be a b o l i s h e d , a n d
t h e F e d e r a l G o v e r n m e n t w i l l be g i v e n an i n d e p e n d e n t t a x i n g p o w e r
sufficient to enable it to finance its developing obligations.
T h i s t a x i n g p o w e r w i l l be g o v e r n e d by t h e f o l l o w i n g a r r a n g e m e n t s :
( a ) The F e d e r a l G o v e r n m e n t ' s p r i n c i p a l s o u r c e o f r e v e n u e w i l l be
the import duties of customs on all the items in List 1 in the
Customs Union P l a n e x c l u d i n g p e t r o l e u m p r o d u c t s . . . .
[There would be a Federal Publ_ic_ Service tomj^ijssjjw (§28) and amendment
o f the U n i t C o n s t i t u t i o n s would r e q u i r e on s p e c i f i c matters the assent
o f the Federal House o f Representatives ( § 2 9 ) . ]

17. INHERITANCE OF TREATY RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS, 8 June 1961 1

[ I n s t e a d o f the normal course taken by f o r m e r l y dependent t e r r i t o r i e s
(and r e c e n t l y by Malaya, Ghana and N i g e r i a and by c o u n t r i e s not p a r t o f
H.M.'s dominions, as T r a n s j o r d a n , Sudan and Morocco) - i.e. by an
exchange o f l e t t e r s wherein the new State took over a l l i n t e r n a t i o n a l
r i g h t s and o b l i g a t i o n s from H.M.'s G. i n s o f a r as they were r e l e v a n t , i t
had been agreed at the i n t e r - g o v e r n m e n t a l conference i n T r i n i d a d t h a t the
independent Federal Government should review a l l t r e a t i e s made by H.M.'s
G. on b e h a l f o f the Colonies and could decide which t o accept. This was
c o n t r a r y t o the customary r u l e s o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l law and would be
impossible t o present w i t h f u l l and t o t a l p r e c i s i o n . ]
I f i t became known t h a t The W e s t I n d i e s on b e c o m i n g i n d e p e n d e n t
were n o t n e c e s s a r i l y g o i n g t o a c c e p t a l l t h e t r e a t y r i g h t s and
o b l i g a t i o n s w h i c h s h o u l d d e v o l v e on h e r on i n d e p e n d e n c e but
i n t e n d e d i n s t e a d t o e x a m i n e w h i c h a g r e e m e n t s s h o u l d be a c c e p t e d
and w h i c h r e j e c t e d , i t m i g h t w e l l s u g g e s t t o t h e w o r l d t h a t t h e
n e w l y i n d e p e n d e n t S t a t e was n o t p r e p a r e d t o h o n o u r p a s t o b l i g a -
t i o n s . F o r o b v i o u s r e a s o n s t h i s w o u l d be u n d e s i r a b l e . The s e c o n d
point is that there can be no guarantee that the lists of
t r e a t i e s a p p e r t a i n i n g t o The West I n d i e s w h i c h h a v e b e e n d r a w n
up a r e e x h a u s t i v e . The m a i n r e a s o n i s t h a t t h e r e may w e l l be
t r e a t i e s o f g e n e r a l a p p l i c a t i o n n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y r e f e r r i n g t o The
West I n d i e s w h i c h , h o w e v e r , c o n t a i n t r e a t y r i g h t s w h i c h w o u l d be
o f v a l u e t o The W e s t I n d i e s .
O b v i o u s l y t h e s e r i g h t s w o u l d be l o s t i f t h e G o v e r n m e n t o f The
W e s t I n d i e s was u n w i l l i n g t o g i v e an o v e r a l l a c c e p t a n c e o f t r e a t y
ri ghts.
I n any c a s e , i t i s a p p a r e n t f r o m t h e l i s t s w h i c h have been p r e -
p a r e d t h a t some o f t h e e x i s t i n g t r e a t i e s , s u c h as t h e many T r e a -
t i e s o f Commerce a n d N a v i g a t i o n c o n c l u d e d by t h e G o v e r n m e n t o f
t h e U n i t e d Kingdom and a p p l y i n g t o t h e t e r r i t o r y o f t h e F e d e r -
a t i o n , c o n f e r i m p o r t a n t r i g h t s w h i c h The West I n d i e s w o u l d p r e s u -
mably w i s h t o i n h e r i t . Though t h e agreement embodied i n t h e t r a -
d i t i o n a l Exchange o f L e t t e r s a p p l i e s d i r e c t l y o n l y between t h e

1. C O . 1031/3202 conf: a note for the W.I. c o n s t i t u t i o n a l conference at

Lancaster House in 1961 by the U.K. d e l e g a t i o n .
 93

existing State and the new State, the third States concerned have
in the past generally accepted the arrangements therein contai-
ned. But if there were no Exchange of Letters and instead it was
learnt that The West Indies were going to decide which treaties
they wish to inherit, other parties to those treaties might be
tempted also to pick and choose. Valuable rights would thereby
be lost and the Government of the new State would be burdened
with the task of negotiating new treaties to replace them.
In the light of these considerations it is suggested that the
Exchange of Notes is the only solution which is both practicable
and capable of ensuring that the interests of The West Indies are
ful1y preserved.

18. IAIN MACLEOD TO HAROLD MACMILLAN, 22 September 19611

[The Jamaican referendum was final. Whether an East Caribbean federation
could survive the defection, would depend on Trinidad: if Trinidad
refused to shoulder the increased financial burden (Jamaica and Trinidad
contributed about 85% of the federal revenues) it would be difficult
indeed to see a 'rump" Federation of Barbados and the smaller islands
surviving.]
Antigua has always taken a pro-Jamaica line and is unlikely in
any case to continue in a Federation which does not include Ja-
maica.2 She may well seek some form of association with Jamaica
(though whether Jamaica after the referendum would be in a
position to accommodate her is doubtful). Barbados is not very
likely to press for independence and is more likely to want to
continue as a separate self-governing Colony, possibly with some
special status. This would leave us with six small Windward and
Leeward Islands which have no prospect of 'making independence'
alone and all but one of which are budgetarily in the red and
supported financially by the U.K. - a most dismal prospect.
It is, however, just possible that Trinidad might be prepared
to lead an East Caribbean Federation - on her terms. Eric
Williams has always dislike the present loose form of Federation
which has been a condition of Jamaica belonging. The defection
of Jamaica will give him the opportunity to press for the tighter
form of Federation which he has always advocated, with strong
central powers over taxation, development, planning etc. In
return for that he might be prepared to make a concession over
his earlier stand against the early introduction of freedom of
movement. This might overcome the prejudice of other Islands
against continuing in a Federation dominated by Trinidad, since
it is on this issue that they have been most bitterly critical
of Trinidad. On this hypothesis we might salvage a viable
Federation which could go forward to independence without Jamaica
- and relieve us of the prospect of having the smaller islands
indefinitely on our hands. But Eric Williams will in that case
make full use of his strong bargaining position and no doubt

1. C O . 1031/3278 secret: the secretary of state was reporting to the P.M. on

the unexpected * narrow but clear negative' to federation in the Jamaican
referendum. 2. The administrator of Antigua wrote (25 Sept: ibid.) that
Antigua's sympathy always had been with Jamaica; but Bird, the chief minister,
declared it might consider joining a federation of the E. Caribbean with or
without Trinidad but as equal partners only, not 'as little Tobagos'.
94

demand a handsome f i n a n c i a l c o n t r i b u t i o n over the e a r l y years

f r o m H . M . G . o n b a l a n c e . H o w e v e r , i t seems m o r e p r o b a b l e t h a t he
1
w i l l want t o 'go i t a l o n e ' .
We c a n n o t , o f c o u r s e , e x p r e s s p u b l i c l y o u r r e g r e t a t t h e r e s u l t
of the referendum since t h a t could e m b i t t e r our r e l a t i o n s w i t h
B u s t a m a n t e i f he r e t u r n s t o p o w e r i n J a m a i c a . Our i m m e d i a t e l i n e
w i t h t h e P r e s s i s t h a t i t was r e c o g n i s e d t h a t t h e L a n c a s t e r H o u s e
A g r e e m e n t was d e p e n d e n t on the Jamaica r e f e r e n d u m and the
e n d o r s e m e n t by L e g i s l a t u r e s i n o t h e r I s l a n d s ; t h a t we h a v e a l w a y s
r e g a r d e d t h e f o r m o f F e d e r a t i o n as a m a t t e r f o r E a s t Indians
t h e m s e l v e s t o s e t t l e ; a n d t h a t t h e r e f e r e n d u m r e s u l t i s a new
f a c t o r i n t h e s i t u a t i o n t h e e f f e c t s o f w h i c h we a r e s t u d y i n g . . . .
[The U.S. would be extremely concerned over t h i s development and the F.O.
and C.R.O. were sending assessments t o Washington and Ottawa.]

19. IAIN MACLEOD: MEMORANDUM FOR THE CABINET, 25 September 19612

FUTURE OF JAMAICA
The Jamaica Referendum has r e s u l t e d i n t h e d e c i s i o n t h a t t h e
t e r r i t o r y s h o u l d w i t h d r a w f r o m The West I n d i e s F e d e r a t i o n . There
can be no q u e s t i o n o f H.M.G. n o t a c c e p t i n g t h i s d e c i s i o n ; indeed
we agreed over a year ago t h a t Jamaica would be f r e e t o secede
i f i t so w i s h e d . . . . [This would have important implications for the other
islands in the Federation. Next week he would be discussing these with
the federal P.M. and his ministers.]
S u b j e c t t o t h i s , i t remains t o be d e c i d e d what t h e f u t u r e o f
Jamaica s h o u l d be. Mr. Manley, t h e P r e m i e r , i s coming t o London
t o see me on t h e 2nd October and he w i l l , I know, ask f o r f u l l
independence w i t h i n t h e Commonwealth. I n view o f J a m a i c a ' s s i z e
( 4 , 4 0 0 square m i l e s ) , population (1.6 m i l l i o n s ) , economic
viability and f a i r political stability, we cannot really
c o n t e m p l a t e r e s i s t i n g such a r e q u e s t , g i v e n t h e p r e c e d e n t s o f
Cyprus and S i e r r a Leone. I p r o p o s e , t h e r e f o r e , s u b j e c t t o t h e
agreement o f my c o l l e a g u e s , t o agree t h a t Jamaica s h o u l d have
f u l l independence and t h a t H.M.G. w i l l sponsor i t s a d m i t t a n c e t o
Commonwealth membership when t h e t i m e comes.
The Jamaica Premier a p p r e c i a t e s t h a t t h e l e g i s l a t i v e and
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e problems c r e a t e d by h i s t e r r i t o r y ' s w i t h d r a w a l
f r o m t h e F e d e r a t i o n w i l l t a k e some t i m e t o r e s o l v e , and t h a t
u n t i l t h e s e have been s t u d i e d i n some d e t a i l i t would be
i m p r a c t i c a b l e t o s e t a f i r m d a t e f o r independence. F u r t h e r , Mr.
Manley has s a i d p u b l i c l y t h a t t h e r e i s t o be a General E l e c t i o n
b e f o r e Independence Day, a n d , w h i l e u n l i k e l y , i t c a n n o t be r u l e d

1. At the W.I. conference Eric Williams had threatened to follow Jamaica's

example if i t seceded.
2. C O . 1031/3200 s e c r e t . Macleod was s e c r e t a r y of s t a t e (1959-61) succeeding
Lennox-Boyd. He had written to the P.M., Harold Macmillan, on 22 Sept. [see
No. 18]. On 21 Sept. 1961 a referendum had been held in Jamaica. Devised
o r i g i n a l l y in May 1960 as a means to e x t o r t more concessions for Jamaica in
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l bargaining and thereby to undermine Jamaican c r i t i c s of
federalism, i t succeeded in i t s f i r s t object but not in the second for the
majority (over 35,000 in a vote of some 468,000) voted against federation.
Faced with t h i s vote for secession, H.M.'s G. agreed in October to Jamaica's
secession and independence. Trinidad, refusing to shoulder alone the c o s t s of
the smaller islands in an East Caribbean union also onted to secede.
 95
out that there may be a change of government. Such an event would
lead to further delay. In these circumstances I propose if
possible to avoid agreeing to a firm date for Jamaican Indepen-
dence at this stage; I shall, however, undertake that H.M.G. will
do everything possible to achieve that end as speedily as is
practicable.
As mentioned above I am having discussions with the Federal
Prime Minister at the moment and I will report on the position
regarding the remainder of The West Indies Federation as soon as
the picture is clearer. The key to an Eastern Caribbean Feder-
ation is held by Dr. Williams, Premier of Trinidad and Tobago.
Trinidad is the richest of the West Indian territories and the
only one capable of maintaining an independent Federation now
that Jamaica has withdrawn. Dr. Williams' present attitude
towards Federation without Jamaica is unknown and he has so far
refrained from comment. I have sent him a message asking for his
views but, meanwhile, it is quite likely that Trinidad will ask
for independence on its own. In that event we should have no
option other than to agree.

20. AMBLER THOMAS: THE FUTURE OF FEDERATION AND THE POSITION OF THE LEEWARD
AND WINDWARD ISLANDS, 6 November 19611
Clearly the main (though undeclared) aim of our policy now is
to try to keep Trinidad in some form of close association with
Barbados and the Leeward and Windward Islands. (I say * undec-
lared' because any initiations or indications of policy at this
juncture by H.M.G. might set up reactions which could result in
their being counterproductive.) A federation on this basis would
be viable and would be capable of proceeding to independence. If,
on the other hand, Trinidad were to follow Jamaica's lead and ' go
it alone', then the possibility of forming some sort of a unit
out of Barbados and the Leewards and Windwards capable, on any
of our present criteria, of sustaining an independent existence
within the foreseeable future is remote.
The difficulties we have to face in securing this aim are
twofold. The first is that Dr. Williams may find the temptation
to follow JamaTcsT's lead too strong anyway and may decide, as
soon as his elections are over, to submit an immediate demand for
Trinidad to be granted independence - a demand which the British
Government could hardly refuse. The second is that even though
Dr. Williams were prepared to contemplate some form of closer
union with the other islands, it would be only on such terms as
they - and even perhaps the British Government - might find it
impossible to accept.
The only conclusion to be drawn in these circumstances is that
there is now a distinct possibility that the dependent status of
the Leeward and Windward Islands and possibly of Barbados may be
indefinitely prolonged. It is against this background that our
despatch No. 993 of 24th October should be read.
The difficulties of the situation with which we shall then be

1. C O . 1031/3278 secret and personal. A.R. Thomas was assistant under-

secretary. This paper was sent to the administrators of Antigua, Montserrat,
St. Kitts, Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia and St. Vincent and to the federal
governor-general.
96

faced in the Leewards and W i n d w a r d s w i l l be as obvious to you as

they are to u s . They are h i n t e d at i n the last sentence of parag-
raph 3 of our despatch No. 993 in w h i c h we r e f e r to the fact that
' a n y f u t u r e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a r r a n g e m e n t s ' w i l l have to be compa-
t i b l e ' w i t h a n y r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s w h i c h H e r M a j e s t y ' s Government
may have to c o n t i n u e to d i s c h a r g e in the Eastern C a r i b b e a n ' .
On the assumption that the w h o l e of the West I n d i e s w o u l d be
proceeding to independence as a f e d e r a t i o n in the not-too-distant
f u t u r e , we have over the past few years a l l o w e d M i n i s t e r s in the
Leewards and W i n d w a r d s to secure a measure of control over t h e i r
own a f f a i r s w h i c h t h e i r competence and experience do not j u s t i f y .
T h i s is shown q u i t e c l e a r l y by reports now b e i n g received f r o m
a n u m b e r of i s l a n d s i n d i c a t i n g attempts by M i n i s t e r s to i n t e r f e r e
w i t h the C i v i l S e r v i c e and also s h o w i n g that standards of
f i n a n c i a l p r o b i t y are not of the h i g h e s t . Now t h a t our m a i n
assumption is in danger of b e i n g i n v a l i d a t e d , it may w e l l be that
if we are to continue to d i s c h a r g e our r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s in the
area - p a r t i c u l a r l y our r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to P a r l i a m e n t for the
proper e x p e n d i t u r e of g r a n t - i n - a i d - we s h a l l have to assert a
greater measure of control than we have been in the h a b i t of
e x e r c i s i n g in the recent past. E x a c t l y how we s h a l l do t h i s , it
is as yet not p o s s i b l e to say: it is s o m e t h i n g we s h a l l have to
d e t e r m i n e when the c o n d i t i o n s under w h i c h we s h a l l be o p e r a t i n g
are c l e a r e r . C o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y it w o u l d be d i f f i c u l t to put the
clock back f r o m the e x i s t i n g p o s i t i o n , u n l e s s the s i t u a t i o n
deteriorates c o n s i d e r a b l y , a l t h o u g h we have made it c l e a r that
the advances p r e v i o u s l y agreed for the 31st May next cannot now
be made. In the m e a n t i m e , h o w e v e r , in your day-to-day d e a l i n g
w i t h a f f a i r s i n your t e r r i t o r y , w e suggest y o u s h o u l d bear t h i s
changed s i t u a t i o n i n m i n d a n d p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e p r o b a b i l i t y that
there w i l l have to be much t i g h t e r economic c o n t r o l , and not
hesitate to make f u l l use of y o u r e x i s t i n g c o n s t i t u t i o n a l powers
should the c i r c u m s t a n c e so r e q u i r e . We can assure you of the f u l l
b a c k i n g of Her M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n m e n t .
2 1 . GOVERNOR-GENERAL BARON H A I L E S TO R E G I N A L D M A U D L I N G , 1 December 1961 1
[He recognised that any new plans must be tentative and depend on the
December e l e c t i o n s in T r i n i d a d and Barbados. H . M . ' s G. might l e g a l l y be
able to impose the federal constitution on the remaining 9, but that
constitution was agreed between the 10 territories and if one withdrew
then the whole agreement was undermined: the balance of representation
and finance was f u n d a m e n t a l l y disturbed and 'what remains cannot in any
real sense be as among the n i n e , the same r e l a t i o n s h i p as existed amongst
the ten'. If T r i n i d a d also were to secede, he did not see how a rump
association of 8 could be the same.] E v e r y s i n g l e facet of the
s t r u c t u r e w i l l r e q u i r e change; t h e composition o f t h e L e g i s l a t u r e
and its powers; its f i n a n c i a l powers and resources; the n a t u r e
of the E x e c u t i v e ; not to m e n t i o n e i t h e r the s i m p l e fact that such
an association is not an e c o n o m i c a l l y v i a b l e e n t i t y , or the

1. C.0.1031/3278 private, secret and personal. The governor-general f e l t that

a new beginning was necessary since the o r i g i n a l federation had been
dissolved. The federal m i n i s t e r s had f o r m a l l y protested against H . M . ' s G . ' s
decision to introduce legislation for Jamaica's withdrawal as contrary to the
s p i r i t of the existing federation (to Maudling, 17 Oct. ibid.).
 97

necessity to recruit a completely new s t a f f , since no s e r v i n g

Federal public officer would regard an appointment to such a
government as being that which he had o r i g i n a l l y accepted. And
what if Barbados also contracted out? On this aspect I and my
advisers consider that w i t h the withdrawal of Jamaica the
Federation w i l l be ' de facto' dissolved and this is the v i e w
which Eric W i l l i a m s has been advancing.
Moreover, in the interest of achieving the maximum measure of
agreement between the Nine at the earliest possible moment, it
is in my v i e w desirable that the present Federal Government
should disappear. The poor quality of Federal representatives and
Senators generally and the Ministers e s p e c i a l l y , certainly not
excluding the Prime Minister himself, is notorious throughout the
Federation. It is not just a question of the personal animosities
which have developed between Federal and T e r r i t o r i a l (notably
T r i n i d a d ) Ministers. In addition to this, over the three and a
half years of its existence the Federal Government, with one or
two exceptions, has f a i l e d miserably to rise to its responsibili-
ties and provide any real leadership. It started w i t h consider-
able g o o d w i l l , but as time went on the i n i t i a t i v e passed to the
hands of the T e r r i t o r i a l Governments, until today I think it must
be faced that it does not command the full respect of the peoples
of The West Indies: and it has ceased to be in any genuine sense
representative of West Indian interests, except the personal in-
terests of Ministers. As an illustration of Federal Ministers'
irresponsibility and the desire of some of them to intrigue ag-
ainst a Trinidad dominated Federation, I may mention that Brad-
shaw - who is one of the more competent Ministers - has said that
he intends to demand the whole of the mandatory levy for 1962
from the T e r r i t o r i e s , as soon as the New Year begins; an act
which is bound to antagonise W i l l i a m s , and also to prejudice the
expressed desire of Jamaica to co-operate in a final settlement.
It r e a l l y must be accepted that the continued existence of Feder-
al Ministers can contribute nothing but d i f f i c u l t y and probably
ruin for any new constitutional arrangements. We know that Adams
and La Corbiniere at least, whatever lip s e r v i c e there may be to
L e w i s ' s 1 or any other scheme, w i l l do all they can to sabotage
a Federation of the Nine, in which there w i l l be no place for
them....

22. (a) REGINALD MAUDLING: STATEMENT, 6 February 19622

[In January he had visited the West Indies to discuss with leaders in
Eastern Caribbean governments the situation consequent on Jamaica's
secession. ]

1. Arthur Lewis, the W . I . economist and P r i n c i p a l of the U n i v e r s i t y College

of the W . I . , reported to Hailes after a successful tour of the 8 that they all
wanted a continuation of the federation of the 9 and were prepared to make
s a c r i f i c e s of sovereignty, to regard T r i n i d a d as their natural leader and to
accept W i l l i a m s ' principles of economics and nationhood. At this junction
Hailes reported that W i l l i a m s wanted a federation to continue, but was
determined to smash this f e d e r a t i o n f i r s t and then to begin again: ( H a i l e s to
Thomas, 4 Nov. 3961 ibid.).2. Hansard Comm. 653 230-1. Maudlins was secretary
of state at the C.O. from Oct. 1961 - J u l y 1962. Since the d i v i s i o n of Jamaica
and T r i n i d a d , the federation, floundering from i n e f f e c t i v e central power and
98

My talks revealed that we face this situation: Jamaica has dec-

lared its determination to withdraw from the Federation and this
decision has been accepted by Her Majesty's Government. The Go-
vernment of Trinidad and Tobago have decided not to participate
in any federation of the Eastern Caribbean. Finally, the Premier
of Barbados and the Chief Ministers of the Leeward and Windward
Islands, while advocating a new federation between their terri-
tories, are agreed that the present one should be dissolved. In
these circumstances, Her Majesty's Government have with regret
reached the conclusion that they have no alternative but to
arrange for the dissolution of the present Federation.
Under the Federation, however, a number of common services of
great value have been operating in the area. We are anxious to
ensure their continuation on a regional basis pending clarifica-
tion of the constitutional position throughout the area. Her Ma-
jesty's Government have, therefore, decided to introduce legisla-
tion into Parliament very shortly which will enable us to dis-
solve the present Federation, and to set up an interim organisa-
tion, under a Commissioner appointed by Her Majesty's Government
which will be responsible for running the common services for the
time being, until some more permanent arrangements for their
operation can be worked out in conjunction with the Governments
of the West Indies.1
Her Majesty's Government regard the suggested federation of
Barbados and the Leeward and Windward Islands as a promising de-
velopment. They consider, however, that a great deal of careful
study both here and in the West Indies will be needed before any
final decisions can be taken and they propose for their part to
initiate this study in the very near future.
(b) MEETING OF THE FEDERAL DELEGATION WITH REGINALD MAUDLING: MINUTES,
8 March 19622
Sir Grantley Adams opened the meeting by complaining that
Her Majesty's Government were proceeding with indecent haste
in pushing through the Bill to dissolve the Federation. He
and his colleagues felt they were being treated shabbily. In
common fairness they should have been consulted about the
terms of the Bill and given an opportunity to comment before
it was introduced. The Secretary of State replied that he
could not agree that they were being treated shabbily.
During his visit to Port-of-Spain he had informed them fully
of his conversations with the Governments and the Units and
of the conclusions which he had drawn from them. The policy
that he was pursuing was entirely in line with what he had
then forecast. In particular, it was well known to them all
that we had given an undertaking to try to pass legislation
by the 31st March.
During the subsequent discussion the following points were

the insularity of its leaders, was moving towards dissolution. Maudling saw
no useful purpose in pressuring it. The importance of the accession of Jamaica
and Trinidad had been clear from the first: (Rogers to Hailes, 12 Feb. 1959:
C O . 1031/2263): their example now was crucial for the rest. 1. This was faci-
litated by 10 & 11 Eliz.II cap.19 and order-in-council (23 May 1962: Stat. R.
1962 No.1084). 2. C O . 1031/3228. Secret. [See also No.5Ul
 99
made:-
(a) Mr. Shar maintained that the draft of the Bill should
have been submitted to the Federal Government and Parliament
before it was introduced. In the view of the Federal Opposi-
tion there had been no adequate consultation with Federal
authorities before the Bill was introduced.
(b) Sir Grantley Adams maintained that only the Federal
Government was entitled to speak on behalf of the Federa-
tion. The views of Unit Governments should not prevail over
those of the Federal Government.
(c) There was considerable discussion of Trinidad's atti-
tude to federation and of internal politics in Trinidad. It
was argued that since the Premier of Trinidad did not make
federation an electoral issue, his views on the subject
should be disregarded and the Secretary of State should
insist on a referendum in Trinidad. The Secretary of State
pointed out that he had no power whatsoever to do this even
if he thought it desirable. He considered that the Govern-
ment of Trinidad were perfectly entitled to decide on a
policy and he had no evidence to show that the recently
elected Legislature in Trinidad would reject the Govern-
ment's policy on federation.
(d) On the referendum in Jamaica it was argued by Sir
Grantley Adams that it was immoral to allow Jamaica to
secede as a result of the referendum. The Secretary of State
replied that H.M.G. had not been consulted before the refer-
endum in Jamaica was held but that the Government of Jamaica
had accepted the result as final. H.M.G. felt they had no
alternative but to accede to the view of the Jamaican Gover-
nment on this matter.
(e) The Secretary of State was asked whether he thought
the federation of the Little Eight would go through. He said
that as yet it was impossible to say. This produced the
argument that, in that case, the Secretary of State ought to
keep the existing Federation in existence for another five
years to enable the position to be clarified: this would be
preferable to government by commission for even a short
period.
(f) There was considerable comment about internal politics
in Trinidad, particularly from Mr. Gomes. It was argued that
there was an extremely explosive situation in Trinidad and
that when the explosion came it would make British Guiana
look like a Sunday school picnic...
23. THE WEST INDIES ACT (10 & 11 Eliz. cap 19), 18 April 19621
Parliament empowered H.M. (a) by Order-in-Counci1 [to] provide
for a colony's ceasing to be included in the Federation establi-
shed by virtue of section one of the British Caribbean Federat-
ion Act, 1956, by the name of the West Indies (in this Act refer-

1. An order-in-council (Stat.R. 1962 No.1054) provided for the dissolution of

the West Indies federation. Meanwhile a Jamaican Independence conference had
been held in London in February (P.P.1961-2 XI (1638)) to agree a constitution
for the island: this was contained in an order-in-council {Stat.R. 1962 No.
1550): [No. 55b/.
100

r e d t o a s ' t h e F e d e r a t i o n ' ) ; ( b ) by O r d e r - i n - C o u n c i 1 [ t o ] d i s -
solve the Federation and, with i t , the a u t h o r i t i e s established
by v i r t u e o f s u b - p a r a g r a p h ( i ) o f p a r a g r a p h ( a ) o f s u b s e c t i o n ( 1 )
o f t h a t s e c t i o n ( i n t h i s A c t r e f e r r e d t o as t h e ' F e d e r a l a u t h o r i -
ties' )\...

24. CONFERENCE ON EAST CARIBBEAN FEDERATION: REPORT, 24 May 1962 1

[Several Conferences had been held between 1947 and 1956 i n London and
the West I n d i e s t o discuss f e d e r a t i o n . I n February 1956 [No.12] t e n t e r -
r i t o r i e s had decided t o f e d e r a t e , and by s t a t u t e and o r d e r - i n - c o u n c i l i n
1956-7 t h i s had been accomplished. I n May-June 1961 a London Conference
agreed t o r e v i s e t h e Federal and U n i t c o n s t i t u t i o n s a p p r o p r i a t e t o i n d e -
pendence on 21 May 1962 ' s u b j e c t t o such d e c i s i o n s as may be obtained by
each d e l e g a t i o n from t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e l e g i s l a t u r e s and p e o p l e s ' . But
H.M.'s G. had i n October 1961 acknowledged t h e referendum o f 19 September
as ' a f i n a l i n d i c a t i o n o f Jamaica's wishes' and promised t o l e g i s l a t e t o
p r o v i d e f o r Jamaica's s e c e s s i o n . ]
On 1 3 t h J a n u a r y 1 9 6 2 , t h e S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e f o r t h e C o l o n i e s
a r r i v e d i n t h e West I n d i e s f o r c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h t h e G o v e r n m e n t s
o f t h e F e d e r a t i o n a n d o f t h e U n i t s ( o t h e r t h a n J a m a i c a ) . On 1 4 t h
January 1962, t h e General Council o f t h e governing p a r t y i n T r i -
n i d a d and Tobago u n a n i m o u s l y a p p r o v e d a r e s o l u t i o n w h i c h s t a t e d
t h a t t h e t e r r i t o r y ' s p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n a n y new f e d e r a t i o n o f t h e
E a s t e r n C a r i b b e a n s h o u l d be r e j e c t e d a n d t h a t T r i n i d a d a n d T o b a g o
s h o u l d p r o c e e d f o r t h w i t h t o i n d e p e n d e n c e . T h i s p o l i c y was l a t e r
a d o p t e d by a s p e c i a l c o n v e n t i o n o f t h e p a r t y a n d t h e P r e m i e r o f
T r i n i d a d and Tobago s u b s e q u e n t l y n o t i f i e d t h e S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e
t h a t h i s G o v e r n m e n t h a d e n d o r s e d i t . On 1 9 t h J a n u a r y 1 9 6 2 , t h e
P r e m i e r o f Barbados and t h e C h i e f M i n i s t e r s o f t h e Leeward and
Windward I s l a n d s h e l d a m e e t i n g w i t h t h e S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e , a t
which t h e y p r e s e n t e d p r o p o s a l s f o r a f e d e r a t i o n between their
e i g h t t e r r i t o r i e s . . . . [and a conference met i n Barbados (26 Feb.-3 March)
t o consider an East Caribbean Federation and submitted d e t a i l e d propo-
s a l s . On 16 A p r i l Maudling announced t o t h e Commons t h a t a f e d e r a t i o n o f
Barbados, t h e Leewards and Windwards seemed] t h e b e s t s o l u t i o n t o
the problems of the area, provided that the federal constitution
was s u c h a s t o p r o v i d e a d e q u a t e p o w e r s t o t h e c e n t r a l g o v e r n m e n t
and t o o f f e r a r e a s o n a b l e p r o s p e c t o f e c o n o m i c and f i n a n c i a l s t a -
b i l i t y . . . [a conference i n London t o consider the proposals met on 9 May
1962.]

Chapter II - The Federation

The C o n f e r e n c e agreed t o recommend t h a t t h e r e s h o u l d be a f e d e -
r a t i o n of the e i g h t t e r r i t o r i e s . . . .
9. The West I n d i a n Governments r e p r e s e n t e d a t t h e C o n f e r e n c e e x p -
r e s s e d t h e d e s i r e t h a t on t h e a t t a i n m e n t o f independence t h e new
F e d e r a t i o n s h o u l d seek membership o f t h e Commonwealth, and t h e
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o p o s a l s below r e f l e c t t h i s d e s i r e . . . . [ I t would be
called the West Indies Federation and the Federal capital would be Bar-
bados (§11). There would be a Governor-General appointed by H.M. on the
advice of the Secretary of State with 'powers appropriate to a c o n s t i t u -
t i o n conferring internal self-government in the Federal sphere'. Until

1. The f e d e r a t i o n was d i s s o l v e d u n d e r t h e o r d e r - i n - c o u n c i l (23 May) on 31 May

1962. 2 . P . P . 1 9 6 1 - 2 XI (1746) p p . 7 4 9 - 6 9 . E n c l . No.130 t o M a u d l i n g .
 101

the attainment of independence t h e r e would continue t o be Queen's Rep-

r e s e n t a t i v e s i n the U n i t s ( § 1 2 ) . ]

Chapter IV- Structure of the Federa1 Government

13
- The Federal L e g i s l a t u r e . The l e g i s l a t i v e power o f t h e Federa-
t i o n would be v e s t e d i n t h e Federal L e g i s l a t u r e , which would c o n -
s i s t o f Her M a j e s t y , a Senate and a House o f R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . The
r e s p e c t i v e powers o f t h e Senate and t h e House o f R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s
would be d e f i n e d i n t h e Federal c o n s t i t u t i o n . Dual membership o f
t h e L e g i s l a t u r e s o f a U n i t and o f t h e F e d e r a t i o n would n o t be
permitted.
14. The Senate. Each U n i t would be r e p r e s e n t e d i n t h e Senate by
one S e n a t o r . There would be p r o v i s i o n f o r an a l t e r n a t e r e p r e s e n -
t a t i v e i n r e s p e c t o f each U n i t . The S e n a t o r s would be a p p o i n t e d
by t h e G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l on t h e a d v i c e o f t h e l e a d i n g m i n i s t e r s
o f t h e U n i t s which t h e y r e p r e s e n t e d . The members o f t h e Senate
would n o t be p a i d s a l a r i e s .
15
• Tne House of 3.e^r.e-sentatlyes would be elected in accordance
w i t h t h e ' f o l l o w i n g f o r m u l a - ( a ) The number o f members o f t h e
House o f R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s t o be e l e c t e d i n a t e r r i t o r y w i l l be one
member p l u s an a d d i t i o n a l member f o r each complete u n i t o f popu-
l a t i o n i n t h a t t e r r i t o r y ; and ( b ) t h e u n i t o f p o p u l a t i o n w i l l be
5 0 , 0 0 0 . There would be p r o v i s i o n f o r an a l t e r n a t e member f o r any
t e r r i t o r y which d i d n o t q u a l i f y f o r any members i n a d d i t i o n t o
t h e b a s i c member.
16
• Tne FederaJ Bcecutiye. The Federal Cabinet would consist of
a P r i m e M i n i s t e r a n d s u c h number o f o t h e r M i n i s t e r s as t h e P r i m e
M i n i s t e r m i g h t d e c i d e : by c o n v e n t i o n t h i s number w o u l d n o t e x c e e d
f i v e . The G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l w o u l d a s s i g n p o r t f o l i o s t o M i n i s t e r s
on t h e a d v i c e o f t h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r . . . . [The Federal A.-G. should be
a p o l i t i c a l appointment. Chapter V (§§18-23) d e a l t w i t h the Formation of
the U n i t Governments - the L e g i s l a t u r e s and the Executive: Chapter VI
w i t h the d i v i s i o n of powers - income t a x , e x t e r n a l l o a n s , movement of
people (§§24-30); Chapter V I I (§§31-40) on economic and f i n a n c i a l matters
( i n c l . U.K. a s s i s t a n c e , economic development and customs u n i o n ) : Chapter
V I I I (§§41-45) on the procedure f o r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l amendment; Chapter IX
w i t h accession and secession; Chapter X w i t h the P u b l i c S e r v i c e s ; Chapter
XI w i t h the J u d i c i a r y ; Chapter X I I w i t h overseas r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and Chap-
t e r X I I I w i t h the steps f o r s e t t i n g up the f e d e r a t i o n - the Exclusive and
Concurrent L i s t s were t a b l e d i n Annex B.]

2 5 . DUNCAN SANDYS: STATEMENT, 22 January 19631

[He had met, on 28-29 December 1962 i n Barbados, M i n i s t e r s o f the t e r -
r i t o r i e s concerned and discussed the next steps f o r implementing the con-
c l u s i o n s o f t h e London Conference (May 1962) f o r a West I n d i e s Federation
o f some of the i s l a n d s . ]
I n view o f t h e c u r r e n t d i s c u s s i o n s between t h e Government o f
Grenada and t h e Government o f T r i n i d a d and Tobago r e g a r d i n g a
p o s s i b l e u n i o n between t h e two c o u n t r i e s , t h e Government o f Gre-
n a d a was n o t r e p r e s e n t e d a t t h e m e e t i n g . The S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e
e x p l a i n e d t h a t when t h e G o v e r n m e n t o f G r e n a d a h a d s o u g h t h i s p e r -
m i s s i o n t o examine t h i s m a t t e r w i t h t h e Government o f T r i n i d a d

1. Hansard Comm. 670 13-14. Sandys had succeeded Maudling as s e c r e t a r y of

s t a t e from July 1962 to October 1964.
102

a n d T o b a g o he h a d r e p l i e d t h a t he w o u l d n o t w i s h t o r a i s e a n y
objection, on the understanding that these initial discussions
w o u l d be p u r e l y e x p l o r a t o r y a n d w i t h o u t c o m m i t m e n t e i t h e r t o t h e
B r i t i s h Government o r t h e Government o f Grenada.
The M i n i s t e r s o f t h e s e v e n o t h e r t e r r i t o r i e s r e - a f f i r m e d t h e i r
c o n v i c t i o n t h a t f e d e r a t i o n o f f e r s the best prospect f o r the eco-
nomic and p o l i t i c a l p r o g r e s s o f t h e i r t e r r i t o r i e s . They e m p h a s i -
sed t h a t t h e u n c e r t a i n t y a b o u t G r e n a d a ' s a t t i t u d e d i d n o t i n any
way a f f e c t t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e i r g o v e r n m e n t s t o p r o c e e d w i t h
t h i s p l a n ; a n d t h e y w e l c o m e d t h e a s s u r a n c e by M r . S a n d y s o f t h e
B r i t i s h Government's continued readiness t o support t h i s p r o j e c t ,
i r r e s p e c t i v e o f whether Grenada d e c i d e d t o p a r t i c i p a t e .
I t was n o t e d t h a t t h e l e g i s l a t u r e s o f M o n t s e r r a t , S t . K i t t s -
N e v i s - A n g u i 1 l a and S t . V i n c e n t had a l r e a d y passed resolutions
e x p r e s s i n g g e n e r a l a p p r o v a l o f t h e recommendations o f t h e London
C o n f e r e n c e , a s s e t o u t i n t h e W h i t e P a p e r ( N o . 1 7 4 6 ) [ N o . 2 4 ] . The
M i n i s t e r s o f A n t i g u a , B a r b a d o s , D o m i n i c a and S t . L u c i a stated
t h a t i t was t h e i r i n t e n t i o n l i k e w i s e t o s e e k d e c i s i o n s f r o m t h e i r
l e g i s l a t u r e s during the course of January.
I t was a l s o n o t e d t h a t t h e e x p e r t i n q u i r i e s o n f i s c a l m a t t e r s ,
c i v i l s e r v i c e o r g a n i s a t i o n , economic d e v e l o p m e n t and t h e p r o p o s e d
c u s t o m s u n i o n , w h i c h had been s e t i n t r a i n a t t h e London C o n f e r -
e n c e , were w e l l advanced and t h a t r e p o r t s were e x p e c t e d w i t h i n
t h e n e x t t h r e e m o n t h s . . . . [A Conference i n London would be convened i n
June 1963 ' t o reach f i n a l d e c i s i o n s about the form o f t h e F e d e r a t i o n ' . ] 1

2 6 . ( a ) DUNCAN SANDYS: CIRCULAR DESPATCH TO THE GOVERNOR AND ADMINISTRATORS

OF EAST CARIBBEAN COLONIES, 9 August 19632
[That t h e Regional Council o f M i n i s t e r s wished f o r independence as soon
as t h e f i r s t Federal Government took o f f i c e was ' h i g h l y u n u s u a l ' . He was
prepared t o consider i t but must p o i n t out some consequences.]
The p r o p o s e d p r o c e d u r e w o u l d g i v e t h e new F e d e r a l G o v e r n m e n t
no o p p o r t u n i t y t o s e t t l e down b e f o r e l a u n c h e d i n t o i n d e p e n d e n c e .
T h e r e a r e a number o f m a t t e r s r e l a t e d t o t h e s t a t u s o f i n d e p e n -
d e n c e u p o n w h i c h d e c i s i o n s w o u l d be n e c e s s a r y a l m o s t i m m e d i a t e l y
a f t e r t h e new F e d e r a l G o v e r n m e n t was e s t a b l i s h e d : T h e s e i n c l u d e
the appointment of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the Federation abroad, the
a c c e p t a n c e o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l r i g h t s and o b l i g a t i o n s i n h e r i t e d f r o m
the B r i t i s h Government, t h e n e g o t i a t i o n o f a i d agreements w i t h

1. But in July 1963 the parliamentary u n d e r - s e c r e t a r y , Nigel F i s h e r , reported

t h a t h i s t a l k s with the chief m i n i s t e r s of the 7 t e r r i t o r i e s a t the end of May
had ' r e v e a l e d a s i g n i f i c a n t divergence of opinion between the governments con-
cerned. Some of the d i f f e r e n c e s arose from further r e f l e c t i o n upon the o r i g i -
nal p r o p o s a l s , while o t h e r s arose from c o n s i d e r a t i o n of recent expert s t u d i e s
of the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e , f i s c a l and economic a s p e c t s of the problem.' On 31 May
the chief m i n i s t e r s had presented him with proposals for a new procedure for
e s t a b l i s h i n g a f e d e r a t i o n : the 7 had agreed, but 3 s t i l l had r e s e r v a t i o n s .
Since t h i s involved r a d i c a l changes, i t had been agreed to postpone the London
conference. 2. C O . 1031/3160. This despatch was addressed to the governor of
Barbados, Sir John Stow, and a d m i n i s t r a t o r s of Antigua, St. K i t t s , Montserrat,
Dominica, S t . Lucia and St. Vincent and a copy was sent to the chairman of the
regional Council of M i n i s t e r s and for information to the a d m i n i s t r a t o r of
Grenada which had not been represented a t the Barbados conference [No.22j] and
was resolved not to commit i t s e l f to the f e d e r a t i o n .
 103

o t h e r independent c o u n t r i e s , and t h e a p p l i c a t i o n f o r membership

o f t h e Commonwealth which would have t o be c o n s i d e r e d by a l l t h e
t h e n e x i s t i n g members. I t would a l s o be necessary t o e n a c t c i t i -
z e n s h i p l e g i s l a t i o n . An i n t e r i m a u t h o r i t y e s t a b l i s h e d i n connec-
t i o n w i t h t h e s e t t i n g up o f t h e F e d e r a t i o n . . . w o u l d n o t be i n a
p o s i t i o n t o reach f i n a l d e c i s i o n s on such m a t t e r s , p a r t i c u l a r l y
when i t came t o e n t e r i n g i n t o o b l i g a t i o n s w i t h o t h e r Governments
which t h o s e Governments c o u l d c o n s i d e r b i n d i n g . I n a d d i t i o n t o
t h e f o r e g o i n g m a t t e r s , t h e M i n i s t e r s i n t h e Federal Government
w o u l d , i n t h e i n i t i a l p e r i o d o f t h e F e d e r a t i o n ' s e x i s t e n c e , have
t o u n d e r t a k e t h e f o r m u l a t i o n o f d e t a i l e d p o l i c y i n t h e domestic
f i e l d and t h e r u n n i n g i n o f an u n t r i e d Government machine. To
throw burdens o f t h i s magnitude on a n e w l y - f o r m e d Government i n
a F e d e r a t i o n which has o n l y j u s t been c r e a t e d w i t h o u t a l l o w i n g
time f o r c o n s o l i d a t i o n could I c o n s i d e r , lead t o s e r i o u s d i f f i -
culties.
Most o f t h e s e d i f f i c u l t i e s c o u l d be a v o i d e d i f t h e d a t e o f i n -
dependence were so f i x e d as t o a l l o w f o r a p e r i o d t o e l a p s e a f t e r
t h e f i r s t Federal Government had t a k e n o f f i c e , f o l l o w i n g t h e
f i r s t e l e c t i o n s . T h i s p e r i o d would n o t need t o be l o n g b u t s h o u l d
be s u f f i c i e n t t o a l l o w t h e new Government f o r m a l l y t o r e q u e s t
membership o f t h e Commonwealth a f t e r r e f e r e n c e t o i t s l e g i s l a t u r e
and f o r t h e o t h e r Commonwealth Governments t o c o n s i d e r t h e r e -
q u e s t and t o a l l o w f o r p r o p e r arrangements t o be made about t h e
i n h e r i t a n c e o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l r i g h t s and o b l i g a t i o n s r e p r e s e n t a -
t i o n abroad and s i m i l a r m a t t e r s . . . .
[On the proposed Federal scheme, divergences had been revealed in the
Barbados discussion. Therefore (1) he would l i k e the confirmation that
a l l Governments agreed that the constitution proposed in 1962 [No.24]
would be the basis for discussion. This would not prevent governments
suggesting amendments, p a r t i c u l a r l y in the l i g h t of expert surveys, but
i t should prevent the next conference from devising 'some radically d i f -
ferent scheme'. (2) He would like confirmation that a l l governments ac-
cepted that the Federal Government should not be deprived of having ex-
ecutive power over a l l matters on the l e g i s l a t i v e l i s t s : he would consi-
der special arrangements for a limited period as the Regional Council
requested in regard to income tax, postal service and police; but he was
strongly of the opinion that, apart perhaps on policing, 'a Unit Govern-
ment should not have the right in perpetuity to withhold from the Federal
Government the exercise of i t s proper power in these f i e l d s ' . (3) He wel-
comed the acceptance of a unified public service for administrative, pro-
fessional and technical s t a f f . (4) As for the Federal Judiciary he was
advised that the Legal Committee's proposals had been broadly accepted
and should therefore be passed to the Bar Associations for comment.]
F i f t h l y , there i s the question of i n t e r n a l self-government in the
U n i t s . I f t h e F e d e r a t i o n i s t o be independent a t i t s i n c e p t i o n ,
c o n s i d e r a t i o n w i l l a l s o have t o be g i v e n a t t h e n e x t c o n f e r e n c e
t o t h e f o r m o f u n i t c o n s t i t u t i o n s a t independence and t o t h e s t a -
ges by which t h e u n i t s w i l l advance t h r o u g h s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t t o
independence w i t h i n t h e F e d e r a t i o n .
F i n a l l y , I come t o t h e number o f f i n a n c i a l m a t t e r s . The f i r s t
o f t h e s e concerns t h e p r o p o s a l s f o r a Loan C o u n c i l . . . . [a matter
discussed at the Marl borough House Conference (May 1962) and again in Barbados
(Dec. 1962).] As we a r e a l l agreed t h a t one o f t h e main purposes
o f s e t t i n g up t h e F e d e r a t i o n would be t o make t h e area more v i -
a b l e e c o n o m i c a l l y , I c o u l d n o t a c c e p t any c h a n g e s . . . w h i c h would
104

have t h e e f f e c t o f w e a k e n i n g t h e l o a n r a i s i n g powers o f the

Federation.
The s e c o n d f i n a n c i a l p o i n t t o w h i c h I w i s h t o r e f e r c o n c e r n s
the sources of Federal revenue. I t h i n k i t i s g e n e r a l l y agreed
t h a t t h e F e d e r a t i o n m u s t h a v e s o u r c e s o f r e v e n u e u n d e r i t s own
c o n t r o l w h i c h w i l l be a d e q u a t e f o r i t s n e e d s . I t w i l l be m o s t i m -
p o r t a n t t o p r o v i d e , under the c o n s t i t u t i o n , t h a t the sources of
Federal revenue are s u f f i c i e n t l y f l e x i b l e f o r the Federal Govern-
m e n t t o be a b l e t o i n c r e a s e i t s r e v e n u e s as i t s r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s
g r o w . The e x a c t f o r m u l a f o r a c h i e v i n g t h i s e n d w i l l h a v e t o be
w o r k e d o u t i n d e t a i l a t t h e n e x t c o n f e r e n c e ; b u t I w i s h t o be
sure at t h i s stage t h a t the p r i n c i p l e is a c c e p t e d . . . .
The t h i r d f i n a n c i a l m a t t e r t o w h i c h I w i s h t o r e f e r is...the
question of H.M.G.'s assistance to the Federation a f t e r i t is
e s t a b l i s h e d . As s t a t e d i n p a r a g r a p h 32 o f Cmnd. 1746 [ N o . 1 8 ] , H e r
M a j e s t y ' s Government r e c o g n i s e t h a t a F e d e r a t i o n would s t a n d i n
n e e d o f e x t e r n a l a s s i s t a n c e f o r a p e r i o d a f t e r i t was e s t a b l i -
s h e d , b o t h on c a p i t a l a n d b u d g e t a r y a c c o u n t . T h i s i s a m a t t e r
w h i c h I s h o u l d be p r e p a r e d t o d i s c u s s f u r t h e r w i t h y o u a t t h e
n e x t c o n f e r e n c e . I s h o u l d a l s o be p r e p a r e d t o d i s c u s s t h e g e n e r a l
t e r m s o n w h i c h s u c h a i d m i g h t be made a v a i l a b l e a f t e r t h e e s t a b -
l i s h m e n t o f t h e F e d e r a t i o n . I s e e no p o s s i b i l i t y , however, of
c o n s i d e r i n g a t t h e n e x t c o n f e r e n c e t h e l e v e l s o f a i d f o r as l o n g
a p e r i o d as t e n y e a r s a h e a d . . . .
[Much more p r e p a r a t o r y work had t o be done before a f i n a l conference.
Since t h e r e was no adequate permanent machinery i n the West I n d i e s t o un-
dertake t h i s , he suggested meetings of o f f i c i a l s w i t h the help of C O ad-
v i s e r s on i n s t r u c t i o n s t o l e g a l draftsmen, and on t h e c i v i l s e r v i c e and
f i s c a l aspects o f F e d e r a t i o n . He would l i k e comments from i s l a n d govern-
ments by 15 September: they would then be sent t o a l l governments, and
i f t h e r e were s u f f i c i e n t measure o f agreement, he would c o n s u l t on t h e
next steps which he would l i k e t o take as q u i c k l y a s . p o s s i b l e . ]

(b) GOVERNOR SIR JOHN STOW TO DUNCAN SANDYS, 14 September 1963 1

[The premier of Barbados had suggested a meeting o f the Regional Coun-
c i l o f M i n i s t e r s t o consider Sandys' c i r c u l a r . I t had met on Antigua on
9 September. The m a j o r i t y welcomed h i s statement t h a t the next conference
would take place 'on the basis t h a t i t would s e t t l e the terms o f a cons-
t i t u t i o n f o r an independent F e d e r a t i o n ' as resolved by both Houses of the
Barbadian L e g i s l a t u r e . ]
The B a r b a d o s G o v e r n m e n t h a s p o i n t e d o u t t h a t . . . t h e B a r b a d o s G o -
v e r n m e n t i n s u c c e s s i v e c o n f e r e n c e s h e l d s i n c e J a n u a r y 1962 h a s
n e v e r d e v i a t e d f r o m t h e o r i g i n a l and unanimous d e c l a r a t i o n o f a l l
the Governments concerned i n f a v o u r of independence a t i t s i n c e p -
tion .
The A n t i g u a , D o m i n i c a , S t . L u c i a , S t . V i n c e n t a n d S t . K i t t s G o -

1. P. P. 1962-3 X (1992) pp. 321 ff, the report by Sir Richard Mantelow's
commission on the East Caribbean c i v i l s e r v i c e : Stow, governor of Barbados,
was chairman of the regional council of m i n i s t e r s for the East Caribbean
c o l o n i e s : with tongue in cheek he suggested (22 Oct. 1962) the motto of the
eight might be ' t o dwell together in enmity'. The council consisted of V.C.
Bird (Antigua), E.W. Barrow (Barbados), E.O. Le Blanc (Dominica), W.H. Bramole
(Montserrat), R.L. Bradshaw (St. K i t t s ) , H.B. Collymore (St. Lucia) and C.L.
Tannis (St. Vincent).
 105

vernments are prepared to seek authority from their legislatures

to discuss at a London Conference an independent federation but
all the Governments insist that a firm indication of Her Majes-
ty's Government's intention to make the necessary capital and
budgetary provision should first be obtained and that there
should be a clear understanding of the financial and interna-
tional obligations involved before independence is achieved. All
delegates stressed the view before the conference of the measure
of financial assistance which can be expected from Her Majesty's
Government.
The Chief Minister of Montserrat is not at present in favour
of submitting a resolution in the terms proposed to his legisla-
ture, but his attitude to the procedure for setting up the Feder-
ation is set out in the last sentence of paragraph 6 below and
he is prepared to seek the approval of his legislature for pro-
ceeding on that basis.
Turning to the procedure for setting up the Federation...most
delegates feel unable to be bound by the dates mentioned.... The
Chief Minister of St. Kitts would wish to discuss the procedure
proposed at the London Conference without committing himself to
any definite dates.... He also feels that the life of the Federal
Council of Ministers should within reason, be as short as poss-
ible and he doubts whether it is necessary for a Governor-General
to be appointed until very shortly before the Federation is laun-
ched, as he feels that the duties of that post might appropriate-
ly be performed until then by the Chairman Regional Council of
Ministers....
The Chief Minister of St. Lucia feels that the following should
be the steps by which independence should be achieved: (a) The
enactment of legislation to establish the Federation - February,
1964. (b) Appointment of Governor-General, (c) Federal elections
- about August, 1964. (d) Inauguration of Federal Parliament with
full internal self-government - October 1964. (e) Proclamation
of Independence - July 4, 1965. (f) In the period between (a) and
(b) the establishment of the Regional Council of Ministers as a
body corporate to advise the Governor-General with powers to
legislate on all matters necessary for the establishment of the
Federation, (g) Full internal self-government to be given to all
units, on the inauguration of the Federation, (h) An interim Pub-
lic Service Commission to be appointed by Governor-General as
soon as possible after his appointment, with subsequent appoint-
ment of essential pre-Federal Staff.
The Chief Minister of Montserrat would be prepared to support
a similar procedure.,.,
[The difficulties outlined by Sandys in his despatch were not consi-
dered 'insurmountable'. Most Ministers thought a lengthy period during
which the new Federal Government would settle down was unnecessary; it
had not been required of other territories recently achieving indepen-
dence: 'an independent state will be far more capable of tackling the
problems of a Federation effectively than a Government of inferior sta-
tus'. Commissions for the Eastern Caribbean already existed in London and
Montreal and approval for commissions abroad would not be delayed. Minis-
ters felt that, in regard to international affairs and recognition] an
arrangement could be made whereby existing international rights
and obligations assumed by the British Government and applicable
to the territories comprising the Federation could be continued
106

f o r a p e r i o d as has been done i n t h e case o f T r i n i d a d and Tobago

u n t i l t h e Federal Government had reached d e c i s i o n s on them.
I t i s a l s o f e l t t h a t a i d agreements w i t h o t h e r independent
c o u n t r i e s c o u l d be more e f f e c t i v e l y and e x p e d i t i o u s l y n e g o t i a t e d
w i t h o u t t h e r e s t r i c t i o n s which Her M a j e s t y ' s Government a t p r e -
s e n t e x e r c i s e s . The need t o r e f e r t h e q u e s t i o n o f Commonwealth
Membership t o t h e F e d e r a l l e g i s l a t u r e i s n o t a p p r e c i a t e d s i n c e
no such r e q u i r e m e n t , so f a r as i s known, has been i n s i s t e d upon
in the case of other territories (e.g. Trinidad and Tobago) which
have been g r a n t e d independence i n t h i s a r e a . I t i s c o n s i d e r e d
t h a t p r o v i s i o n s r e l a t i n g t o c i t i z e n s h i p s h o u l d a p p r o p r i a t e l y be
i n c l u d e d and s e t o u t i n t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n i t s e l f i n t h e same way
as t h e B i l l o f R i g h t s .
F i n a l l y no g r e a t d i f f i c u l t y i s f o r e s e e n i n M i n i s t e r s o f t h e Fe-
d e r a l Government s p e e d i l y r e a c h i n g p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s i n t h e domes-
t i c f i e l d as t h e s e would have been b r o a d l y s e t t l e d b e f o r e t h e
M i n i s t e r s o f f e r e d themselves f o r e l e c t i o n . Experienced c i v i l s e r -
v a n t s w i l l , i t i s e x p e c t e d , be r e c r u i t e d i n t o t h e s e r v i c e o f t h e
F e d e r a l Government and t h e r e seems no reason t o b e l i e v e t h a t t h e y
c o u l d n o t c o n s t i t u t e a r e l i a b l e machine f o r c a r r y i n g o u t t h e p o l -
i c y of Federal M i n i s t e r s . . . .
[The Chief Minister of Dominica however believed that a preparatory
period for the new Federation to s e t t l e down should not be ignored: he
feared inexperienced p o l i t i c i a n s would face a formidable task: the Chief
Minister of St. Lucia needed convincing that the d i f f i c u l t i e s envisaged
by Sandys were non-existent; and the Chief Minister of St. K i t t s wanted
discussion with H.M.'s G. to assess whether these d i f f i c u l t i e s were i n -
surmountable and ( i f so) to postpone the date of independence t i l l c i r -
cumstances made i t possible. A l l were agreed that the draft constitution
of May 1962 [No.24: Cmnd. 1746] provided] a s u i t a b l e framework f o r
t h e F e d e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n p r o v i d e d t h a t s u i t a b l e amendments and
s a f e g u a r d s were made i n t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n t o r e f l e c t t h e v a r i o u s
a d j u s t m e n t s which would be necessary i n t h e l i g h t o f t h e e x p e r t
s u r v e y s and t h e agreement s e t o u t i n t h i s d e s p a t c h . . . . [on the exe-
cutive powers of the Federal Government a l l agreed that the draft should
be amended to transfer to the Federal Government the following services:
audit, customs and excise, the whole judiciary ( i n c l . appointment of ma-
g i s t r a t e s ) , prisons, telecommunications (other than broadcasting, t e l e -
vision and Unit telephone services), c i v i l aviation, meteorology, ex-
change control, internal and external movement of persons, weights and
measures, the execution of j u d i c i a l decision, c i v i l and c r i m i n a l . ]
I n respect of the t r a n s f e r of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of Postal Ser-
v i c e s , P o l i c e and Income Tax f r o m t h e U n i t Governments t o t h e Fe-
d e r a l Government, t h e S t . K i t t s , S t . L u c i a , S t . V i n c e n t and A n t i -
gua d e l e g a t i o n s were i n f a v o u r o f a f i v e year p e r i o d b e i n g p r e s c -
r i b e d w i t h i n which t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f t h e s e d e p a r t m e n t s would
remain w i t h t h e U n i t s , and t h a t s u b s e q u e n t l y t r a n s f e r t o t h e Fed-
e r a l Government c o u l d o n l y be c a r r i e d o u t i n accordance w i t h t h e
e n t r e n c h e d p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e Federal C o n s t i t u t i o n [as in the draft
of May 1962, but the Barbadian delegation wanted no such t r a n s i t i o n
period; and Dominica, regretting the deletion of Police from the l i s t and
the inclusion of other items from the Concurrent L i s t , did not approve -
income tax, magistrates courts, and postal services should be Federal
matters. Income tax had been removed now from the Federal List and estab-
lished as a Unit r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . ] The Federal Government, however,
save i n t h e case o f M o n t s e r r a t , would e x e r c i s e l e g i s l a t i v e power
 107
with respect to the rates of tax on company income and the types
of allowance on which relief from personal income tax could be
claimed. The unit Governments would legislate with respect to the
rates of personal income tax and allowances. The Federal Govern-
ment would exercise supervision through an Inspector-General of
Inland Revenue.
With regard to EpJJ.ce it was agreed that the Federal Government
should be responsible for the Police Training School and for the
creation of a nucleus police force specially trained for security
duties. The Police Forces in each unit, would, however, remain
under the control of the unit Governments and gazetted officers
in respect of appointment, promotion, transfer or discipline
would be under the control of the Federal Police Commission. The
Federal Government would have power to take control of all police
forces in case of emergency....
As regards federal sources Q £ revenue all delegations agreed
that the sources of revenue of the Federation had been agreed af-
ter lengthy discussion at the Sixth Meeting of the Regional Coun-
cil of Ministers held in Barbados in May, 1963, and that flexi-
bility could be achieved by adjusting the amount of revenue to
be returned to unit Governments.
With regard to the question of Her Majesty's Government's as-
sistance to the. Federation after its establishment...the Confer-
ence was impressed by the arguments advanced by Dr. O'Loughlin
at the conference in support of assistance for a ten year period.
In her view it would be unrealistic to attempt to settle finan-
cial aid for a lesser period as to do so would threaten the ach-
ievement of full financial independence by the Unit Governments.
During a ten year period the Federation could be enabled to stand
on its feet financially and, in her assessment, if financial aid
of the order suggested in her Report was forthcoming, all unit
Governments should be able to escape from grant-in-aid and become
economically viable at the end of a ten year period with the pos-
sible exception of Montserrat. Moreover there would be serious
organisational difficulties to absorbing a capital programme of
the size necessary to secure viability in any shorter period,
although it would not be impossible.
Ministers strongly felt that the statement contained in...your
despatch that no possibility was seen at the next conference of
considering the levels of aid for a period as long as ten years
could only cause the greatest concern and could jeopardise the
success of the Federation as a whole. The Conference unanimously
endorsed a request that financial assistance on the scale envis-
aged in Dr. O'Loughlin's Economic Survey be made available and
that no conference to settle the details of a constitution for
an independent Federation be held until satisfactory assurances
about the quantum and duration of assistance from Her Majesty's
Government had been obtained.

(c) COMMISSION ON THE FEDERATION OF THE EAST CARIBBEAN TERRITORIES: REPORT,

March 19631
[Though it would be inappropriate to discuss attempts to establish W.I.
federation, some brief reference to the collapse of the 1958 Federation

1. P.P.1962-3 X (1992) p.321. Sir Richard Mantelow, who had been deputy
 108

was necessary because it was fresh in people's minds, especially of civil

servants.] The break up of that Federation, after the Parlia-
mentary and administrative machine had been -built up and had ac-
tually operated for four years, inevitably led to a great many
difficult problems. One of these concerned the future of public
servants who in good faith had joined the Federal service only
to see it disintegrate under their very eyes.... The main point
we wish to emphasise is that in view of this recent history it
would not be surprising if the prospect of employment by a new
Federal Government were looked upon with a degree of doubt by
some of the members of the existing unit public services. For
this reason it would be essential that the plans for the new Fe-
deral Services should be prepared with the utmost care and ex-
plained in full detail before any appointments were actually
made....
While speaking of the collapse of the 1958 Federation it may
not be inappropriate to mention an incident of nearly 100 years
ago that is now seldom referred to but which gave rise to a
phrase that is still heard now and again. We understand that at
the time of the Governorship of Mr. (later Sir John) Pope Hennes-
sey (1875-1876) an effort was made to introduce a Federation and
this was strenuously resisted in some quarters. In Barbados the
resistance developed from heated arguments to fights and distut—
bances.1 We were credibly informed that as a result of that in-
cident any brawl or free fight in some of the country areas in
the island is even now apt to be described by the local people
as ' a regular federation'. If this 1i ght-hearted i nterjection has
any relevance it must tend to underline the need for a conscious
and determined effort to win support for Federation in advance
of its coming, and the need to plan the new organisation care-
fully and wisely so as to gain confidence for it before it is
establi shed....
[He listed again the services which would be transferred to the Federal
Government [p.101] and added civil aviation (air traffic control). The
London Conference had accepted in principle the idea of a Unified Public
Service for both Federal and Unit Governments in the senior administrat-
ive, professional and technical grades - for the implementation of such
an objective he had been appointed.] The principle of unification
has been under discussion for a very long time and has been en-
dorsed by several Commissions over the years. ... At the same time
we must add that in talking with officials they more often than
not enlarged on the practical difficulties involved and the obs-
tacles in the way of movement from unit to unit. Frequently such
movement was described as 'going abroad'. And that was by no
means the only evidence we found of an insular outlook that must
be broken down as quickly as possible if a Unified Public Service
- if not Federation itself - is to take root and prosper. On the
other hand it was encouraging to meet some of the younger, well
qualified and progressive types, mostly but not entirely in the
professional and technical groups, who were enthusiastic about
unification and inclined to minimise the difficulties. They could

secretary at the ministry of agriculture and chairman of the W.I. commission

on regional public services survey, led the commission; T.M. Skinner and CA.
Sormaindo were members. 1. [See Vol.V p.186.1
 109
hardly wait to get to grips with the challenges ahead of them.
This is the spirit to foster and we feel sure it can be fostered
and will grow sturdily if the initial planning of unification is
sound and if too much is not expected too soon....

27. ARTHUR GREENWOOD: CIRCULAR DESPATCH TO THE GOVERNOR AND ADMINISTRATORS

OF THE EAST CARIBBEAN COLONIES, 22 March 19651
In my view, the first requirement if the federation is to en-
dure is that the Federal Government should have the power to deal
with all matters of major concern to the region as a whole. This
is particularly important in relation to matters concerning the
economic development of the region. The Eastern Caribbean will
remain dependent for some years to come on external aid for its
economic development; and the Federal Government must be strong
enough not only to ensure that this aid is used to the best ad-
vantage but also to inspire the donors of such aid, and private
investors, with confidence in its capacity to ensure political
stability and promote the welfare and development of the region.
At the same time I recognise that the system of government we
are considering is a federal system and that under such a system
the Unit Governments must be left clearly responsible for the
matters which are of purely Unit concern. I also recognise that
in many areas of government it is not possible in the constitu-
tion to draw a sharp distinction between matters of Unit concern
and matters which affect the region as a whole. The exact divi-
sion of powers between the Federal and the Unit Governments is
still open for negotiations:... It would, however, in my view be
essential to provide that in general the executive authority of
the Federation should extend to those matters with which the
Federal Legislature has for the time being power to make laws....
[as for the Federal finances] the exact method by which public
revenue is divided between the Federal and Unit Governments is
one which always gives rise to difficulty in any Federal Consti-
tution. It is clearly a matter to which all the Governments con-
cerned in the present negotiations have already given a great
deal of thought, and it is also one on which...the Governments
concerned are still not entirely agreed among themselves. It
would be essential in my view that the Federal Government should
have its own sources of finance and that these should be adequate
to permit it, when it so decides, to carry out all the functions
which under the constitution it is empowered to undertake. The
exact way in which this is to be achieved will be for further
negotiation; but I should like some further consideration to be
given to the possibility that from the outset the Federal Govern-
ment might derive some of its revenue from income tax.
A further matter to which I attach importance concerns the pow-
ers of the Federation in relation to any matter tending to under-
mine financial stability for good government in any part of the
Federation. Paragraph 19 of the draft Federal Scheme proposes
that control over external borrowing should be on the Exclusive
List and that the Federal Government would be empowered to raise

*•• Greenwood was secretary of state in Wilson's administration from October

1964 to December 1965: the general guidelines suggested here had obvious ori-
gins in the failure of the West Indies federation. Stow was still governor of
110

l o a n s on t h e j o i n t s e c u r i t y o f t h e r e v e n u e s o f t h e F e d e r a l a n d
U n i t G o v e r n m e n t s . U n d e r t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , i t seems t o me t h a t
s e r i o u s m i s g o v e r n m e n t or f i n a n c i a l m a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n o n e p a r t
o f t h e F e d e r a t i o n c o u l d damage t h e c r e d i t - w o r t h i n e s s o f the
w h o l e . P a r a g r a p h 20 o f t h e d r a f t F e d e r a l Scheme g i v e s t h e F e d e r a l
G o v e r n m e n t t h e p o w e r t o s e t up C o m m i s s i o n s o f E n q u i r y i n s u c h
c i r c u m s t a n c e s b u t does n o t p r o v i d e t h e F e d e r a l Government w i t h
any powers t o d e a l w i t h t h e s i t u a t i o n a f t e r t h e Commission o f
E n q u i r y h a s r e p o r t e d . T h i s i n my v i e w i s a s e r i o u s d e f e c t i n t h e
p r o p o s a l s , and I s h o u l d w i s h t o c o n s i d e r w i t h you i n any f u r t h e r
n e g o t i a t i o n s how t h i s m i g h t be r e m e d i e d . . . .

28. FEDERAL NEGOTIATIONS, 1962-65: A BARBADIAN REVIEW, 19651

LThe Chief M i n i s t e r s o f the Leewards and Windwards and the Premier of
Barbados had, i n January 1962, unanimously r e j e c t e d the proposal o f the
r u l i n g p a r t y i n T r i n i d a d and Tobago welcoming the e i g h t t e r r i t o r i e s i n t o
a ' u n i t a r y statehood w i t h T r i n i d a d and Tobago', and i n the c o n t e x t o f
M a u d l i n g ' s v i s i t t o T r i n i d a d had assembled and presented a j o i n t memo.
t o him f o r an Eastern Caribbean Federation on 19 January 1962.] A t t h i s
meeting with Mr. Maudling, the Premier of Barbados emphasised
that considerable economic and financial assistance was required
for regional development, and that the new Federation must be an
independent state within the Commonwealth simultaneously with the
dissolution of the then Federation. In this he was fully support-
e d by t h e o t h e r M i n i s t e r s who s t r e s s e d t h e u r g e n c y o f t h e m a t t e r ,
and i n s i s t e d t h a t t h e r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s o f t h e Economic A i d M i s s i o n
w h i c h was s e n t t o t h e W i n d w a r d a n d L e e w a r d I s l a n d s a f t e r t h e L a n -
c a s t e r H o u s e C o n f e r e n c e , s h o u l d be i m p l e m e n t e d .
On t h e q u e s t i o n o f I n d e p e n d e n c e , M r . M a u d l i n g s a i d t h a t this
r e q u i r e d c a r e f u l e x a m i n a t i o n s i n c e t h e q u e s t i o n o f v i a b i l i t y was
i m p o r t a n t . T h i s t h e P r e m i e r and C h i e f M i n i s t e r s e f f e c t i v e l y a n s -
wered w i t h e v i d e n c e showing t h e N a t i o n a l Incomes o f s e v e r a l c o u n -
t r i e s w h i c h , on t h a t b a s i s a l o n e , were l e s s e n t i t l e d t o t h e e n -
joyment of s o v e r e i g n t y than the proposed F e d e r a t i o n . . . .
[When Maudl ing l e f t , they had held a Conference i n Bridgetown (26 Feb.-
3 March 1962) t o examine more c l o s e l y the d e t a i l o f the proposed Federal
c o n s t i t u t i o n : i t s proposals were included i n despatch No.130 sent t o
Maudling on 14 March. Maudling had argued (30 A p r i l ) t h a t a s t r o n g e r
c e n t r a l Government was necessary and t h a t income t a x , e x t e r n a l loans and
higher education must be e x c l u s i v e l y Federal m a t t e r s . He had a l s o doubted
whether ' a f u l l m i n i s t e r i a l system' was necessary i n the U n i t t e r r i t o r i e s
and r e j e c t e d the assumption t h a t the d e c i s i o n s of the Windwards-Leewards
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Conference i n June 1961 f o r i n t e r n a l self-government i n
those t e r r i t o r i e s was not a p p r o p r i a t e i n the new F e d e r a t i o n . As f o r the
r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t 'a c o n s i d e r a b l e amount o f f i n a n c i a l a s s i s t a n c e ' would
be r e q u i r e d , he had made i t ' p l a i n ' t h a t i t must be sought elsewhere:
i n the many heavy commitments o f H.M.'s G. i n o t h e r regions where needs
were 'even g r e a t e r ' , i t would be ' u n l i k e l y t o be able t o a s s i s t t h e West
I n d i e s on a g r e a t e r scale than has so f a r been e n v i s a g e d ' .
The London Conference i n May 1962 between the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f the
e i g h t t e r r i t o r i e s and H.M.'s G. agreed on recommendations ( p u b l i s h e d i n
Cmnd.1746: [No.24] were approved i n p r i n c i p l e by the Barbadian L e g i s l a -

Barbados. 1. Govt. Pr. Off. Bridgetown 1965: a useful r e t r o s p e c t of the

abortive attempt at federation in the eastern Caribbean.
 Ill

ture (19 Feb. 1963). Previously the Barbadian premier had informed
Maudling (19 Jan. 1962) that] ( 1 ) t h e y f e l t s t r o n g l y t h a t t h e new
a s s o c i a t i o n must be an independent s t a t e w i t h i n t h e Commonwealth
i m m e d i a t e l y on i t s e s t a b l i s h m e n t , s i m u l t a n e o u s l y w i t h t h e d i s s o -
l u t i o n of the present Federation;
( 2 ) f o r t h e s u r v i v a l o f t h e new F e d e r a t i o n i t would be i m p e r a t i v e
t o have a l a r g e measure o f f i n a n c i a l a s s i s t a n c e over a p e r i o d . . .
a t t h e same t i m e c o n s i d e r a b l e a s s i s t a n c e f o r economic development
was needed
[But the attitude of the U.K. Government grew 'vaguer and more nebulous'
as time went on, making no moves to c r y s t a l l i s e proposals for positive
assistance to the Eastern Caribbean. Duncan Sandys replied to a Barbadian
request for a statement on the amount of financial assistance that could
be expected,by declaring that the British Government was not] 'buying
a Federation' and that the islands should want a Federation for
a F e d e r a t i o n ' s s a k e . The P r e m i e r ' s r e p l y was t h a t t h e people of
Barbados had no F e d e r a t i o n t o s e l l , and were l o o k i n g n o t f o r
c o l o n i e s , but p a r t n e r s . . . .
[At the ninth meeting of the Regional Council of Ministers in Barbados
(Oct. 1964) with the newly elected St. Lucia government represented for
the f i r s t time, the draft Federal Scheme was generally accepted - with
Antigua's reservations on income tax, agriculture, police and postal ser-
vices; St. K i t t s ' on customs union; and St Lucia's and Dominica's on the
use of federal revenues. The meeting was adjourned from 31 Oct. to 7 Dec.
to enable these Governments to reconsider t h e i r reservations and arrive
at a decision on publication of the d r a f t . In December i t was agreed to
communicate Antigua's views to each of the Governments. The draft as pub-
lished on 10 Feb. 1965 included the procedural steps for establishing the
Federation and the reservations of Antigua, St. Lucia and Dominica. Be-
fore the tenth meeting was convened (26 April 1965) Antigua had decided
that i t was not in i t s best interests to enter a Federation on the terms
laid down by the Secretary of State and the draft scheme, and St. Lucia
had rejected the scheme. In the general atmosphere of pessimism the Bar-
badian cabinet (24 A p r i l ) reaffirmed i t s continuing commitment to the de-
s i r a b i l i t y of an East Caribbean federation and blamed 'the state of disa-
greement and indecision' on the f a i l u r e of the U.K. Government to state
' i n unequivocal terms' the amount of 'long overdue' development aid i t
would make available.]
D i s c u s s i o n o f t h e proposed F e d e r a t i o n began on t h e morning o f
A p r i l 27, 1 9 6 5 . . . . The C h i e f M i n i s t e r s o f D o m i n i c a , S t . V i n c e n t
and S t . K i t t s - N e v i s - A n g u i 1 l a expressed t h e i r w i l l i n g n e s s t o p r o -
ceed w i t h p r o p o s a l s f o r t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f a F e d e r a t i o n o f s i x
t e r r i t o r i e s . The C h i e f M i n i s t e r o f M o n t s e r r a t s a i d t h a t , w i t h t h e
w i t h d r a w a l o f A n t i g u a , h i s Government would be v e r y r e l u c t a n t t o
e n t e r i n t o a F e d e r a t i o n . The C h i e f M i n i s t e r o f S t . L u c i a , a f t e r
much d e l a y , s t a t e d t h a t t h e S t . L u c i a D e l e g a t i o n was ' p r e p a r e d
t o recommend t o t h e S t . L u c i a Government t h a t t h e y s h o u l d c o n t i -
nue t h e i r d i s c u s s i o n w i t h such o t h e r t e r r i t o r i e s as w i s h t o e s t a -
b l i s h some f o r m o f a s s o c i a t i o n i n t h e E a s t e r n C a r i b b e a n ' . The
p a r t i c u l a r f o r m o f a s s o c i a t i o n he c o u l d n o t , however, s t a t e be-
cause ' a number o f t h i n g s had changed s i n c e t h e y had been sum-
moned to the meeting', (e.g. Antigua's withdrawal and Montser-
rat7 s reluctance to c o n t i n u e . ) . . . .
[In view of the withdrawal of Antigua and the uncertainty of St. Lucia
and Montserrat on the form of association required, whether unitary or
federal, the Barbadian Government proposed adjournment before discussions
 112
were resumed: the Barbadian premier withdrew when a St. Lucia delegate
challenged the Barbadian cabinet's bona fides in offensive terms. Next
day the St. Lucia Ministers did not attend and the Chief Minister of
Dominica withdrew 'since no other leader of a delegation was present*.
So the meeting was adjourned S77?e die. ]
An examination of the efforts of the Regional Council of Minis-
ters to arrive at some consensus on the shape and form of a fede-
ral structure, reveals several changes of attitude from time to
time which on the surface expose the Governments to possible
charges of inconsistency and of being unable to make firm
decisions.
(i) At the meeting with the Secretary of State in Trinidad
early in 1962, the Governments requested that an Independent
Federation should be established on the same date as the disso-
lution of the former West Indies Federation. At the Conference
in London in 1962, the Governments appear to have accepted a di-
latory proposal that the date of Independence would be a matter
to be discussed some indeterminable time after the establishment
of the Federation. At a later date the Governments reverted to
their former demand for Independence for the Federation from its
inauguration.
(ii) The division of legislative powers between the federal go-
vernment and the territorial governments was set out in the
Report of that Conference and was accepted by the Governments as
a basis for a Federal Constitution. Subsequently, several Govern-
ments expressed their disagreement with the allocation of sub-
jects as they appeared in the Exclusive and Concurrent lists.
(iii) The question of the location of the Federal Capital was
settled by the Governments of the Windward and Leeward Islands
even before the arrival of the Barbados Delegation in Trinidad
in January, 1962. The Government of St. Lucia has challenged the
wisdom of that decision and, along with the Government of Mont-
serrat, has attempted to reopen the question....
The case for Barbados independence.
[In a study of Barbados and the Confederation question 1871-85 by Bruce
Hamilton in 1956 he had written 'In trying to assess the characteristics
of the people, it must be realised that they do constitute a nation. In
the first place they feel themselves to be one'.]
At any time since 1962 the Government of Barbados could have
concluded the constitutional arrangements for Independence, if
it had been prepared to dissociate this territory from attempts
to establish an Eastern Caribbean Federation.
The main misgivings about separate Independence for Barbados
appear to be - (a) that by so doing it would make the establish-
ment of a Federation more difficult, (b) that it would be too
costly, (c) that the country cannot defend itself, and (d) that
the country could not be economically viable on its own....
The core of the problem is that, whether there is a Federation
or not, the Government of the United Kingdom, as Sir Ellis Clare
was at pains to point out, has a binding political, economic,
legal and moral obligation to its territories in the Eastern
Caribbean other than Barbados....
[They had no wish to create a federation 'without the assurance that the
people of this island will not become the holders in due course of a dis-
honoured promissory note'.]
 113
To sum up, the justification for economic aid to the Windward
and Leeward Islands does not arise from the establishment of a
Federation. Therefore its establishment could not be rendered
more difficult by Barbados' Independence unless it was intended
that Barbados should assume the responsibility which so clearly
lies at other people's doors....
[The arguments that Barbados had not the necessary facilities to maintain
independence were false.]1
The fact that they cannot afford to maintain an Army, Navy or
Air Force cannot in any way weaken a people's resolve to manage
their own affairs. Freed from the temptations to posture and to
strike attitudes, they can bring to international affairs a sani-
ty which larger, and therefore deeply committed, nations cannot
do. They have no 'a priori' enemies, because they have only
friendship to give and fair treatment to receive. The test of
sovereignty in the middle Twentieth Century is not therefore a
country's ability to defend itself against attack since no coun-
try on earth could so qualify in the age of nuclear warfare.
The issue of economic viability is soon disposed of. We pay our
way now and we intend to continue to do so. We will strengthen
the economy by trade and will not cringe for aid. The United Kin-
gdom Government has invariably furnished considerable financial
assistance to the emergent countries of the Commonwealth as they
move into Independence. . . . [It was 'difficult to understand the reluc-
tance' of the U.K. 'to make reparations to the Eastern Caribbean'.]2
This territory has long possessed all the adjuncts of a nation
approaching sovereignty. It has never since its settlement in the
early seventeenth century, received any grant in support of its
administration. Three hundred years of representative institut-
ions in a parliamentary system have been crowned with the reality
of full internal self-government. It possesses an infrastructure
superior to that enjoyed by many independent states admitted to
membership of the United Nations Organisation, both at its incep-
tion and in the recent past. Its rate of economic growth, parti-
cularly since 1961, indicates that, in this field, the burdens
of Independence can be adequately sustained and that these bur-
dens need not be unduly onerous.
In any case, the arguments for Independence do not rest on the
mere rebuttal of weak arguments against it. The real and final
test of people's fitness for sovereignty is their willingness to
discharge the obligations arising out of Independence.
In the history of the Commonwealth, no former British territory
has moved into Independence with a longer tradition of Parliamen-
tary Government than Barbados. No country has endured a longer
period of tutelage. In recent years, of all the British Colonies
to achieve Independence, Jamaica alone possessed a representative
assembly going back, though not without interruption, to 1664.
Important countries like Ceylon, Ghana, Nigeria, Cyprus and Mal-

1. These arguments of course had a more general relevance and publicity in the
contemporary discussions of dependency. They countered the view of the
S.C.A.C. report [pp.69^1 that in the modern world independence on a unit
basis was 'a mirage'. 2. The new claim that colonies were owed by the imper-
ial power recompensation for the alleged wrongs done during the period of de-
pendence. Conveniently of course the benefits were forgotten.
114

ta, and even Trinidad and Tobago, enjoyed responsible Government

only for a few years immediately preceding their attainment of
Independence....
[The Government of Barbados had made no formal deal with the U.K. for
independence and had no doubts that it could assume the full responsibil-
ities that challenge would entail. The U.K. had indicated that it would
willingly entertain such a proposal. The Barbadian Government was convin-
ced that] their sense of pride and their industry, are more
than adequate to support the dignity of Nationhood. Moreover, it
is further convinced that the people of this island will so meet
their obligations in the new setting that their fellow citizens
in the Eastern Caribbean will reap the benefits of our exertion
and example. 1

(b) THE TEMPORARY SOLUTION OF ASSOCIATED STATUS

When it was manifestly clear that the closer association among the small
territories in the West Indies could find no whole-hearted general agreement
among them - partly through prejudice, partly through fear - reluctant freely
to assign sufficient power and resources to any central or common authority,
it was natural that the emphasis should once again return to the pursuit of
individual constitutional reform in the direction of greater insular self-
government as indeed had happened in Jamaica (6 August 1962), Trinidad (31
August 1962) and Barbados (30 November 1966). Those islands had indeed accep-
ted the responsibilities of full self-governming independence as members of
the Commonwealth. But those responsibilities were indeed now heavv: the deve-
lopment of Dominion Status since 1907 had indeed attracted burdens in foreign
relations and defence which had grown with the decades [Vol.VI, p.28, 55, 124,
333, 340, 391 &c] and indeed that title had become obsolescent [ibid. p.375]
and replaced by 'membership of the Commonwealth' in 1949 [ibid. p.179] without
discrimination between 'full' and 'associate' status. But whatever its title
that status involved responsibilities which could not easily or lightly be
undertaken bv some of the mini-states of the Commonwealth on achieving inter-
nal self-government. As Grantley Adams had pointed out [ibid. p.748] new mem-
bers of the Commonwealth had, unlike the original Dominions in 1907, to shoul-
der increasingly powers and functions often expensive which had accrued to
that status in the previous half century: they had to step onto the moving
escalator at a much higher and demanding point. He, for one, had wished that
earlier vintages of that status were still on offer. This was another dimen-
sion of the problem of smaller territories [Vol. VII, No.18d and above pp. 1-
67]. It was for this reason that a categorv of 'Associated States' emerged
temporarily: where Governments secured full internal responsible government
but left their foreign relations and diplomacy in the hands of the U.K. [see
also Vol.VII 'special membership': the Maldives p.256].

29. CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS FOR THE SIX LEEWARDS AND WINDWARDS,

December 19652
The British Government still believe that closer association

1. Barbados became an independent member of the Commonwealth on 30 Nov. 1966.

In 1963 the voting age had been reduced to 18. A cabinet system existed on a
parliamentary model - with two houses: the Assembly elected (27 members) for
5 years on adult suffrage, the Senate of 21 members (12 on the advice of the
P.M., 2 on the advice of the leader of the opposition, and 7 by the Governor-
general at discretion to represent religions, economic, social or other inter-
ests he thought necessary). 2. P.P.1965/6 XII (2865) p.l (presented to Parl.
 115

between t h e t e r r i t o r i e s o f f e r s t h e b e s t f u t u r e p r o s p e c t f o r t h e
area1 but they recognise t h a t t h i s i s a matter f o r l o c a l d e c i -
s i o n . I n t h e meantime, some o f t h e Governments concerned have
asked f o r e a r l y c o n s t i t u t i o n a l changes g i v i n g them g r e a t e r c o n -
t r o l over t h e i r own a f f a i r s . The B r i t i s h Government have g r e a t
sympathy w i t h t h e o b j e c t o f t h e s e r e q u e s t s , b u t t h e y f e e l t h a t
the time has come to replace the existing colonial relationship
by a new f o r m o f a s s o c i a t i o n . A c c o r d i n g l y t h e y have made new and
comprehensive c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o p o s a l s t o each o f t h e Governments
of A n t i g u a , S t . K i t t s / N e v i s / A n g u i 1 l a , Dominica, S t . Lucia, St.
V i n c e n t and Grenada w h i c h , i f t h e y are a c c e p t a b l e t o t h e t e r r i -
t o r i e s and t o P a r l i a m e n t , w i l l , t h e y b e l i e v e , a c h i e v e t h e s e two
o b j e c t i v e s . (The B r i t i s h Government i n t e n d t o d i s c u s s c o n s t i t u -
t i o n a l changes f o r t h e s m a l l e r t e r r i t o r y o f M o n t s e r r a t s e p a r a t e l y
w i t h t h a t Government a t a l a t e r d a t e . )
The p r o p o s a l s [made in the Memo. (Appendix 1) sent by the Secretary of
State to the Administrators of a l l the islands] o f f e r each t e r r i t o r y
arrangements under which i t would become a s t a t e i n a s s o c i a t i o n
w i t h B r i t a i n , w i t h c o n t r o l o f i t s i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s and w i t h t h e
r i g h t t o amend i t s own c o n s t i t u t i o n , i n c l u d i n g t h e power t o end
t h e a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h B r i t a i n and t o d e c l a r e i t s e l f indepen-
dent. . . .
So l o n g as t h e t e r r i t o r i e s remained s t a t e s i n a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h
B r i t a i n , t h e B r i t i s h Government would a c c e p t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r
t h e i r e x t e r n a l a f f a i r s and defence and t h e B r i t i s h P a r l i a m e n t and
Her M a j e s t y - i n - C o u n c i 1 would have l e g i s l a t i v e powers f o r t h e d i s -
charge o f t h i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . A p a r t f r o m t h e s e powers and r e s -
p o n s i b i l i t i e s , and powers concerned w i t h t h e a p p l i c a t i o n i n t h e
t e r r i t o r i e s of the B r i t i s h N a t i o n a l i t y Acts, the B r i t i s h P a r l i a -
ment would have no powers t o l e g i s l a t e f o r t h e t e r r i t o r i e s w i t h -
o u t t h e i r consent and t h e B r i t i s h Government would have no r e s -
p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e conduct o f t h e i r a f f a i r s .
A s a l i e n t f e a t u r e o f t h e arrangements proposed by t h e B r i t i s h
Government would be t h e entrenchment o f s a f e g u a r d s i n t h e c o n s t i -
t u t i o n o f t h e t e r r i t o r i e s f o r t h e maintenance o f t h e c o n s t i t u -
t i o n s , f o r t h e p r e s e r v a t i o n o f d e m o c r a t i c forms o f government and
f o r t h e p r o t e c t i o n o f fundamental r i g h t s . The B r i t i s h Government
propose t h a t a S u p e r i o r C o u r t f o r t h e r e g i o n s h o u l d be e s t a b l i -
shed as a means o f s e c u r i n g t h e observances o f t h e s e s a f e g u a r d s . 2
The C o u r t would have j u r i s d i c t i o n t o d e t e r m i n e whether any law
o r any e x e c u t i v e a c t was i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n s and
a l s o t o s e t t l e a l l q u e s t i o n s on t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e
c o n s t i t u t i o n s ; and i t would have power t o i s s u e and t o e n - f o r c e
o r d e r s o r d i r e c t i o n s t o ensure compliance w i t h t h e c o n s t i -

Dec. 1965). With Grenada withdrawn for the t a l k s on Eastern Caribbean federa-
tion in 1962, Antigua in 1965 and Barbados proceeding towards i t s separate in-
dependence * before considering federation f u r t h e r ' , i t was necessary to consi-
der the six islands - Antigua, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, Dominica, St. Lucia,
St. Vincent and Grenada. There was also Montserrat, an even smaller t e r r i t o r y .
The Eastern Caribbean federation had been a f i r s t attempt to salvage something
from* the d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of the wider federation: i t had been beset by almost
the same problems. Now another rescue was being attempted. This f i r s t overall
plan was however s t i l l too ambitious. 1. See also the final vain hope of t h i s
paper [p.119]. 3. These were provided in the W.I. associated s t a t e s Supreme
116

t u t i o n s . The P r e s i d e n t o f t h e C o u r t would be a p p o i n t e d by t h e
Lord Chancel l o r .
The t e r r i t o r i e s would c o n t i n u e t o be e l i g i b l e t o r e c e i v e a i d
f r o m B r i t a i n under t h e B r i t i s h Government's a i d programme. The
B r i t i s h Government r e c o g n i s e t h a t some o f them w i l l c o n t i n u e t o
need b u d g e t a r y a i d , and under t h e new arrangements i t w i l l be
p o s s i b l e f o r such a i d t o be p r o v i d e d i n much t h e same way as i t
i s t o c e r t a i n independent Commonwealth c o u n t r i e s . . . .
Once t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l f u t u r e o f t h e s e t e r r i t o r i e s i s s e t t l e d ,
t h e B r i t i s h Government hope t h a t t h e i r Governments w i l l have
d i s c u s s i o n s among t h e m s e l v e s about f u t u r e r e g i o n a l c o - o p e r a t i o n .
[Appendix I followed - a Memo, on an Outjjne Constitution. 1 There
would be a Queejn's Represent at i.ye., appointed as a matter of convention
with advice of the Chief Minister after consultation, and who would act
on advice of his Ministers (though over dissolution he might at
discretion refuse advice). There would also be a representative of the
B r i t i s h Government to conduct relations between B r i t a i n and the
associated t e r r i t o r i e s . The t e r r i t o r i a l Legislatures, unicameral or
bicameral, would have f u l l powers of legislation (there would be no power
to reserve or disallow) including amendment of the constitutions: the
rule of repugnancy in §2 of the Colonial Laws V a l i d i t y Act would not
apply, nor would Westminster statutes passed after the commencement of
the new constitution extend save at request or with consent.]
10. The C o n s t i t u t i o n w i l l i n i t i a l l y be e s t a b l i s h e d by Order o f
Her M a j e s t y - i n - C o u n c i 1 . T h e r e a f t e r t h e r e w i l l be two methods by
which t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n may be a l t e r e d as f o l l o w s : - ( a ) by t h e
l e g i s l a t u r e o f t h e t e r r i t o r y i n accordance w i t h t h e p r o c e d u r e s
[provided below] - t h i s w i l l be t h e normal method; ( b ) by t h e
B r i t i s h P a r l i a m e n t o r Her M a j e s t y - i n - C o u n c i 1 [subject to the
provision for unilateral termination of the association]; a l t e r a t i o n s o f
t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n w i l l o n l y be made by t h e B r i t i s h P a r l i a m e n t o r
Her M a j e s t y - i n-Counci 1 a t t h e r e q u e s t and w i t h t h e c o n s e n t o f t h e
t e r r i t o r y , s i g n i f i e d by r e s o l u t i o n o f t h e chamber o r chambers o f
t h e l e g i s l a t u r e o f t h e t e r r i t o r y passed by s i m p l e m a j o r i t y . I t
w i l l be u n d e r s t o o d t h a t t h e r e w i l l be no o b l i g a t i o n on t h e
B r i t i s h P a r l i a m e n t or Her M a j e s t y - i n - C o u n c i 1 t o comply w i t h a
request from the t e r r i t o r y t o a l t e r i t s C o n s t i t u t i o n .
1 1 . Following practices commonly adopted in independent countries
which have autonomy i n m a t t e r s o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a l t e r a t i o n ,
t h e r e w i l l be s p e c i a l p r o c e d u r e s f o r amendment o f t h e C o n s t i t u -
t i o n ; f o r t h i s purpose c e r t a i n b a s i c c l a u s e s w i l l be d i s t i n -
g u i s h e d as e n s h r i n i n g t h e arrangements f o r d e m o c r a t i c government
and f o r t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between B r i t a i n and t h e t e r r i t o r y and
the procedure f o r a l t e r a t i o n of these clauses w i l l involve
approval of the e l e c t o r a t e . With the exception of the basic
c l a u s e s , t h e l e g i s l a t u r e o f t h e t e r r i t o r y w i l l be empowered t o
amend any p r o v i s i o n o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n by a m a j o r i t y o f n o t l e s s
t h a n t w o - t h i r d s o f a l l t h e members o f t h e e l e c t e d chamber a n d ,
i f t h e r e a r e two chambers by a m a j o r i t y o f a l l t h e members o f t h e
upper chamber.
12. The l e g i s l a t u r e o f t h e t e r r i t o r y w i l l be empowered t o a l t e r

Court Agreement 1967 and o r d e r - i n - c o u n c i l (Stat.R. 1967 No.223). 1. Clearly

another indication of the f a i t h of the B r i t i s h Government t h a t the best pros-
pect s t i l l lay in some formal c l o s e r a s s o c i a t i o n .
 117
the basic clauses referred to above by a law passed in accordance
with the procedure set out above (i.e. by a majority of not less
than two-thirds of all the members of the elected chamber and,
if there are two chambers, by a majority of all the members of
the upper chamber) but this law will have to be approved in a re-
ferendum by not less than two-thirds of the votes cast; the per-
sons entitled to vote in the referendum will be the electorate
for the purpose of elections to the elected chamber. There will
be a period of three months' delay between the introduction of
a bill to amend any of the basic clauses and the first debate on
the bill in the legislative chambers. The basic clause to which
this procedure will apply will include the provisions of the
Constitution relating to - (a) the position of Her Majesty and
Her Representatives; (b) the establishment of the legislature,
its duration, sessions and dissolution; (c) the franchise, the
arrangements in the Constitution relating to the delimitation of
constituencies and the holding and supervision of elections to
the elected chamber of the legislature; (d) the fundamental
rights and freedoms [as provided]....; (e) the establishment, ju-
risdiction and powers of the superior court, the appointment and
removal of judges and other judicial officers and any rights of
appeal guaranteed by the Constitution [as provided]....; (f) the
provisions for the protection of the public service; (g) control
by the legislature over expenditure; (h) the responsibility and
powers of the British authorities [as provided]....; (i) the pro-
cedure for alteration of the Constitution by the legislature of
the territory.
13. Both the territory and Britain will be able to terminate the
association unilaterally; the legislature of the territory will
have power to do so by revoking the constitutional provisions re-
lating to the responsibilities and powers of and British authori-
ties as a whole in accordance with the procedures set out above
the revocation of these provisions may also be effected by the
British Parliament or Her Majesty-in-Counci 1 by a law which will
not require the request and consent of the territory. Apart from
making constitutional alterations to terminate the association,
neither Britain nor the territory will be able to change the re-
lationship (e.g. by modifying the responsibilities or powers of
Britain) without the consent of the other party; arrangements
will be made for this purpose and to this extent the powers of
constitutional alteration of the legislature of the territory set
out above will be limited.
Fundamental Ri ghts and Fj^ejedoms
14. The Constitution will include a Chapter which will prescribe
the fundamental rights and freedoms to be enjoyed by the people
of the territory. These rights and freedoms will include the fol-
lowing:- (a) the right of life; (b) the right of personal liber-
ty; (c) protection from slavery and forced labour; (d) protection
from inhuman treatment; (e) protection from deprivation of pro-
perty; (f) protection against arbitrary search or entry upon pro-
perty; (g) the right to a fair trial in criminal and civil pro-
ceedings; (h) freedom of conscience; (i) freedom of expression;
(j) freedom of assembly; (k) freedom of association; (1) freedom
of movement; (m) protection from discrimination on grounds of
race, political opinions, colour or creed.... [The superior court to
 118
be established would have powers to enforce these and the Chapter would
generally conform to the pattern of similar provisions in other indepen-
dent Commonwealth countries. There would be a Cabinet of ministers with
tenure and responsibilities 'on the usual lines' and there would be a
Premier.]

The, Judiciary
17. There will be a superior court for the region which will have
special jurisdiction and powers to safeguard the Constitution and
will also be the appeal court for the associated territories; the
court will have by virtue of the Constitution, jurisdiction to
determine whether any law or any executive act is inconsistent
with the Constitution and also in all other questions on the in-
terpretation of the Constitution; the court will have power to
issue to any person or authority any orders or directions which
it considers necessary to ensure that the Constitution is com-
plied with and to enforce these orders and directions. The
representative of the British Government (in addition to any
other person entitled to do so) will have the right to initiate
proceedings in the court to determine whether any law or any ex-
ecutive act is inconsistent with the Constitution. An appeal will
lie as of right from final decisions of the court to the Privy
Council; constitutional questions arising in other courts in the
territory will be referred to the court for a decision.... [The
Court would consist of a President, appointed by the Lord Chancellor of
England, and at least 2 other judges appointed by a special Commission.]
19. There will also be a single Supreme Court for the territories
entering into association arrangements and a single Service Com-
mission responsible for the appointment of judges, magistrates
and officials of the courts. The British Government hope that it
will also be possible for legal officers to continue to be ap-
pointed by the same Commission. The tenure of office of judges
of the superior court and the Supreme Court will be protected.
The territory will contribute a proportion of the cost of the
superior court and Supreme Court, the amount of which will be a
charge on the revenue of the territory and will not be subject
to appropriation by the legislature.

I.!?.®. Qiyll i>e_rv."Lee

20. The constitutional provisions for this purpose will be con-
sistent with the general aim that the civil service of the ter-
ritory should be competent and politically neutral. The appoint-
ment, promotion, discipline and removal from office of public
servants will be the responsibility of a Service Commission or
Commissions; these Commissions will be independent of the execu-
tive Government in carrying out their functions in relation to
individual cases. There will be provision for each department of
Government placed under a Minister to be supervised by a Perman-
ent Secretary who will be a public officer, the Chief Minister
will have a voice in any appointments to the office of Permanent
Secretary. The pension rights of public officers will be protec-
ted against unfavourable alteration, and the approval of the app-
ropriate Service Commission will be required for the withholding
or reduction of the pension of a public officer.... [The appoint
ment, promotion, discipline and removal of the police would be in accor-
dance with these same principles (§21). No public expenditure would be
 119

made without statutory authority and the prescribed procedure which would
include provisions for the annual budget, supplementary and contingent
expenditure, under an Audit Office (§22). No power of intervention nor
responsibility for government of the territory of the six would be re-
tained by the British government (§23) save that]
24. Responsibility for external affairs and defence w i l l l i e with
the British Government and for the discharge of this responsibil-
ity (which w i l l include the fulfilment and protection of Brit-
ain's Commonwealth and international obligations and interests)
the British Government w i l l have the necessary executive author-
ity in the territory. Parliament and Her Majesty-in-Counci1 w i l l
have legislative powers in the interests of Britain's defence and
external affairs responsibilities. These legislative powers w i l l
extend to the making of any provision (including provision relat-
ing to any matter in the field of internal government) which ap-
pear to Parliament or Her Majesty-in-Counci1 necessary to prevent
circumstances arising or continuing in the territory that may
prejudice the discharge of Britain's responsibilities. Such legi-
slation w i l l prevail over any law in force in the territory, with
the exception of the Constitution, and may confer functions on
any officers or authorities of the Government of the territory
as well as upon other persons or authorities. The power to enact
such legislation w i l l not be invoked unless the Government of the
territory has been requested to take the appropriate action with-
in a time to be specified in each case and has not done so.
25. In order to enable the British Government and their represen-
tative to carry out their functions in relation to defence and
external affairs it w i l l be necessary for the representative of
the British Government to be kept fully informed on matters rela-
ting to or affecting these responsibilities of the British Go-
vernment. . . .
[Control of criminal prosecutions and the power of pardon would be
exercised on principles 'generally accepted' and 'free from political
bias'. On Citizenship]
27. Citizenship w i l l continue to be governed by the British Na-
tionality Acts unless a territory establishes a separate citi-
zenship; since these Acts provide for a common nationality not
only for the territory but also for other countries including
Britain, it w i l l be necessary for the British Parliament to
retain powers of legislation in respect of them. As regards the
establishment of a separate citizenship by a territory the pro-
cedures for amendment of the basic clauses of the Constitutions
(see paragraph 12 above) w i l l , unless the territory becomes
independent, apply to legislation of the territory to establish
or alter citizenship of the territory. It has been the practice
for the British Government to negotiate with any territory pro-
ceeding to independence the arrangements for its separate citi-
zenship; in view of the fact that the territory w i l l have the
right to proceed unilaterally to independence at any time it is
the intention of the British Government that an agreement should
be negotiated between the British Government and the Government
of the territory prior to the introduction of the new Constitu-
tion, as to the principal classes of persons who w i l l be entitled
to citizenship of the territory in the event of separate citizen-
ship being established.
120
30. ANTIGUA CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE: REPORT, 25 March 19661
The purpose of this Conference was to settle in detail arrange-
ments by which Antigua would move to self-government in a new re-
lationship of association with Britain. This would take the place
of the exiting colonial relationship....

Nature of the As.sociat_LQQ

5. The prime characteristic of the new association between the
United Kingdom and Antigua is that it will be a free and volun-
tary one and will be terminable by either country at any time.
6. Because the colonial relationship between Antigua and the
United Kingdom is to be terminated in favour of a free relation-
ship of a different and novel character, provision for the asso-
ciation will require the authority of an Act of the Parliament
of the United Kingdom.

The Constitution of Antigua

7. The United Kingdom legislation establishing the association
between the United Kingdom and Antigua should provide for the
grant of a new Constitution for Antigua under which Antigua would
be fully self-governing in all its internal affairs, and which
would come into force at the commencement of the association2...

Responsi bi1ities and Powers of the United Kingdom

9. It was agreed that the United Kingdom will be responsible for
defence and external relations. In discharging this responsibil-
ity the United Kingdom will act in close consultation with Anti-
gua in matters which affect the territory. It was accordingly ag-
reed that during the continuance of the association the relations
between the United Kingdom and Antigua should be governed by the
arrangements described in paragraphs 10 to 19.
10. The United Kingdom legislation establishing the association
between the United Kingdom and Antigua would provide that the Go-
vernment of the United Kingdom are to be responsible for the de-
fence and external relations of Antigua and confer on the Govern-
ment of the United Kingdom executive authority for this purpose.
11. The United Kingdom legislation should also provide that the
United Kingdom could confer a general or specific authority upon
the Government of Antigua, subject to any exceptions, limitations
or conditions that may be appropriate, to deal on their behalf
with specified matters in the field of external relations.
12. The United Kingdom legislation should contain provisions to
the effect that no Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom passed
after the commencement of the association would extend to Antigua
as part of its laws unless it is expressly declared in the Act
that Antigua has requested and consented to the enactment of the
Act.
13. Similarly, the United Kingdom legislation providing for the
Constitution of Antigua should reserve to Her Majesty a general

1. P.P.1966-7 XXV (2963): the new phenomenon of 'associated status'. Reports

of similar conferences on the Windwards (6 May 1966) and on St. Kitts-Nevis-
Anguilla (26 May 1966) were also published (P.P.1966-7 XXV (3021), (3031)).
2. This was substantially as suggested in the Memo, attached to the 1965
proposals [No.29].
 121
power to make laws by order-in-Counci1 but no such Order-in-
Council should have effect as part of the law of Antigua unless
it is expressly declared in the Order-in-Council that Antigua has
requested and consented to the making of the Order-in-Council.
14. For the purposes of the two preceding paragraphs the request
and consent1 of Antigua should be signified by resolutions of
both Houses of the Parliament of Antigua.
15. The legislative provisions described in paragraphs 12 and 13
above should be subject to an exception under which an Act of
Parliament of the United Kingdom or an Order of Her Majesty-in-
Council would have effect as part of the law of Antigua if it is
expressly declared in the Act or Order-in-Counci 1 that in the
opinion of the Parliament or Government of the United Kingdom the
Act or Order-in-Council is required to have effect in Antigua in
the interests and responsibilities of the Government of the Uni-
ted Kingdom for defence and external relations. It would not be
possible, by means of an Act of Parliament or Order-in-Council
having effect by virtue of the exception, to amend, suspend or
revoke the Constitution of Antigua (nor or course would it be
possible for the Parliament of Antigua to amend the Constitution
of Antigua by the insertion of provisions inconsistent with the
United Kingdom legislation described in the preceding four parag-
raphs) while the association exists.
16. An Agreement should be entered into by the Government of the
United Kingdom and the Government of Antigua before the commence-
ment of the association between the United Kingdom and Antigua
referring to the provisions of the United Kingdom Legislation
described in paragraphs 10, 12 and 13 above having effect so long
as the association continues2....
17. The Government of the United Kingdom, in pursuance of the
provisions of the United Kingdom legislation referred to at para-
graph 11 above should at the commencement of the association- ent-
rust the Government of Antigua with authority in the field of ex-
ternal relations by means of a despatch drawn up on the basis of
Annex D.
18. It is the firm intention of both Governments that the arran-
gements with respect to defence and external relations described
in the preceding eight paragraphs should be operated in a spirit
of co-operation and mutual confidence. The spirit is reflected
in the Heads of Agreement at Annex C, which provide for the ful-
lest possible consultation at all stages, and in the outline of
a despatch at Annex D under which there will be a substantial
degree of entrustment to the Government of Antigua in the field
of external relations from the outset of the association. The
Government of Antigua recognise that the Government of the United
Kingdom, so long as they are responsible for the defence and ex-
ternal relations of Antigua, may legitimately take account, not
only of the specific interest of Antigua but also of the general
interest of the United Kingdom itself and its associated states
and territories, while expressing the view that there should be
no occasion for the use of powers of legislation by the United

1. The formula in the Statute of Westminster 1931 §4 [Vol.VI p.126].

2. See the Antigua agreement (16 Feb. 1967) between the Commonwealth secretary
of state, Herbert Bowden and Vere Bird, the Antiguan chief minister [No.33],
122

Kingdom a t any t i m e d u r i n g t h e c o n t i n u a n c e o f t h e a s s o c i a t i o n ,
w h i c h c o u l d be t e r m i n a t e d by A n t i g u a a t a n y t i m e .
1 9 . The G o v e r n m e n t o f t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m f o r t h e i r p a r t a c k n o w l -
e d g e t h a t , a s t h e a s s o c i a t i o n i s a v o l u n t a r y o n e t e r m i n a b l e by
e i t h e r c o u n t r y , e v e r y p o s s i b l e e n d e a v o u r s h o u l d be made t o r e -
s o l v e a n y d i f f e r e n c e o f v i e w b e t w e e n t h e t w o G o v e r n m e n t s by means
o f a f r e e n e g o t i a t i o n and t o m a i n t a i n t h e s p i r i t o f c o - o p e r a t i o n
a n d m u t u a l c o n f i d e n c e t h a t now e x i s t s a n d t h a t makes a v o l u n t a r y
a s s o c i a t i o n p o s s i b l e . The G o v e r n m e n t o f t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m r e g a r d
t h e l e g i s l a t i v e powers o f t h e P a r l i a m e n t o f t h e U n i t e d Kingdom
and Her M a j e s t y - i n - C o u n c i 1 o v e r A n t i g u a i n r e s p e c t o f d e f e n c e and
e x t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s a s an u l t i m a t e s a f e g u a r d o f t h e l e g i t i m a t e i n -
t e r e s t s o f t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m , n e c e s s a r y b e c a u s e i t w o u l d n o t be
r e a s o n a b l e t o e x p e c t t h e U n i t e d Kingdom t o bear a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y
w i t h o u t h a v i n g t h e means o f d i s c h a r g i n g i t w h a t e v e r c o u r s e e v e n t s
might take, but unlikely to be invoked except as a last resort
i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h a t i n p r a c t i c e seem u n l i k e l y t o a r i s e . . . .
[Free V o l u n t a r y t e r m i n a t i o n o f the a s s o c i a t i o n by e i t h e r c o u n t r y was
provided ( § 2 0 ) . An Act i n the Antiguan parliament would r e q u i r e 2 / 3 r d s
majorities in the House of Representatives and in the referendum.1 No
referendum would be r e q u i r e d where Antigua j o i n e d a f e d e r a t i o n or union
o f Caribbean Commonwealth c o u n t r i e s which would become r e s p o n s i b l e f o r
defence and e x t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s . Common c i t i z e n s h i p o f Antigua w i t h the
U.K. and c o l o n i e s (§21). The p r i n c i p l e o f P u b l i c and P o l i c e Service Com-
missions would be secured ( § 2 2 ) . Antigua would continue t o be e l i g i b l e
t o r e c e i v e B r i t i s h a i d , and undertakings under the U.K. Overseas Develop-
ment and Services Act (1965) would be f u l f i l l e d ( § 2 3 ) . Future r e g i o n a l
c o - o p e r a t i o n between Antigua and o t h e r Caribbean t e r r i t o r i e s , as f o r e -
shadowed i n the 1965 proposals [No.29] would c o n t i n u e : the Antigua d e l e -
g a t i o n had made proposals on common s e r v i c e s ( § 2 4 ) . ]

31. WINDWARD ISLANDS CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE: REPORT, 5 May 19662

[ A l l t h e i s l a n d d e l e g a t i o n s expressed t h e view t h a t t h e 1965 p r o p o s a l s ,
d e a l i n g o n l y w i t h c o n s t i t u t i o n a l m a t t e r s , ought t o have i n v o l v e d a r r a n g e -
ments f o r a i d and t r a d e . ] T h e y a s k e d f o r a s s u r a n c e s t h a t t h e p r o -
posed c o n s t i t u t i o n a l changes would n o t p l a c e them i n a l e s s f a -
v o u r a b l e p o s i t i o n as r e g a r d s t r a d e , a i d and i m m i g r a t i o n . I n d e e d
t h e y c o n s i d e r e d t h a t t h e o p p o r t u n i t y s h o u l d be t a k e n o f t h e s e new
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a r r a n g e m e n t s t o b r i n g t h e t e r r i t o r i e s i n t o a more
f a v o u r a b l e and c l o s e r r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h t h e U n i t e d Kingdom i n
t h e s e m a t t e r s t h a n t h e y e n j o y a t t h e moment. They c o n s i d e r e d t h a t
t h i s w o u l d g i v e t h e a s s o c i a t i o n s t a b i l i t y and p r o v i d e a s a t i s f a c -
t o r y framework f o r r a i s i n g the l i v i n g standards of the people of
the associated t e r r i t o r i e s . In reply the B r i t i s h delegation s t a -
t e d t h a t t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c h a n g e s p r o p o s e d w o u l d be i r r e l e v a n t
i n t h e c o n t e x t o f d e v e l o p m e n t a i d , t r a d e and i m m i g r a t i o n . I n v i e w
o f t h e i r many c o m m i t m e n t s t h e B r i t i s h G o v e r n m e n t c o u l d n o t c o n -
t e m p l a t e any i n c r e a s e i n a i d f o r t h e s e t e r r i t o r i e s above t h e a l -
l o c a t i o n s a l r e a d y made, t h o u g h t h e y w o u l d u n d e r t a k e v a r i o u s m e a -
s u r e s t o e n s u r e t h a t t h e i r a i d was s p e n t more e f f e c t i v e l y . T h e y
p o i n t e d out t h a t d u r i n g the l a s t f i n a n c i a l year B r i t i s h a i d t o

1. The U.K. would terminate the association by an order-in-council.

2. P.P. 1966-7 XXV (3021) p. 1009. The delegations now felt that the 1965
proposals [No.29] had not explicitly involved provisions for aid and trade.
 123
these four islands had been increased compared with previous al-
locations and, at £2.15m., represented roughly £6 for every man,
woman and child in the islands. The British Government were well
aware of the importance of the United Kingdom market as an outlet
for their main export crops but said that the proposed constitu-
tional changes would not of themselves alter present trading
arrangements. Equally the British Government would not feel able
to offer the inhabitants of these countries specially favourable
treatment as compared with other Commonwealth immigrants into the
United Kingdom. The British Government however fully appreciated
the economic difficulties of these territories and the special
nature of their economic problems. This was one of the reasons
why the British Development Division had recently been establi-
shed in the Caribbean so that the United Kingdom department res-
ponsible for aid could be more closely and directly associated
with the territorial Governments in their efforts to deal with
their economic problems. The British Government also undertook
to examine other suggestions for promoting the economic prosper-
ity of these territories which were discussed at the Confer-
ence. . . . [The question of budgetary and development aid under the new cons-
titutional arrangements was further discussed.]

The Alternative to these Proposals

9. During the Conference the Secretary of State was asked to say
whether he would be prepared to consider full internal self-go-
vernment for these territories on the normal colonial pattern as
an alternative to the present proposals. The Secretary of State
replied by pointing out that when full internal self-government
was granted to a territory which remained a colony, the United
Kingdom retained the ultimate power to legislate for all aspects
of that territory's affairs, including its constitution, and the
United Kingdom Government was answerable to Parliament according-
ly. This was a situation which had been found acceptable in the
case of territories on the road to independence within a reason-
ably short period and within a foreseeable future, but was likely
to create difficulties for both sides if unduly prolonged. The
British Government were held internationally responsible for mat-
ters which they had no effective means of controlling. At the
same time the British Government were constantly urged to try to
interfere in matters which the local Government regarded as their
sole responsibility. This, therefore, was not an arrangement
which the British Government wanted to enter into with territor-
ies which, because of their size and because of the vulnerability
of their economies and other factors, were not contemplating
early independence. The scheme in Cmnd. 2865 [No.29] was designed
to grant to such territories full internal self-government while
avoiding the difficulties which arose if the United Kingdom
Government continued to have the ultimate authority to legislate
for all aspects of their constitutions and was answerable to Par-
liament for all their affairs. The scheme in Cmnd.2865 is design-
ed to show where Britain's responsibility begins and ends and it
is hoped it would be more satisfactory to both sides.... [It was
agreed that 'subject to the approval of the Legislatures' the four remaining
124

t e r r i t o r i e s 'would enter into an association with B r i t a i n ' . ] 1

32. THE WEST INDIES ACT (15 & 16 E l i z . I I cap), 16 February 19672
[On an appointed day the t e r r i t o r i e s named - Antigua, Dominica,
Grenada, St. Christopher-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia and St. Vincent 3 -
would assume 'the status of association' with the U.K. and as long as i t
were not terminated, would be known as 'an associated state' (§1). The
U.K. would cease to have responsibility for the government of such a
state except in what H.M.'s G. considered a matter of external a f f a i r s
or defence, of nationality or citizenship or of relevance to the royal
succession or style and t i t l e s (§2). No other Act of the U.K. Parliament
would extend thereafter unless expressly requested and consented to by
the associated state (§3). On the appointed day the provisions of Sche-
dule I for the l e g i s l a t i v e pdwers of associated states would take effect
(§4). H.M. by order-in-council would provide a constitution for each t e r -
r i t o r y to come into effect that day which would provide for i t s amendment
by the legislature, a separate citizenship (when the status terminated)
(§5), and also establish courts in common (with additional j u r i s d i c t i o n
over Montserrat and the Virgin Islands) (§6).]
7.(1) Without p r e j u d i c e t o the p r o v i s i o n s of s e c t i o n 5(4) of
t h i s A c t , Her M a j e s t y may by O r d e r - i n - C o u n c i 1 made a t t h e r e q u e s t
and w i t h t h e c o n s e n t o f any a s s o c i a t e d s t a t e make, as p a r t o f t h e
law o f t h a t s t a t e , any p r o v i s i o n which appears t o Her M a j e s t y t o
be necessary o r e x p e d i e n t f o r t h e peace, o r d e r o r good government
o f t h a t s t a t e . ( 2 ) Where i t appears t o Her M a j e s t y t h a t i n t h e
i n t e r e s t s o f t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s o f Her M a j e s t y ' s Government i n
t h e U n i t e d Kingdom r e l a t i n g t o defence and e x t e r n a l a f f a i r s a
change s h o u l d be made i n t h e law o f an a s s o c i a t e d s t a t e , Her
M a j e s t y may by O r d e r - i n - C o u n c i 1 e x p r e s s l y s t a t i n g t h a t f a c t make,
as p a r t o f t h e law o f t h a t s t a t e , such p r o v i s i o n as appears t o
Her M a j e s t y t o be a p p r o p r i a t e , i n c l u d i n g ( i f by reason o f war o r
o t h e r emergency i t appears t o Her M a j e s t y t o be necessary and
t h a t f a c t i s expressly s t a t e d in the Order) p r o v i s i o n derogating
from the provisions of the constitution of that state relating
t o f u n d a m e n t a l r i g h t s and f r e e d o m s . . . .
9 . ( 1 ) S u b j e c t t o t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h i s s e c t i o n , Her M a j e s t y may
by O r d e r - i n - C o u n c i 1 ( a ) f e d e r a t e o r o t h e r w i s e u n i t e two o r more
a s s o c i a t e d s t a t e s w i t h each o t h e r , o r f e d e r a t e o r o t h e r w i s e u n i t e
one o r more a s s o c i a t e d s t a t e s w i t h one o r more o t h e r t e r r i t o r i e s
which a r e n o t a s s o c i a t e d s t a t e s ; ( b ) d i v i d e an a s s o c i a t e d s t a t e
i n t o two or more s e p a r a t e t e r r i t o r i e s ; ( c ) t r a n s f e r p a r t o f t h e
t e r r i t o r y o f an a s s o c i a t e d s t a t e t o a n o t h e r t e r r i t o r y ( w h e t h e r
an a s s o c i a t e d s t a t e o r n o t ) o r i n c o r p o r a t e p a r t o f a n o t h e r t e r -
r i t o r y ( w h e t h e r an a s s o c i a t e d s t a t e o r n o t ) i n an a s s o c i a t e d
s t a t e . . . . [But no other order-in-council could be made affecting an asso-
ciated state unless requested and consented or affecting any other t e r r i -
t o r y . At any time the legislature of an associated state could terminate
the status (as could H.M. by order-in-council) or cease to form part of

1. The terras of a s s o c i a t i o n and of i n t e r n a l self-government followed the

Antiguan model [No.30], 2. 'An Act to confer on c e r t a i n West Indian t e r r i t o r -
ies a new a s s o c i a t i o n with the United Kingdom', to make provision for i t s
termination or c o n s t i t u t i o n a l changes; and to provide for grants under the
Overseas Aid Act (1966). 3. Due to i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c s St. Vincent's assumption
of the s t a t u s was delayed t i l l 1969.
 125

H.M.'s dominions (§10). 1 The B r i t i s h Nationality Acts (1948-63) would

(subject to Schedule 3) have effect and citizens might be known as 'of
the U.K., Associated States and Colonies'. Grants under the Overseas Aid
Act (1966 §1(iv)) giving the U.K. Minister of Overseas Development power
to help certain governments meet administrative expenses could be made
as i f associated states were included (§16).]

Schedule I L e g i s l a t i v e powers o f A s s o c i a t e d S t a t e s
[The Colonial Laws V a l i d i t y Act (1865) and the rule of repugnancy would
not apply after the appointed day to any law of the legislature of an As-
sociated State. The legislature could repeal or amend any such Act of the
U.K. Parliament or order made under such Act (§1). Such a legislature was
empowered to make laws with e x t r a - t e r r i t o r i a l operation (§2). But i t was
not empowered to repeal or amend or legislate repugnant to t h i s Act, or
any order made under t h i s Act, or to U.K. Acts relating to n a t i o n a l i t y ,
citizenship or the royal succession or style and t i t l e s ; nor indeed to
make law whereby] ( a ) t h e Government o f t h a t s t a t e would be a u -
t h o r i s e d o r r e q u i r e d t o c o n d u c t any e x t e r n a l a f f a i r s , e x c e p t i n
so f a r a s , by arrangements made i n accordance w i t h t h e n e x t f o l -
l o w i n g s u b - p a r a g r a p h , t h a t Government may be a u t h o r i s e d t o c o n -
d u c t any e x t e r n a l a f f a i r s on b e h a l f o f Her M a j e s t y ' s Government
i n t h e U n i t e d Kingdom, o r ( b ) t h e Government o f t h a t s t a t e would
be a u t h o r i s e d o r r e q u i r e d t o r e s t r i c t o r o t h e r w i s e i n t e r f e r e w i t h
t h e c o n d u c t by Her M a j e s t y ' s Government i n t h e U n i t e d Kingdom o f
defence o r o f e x t e r n a l a f f a i r s .
( 4 ) . The arrangements r e f e r r e d t o i n s u b - p a r a g r a p h ( 3 ) ( a ) o f
t h i s p a r a g r a p h a r e any arrangements which may be made between Her
M a j e s t y ' s Government i n t h e U n i t e d Kingdom and t h e Government o f
an a s s o c i a t e d s t a t e a u t h o r i s i n g t h e l a t t e r Government on b e h a l f
o f t h e f o r m e r Government t o c o n d u c t e x t e r n a l a f f a i r s i n r e s p e c t
o f such m a t t e r s o r c l a s s e s o f m a t t e r s , and s u b j e c t t o any such
e x c e p t i o n s , l i m i t a t i o n s and c o n d i t i o n s , as may be s p e c i f i e d i n
the arrangements.
( 5 ) . Sub-paragraphs ( a ) and ( b ) o f p a r a g r a p h 1 o f t h i s Schedule
s h a l l n o t have e f f e c t i n r e l a t i o n t o any law w h i c h , i n accordance
w i t h the preceding p r o v i s i o n s of t h i s paragraph, the l e g i s l a t u r e
o f an a s s o c i a t e d s t a t e has no power t o make.
Schedule I I Procedure f o r t e r m i n a t i n g s t a t u s o f A s s o c i a t i o n
[90 days must lapse between the introduction of a b i l l to terminate the
association and the second reading; 2 / 3 rds of a l l the elected members
must on the t h i r d reading support the b i l l ; and 2 / 3 rds of the votes v a l i -
dly cast in a referendum must approve the b i l l (§2). Where there was a
bicameral legislature the same procedure would be followed at the f i r s t ,
second and t h i r d readings in the lower house, and any amendments by the
upper house must obtain the support in the lower house of two-thirds of
a l l the elected members before i t was put to a referendum. I f the b i l l
were not passed by both houses in the same session, then 6 months must
lapse between i t s passage in the lower house and passage again in that
house. Then i f the b i l l were not approved by the upper house, i t could
be submitted for a referendum (§3).]

1. Termination would be tantamount to a d e c l a r a t i o n of independence, and the

newly independent s t a t e could opt out of the Commonwealth or become a republic
within or without the Commonwealth.
126

4 ( 1 ) The p r o v i s i o n s o f t h i s p a r a g r a p h s h a l l have e f f e c t where,

b e f o r e t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f t h e B i l l , arrangements have been made
between t h e Government o f t h e s t a t e and t h e Government o f a t e r -
r i t o r y t o w h i c h t h i s p a r a g r a p h a p p l i e s whereby, i m m e d i a t e l y a f t e r
the t e r m i n a t i o n of the s t a t u s of a s s o c i a t i o n of the s t a t e w i t h
t h e U n i t e d Kingdom, - ( a ) t h e s t a t e w i l l e n t e r i n t o a f e d e r a t i o n
o r u n i o n o r some o t h e r f o r m o f a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h t h a t t e r r i t o r y
( w i t h o r w i t h o u t o t h e r t e r r i t o r i e s ) , and ( b ) t h e Government r e -
s u l t i n g from t h a t f e d e r a t i o n , union or other form of a s s o c i a t i o n ,
o r t h e Government o f t h a t t e r r i t o r y , w i l l be r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e
defence and e x t e r n a l a f f a i r s o f t h e s t a t e , and t h e B i l l r e f e r s
t o t h e s e arrangements and makes p r o v i s i o n f o r g i v i n g e f f e c t t o
them on t h e p a r t o f t h e s t a t e .
( 2 ) T h i s p a r a g r a p h a p p l i e s t o any t e r r i t o r y which - ( a ) l i e s b e -
tween t h e e q u a t o r and t h e 2 0 t h p a r a l l e l o f n o r t h l a t i t u d e and b e -
tween l o n g i t u d e 50 degrees west and l o n g i t u d e 90 degrees west
[i.e. the whole Caribbean region - islands and mainland] and ( b ) a t t h e
t i m e when t h e arrangements i n q u e s t i o n a r e made i s a t e r r i t o r y
w i t h i n t h e Commonwealth f o r whose government Her M a j e s t y ' s Go-
vernment i n t h e U n i t e d Kingdom have no r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .
( 3 ) I n t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s s p e c i f i e d i n s u b - p a r a g r a p h (1 ) o f t h i s
p a r a g r a p h , t h e B i l l may be s u b m i t t e d t o t h e Governor f o r h i s a s -
s e n t w i t h o u t a r e f e r e n d u m and a c c o r d i n g l y p a r a g r a p h 2 ( c ) o r (as
t h e case may be) s u b - p a r a g r a p h s ( 5 ) o f p a r a g r a p h 3 o f t h i s Sche-
dule s h a l l not apply.1

33. THE ANTIGUA AGREEMENT, 16 February 19672

2. The Government o f A n t i g u a s h a l l t a k e a l l s t e p s ( i n c l u d i n g
where n e c e s s a r y , s t e p s t o s e c u r e t h e enactment o f l e g i s l a t i o n by
t h e l e g i s l a t u r e o f A n t i g u a o r by o t h e r competent a u t h o r i t y i n A n -
t i g u a ) t o p r o v i d e o r p e r m i t t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f such f a c i l i t i e s
as may be r e q u i r e d i n A n t i g u a by Her M a j e s t y ' s Government i n t h e
U n i t e d Kingdom i n t h e i n t e r e s t o f t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s r e l a t i n g
t o t h e d e f e n c e o f A n t i g u a o r o f any o t h e r t e r r i t o r y h a v i n g a s t a -
t u s o f a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h t h e U n i t e d Kingdom o r o f t h e U n i t e d K i n g -
dom o r o f any o t h e r t e r r i t o r y f o r whose government Her M a j e s t y ' s
Government i n t h e U n i t e d Kingdom a r e w h o l l y o r p a r t l y r e s p o n s i b l e

1. The i n t e r n a l c o n s t i t u t i o n s of the ' a s s o c i a t e d s t a t e s ' generally followed

the 1965 proposals [No.29J as in Antigua* Dominica, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla,
and S t . Lucia had unicameral l e g i s l a t u r e s with a few nominees among the e l e c -
ted members, though St. Lucia provided, on a simple r e s o l u t i o n in the assemb-
ly, for a bicameral l e g i s l a t u r e with a Senate (7 named by the premier, 2 by
the leader of the opposition and 2 as advised by r e l i g i o u s , economic or s o c i a l
bodies) the assembly then becoming wholly e l e c t e d . Grenada had a Senate on the
same terms envisaged for St. Lucia, while Antigua's upper house was composed
of 7 senators appointed on the p r e m i e r ' s advice and 3 by the governor a f t e r
consulting the premier. The p o s s i b i l i t y of a governor r e j e c t i n g the p r e m i e r ' s
advice, though l e g a l l y p o s s i b l e , became most improbable with the coming of
responsible government. In the supervision of e l e c t i o n s and the d e l i m i t a t i o n
of constituency boundaries there were differences in the S t a t e s : but the ap-
pointments to the public s e r v i c e commissions were l e f t in the hands of the
premiers. 2. Similar agreements were concluded with a l l the associated s t a t e s
between the s e c r e t a r y of s t a t e for Commonwealth a f f a i r s and the chief minis-
t e r s of the s t a t e s .
 127
or of any other part of the Commonwealth or of any of the allies
of the United Kingdom.
3. The Government of Antigua shall not, without the consent of
Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, grant access to
any part of Antigua or its territorial waters to the armed forces
or agents of any other Government or allow them the use of any
airfields, communications or harbour or other military facilities
in Anti gua....
5. Any armed forces of the United Kingdom sent to Antigua for
defence purposes shall not be used in aid of the civil power in
Antigua or for any purposes other than defence purposes except
with the consent of Her Majesty's Government in the United King-
dom and at the request of the Government of Antigua: Provided
that the request of the Government of Antigua shall not be neces-
sary if at any time they are unable, through circumstances beyond
their control, to make a request.
6. Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom shall consult
with the Government of Antigua before entering into international
obligations with respect to Antigua.
7. The extent to which the Government of Antigua will be autho-
rised to conduct external affairs shall be defined from time to
time by despatch addressed to the Government of Antigua by Her
Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.1
8. The Government of Antigua shall take all steps (including
where necessary, steps to secure the enactment of legislation by
the legislature of Antigua or by other competent authority in An-
tigua) that, after full consultation between Her Majesty's Gover-
nment in the United Kingdom and the Government of Antigua, are
required by Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom:- (a)
to secure the discharge of the responsibilities of Her Majesty's
Government in the United Kingdom relating to external affairs;
or (b) otherwise in the interests of good relations between Anti-
gua or the United Kingdom and any other country or territory.
9. The Government of Antigua shall not take steps to secure, or
support proposals for, the enactment of any legislation having
effect in Antigua that might attack the discharge of the respon-
sibilities of Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom re-
lating to external affairs or the maintenance of good relations
between Antigua or the United Kingdom and any other country or
territory without prior consultation with Her Majesty's Govern-
ment in the United Kingdom; and the Government of Antigua shall
not proceed with, or support any proposals for, the enactment of
legislation as aforesaid if they are informed by Her Majesty's
Government in the United Kingdom that its enactment would be det-
rimental to the discharge of these responsibilities of the main-
tenance of such good relations.
10(1) Where in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government in the
United Kingdom the enactment of legislation having effect in An-
tigua is required in the interests of the responsibilities of Her
Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom relating to defence
(whether of Antigua or of any other territory having a status of

1. See the despatch [16 Feb. 1967: No. 34] to the administrator of Antigua from
the secretary of state for Commonwealth affairs (the C O . was abolished 7 Jan.
1967).
128
association with the United Kingdom or of the United Kingdom or
of any other territory for whose government Her Majesty's Govern-
ment in the United Kingdom are wholly or partly responsible) or
external affairs, Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom
shall request the Government of Antigua either: (a) to signify
their agreement to the enactment of the legislation by the Parli-
ament of the United Kingdom or by Her Majesty-in-Counci 1 ; or (b)
to take steps to secure the enactment of the legislation by the
legislature of Antigua or by other competent authority in
Antigua.
(2) If the agreement of the Government of Antigua to the enact-
ment of the legislation is signified under paragraph 1(a) of this
article, Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom may take
steps to secure the enactment of the legislation accordingly.
(3) If the Government of Antigua see difficulty in acceding to
a request made by Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom
under paragraph (1) of this article, then the fullest consulta-
tion that is practicable in the circumstances of the case shall
take place between Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom
and the Government of Antigua with a view of resolving the diffi-
culty.
(4) Where after consultation under paragraph (3) of this article
there is a failure to reach agreement concerning the enactment
of legislation, and Her Majesty's Government in the United King-
dom remain of the opinion that it is nevertheless necessary for
legislation to be enacted in the interests of the responsibili-
ties of Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom referred
to in paragraph (1) of this article, Her Majesty's Government in
the United Kingdom shall give as much notice as possible of their
intention to secure the enactment of the legislation by the Par-
liament of the United Kingdom or by Her Majesty-in-Counci1; and
before taking such steps shall so far as is practicable afford
the Government of Antigua the opportunity of considering whether,
in all the circumstances, the Government of Antigua would wish
to take steps to terminate the status of association of Antigua
with the United Kingdom. Provided that Her Majesty's Government
in the United Kingdom shall not take steps to secure the enact-
ment of the legislation if its effect would be to amend, suspend
or revoke the Constitution of Antigua (otherwise than by way of
derogation from the provisions of the Constitution relating to
fundamental rights and freedoms by reason of war or other
emergency), or to amend, suspend or revoke any provision of the
West Indies Act 1967 in so far as it forms part of the law of
Antigua, unless the Government of Antigua gives its consent to
the enactment of the legislation.
(5) The provisions of this article shall be without prejudice
to the provisions of articles 2 and 8 of this Agreement.
11. In order to enable Her Majesty's Government in the United
Kingdom to discharge their responsibilities relating to defence
and external affairs, the Government of Antigua shall keep Her
Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom fully informed on all
matters affecting these responsibilities.
 129
3 4 . HERBERT BOWDEN TO THE ADMINISTRATOR OF ANTIGUA, 16 February 19671
2. Her Majesty's Government i n the United Kingdom wish i t t o be
f o r m a l l y recorded t h a t i n c a r r y i n g out t h e i r general r e s p o n s i b i l -
i t y f o r the external a f f a i r s of Antigua they w i l l seek the f u l l -
est c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h the Government of Antigua and w i l l at a l l
times have special regard t o the i n t e r e s t s of the Government of
Antigua and of the association between the two Governments.
3. Subject t o paragraph 5 of t h i s despatch Her Majesty's Govern-
ment i n the United Kingdom hereby delegate executive a u t h o r i t y
t o the Government of Antigua t o conduct on behalf of Her Majes-
t y ' s Government external a f f a i r s as f o l l o w s - (a) a u t h o r i t y to
apply f o r f u l l or associate membership, as may be provided f o r
i n the C o n s t i t u t i o n of the organisation concerned, of those Uni-
ted Nations Specialised Agencies or s i m i l a r i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i -
sations of which the United Kingdom i s i t s e l f a member and f o r
membership of which Antigua i s el i g i b l e ; . . . . [authority to permit v i -
sits by representatives of such organisations; to negotiate trade agree-
ments, bilateral or multilateral relating to the treatment of goods (but
not normally establishment matters affecting the rights of persons or
companies; to arrange visits for commercial purposes by Antlguans; to ne-
gotiate agreements of purely local concern with other Commonwealth count-
ries, Associated States, or British Colonies in the Caribbean area; to
negotiate financial, technical, cultural and scientific agreements with
any Commonwealth member, the U.S. or any International organisation of
which the U.K. was a member; to negotiate emigration agreements and lab-
our schemes with other countries. H.M. 's G. would give sympathetic consi-
deration to Antiguan requests for authority to take action on individual
external affairs questions not covered in §3.]
5. In view of the general r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of Her Majesty's Gover-
nment f o r external a f f a i r s under the terms of the association ag-
reed between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of A n t i -
gua, Her Majesty's Government's delegation of executive a u t h o r i t y
to the Government of Antigua t o conduct the external a f f a i r s r e -
f e r r e d t o i n paragraph 3 ( c ) , ( e ) , and (g) of t h i s despatch i s
made subject t o the understanding t h a t the Government of Antigua
w i l l inform Her Majesty's Government i n advance of any proposal
f o r the exercise of the delegated executive a u t h o r i t y and w i l l
keep Her Majesty's Government f u l l y informed of the progress and
conduct of any negotiations r e l a t i n g t o the external a f f a i r s . Any
subsequent delegation under paragraph 4 w i l l be subject t o the
same understanding.
6. Her Majesty's Government wi11 inform the Government of A n t i -
gua i f i t s h a l l appear t h a t the actions or proposals of the Go-
vernment of Antigua i n the f i e l d of external a f f a i r s c o n f l i c t

1. The burden of foreign policy, of world wide ambassadorial and high

commissioner r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and of the network of i n t e r n a t i o n a l organisations
and agencies was one which m i n i - s t a t e s found i t d i f f i c u l t and c o s t l y to bear
[see Vol.VI pp.375, 748]. In associated s t a t e s H.M.'s G. continued, a t request
and u n t i l revoked, to carry those r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . But i t was f e l t t h a t
c e r t a i n executive r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s could be delegated back to the s t a t e s . This
despatch to the administrator of Antigua was a model for others to the r e s t
of the associated s t a t e s . D.J.G. Rose was the a d m i n i s t r a t o r . Bowden was
s e c r e t a r y of s t a t e a t the Commonwealth Relations Office which was merged with
the F.O. in 1968.
130

w i t h the i n t e r n a t i o n a l commitments, r e s p o n s i b i l i t y or p o l i c i e s
o f Her M a j e s t y ' s Government o r i f t h e y a r e l i k e l y t o l e a d t o such
c o n f l i c t . The G o v e r n m e n t o f A n t i g u a h a v e a g r e e d t h a t a f t e r c o n -
s u l t a t i o n t h e y w i l l a c c e p t t h e d e c i s i o n o f Her M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n -
ment i n such m a t t e r s .
7. I n t h e f u r t h e r a n c e o f t h e i n t e r e s t s o f A n t i g u a and o f t h e
a s s o c i a t i o n between t h e U n i t e d Kingdom and A n t i g u a , Her M a j e s t y ' s
Government w i l l - (a) endeavour t o a s s i s t i n t h e t r a i n i n g o f o f -
f i c i a l s f r o m A n t i g u a who w i l l be r e q u i r e d t o d e a l w i t h m a t t e r s
c o n n e c t e d w i t h t h e c o n d u c t o f e x t e r n a l a f f a i r s and d e f e n c e ; ( b )
c o n s i d e r t h e i n c l u s i o n o f a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f t h e Government o f
A n t i g u a or o f t h e Governments o f t h e A s s o c i a t e d S t a t e s , either
a s an a d v i s e r o r o b s e r v e r o r i n a s i m i l a r c a p a c i t y , i n a n y U n i t e d
Kingdom d e l e g a t i o n whenever a s u b j e c t m a t e r i a l l y a f f e c t i n g the
i n t e r e s t s of Antigua or of the Associated States i s being d i s c u s -
s e d i n an i n t e r n a t i o n a l b o d y o f w h i c h t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m i s a
member; and ( c ) c o n s i d e r t h e a p p o i n t m e n t o f a p e r s o n n o m i n a t e d
by t h e G o v e r n m e n t o f A n t i g u a t o a d v i s e a d i p l o m a t i c m i s s i o n i n
the e x e r c i s e of consular f u n c t i o n s in respect of persons belong-
i n g t o A n t i g u a i n a p l a c e a b r o a d i f s u c h an a p p o i n t m e n t w e r e a t
a n y t i m e f e l t t o be n e c e s s a r y . . . .

3 5 . WEST INDIES ASSOCIATED STATES SUPREME COURT AGREEMENT,

22 February 19671
[The W . I . Associated States Supreme Court order o f 1967 would have
f o r c e o f law i n each S t a t e as long as t h i s Agreement c o n t i n u e d . ]
4 ( 1 ) The h e a d q u a r t e r s o f t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t a n d o f t h e L e g a l a n d
J u d i c i a l S e r v i c e s C o m m i s s i o n s h a l l be s i t u a t e i n G r e n a d a . . . .
5 ( 1 ) The G o v e r n m e n t o f e a c h S t a t e s h a l l t a k e s t e p s t o s e c u r e t h e
appointment in accordance w i t h the C o n s t i t u t i o n of the State of
a r e g i s t r a r o f t h e H i g h C o u r t f o r t h a t S t a t e and such o t h e r o f f i -
c e r s o f t h e H i g h C o u r t ( a l l o f whom s h a l l be o f f i c e r s i n t h e p u b -
l i c s e r v i c e o f t h a t S t a t e ) a s may be r e q u i r e d t o e n a b l e t h e H i g h
C o u r t t o e x e r c i s e i t s j u r i s d i c t i o n and powers i n r e l a t i o n t o t h a t
S t a t e . . . . [Such r e g i s t r a r s and t h e i r o f f i c e r s would be s u b j e c t t o the con-
t r o l , s u p e r v i s i o n and i n s p e c t i o n o n l y of the Chief J u s t i c e or h i s deputy.
Grenada would bear the cost o f m a i n t a i n i n g the accommodation f o r the Sup-
reme Court, t h e J u d i c i a l and Legal Services Commission, the C . J . , J u s t i -
ces of Appeal, the Chief R e g i s t r a r and o t h e r o f f i c e r s appointed f o r a l l
the S t a t e s . The cost o f a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f the Court o f Appeal and the
High Court would be borne p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y by the S t a t e s . Apart from t h e
c o n t r i b u t i o n s paid by Montserrat and the V i r g i n I s l a n d s , the Associated
S t a t e s would bear e q u a l l y the c c s t s o f the H.Q. o f the Supreme Court and
the Commission, and the s a l a r i e s o f the judges, commissioners and o t h e r
o f f i c i a l s , and the income tax paid by the C.J. and judges would be shared
e q u a l l y between the S t a t e s . ]

1. The West Indies Associated S t a t e s Supreme Court order (22.Feb. 1967:

Stat.R. No.223) e s t a b l i s h e d a Supreme Court of a Court of Appeal and High
Court of J u s t i c e , a C.J. appointed by royal l e t t e r s patent and the judges by
the federal and legal s e r v i c e s commission: provision was made for t h e i r
q u a l i f i c a t i o n , tenure, removal (on appeal to the Lord High Chancellor of Great
B r i t a i n in the case of the C . J . ) , s a l a r i e s &c.; for puisne judges and chief
r e g i s t r a r s in each S t a t e ; and for a 3 year r o t a t i o n of the j u d i c i a l and legal
commission.
 131
10. The Governments of the States shall take such steps as may
be reasonably practicable, having regard to the circumstances of
each State, to promote uniformity in the laws of the State con-
ferring jurisdiction and powers on the Court of Appeal and the
High Court and regulating the practice and procedure of these
courts, the execution and enforcement of the process of those
courts, the right of practising before those courts and the rep-
resentation of persons in any proceedings before these courts... .
[This Agreement might be amended if a State Government gave 6 months warning
to the others and if after consultation all the States agreed (§11).]

(2) JAMAICA

3 6 . GOVERNOR SIR JOHN HUGGINS TO HAROLD BECKETT, 16 May 19501

[He had hoped t o be able t o r e p o r t progress i n the House o f Representa-
t i v e s on r e v i s i o n of the c o n s t i t u t i o n , but though n o t i c e o f a motion f o r
a s e l e c t committee had been given on 28 March, no a c t i o n had yet been
t a k e n . ] T h e r e i s , i n f a c t , a p e c u l i a r r e l u c t a n c e on t h e p a r t
o f b o t h p a r t i e s i n t h e House t o g e t down t o s e r i o u s b u s i n e s s , n o t
only in regard to the r e v i s i o n of the C o n s t i t u t i o n but in regard
t o o t h e r m a t t e r s . E v e r y e x c u s e h a s been t a k e n f o r a d j o u r n i n g t h e
House a n d t h e r e i s now a v e r y c o n s i d e r a b l e b a c k l o g o f b u s i n e s s
2 t o be d e a l t w i t h . The H o u s e w e n t i n t o S e l e c t C o m m i t t e e t h i s week
t o c o n s i d e r t h e E s t i m a t e s and i t i s t h e r e f o r e u n l i k e l y t h a t any
a t t e m p t w i l l be made t o d e a l w i t h t h e r e v i s i o n o f t h e C o n s t i t u -
t i o n u n t i l t h e E s t i m a t e s h a v e b e e n p a s s e d . I h a v e d o n e my b e s t
t o g e t t h i n g s m o v i n g a n d c a n do no more i n t h a t d i r e c t i o n . The
p l a i n t r u t h o f t h e m a t t e r i s t h a t , a l t h o u g h b o t h P a r t i e s have
t a l k e d a good d e a l a b o u t C o n s t i t u t i o n a l c h a n g e s , f o r reasons
w h i c h a r e n o t common t o b o t h P a r t i e s , t h e r e a p p e a r s t o be a
r e l u c t a n c e t o go f o r w a r d w i t h t h e m . . . . [A commission o f t h r e e might
be d e s i r a b l e but the m a j o r i t y might consider t h a t a waste o f t i m e . I f the
dependencies o f the Cayman I s l a n d s 2 and the Turks and Caicos were
included i n the review, i t would be important f o r the C.O.'s views t o be
i n d i c a t e d : i n such minute communities the commissioners must not be drawn
into discussions.]

3 7 . SIDNEY SOUTHGATE: MINUTE, 24 January 19503

M r . B u s t a m a n t e , t h e House o f R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , and t h e P.N.P.

I . CO.137/894/68714/50 [see Vol.VII pp.90-110], Huggins (governor 1943-51)

had served in Malaya, and in Trinidad as colonial s e c r e t a r y and acting gover-
nor (1938-42), Beckett had r e c e n t l y returned to head the W.I. department of
the C O . 2. In the debate in the house of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s in July 1950 i t was
declared t h a t *if the islands wish to enjoy the s e r v i c e s of Jamaican o f f i c e r s
without payment in f u l l for value received, they cannot expect to be v i r t u a l l y
independent of Jamaica'. 3. CO. 137/894/68714/50. The working of the new form
of semi-responsible government as i t had evolved was a major concern. S.J.E.
Southgate, a p r i n c i p a l with the W.I. department (A), was commenting on the
report of Lord Listowel (minister of s t a t e at the C O . , 1948-50) on h i s v i s i t
to the W.I. I n i t i a t i v e for reform was awaited from Jamaica, but i t was now
obvious t h a t any recommendations would be 'influenced by the knowledge of the
m i n i s t e r i a l system proposed for T r i n i d a d ' ; so Huggins must be provided p r i v a -
t e l y with a copy of the draft memo, prepared on the functions of ministers un-
der the constitution there; (Min., 27 Jan. ibid.). MacGillivray, the colonial
132
all seem to think that elected members should be removable by
a vote of the House. The provisional conclusion reached in dis-
cussion with the Governor here got rid of this difficulty by pro-
viding for appointment, and it was then suggested that unofficial
members should hold office during the pleasure of H.M. or the Go-
vernor, and should be removed if they were in disagreement. This
would get rid of one of the main difficulties of the present
system.
It is uncertain how the alteration in the plans of parties in
the present House will affect proposals for the Constitution. On
the one hand the fact that he has a narrow majority may cause Mr.
Bustamante and his colleagues to be less lighthearted in the
avoidance of unpleasant responsibility, on the other hand this
fact may well make it impossible for ministers to maintain the
policy of Executive Council in the House unless they are respon-
sible for it and are known to be responsible for it.
In any case it seems that this question will have to be exami-
ned ab initio. The present constitutional instruments make no
provision for ministers. They simply prescribe that 5 members
shall be elected to Executive Council from the Lower House, and
that the Executive Council will be the principal instrument of
policy. In paragraph 5 of Colonel Stanley's despatch of the 10th
February, 1943, [Vol. VI, No. 29(d)], the arrangement by which
members of the House of Assembly sitting on the Executive Council
should form an embryo ministerial system was accepted as an expe-
rimental measure for which provision in the constitution was un-
necessary. The system of committees of the House of Representa-
tives seems to have been a complete failure, and it is possible
that the difficulties which this so-called ministerial system has
run into are due even more to the fact that the ministers have
no constitutional status than to the fact that they have no indi-
vidual responsibility. Unless something very near self-government
is granted, it is hard to see how responsibility for their depar-
tments can be given to ministers without either facing the neces-
sity of frequent use of the reserve power, or devising some sys-
tem by which the responsibility of ministers shall be expressly
limited to purely domestic matters. When Sir J. Huggins was in
London in 1948 he said that he had been inclined to favour some
division of subjects, with a view to allocating the responsibil-
ity of ministers, and reserving others; on examination, he came
to the conclusion that it would be too difficult to devise a
satisfactory division of subjects, and that it would be necessary
to leave the Governor's responsibilities more or less as they are
stated in the present instruments. (See the typescript paragraph
(iv) on page 4 of (7) on 68714/22/48). The Governor's appreci-
ation of the way in which the present system is working is given
in the telegram on 68714/22/49, at (5) enclosure A.

secretary, was deeply involved in the discussions and reported on the practi-
cal details of organising the establishment of ministries (17 August 1951:
Kirkwood to Lennox-Boyd 2 Jan. 1952 C O . 137/327). Foot seemed to be driving
towards change without any formal constitutional review or political agreement
or a new election in Jamaica: - especially an elected majority on the execut-
ive; (to Luke, 12 Jan. 1952 ibid.).
 133

38. STEPHEN LUKE TO SIR THOMAS LLOYD, 9 February 19511

The s t r u g g l e f o r power between t h e p a r t i e s l e d by Bustamante
and Manley pervades a l l a s p e c t s o f l i f e i n t h e I s l a n d . I t i s
waged w i t h g r e a t d e t e r m i n a t i o n , and i s l i a b l e v e r y e a s i l y t o
d e g e n e r a t e i n t o pure gang w a r f a r e . N e i t h e r s i d e i s f r e e f r o m t h e
r e p r o a c h o f p u r s u i n g p o l i t i c a l and t r a d e u n i o n o b j e c t i v e s by
v i o l e n c e and i n t i m i d a t i o n . The f e e l i n g seems t o be t h a t t h e
P.N.P. a r e perhaps t h e more r u t h l e s s i n t h i s f o r m o f a c t i v i t y .
The e x i s t e n c e o f a l a r g e body o f unemployed or u n d e r - e m p l o y e d ,
e s p e c i a l l y i n K i n g s t o n , means t h a t t h e r e are i n s t r u m e n t s always
ready t o hand.
A large p a r t of the population - i n c l u d i n g , of course, the p r o -
f e s s i o n a l and commercial c l a s s e s and g e n e r a l l y t h o s e most a c c e s s -
i b l e t o a v i s i t i n g C O . o f f i c i a l - are h e a r t i l y s i c k of the per-
v a s i v e c h a r a c t e r o f t h e p o l i t i c a l s t r u g g l e . The more r e s p o n s i b l e
p e o p l e f e e l t h a t i t i s t e a r i n g t h e c o u n t r y i n p i e c e s , and f a t a l l y
i n j u r i n g i t s e x t e r n a l c r e d i t , a t a t i m e when i t i s f a c i n g econom-
i c and f i n a n c i a l problems o f t h e utmost c o m p l e x i t y . Many o t h e r s
a r e d i s t u r b e d by t h e g r o w i n g tendency t o w a r d s e x t r e m i s m , and i t
i s s a i d t h a t b o t h p a r t i e s have l o s t s u b s t a n t i a l numbers o f s u p -
p o r t e r s o r s y m p a t h i z e r s who a r e d i s i l l u s i o n e d by t h e d i s c r e p a n c y
between p l a t f o r m promises and subsequent p e r f o r m a n c e .
There i s g e n e r a l agreement t h a t t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n must be r e v i -
s e d . H i t h e r t o , Bustamante and t h e M a j o r i t y P a r t y have o b s t r u c t e d
t h i s , because t h e y a r e l o s i n g ground t o t h e P.N.P. and f e a r t h a t
t h e l a t t e r w i l l reap t h e advantage o f any f u r t h e r t r a n s f e r o f
power and w i l l use i t t o keep themselves i n power. I do n o t know
what a r e M a n l e y ' s views on t h e t i m i n g o f a r e v i e w o f t h e c o n s t i -
t u t i o n ; he i s i n England and I have been g i v e n no o p p o r t u n i t y t o
t a l k t o h i s l i e u t e n a n t s . O u t s i d e t h e two p a r t i e s , t h e r e i s a
s t r o n g f e e l i n g t h a t e a r l y changes a r e e s s e n t i a l , and a hope t h a t
H.M.G. w i l l t h e m s e l v e s t a k e t h e i n i t i a t i v e i n c a l l i n g f o r a
r e v i e w o f t h e o p e r a t i o n o f t h e 1944 c o n s t i t u t i o n .
There i s , o f c o u r s e , no agreement about t h e changes needed.
Bustamante t o l d [Henry] B o u r d i l l o n and m y s e l f t h a t he wanted f u l l
M i n i s t e r i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ; i n h i s v i e w , t h e Governor s h o u l d
r e t a i n h i s p r e s e n t powers. He emphasised t h a t he d i d n o t l i k e
t h e s e , b u t c o n s i d e r e d them e s s e n t i a l a t t h i s s t a g e t o t h e w e l l -
b e i n g o f Jamaica. There seems t o be no doubt t h a t Manley would
ask f o r much more; i t seems u n l i k e l y t h a t he c o u l d c a r r y h i s
P a r t y behind any programme f a l l i n g s h o r t o f f u l l responsible
self-government w i t h i n the Commonwealth....
[Many in the professional and commercial classes whose qualities would
have benefitted the working of the government had avoided the heat and
dust of p o l i t i c s , but there were increasing signs that t h e i r concern for
the future of the island was awakening t h e i r sense of responsibility.
Some were indeed nostalgic for the restoration of Crown Colony government
and a r e s t r i c t i o n of the franchise, but realised that the clock could not
be put back. A ministerial system on the lines of that in Trinidad would
be well supported as the next step. The most obvious weakness at present
was that the ministers enjoyed prestige, power and influence but no

1. C O . 137/894/68714/51. Luke was a s s i s t a n t under-secretary, Lloyd was per-

manent under-secretary. He was reporting on h i s impressions of the p o l i t i c a l
s i t u a t i o n in Jamaica.
 134

responsibility. The constitution might work better in Mess eccentric

hands' than Bustamante's, but the weakness was inherent. I t was doubtful
whether i t would be better for the governor to intervene and require a
review at once or to let the situation get worse. The object should be
to make clearer where responsibility lay and to ensure that in the few
cases where the governor f e l t i t necessary to override any proposal put
forward by a l l the elected members, he should do t h i s publicly by use of
his reserve powers,1 not his casting vote.]

39. THE EARL OF MUNSTER TO OLIVER LYTTELTON, 9 April 19512

[Foot had secured almost universal approval for reform of the 1944 Con-
s t i t u t i o n but there was no unanimity among the leaders and the bulk of
the people were unconcerned. Changes should be introduced by 1 April
1953.] I n t h e o r y t h e s e changes m i g h t make f o r b e t t e r g o v e r n -
ment b u t f r a n k l y I doubt t h a t t h e g r a n t i n g o f any a d d i t i o n a l p o -
wers w i l l improve t h e e f f i c i e n c y o f t h e government machine. The
e x i s t i n g M i n i s t e r s w i t h few e x c e p t i o n s a r e a poor l o t and I d o u b t
i f t h e O p p o s i t i o n c o u l d produce any l a r g e r number o f competent
men.
The f i r s t amendment t o t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n s h o u l d be made i n t h e
E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l and t h e r e m a i n i n g a l t e r a t i o n s a r e a l m o s t comp-
l e m e n t a r y . The E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l now f u n c t i o n s as an i n s t r u m e n t
o f a d m i n i s t r a t i o n r a t h e r t h a n o f p o l i c y and e v e r y l i t t l e p e t t y
d e t a i l has t o be s u b m i t t e d t o and approved by i t . By t h i s method
q u e s t i o n s o f u r g e n t p u b l i c i m p o r t a n c e a r e f r e q u e n t l y d e l a y e d and
i n v a r i a b l y r e c e i v e l e s s c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h a n i s j u s t l y due. The
e x i s t i n g composition of the Executive Council i s three o f f i c i a l s ,
two nominated members f r o m t h e L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l and f i v e e l e c -
t e d members f r o m t h e House o f R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . I recommend we
s h o u l d g i v e t h e e l e c t e d members a m a j o r i t y by i n c r e a s i n g t h e i r
number t o e i g h t , 3 b u t we s h o u l d m a i n t a i n t h e t h r e e o f f i c i a l s as

I . Minutes in the C O . i n d i c a t e t h a t a necessary c o r o l l a r y to the e s t a b l i s h -

ment of an e l e c t e d majority was the more p o s i t i v e use of the governor's r e s e r -
ve powers. There was fear t h a t against the background of ' t h e quiescence of
the p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s ' , Sir Hugh Foot was in danger of 'pushing ahead too
fast': (Beckett, Heinemann: Mins. 6, 21 July ibid.) Bustamante realised that
the r e t e n t i o n of reserve powers was ' e s s e n t i a l if only for the a t t r a c t i o n of
overseas p r i v a t e c a p i t a l ' but would feel bound to attack such powers p u b l i c l y :
(Foot to Luke, 22 October 1951: CO. 1031/327). Beckett in a general note f e l t
t h a t ' i t was pace more than p r i n c i p l e ' t h a t in most cases had to be considered,
and i t was now too slow. 'How long can we preserve these museum pieces - the
3B's?' [Bermuda, Barbados, Bahamas], 'Jamaica was a seething cauldron: we dare
not take the l i d off^but the present o u t l e t for steam was not big enough. [See
C Buller: V o l . I l l , p.561] Of course the p o l i t i c i a n s did not represent the s i -
l e n t , t o i l i n g masses.but t h a t was i r r e l e v a n t since they were being educated
into the view t h a t a l l i l l s were due to the wicked imported i m p e r i a l i s t gover-
nment and t h a t the cure was'Jamaica for the Jamaicans/ Therefore the pace must
be increased but not to the point where the t r a i n could not get safely round
the curve. With a l o t more democracy at once, i t would run f a s t e r , but ' t h e
driver must s t i l l have the l a s t word.' The new gang had united in wanting a
return of the pre-1866 c o n s t i t u t i o n [Vol. V, pp. 158ff] but with the whole
people, not j u s t the white oligarchy, as the e l e c t o r a t e . ' 2. CO. 1031/327. The
parliamentary under-secretary was reporting on his discussions with Jamaican
l e a d e r s . 3. Foot had some doubt about t h i s f i g u r e , believing t h a t in a t o t a l
 135
full members. No one appears enamoured with the Legislative Coun-
cil, but so long as it remains in being some representation must
be given to it in the Executive Council and I suggest that the
figure of two remains unaltered. There may well be some clamour
to abolish the Upper House but even in its present form it acts
as a kind of buffer against hasty or i 11 considered legislation.
There will be ample opportunity in the future to decide whether
or not Jamaica could function with a single-chamber government,
but for the present, at any rate, the Legislative Council should
remain and its limited authority in no way lessened. The Opposit-
ion party are of the opinion that the three official members
should, in future, attend meetings of the Executive Council and
offer their advice but should not be allowed to vote. The argu-
ment they advance is based on the belief that if any dispute
occurred among the elected members within the Executive Council,
the officials by the use of their vote could decide the issue.
This would be a reasonable view if we intended to transfer every-
thing and abandon our responsibilities but we are only suggesting
a limited reform and in any event the official members with their
capabilities and knowledge of government will still be required.
We should not limit their authority and in my view they should
remain members of the Executive Council and exercise their full
rights.
If you concur in the reformation of the Executive Council there
remains the proposal for simultaneously placing Ministers in
charge of departments. The permanent officials have strongly
represented that under the present constitution Ministers will
run away from decisions reached in the Executive Council when it
ultimately appears that these are likely to be unpopular. Cases
have also occurred when Ministers have introduced legislation in
the House of Representatives with casual interest and little re-
gard for decisions previously reached. It stands to reason that
if Ministers were made responsible for their departments many of
these troubles should disappear. Moreover, much of the detailed
administrative work now taken before Executive Council could be
decided by the Minister concerned and the policy-making body
could deliberate on far more urgent matters. I repeat what I said
at the beginning of this letter that Government is unlikely to
prove more efficient by this move, but if good permanent offic-
ials can be placed at the head of each department they would be
able to bolster up the Ministers. From all accounts there seem
to be a number of capable officials who could function at this
level but additional bodies may well be required.
You will recall that under the existing constitution Ministers
can only be removed by a two-thirds majority in the House of
Representatives. I have been told of a case of a Minister who
resigned from the party and yet remained in office for the full
term of five years as Bustamante was unable to secure a two-
thirds majority for his removal. As Manley told me, he exercises
his undoubted constitutional right by refraining from voting, al-
though his party did come to the assistance of Government in the

of 14 (including the governor) he would be less likely to have to use his

casting vote: he did not like lumping trade, industry and labour as a single
ministry (to Luke, 5 May 1952, ibid.).
136

c a s e o f t h e M i n i s t e r o f E d u c a t i o n who was r e c e n t l y s e n t e n c e d t o
two y e a r s imprisonment f o r f r a u d ! ! I suppose t h e o r i g i n a l concep-
t i o n o f t h i s i d e a was t o s e c u r e i n t h e f i r s t p l a c e a c a r e f u l
s e l e c t i o n o f M i n i s t e r s , b u t i f t h e y a r e now t o be p l a c e d i n a
p o s i t i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i t is necessary t o repeal t h i s p r o -
v i s i o n , a n d I c a n s e e no r e a s o n why i t s h o u l d be r e t a i n e d .
F i n a l l y I come t o t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e G o v e r n o r ' s r e s e r v e p o w -
e r s . U n d e r t h e e x i s t i n g c o n s t i t u t i o n he c a n u s e t h e s e p o w e r s o n l y
i n a g r e e m e n t w i t h h i s E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l , b u t i n f u t u r e he m u s t
become t h e s o l e j u d g e a n d w h e n e v e r he e x e r c i s e s t h e m t o a n n o u n c e
p u b l i c l y he h a s d o n e s o . . . [ t h o u g h no doubt these powers would be c h a l -
lenged. The work o f the C o l o n i a l Secretary would be much reduced: should
he not be j u s t r e t i t l e d L i e u t . - G o v e r n o r ? Munster had attended a meeting
o f both Houses but few t u r n e d up and the Speaker d e l i v e r e d a m a g n i f i c e n t
political oration.]

40. GOVERNOR SIR HUGH FOOT TO STEPHEN LUKE, 21 June 1951 1

[ A f t e r f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h Bustamante and Manley he had some sug-
g e s t i o n s t o make. Debate i n the House o f Representatives had produced
some ' w o o l l y ' i d e a s , but he thought some general agreement might be pos-
s i b l e once the deadlock over a general e l e c t i o n (which Bustamante r e s i s -
ted and Manley demanded) had been r e s o l v e d . Some L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l l o r s
and o t h e r s were proposing a s i n g l e chamber ( i n c l . o f f i c i a l s , nominees and
e l e c t e d s ) and e l e c t i o n by P.R. But l i t t l e thought had been given t o t h e
next s t e p . Governor Huggins had contemplated a commission from o u t s i d e
Jamaica, 2 but Foot p r e f e r r e d l i m i t e d but v i t a l changes which could be
i n t r o d u c e d w i t h minimum formal amendment, and was opposed t o a f u l l cons-
t i t u t i o n a l r e v i e w . ] One p r i n c i p a l f a c t o r i n my m i n d i s t h a t a
f u l l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e v i e w ( a s I d i s c o v e r e d i n N i g e r i a ) t a k e s an
e n o r m o u s a m o u n t o f t i m e a n d e f f o r t . I t w o u l d t h r o w a new b u r d e n
on t h e p r i n c i p a l o f f i c i a l s i n J a m a i c a d u r i n g t h e n e x t y e a r o r t w o
a t a t i m e when t h e y s h o u l d be a b l e t o d e v o t e m o s t o f t h e i r e f f o r t
t o t h e v a s t a m o u n t o f c o n s t r u c t i v e w o r k w h i c h i s w a i t i n g t o be
d o n e . A n o t h e r f a c t o r , even more i m p o r t a n t , i s t h a t I b e l i e v e a
f u l l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l review would tend t o s p l i t Jamaica between
t h e t w o p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s on t h e o n e h a n d ( e a c h t r y i n g t o o u t b i d
t h e o t h e r ) a n d , on t h e o t h e r , t h e s u b s t a n t i a l n u m b e r s o f s e n -
s i b l e , s t e a d y - g o i n g p e o p l e who a r e f r i g h t e n e d t h a t t h e y may be
l e f t t o s u f f e r f r o m t h e i n e x p e r i e n c e and c o r r u p t i o n o f t h e p o l i -
t i c i a n s . I m i g h t a l s o say t h a t s i n c e I have been back h e r e I have
b e e n t r e m e n d o u s l y i m p r e s s e d w i t h t h e d e s i r e on a l l s i d e s t o s e e
p r a c t i c a l , c o n s t r u c t i v e w o r k u n d e r t a k e n a n d I am s u r e t h a t we
s h o u l d be d o i n g t h e I s l a n d a d i s s e r v i c e i f we l e d p e o p l e t o e x -
p e c t t h a t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l changes a l o n e can s o l v e o u r p r o b l e m s .
My h o p e t h e r e f o r e i s t h a t we c a n a g r e e w i t h i n a f e w m o n t h s o n
a l i m i t e d number o f v i t a l c h a n g e s , p u t them i n t o e f f e c t and g e t
on w i t h t h e j o b .
The k i n d o f c h a n g e s I h a v e i n m i n d a r e t h o s e w h i c h I m e n t i o n e d
i n my t e l e g r a m N o . 4 2 1 . T h e y w e r e a s f o l l o w s : - ( a ) t o i n c r e a s e t h e

1. CO.137/894/68714/51. Foot was governor (1951-57) and l a t e r (1957-60) of

Cyprus. He had previously (1945-7) been colonial s e c r e t a r y in Jamaica. S.E.V.
Luke was a s s i s t a n t under—secretary in the C O . (1950-3); he had r e c e n t l y v i s i -
ted Jamaica, 2. Professor Coupland, Creech Jones and Lord Hastings were in
mind: Luke had a d d i t i o n a l names (1 August 1950).
 137
number of elected members in Executive Council (to give them a
clear majority); (b) to give the Governor full reserve powers
(without having to obtain approval of a majority of the Council);
(c) to give Ministers greater executive authority; and (d) to es-
tablish a Public Service Commission.
Following my talks with Bustamante and Manley (and with one or
two others such as Barker and T.R. Williams) I feel that there
is a real possibility of reaching a fairly wide measure of agree-
ment on limited changes of this kind. Moreover I believe that
there would be general relief if limited constitutional advance
of this kind could take place at once and if we could avoid hold-
ing everything up by a full constitutional review at this time.
I shall not now attempt to discuss in detail the merits (or
disadvantages) of the four specific proposals which I have men-
tioned, for I believe that the next step should be to undertake
discussions with representatives of the two political parties and
with unofficial members of the Legislative Council.
My proposal is that I should announce fairly soon that I am
aware of the discussions which have already taken place on the
question of constitutional changes both in the House of Represen-
tatives and the Legislative Council and that I think that a stage
has been reached when I might usefully have conversations with
representatives of each of the political parties and with unoffi-
cial members of the Legislative Council. The purpose of these
conversations would be to attempt to reach a measure of common
agreement on constitutional changes which could be put into ef-
fect without delay. Manley has told me that he feels sure that
the P.N.P. would accept an invitation to hold discussions with
me on this basis and, although I can't be quite sure how Busta-
mante would react, I can see no reason why he should not also
welcome discussions with me following such an announcement. My
suggestion is that the discussions should be with each of the
three groups separately.
I do not wish to minimise the difficulties of reaching even a
measure of agreement but it seems to me that to invite discus-
sions with the three groups holds out a good deal better prospect
of sensible proposals emerging than any other course which I can
conceive. It might be that the discussions would break down alto-
gether, possibly on the issue of whether or not there should be
a general election, but I should do my best to carry out the dis-
cussions on constitutional changes without reference to this
question of the general election.
I do not know if you would wish me to set out these ideas more
tidily in the form of a despatch. If you think it desirable to
do so, will you please let me know and I shall try to get the
despatch off within a week or two. It may be, however, that, sin-
ce al 1 I am asking is authority to invite representatives of the
two parties and of the Legislative Council to discuss constitu-
tional changes with me, you would be able to obtain approval for
that course on what I have said in this letter.
I should in any event not make any announcement until Bustaman-
te returns early next month and until I have seen him again but,
if you think that there is no objection to my making an announce-
ment that I intend to invite the three groups to discuss consti-
tutional matters with me, it would be helpful if you could let
138

me know f a i r l y soon by t e l e g r a m . 1

4 1 . H.F.HEINEMANN: MINUTE, 13 December 19512

[He summarised the 1944 bicameral c o n s t i t u t i o n . ] I n p r a c t i c e this
c o n s t i t u t i o n has proved cumbersome because o f t h e weakness o f t h e
l i n k between t h e e f f e c t i v e e x e c u t i v e ( t h e Governor and s e n i o r
o f f i c i a l s ) and t h e e f f e c t i v e L e g i s l a t u r e ( t h e House o f Represen-
t a t i v e s ) . The e l e c t e d members o f t h e E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l have been
s t y l e d ' M i n i s t e r s ' 3 b u t have n o t had e x e c u t i v e f u n c t i o n s as
heads o f d e p a r t m e n t s . They have o f t e n agreed t o a p r o p o s a l i n
E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l b u t e i t h e r n o t i n t r o d u c e d i t i n t o t h e House,
or i n t r o d u c e d i t b a d l y , o r even abandoned i t as a c r e a t u r e o f t h e
' o f f i c i a l government' when c h a l l e n g e d i n t h e House. I t has n o t
h e l p e d t h a t t h e Jamaica Labour P a r t y members, i n power s i n c e
1944, a r e l e s s e f f e c t i v e [ i n debate] t h a n t h e o p p o s i t i o n members,
t h e P e o p l e ' s N a t i o n a l P a r t y - and b o t h s i d e s know i t .
R e v i s i o n o f t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n has been under d i s c u s s i o n f o r some
y e a r s . I n 1949, t h e r e s i d e n t i a l q u a l i f i c a t i o n f o r members o f t h e
House o f R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s was a b o l i s h e d b u t no p a r t y has p r e s s e d
t h e i s s u e s i n c e t h e n or s a i d what i t w a n t e d . S i r H. Foot hoped
t o deal w i t h t h e problem f o r a few y e a r s w i t h o u t t h e d i s t r a c t i o n
o f a t t e n t i o n f r o m J a m a i c a ' s i m p o r t a n t economic problems w h i c h a
f u l l - s c a l e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e v i e w would mean. B e f o r e he assumed
t h e G o v e r n o r s h i p i n A p r i l , 1 9 5 1 , he o b t a i n e d f r o m Mr. G r i f f i t h s
[the Secretary of State] a p p r o v a l t o h i s t a k i n g t h e i n i t i a t i v e a l o n g
t h e f o l l o w i n g l i n e s : M i n i s t e r s t o be g i v e n e x e c u t i v e r e s p o n s i b i l -
i t y f o r t h e i r d e p a r t m e n t s ; * e l e c t e d members t o be g i v e n a w o r k i n g

1. Four months l a t e r Foot gave an interim report on his d i s c u s s i o n s , finding

the u n o f f i c i a l l e g i s l a t i v e council divided and * s u r p r i s i n g l y u n r e a l i s t i c ' on
reforms. Some wanted to curb demagogy by r e s t r i c t i n g the franchise in return
for the delegation of increased executive r e s p o n s i b i l i t y : others a return to
the pre-1866 c o n s t i t u t i o n [Vol.V pp. 158f.f]. Though the J . L . P . was l e s s extreme
than the J . N . P . , Bustamante admitted t h a t , though he r e a l i s e d t h a t reserve
powers were ' e s s e n t i a l ' if only to a t t r a c t overseas investment, he would have
to a t t a c k them in p u b l i c . Generally there was agreement on the need for an
u n o f f i c i a l majority in the executive, the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of m i n i s t e r s for
departments, and the appointment and removal of m i n i s t e r s on the advice of the
chief minister (to Luke, 22 Oct. 1952: C O . 1031/327). In the C O . there was
fear t h a t Foot was hurrying matters (Min. Beckett, 6 July, 14 D e c : CO. 137/
894/68714/51 and CO. 1031/327) After further discussions Foot f e l t able to
claim more general agreement (as above) on the reform of the executive, l e s s
so on the l e g i s l a t u r e s (to Luke, 12 Jan. 1952: CO. 1031/327). Manley would
accept the need for the presence of o f f i c i a l s but they would have no vote:
m i n i s t e r s would be free to speak and vote on a l l motions: but he opposed the
governor's reserve powers. Foot thought t h a t there was a good deal to be said
for r e s t r i c t i n g votes to elected members only, but demanded the r e t e n t i o n of
his full reserve powers (16 Feb. ibid.).
2. C O . 1031/327. Heinemann was the desk o f f i c e r in the W.I. department A and
responsible for Jamaica.
3. A marginal note said 'Only by courtesy*.
4. Foot wanted even local government and finance to be handed over to e l e c t e d
members: otherwise m i n i s t e r s would * s t i l l escape r e s p o n s i b i l i t y by blaming
o f f i c i a l government for anything which goes wrong'. Until f u l l self-government
was granted, H.M.'s G., the governor and the e x p a t r i a t e o f f i c i a l s would remain
 139

m a j o r i t y in Executive Council; the Governor t o have i n reserve

power t o l e g i s l a t e by c e r t i f i c a t i o n without the agreement of the
Executive Council. Sir H. Foot hoped t o f i n d ways of doing t h i s
without amending the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l Instruments.
In J u l y , 1951, the Governor was authorised t o discuss his
proposals separately w i t h representatives of the L e g i s l a t i v e
Council and of the two p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s between which the seats
i n the House of Representatives are d i v i d e d . His aim was agreed
proposals. The hurricane intervened and the Governor has only now
been able t o resume h i s c o n s u l t a t i o n s . In the meantime, the
Colonial Secretary has submitted t o him a report on the adminis-
t r a t i v e aspects of i n s t i t u t i n g a m i n i s t e r i a l system.
M i n i s t e r i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y would g r e a t l y improve p o l i t i c a l l i f e
in Jamaica. I t would prevent important measures being held up
awaiting i n t r o d u c t i o n i n t o the House and i t would demonstrate
which of the elected members of the Executive Council were
competent and which were not.
On assuming departmental r e s p o n s i b i l i t y M i n i s t e r s would expect
t o have a m a j o r i t y i n Executive Council. Before he went out, S i r
H. Foot had i n mind t h a t he might give them t h i s by announcing
t h a t he would not use h i s casting vote, save as a prelude t o
using the reserve powers. This s o l u t i o n has the advantage t h a t
the Instruments need not be amended, but against i t are f i r s t ,
t h a t i t i s doubtful whether the Governor can so bind himself,
secondly, t h a t w h i l s t the elected members could not be out-voted
they would s t i l l not have a majority 1 * A possible s o l u t i o n would
e x i s t i f the L e g i s l a t i v e Council contained men acceptable to the
m a j o r i t y Party i n the House of Representatives who could be
nominated t o Executive Council and given m i n i s t e r i a l posts. But
the present L e g i s l a t i v e Council i s made up e n t i r e l y of represen-
t a t i v e s of the propertied and professional classes; t h i s may be
i n e v i t a b l e since there has hardly been popular government i n
Jamaica long enough t o produce elder statesmen from the p o l i t i c a l
p a r t i e s . At present, the L e g i s l a t i v e Council does not f u n c t i o n
as a r e v i s i o n a r y upper House; i t i s a forum f o r pronouncements -
mainly d e s t r u c t i v e and often as i r r e s p o n s i b l e as i n the lower
House - by a group who have l i t t l e popular support. The p o s s i b i l -
i t y of e l e v a t i n g say Sir Harold A l l a n t o the L e g i s l a t i v e
Council and appointing him to the Executive Council at the next

'whipping boys' but Heinemann did not think i t Appropriate t h a t local govern-
ment should be a p o r t f o l i o of the chief minister who, if he were conscien-
t i o u s , would be already overburdened and was strongly c r i t i c a l of Foot's pro-
posal (as was R. Newton, the present f i n a n c i a l s e c r e t a r y ) t h a t finance should
become the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of an elected member: t h e r e could be a f i n a n c i a l
' a d v i s e r ' and a f i n a n c i a l permanent s e c r e t a r y , but i t would be too great a
cost to permit an incapable and lazy man whose f i n a n c i a l policy was only ' a
hobby with no r e a l relevance to the facts of l i f e ' to hold the finance
p o r t f o l i o . Only in Malta was the f i n a n c i a l s e c r e t a r y an elected member: i t
would lead to s i m i l a r demands in Trinidad, Nigeria and B.G. (Min. 16 Sept.
1952: CO.1031/328).
1. He pointed out (10 July 1952) t h a t i t would be impossible for any member
of the House to oppose an opposition motion for self-government(which was
passed unanimously on 22 July) but he also f e l t t h a t public opinion would soon
swing against Manley's more extreme proposals.
140
opportunity is, however, a tentative suggestion which might be
tried on the Governor. If it could be done, it would give the
majority Party a majority in the Executive Council without
changing the Instruments. Failing that, the number of members of
the House of Representatives in the Executive Council would have
to be increased.
The problem of the reserve power is difficult. In my view, a
positive power of certification is essential if in present
conditions the elected element is to be given a majority on the
Executive Council, but it is, in a sense, a retrogressive move
and will be represented as such in Jamaica. The political parties
might agree to it behind the scenes but neither can well be
expected to agree to it in public. The only hope is to emphasise
what is being given so as to secure acquiescence in the resump-
tion by the Governor of power to legislate in emergencies.
At present, agreement in Jamaica seems far off. Sir H. Foot
reports that some members of the Legislative Council are toying
with unrealistic proposals for restricting the franchise. In my
view, a great deal turns at the next stage on the Legislative
Council. At present, it carries little weight; perhaps, when
elder statesmen have been produced, this will improve. If the
unofficial nominated members were removed from the Executive
Council, the only connection between the Executive Council and
the Legislative Council would be the three officials who are
members of both; the unofficial members of Legislative Council
would probably feel that they were wasting their time. Ultimate-
ly, the choice of unofficial members of Executive Council,
whichever House they come from, will be a matter for the Chief
Minister but at the next stage in Jamaica I think it would be
wise to retain the members nominated from the Legislative
Counci1 .
The one thing that is new in Sir H. Foot's letter is at (c) on
the last page: 'To introduce a system whereby Ministers are
appointed or removed by the Governor on the recommendation of the
Chief Minister'. This is ambiguous. It could mean that, the
Executive Council having been appointed as now, the Governor will
appoint as Ministers such members of it as the Chief Minister
recommends; no change in Instruments required. But it may mean
that appointments to the Executive Council are to be made on the
recommendation of the Chief Minister; that would require change
in the Instruments and is a big jump. Further, how is the Chief
Minister to come into being? Sir H. Foot may have in mind that
the Governor would appoint someone as Chief Minister and ask him
to recommend who shall be his colleagues or he may have in mind
that the House shall elect a Chief Minister. Incidentally, it
would be dangerous to assume that because there are now two well-
divided parties that position will always obtain....1

1. Questions remained relating to the appointment and removal of the chief

minister (a title which Bustamante would accept though he preferred 'P.M.'):
Foot wanted the 1946 Ceylon practice, but Bustamante was wedded to the British
system. The new order-in-council was issued 30 May 1953: and Bustamante
demanding full self-government dismissed the new constitution as illegitimate
and not worth anything: (19 June: C O . 1031/329). But the first reports were
not discouraging: D.B. Sangster appointed to finance, in which he had declared
 141
1
42. (a) NOTE BY THE WEST INDIAN DEPARTMENT, 3 March 1952
1. The Secretary of State has asked for views on whether
officials should continue to have votes in Executive Council. The
Legal Advisers say that most colonial constitutions do not make
provision for voting in Executive Council; (this presumably
arises out of the advisory origin of Executive Councils). In the
'advanced' constitutions of Jamaica, Trinidad and the Gold Coast
there is such provision and all members, elected and nominated
(both official and unofficial) vote equally; (the Governor has
a casting vote only). The lawyers know of no precedent for
denying the vote to officials except the Donoughmore Constitution
in Ceylon (1931-46) under which the three top officials sat in
both legislature and executive, but had votes in neither. But
that Constitution and the political position in Ceylon were both
so different from Jamaica today that useful comparisons cannot
be made.
2. The Governor reports that opinions in Jamaica are divided.
Mr. Bustamante is inclined to think that all members should vote
equally. Mr. Manley's argument, with which the Governor expresses
a good deal of sympathy, is that official and nominated members
should not have votes, on the grounds that, if they had, the
elected members would feel obliged to gang up against them rather
than vote on each proposal on its merits; (but it should be borne
in mind that Mr. Manley does not agree that the nominated members
and the officials, other than the Colonial Secretary, should
continue to be members of Executive Council).
3. The view of the West Indian Department is that, so long as
Jamaica has a transitional constitution and officials are kept
in the Executive Council who are responsible for subjects which,
by implication, unofficials are not yet competent to handle,
those officials should have equal standing with their colleagues
in Executive Council and should have votes. In this transitional
stage, the members of Executive Council are a team working under
the Governor and anything which tends to divide them into
official and unofficial camps is to be avoided if possible. (At
this stage, the senior elected member is not the head of the
government; he will only become that when, at a later stage,
unofficials take over all portfolios and the officials, and
presumably the Governor, leave Executive Council).
4. The point may, in practice, appear academic in Jamaica
whilst the party divisions are clear and the majority party whip
operates; but it would be a mistake to frame the constitution on
the assumption that this will always necessarily be so. To
imagine an example, if the People's National Party (the present
opposition party, whose members' politics are not unanimous) came
to power, there might well be differences between the elected
members of Executive Council which could be resolved in favour

his disinterest, began to show some concern: the real trouble was that
Bustamante interfered a great deal in the affairs of all departments and no
minister dare criticise him: (Newton to Heinemann, 6 Aug.* C O . 1031/329).
1. C O . 1031/327. It was comparatively rare for one of the geographical
departments in the C O , to present a collective view. It demonstrated the
importance attached to the success of the next step in evolving a semi-
responsible government system.
142

o f m o d e r a t i o n by t h e o f f i c i a l (and nominated) v o t e s i n a manner

p r o p e r under a c o n s t i t u t i o n w h i c h i s i n i n t e n t i o n s h o r t o f s e l f -
government. I n o b j e c t i n g t o t h i s , Mr. Manley i s n o t , r e a l l y
c o n s i d e r i n g t h e problem o f an E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l under a t r a n s i -
t i o n a l c o n s t i t u t i o n , b u t i s s e e k i n g a more advanced c o n s t i t u t i o n ,
v i r t u a l l y s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t . To t a k e away t h e o f f i c i a l v o t e s i n
e x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l i s t o i n c r e a s e t h e chances o f t h e Governor
h a v i n g t o use h i s r e s e r v e powers.
5. Take t h e v o t e f r o m t h e o f f i c i a l s and i t m i g h t be d i f f i c u l t
n o t t o t a k e i t a l s o f r o m t h e nominated members. These and, i n
t u r n , t h e Upper House ( L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l ) f r o m which t h e y a r e
drawn would t h e n f e e l c o m p l e t e l y f r u s t r a t e d . T h i s m i g h t w e l l s t i r
up t h e i s s u e s about t h e L e g i s l a t u r e which we hope t o l e a v e a l o n e
u n t i l t h e more u r g e n t problems o f t h e e x e c u t i v e had been d e a l t
w i t h ; f u r t h e r , i t m i g h t p r e j u d i c e t h e f u t u r e o f t h e Upper House
which would be a p i t y a s , perhaps m o d i f i e d , t h e Upper House has
an i m p o r t a n t p a r t t o p l a y i n t h e f u t u r e .
6. I t m i g h t be awkward f o r o f f i c i a l s t o s u p p o r t i n L e g i s l a t i v e
C o u n c i l measures on w h i c h t h e y had been o u t v o t e d i n E x e c u t i v e
C o u n c i l , b u t i t m i g h t be even more d i f f i c u l t f o r them t o do t h i s
i f t h e y had n o t even had t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o r e g i s t e r their
d i s a g r e e m e n t by a v o t e i n E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l .
7. A f i n a l argument a g a i n s t d e p r i v i n g o f f i c i a l s o f t h e i r v o t e s
i n E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l i s t h e view o f t h e West I n d i a n Department
t h a t , t o avoid s t a r t i n g hares, the i n t r o d u c t i o n of the M i n i s t e r -
i a l system s h o u l d be done w i t h as few changes i n t h e C o n s t i t u -
t i o n a l I n s t r u m e n t s as p o s s i b l e .
8 . The D e p a r t m e n t f o r t h e r e a s o n s g i v e n i s s t r o n g l y i n f a v o u r
o f t h e o f f i c i a l s i n E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l c o n t i n u i n g t o have v o t e s .
C o n s t i t u t i o n s , h o w e v e r , a r e made f o r m e n , n o t men f o r c o n s t i t u -
t i o n s , a n d h o w e v e r l o g i c a l a c o n s t i t u t i o n may b e , i t w o n ' t w o r k
u n l e s s a s u f f i c i e n t number o f p e o p l e c o n c e r n e d w a n t i t t o ; if
p e o p l e want t o work i t , i t w i l l work even t h o u g h i t contains
i l l o g i c a l i t i e s . The D e p a r t m e n t t h e r e f o r e s u g g e s t s , particularly
s i n c e we h a v e no d e v i l ' s a d v o c a t e h e r e , t h a t a h a r d a n d f a s t
d e c i s i o n on t h i s p o i n t s h o u l d n o t be t a k e n u n t i l after Lord
Munster's discussions in Jamaica.1

( b ) GOVERNOR SIR HUGH FOOT: SPEECH, 29 A p r i l 19522

I t was f e l t by a l l t h o s e whom I c o n s u l t e d t h a t t h e p r a c t i c a l
a n d s e n s i b l e c o u r s e w o u l d be t o s e e w h e r e e x p e r i e n c e s i n c e t h e
1944 c o n s t i t u t i o n was i n t r o d u c e d s h o w e d t h a t weaknesses and
s h o r t c o m i n g s e x i s t e d , and t h e n t o u n d e r t a k e r e f o r m s d e s i g n e d t o

1. Oliver Lyttelton noted: 'In short a Fabian policy in the true sense but the
U/S should go out with a strong and of course impartial bias in favour of the
o f f i c i a l s r e t a i n i n g t h e i r v o t e s ' . Munster was under-secretary.
2. Jam. H of R. Mins. Vol.VIII pp.8-9. C O . 140/326. Foot believed strongly in
the need for c o l o n i a l progress to be based on the co-operation of the colonial
peoples, for democratic p r i n c i p l e s to be communicated and for t r a i n i n g in
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s to create r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . He was addressing the l e g i s l a t u r e ,
reporting on h i s c o n s u l t a t i o n s on c o n s t i t u t i o n a l reform. The s e c r e t a r y of
s t a t e , Oliver L y t t e l t o n , had already agreed to a l l these proposals which were
accordingly implemented in 1953 ( o r d e r - i n - c o u n c i l 30 April) and m i n i s t e r s were
assigned departments forthwith.
 143

e r a d i c a t e t h o s e weaknesses and s h o r t c o m i n g s , r a t h e r t h a n t o t h r o w
t h e whole o f our c o n s t i t u t i o n a l system back i n t o t h e m e l t i n g p o t .
The n e x t i s s u e on which t h e r e seemed t o be g e n e r a l agreement
was t h a t a l t h o u g h t h e changes m i g h t l a t e r be shown t o be neces-
s a r y i n t h e L e g i s l a t u r e , i t was i n t h e E x e c u t i v e t h a t r e f o r m s
were most u r g e n t l y r e q u i r e d . . . [The system operated since 1944 had shown
basic weaknesses. I t had served a useful purpose but he agreed with
others that an 'overhaul' was 'overdue'.1
A l l a r e agreed t h a t t h e f i r s t weakness i n our e x i s t i n g system
i s t h e o v e r - c o n c e n t r a t i o n o f a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a u t h o r i t y i n t h e Exe-
c u t i v e C o u n c i l . The E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l was o r i g i n a l l y d e c l a r e d t o
be t h e p r i n c i p a l i n s t r u m e n t o f p o l i c y . So i t s h o u l d be: b u t i t
i s a l s o under our p r e s e n t s y s t e m s , t h e p r i n c i p a l i n s t r u m e n t o f
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . Under t h e e x i s t i n g c o n s t i t u t i o n , practically
e v e r y q u e s t i o n which needs a Government d e c i s i o n has t o be r e f e r -
red t o t h e E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l . The r e s u l t i s t h a t t h e C o u n c i l , i s
so o v e r - b u r d e n e d w i t h a d m i n i s t r a t i v e m a t t e r s t h a t i t has i n a d e -
quate t i m e t o c o n s i d e r q u e s t i o n s o f major p o l i c y . Moreover grave
d e l a y s a r e caused i n a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a c t i o n .
Another r e s u l t i s t h a t an a l m o s t i n t o l e r a b l e burden i s p l a c e d
on t h e o f f i c i a l members o f t h e C o u n c i l who a r e r e s p o n s i b l e f o r
s e e i n g t h a t a l l t h e d e c i s i o n s o f t h e C o u n c i l a r e c a r r i e d o u t . Yet
another r e s u l t of the c o n c e n t r a t i o n of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e f u n c t i o n s
i n the Executive Council is t h a t the leading o f f i c i a l s outside
t h e C o u n c i l have i n s u f f i c i e n t o p p o r t u n i t y f o r e x e r c i s i n g t h e i n i -
t i a t i v e and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y which t h e i r s e n i o r i t y and e x p e r i e n c e
would j u s t i f y . No one o f t h e groups whom I c o n s u l t e d had any
doubt t h a t t h i s system r e q u i r e s r a d i c a l c h a n g e . . .
I t was agreed t h a t s e p a r a t e M i n i s t r i e s , each under t h e d i r e c -
t i o n o f a M i n i s t e r and each manned by t h e b e s t m a t e r i a l we can
p r o v i d e f r o m t h e Government s e r v i c e , must be g i v e n r e s p o n s i b i l i t y
f i r s t f o r i n i t i a t i o n o f p r o p o s a l s on p o l i c y f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n by
t h e E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l and t h e n f o r t h e e x e c u t i o n o f t h e p o l i c y
d e c i d e d upon by t h e C o u n c i l . The E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l must and
s h o u l d remain t h e p r i n c i p a l i n s t r u m e n t o f p o l i c y : i t s h o u l d no
l o n g e r be t h e p r i n c i p a l i n s t r u m e n t o f a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . 1

1, Ministers would be p o l i t i c a l heads of departments and would be appointed

and removed by the governor on the advice of the leaders of the majority party
in the house. The governor would no longer have control in the executive:
therefore he was empowered to use h i s reserve powers on h i s own r e s p o n s i b i l -
i t y . I t proved a hard task to educate the J . L . P . m i n i s t e r s , e s p e c i a l l y the
mercurial Bustamante, in the conventions of cabinet government: he v a c i l l a t e d ,
voted whimsically against his own government's motions, and i n t e r f e r e d
regularly in fellow m i n i s t e r s ' departments, and 'none of them dare c r i t i c i s e
him'. After h i s v i s i t to London for the coronation and association with the
P.M.s of S. Rhodesia, Ceylon and Malta, he talked of a national flag and
anthem and aspired to be the f i r s t governor-general of Jamaica (Foot to
Wallace, 11 Aug. C O . 10329). D.B. Sangster, the finance minister who had
boasted his unconcern with the i s l a n d ' s finances, came, in the knowledge of
i t s f a c t s , to warn his fellow ministers to go slow on a d d i t i o n a l expenditure
(Newton to Heinemann, 6 Aug. 1953 ibid,). Corruption was to provide Manley and
the P.N.P. with a strong card. One of the J.L.P. government's f i r s t acts was
to increase m i n i s t e r ' s s a l a r i e s (Rogers to Foot, 15 Sept. 1953 ibid, also Foot
to Lyttelton, 26 Oct. 1953 ibid.).
144
In addition to agreement on that vital matter, it seemed to me
that general agreement existed on another very important issue.
There has in the past been a good deal of public misunderstanding
about the working of Executive Council. We do not attempt to dis-
pose of our business in the Council by working in competing blocs
and forcing each issue to a vote. In fact it is rare for us to
take a vote at all. Rather we approach the many and varied and
complicated problems which come before us in a spirit of co-oper-
ation with all of us seeking the best solution and each member
freely expressing his view. Moreover, nominated members of the
Executive Council are not only free to speak and vote in the
Council in accordance with their own opinions: they are under a
clear obligation to do so.
Nevertheless the system we now operate in the Executive Council
may be called a system of balance in that if the elected members
were to vote one way and then non-elected members were to vote
another the matter would have to be decided by my casting vote.
In fact the casting vote is very seldom used but any system of
balance has grave disadvantages. It encourages irresponsibility.
It is a cardinal principle of the British Cabinet System that,
whatever differences of view have appeared in the discussions in
the Cabinet, when once a decision of the Cabinet is reached every
member of the Cabinet must either resign or support the decision.
He must also use his best endeavour, where action in the Legisla-
ture is required, to secure acceptance of the decision in the
Legislature.
We do not hear so much these days about the 'official govern-
ment' and the 'elected government' and I should not fail to pay
tribute to the loyal way in which Ministers have increasingly re-
spected this principle. But if we are to achieve greater respon-
sibility in the Government of Jamaica it must be clear to every-
one where responsibility lies - and under our present system res-
ponsibility is divided. No one can tell whether a Bill or a money
measure or an administrative decision conforms with the views and
the wishes of elected Ministers or not.
I have long maintained that we should seek to make our system
of government not less representative and less responsible but
more representative and more responsible and I believe that there
is wide agreement that the time has come to end the system of ba-
lance, and to increase the number of elected ministers and thus
to establish an elected majority in the Executive Council.
There is one other important reform on which I find that agree-
ment exists. The present system whereby a minister who is in com-
plete disagreement with other Ministers must be retained unless
a two-thirds majority of the House of Representatives in favour
of his removal can be secured is not recognised as unsound. It
means that the Opposition could, [if] it wished, keep a Minister
in office even when he had forfeited the confidence both of his
fel low Ministers and his party. It is, I think, fully agreed that
a new system should be worked out under which both appointment
and removal of elected Ministers should be on the recommendation
of the Leader of the Majority Party....
[The Secretary of State had indicated his approval of these reforms. On the
Governor's powers] You know very well that the reserve powers have
been very seldom exercised and I am glad that I have never had
to resort to their use. I hope that I shall not have to use them
 145
in future, but you will appreciate that to make the exercise of
reserve powers subject to the approval of a Council in which
there were an elected majority would, in effect, mean that the
Governor had no reserve powers at all. You will see from the Sec-
retary of State's statement that if the proposals for an elected
majority in Executive Council is put into effect the necessary
changes will be made in the constitutional instruments to retain
the Governor's reserve power, subject only to the approval of the
Secretary of State. At the same time, I should emphasize the vi-
tal change which the constitutional proposals, which I have exp-
lained, will have in regard to the Governor's powers. In the
past, the Governor, if supported on any issue by both nominated
and official members, has been in a position, by the exercising
of a casting vote in Executive Council, to pursue a course cont-
rary to that supported by elected Ministers. That he has scarcely
ever exercised his casting vote in Executive Council is beside
the point. The fact is that at present the Governor, in the cir-
cumstances I have described, has the power to override the views
of the elected Ministers.
The difference in future, if the proposals which I have explai-
ned are accepted, will be that if occasion every arose in which
the Governor wished to exercise reserve powers in regard to legi-
slation or finance contrary to the advice of the elected members
he would not be able to do so by resort to a casting vote in the
Council in secret. He would have to do so by exercise of his re-
serve powers in public. He would have to take public responsibi-
lity for his action. I think that Ministers have a right to say,
in effect: 'If our advice is not to be followed, then the respon-
sibility should be clearly fixed by the Governor acting not in
secret but in p u b l i c ' I myself fully agree that if ever I feel
bound to act in contrary to the advice of a majority in the Exe-
cutive Council I should take full responsibility for so doing.

(c) RESOLUTION OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 22 July 19521

Be it resolved that this House declares itself in favour of
Self Government for Jamaica and appoints a Committee of seven
members of the House forthwith to prepare a constitution provi-
ding for Self Government to be submitted for approval to the Sec-
retary of State for the Colonies at the earliest possible date,
providing that the proposals in no way delay constitutional re-
forms recently accepted by the House which should be put into
effect immediately.

43. SELECT COMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: INTERIM REPORT,

23 September 19542
4. Your Committee commenced its deliberations by accepting the

1. C O . 1031/330: end. in Foot's circular 26 July. Manley's motion was carried

unanimously when the amendment proceeding for the implementation of the
reforms recently accepted had been added. Manley found the existing proposals
inadequate. In the event the P.N.P. abstained and these recommendations were
approved by the house.
2. Jam. Min. H of R 1954 App. XCIX, C O . 140/328; CO. 1031/1364. By resolution
(22 July 1952) a select committee had been appointed, under Sir H. Allan, then
Sangster, to prepare *a constitution providing for the self-government of
146

f o l l o w i n g basic p r o p o s i t i o n s and guiding i t s e l f by them and by

what they i m p l y : - (a) Jamaica's experience in the working of Par-
liamentary i n s t i t u t i o n s j u s t i f i e s the view t h a t our immediate
long-term aim must be the achievement of Dominion Status w i t h i n
as short a time as possible a f t e r f u r t h e r experience has been
gained i n the working of the present C o n s t i t u t i o n as amended i n
terms of the proposals embodied i n t h i s Report, (b) That amend-
ments should be made t o the e x i s t i n g C o n s t i t u t i o n t o take e f f e c t
immediately or as near t h e r e t o as may be reasonably possible a f -
t e r the general e l e c t i o n s of 1954. (c) That the proposed amend-
ments should secure t o Jamaica immediate f u l l Self-Government i n
i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s , (d) That i n view of the recommendation f o r f u l l
Self-Government i n i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s the power of the Secretary
of State f o r the Colonies t o appoint or c o n t r o l the appointment
of the higher l e v e l s of the C i v i l Service in Jamaica requires t o
be d e a l t w i t h - Our aim should be t o e s t a b l i s h a p o s i t i o n in t h i s
v i t a l matter c o n s i s t e n t w i t h Self-Government and t o prepare now
f o r the time when we w i l l , through our own independent C i v i l Ser-
vice Commission have complete r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r p r o v i d i n g f o r
our own C i v i l Service, (e) That decision as t o the f u t u r e of the
L e g i s l a t i v e Council and as t o the number of Constituencies which
ought t o be provided should await the f o r m u l a t i o n of the C o n s t i -
t u t i o n p r o v i d i n g f o r Dominion Status f o r Jamaica or f o r a f u r t h e r
advance beyond the present C o n s t i t u t i o n as same may be amended
by v i r t u e of these recommendations.
5. Your Committee t h e r e f o r e has the honour t o recommend t h a t the
f o l l o w i n g amendments t o be made t o the e x i s t i n g C o n s t i t u t i o n of
Jamaica as soon as possible a f t e r the General Elections t o be

Jamaica' to be submitted to the s e c r e t a r y of s t a t e . Much debate now centred

on the s i z e of the l e g i s l a t u r e s and the question of a bicameral body; on both
Bustamante was suspect of seeking more patronage (Rogers to Foot, 15 Sept.
1953 C O . 1031/329; Min. Wallace, 12 March 1954: C O . 1031/1363). There was a
strong case for showing Jamaica t h a t 'Mr. Bustamante does not always get h i s
own way. We may agree t h a t t h e r e could scarcely have been a b e t t e r wicket for
the governor to bat on. As might have been expected he i s playing the bowling
successfully.' (Min. Wallace ibid.). But the CO. would not resist any propo-
s a l s generally supported - for a b o l i t i o n for the upper house, for i t s nomina-
t i o n , for i t s d i r e c t or i n d i r e c t (as in Soulbury [Vol.VII p.244]) e l e c t i o n ,
and for m i n i s t e r i a l membership t h e r e i n (Rogers to Foot, 14 Dec. ibid.: Wallace
to Deverell, 30 July 1954: C O . 1031/1363) though t h e r e was l i t t l e hope t h a t
the q u a l i t y of membership would be improved by any device. The new c o n s t i t u -
t i o n required further t r i a l before more powers were t r a n s f e r r e d . Certainly no
further reforms before the e l e c t i o n (Rogers to Deverell, 21 J u l y : C O . 1031/
1364). The Sangster committee envisaged a phased approach to self-government -
the delegation of departmental r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s and the removal of o f f i c e r s
(save c o l o n i a l s e c r e t a r y ) from the executive as the f i r s t s t a g e s . The c o l o n i a l
s e c r e t a r y and a c t i n g governor, CM. Deverell, reported more agreement between
the parties than ever before (to Rogers, 23 July: ibid.). The house agreed to
adopt the above interim proposals unanimously on 20 Oct. 1954. But when Manley
became chief minister in 1955 he did not immediately press for t h e i r implemen-
t a t i o n , believing t h a t the c o n s t i t u e n c i e s would have to be redefined to accom-
modate a larger membership. An order-in-council (29 July 1955: Stat.R. No.
1214) provided for a ninth minister alongside 3 ex officio and 2 nominees:
(also Stat.R. No.1209: 3 Aug. 1956).
 147

h e l d i n t h e year 1954:-

E x e c u t i v e Counci1
( a ) That t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n o f t h e E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l be amended by
removing t h e r e f r o m t h e t h r e e O f f i c i a l Members.
( b ) That H i s E x c e l l e n c y t h e Governor s h o u l d cease t o be an ex
officio member and to preside and that the Chief Minister or his
deputy s h o u l d p r e s i d e a t a l l meetings o f t h e E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l .
I t s h o u l d be p r o v i d e d however t h a t t h e Governor s h a l l have t h e
r i g h t t o summon a s p e c i a l m e e t i n g o f t h e E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l and
t h a t a t such s p e c i a l m e e t i n g he s h a l l p r e s i d e b u t s h a l l n o t have
a vote.
( c ) That t h e r e s h o u l d be t e n M i n i s t e r s i n s t e a d o f e i g h t i n t h e
Executive Council to allow f o r the establishment of a M i n i s t r y
o f J u s t i c e and a M i n i s t r y o f Home A f f a i r s .
( d ) The M i n i s t r y o f J u s t i c e t o have t h e f o l l o w i n g f u n c t i o n s : -
( i ) The A d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f J u s t i c e
( i i ) The d r a f t i n g o f l e g i s l a t i o n
( i i i ) The f u n c t i o n s o f t h e P u b l i c T r u s t e e .
( e ) The M i n i s t r y o f Home A f f a i r s t o have t h e f o l l o w i n g f u n c -
tions:-
( i ) The a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f Local Government i n r e g a r d t o t h e
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f C e n t r a l Government t h e r e i n ,
( i i ) The maintenance o f o r d e r t o i n c l u d e t h e d i r e c t i o n o f t h e
Pol 1ce F o r c e . 1
( i i i ) S e c u r i t y , I m m i g r a t i o n and E m i g r a t i o n .
( f ) That t h e Nominated Members s h o u l d be a p p o i n t e d by t h e
Governor on t h e n o m i n a t i o n o f t h e C h i e f M i n i s t e r . . . .
The A t t o r n e y General
I n o r d e r t o s e c u r e t h a t t h e A t t o r n e y General s h a l l be c o m p l e t e -
l y f r e e from P o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l i n regard t o the p r o s e c u t i o n of
o f f e n c e s and o t h e r m a t t e r s w h e r e i n he a c t s w i t h such freedom
under t h e B r i t i s h C o n s t i t u t i o n t h e r e s h a l l be w r i t t e n i n t o t h e
C o n s t i t u t i o n o f Jamaica a p r o v i s i o n as f o l l o w s : - That t h e A t t o r -
ney General s h a l l i n Jamaica a c t a t h i s s o l e d i s c r e t i o n i n a l l
m a t t e r s w h e r e i n by C o n s t i t u t i o n a l usage i n England he a c t s a t
such d i s c r e t i o n . . . . [A Judicial Services Commission should advise the Go-
vernor on appointments, dismissals and disciplinary control of a l l mem-
bers of the j u d i c i a l service; and a Public Service Commission s i m i l a r l y
for public o f f i c i a l s , though certain specified o f f i c e r s (e.g. the A.G.)
should be made by the Governor acting in his d i s c r e t i o n . ] 2

4 4 . SIR CHARLES JEFFRIES: MINUTE, 22 October 19543

As I see i t , t h e r e can be no q u e s t i o n o f Jamaica becoming an
Independent S t a t e i n i t s own r i g h t . A l t h o u g h i t s p o p u l a t i o n i s

1. ( i i ) and ( i i i ) were powers usually retained u n t i l the grant of indepen-

dence,
2. In the general e l e c t i o n of 1955 Manley's P.N.P. won 18 s e a t s : Bustamante's
J . L . P . 14. Manley as chief minister i n s t i t u t e d a m i n i s t e r s ' conference
preceding each meeting of the executive council to agree on united action so
t h a t i n e v i t a b l y the l a t t e r became a rubber stamp.
3. CO. 1031/1364. See also the discussions on the problem of the smaller
t e r r i t o r i e s , Nos.4-10.
148

c o m p a r a b l e w i t h t h e s m a l l e s t South and C e n t r a l A m e r i c a n r e p u b -
lics, i t is not really l a r g e enough, o r possessed o f enough
r e s o u r c e s t o s t a n d o n i t s own f e e t . T h e r e a s o n a b l e e x p e c t a t i o n
i s t h a t , i f one I n d e p e n d e n t S t a t e emerges i n t h a t p a r t o f t h e
w o r l d , i t w i l l be a C a r i b b e a n f e d e r a t i o n i n w h i c h J a m a i c a w i l l
have a l e a d i n g p a r t .
On t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e r e c a n be no q u e s t i o n o f r e t a i n i n g f o r
much l o n g e r a n y e x t e r n a l c o n t r o l o f t h e d o m e s t i c g o v e r n m e n t o f
t h e i s l a n d . We a r e n e a r t o t h e p o i n t a t w h i c h t h e v e s t i g e s o f
C O . c o n t r o l s e r v e l i t t l e u s e f u l p u r p o s e and a c t as i r r i t a n t s .
I n s h o r t w h i l e we s h o u l d s e e k t o s e c u r e t h a t a t t h i s n e x t s t a g e
o f p r o g r e s s i n t h e l e a s t o n e o f f i c i a l m i n i s t e r s h o u l d be r e t a i n e d
i n t h e C a b i n e t , we s h o u l d h a v e i t i n m i n d t h a t v e r y shortly
Jamaica s h o u l d advance t o r o u g h l y t h e p r e s e n t (1954) p o s i t i o n o f
the Gold Coast, b u t s h o u l d s t o p f i r m l y a t t h i s stage u n t i l such
t i m e as t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r d e f e n c e , s e c u r i t y and e x t e r n a l
a f f a i r s c o u l d be t r a n s f e r r e d f r o m t h e U . K . t o t h e g o v e r n m e n t o f
an i n d e p e n d e n t f e d e r a t i o n . T h i s w i l l b e , i n e f f e c t , a d i a r c h y ,
and I have been i m p r e s s e d by M r . Leo A m e r y ' s v i e w , g i v e n t o L o r d
M u n s t e r a n d m y s e l f , t h a t t h e r e i s much t o be s a i d f o r m a k i n g t h e
d i a r c h y open r a t h e r t h a n c o n c e a l e d . T h i s i s c o n t r a r y t o t h e
accepted t r e n d o f o p i n i o n , but i t deserves s e r i o u s s t u d y . There
is, a s we v e r y w e l l know, a d i f f i c u l t y about d e f i n i n g the
r e s p e c t i v e spheres o f t h e two s i d e s o f t h e d i a r c h y - b u t ,
s u p p o s i n g t h i s c a n be g o t over, we c a n e n v i s a g e a n a r r a n g e m e n t
f o r J a m a i c a , a n d o t h e r t e r r i t o r i e s i n t h e same c a t e g o r y , under
w h i c h t h e G o v e r n o r w o u l d a c t as a s t r i c t l y c o n s t i t u t i o n a l head
o f s t a t e , i.e. on t h e a d v i c e o f l o c a l M i n i s t e r s , i n a l l except
reserved matters; while taking executive action o n h i s own
a u t h o r i t y in matters reserved to the ' I m p e r i a l ' side.
I f t h i s i s t o become t h e a c c e p t e d p a t t e r n ( o r e v e n i f we s t i c k
t o t h e c o n c e a l e d f o r m o f d i a r c h y ) we o u g h t f r o m now o n t o be
t a k i n g d e l i b e r a t e a n d p o s i t i v e a c t i o n t o t r a i n up a s e l e c t b o d y
of c i v i l servants t o a s s i s t t h e Governors i n t h e I m p e r i a l side
of t h e i r f u n c t i o n s .

45. SIR CHARLES JEFFRIES TO GOVERNOR SIR HUGH FOOT, 30 October 19541
[The C O . approved e n t i r e l y o f what he had s a i d about c o n s i d e r i n g
f u r t h e r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l advance when t h e e l e c t i o n s were over: t h e more
i n f o r m a l and t h e vaguer he l e f t the t i m e t a b l e the b e t t e r . 2 ]
As y o u k n o w , we s h a r e y o u r v i e w t h a t we s h o u l d k e e p t h e
i n i t i a t i v e b u t we t h i n k t h a t t h i s means a c t i n g o n l y shortly
b e f o r e we h a v e t o ; i t i s i n J a m a i c a ' s own i n t e r e s t n o t t o r u s h

1. C O . 1031/1364. Tel: immediate, s e c r e t , and p e r s o n a l . J e f f r i e s had served

in the C O . since 1917 and was now deputy u n d e r - s e c r e t a r y of s t a t e .
2. A minute (Gordon Taylor, 11 Oct. ibid.) emphasised the need to say ' a s
l i t t l e as p o s s i b l e about what might happen next year in the hope ( s l e n d e r as
i t may be) t h a t when the time comes to consider the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p o s i t i o n ,
i t may be p o s s i b l e to s t a l l off the more fundamental changes by s e t t l i n g for
such t h i n g s as the dropping of the f i n a n c i a l s e c r e t a r y from the Ex. Co., the
reform of the Leg. Co. and the s e l e c t i o n of the nominated members of the Ex.
Co. on the recommendation of the Chief M i n i s t e r . I t would almost c e r t a i n l y be
impossible to do t h i s if there were f u l l d r e s s d i s c u s s i o n s with a l l the
ballyhoo t h a t would precede them'.
 149
things. The political leaders have much to learn about such
things as financial prudence, particularly important in a poor
country, and if Manley's party win the elections it would be well
for them to learn something about running the machine by working
it before settling down to alter it. All this, as you know, is
subject to our unreserved recognition that the best way to learn
to be responsible is to have to exercise responsibility. But
there is a virtue in not handing over responsibility too quickly
for the recipients to adjust themselves to it.
There is no point in our commenting in detail on Report of
Constitutional Committee at this stage,1 but it may be useful to
you to know straight away that there are at least two of its
recommendations which will not be acceptable here. One is the
proposal that the Colonial Secretary should be removed from
Executive Council (though his title might conceivably be
changed); the other that the maintenance of order including the
direction of the Police Force should come under Ministerial
control. The latter has not even now been conceded in the Gold
Coast.... 2

46. WORKING PARTY OF DEPARTMENTAL HEADS ON THE DIARCHY SYSTEM: REPORT,

21 January 19553
We took 'diarchy' to mean a system in which the functions of
Government are explicitly divided between 'reserved' and
'transferred' sides; the former is dealt with by persons
appointed by the Crown; the latter by an elected legislature and
an elected executive. There may be provisions for some consulta-
tion between the two sides, but the formal division of responsi-
bilities is a constitutional fact. Such a diarchy exists in Malta
today, and was practiced in the Provincial Governments of India
under the 1919 Constitution, and in the Central Government of
India under the 1935 Constitution. The advantage claimed for it
is that it permits complete responsibility for the 'transferred'
matters (which usually cover virtually all internal affairs) to
the local people and their representatives, and enables Her
Majesty's Government to discharge its own responsibilities
unhindered. The system might therefore be thought appropriate for
Colonial territories where such a division as between internal
and external affairs, will be inherent in the degree of self-
government which they may expect to attain.
From our examination of the working of diarchy in Malta and
India, however, we have found that the very definition of lists
of 'reserved' and 'transferred' subjects has encouraged disputes
about their interpretation and has stimulated the elected element

1. The report of this committee presented to the house of representatives on

23 Sept. was unanimously adopted by the house on 20 Oct. 1954.
2. In a further minute (231 Jan. 1955 ibid.) Jeffries urged that it was
crucial to retain defence, internal security and foreign affairs as explicit
responsibilities of H.M.'s G. till such time as it would be possible to hand
them over to an independent Caribbean federation.
3. CO.1031/1364 Geo. 174/07. confidential. The evolution of anew system of
semi-responsible government as a preparation for a full cabinet system was a
matter of general concern and the heads of the geographical departments in the
CO. met and agreed this report.
150
to nibble at the 'reserved' side, with consequent resentment when
they have been reminded of the limitations of their authority.
This dissatisfaction has put a considerable strain upon Govern-
ment by consent. In other Colonial territories, where there has
been no such explicit division of functions, legislatures have
generally been willing to pass any measures, including provisions
made necessary by Her Majesty's Government's overseas responsi-
bilities, which they are persuaded are for the general benefit.
We recognise that there is a growing public interest in many of
the local aspects of 'external affairs' and 'defence'. For
example, the work of International Organisations such as the
C.C.T.A., U.N.E.S.CO. , and the I.L.O. is a legitimate interest
to a growing number of the public; while to the citizen 'defence'
usually means something as ordinary as construction of air raid
shelters, or organisation of local forces. We consider that it
would be unwise to thwart legitimate public interest by defining
'external affairs' and 'defence' too broadly, and then excluding
local participation in them too rigorously.
We recognise however that it is necessary to provide effective-
ly for Her Majesty's Government's ultimate responsibility in
territories which do not achieve independence, for external
relations, internal security, defence, and financial stability.
There are broadly two ways in which these responsibilities can
be properly exercised, while at the same time representatives of
the people can be brought into discussion and associated with Her
Majesty's Government, and the Colonial Government, in the
discharge of them. At the stage when a considerable amount of
responsibility for internal affairs is given to unofficials,
there usually remain three ex officio members of the Executive
Council, the Colonial (or Chief) Secretary, the Attorney General,
and the Financial Secretary. These officials retain departmental
responsibility for the matters described above. The Governor
possesses reserve powers both executive and legislative. (These
powers are general in character. They do not operate to prevent
a legislature from discussing the matters which are the depart-
mental responsibility of officials). As self-government develops
beyond this stage, these official members are withdrawn from the
Executive Council. Her Majesty's Government may then exercise its
responsibilities by vesting the Governor personally with disc-
retionary authority over certain defined matters. We noted
constitutional developments in Gold Coast from 1950 to 1954 as
illustrating both systems. While under the 1954 constitution the
Governor's discretion for these matters is absolute, he is
assisted in its exercise by Committees of elected Ministers. He
retains his reserve powers. We do not, on balance, see any
advantage in trying to narrow the reserve powers by, say,
defining more precisely than does this constitution the circum-
stances in which they could be used.
We consider that such systems amount to a form of diarchy, and
one which is politically all the better because it is 'concealed'
rather than 'open'. Such 'concealed' diarchy has advantages of
flexibility, and offers better prospects of rendering a limited
form of self-government acceptable than 'open' diarchy has done.
We felt it desirable to examine the structure of Executive
Councils in territories with a considerable amount of self-
government, to see whether more flexible arrangements than are
 151
usually found in constitutional instruments, might not be encour-
aged in the methods of selection, and the tenure of office of
their unofficial members.
We can hardly predict, other than most generally, how party
systems will develop in the Colonial territories; but it seems
possible that in some of the territories which may legitimately
expect to achieve independence within the Commonwealth, there
will grow up one majority party associated with the early achie-
vement of that independence, and that such opposition to it as
may exist will come from small and unimportant groups. We are
aware of the danger of encouraging one party rule by an ill-timed
grant of independence, but we recognise that some risk may be in-
evitable, to avoid the error of delaying independence too long.
We consider it possible that in territories where public opinion
is content to acknowledge that independence is not practicable,
there may develop an effective balance of parties, each able to
formulate alternative policies for administration of internal af-
fairs. At present however, there is little sign of such a develo-
pment in many of the territories with which we are concerned; and
rather than try to build Executive Councils on bases which do not
really exist we consider it desirable that Governors should go
as far as possible in giving all respectable political interests
some share in Government. We think this especially important in
multi-racial communities. There are generally, three methods open
by which Executive Councillors may be appointed:
(i) They may be elected by the Legislative Council;
(ii) The Governor may select them on the advice of the leader
of the majority party in the legislature;
(iii) The Governor may appoint some or all of the members in his
discretion.
Method (ii) appears to us unlikely to be practicable in many
Colonial territories so long as they lack proper party systems;
the principle implicit in method (i) is, in our view, better imp-
lemented in practice where the Governor consults with members of
the legislature, than where the latter votes individual members
to the Executive Council. We noted the arrangements recently int-
roduced in Gambia, where Royal Instructions require the Governor
to consult the members of the Legislative Council before appoin-
ting their representatives to his Executive Council; but we are
attracted by the idea of making Royal Instructions even less ex-
plicit as to consultation. We feel that in general it is desir-
able to deal with these matters by establishing conventions
rather than by laying down hard and fast rules, and that there
might be advantage in stating in Royal Instructions no more than
that 'the Governor shall appoint the Ministers in accordance (so
far as may be practicable) with the conventions which apply in
the United Kingdom'. Such instructions could, where it is desir-
able, be accompanied by guidance in open despatches. Such flex-
ible instructions would, we feel, permit enough of method (ii)
above to suit political realities and imply recognition of the
authority of the legislature in accordance with method (i); and
also permit the selection of nominated members. We recall that
even in as advanced a constitution as the Ceylon Constitution of
1946 there was provision for nominated members in the legisla-
ture, nor were they specifically excluded from holding Cabinet
posts. Again the Constitution which will come into effect in
152
Singapore this year permits the appointment of one nominated
member of the Legislative Council to the Council of Ministers.
We recognise that, in favouring a course which encourages Go-
vernors to construct their Executive Councils with a fairly free
hand, we depart from the conception of their being wholly 'above
polities'; but we consider this a realistic appreciation of the
continuing responsibilities which they must carry so long as they
continue to preside over Executive Council and therefore to dis-
charge, amongst their other functions, that of Prime Minister.
The Governor, like a Prime Minister, has to form a government
with which he can work and which will command the necessary sup-
port in the Legislative Assembly and with the public. It seems
reasonable that he should have as free a hand as possible to
assemble his team.
Hitherto the tendency has been for there to be no intermediate
stage between an Executive Council with three ex officio members,
and an entirely unofficial Executive Council. Even in Jamaica,
where there is an unofficial Minister of Finance, the Permanent
Secretary to his Ministry, who also has the title of Financial
Secretary, remains a member of Executive Council, along with the
Chief Secretary and the Attorney General. There is something to
be said for transferring the responsibility for the Financial
Department to unofficial hands at a comparatively early stage in
constitutional development, because there is no departmental res-
ponsibility more likely to bring home to unofficials what self-
government involves, and none more likely to satisfy the people
of a Colony that they are being given the reality and not the il-
lusion of domestic self-government. On the other hand in many
territories, whose economies are precarious, this step would be
justified, if at all, only after a cool calculation of the risks
involved. In any case, when responsibility for the Financial De-
partment is transferred to unofficial hands, it would seem neces-
sary to provide safeguards in Audit; and for the appointment by
the legislature of a Committee of its members on the lines of the
Public Accounts Committee. When the time comes for the Colonial
Secretary to leave the Executive Council, it is necessary for
those matters over which Her Majesty's Government desires to re-
tain ultimate control to be vested in the Governor. It is also
necessary at that point to provide for a Deputy Governor in order
that he may become Officer Administering the Government in the
Governor's absence.
CONCLUSIONS
(i) We do not favour an 'open' diarchy, on the Malta model, as
an aim of policy for Colonial Territories.
(ii) We identify a 'concealed' diarchy in the Gold Coast consti-
tutions of 1950 and 1954, and consider a similar process of
development as a desirable aim of policy for other territories;
both as an interim arrangement for those which may achieve
independence, and as a permanent one for those which will not.
(iii) We note that such a 'concealed' diarchy can be made effec-
tive, as appropriate to the stage of development of each terri-
tory, either by retaining the departments of Government concerned
with 'reserved' subjects in hands of official members of Execu-
tive Councils; or when the official members leave Executive Coun-
cils, by vesting these matters in the discretion of Governors,
(iv) We consider it desirable that unofficial representatives
 153
be associated with Governors in the discharge of these discre-
tionary responsibilities in an advisory way.
(v) Bearing in mind the uncertainty of the development of
balanced party systems in many Colonial Territories, we consider
that the arrangements for the selection and appointment of
members of executive Councils should be as flexible as possible,
(vi) We recognise the value of encouraging unofficials to
appreciate the realities of self-government as early as practi-
cable, and we regard the assumption of responsibility for the
Financial Department as one means of doing so. We also recognise
the risks of applying this principle in Colonial Territories with
a precarious economy. We stress the desirability of safeguards
on audit, and of an accounts committee of the legislature.

47. PHILIP ROGERS TO GOVERNOR SIR HUGH FOOT, 12 September 19561

[The CO. was grateful to him for keeping them so fully informed about
the progress in drafting the new constitution. But]
We are sorry to see that difficulty is likely to arise after
all about the Governor's reserve powers. We are frankly not so
much concerned about the need to retain these intact, for with
practically full internal self-government, which the next consti-
tutional stage in Jamaica will in fact amount to, such extensive
powers are unnecessary. What does concern us is that once the
process of whittling down the reserve powers begins, it may be
difficult to retain adequate powers to cover the few important
matters which we think it essential to cover. These are essen-
tially defence and external affairs, with such coverage of inter-
nal security as may be necessary for the proper carrying out of
the Governor's responsibilities in respect of both. This raises
questions of both the reserve legislative and the reserve Execu-
tive powers, although to some extent the former may be covered
by reserving specifically the power of legislation to Her
Majesty-in-Counci1 instead of to the Governor if that is easier
politically. All this, and the way in which these necessary
powers should be provided is something that we would like to
discuss with you in more detail in October.2 In the meantime we
trust the matter will not come up since we think it most impor-
tant that you and we should be fully agreed in advance on what
powers we should seek to get should the process of whittling down
reserve powers once start.
The other main question which you raise in your letter, i.e.
the retention of the Legislative Council, is however in our view
connected in some degree with the issue of reserve powers. If the
Governor's reserve powers in respect of purely internal matters
are to be removed, we would attach importance to a suitable
alternative check on the power of the Lower House, in the shape
of a properly constituted Legislative Council with reasonable

1. C O . 1031/1366 personal and confidential.

2. At the meeting in the CO. (28 Sept. ibid.) Foot opposed the retention of
any general reserve power, but accepted the present need for such legislation
in specific subjects. On the upper house if it were properly reconstituted,
it might be more useful than reserve powers which were unused. On Cayman and
Turks and Caicos it seemed prudent that a U.K. act be passed to deal
separately with them before the new Jamaican constitution became effective.
154

p o w e r s , a t any r a t e u n t i l t h e F e d e r a l Government i s p r o p e r l y
e s t a b l i s h e d and we can s e e w h e r e i t i s g o i n g . We h a v e n o t come
t o any c l e a r v i e w h e r e a s t o w h a t s h o u l d happen a t t h a t s t a g e ,
b u t i n any c a s e t h e m a t t e r i s l i k e l y t o be l a r g e l y o u t o f o u r
hands by t h e n . We do however t h i n k i t d e s i r a b l e t o r e t a i n t h e
L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l u n t i l t h e n , and f o r t h e f i r s t few y e a r s i n
w h i c h t h e J a m a i c a G o v e r n m e n t has c o m p l e t e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r i t s
i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s . We c e r t a i n l y w o u l d n o t r e g a r d i t as s u i t a b l e
t h a t t h e L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l s h o u l d be n o m i n a t e d s o l e l y on t h e
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n o f t h e C h i e f M i n i s t e r and we s h a r e y o u r o p p o s i t i o n
t o t h e e l e c t i o n o f t h e Upper H o u s e . We hope v e r y much t h a t you
w i l l be a b l e t o p e r s u a d e M a n l e y t o r e t a i n t h e C o u n c i l with
a d e q u a t e powers and w i t h a method o f n o m i n a t i o n w h i c h p r o v i d e s
f o r a s u i t a b l e b a l a n c e t o t h e Lower H o u s e .
To t u r n t o t h e D e p e n d e n c i e s , [Cayman, and Turks and Caicos] we c a n
say l i t t l e a b o u t t h e i r p o s i t i o n a n d , i n p a r t i c u l a r , t h e d e s i r -
a b i l i t y and p r a c t i c a b i l i t y o f an A c t o f P a r l i a m e n t u n t i l we r e -
c e i v e y o u r comments on my l e t t e r o f t h e 1 7 t h J u l y . I t w i l l o f
c o u r s e be n e c e s s a r y t o r e t a i n t h e G o v e r n o r ' s f u l l r e s e r v e powers
f o r t h e D e p e n d e n c i e s w h a t e v e r happens i n J a m a i c a s i n c e i t i s n o t
p o s s i b l e f o r obvious reasons t o contemplate i n t e r n a l s e l f - g o v e r n -
ment f o r t h o s e s m a l l i s l a n d s .

4 8 . ( a ) COMMITTEE OF UNOFFICIAL MEMBERS OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL: REPORT,

14 March 19571
[The case f o r second chamber2 was fundamental and simply summarised.

1. Jam. Govt. P r i n t e r 1957. A committee of seven (Manley, Glasspole, Lloyd and

Nethersole for the P.N.P. and Bustamante, Sangster and Allen for the J . L . P . )
had been appointed by and from the house of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s on 3 November 1956
and reported 19 June 1957, recommending the r e c o n s t i t u t i o n of the executive
as a council of m i n i s t e r s under the chief minister (though the governor could
summon and preside a t s p e c i a l meetings and the extension of the minister of
home a f f a i r s ' r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s to include order, p o l i c e , s e c u r i t y and immig-
r a t i o n . The governor would r e t a i n r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for defence, foreign a f f a i r s ,
and oversight of the public s e r v i c e s . Manley believed t h a t the West Indian
federation could only succeed on the b a s i s of self-governing u n i t s : the
p o s s i b i l i t y of dominion s t a t u s for the federation made speed in the Jamaican
reform urgent.
2. The l e g i s l a t i v e council in Jamaica was the upper house. Though valuable in
the immediate s t a g e , n e i t h e r Deverell (23 J u l y , 18 Aug. 1954: C O . 1031/1364)
nor Foot had thought t h a t the l e g i s l a t i v e council had a long term future: for
the present t h e r e was i n s u f f i c i e n t demand for i t s a b o l i t i o n : nomination was
c e r t a i n l y p r e f e r a b l e to e l e c t i o n , but the l a t t e r might be accepted if t h e r e
were strong p r e s s u r e . I t s a b o l i t i o n might be ' a useful bargaining counter'
l a t e r . I t would be d i f f i c u l t to f i l l i t s u i t a b l y once there was need for
members of the federal l e g i s l a t u r e (CO. meeting 25 Aug. ibid.). Later Foot
urged the need for a second chamber, even if nominated by the chief m i n i s t e r ,
enabling him to bring one or two able men, otherwise u n a v a i l a b l e , into the
cabinet (to Rogers, 13 Aug. 1956: C O . 1031/1366) (Min. Watt, 13 Jan. 1958:
C O . 1031/2262). Manley had doubts, p a r t i c u l a r l y of the J . L . P . members with
' t h e i r p o l i t i c s of low s t a n d a r d ' , but F o o t ' s successor, Sir Kenneth Black-
burne, strongly supported the r e t e n t i o n of the second chamber i t s members were
mostly ' f i r s t c l a s s and made good c o n t r i b u t i o n to thought and p o l i c y ' ( t o A.R.
Thomas, 22 May 1961: C O . 1031/3198). Foot a l s o saw benefit in h i s s t i l l s i t -
 155
Their origins were historical: 1n the second place they had a revlsionary
purpose; and thirdly they 'enfranchised...important classifications of
the body politic which might otherwise have no voice in the direction of
the affairs of the country'. To expand on these last two reasons: as for
the revislonary function] Human experience is overwhelmingly in
favour of 'the second look' and it is the recognition of this
simple fact that accounts for the existence of a second chamber
wherever (with minor exceptions) democracy is understood and
practised... Furthermore the public seldom becomes fully aware
of the implications of important legislation until it has comp-
leted its passage through the primary house...particularly when
second reading is completed at one sitting. It is then, if at
all, that the voice of public opinion is raised - but all too
late if there is no second chamber. There is also the pedestrian
necessity to revise and check in the ordinary sense of those
words... Finally, it should surely be understood and always borne
in mind that the procedure now accepted wherever bi-cameral legi-
slature exists, is not that the second chamber can reject any
measure for all time but merely that it can insist that the pri-
mary house itself review its original decision in the light of
considerations put before it by the revisionary house. If the
primary house does not accept the recommendations of the second
chamber it has the power to force its will upon the State. A re-
visionary house does not make laws; it only makes suggestions.
The third reason for a bi-cameral legislature originates in the
advisability of ensuring that all sections of the state are rep-
resented in the legislature - to a lesser extent, of guarding
against freak results at the polls. The sheer weight of numbers
involved in adult franchise bearing down on principles of democ-
racy which had their origin when citizens were few, may also be
said to have disenfranchised some important elements in the com-
munity... Experience is not to be confused with ability nor is
ability a substitute for experience and it is in this context
that it is idle to pretend that those who could not face the hus-
tings are therefore incapable of helping to bear the burden of
public administration for the common weal.
After due consideration of the May, 1954, report of its prede-
cessors. ..which recommend a gradual development from an all-nomi-
nated to an all-elected second chamber and after reviewing other
methods of selection, the committee has come to the unanimous
conclusion that the second chamber should be entirely nominated
by the Governor after consultation with the leaders of the Parli-
amentary majority and minority respectively. The reasons for mak-
ing this recommendation are as follows: (1) The present Parlia-
mentary majority and minority are understood to be unalterably
opposed to any second chamber based on the elective principle.
It is not for this committee to speculate as to their reasons for
this opposition but it must be said that the great majority of
this Committee are of the same view. A small minority still feels
that election on the basis of very broad constituencies - not
more than three or four for the whole island - might well provide
the type of representation which is sought to be assured in a

ting in the executive as 'a stabilising influence' though he was often over-
ruled and had then to take responsibility for effecting decisions.
156
second chamber while at the same time giving it the added influ-
ence of being election-based. (2) The abandonment of the elective
principle leaves few practicable alternatives. Indirect election
whether by a college of electors or by the primary chamber is
open to the same objections, though in a more limited form, as
are advanced against straight election. Election or nomination
by groups of the state such as agricultural, commercial, indust-
rial and other divisions presents technical difficulties of great
complexity and tends to encourage a limited and partisan view
which is most to be avoided in a second chamber Again one
falls back on appointment by an impartial and independent author-
ity - the Governor.
It is an important part of the committee's recommendation that
prior to making his appointments to the Second Chamber the Gover-
nor must consult with the leaders of the Parliamentary majority
and minority respectively... In the opinion of the committee
there is an important distinction between the Chief Minister him-
self appointing any of the members of the second chamber on the
one hand and the Governor doing so on the other, after consulta-
tion with the Chief Minister.

(b) SELECT COMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: REPORT, 19 June 19571

[The Committee had decided to consider the Governor's proposals of
March 1957 both in respect of their implications themselves and 1n
respect of the Interim Report of 1954.]
6. The examination of the Interim Report of 1954 and a compari-
son of that Report with the Governor's proposals disclosed the
following points which were dealt with as is hereinafter set
out:-
(a) The Committee noted that the proposals made by the Governor
did not deal with the establishment of a Ministry of Justice, the
establishment of a Judicial Service Commission and the Public
Service generally, all these being matters dealt with in the Re-
port of 1954.
(b) It was agreed in regard to the establishment of a Ministry
of Justice, that this was not necessary at this stage. It was
agreed, however, that the subject 'The Administration of Justice'
should be assigned to some appropriate Minister, probably the
Minister of Home Affairs, together with all the Departments and
matters arising thereunder. It was noted that the drafting of le-
gislation a matter referred to in the 1954 report, was now being
dealt with by an established Drafting Department and that there
was a special Legislation Committee of Executive Council with
particular duties in regard to this matter.
(c) In regard to the Judicial Service, the Committee was advi-
sed that there were proposals for the early passing of a Law to
provide for the creation of a Judicial Services Commission.
(d) As to the Public Service generally, it was agreed that the
existing arrangements should not at present be altered in any

1. Jam. Min. H of R. 1957 App. XLI CO.140/346. By resolution (31 Oct. 1956)
another select committee to prepare for 'complete self-government in all
internal affairs' had been appointed. The governor, Foot, had proposed some
immediate changes (14 March 1957); the house had unanimously welcomed them (25
April 1957); and the full reforms came into effect (11 Nov. 1957).
 157
way.
7. All the other matters dealt with in the 1954 report were ac-
cepted as covered directly, or by necessary implication, by the
Governor's proposals and the following conclusions were reached:-
(a) That there should be a Council of Ministers to take the
place of the existing Executive Council and that the Council of
Ministers should ordinarily be presided over by the Chief Minis-
ter but that the Governor should have the right to summon special
meetings of the Council, on which occasions he would preside.
(b) That the Council would consist of 10 Ministers and two Mem-
bers of the Legislative Council [the upper house] to be appointed
by the Governor on the recommendation of the Chief Minister.
(c) That there should be a Minister of Home Affairs and that
the Ministry of Home Affairs should, in addition to such other
subjects as may be assigned, have general responsibility for the
maintenance of order, the Police Force, Security, Immigration and
Emigration.
(d) That all officials should be removed from the Legislative
Council save the Attorney General.
(e) That the title of the Colonial Secretary should be changed
to that of Chief Secretary.
(f) That the Members of the Legislative Council who are Members
of the Council of Ministers should have the style and rank of Mi-
nisters without portfolio and should be responsible in the Legis-
lative Council for presentation of Government business in that
Counci1.
(g) That the new constitutional proposals should include a spe-
cial provision in relation to the Attorney General as follows:-
'That the Attorney General shall in Jamaica act at his sole disc-
retion in all matters wherein by Constitutional usage in England
he acts at such discretion.'
8. At the meeting on the 4th of June the Unofficial Members of
the Honourable Legislative Counci1...agreed with all the propo-
sals as set out in the said paragraph.
9. As to the provision in paragraph 7(g), it was noted that in
addition to the Constitutional right which the Attorney General
had to act at his discretion in regard to the initiation and con-
duct of criminal proceedings he had also a constitutional right
to act at his discretion in regard to permitting his name to be
used in proceedings brought against statutory bodies or public
officers at the relation of private individuals.
It was considered that it might be sufficient to include in the
Constitution a provision that responsibility for the initiation
and conduct of criminal proceedings should not be assigned to a
Minister but should vest in the Attorney General.
10. Your Committee has the honour to recommend that the existing
Constitution of Jamaica be amended in accordance with the provi-
sions of paragraph 7 hereof.1
11. The representatives of the Parliamentary Minority to wit -
Sir Alexander Bustamante, Mr. D.B. Sangster and Mr. E.L. Allen
accept this report subject to the reservation set out below -
'The representatives of the Parliamentary Minority. . .are of opin-
ion that the name 'Executive Council' should remain unchanged and

1. These recommendations were introduced in the 1957 constitution.

158
that the members of the Legislative Council who are members of
the reconstituted Executive Council should not have the style and
rank of Ministers without portfolio.'

Annexure I Extract from Governor Foot's address in March, 1957

[A full review and revision would take some time - It was agreed that
a larger House of Representatives should be introduced and therefore 'the
complete job' would await the next general election. So he would make a
practical proposal which he had already discussed with the Chief Minister
and the Leader of the Opposition.] I propose that in advance of
the full constitutional changes we should during this session of
the Legislature and during this year take another important step
in the development of our system of representative government.
I propose that that step should be fully in accordance with the
constitutional purposes which both parties have publicly suppor-
ted.
My suggestion is that this year the Executive Council should
be reconstituted as a Council of Ministers, and that apart from
the Chief Minister, the Council should have eleven members. Of
that number eight or nine would be Members of the House of Repre-
sentatives appointed by the Governor on the recommendation of the
Chief Minister, and not less than two or more than three would
be Members of the Legislative Council also appointed by the Go-
vernor on the recommendation of the Chief Minister. That would
give a Council of twelve in all to replace the existing Council
of fifteen. Moreover I propose that the Chief Minister should
normally call meetings of the new Council and that he should nor-
mally preside over it.
These proposals would involve the withdrawal of the Governor
and the Colonial Secretary and the Financial Secretary and the
Attorney General from the Executive Council, and I also propose
that the Colonial Secretary and the Financial Secretary should
withdraw from the Legislative Council though I think that it
would be well for the Attorney General to remain a Member of the
Legislative Council. Two unofficial Members would be added to the
Legislative Council to replace the Colonial Secretary and the Fi-
nancial Secretary.
Although the Chief Minister would normally call meetings of the
Executive Council and preside over it, I propose that the Gover-
nor should have the right to call a meeting of the Council at his
discretion and that when the Governor is present in the Council
he should preside. I further propose that the title of the Colon-
ial Secretary should be changed at the same time to that of Chief
Secretary.
49. SELECT COMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: REPORT,
12 February 19581
[The major remaining points to be dealt with were]
(a) Legislature
(i) whether the Legislature should consist of two Chambers or

1. Jam. Min. H of R. 1958 App. XII: C O . 1031/2262 The report was presented 'on
the background of the constitution as it now exists' after the immediate re-
forms effected in 1957 which had made additional grants of responsible govern-
ment. Its proposals were unanimously accepted in the house of representatives
 159
of the House of Representatives only; (ii) assuming that the
Legislative Council was retained, what its numbers should be and
how the members should be appointed; (iii) what should be the
number of the members of the House of Representatives and how the
number of seats should be distributed among the parishes.
(b) Legislative Powers
The extent to which the Legislative Council, if retained,
should have the right to delay the enactment of money bills and
other bills.
(c) Reserve Powers
What should happen to the reserve powers properly so called and
to the existing provisions requiring bills to be reserved for the
special assent of Her Majesty-in-Counci1 as set out in the exist-
ing Constitution.
(d) The Civil Service Commission and the Privy Council
The extent to which the Civil Service Commission should be res-
ponsible for the appointment and promotion of Civil Servants and
the Governor's power in relation thereto, and questions relating
to the Privy Council and its responsibility in regard to discip-
linary matters affecting the Civil Service...
9. Your Committee proposes that a new Constitution be made for
Jamaica using the existing Constitution as a basis and incorpor-
ating the following provisions:-
Legislature
(i) The Legislature shall consist of 2 Chambers to be known
respectively as the Legislative Council and the House of Repre-
sentatives.
(ii) The Legislative Counci 1 shall consist of persons appointed
by the Governor after consultation with the political leaders of
the Parties represented in the House of Representatives.
(iii) The Chief Minister, who may be designated Premier, shall
have the right to recommend the appointment of not more than 3
persons to be members of the Legislative Council.
(iv) The Legislative Council shall consist of 21 members,
(v) No official shall be a member of the Legislative Council.
(vi) The Legislative Council will elect a President and a
Deputy President.
(vii) The House of Representatives shall consist of 45 mem-
bers. . .
(viii) The House of Representatives shall elect a Speaker and a
Deputy Speaker.
Legislative Powers
(The Committee recommend that the Legislative Council have powers
similar to those of the House of Lords in the British Parlia-
ment. )
Executive
(xi) The Council of Ministers shall be known as the Cabinet.
The number of Ministers shall not exceed 15, of whom not more
than 12 shall be members of the House of Representatives...
Reservation of Bills

on 18 June (CO. 1031/2262). All officials save the A.G. had been removed from
the legislative council. Jamaica now had full internal self-government, the
general reserve powers of the governor, both legislative and executive, dis-
appearing (CO. note 18 June 1958: ibid.).
160
(xvii) No bill shall be reserved for the Special assent of Her
Majesty-in-Counci1 except a bill purporting to affect Defence or
international relations or appearing to be inconsistent with the
Constitution itself.
(xviii) The Governor's veto power in respect of legislation
should be exercised in accordance with constitutional procedures
which should require him to act on the advice of the Cabinet.
Reserve Powers
(xix) All the reserve powers, that is to say the powers contai-
ned in section 47 of the Jamaica (Constitution) Order-in-Counci1
1944 whereby the Governor may declare that any Bill, Motion,
Resolution or Vote shall have effect notwithstanding that it may
not have been approved by the Legislature, and the power to re-
ject the advice of the Council of Ministers in the interest of
public order, public faith or good Government, shall be removed
from the Constitution.
The Civil Service
(xxii) The Civil Service Commission shall be responsible for the
appointment and promotion of Civil Servants, the Governor acting
on the recommendation of the Commission but having the right to
refer a recommendation once only for further consideration.
The Privy Counci1
(xxiii) The Privy Council shall be retained and in addition to
its duties of being advisory to the Governor in matters relating
to the exercise of the Royal Prerogative, shall continue to be
responsible for disciplinary matters relating to the Civil
Service.

50. J.E. MARNHAM TO GOVERNOR SIR KENNETH BLACKBURNE, 29 April 19581

[The report of the Constitution committee had been received. It seemed
necessary and desirable to involve the federal government in the consti-
tutional advance in all unit territories, large and small, though in the
latter cases the federal government would have to move with great
caution.]
It seems to us, therefore, desirable to make a start by associ-
ating the Federal Government in some way with the forthcoming
constitutional changes in Jamaica. Particularly in view of the
results of the Federal elections in Jamaica, we recognise the
need for much circumspection. In fact, since H.M.G. has been com-
mitted to the general plan of constitutional advance from a time
before the Federation was established, it should make it easier
for us to recognise the interest of the Federal Government with
a due formality, without going to the probably awkward extent of
inviting them to comment on the substance of what is proposed. . . .
[He suggested that perhaps the most prudent procedure would be to send
all the new constitutional instruments to the federal government for
information.]

51. DEPARTMENTAL BRIEF ON CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT: JAMAICA, CAYMAN AND

TURKS AND CAICOS ISLANDS, 6 May 19592
J a m a i c a . Under t h e p r e s e n t c o n s t i t u t i o n t h e G o v e r n o r o f J a m a i c a
r e t a i n s r e s e r v e d e x e c u t i v e and l e g i s l a t i v e powers and c e r t a i n

1. C O . 1031/2262 personal and conf. Blackburne had succeeded Foot as governor

(1957-62). Marnham was now the head of the W.I. department A. 2. C O . 1031/
 161
Jamaican Bills must be reserved for the signification of Her
Majesty's pleasure, while all Jamaican laws are subject to dis-
allowance by Her Majesty. The public service is the ultimate res-
ponsibility of the Secretary of State. Under the new constitution
the reserved legislative and executive powers of the Governor
will disappear, while the only Bills which will have to be reser-
ved are those effecting international obligations or the Royal
Prerogative. The power of Her Majesty to disallow Jamaican laws
will exist only in respect of Bills affecting Jamaican Government
stock which has been given the status of trustee stock in the
United Kingdom. Control of the public service will be exercised
by Service Commissions. Jamaica will then attain complete inter-
nal self-government although her position as a unit territory of
the Federation of The West Indies will remain unchanged. That is
to say, the Federal Government will still retain responsibility
for subjects on the Exclusive Legislative List and the power to
pass over-riding legislation in the fields covered by the Concur-
rent Legislative List, but the Government of Jamaica will be
responsible for all other subjects.
The main features of the new constitution will be as follows:
(i) the Governor will normally act in accordance with the ad-
vice of the Cabinet (as the Council of Ministers will be called)
except where the matter is the responsibility of some other body
(e.g. the Public Service Commission) or where the constitution
specifically provides for him to act in his discretion. In the
last mentioned case he will act in accordance with United Kingdom
constitutional conventions where applicable;
(ii) the legislature will consist of:-
(a) the Legislative Council consisting of 18 members appointed
by the Governor after consultation with persons speaking for the
differing political points of view of groups represented in the
House of Representatives; and not more than 3 nor less than 2
members nominated by the Premier (as the Chief Minister will be
called);
(b) the House of Representatives consisting initially of 45
members (at present 32) elected by universal adult suffrage. The
constitution will provide for the number of members of the House
of Representatives to vary between 45 and 60. The Legislative
Council will be essentially a revisionary Chamber with no powers
to delay bills more than a certain period of time;
(iii) the Cabinet will consist of the Premier and not less than
11 other Ministers charged with the general direction and control
of the Government, who will be collectively responsible to the
Legislature. The Premier will be the member of the House of Rep-
resentatives best able to command the confidence of the majority
of members of the Chamber and the remaining Ministers will be
appointed on his advice;
(iv) the existing advisory Judicial Service, Public Service and
Police Service Commissions will become executive and will be
responsible for recruitment, appointments, transfers, promotions,

2264. This memo, by the W.I. department described the changes to be introduced
in the new order-in-council and royal instructions at the next privy council;
(19 May, C O . 1031/2266).
162
discipline and dismissals in the Services for which they are
responsible. The Governor will have the power to refer their
recommendations back once. Officers in the Public Service and the
Police Service against whom disciplinary action is taken will be
entitled to appeal to the Privy Council, whose decision will be
final. Judicial officers will have no right of appeal to the
Privy Council, but a Judge may be removed from office only if the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the U.K. recommends
that he should be removed for inability or misbehaviour after the
matter has first been investigated by a locally appointed
Judicial tribunal. The members of the Police and Public Service
Commissions will be appointed by the Governor in his discretion.
The Judicial Service Commission will consist of the Chief
Justice, the Chairman of the Public Service Commission, the
Senior Puisne Judge and one other judge or ex-judge appointed by
the Governor in his discretion. The parts of the Constitution
relating to the assumption of executive functions by the Judicial
Service, Public Service and Police Service Commissions will not
become effective until a compensation scheme has been drawn up
and approved by the Secretary of State to cover officers whose
careers have been adversely affected as a consequence of
constitutional change;
(v) special provision is made for the posts of Attorney-General
and Auditor-General and Clerk and Deputy-Clerk of the Legislature
and to protect these persons' tenure of office;
(vi) provision is made for the replacement in due course of the
existing office of Chief Secretary by the office of Governor's
Secretary;
(vii) in addition to acting as an appeal body from the decisions
of the Police and Public Service Commissions in respect of
discipline, the Privy Council will advise the Governor on the
exercise of the power of pardon in criminal cases. The members
of the Privy Council will be appointed either by Her Majesty or
by the Governor in his discretion.
This constitution will come into effect on a day to be
appointed by the Governor by proclamation. Shortly thereafter a
General Election will be held to elect the first House of
Representatives under the new constitution.

Cayman Islands and Turks and Caicos Islands. The Cayman Islands
and the Turks and Caicos Islands are at present administered as
dependencies of Jamaica, although they have not in practice been
subject to the direct control of Jamaican Ministers. It was
considered desirable that, when Jamaica achieved full internal
self-government, the constitutional position of the dependencies
should be adjusted and clarified, and that their inhabitants
should be given a greater share of the responsibility for running
their affairs. Accordingly the Cayman Islands and Turks and
Caicos Islands Act, 1958, was passed, giving Her Majesty power
to constitute separate governments for them by Orders-in-Counci 1.
When the new Jamaica constitution comes into operation, new
constitutions will also come into operation for the Cayman
Islands and the Turks and Caicos Islands.
Their main features will be as follows:
(i) the Governor of Jamaica will be Governor of the Cayman
Islands and Governor of the Turks and Caicos Islands;
 163
(ii) the existing Commissioners of the Islands will be restyled
'Administrators'. (There is one in each of the two groups of
islands responsible to the Governor for day-to-day administra-
tion);
(iii) the Legislative Assembly of the Cayman Islands will consist
of:
( a ) The A d m i n i s t r a t o r ,
( b ) two o r t h r e e o f f i c i a l members,
( c ) two o r t h r e e nominated members,
( d ) t w e l v e members e l e c t e d by u n i v e r s a l a d u l t s u f f r a g e ;
( i v ) t h e L e g i s l a t i v e Assembly o f t h e T u r k s and Caicos I s l a n d s
w i l l be s i m i l a r l y c o n s t i t u t e d e x c e p t t h a t t h e r e w i l l be n i n e
e l e c t e d members;
( v ) t h e E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l o f each o f t h e two groups o f i s l a n d s
w i l l c o n s i s t o f t h e A d m i n i s t r a t o r , two o f f i c i a l members, one
nominated member and two e l e c t e d members. The E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l
w i l l n o r m a l l y be c o n s u l t e d i n m a t t e r s o f p o l i c y , b u t t h e r e w i l l
be p r o v i s i o n f o r d i s p e n s i n g w i t h t h e need t o c o n s u l t them, o r f o r
t h e i r a d v i c e n o t t o be f o l l o w e d , i n c e r t a i n s p e c i f i e d c i r c u m -
s t a n c e s . The Governor w i l l a l s o have a g e n e r a l r e s e r v e d l e g i s l a t -
i v e power, and Her M a j e s t y w i l l have t h e power o f d i s a l l o w a n c e ;
( v i ) laws e n a c t e d by t h e L e g i s l a t u r e o f Jamaica may be a p p l i e d
t o t h e Cayman I s l a n d s and t o t h e T u r k s and Caicos I s l a n d s by
v i r t u e o f a s p e c i a l p r o c e d u r e p r o v i d e d f o r by t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n .
When t h e new c o n s t i t u t i o n comes i n t o e f f e c t t h e e x i s t i n g
l e g i s l a t u r e s w i l l cease t o e x i s t and General E l e c t i o n s w i l l be
h e l d w i t h i n t h r e e months.
The Cayman I s l a n d s and t h e Turks and Caicos I s l a n d s a r e p a r t
o f t h e F e d e r a t i o n o f The West I n d i e s , b u t t h e y do n o t r e t u r n
members t o t h e F e d e r a l L e g i s l a t u r e and Federal laws do n o t a p p l y
t o them u n l e s s t h e y a r e e x p r e s s l y s t a t e d t o do s o . The r e l a t i o n -
s h i p o f t h e I s l a n d s t o t h e F e d e r a t i o n w i l l be unchanged by t h e i r
new c o n s t i t u t i o n s .
52. CONSTITUTION ORDER-IN-COUNCIL, 13 May 19591
P a r t I I - The Governor
9 . ( 1 ) The Governor s h a l l c o n s u l t w i t h t h e C a b i n e t ( o r a M i n i s t e r
a c t i n g under t h e g e n e r a l a u t h o r i t y o f t h e C a b i n e t ) i n t h e e x e r -
c i s e o f a l l h i s f u n c t i o n s o t h e r t h a n - ( a ) any f u n c t i o n which i s
e x p r e s s e d ( i n whatever t e r m s ) t o be e x e r c i s a b l e by him on o r i n
accordance w i t h t h e recommendation o r a d v i c e o f , o r w i t h t h e c o n -
c u r r e n c e o f , o r a f t e r c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h , any person o r a u t h o r i t y
o t h e r t h a n t h e C a b i n e t ; and ( b ) any f u n c t i o n w h i c h i s expressed
( i n whatever t e r m s ) t o be e x e r c i s a b l e by him i n h i s d i s c r e t i o n .

1. Stat.R. 1959 No.862. Full internal self-government granted here was also,
in 1961, s i m i l a r l y conceded to Barbados, B.G., and Trinidad and in 1969 to the
Bahamas. Though powers over s e c u r i t y and finance were granted in 1964 to B.H.,
in t h a t year i t secured a considerable amount of i n t e r n a l self-government.
Blackburne reported as a r e s u l t of Jamaican secession, the Caymans was opposed
to any a s s o c i a t i o n with the rump federation and would prefer i n t e r n a l s e l f -
government with no l i n k . In Turks and Caicos the minority which had supported
federation would now consider joining the Bahamas (to Macleod, 23 Sept. 1961:
CO. 1031/3199); though the majority might also seek i n t e r n a l self-government
(CO. b r i e f : CO.1031/3200).
164
(2) The Governor shall act in accordance with the advice of
the Cabinet (or of the said Minister) in the exercise of any fun-
ction in the exercise of which he is obliged by this section to
consult with the Cabinet (or the said Minister).
(3) Where the Governor is directed by this Order to exercise
any function on the recommendation of any person or authority,
he shall exercise that function in accordance with such recommen-
dation:
Provided that - (a) before he acts in accordance therewith, he
may, in his discretion, once refer that recommendation back for
reconsideration by the person or authority concerned; and (b) if
that person or authority, having reconsidered the original recom-
mendation under the preceding paragraph, substitutes therefor a
different recommendation, the provisions of this subsection shall
apply to that different recommendation as they apply to the ori-
ginal recommendati on.
(4) Where the Governor is directed by this Order to exercise
any function after consultation with any person or authority
other than the Cabinet (or a Minister acting under the general
authority of the Cabinet), he shall not be obliged to exercise
that function in accordance with the advice of that person or
authority.
(5) Where the Governor is directed by this Order to exercise
any function in accordance with the recommendation or advice of,
or with the concurrence of, or after consultation with, any per-
son or authority, the question whether he has so exercised that
function shall not be enquired into in any court.
(6) Subject to any instructions which Her Majesty may from
time to time see fit to give him, the Governor shall, in the ex-
ercise of any function conferred on him by this Order which is
expressed (in whatever terms) to be exercisable by him in his
discretion, act, so far as may be, in accordance with any cons-
titutional conventions applicable to the exercise of any similar
function by Her Majesty in the United Kingdom. Provided that the
question whether he has so exercised that function shall not be
enquired into in any court. . . . [The Governor might make grants of land
and Crown property in H.M. 's name under the broad seal subject to any law
or instructions (§10). He might constitute lawful offices, make appoint-
ment during pleasure and discipline or dismiss officials (§11). In H.M.'s
name he could pardon, suspend a sentence, substitute a milder penalty or
remit a sentence at his discretion (§12).]

Part III - The Legislative

14. There shall be a Legislature in and for Jamaica which shall
consist of Her Majesty, a Legislative Council and a House of Rep-
resentatives.
15.(1) The Legislative Council shall consist of persons who, be-
ing qualified for appointment as members in accordance with the
provisions of this Order, have been so appointed in accordance
with the provisions of this section.
(2) Not more than three nor less than two (as the Governor,
acting in accordance with the advice of the Premier, may from
time to time decide) of the members of the Legislative Council
shall be persons who have been appointed by the Governor, acting
as aforesaid, by instrument under the Broad Seal.
(3) The remaining members of the Legislative Council shall
 165

c o n s i s t o f e i g h t e e n persons who have been a p p o i n t e d by t h e Gover-

n o r , by i n s t r u m e n t under t h e Broad S e a l , a f t e r c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h
such persons a s , i n h i s d i s c r e t i o n , he c o n s i d e r s can speak f o r
t h e d i f f e r i n g p o l i t i c a l p o i n t s o f view o f groups r e p r e s e n t e d i n
t h e House o f R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .
1 6 . ( 1 ) The House o f R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s s h a l l c o n s i s t o f persons who,
b e i n g q u a l i f i e d f o r e l e c t i o n as members i n accordance w i t h t h e
p r o v i s i o n s o f t h i s O r d e r , have been so e l e c t e d i n t h e manner p r o -
v i d e d by o r under any law f o r t h e t i m e b e i n g i n f o r c e i n Jamaica.
( 2 ) There s h a l l be one member o f t h e House o f R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s
f o r each c o n s t i t u e n c y c o n s t i t u t e d i n accordance w i t h t h e p r o v i s -
i o n s o f s e c t i o n 45 o r s e c t i o n 106 o f t h i s O r d e r . . . . [ B r i t i s h sub-
jects over 21 and resident for 12 months would be qualified as members
of the Legislatures (§17). Subject to the West Indies Federation order-
in-councll 1957 the Legislature had powers to make laws for the peace,
order and good government of Jamaica. The upper house could not originate
a money b i l l , could delay a money b i l l only for one month and other l e g i -
slation for 7 months. Both chambers could make, amend and revoke t h e i r
standing orders (§27). A governor might abort, reserve or veto a b i l l :
he might reserve b i l l s under instruction, or at his direction i f he
thought i t inconsistent with H.M.'s treaty obligations or the royal pre-
rogative or repugnant to t h i s order (§37). H.M. might disallow l e g i s l a -
t i o n only i n j u r i n g government s t o c k . ] 1
4 2 . ( 1 ) The Governor may a t any t i m e , by P r o c l a m a t i o n p u b l i s h e d
i n t h e Gazette, prorogue the L e g i s l a t u r e .
( 2 ) The G o v e r n o r , a c t i n g i n h i s d i s c r e t i o n , may a t any t i m e ,
by Proclamation published in the Gazette, dissolve the Legisla-
ture.2
( 3 ) The Governor s h a l l d i s s o l v e t h e L e g i s l a t u r e a t t h e e x p i r a -
t i o n o f f i v e y e a r s f r o m t h e d a t e when t h e House o f R e p r e s e n t a t i -
ves f i r s t meets a f t e r any g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n u n l e s s i t has been s o -
oner d i s s o l v e d . . . . [On the advice of the Premier he might recall the Legi-
slature in an emergency. A general election must be held within 3 months
of a dissolution and after every general election the Governor would pro-
ceed under §15 to appoint Legislative Councillors (§43). The chamber
would determine t h e i r powers and privileges, so long as they did not ex-
ceed those of the U.K. Commons (§44). As for the Delimitation of Consti-
tuencies (Part IV) provision was made for a Standing Committee of the
lower House to keep the matter under review. The t h i r d Schedule dealt
with the number (45-60) and boundaries and set out the rules.]

P a r t V - The E x e c u t i v e
4 6 . ( 1 ) The e x e c u t i v e a u t h o r i t y o f Jamaica s h a l l be v e s t e d i n Her
Majesty.
(2) Subject t o the p r o v i s i o n s of t h i s Order, the executive au-
t h o r i t y o f Jamaica may be e x e r c i s e d on b e h a l f o f Her M a j e s t y by
t h e G o v e r n o r , b u t n o t h i n g i n t h i s s u b s e c t i o n s h a l l o p e r a t e so as
t o p r e j u d i c e t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f any law f o r t h e t i m e b e i n g i n
f o r c e i n Jamaica whereby f u n c t i o n s a r e c o n f e r r e d on persons o r
a u t h o r i t i e s o t h e r t h a n t h e Governor.
4 7 . ( 1 ) There s h a l l be i n and f o r Jamaica a C a b i n e t which s h a l l
c o n s i s t o f t h e Premier and n o t l e s s t h a n e l e v e n o t h e r M i n i s t e r s

1. N.B. the power of certification had been removed.

2. No mention of the premier's advice.
166

appointed i n accordance w i t h the p r o v i s i o n s of the f o l l o w i n g

section.1
(2) The Cabinet s h a l l be the p r i n c i p a l instrument of p o l i c y
and s h a l l be charged w i t h the general d i r e c t i o n and c o n t r o l of
the Government of Jamaica and s h a l l be c o l l e c t i v e l y responsible 2
t h e r e f o r t o the L e g i s l a t u r e . . . .
53. The Premier s h a l l , so f a r as i s p r a c t i c a b l e , attend and p r e -
side a t a l l meetings of the Cabinet and i n h i s absence such other
Minister shall preside as the Premier shall appoint. Provided
t h a t whenever the Governor i s present a t any meeting of the Cabi-
net which he has summoned under the p r o v i s i o n s of the f o l l o w i n g
s e c t i o n , he s h a l l p r e s i d e . 3
54. The Governor, a c t i n g i n h i s d i s c r e t i o n may summon a special
meeting of the Cabinet whenever he t h i n k s f i t , b u t , s u b j e c t
t h e r e t o , the Cabinet s h a l l not be summoned except by the autho-
r i t y of the Premier.
55. The Governor s h a l l , f o r t h e due e x e r c i s e o f h i s f u n c t i o n s ,
be e n t i t l e d t o a l l papers w h i c h a r e a v a i l a b l e t o t h e C a b i n e t and
t o any o t h e r i n f o r m a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g t h e government o f Jamaica
w h i c h i s so a v a i l a b l e . . . .
5 9 . ( 1 ) S u b j e c t t o t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f s u b s e c t i o n ( 3 ) o f s e c t i o n 56
o f t h i s O r d e r , where any M i n i s t e r has been charged w i t h t h e r e s -
p o n s i b i l i t y f o r a s u b j e c t o r d e p a r t m e n t o f government, he s h a l l
e x e r c i s e g e n e r a l d i r e c t i o n and c o n t r o l o v e r t h e work r e l a t i n g t o
t h a t s u b j e c t and over t h a t d e p a r t m e n t ; a n d , s u b j e c t as a f o r e s a i d
and t o such d i r e c t i o n and c o n t r o l , t h e a f o r e s a i d work and t h e d e -
p a r t m e n t s h a l l be under t h e s u p e r v i s i o n o f a Permanent S e c r e t a r y
a p p o i n t e d i n accordance w i t h t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f s e c t i o n 78 o f t h i s
O r d e r . ( 2 ) A person may be a Permanent S e c r e t a r y i n r e s p e c t o f
more t h a n one d e p a r t m e n t o f government. ( 3 ) The o f f i c e o f F i n a n -
c i a l S e c r e t a r y i s hereby c o n s t i t u t e d a n d , f o r t h e purposes o f
t h i s s e c t i o n , he s h a l l be deemed t o be a Permanent S e c r e t a r y .
6 0 . ( 1 ) There s h a l l be i n and f o r Jamaica a P r i v y C o u n c i l w h i c h
s h a l l c o n s i s t o f such persons a p p o i n t e d i n such manner as Her
M a j e s t y may d i r e c t by i n s t r u c t i o n s g i v e n t o t h e Governor f r o m
t i m e t o t i m e under Her Sign Manual and S i g n e t o r t h r o u g h a S e c r e -
tary of State4. . ..
6 1 . ( 1 ) There s h a l l be i n and f o r Jamaica an A t t o r n e y - G e n e r a l who
shall be appointed by the Governor, acting in his discretion5

53. THE FUNCTIONS OF THE GOVERNOR OF JAMAICA AFTER INDEPENDENCE AND THE
CLOSING OF THE GOVERNOR'S SECRETARY'S OFFICE: MEMORANDUM, 18 May 19616
I- Constitutional Development
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l changes w i l l i n f u t u r e be handled a u t o m a t i c a l l y

1. §48 on appointments of the premier and m i n i s t e r s and t h e i r tenure followed

U.K. conventions and were already as p r a c t i s e d in the i s l a n d . 2. [See Vol.IV
p.378; Vol.VI pp.576,793.] 3. In an independence c o n s t i t u t i o n of course t h e r e
would not be any such provision. 4, The Jamaican Privy Council advised the go-
vernor, e s p e c i a l l y on pardon. 5. S t i l l an o f f i c i a l appointment, h i s s a l a r y
paid by the consolidated fund. But a t independence i t became a p o l i t i c a l
o f f i c e . 6. C O . 1031/3198 conf. With the speed of decolonisation many colonies
were coming t o t h a t point where t h e functions of the governor, h i s s e c r e t a r y
and the c o l o n i a l / c h i e f s e c r e t a r y were changing: [see s i m i l a r l y Vol. IV, No.106
for N.S.W.]
 167
in the Premier's O f f i c e . No immediate a c t i o n i s needed other than
t o embody the Royal I n s t r u c t i o n s of the 19th May, 1959, in the
f i n a l Order-in-Counci1.
I I « External a f f a i r s and Consular Corps
Much of t h i s work w i l l automatically be handled by the Federal
Government; but there must be an a u t h o r i t y i n Jamaica who w i l l
deal w i t h the Federal Government, and an a u t h o r i t y t o whom the
members of the Consular Corps can have access. I t i s recommended
t h a t a new branch be established i n the Premier's o f f i c e t o
handle a l l correspondence under t h i s heading. This 'Commonwealth
and Foreign A f f a i r s Branch' could perhaps be combined with the
e x i s t i n g 'Federal A f f a i r s Branch'. The Branch would handle i n
a d d i t i o n the subjects of United States Bases and v i s i t s of
B r i t i s h and f o r e i g n warships.
I I I . Cayman Islands and Turks & Caicos Islands
On the assumption t h a t the Cayman Islands a t t a i n i n t e r n a l s e l f -
government on independence and are associated w i t h the Federal
Government f o r f o r e i g n a f f a i r s and defence, the Governor of
Jamaica w i l l cease t o have r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r these Islands. On
the assumption t h a t the Turks and Caicos Islands are linked more
d i r e c t l y w i t h the Federal Government as an 'associated s t a t e ' or
i n some other way, the Governor of Jamaica w i l l cease t o have
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r these Islands as w e l l . There w i l l accordingly
be no work t o be done f o r e i t h e r group of Islands i n the o f f i c e
of the Governor's Secretary. There w i l l , however, be need f o r a
correspondence l i n k between Jamaica and the two groups of Islands
i n order t o enable the l a t t e r t o seek assistance i n regard t o the
secondment of s t a f f and in order t o seek technical advice. I t i s
recommended t h a t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r l i a i s o n w i t h the Cayman
Islands and the Turks and Caicos Islands should be entrusted t o
the 'Commonwealth, Foreign and Federal A f f a i r s Branch' of the
Premier's o f f i c e .
IV. Defence
Although the subject of defence i s on the exclusive Federal
l i s t , there i s considerable work to be handled l o c a l l y - l i a i s o n
w i t h the m i l i t a r y a u t h o r i t i e s i n Jamaica and correspondence w i t h
the Federal Government. In a d d i t i o n , r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the
Jamaica T e r r i t o r i a l Regiment must be entrusted t o a s i n g l e
M i n i s t r y , while there i s need f o r close l i a i s o n w i t h the M i n i s t r y
of Education i n regard t o the Army and A i r Cadet Force. I t i s
recommended t h a t a 'Defence Branch' be established in the
Premier's o f f i c e t o handle these s u b j e c t s . . . .
[As for the ceremonial functions of the Custodes in their parishes and
their general supervision over the J.P.s of the parishes, these would
continue. I t was recommended that they should be appointed (as at
present) by the Governor on the recommendation of the Premier and that
though personally as the representatives of the Governor they had the
right to communicate direct with him, in future a l l their official
correspondence should be directed to the appropriate ministry. The J.P.s
were appointed by the Governor on their recommendation and that of an
advisory committee of the R.M. and a senior police officer; this was
based on a statute of Edward I I I : in future they should be appointed and
removed by the Governor on the recommendation of the Minister of Home
Affairs. At present Privy Councillors were appointed by H.M. on the
advice of the Governor, but in future i t should be by the Governor on the
recommendation of the Premier. I t was suggested that the power of pardon
 168

should continue to be exercised by the Governor but he should now act in

accordance with the majority advice of the Privy Council. Similarly 1n
regard to breaches of d i s c i p l i n e by c i v i l servants the Governor must now
act on the advice of the Public Service and Police Service Commissions,
though o f f i c e r s might appeal to the Governor who must act on the advice
of the Privy Council. A l l matters of ceremonial should henceforth be
handled in the Premier's o f f i c e . The award of honours should be
transferred to the Premier. A l l o f f i c i a l mail should be sent not to the
Governor's secretary at King's House, but to the Premier's Office. The
Governor's secretariat should be closed and the Premier's s t a f f should
be substantially increased.]

54. BRIEF FOR REGINALD MAUDLING IN DISCUSSIONS WITH JAMAICAN GOVERNMENT

DELEGATION, October 19611
[There was need to gain time to enable the other islands to formulate
plans to keep the Federation in being. Eric Williams was the unknown
factor and he would not c l a r i f y his views t i l l after the Trinidad
elections. 'We should aim to securo that nothing emerges from our talks
with the Jamaicans which might stimulate Trinidad - or Indeed any other
t e r r i t o r y - to follow Jamaica's lead.] I t i s suggested t h a t , w i t h
t h i s o b j e c t i n v i e w , M i n i s t e r s i n d e a l i n g w i t h Mr. Manley can
t a k e a p r e t t y t o u g h l i n e . Many months have been s p e n t in
n e g o t i a t i n g a f o r m o f f e d e r a t i o n w h i c h m i g h t be a c c e p t a b l e t o
Jamaica, and Jamaica has now r e j e c t e d i t , t h e r e b y r a i s i n g s e r i o u s
problems f o r i t s p a r t n e r s i n t h e F e d e r a t i o n . Jamaica o u g h t t h e r e -
f o r e t o a p p r e c i a t e t h a t we and t h e o t h e r s must be g i v e n ample
t i m e t o s o l v e t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s her a c t i o n has c a u s e d . We can make
s y m p a t h e t i c n o i s e s i f Mr. Manley m e n t i o n s h i s own d o m e s t i c
p o l i t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s w h i c h m i g h t be a g g r a v a t e d i f t h e r e i s any
d e l a y i n i m p l e m e n t i n g t h e e x p r e s s e d wishes o f t h e Jamaican
e l e c t o r a t e t o l e a v e t h e F e d e r a t i o n . But we a r e i n a f a i r l y s t r o n g
p o s i t i o n i n i n s i s t i n g on a programme f o r c a r r y i n g them o u t w h i c h
i n a l l t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s i s t h e most c o n v e n i e n t t o u s . Our hand
i s s t r e n g t h e n e d by t h e f a c t t h a t U n i t e d Kingdom l e g i s l a t i o n w i l l
be r e q u i r e d t o implement t h e r e s u l t s o f t h e r e f e r e n d u m .
[The Federal cabinet had been informed that though legally and
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y the Jamaican referendum had changed nothing, H.M.'s G.
had accepted the decision as f i n a l : Jamaica had been t o l d early in 1960
that i f i t wished to secede, i t was free to do so.] There i s e q u a l l y
no d o u b t t h a t Jamaica i s c a p a b l e o f s u s t a i n i n g independence as

1. C O . 1031/3200 s e c r e t [see a l s o No.22b], This brief contained an i n t e r e s t i n g

list of desiderata for Commonwealth membership [see Section I]. Jamaica had
voted in a referendum in September 1961 for secession from the federation
[pp.93fl» Manley was 'completely astonished' a t the r e s u l t , a t t r i b u t i n g the
r e j e c t i o n of federation to fears of increased t a x a t i o n . But the referendum had
never been made a vote of confidence in h i s government and the governor urged
him to continue ' t o guide Jamaica in the coming y e a r s ' . A delegation would be
i n v i t e d to London. There had been no statement t h a t Jamaica would be free to
secede nor any promise t h a t independence would be granted>but these p o i n t s
were now academic: (Blackburne to Macleod, 20 Sept. 1961: C O . 1031/3199). But
to minimise the enthusiasm of Trinidad to i m i t a t e Jamaica and to adjust the
balance within the federation, independence should be delayed t i l l a
conference (including the J . L . P . ) had met e a r l y in 1962 to agree a new
c o n s t i t u t i o n and the date of independence.
 169

a s e p a r a t e s t a t e and m i g h t w e l l be a c c e p t e d by t h e r e s t o f t h e
Commonwealth f o r Commonwealth membership. There can be l i t t l e
argument that Jamaica satisfies mutatis mutandis the following
eight minimum criteria which, when Mr. Manley visited London in
1960, he was t o l d by t h e s e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e had t o be s a t i s f i e d
b e f o r e a dependent t e r r i t o r y ( t h e F e d e r a t i o n was a c t u a l l y i n
mind) c o u l d become i n d e p e n d e n t , ( i ) The p o s s e s s i o n o f a defence
f o r c e c a p a b l e o f k e e p i n g t h e peace w i t h i n t h e F e d e r a t i o n ' s
b o u n d a r i e s and p o s i n g a t l e a s t a d e t e r r e n t t o any minor i n c u r s i o n
by an o u t s i d e a g g r e s s o r ; ( i i ) a d i p l o m a t i c o r g a n i s a t i o n c a p a b l e
of maintaining the external r e l a t i o n s of the Federation w i t h the
U n i t e d N a t i o n s and t h e more i m p o r t a n t f r i e n d l y and n e i g h b o u r i n g
c o u n t r i e s , e s p e c i a l l y o f c o u r s e t h e Commonwealth; ( i i i ) an
e f f e c t i v e c e n t r a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n capable of e x e c u t i n g the p o l i c y
o f t h e Federal Government w i t h i n t h e f i e l d o f a c t i v i t y g i v e n i t
by t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n ; ( i v ) adequate f i n a n c i a l r e s o u r c e s , based on
i n d e p e n d e n t t a x i n g and l o a n r a i s i n g powers, s u f f i c i e n t t o e n a b l e
i t t o f i n a n c e i t s own r e c u r r e n t e x p e n d i t u r e and o b l i g a t i o n s as
t h o s e d e v e l o p ; ( v ) a s t a r t w i t h a w o r k a b l e programme f o r a
Customs U n i o n ; ( v i ) c e n t r a l c o n t r o l o f t h e c u r r e n c y ; (vii)
Freedom o f Movement of p e o p l e s w i t h i n i t s b o u n d a r i e s ; ( v i i i ) t h e
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t and a b i l i t y t o n e g o t i a t e and implement
i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r e a t i e s and agreements i n t h e p r i n c i p a l f i e l d s i n
which s o v e r e i g n S t a t e s n o r m a l l y n e g o t i a t e w i t h one a n o t h e r . These
i n c l u d e t h e r e g u l a t i o n o f overseas t r a d e ; t a r i f f s and o t h e r
r e s t r a i n t s on t r a d e such as q u a n t i t a t i v e r e s t r i c t i o n s ; commodity
agreements; arrangements whereby t h e F e d e r a t i o n would r e c e i v e
economic and f i n a n c i a l a s s i s t a n c e f r o m i n t e r n a t i o n a l a g e n c i e s
i n c l u d i n g t h e I . M . F . and I . B . R . D . ; p o s t a l m a t t e r s , s h i p p i n g ,
c i v i l a v i a t i o n and t e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s ; and d o u b l e taxation
agreements....
[The remaining problems could be considered under 5 headings -
secession, Independence, common services, expatriate d v 1 l servants, and
the ex-dependencies of Cayman and Turks and Caicos islands. The main
present objection should be to avoid naming a date for independence, lest
ideas should be put into heads in Trinidad. Manley should be made to
realise that Jamaica's secession was not a simple unilateral action but
1t affected other partners and the balance 1n the Federation. Though in
1959 the Cayman and Turks and Caicos islands had ceased formally to be
dependencies of Jamaica, they were s t i l l dependent for personnel,
technical expertise &c. and Manley might consider some form of associ-
ation. I t had been decided that Cayman should enter into an agreement
with the Federation for the l a t t e r to be responsible for defence and
foreign a f f a i r s : s i m i l a r l y that the Turks and Caicos should remain 1n the
Federation; and that a l l should move towards internal self-government 1n
expectation of becoming units 1n the Federation.]

55. ( a ) LONDON CONFERENCE: REPORT, 9 February 19621

Jamaica has been a member o f t h e F e d e r a t i o n o f The West I n d i e s

1. P.P. 1961/2X1 (1638) pp.5-6, 13-14, 800-1, 808-9: C O . 1031/3211. D i f f i -

c u l t i e s would be created if Jamaica seceded before independence: a new c o n s t i -
t u t i o n p o s t - f e d e r a t i o n , pre-independence, would be necessary temporarily. The
opposition would seek to take the i n i t i a t i v e if secession had to await inde-
pendence. I t was understood t h a t Manley would be charged as being 'an imperia-
170

since i t s inception i n 1957. Having regard however t o the growth

of o p p o s i t i o n i n Jamaica t o i t s continued p a r t i c i p a t i o n in the
Federation, and the desire t o seek independence on i t s own, the
Jamaican Government announced on the 31st May, 1960, t h a t the
e l e c t o r a t e would be given an o p p o r t u n i t y t o determine the issue
by way of referendum. The Government introduced the necessary
l e g i s l a t i o n and the referendum which was held on the 19th Sep-
tember, 1961 resulted i n a m a j o r i t y of 35,535 votes against
Jamaica remaining i n the Federation.
The Government of Jamaica accepted without question the d e c i -
sion of the e l e c t o r a t e and immediately put i n hand the many and
varied measures necessary t o seek the withdrawal of the t e r r i t o r y
from the Federation and the attainment of f u l l independence by
Jamaica at the e a r l i e s t possible date. The Premier, Mr. N.W. Man-
l e y , led a Government delegation t o London at the end of Septem-
ber, 1961 t o discuss w i t h the Secretary of State f o r the Colonies
the i m p l i c a t i o n s of the referendum r e s u l t and t o seek e a r l y inde-
pendence. At the outset of these discussions the Secretary of
State informed the delegation t h a t the B r i t i s h Government, no
less than the Government of Jamaica, accepted the r e s u l t of the
referendum as a f i n a l i n d i c a t i o n of Jamaica's wishes. The t a l k s
r e s u l t e d i n a large measure of agreement on the steps t o be taken
t o enable Jamaica t o withdraw from the Federation and t o achieve
independence on i t s own. The B r i t i s h Government, while unable at
t h a t time t o agree t o f i r m dates f o r the withdrawal of Jamaica
from the Federation and i t s independence, gave an assurance t h a t
Parliament would be asked t o pass l e g i s l a t i o n , i f possible by the
end of March, 1962, 1 which would provide f o r Jamaica's w i t h -
drawal from the Federation and, provided proposals f o r the inde-
pendence C o n s t i t u t i o n could be made a v a i l a b l e i n time by the Ja-
maican Government, t o hold an independence Conference i n January
or February 1962 at which the C o n s t i t u t i o n would be discussed and
a date f o r independence agreed. Meanwhile, the B r i t i s h Government
gave an assurance t h a t the independence date would be the e a r l i -
est date i n 1962 which was p r a c t i c a b l e having regard t o the legal
and other arrangements which must necessarily be made before the

l i s t stooge' if he did not press for action and refuse to pay the federal con-
t r i b u t i o n ; (to Maudling, 16 Dec. 1961: C O . 1031/3205). In October 1961 the
house of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s unanimously approved a b i - p a r t i s a n s e l e c t committee
on an independence c o n s t i t u t i o n and H.M.'s G. promised to seek Commonwealth
approval for Jamaica as an independent member of the Commonwealth. Bustamante
was * an unpredictable person' without * the conventional committee mind': mere-
ly ' t o a s s e r t himself if not from boredom, he may well fly off the h a n d l e ' ,
but the mood would pass and he had l i t t l e malice. I t would be best to adjourn
and let him sleep it off; (to Thomas, 29 Jan. 1962 ibid.) (Later it was argued
t h a t delay was needed to synchronise with Trinidad independence, and agreement
in Trinidad on an independence c o n s t i t u t i o n would take a long time: I t would
have been ' a t i d y arrangement' for the federation of the 8 [Nos. 24ff] to be
e s t a b l i s h e d when Jamaica, Trinidad, and B.G. became independent. I t would of-
fer some balm to the wounded small i s l a n d s . But i t was u n l i k e l y given the
amount of n e g o t i a t i o n necessary. The Jamaicans had indeed given much help in
undertaking to co-operate in common s e r v i c e s . (Poynton to Bligh, 7 Feb. 1962:
C O . 1031/3205). 1. 10 & 11 E l i z . II cap. 19 and the o r d e r - i n - c o u n c i l d i s s o l v i n g
the federation (Stat.R. 1962: No.1084 23 May 1962).
 171
introduction of a new Constitution. For its part, the Jamaican
Government delegation gave the Secretary of State an assurance
that Jamaica would co-operate in such arrangements as might be
needed to enable the many common services operated by the Federal
Government to continue on their existing basis until final deci-
sions for long-term arrangements about their future could be
made. Such final arrangements would not be possible so far as
Jamaica was concerned until the elections to be held before inde-
pendence had taken place.
On the 20th September, 1961, the day following the referendum,
the Jamaican Government put in hand the examination of the impli-
cations of the decision to withdraw from the Federation and to
seek independence on its own.
The Opposition Party under the leadership of Sir Alexander Bus-
tamante co-operated fully with the Government, and Select Commit-
tees of both Houses of the Legislature were appointed and met to-
gether under the chairmanship of the Premier on 31st October,
1961, to consider and supervise the preparation of a draft inde-
pendence Constitution. The reports of the Committees were laid
before both Houses in January, 1962, and after full debate,
approved unanimously.
The Jamaican delegation representing government and opposition
parties in the Legislature arrived in London at the end of Janu-
ary, 1962 and the Conference opened at Lancaster House, on Thurs-
day, 1st February under the chairmanship of the Rt. Hon. Reginald
Maudling, M.P. In subsequent sessions the chair was taken by Mr.
Maudling or in his absence by the Hon. Hugh Fraser, M.P. The list
of delegates and advisers who attended is annexed. The Conference
held seven Plenary Sessions and at an early stage set up a Legal
Committee to examine the draft independence Constitution and to
report back to the Conference.
The principal conclusions of the Conference are set out in the
following paragraphs of this report..-..
[The agreed date of Independence was 6 August 1962. On Membership of the
Commonwealthl The Jamaican delegation expressed the wish that on
achieving independence Jamaica should be accepted as a Member
Country of the Commonwealth and the hope that the British Govern-
ment would be prepared to sponsor its application with other Mem-
bers of the Commonwealth. This the British Government very wil-
lingly undertook to do and the Conference expressed the hope that
Jamaica's acceptance as a Member of the Commonwealth might be
made known before independence day.

Imp!ications of Jamaica's withdrawal from the Federation, the

interim organisation and the common services.
The Conference discussed the Secretary of State's statement in
the House of Commons on the 5th February, announcing the inten-
tion of the British Government to dissolve the present Federation
of The West Indies, and to set up an interim organisation for the
continuation of the regional common services at present operated
by the Federal Government. It was noted that on the dissolution
of the Federation, which would probably take effect before the
end of April, Jamaica's participation in the Federation would au-
tomatically come to an end. The Jamaican delegation made it clear
that they would be willing to carry out fully any arrangements
for continuing all the common services on an ad hoc basis pending
172

a Conference o f Governments concerned t o c o n s i d e r permanent

a r r a n g e m e n t s . A t t h a t C o n f e r e n c e , i n which t h e y would be g l a d t o
p a r t i c i p a t e , t h e y would c o n s i d e r w i t h t h e o t h e r Governments c o n -
c e r n e d , what common s e r v i c e s s h o u l d be p e r m a n e n t l y r e t a i n e d i n
t h e i n t e r e s t s o f t h e Region as a w h o l e . A t t h e same Conference
t h e y would be w i l l i n g t o a f f o r d some a s s i s t a n c e up t o t h e end o f
1962 o r u n t i l t h e f u t u r e o f t h e s m a l l e r i s l a n d s had been s e t t l e d ,
w h i c h e v e r o c c u r r e d f i r s t , t o any o f t h e e x i s t i n g s e r v i c e s w h i c h
would be o f b e n e f i t t o t h e s m a l l e r i s l a n d s even i f t h e i r m a i n -
t e n a n c e was n o t c o n s i d e r e d necessary t o t h e Region as a w h o l e .

Discussions on economic, financial and defence matters.

I t was agreed t h a t b e f o r e t h e d a t e o f independence, t h e r e
s h o u l d be d i s c u s s i o n s between t h e Governments o f t h e U n i t e d
Kingdom and Jamaica c o n c e r n i n g f i n a n c i a l , economic and defence
matters.
Signed t h i s 9 t h day o f F e b r u a r y , 1962
J.E. Whitelegg R. M a u d l i n g
Secretary-Genera 1 Secretary of State for the Colonies
N.W. Manley
Premier o f Jamaica
A l e x a n d e r Bustamante
Leader of the Opposition, Jamaica1

( b ) CONSTITUTION ORDER-IN-COUNCIL, 23 July 19622

2 . S u b j e c t t o t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f s e c t i o n s 49 and 50 o f t h i s Cons-
t i t u t i o n , i f any o t h e r law i s i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n ,
t h i s C o n s t i t u t i o n s h a l l p r e v a i l and t h e o t h e r law s h a l l , t o t h e
e x t e n t o f t h e i n c o n s i s t e n c y , be v o i d .

Chapter I I - C i t i z e n s h i p
[Those born in Jamaica who on 5 August 1962 were citizens of the U.K.
and Colonies became citizens of Jamaica on 6 August (§3).]
9 . ( 1 ) Every person who under t h i s C o n s t i t u t i o n o r any A c t o f
P a r l i a m e n t i s a c i t i z e n o f Jamaica o r under any enactment f o r t h e
t i m e b e i n g i n f o r c e i n any c o u n t r y t o which t h i s s e c t i o n a p p l i e s
i s a c i t i z e n o f t h a t c o u n t r y s h a l l , by v i r t u e o f t h a t c i t i z e n -
s h i p , have t h e s t a t u s o f a Commonwealth c i t i z e n .
( 2 ) Every person who i s a B r i t i s h s u b j e c t w i t h o u t c i t i z e n s h i p
under t h e B r i t i s h N a t i o n a l i t y A c t , 1948, o r who c o n t i n u e s t o be
a B r i t i s h s u b j e c t under s e c t i o n 2 o f t h a t A c t s h a l l by v i r t u e o f
t h a t s t a t u s have t h e s t a t u s o f a Commonwealth c i t i z e n .

1. By t h e Jamaican independence Act (10 & 11 E l i z . II c a p . 4 0 : 19 J u l y 1962)

r e c o g n i s i n g J a m a i c a ' s a t t a i n m e n t of ' f u l l y r e s p o n s i b l e s t a t u s w i t h i n t h e
Commonwealth', from 6 August 1962 H.M.'s G. in the U.K. ' s h a l l have no
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e government of J a m a i c a ' : no U.K. s t a t u t e or instrument
would apply t o Jamaica; but p r o v i s i o n was made for c o n t i n u i n g B r i t i s h
c i t i z e n s h i p . Independence day was 6 August 1962 (agreed in c a b i n e t 8 Feb. :
CO. 1031/3208).
2. Stat. R. No.1550. The independence c o n s t i t u t i o n was e s t a b l i s h e d by order
under t h e Jamaican Independence Act (10 & 11 E l i z . II cap. 4 0 ) . I t i s an
i n t e r e s t i n g document in t h a t i t s o u g h t , as d i d t h e Indian independence
c o n s t i t u t i o n [ V o l . VI, No.191b, p . 7 9 2 1 > t o w r i t e down many of the c o n v e n t i o n s
and u s a g e s of t h e B r i t i s h c o n s t i t u t i o n .
 173

(3) Save as may be otherwise provided by Parliament, the coun-

tries to which this section applies are the United Kingdom and
Colonies, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India, Pakistan, Cey-
lon, Ghana, the Federation of Malaya, the Federation of Nigeria,
the Republic of Cyprus, Sierra Leone, Tanganyika, the Federation
of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and the State of Singapore...,
Chapter III - Fundamental Riahts and Freedoms1
13. Whereas every person in Jamaica is entitled to the fundamen-
tal rights and freedoms of the individual, that is to say, has
the right, whatever his race, place of origin, political opin-
ions, colour, creed or sex, but subject to respect for the rights
and freedoms of others and for the public interest, to each and
all of the following, namely (a) life, liberty, security of the
person, the enjoyment of property and the protection of the law;
(b) freedom of conscience, of expression and peaceful assembly
and association; and (c) respect for his private and family life,
the subsequent provisions of this Chapter shall have effect for
the purpose of affording protection to the aforesaid rights and
freedoms, subject to such limitations of that protection as are
contained in those provisions being limitations designed to en-
sure that the enjoyment of the said rights and freedoms by any
individual does not prejudice the rights and freedoms of others
or the public interest.
14. (1 ) No person shal 1 intentional ly be deprived of his 1 ife save
in execution of the sentence of a court in respect of a criminal
offence of which he has been convicted. (2) Without prejudice to
any liability for a contravention of any other law with respect
to the use of force in such cases as are hereinafter mentioned,
a person shall not be regarded as having been deprived of his
life in contravention of this section if he dies as the result
of the use of force to such extent as is reasonably justifiable
in the circumstances of the case - (a) for the defence of any
person from violence or for the defence of property; (b) in order
to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person
lawfully detained; (c) for the purpose of suppressing a riot, in-
surrection or mutiny; or (d) in order lawfully to prevent the
commission by that person of a criminal offence, or if he dies
as the result of lawful act of war.
[No one would be deprived of personal liberty save lawfully in conse-
quence of unfitness to plead to a criminal charge, of sentence of convic-
tion; of execution for contempt of court, or court order to enforce obli-
gation or attendance; of 'reasonable suspicion' of commission or inten-
tion to commit a criminal offence; of education or welfare needs of those
under 21; of prevention of spread of disease; of the protection of the
community against the insane, drug or alcohol addicts, or vagrants; of
preventing unlawful entry or expulsion, or of exclusion of a person from
a specified area of Jamaica. Those arrested would be informed '1n a lan-
guage which he understands' of the reasons, would be brought without de-
lay before a court and released on conditions ensuring his appearance for
trial later. Compensation would be made for unlawful arrest. Provision

1. These had now become a normal fashion: rights were recognised, though
notably limited cautiously by the government's power to act in the public
interest.
 174

was made for emergency powers and for independent review of those d e t a i -
ned under them, but i t s recommendations would be advisory, not obligatory
on the government (§16). Freedom of movement was recognised but lawful
detention or r e s t r i c t i o n would not be inconsistent with i t , or any rea-
sonable action taken in the interests of defence, public safety, order,
morality, health &c. which would be subject to Independent review but
again 'the authority shall not be obliged to act in accordance with any
such recommendations' (§16). No person would be subjected to torture or
degrading punishment (§17). No compulsory seizure of property would be
made without provision for compensation and access to court: but d i s t -
raint was lawful in satisfaction of tax, rate or due, or f i n e after con-
v i c t i o n , or the execution of t r u s t s or judgements; or regulations made
for marketing or mining in the Interests of protecting others (§18). No
search of person or property was to be recognised save that done lawfully
in the interest of defence &c. (as above) public revenue, planning, deve-
lopment, detection of crime, or the protection of the rights of others
(§19).
2 0 . ( 1 ) Whenever any person i s charged w i t h a c r i m i n a l o f f e n c e he
s h a l l , u n l e s s t h e charge i s w i t h d r a w n , be a f f o r d e d a f a i r h e a r i n g
w i t h i n a r e a s o n a b l e t i m e by an i n d e p e n d e n t and i m p a r t i a l c o u r t
e s t a b l i s h e d by l a w . . . . [Similarly for any determination of any c i v i l
rights or obligations. 'Every person who is charged with a criminal of-
fence shall be presumed to be innocent u n t i l he is proved or has pleaded
g u i l t y ' , but the law imposed on a person charged 'the burden of proving
particular f a c t s ' . In regard to a criminal charge a suspect would be i n -
formed 'as soon as reasonably practicable in a language which he under-
stands' of the charge, be given time to prepare his defence and see legal
representation, be afforded f a c i l i t i e s to examine witnesses, and be per-
mitted an interpreter i f necessary: he w i l l not be t r i e d a second time
for a criminal offence (§20). Freedom of conscience of thought and r e l i -
gion, and of the right to manifest or propagate that r e l i g i o n in worship,
teaching and observance was guaranteed. Freedom of expression and assem-
bly and from discrimination were s i m i l a r l y guaranteed - again provided
that the interests of defence, safety, order, morality and health and the
freedoms of others to observe t h e i r r e l i g i o n without unsolicited i n t e r -
vention were respected and enforced by law (§25?). These freedoms would
be protected by the Supreme Court.]

Chapter IV - The G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l
3 2 . ( 1 ) The G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l s h a l l a c t i n accordance w i t h t h e a d -
v i c e o f t h e C a b i n e t o r a M i n i s t e r a c t i n g under t h e g e n e r a l a u t h o -
r i t y of the Cabinet in the e x e r c i s e of h i s f u n c t i o n s other than -
( a ) any f u n c t i o n which i s e x p r e s s e d ( i n whatever t e r m s ) t o be e x -
e r c i s a b l e by him on o r i n accordance w i t h t h e recommendation o r
advice o f , or w i t h the concurrence o f , or a f t e r c o n s u l t a t i o n
w i t h , any person o r a u t h o r i t y o t h e r t h a n t h e C a b i n e t ; and ( b ) any
f u n c t i o n w h i c h i s e x p r e s s e d ( i n w h a t e v e r t e r m s ) t o be e x e r c i s a b l e
by him i n h i s d i s c r e t i o n .
( 2 ) Where t h e G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l i s d i r e c t e d t o e x e r c i s e any
f u n c t i o n on t h e recommendation o f any person o r a u t h o r i t y , he
s h a l l e x e r c i s e t h a t f u n c t i o n i n accordance w i t h such recommenda-
tion: Provided that (a) before he acts in accordance therewith,
he may, i n h i s d i s c r e t i o n , once r e f e r t h a t recommendation back
f o r r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n by t h e p e r s o n o r a u t h o r i t y c o n c e r n e d ; and ( b )
i f t h a t person o r a u t h o r i t y , h a v i n g r e c o n s i d e r e d t h e o r i g i n a l r e -
commendation under t h e p r e c e d i n g p a r a g r a p h , s u b s t i t u t e s t h e r e f o r e
 175

a d i f f e r e n t recommendation, the provisions of t h i s subsection

s h a l l apply t o t h a t d i f f e r e n t recommendation as they apply t o the
o r i g i n a l recommendation.
(3) Where the Governor-General i s d i r e c t e d t o exercise any
f u n c t i o n a f t e r c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h any person or a u t h o r i t y he s h a l l
not be obliged t o exercise t h a t f u n c t i o n i n accordance w i t h the
advice of t h a t person or a u t h o r i t y .
(4) Where the Governor-General i s d i r e c t e d t o exercise any
f u n c t i o n in accordance w i t h the recommendation or advice o f , or
with the concurrence o f , or a f t e r c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h , or on the
representation o f , any person or a u t h o r i t y , the question whether
he has t o exercise t h a t f u n c t i o n s h a l l not be enquired i n t o i n
any c o u r t .
(5) Where the Governor-General i s d i r e c t e d t o exercise any
f u n c t i o n on the recommendation of the Prime M i n i s t e r a f t e r con-
s u l t a t i o n w i t h the Leader of the Opposition the f o l l o w i n g steps
s h a l l be t a k e n : - (a) the Prime M i n i s t e r s h a l l f i r s t consult the
Leader of the Opposition and t h e r e a f t e r tender h i s recommendation
t o the Governor-General; (b) the Governor-General s h a l l then i n -
form the Leader of the Opposition of t h i s recommendation and i f
the Leader of the Opposition concurs t h e r e i n the Governor-General
s h a l l act i n accordance w i t h such recommendation; (c) i f the Lea-
der of the Opposition does not concur i n the recommendation the
Governor-General s h a l l so inform the Prime M i n i s t e r and r e f e r the
recommendation back t o him; (d) The Prime M i n i s t e r s h a l l then ad-
vise the Governor-General and the Governor-General s h a l l act i n
accordance w i t h t h a t advice.
(6) Any reference in t h i s C o n s t i t u t i o n t o the functions of the
Governor-General s h a l l be construed as a reference t o h i s powers
and d u t i e s i n the exercise of the executive a u t h o r i t y of Jamaica
and t o any other power and duties conferred or imposed on him as
Governor-General by or under t h i s C o n s t i t u t i o n or any other
1 aw. 1

Chapter V - Parliament
34. There s h a l l be a Parliament of Jamaica which s h a l l consist
of Her Majesty, a Senate and a House of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . . . .
[Members of Parliament, duly qualified and elected would constitute the
House of Representatives (§36). Qualifications for electors over 212
(Jamaican citizens and other Commonwealth citizens resident for at least
12 months) and disqualifications (convicts, the insane &c.) were presc-
ribed (§37). The nominated Senate would be presided over by its elected
President or deputy (§51). Each House would make its own standing orders
and prescribe Its quorum: the House of Representatives by its elected
Speaker or deputy (§52).]
D e l i m i t a t i o n of Constituencies
66.(1) U n t i l otherwise provided by an Order made by the Governor-
General under section 67 of t h i s C o n s t i t u t i o n , Jamaica s h a l l f o r
the purpose of e l e c t i n g the members of the House of Representati-
ves, be divided i n t o the f o r t y - f i v e constituencies prescribed by

1. By 1999 t h e r e were strong moves in Jamaica (as in S t . Kitts-Nevis, Belize

and even Barbados) for t h e i r own head of s t a t e , a P r e s i d e n t .
2. Reduced to 18 in 1972.
176

the Constituencies (Boundaries) Order, 1 9 5 9 . . . . [of the former Col-

ony of Jamaica, and each constituency would return one member. In future
there might be from 45-60 members, and a Standing Committee (the Speaker,
3 M.P.s appointed by the P.M. and 3 by the Leader of the Opposition)
would monitor and review the number of constituencies and their bounda-
ries and report to the House whether i t recommended any alteration or not
(for the House itself to approve or amend (§67)1
Chapter VI - Executive Powers
68.(1) The executive a u t h o r i t y of Jamaica i s vested i n Her Majes-
t y . 2 (2) Subject t o the p r o v i s i o n s of t h i s C o n s t i t u t i o n , the ex-
e c u t i v e a u t h o r i t y of Jamaica may be exercised on behalf of Her
Majesty by the Governor-General e i t h e r d i r e c t l y or through o f f i -
cers subordinate to him. (3) Nothing i n t h i s section s h a l l pre-
vent Parliament from c o n f e r r i n g f u n c t i o n s on persons or author-
i t i e s other than the Governor-General.
69.(1) There s h a l l be i n and f o r Jamaica a Cabinet which s h a l l
c o n s i s t of the Prime M i n i s t e r and not less than eleven other
M i n i s t e r s appointed i n accordance w i t h the provisions of section
70 of t h i s C o n s t i t u t i o n . (2) The Cabinet s h a l l be the p r i n c i p a l
instrument of p o l i c y and s h a l l be charged w i t h the general d i r e c -
t i o n and c o n t r o l of the Government of Jamaica and s h a l l be c o l -
l e c t i v e l y responsible t h e r e f o r t o Parliament.
70.(1) Whenever the Governor-General has occasion t o appoint a
Prime M i n i s t e r he, a c t i n g in h i s d i s c r e t i o n , s h a l l appoint the
member of the House of Representatives who, in h i s judgement, i s
best able t o command the confidence of a m a j o r i t y of the members
of t h a t House and s h a l l , a c t i n g i n accordance w i t h the advice of
the Prime M i n i s t e r , appoint the other M i n i s t e r s from among the
members of the two Houses. (2) Not less than two nor more than
three of the M i n i s t e r s s h a l l be persons who are members of the
Senate. . . . [An M.P. of the previous House could be appointed P.M. during a
dissolution, and a member of either House could be appointed a minister,
but they must vacate office i f after the summoning to the new Parliament
they did not retain membership.]
71.(1) The o f f i c e of Prime M i n i s t e r s h a l l become vacant - (a) i f
he resigns his o f f i c e ; (b) i f he ceases to be a member of the
House of Representatives otherwise than by a d i s s o l u t i o n of Par-
liament; (c) i f he i s required to cease t o exercise any of h i s
f u n c t i o n s as a member of the House of Representatives; (d) when,
a f t e r any d i s s o l u t i o n of Parliament, the Prime Minster i s i n f o r -
med by the Governor-General a c t i n g i n his d i s c r e t i o n , t h a t the
Governor-General i s about t o re-appoint him as Prime M i n i s t e r or

1. A schedule to t h i s o r d e r - i n - c o u n c i l l a i d down r u l e s : constituency bounda-

r i e s should not cross parish boundaries; each parish should have a t l e a s t 2
c o n s t i t u e n c i e s ; c o n s t i t u e n c i e s should have e l e c t o r a t e s as equal as possible
and as near to the quota dividing the t o t a l island e l e c t o r a t e by the number
of c o n s t i t u e n c i e s , though deviation could take account of physical f e a t u r e s ,
t r a n s p o r t a t i o n f a c i l i t i e s and density of population between town and country
but never by more than 50% in excess, nor l e s s than 662/3% of the quota. There
was n e i t h e r in Jamaica nor in Barbados a s p e c i a l provision for an e l e c t i o n s
commission as in Guyana and Trinidad.
2. Apart from Guyana where a president became head of s t a t e , these provisions
were t y p i c a l of the Commonwealth Caribbean s t a t e s ,
 177

a p p o i n t a n o t h e r person as Prime M i n i s t e r ; o r ( e ) i f t h e G o v e r n o r -
General r e v o k e s h i s a p p o i n t m e n t i n accordance w i t h t h e p r o v i s i o n s
of subsection (2) of t h i s s e c t i o n .
( 2 ) I f t h e House o f R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s by a r e s o l u t i o n which has
r e c e i v e d t h e a f f i r m a t i v e v o t e o f a m a j o r i t y o f a l l t h e members
t h e r e o f has r e s o l v e d t h a t t h e a p p o i n t m e n t o f t h e Prime M i n i s t e r
ought t o be r e v o k e d , t h e G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l s h a l l , s u b j e c t t o t h e
p r o v i s i o n s o f s u b s e c t i o n ( 3 ) o f t h i s s e c t i o n , by i n s t r u m e n t under
t h e Broad S e a l , revoke h i s a p p o i n t m e n t .
( 3 ) I f t h e House o f R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s has passed a r e s o l u t i o n
as p r o v i d e d by s u b s e c t i o n ( 2 ) o f t h i s s e c t i o n t h a t t h e a p p o i n t -
ment o f t h e Prime M i n i s t e r o u g h t t o be r e v o k e d , t h e G o v e r n o r -
General s h a l l c o n s u l t w i t h t h e Prime M i n i s t e r a n d , i f t h e Prime
M i n i s t e r w i t h i n t h r e e days so r e q u e s t s , t h e G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l
s h a l l d i s s o l v e Par1iament i n s t e a d o f r e v o k i n g t h e a p p o i n t m e n t . . . .
[Other ministerial posts would become vacant when a new P.M. was appointed,
or his appointment was revoked, or he ceased to be a member of the House,
or he resigned.]
7 8 . ( 1 ) The G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l , a c t i n g i n accordance w i t h t h e a d v i c e
o f t h e Prime M i n i s t e r , may by i n s t r u m e n t under t h e Broad S e a l ,
a p p o i n t P a r l i a m e n t a r y S e c r e t a r i e s f r o m among t h e members o f t h e
two Houses t o a s s i s t M i n i s t e r s i n t h e d i s c h a r g e o f t h e i r f u n c -
t i o n s . . . . [but no more than 3 Senators could be appointed. An A.G. would be
the principal legal adviser to the Government.]
8 0 . ( 1 ) There s h a l l be a Leader o f t h e O p p o s i t i o n who s h a l l be
a p p o i n t e d by t h e G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l by i n s t r u m e n t under t h e Broad
S e a l . ( 2 ) Whenever t h e G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l has o c c a s i o n t o a p p o i n t
a Leader o f t h e O p p o s i t i o n he s h a l l , i n h i s d i s c r e t i o n , a p p o i n t
t h e member o f t h e House o f R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s who, i n h i s j u d g e m e n t ,
i s b e s t a b l e t o command t h e s u p p o r t o f a m a j o r i t y o f t h o s e mem-
b e r s who do n o t s u p p o r t t h e Government, o r , i f t h e r e i s no such
p e r s o n , t h e member o f t h a t House who, i n h i s j u d g e m e n t , commands
t h e s u p p o r t o f t h e l a r g e s t s i n g l e group o f such members who a r e
p r e p a r e d t o s u p p o r t one l e a d e r . . . .[The post would be vacated i f he re-
signed; i f , after dissolution, the Governor-General proposed to appoint
someone else; i f he ceased to be an M.P., or i f his appointment was
revoked as no longer commanding majority support.]
8 2 . ( 1 ) There s h a l l be i n and f o r Jamaica a P r i v y C o u n c i l w h i c h
s h a l l c o n s i s t o f s i x members a p p o i n t e d by t h e G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l
a f t e r c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h t h e Prime M i n i s t e r , , by i n s t r u m e n t under
t h e Broad S e a l . ( 2 ) A t l e a s t two o f t h e members o f t h e P r i v y
C o u n c i l s h a l l be persons who h o l d o r have h e l d p u b l i c o f f i c e . ( 3 )
The P r i v y C o u n c i l s h a l l have such powers and d u t i e s as may be
c o n f e r r e d o r imposed upon i t by o r u n d e r , t h i s C o n s t i t u t i o n o r
any o t h e r law. . . . [Privy Councillors would be appointed for 3 years, but
could resign, or have appointments revoked or suspended for absence or
i n f i r m i t y . The Governor-General would summon meetings and preside (§§87,
88). With t h e i r recommendation the Governor-General would exercise the
prerogative of mercy, pardon, respite and remission. On death sentences
he could act 1n emergency on his own discretion but would normally have
the advice of the Privy Council (§§90, 91). Ministers would be in direc-
t i o n and control of t h e i r departments under the supervision of permanent
secretaries (§93).]
178

9 4 . ( 1 ) There shall be a Director of Public Prosecutions, whose

o f f i c e shall be a public o f f i c e . . . . (3) The Director of Public
Prosecutions shall have power in any case in which he considers
it desirable so to do - (a) to institute and undertake criminal
proceedings against any person before any court other than a
courts-martial in respect of any offence against the law of Jama-
ica; (b) to take over and continue any such criminal proceedings
that may have been instituted by any other person or authority;
and ( c ) to discontinue at any stage before judgement is delivered
any such criminal proceedings instituted or undertaken by himself
or any other person or authority. . . . [For salary and tenure the
provisions were similar to those for the Auditor General.]
1 1 2 . ( 1 ) Power to make appointments to the offices to which this
section applies and, subject to the provisions of subsections (3)
and (4) of this section, to remove and to exercise disciplinary
control over persons holding or acting in such offices is hereby
vested in the Governoi—General acting on the advice of the Judi-
cial Service Commission. 2 (2) This section applies to the offices
of Resident Magistrate, Judge of the Traffic Court, Registrar of
the Supreme Court, Registrar of the Court of Appeal and to such
other offices connected with the courts of Jamaica as, subject
to the provisions of this Constitution, may be prescribed by
Parliament. (3) Before the Governor-General acts in accordance
with the advice of the Judicial Service Commission that any o f f i -
cer holding or acting in any o f f i c e to which this section applies
should be removed or that any penalty should be imposed on him
by way of disciplinary control he shall inform the officer of
that advice and, if the officer then applies for the case to be
referred to the Privy Council, the Governor-General shall not act
in accordance with the advice but shall refer the case to the
Privy Council accordingly: Provided that the Governor-General,
acting on the advice of the Commission, may nevertheless suspend
that officer from the exercise of his o f f i c e pending the determi-
nation of the reference to the Privy Counci1 .... [which would advise
the Governor-General who must act on such advice. 3 The Governor-General
could delegate power to make such appointments to members of the Commis-
sion who would, where appropriate, consult the Public, or Police, Service
Commissions (§113). The Auditor-General and deputy would be appointed by
the Governor-General, would be ineligible for any other public office
and would be paid as prescribed by a resolution of the House of Represen-
tatives (which would not reduce his salary) out of the Consolidated Fund.
There were detailed provisions for his removal (§§120, 121).]

1. Appointed, as in Guyana, on the advice of the public service commission:

in Barbados on the advice of the judicial and legal service commission. There
was no such post in Trinidad and the A . G . , a political nominee, performed
these functions.
2. The removal of nominated members of the judicial and legal commission was
by the P.M. in Jamaica: by the P.M. after consulting the leader of the
opposition in Trinidad. In Guyana and Barbados there were more elaborate
safeguards involving a tribunal of enquiry, the chancellor and the C.J.
3. In Barbados too there was similarly an appeal to the privy council - which
did not exist in Guyana and Trinidad. In Trinidad the P.M. had the right to
reject the appointment of the S.G., the chief legal draftsman, the registrar-
general and the Crown solicitor.
 179

1 2 2 . ( 1 ) The a c c o u n t s o f t h e C o u r t o f A p p e a l , t h e a c c o u n t s o f t h e
Supreme C o u r t , t h e a c c o u n t s o f t h e o f f i c e s o f t h e C l e r k s t o t h e
Senate and t h e House o f R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s and t h e a c c o u n t s o f a l l
d e p a r t m e n t s and o f f i c e s o f t h e Government o f Jamaica ( i n c l u d i n g
t h e o f f i c e s o f t h e C a b i n e t , t h e J u d i c i a l S e r v i c e Commission, t h e
P u b l i c S e r v i c e Commission and t h e P o l i c e S e r v i c e Commission b u t
e x c l u d i n g the department of the A u d i t o r - G e n e r a l ) s h a l l , a t l e a s t
once i n e v e r y y e a r , be a u d i t e d and r e p o r t e d on by t h e A u d i t o r -
General who, w i t h h i s s u b o r d i n a t e s t a f f , s h a l l a t a l l t i m e s be
e n t i t l e d t o have access t o a l l books, r e c o r d s , r e t u r n s and r e -
p o r t s r e l a t i n g t o such a c c o u n t s .
[The Speaker would lay his reports before the House of Representatives.
The Auditor-General 'shall not be subject to the direction or control of
any other person or a u t h o r i t y ' . The Minister of Finance must report on
the findings of the a u d i t . ]

(3) BARBADOS

56. INDEPENDENCE ORDER-IN-COUNCIL, 22 November 19661

[Under powers vested in the Queen by the Barbados Independence Act (14
& 15 E l i z . I I cap.37) 1966 §5, H.M.-in-Counc1l issued t h i s order. In the
interim before the appointed day (30 Nov.), the Governor might exercise
the powers conferred on the Governor-General to enable the independence
constitution to function: and references to the Prime Minister and the
leader of the Opposition should be construed as i f to the Premier and the
leader of the Opposition in the Letters Patent Consolidation Order 1964
§2 which was now revoked: existing laws would continue to have effect
with such modifications as necessary: the Governor-General might, before
30 Nov. 1967, make such amendments as necessary to make any law conform
with the 1966 Act and t h i s order (§1-4).]
5 . ( 1 ) The persons who i m m e d i a t e l y b e f o r e t h e a p p o i n t e d day a r e
members o f t h e Senate e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e e x i s t i n g O r d e r . . . s h a l l
as f r o m t h e a p p o i n t e d day be members o f t h e Senate e s t a b l i s h e d
by t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n as i f t h e y had been a p p o i n t e d as such under
. . . t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n and s h a l l h o l d t h e i r s e a t s as S e n a t o r s i n a c -
cordance w i t h t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n . . . . [The President
and Deputy President would continue 1n o f f i c e . ]
( 3 ) The persons who i m m e d i a t e l y b e f o r e t h e a p p o i n t e d day a r e
members o f t h e House o f Assembly t h e n e s t a b l i s h e d f o r Barbados
( i n t h i s s e c t i o n r e f e r r e d t o as t h e e x i s t i n g A s s e m b l y ' ) s h a l l as
f r o m t h e a p p o i n t e d day be members o f t h e House o f Assembly
e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n as i f e l e c t e d as such i n p u r s u -
ance o f s e c t i o n 4 1 ( 2 ) o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n and s h a l l h o l d t h e i r
s e a t s i n t h a t House i n accordance w i t h t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e Con-
s t i t u t i o n . . . . [The Speaker and Deputy Speaker would continue 1n o f f i c e .
Standing Orders of both existing Houses would continue to be those of the
new Houses. Parliament would, unless sooner dissolved, continue for the

i . Stat. R. No.1455 [see Vol.VII, pp.111-6]. Universal suffrage had been

introduced in 1949; f u l l responsible government in i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s in 1954;
and the executive committee r e c o n s t i t u t e d to admit more than the 4 assemblymen
(provided for in 1891) and a l e g i s l a t i v e councillor in 1959. On 17 November
the independence Act had become law enabling t h i s o r d e r - i n - c o u n c i l . One
o s t e n s i b l e mark of the independence c o n s t i t u t i o n was i t s commitment to
continuity - 'the existing order',
 180

normal 5 year period from the last general election.]

6.(1) The person who immediately before the appointed day holds
the office of Premier under the existing Order shall, as from the
appointed day, hold office as Prime Minister as if he had been
appointed thereto under section 65(1) of the Constitution....
[Similarly Ministers, departmental heads, and parliamentary secretaries.]
7. The person who immediately before the appointed day is the
Leader of the Opposition (as defined for the purposes of Schedule
2 to the existing Order) shall, as from the appointed day, hold
office as Leader of the Opposition as if he had been appointed
thereto under section 74 of the Constitution.... [Similarly all
Privy Councillors, public officers, and judges.]
12.(1) Parliament may alter any of the provisions of this Order
in the same manner as it may alter any of the provisions of the
Constitution: Provided that section 3, section 5(1) and (7), sec-
tion 9 of this section may be altered by Parliament only in the
same manner as the provisions specified in section 49(2) of the
Constitution....
(2) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any
law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of
this section to the extent that the law in question makes provi-
sion (a) that is reasonably required in the interests of defence,
public safety, public order, public morality or public health;
or (b) that is reasonably required for the purpose of protecting
the reputations, rights and freedoms of other persons or the pri-
vate lives of persons, concerned in legal proceedings, preventing
the disclosure of information received in confidence, maintaining
the authority and independence of the courts or regulating the
administration of technical operation of telephony, telegraphy,
posts, wireless broadcasting, television or other means of com-
munication or regulating public exhibitions or public entertain-
ments; or (c) that imposes restrictions upon public officers or
members of a disciplined force.
21.(1) Except with his own consent, no person shall be hindered
in the enjoyment of his freedom of assembly and association, that
is to say, his right to assemble freely and associate with other
persons and in particular to form or belong to political parties
or to form or belong to trade unions or other associations for
the protection of his interests.
(2) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any
law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of
this section to the extent that the law in question makes provis-
ion - (a) that is reasonably required in the interests of defence
public safety, public order, public morality or public health;
or (b) that is reasonably required for the purpose of protecting
the rights or freedom of other persons; or (c) that imposes rest-
rictions upon public officers or members of a disciplined force
.... [The right freely to move throughout Barbados, to reside, to enter and
leave, and to be immune from expulsion was recognised but this did not
prevent lawful detention, restrictions of movement or residence in the
interests of defence &c. or on the acquisition of land or property, or
removal of persons by lawful extradition if there were within 5 days a
written statement of the grounds for restriction, 14 days notification
in the Gazette, and reviews at intervals by independent tribunal and
 181
1
facilities to instruct counsel.]
(4) TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
57.( a) CABINET COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS COMMITTEE: MINUTE, 29 October 19482
[Creech Jones in his memo, advocated the adoption of the moderate pro-

1. By 1999, though Barbados had close British ties and a strong Anglican
church, there were imminent moves towards establishing a republic - of
removing the oath to H.M. as head of state and substituting one to the
constitution. A new Caribbean court of appeal would replace that to the
J.C.P.C. In Trinidad there was opposition to the appeal to the latter because
of its attitude against capital punishment.
2.Cab. 134/55 CA 8(48) [See Vol.VII, pp.117-135] The existing constitution,
with universal suffrage [Vol. VII, p.135] and parity of elected members with
officials and nominated unofficials, had been operating since July 1946. But
in December that year the legislative council had resolved to set up a commit-
tee to consider further reforms and in February 1947 such a committee of 16
under Sir Lennox O'Reilly was instructed to make proposals which would enable
the colony to catch up with other colonies [especially Jamaica] which had re-
cently moved 'ahead' and to secure a constitution in which the people 'should
be more fully associated' in the management of their own affairs'. In the C.O.
George Seel, assistant under-secretary, had reported after visiting the colony
that it would be imprudent 'to let the worn-out Government machine continue':
"the best/only policy' was 'drastic constitutional reform which would give the
Government a democratic foundation': to delay the indication of a forward pol-
icy would risk 'an explosion': (Kennedy, Min., 18 March 1948: C.O.295/639/4).
After some embarrassing delay (O'Reilly finding it difficult to secure a con-
sensus: Kennedy, Min., 30 March ibid.) the committee finally reported (Dr.
Solomon submitting a minority report, and 3 others, who signed the majority
report, dissenting on several minor details). The majority report was cautiou-
sly concerned to maintain safeguards to prevent power 'falling into the hands
of mob leaders': but already agitation had begun particularly among the trades
unions at a conference (6 March 1949) which demanded a referendum on respon-
sible government. Governor Shaw thought the majority report 'not bad' and dis-
missed resolutions in borough and country councils for responsible government,
doubting whether those who voted for it understood its implications. But he
felt the majority report did not go far enough: he had no qualms about Trini-
dadian ability to govern with efficiency; but he thought some training in
practical administration was advisable if local politicians were not to do
injustice to themselves and injury to the people. With racial antagonism
caution was needed to avoid chaos and the majority report provided a temporary
transitional stage. With patience and goodwill, the conditions for full res-
ponsible government could be created. He thought officials should be excluded
from voting on unofficial executive council issues; maybe on all matters (Ken-
nedy, Min., 8 June 1948: C.O.295/639/5). Previously (to G. Seel, 24 Nov. 1947:
C.O.295/639/3 No.34) he had urged the necessity of delegating some responsi-
bility to leaders as advisory quasi-ministers: 'individual responsibility by
some persons other than professional officials is the key to the situation in
my judgement': if India, Burma and Ceylon were considered 'ripe for self-go-
vernment, Trinidad seemed to him no less so. Seel backed Shaw: he was less
sanguine about the likelihood of responsible politicians emerging, and stres-
sed the need for a probationary period (Min., 22 June 1948: C.0.295/639/5);
and Caine agreed, but warned that in Jamaica neither the right kind of train-
ing nor co-operation between politicians and officials had resulted from the
 182
posals, put forward in the majority report: 'the time was ripe for a
change' though not the immediate grant of responsible government as pro-
posed in the minority report.] In the present conditions of T r i n -
idad, i t would not, i n h i s view, be safe t o go f u r t h e r i n the d i -
r e c t i o n of responsible government. The people of the Colony were
p o l i t i c a l l y inexperienced and e d u c a t i o n a l l y backward; there was
no proper system of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s ; and the f i n a n c i a l p o s i t i o n
of the Colony gave cause f o r some a n x i e t y .
The Prime Minister said that, in considering the question of
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l reform i n T r i n i d a d , M i n i s t e r s were faced w i t h the
consequences of past f a i l u r e t o provide the people of T r i n i d a d
w i t h adequate opportunity t o gain p o l i t i c a l and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e
experience. In T r i n i d a d , as i n other Colonial t e r r i t o r i e s , there
had been a r e g r e t t a b l e f a i l u r e t o develop municipal i n s t i t u t i o n s
as a f i r s t school of p o l i t i c a l and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e t r a i n i n g , and
the consequences of t h i s f a i l u r e were accentuated by the inade-
quacy of the local education system and the shocking housing con-
d i t i o n s . In h i s view, the weaknesses of any t r a n s i t i o n a l c o n s t i -
t u t i o n were s e l f - e v i d e n t , but i t was clear t h a t i t would not be
possible t o go f u r t h e r than had been suggested by the Secretary
of S t a t e . I t was a necessary c o r o l l a r y of the adoption of these
proposals t h a t the Government should take more a c t i v e measures
t o develop the system of education and t o improve housing c o n d i -
t i o n s , and i n other ways t o provide the people of T r i n i d a d w i t h
o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r developing an understanding of the r e s p o n s i b i l -
i t i e s of c i t i z e n s h i p .
Discussion showed t h a t there was general agreement t h a t i t
would not be prudent t o go f u r t h e r i n the d i r e c t i o n of respon-
s i b l e government in T r i n i d a d than would r e s u l t from the measure
of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l reform proposed i n C A . ( 4 8 ) 17.
In f u r t h e r discussion, the f o l l o w i n g points were made:-
(a) T w o - f i f t h s of the population of Trinidad were East Indians,
and the Prime M i n i s t e r of I n d i a might be asked t o exercise a
r e s t r a i n i n g influence on them, i f they continued to a g i t a t e f o r
more f a r reaching c o n s t i t u t i o n a l concessions.
(b) Some doubt was expressed whether a s u f f i c i e n t number of com-
petent persons would be found t o serve on the Governor's Execu-
t i v e Council. In r e p l y , i t was pointed out t h a t the Governor had
not regarded t h i s as an o b j e c t i o n t o the proposals under discus-

1944 experiment: in the old Dominions - even India - a t t h i s stage t o -

wards self-government senior posts had been held by l o c a l s - a fact by
no means true in the West Indies (Min., 24 June ibid.). Indeed, a CO.
meeting (2 July 1948) under Listowel (minister a t the C O . ) accepted the
moderate proposals of the majority r e p o r t , and agreed to appoint a com-
mission to consider the next s t e p s towards responsible government: r e s -
ponsible government might be granted soon but not immediately; t h e r e was
doubt whether general e l e c t i o n s 'would yet throw up men of q u a l i t y '
capable of working responsible government ' u n s e l f i s h l y and s u c c e s s f u l l y '
and the r e l a t i o n s h i p between m i n i s t e r s and c i v i l servants mostly expat-
riates required quiet adjustment: (ibid. No.61). Creech Jones was now
submitting his memo. Constitutional reform in Trinidad and Tobago (CA/48/
17) to a cabinet committee, ' a n x i o u s . . . t o do nothing which w i l l throw
moderate progressive opinion in the d i r e c t i o n of the extremist elements'
(CO.295/639/5 No.99).
 183

s i o n ; t h e r e were a number o f c a p a b l e and e x p e r i e n c e d men among

t h e e l e c t e d members o f t h e p r e s e n t L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l .
( c ) Some p r o g r e s s had been made i n r e c e n t y e a r s w i t h t h e d e v e l o p -
ment o f l o c a l government i n T r i n i d a d , b u t t h e powers o f t h e m u n i -
c i p a l i t i e s and o t h e r l o c a l b o d i e s were v e r y l i m i t e d .
( d ) A t t e n t i o n was drawn t o t h e v e r y grave s i t u a t i o n c r e a t e d by
t h e r a p i d i n c r e a s e i n t h e p o p u l a t i o n o f t h e C o l o n y . Every e f f o r t
was b e i n g made t o f i n d a s o l u t i o n by way o f economic development
and t h e c r e a t i o n o f o u t l e t s e l s e w h e r e , b u t t h i s would remain a
dominant problem i n T r i n i d a d . . . . [The memo, was approved by the
Committee.]

( b ) ARTHUR CREECH JONES TO GOVERNOR SIR JOHN SHAW, 7 January 19491

[The majority report of the Committee of the Legislative Council had in
March 1948 recommended that the Legislative Council should consist of 3
ex officio, 6 nominated and 18 elected members;2 that the Governor
should appoint the Speaker (with casting vote only 3 ) from outside the
Council; and that the Governor should use his executive powers r as in the
case of Jamaica' subject to the resolution of the Executive Council and
the approval of the Secretary of State. The Legislative Council had 'by
a majority vote' agreed broadly with the recommendations of the majority
report.]4
I t i s an i m p o r t a n t p a r t o f H i s M a j e s t y ' s Government's c o l o n i a l
p o l i c y t h a t , so soon as i t can be b r o u g h t about by o r d e r l y p r o -
c e s s , i n t h e p a r t i c u l a r c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f each t e r r i t o r y , t h e
l e g i s l a t u r e s t o which t h e c o n t r o l o f p u b l i c a f f a i r s i s e n t r u s t e d
s h o u l d become f u l l y e l e c t i v e . There i s indeed no c o n c l u s i v e a n s -
wer t o t h e argument t h a t a system o f n o m i n a t i o n i s c o n t r a r y t o
a c c e p t e d d e m o c r a t i c p r i n c i p l e , and can be defended o n l y where
s p e c i a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o b t a i n . I have t h e r e f o r e c o n s i d e r a b l e sym-
p a t h y w i t h t h e v i e w s on t h i s s u b j e c t which a r e expressed i n t h e
m i n o r i t y r e p o r t [by Dr. Solomon]; n e v e r t h e l e s s I am n o t p r e p a r e d t o
say t h a t a t t h i s s t a g e i n t h e development o f T r i n i d a d and Tobago,
t h e nominated element c o u l d be w h o l l y e l i m i n a t e d w i t h o u t s e r i o u s -
l y d i s t u r b i n g c o n f i d e n c e i n t h e economic and f i n a n c i a l s t a b i l i t y

1. CO.295/639/5 No, 120. A majority report had favoured a t r a n s i t i o n a l move

towards g r e a t e r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y - not f u l l responsible government y e t , but a
cautious step towards i t . Shaw was governor (1947-50), he had been c o l o n i a l
s e c r e t a r y in Cyprus and chief s e c r e t a r y in P a l e s t i n e . 2. In h i s minority r e -
port (which a fellow committee member, Hannays, c h a r a c t e r i s e d as demanding ' t o
jump from Crown colony government to self-government in one s t e p ' ) , Dr.
Solomon, ' t h e moderate s o c i a l i s t leader of probably the biggest group' in the
council (Listowel, Rept.: 4 Jan. 1950: CO. 28/342/6), had recommended a s i n g l e
chamber of 25 members, a l l e l e c t e d , and the immediate grant of responsible
government, and had hoped vaguely for Dominion s t a t u s . 3. In the 1950 order-
in-council the speaker had n e i t h e r o r i g i n a l nor c a s t i n g vote.
4. By 3 votes (6 nominees and 2 e l e c t e d s in favour; 5 e l e c t e d against - the
o f f i c i a l s a b s t a i n i n g ) . In the debate ending 2 April 1948 Gomes successfully
c a r r i e d a vote against submitting the proposals to a referendum: 11 to 5 (the
elected members s p l i t t i n g between 3 for his amendment and 5 a g a i n s t ) . In
Tobago the county council (24 Jan. 1949) gave f u l l approval to the new c o n s t i -
t u t i o n hoping t h a t 'with the passage of time i t w i l l give place to a fully
elected and responsible l e g i s l a t u r e ' : 'an excellent example' to other councils
in Trinidad (Kennedy, Mins. 1 April 1949: CO. 295/640/1).
184

of the Colony on which the prosperity and therefore the welfare

and standard of living of the people depend. I would add, how-
ever, that nominated members should only be introduced to streng-
then the experience and knowledge of the Councils in dealing with
the complex issues of Government and that they should not be no-
minated to represent 'interest' but should be appointed to serve
the broad and best interests of the Colony as a whole.
I do not believe however that for this purpose it is necessary
to retain nominated members to the full number recommended in the
majority report, and I consider that a start can be made now in
applying the policy of progressive reduction.... [ A s a first step
therefore he suggested 5 nominees, not 6. Moreover in regard to the ma-
jority report's recommendation that the proviso to §47 (a and b) of the
Jamaican 1944 order-in-council [Vol.VII, p.110] should apply to Trinidad
and Tobago - restricting the Governor's discretion to certify 'a bill or
motion rejected by the Chamber', unless the Executive Council by resolu-
tion, or the Secretary of State had approved his written submission so
to act.] The proposal of the present Legislative Council, with
which I fully agree, that the elected members of the Executive
Council should be in a majority of one, creates a situation quite
different from that envisaged in the Jamaican Order-in-Counci1,
and the above mentioned proviso would not be appropriate. It w i l l
be necessary to provide in Trinidad and Tobago that, should the
Executive Council in any instance refuse to authorise the Govet—
nor by resolution to use his reserve powers he may nevertheless
do so if (except where urgency makes this impracticable) the Sec-
retary of State's consent is first obtained. ... [Therefore he would
approve a Legislative Council of 3 ex officio, 5 nominated and 18 elected
members presided over by an outside Speaker appointed by the Governor
(without original or casting vote) and reserve powers for the Governor
where public order, public faith and good government were involved, nor-
mally with the Secretary of State's consent.
As for the Executive Council and transition to greater responsibility]
In the majority report it was recommended that the Executive
Council should be 'the chief instrument of policy' and respon-
sible to the Legislative Council, and that it should be composed
of three ex officio members (Colonial Secretary, Attorney Gener-
al , and Financial Secretary), and three nominated and six elected
members from the Legislative Council. The Governor would preside
and have a casting vote. It was also proposed that the unofficial
members of the Executive Council should be actively associated
in the work of administration of Government Departments.... The
publication of the Reports and subsequent discussion in the Legi-
slative Council have further stimulated public interest in the
question of constitutional progress. I have received many resolu-
tions and petitions from representative bodies in the Colony. I
have also had the opportunity of personal discussion with repre-
sentatives of a number of important sections of opinion, and also
with yourself. It is clear from the various representations which
have been made to me that there is unanimity in the view that the
present constitution, which gives representation without execut-
ive responsibility, is unsatisfactory, and that the time has come
to take a definite step forward.
I agree that the stage has been reached when the people of Tri-
nidad and Tobago must be enabled to assume greater responsibility
for the control of their own a f f a i r s . . . . [As he had said at Montego
 185

Bay in 1947, H.M.'s G.'s policy was increasingly to transfer responsibil-

ity from London to the peoples of the territories themselves and 'when-
ever possible to increase the measure of responsibility for government
borne by Colonial Legislatures'.] The question which i s now c l e a r -
l y posed by the reports of the C o n s t i t u t i o n Committee i s whether
responsible government should be reached i n T r i n i d a d and Tobago
at one step, or through a f u r t h e r t r a n s i t i o n a l stage.
The proposals in the m a j o r i t y report are based on a f e e l i n g
t h a t such a t r a n s i t i o n a l stage i s d e s i r a b l e . The supporters of
these proposals hold the view t h a t a nominated element should be
retained f o r the present i n both the Executive and L e g i s l a t i v e
Councils. In t h e i r opinion the experience and knowledge of nomi-
nated members are v i t a l l y necessary t o the welfare of the Colony
during i t s present stage of development; and the presence of per-
sons w i t h such experience and knowledge gives strength to both
Councils i n t h e i r d e l i b e r a t i o n s on problems concerning the well
being and development of the Colony. Further, they consider i t
desirable t h a t before f u l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s assumed by the e l e c -
ted representatives of the people, there should be a period dur-
ing which the members of the L e g i s l a t u r e , who under the c o n s t i t u -
t i o n envisaged in the m a j o r i t y report would be associated w i t h
the work of Government Departments, should have an opportunity
of gaining d i r e c t experience and t r a i n i n g in the conduct of pub-
l i c business.
I am s a t i s f i e d t h a t the aim of p o l i c y f o r Trinidad and Tobago
must be the e a r l y attainment of a c o n s t i t u t i o n under which the
Government w i l l be d i r e c t l y responsible t o the people whose a f -
f a i r s i t c o n t r o l s ; and I am f u l l y aware of the earnest desire of
many sections of opinion t h a t t h i s aim should be achieved now.
At the same time, a s u b s t a n t i a l body of opinion i s in favour of
a f u r t h e r intermediate stage, and t h i s view, as r e f l e c t e d in the
m a j o r i t y r e p o r t , i s shared by the m a j o r i t y of the members of the
present L e g i s l a t i v e Council.
There i s a f u r t h e r p o i n t of some importance. In the m i n o r i t y
report i t i s recommended t h a t the members of the Executive Coun-
c i l should have f u l l m i n i s t e r i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and be c o l l e c t i -
vely responsible to the L e g i s l a t u r e . Experience has shown, how-
ever, t h a t the success of Parliamentary government depends l a r -
gely on the existence of responsible p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s w i t h co-
herent and d e f i n i t e programmes. I t cannot be s a i d ,1 however, t h a t
in Trinidad t h i s c o n d i t i o n i s as yet f u l f i l l e d . No doubt the

1. The grant of universal adult suffrage in 1945 [Vol.VII, p.136] had increa-
sed the East Indian membership of the council and made i t more of a permanent
opposition, but i t had not yet stimulated the development of a party system.
In the 1946 e l e c t i o n s only 3 United Front candidates were successful: two
former West Indian National Party members (Dr. Patrick Solomon and Roy Joseph)
and Albert Gomes who had been expelled from the W.I.N.P. and defeated Butler,
the t r a d e s u n i o n i s t . Yet in the 1950 e l e c t i o n these three stood under
d i f f e r e n t d e s i g n a t i o n s : Gomes as candidate for the Party of P o l i t i c a l Prog-
r e s s , Solomon for the Caribbean S o c i a l i s t s and Joseph as an independent. But-
l e r ' s a f f i l i a t e s won 7 s e a t s , but the l e g i s l a t i v e council voted for none of
them, p r e f e r r i n g 3 independents, 1 Caribbean S o c i a l i s t and 1 P o l i t i c a l Prog-
r e s s group, (Gomes). Much government business continued to be introduced by
the colonial and f i n a n c i a l s e c r e t a r i e s . But Gomes proved a redoubtable cham-
186
limitations of the existing constitution in part account for this
failure. It is clear, however, that until there has been a fur-
ther opportunity under more favourable circumstances for politi-
cal parties to develop and work out definite programmes, the
grant of responsible government would be unlikely to succeed.
In these circumstances it is pertinent to consider how far the
majority proposals themselves as amended by the Legislative Coun-
cil go to place the elected representatives in a position of res-
ponsibility. Those proposals contemplate a definite elected ma-
jority in the Executive Council, which is designed to be the
chief instrument of Government policy. As I see it, this would
afford the elected element full opportunity to assume responsi-
bility forthwith for all internal affairs, subject only to provi-
sion for the use by the Governor of reserve powers in certain de-
fined ci rcumstance and under limitations similar to those provid-
ed in the constitution of Jamaica. (Provision for reserve powers
is envisaged in both the majority and minority reports.) The ma-
jority proposals, as amended in Legislative Council, go in fact
beyond the existing provision in Jamaica, which was at the time
of its introduction in 1944 widely regarded as a striking advance
towards responsibility. At the same time they would retain for
the time being certain features which would constitute some reas-
surance for those who would view with hesitation the immediate
grant of responsible government. I shall make some observations
later upon certain of the elements by which that reassurance is
provided, and particularly upon the retention of nominated mem-
ber. Subject to these, and to certain modifications which, as
indicated below, I propose to make, I consider that the amended
majority proposals, far reaching as they are, afford a basis upon
which all parties should be able to co-operate sincerely and ef-
fectively. At the same time, those proposals, if carried into
effect, would provide the unofficial members of the Legislature
with full opportunities of gaining the necessary experience in
the administrative conduct of affairs, a feature for which the
existing arrangements have not provided but which, as mentioned
above, experience elsewhere has shown to be essential to the suc-
cessful launching of self-government.
After most carefully reviewing these various considerations I
have reached the conclusion that, looking to the ultimate politi-
cal future of Trinidad and Tobago, the wisest course will be to
accept, for a period, a constitution based generally on the pro-
posals in the majority report, as amended by the Legislative
Council. In saying this, however, I wish to emphasise the inten-
tion, so far as His Majesty's Government are concerned, that any
such arrangement should be of a transitional nature, and should
be designed to bring about the circumstances which would enable
responsibility to be assumed without the misgivings which are now
felt by many of those who would be directly concerned. At the
same time, I wish to draw attention to certain respects in which,
in my view, the amended majority proposals themselves require mo-
dification. One of these, as already indicated above, relates to
the provision for nominated members...

pion of government and Butler's opposition bloc suffered defections till it

consisted of only 3.
 187

I n t h e E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l t h e r e s h o u l d be one nominated member

o n l y , and t h e e l e c t e d members s h o u l d , as p r o p o s e d , be i n a m a j o r -
ity of one over the ex officio and nominated members combined.
T h i s r e s u l t s h o u l d be o b t a i n e d by r e d u c i n g t h e number o f e l e c t e d
members f r o m seven t o f i v e . T h i s would a l s o have t h e advantage
o f making t h e E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l a more compact body.
There i s some s u p p o r t f o r t h e view t h a t t h e e l e c t e d members o f
t h e E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l s h o u l d be chosen by v o t e o f t h e e l e c t e d
s i d e o n l y o f t h e l e g i s l a t u r e . I b e l i e v e i t t o be o f p a r t i c u l a r
i m p o r t a n c e , however, t o encourage t h e view t h a t t h e members o f
t h e E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l s h o u l d be r e s p o n s i b l e t o t h e L e g i s l a t i v e
C o u n c i l as a w h o l e , r a t h e r t h a n t o a s e c t i o n o f t h a t body o n l y .
I c o n s i d e r , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t a l l members o f t h e L e g i s l a t i v e Coun-
c i l s h o u l d have a v o t e i n t h e s e l e c t i o n o f t h e e l e c t e d members
o f t h e E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l . The s i n g l e nominated member o f t h e Exe-
c u t i v e C o u n c i l s h o u l d be nominated by t h e Governor because i t
i s o b v i o u s l y anomalous t o g i v e an e l e c t i v e c h a r a c t e r i n t h e Exe-
c u t i v e C o u n c i l t o a member who owes h i s p o s i t i o n i n t h e L e g i s l a t -
i v e C o u n c i l t o n o m i n a t i o n . He s h o u l d h o l d o f f i c e as an E x e c u t i v e
Councillor at pleasure.
As r e g a r d s t h e removal o f e l e c t e d members o f t h e E x e c u t i v e
C o u n c i l . I c o n s i d e r t h a t t h i s s h o u l d be s u b j e c t t o a t w o - t h i r d s
m a j o r i t y of the L e g i s l a t i v e Council.
To sum up, my c o n c l u s i o n i s t h a t t h e new c o n s t i t u t i o n s h o u l d
provide for:.... (ii) an Executive Council of three ex officio
members, one nominated member ( a p p o i n t e d by H i s M a j e s t y on t h e
recommendation o f t h e G o v e r n o r ) , and f i v e e l e c t e d members t o be
e l e c t e d by t h e L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i 1 ; . . . . I n a d d i t i o n , arrangements
s h o u l d be made f o r t h e u n o f f i c i a l members o f t h e E x e c u t i v e Coun-
c i l t o be a c t i v e l y a s s o c i a t e d i n t h e work o f a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f
Government d e p a r t m e n t s . I propose t o g i v e f u r t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n ,
i n c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h y o u , t o t h e q u e s t i o n how t h i s can b e s t be
effected.
F i n a l l y , a P u b l i c S e r v i c e s Commission s h o u l d be s e t up. I s h a l l
address you s e p a r a t e l y on t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n and f u n c t i o n s o f such
a c o m m i s s i o n , and I n o t e t h a t you w i l l w i s h t o i n f o r m me o f t h e
views of the C i v i l Service A s s o c i a t i o n i n t h i s matter before
f i n a l conclusions are reached.1
( c ) CONSTITUTION ORDER-IN-COUNCIL, 31 March 19502
[On the Legislative Council (Part IV) 1t was ordered that i t should

1. The o r d e r - i n - c o u n c i l (31 March 1950), l e t t e r s patent (16 March) and royal

i n s t r u c t i o n s (31 March) embodied Creech Jones' recommendations [No.57b], the
executive of the governor, 3 o f f i c i a l s 1 nominee and 5 elected by the l e g i s -
l a t u r e ; the l e g i s l a t u r e of 3 o f f i c i a l s , 5 nominees and 18 e l e c t e d . The r e l a -
t i o n s h i p of the executive council with the governor s u b s t a n t i a l l y was as i n t -
roduced into Jamaica in 1944. This g u a s i - m i n i s t e r i a l system was extended e l s e -
where in the B r i t i s h Caribbean in the next half dozen y e a r s : to B.G. (1953),
B.H. (1954), the Windwards (1955), Antigua (1956) and St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla
(1956). 2. Stat.R. 1950 No.510. A similar constitution was introduced in 1954
into B.H. Similarly the 1956 amendments were followed in 1960 in B.H. Though
the Tobago county council (24 Jan. 1949) accepted the new proposals hoping
t h a t *in the passage of time' a fully elected and responsible l e g i s l a t u r e
would be achieved, in Trinidad a g i t a t i o n was organised for the immediate grant
 188

consist of a Speaker,1 3 ex officio, 5 nominated and 18 elected

members.]
30.(1) The Speaker shall be a person who is not an ex officio,
N o m i n a t e d , o r E l e c t e d Member o f t h e L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l a n d who
does n o t h o l d any o f f i c e o f emolument under t h e Crown, and s h a l l
be a p p o i n t e d by t h e G o v e r n o r , a c t i n g i n h i s d i s c r e t i o n , by I n s t -
r u m e n t u n d e r t h e P u b l i c S e a l . ( 2 ) The S p e a k e r s h a l l h o l d o f f i c e
d u r i n g H i s M a j e s t y ' s p l e a s u r e a n d , s u b j e c t t h e r e t o , f o r such
p e r i o d a s may be s p e c i f i e d i n t h e i n s t r u m e n t by w h i c h he i s a p -
p o i n t e d , a n d s h a l l n o t v a c a t e h i s o f f i c e by r e a s o n o f a d i s s o l -
ution of the Legislative Council: Provided that the Speaker may,
by w r i t i n g u n d e r h i s h a n d a d d r e s s e d t o t h e G o v e r n o r , r e s i g n h i s
o f f i c e ; a n d u p o n r e c e i p t o f s u c h r e s i g n a t i o n by t h e G o v e r n o r t h e
o f f i c e o f S p e a k e r s h a l l be come v a c a n t . . .
33. The ex officio Members of the Legislative Council shall be
t h e C o l o n i a l S e c r e t a r y , t h e A t t o r n e y General and t h e F i n a n c i a l
Secretary.
3 4 . ( 1 ) S u b j e c t t o t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f s e c t i o n 37 o f t h i s O r d e r , t h e
Nominated Members of the Legislative Council shall be British
s u b j e c t s o f t h e a g e o f t w e n t y - o n e y e a r s o r u p w a r d s a n d s h a l l be
a p p o i n t e d by t h e G o v e r n o r , a c t i n g i n h i s d i s c r e t i o n , by I n s t r u -
m e n t u n d e r t h e P u b l i c S e a l . 2 ( 2 ) The G o v e r n o r s h a l l forthwith
report t o His Majesty through a Secretary of State every appoin-
t m e n t o f a n y p e r s o n t o be a N o m i n a t e d Member o f t h e L e g i s l a t i v e
Counci1.
3 5 . T h e E l e c t e d Members o f t h e L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l s h a l l be p e r -
sons q u a l i f i e d f o r e l e c t i o n i n accordance w i t h t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f
t h i s O r d e r and e l e c t e d i n t h e manner p r o v i d e d b y , o r i n p u r s u a n c e
o f , a n y l a w e n a c t e d u n d e r t h i s o r d e r . . . . [The q u a l i f i c a t i o n s f o r E l -
ected Members were B r i t i s h subjecthood, over 2 1 , w i t h 2 years residence
and d o m i c i l e , able t o speak and (unless b l i n d ) read E n g l i s h s u f f i c i e n t
t o take p a r t i n t h e proceedings, w i t h income o f $960. p . a . or ownership
o f r e a l e s t a t e over $5,000 or producing $480 p.a. ( § 3 6 ) . The Governor 3
w i t h t h e advice and consent o f t h e L e g i s l a t i v e Council was empowered t o
make laws f o r t h e peace, order and good government o f t h e Colony ( § 4 8 ) . ]

( d ) GOVERNMENT NOTICE, 16 March 19504

1 . There w i l l b e , under t h e Chai rmanship o f t h e G o v e r n o r , nine

of r e s p o n s i b l e government and a referendum on the issue demanded (Shaw. 3

April 1949: CO.295/640/1) which Gomes defeated in the l e g i s l a t u r e (2 A p r i l ) .
1, There was p r o v i s i o n a l s o for a deputy Speaker to be e l e c t e d from the l e g i s -
l a t i v e c o u n c i l l o r s : he could not be a l s o an executive c o u n c i l l o r . In the Lee-
wards and Windwards the Administrators s t i l l p r e s i d e d . 2. The q u a l i f i c a t i o n s
for e l e c t e d members of the l e g i s l a t i v e council were more r e s t r i c t i v e than for
those nominated. 3. The governor s t i l l r e t a i n e d the d i s c r e t i o n a r y powers of
a s s e n t , r e s e r v a t i o n , veto and c e r t i f i c a t i o n - the l a s t normally to be used
only with the advice of ' t h e e x e c u t i v e ' council unless s p e c i f i c a l l y overridden
with the consent of the secretary of state or in emergencies. 4. Stat.R. 1950
L.P. the o r d e r - i n - c o u n c i l and i n s t r u c t i o n s (31 March): a l s o Trinidad and Toba-
go Gazette 1950: Govt. Notice No.94. Members of the executive council were b e -
ing a s s o c i a t e d with the work of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n in government departments. But
a t the same time the g o v e r n o r ' s power of c e r t i f i c a t i o n to o v e r - r i d e opposition
in the executive as well as the l e g i s l a t i v e was strengthened. G r i f f i t h s s e n t
a memo, on the m i n i s t e r i a l system as i t was working elsewhere.
 189
members of Executive Council, namely Colonial Secretary, Attorney
General, Financial Secretary, five elected members and one nomi-
nated member of the Legislative Council.
2. Departments of Government
Subject to financial provision being made, the power to deter-
mine and define from time to time what departments of Government
there shall be will be vested in the Governor in Executive Coun-
cil, i.e. the Governor acting after consultation with the Execu-
tive Council and (save in the exceptional circumstances prescri-
bed in the Royal Instructions) in accordance with the advice of
the Executive Council.
3. Assignment of Departments to members of the Executive Council
The administration of departments of Government will be assign-
ed to members of Executive Council as follows:-
(a) Ex officio members. The Governor will have power in his
discretion to assign from time to time to each of the ex officio
members of Executive Council the administration of such depart-
ments and such subjects as he thinks fit.
(b) Other members, (i) The Governor will have power in his dis-
cretion to prescribe from time to time which departments and sub-
jects may be assigned to members of Executive Council other than
ex officio members, (ii) The Governor in Executive Council will
have power from time to time to assign to any member of Executive
Council, other than an ex officio member, any department or sub-
ject for the time being prescribed by the Governor under (i)
above, but will not be required to assign a department or subject
to every such member and may assign more than one department to
any such member.
4. The nominated member of the Executive Counci1
Although the constitution will make no distinction between the
elected members and the nominated member as regards their right
to have departments or subjects assigned to them, it is not anti-
cipated that the nominated member will, in normal circumstances,
in fact have a department or subject assigned to him.
5. Ministers
A member of Executive Council (other than an ex officio member)
t o whom any d e p a r t m e n t o r s u b j e c t i s a s s i g n e d wi 11 , w h i l e charged
w i t h t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f any department o r s u b j e c t , be s t y l e d
a Minister....
[6. Special Officers. The advice of the Economic Adviser and S t a t i s t i c i a n
would be available to a l l Ministers, would not be under the control of
any particular Minister, but would be controlled by the Governor-in-Exe-
cutive Council. The Sub-Intendant for Crown lands would remain d i r e c t l y
responsible to the Governor as Intendant. The relationship of the Direc-
tor of Audit and his department with the Secretary of State, the Governor
and the local administration would not be altered.
9. Salaries. A minister would be paid annually in respect of his o f f i c e :
executive councillors who were not ministers or ex officio would be paid
annually as members of the Executive Counci1.1
10. M i n i s t e r i a l f u n c t i o n s o f members o f t h e E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l
Members o f E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l t o whom d e p a r t m e n t s a r e a s s i g n e d
w i l l be r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e i r s u b j e c t s and d e p a r t m e n t s both i n
E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l and i n L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l . They w i l l a l s o be
r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e c a r r y i n g o u t o f p o l i c y approved by E x e c u t i v e
C o u n c i l and f o r t h e day t o day a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f t h e i r d e p a r t -
ments.
190
In this transition stage the central secretariat will remain
and the five ministers will be accommodated either in the same
building or nearby. The Secretariat will remain organised into
branches very much as at present with an Assistant Secretary at
the head of each branch, but the Assistant Secretaries will sub-
mit files and papers to the minister concerned instead of to the
Under-Secretary and the Colonial Secretary. Ministers will have
access to all files of their own departments except personnel
files. They will not have access to the files of any other depar-
tments except with the permission of the member of Executive
Council concerned. The Colonial Secretary, Attorney General and
Financial Secretary, in view of the nature of their duties, will
be allowed access to all files and papers....
12. Disagreement between heads of Departments and Ministers
If there is disagreement between the minister in charge of any
department and the officer who is for the time being head of that
department, the latter may submit to the minister, in writing,
a statement of his reasons for disagreeing with the minister and
of his own recommendations on the question at issue. The minister
will then be required to forward to the Clerk of Executive Coun-
cil a copy of the statement together with any written statement
which he may himself wish to make. The Governor-in-Counci1 will
consider the statement or statements and decide the question at
issue....
[On personnel matters and conditions of service (13) heads of Depart-
ments would deal directly with the Colonial Secretary and the Governor
who would seek advice from the Public Service Commission.]
15. Finance Committee
Apart from the Finance Committee which will presumably be com-
posed as at present of all unofficial members of the Legislative
Council under the chairmanship of the Financial Secretary, it is
considered that standing committees of Legislative Council should
not be necessary1 on any matter for which any member of Execu-
tive Council is responsible. It is also considered that in pre-
sent circumstances there should be no deputy ministers or parlia-
mentary secretaries and no provision has, therefore, been made
for such officers. 2

1. A committee system as operating in Ceylon under the Donoughmore constitu-

tion and indeed previously [Vol.VII, pp.205-281 was being ruled out.
2. Constitutional reform was an issue which excited only the few politically
active. Moves in 1953 'to widen the government' found little agreement - even
those signing majority reports boasted their reservations on important points
(Ranee to Lyttelton, 10 Apr. 1953: C O . 1031/335; Beetham to Lennox-Boyd, 30
Aug. 1955: C O . 1031/1394). But jealousy for Jamaica's constitutional advance
fuelled the drive for more self-government (e.g. Ranee to Lyttelton, 11 Feb.
1953). Governor Sir Hubert Ranee in January 1955 appointed a constitutional
reform committee of all the unofficial legislative councillors together with
11 other 'eminent persons' which reported formally on 3 September to his
successor, Sir Edward Beetham - the proposals were generally acceptable,
'nothing extreme', (Min. Wallace, 29 August: C O . 1031/1394) though Jeffries
thought that as in Mauritius, the ministers should be elected by P.R. (Min 6
Sept. ibid.). Lennox-Boyd thought the executive should not be too large in
relation to the work to be done: he did not favour ministers without port-
folios: too many cheapened important office (7 Sept. ibid.). Wallace had
 191

(e) STEPHEN LUKE TO GOVERNOR SIR HUGH FOOT, 12 June 19521

'I said that we would talk to Ranee about how they organised

warned that H.M.'s G. would approve 8 ministers and a chief minister provided
that, after appointment by the governor, he selected his own team (as in
Singapore). This might encourage some party stability but in Trinidad parties
were developing on racial lines. The incorporation of the need for collective
responsibility as provided in the Gold Coast constitution, had done little to
encourage cohesion (Wallace to Beetham, 30 June: ibid.). On 7 June 1956
(Stat.R. No.835) both legislative and executive councils had increased numbers
of elected members. The executive consisted of the governor, 2 ex officio
(colonial secretary and A.G.) and 7 elected: the legislature was enlarged to
31 (24 elected) from 27 (18 elected) there being the chief minister, 5
nominees and the 2 ex officio (the colonial secretary and A.G.). The elected
members chose the chief minister who became the government leader in the
councils. The chief minister did not choose his team, but advised the governor
on his appointments and ministers could only be removed by a 2/3 majority in
the legislature. The ex officio financial secretary was replaced by a finance
minister. In the 1956 elections Dr. Eric Williams' People's National Movement
won 13 of the 24 elected seats; while B.S. Marcy's disparate People's Democra-
tic Party won 5, the Labour Party 2, the Butler party 2 and independents 2.
1. C.0.1031/336. The governor of Jamaica was being informed by the C.O. what
Sir Hubert Ranee (governor of Trinidad, 1950-5: previously chairman of the
standing closer association committee) had communicated on the working of the
new <?uasi-ministerial system in Trinidad. Luke was an assistant under secre-
tary who was made responsible for the W.I, department in 1952, In November
1954 Aubrey Jones moved 'Whereas the Secretary of State has seen fit to grant
further constitutional advances to other West Indian colonies and whereas this
colony may be at a disadvantage to enter the federation if it can be said of
us that we are not ready for constitutional advancement [C.O. marginal comment
'What nonsense'] and whereas the people of this country feel absolutely frust-
rated in the thought that another election should be held under the present
constitution, which would mean that the present constitution must remain for
10 years, and whereas the Secretary of State has clearly stated that this
constitution is only transitional, and whereas, despite its many shortcomings,
this constitution has served its transitional period satisfactorily, and
whereas it is desirable that the loyalty of the people and of this colony to
H.M. 's G. should continue. Be it resolved that this Honourable House, in keep-
ing with the generally accepted procedure in matters of this kind, requests
His Excellency the Governor to appoint a fully representative committee inclu-
ding all the Elected Members of this Honourable House for the purpose of con-
sidering constitutional advancement': (26 Nov.:C.O.1031/1393). The government
accepted the motion and it was carried unanimously, Maurice Dorman, the colon-
ial secretary, submitted a memo, warning that the establishment of the usual
semi-responsible constitution, depending on a party system and a chief minis-
ter would exacerbate racial feeling and deliver the country into the mercies
of an East Indian group controlled by the anti-federal 'gangster, Bhadase
Maraj': 'a glance at the names of the new S. African cabinet shows what can
happen as a result of a party system on our model - there is not one English
name among them.' In his minute on this (4 Dec. ibid.) Ian Wallace confessed
that he could not see what was the right constitution for Trinidad, but with
Jamaica going ahead 'with something approaching the present Gold Coast consti-
tution', Trinidad could not be 'held static' and some new blood in the Govern-
ment would do no harm. He suggested constitutional discussions and no change
till after the next election in September 1956, Philip Rogers recognised Trin-
192

things in Trinidad and let you know anything w h i c h we thought you

might f i n d helpful.
Ranee tells us that the Ministries in Trinidad function
independently and that papers are no longer centralised in the
secretariat. Incoming despatches are marked by the Governor's
secretary to the appropriate Ministry and matters coming up from
the Ministries to the Governor's secretary do not pass through
the Secretariat machine. In each Ministry, there is an adminis-
trative officer in the Assistant Secretary grade with responsi-
bility for administration. In rank, this o f f i c e r , who corresponds
to a Permanent secretary may be junior to the technical Head of
Departments for which the minister is responsible. The Heads of
Department have the right of access to the Minister without going
through the Assistant Secretary. Papers, however, all come to the
minister through the Assistant S e c r e t a r y , '

( f ) GOVERNOR SIR EDWARD BEETHAM TO ALAN LENNOX-BOYD, 15 December 19551

[He summarised the frustrated moves towards constitutional reform since
the Creech Jones despatch of January 1949 [No.57b] and the 1950 order-in-
council and letters patent. The reform committee had now reported. The
5 year experience of the 1950 constitution was not so discouraging as to
block devolution of further responsibility: not that within his own
department a minister could have fuller responsibility than he had had,
and indeed all had accepted fully the objections of collective responsi-
b i l i t y - 'a significant achievement'. But] it must, however, be ad-
mitted that little progress has been made in the development of
responsible political parties and it is the realistic acceptance
of this fundamental fact which must underly all consideration of
further constitutional change. It was the hope that the 1950
constitution would create more favourable circumstances for the
development of a party system. I believe that this was and is the
case. Some people are disposed to argue, however, that because
the development of a party system has not made the progress hoped
for the constitution must be at fault. This is a dangerous
f a l l a c y . Constitutions do not make parties, parties make
constitutions. Neither the present constitution, nor that
proposed, in any way prevents the operation of a party system;
and as in the Gold Coast or in British Honduras so here in
Trinidad a well organized party could come to power and the
constitution would then operate in accordance with many of the
conventions usually applying in a parliamentary system. If it
were solely the terms of the constitution which were at fault,
one would expect to see some development of party government at

idad's 'lack of social cohesion' as potentially dangerous and was doubtful

about handing over increased power to an elected government at this juncture,
but he thought a change might o f f e r a greater opportunity for the development
of power and anyway 'we are not in a position to refuse an agreed demand from
Trinidad for this': ( M i n . 7 Dec. ibid.). Any long postponement of the elec-
tions (as some members wished to keep Mara.i out of power and 'brought to book'
and to facilitate federation) would be wholly unwise: anyone in Maraj's place
might be as bad. A short delay to aid the inauguration of the federation might
be reasonable: ( M i n . , 12 Apr. 1955 ibid.). 1. C.0.1031/1395. Beetham (gover-
nor 1955-60) had served in Kenya, S.L. and the High Commission Territories,
before becoming governor of the Windwards (1953-5).
 193
the local government level; even here it cannot be said that the
parties which do exist can either hold their members together
when personal interests conflict with party requirements or
present such a definite and distinctive programme that the party
will be supported for its programme in several different
localities. In Trinidad and Tobago personalities are far stronger
at present than parties....
[Already 7 groups had announced their intention to contest seats - the
Party of Political Progress, the People's Democratic and the National
Democratic parties, the Tribal Uriah Buzz party, the Labour and the
Independent Labour parties and the West Indian Independence party. Others
might emerge - some no doubt weak. It was doubtful whether any would
secure a substantial measure of representation or any coalition of them
would hold together either in success or in adversity for very long. The
influential Federation of Trades Unions was demanding one of the promised
seats. In these political circumstances] it would be foolhardy to
adopt any constitutional form which could only operate under a
party system. This might lead to two equally dangerous situ-
ations, either the emergence of parties inherently racial in
outlook or make-up, or the development of an innately unstable
government and legislature. It is far better to avoid these risks
by continuing with the natural development of a constitution
which will work either with or without parties than to risk ir-
reparable damage to the community by plunging forward to our
agreed objective in a forced march.
[Even without a party system he would strongly support the creation of
a chief minister, the elected leader of the Government in both Councils.]
It is time that there should be some one person who is clearly
authorized to speak for Trinidad and Tobago, as other leaders in
the Caribbean speak for their islands. It is also right that
there should be one leader who can answer for the Government as
a whole and who can concern himself with the overall working of
the Ministerial team. With the firm backing of a party a Chief
Minister would clearly be in a stronger position but the lack of
it should not prevent what is in every respect a desirable
development.
If there is general agreement about the need for a Chief
Minister, there is a sharper difference of opinion about the way
in which he should be appointed. The majority of the Committee
propose that the Chief Minister should be elected by the
Legislative Council and although it is not explicitly stated, I
understand that it was the intention to retain the present system
of electing other Ministers. Thereafter the Governor would
allocate portfolios after consultation with the Chief Minister.
The effect of these recommendations in a political system which
has not developed effective parties would be to make the Chief
Minister primus inter pares. He would be selected one amongst
others and would have no effective powers over those elected with
him; he would not have selected his colleagues and would not be
able to dispense with them. If however a majority party, or a
coalition group, comes to power, their leader could select his
own team and in securing approval for it by the use of their
majority, he would be obtaining ratification of his or his
party's proposals; in such a case, the loyalties of the Ministry
would be of an ^entirely different character. Some of the minority
reports draw attention to this point and recommend in effect that
194
t h e Governor s h o u l d send f o r t h e person most l i k e l y t o command
a m a j o r i t y i n t h e L e g i s l a t u r e and i n v i t e him t o s e l e c t h i s
minister, t h e r e a f t e r t h e C h i e f M i n i s t e r would have t o see
r a t i f i c a t i o n by t h e L e g i s l a t u r e b e f o r e assuming o f f i c e . I n f a c t
t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n s t r u m e n t s s h o u l d be such as t o p e r m i t e i t h e r
p r o c e d u r e depending upon t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s . Having r e g a r d t o t h e
v e r y s e r i o u s c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o u t l i n e d above about t h e l a c k o f a
p a r t y s y s t e m , i t would i n my view be w r o n g , and an i r r e s p o n s i b l e
d e v o l u t i o n o f a u t h o r i t y , so t o d r a f t t h e O r d e r - i n - C o u n c i l t h a t
i t w i l l o n l y o p e r a t e i n one way t h a t i s t o say t h a t i t would
r e q u i r e t h e Governor t o send f o r one i n d i v i d u a l . T h i s m i g h t ,
i n d e e d , mean t h a t t h e Governor was f a c e d w i t h a s e l e c t i o n o f one
among many i n d i v i d u a l s , a s e l e c t i o n t h a t would have t o be made
in the f u l l l i g h t of p u b l i c i t y . I f i t turned out t h a t the
m a j o r i t y t h o u g h t t o be i n f a v o u r o f such a person had m e l t e d away
o v e r n i g h t , t h e Governor would t h e n f i n d h i m s e l f i n v o l v e d i n a
p a t t e r n o f t r i a l and e r r o r w i t h which we have become o n l y t o o
f a m i l i a r i n C i t y C o u n c i l c i r c l e s . No one would w i s h t o see a
development o f t h i s k i n d . S e c o n d l y , i n t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f
T r i n i d a d i t i s my own view t h a t t h e system recommended by t h e
m a j o r i t y i s i n h e r e n t l y more d e m o c r a t i c a t t h i s s t a g e o f a f f a i r s .
I f t h e Governor had t o s e l e c t one i n d i v i d u a l among many, o r among
s m a l l g r o u p s , i t would p l a c e so much power i n t h e hands o f t h a t
one i n d i v i d u a l , who would n o t be s u b j e c t t o t h e same checks
i n h e r e n t i n l e a d i n g a p a r t y , t h a t many people would f e e l i t was
more a u t o c r a t i c t h a n d e m o c r a t i c . L a s t l y , i f o r when a r e a l p a r t y
d e v e l o p s , t h e r e w i l l be n o t h i n g i n t h e p r e s e n t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
arrangements t o p r e v e n t e i t h e r t h e Governor recognising its
emergence and a c t i n g a c c o r d i n g t o t h e normal c o n v e n t i o n s , o r t h e
p a r t y i n s i s t i n g t h a t i t i s s t r o n g enough t o be e n t i t l e d t o such
r e c o g n i t i o n . . . . [For these reasons he supported the majority view and the
way i t would work should be l e f t open for the Governor to judge in the
actual circumstances. The d i s t r i b u t i o n of portfolios should not be at his
discretion but clearly on the advice of the Chief Minister who must be
seen to bear f u l l responsibility. There must be a responsible Minister
of Finance (as in Jamaica and Barbados) and the o f f i c i a l Financial
Secretary should not remain on the Executive Council: he was sure that
recent experience showed that men of quality and capacity would be
available. On balance though there might be need later for an upper
house, he agreed with the committee that the legislature should continue
bi-cameral. The committee inclined to believe that the number of
ministers should be increased. Certainly work needed to be redistributed.
Too many ministers might dominate the legislature. A moderate increase
therefore perhaps to 10 might serve. Any legislation which favoured
minority government should be avoided - a weak government was 'never any
good for a country', Moreover, i t was unfortunately not true that sound
policies would always a t t r a c t support.] I a d m i t t h a t a t f i r s t s i g h t
t h e p r o p o s a l has i t s a t t r a c t i o n s because i t appears t o l e a d t o
a more d e m o c r a t i c f o r m o f government i n which t h e e x e c u t i v e i s
c o m p e l l e d t o respond t o t h e p r e s s u r e s o f e l e c t e d b a c k b e n c h e r s ;
but the fundamental o b j e c t o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l reform i s t o place
so f a r as p o s s i b l e t h e management o f t h e Government i n t h e hands
o f t h e e l e c t e d r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f t h e p e o p l e , who f r o m t i m e t o
t i m e s h o u l d be a b l e t o e x p r e s s t h e i r p r e f e r e n c e f o r a change
t h r o u g h t h e o r d i n a r y p r o c e s s e s o f an e l e c t i o n - and t h i s i s
e x a c t l y the e f f e c t of the Committee's proposals. I t i s e q u a l l y
 195
important that the responsibility should rest clearly on the
government of the day and that it should not be able to push
forward the Legislature as an alibi for inaction. Further, in the
last analysis if the electorate or political leaders really
desire to make their government even more responsive to the
elected element, it is open to them to do so through the
development of a party system - provided that the electorate and
their representatives are prepared to make compromises and
personal sacrifices to achieve it; in a party government there
would of course be the double obligation of Ministers to take
into consideration their party members' views and of the
backbenchers to support their Ministers even when they did not
agree with them. I do not myself agree that the advantages to be
gained by reducing the number of Ministers and legislating for
a minority Government in any way outweigh the disadvantages of
weak government.
The arguments against so many Ministers as ten are simple in
essence. It is held that to create ten Ministries will be to
establish an unnecessarily top-heavy superstructure which will
be expensive to maintain particularly when taking into account
the permanent staff required for the extra Ministries. Secondly,
it would place too heavy a strain on the civil service to be cal-
led upon to man so many Ministries and since the real strength
of a Ministry lies in the quality of its staff, this might well
weaken rather than strengthen the administration. Thirdly, it
would be too much to expect that in the absence of a party system
ten Ministers could hold together effectively throughout the
vicissitudes of their term of office; there would be a serious
risk of an opposition developing within the Government itself -
a minority group out of sympathy with the majority, disaffected
and disinclined to maintain the conventions of collective respon-
sibility; such a development would undermine the whole structure
of Government and is too serious to be risked. Fourthly, the more
Ministers are appointed, the more the status of the position is
depreciated and discontented; it would do the country no good to
have ten Ministers who were not respected as compared with a
smaller number who were.
If the number of Ministries is to be limited, then there is a
case for considering the introduction of a certain number of
Parliamentary Secretaries and I believe that there would be
marked advantage in doing so. A Parliamentary Secretary would be
drawn from the ranks of the elected members, would be a purely
political appointment and would be attached to one of the larger
and busier ministries. He would not be expected to make himself
available wholetime nor to be under the same obligations as
Ministers. He would not be a member of Executive Council; he
would not have authority within ministries nor, as a rule,
executive responsibilities unless they were specially devolved
upon him. But he would be expected to assist the Minister in the
House, perhaps to answer Questions, and sometimes to tackle a
special problem passed to him by the Minister. He would also be
expected to assume duties in place of his Minister when he was
away. The Minister for his part would be under an obligation to
take his Parliamentary Secretary into his confidence in order to
marshal 1 his support and to keep him fully au fait with Govern-
ment's intentions and policies; in some cases the Minister might
196

f e e l i t w o r t h w h i l e t o d i s c u s s proposals w i t h him b e f o r e t a k i n g
them t o E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l . I n e f f e c t t h e P a r l i a m e n t a r y S e c r e -
t a r i e s w o u l d become t h e s e c o n d e c h e l o n o f M i n i s t e r s ; i t w o u l d be
a t r a i n i n g g r o u n d and s t e p p i n g s t o n e f o r a s p i r a n t s t o m i n i s t e r i a l
status....
[Having discussed t h e committee's r e p o r t , t h e Government unanimously
recommended 8 M i n i s t e r s and 4 P a r l i a m e n t a r y S e c r e t a r i e s which should
p r o v i d e an e f f i c i e n t , c l o s e r e x e c u t i v e capable o f developing c a b i n e t
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . I t a l s o accepted t h e committee's advice on t h e r e t e n t i o n ,
but p r o p o r t i o n a t e r e d u c t i o n , o f nominated members whose c o n t r i b u t i o n t o
d i s c u s s i o n s was r e c o g n i s e d . 1 I f t h e increased powers were used w i s e l y
and c o n s t r u c t i v e l y as i n t h e p a s t , t h e f u t u r e o f these i s l a n d s i n t h e
f e d e r a t i o n was secure, t h e management o f v i r t u a l l y a l l i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s
i n t h e hands o f r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s e l e c t e d on t h e widest f r a n c h i s e should
ensure good and s t a b l e government. T h e i r leaders would stand as equals
w i t h those from o t h e r i s l a n d s . He quoted C h u r c h i l l on t h e p r i o r i t y o f
l o y a l t i e s o f an M.P. - t o c o u n t r y , c o n s t i t u e n t s and p a r t y . I f i n d i v i d u a l -
ism continued t o dominate p o l i t i c s t o t h e e x c l u s i o n o f p a r t y , t h a t was
i n t h e l a s t r e s o r t T r i n i d a d ' s concern a l o n e . 2

(g) CONSTITUTION AMENDMENT ORDER-IN-COUNCIL, 7 June 19563

[§29 o f t h e p r i n c i p a l O r d e r - i n - C o u n c i l o f 1950 was revoked and replaced by]
2 9 . T h e r e s h a l l be a L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l i n a n d f o r t h e C o l o n y
which shall consist of thirty-one Members, namely two ex officio
M e m b e r s , f i v e N o m i n a t e d Members a n d t w e n t y - f o u r E l e c t e d M e m b e r s .
Provided that if any person elected to be Speaker of the Legisla-
t i v e C o u n c i l s h a l l n o t a t t h e t i m e o f h i s e l e c t i o n be a Member
of the L e g i s l a t i v e Council in a d d i t i o n t o the aforesaid t h i r t y -
one Members, and i n s u c h e v e n t t h e L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l s h a l l c o n -
s i s t of t h i r t y - t w o Members....
[ S i m i l a r l y §30 would be replaced by a new s e c t i o n . ]
3 0 . ( 1 ) T h e r e s h a l l be a S p e a k e r who s h a l l be a p e r s o n who i s n o t
an ex officio or Nominated Member of the Legislative Council or
a Member o f t h e E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l , o r a p e r s o n who h o l d s a n y o f -

1. The C O , was s t r o n g l y opposed to a s i n g l e a l l - e l e c t e d chamber 'not

p r i m a r i l y because of the l o s s of the moderating vote of nominated members'.
In a t e r r i t o r y as advanced as Trinidad t h a t was ceasing to be of importance
as the agreement about Williams nominating h i s s u p p o r t e r s recognised. But
t h e r e was abundant need t o enable e l e c t e d m i n i s t e r s ' t o have recourse to
experience, knowledge and advice more weighty than from the e l e c t e d members';
(Rogers to Beetham, 13 March 1957).
2. Lennox-Boyd found the proposals g e n e r a l l y a c c e p t a b l e , thoughtful and
reasonable; (to Beetham, 1 Feb: also Min., Wallace, 17 Jan. ibid.).
3. Stat.R. No.835. (Similar changes took place in B.H. in 1960). In the
e l e c t i o n s in Sept. 1956 Dr. Eric Williams with two P e o p l e ' s National Movement
(formed in Jamaica, modelled on Manley's P.N.P., and promoted by h i s open a i r
l e c t u r e s in Woodford Square and elsewhere) won 13 of the 24 e l e c t e d s e a t s . I t
was suspected t h a t Williams might refuse to work the new c o n s t i t u t i o n , being
unprepared to r e l y on nominated members. Beetham was reminded by Lennox-Boyd
t h a t in Singapore the governor had used h i s power of nomination to appoint no
longer r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of economic i n t e r e s t s as previously but to i n c r e a s e the
working majority of the chief m i n i s t e r , (Marshall to Beetham, 29 S e p t . , 1 Oct.
ibid.). The nomination system, often used to strengthen the government, could
be used to f o r t i f y an e l e c t e d i n s t e a d of an o f f i c i a l group.
 197
fice of emolument under the Crown, who shall be elected by the
Legislative Counci 1 .... [His election would be the first business of the
Legislative Council meeting after 26 May and of any future Council after
dissolution. The Speaker could resign and must vacate his office if he
ceased to be an Elected Member.]
(5) A person holding office as Speaker shall not vacate his
office by reason of the dissolution of the Legislative Council
but shall, subject to the provisions of this section, continue
to hold office until such time as the Legislative Council shall
after such dissolution elect a person to be Speaker in pursuance
of sub-section (2) of this section...
[A new §33 provided for the Colonial Secretary and the A.G. to be the ex
officio Members of the Legislative Council.]
58. (a) ALAN LENNOX-BOYD: STATEMENT, 3 November 19581
[He reported that he had had discussions with Dr. P.V. Solomon, deputy
Chief Minister, the Minister of Education representing the Government of
Trinidad and Tobago in the presence of Governor Sir Edward Beetham and
the A.G., Ellis Clarke: a nominated Legislative Councillor, W.J.
Alexander, attended the initial meetings. The Governor was also present
when he met representatives of the main opposition party, the Democratic

1, Hansard. Comm. 594 18-22. Agreement had been reached in mid-1957 on the
demands of the P.N.M. - for more explicit definition of the chief minister's
powers, limitation of the governor's discretion (esp. over the public service)
and a closer approximation to a full cabinet system and internal self-
government (C.O. brief 24 July 1957: C.0.1031/2286); but there was delay when
Williams increased his demands, Beetham attributing this as due to the
establishment of the federation and its effect on the powers of the governors
(to Rogers, 27 Feb. 1958 ibid.}: he noted that 'Adams, Manley and Williams
work very closely together and I shall be surprised if whatever the Trinidad
Government has in mind has riot already been discussed between them, ' Williams
might make further constitutional reform a plan in his federal election
platform. In the C.O. there was a feeling that these changes were less for
their legal content than political implications: they were premature. Trinidad
was not Jamaica and to grant to Trinidad what was promised to Jamaica would
weaken the apparent power and the real influence of the governor when, in view
of the federation, it needed strengthening. The Trinidad ministers had not
taken a realistic view of their responsibilities and did not deserve
confidence (Min., Baxter, 4 July 1956 ibid.). The important matter was to
decide (and make clear) whether to grant self-government or not: Trinidad was
hardly ready. Williams was 'too clever by half and showed 'little sign of
recognising those self-imposed restraints' which alone made British
institutions work. His stance was authoritarian. But resistance to his demands
might provoke a reaction out of proportion to the minor issues involved -
there would be still 'a fair residue of reserve power left'. There was hope
that he would grow up before he did much harm; a healthy opposition might keep
him on the rails: (Min., Marnham, 7 July ibid.). The acting-governor, Solomon
Hochoy assured Lennox-Boyd that the proposals had won widespread inter-party
support (27 Aug. ibid.) but there was an outbreak of bitter opposition,
fearing a 'police state'. On 21 Oct. Rogers minuted that it was hardly the
best time for concession: Williams was showing 'all too many signs of the
paranoia of a dictator' with telephone tapping and his own spy service
(C.O,1031/2287), but on 24 Oct. Solomon seemed to have moderated the demands.
A formal despatch confirming H.M.'s G.'s approval was sent (8 Jan, 1959).
 198

Labour Party. The discussions were based on motions passed by the

Legislative Council (Sept. 1957 and Jun 1958).]
In putting forward the views of his Government, Dr. Solomon
confirmed their decision, earlier communicated to me, not to seek
the removal of Her Majesty's powers to legislate by Order-in-
Council and to disallow Ordinances. On the other hand, the Gover-
nment wished three changes not included in either of the Motions
to be made: that the Governor should consult the Premier regard-
ing the appointment of Nominated Members before making such ap-
pointments acting in his discretion; that the Governor should
dissolve and prorogue the Legislative Council on the advice of
the Premier and that a Judicial Service Commission should be set
up. Dr Solomon explained that the purpose in proposing that the
Governor should consult the Premier before appointing Nominated
Members in his discretion was to ensure that, if the necessity
arose, the direction given by me in 1956 that the Governor should
consult the leader of the majority party regarding the appoint-
ment of suitable Nominated Members so as to permit him to have
a reasonable working majority should continue to apply. I confir-
med that this would be the case and in the light of this assui—
ance Dr Solomon on behalf of his Government withdrew this propo-
sed amendment. On the question of the dissolution and prorogation
of the Legislative Council, it was not the intention of the Tri-
nidad Government that any amendment'should go beyond the conven-
tions in force in the United Kingdom. Dr. Solomon explained that
the proposals in respect of the Judicial Service Commission were
a logical development following the establishment of the Public
Service Commission and the Police Service Commission. I took note
of the views of the Trinidad Government, expressed by Dr. Solo-
mon, that the retention of the Governor's power to refuse to as-
sent to B i l l s was unnecessary inasmuch as B i l l s could be reserved
for the signification of Her Majesty's pleasure. It was recogni-
sed, however, that future constitutional changes would involve
the transfer from Her Majesty to Her representative in the terri-
tory of the Sovereign's discretion to assent to B i l l s . In the
circumstances Dr. Solomon agreed that the appropriate course
would be to leave the present provisions in the Constitution un-
altered, and instructions to be given to the Governor not to ex-
ercise the power to refuse to assent unless so directed by Her
Majesty.
Subject to the points which are explained in this statement,
I agreed that the changes now sought by the Government of Trini-
dad and Tobago were appropriate at this stage of constitutional
development in the territory and undertook to recommend them to
Her Majesty-in-Counci1. These changes may be summarised as fol-
lows :
(a) the Governor w i l l call upon the leader of the majority party
in the Legislative Council to form a government; if no party has
a clear majority of elected seats, the Governor w i l l call upon
the person most likely to command a majority;
(b) the Chief Minister w i l l be empowered to select and remove
Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries;
(c) the Chief Minister and not the Governor w i l l preside at Exe-
cutive Council meetings. The Governor, however, in his discretion
may-summon a special meeting of the Executive Council at which
he w i l l preside. The name 'Executive Council' w i l l be changed to
 199
'Cabinet' and that of 'Chief Minister' to 'Premier';
(d) the Colonial Secretary (to be redesignated 'Chief Secretary')
and the Attorney General will retain their seats in the Cabinet
and Legislative Council but will no longer be entitled to vote
in the former;
(e) the Public Service Commission and the Police Service Commis-
sion will be remodelled as independent bodies with full-time
chairmen, and the Governor will be bound to accept their advice
except with regard to discipline and a few senior appointments;
(f) provisions dealing with the salaries of Ministers, Parliamen-
tary Secretaries, the Speaker and Deputy Speaker, will be deleted
from the Constitution but provision will be made preventing the
reduction of the salaries of the Speaker and the Deputy Speaker
during their continuance of office;
(g) the Premier will not be obliged to recommend the appointment
of the full number (four) of Parliamentary Secretaries;
(h) if the Speaker is elected from outside the Legislative Coun-
cil he will not have a casting vote;
(i) so long as it appears to the Governor that the Premier com-
mands the support of the majority of the elected members of the
Legislative Council the Governor will act in accordance with his
advice in the dissolution and prorogation of the Legislative
Counci1;
(j) the establishment of a Judicial and Legal Service Commission
with executive functions except in regard to judges, in which
case the Commission will be advisory to the Governor;
(k) the provision for the appointment of a ninth Minister.1
In explaining the Trinidad Government's desire for the appoint-
ment of a ninth Minister, Dr. Solomon drew attention to the fact
that under the present Constitution the Governor had discretion
to declare which Departments and subjects may be assigned to Mi-
nisters and that no amendment to the Constitution was therefore
necessary before responsibility for the Police could be trans-
ferred to a Minister. The transfer of Police to a Minister was
regarded by the Trinidad Government as a logical next step and
appropriate at this stage since the Minister of Finance was al-
ready responsible for pay, etc., and establishment matters, and
the independence and responsibility of the Attorney General for
the initiation, conduct and discontinuance of criminal proceed-
ings would remain unaffected. Furthermore, there would shortly
be established an independent Police Service Commission with ex-
ecutive authority. The ninth Minister would fill a twofold need:
firstly, an additional Minister would in any event be necessary
when Police was transferred to a Minister; and secondly, quite
apart from the question of the transfer of the Police, an addi-
tional Minister was necessary now if present Government business
was to continue to be effectively discharged. In view of the po-
sition explained at the beginning of this paragraph, it was agre-
ed that the transfer of the Police to a Minister could be consi-
dered as an issue quite separate from the constitutional changes
now under discussion. In order not to delay these changes, which
had been agreed in principle and which the Trinidad Government

1, These changes would, he said, be submitted to the Queen-in-Council as soon

as the necessary instruments could be prepared.
200

wished t o see e f f e c t e d as soon as t h e necessary amending I n s t r u -

ments c o u l d be made, i t was d e c i d e d t h a t t h e t r a n s f e r o f t h e Po-
l i c e t o a M i n i s t e r s h o u l d be t h e s u b j e c t o f f u r t h e r c o n s u l t a t i o n
w i t h me. Meanwhile I agreed t o a p r o v i s i o n f o r a n i n t h M i n i s t e r
as s u c h . . . .
[The Government's request for removal of the Governor's reserved l e g i s -
l a t i v e powers involved considerable legal and constitutional d i f f i c u l -
t i e s , but he hoped i t would be possible to reach a decision for the f i n a l
agreed changes to be submitted to the Queen-in-Council. He welcom-ed the
intention of the Government to seek a Legislative Council select
committee to consider changes 'of a more fundamental nature than those
which had been under d i s c u s s i o n ' . ] 1 The t i m e i s most o p p o r t u n e t o
c o n s i d e r f u r t h e r changes o f t h i s n a t u r e - changes which w i l l l e a d
t h e t e r r i t o r y t o a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p o s i t i o n which w i l l be more a p -
p r o p r i a t e i n view o f t h e approach o f t h e West I n d i e s t o f u l l i n -
dependence w i t h i n t h e B r i t i s h Commonwealth. The p r o s p e c t o f f u l l
independence w i t h i n t h e Commonwealth f o r t h e F e d e r a t i o n means
t h a t i n T r i n i d a d i t i s d e s i r a b l e t o p r e p a r e t h e ground now f o r
t h e change which w i l l be necessary by t h a t t i m e . . . . 2
( b ) J.E. WHITELEGG: MINUTE, 30 September 19593
[The report of the select committee on constitutional reform under
Mortimer Duke ( i n c l . Williams and 5 other P.N.M. members, 1 Democratic
Labour Party member and U. Butler) set up in November 1958, was designed
to give Trinidad f u l l internal self-government which H.M.'s G. had
accepted as the aim. There were many recommendations which were unobjec-
tionable, as was t h e i r repeated desire to follow B r i t i s h practice, though
there might therein be d i f f i c u l t i e s . On the appointment of the Governor]
t h e Committee by a m a j o r i t y v o t e recommend t h a t t h e Governor
s h o u l d be a p p o i n t e d by t h e S o v e r e i g n on t h e a d v i c e o f t h e C a b i n e t
o f T r i n i d a d , h o l d o f f i c e d u r i n g t h e S o v e r e i g n ' s p l e a s u r e and have
o n l y t h o s e powers e x e r c i s e d by t h e S o v e r e i g n i n t h e U.K. T h i s i s
c e r t a i n l y one p o i n t on which we s h a l l have d i f f i c u l t y i n a c c e p -
t i n g t h e C o m m i t t e e ' s recommendations. W h i l e i t i s i n t e n d e d t h a t
T r i n i d a d s h o u l d become f u l l y i n t e r n a l l y s e l f - g o v e r n i n g , i t i s I
b e l i e v e t h e p r a c t i c e t h a t t h e S o v e r e i g n ' s freedom o f a c t i o n i n
t h e s e l e c t i o n o f Her r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s s h o u l d n o t i n any way be
f e t t e r e d o r c i r c u m s c r i b e d . I n t h e case o f Jamaica ( § 4 ( 1 ) o f t h e

1. A s e l e c t committee to make recommendations for a new c o n s t i t u t i o n was

appointed following a further l e g i s l a t i v e council r e s o l u t i o n (21 Nov. 1958):
i t reported in Sept. 1959. Meanwhile, the o r d e r - i n - c o u n c i l introducing these
agreed reforms was dated 15 June 1959 {Stat.R. No.1044): the colonial secre-
t a r y and the A.G, remained in the cabinet without votes, and the governor's
veto power was not to be exercised unless d i r e c t e d by H.M. (to Beetham, 15
June: C O . 1031/2288).
2. The s e l e c t committee r e p o r t i n g in September 1959 (encl. Hochoy to Rogers,
18 S e p t . : CO. 1031/2288) recommended a bicameral l e g i s l a t u r e (the c r e a t i o n of
a senate of 18 nominees of the P.M. - 7 to be from main r e l i g i o u s and economic
i n t e r e s t s ) a cabinet of 16 as the instrument of policy (and to include no more
than 2 from s e n a t e ) , a P.M., a b i l l of human r i g h t s in the preamble, and
amendment by 2/ 3 rds of the lower house and a simple majority in the senate.'
The opposition boycotted the f i n a l debate and wanted the issue to be delayed
t i l l a f t e r the next e l e c t i o n .
3. CO.1031/2289. Whitelegg was a p r i n c i p a l in the W.I. department (1958-62).
 201
1959 Const.) and Ghana (§4(1) of the 1959 Const.) H.M. appoints
Her representative at Her discretion and he holds office during
Her pleasure. On the other hand in Singapore which is now inter-
nally self-governing, H.M.'s representative (Yang de-Pertuan
Nagara) is appointed by H.M. in Her discretion although the
Government of Singapore must be consulted concerning the person
who is to be appointed. So far as Trinidad is concerned we must,
I think, take the line that it is for the Sovereign to appoint
Her representative acting in Her discretion; having gone that far
it is for consideration whether we should agree that the Govern-
ment of Trinidad should be consulted concerning the appointment
on the Singapore pattern. My preference is for the former at the
moment although we might perhaps give way if sharply pressed and
follow the Singapore precedent....
The Senate. This is to consist of 18 members nominated by the
Governor on the advice of the Premier of whom 7 shall be ap-
pointed from the mainly religious and economic interests and the
other 11 from other persons in the territory. Members would serve
for 5 years irrespective of whether to not the House of Represen-
tatives was dissolved earlier. The qualifications for membership
are those set out in para. 29(1) of the Report and, subject to
Mr Hammer's views, will I think be unobjectionable.
The other proposal that we cannot accept is that all the mem-
bers of the Senate should be appointed by the Governor on the
advice of the Premier. To do so would in effect enable the
Government of the day to pack the Upper House with its own
supporters and perhaps lead to a situation where membership of
the Senate would be handed out by the Premier of the day to his
loyal supporters by way of reward. We should I suggest go for
something on the Jamaica lines (see Section 15 of the 1959
Jamaica Constitution), that is a small number of members - say
not more than 4 or 5 - appointed by the Governor on the advice
of the Premier and the remainder, 12 or 13 members, appointed by
the Governor after consultation with such persons as he considers
can speak for the differing political points of view of groups
represented in the House of Representatives.
It could perhaps be argued that in view of the shortage of good
political brains in the area and the drain imposed by a bicameral
Federal Legislature that there would be difficulty in finding
suitable people for a second house in Trinidad. This may partly
be true but it is I think countered to some extent by the fact
that people who would not otherwise be prepared to go through the
trial and hurly-burly of an election campaign would be prepared
to serve in the Senate. The existence of the Senate would more-
over enable the Governor to ensure that business and other
interests had some say in the Government of the country...
[The House of Representatives of 30 elected on adult suffrage would
remain apart from the removal of nominated ex officio members.]
The Cabinet. This would be the principal instrument of policy
and the Governor would be obliged to act on its advice on all
internal matters. Its composition compared with the present
Cabinet would be as follows:-
202
Present Cabinet Proposed Cabinet
Premier Premier
8 Ministers Attorney-General (political) plus
Chief Secretary Up to 10 members of whom not more
(ex officio member). than 2 should be appointed from
Attorney-General the Senate (3 if the Attorney-
(ex officio member). General is a member of the Upper
House).
[On the P.M. there was no major change, but there was no reference to the
Governor's right to all information available to Cabinet and power to
preside at special meetings: this provided for consultation of Governor
and Ministers over external affairs and defence. On the A.G. they
recommended a political, not official, appointment (as in the U.K. but
not in other colonies)1; but he suspects Williams dictatorial tendencies
and he might add control over prosecutions to his control over the
police. On the judiciary, public, political and judicial commissions, on
amendment and the declaration of human rights he found nothing objection-
able.2
59. (a) IAIN MACLEOD TO DR. ERIC WILLIAMS, 12 January I9603
[Following a visit to E. Africa, he was concerned with mutual mis-
understandings over the method of introducing the new constitution. Both
sides had made assumptions which had only lately become clear. It was
true that a secretary of state had often said in earlier stages of
constitutional advance that 'This is as far as I am prepared to go at
present. I must ask you to work this constitution for the time being and
we will discuss the next step later.' But that was at a stage when H.M.'s
G. had a limit on the degree of internal self-government which it could
at that moment accept. But H.M.'s G. had repeatedly stated that the aim
of full self-government as embodied in this constitution was recognised
and was not in dispute. There were only a few points to settle. He had
no intention of modifying his premise as Williams implied.]
Of the points still at issue, there are as you know one or two
on which the Select Committee's proposals seemed to go rather

1. E.P. Hammer, in the general department, noted that in fact in E. and W.

Nigeria the A.G, was appointed by the governor on the premier's advice: in N.
Nigeria by the governor after consultation; in Jamaica by the governor at
discretion - i.e. not political; and in Barbados it was agreed that for the
time being A.G. should remain non-political.
2. In October and November Iain Macleod had discussions with government and
opposition delegations: a concession was made to admit opposition representa-
tives to the senate. The opposition feared Williams: Gomes thought he wished
to imitate Castro. Lennox-Boyd tried to persuade them particularly over their
opposition to a bicameral legislature (Brief for Cabinet C O . 1031/2290: W.I.
dept. Note Nov. 1959: CO. 1031/2291) but in view of the coming election tried
hard to avoid being seen to be partizan - pro. P.N.M. - (Min., Rogers, 23 Nov.
ibid.) which claimed to have won the last election on the bicameral issue. But
this {did} not prevent recriminations from Williams (to Macleod, 5 Dec,
ibid.). 3. CO. 1031/2292 confidential. Rogers confessed to a growing sym-
pathy with Williams: the opposition D.L.P. had not really tried to play the
game in discussing the Trinidad constitution, some of them (incl. Gomes)
really wanted a senate but felt there was political capital in opposing one
at the election: (Min., 24 Dec. 1959, ibid.).
 203
beyond full internal self-government and to be inappropriate
before the stage of independence, but I do not think it should
be difficult to dispose of them. On the questions which are at
issue between the parties and on which I myself am not prepared
to lay down the law I have already agreed that the new constitu-
tion should be drafted and the instruments made in a form which
reflects your party's views. I entirely agree with you and your
party that room ought to be found for the main religious and
economic interests to be represented and I consider that there
is a very strong case for doing this by means of a second
Chamber. At the same time I do not feel that this is something
which I ought to force upon Trinidad if in the event the party
successful at the polls were to be strongly opposed to it either
in principle or in the details. Should your party win the
election, or indeed should whichever party wins wish this
constitution to come into force, that will happen. I am certainly
not 'inviting (the electorate) to reject it'. What I have already
said in this paragraph shows what my own views are. But I cannot
ignore the difference on this issue between the two main parties
and I cannot accept the proposition in the context of full
internal self-government that, immediately after an election at
which a particular constitutional proposal of this nature has
been an issue, a particular provision should be automatically
enacted even if the party opposing it obtains a majority.
Once the stage of full internal self-government has been
reached it is surely necessary that the agreement of all parties
should be obtained to the maximum possible extent to the new
constitution if the party system is to flourish. Where differ-
ences still remain, I think you will agree that the party
obtaining a majority should have its way provided this is
compatible with a democratic form of constitution. It is also
essential that there should be agreement as to the way the
elections should be conducted. In the West Indies it has hitherto
been the general, practice to charge a Select Committee of the
legislature with the task of delimiting the constituencies.
Although this is not the general practice in the independent
Commonwealth countries, including the United Kingdom, there is
no reason why H.M.G. should refuse to accept it provided the
parties agree to that method. Where however there is disagreement
it seems to me that the only satisfactory solution is to adopt
the procedure of the independent Commonwealth countries and
appoint a non-political independent commission. .. . [He urged him to
consider whether the procedure proposed was not the swiftest way to secure
self-government.]
(b) DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY TO IAIN MACLEOD, 11 June I9601
The situation in Trinidad and Tobago is inflammatory. There are

1. CO. 1031/3221. Fears that Dr. Williams would create *a racial dictatorship'
and suspicious that the safeguards secured by the D.L.P. were worthless were
voiced by the Indian Association which indeed asked for the incorporation of
the colony in the U.K. or (if not possible) Canada. Otherwise there was need
for minority guarantees by P.R. in the legislature, the administration and
services (as in Cyprus) - even partition: (to Hastings, 11 July 1962: also
letter of May 1962: CO. 1031/3230). It seemed a long time since the fiasco in
204

f a r t o o many s t r a i n s a n d s t r e s s e s . F o r e x a m p l e , C h a j u a r a m a s , t h e
P.N.M. march, and the burning of documents, racial tension,
disregard for democratic procedure and political enterprise in
t h e p u b l i c s e r v i c e s . We b e l i e v e t h a t t h e g o v e r n m e n t i s u n p o p u l a r
and belief is supported by the results of the federal and the
c o u n t r y c o u n c i l e l e c t i o n s . We f e e l t h a t t h e o n l y way t o q u i e t e n
the country is for a general election to take place. This will
give the government an opportunity to secure a vote of con-
f i d e n c e . I f i t w i n s t h e e l e c t i o n , we s h a l l c o - o p e r a t e w i t h i t i n
e v e r y s p h e r e f o r t h e g o o d o f t h e w h o l e c o u n t r y . I f i t l o s e s we
e x p e c t t h e same c o - o p e r a t i o n .
There a r e t h r e e main p a r t i e s - D . L . P . , P.N.M. and t h e B u t l e r
p a r t y . A t t h e London t a l k s l a s t y e a r M r . B u t l e r i n s i s t e d t h a t a l l
q u e s t i o n s o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m be r e f e r r e d t o t h e e l e c t o r a t e .
We e n d o r s e t h i s v i e w . We b e l i e v e C o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m i s n o t
n e e d e d . What i s n e e d e d i s s t a b i l i t y a n d d e v e l o p m e n t . . . [They
acknowledged they had made l i t t l e c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e debate on c o n s t i t u -
t i o n a l r e f o r m , because they recognised no such need. They submitted t h a t
the matter should be referred to the electorate. Now they wished however
t o a s s i s t agreement by making p r o p o s a l s . They were not opposed t o a
second chamber i n p r i n c i p l e o n l y t o one w i t h a m a j o r i t y nominated by t h e
P.M.; they were opposed (as t h e P.N.M. were i n 1956) t o t h e expense o f
c r e a t i n g 6 more s e a t s , not warranted by increase i n t h e p o p u l a t i o n . 28
seats were s u f f i c i e n t f o r T r i n i d a d t o be d e f i n e d by an U.K. independent
boundary commission a f t e r t h e next e l e c t i o n due i n 1961. They were
committed t o n e g o t i a t e f o r Tobago's f u l l i n t e r n a l self-government w i t h i n
the f e d e r a t i o n . No f u r t h e r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l changes should take place
before t h e next e l e c t i o n ]

6 0 . ( a ) GOVERNOR SIR SOLOMON HOCHOY TO AMBLER THOMAS, 21 November 1961 1

*As y o u w e l l k n o w , t h e o f f i c e o f C h i e f S e c r e t a r y i s down f o r
a b o l i t i o n when t h e n e x t g o v e r n m e n t t a k e s o f f i c e a n d t h e r e m a i n -
ing provisions of the new Order-in-Counci1 are brought to
operation.
The subject of Defence and External Relations which were
i n c l u d e d i n t h e C h i e f S e c r e t a r y ' s p o r t f o l i o h a v e t h e r e f o r e t o be
r e - a s s i g n e d ; and i t i s on t h e c a r d s t h a t t h e y w i l l b o t h go t o t h e
P r e m i e r , i f t h e o u t g o i n g g o v e r n m e n t i s r e t u r n e d . You a r e a w a r e ,
I am sure, that the new Constitution makes no reservations in
r e s p e c t o f t h e s e s u b j e c t s , b u t I t h o u g h t t h a t I s h o u l d remind you
o f f t h i s f a c t . H o w e v e r we a r e w e l l o n t h e way t o I n d e p e n d e n c e ,
w h e t h e r s i n g l y o r i n c o m b i n a t i o n w i t h o t h e r s , a n d i t may be a s
well that these responsibilities are shouldered now by the
elected representatives of the people.

the mid-1950s when the C O . feared the domination of the East Indian group
under the c o n t r o l of Bhadase Maraj and i t s t h r e a t to f e d e r a t i o n : ( S i r C J e f f -
r i e s Press resume, 4 March 1955). C O . 1031/3223, 3229 contain many vehement
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s from other groups and p a r t i e s fearful of Williams' ambitions -
the Indians claiming t h a t race r e l a t i o n s were harmonious t i l l the advent of
the P.N.M.: they urged inquiry i n t o a l l e g e d a t r o c i t i e s . In the C O . such f e a r s
were seen to be genuine but exaggerated: they were seen now as ' a reasonable
but very frightened people': (Min., 32 May 1962, ibid.). 1. CO. 1031/3223.
Hochoy (governor 1960-2) had been chief s e c r e t a r y (1956-60). Thomas was an
a s s i s t a n t u n d e r - s e c r e t a r y of s t a t e (1952-64).
 205
(b) LEGAL ADVICE TO REGINALD MAUDLING, 8 December 19611
'The Trinidad Constitution does not exclude from the exclusive
authority of the Trinidad Government those matters which fall
within the exclusive executive powers of the Federal Government.
Nevertheless these matters which under the Constitution of The
West Indies fell within the exclusive executive authority of the
Federal Government remain within that executive authority and are
not (subject to delegation) within the executive power of the
Trinidad Government. This is so because the Trinidad Constitution
takes effect subject to the Constitution of The West Indies, not-
withstanding that it was enacted after the Federal Constitution.
It follows therefore that defence and such external relations
as are entrusted to the Federation by the British Government are
not matters within the authority of the Trinidad Government.
There is, however, provision in Section 57 of the Federal
Constitution for the Governor-General to entrust functions
relating to matters within the executive authority of the
Federation to officers or authorities of a territory. Moreover,
it is also possible for the British Government to entrust some
functions in relation to external affairs to a territory. There
may, therefore, be some limited executive functions in relation
to defence or external affairs which could be performed by a
territorial minister; presumably this was the reason why these
matters were assigned to the portfolio of the Chief Secretary.'
[That is the Federal Government was responsible for Defence and External
Affairs so far as delegated from the ultimate authority, H.M.'s G. If
Williams asked for these powers so far as they impinge on Trinidad, that
would not affect the responsibility of the Federal Government or of
H.M.'s G. As long as these limitations were understood, there would be
no constitutional objection to the Governor's assigning them to a
Minister. The Governor-General of the Federation, Lord Hailes, should be
informed.]

61 . MEETING OF THE FEDERAL DELEGATION WITH REGINALD MAUDLING; MINUTES,

8 March 19622
Mr. Gomes appreciated that the Secretary of State had very
little room in which to manoeuvre, but he pointed out that
hitherto the British Government had shown a high sense of
respon-sibi1ity in dealing with all its territories,
especially in the latter stages of the advance to indepen-
dence. The people of Trinidad were terrified. If the
Federation issue were put to a referendum they would vote to
remain in it because they would feel that Federation would
protect them to some extent from the worst excesses of their
Government when it became independent. There was a great
need for minority safeguards in any independence constitu-
tion for Trinidad. The Secretary of State replied that
secessional independence was two different things. He was
very conscious of all the problems which would have to be
tackled when he came to discuss independence for Trinidad.

1. CO. 1031/3222: secret and personal enclosed in Williams to Hochoy. The

legal department in the CO. had been asked to advise on the possibility that
Williams might ask for defence and external affairs to be assigned to a
minister. 2. CO. 1031/3228. [See above, No.22(b).]
 206
He certainly appreciated the need for minority safeguards
and had been very much impressed by what the leaders of the
D.L.P. had said to him in Trinidad.
In conclusion the Secretary of State was asked to say
whether he would be prepared to delay the bill until the
wishes of the people of Trinidad had been obtained. The
Secretary of State said that he was not prepared to do this.

62. LONDON CONFERENCE: REPORT, 8 June 19621

Since a Ministerial system of government was introduced in
1950 responsibility for the conduct of the internal affairs
of Trinidad and Tobago has passed progressively to elected
Ministers. In December, 1961, full internal self-government
was attained, following a general election at which the
People's National Movement, led by Dr. Eric Williams, gained
20, and the Democratic Labour Party, led by Dr. Rudranath
Capildeo 10 of the 30 seats in the House of Representatives.
Attention was then turned to the future of Trinidad and
Tobago in the light of the situation created by Jamaica's
decision to withdraw from the Federation of The West Indies.
On 14th January, 1962, the General Council of the People's
National Movement unanimously approved a resolution that
Trinidad and Tobago should not participate in any new
federation of the East Caribbean which might be formed but
should proceed forthwith to independence without prejudice
to the possibility of the territory's future association in
a unitary state with other territories in the East Caribbe-
an. The resolution also requested the Government to take the
initiative in proposing the maximum possible measure of col-
laboration between the former members of the Federation of
The West Indies regarding common services, and to declare
their willingness to take part in and work for a Caribbean
economic commun-ity. This resolution was endorsed at a
special convention of the party held towards the end of
January, and the Government accepted the terms of the
resolution as their policy in this matter. In April the
Secretary of State for the colonies, in reply to a despatch
from the Governor, agreed that Trinidad and Tobago should
become independent as early as practicable in 1962, and
proposed that, provided that the necessary steps could be
taken in time, an independence conference should be held in
London towards the end of May to agree upon a constitution
and the date of independence.
Meanwhile, in February, the Government of Trinidad and

1. P.P. 1961-2 XI (1757) pp.1026-33, 1038. In the brief prepared for the U.K.
delegation by the C O . (May 1962: C O . 1031/3226) it was noted that the S.L.
and Nigerian constitutions had been 'drawn heavily on'.,.'to pander to Dr.
Williams' dictatorial tendencies': the Senate would be objectionable since all
but 2 of the 21 members would be appointed by the P.M. since the governor-
general would certainly be influenced by him: there would be need to reflect
the strength of all the parties as in the lower house: and for more deep
entrenchment of certain fundamental aspects of the constitution (as in
Jamaica) by more than a simple majority in the senate and perhaps a delay of
six months between the votes in the two houses.
 207
Tobago had published the first draft of an independence
constitution: this was distributed widely in the territory,
and organisations and the general public were invited to
submit written comments on it by 31st March. Over 160
memoranda were received, and from 25th to 27th April the
Government held meetings with those who had submitted
memoranda, at which the draft constitution was con-sidered.
The draft constitution, as amended in the light of these
consultations, was considered by a Joint Select Committee of
the Senate and House of Representatives, after which it was
debated and, on 11th May, approved by a majority of 16 to 9
in the House of Representatives.
The revised draft of the independence constitution, as
approved by the Legislature, formed the basic document at
the Trinidad and Tobago Independence Conference which opened
at Marl borough House in London on Monday, 28th May, 1962,
under the Chairmanship of the Secretary of State for the
Colonies, the Rt. Hon. Reginald Maudling, M.P....
[The principal conclusions were that the islands would become indepen-
dent on 31 August 1962; that the Trinidad and Tobago delegation unani-
mously desired on achieving independence for the territory to be 'accep-
ted as a member country of the Commonwealth'; that it was the 'firm wish'
of the people to continue after independence in allegiance to H.M. as
Queen of Trinidad and Tobago, and that the U.K. Government would support
the application of Trinidad and Tobago to be accepted as a fellow member
of the Commonwealth.]
63. INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION, 8 June 19621
Chapter 1 - Recognition and protection of human rights and
fundamental freedoms
10. The constitution will include provisions safeguarding the
fundamental freedoms of the individual, irrespective of race,
place of origin, political opinions, colour, creed or sex. These
fundamental freedoms will include the right to life, liberty,
security of the person and protection from arbitrary arrest; the
enjoyment of property and the protection of the law; freedom of
conscience, movement, expression and assembly; and respect of
private and family life.
11. Provision will be made to permit, subject to safeguards, de-
rogation from the fundamental freedoms in time of war or during
an emergency. Provision will, however, also be made, subject to
the permitted degree of derogation, for the continued enforcement
by the Courts of the fundamental freedoms. In particular, it will
be made clear that the Courts can declare void a law which inf-
ringes or abridges the rights referred to in section 2 of the
draft constitution; and there will also be a provision whereby
there can be an appeal to the Courts to obtain a decision whether
a law, passed during a period of emergency, which derogates from
the fundamental rights and freedoms, is reasonably justifiable
for the purpose of dealing with the situation that exists during
that period. The period during which a proclamation of a state
of emergency can remain in force, without being extended by a

1. This constitution as agreed at the London conference was slightly reworded

and renumbered in the order-in-council (Stat.R. 1962 No.1875): 24 Aug. 1962).
208

v o t e o f a m a j o r i t y o f t h e House o f R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , w i l l be l i m i -
t e d t o s i x months.

Chapter I I - C i t i z e n s h i p
12. P r o v i s i o n w i l l be made f o r c i t i z e n s h i p o f T r i n i d a d and Toba-
go. All persons born in Trinidad and Tobago after independence
w i l l a u t o m a t i c a l l y a c q u i r e c i t i z e n s h i p o f T r i n i d a d and Tobago and
t h e r e w i l l be p r o v i s i o n f o r t h e a c q u i s i t i o n o f c i t i z e n s h i p by
p e r s o n s born o u t s i d e T r i n i d a d and Tobago o f p a r e n t s who a r e c i t i -
zens o f T r i n i d a d and Tobago. Persons born i n T r i n i d a d and Tobago
(or p e r s o n s born o u t s i d e T r i n i d a d and Tobago o f p a r e n t s born i n
T r i n i d a d and Tobago) b e f o r e independence who, i m m e d i a t e l y p r i o r
t o independence, a r e c i t i z e n s o f t h e U n i t e d Kingdom and C o l o n i e s
w i l l a l s o a u t o m a t i c a l l y become c i t i z e n s o f T r i n i d a d and Tobago.
13. A p p r o p r i a t e p r o v i s i o n s w i l l be made p e r m i t t i n g c e r t a i n p e r -
sons who w i l l n o t a u t o m a t i c a l l y become c i t i z e n s o f T r i n i d a d and
Tobago t o be r e g i s t e r e d as s u c h .
14. The r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t any person who i s a l r e a d y a c i t i z e n o f
another country must renounce that citizenship before he can be
a d m i t t e d t o c i t i z e n s h i p o f T r i n i d a d and Tobago w i l l n o t a p p l y t o
any person who would t h e r e b y be r e n d e r e d s t a t e l e s s .
15. The power o f P a r l i a m e n t t o d e p r i v e o f h i s c i t i z e n s h i p o f T r i -
n i d a d and Tobago a person who i s a c i t i z e n o f T r i n i d a d and Tobago
w i l l n o t e x t e n d t o persons who a u t o m a t i c a l l y a c q u i r e such c i t i -
z e n s h i p on independence.

Chapter I I I - The G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l 1
16. The G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l w i l l be a p p o i n t e d by t h e Queen and w i l l
h o l d o f f i c e d u r i n g Her p l e a s u r e . P r o v i s i o n w i l l be made f o r t h e
G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l ' s f u n c t i o n s t o be p e r f o r m e d by such person as
Her M a j e s t y may a p p o i n t when t h e o f f i c e o f G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l i s
v a c a n t o r t h e h o l d e r o f t h e o f f i c e i s absent f r o m T r i n i d a d and
Tobago.

Chapter IV - P a r l i a m e n t 2
17. The existing bicameral form of Legislature will be re-
tained.3

1. The o r d e r - i n - c o u n c i l runs 'There s h a l l be a Governor-General and Commander-

in-Chief of Trinidad and Tobago who s h a l l be appointed by H.M. and s h a l l hold
office during H.M. ' s pleasure and who s h a l l be H.M. ' s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e in T r i n i -
dad and Tobago' (§19). 2. The o r d e r - i n - c o u n c i l runs: 'There s h a l l be a Par-
liament of Trinidad and Tobago which s h a l l c o n s i s t of Her Majesty, a Senate
and a House of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ' (§22).
3. Only Guyana opted for a unicameral l e g i s l a t u r e . The senates were weak
revisionary houses. In Jamaica i3 senators were appointed on advice from the
P.M. and 8 on advice of the opposition leader and (unlike those here in
Trinidad or in Barbados) could not be dismissed during t e n u r e . In Barbados 12
were appointed on the P.M.'s advice, 2 on the opposition l e a d e r ' s advice, and
7 by the Governor-General having consulted those whose i n t e r e s t s ( r e l i g i o u s ,
economic and s o c i a l ) ought to be represented - these l a s t 7 could not be
dismissed during t e n u r e . In the o r d e r - i n - c o u n c i l the provisions for the Senate
and q u a l i f i c a t i o n s for senators were in §§23-6; the powers and procedures of
Parliament were d e t a i l e d in §§36-8; §§45-8 d e a l t with money b i l l s which could
not be i n i t i a t e d in the senate; §§49-51 d e a l t with summoning and d i s s o l u t i o n ;
 209
The Senate
18. The Upper House will consist of twenty-four Senators, of whom
thirteen will be appointed by the Governor-General on the advice
of the Prime Minister, four by the Governor-General on the advice
of the Leader of the Opposition and seven by the Governor-General
on the advice of the Prime Minister after consultation by the
latter with those religious, economic or social bodies or asso-
ciations from which the Prime Minister considers that such Sena-
tors should be selected. (The Opposition delegates did not accept
the provisions of this paragraph.)

The House of Representatives

19. This will consist of thirty members elected by universal
adult suffrage, but provision will be included to permit the
number to be varied (see paragraph 3 ) .

77?e President and Deputy President of the Senate

20. The President and Deputy President of the Senate will be
elected by the Senate from within their own membership.
The Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the House of Representatives
21 . The Speaker of the House may be elected either from among the
members of the House who are not Ministers or Parliamentary Sec-
retaries, or from outside the House. A Speaker elected from out-
side the House will have neither an original nor a casting vote;
and if on any question the votes of members are equally divided,
the motion will be lost. The Deputy Speaker will be appointed
from within the House,.

Qualifications for Appointment or Election

22. A person will be qualified for appointment to the Senate if
he is a citizen of Trinidad and Tobago and is aged 30 years or
more. A person will be qualified for election to the House of Re-
presentatives if he is a citizen of Trinidad and Tobago, is aged
21 years or more and has either resided in the territory for a
period of two years immediately before the date of his nomination
or is domiciled and resident in the territory at that date.
23. Persons holding or acting in public office; Judges of the
Supreme Court; and persons who are under allegiance to another
state, undischarged bankrupts, of unsound mind, under sentence
of death, serving a sentence of imprisonment exceeding twelve
months without the option of a fine or disqualified by or under
any law for the time being in force relating to offences connec-
ted with elections, will be disqualified for appointment as Sena-
tors or for election as members of the House of Representatives.

Qualifications of Voters
24. Subject to such disqualifications as Parliament may presc-
ribe, a person will be qualified to vote at an election of mem-
bers to serve in the House of Representatives if, and will not

§§52-4 with the delimitation of constituencies; §55 with election commissions;

§§74-82 dealt with the judicature, the Supreme and High Courts and appeals
(incl. to the J.C.P.C.) and §83 and §92 with the Judicial and Legal, and the
Public Service Commissions.
210

be q u a l i f i e d t o vote at such an e l e c t i o n unless, he i s a Common-

wealth c i t i z e n aged 21 years or more and has such other q u a l i f i -
cations regarding residence or r e g i s t r a t i o n as may be prescribed
by Parliament.
Amendment of the Constitution
25. The p r i n c i p a l provisions of the c o n s t i t u t i o n w i l l be e n t r e n -
ched, and of these the most important w i l l be s p e c i a l l y e n t r e n -
ched. The o r d i n a r i l y entrenched provisions may be amended by an
a f f i r m a t i v e vote of not less than t w o - t h i r d s of a l l the members
of each House. The s p e c i a l l y entrenched provisions may be amended
by an a f f i r m a t i v e vote of not less than t h r e e - f o u r t h s of a l l the
members of the House of Representatives and not less than two-
t h i r d s of a l l the members of the Senate. A l i s 1t of the entrenched
clauses of the c o n s t i t u t i o n i s at Appendix B. The other p r o v i s -
ions may be amended by a simple m a j o r i t y of each House.
Prorogation and Dissolution of Parliament
26. Parliament w i l l be prorogued or dissolved by the Governor-
General on the advice of the Prime M i n i s t e r , provided t h a t , i f
the House of Representatives, by m a j o r i t y of a l l i t s members,
passes a r e s o l u t i o n t h a t i t has no confidence in the Prime M i n i s -
t e r of T r i n i d a d and Tobago, and the Prime M i n i s t e r does not w i t h -
in seven days e i t h e r resign or advise a d i s s o l u t i o n , the Gover-
nor—General s h a l l revoke the appointment of the Prime M i n i s t e r .
27. In any event Parliament s h a l l not continue f o r more than f i v e
years from the date of i t s f i r s t s i t t i n g a f t e r any d i s s o l u t i o n .
In time of war, however, Parliament i t s e l f may extend i t s l i f e
f o r a period not exceeding twelve months at a time up t o a maxi-
mum of f i v e years.
Immunity of Members of the Legislature
28. There w i l l be a p r o v i s i o n i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n ensuring t h a t ,
in a l l the proceedings of the L e g i s l a t u r e , members w i l l enjoy im-
munity from a l l a c t i o n , whether c i v i l or c r i m i n a l , in respect of
anything said in the course of those p r o c e e d i n g s . . . .
[An Elections Commission would be established, its responsibilities de-
fined (§29). A Boundaries Commission would also be set up of persons not
normally actively engaged in politics; i t would periodically review and
propose adjustments (§31).]
Chapter V - Executive Powers
The Prime Minister
33. The Governor-General w i l l appoint as Prime M i n i s t e r the mem-
ber of the House of Representatives who, in h i s own d e l i b e r a t e

1. These entrenched sections included r i g h t s and freedoms, prorogation, the

j u d i c i a r y , the a u d i t o r - g e n e r a l , public debt, the public service commission,
control of public o f f i c i a l s , police o f f i c i a l s , pension r i g h t s ; the governor-
general, Parliament, the composition of both houses, amendment, annual
s e s s i o n s , d i s s o l u t i o n , general e l e c t i o n s and s e n a t o r i a l appointments, boun-
d a r i e s commission, the supreme c o u r t , high c o u r t , court of appeal, puisne
judges, appeals to J . C . P . C . , the j u d i c i a l and legal s e r v i c e s commission,
e l e c t i o n s commission, universal adult franchise, freedom of speech, the
Independence Act.
 211
judgement, is best able to command the support of a majority of
the members of that House.

The Cabinet
34. The Cabinet will consist of the Prime Minister and such num-
ber of other Ministers as the Governor-General, acting in accor-
dance with the advice of the Prime Minister, shall appoint from
among the Senators and the members of the House of Representati-
ves, provided that not more than two or, if the Attorney General
is appointed from among the Senators, not more than three Minis-
ters will be appointed from the Senate. Portfolios wi11 be assig-
ned to Ministers by the Governor-General on the advice of the
Prime Minister.

Attorney General
35. There will be an Attorney General, who may be a member of the
Senate or of the House of Representatives, who will be appointed
by the Governor-General on the advice of the Prime Minister. He
will have power to institute, conduct and discontinue criminal
proceedings, and to take over and conduct or discontinue criminal
proceedings before all Courts. The constitution will provide that
in the discharge of these functions the Attorney General shall
be completely independent and not subject to the direction of any
other person or authority.

Leader of the Opposition

36. There will be a Leader of the Opposition appointed by the
Governor-General from the House of Representatives who, in the
Governor-General's own deliberate judgement, is the leader in the
House of the party which commands the support of the largest num-
ber of members of the House in opposition to the Government.

Exercise of the Governor-General's powers

37. The Governor-General will be required to act on the advice
of the Cabinet in the exercise of his functions except in respect
of :-
(a) any function in respect of which he is required to exercise
his own deliberate judgement; or
(b) any function in the exercise of which he is required to act
on the advice of persons or authorities other than the Cabinet.
38. The Cabinet will be summoned by the Prime Minister, who will
preside at its meetings or appoint some other Minister to do so.
39. The Governor-General will be entitled to receive from the
Prime Minster full information about the general conduct of the
government of Trinidad and Tobago and information on any parti-
cular matter.
Chapter VI - The judicature
The Supreme Court
40. There will be a Supreme Court consisting of a High Court of
Justice and a Court of Appeal, with such jurisdiction and powers
as may be conferred on it by the constitution or by any other
law.

The High Court

41. The High Court will consist of such number of Puisne Judges
212
as may be prescribed by Parliament and the Chief Justice shall
ex officio be a member of the Court. The jurisdiction of the
Court and its powers will be those conferred upon it by the cons-
titution or by any other law.

Court of Appea 1
42. The Court of Appeal will consist of the Chief Justice, who
will be President, and such other number of Justices of Appeal
as may be prescribed by Parliament. The Court will be a Superior
Court of Record and, save as otherwise provided by Parliament,
will have all the powers of such a Court.

Judicature Act
43. A Judicature Act, which will come into effect on the date of
independence, will prescribe the jurisdiction of the Courts and
the qualifications of Judges.

Appeals to Her Majesty-in-Counci 1^

44. An appeal, whether on matters of law or on matters of fact,
will lie as of right from final decisions of the Court of Appeal
to Her Majesty-in-Counci1 where the matter in dispute is of the
value of fifteen hundred dollars or more or where the appeal in-
volves, directly or indirectly, a claim to or question respecting
property or a right of fifteen hundred dollars or more; from fi-
nal decisions regarding dissolution or nullity of marriage; from
final decisions in any civil, criminal or other proceedings on
questions as to the interpretation of the constitution; and in
such other cases as may be prescribed by Parliament.2

(5) BRITISH GUIANA

64. CONSTITUTION COMMISSION: REPORT, 29 June 19513

The decision [in 1928] to abrogate the old constitution and to

1. 30 years later these became an issue with the U.K. and the E.U. ,
particularly over capital punishment.
2. Chapter VI in the order-in-council - §§73-82 dealt with the courts and with
appeals to the J.C.P.C.; §§52-55 dealt with elections and the elections
commission; §63 with the judicial and legal service commission; §§92-5 with
the public service, and §98 with the police service, commissions. As for
Jamaica [No.55bl the Independence Act (1 August 1962: 10 & 11 Eliz. II cap.54)
provided for * fully responsible status within the Commonwealth' from 31
August; and at the Commonwealth P.M.'s meeting in London (19 Sept. 1962:
P.P.1961-2 XXX (1836) pp.69ff) it was noted that S.L., Tanganyika, Jamaica and
Trinidad and Tobago had been present as independent countries: the presence
of their P.M.s, together representing 15m. people who had achieved indepen-
dence since the last Commonwealth meeting in March 1961, was welcomed by the
other members. In 1976 Trinidad and Tobago chose to become a republic. The
president was elected for 5 years by the members of the senate (31-6 by the
president, 16 by the P.M. and 9 by the opposition leader) and the assembly
(36). In September 1980 Tobago secured a measure of self-administration.
3. Col.P. 280 [see Vol.VII, pp.135-1591. The commission had been appointed in
November 1950 by James Griffiths: Sir John Waddington was chairman: Professor
Vincent Harlow of Oxford University and Rita Hinden of the Fabian Colonial
Bureau were the other members. They recommended universal suffrage, the abo-
 213
replace it by an advanced form of the Crown Colony government
aroused opposition among those who, while they admitted the
shortcomings of the old, felt that the new represented a needless
abatement of their constitutional privileges....
Criticism fastened upon the composition of the legislature,
where the introduction of nominated members would enable them,
in combination with the officials, to out-number the elected mem-
bers, since this provision was additional to the grant of reser-
ved power to the governor. The British Guiana Commission had in-
deed recommended that the power to govern be given through either
of these media - not both. But, if the freedom of action of the
nominated unofficial members was to be entirely unfettered, their
presence could not ensure to the government the power to govern,
and it was properly felt that it was indefensible and intolerable
that a man should be constrained to vote against the dictates of
his conscience. In Jamaica, alone of the Caribbean territories,
the Governor had, until 1922, possessed this power to demand the
support of the nominated members, and this requirement had had
the effect of deterring many from accepting an offer of nomina-
tion.
But the important feature of the changes of 1928 was that they
held out to British Guiana the promise of advance where none
existed before. Under the old constitution, the colony was in a
'cul-de-sac1 , from which there was no outlet for either political
or economic development. In 1943, British Guiana moved forward
again, when the unofficial members were placed in a clear major-
ity in the Executive Council, and in the Legislative Council the
elected members alone outnumbered their nominated and official
colleagues by 14 to 10. In 1943, too, advisory committees of the
legislature were established, and, two years later, the franchise
was further extended. These events, and the appointment of our
present commission, have demonstrated the truth of the words
which Sir Cecil Rodwell used in November, 1927, when he said:
'The short cut is often the longest way round, and it will be
much better...to back out on to the main road which leads from
the plain and elementary form of Crown Colony government through
the various stages of increasing popular representation to the
ultimate goal of autonomy within the Empire...'.
Lack of participation by a part of a community in political
life cannot make for healthy democracy, and, in addition to those
in the country districts whom central politics pass by, we must
mention also those who stand consciously aloof. We appreciate
that all may not feel the same impulse to choose political life
as their form of public service, but we have no sympathy with
those who refrain for fastidious reasons. The position and atti-
tude of the European community are particularly important in this
context, for, although small in numbers, the Europeans still pro-
vide much of the commercial and industrial enterprise and wield
a great degree of economic power, and their withdrawal would have
disproportionate effect for harm upon political life. Sheer
weight of numbers made it certain that, following emancipation,
the non-European communities would eventually predominate, but,

litibn of the literacy test and an interim scheme of semi-responsible govern-

ment on a dyarchic principle.
214
owing largely to the oligarchical nature of the old constitution,
the European community was for a considerable time able to retain
a substantial majority in the legislature.
Today, the European community finds itself in somewhat of a
quandary. Its identification with management impairs, so it
feels, its chances of achieving the favour of a predominantly
labouring electorate. We were glad, however, to see among the
European community a readiness to take a greater part in politi-
cal life. Indeed, under an advanced constitution, the true inter-
est of the country can only be assured by the active participa-
tion of all upon equal terms in its government, for only so can
all be brought to a recognition of their dependence each upon the
other.
In an unhappy choice of phrase, the British Guiana Commission
of 1927 described the Colony as being 'politically precocious'.
If this be taken to mean that there is a wide interest in politi-
cal discussion we would agree, and we would argue, too, that when
this is so, a system of semi-representative government places a
premium upon demagogy and depresses the standards of public life
by confining politicians largely to the role of tacticians rather
than enabling them to become statesmen. Absorption in politics
is clearly to be seen in the Trade Union Movement, where this as-
pect of labour organisation has sometimes been stressed at the
expense of the industrial. We need survey the Trade Union Move-
ment only briefly, for its place in Guianese life is not our con-
cern. Trade Unions have a valued and essential part to play in
a modern society, and we recognise the excellent work of those
who came forward to found them in British Guiana. The true reward
of these pioneers lies not only in the improvements that have be-
en won, but in the knowledge 'that the need for... guidance...has
now largely disappeared', and that 'what they have toiled for has
come to pass and that the workers themselves. . .are ready to stand
on their own feet and speak for themselves'.1 It is therefore a
positive disservice to the Trade Union Movement that the power
and prestige given by the presidency of a union should prove so
sore a temptation to personal ambition that individuals should
seek to found unions 'with an eye more to political gain and
cheap publicity than to the real benefit of the worker'.
Trade Unions are at present also subject to external stresses
from the widely held expectation of constitutional advance. Nas-
cent political parties see in the adhesion of this or that union
an accession to their strength. Since it so happens that in most
of the important unions there are officers who incline to differ-
ent parties, a tug-of-war is at present being waged, and strenu-
ous efforts made to undermine the influence of unions which are
potentially the supporters of a rival political party. Too often,
these stresses coincide with the personal ambitions of the un-
ion's officers, or, in rival unions are exacerbated by personal
animosities. This feature, unhealthy as it is, is perhaps unavoi-
dable in the conditions of the moment, when widespread expecta-
tion of a grant of adult suffrage faces politicians with impon-
derable electoral chance. Nor is it entirely to be wondered at

1. This and the following quotation were from the report of the commission
inquiring into B.G.'s sugar industry (Col.P. 249 of 1949 §§159, 157).
 215
that this political ferment should invade the Trade Union Move-
ment, for, under a system of semi-representative government,
Trade Unionism, rather than parliamentary pressure, can come to
be regarded as the more effective instrument for controlling go-
vernment. Nevertheless, it is in the best interests of the coun-
try that this jockeying should speedily subside, and the proper
channels of political campaigning be established.
We have set out in this brief survey some of the economic ten-
dencies which must give the legislator pause, and certain other
political manifestations which call for comment. The present sys-
tem of government has been honourably administered, but, disre-
garding the psychological sense of grievance over the abolition
of the old constitution in 1928, it is clear to us that the pre-
sent system is outworn and no longer satisfies the wishes of the
people. Although we have been impressed by the attention that is
now being given to economic and social problems by political lea-
ders in British Guiana, we recognise that for some time yet to
come the appeal of personalities may be the determinant with the
electorate, until the now emerging political parties establish
themselves, and build up stable and energetic constituency orga-
nisations which are the hallmark of a mature party system. But,
when all that has been said, we are of the opinion that the peo-
ple of British Guiana can well sustain a further measure of cons-
titutional advance. In fact, many, though not all, of the present
unwholesome tendencies have been fostered by a sense of inferior-
ity springing from inadequate opportunities for responsible
political expression.
We have indeed been conscious throughout of the need to recom-
mend the greatest, and not the least, degree of self-government
that can be sustained. Proposals which do not match the stature
of the community can be as harmful as those which place an unrea-
sonable load upon untried legislators. Nor, indeed, can a grud-
ging attitude find any encouragement in the declared policy of
His Majesty's Government to advance all colonial peoples to the
goal of self-government as speedily as their political develop-
ment and economic viability will allow....
[On the franchise (Chap. IV)1 the Royal Commission of 1939 had placed
universal adult suffrage as 'one of the more immediate goals'.] It has
long been regarded as a privilege of citizenship that distin-
guishes a politically mature people. It is, moreover, a demand
which, when made by the generality of the people, is as difficult
to resist as the alternatives to it are to defend. The demand for
the grant of universal adult suffrage is often premature and may
be advanced in a spirit of competition, rather than upon an im-
partial assessment of political maturity; but it is inevitable
that, when once a breach has been made in the walls of a restric-
tive franchise, little time can elapse before the grant of an un-
fettered suffrage. Neither a property qualification nor a simple
literary test - or any other 'fancy' franchise - can be suffi-
cient or logical criteria of an individual's native sagacity and

1, In 1950 the qualifications for the franchise included a literacy test in

any language, ownership or occupation of 3 acres, or ownership of land worth
$150, or occupation at a rent of $45 p.a., or an income of $120 p.a. [Vol.VII,
pp.158-9],
216
fitness to be an elector. This was the experience in England
after the First Reform Bill, and we therefore take as the start-
ing point of our enquiry the knowledge that the grant of univer-
sal adult suffrage cannot long be stayed. Our task must be to de-
termine whether it should be granted now to British Guiana....
[It had been granted since 1939 to other Caribbean territories.] In British
Guiana, therefore, where the standards of intelligence and of
articulation are in no way below those obtaining in these other
territories, an indefinite deferment of its introduction would
cause dissatisfaction; and the arguments which could justify its
being now withheld must be cogent and based upon conditions which
are not to be found elsewhere.
The chief remaining restriction on the suffrage in British
Guiana is the literacy test. Many witnesses spoke to us of the
dangers which would attend its abolition, and of these we are
fully aware. The accession of a large number of illiterate per-
sons to a voter's register will in all likelihood increase poli-
tical irresponsibility, and place a premium upon demagogy. Elec-
tions upon this broader basis will probably encourage the return
to the legislature of a number of members who may not be best
qualified to exercise legislative functions. Yet, if the basis
of the franchise is more restricted, we are doubtful whether,
under a system of representative government such as we recommend,
the needs and aspirations of the poorer people will meet with
adequate recognition. Unless peculiar local circumstances are
found to present overwhelming objections, we can find no satis-
fying justification for denying 'humble people the political
status of their more fortunate fellows',1 the more so since this
'leap in the dark' has been, almost without exception, taken
elsewhere. Indeed, many of the persons who now exercise the fran-
chise are only semi-1 iterate; and these, who can do little more
than sign their names, and who may have set themselves to acquire
this ability solely in order to exercise the franchise, are as
little qualified as their illiterate brethren to distinguish from
written evidence the competing merits of rival candidates. More-
over, illiterate persons have been entitled to the vote in local
government elections for some years now, and we were informed
that they had exercised this privilege with discretion. On the
other hand, a thoroughgoing literacy test, however desirable it
may be, is, as things now are, impracticable and would be cumber-
some to the point of inoperation....
In our study of the special and local circumstances that might
be adduced for the retention of a literacy test, we have paid
careful regard to the report of the local Franchise Commission,
which was appointed in 1941 to consider this subject in the light
of the recommendations of the Royal West India Commission. After
prolonged consideration, the Franchise Commission issued a re-
port, in which, while a minority supported the principle of uni-
versal adult suffrage, the many proposed the retention of a lite-
racy test, and only minor modifications in the property qualifi-
cation. In the ensuing discussions, both in the Legislative Coun-
cil and in the country at large, it became clear that a substan-
tial body of opinion supported the majority recommendations, and

1. A quotation from the Donoughmore report [Vol.VII, No.63b].

 217
no material change in the franchise was effected.
We found the position much changed since 1944. A number of wit-
nesses, indeed, still opposed the abolition of the test, but a
large and representative body of opinion was strongly in favour
of universal adult suffrage. While it would be unreal to suggest
the introduction of universal adult suffrage in the absence of
a general demand for it, we had to consider whether the arguments
which determined the Franchise Commission in 1944 possessed any
continuing validity, which could support the retention of liter-
acy test. The crux of the Commission's argument is contained in
the sentence in paragraph 40, which reads:- 'We are ready and
willing to concede that this very large section ('for the most
part...persons of East Indian descent...(who) labour on the sugar
estates and in the villages of the colony') have in their midst
a considerable number of persons of both sexes who, though handi-
capped by lack of education of any kind, are possessed of more
than an average amount of intelligence: but we cannot admit the
claim that these persons are capable of exercising their votes
with the same judgement and unbiased decision that the educated
classes of the population may be expected to employ in their sup-
port of suitable candidates for election to the Legislative Coun-
cil; nor are we satisfied that they can be depended upon to exer-
cise the franchise freely and independently.'
The Commission go on to express the fear that the preponderance
of illiterate voters would secure the return of representatives
to the Legislative Council chosen exclusively upon racial consi-
derations, rather than upon careful judgement of opposing polic-
ies. There may have been present, too, in many minds the fear
that the hitherto voteless East Indians would by sheer weight of
numbers cause a serious and permanent disturbance in the balance
of political power in favour of that community; for, in the ab-
sence of any recent census return, the impression was current
that the East Indian community was preponderant in most of the
constituencies, other than those of Georgetown and New Amsterdam.
A cleavage of opinion then developed, which placed the East In-
dian community and the rest of the population in opposing camps.
Since that time, the census figures of 1946 have been publi-
shed, and disclose that the distribution of population in the
constituencies, as they now stand, does not present the prepon-
derance of East Indians that had been expected, and it may be
that this was one of the reasons why we received a widespread
demand for universal adult suffrage. Certainly we found that a
considerable section of the African community, who at the time
of the Franchise Commission had opposed its introduction, had now
changed its view.
While on grounds other than those of section advantage, the
arguments adduced by the Franchise Commission have considerable
force, it is to our minds repugnant that the retention of a lite-
racy test should operate to the disfranchisement of a large sect-
ion of one particular community, unless that disfranchisement
were justified upon grounds of the patent incapacity of the illi-
terate. Observation in British Guiana itself, and comparison with
neighbouring territories, give no support to this proposition.
Illiterates may, indeed, tend to vote upon racial lines more than
will the educated classes, but, as has been said, many who now
fall within the ambit of the electoral laws can scarcely be desc-
218
ribed as 'educated'. Moreover, retention of a literacy test would
inevitably be regarded by the East Indian community as evidence
of sectional discrimination, and would intensify racial antagon-
ism. The present cleavage would then harden, so that when the
great mass of the East Indian community became literate, and so
be entitled to the franchise - a time which is reliably estimated
to be not far distant - the virus of racialism, which it is at
present possible to expel, will have become irremediably
established in the body politic.
It is, therefore, for a variety of considerations - public de-
mand and expectation, the example of adjoining territories, and
disbelief in the efficacy of a literacy test infallibly to segre-
gate the politically responsible from the irresponsible - that
we have come to the conclusion that we should recommend its abo-
lition. There were few witnesses who were not in favour of the
abolition of property and income qualifications, and this matter
gave us less food for thought...
Chapter V: The Legislature
The most convenient division of the components of government
is threefold - the Legislature, the Executive, and the Judiciary
- and we shall discuss each in turn. These are not, of course,
watertight compartments, for the Governor has a part to play in
each. His assent to bills is the last stage of the legislative
process, but for our present purpose it will be sufficient if we
confine ourselves to the character of the other elements that go
to make up the Legislature.
Democratic governments derive 'their just powers from the con-
sent of the governed'. This doctrine of consent is distinctive
of democracy and fundamental to it. It means, for one thing, that
a government elected by a majority of the population should al-
ways consult the interests of all. For this reason, and to enable
the will of the community to be more perfectly discovered, checks
and balances are an integral feature of democratic government as
western civilisation understands it....
We subscribe wholeheartedly to the belief that the preponderant
voice in any deliberative assembly should be that of the elected
representatives of the people, but we are convinced that a commu-
nity in which these checks do not exist or are of illusory power
is not truly democratic, and we dismiss at once from our consi-
deration all proposals for a legislature which does not in some
way or other embody these safeguards. Having said this, there is
little need to elaborate the point that the reserved powers of
the Governor acting upon the deliberations of a wholly elected
single chamber do not accord with democratic experience, and do
not offer a practicable alternative to a system of checks and
balances embedded in the structure of the legislature itself. The
Governor's powers of suspension, veto, and certification, are in-
tended to be exercised only on rare occasions of grave public
consequence, and to ensure that 'public faith, public order, and
other essentials of good government' are preserved. Their frequ-
ent use would bring the Governor right into the political arena,
where his position as the representative of the Crown would ra-
pidly become intolerable both to the legislature and to himself,
and would place a premium upon irresponsibility by encouraging
the belief that real power was being withheld.
 219
The constitutional checks which have been welded into colonial
constitutions are of two sorts; the system of nomination, whereby
some portion of an otherwise elected unicameral legislature is
reserved for persons nominated by the Governor; or the bicameral
system, whereby an upper or revisionary chamber serves as a check
upon the legislative acts of the elective chamber. We have given
anxious thought to what checks and balances would be most benefi-
cial to British Guiana at the present stage of her constitutional
development, and have debated carefully the alternative types of
legislature which embody them. We regret that we have not been
able to reach identity of outlook in this particular. The unica-
meral structure appeals to one of our number,1 but the others of
us prefer the operation of a bicameral legislature. This apart,
the area of agreement between us is great, and our proposals for
the composition and functions of the Executive remain unchanged
under both a bicameral and a unicameral system, although the man-
ner of election of the unofficial members will vary slightly....
Whether the structure be unicameral or bicameral, and excluding
always the official members, we recommend that the qualifications
for membership of the elective chamber should be those of age,
citizenship, and residence, that we propose for an elector, toge-
ther with the requirements of mental and civic capacity usual for
a legislator. To this we should add the further requirement that
all should be literate in English. We are conscious that the el-
ection of an illiterate person is a remote contingency, but a
fluency, both written and spoken, in the language in which the
business of government is conducted - and which is also the offi-
cial language of British Guiana - is nevertheless so essential
a part of a legislator's equipment that we feel it should be made
mandatory upon him.
We have given careful thought to two other proposals that were
made to us from time to time: that candidates for the legislature
should reside in the constituency for which they seek election;
and that a member should be bound under pain of suspension to
attend a specified minimum number of meetings of the Legislature
and of its committees. We have examined these proposals with sym-
pathy. . .but we are not convinced that they are practicable or in-
deed more efficacious than the simple power, which resides in the
electorate, of dismissing at the next election any candidate who
has been remiss or inattentive in the discharge of his duties.
The present legislature in British Guiana has a life of five
years, and many witnesses urged upon us that this should be re-
tained, since it would enable ministers to familiarise themselves
with their tasks, and would afford them a reasonable space of
time in which to carry through their programme. It can be argued,
too, that if a government requires five years in which to demons-
trate its mettle, the electorate cannot, in any shorter time, ob-
tain a clear appreciation of its achievement; and, finally, more
frequent elections mean increased expenditure. These arguments
have force in that they are clearly based upon the analogy of
British practice, but the analogy is not entirely appropriate in
the circumstances of British Guiana, where the introduction of
an intermediate form of responsible government makes a more fre-

1. Waddington; but in the 1953 constitution the legislature was bicameral.

220
quent reference to the electorate desirable. On the one hand, it
will encourage the electorate to appreciate the reality of the
grant of universal adult suffrage, and the privileges and duties
it confers; on the other, legislators and ministers will be ren-
dered more sensitive to opinion in the constituencies. For these
reasons, and because we are confident that ministers will find
in a shorter term than five years adequate opportunity to develop
their policies, we recommend that the legislature should have a
life of three years. Within this term, a session of the legisla-
ture should be held at least once a year, while the Governor
should possess a discretionary power of prorogation and dissol-
ution.
As the elected representatives come increasingly to assume the
responsibilities of government, it is proper that the Governor,
as His Majesty's representative, should be withdrawn more and
more from the political arena. One of the forms in which his po-
litical influence is most ponderable arises from his presence in
the debates of the Legislature as its president often with an
original or casting vote (or, as in the old Court of Policy, with
both), and we welcome the progress that has already been made in
British Guiana by the occasional withdrawal of the Governor from
the Legislative Council, when his place is taken by a Deputy Pre-
sident, who is an elected member of the Council.1 The presence
of the Governor at the debates of the Legislative Council as its
president becomes increasingly anomalous in the circumstances of
ministerial government, and we therefore recommend that a Speaker
shall be appointed, who shall also be the Chairman of any commit-
tee of the whole house.
We do not recommend that British practices, by which the Spea-
ker is appointed by the House from among its own members, should
be followed in British Guiana. The removal of one member from the
arena of dispute on the floor of the house to the impartial of-
fice of Speaker deprives that member's constituency of its normal
representation, and this feature is open to greater criticism in
a chamber where the electives will number only 18 or 24 than in
one in which they are over 600. Leaving aside for a moment the
possible repercussions which, in a narrowly divided house, the
election of one of its members to the Speaker's chair may have
upon a party's majority, we have also to remember that the de-
mands of the Executive for men of ability will have first call
upon the relatively small membership of the Legislature. The of-
fice of Speaker demands a capacity for judicious and impartial
supervision of debate which may not commend its owner for a fur-
ther extension of electoral favour, and we cannot deprecate too
earnestly the mischief which frequent changes in the occupancy
of the Speaker's chair can cause by depriving the house of the
knowledge of constitutional practice and of the humours of men
which comes to any Speaker over a period of years. We, therefore,
recommend that the Governor be empowered to appoint at his disc-
retion an independent person to be Speaker, who shall not be a
member of the Legislature, and who is not the holder of any of-
fice of emolument under the Crown. The Speaker shall hold his

1. Frequently in other West Indies colonies a deputy president chaired meet-

ings of the legislative council in the governor's absence.
 221
office during pleasure, although it shall be permissive for him
at any time to resign.
We recommend that a Deputy Speaker, who is not to be a member
of the legislative body, shall be appointed by the members of the
elective house from among their own number....

Chapter VI: The Executive

We now have to consider the second of the three branches of the
constitution - the Executive. In the progress of a colonial ter-
ritory towards self-government, there is a difficult stage during
which the elected representatives of the people are in a substan-
tial majority in the legislature, and yet the ultimate responsi-
bility for the conduct of public affairs remains in the hands of
appointed officials. This situation - which may be called semi-
representative government - was described more than a century ago
by Charles Buller in the famous metaphor that 'We have made the
fire, but have stopped the chimney'.1
Irresponsibility is bred if responsibility is too long with-
held. We are entirely convinced that the time has now come in
British Guiana when semi-representative institutions should give
place to a form of ministerially responsible government. We are
no less convinced that the responsibility to be placed upon the
shoulders of ministers must be real. If this is not so, they will
enjoy power, but can evade responsibility. Where ministers are
not vested with effective control over their departments, or can
claim that the decisions taken in Executive Council are at vari-
ance with the wishes of the elective element, they tend to con-
cern themselves only with the outward and visible signs of of-
fice, and to avoid the labour necessary to an effective supervi-
sion of departmental activity. On the other hand, in territories
where departmental responsibility has been squarely transferred
to ministers, their assiduity and devotion to duty is impressive.
The traditions of colonial institutions make it more than ever
desirable that this transfer of responsibility, when made, should
be manifest. The functions of government have in the past been
entrusted in varying degree to permanent officials, who could act
independently of the advice of popular representatives. Necessary
as this may have been in the more primitive conditions of past
time, it has encouraged and tends to perpetuate the unwholesome
tradition that 'government' has been and will always remain some-
thing divorced from the community. As a result, the essential
difference between the Executive and the Legislature is often not
fully appreciated. It is the duty of the Executive to govern, and
this responsibility cannot be divided or abdicated without confu-
sion or inefficiency. The Executive in the United Kingdom and in
other democratic countries is responsible to the Legislature, and
the Legislature is associated with the policy of the government
since it alone can authorise those bills - and particularly fin-
ance bills - in which the policy of the Executive is expressed.
But, while the members of the government derive support for their
policies from the Legislature, expressed in favourable majorit-
ies, they are vested with their executive power by the King as
the Head of the State. There is thus no inconsistency between the

1. [See Vol.Ill, p.561 - Charles Buller] - presumably Harlow's drafting.

222
responsibility which a member of the Executive owes to the Head
of the State (in a colony, to the Governor as His Majesty's rep-
resentative) and that which he owes to the Legislature of which
he is a member: these two loyalties are in face complementary.
This situation is not always perfectly understood. Even when
a grant of responsible government has been made by the distribu-
tion of ministerial portfolios to elected members, the tradition
may still linger that government remains something aloof and se-
parated from the popular will. There is thus developed a tendency
to escape from responsibility and to maintain an attitude of mind
of an opposition even after becoming a member of government.
The essential feature of any constitution which involves the
grant of a form of responsible government is that the Executive
Council becomes the 'principal instrument of policy' and that the
advice tendered to the Governor by the Executive Council must po-
ssess the ultimate sanction of the Legislature. This can only be
done - and the principle is therefore fundamental - by ensuring
that the Executive Council shall comprise a majority of elected
ministers.1 for, since these ministers are to be exposed to the
constant criticism of the Legislature and of the broader public
beyond, it is only just to them that their policies should not
be outvoted in the Executive Council by a majority combination
of officials and unrepresentative nominated members. Furthermore,
if a coherent party system should develop, it would be more than
ever desirable that ministers should find no impediment in the
way of bringing their programme before the Legislature. Any other
arrangement would foster suspicion that there were men 'behind
the scenes' who were manipulating the government against the will
of the Legislature.
We must now consider the method whereby members of the Legisla-
ture shall be appointed to the Executive Council. Ministerial re-
sponsibility in England is collective, and predicates the exis-
tence of a fully-fledged party system. This does not yet apply
in British Guiana. Political groups are indeed coming into exist-
ence with distinctive programmes, based upon differing social and
economic concepts, and there are signs that some of these may be
able to maintain stable and effective party organisations, not
only at the centre but also in the constituencies, and to inspire
a reasoned loyalty transcending racial and personal allegiance.
It would be unrealistic, however, to recommend constitutional ar-
rangements based upon fully developed party organisations which
do not as yet exist. We accordingly propose that ministers should
be individually responsible for the portfolios allotted to them.
A vote of censure on one minister carried in the Legislature by
a simple majority would thus bring about his dismissal, but it
would not necessarily entail that consequential resignation of
his colleagues which is implicit in collective responsibility.
It is to be expected that, when a group of ministers are associa-

1. The Commissioners noted 'We consequently dismiss, as being inconsistent

with this principle, the position which obtained in the old Court of Policy,
where the votes of the elected representatives were exactly balanced with
those of the official and nominated members, and the responsibility for
executive decision was thus thrown back on the Governor as Chairman.' This
balanced executive council had been the same as provided for Jamaica in 1944.
 223
ted in the day-to-day operations of government, they will develop
a team spirit, even when they are not bound together by a closely
defined party allegiance; and the experience of co-operation, in-
volving, as it does, constant give-and-take in reaching policy
decisions, can be a potent force in fostering cohesion and commu-
nity of purpose, not only among the ministers themselves but also
among the groups supporting them in the Legislature. By this, the
political climate necessary for the successful operation of 'ca-
binet' government can gradually develop.
When a system of individual ministerial responsibility is adop-
ted, elections to ministerial office are usually effected by the
vote of the entire Legislature. This is at variance with the pro-
cedure under a system of collective ministerial responsibility,
under which the Head of the State invites the member whom he be-
lieves to possess a majority in the elective chamber to form a
government - a procedure tantamount to the election by the Legis-
lature of one man acceptable to itself to the post of Prime Mini-
ster. It is commonly held that this practice does not lend itself
to adoption in the absence of a party system, but it is sometimes
argued that party differentiations are the product, and not the
antecedent, of a system of collective responsibility. Those who
take this view further contend that a sense of common loyalty is
a tender plant, which needs favourable conditions in which to
flourish - conditions which the practice of individual minister-
ial responsibility does not satisfy - and they maintain that, de-
spite the absence of a party system, the action of the Legisla-
ture should be confined to the choice of one of its number to be
a Prime Minister, who shal1 himself select his several unofficial
colleagues. But this means, they argue, the other ministers will
be bound more closely to him as the fount of their office, and
a sense of common loyalty and, perhaps more important, of discip-
line will be achieved, leading to the more speedy emergence of
party differentiations.
We have submitted this argument to careful examination, for it
has much to commend it. We have nevertheless rejected it, since
it does not possess the flexibility which is a feature of the
alternative system. Collective responsibility carries with it the
necessity of collective resignation in the face of an adverse
vote, and this, which might not be an infrequent phenomenon in
a house of emergent party groups, would not make for stable or
confident government. Furthermore, the corollary of a discipline
imposed upon the members of the Executive Council must be a dis-
cipline upon the members of the Legislature through party whips.
Without this, the Prime Minister would have no sanction for his
authority, and his position would be rendered unreal and anomal-
ous. We, therefore, recommend that the selection of the unoffi-
cial ministers be determined by the ballot of the Legislature (or
in a bicameral system of the elective house), with the modifica-
tion, however, that the ministers so chosen should elect one of
their number to be 'primus inter pares1 among them, with the
designation of 'Leader of the House'. By this means, flexibility
will be maintained, a sense of common purpose fostered, but not
imposed, and the way made smooth for the emergence, as circum-
stances may dictate, of the office of a Prime Minister and of the
224
practice of collective ministerial responsibility1.... [The
Commissioners recommended that there should be a return to the old name - the
Court of Policy.]
We propose that the Court of Policy shall consist of the Go-
vernor, who shall preside and possess a casting vote only, and
ten other members. Of these, the chief officials - the Colonial
(or, as we propose he should now be called, the Chief) Secretary,
the Financial Secretary and the Attorney General - shall be
three, and seven shall be unofficial members of the Legislature
who shall be designated ministers. Six of these ministers shall
be elected members of the Legislature. In a unicameral type of
legislature, they will be chosen by the ballot of all the members
of that house; in a bicameral system, by that of the elected mem-
bers of the House of Assembly. The seventh minister will, in a
unicameral legislature, be appointed by the Governor from the
members of the legislature, while, in a bicameral system, he will
be chosen by the members of the revisionary chamber from among
their own number. In either event, the elected members will pos-
sess the majority, and the fundamental principle we have earlier
propounded is thereby satisfied.
We should perhaps indicate the reasons which have led us, while
stressing the importance of this principle of an elected major-
ity, to recommend the retention of the three official members.
First, they will be needed to handle certain portfolios - Law and
Order, Finance - which cannot yet be transferred with confidence
to elected ministers. We say this with no reflection upon the in-
tegrity of prospective ministers, but from an appreciation of the
degree of specialised knowledge required to direct the work of
these departments. There can be no guarantee that the small popu-
lation of British Guiana will be able regularly to throw up per-
sons possessed of this wealth of knowledge and experience. More-
over, there can be no certainty that, were such persons avail-
able, they would be successful candidates at an election, or,
even if they were, that they would be chosen to be members of the
Court of Policy. Secondly, we must not lose sight of the fact
that the elected representatives of the people of British Guiana
have not hitherto been given the opportunities to become experi-
enced in affairs of state. The officials will be invaluable mem-
bers of the Court of Policy for the guidance which their expert
knowledge can give to its discussions. The legal and financial
implications of measures of policy demand skilled examination,
and the counsel which the official members can afford is not
something with which ministers new to responsibility can with
wisdom dispense. Moreover, the three official members will, we
are confident, share a sense of common responsibility with their
elected colleagues. They will be bound by the decision of the
majority of the Court of Policy and this stipulation will lay any
fears, however unjustified, that they may seek to act against the
will of the majority.
We have considered what functions should fall under this system
of government to the Chief Secretary. There were, indeed, those
among our witnesses who went so far as to suggest the abolition

1. Tliis sense of common responsibility was not easy to evolve as events

showed.
 225
of the post of Chief Secretary. It is certainly true that, when
members of the public have direct access to the various minis-
tries, and the ministers themselves are in a position to defend
and explain the policies of their departments before the Court
of Policy, the burden on the Chief Secretary will be greatly di-
minished. Nevertheless, there will remain many important subjects
which will not attach to other ministers and will best depend up-
on him for resolution. Among these, although this citation is not
exhaustive and can be reserved for local decision, we would ins-
tance the conduct of foreign and commonwealth affairs, defence,
which should include the police force,1 and information matters.
As head of the civil service, another wide range of duties will
fall to him. There will further be the delicate task, which he
can best perform, of assisting the operation of the new system,
of encouraging the efficient execution of business, and of promo-
ting understanding between elected minister and permanent offic-
ial. It is possible that, in the fullness of time, the popular
representatives will have gained such familiarity with the busi-
ness of government that his position, together, indeed, with that
of the other official members, can with advantage be reviewed,
but that time is not yet.
In providing for the presence in the Court of Policy of a
seventh unofficial member, who shall either be nominated by the
Governor or elected by and from the members of the revisionary
chamber, we wish to secure the participation in the work of go-
vernment of one member who can supply experience which elected
representatives may lack. He would bring to the deliberations of
the Court of Policy a further measure of knowledge - and that
from the unofficial angle - and, should his views at any time in-
cline him away from the side of the elected ministers, they will
still be in the majority. We favour his being a minister without
portfolio, but expect that he would devote himself to a variety
of non-controversial subjects, which cannot easily be allocated
to other ministers....
Since the members of the Court of Policy owe responsibility as
members of the government to the Head of the Executive, who is
the Governor, it is in the order of things that, while the elect-
ed unofficial minister should be chosen by the vote of the elect-
ive house, the distribution of the portfolios of government among
them should be made by the Governor, in consultation with the mi-
nisters themselves.... The following grouping has, however, com-
mended itself to us as being both comprehensive and logical:
Labour, Industry and Commerce; Agriculture, Forestry and Mines;
Public Works and Communications; Health; Education; Local Govern-
ment and Social Welfare.
We have given earnest thought to the desirability of providing
a portfolio for economic affairs. In sustained economic develop-
ment lies the key to British Guiana's future, and we felt that
much advantage would derive from its care being made the special

1. Here the commissioners noted 'That the police should be free from all
political pressure and their impartiality strenuously preserved is, of course,
a truism. The Governor's control and his power to call out the force to
maintain the peace in an emergency must be completely unimpaired. This power
is fully safeguarded by our recommendations here....'
226
concern of one minister. At the same time, we appreciate that
such a minister, if he is to be more than a figurehead or mere
co-ordinating agent, would, in the nature of things, trespass up-
on and detract from the authority of the other departmental mini-
sters, particularly that of the Ministers of Labour, Industry and
Commerce, Agriculture, Forestry and Mines, Public Works and Com-
munications and of the Financial Secretary. We propose, there-
fore, upon the analogy of the cabinet committees of the United
Kingdom, that there should be established a special economic com-
mittee of the Court of Policy, which should consist of these four
members. The chairmanship should be held by one of the three un-
official members who should be its inspiration and driving force.
We make this recommendation because diffusion of responsibility
may induce timidity and inaction, and it is a matter of paramount
importance that the responsibility for initiative should be
squarely placed upon the shoulders of one man. As with cabinet
committees in this country, this committee should not be made
statutory.
The burden of office is likely to be considerable, and while
it would be unfortunate if too great a proportion of the members
of the Legislature were vested with executive office, we would
urge the appointment of a small number of junior ministers - to
be known as Under-Secretaries - to afford ministers support in
debate, and to assist them in the despatch of their departmental
business. One junior ministry which we feel to be of particular
importance is the Financial Under-Secretaryship. Apart from the
obvious argument that, if elected members are eventually to as-
sume responsibility for the Ministry of Finance, the sooner they
are associated with its work the better, we trust that the ap-
pointment of this junior minister, and his participation in de-
bate, will afford the elected members a greater confidence that
they are fully associated with all aspects of policy. We would
also urge that consideration be given to the appointment of a
junior minister to the Ministry of Labour, Industry and Commerce,
since the burden of this office is likely to be exceptionally
heavy.
Ministers are entitled to a loyal and willing co-operation from
the permanent officials of their departments, and we see every
reason to expect that this co-operation will be given, and that
they will work in harmonious association. Nevertheless, a minis-
ter and the permanent head of his department may, upon occasion,
differ upon a matter of principle, and, where this happens, the
disagreement should be resolved, after discussion in the Court
of Policy, as the Governor may direct. To enable this to be done,
the permanent official should submit a written statement of his
own standpoint to his minister, who will forward it to the Court
of Policy together with any observations he may wish to make....
The Court of Policy shall be summoned only upon the authority
of the Governor, but shall be summoned by him upon the written
request of at least five members. No business shall be transacted
in it if objection be made by any member that there are less than
five members present other than the Chairman....
The division between the Executive and Legislature is not, as
we have said, clearcut, and a further example of an overlap bet-
ween the two is to be found in the existence of advisory commit-
tees of the Legislative Council. The present advisory committees
 227
of the Legislative Council were instituted in 1943 with the pur-
pose of associating members of the Legislature more intimately
with the work of departmental administration. They were expressly
withheld from any executive functions, but it was hoped that the
members of the advisory committees 'as delegates of the whole
council (would) be in a peculiarly advantageous position to lead
and advise their colleagues on the particular matters which come
within the purview of the department for which they can speak'.
In so doing, they would promote harmonious relations between the
Executive and the Legislature, and, to this end, it was intended
that the chairmen of the advisory committees should be members
of the Executive Council, where they would be in touch with the
other activities of government, and where they would gain that
experience of public administration which clearly fore-shadowed
the development of a ministerial system. ... [as Governor Sir Gordon
Lethem had directed the chairmen of the advisory committees (1 Nov. 1943).]1
We have carefully examined the working of this innovation, but
we regret that the full expectations with which its introduction
was greeted have not been fulfilled. There are many reasons for
this. First, the chairmen of two of the committees are not elec-
ted, but nominated, members, so that those persons who might have
been considered to be potential ministers have not been afforded
the necessary experience. Secondly, the association between the
Executive and the Legislature has not been maintained, for of two
committees only do the Chairmen serve on the Executive Council.
There is little purpose in investigating the reasons for these
developments; rather we would point to their results in fostering
amongst the members of the advisory committees a feeling of their
impotence to affect the course of government, since decisions
have rested with an executive council on which their views are
not represented. Nevertheless, it is still our view that the ad-
visory committees have afforded the members of the Legislature
a useful insight into the business of government, and have been
a valuable forum in which policy could be examined and proposals
ventilated. If the deviations from the original model had been
remedied, the committees would have been capable of contributing
even more.
The question arises, however, whether their usefulness would
not come to an end with the institution of a ministerial system.
We are satisfied that this would be so. Nothing should be allowed
to confuse or undermine the cardinal principle that a minister
must assume real responsibility for the department in his charge,
and we fear that on two counts the association with him of a com-
mittee of the Legislature would have this effect. First, if he
accept the advice of his committee, he can plausibly maintain
that the responsibility for the decision is not wholly his but
is shared by members of the committee; and, secondly, if he acts
counter to that advice, his position will be embarrassing when
the matter comes to be debated in the Legislature. For these
reasons we recommend that advisory committees of the Legislature
should no longer be appointed.
The devolution of real responsibility upon elected members, by
vesting them with ministerial functions and by establishing the

1. [Vol.VII, p.158]
228
C o u r t o f P o l i c y as t h e p r i n c i p a l i n s t r u m e n t o f p o l i c y , i n v o l v e s
a d i m i n u t i o n o f t h e d a y - t o - d a y e x e c u t i v e a c t i v i t i e s o f t h e Gover-
n o r . He w i l l now move t o a p o s i t i o n c l o s e t o t h a t o c c u p i e d by t h e
S o v e r e i g n i n t h e U n i t e d Kingdom, and w i l l be bound c u s t o m a r i l y
t o a c t i n accordance w i t h t h e a d v i c e t e n d e r e d t o him i n t h e C o u r t
o f P o l i c y . N e v e r t h e l e s s , i n any c o l o n y where a g r a n t o f r e s p o n -
s i b l e government has been made, i t i s an e s t a b l i s h e d p r i n c i p l e ,
w i t h w h i c h we a r e i n c o m p l e t e agreement, t h a t , u n t i l t h e goal o f
autonomy w i t h i n t h e Commonwealth has been a t t a i n e d , t h e Governor
s h o u l d r e t a i n t h e d i s c r e t i o n a r y powers o f d i s s e n t , r e s e r v a t i o n 1
and d e c l a r a t i o n , t o e n a b l e h i m , r a t h e r as an u m p i r e , t o s a f e g u a r d
t h e i n t e r e s t s o f p u b l i c o r d e r , p u b l i c f a i t h , and o t h e r e s s e n t i a l s
o f good government. These powers a r e by t h e i r n a t u r e i n s t r u m e n t s
o f l a s t r e s o r t t o be used o n l y i n m a t t e r s o f g r a v e p u b l i c c o n s e -
quence.2
Under t h e o l d o r d e r , t h e p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f t h e Governor i n t h e
h u r l y - b u r l y o f p o l i t i c s i s t h e r u l e ; under t h e new i t must be t h e
exception....

65. ( a ) CONSTITUTION ORDER-IN-COUNCIL, 1 April 19533

[The Executive Council would consist of the Governor as president, 3
ex officio and 7 ministers (§5): it would be 'the principal instrument
of p o l i c y ' , and the Governor should consult i t and act on i t s advice,
except where i t would prejudice H.M. 's service, or the matter was t r i v i a l
or urgent, or prejudicial to public f a i t h , order and good government. The
colonial secretary, A.G. and financial secretary were the ex officio mem-
bers: 6 of the ministers would be elected by the House of Assembly and
1 by the State Council and the members of the Assembly would elect the
leader of the House (§§7-9). Either chamber could revoke the election of
a minister by a 2/3rd. majority (§10). The Governor could appoint under-
secretaries from the Elected Members of the Assembly (§24). On the State
Counci1 (Part IV), the order provided]
3 1 . There s h a l l be a S t a t e C o u n c i l i n and f o r t h e Colony which
s h a l l c o n s i s t o f n i n e Members q u a l i f i e d and a p p o i n t e d i n a c c o r -
dance w i t h t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h i s P a r t o f t h i s O r d e r . 4
3 2 . ( 1 ) Of t h e n i n e Members - ( a ) two s h a l l be a p p o i n t e d by t h e
Governor i n accordance w i t h t h e recommendation o f t h e s i x M i n i -
s t e r s e l e c t e d by t h e House o f Assembly; t h e making o f a recommen-
d a t i o n t o t h e Governor s h a l l be t h e f i r s t d u t y o f such M i n i s t e r s
after their election; Provided that if the Ministers fail (whe-
t h e r a f t e r t h e i r e l e c t i o n o r a f t e r t h e o c c u r r e n c e o f a vacancy
i n r e s p e c t o f t h e s e a t o f a Member o f t h e S t a t e C o u n c i l a p p o i n t e d
under t h i s p a r a g r a p h ) w i t h i n such t i m e as t h e G o v e r n o r , a c t i n g
i n h i s d i s c r e t i o n , c o n s i d e r s r e a s o n a b l e , t o recommend a person

1. This paragraph was seen by the commissioners as again safeguarding the

governor's power.
2. Here the report referred to the governor's d i s c r e t i o n to reserve a b i l l and
also to c e r t a i n c a t e g o r i e s of b i l l s where he could not assent unless there was
a clause suspending operation u n t i l H.M. ' s pleasure was known: the commission-
e r s recommended t h a t t h i s l a t t e r requirement should be applied in a l l b i l l s
a f f e c t i n g the i n t e r e s t s of the Amerindians.
3. Stat. R. 1953, No.586. Taking effect from 8 April universal adult suffrage
was how being introduced.
4. There was provision for an appointed president of the council.
 229
o r persons f o r a p p o i n t m e n t , t h e Governor may, a c t i n g i n h i s d i s -
c r e t i o n , a f t e r c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h t h e M i n i s t e r s , make an a p p o i n t -
ment o r a p p o i n t m e n t s , as t h e case may r e q u i r e ; ( b ) one s h a l l be
a p p o i n t e d by t h e G o v e r n o r , a c t i n g i n h i s d i s c r e t i o n , a f t e r c o n -
s u l t a t i o n w i t h such E l e c t e d Members o r groups o f E l e c t e d Members
o r w i t h b o t h such Members and groups a s , i n h i s o p i n i o n , c o n s t i -
tute the minority in the House of Assembly; (c) thereafter, six
s h a l l be a p p o i n t e d by t h e Governor, a c t i n g i n h i s d i s c r e t i o n :
Provided that the Governor shall not appoint, under this parag-
r a p h , any person who has u n s u c c e s s f u l l y sought e l e c t i o n t o t h e
House of Assembly at or since the immediately preceding general
e l e c t i o n o f E l e c t e d Members t o t h a t C h a m b e r . . . . 1
[The qualifications for membership included B r i t i s h subjecthood, over
35 with 2 years residence and domicile, and a b i l i t y to speak and (unless
blind) read the English language with a degree of proficiency s u f f i c i e n t
to enable him to take an active part in the Council's proceedings (§34).
The usual disqualifications were l i s t e d (§35).]

P a r t V - House o f Assembly
64. There s h a l l be a House o f Assembly i n and f o r t h e Colony
which shall consist of a Speaker,2 three ex officio Members and
twenty-four Elected Members....
[As for Legislation and procedure in the Legislative (Part VI) the
Governor with the advice and consent of the State Council would make
laws. He would retain discretionary powers of veto, reservation and cer-
t i f i c a t i o n - the last being exercised normally on the advice of the Exe-
cutive Council, though in emergencies could override that advice with the
consent of the Secretary of State. The Governor and two Chambers must
conform 'as nearly as may be to the directions contained in any Instruc-
t i o n s ' . Save with the Governor's consent no b i l l dealing with revenue,
taxation or the public funds of the Colony could be i n i t i a t e d and money
b i l l s must be f i r s t introduced in the Assembly. Otherwise any Member of
either House could introduce any b i l l or motion (§§67, 68).]
6 9 . ( 1 ) S u b j e c t t o t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h i s O r d e r , i f a Money B i l l ,
h a v i n g been passed by t h e House o f Assembly and s e n t t o t h e S t a t e
C o u n c i l a t l e a s t t h r e e months b e f o r e t h e end o f t h e s e s s i o n , i s
rejected by the State Council within three months after it is
s e n t t o t h a t Chamber, t h e B i l l , w i t h any amendments which a r e
c e r t i f i e d by t h e Speaker t o have been made by t h e S t a t e C o u n c i l
and agreed t o by t h e House o f Assembly, s h a l l , i f t h e House o f
Assembly so r e s o l v e , be p r e s e n t e d t o t h e Governor f o r a s s e n t ;
and, i f t h e Governor s h a l l a s s e n t t h e r e t o , o r i f he s h a l l r e s e r v e
t h e B i l l f o r t h e s i g n i f i c a t i o n o f Her M a j e s t y ' s p l e a s u r e and Her
M a j e s t y s h a l l a s s e n t t h e r e t o , t h e B i l l s h a l l become a law n o t -
w i t h s t a n d i n g t h a t t h e S t a t e C o u n c i l have n o t consented t o t h e
Bill.3

1. This prevented the much c r i t i c i s e d appointments in the Jamaican senate,not

l e a s t a f t e r independence, of unsuccessful candidates.
2. The Speaker was to be appointed, h i s deputy e l e c t e d .
3. By c o n t r a s t with the o r d e r - i n - c o u n c i l for Jamaica in 1944, there were more
r e s t r i c t i o n s on the s t a t e council here than on the l e g i s l a t i v e council t h e r e .
230

(2) There shall be endorsed on every Money Bill when it is

s e n t t o t h e S t a t e C o u n c i l t h e c e r t i f i c a t e o f t h e Speaker s i g n e d
by him t h a t i t i s a Money B i l l a n d , when i t i s p r e s e n t e d t o t h e
Governor f o r a s s e n t i n pursuance o f t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h i s s e c t -
i o n , a f u r t h e r c e r t i f i c a t e o f t h e Speaker s i g n e d by him t h a t t h e
p r o v i s i o n s o f t h i s s e c t i o n have been d u l y c o m p l i e d w i t h .
7 0 . ( 1 ) S u b j e c t t o t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h i s O r d e r , i f any Government
B i l l o t h e r t h a n a Money B i l l i s passed by t h e House o f Assembly
i n two s u c c e s s i v e s e s s i o n s ( w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e Chambers a r e d i s -
s o l v e d between t h o s e s e s s i o n s ) , a n d , h a v i n g been s e n t t o t h e
S t a t e C o u n c i l a t l e a s t t h r e e months b e f o r e t h e end o f t h e s e s -
s i o n , i s r e j e c t e d by t h e S t a t e C o u n c i l i n each o f t h o s e s e s s i o n s
w i t h i n t h r e e months a f t e r i t i s so s e n t , t h a t B i l l s h a l l , a f t e r
i t i s r e j e c t e d f o r t h e second t i m e by t h e S t a t e C o u n c i l , i f t h e
House o f Assembly so r e s o l v e , be p r e s e n t e d t o t h e Governor f o r
a s s e n t a n d , i f t h e Governor s h a l l a s s e n t t h e r e t o , o r , i f he s h a l l
r e s e r v e t h e B i l l f o r t h e s i g n i f i c a t i o n o f Her M a j e s t y ' s p l e a s u r e
and Her M a j e s t y s h a l l a s s e n t t h e r e t o , t h e B i l l s h a l l become a law
n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h a t t h e S t a t e C o u n c i l have n o t c o n s e n t e d t o t h e
Bi 11 : . . . [provided that a year had elapsed between the f i r s t debate and the
second in the Assembly and t h i s was c e r t i f i e d by the Speaker.] 1

( b ) OLIVER LYTTELTON TO GOVERNOR SIR ALFRED SAVAGE, 2 May 19532

[The i n s t i t u t i o n of a new Executive Council provided the opportunity

1. Though Cheddi Jagan denounced the report as a manoeuvre to keep B.G, under
the imperial yoke and demanded instead immediate self-government under a
Soviet communist system; and a Caribbean Labour Congress (4 Nov: C O . 1031/311)
demanded independence and the removal of foreign armed forces, t h e r e was
general approval, even c o n g r a t u l a t i o n s ; (Local A u t h o r i t i e s , 3 Nov.) and E.
Indian Association (30 March, 1952 ibid.). Sir Charles Woplley (governor 1947-
59) gave h i s formal agreed r e a c t i o n s (to L y t t e l t o n ; 21 June 1952: C O . 1031/
310): a l l means must be deployed to reduce r a c i a l antagonism between negroes
and E. Indians and the governor must be empowered to reserve discriminatory
b i l l s : i t was e s s e n t i a l to provide the checks and balances B.G. lacked and to
secure the nomination of men of wide experience to the S t a t e council which
might have a delaying power of 3 months but would have mainly a r e v i s i n g
function. Amerindian a f f a i r s should remain the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the chief
s e c r e t a r y . He thought the new c o n s t i t u t i o n might be ready by June 1953.
Unfortunately the debate in the l e g i s l a t i v e council concentrated an a t t a c k on
Jagan and communism, not the commission's report (Woolley to L y t t e l t o n , 9
August 1952: CO, 1030/317), In the C O . a meeting agreed t h a t m i n i s t e r s must
be given r e a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and made to feel i t was t h e i r job to defend t h e i r
departments in the l e g i s l a t i v e and executive council. A paper would be
prepared on the way ministers should behave - p a r t i c u l a r l y t r a d e s u n i o n i s t s -
and a general despatch on the c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t s , d i s c l o s u r e , r e s i g n a t i o n
of d i r e c t o r s h i p s , avoidance of t r a n s a c t i o n s &c. (to Savage, 2 May 1953, Gutch
to Mayle, 29 May: C O . 1031/315). Lyttelton was blunt on m i n i s t e r s s t i r r i n g up
labour d i s p u t e s for t h e i r own ends and approved Governor Savage's strong
words: m i n i s t e r s must be in no doubt of improper conduct - c a l l i n g a general
s t r i k e would lead to the breakdown of the c o n s t i t u t i o n and i t s suspension (to
Savage, 4 Sept. 1953: CO, 1031/315).
2. C O . 1031/315, No. 343; a general despatch dealing with some of the problems
of introducing semi-responsible government in the new executive council.
Savage was governor (1953-5): he had served in the t r e a s u r i e s of N. Rhodesia,
 231
for him to emphasise the fundamental significance of t h i s reform.] I n
c o n t r a s t t o t h e p r e s e n t p r a c t i c e , t h e u n o f f i c i a l members o f t h e
new E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l w i l l be d i r e c t l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e d i r e c -
t i o n and c o n t r o l o f a l a r g e p r o p o r t i o n o f Government b u s i n e s s .
The c o n s t i t u t i o n p r o v i d e s , amongst o t h e r t h i n g s , t h a t u n o f f i c i a l
members o f t h e E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l , w h i l e so charged w i t h t h e a d m i -
n i s t r a t i o n o f any Departments o r s u b j e c t s , w i l l be s t y l e d ' M i n i s -
t e r s ' . I n t h e c o u r s e o f t h e i r m i n i s t e r i a l d u t i e s members w i l l be
c a l l e d upon, b o t h i n d i v i d u a l l y and c o l l e c t i v e l y , t o deal w i t h and
t o t a k e d e c i s i o n s upon a wide v a r i e t y o f s u b j e c t s t o u c h i n g a l m o s t
a l l a s p e c t o f t h e l i f e o f t h e community; and s i t u a t i o n s w i l l no
doubt a r i s e f r o m t i m e t o t i m e where t h e y may f i n d t h a t t h e i r pub-
l i c d u t i e s a f f e c t o r even c o n f l i c t w i t h t h e i r p e r s o n a l and p r i -
v a t e i n t e r e s t s . S i t u a t i o n s o f t h i s n a t u r e c o u l d a r i s e i n a number
o f ways and I need m e n t i o n here o n l y t h e more o b v i o u s c o n t r i b u -
t o r y f a c t o r s such as t h e n a t u r e and e x t e n t o f a member's p r i v a t e
b u s i n e s s a c t i v i t i e s , h i s f i n a n c i a l i n t e r e s t i n p a r t i c u l a r compan-
i e s o r schemes, o r h i s a c t i v i t i e s and i n t e r e s t s as an o f f i c i a l
of a trade union.
Under t h e new B r i t i s h Guiana C o n s t i t u t i o n , p r o v i s i o n i s made
f o r t h e d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n f o r e l e c t e d membership o f t h e House o f
Assembly ( s u b j e c t t o s t a t e d e x e m p t i o n s ) o f a d i r e c t o r o r manager
o f a company which i s a p a r t y t o any s u b s i s t i n g c o n t r a c t w i t h t h e
Government f o r o r on a c c o u n t o f t h e P u b l i c S e r v i c e . There i s a
s i m i l a r p r o v i s i o n i n r e s p e c t o f membership o f t h e S t a t e C o u n c i l .
These p r o v i s i o n s do n o t a p p l y t o persons who a r e merely s h a r e -
h o l d e r s i n any company. I t i s however t o be e x p e c t e d t h a t when
a member o f t h e House o f Assembly o r t h e S t a t e C o u n c i l becomes
a member o f t h e E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l he s h o u l d , on assumption o f
o f f i c e , d i s c l o s e t o t h e Governor i n c o n f i d e n c e a f u l l l i s t o f h i s
h o l d i n g s o f s t o c k s o r shares i n a l l companies whether t h e y a r e
o r a r e n o t a t t h e same t i m e p a r t i e s t o Government c o n t r a c t s ; a n d ,
i n a d d i t i o n , t h a t he s h o u l d use t h e s t r i c t e s t d i s c r e t i o n i n d e c i -
d i n g , i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s where h i s p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t and h i s p u b l i c
d u t y c o n f l i c t , whether he can p r o p e r l y c o n t i n u e t o h o l d such
s t o c k s o r s h a r e s . The q u e s t i o n a l s o a r i s e s where, i n t h e case o f
u n o f f i c i a l members o f E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l , t h o s e members s h o u l d a t

F i j i and Nigeria and had been governor of Barbados (1949-53). The f i r s t

elec-tions under universal adult suffrage had taken place on 27 A p r i l .
Candidates had separate ballot boxes with names and photographs and
p i c t o r i a l symbols: i l l i t e r a t e s placed a blank numbered ballot in t h e i r
chosen box. This helped to deal with the Amerindians where i l l i t e r a c y was
higher and the turnout lower than in other groups. About 75% voted, and
of these j u s t over half (51%) voted for the P.P.P. which won 18 of the
24 elected seats and named as ministers the 4 'Politburo' members (Jagan,
Forbes Burnham, Chase, King) and Dr. Lachhmansingh and Jai Navine Singh.
Mrs. Jagan became deputy speaker to the distinguished but elderly and
infirm Sir Eustace Woolford [ V o l . V I I , p.148], The ministers, led by
Jagan, attacked the constitution, the c i v i l servants, and the state
council: they argued that the 1953 reforms were a fraud and preven-ted
them and the people from implementing t h e i r programme: no checks should
be placed on t h e i r w i l l and a l l opposition must be destroyed. In practice
they did l i t t l e to tackle the colony's problems and concentrated on
consolidating t h e i r own position.
232
the time of their appointment or election to Executive Council,
divest themselves for the period of their membership of that body
of any other outside interests which might conflict with their
public responsibilities. Since the unofficial members are to re-
ceive salaries from public funds in respect of their functions
as Ministers, that can reasonably be expected of them. I believe
that this matter is one which is best left to the sanction of
public opinion and to the development of custom and usage under
the Constitution. The subject is, nevertheless, one of cardinal
importance in the development of a healthy system of government,
and is therefore, to be borne carefully in mind by all those
whose task it will be to work for development along these lines.
While there are certain practical difficulties in attempting
to formulate a complete code of behaviour for persons who are ap-
pointed to important public offices and who are charged, in vary-
ing degrees, with the direction and conduct of the affairs of Go-
vernment, some definite rules have been laid down in the United
Kingdom which may be of assistance in the working of the new
Constitution in British Guiana. In the United Kingdom, certain
easily identifiable forms of misconduct, e.g. disclosure of of-
ficial secrets and corruption generally, are the subject of le-
gislation (the Official Secrets Acts and the prevention of Cor-
ruption Acts). In addition, there is a code of ethics prescribed
by rules which have been laid down by successive Governments over
a long period. These rules are based on custom and usage of the
Constitution, and any serious infringement of them, even though
not punishable by law, would incur the drastic penalty of dismis-
sal from office, it may be appropriate, at this juncture in the
Colony's progress towards self-government, for me to give the
following summary of the rules which govern Ministerial conduct
in the United Kingdom:-
(a) All directorships held by Ministers must be resigned except
honorary directorships, directorships in connection with philan-
thropic undertakings and directorships in private companies which
deal wholly or mainly with family affairs or interests and are
not primarily engaged in trading. A similar rule applies in the
case of Ministers who hold official positions in trade unions.
(b) Ministers ought not to enter into any transactions whereby
their private pecuniary interest might, even conceivably, come
into conflict with their public duty.
(c) No Minister is justified in any circumstances, in using offi-
cial information that comes to him as a Minister, for his own
private profit or for that of this friends.
(d) No Minister ought to put himself, or allow himself to be put,
in a position to be tempted to use his official influence in sup-
port of any scheme or in furtherance of any contact in regard to
which he has an undisclosed private interest.
(e) No Minister ought to accept any kind of favour from persons
who are in negotiation with, or seeking to enter into contractual
or proprietary or pecuniary relations with the Government.
(f) Ministers should scrupulously avoid speculative investments
in securities as to which, from their position and their special
means of early or confidential information they have, or may
have, an advantage over other people in anticipating market
changes.
(g) Ministers should not practice journalism while holding of-
 233

f i c e . T h i s p r o h i b i t i o n does n o t , however, e x t e n d t o w r i t i n g s o f
a literary, historical, scientific, philosophical or romantic
character.
The above r u l e s a r e by no means e x h a u s t i v e , b u t t h e y s e r v e t o
i l l u s t r a t e t h e manner i n w h i c h , i n t h e U n i t e d Kingdom, t h e h o l d -
e r s o f h i g h p u b l i c o f f i c e i n t h e s e r v i c e o f t h e Crown a r e expec-
t e d and r e q u i r e d t o c o n d u c t t h e m s e l v e s ; and t h e y may be regarded
as ' r u l e s o f o b l i g a t i o n ' . There a r e , i n a d d i t i o n , c e r t a i n ' r u l e s
o f p r u d e n c e ' w h i c h have never been f o r m u l a t e d and which i t would
be v e r y d i f f i c u l t t o f o r m u l a t e i n p r e c i s e o r u n i v e r s a l t e r m s . One
o f t h e s e r u l e s , however, i s t h a t M i n i s t e r s s h o u l d c a r e f u l l y a v o i d
a l l t r a n s a c t i o n s such as t h e acceptance o f g i f t s o f s u b s t a n t i a l
v a l u e f r o m members o f t h e p u b l i c which can g i v e c o l o u r o r c o u n t e -
nance t o t h e b e l i e f t h a t t h e y a r e d o i n g a n y t h i n g which t h e ' r u l e s
of o b l i g a t i o n ' f o r b i d . 1

( c ) RESOLUTION OF THE STATE COUNCIL, 21 September 19532

Be i t r e s o l v e d That t h i s C o u n c i l views w i t h grave a n x i e t y t h e
p r e s e n t d i s a s t r o u s stoppage o f work on t h e sugar e s t a t e s a n d ,
w i t h o u t s e e k i n g t o pass judgement upon t h e m a t t e r i n d i s p u t e ,
urge a l l concerned t o renew t h e i r e f f o r t s t o end t h e s t r i k e , a
c o n t i n u a n c e o f which i n one o f t h e main i n d u s t r i e s i n t h e Colony
must i n e v i t a b l y have an adverse e f f e c t upon t h e g e n e r a l economy
and cannot f a i l t o cause p r i v a t i o n and s u f f e r i n g i n c r e a s i n g l y t o
thousands o f people and n o t l e a s t t o sugar w o r k e r s themselves and

1. But since the ministers acted as the opposition and concentrated on quasi-
Communist control of a l l independent boards, commissions and the c i v i l service
the r i c e farmers ( s e c u r i t y of tenure) b i l l sought to give Jagan extraordinary
powers and the labour r e l a t i o n s b i l l led to a general s t r i k e . When the speaker
ruled against Ashton Chase's move to suspend the r u l e s so t h a t h i s measure
could become law in a day, the P.P.P. member l e f t the chamber. In October
Welsh forces from Jamaica arrived. Savage declared a s t a t e of emergency under
the 4 October 1953 o r d e r - i n - c o u n c i l , dismissed the Council of People's minis-
t e r s and prorogued the l e g i s l a t u r e : (Lyttelton, 4 Oct; CO. 1031/1179). On 9
October i t was announced t h a t the c o n s t i t u t i o n would be suspended and a
commission of inquiry would i n v e s t i g a t e and recommend c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e v i s i o n .
The suspension was approved by the U.K. Parliament (see Hans. 518, 22 Oct.
1955). The reasons for the suspension on 8 October were given in P.P.1953/4
X (8980) (9274) p . 6 1 : the attempt of the P.P.P. to secure t o t a l control in a
one party government; the effective replacement of the executive council by
p r i o r Councils of People's M i n i s t e r s ; the creation of an atmosphere of
permanent c r i s i s , near revolution, mass meetings and intimidation. The
governor chose not to r e l y on h i s veto and c e r t i f i c a t i o n , but to suspend the
c o n s t i t u t i o n a f t e r 6 months of mob r u l e . In December 1953 he convened a wholly
nominated single-chamber legislature and an executive council of 3 ex officio
and 7 nominees (2 with m i n i s t e r i a l p o r t f o l i o s ) and embarked on a 5-year
development plan of some $66m. funded l o c a l l y , by a loan and Colonial Develop-
ment and Welfare g r a n t s . The P.P.P. had hoped, by d r a s t i c a l l y c u t t i n g police
appropriation, to force the governor to use h i s reserve power so t h a t they
would be provided with a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s s u e . The s p l i t between the Jagan and
Burnham factions of the P . P . P . , long predicted and foreseen by the Robertson
commission (P.P.1953/4 X (9274) pp.688-90), took place in February 1955.
2. CO. 1031/60 e n c l . Savage, 23 Sept. Ministers (esp. King) had urged an
immediate colony-wide strike (31 Aug. ibid.)
234

to t h e i r w i v e s and c h i l d r e n .
Further, this Council regrets the fact that certain Ministers
o f t h e Crown i n t h e C o l o n y have been a c t i v e l y engaged i n v a r i o u s
p a r t s o f t h e c o u n t r y i n p r o m o t i n g and s u s t a i n i n g t h e s t r i k e and
t h a t t h e y c o n t i n u e t o do s o .
And f u r t h e r , t h a t t h i s C o u n c i l h a v i n g b e e n c o n v i n c e d t h a t s u c h
action by Ministers of the Crown is a grave danger to the
C o n s t i t u t i o n , and a d i r e c t t h r e a t t o t h e peace ad s e c u r i t y o f t h e
c i t i z e n s o f t h e C o l o n y and a n e g a t i o n o f good and r e s p o n s i b l e
democratic government, respectfully ask His Excellency the
Governor without delay to request the Secretary of State after
d u e i n q u i r y t o t a k e s u c h a c t i o n a s he may deem f i t t o e n s u r e
c o n f i d e n c e i n t h e government and t h e p r o p e r and e f f i c i e n t w o r k i n g
of the constitution as promulgated by the Present Order-in-
C o u n c i l made o n t h e 1 s t d a y o f A p r i l 1 9 5 3 .

( d ) REPORT ON THE SUSPENSION OF THE CONSTITUTION, October 19531

[The c o n s t i t u t i o n o f A p r i l 1953 had been based on t h e Waddington r e -
p o r t , p r o v i d i n g u n i v e r s a l a d u l t s u f f r a g e , and a bicameral l e g i s l a t u r e ;
the appointment o f 6 members o f t h e Assembly as m i n i s t e r s w i t h d e p a r t -
mental r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , g i v i n g them a m a j o r i t y o f 2 i n t h e Executive
C o u n c i l , ' t h e p r i n c i p a l instrument o f p o l i c y ' , since i n e x c e p t i o n a l cases
the Governor was o b l i g e d t o c o n s u l t and accept t h e advice o f t h e C o u n c i l .
I n t h e A p r i l e l e c t i o n s t h e P.P.P. gained 51% o f votes cast and won 18 o f
t h e 24 s e a t s , thereby securing t h e r i g h t t o e l e c t 6 m i n i s t e r s and 2
members o f t h e S t a t e C o u n c i l . The P.P.P. had a m a j o r i t y on t h e E x e - c u t i v e
Council and i n t h e Assembly ( b u t not i n t h e State C o u n c i l ) and i n any
j o i n t session o f t h e two Houses.]

(i i ) A c t i v i t i e s of Ministers
The c o n d u c t o f M i n i s t e r s s h o w e d no c o n c e r n f o r t h e t r u e w e l f a r e
of the Colony and threatened its progress as an orderly state:
i t had s e r i o u s l y endangered t h e economic l i f e o f t h e c o u n t r y and
had set it on the road to collapse. Examples of this conduct
a r e : - ( i ) Fomenting o f s t r i k e s f o r p o l i t i c a l ends ( p a r a g r a p h s 15-
1 8 ) ; ( i i ) A t t e m p t i n g t o o u s t e s t a b l i s h e d t r a d e u n i o n s by l e g i s -
lative action (paragraph 19) ;2 (iii) Removal of the ban on the
e n t r y o f West I n d i a n c o m m u n i s t s ( p a r a g r a p h 8 ) ; ( i v ) I n t r o d u c t i o n
o f a b i l l t o r e p e a l t h e U n d e s i r a b l e P u b l i c a t i o n s O r d i n a n c e and
the flooding of the territory with communist literature (para-
g r a p h 8 ) ; ( v ) M i s u s e o f r i g h t s o f a p p o i n t m e n t t o B o a r d s a n d Com-
mittees (paragraph 13); (vi) Spreading of racial hatred (para-
graph 1 4 ) ; ( v i i ) Plan t o s e c u l a r i z e Church s c h o o l s and t o r e -
write textbooks to give them a political bias (paragraph 36);
( v i i i ) Neglect of t h e i r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e duties (paragraphs 22-23);
( i x ) Undermining of the l o y a l t y of the Police (paragraphs 9-11);
(x) Attempts to gain control of the Public Service (paragraph

1. P.P.1952-3 XXIII (8980) p.305 (presented to Parliament October 1953), a l s o

C O . 1031/343 and 1177; not r e a l l y a r e p o r t , but a c o l l e c t i o n of documents and
not signed. 2. See a l s o P.P. 1953-4 X (9274) p.655. The Manpower C i t i z e n ' s As-
s o c i a t i o n had been recognised as the sugar workers' union by the Sugar Produ-
c e r s A s s o c i a t i o n , but Dr. Lachhmansingh's Guiana I n d u s t r i a l Workers' Union had
the power and support to c a l l a successful s t r i k e which the P.P.P. m i n i s t e r s
termed a government s t r i k e which should be supported to back the P.P.P.
 235

12); ( x i ) Threats of violence (paragraphs 28-33).

Each one of these acts judged separately was serious enough,
and the cumulative e f f e c t was d i s a s t r o u s . Viewed i n the l i g h t of
the Communist connexions of M i n i s t e r s , t h e i r aim was unmistake-
able.
In the succeeding paragraphs the events of the period May-
September, 1953 are described roughly in chronological o r d e r . . . .
[On 17 June the P.P.P. refused to move a loyal Address to H.M. on the
introduction of the new constitution; the P.P.P. insisted on the with-
drawal of the ban on the entry of well-known West Indian Communists and
of Communist literature and proposed a b i l l to make officials actionable
for their execution of the Undesirable Publications Ordinance (1953); the
P.P.P. ministers intended to organise a People's Police, quoting Dr. Ja-
gan 'Comrades, in the past when we asked for bread we were given bullets
and those who fired at workers were honoured by the masters. But when the
P.P.P. gets into power the same bullets which were fired on those poor
people will be fired on our oppressors. We shall organise a Police Force;
i t will be known as the People's Police': (3 May) and encouraging discon-
tent and disaffection among the police which they sought to control.]

( v i ) Action by Her Majesty's Government

I t became clear by the end of September t h a t B r i t i s h Guiana was
f a c i n g a rapid d e t e r i o r a t i o n i n the e f f i c i e n c y of i t s administra-
t i o n in i t s economy and in i t s s e c u r i t y . This d e t e r i o r a t i o n
threatened not only public order, but the very l i v e l i h o o d of the
people. The Governor's reserve powers were c e r t a i n l y never i n t e n -
ded t o deal w i t h a s i t u a t i o n of t h i s k i n d , so t h a t e f f e c t i v e ac-
t i o n could not be taken w i t h i n the terms of the C o n s t i t u t i o n t o
remedy matters. A f t e r c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h the Governor, Her Majes-
t y ' s Government were driven r e l u c t a n t l y to the conclusion t h a t
the only course was t o take steps t o suspend the C o n s t i t u t i o n .
To have waited u n t i l f u r t h e r d e t e r i o r a t i o n in the s i t u a t i o n had
brought loss of life would have been a betrayal of Her Majesty's
Government's r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s .
Her Majesty's Government r e a l i s e d the g r a v i t y of t h i s step.
Some M i n i s t e r s had threatened violence and tension was great.
They and other extremists might have used t h i s occasion f o r s t i r -
r i n g up d i s o r d e r . Her Majesty's Government accordingly decided
to t r a n s f e r t o B r i t i s h Guiana the troops which were stationed in
Jamaica and B r i t i s h Honduras to support the s e c u r i t y forces and
to ensure the maintenance of order. In the event the action taken
by Her Majesty's Government was greeted with widespread r e l i e f
i n the Colony and there were no incidents beyond the general
strike which the P.P.P. Ministers are [sic] attempting to organ-
i s e . In the West Indies the u n o f f i c i a l members of several Execu-
t i v e Council and Committees have supported Her Majesty's Govern-
ment's a c t i o n . Strong c r i t i c i s m s of the P.P.P. by leaders of the
two p r i n c i p a l p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s in Jamaica have been published
in the Press.
Pending the making of the Order-in-Counci1 t o suspend the Cons-
t i t u t i o n P.P.P. M i n i s t e r s were deprived of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r de-
partment and steps were taken t o amend the C o n s t i t u t i o n so t h a t
the Governor, in exercising h i s powers, under the C o n s t i t u t i o n ,
was no longer obliged to act on the advice of Executive Coun-
cil...
236
(e) OLIVER LYTTELTON: SPEECH, 22 October 19531
The proposal to suspend the Constitution is indeed a grave
step. Viewed in any light, it is a setback to the principle upon
which all political parties in this House are agreed, namely,
that our colonial policy should be directed towards giving the
peoples in the Colonial Territories an increasing responsibility
for the management of their own affairs. We have readily done so
in many territories. To look no further than the West Indies, the
Constitutions based on universal adult suffrage in Trinidad, Bar-
bados and Jamaica, to quote three examples, show that the risks
taken were justified. That sense of responsibility upon which
alone these arrangements can take root and grow is becoming evi-
dent. .. . Risks are necessary in these matters unless the pace of
constitutional advance is to be altogether too pedestrian or is
to be too much out of harmony with the aspirations of these peo-
ple. But if we accept the corollary, which is that when events
have proved that the risks were unjustified, when events, as of-
ten happens in human affairs, have falsified our predictions and
dashed our hopes, we must be prepared to retrace our steps and
try something else, always keeping in mind the ultimate goal to
which our thoughts and policy should be directed....
The opinions which I have just expressed are widely held in the
West Indies by political leaders of parties of different politi-
cal complexions. I first quote Mr. Grantley Adams, 'Our experi-
ence of Jagan and his sympathisers leads us to feel certain that
social and economic progress in the British West Indies is much
more likely to be harmed by that sort of person than by the most
reactionary. However much we must regret suspension of any cons-
titution, we should deplore far more the continuance of a Govern-
ment that put Communist ideology before the good of the people.'
Mr. Bustamante, the Chief Minister in Jamaica, said: 'If British
Guiana were fighting for complete self-government within the
democratic nations I would have stood beside British Guiana, but
British Guiana today can get no sympathy from me - can get no
sympathy from the free-thinking world. I am sorry for the people
there. I am not sorry for the leaders. They are not leaders at
all. They do not know what they are doing'. Mr. Manley's party,
the P.N.P. [in opposition, declared] 'It was a betrayal of the cause
of colonial peoples the world over, and a reckless and stupid be-
trayal of those who voted for them'.
I think it very significant to notice that the P.P.P. leaders
have not yet appealed to public opinion in the West Indies where
they are known only too well. The appeal has been elsewhere.
At this point let me lay out two broad propositions which I
hope will have the consent of the House; that among the duties
that fall to the Government in this country and to the Secretary
of State for the Colonies there are two which are outstanding in
the political field. The first I have already touched upon. It
is to pursue a policy which gives an increasing share of respon-
sibility for their own affairs to the people of these Colonial
Territories. But the second one is no less important. It is that
Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Secretary

1. Hansard Comm. 518 2159-74. The Commons was debating H.M.'s G.'s suspension
of the constitution which was approved: the Lords gave approval on 28 October.
 237
of State for the Colonies have responsibility laid upon them by
this House, which they cannot set aside without the leave of this
House, to see that peace and order, good government and condi-
tions of social and economic advance are promoted....
Let me be quite clear. So long as Her Majesty's Government have
a responsibility to this House for the affairs of Colonial Terri-
tories, that is to say, before those territories gain complete
independence - and some may never be in the position to do so -
(Interruption) - some of them may never be in a position to do
so1 - (Hon. Members: Why?) - Hon. Members who follow these
affairs know that I am referring there to Colonies likely to be
permanently grant-aided2 - there are no means by which they can
lay aside their responsibilities for peace and order....
Today we must face the sad fact that constitutional advance in
British Guiana has failed, for the moment. The evidence of that
failure is set before the House in the White Paper [No.65d]. What
emerges, I suggest, is a coherent picture of Ministers, no doubt
largely dominated by Communist ideas, who gradually reduce gover-
nment to a farce, who are threatening the order of the Colony,
threatening the livelihood of its inhabitants, and undermining
not only its present economic stability but also all chances of
building it up.
Many of the statements that have been made, and indeed the mea-
sures that have been concerted, will appear to us literally inc-
redible, but they are unfortunately all part of the deadly design
to turn British Guiana into a totalitarian state dominated by
Communist ideas, whose whole political, industrial and social
life would be concentrated in the hands and in the power of one
party. Dr. Rita Hinden, a member of the Commission, I would men-
tion to Hon. Members opposite, which originally propounded this
Constitution, in a thoughtful article no longer ago than 17th
October, used these words: 'But one very disturbing thing emerged
when our Commission took its public evidence. The People's Prog-
ressive Party representatives and also the trade unions connected
with them who gave evidence had quite a different conception of
democracy from what we had. They interpreted democracy as what
I can only describe as 'one-party rule'.' She went on: 'They have
acted consistently with the theory they propounded to us. They
could now do what they wanted; they could override every obstacle
that impeded them; they could use their majority to alter the
processes of law to their convenience and thus eliminate all
trace of opposition. In other words, democratic institutions were
to be given by Britain as the stepping-stone to the totalitarian
state'....
I now turn to the subject of Communism. I do not want to recite
again the reasons set out in the White Paper upon which we base
our statement that the leaders of P.P.P. were dominated by Com-
munist ideas and were using all the standardised methods of Com-
munist penetration into the machinery of Government, the public
services, the police, the youth movements and the trade unions.
I suggest with great earnestness that any impartial reader of the
paragraph and appendix will see that these leaders looked for
their inspiration to the network of Communist organisations which

1. [No.127] 2. [See Vol.VII, No.l8d]

238
r e v o l v e round t h e W . F . T . U . , and i n t h e W . F . T . U . i t s e l f . I say t o
t h e House t h a t we a r e here f a c e d w i t h p a r t o f t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l
Communist c o n s p i r a c y . . . . Her M a j e s t y ' s Government a r e n o t p r e p a -
red t o t o l e r a t e t h e s e t t i n g up o f Communist s t a t e s i n t h e B r i t i s h
Commonwealth, and I have no d o u b t t h a t , i n t a k i n g up t h a t p o s i -
t i o n , we have t h e s u p p o r t o f t h e overwhelming m a j o r i t y o f t h e
people of t h i s country behind u s . . . .
[He dismissed a weekend speech of Aneurin Bevan that the P.M., Winston
Churchill, had ' l a i d down new principles for the B r i t i s h Commonwealth:
you are free to have whatever Government you l i k e as long as i t is the
kind of Government we l i k e ' . ]
It is necessary at this point...for me to say something about
the Governor's reserve powers. It is all the more necessary to
do so because an influential newspaper has suggested, as I think
the hon. Lady [Barbara Castle, Bevan's wife, had suggested that the reserve
powers were included 'for the express purpose' of dealing with such a
situation] did, that the Government of the Colony could have been
carried on, without suspending the Constitution, by the continu-
ing use of the Governor's reserve powers.
I think the House is entitled to ask me to explain Her Majes-
ty's Government's view on this point. What would have happened
if the Governor had attempted to carry on the present Constitu-
tion with the Ministers holding the offices from which they have
been dismissed, by the continuing use of his reserve powers? Un-
der those powers, the Governor could, in the interests of public
safety, public order, or good government, act contrary to the
advice of the Executive Council, provided that, except in urgent
cases, he secured the Secretary of State's prior approval. Simi-
larly he could ensure that a Bill which the Legislature had fail-
ed to pass should become law, provided that he had the approval
of the Executive Council, or, failing that, of the Secretary of
State. The Governor could also, in his absolute discretion, re-
fuse his assent to any Bill.
In fact, a study of these reserve powers will show hon. Mem-
bers, I believe, that they are intended to meet single and extra-
ordinary cases, and cannot in any way be deemed suitable for car-
rying on day-to-day government. What would have happened had they
been so continuously used? In the first place, there would have
been a constant clash with Ministers, making the ordinary proces-
ses of government impossible. There would have been an ever-inc-
reasing tension and risk of disorder. But, even more important,
if the Governor had attempted to carry on government by these
means, they would in fact, have by-passed all the provisions of
the constitution.
I do not consider, and I choose my words with the greatest
care, that it is constitutionally proper or seemly to set aside
the provisions of the Constitution by continuous use of the Go-
vernor's reserve powers when there is a Parliamentary procedure
by which the Constitution can be suspended....
I do not know of any legal or practical means by which we can
force Ministers to do their job. I am on another point of the
Amendment, and I claim that I am following the only responsible
course which one of Her Majesty's Ministers could pursue, in lay-
ing an Order-in-Counci1 before both Houses of Parliament which
de jure suspends the Constitution, and not attempting to suspend
it de facto by some juggling with the Governor's powers....
 239
[To a question why the Governor had not dissolved the Assembly and called
for new election, Lyttelton answered:] The Ministers did not advise
dissolution. That is the last thing they wanted to do. Some
strong reason would clearly have to be given for the Governor's
dissolving the Assembly contrary to their advice. This is a very
serious constitutional issue. The only reason that the Governor
could have given was that it was impossible to work with the
P. P. P. A statement of that kind would have meant a descent by the
Governor into the political arena with a vengeance. Hon. Members
have probably in mind the very severe consequences which have
occurred from the use of the power of dissolution in other parts
of the world, where the Governor publicly declared his support
of one lot of Ministers against another.1

(f) TEMPORARY CONSTITUTION ORDER-IN-COUNCIL, 22 December 19532

[From the date of this Order-in-Council Statutory Rules and Instruments
Nos. 586, 1478 and 1564 of 1953 should have no effect 'unless and until
Her Majesty, by Order-in-Council should otherwise provide'.]

Part II - The Executive Council

4. There shall be an Executive Council in and for the Colony
which shall consist of three ex officio Members and not more than
seven Nominated Members.
5. The ex officio Members of the Executive Council shall be the
Chief Secretary, the Attorney General and the Financial Secre-
tary.
6. The Nominated Members of the Executive Council shall be such
persons as the Governor, in pursuance of Instructions from Her
Majesty through a Secretary of State, shall appoint by Instrument
under the Public Seal: Provided that, after Part IV of this Order
comes into operation no person shall be appointed to be a Nomina-
ted Unofficial Member of the Council who is not a Nominated Unof-
ficial Member of the Legislative Council.
7.(1) Every Nominated Member of the Executive Council shall hold
his seat in the Council during Her Majesty's pleasure....
8.(1) The Governor, acting in his discretion, may, by Instrument
under the Public Seal, suspend any nominated Member of the Execu-
tive Council from the exercise of his functions as such; and
while such suspension is in force the person suspended shall not
sit in or take part in the proceedings of the Executive Council
.... [Such suspension would be reported, and subject to the final confirma-
tion of H.M. on the Secretary of State's advice.]
17.(1) The Governor may act in opposition to the advice given to
him by the Members of the Executive Council, if he shall in any
case consider it right so to do; but in any such case he shall
report the matter to the Secretary of State, at the first conven-
ient opportunity, with the reasons for his action.
(2) Whenever the Governor shall so act against the advice of
the Executive Council it shall be competent to any Member to
require that there be recorded upon the minutes any advice or
opinion he may give upon the question with the reasons therefor.

1. [Maybe the Byng-King incident: Vol.VI No.50]

2. Stat.R. No.1910. For four years B.G. was governed under this temporary
order, virtually a return to the constitution of 1943.
240
18. The Governor shall alone be entitled to submit questions to
the Executive Council, but if the Governor shall decline to sub-
mit any question to the Council when requested in writing by any
Member so to do, it shall be competent to such member to require
that there be recorded upon the minutes his written application,
together with the answer returned by the Governor thereto...
20. The Governor, acting in his discretion, may, by directions
in writing -
(a) charge any Member of the Executive Council with the responsi-
bility for any Department or subject; and
(b) revoke or vary any directions given under this section....
22. If the public officer who is for the time being head of any
Department shall, on any question relating to the administration
of the Department, disagree with the Member of the Executive
Council who is charged with the responsibility for the Depart-
ment, then -
(a) the said officer may submit to the Member a statement in wri-
ting of his reasons for disagreeing with the Member and of his
own recommendations on the question at issue;
(b) The Member shall send to the Governor's Secretary and Clerk
to the Executive Council a copy of such statement together with
any written statement which he himself may wish to make on the
question at issue; and
(c) the question shall be considered at a meeting of the Exe-
cutive Council and shall be disposed of as the Governor may
di rect....
Part III - Legislation enacted by the Governor
25.(1) Subject to the provisions of this Order, it shall be law-
ful for the Governor to make laws for the peace, order and good
government of the Colony....
26. Subject to the provisions of this Order, the Governor shall,
in the making of laws, conform as nearly as may be to the direct-
ions contained in any Instructions under Her Majesty's Sign Man-
ual and Signet which may from time to time be addressed to the
Governor in that behalf.
27.(1) Any law made by the Governor under the provisions of this
Order may be disallowed by Her Majesty through a Secretary of
State....
Part IV - Legislative Council
28. There shall be a Legislative Council in and for the Colony,
which shall consist of a Speaker, three ex officio Members and
not more than twenty-four Nominated Members.
29.(1) The Speaker shall be a person who is not an ex officio or
Nominated Member of the Legislative Council and who does not hold
any office of emolument under the Crown; and he shall be appoin-
ted by the Governor, acting in his discretion, by Instrument un-
der the Public Seal.
(2) The Speaker shall hold office during Her Majesty's
pleasure....
30. The ex officio Members of the Legislative Council shall be
the Chief Secretary, the Attorney General and the Financial
Secretary.
31.(1) The Nominated Members of the Council shall be such per-
sons, qualified in accordance with the provisions of this Order,
 241
as the Governor, acting in his discretion, shall appoint by Inst-
rument under the Public Seal.
(2) The Governor shall, without delay, report to Her Majesty,
through a Secretary of State, every appointment of any person as
a Nominated Member of the Council.
32. Subject to the provisions of section 33 of this Order, any
person who is a British subject of the age of twenty-one years
or upwards shall be qualified to be appointed a Nominated Member
of the Legislative Council, and no other person shall be quali-
fied to be so appointed or, having been so appointed, shall sit
or vote in the Council.
33. No person shall be qualified to be appointed a Nominated
Member of the Legislative Council, or, having been appointed
thereto, shall sit or vote in the Council, who at the time of
appointment -
(a) is by virtue of his own act, under any acknowledgement of
allegiance, obedience or adherence to a foreign Power or State;
or
(b) holds the office of Speaker; or
(c) is an undischarged bankrupt, having been adjudged or other-
wise declared bankrupt under any law in force in any part of Her
Majesty's dominions; or
(d) is a person adjudged to be of unsound mind or detained as a
criminal lunatic under any law in force in the Colony; or
(e) has been sentenced in any part of Her Majesty's dominions to
death or to imprisonment (by whatever name called) for a term
exceeding twelve months, and has not either suffered punishment
to which he was sentenced or such other punishment as may, by
competent authority have been substituted therefor, or received
a free pardon; or
(f) as, in the case of a Nominated Unofficial Member, a party to,
or a partner in a firm or director or manager of a company, which
is a party to, any contract with the Government of the Colony for
or on account of the public service, and has not disclosed to the
Governor the nature of such contract and his interest, or the in-
terest of any such firm or company, therein.
34.(1) Every Nominated Member of the Legislative Council shall
hold his seat in the Council during Her Majesty's Pleasure....
Part V - Legislation and procedure in Legislative Council
41. Subject to the provisions of this Order, it shall be lawful
for the Governor, with the advice and consent of the Legislative
Council, to make laws for the peace, order, and good government
of the Colony.
42. Subject to the provisions of this Order, the Governor and the
Council shall, in the transaction of business and the making of
laws, conform as nearly as may be to the directions contained in
any Instructions under Her Majesty's Sign Manual and Signet which
may from time to time be addressed to the Governor in that
behalf ....
44. The Governor may address the Legislative Council at any time
while it is in session after giving previous notice to the Spea-
ker or other Member presiding. . . . [Provision followed for the Governor
to address the Council, and for the transaction of business and the int-
roduction of bills &c. (§§44, 48); for the reserve powers of the Governor
(§50); for the privileges of the Council (§52); for prorogation (§55);
 242
for emergency powers (§56) and for H.M.'s power to amend (§58).]

66. ROYAL INSTRUCTIONS TO GOVERNOR SIR ALFRED SAVAGE, 22 December 19531

10. The Governor shall not, without having previously obtained
Our Instructions through a Secretary of State, enact any Ordi-
nance within any of the following classes, unless such Ordinance
shall contain a clause suspending the operation thereof until the
signification of Our pleasure thereon, that is to say -
(a) any Ordinance for the divorce of married persons;
(b) any Ordinance whereby any grant of land or money or other do-
nation may be made to himself;
(c) any Ordinance affecting the currency of the Colony or relat-
ing to the issue of bank notes;
(d) any Ordinance establishing any banking association or amend-
ing the constitution, powers or privileges of any banking asso-
ciation;
(e) any Ordinance imposing differential duties;
(f) any Ordinance the provisions of which shall appear to him to
be inconsistent with obligations imposed upon Us by treaty;
(g) any Ordinance the provisions of which shall appear to him to
be likely to be harmful or unfair to the Amerindians;
(h) any Ordinance whereby persons of any racial or religious com-
munity may be subjected or made liable to any disabilities or
restrictions to which- persons of other such communities are not
subjected or made liable or may be granted advantages which are
not enjoyed by persons of other such communities;
(j) any Ordinance affecting the discipline or control of Our
naval, military or air forces;
(k) any Ordinance of an extraordinary nature and importance
whereby Our prerogative, or the rights or property of Our sub-
jects not residing in the Colony, or the trade or transport or
communications of any part of Our dominions may be prejudiced.
(1) any Ordinance containing provisions which have been disal-
lowed by Us:
Provided that the Governor may, without such instructions, as
aforesaid and although the Ordinance contains no such clause as
aforesaid, enact any Ordinance falling within any of the clauses
described in this clause (except an Ordinance with any obliga-
tions imposed upon Us by treaty), if he shall have satisfied him-
self that an urgent necessity exists requiring that the Ordinance
be brought into immediate operation; but in any such case he
shall forthwith transmit to Us the Ordinance which he shall have
enacted together with his reasons for so enacting it.
11. The Governor shall not, without having previously obtained
Our instructions through a Secretary of State, assent to any Bill
within any of the following classes, unless such Bill shall con-
tain a clause suspending the operation thereof until the signifi-
cation of Our pleasure thereon....
13. When any Ordinance shall have been enacted, the Governor

1. Stat.R. 1953 Appendix. Savage foresaw a legal challenge to legislation

under this emergency order, questioning its validity on the basis of arguments
from Campbell v Hall [Vol.Ill, No.166] and Sammut v Strickland [Vol.VII, No.
80]; (to Lyttelton, 18 Dec. 1953: C O . 1031/321) but was told his doubts were
unfounded (22 Dec. ibid.).
 243
shall forthwith transmit to Us, through a Secretary of State, for
the signification of Our pleasure, a transcript in duplicate of
the Ordinance, duly authenticated under the Public Seal of the
Colony and by his own signature, together with an explanation of
the reasons and occasion for the enactment of the Ordinance....

67. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION: REPORT, 1 September 19541

Chapter 1 - Conclusions
To sum up, in trying to convey a general picture of the present
position in British Guiana, as we have seen it during our enquir-
ies, we cannot but stress as main features the difficult and un-
promising nature of this country: the undoubted dissatisfaction
and 'frustration' of the people generally at their social and
economic environment: and their strong desire to speedy changes
and improvements. We must couple with this the past attempts,
some successful and some unsuccessful, to develop the country and
to safeguard its assets. We were impressed by the friendliness
and cheerfulness of people we met, but also by their naivete' and
lack of appreciation of the economic realities of the situation
. . . .

Chapter 2 - The Waddington Constitution

[They had to consider how reasonable it was for the People's Progress-
ive Party, fresh from success at the polls, to frustrate the fulfilment
of the policies which the Waddington commissioners intended.]
These powers (the executive powers available under the Consti-
tution) reposed essentially in the Executive Council which com-
prised a majority of elected ministers. The Governor was bound,
in the normal exercise of his duties, to consult with the Council
and to act in accordance with its advice, and the Constitution
provided that it should be the 'principal instrument of policy'.
The Council was thus the forum in which policy and all matters
of importance in the executive and legislative fields were dis-
cussed and settled. The P.P.P., having a clear majority in the
House of Assembly, was able to elect six of its number to the
ministerial posts in the Council and to dominate its proceedings.
The three official members and the Minister without Portfolio
chosen by the State Council could, of course, seek to influence
matters in discussion, but their advice could be ignored by the
elected Ministers who by their voting strength could decide every
issue as they wished. In executive matters such decisions were
final and, as we shall see, the enactment of any legislative mea-
sure decided upon in Council could be checked finally only by the
interposition of the Governor's veto after passage through both
houses. Thus, unless the Governor used the powers reserved to
him, the Ministers were in control of the effective policy-making
body and were virtually the Government. Under the Constitution
Ministers could be removed from the Executive Council only by
resolution of the Council itself upon the proposal of the Gover-

1. P.P.1953-4 X (9274) p.653. Though some P.P.P. sympathisers gave evidence,

the P.P.P. officially boycotted this commission: allegedly because its terms
seemed to imply a more restricted constitution and its membership was not
impartial. The commissioners however dismissed these reasons: the P.P.P. would
be embarrassed by having to answer questions on its purpose and behaviour.
244
nor1 or by resolution of the House of Assembly supported by at
least two-thirds of the members. The elected Ministers were,
therefore, in an impregnable position so long as party solidarity
continued.
The allocation of Portfolios to the Ministers (and their with-
drawal) was a matter for the Governor in his discretion, but in
fact Dr. Jagan, the Leader of the House, was consulted before-
hand. It follows from the previous paragraph that Ministers could
secure the endorsement of the Executive Council for such policies
as they proposed for the departments under their charge. Their
power to secure the observance of any directions they might give
to the heads of departments for the execution of their policies
was circumscribed only by the provision in the Constitution which
laid down that any disagreement between a Minister and a head of
department should be considered in Executive Council and disposed
of as the Governor might direct. No such disagreement was refer-
red to the Executive Council.
It was true that a number of important departments and subjects
were the responsibility of the three official members and thus
not susceptible to day-to-day control by the elected Ministers.
These subjects were not however 'reserved' in the constitutional
sense; that is to say, they were not the exclusive responsibility
of the official members, or subject to special control by the
Governor - except that control of the Public Service was vested
in the Governor, acting in his discretion. It appeared from what
happened that matters affecting official members' portfolios
could be raised by elected Ministers, discussed and decided as
they wished. For example, although immigration and internal secu-
rity were the responsibility of the Chief Secretary, the P.P.P.
Ministers insisted on the removal of the ban on the entry into
the Colony of certain well-known West Indian communists.
In the Legislature it was provided, as the Waddington Commis-
sion had recommended, that the elective chamber - the House of
Assembly - should have the primacy. Here, as we have seen, the
P. P. P. had control by virtue of its majority and the elected
Ministers could rely on the passage by the House of such legisla-
tion as they might introduce in pursuance of decisions reached
in Executive Council. The presence in the House of the three ex
officio members, and the appointment by the Governor in his dis-
cretion of a Speaker from outside it, were objected to by the
Party but cannot properly be said to have constituted an impedi-
ment to its wi11.
It was true that the State Council could impose some check on
measures coming forward from the lower house. This is, however,
the normal and proper function of the upper house in any bicame-

1. Here the report noted that 'This is the view upon which Her Majesty's
Government acted and to which they adhered in the debate in the House of
Commons on the 7th December, 1953, when some Members suggested that under
Section 11 of the British Guiana Constitution Order-in-Council, 1953, the
Governor could have removed a Member of the Executive Council at his
discretion without the approval of the Council. In any case, even if the
Governor had been able to remove a Minister, the House of Assembly acting in
accordance with Section 12 of the Order-in-Council could at once have re-
elected him. '
 245
ral legislature and is not peculiar to colonial constitutions The
delaying powers of the State Council were in fact no greater than
those usually accorded to the upper chamber of a bicameral legis-
lature in a fully developed democratic community. Moreover, no
money bill could be originated in the State Council, and the Co-
uncil could not proceed upon any measure affecting public funds
without the consent of the Governor, who in this matter was cons-
titutionally bound to consult with the Executive Council.
The provision in the Constitution whereby the Governor in his
discretion could summon joint sessions of both houses to consider
measures of major concern which had been passed by one chamber
but rejected by the other was not used. It is clear, however,
that it could have imposed no check on the P.P.P. so far as votes
go, since, with the assistance of its two nominees in the State
Council, it would have commanded a majority in joint session.
Indeed, the device would have operated to the Party's advantage
since in joint session it could have insisted upon the passage
of any measure which had been rejected by the State Council and
thus have obviated the delay of three months or a year which
might otherwise have been imposed. There can be no doubt that the
P.P.P. Ministers would have pressed the Governor very strongly
to summon a joint session to consider any important Government
measure rejected by the State Council, and on crucial issues his
refusal to do so would probably have precipitated a constitu-
tional crisis.
In the above examination of the Constitution we have not
thought it necessary to refer at each point to the powers reser-
ved to the Governor, in both the executive and legislative
fields, and the overriding powers of the Crown. These powers ad-
mittedly incompatible with fully responsible self-government are
nevertheless necessary so long as that goal has still to be rea-
ched and ultimate responsibility for the welfare of a territory
and its people remains with Her Majesty's Government. In point
of fact in British Guiana during the period up to the suspension
of the Constitution no recourse was made to the Governor's reser-
ved powers and there can, therefore, be no suggestion that the
P.P.P. was goaded by their use into extreme paths.
On close examination of the Constitution, therefore, we do not
find its provisions, taken singly or in combination, irksome or
such as would in practice render them unworkable. 'Checks and ba-
lances' - a much overworked phase in British Guiana - were cer-
tainly included in it, but none of these were in themselves so
severe as to prevent a party, which was prepared to work the Con-
stitution constructively, from carrying out a programme of radi-
cal social reform....

Chapter 3 - The Elections

With regard to the method of election, it was held by many wit-
nesses that the system whereby a party suypported by 51 per cent.
of those who actually voted, and bny only 37 per cent, of the
whole electorate, obtained 75 per cent, of the seats in the House
of Assembly was far from stisfactory, and it was suggested that
some form of proportional representation should be adopted in
future. We would not pretend to have studied in any detail the
many different electoral systems which exist elsewhere, such as
the second ballot, the alternative vote and the various forms of
246
proportional representation. The merits and demerits of these
sytems may be argued extensively on both theoretical and prac-
tical grounds. So far as we are aware, however, until the 1953
elections there was no substantial body of opinion in British
Guiana in favour of a change in the present system - of the
simple election of a single member for each constituency - on the
ground that the system is unsuited to the circumstances of the
country; and we ourselves would hesitate to support a proposal
based on an assumption of that kind. Certainly no convincing case
for a change can be argued from the results of a single general
election and if some system of proportional representation were
not introduced it could hardly be represented as other than a
device to mitigate the present dominance of the P.P.P. To
enshrine in a constitution such a device would in our view be
wrong and we, therefore, recommend no change in the present
electoral system....

Chapter 4 - The Public Service

Until 1953 there had been no ministerial system in British Gui-
ana and the administrative functions of government had been car-
ried out under the Governor alone. We do not think that the int-
roduction of a ministerial system into the organisation and the
development of ministerial responsibility and initiatives for po-
licy could have been affected even in the most favourable circum-
stances without some friction and disorganisation.
The British conception of the Civil Service as a body of state
officials outside politics, carrying out the policy decided by
political ministers, but themselves free of all political influ-
ences, is obviously an ideal to be arrived at rather than a conc-
lusion which can be automatically achieved. In order to assist
the Colonial territories in working towards this ideal, it has
become customary to appoint a Public Service Commission in each
territory to ensure against political influence in appointments,
promotions, dismissals and discipline in the Public Service. In
British Guiana the Constitutional Order-in-Council of the 1st
April, 1953, gave the Governor discretionary powers in all mat-
ters concerning the Public Service Commission to advise him on
them.
This provision was the subject of sustained criticisms by the
elected Ministers who saw in it a formidable brake upon their
power and attacked it publicly. Mr. King (Minister of Communica-
tions and Works) in Thunder (May issue, 1953) advocated 'agita-
tion for ultimate democratic control of the Public Service'; Mr.
Martin Carter (a P.P.P. Executive Committee member), writing in
the June issue of the same periodical, said: 'This Public Service
Commission is nothing but the body which controls the State. This
Public Service Commission is not controlled by the representa-
tives of the people.... Although the P.P.P. has won the majority
of the seats at the last General Election, and, allegedly cont-
rols the Government yet staff and state power still remain in the
hands of those who have ruled us for centuries', and Dr. Jagan
in a speech on the 26th July, said: 'They have appointed a Civil
Service Commission because they do not want us to have anything
to do with the appointment of civil servants. We would like to
have power to appoint our own people, who would be able to do our
work.'
 247
It is clear to us that the P.P.P. Ministers either intentional-
ly or in ignorance quite failed to appreciate the purpose of the
Commission and had they remained longer in power, these threats
against the Public Service Commission would have become more in-
sistent. Indeed the Ministers had made clear their intention of
refusing to vote the necessary financial provision.
It may well be that some senior officials were unsympathetic
to the policies of the Party and there is no doubt that the Mini-
sters genuinely suspected the loyalty of some officials working
in close association with them.1 In the atmosphere of mutual su-
spicion which arose in the Executive Council between the ex offi-
cio Ministers and the elected Ministers it became impossible for
what otherwise would have been treated as ordinary staff diffi-
culties to be adjusted in friendly discussion between the Chief
Secretary and the individual Minister concerned. The Chief Secre-
tary and Heads of Departments were suspicious of the interest
which P.P.P. Ministers were showing in civil service matters and
of the reason why they did not always work through the proper
departmental channels. The P.P.P. Ministers were inclined to take
action without any departmental consultation, and indeed we had
evidence of occasions when they completely ignored the heads of
departments or without their knowledge took junior officials into
consultation on matters of departmental policy. The Minister of
Education, for example, decided, and announced his intention, to
abolish the system of dual control of denominational schools
without prior consultation or discussion with the Director of
Education, and the Minister of Labour gave the Commissioner of
Labour only a few hours notice of his intention to introduce the
Labour Relations Bill in the Executive Council.

MAIN ISSUES WHICH AROSE

Payment of Salaries to Members of the State Council
The Waddington Commission had recommended that members of the
State Council should not receive salaries as such but only expen-
ses. As against this the former Governor, in his comments on the
Waddington Report, had said that members of the State Council
should be renumerated on the same scale as members of the House
of Assembly. The Secretary of State for the Colonies (then Mr.
James Griffiths) had agreed with the former Governor's view. The
previous Legislative Council had accordingly voted a sufficient
sum in the 1953 Estimates to cover payment of salaries to members
of both Houses, but since no specific authority for the payment
had been included in the Constitution Order-in-Council it was
necessary for special legislation to be enacted by the new Legis-
lature. In this way the issue came up for decision. In the Execu-
tive Council the Minister without Portfolio urged that salaries
should be paid to State Council members (of which he was one,
though as Minister he was not financially affected by the propo-
sal), but the P.P.P. Ministers would not agree to this. Their
view were sustained by the Executive Council, and the Minister
without Portfolio was alone in dissenting from the proposal not

1. There was quite understandable suspicion among some officials, for the
antics of the P.P.P.were of course alien to the accepted British traditions
of cabinet government.
248

t o i n c l u d e p r o v i s i o n f o r t h e payment o f s a l a r i e s t o S t a t e C o u n c i l
members i n a B i l l d e a l i n g w i t h t h e payment o f r e m u n e r a t i o n and
subsistence allowances, etc. to members of the legislative
bodies.
When t h i s B i l l came b e f o r e t h e House o f Assembly t h e t h r e e o f -
f i c i a l M i n i s t e r s v o t e d w i t h t h e P . P . P . m a j o r i t y . The S t a t e Coun-
c i l never d e a l t w i t h t h e B i l l as s u c h : i t d i d , however, debate
a m o t i o n moved by t h e M i n i s t e r w i t h o u t P o r t f o l i o , who was a l s o
P r e s i d e n t o f t h e C o u n c i l , recommending t h a t Government s h o u l d
i n t r o d u c e l e g i s l a t i o n a u t h o r i s i n g t h e payment o f r e m u n e r a t i o n t o
S t a t e C o u n c i l l o r s on t h e same s c a l e as Members o f t h e House o f
Assembly:1....
[The Undesirable Publications (Prohibition of Importation) b i l l (passed
in February 1953 by the previous Legislative Council) had enabled the Ex-
ecutive Council to forbid the importation of l i t e r a t u r e i t regarded as
undesirable: Lionel Luchoo had i n i t i a t e d the measure, being concerned at
the quantity of Communist material Imported and distributed by the P.P.P.
The P.P.P. ministers were now determined on i t s Immediate repeal: and
there was no opposition from the o f f i c i a l s when that was proposed in the
Executive Council. But the b i l l Included a clause declaring retrospec-
t i v e l y that seizures had never been validated and the Comptroller of Cus-
toms, who had confiscated Jagan's importation, had therefore no immunity
to action in the courts - which the A.G. found I l l e g a l l y improper and the
State Council deleted from the b i l l - an amendment rejected by the P.P.P.
majority in the Assembly.
To ensure security of tenure to rice farmers and prevent landlords inc-
reasing rents the existing law had been considered Inadequate and out-of-
date and a committee of the previous Legislative Council had been appoin-
ted to enquire. The P.P.P. ministers now decided without waiting for that
report or consulting the Rice Producers' Association. Their R1ce Farmers
(Security of Tenure) Amendment b i l l proposed to enable the minister (Ja-
gan) through D i s t r i c t Commissioners t o demand Improvements from landlords
which, i f not done at once, the Commissioners would authorise and the
cost assessed against the landlords by summary action (parate execution)
under Roman-Dutch law which might mean a forced sale of the property. The
o f f i c i a l ministers did not oppose the general Intention of the measure
but objected to the authorisation of D i s t r i c t Commissioners to act a r b i t -
r a r i l y and to the threat of 'parate execution'. By the time the b i l l was
considered by the State Council the drought, which 1n August had been the
excuse, was at an end. The amendment could have been used to dispossess
landlords. The o f f i c i a l s did not vote against the b i l l as a whole but ab-
stained on these relevant sub-clauses.] We c a n n o t , t h e r e f o r e , see
i n t h e a t t i t u d e o f t h e o f f i c i a l M i n i s t e r s t o w a r d s t h i s measure
any e v i d e n c e o f p o l i t i c a l h o s t i l i t y ; r a t h e r does i t seem t o us
t h a t i n endeavouring i n the Executive Council t o guide the P.P.P.
M i n i s t e r s i n t h e s e d i r e c t i o n s t h e y were d o i n g e x a c t l y what t h e y
were intended to do, i.e. to try to stop the inexperienced elec-
t e d M i n i s t e r s f r o m making s e r i o u s b l u n d e r s . . . . [The Amendment b i l l
was rejected by 6 to 2 in the State Council.
The o f f i c i a l s recognised that the wartime law r e s t r i c t i n g the right of
workers 1n essential services from s t r i k i n g needed revision, perhaps
along the lines of U.K. law requiring 10 days notice, but they opposed

1. The officials clearly accepted the conventions of collective responsibil-

ity, but i t would seem that this minister in the State Council did not.
 249
the simple repeal advocated by the P.P.P. This was not evidence of o f f i -
cial hostility to the P.P.P. but of the recklessness of P.P.P. minis-
ters.] The a t t i t u d e of the o f f i c i a l M i n i s t e r s i s t o us e v i -
dence only of t h e i r determination t o do t h e i r duty as respon-
s i b l e o f f i c i a l s and members of the Executive Council even in the
face of the tremendous pressure t h a t was being exerted upon them
in the Executive Council and i n p u b l i c at t h a t time. . . . [The Repeal
b i l l was introduced in the Assembly but overtaken by the suspension of
the constitution.
The P.P.P. manifesto had indicated that in view of 'the multiplicity
of trades unions' (to which Jagan had drawn attention in July 1952),
legislation based on the Wagner Act in the U.S. would require employers
to negotiate only with unions which had 'the confidence of the majority
of workers'. Ashton Chase (Minister of Labour) sought on 22 September to
suspend the rules so that a measure could be enacted within a day. The
draft b i l l would have enabled the minister] t o decide by himself
whether any p a r t i c u l a r b a l l o t should cover a whole industry or
service or merely a section of i t or simply a s i n g l e undertaking
or only a p a r t of an undertaking, and to decide also whether a l l
the separate categories of workers i n any p a r t i c u l a r i n d u s t r y ,
etc. should be lumped together f o r the purpose of the b a l l o t or
should vote s t r i c t l y according t o some d i v i s i o n r e l a t e d t o c r a f t
or s t a t u s as determined by him. Any trade u n i o n i s t w i l l see at
once t h a t w i t h such powers a M i n i s t e r would be able, i f he was
so minded, t o ensure i n the great m a j o r i t y of cases t h a t the r e -
s u l t of a b a l l o t was a foregone conclusion. Again, the B i l l p r o -
vides for the appointment by the Minister of ad hoc committees
t o consider a p p l i c a t i o n s from trade unions or employers f o r an
enquiry t o be held under i t s p r o v i s i o n s . But, i n a d d i t i o n to the
power of the M i n i s t e r t o s e l e c t the members of the committees,
the B i l l also empowers him t o dispense w i t h a committee i n any
p a r t i c u l a r case and without a formal enquiry t o d i r e c t t h a t a
b a l l o t s h a l l be t a k e n . . . . 1
. . . . We were given d i r e c t evidence of several instances of
stone throwing and of steps taken by shopkeepers t o p r o t e c t t h e i r
property. Moreover i t i s impossible t o discount the evidence of
witnesses who told [sic] us of ugly incidents in which they them-
selves had been concerned w i t h P.P.P. supporters and of remarks
made t o them or in t h e i r hearing about what would soon happen t o
the ' w h i t e s ' ; a l l t h i s goes t o show t h a t the general s i t u a t i o n
was d e t e r i o r a t i n g very r a p i d l y and t h a t i t might at any time have
got completely out of hand.
We have no doubt t h a t the insolence shown by P.P.P. M i n i s t e r s
towards the Governor and the ex officio Ministers had a bad ef-
f e c t upon the general p o s i t i o n i n the colony. Whatever the real
i n t e n t i o n s of the P.P.P. leaders, i f they did not d e l i b e r a t e l y
i n c i t e the people t o violence they were c e r t a i n l y not w i l l i n g t o
go out of t h e i r way t o discourage violence i f i t should develop

1. The fact was t h a t the o f f i c i a l union recognised by the Sugar Producers'

Association long before the formation of Dr. Lachhmansingh's Guiana I n d u s t r i a l
Workers' Union was weak while the l a t t e r showed i t could paralyse the
industry. There was however the p o s s i b i l i t y of a compromise settlement by the
M.P.C.A. and G.W.I.U. which the party extremists feared and sought to prevent
by an immediate s t r i k e .
250
more or less spontaneously. In our view it had become necessary
to resolve the impossible position that had developed in the Ex-
ecutive Council, to put an end to the general anxiety and uncer-
tainty in the Colony and in one way or another to remove the dis-
tinct danger of real trouble. The question as to whether this
could have been done by measures short of suspension of the Con-
stitution is one that was fully debated in the British House of
Commons. Insofar as the answer to the question involves consider-
ation of the various powers open to the Governor under the Cons-
titution Order-in-Council, we do not think that we can add much
to the Commons' debate. What we can say is that the fear of vio-
lence was real enough, that the Executive Council had come no-
where near to fulfilling its constitutional role and that if
there was no certain way of resolving the situation short of sus-
pension of the Constitution, then there was no option but to sus-
pend the Constitution....
We are, therefore, driven to the conclusion that so long as the
P.P.P. retains its present leadership and policies there is no
way in which any real measure of responsible government can be
restored without the certainty that the country will again be
subjected to constitutional crisis.

68. PHILIP ROGERS TO GOVERNOR SIR ALFRED SAVAGE, 14 December 19541

[There were more objections to his wish to increase the number of
nominated ministers with portfolios: 1t might reflect on the number of
portfolios in other W.I. colonies, but that was not important.]
There is I think disagreement between us on a fundamental as-
pect of this problem. In your telegram Personal No. 109 you say
that the most important reason for your proposals is a political
one: in brief, that the further development of the ministerial
system - virtually its restoration in the form adopted under the
Waddington Constitution - would demonstrate to the people that
political evolution is being encouraged during the period of
'marking time'. I am afraid that we do not share the view, imp-
licit in this, that the Interim Government can become a substi-
tute for a responsible Government, drawing its strength from a
representative legislature, or that by approximating its form to
that of the Executive Council of last year the people will credit
it with political substance. On the contrary, we believe that
there can be no disguising (indeed that there is no advantage in
seeking to disguise) the fact that during this period ultimate
control will be in official hands and that the members of the
Legislative and Executive Councils are nominated advisers who
cannot claim any sort of political standing. Indeed, if there is
a political angle to the problem we think it is a risk that the
public will resent what may be regarded as an attempt to endow

1. C O . 1031/1357. Savage had wished to increase the number of portfolios under

the temporary constitution in an attempt to make government more representa-
tive by involving more interests and sections of the community including
opposition members of the previous assembly and State council. The P.P.P. had
miscalculated believing Savage would have to rely entirely on his reserve
power and thus giving them a constitutional cause. But though Savage failed
to secure a united moderate front against the P.P.P., the split between Jagan
and Burnham, long foreseen, was imminent.
 251
yet more of the nominated unofficials with ministerial status to
which they could hardly aspire under a democratic constitution.
In our view the Interim Government should devote itself essen-
tially to efficient progressive administration, the vigorous car-
rying out of the development plan in a determination to procure
for the people some at least of the improvement of conditions
which the P.P.P. promised, but so badly failed to achieve. The
political education of the people must in our view be pursued
through other means, e.g. local government reform, than the buil-
ding up of the political reputation of the unofficial members of
the Interim Government. In so far as the latter is important it
seems to us that it is only in this way - by handing over to its
successors an improved and more efficient organisation with a re-
cord of solid progress - that those members of the Interim Gover-
nment who may in future face the electorate can hope to gain
political advantage. We therefore feel strongly that the over-
riding need at the present time is to strengthen and improve the
efficiency of the machinery of government, and that the test -
the sole test - to be applied to any changes in the Ministerial
system is whether they will assist this end.
Looking at the matter from this point of view, we are very
doubtful indeed whether there is advantage to be gained in inc-
reasing the number of portfolios to six. In fact, we believe it
would be positively disadvantageous. We recognise that perhaps
one Minister at any rate may be overburdened and certainly that
there is need for Ministers to get out more in the country and
see on the ground the problems with which they are concerned. We
do not believe, however, that the mere increase of portfolios
outside the ex officio ones is the way to cope with this problem.
It is worth recalling, for example, that the Gold Coast under the
1954 Constitution has managed with 8 unofficial Ministers (in
addition to 3 officials) to run a country with ten times the po-
pulation of British Guiana and an infinitely more complex social
organisation. The reason is, quite simply, that the Gold Coast
had and has an efficient and well-manned civil service, and it
is here, we believe, that the real clue to the problem lies. Cer-
tainly before coming ourselves to the reimposition of all the
ministerial top hamper of last year, we must make sure that there
is the backing of an effective administrative organisation, and
it is here that we are most doubtful about your proposal. The
addition of two Ministers (and incidentally if they are to be
increased we feel strongly that at least one should be an offi-
cial...) would, quite apart from additional expenditure, merely
increase the strain on an already inadequate administrative
machine.
We believe that the right approach to this problem lies in
improving, in the first instance, the status and calibre of those
appointed to discharge the duties of Permanent Secretaries in the
Ministries. In most Colonial territories where, as in British
Guiana, political advance has reached the point at which Minis-
ters take direct responsibility for the Departments within their
portfolios, it has been laid down that the Permanent Secretary
should be the senior Official Adviser to the Minister and respon-
sible, under him, for the supervision of departments within the
portfolio. From this it has followed that the Permanent Secre-
taries should be senior to, and the normal channel for communica-
252
tions from Heads of Departments. Heads of Departments continue,
of course, to be responsible to the Minister for the administra-
tion of their departments, and for the tendering of professional
or technical advice on matters falling within their scope. Nor-
mally the Head of Department would do his business with the Per-
manent Secretary, but he would have the right of personal access
to the Minister.
We think that a mistake was pretty certainly made in British
Guiana last year, when the new Constitution was introduced, in
endeavouring to work the new arrangements on a cheap basis. We
are learning all the time, and the lesson of our recent experi-
ences in many parts of the world is that the success or failure
of constitutional experiments depends at least as much on the
general efficiency and stability of the civil service organisa-
tion as upon whether the people are 'ready for self-government',
whatever that may mean. As we understand it, each of the elected
Ministers (with the exception of the Minister of Local Government
and Social Welfare, for whom special arrangements were made) was
given a separate ministerial staff, headed by a Permanent Secre-
tary whose duty it was 'to advise the Minister on all questions
of policy coming within the scope of the Ministry's responsibil-
ity, to assist in the formulation of policy, to ensure that deci-
sions of policy are transmitted to the proper quarter for execu-
tion, and to keep the Minister informed of the progress made in
translating such decisions into action*. This sounds all right,
but the officers appointed to these posts were either Principal
Assistant Secretaries (salary £1,100) or Assistant Secretaries
(salary £750-£1,000) and they were clearly junior in status and
seniority to all the important Heads of Departments with whom
they would have to deal. Moreover, the officers selected were far
from being in the top flight - the salaries offered would not
have allowed of that. It was laid down that a Head of Department
was to be the Minister's Adviser on professional or technical
matters falling within his scope and he too had the duty of as-
sisting the Minister in the formulation of policy. It was, so far
as I can gather, by no means clear what authority, if any, Perma-
nent Secretaries were to have in relation to Heads of Depart-
ments, and we doubt whether you can expect to build on such a
basis a proper ministerial system. Permanent Secretaries in these
conditions either will be no more than glorified chief clerks or
private secretaries, leaving the whole burden of administration
to be carried by their Ministers; or those of them who have the
ability to do the job as it should be done, and who try to recon-
cile perhaps opposing views of different Heads of Departments
within the Portfolio so as to submit useful and conclusive offi-
cial advice to which a Minister will pay attention, will almost
inevitably suffer from the lack of necessary authority. This
system, with its inherent weakness, has continued, so far as
three out of the four existing portfolios are concerned.
We feel that the opportunity given during the period of the
Interim Government should be seized to find out by experiment
what in the circumstances of the Colony is the best way of
adapting the administrative machine to a ministerial system. On
the face of it the courses open to us seem to be either to
appoint Permanent Secretaries of status and ability so that they
can make a positive and proper contribution to the working of the
 253
system, or to abolish them altogether and leave Heads of
Departments to function as Permanent Secretaries. There is indeed
much to be said for the latter arrangement when it is a case of
one Minister one Department and I know, of course, that you
yourself have adopted it, since the suspension of the Constitu-
tion, in the case of the Department of Education. It is not so
easy when a Minister is in charge of more than one Department,
especially when the nature of those differs widely, and although
in some instances this system is working well (e.g. in Jamaica
the Director of Education is also Permanent Secretary to the
Minister of Education and Social Welfare), the right solution in
this kind of case is pretty certainly the appointment of an
administrative Permanent Secretary.
I am afraid all this sounds rather dogmatic, and you may well
have some comments from your greater knowledge of the local
situation. I hope, however, that we can carry you with us in the
conclusion that the proper course is to build up, while we are
in a position to do so, an efficient administrative machine to
support the Ministry, and that this will mean the importation of
a sufficient member {sic} of trained Permanent Secretaries from
elsewhere at salaries which will attract and retain men of the
right type and experience. With this in mind we have drawn out
a possible scheme, which I enclose. Let me emphasise however that
the purpose of this letter is not to advocate a cut and dried
plan of this or of any kind, and that the scheme is put forward
only in case it may be of help, and as an illustration of some
of the points which we have in mind. As you will see, it involves
the creation of three large portfolios (apart from the ex officio
portfolios) each comprising a number of cognate departments and
subjects. Each of these portfolios would be held by a Minister
who would be assisted by a Junior Minister. They would each have
a Permanent Secretary of the kind referred to at the beginning
of this paragraph, supported by an adequate establishment of
junior officers. Under this arrangement it would not be necessary
to introduce more than three new Permanent Secretaries, and it
would be possible to concentrate our resources on ensuring that
they were really first-class men. They would certainly need to
be paid at least as much as, and preferably rather more than,
your senior Heads of Departments. Such an arrangement, it seems
to us, would have several advantages. Among other things, it
should be possible, under this system, to harness the able and
less able of your unofficials in pairs, thus making the best use
of available talent. (It would not necessarily follow that all
three Junior Ministers should be selected from among members of
the Executive Council.) It should also be easier for Ministers
to leave the desk work to the civil servants whose job it is, and
to get around the country and speak authoritatively to the local
people about a wide range of Government activity.
If this scheme or one on these lines were to be agreed as the
objective, it would probably be desirable to start it off on an
experimental basis with one Senior Member assisted by a Junior
Member, and to leave the appointment of the other two senior
members over for further consideration after experience has been
gained. To go for the full-blown scheme at the outset would
hardly be justifiable in view of the dislocation and the
expenditure involved until we had some experience of its
254

suitability on a smaller scale, especially in view of the

o b j e c t i o n t h a t may be t a k e n t o t h e i m p o r t a t i o n o f men f r o m t h e
Overseas S e r v i c e t o r e i n f o r c e your S e c r e t a r i a t c a d r e . On t h i s ,
however, our p r e s e n t f e e l i n g i s t h a t such i m p o r t a t i o n s a r e g o i n g
t o be n e c e s s a r y i n any c a s e . Both t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Commission
and the recent Medical Enquiry Committee have pointed to
s h o r t c o m i n g s i n t h e P u b l i c S e r v i c e and we have g o t t o do
s o m e t h i n g about i t . I know t h a t you have made a s t a r t by c r e a t i n g
four a d m i n i s t r a t i v e cadetships f o r local graduates, but i t w i l l
be a l o n g t i m e b e f o r e you reap any s u b s t a n t i a l b e n e f i t f r o m t h i s ,
and what we a r e concerned a b o u t i s t h e n e x t two o r t h r e e y e a r s
w h i c h a r e g o i n g t o be c r i t i c a l f o r t h e f u t u r e o f B r i t i s h G u i a n a .
We do n o t o v e r l o o k t h e l o c a l demand f o r a p p o i n t i n g l o c a l p e o p l e
t o any and e v e r y p o s t i n t h e P u b l i c S e r v i c e . H e r e , however, t h e
s t r i c t u r e s o f t h e M e d i c a l E n q u i r y Committee on t h e m e d i c a l s i d e
seem t o us o f much w i d e r a p p l i c a t i o n . R e s p o n s i b i l i t y d u r i n g t h i s
p e r i o d i n t h e C o l o n y ' s h i s t o r y i s i n e s c a p a b l y and c o m p l e t e l y
o u r s ; we must t a k e such s t e p s as seem t o us n e c e s s a r y , and do i t
so w e l l t h a t o u r a c t i o n w i l l p r o v i d e i t s own j u s t i f i c a t i o n by t h e
r e s u l t s achieved.
Again we recognise that in any rearrangement of portfolios,
whether i t be on t h e l i n e s t e n t a t i v e l y suggested i n our p l a n , o r
on o t h e r s , you would have d i f f i c u l t y w i t h your p r e s e n t members
o f E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l . That a g a i n i s something w h i c h must c l e a r l y
be t a k e n i n t o a c c o u n t , b u t f o r t h e reasons I have g i v e n i n t h e
e a r l y p a r t o f t h i s l e t t e r we do n o t f e e l t h a t i t s h o u l d i n any
way o v e r r i d e t h e need t o e s t a b l i s h a sound a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .
We s h o u l d be g r a t e f u l i f you c o u l d l e t us have a r e p o r t on how
t h e p r e s e n t system has w o r k e d , b o t h under t h e P . P . P . Government
and s i n c e , and your v i e w s on t h e v a r i o u s p o i n t s which I have
raised in this letter....1
69. GOVERNOR SIR ALFRED SAVAGE TO ALAN LENNOX-BOYD, 1 June 19552
[Temporary r e s t r i c t i o n s on p o l i t i c a l meetings and the movement of
leaders had contributed to an improvement of the general s i t u a t i o n , but
these could not continue i n d e f i n i t e l y and must be progressively relaxed.

1. In a reply t o P h i l i p , Savage explained t h a t the reason for having more

nominated u n o f f i c i a l ' m i n i s t e r s ' in the Interim Government was to demonstrate
to moderates t h a t the C O . had not abandoned i t s policy for progressive
advance to self-government. Having adopted the policy of gradual devolution
of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , they could not be expected to r e v e r t to be mere ' a d v i s e r s ' .
Surely the purpose must be to give as much r e s p o n s i b i l i t y as possible to those
who might be e l e c t e d in future and might thereby gain a d m i n i s t r a t i v e e x p e r i -
ence and earn p o l i t i c a l support. I t was 'an experiment in compromise', attemp-
t i n g to see t h a t ' t h e m i n i s t e r i a l system functions within the framework of a
purely nominated l e g i s l a t u r e ' . I t s r e t e n t i o n even on a limited b a s i s consider-
ably heightened the p r e s t i g e of the Interim Government and defeated the P. P.P.
propaganda against the C O . He s t i l l believed t h a t there was now need to a c -
c e l e r a t e and expand the system. The Interim Government took office in
d i f f i c u l t circumstances, dubbed the 'Governor's stooges' by the P.P.P.^but had
done much useful work and were winning support. He s t i l l f e l t i t d e s i r a b l e t o
appoint 2 more ' m i n i s t e r s ' (to Rogers, 24 Jan. 1955: C O . 1031/ 1357). But the
matter was shelved t i l l Renison replaced Savage and he pressed ahead.
2. CO.1031/1431.
 255

The division 1n the P.P.P. leadership was r e a l , but 1t was d i f f i c u l t to

assess i t s effect on the rank and f i l e and the s p l i t was l i k e l y on racial
and geographical (urban v. rural) lines. The election results in 1953
were d i s t o r t e d : the P.P.P. polled 77,695 out of 152,231 v a l i d votes. The
results were 'humbugged' by 86 independents, many of whom lost t h e i r
deposits. I f the right wing would organise t h e i r forces by 1957, then the
P.P.P. would not get a majority.]
The b a s i c t r o u b l e w i t h t h e Guianese i s t h a t t h e y have n o t y e t
d e v e l o p e d a n a t i o n a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s which c o u l d overcome t h e
d i f f e r e n c e s o f race and c r e e d . The c l i m a t i c c o n d i t i o n s seem t o
have produced an i n d i f f e r e n c e more severe t h a n t h a t i n any o f t h e
e i g h t c o u n t r i e s i n which I have s e r v e d . Too l o n g moreover has t h e
d i r e c t i o n o f t h e a f f a i r s o f t h e c o u n t r y been dominated by a group
and everyone seems t o be f r i g h t e n e d t o c r i t i c i s e o p e n l y o r t o
challenge f o r leadership.
W i t h i n r e c e n t t i m e s , however, t h e r e has u n d o u b t e d l y been a
p o l i t i c a l awakening i n B r i t i s h Guiana as i n o t h e r p a r t s o f t h e
w o r l d . The g r e a t t r a g e d y has been t h a t t h i s new z e s t has been
e x p l o i t e d by i r r e s p o n s i b l e l e a d e r s h i p . Hope f o r t h e f u t u r e must
l i e i n t h e emergence o f balanced and courageous l e a d e r s d e t e r -
mined t o channel t h i s new e n t h u s i a s m t o n o b l e r and more b e n e f i -
cial ends....
[He repeated that the Interim Government, though 'not a proper
substitute f o r a democratically elected Government', was gaining respect
and making solid achievement, especially in economic and social
development.1 In the Robertson report (§212) i t was stated that] No
r e a l measure o f s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t c o u l d be r e s t o r e d ' s o l o n g as t h e
p r e s e n t l e a d e r s h i p and p o l i c i e s o f t h e P e o p l e ' s P r o g r e s s i v e P a r t y
c o n t i n u e ' . I have r e f e r r e d e a r l i e r t o t h e s p l i t i n t h e l e a d e r -
s h i p , b u t what i s r e q u i r e d i s a complete d i s a v o w a l o f Jagan and
h i s s a t e l l i t e s and t h e i r p o l i c i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y o f t h e Communist
t e c h n i q u e s o f p r e v e n t i n g by c o m p u l s i o n any o p p o s i t i o n . T h i s has
so f a r n o t been f o r t h c o m i n g . I would have hoped t h a t i n t h e
months ahead, t h e P.P.P. s p l i t would have been made a l m o s t
irrevocable and that consideration could have been given to
inviting some of the moderate members to membership of the
c o u n c i l . . . . But t h e p o s i t i o n i s v e r y f l u i d a t t h e moment.
70. PHILIP ROGERS: NOTE ON POLICY FOR BRITISH GUIANA, 15 July 19552
[The Robertson Commission had endorsed the action of H.M.'s G. in
suspending the advanced constitution so soon after i t had been i n t r o -
duced.]

1. He had argued (to Rogers, 24 Jan. 1955: C O . 1031/1357) t h a t , d e s p i t e a

barrage of misrepresentations as 'Governor's stooges' by the P . P . P . , the
p r e s t i g e of the interim government had slowly increased: t h e r e was no j u s t i f i -
cation for a r e t u r n t o o f f i c i a l r u l e (The Robertson r e p o r t had recommended
'marking t i m e ' , not back-pedalling). Surely our purpose must be to give as
much r e s p o n s i b i l i t y as possible to those who may well be elected in the
f u t u r e ' : they must be given ' t h e opportunity to earn p o l i t i c a l support' and
learn a d m i n i s t r a t i v e experience. He i n s i s t e d t h a t the number of p o r t f o l i o s
should be increased from 4 to 6 and there was l i t t l e merit in appointing
'junior ministers'.
2. C O . 1031/1432.
256
H.M.G.'s immediate policy for the Colony has two major aims.
First, to strengthen and develop the economy and resources of the
Colony and to improve the conditions of the people. Secondly to
fit the Colony for the resumption as soon as practicable of
political advance towards self-government.
The first aim is the normal one of any Colonial administration
but, having dismissed the politicians partly on the grounds that
they were ruining the Colony. H.M. 's G. have shouldered a special
and direct responsibility for ensuring that progress is as rapid
as possible. We must not leave ourselves open to the charge that,
having suspended, the Constitution, we have merely transferred
responsibility to those whose enthusiasm for helping the ordinary
people was not so clearly established as to win them support at
the polls. It therefore follows that during this period H.M.'s
G. must take responsibility for major decisions affecting the
economic and social development of British Guiana, and that the
nominated Interim Government must be the executor and not the
maker of policy. Its members are useful advisers, but no more.
As regards political advance, it is preferable that this should
be within the Caribbean Federation, but only if this is accepted
by the majority of the inhabitants. Within the federation British
Guiana could then look forward eventually to full independence
within the Commonwealth. On its own it is not at present
sufficiently developed, nor has it a large enough population to
do so and, for the present, the aim would have to be restricted
to the inhabitants exercising control of its internal affairs.
A return to any considerable measure of even internal self-
government must, however, be dependent upon the prospect of a
reasonable Government in the Colony. In view of its responsibil-
ities H.M.'s G. cannot contemplate a Communist Government and for
one which like the late P.P.P. Government would let the adminis-
tration and economy of the country run down. This does not mean
that there is no future for any part of the P. P. P. Indeed it does
seem quite probable that any popularly elected government in
British Guiana will have to derive a good deal of its backing and
possibly some of its membership from the party. But its Communist
leader would not be acceptable, nor would any leaders who would
not work for a stable administration.
The task of restoring a measure of self-government is not to
be rushed, nor to be achieved by playing politics at the centre
in present circumstances. Apart from developing the resources of
the Colony, the first task of government is to create conditions
in which a return to representative Government could be made
without the substantial risk of a recurrence of the events which
led to the suspension of the Constitution. This may well take
some time. To start with it is necessary to clean up and make
effective Government administration. This is inefficient, slow
and ineffectual, and in some instances corrupt. Even by the
standards of the Caribbean, there is a particular resentment of
any importations into the service from outside. It is, however,
our view that a number of key officers from outside, both
technical and administrative, are required to enable the Service
to become reasonably efficient and to make possible the official
and economic spending of the comparatively large sums made
available from the U.K. for development. The Governor will be
given the full backing of the Secretary of State in bringing in
 257

o f f i c e r s f r o m o u t s i d e whenever he t h i n k s . t h i s i s necessary and

would be e f f e c t i v e f o r t h e s e p u r p o s e s . . . .
[ I n addition, there must be a clear up of landlord-tenant relations and
of ruthless vested interests, and of the old gang in local p o l i t i c s .
Within l i m i t s the Governor should have f u l l backing for necessary
measures to achieve t h i s , including authorization to overrule ministers
and l e g i s l a t i v e Council i f he thought f i t ; for they had no p o l i t i c a l
backing and had advisory powers only. Through local government, P.P.P.
might become p o l i t i c a l l y educated. H.M.'s G. should be prepared to see
P.P.P. capturing local councils and l e t t i n g the electors learn useful
lessons thereby.] 1

7 1 . ( a ) ALAN LENNOX-BOYD: STATEMENT, 25 April 19562

B r i e f l y , t h e r e w i l l be a L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l o f t w e l v e e l e c t e d
members, f o u r o f f i c i a l s , and n o t more t h a n e i g h t nominated mem-
bers.3 The Executive Council under the Governor will normally
c o n s i s t o f f o u r o f f i c i a l s , one nominated and f i v e e l e c t e d members
of the L e g i s l a t i v e Council.
P r e p a r a t i o n s w i l l be p u t i n hand f o r t h w i t h f o r t h e necessary
amendments t o t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n and f o r s e t t i n g up t h e e l e c t i o n
m a c h i n e r y . The Governor w i l l s e t t l e a s u i t a b l e d a t e f o r t h e e l e c -
t i o n s . T h i s w i l l p r o b a b l y be some t i m e n e x t year b u t may have t o
be even l a t e r .
Her M a j e s t y ' s Government hope t h a t t h i s s u b s t a n t i a l s t e p f o r -
ward w i l l encourage h e a l t h y p o l i t i c a l development and e n a b l e e x -
p e r i e n c e t o be g a i n e d upon w h i c h f u r t h e r p r o g r e s s can be based.
U n t i l more o f t h e people u n d e r s t a n d t h e dangers o f Communist
l e a d e r s h i p w h i c h c o u l d o n l y b r i n g a second c o l l a p s e l i k e t h a t o f
1953, we cannot run t h e r i s k o f r e s t o r i n g t h e t y p e o f c o n s t i t u -
t i o n which was suspended.
Meanwhile, t h e development programme w i l l be pushed ahead, and
whatever i s necessary w i l l be done t o p r e v e n t c o u n t e r a c t i v i t i e s
promoted by a h a n d f u l o f C o m m u n i s t - t r a i n e d a g e n t s , who a r e c a u s -
ing i n t e r r u p t i o n of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l progress. 4

( b ) TEMPORARY PROVISION (AMENDMENT) ORDER-IN-COUNCIL, 19 December 19565

[§20 of the 1953 order would be amended to read] A nominated Member o f
t h e E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l s h a l l , w h i l e charged w i t h t h e r e s p o n s i b i l -
i t y o f any d e p a r t m e n t o r s u b j e c t under t h i s s e c t i o n be s t y l e d a
Minister.
9 . ( 1 ) S e c t i o n 28 o f t h e P r i n c i p a l Order 8 i s hereby revoked and
the f o l l o w i n g Section i s s u b s t i t u t e d t h e r e f o r -
2 8 . ( 1 ) There s h a l l be a L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l i n and f o r t h e C o l -

1. But within a month Savage had resigned on health grounds. Derek Jakeway as
acting-governor (29 August: C O . 1031/1432) argued t h a t the time had come for
a considerable move forward: i t would be dangerous to delay.
2. Hansard Comm. 551 1779-80.
3. In fact the numbers were increased but the balance was temporarily
retained.
4. The P.P.P. won a majority of s e a t s but was now s p l i t between J a g a n ' s P.P.P.
( l a r g e l y Indian supported) and the Peoples' National Congress under Burnham
( l a r g e l y Afro-Guyanese supported).
5. Stat.R. No.2030.
6. That of 22 December 1953 [No.65f].
258

o n y , w h i c h , s u b j e c t t o t h e p r o v i s i o n s of t h i s O r d e r , s h a l l c o n -
sist of a Speaker, three ex officio members and not more than
t w e n t y - f i v e o t h e r members, b e i n g e i t h e r N o m i n a t e d Members, o r ,
i f i t i s so p r e s c r i b e d by any P r o c l a m a t i o n f o r t h e t i m e b e i n g
h a v i n g e f f e c t under s u b s e c t i o n ( 2 ) o f t h i s s e c t i o n , b e i n g n o t
more t h a n e l e v e n N o m i n a t e d Members and n o t l e s s t h a n f o u r t e e n
E l e c t e d Members.1
(2) If Her Majesty shall so direct by instructions given
t h r o u g h a S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e , t h e Governor a c t i n g i n h i s d i s -
cretion by Proclamation published in the Gazette shall, in pur-
suance o f s u b s e c t i o n ( 1 ) o f t h i s s e c t i o n , p r e s c r i b e , w i t h e f f e c t
f r o m any d i s s o l u t i o n o f t h e C o u n c i l u n d e r s e c t i o n 55 o f t h i s O r -
d e r , t h e number o f N o m i n a t e d and E l e c t e d Members t o be c o m p r i s e d
i n t h e L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h such i n s t r u c t i o n s ;
and a n y such P r o c l a m a t i o n may be amended o r r e v o k e d i n l i k e man-
n e r by t h e G o v e r n o r , i n p u r s u a n c e o f i n s t r u c t i o n s g i v e n a s a f o r e -
s a i d , w i t h e f f e c t f r o m any s u b s e q u e n t d i s s o l u t i o n o f t h e C o u n -
cil.... [ S i m i l a r l y at his discretion the Governor might by Proclamation
establish and define and amend or revoke the e l e c t o r a l d i s t r i c t s . ]

72. ALAN LENNOX-BOYD TO GOVERNOR SIR PATRICK RENISON, 23 August 19572

[He was g r a t e f u l f o r the way Renison was handling Jagan, but could not
consent t o l e t t i n g Jagan nominate one of the executive c o u n c i l l o r s . ]
I n d i s c u s s i n g w i t h you p o l i c y t o be f o l l o w e d a t t h i s s t a g e i n
B r i t i s h G u i a n a I have had i n mind t h r o u g h o u t t h r e e m a i n a s p e c t s : -
( 1 ) To e a s e t o t h e maximum p o s s i b l e e x t e n t y o u r t a s k i n h a v i n g
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r good g o v e r n m e n t i n B r i t i s h G u i a n a and i n
p a v i n g t h e way f o r n o r m a l p o l i t i c a l e v o l u t i o n . ( 2 ) The need t o
consider both the interests of British Guiana and interests
outside in the l i g h t of events of 1953. I include here with the
ultimate responsibility of H.M.G. both the legitimate interests
o f Commonwealth and U n i t e d S t a t e s G o v e r n m e n t s and l e g i t i m a t e
o u t s i d e economic i n t e r e s t s . ( 3 ) The need t o a v o i d a d o p t i n g a
particular constitutional course which would make the task of
H.M.G. and of Governors in other territories more difficult,
p a r t i c u l a r l y on t h e i s s u e o f t h e n o m i n a t i o n o f members t o t h e
Legislature.
The p r e s e n t C o n s t i t u t i o n h a s been d e s i g n e d t o g i v e a number o f

1. The governor, S i r P a t r i c k Renison, in f a c t made provision for 14 e l e c t e d

members and in the l e g i s l a t i v e council in 1957 he appointed only 6 nominated
members. So the e l e c t e d members were in the majority and the P . P . P . was in
o v e r a l l m i n o r i t y . After the e l e c t i o n s (12 April 1957) the council c o n s i s t e d
of the speaker, 3 ex officio, 6 nominees, and 14 elected members (9 P.P.P.,
3 P . N . C , 1 National Labour Front and 1 United Democratic P a r t y ) . The J a g a n i t e
f a c t i o n of the P.P.P. won only 45% of the v o t e s , but 64% of the e l e c t e d s e a t s :
perhaps t h i s explained why Renison r e f r a i n e d from appointing the f u l l compli-
ment of non-elected members and for adding 2 nominated t o the executive coun-
c i l . He i n v i t e d the Jagans and 3 o t h e r e l e c t e d P.P.P. members to m i n i s t e r i a l
o f f i c e on the executive c o u n c i l , t o g e t h e r with the governor and the 3 ex
officio. The return to a more advanced constitution led once more to violent
racial divisions.
2. C O . 1031/2253: Tel. s e c r e t . I t was s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t t h i s telegram and
R e n i s o n ' s r e p l y should be e x p r e s s l y copied for Washington, for the U.S.A. was
concerned.
 259
balancing factors to any possible outcome of the election and to
give you additional powers beyond the special reserve powers. I
regard it as important, particularly in relation to second and
third considerations above, but also indeed in relation to the
situation in British Guiana itself, that at the outset the
balances and checks should not be dissipated so that you would
only have the use of what are in effect emergency powers if
things go wrong.
As you know, I regard it as reasonable that Jagan should be
given the change to co-operate in Government. As was indicated
in my telegram Personal No. 33 I am prepared to agree that he
should have a majority both in Executive Council and in Legislat-
ive Council to the extent and in the manner approved in that
telegram to make it clear both to him and to his followers in
British Guiana that he is being given ample scope and opportunity
to show what he can do. Power to nullify majority by filling
vacant nominated seats would not be used unless Jagan overstepped
permissible bounds and would not therefore hinder him at all in
carrying out any proper Governmental functions. I also regard it
as reasonable that he should be particularly concerned about the
nominations to Executive Council since clearly these would have
to be persons with whom he could work, if the machinery of
Government is to run smoothly. I therefore agree that any
nominations to Executive Council, while at your discretion,
should be of persons acceptable to him. I could not however agree
that he himself should nominate persons either to the Executive
Council or the Legislative Council having regard to the history
of 1953. I do not at all like you nominating someone like
Hubbard, even to Legislative Council, but if you feel it
essential to do so in order to prevent breakdown please let me
know and I will consider further. In short, H.M.G. have shown
that they are prepared to take risks, to allow Jagan full scope
for taking part in the Government and to demonstrate this by
their willingness to agree that full use should not be made of
the provisions of the Constitution regarding nomination in order
to give him a working majority, but, having regard to past
history, they are not prepared to put Jagan in the same position
as leaders in other colonial territories who have been successful
in elections. I hope that Jagan can be induced to co-operate on
these terms. I authorise you to speak to him on the terms you
proposed in paragraphs 10 and 11 of your telegram amplifying as
you think fit in the light of the above.

73. (a) IAN WATT: MINUTE, 20 May 19591

We sailed nearer to the wind in B.G. than elsewhere (Malaya and
Trinidad) in using the power of nomination to support the elected
leader in Leg. Co., but surely the principle of the arrangement
implies that any such leader must keep his own majority intact?
To my mind it would be most dangerous to give any man in Dr.
Jagan's position the artificial support which the Governor
proposes. An election might be undesirable, but in my opinion it
would be a lesser evil than for the Governor to bail out a party
political leader. We cannot give Dr. Jagan the promise of support

1. CO. 1031/2253. Watt was an assistant secretary in the CO.

260
proposed w i t h o u t c r e a t i n g awkward p r e c e d e n t s e l s e w h e r e , and t h e
f u r t h e s t we s h o u l d go i n my o p i n i o n . . . [was to t e l l Jagan that
reasonable steps would be taken to help him out of his d i f f i c u l t y , even
to the extent of adding nominated members on whose support he could rely
but not going as far as nominating persons active members of his party,
although names of other people he might suggest would be sympathetically
considered, i f generally suitable. But no appointments would be made
u n t i l government majority was threatened and only to provide minimum
working m a j o r i t y . ]

( b ) CO. MEETING, 20 August 19591

[ I t was agreed that Dr. Jagan's request to be styled 'Chief Minister*
could be granted, provided i t was honorific only; that the Governor could
consult Jagan on appointments of elected ministers though the constitu-
t i o n a l instruments made i t clear that i t was at ' h i s d i s c r e t i o n ' ; and
that while retaining the Financial Secretary on the Executive Council,
i t might be possible that 'an elected member could be charged with
responsibility for finance and development'.]
S i r P a t r i c k Renison asked whether Dr. Jagan c o u l d p r e s i d e a t
most m e e t i n g s o f E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l . The e x i s t i n g i n s t r u m e n t s s a i d
t h a t t h e Governor s h o u l d a t t e n d and p r e s i d e a t a l l m e e t i n g s ' s o
far as is practicable' which would probably be difficult to
circumvent. Mr. Austin, the Attorney-General, had, however,
s u g g e s t e d t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f a p p o i n t i n g a committee o f E x e c u t i v e
C o u n c i l c o n s i s t i n g o f t h e whole o f t h e E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l l e s s t h e
G o v e r n o r . The Committee would be p r e s i d e d over by Dr. Jagan and
t h e m i n u t e s would come up f o r f o r m a l a p p r o v a l by t h e E x e c u t i v e
C o u n c i l , which f o r t h i s purpose need c o n s i s t o n l y o f t h e Governor
and one or more of the ex officio members. The Governor would,
o f c o u r s e , p r e s e r v e t h e r i g h t t o i n t e r v e n e by summoning a f u l l
Executive Council meeting whenever he saw fit. Mr. Crichley
undertook to look into this proposal which, on the face of it,
seemed t o him t o be l e g a l l y u n e x c e p t i o n a b l e .
S i r P a t r i c k Renison s a i d t h a t f o r p o l i t i c a l reasons Dr. Jagan
wanted powers t o be d e l e g a t e d t o M i n i s t e r s t o a p p o i n t members o f
boards and committees. Some such powers are vested in the
Governor under O r d i n a n c e s , b u t M i n i s t e r s had so f a r n o t t r o u b l e d
t o go t h r o u g h t h e O r d i n a n c e s as he had suggested and s u b m i t t o
him l i s t s o f powers which t h e y would l i k e d e l e g a t e d .
Mr. Rogers s a i d , and S i r P a t r i c k Renison a g r e e d , t h a t i n s o f a r
as powers were c o n t a i n e d i n O r d i n a n c e s i t was up t o M i n i s t e r s t o
b e s t i r t h e m s e l v e s and s u b m i t p r o p o s a l s t o t h e G o v e r n o r .
S i r P a t r i c k Renison r a i s e d t h e q u e s t i o n o f Dr. J a g a n ' s w i s h t o
see two p a r t y members nominated t o L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l . He s a i d
Dr. Jagan's difficulties could be resolved by reducing the
numbers o f nominated members, b u t t h i s would p r o b a b l y i m p a i r t h e
e f f i c i e n c y o f t h e l e g i s l a t u r e by making t h e t o t a l number o f
members t o o s m a l l . I n any c a s e , i t would be d i f f i c u l t t o know
w h i c h o f t h e nominated members t o r e l e a s e f r o m h i s a p p o i n t m e n t
i n o r d e r t o have t h e d e s i r e d e f f e c t . Mr. Rogers s a i d t h a t t h e
a l t e r n a t i v e t o S i r P a t r i c k R e n i s o n ' s s u g g e s t i o n was t o i n c r e a s e

1. C O . 1031/2247. A departmental meeting in Roger's room on J a g a n ' s

suggestions on the use of the f l e x i b i l i t i e s of the present c o n s t i t u t i o n . S i r
P a t r i c k Renison was present and put questions from Jagan.
 261
the number of elected members, but this would require a fresh
election which it was better to avoid before 1961. It has so far
been possible to stave off Dr. Jagan on the question of nominated
members, and the fallacy of the alleged Trinidad precedent had
been pointed out to him. Mr. Rogers said, however, that whilst
it might be reasonable to hold out on this question for a period
of six months or so, it might be a different matter to do so for
two years, that is until the next election in 1961. This,
however, was a question which the Colonial Office would need to
consider. Much might depend on the course which Mr. Bowman and
Mr. Beharry eventually decided to adopt.
Sir Patrick Renison ended by pointing out the political use
which Mr. Burnham would no doubt be quick to make of any
nomination of P.P.P. members. Mr. Rogers said he appreciated this
point, though he doubted whether it would carry much weight with
the electorate.

(c) ANGUS MACKINTOSH: MINUTE, 3 March I9601

It is in the hard interest of the United Kingdom, both short
and long term, to hand over power in the dependent territories
as fast as possible. This is more likely to increase our
manoeuvrability and influence in those territories and outside
than if, however altruistic our motives, we hang on to power in
the face of growing hostility from local or world opinion or
both. It may on occasion mean getting out even though we think
that to do so is not in the true interests of the local peoples.
We should not cynically get out irrespective of the welfare of
the dependent peoples for whom we are at present responsible, but
there are limits to the extent to which we can go on protecting
those peoples against themselves or their accepted leaders. I
think that it was Lord Milner who said, about the turn of the
century, that the main problem facing the U.K. in the imperial
field in the mid-20tfl Century would be putting up with the third
rate.

7 4 . CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE: REPORT, 8 A p r i l , I960 2

[ I a i n Macleod had convened the conference at the request of the B.G.
Legislature to consider appropriate measures of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l advance.
In discussion i t soon was clear that 'on many p o i n t s ' ] t h e S e c r e t a r y
o f S t a t e ' s p r o p o s a l s f e l l f a r s h o r t o f t h e d e s i r e s o f members o f
t h e B r i t i s h Guiana D e l e g a t i o n . D i f f e r e n c e s o f view were f r a n k l y
s t a t e d and d i s c u s s e d a n d , s a v e i n r e s p e c t o f t h e i n t e r i m c h a n g e s ,
a compromise was r e a c h e d . The c o n c l u s i o n s o f t h e C o n f e r e n c e so
r e a c h e d a r e summarised i n t h e f o l l o w i n g p a r a g r a p h s .

LEGISLATURE
The new Constitution would provide for a bicameral Legislature
w h i c h w o u l d c o n s i s t o f an e l e c t e d chamber t o be c a l l e d t h e ' L e -
gislative Assembly' and a nominated chamber to be called the
'Senate' ....3

1. C O . 1031/3163. MacKintosh had been seconded to the F.O. as deputy

commissioner-general in S.E. Asia and was now head of the W.I. department.
2. P.P.1959-60 X (998) p.865.
3. With powers similar to the Jamaican second chamber.
262
LEGISLATIVE POWERS
The Governor would assent or refuse to assent to Bills in ac-
cordance with the advice of Ministers. However, unless he were
authorised by the Secretary of State to assent thereto, the Go-
vernor would be required to reserve for the signification of Her
Majesty's pleasure any Bill which, in his opinion, affected de-
fence, external affairs or the Royal Prerogative or was incon-
sistent with the Constitution. This provision would also apply
to Bills affecting the maintenance of law and order until res-
ponsibi 1 ity for these subjects had passed to a Minister. $imi lar-
ly, the above provision would also apply to Bills affecting the
terms and conditions of service, including pensions, of public
officers until the time when the Public, Police and Judicial Ser-
vice Commissions became executive.
The Governor would have a reserved legislative power which
would be restricted to Bills and motions which, in his opinion,
were necessary or expedient for the purpose of defence or exter-
nal affairs or, until responsibility for law and order had passed
to a Minister, or the Service Commissions had become executive,
as the case may be, for maintaining law and order or securing
satisfactory terms and conditions of service of public officers.
To make this power fully effective, the Governor would have to
be able to secure that a Bill or motion for any of the above pur-
poses was introduced or proposed in either chamber of the Legis-
lature.1
The powers of Her Majesty to legislate for British Guiana by
Order-in-Council under the British Guiana Act, 1928, would be re-
tained in the next constitutional stage. The Secretary of State
in consideration of the special circumstances of British Guiana
gave an assurance that it was his intention not to advise that
these powers be exercised except for the purpose of enacting con-
stitutional instruments or to deal with grave emergency.
Her Majesty's power to disallow a law of the British Guiana
Legislature would be retained only in the case of laws affecting
British Guiana Government stock....
ELECTORAL SYSTEM
It was accepted that election to the Legislative Assembly
should be by the 'first past the post' system in single-member
constituencies. A Boundary Commission would be appointed without
delay with the object of delimiting new constituency boundaries
if possible before the end of I960.2
The Commission would consist of a single Commissioner selected
by the Lord Chancellor. The Commissioner should be a member or
retired member of the Superior Judiciary; he would be assisted
by expert advisers, including experts with local knowledge....
For the purpose of general elections under the new Constitu-
tion, there would continue to be universal adult suffrage.

75. GOVERNOR SIR RALPH GREY TO SIR HILTON POYNTON, 18 February 19623
Although, as a matter of important policy, I am trying to pre-

1. A restriction on full internal self-government.

2. Ail order-in-council was accordingly issued (26 June 1961: Stat.R. No. 1188).
3. C O . 1031/3181 secret and personal. Grey, a New Zealander, had served in
 263
serve the constitutional truth that full responsibility in all
internal matters rests with Jagan and his Ministers, the business
of seeing that essential action is taken to cope with the emer-
gency, of trying to keep some civil administration going despite
a strike of all but a few senior officers in the Public Service,
of stirring the Premier and the Minister of Home Affairs and the
Attorney-General into the actions required of them during the
emergency (indeed, the business of finding them and of getting
speech with them either on ever-busy telephone lines or, less
frequently, face to face) all falls on me - as well as the work
that the Governor would in any event have to do in liaison with
the naval, military and police commanders and in consulting with
influential members of the public in attempts to bring strikes
and disorders to an end....
My main purpose in this letter is to tell you of Jagan's atti-
tude towards his responsibilities and to ask for any counsel you
would like to give me about the line in regard to them that
H.M.G. would wish to be taken.
[As indicated previously] Ministers showed on February 14 that they
were disposed to assert a responsibility on Her Majesty's Govern-
ment to provide sufficient force to enable Guianese Ministers to
ride out any trouble caused by the policies. Mr. Erhart Regier,
a Canadian M.P. guest of Jagan's, whom I have not met, made a re-
markably ill-advised statement to the Guiana Graphic which ap-
peared on the morning of February 14, that the United Kingdom
could be relied on to provide sufficient military force to sus-
tain the democratically-elected Government and 'to quash rebel-
lion'! I made it plain to Rai that Mr. Regier had not been help-
ful. I thus thought it wise to put my views about the use of
British troops in writing. I therefore wrote to Jagan the letter
of February 15, a copy of which is attached to this, and I had
copies given to each Minister. On the afternoon of February 16,
by which time half the business section of Georgetown was alight,
I received from Jagan the letter a copy of which is also attach-
ed. When sending it, he apologized for 'the absence of frills' -
even so, it must have taken up a lot of the Premier's time when
he ought to have been better employed; but he was then happily
cordoned off in 'The Red House' (former home of the Chief Secre-
tary) guarded by British troops....
About midday on February 16, when it became clear that we were
going to have call in troops, I recorded a broadcast that sought
briefly to explain some facts about the maintenance of law and
order and what would be the position of the troops if they were
called. This broadcast was probably not very effective as elect-
ricity was off and although I was able by various means to record
and to get the tape broadcast, only those with battery radios
would have heard me. I send a copy with this.
At the end of the afternoon, when the shooting, fire-raising
and general disorder had taken place and looting was in full
swing, I broadcast again, and again I mentioned the position of
British servicemen. I send a copy of the script.
During the evening the Manager of the Broadcasting Company

Nigeria (1937-59) and was now governor of B.G. (1959-64). Poynton was now the
permanent under-secretary.
264
telephoned to say that Jagan wished to broadcast to tell his
followers not to attempt reprisals for what had been done to
Indians in Georgetown during the day. The Manager feared - and
with reason - that Jagan's broadcast, while purporting to forbid
reprisals, might in fact encourage them. Jagan is Minister in
charge of Broadcasting and there were complications about
refusing his request. Eventually we got a script that was thought
harmless enough and he went on the air. I send a copy of what he
said. No sooner had he finished than Africans telephoned the
studio, which by this time again had power, and threatened to
come and sack it. The mention of 'Independence' infuriated a lot
of people - as I also was told.
On the morning of February 18, Jagan wanted to broadcast again
to call off P.P.P. meetings fixed for Sunday (today). I was all
for calling off the meetings but did not want him on the air
again. By this time there was need for someone to explain the
effect of the Proclamation and the Emergency Order and I got
Jagan to agree to my speaking on this and including in what I
said an announcement of his decision to call off all party
meetings (he had intended - or, more correctly, Janet Jagan had
arranged - motorcades and other follies) and an appeal to other
party-leaders to do likewise. I send a copy of this script and
you will see that again I mentioned the British servicemen.
Much of Saturday was occupied in trying to get the Civil
Service Association and the T.U.C. to call off their strikes. I
find it difficult to express in words my astonishment at the
lengths to which Guianese can carry their refusal to face facts.
With half the business area destroyed (Bookers this morning
estimate their losses at $5 million - and they were not deliber-
ately attacked and many of their more valuable properties are
untouched), the C.S.A. and the T.U.C. were arguing for hours
about increments and sick-leave and so forth, regardless of the
fact that no Government here is likely to be able easily to go
on meeting the obligations arising under present conditions of
service without great inroads in all development - and there will
be those inroads anyway! Although the Government seems to have
met all the C.S.A. demands, the C.S.A. refuse to return unless
the T.U.C. demands are met. The Government seems willing to back
down most of the way on the Budget, but the T.U.C. were said to
have included a demand that British troops be removed before
there is any return to work! When I heard this, I spoke to
Ishmael, President of the T . U . C , and pointed out the folly of
the demand. Ishmael (who probably is not even as much in control
of the Unions as he claims to be - and he admits to some loss of
control) said the demand was 'all bunk'. Last night he was
telephoning me asking for my personal intervention to get an
armed guard put on his house as his life was threatened! I
prevailed on my Joint Operators to add yet another fpenny-packet'
obligation to the many they have had to assume - Jagan, Rai and
Ramsahoye, Burnham, d'Aguiar and his brewery at the other end of
the town, and now Nunes (Minister of Education, because he is a
negro and ought not to be with P.P.P. Indians, etc.). So, one way
and another, British troops are likely to be the subject of
comment for a long time, quite apart from what they do day-to-
day.
Brigadier Lister (with whom, as with Commodore Martin, I am
 265
getting along happily and - I trust - effectively) told me this
morning that in reporting to his superiors on possible command
structure here he has said that it is impossible now to say just
what political solution to local problems the British troops will
have to work with in maintaining law and order. It seems to me,
so far as thought is possible in the hurly-burly and with endless
local v.i.ps. seeking to persuade me of the first half of other
solutions but never telling me what the second half is to be,
that the only thing to do is to struggle on with Jagan's
democratically-elected government until it is seen by lawful
means how unfitted it is to govern and it falls - possibly with
the fall hastened by defections, though I do not see those yet.
Any other way will whip up illogical but powerful support for
Jagan abroad - and, I should think, restore to him the local
Indian support that the Budget proposals lost him. Indians who
have been sacked, looted and burnt are more likely to be against
the P.N.C and U.F. than they are to think that their troubles
were brought on them by 'our boy'. And Indians in the country
districts, once the Budget proposals are abandoned, will soon
forget the distrust those proposals induced in them - and
racialism will drive them once again to solid support for an
Indian leader.
I sought in vain to persuade Rai this morning to mount a
special exercise to find out just what is happening outside
Georgetown. After all, three-quarters of the population live
elsewhere - and the maintaining of order in the coastlands would
be a much more difficult business than doing it in Georgetown,
with its compact area intersected by paved roads and provided
with electricity (on again) and water (partly on). But he is
content to check reports from District Commissioners against
reports from District Superintendents of Police and reports from
Party supporters. Thus far, all seems well enough; but I should
have much preferred to have someone like Major I.O. Smith, not
now busy with work of the Public Service Commission (Commissioner
Mrs. Rayman was one of the principal sufferers from the mob's
attack on property), to make a special report. However, I can not
order it and still maintain that Rai is in charge. Brigadier
Lister has, however, sent out joint mi 1itary-and-police patrols
and will give me the result later today.
76. R.W. PIPER: MINUTE, 23 February 19621
The Governor's letter opposite provides additional evidence,
if such were needed, to show that Dr. Jagan and his Ministers are
incapable of governing British Guiana effectively. Their record
over the past six months has been one of inactivity, dithering
and, as in the case of the Budget, gross miscalculation. On the
other hand, if Mr. Burnham had to form a Government, it seems
most unlikely that he and his Ministers would be any better. They
would have no experience of government, whereas some of Dr.
Jagan's Ministers have held office since 1957. I do not think we
need consider Mr. d'Aguiar as Leader of Government in the Colony,
since it is inconceivable that he could secure widespread

1. CO.1031/3181. Piper was the new head of the W.I. department (B). Poynton
noted that this assessment was 'about right'; (23 Feb. ibid.).
266
support.
It seems to me inevitable that the Government of British
Guiana, in both the period before independence and after, will
be of low standard so long as it rests on Elected Ministers. But
I would submit that this alone is not reason for withholding full
independence from the territory. It will doubtless sink to the
level of other South American States but this apparently is
acceptable to the majority of British Guianese, and independence
is what they want.
The events of the last ten days have shown, however, that
Jagan's Government cannot control Georgetown without external
military aid. It is possible that Burnham, with his over-whelming
support in the Georgetown area, could do so. From the point of
view of getting our troops out of the territory as early as
possible, it might, accordingly, be no bad thing if Mr. Burnham
and his Party were to assume responsibility for government, but
even if there were fresh elections it is by no means certain that
Dr. Jagan would not be returned once again.
If Jagan remains in power and the country proceeds to indepen-
dence, it seems as though at least a substantial number of troops
would be required in the territory, and on their withdrawal,
which could hardly be later than Independence Day, there would
be a real risk of violence unless by that time a local force had
been set up and trained to a point of efficiency. Since we must
surely avoid the possibility of a 'Congo' in British Guiana, it
seems to me that if British Guiana is to proceed smoothly to
independence, a prerequisite is the establishment of an efficient
force to aid the civil powers in times of riot. In reaching this
conclusion, I have assumed that the Police Force will, under
efficient expatriate leadership, perform as well in an indepen-
dent British Guiana as it apparently did last Friday. I recognise
that this is quite an assumption if Jagan and the P.P.P. form the
Government at independence.
If the above analysis is correct, the arguments for having
fresh elections seem to be pretty evenly balanced. On the one
hand, Jagan and his Ministers, inefficient though they are, at
least have some years of experience behind them. On the other
hand, if Mr. Burnham came to power, although his Government would
inevitably be completely inexperienced, he would have popular
support in the main centre of population - Georgetown. Moreover,
one's doubts about the loyalty of the Police would be less with
a Burnham-led Government than with a Jagan-led Government.
Frankly, I don't know which is the worse alternative, but my
inclination prompts me to advocate fresh elections to clear the
air. It would also help us with the Americans.
Whether or not there were fresh elections, the formation of a
riot squad or local security force seems essential. It might, as
in the case of the Gendarmerie in Cyprus,1 comprise African and
Indian recruits in a set proportion. If the May Conference is
held, and I am inclined to think that it should be, I would have
thought it necessary to link the date of independence with the
formation and the training to a reasonable pitch of efficiency

1. In the margin Poynton noted here 'the 6:4 ratio in the recruitment of Greek
and Turkish Cypriots'. [See p.458, §§11, 15; also p.473]
 267
of such a local force.
To sum up, I would favour the holding of a Conference in May
which would largely concern itself with the future of British
Guiana in general, rather than independence, but at which it
would be generally agreed that fresh elections should be held
before independence, and that independence should not take place
until an effective local force had been built up. It might well
discuss the question of the form of constitution at independence
and related matters.
To return to the Governor's letter. In paragraph 4 he asks if
we have any comments on the letter from Dr. Jagan, dated the 16th
February. Dr. Jagan's letter sets out very slickly the case for
his remaining in power with the help of large numbers of British
troops. The fallacy in the argument is, of course, that Dr.
Jagan's Government, having responsibility for full internal self-
government, including internal security, should have set about
acquiring adequate police or other forces necessary to maintain
law and order. This they have not done, and Dr. Jagan seems to
be content to shuffle off his Government's responsibility for law
and order on to Her Majesty's Government. At independence, he
seems prepared to have a blood-bath if that is what the British
Guianese want. I attach opposite a draft telegram which sets out
this comment on Dr. Jagan's letter. It might help the Governor
if he were authorized to pass on to Jagan the comment in the
draft telegram as a comment from the Secretary of State, and I
have drafted the telegram in this form.

77. INDEPENDENCE CONFERENCE: REPORT, November 19631

At the British Guiana Constitutional Conference in 1960, a con-
stitution providing for full internal self-government was agreed
and the principle of independence for British Guiana was accep-
ted. In August, 1961, the new constitution was brought into ef-
fect and a general election was held. The People's Progressive
Party (led by Dr. Cheddi Jagan) gained 42.6 per cent, of the vote
cast and 20 seats in the Legislative Assembly; the People's Na-
tional Congress (led by Mr. Forbes Burnham) obtained 41 per cent.
of the votes and 11 seats; and the United Force (led by Mr. Peter
d'Aguiar) secured 16.4 per cent, of the votes and 4 seats. (Of
the 35 seats, the People's Progressive Party did not contest six
and the United Force did not contest one.)
In November, 1961, the Legislature of British Guiana passed a
Resolution calling on Her Majesty's Government in the United
Kingdom to grant independence to British Guiana. On receipt of
this Resolution, the Secretary of State for the Colonies informed
Dr. Jagan of his willingness to hold a Conference for the purpose
of settling the form of the Constitution and of fixing a date for
independence. The Conference met in London at Lancaster House on
23rd October, 1962, under the chairmanship of the Secretary of
State for the Colonies, Mr. Duncan Sandys. It was attended by de-

i. P.P.1963-4 X (2203) pp.711ff. It had been stated (in 1962) when the 1961
constitution came into operation, that two years or more after the first
elections under it, another conference would decide on the timing of
independence - acknowledged by H.M.'s G. since 1960 as the goal. Much had
depended on whether the W.I. federation attained independence.
268
legates from three political parties represented in the Legislat-
ive Assembly of British Guiana.... Eighteen sessions of the Con-
ference were held. A number of constitutional points were sett-
led. But it was found that no substantial progress could be made
until decisions were reached on three major questions:
(a) Should elections be fought on the basis of single-member con-
stituencies as at present or on the basis of proportional repre-
sentation?
(b) Should the right to vote be accorded at the age of 21 as at
present or at the age of 18?
(c) Should fresh elections be held before Independence?
The People's Progressive Party advocated single-member consti-
tuencies, voting at 18, and no elections before Independence. The
People's National Congress and the United Force asked for propor-
tional representation, voting at 21, and fresh elections.
These issues were exhaustively discussed, but no agreement
could be reached. These talks having proved fruitless, the three
leaders decided to ask the Secretary of State to settle the out-
standing issues on the authority of the British Government. The
request was embodied in a letter to him, dated 25th October 1963,
in the following terms:-
*At your request we have made further efforts to resolve the
differences between us on the constitutional issues which require
to be settled before British Guiana secures independence, in par-
ticular, the electoral system, the voting age, and the question
whether fresh elections should be held before independence.
We regret to have to report to you that we have not succeeded
in reaching agreement; and we have reluctantly come to the conc-
lusion that there is no prospect of an agreed solution. Another
adjournment of the Conference for further discussions between
ourselves would therefore serve no useful purpose and would re-
sult only in further delaying British Guiana's independence and
in continued uncertainty in the country.
In these circumstances we are agreed to ask the British Govern-
ment to settle on their authority all outstanding constitutional
issues, and we undertake to accept their decisions.
Signed: CHEDDI JAGAN. L.F.S. BURNHAM. P.S. D'AGUIAR '
After further meetings with the leaders of the three delega-
tions, the Secretary of State announced his decisions at a final
plenary session on 31st October 1963. In his statement (Annex A ) ,
Mr. Sandys said that he was satisfied that the root cause of Bri-
tish Guiana's trouble was the development of party politics along
racial lines. He had therefore decided that the system of propor-
tional representation should be introduced, since this would tend
to encourage coalitions between parties and would make it easier
for new political groupings to form on a multi-racial basis. Pre-
parations for elections under this system would be put in hand
without delay, after which the British Government would convene
a conference to fix a date for independence.
Disappointment was expressed that the Secretary of State's
decisions did not include a firm date for independence. However,
Mr. Sandys emphasized that the British Government had no wish to
delay British Guiana's independence any longer than was absolute-
ly necessary to enable power to be transferred in conditions of
peace and stability.
 269
Annex A. Duncan Sandys: Statement, 31 October 1963.
I had hoped that after a year's adjournment the political lead-
ers of British Guiana could have succeeded in reaching agreement.
But since that had proved impossible there was clearly no advan-
tage in the further postponement of decisions. Therefore, al-
though it was for me an unenviable task, I am sure that in all
the circumstances you were right to ask the British Government
to settle on your behalf your unresolved differences.
British Guiana faces many difficulties, but all that you have
told me at this Conference, and all that I saw during my visit
to your country last July, have convinced me that there is one
problem which transcends all others, namely the growth of racial-
ism. That is the curse of British Guiana today. The whole life
of the country is poisoned and weakened by mutual suspicion and
fear between the two predominant racial groups, the Indians and
the Africans. This state of tension has become acute in the last
few years, and has led to racial murder, arson and violence. Last
summer it reached the point where law and order could not be
maintained without the assistance of two battalions of British
soldiers. In fact the Premier told me that, if the British troops
were withdrawn, the situation would get completely out of cont-
rol .
Before British Guiana can safely assume the responsibilities
of sovereign independence, it is clear that by one means or
another harmony and confidence must be restored.
This need not necessarily take long. There is no deep-rooted
or historical enmity between the races; nor is there any basic
clash of interests between them; nor is there animosity between
the religious groups, Christian, Hindu and Muslim.
The root of the trouble lies almost entirely in the development
of party politics along racial lines. In its present acute form
this can be traced to the People's Progressive Party, which had
previously drawn its support from both the main races, and which
broke into two bitterly opposed political groups, the one
predominantly Indian, led by Dr. Jagan, and the other predominan-
tly African, led by Mr. Burnham. Both parties have, for their po-
litical ends, fanned the racial emotions of their followers, with
the result that each has come to be regarded as the champion of
one race and the enemy of the other.
In this atmosphere of mutual suspicion, objectivity has entire-
ly disappeared. Every political act is, or is alleged to be, dic-
tated by racial prejudice. The Africans accuse the Government
party of governing in the interests only of the Indians, and de-
mand a share in political decisions. On the other side, the
Indians accuse the Police, which is mainly African, of partiality
towards the Africans and demand the creation of a separate de-
fence force, recruited more extensively from the Indian commun-
ity, to counterbalance the Police.
This state of general distrust has had a profoundly demoralis-
ing effect throughout the country. It has not only undermined
political stability, but gravely threatens economic progress. It
has led to such financial difficulties that the Government is un-
able, despite severe economies, to balance its budget, and will
be obliged to seek outside assistance.
British Guiana is thus faced with an acute crisis of confi-
dence. While this manifests itself primarily in a racial form,
270
the cause is basically political. It is therefore a political
solution which must be sought.
The aim of any such solution must be to create a reasonable de-
gree of mutual trust and co-operation between the races. In the
grave situation which has developed, no single remedy will be
sufficient. The problem must be tackled from all possible angles.
In the first place, the Constitution must provide the strongest
safeguards to protect minorities to preserve basic human rights,
to ensure the impartiality of the Police, and to insulate the
Judiciary and the Public Service from party political influences.
On constitutional issues there should be a right of Appeal to the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. The Constitutions of a
number of new Commonwealth countries contain provisions designed
to achieve these objectives, and, with necessary adaptations, I
propose to apply them to British Guiana.
In view of the racial character of the problem I consider that
there should, in addition, be some special provisions to penalise
those who seek to promote antagonism between the races.
At the same time, every possible step must be taken to improve
the relationship between the Government and the Opposition, of
whatever political complexions they may be. Under a democratic
system minorities must accept the decisions of the majority. But
there are limits beyond which it is neither right nor safe for
a Government to disregard the feelings and wishes of large sect-
ions of the people. In a country with a small population and
slender resources, it is more than ever important that the Gover-
nment should endeavour to rule with the general consent of the
population. Bi-partisan policies may not be possible, but the po-
litical temperature can be greatly reduced by sincere and effec-
tive consultation. Of this there has been all too little in Bri-
tish Guiana, due to the intransigent and uncompromising attitude
of both sides. The need for improvement in the methods and prac-
tice of consultation is recognised in all quarters, and all three
political leaders have put forward a variety of proposals to this
end. These will be studied and will, where appropriate, be adop-
ted.
It is also necessary to strengthen the forces available to
maintain law and order. A Country should only in the most rare
and exceptional circumstances have to call upon troops to assist
the civil power; and after independence it would, of course, be
most undesirable for British Guiana to have to rely upon the army
of another country to preserve internal security. It is arguable
whether the additional forces required for this purpose should
be regarded as an army or as an extension of the police But what-
ever may be decided on this point, these should be constituted
before independence by the Governor, who would endeavour to en-
sure that recruits were not drawn predominantly from any one
racial group.
The measures I have indicated should to some extent help to
reduce the present tensions and fears. But, if confidence and co-
operation are to be restored, more positive steps must be taken
to encourage the healthy development of political life along non-
racial lines. The opposition parties have insisted that, in order
to achieve this, a change in the electoral system is essential.
On the other hand, this view has been strongly contended by the
Government delegation.
 271
I have listened carefully to the arguments advanced in favour
of single member constituencies ('first past the post'), and
those advanced in favour of various types of proportional repre-
sentation. I must, however, say that I got the impression that
the advocates of the different solutions, while propounding im-
peccable principles, were more concerned with their own electoral
prospects than with the furtherance of racial harmony in British
Guiana.
After taking into account all that has been said, I have tried
to examine this problem with complete objectivity and with one
aim only, namely to assess what electoral system would be most
likely to give to your country peace and good government.
A powerful case was made for the retention of the system of
'first past the post'. It was pointed out that this is the stan-
dard practice in almost every country where the British Parlia-
mentary system has been introduced; that it tends to produce
clear Parliamentary majorities, thereby helping the winning party
to provide effective government; and that it gives constituents
direct contact with a member of Parliament who has a special res-
ponsibility for looking after their interests.
The main arguments advanced in favour of proportional represen-
tation are, first, that it is absolutely fair, in that the pro-
portion of seats exactly reflects the proportion of votes cast
for each party; and, secondly, that it would be likely to compel
the formation of coalitions between parties and races which, in
the circumstances of British Guiana, would be most desirable.
In addition, I considered a variety of electoral devices, spe-
cially designed to encourage cross-voting between races and par-
ties. These included a proposal that votes cast by one race which
were matched with votes by other races should be given increased
value, thereby rewarding parties which secured a multi-racial
following. Although this scheme was at first sight attractive,
I felt obliged to reject it, since it involved registering voters
on separate racial rolls, which might in practice have the effect
of accentuating rather than diminishing racial consciousness.
I also examined a proposal that electors should be required to
cast first and second preference votes, the latter counting a
half or a quarter. The object was to encourage middle-of-the-road
parties, acceptable to the two main races. However, I discarded
this idea on the grounds that it might give a very unfair advan-
tage to the opposition parties if they were to make an electoral
pact, and that it could be frustrated by the formation of dummy
parties.
I considered a number of other ingenious proposals, but in
every case I found that the disadvantages outweighed the advan-
tages. I was thus forced to the conclusion that the choice lay
between the existing system of 'first past the post' or some
straightforward form of proportional representation. In deciding
between these two alternatives, I felt it right not only to weigh
the theoretical arguments for and against each system, but above
all to take into account the actual conditions and practical
problems in British Guiana.
The system of 'first past the post' has undoubtedly fulfilled
the principal claim of its supporters, in that it has in succes-
sive elections given to the winning party a substantial parlia-
mentary majority. In 1953 the P.P.P., with 51 per cent, of the
272
votes, obtained 75 per cent, of the seats. In 1957, with 47 per
cent, of the votes, it secured 64 per cent, of the seats. In 1961
the P.P.P. polled 43 per cent, of the votes and obtained 57 per
cent, of the seats, as compared with the P.N.C. party, which pol-
led only 2 per cent, fewer votes but obtained only 31 per cent.
of the seats.
The wide disparity between votes and seats which this system
has consistently produced in British Guiana has not unnaturally
engendered a sense of frustration and grievance among the opposi-
tion parties, which together polled a majority of the votes at
the last two elections. On the other hand, it is argued that a
certain measure of over-representation should be accepted as the
price of strong government.
Unfortunately, in British Guiana this electoral system, while
providing clear parliamentary majorities, has not provided strong
government. The fact is that the administration of the country
has been largely paralysed, the Government is insolvent, and law
and order can be maintained only with the help of outside troops.
Without attempting to apportion blame, the reason for this state
of affairs is that the ruling party has alienated the confidence
of the non-Indian communities, while they on their side have obs-
tructed and resisted the Government at every turn.
Against this background, I have had to consider whether the
situation would be improved by the introduction of proportional
representation. The supporters of this system claim that, since
no one race constitutes a majority of the electorate, all parties
will have to appeal for support to all races. In practice I doubt
whether either the Indian or the African party could, under its
present leadership, hope to increase appreciably its following
among the other racial groups. On the other hand, I am satisfied
that there is validity in the argument that in present circum-
stances, where no party commands an overall majority of votes,
proportional representation would be likely to result in the for—
mation of a coalition government of parties supported by differ-
ent races, and that this would go some way towards reducing the
present tension.
But the creation of temporary alliances in Parliament between
the representatives of rival groups, though a step in the right
direction, is not enough. Normal conditions will not be restored
until the present racial alignments are replaced by genuinely
political alignments based upon a common belief in political and
economic objectives.
So long as the whole political field is occupied by three par-
ties, each identified with a different racial group, it is hard
to see how non-racial politics can develop. It would seem, there-
fore, that the best hope of altering the present rigid pattern
may well lie in the formation of new parties which are not handi-
capped by past animosities. It must, however, be recognised that,
under a system based upon single-member constituencies, new par-
ties would have little hope of winning any seats and would prob-
ably never be formed.
In the light of these various considerations, I conclude that
it must be our deliberate aim to stimulate a radical change in
the present pattern of racial alignments. It was therefore my
duty to choose the electoral system which would be most likely
to encourage inter-party coalitions and multi-racial groupings
 273
and which would make it easy for new parties to form. Having thus
defined the objective, the answer was clear. British Guiana must
change over to a system of proportional representation.
It remained for me to consider which form of proportional rep-
resentation should be adopted. Of the various systems which have
been advocated at this conference, I am satisfied that the simp-
lest and fairest is that under which the whole country forms a
single constituency and seats are allocated in proportion to the
votes cast for each party. I am furthermore convinced that this
is the system best suited to the present circumstance of British
Guiana.
It remains to be decided whether, in order to obtain seats, a
party should be required to poll a qualifying minimum percentage
of the total national vote. During our discussions the figures
of two, five and ten per cent, were mentioned. In normal circums-
tances, it would be desirable to discourage splinter parties.
But, in view of the overriding importance of reshaping the poli-
tical pattern, there would be no advantage at present in rest-
ricting the creation of new parties, which at first will inevi-
tably be smal1.
However, once these new parties, some of which may still have
racial connections, have been brought into being, it is to be
hoped that some may amalgamate into larger multi-racial groupings
and contest subsequent elections together. To encourage this pro-
cess of fusion, it may well be desirable, after the first elect-
ion, to introduce, a minimum qualifying percentage. The level at
which this should be fixed need not be determined now.
No case has been made to show that a lowering of the voting age
would help to solve the problems which face British Guiana. I do
not therefore propose to make any change.
In order to prevent personation and other forms of cheating,
about which complaints have been made, there should be a fresh
registration of electors, who should be issued with reliable
identity cards. The work of registration, and the responsibility,
for preparing and conducting the first elections under the new
system should be entrusted to a special commissioner appointed
by the British Government from outside British Guiana. Subsequent
elections should be conducted by an independent commission to be
set up under the constitution.
Another question I was asked to decide was whether there should
be fresh elections before independence. If it were proposed to
retain the existing electoral system, there would be no justifi-
cation for holding further elections. However, since the system
is to be changed, it is clearly right that fresh elections under
the new system should be held before independence. Preparations
for them should be put in hand as soon as practicable.
After the elections are over, the British Government will
convene a conference to settle any remaining constitutional
issues, and to fix a date for independence.1

1. The elections early next year resulted in the P.P.P. with a 45.8% vote
winning 24 seats, the P.N.P. with 40.5% winning 22 and the United Front with
12.4% winning 7. There was sporadic rioting when Jagan refused to accept he
had no overall majority. Burnham's P.N.P. and d'Augier's U.F. formed a
coalition but Jagan did not resign. Two constitutional conferences had in 1962
274
78. CONSTITUTION ORDER-IN-COUNCIL, 23 June 19641
[On the House of Assembly (Part IV) i t was ordered that]
46. There s h a l l be, f o r B r i t i s h Guiana, a House of Assembly.
47.(1) Subject t o paragraph (2) of t h i s a r t i c l e , the House of
Assembly s h a l l consist of f i f t y - t h r e e members.
(2) For the purpose of r e t u r n i n g the said f i f t y - t h r e e members
t o the House of Assembly B r i t i s h Guiana s h a l l form a s i n g l e e l e c -
t o r a l area and the said members s h a l l be elected i n accordance
w i t h such system of p r o p o r t i o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , and otherwise
i n such manner, as may be provided by regulations made by the
Governor.
(3) Any regulations made under t h i s a r t i c l e may charge upon
the revenues or public funds of B r i t i s h Guiana any expenditure
incurred f o r the purposes of any such r e g u l a t i o n and the Governor
may, by warrant under h i s hand, authorise the withdrawal from the
p u b l i c funds of B r i t i s h Guiana of any sum of money c e r t i f i e d by
such warrant t o be required f o r the purpose of meeting any expen-
d i t u r e so charged.
(4) I f any person who i s not a member of the House of Assembly
i s elected t o be a Speaker of the House he s h a l l , by v i r t u e of
holding the o f f i c e of Speaker, be a member of the House i n a d d i -
t i o n t o the f i f t y - t h r e e members a f o r e s a i d .
(5) The powers of the Governor under t h i s a r t i c l e s h a l l be
exercised by him in his d i s c r e t i o n .
4S.(1) Subject t o the provisions of paragraph (2) of t h i s a r t i c l e
a person s h a l l be q u a l i f i e d t o be r e g i s t e r e d as an e l e c t o r f o r
e l e c t i o n t o the House of Assembly i f , and s h a l l not be so q u a l i -
f i e d unless, on the q u a l i f y i n g date, he -
(a) i s a B r i t i s h subject of the age of twenty-one years or up-
wards;
(b) i s resident i n B r i t i s h Guiana and e i t h e r has been so resident
f o r a period of two years immediately before the q u a l i f y i n g date
or i s domiciled i n B r i t i s h Guiana. 2
79. THE CONSTITUTION OF GUYANA, 16 May 19663
Whereas t h e People o f Guyana - ( a ) acknowledge t h a t reverence

failed to find a basis. Eric Williams' offer of mediation was refused. As in

1953 and 1962 British troops arrived to secure order.
1. Stat.R. No.921. This order-in-council granting virtually full responsible
internal self-government, provided a unicameral l e g i s l a t u r e , and a propor-
tional representation system of voting. The governor had power to c e r t i f y
defence or foreign policy l e g i s l a t i o n at discretion, and to reserve, again at
discretion, b i l l s affecting defence, foreign policy, the prerogative or the
constitution. H.M.'s G. power of disallowance was now only in matters relating
to Government Stock.
2. Under t h i s system of proportional representation new e l e c t i o n s took place
in August. Arrangements for independence were f i n a l l y planned a year l a t e r ,
in September 1965. Jagan and the P.P.P. boycotted t h i s constitutional
conference, but i t was agreed that Guyana should become a sovereign
independent s t a t e on 26 May 1966.
3. Stat.R. No.575. This constitution was scheduled to the Guyana independence
order-in-council, which provided for i t s establishment, for a high court and
parliament, appeals ( i n c l . to J.C.P.C.) and existing c i v i l servants (pensions
&c).
 275
for the Deity and respect for the inherent dignity and the equal
and inalienable rights of all men are the foundation of freedom,
justice and peace in society; (b) affirm the entitle-ment of all
men to the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual; (c)
recognise that the said rights and freedoms are best established
and secured in a democratic society, founded on the rule of law;
Now, therefore, the following articles, which make provision for
the government of Guyana as such a democratic society, shall have
effect as the Constitution of Guyana....
[§§3-20 provided for the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms
of the individual; §§21-9 for citizenship.]

PART II
Chapter IV - The President
30.(1) There shall be a President of Guyana, who shall be the
Head of State and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of
Guyana.1
(2) The President shall be elected by the National Assembly
in accordance with this article.
(3) A person shall not be eligible for election as President
unless he is a citizen of Guyana of the age of forty years or
upwards, and a person shall be disqualified for election as Pre-
sident if he is disqualified for election as a member of the As-
sembly by virtue of any provision of article 60 of this Constitu-
tion other than paragraph (1) or of any law enacted in pursuance
thereof other than a law enacted in pursuance of paragraph 2(a)
or (c) thereof.
(4) The President shall be elected by secret ballot at a meet-
ing of the Assembly held for the purpose of electing the Presi-
dent (in this article referred to as an 'election meeting;); and
each elected member of the Assembly shall be entitled to a single
vote in each ballot for the election of the President taken at
such a meeting (in this article referred to as a 'Presidential
ballot').
(5) An election meeting shall commence on such date (in this
article referred to as 'the Presidential election date') and at
such time as the President shall determine by order published in
the Gazette at least twenty-one days before the election date.
(6) A person shall not be a candidate for election as Presid-
ent at an election meeting unless he is nominated for election
or re-election as the President by a nominated paper which - (a)
is signed by him and by three more elected members of the Assem-
bly; and (b) is delivered to the Speaker at least fourteen days
before the Presidential election date.
(8) A candidate in a Presidential ballot shall be declared to
be elected if, and shall not be declared to be elected unless,
he receives the votes of more than half of all the elected mem-
bers of the Assembly.
(9) If in a Presidential ballot - (a) there are three or more
candidates; and (b) none of the candidates is elected; and (c)
one of the candidates receives a smaller number of votes than

1. When Guyana became a republic in 1970 its president had essentially the
same functions as the governors-general of other independent Commonwealth
Caribbean countries, i.e. titular, not executive.
276
each of the others, that one of the candidates shall not be a
candidate in any subsequent Presidential ballot at the same elec-
tion meeting.
(10) If in a Presidential ballot - (a) the conditions specified
in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of the preceding paragraph are sa-
tisfied but the condition specified in sub-paragraph (c) of that
paragraph is not; and (b) two of the candidates each receives the
same number of votes and that number is smaller than the number
of votes received by the other candidate or each of the other
candidates, as the case may be, a ballot shall forthwith be held
for the purpose of determining which of the two shall be treated
for the purpose of the preced-ing paragraph as the candidate
mentioned in sub-paragraph (c) thereof; and the candidate who
receives the smaller number of the votes cast in that ballot
shall be so treated and that paragraph shall apply accordingly.
(11) Where in a ballot taken in pursuance of the preceding
paragraph each candidate receives the same number of votes, one
of them, as determined by lot, shall be deemed to have received
the smaller number of votes.
(12) If in a Presidential ballot no candidate is declared elec-
ted, a further Presidential ballot shall be taken at the same el-
ection meeting; and an election meeting shall continue until a
candidate is declared elected in a Presidential ballot taken at
that meeting but may be adjourned from time to time for not more
than two days exclusive of the days on which and to which it is
adjourned.
(13) The Court of Appeal shall have exclusive jurisdiction to
hear and determine any question as to the validity of an election
of a President in so far as that question depends upon the quali-
fication of any person for election or the interpretation of this
Constitution; and any decision of that Court under this paragraph
shal1 be final ....
31.(1) Subject to the provisions of the next following paragraph,
a person holding the Office of President shall vacate that office
at the expiration of the period of six years beginning with the
day on which he was last elected as President.
(2) The Office of President shall become vacant before the ex-
piration of the said period - (a) if the person holding that of-
fice resigns it by writing under his hand addressed to the Spea-
ker; or (b) if, in pursuance of the preceding article, he or an-
other person is elected as President.
(3) A person elected as President shall be disqualified for
any other office, employment or appointment to which this para-
graph applies and accordingly on entering upon the duties of the
Office of President shall vacate any such other office, employ-
ment or appointment held by him.
(4) The preceding paragraph applies to the offices of Minis-
ter, Attorney General, Speaker, member, Clerk or Deputy Clerk of
the National Assembly, any Judge of the Supreme Court of Judica-
ture, member of the Elections Commission, the Judicial Service
Commission, the Public Service Commission or the Police Service
Commission, any public office, employment in any armed force of
Guyana and any paid appointment as a member or employee of a body
corporate established by law of Guyana for public purposes....
[§§33-7 provided for the executive authority, for ministers and cabinet,
for portfolios and tenure of office; §§38-9 dealt with the P.M.; §39 with
 277

the leader of the opposition; §40 with the exercise of the Governor-
General's powers.]

Chapter V. Part I - The Attorney General

42.(1) There shall be an Attorney General of Guyana who shall be
the principal legal adviser to the Government of Guyana and who
shall be appointed by the Governor-General.1
(2) A person shall not be qualified to be appointed as Attor-
ney General unless he is qualified to be appointed as a Puisne
Judge of the High Court and is a Commonwealth citizen.
(3) If the Attorney General is an elected member of the Natio-
nal Assembly, at the time of his appointment or subsequently be-
comes such a member, he shall be a Minister by virtue of holding
the office of Attorney General and the provisions of paragraphs
(4) and (5) of article 37 of this Constitution shall apply to the
Office of Attorney General.2
(4) If the Attorney General is not an elected member of the
Assembly but is qualified to be elected as such a member, he may
be appointed by the Governor-General to be a Minister....
(5) If an Attorney General appointed to be a Minister under
the preceding paragraph resigns his office as Attorney General
he shall also vacate his office as a Minister.
(6) If the Attorney General is not a Minister he shall vacate
his office if he ceases to be a Commonwealth Citizen or if his
appointment is revoked by the Governor-General....
(S) The powers of the Governor-General under this article
shall be exercised by him in accordance with the advice of the
Prime Minister.
[There were provisions for Parliamentary and permanent secretaries incl.
Secretary to the Cabinet and Director of Public Prosecutions (§§43-7);
for the prerogative of mercy and an advisory committee on its use (§§49-
50).]
Part I I - The Ombudsman3
52.(1) For the purpose of conducting i n v e s t i g a t i o n s i n accordance
w i t h the p r o v i s i o n s of t h i s Part of t h i s C o n s t i t u t i o n , there
s h a l l be an Ombudsman.
(2) The Ombudsman s h a l l be appointed by the Governor-General
a c t i n g on the recommendation of the Prime M i n i s t e r a f t e r c o n s u l -
t a t i o n w i t h the Leader of the Opposition.
(3) The Ombudsman s h a l l not perform the f u n c t i o n s of any pub-
l i c o f f i c e and s h a l l n o t , w i t h o u t the approval of the Prime M i n i -
s t e r i n each p a r t i c u l a r case, hold any other o f f i c e of emolument,
other than h i s o f f i c e as Ombudsman, or engage i n any occupation,
f o r reward o u t s i d e the d u t i e s of h i s o f f i c e .
(4) Subject t o the p r o v i s i o n s of the next f o l l o w i n g paragraph,
a person holding the o f f i c e of Ombudsman s h a l l vacate t h a t o f f i c e

1. Elsewhere in the independent t e r r i t o r i e s the A.G. was a normal m i n i s t e r i a l

appointment though expressly h i s p o r t f o l i o was l e g a l adviser t o the
government,
2. These a r t i c l e s provide for vacancy if the A.G. ceased t o be a member of the
assembly if the P.M. so d i r e c t e d or if the P.M. resigned or ceased t o be P.M.
3. No other independent Commonwealth country in the Caribbean had such an
office.
278
at the expiration of four years from the date of his appointment.
(5) The provisions of article 118 of this Constitution (which
relate to removal from office) shall apply, to the office of Om-
budsman, and for the purposes of paragraphs (4) and (6) of that
article the prescribed authority shall be the Prime Minister.1
53.(1) Subject to the provisions of this article the Ombudsman
may investigate any action taken by any department of Government
or by any other authority to which this article applies, or by
Ministers, officers or members of such department or authority,
being action taken in exercise of the administrative functions
of that department or authority on or after 26 May, 1966. . . . [any
complaints relating to injustice through administration made by the
complainant, a Minister or Assemblyman or on his own Initiative by the
Ombudsman if there was no judicial remedy: if removal of the officer
concerned was advised it would be investigated by a tribunal. The First
Schedule listed actions and matters not subject to such investigation by
the Ombudsman. He might refuse at discretion to consider matters over a
year old, or trivial, frivolous or vexatious, or where the complainant
was not sufficiently closely involved.]
54.(1) After conducting an investigation under this Part the Om-
budsman shall inform the department or authority concerned of the
result of that investigation and if he is of the opinion that any
person or body of persons has sustained injustice in consequence
of fault in administration, he shall inform that department or
authority of the reasons for that opinion and may make such re-
commendations for action by that department or authority as he
thinks fit.
(2) After conducting an investigation under this Part in pur-
suance of a complaint or a request for an investigation made by
a Minister or a member of the National Assembly, the Ombudsman
shall -
(a) if he is of the opinion that the complainant, or in the case
of an investigation conducted in pursuance of such a request, the
person or body of persons specified in the request has sustained
injustice in consequence of a fault in administration, inform the
person or body of persons who made the complaint or request that
he is of that opinion and the nature of the injustice that he
considers has been sustained;
(b) if he is of the opinion that the complainant or, in the case
of an investigation conducted in pursuance of such a request, the
person or body of persons specified in the request has not sus-
tained injustice, inform the person or body of persons who made
the complaint or request that he is of that opinion and the rea-
sons therefor.
(3) Where the Ombudsman has made recommendation under para-
graph (1 ) of this article and within a reasonable time thereafter
no action has been taken which appears to the Ombudsman adequate-
ly to remedy the injustice, he may lay before the Assembly a spe-
cial report on the case.
(4) The Ombudsman shall annually lay before the Assembly a ge-
neral report on the performance of his functions under this Part.
55. Parliament may make provision for such supplementary and an-

1. These articles provided for his removal from office for inability or
misbehaviour after recommendation of a tribunal.
 279
ciliary matters as may appear necessary or expedient in conse-
quence of any of the provisions of this Part....

Chapter V - The Parliament

57. There shall be a Parliament of Guyana, which shall consist
of Her Majesty1, and a National Assembly.... [Provisions were made
for membership, disqualification and vacation of seats (§61), for the
Speaker and Clerks (§§62-3).]

Part II - Elections
66.(1) The election of members of the National Assembly shall be
conducted by secret ballot in accordance with the system of pro-
portional representation prescribed by this article.
(2) Subject to the provisions of the next following paragraph-
(a) votes shall be cast throughout Guyana in favour of lists of
candidates;
(b) each elector shall have one vote and may cast it in favour
of any of the lists; and
(c) the seats of elected members in the Assembly shall be alloca-
ted between the lists in such a manner that the proportion that
the number of such seats allocated to each list bears to the num-
ber of votes cast in favour of the list is as nearly as may be
the same for each list.
(3) Parliament may make provision for the division of Guyana
into such number of electoral areas, not being more than half the
number of elected members of the Assembly, as Parliament may pre-
scribe and for the election in each such area of one member of
the Assembly, each elector having for this purpose one vote in
addition to the vote which he may cast in favour of a list of
candidates, but, if Parliament makes provision as aforesaid,
then -
(a) a person may stand as a candidate for election in any such
electoral area only if, in such manner as Parliament may presc-
ribe, he has declared that he supports, or has otherwise identi-
fied himself with one of the lists; and
(b) those seats in the Assembly for which members are not elected
in electoral areas as aforesaid shall be allocated between the
lists in accordance with the results of the voting throughout
Guyana in favour of lists in such manner that the proportion that
the number of seats allocated to each list, when added to the
number of members identified with that list elected in electoral
areas, bears to the number of votes cast in favour of that list
is as nearly as may be the same for each list.
(4) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution Parliament
may make provision for -
(a) the registration of electors;
(b) the manner in which lists of candidate shall be prepared and
entered for an election;
(c) the manner in which the number of seats to be allocated to
each list shall be calculated in order to give effect to the pro-
visions of paragraph (2) or paragraph (3), as the case may be,
of this article;
(d) for the combination of lists of candidates for the purpose

1. In 1970 Guyana became a republic.

280
of the allocation of seats (but not for the purpose of voting);
(e) for the extraction from the lists and the declaration of
names of the candidates who have been elected; and
(f) generally for the conduct of elections and for the giving
effect to the provisions of this article.
68.(1) There shall be an Elections Commission for Guyana consis-
ting of a Chairman and such other members as may be appointed in
accordance with the provisions of this article.
(2) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (6) of this arti-
cle, the Chairman of the Elections Commission shall be appointed
by the Governor-General, acting in accordance with the advice of
the Prime Minister, from among persons who hold or have held of-
fice as a judge of a court having unlimited jurisdiction in civil
and criminal matters in some part of the Commonwealth or a court
having jurisdiction in appeals from any other court.
(3) In addition to the Chairman, there shall be one member of
the Commission (hereinafter referred to as a 'representative mem-
ber') in respect of every list of candidates which at the elec-
tion next preceding the appointment of such member obtained not
less than five seats in the Assembly:
Provided that no appointment shall be made under this paragraph
during the period of three months immediately following the date
of an election....
(5) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (6) of this arti-
cle, a representative member shall be appointed by the Governor-
General, acting in accordance with the advice of the member of
the Assembly whose name appears first on the list in respect of
which the member is appointed or, if a majority of the members
of the Assembly who belong to that list notify the Governor-
General that he should act in accordance with the advice of some
other member of the Assembly who belongs to that list, in accor-
dance with the advice of that member:
Provided that if occasion arises for making an appointment
while Parliament stands dissolved this subsection shall have
effect as if Parliament had not been dissolved.
(6) A person shall be disqualified for appointment as a member
of the Commission if he is a public officer or an alien.
(7) A member of the Elections Commission shall vacate his
office -
(a) at the expiration of three months from the date of the
election next following this appointment; or
(b) if any circumstances arise that, if he were not a member of
the Commission, would cause him to be disqualified for appoint-
ment as such.
(8) The provision of article 118 of this Constitution (which
relates to removal from office) shall apply to the office of mem-
ber of the Elections Commission, and, for the purposes of para-
graphs (4) and (6) of that article, the prescribed authority,
shall be the Prime Minister:
Provided that, before tendering any advice to the Governor-
General under paragraph (4) of the said article in relation to
the representative member appointed in respect of a list other
than that to which the Prime Minister belongs, the Prime Minister
shall consult the person on whose advice, if the office of that
member were vacant, the Governor-General would act under para-
graph (5) of this article in appointing a person to fill the
 281

vacancy....
6 9 . ( 1 ) The E l e c t i o n s Commission s h a l l have such f u n c t i o n s connec-
ted w i t h or r e l a t i n g t o the r e g i s t r a t i o n of e l e c t o r s or the con-
d u c t o f e l e c t i o n s as a r e c o n f e r r e d upon i t by o r under t h i s Cons-
t i t u t i o n o r , s u b j e c t t h e r e t o , any A c t o f P a r l i a m e n t ; and s u b j e c t
t o t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h i s C o n s t i t u t i o n , t h e Commission - ( a ) s h a l l
e x e r c i s e g e n e r a l d i r e c t i o n and s u p e r v i s i o n o v e r t h e r e g i s t r a t i o n
o f e l e c t o r s and t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e conduct o f e l e c t i o n s ; and
( b ) s h a l l i s s u e such i n s t r u c t i o n s and t a k e such a c t i o n as appear
t o i t necessary o r e x p e d i e n t t o ensure i m p a r t i a l i t y , f a i r n e s s and
c o m p l i a n c e w i t h t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h i s C o n s t i t u t i o n o r o f any A c t
o f P a r l i a m e n t on t h e p a r t o f persons e x e r c i s i n g powers o r p e r f o r -
ming d u t i e s connected w i t h o r r e l a t i n g t o t h e m a t t e r s a f o r e s a i d .

P a r t I I I - Powers and Procedure o f P a r l i a m e n t

7 3 . ( 5 ) I f t h e N a t i o n a l Assembly, upon a m o t i o n i n t r o d u c e d by t h e
Prime M i n i s t e r and s u p p o r t e d by t h e v o t e s o f a m a j o r i t y o f a l l
t h e members o f t h e N a t i o n a l Assembly, r e s o l v e s t h a t , on such day
a f t e r t h e p a s s i n g o f t h e r e s o l u t i o n as may be s p e c i f i e d t h e r e i n ,
Guyana s h a l l become a R e p u b l i c 1 and a c c o r d i n g l y cease t o be a
p a r t o f Her M a j e s t y ' s dominions and t h a t f o r t h a t purpose t h e
a l t e r a t i o n s t o t h i s C o n s t i t u t i o n s e t o u t i n t h e second Schedule
t o t h i s C o n s t i t u t i o n s h a l l have e f f e c t . . . .
Provided t h a t -
( a ) n o t i c e o f a m o t i o n under t h i s paragraph s h a l l be g i v e n n o t
l e s s t h a n t h r e e months b e f o r e t h e N a t i o n a l Assembly proceeds upon
t h e m o t i o n ; and
( b ) n o t i c e o f such a m o t i o n s h a l l n o t be g i v e n b e f o r e 1 s t January
1969.
[Provisions were made for voting, quorum, introduction of b i l l s , summons
and dissolution (§§74-82); for the Courts, judges and appeals (§§83-92);
for Judicial and Public Service Commissions (§§93-6?).]
Second Schedule
A l t e r a t i o n s t o t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n t o have e f f e c t if a Resolution
i s passed i n accordance w i t h A r t i c l e 7 3 ( 5 ) .

(6) LEEWARD AND WINDWARD ISLANDS

80. LEEWARDS: GOVERNMENT NOTICE, 6 A p r i l , 19492

The S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e [Creech Jones] has r e c e n t l y had under
c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h e q u e s t i o n o f C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Reform i n t h e Wind-

1. A co-operative republic was e s t a b l i s h e d (17 March 1970) with Arthur Chury

elected as president for 6 y e a r s . The l a s t e l e c t i o n under t h i s 1966 c o n s t i -
t u t i o n took place in 1973. In 1978 a Constitution Amendment Act was passed by
the National Assembly removing the requirement for a referendum in §73 if
2/3rds of the e l e c t e d members of the Assembly approved. A referendum on 10
July 1978 permitted t h i s amendment. A new c o n s t i t u t i o n promulgated in October
1980 provided for an executive p r e s i d e n t , a National Assembly of 65 and a
National Congress of Local Democratic Organs responsible for local government.
These two bodies - Assembly and Congress - j o i n t l y c o n s t i t u t e d the Supreme
Congress of the People. Forbes Burnham was elected president (15 Dec. 1980).
2. Leeward Is. Gazette, 7 Apr. 1949, p.87. [See Vol.VII, pp.159-171: also
above Nos. 24-35.]
282
ward Islands and Leeward Islands.
He agrees that adult suffrage should be introduced at the next
election to Legislative Councils of the two groups. He considers
that the right to vote should be subject to a simple literacy
test. He also agrees to the removal of property qualifications
for candidates subject to further examination of the present
arrangement for deposits which candidates are required to make.
He has indicated, however, that as yet he has been unable to
give consideration to the establishment of wholly elected legis-
latures in the Windward Islands and Leeward Islands and for the
present this must be deferred.
In the Leeward Islands, it is proposed to establish a Committee
to examine and report upon the changes required in the law, to
meet the desired form of adult suffrage and literacy test and of
property qualifications and deposit. As it will take some time
for this Committee to report and for the necessary amendments to
be made in the law and subsequently for a new voters' list to be
compiled, it is proposed that the life of the Legislative Coun-
cils of Antigua, St. Kitts-Nevis and Montserrat should be exten-
ded for one year so that the General Elections due to be held in
those Presidencies in October of this year would be postponed
until 1950.

81. WINDWARDS: ROYAL INSTRUCTIONS TO GOVERNOR SIR ROBERT ARUNDELL,

10 August 19511
9.(1) The Executive Council, of each of the Islands, shall
consist of the following:- (i) Two, or, if the Governor is
present in the Executive Counci 1 , three, ex off icio Members; (ii)
One Member, being a person holding a public office in the Island,
appointed as provided in Clause 11 of these Instructions, who
shall be styled the Official Member; (iii) One Member, being a
Nominated Member of the Legislative Council of the Island,
appointed as provided in Clause 11 of these instructions, who
shall be styled the Nominated Member; and (iv) Three Members,
being Elected Members of the Legislative Council of the Island,
elected as provided in Clause 12 of these Instructions, who shall
be styled Elected Members. . . .[By a 2/3rd majority vote in the Legislat-
ive Council their appointment could be revoked.]
10. The ex officio Members shall be:- (i) the Administrator, if
the Governor is present in the Executive Council; and (ii) in the
case of Grenada, the Attorney-General, and, in the case of Saint
Vincent, Saint Lucia and Dominica, the Crown Attorney; and (iii)
in the case of Grenada, Saint Vincent and Saint Lucia, the
Treasurer, and, in the case of Dominica, the Financial Secretary.
11.(1) The Official Members and the Nominated Members shall be
appointed by the Governor by Instrument under the Public Seal of
the Island concerned.
(2) The Governor shall forthwith report to Us through a
Secretary of State every appointment made under paragraph (1 ) of

1. Stat R. 1951 App. Brigadier Arundell was governor of the Windwards (1948-
53) and later of Barbados (1953-9) and also acting governor-general of the
West Indies (1959). He had served in Tanganyika, Nyasaland, Uganda and the
Middle East and had been the U.K. resident member of the Caribbean Commission
in Washington (1946-7).
 283
this Clause.1
12.(1) At the first meeting of the Legislative Council of an
Island after the commencement of the Legislative Council Order-
in-Council constituting that Council, and thereafter at the first
meeting after every dissolution thereof or as soon as convenient
after such meeting, the Legislative Council shall elect from
among its Elected Members, three Members to serve as Elected Mem-
bers of the Executive Council of that Island.
(2) Whenever the seat of an Elected Member of an Executive
Council becomes vacant from any cause other than the dissolution
of the Legislative Council of that Island, the Legislative Coun-
cil shall, as soon as convenient, in like manner,elect a Member
to fill the vacancy...
17. Whenever upon any special occasion the Governor or an Admini-
strator desires to obtain the advice of any person in an Island
touching Our affairs therein he may, in writing, summon such
person to the Executive Council of that Island for such special
occasion...
19.(1) The Executive Councils shall not be summoned except by the
authority of the Governor or of the Administrator....
20.(1) The Governor shall, so far as he considers it to be neces-
sary for the exercise of his powers and the performance of his
duties, attend the meetings of the Executive Council of the Is-
land in which he is, from time to time, present; and, whenever
he shall so attend, he shall preside.
(2) Every Administrator shall, so far as is practicable, at-
tend at all meetings of the Executive Council of the Island of
which he is Administrator; and, whenever he shall so attend in
the absence of the Governor, he shall preside.
(3) In the absence of both the Governor and the Administrator,
such Member as the Governor may appoint, or, in default of such
appointment or in the absence of any Member so appointed, the
senior Member of the Executive Council actually present shall
preside.

82. GOVERNOR KENNETH BLACKBURNE: ADDRESS, 15 October, 19512

It is now ten months since I announced that the Secretary of
State had agreed to the introduction of constitutional reform on
the lines of the constitutional reform granted in the Windward
Islands. The draft legislation and constitutional instruments to
give effect to these changes were sent to London in January, and
at that time I hoped that we could have the elections in August
so that the new Councils would be able to consider the Estimates
for 1952. Alas - all our hopes and plans have come to nothing ow-
ing to the delay in finalising the draft legislation. I would not
attempt to excuse the delay; it should not have occurred; but in
fairness to the legal experts who had to handle this work in Lon-
don I should say that the Leeward Islands have one of the most
complicated constitutions in the world. It has been necessary to

1. Apart from the composition, the powers and functions of the executive
council and the relationships between the governor and administrators were
unchanged. 2. Lee. Is. Gazette Supplement, 18 Oct. 1951. Bljicjcburne was
governor of the Leewards (1950-57) and then of Jamaica (1957-63) where he
became the first governor-general.
284
prepare not only three Constitution and Elections Ordinances for
the three Presidencies concerned, but also a new Leeward Islands
Act, and new Letters Patent and Royal Instructions. One verbal
change in one of these drafts may affect all the others, and I
know that the draftsmen have been faced with a task of extreme
complexity....
This is not the place to refer to opposition in some places to
certain aspects of the constitutional proposals; the proposals
must first be considered by the Legislatures concerned. But this
is the place to make my own position clear, and also the position
of the Government Service as a whole.
As I said in my address last year, no administration, however
benevolent and efficient, can make lasting progress unless it has
the force of public opinion behind it. In this Colony perhaps
more than in most, there is a desperate need to associate the
public with the Government. Constitutional reform is vital to the
further development of this Colony, whatever anyone may say to
the contrary. But there is a danger - one very obvious danger -
which we must face. A constitution which merely gives power to
the elected members without at the same time giving them some
responsibility for their actions can lead to disaster. It has
been said - by myself among others - that the constitutional pro-
posals for the Leeward Islands grant power to the Legislature
without giving it responsibility as well; the Legislature can
oppose and block any financial provision or any legislation, but
its representatives in the Executive Council, being in the minor-
ity, can plead an alibi and say that they have no responsibility
for the actions of the Government. That is perfectly true; but
I believe that we can make these new constitutions work provided
that we all sincerely try to do so. For my part I intend to see
that as much responsibility as possible is placed upon the elec-
ted members within the framework which may be approved by His
Majesty's Government; and I pledge myself and the Government Ser-
vice to do all in our power to see that the new constitutions are
operated in this way. I know that there are Jeremiahs who say
that the economy of the Colony will be ruined or that the effi-
ciency of the Civil Service will be undermined. I refuse to be-
lieve that the people of the Leeward Islands are any less sen-
sible than those in other parts of the world who are already en-
joying greater power and responsibility in managing their own
affairs. But let there be no misunderstanding on this score. The
Government Service and I can - as the saying goes - 'fall over
backwards1 in trying to make the new constitutions work; but our
somersaults will be of no avail unless we can enter this adven-
ture with the co-operation of the elected members.
83. ANTIGUA: CONSTITUTION AND ELECTIONS ORDINANCE, 1 December 19511
Part II - Constitution and Powers of Council etc.
4. The Council shall consist of the Administrator, two ex offi-
cio members, three nominated members and eight elected members.

1. Laws of Antigua: Ordinance No.10 of 1951. Similar constitutions in 1951

were authorised for Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and St. Kitts-
Nevis-Anguilla. In 1967 Anguilla repudiated government from St. Kitts, a
commissioner was appointed, and in 1976 the island was given a separate con-
 285

5. The ex officio members of the Council shall be the Crown At-

torney and the Treasurer of the Presidency.. . . [which at discretion
the Administrator could summon officials when he f e l t i t desirable, but
(as previously) those not legislative councillors could not vote.]
7. The elected members of the Council s h a l l be persons q u a l i f i e d
f o r e l e c t i o n i n accordance w i t h the provisions o f , and elected
i n the manner provided by, t h i s O r d i n a n c e . . . .
10. Subject t o the provisions of section 11 of t h i s Ordinance,
any person who - (a) i s a B r i t i s h subject of the age of twenty-
one years or upwards; and (b) has resided i n the Presidency f o r
a period of twelve months immediately preceding the date of h i s
nomination f o r e l e c t i o n , or i s domiciled i n the Presidency and
i s resident t h e r e i n at the date a f o r e s a i d , s h a l l be q u a l i f i e d t o
be elected as an elected member of the Council , and no other per-
son s h a l l be q u a l i f i e d t o be so elected o r , having been so e l e c -
t e d , s h a l l s i t or vote i n the C o u n c i l . . . . [Disqualifications for Mem-
bership were listed.]
20. The A d m i n i s t r a t o r , i f present, s h a l l preside at meetings of
the Council, and in h i s absence the Deputy President [elected from
among the nominated and elected members] o r , i n the absence of the
Deputy President or if there be no Deputy President, the ex offi-
cio member present who stands f i r s t i n order of precedence s h a l l
preside.
21. The Governor s h a l l have the r i g h t of addressing the Council
at any time when he s h a l l t h i n k f i t . . . .
24. Subject t o the provisions of t h i s Ordinance a l l questions
proposed f o r decision i n the Council s h a l l be determined by a
m a j o r i t y of votes of those present and v o t i n g . The Administrator
or other member presiding s h a l l not have an o r i g i n a l vote on any
question, but s h a l l have a casting vote i f the votes s h a l l be
equally d i v i d e d .
25.(1) The Governor may at any time, by proclamation, summon,
prorogue or dissolve the Council.
(2) The Governor s h a l l dissolve the Council a t the e x p i r a t i o n
of three years from the date of the r e t u r n of the f i r s t w r i t a t
the l a s t preceding general e l e c t i o n , i f i t s h a l l not have been
sooner d i s s o l v e d . . . .
27. Subject t o the provisions of t h i s Ordinance and the Standing

s t i t u t i o n . When f i n a l separation was effected from St. Kitts-Nevis (merged in

1882) in 1980 (the l a t t e r becoming an independent member of the Commonwealth
in 1983) Anguilla remained a colony of the Crown, a t i t s own wish, as did
Bermuda - a f t e r a referendum in 1995. In 1996 Vance Amory, premier of Nevis,
gave n o t i c e t h a t Nevis would secede from i t s federal union with St. K i t t s : i t
was concerned with the crime in St. K i t t s and control over i t s own off-shore
s e c t o r . A federal government office had been planned for Nevis, which Amory
regarded as a t h r e a t t o h i s administration and ' a c a l l o u s disregard for the
r i g h t s of a l l N e v i s i a n s ' . Nevis had 3 members in a j o i n t parliament of 11. But
when the referendum took place in August 1998, only 61.8% of those voting in
Nevis supported secession, and since such a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change required a
two-thirds majority, Nevis could not become independent. How d i f f e r e n t in the
U.K. when e a r l i e r t h a t year in a referendum in Wales a mere 50.3% of those few
voting was regarded by a fervent government as s u f f i c i e n t support to s e t up
a Welsh assembly and change a c o n s t i t u t i o n which had been in existence for
over 450 years - since 1543. [Vol.I, p.133],
286
Orders of the Council, any member may introduce any Bill or pro-
pose any motion for debate in, or may present any petition to,
the Council and the same shall be debated and disposed of accord-
ing to the Standing Orders: Provided that, except with the recom-
mendation or consent of the Administrator signified thereto, the
Council shall not proceed upon any Bill, amendment, motion or pe-
tition which, in the opinion of the Administrator or other presi-
ding member, would - (a) dispose of or charge any public revenue
or public funds of the Presidency or revoke or alter any disposi-
tion thereof or charge thereon, or impose, alter or repeal any
rate, tax or duty; or (b) suspend the Standing Orders of the
Council or any of them.
28. Subject to the provisions of this Ordinance, it shall be law-
ful for the Governor, with the advice of the Council, to make
laws for the peace, order and good government of the Presi-
dency. . .
31.(1) If the Governor shall consider that it is expedient1 -
(a) in the interests of public order, public faith or of good
government (which expressions shall, without prejudice to their
generality, include the responsibility of the Presidency as a
territory within the British Commonwealth of Nations and all
matters pertaining to the creation or abolition of any public
office or to the appointment, salary or other conditions of
service of any public officer); or
(b) in order to secure detailed control of the finances of the
Presidency during such time as, by virtue of the receipt of
financial assistance by the Presidency from His Majesty's Ex-
chequer for the purpose of balancing the annual budget or other-
wise, such control rests with His Majesty's Government,2 that
any Bill introduced, or any motion proposed, in the Council
should have effect, then, if the Council should fail to pass such
Bill or motion within such time and in such form as the Govern-
ment may think reasonable and expedient, the Governor, at any
time in his discretion, may, notwithstanding any provisions of
this Ordinance, or of any other law in force in the Presidency
or of any Standing Orders of the Council, declare that such Bill
or motion shall have effect as if it had been passed by the Coun-
cil, either in the form in which it was so introduced or proposed
or with such amendments as the Governor shall think fit which
have been moved or proposed in the Council or any Committee
thereof; and thereupon the said Bill or motion shall have effect
as if it had been so passed, and in the case of any such Bill,
the provisions of this Ordinance relating to assent to Bills and
disallowance of laws shall have effect accordingly....
Part III - Electoral Districts and Registration of Voters
42.(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) of this sect-
ion, every person who - (a) has attained the age of twenty-one
years; and (b) is not a lunatic so found under any law in force
in the Presidency; and (c) is a British subject; and (d) has re-

1. When amended in 1956 a proviso stated that the governor should exercise his
power to certify laws on the advice of the executive council save when the
secretary of state or urgent necessity allowed him to ignore that advice.
2. This ensured Treasury supervision of finances in territories receiving aid.
 287
sided in the Presidency for twelve months immediately preceding
the date of registration as a voter or is domiciled in the Presi-
dency and is resident therein at the date of such registration;
and (e) is not disqualified under the provision of this Ordinance
from being registered as a voter, shall be entitled to be regis-
tered as a voter and, when registered, to vote at an election.
(2) No person shall be registered as a voter or be entitled
to vote at an election who has been sentenced by any court in His
Majesty's dominions or in any territory under His Majesty's pro-
tection to death, penal servitude, or imprisonment for a term ex-
ceeding twelve months, and has not either suffered the punishment
to which he was sentenced or such other punishment as by compe-
tent authority may have been substituted for the same or received
a free pardon from His Majesty.

84. GOVERNOR SIR KENNETH BLACKBURNE: ADDRESS, 6 January 19531

The past year...has seen the introduction of new constitutions
in Antigua, in St. Kitts-Nevis and Anguilla, in Montserrat, and
in the Federal Government. Even more important, it has seen the
introduction of means whereby the elected members in all the four
Presidencies can exercise a far greater influence on Government
policies and can keep a far closer watch on the execution of
those policies; it has seen the first step taken towards the int-
roduction of a full ministerial system of government.... I have
mentioned the constitutional changes first because I believe that
these changes have contributed more than anything else to such
progress as has been made during the past year. The impact made
by the elected members as Chairman of Committees in Antigua,
Montserrat and the Virgin Islands has been considerable. And I
have no doubt that the 'Members' in St. Kitts will produce the
same result when they have had as much time in office as those
in the other three Presidencies. Although many of us complain
that the pace is still too slow, and that many problems still
remain unsolved, there can be no doubt that the ideas and driving
force provided by the elected members has encouraged the initi-
ation of new projects, and has given a faster tempo to every form
of development.

85. THE LEEWARD AND WINDWARDS CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE: REPORT,

26 June, 19592

IV Powers of the A d m i n i s t r a t o r s
10. Legislative Powers. The Conference agreed that the existing
power of the Governors t o secure the enactment of a B i l l r e j e c t e d
by the L e g i s l a t i v e Council should be a b o l i s h e d . The Conference
also agreed t h a t the A d m i n i s t r a t o r should be r e q u i r e d t o reserve
f o r Her M a j e s t y ' s pleasure B i l l s which f a l l i n t o any of the f o l -

1. Lee. I s . Gazette 22 Jan. 1953. The experiment of a committee system [see

Moyne report: Vol.VII pp.81ff.] had been put into effect in the islands and
in the federal government.
2. P.P.1958-9 X (804) p.701. The recommendations made in t h i s report were put
into e f f e c t in 1959. [For the 19 Nov. 1936 constitutions see Vol.VII pp.163-7,
170.1
288
lowing categories:-
(a) Bills which appear to him to be inconsistent with Her Majes-
ty's Government's international obligations;
(b) Bills which appear to him likely to prejudice the Royal Pre-
rogative;
(c) Bills which are inconsistent with the Constitutional Instru-
ments (including in the case of Antigua, Montserrat and St.
Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, Bills amending or repealing the Constitu-
tion Ordinance of the Territory);
(d) Bills which appear to him to prejudice the efficiency of the
Public Service, the Police, the Judiciary or the Audit Service.
The Conference also agreed that in deciding whether a Bill
falls into one of these categories the Administrator should act
in his discretion.... [H.M.'s power of disallowance would be retained.]

V The Legislative Council

14. Number of Elected Members. The Trinidad Conference had propo-
sed that the Legislative Council of each Territory should include
not less than nine Elected Members, except in Montserrat where
there should be seven. This would involve a minimum increase of
two seats in each Territory. It was stated that this proposal was
desirable for the reason, inter alia, that with an Executive
Council composed of five Unofficial Members the Legislature tend-
ed to be unduly dominated by the Executive Council. In respect
of Dominica, the special point was made that because of the area
of the Island and the peculiar difficulties of communication it
was desirable in any case to increase the number of constituen-
cies. Thus the numbers would be seven Elected Members each for
Montserrat, nine Elected Members for St. Vincent, ten Elected
Members each for Antigua, Grenada, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla and
St. Lucia and eleven Elected Members for Dominica.
15. Number of Nominated Members. The Trinidad Conference had pro-
posed that the number of Nominated Members should be reduced from
three to two in all Territories except Montserrat where they
should be reduced from two to one. The conference agreed that
each of the Territories should in future have two Nominated Mem-
bers in their Legislative Council, except Montserrat which should
have one Nominated Member.
16. Method of appointing Nominated Members. . . It was agreed that
the Nominated Members should be appointed by the Administrator
in his discretion after consultation with the Chief Minister and
with such other persons as he saw fit to consult. It was also ag-
reed, following the precedent adopted in Trinidad, that if it was
necessary in order to provide the majority party with a reason-
able working majority in the Legislative Council one out of the
two Nominated Members would be appointed in such a way as to se-
cure this. This provision would be embodied in a despatch to the
Administrators.
17. Official Members. The Trinidad Conference had recommended
that in future the only official Member of the Legislative Coun-
cil should be the Law Officer, except in Montserrat where the
Financial Secretary should also be a member. The Conference en-
dorsed the recommendation.
18. Presiding in the Legislative Council.. . The Conference agreed
that the Legislative Council of each of the Territories except
Montserrat should in future be presided over by a Speaker elected
 289
by all the members of the Council from either within or without
the Council and that the provisions governing the qualifications
and tenure of office of a Speaker elected from outside the Coun-
cil should be similar to those contained in the Federal Constitu-
tion. The Conference also agreed, in accordance with the wishes
of the Montserrat Delegation that the Legislative Council in
Montserrat should continue for the time being to be presided over
by the Administrator rather than by an elected Speaker. The Con-
ference also agreed that the Deputy Speaker should be elected in
the same way as the Speaker, though he should be elected from
among the members of the Legislative Council. The Conference
agreed that the Speaker and anyone for the time being presiding
in his place should have only a casting vote....

86. GRENADA: (a) GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCEMENT, 20 December 19541

There is yet another announcement of great importance that I
have to make today. It concerns one of the items on the Order
Paper - the Committee System. On the threshold of West Indian
Federation which we hope will materialise within our lifetime,
and with the possibility of Constitutional Advance as a result
of the potential of Federation within this region, it is proposed
that, in Grenada, an opportunity should be furnished to members
of the Legislative Council to have more than a mere nodding
acquaintance with the machinery and operation of Government cor-
respondence and business, and a greater working knowledge than
they now have through their contact with the Administrative
machine in Finance Committee and in Executive Council. No pro-
vision exists in the Constitution for a Committee System, but it
was suggested and recommended by the Royal Commission who came
to these parts in 1938-39 that some such system might, with
profit, be introduced in these Islands.
I cannot speak with absolute certainty, but I have some recol-
lection that it was the idea of the Royal Commission that people
other than members of the Executive and Legislative Councils who
had expert and technical knowledge in particular fields might be
asked to serve on these Committees together with members of the
Legislature.
In the Leeward Islands and in St Vincent, over the last two to
four years, a similar system to that which it is now proposed to
introduce here, has been operating. In the Leeward Islands it has
advanced to the point where the Chairmen of these Committees have
been provided with desks in the central Secretariat so that they
could be on the spot to see the normal day to day operation of
Government correspondence and business.
In St. Vincent that step has only recently been taken. They
have been operating their Committees for the past two years. I
had the honour of introducing the system in St. Vincent.
Before going into any details of the system, I might say that
it has at least, this benefit: because of the greater acquaint-
anceship of members of the Legislature with Government correspon-
dence and Government business through this system, St. Vincent

1. [See Vol. VII, No.53] Grenada Leg. Co. Mins. 1954 pp.19-21. C.B. Gibbs,
the acting Administrator, was president of the council.
290
who formerly took as much as three weeks in 1951 to get through
their Finance Committee Budget Sessions, were able recently to
get through their Budget Session of Finance Committee in 1i days.
That can be attributed, I think to the system, and it has been
stated with certainty by the Administrator of St. Vincent that
the Committee System has been mainly responsible for the expe-
ditious handling of such matters.
So far as the bones of this Committee System are concerned, the
Unofficial Members of the Legislative Council will be divided in-
to three Committees. The Committees will be as follows: 1. Trade
and Production Committee... 2. Communications and Works Commit-
tee... 3. Education and Social Services....
Each Committee will be briefed with the responsibility for dis-
cussing the subjects which come within its purview. These Commit-
tees will be purely advisory to the Administration, Finance Com-
mittee and Executive Council.
Each Committee will comprise four members, one of whom will be
a Nominated Member. Because the total membership of the Unoffi-
cial of this Council is 11, it will have to be arranged for one
Member of the Legislative Council to sit on two Committees.
At a later stage in this meeting, Honourable Members will be
invited to go into the question of the allocation of the member-
ship of this Council among these proposed Committees. At their
inaugural meetings, each Committee will elect its own Chairman.
In so far as the operation of the Committee System vis-a-vis
the Secretariat is concerned, routine subjects which come to the
Administrator and Government Office for attention will be dealt
with as at present. For instance, suppose there is a question of
expenditure by some Department on some specific service for which
provision already exists in the Estimates, and the Head of the
Department is probably merely seeking the Administrator's advice
or authority as to how the money relating to some small item
should be spent, that would hardly be a matter for top-level dis-
cussions by a Committee. Purely routine matters, therefore, will
continue to be dealt with as at present even though some of them
might be matters coming within the scope of a Committee's
business...
There are one or two points that I would like to make about the
operation of the Committee System for the information of Honour-
able ,'Members, pending my ci rculation of an explanatory memoran-
dum to them on the subject. Each Committee will have its own Sec-
retary who will have to be a responsible officer because he will
have to prepare memoranda for circulation to Members of the Com-
mittee and will have to be its Executive Officer. Therefore a
reasonably senior, responsible and qualified Civil Servant will
have to be made the Secretary of each Committee.
The subjects which would be put to the various Committees by
the Administrator would be subjects which would normally have to
be dealt with finally by the Executive Council or Finance Commit-
tee. If a Committee needed information from some outside source,
the secretary to the Committee has forwarded its recommendations
to the Administrator, the Secretariat will take up the subject
from that point: the Administration may either make a decision
on the basis of the Committee's recommendation, or it may be sent
on for further advice from either Executive Council or Finance
Committee. If some financial matter is involved the Administrator
 291
will send it to Finance Committee, but if it is a question of
policy he will send it to Executive Council.
If a Committee feels that it needs more information on a sub-
ject, or that it would like to quiz the Head of Department con-
cerned, the Head of the Department would be invited to attend a
meeting of the Committee to furnish his views and the answers to
such reasonable and pertinent questions as the Committee may ask.
Either the Secretary or the Chairman of a Committee will forward
the Committee's recommendations to the Administrator.
All advice and recommendations from the Committee or Chairman
will be recorded in writing and signed by the Chairman or by the
Secretaries on behalf of the Committees. The Secretaries will
furnish the Chairman with all available information within their
knowledge of the subjects coming within the sphere of the Commit-
tee's business. I may point out that the Chairman and Members of
a Committee are not entitled to issue orders to Government Offi-
cers. But they are entitled to make suggestions regarding the
Government Departments coming within their sphere of influence,
provided that those suggestions are made in writing and addressed
to the Administrator and not to the Head of the Department con-
cerned.
The Chairmen of Committees may invite Heads of Departments to
attend meetings. They can ask Heads of Departments to discuss
matter with them at a meeting of the Committee or outside of the
Committee. They can ask Heads of Departments to accompany them
when visiting institutions and so on. In the event of a differ-
ence of opinion between the Head of a Department and the Chairman
of a Committee the matter will be decided by the Administrator.
It will be possible for Finance Committee and Executive Council
to have the benefit of the prior knowledge of members of the Com-
mittee of a particular subject, and discussions in Executive
Council and Finance Committee could thereby be facilitated. Apart
from the Officials who will be present there will be four Unof-
ficial Members who had already discussed and become acquainted
with the subject in the Committee concerned.
The recommendations made by a Committee will require ratifica-
tion either by Executive Council who is the policy-making body
or by Legislative Council who makes laws and votes funds. It must
be remembered that the Committee System to be introduced in
Grenada is not a Ministerial System because the Committees are
purely advisory and executive authority still remains in the
hands of the Administrator with the advice of Executive Council.
By the introduction of these Committees, however, it is hoped
that the Administrator will obtain from Unofficial Members more
practical assistance.
Provision will be made for a desk and an office for each Chair-
man of a Committee in the premises of Government Office so that
the Chairman will be in close touch with his Secretary and with
the files of Government Office which will have to be referred to
from time to time. Arrangements are also being made for a larger
office attached to the Chairman's Office which will accommodate
the Secretary of the Committee and another clerk attached to that
particular Committee. The larger office will also be utilised for
Committee meetings. The Committees will decide whether they will
have regular meetings or ad hoc meetings as and when there is a
sufficiency of subjects for discussion. The Chairman will be the
292

person who will indicate to the Secretary whenever he desires to

hold a meeting of the Committee. Accommodation arrangements are
now in progress and it is hoped that the Committee System will
be brought into operation as early a practicable in the coming
year.
I have attempted to give you a rough outline of this Committee
System which it is proposed to introduce. I have not the sligh-
test doubt that this will represent a considerable advance, of
benefit not only to all members of the Legislative Council who,
as I have stated before, will thereby get an opportunity of
learning more of what goes on in so far as the Administrative
machine is concerned. On the other hand, the Administration will
benefit from the advice of the Committees who will go into the
subjects with which they deal in greater detail than it has been
possible for members of the Legislature to do in the past.
It is hoped that there will be less friction between the Admi-
nistration and the Legislative Council which, at times in the
past has assumed the role of a kind of opposition party - Govern-
ment officials and the Administration being regarded as the Go-
vernment -. . .
(b) REGINALD MAUDLING: STATEMENT, 26 June 19621
[He was circulating in the Official Report a statement issued on 18
June by the CO.]
I have taken t h i s a c t i o n w i t h very great r e g r e t and only be-
cause the Chief M i n i s t e r of Grenada l e f t me w i t h no a l t e r n a t i v e .
Not only d i d he do a l l i n h i s power t o prevent the i n q u i r y being
h e l d : but h i s comments on the Report also showed t h a t he comple-
t e l y f a i l e d t o appreciate the seriousness of i t s f i n d i n g s . The
only conclusion I could draw, t h e r e f o r e , was t h a t i f he remained
i n o f f i c e under the c o n s t i t u t i o n then i n f o r c e , the same f i n a n -
c i a l malpractices and the same t h r e a t s against the C i v i l Service
would c o n t i n u e . This i s a s i t u a t i o n which I cannot accept as long
as I am responsible f o r good government i n Grenada and f o r the
proper expenditure of United Kingdom moneys provided f o r the
territory.
I very much hope, however, t h a t i t w i l l be possible t o hold
f r e s h e l e c t i o n s i n Grenada i n the f a i r l y near f u t u r e and t h a t the
normal course of constitutional development can shortly be
resumed...
Following is the statement:
The Grenada ( C o n s t i t u t i o n ) O r d e r - i n - C o u n c i l , 1962, provides
w i t h e f f e c t from today, and u n t i l the next General E l e c t i o n i s
held i n the t e r r i t o r y , f o r the d i s s o l u t i o n of the L e g i s l a t i v e and
Executive Councils and f o r the suspension of those p r o v i s i o n s of
the e x i s t i n g c o n s t i t u t i o n r e l a t i n g t o the Executive Council and

1. Hansard Comm. 661 947-9. In 1950 all the Windward Islands received iden-
t i c a l l e g i s l a t u r e s - the Administrator with c a s t i n g v o t e , t h e A.G. and finan-
c i a l s e c r e t a r y , 3 nominees, and 8 e l e c t e d members who e l e c t e d from t h e i r
number 3 executive c o u n c i l l o r s . (In 1956 a system of executive committees was
introduced.) But in Grenada the 1950 reform led t o violence when Eric Gairy,
a d i s c i p l e of Uriah Butler, won 6 of the 8 s e a t s and intimidated the o t h e r s .
Now for f i n a n c i a l i r r e g u l a r i t i e s the c o n s t i t u t i o n was being suspended [Vol.VI
p . 6 3 5 ] . James Lloyd (1957-62) and Lionel Pinard (1962-4) were a d m i n i s t r a t o r s .
 293
to the functions of Ministers. During this period the Administra-
tor will have the sole responsibility for the government of the
territory. The Order-in-Council also provides that after the next
General Election the constitution which came into effect on the
1st January, 1969 (the Grenada (Constitution) Order-in-Counci1,
1959) will be re-introduced subject to a number of changes. The
main changes will be to give the Administrator wider reserved
powers to act contrary to the advice of his Ministers than he
possessed under the former constitution; and to empower the Ad-
ministrator, acting in his discretion, to appoint an official
Minister of Finance. It is hoped, subject to future developments,
to arrange for a general election to be held within the reason-
ably near future.
The Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Control of
Public Expenditure in Grenada during 1951 and subsequently was
published as a White Paper on 22nd May, 1962 (Cmnd. 1735). This
was an independent Commission, of which the Chairman was a West
Indian Judge. Its main findings were as follows:-
(1) The Minister of Finance (Mr. E.M. Gairy who is also Chief
Minister) had disregarded and contravened the laws and regula-
tions governing the control of expenditure;
(2) Expenditure has been incurred wastefully or unnecessarily
through failure by Ministers to seek or refusal to accept the
advice of the civil servants;
(3) The Executive had deliberately destroyed the morale of the
civil service by an undesirable interference with administrative
duties and by improper threats against the security of office;
(4) The Civil Service had been induced by this interference and
these threats to commit or condone improprieties or irregular-
ities in the expenditure of public funds.
After considering Mr. Gairy's comments on the report, the Sec-
retary of State has decided that firm measures must be taken to
remedy the situation. As a first step the Ministers concerned
will be relieved of their offices and the existing constitution
will be temporarily suspended. From now and until a new general
election can be held the Administrator will have the sole respon-
sibility for the Government of the territory.
It clearly will not be possible immediately after the next
general election to restore the same constitution as existed be-
fore and under which these disturbing events occurred. There must
for a trial period be adequate safeguards to prevent any future
recurrence of the malpractices revealed by the Commission of
Inquiry, in particular in regard to the expenditure of public
funds. In the constitution which will take effect after the next
general election, therefore, the Administrator will have a wider
reserved executive power than he has possessed in the immediate
past: he will be empowered to act contrary to the advice of his
Ministers if he considers it necessary to do so in the interests
of public order, public faith or good government. He will also
be given a reserved power enabling him to ensure the enactment
of legislation which the Legislative Council has failed to pass
if he considers that its enactment is necessary in the interests
of public order, public faith or good government. As already
stated he will also be empowered to appoint an official Minister
of Finance.
On receipt of the Report, the Secretary of State found it ne-
294
cessary as he had already announced in Parliament, to suspend any
further issues of grant-in-aid or Colonial Development and Wel-
fare funds for the time being. Now that the necessary constitu-
tional safeguards have been introduced to ensure that proper con-
trol is exercised over the expenditure of public money, the issue
of United Kingdom funds to the territory on the normal basis will
be resumed.
The Secretary of State regrets the necessity to take these
measures, and he hopes that it will be possible to hold a new
General Election in the island within a short time.

(c) COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE CONTROL OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE, 1921-62:

REPORT, May 19621
[On Financial Controls] We interpret our terms of reference into
the control of public expenditure to mean an enquiry into the
control of public expenditure as exercised by the executive or
administrative authority having regard to the relevant substan-
tive law, financial rules and general orders and to the financial
instructions given by the Federal Government in respect of grant
aided territories.
Our terms of reference also include enquiry into matters inci-
dental thereto. We have avoided any enquiry which could be regar-
ded as questioning the authority of the Legislature to appropri-
ate funds and to direct their limits and purposes. Similarly, we
were not concerned with investigating the financial or other
policy of the Government which is subject to the sanction of the
Legislature. Our enquiry has been directed into the supervision
and management of public funds when being applied to purposes
which may form part of the policy of Government....
General conclusions. As a result of our enquiry we have reached
the following general conclusions.
(1) The Minister of Finance has disregarded and contravened the
laws and regulations governing the control of expenditure;
(2) Expenditure has been incurred wastefully or unnecessarily
through failure by Ministers to seek or refusal to accept the
advice of the civil servants;
(3) The Executive has deliberately destroyed the morale of the
civil service by an undesirable interference with administrative
duties and by improper threats against the security of office;
(4) The civil service has been induced by this interference and
these threats to commit or condone improprieties or irregular-
ities in the expenditure of public funds.
Discioline. We think it essential that the morale of the civil
service should be restored and that civil servants should be
permitted and encouraged to perform their proper functions with-
out fear or favour. We therefore recommend that:-
(1) the Grenada (Constitution) Order-in-Council should be amended
so as to provide for the appointment of members of the Public
Service Commission by the Administrator acting in his discretion
and not after consultation with the Chief Minister;
(2) public officers should be left in no doubt that appointment,
dismissal, and all disciplinary proceedings are matters for con-
sideration by the Public Service Commission alone and are in no

1. P.P.1961-2 XI (1735) pp.771ff. presented May 1962.

 295
way the concern of the Executive Council, and that this be made
clear in regulations regarding the Public Service Commission to
be made under Section 54 of the Constitution;
(3) if difficulty is experienced or anticipated in selecting from
the small population of Grenada a sufficient number of Public
Service Commissioners in whose impartiality public officers can
feel full confidence, consideration should be given to the desir-
ability of having a Public Service Commission in respect of se-
nior officers which, like the Legal and Judicial Service Commis-
sion, will include persons resident outside Grenada and will have
jurisdiction over Grenada and over any other territories with
which Grenada is associated.
Surcharge. As a corollary we think that gross negligence or irre-
gularity by public officers in the collection, custody, or pay-
ment of public funds should attract pecuniary penalties and we
therefore recommend amendment of the Finance and Audit Ordinance
so as to provide:-
(1) that in circumstances described in the Ordinance the Finan-
cial Secretary be required and not merely permitted to initiate
proceedings for surcharge;
(2) that the initiation of such proceedings should not be depen-
dent on a report made by the Principal Auditor;
(3) that surcharge should be levied by the Financial Secretary
with the right of appeal to the Public Service Commission; or
alternatively that the irregularity etc. should be reported by
the Financial Secretary to the Public Service Commissioners for
decision by them with right of appeal to the Administrator acting
in his discretion; and in any event that the proceedings and de-
cisions are at no stage referred to the Executive Council or to
any Minister;
(4) that if the Financial Secretary neither imposes surcharge nor
reports to the Public Service Commission, as the case may be, the
Principal Auditor may present the case directly to the Public
Service Commissioners for consideration by them.
In our opinion surcharge is essentially a disciplinary matter
and as such should not be the concern of the Executive; on the
contrary, any interference by the Executive in the enforcement
of discipline is an improper activity which is likely seriously
to impair the efficiency of the public service.
Financial Rules. Certain financial irregularities have apparently
been frequent for some time and we think that they denote an in-
complete understanding by accounting officers of what is required
of them. We therefore recommend an early revision of the Finan-
cial and Store Rules with a view to clarifying them, amending
them in the light of constitutional changes, and expanding them
so as to regulate procedures newly introduced. For instance, we
have learned with surprise that no officer outside the Audit De-
partment records the total amount of the expenditure authorised
by special warrant in anticipation of a supplementary appropri-
ation law, in order to ensure that it does not at any time exceed
$50,000. We also consider that the machinery of control would be
more easily operated if a clear distinction were drawn between
a virement warrant, authorising the transfer of provision within
a Head of expenditure, and a special warrant which authorises
expenditure in addition to that appropriated for the Head. Ac-
counting Officers need also to be made to understand that a
296
decision taken in Executive Council cannot in itself convey any
authority whatsoever for the incurring of expenditure.
We further recommend that consideration be given to the desir-
ability of amending the Finance and Audit Ordinance so as to
provide for giving these revised Financial Rules the force of law
by some simple process such as tabling them, and any amendments
to them, in the Legislative Council.
Method of Communication. The need to record decisions and inst-
ructions in writing might be thought too obvious to merit mention
in this report but there is no doubt that Ministers and civil
servants alike have failed lamentably in this respect. It becomes
all the more important that there should be some written record
when there is any suggestion that officers are being instructed
to act contrary to regulations or where personal relationships
are strained. On many of the matters brought to our attention
there has been a significant absence of anything in writing and
our enquiries have been made more difficult in consequence.
Public Accounts Committee. We understand that a Public Accounts
Committee has recently been established and we have considered
whether it is likely to impose any effective check on public
expenditure. We are inclined to the view that, with the present
composition of the Legislative Council, its value may prove to
be slight but we recommend none the less that the Standing Rules
and Orders of the Legislative Council should be amended so as to
provide for its constitution and conduct.
Other Matters. Finally, we wish to touch on two matters which may
perhaps fall somewhat outside our terms of reference.
Disunity in the civil service has in our view been a potent
factor in producing a state of affairs which we deplore and we
have therefore interested ourselves in inquiring as to the
strength and purpose of the Civil Service Association. We under-
stand that the Association is under the vice-presidency of the
Chief Minister's Principal Secretary, that its meetings are very
infrequent, and that its membership is not representative of the
senior ranks of Government. We think that much good would follow
if the Association could be enlarged and revitalised and, while
we recognise that such a revival is not likely to be lasting
unless the morale of the service has first been restored by the
measures which we have recommended above, we think that the Asso-
ciation should receive encouragement from all who are concerned
to see good government in Grenada.
The second of these two matters concerns the periodical known
as * 77?e Star' . We understand that the publication and free dist-
ribution of political propaganda at public expense was undertaken
before the present Government came into power and we wish to re-
cord our view that such activity is always open to the strongest
objections. We have not had the opportunity of seeing the pre-
vious periodical which was issued under the name of 'The Citi-
zens' Weekly' but our perusal of the 'The Star1 (of which extr-
acts appear in three appendices to this report) induces us to say
that it is an instrument which has been used in a manner calcula-
ted to inflict great injury on the public service. We consider
that its continued publication in its present form can do nothing
but harm.
 297
(d) CONSTITUTION ORDER-IN-COUNCIL, 14 June 19621
2. The Legislative Council constituted at the date of commence-
ment of this Order in accordance with the provisions of the prin-
cipal Order [I.e. No.2200 of 1959] is hereby dissolved, and the
provisions of the principal Order and of any other law in force
in Grenada immediately before that date shall have effect as if
the dissolution of the Council by virtue of this action were a
dissolution of the Council under section 46(2) of the principal
Order.
3.(1) The Executive Council constituted at the date of commence-
ment of this Order in accordance with the provisions of the prin-
cipal Order is dissolved, and, without prejudice to anything pre-
viously done thereunder and until the appointed day:-
(a) the operation of sections 12 to 21 [establishing the Executive
Council, its members, tenure, appointment of the Chief Minister, assign-
ment of portfolios, performance of duties of Chief Minister when vacant,
the appointment of temporary officers, procedure and summoning] of the
principal Order is suspended.
(b) the operation of subsections (1) to (5) of section 6 of the
principal Order [relating to the circumstances in which the Administrator
was required to act on the advice of the Executive Council] and, to the
extent that it requires the Administrator in the exercise of any
function to act in accordance with the advice of, or after con-
sultation with, the Executive Council or any Minister of the Go-
vernment of Grenada, of any other provision of that Order or of
any other law in force in Grenada is suspended; and
(c) any provision of any law in force in Grenada that confers
any power or imposes any duty on any Minister of the Government
of Grenada shall, subject to any modification or adaptation made
under the next following subsection, be construed as if it con-
ferred that power or imposed that duty on the Administrator...
4. As from the appointed day the provisions of the principal
Order shall, without prejudice to anything previously done,
thereunder, be amended in the manner specified in the schedule
to this Order.
5. For the purposes of the two last foregoing sections * the
appointed day* means such day as the Administrator may by pro-
clamation published in the Gazette, appoint for the purposes of
those sections, which day shall not be earlier than the day after
that on which a general election of elected members of the Legis-
lative Council is next held in accordance with the provisions of
the principal Order.
Section 4 - The Schedule
Amendments to the principal Order
1. The insertion at the end of paragraph (c) of section 6(2) of
the words f and the power conferred by section 40A of this
Order',2
2. In section 6(4) (as modified by article 15(2) of the West
Indies (Dissolution and Interim Commissioner) Order-in-Counci 1

1. Stat.R. No.1244.
2. §6(2) prescribed the circumstances when the Administrator did not have to
act on the advice of the executive council. This amendment therefore excluded
his reserve power from being exercised on advice.
298
1962) the substitution for paragraphs (a) to (d) of the words 'in
the interests of public order, public faith or good government
(which expressions shall, without prejudice to their generality,
include the responsibility of Grenada as a territory within the
Commonwealth and all matters relating to the creation or aboli-
tion of any public office or to the salary or other conditions
of service of any public officer).' 1
3. In section 12 the insertion immediately after the words 'sub-
ject to 1 of the words 'the next following subsection and 1 , and
the insertion immediately after subsection (1) of the following
subsection:-
'(1A) The Administrator, acting in his discretion may, by instru-
ment under the public seal, appoint one other person, being a
person who holds a public office, to be a member of the Executive
Council in addition to the member aforesaid.'2
4. The insertion immediately after section 14(4) of the follow-
ing subsection:-
'(5) A member of the Executive Council appointed under subsec-
tion (1A) of section 12 of this Order shall vacate his office as
a member if he ceases to hold a public office or if his appoint-
ment is revoked by the Administrator, acting in his discretion,
by instrument under the public seal.'
5. In section 17(1) the insertion immediately after the words
* Provided that' of '(a)' and at the end of the proviso of the
following paragraph:-
'(b) whenever there is a subsisting appointment of a member of
the Executive Council under subsection 1(A) of section 12 of this
Order, the Administrator, acting in his discretion, shall by
directions in writing, charge that member with responsibility for
finance and for any department of finance (by whatever name cal-
led) and references to the Ministers responsible for finance in
any provision of this Order or of any other law in force in Gren-
ada that confers any power or imposes any duty on that Minister
shall be construed as if they were references to that member.'
6. The insertion immediately after the word 'Composition' at the
beginning of Part IV of the words 'of the Legislative Council',
and the substitution for section 23 of the following section:-
'23. There shall be a Legislative Council in and for Grenada
constituted in accordance with the provisions of this Order.'3
7. In section 24 the substitution for the words and figure
'subsection (2)' in subsection (1) of the words 'the following
provisions' and the insertion immediately after subsection (2)
of the following subsection:-
'(3) Any person appointed to be a member of the Executive Council
under subsection (1A) of section 12 of this Order shall, by vir-
tue of being a member of the Executive Council, be a member of

1. §6(4) allowed the Administrator to act in certain circumstances against the

executive council's advice and in a more general way to do so than the
previous conditions more narrowly specified.
2. The discretion to appoint an additional nominated official to his executive
council (§5 indicated that this would be the minister of finance) was in
practice not used.
3. Previously this section read 'There shall be a Legislature for Grenada
which should consist of H.M. and a Legislative Council.'
 299
the Legislative Council in addition to the members aforesaid.'
8. The substitution for section 33 of the following section:-
'33. Subject to the provisions of this Order, it shall be lawful
for the Administrator, with the advice and consent of the Legis-
lative Council, to make laws for the peace, order and good gover-
nment of Grenada.'1
9. The insertion immediately after section 40(2) of the follow-
ing subsection. . . [that (3) at discretion the Administrator could send a
draft bill or motion to the Speaker and require its introduction by a
specified date and, if not so, this bill or motion would be deemed to
have been proposed.]
10. The insertion immediately after section 40 of the following
section:-
'40.AO) If the Administrator considers that it is expedient in
the interests of public order, public faith or good government
(which expressions shall, without prejudice to their generality,
include the responsibility of Grenada as a territory within the
Commonwealth, and all matters pertaining to the creation or abo-
lition of any public office or to the salary or other conditions
of service of any public officer), that any Bill introduced, or
any motion proposed, in the Legislative Council shall have ef-
fect, then, if the Council fails to pass the Bill or to carry the
motion within such time and in such form as the Administrator
thinks reasonable and expedient, the Administrator may, at any
time he thinks fit, and notwithstanding any provisions of this
Order or of any Standing Orders of the Council, declare that the
Bill or motion shall have effect as if it had been passed or
carried by the Council either in the form in which it was intro-
duced or proposed or with such amendments as the Administrator
thinks fit that have been moved or proposed in the Council, inc-
luding any committee thereof; and the Bill or motion shall be
deemed thereupon to have been so passed or carried, and the pro-
visions of this Order, and in particular the provisions relating
to assent to Bills and disallowance of laws, shall have effect
accordingly.
(2) The Administrator shall not make any declaration under this
section except in accordance with the following conditions:-
(a) the question whether the declaration should be made shall
be submitted in writing by the Administrator to the Executive
Council, and if the Council advises that the declaration should
be made, the Administrator may make the declaration;
(b) if, when the question is submitted to it, the Council does
not within such time as the Administrator may think reasonable
and expedient, advise that the declaration should be made, then -
(i) the Administrator may submit the question to a Secretary
of State and, if the Secretary of State so authorizes him, may
make the declaration; or

1. Previously this section read 'Subject to the provisions of the West Indies
(Federation) Order-in-Council, 1957, and of this Order, the Legislature shall
have power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of Grenada. '
The effect of this amendment, together with the amendment to §23 and the
amendment adding a new §40A, was to return Grenada to a less advanced form of
colonial constitution where the legislative power of the Council was
subordinate to the Administrator.
300

( i i ) the Administrator may make the d e c l a r a t i o n without submit-

t i n g the question to a Secretary of State i f , i n h i s judgement,
urgent necessity requires him t o make the d e c l a r a t i o n before he
can o b t a i n the a u t h o r i t y of a Secretary of State; i n which case
he s h a l l , when he makes the d e c l a r a t i o n , so c e r t i f y i n w r i t i n g .
( 3 ) ( a ) Whenever the A d m i n i s t r a t o r , i n accordance w i t h the p r o v i -
sions of the l a s t foregoing subsection, submits t o a Secretary
of State the question whether a d e c l a r a t i o n should be made, or
makes a d e c l a r a t i o n without submitting the question t o a Secre-
t a r y of State, he s h a l l inform the Executive Council in w r i t i n g
of h i s reasons f o r so doing.
(b) Whenever the Administrator makes a d e c l a r a t i o n under t h i s
s e c t i o n , other than a d e c l a r a t i o n made w i t h the a u t h o r i t y of a
Secretary of S t a t e , he s h a l l f o r t h w i t h report t o a Secretary of
State the making o f , and the reasons f o r , the d e c l a r a t i o n s and,
i n the case of a d e c l a r a t i o n made under sub-paragraph ( i i ) of
paragraph (b) of the l a s t foregoing subsection, the grounds of
urgency.
(4) I f any member of the L e g i s l a t i v e Council objects t o any dec-
l a r a t i o n made under t h i s s e c t i o n , he may, w i t h i n seven days of
the making t h e r e o f , submit t o the Administrator a statement i n
w r i t i n g of h i s reasons f o r so o b j e c t i n g ; and, i f he f u r n i s h e s a
copy of t h a t statement and request the Administrator t o do so,
the Administrator s h a l l , as soon as p r a c t i c a b l e , forward the copy
to a Secretary of S t a t e .
(5) Any d e c l a r a t i o n made under t h i s section t h a t r e l a t e s t o a
motion my be revoked by a Secretary of State, and the Administra-
t o r s h a l l cause notice of the revocation t o be published in the
Gazette; and from the date of such p u b l i c a t i o n any motion t h a t
i s deemed t o have been c a r r i e d by v i r t u e of the d e c l a r a t i o n s h a l l
cease t o have e f f e c t , and section 38(2) of the I n t e r p r e t a t i o n Act
1889(a) s h a l l apply t o the revocation as i t applies t o the repeal
of an Act of P a r l i a m e n t . ' . . .
12. The d e l e t i o n from section 46(1) of the words ' a c t i n g i n ac-
cordance w i t h the advice of the Chief M i n i s t e r ' . 1
13. In s e c t i o n 51(2) the s u b s t i t u t i o n f o r the words ' a f t e r
c o n s u l t a t i o n 2 w i t h the Chief M i n i s t e r ' of the words ' i n h i s
discretion'.
14. The deletion of paragraph (a) of the proviso to section 52.3
( e ) DUNCAN SANDYS TO JAMES LLOYD, 23 July 19624
The abuses d i s c l o s e d by t h e Commission o f I n q u i r y s t r u c k a t t h e

1. Previously (and indeed by t h i s order) the Administrator had to consult the

Chief Minister before prorogation and d i s s o l u t i o n , but now he did not have to
accept the advice given.
2. Similarly the Administrator had now d i s c r e t i o n a r y power to appoint to the
Public Service Commission.
3. The previous proviso had required the Administrator to c o n s u l t , though not
n e c e s s a r i l y to act on the advice of, the Chief Minister when appointing a
permanent s e c r e t a r y of a ministry or head of a government department.
4. Sandys had succeeded Maudling e a r l i e r in J u l y . He was r e f e r r e d to the
conclusions and recommendations of the commission of enquiry into Grenadian
expenditure [No.86c]. Lloyd was the a d m i n i s t r a t o r of Grenada: l a t e r permanent
s e c r e t a r y in Jamaica.
 301
roots of good Government in that they concerned the control of
public expenditure and the morale of the Civil Service. As re-
gards the former, the Commission found that the former Minister
of Finance had disregarded and contravened the laws and regula-
tions governing the control of expenditure; and that expenditure
had been incurred wastefully or unnecessarily through failure by
Ministers to seek or refusal to accept the advice of the civil
servants. It cannot too strongly be emphasized that the observ-
ance of proper controls over the expenditure of public funds is
essential to enable a Government to maintain the confidence of
the public both at home and abroad. As I am responsible to Parli-
ament for the proper expenditure of United Kingdom funds provided
for Grenada, I have felt obliged to take steps to ensure that I
am in a position more effectively to discharge that responsibil-
ity. A large proportion of the funds available for Grenada is
however derived from local revenues and it is therefore of direct
concern to the people of Grenada themselves that there should be
an effective system of control over the expenditure of public
monies and that the system should be faithfully observed. Indeed
this is of importance not only to the people of Grenada but to
the other British territories in the area, particularly if they
should decide to join together in a new federation; since finan-
cial instability in one unit would inevitably affect the finan-
cial stability of the other territories with whom it was asso-
ciated.
I have, therefore, decided that special steps must in the
interest of Grenada, be taken to ensure that there can be no
recurrence of the financial malpractices disclosed by the Commis-
sion of Inquiry. First among these is the provision in the revi-
sed constitution which will come into effect at the time of the
next general election giving you the power to appoint an official
as Minister of Finance. Secondly, it will be necessary to review
the Finance and Audit Ordinance with the object of ensuring that
it adequately safeguards public funds. I shall shortly be addres-
sing a further communication to you suggesting desirable amend-
ments to your Finance and Audit Ordinance including provisions
in regard to surcharge on the lines recommended by the Commission
in paragraph 59 of their report. Thirdly, I should be grateful
if you would put in hand an early revision of the Financial and
Store Rules on the lines recommended in paragraph 60 of the Com-
mission's Report. Lastly, I agree with the Commission (paragraph
62 of their Report) that the Standing Rules and Orders of the
Legislative Council should in due course be amended so as to pro-
vide for the constitution and conduct of the Public Accounts Com-
mittee which should have a permanent place in the machinery of
Government.
As regards the Civil Service, the Commission of Inquiry found
that the Executive had deliberately destroyed its morale by an
undesirable interference with administrative duties and by imp-
roper threats against security of office; and that the Civil Ser-
vice had been induced by this interference and these threats to
commit or to condone improprieties or irregularities in the ex-
penditure of public funds. These are very grave findings. It is
essential to good government to ensure that individual public
servants are in a position to perform their duties without fear
or favour. This state of affairs can only come about by protect-
302
ing the independence of the Civil Service from political inter-
ference. Much damage has been done to the morale of the Civil
Service of Grenada by the policy of threats intimidation [sic]
exercised by the Government now dismissed from office. In the in-
terests of good government in Grenada, I must express the earnest
hope that in time this damage will be repaired by scrupulous
observance of the proper principles and tradition governing the
relationship of Ministers and Civil Servants.
The Commission of Inquiry made certain recommendations in re-
gard to the control of the Public Service in paragraph 58 of
their Report. In accordance with the recommendation in paragraph
58(1) the revised constitution which will come into effect at the
time of the next general election will provide for the appoint-
ment of members of the Public Service Commission by you acting
in your discretion and not after consultation with the Chief
Minister as before (though in this connection I should point out
that even under the former constitution the final decision on the
selection of members of the Public Service Commission rested with
you since you were not constitutionally required to act in accor-
dance with the Chief Minister's advice in this particular mat-
ter). As regards the Commission's recommendation in paragraph
58(2), it should perhaps be stated for the record that under the
Grenada (Constitution) Order-in-Council, 1959, the power to
appoint, promote, transfer, dismiss and exercise disciplinary
control over public servants was clearly vested in you acting
after consultation with the Public Service Commission. As you
know, the effect of these provisions is to place control over
individual members of the Public Service and firmly in your
hands. (The phrase 'acting after consultation with the Public
Service Commission' means that you are required to consult the
Public Service Commission before exercising the powers but that
you are not bound to follow its advice.) As you are aware, these
provisions will remain in the revised constitution to be introdu-
ced at the time of the next general election, but will be modif-
ied by the deletion of Section 52(a) of the Grenada (Constitu-
tion) Order-in-Council which required you to consult with the
Chief Minister before making an appointment to the office of any
permanent Secretary of a Ministry of Head or Deputy Head of a
Department of Government on transfer from another such office
carrying the same salary (though again, having regard to the
definition in Section 6(6) of the phrase 'acting after consulta-
tion', it was not necessary for you to follow the Chief Minis-
ter's advice given under Section 52(a). Due consideration will
be given at the appropriate time to the recommendation in para-
graph 58(3) of the Commission's Report, though it should perhaps
be made clear that the present constitutional provision regarding
membership of the Public Service Commission [sic] does not exc-
lude the appointment of members resident outside of Grenada.
Before leaving the subject of the Public Service I should like
to endorse the views expressed in paragraph 63 of the Commis-
sion's Report which relates to the Civil Service Association in
Grenada. A properly organised Association will receive every
official encouragement in the future and that senior members of
the Service will be encouraged to join and to make a useful cont-
ribution to its activities.
I would also draw attention to paragraph 61 of the Commission's
 303
Report which emphasised the importance of recording decisions and
instructions in writing. This is a matter which relates to all
aspects of Government activity. As the Commission themselves
pointed out, the need to record decisions and instructions in
writing might be thought too obvious to require mention. I share
the Commission's disquiet on learning that both the former Minis-
ters and civil servants in Grenada failed to observe this elemen-
tary but essential procedure. I trust that suitable instructions
will now be issued to ensure that it is faithfully observed in
future.
Finally, I wish strongly to endorse the criticisms voiced by
the Commission in paragraph 64 of their Report against the pub-
lication and free distribution of party political propaganda at
public expense. There are the strongest objections of principle
to this type of activity, and indeed to any similar activities
by which public funds are used for strictly party political pur-
poses (e.g. the financing from public funds of a constituency
office). I am, therefore, glad to note that you have now stopped
the use of public funds for the publication of the party journal
entitled ' The Star1.1

87. ST. VINCENT: (a) COMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM: REPORT,

8 August 19492
The Chairman reminded members that the meeting was called as
a result of a resolution moved by the Honourable Acting Crown
Attorney at the meeting of the Legislative Council on 26 May,
1949, in the following terms: 'Whereas the Secretary of State has
recently announced that the next election in the Windward and
Leeward Islands will be held on a basis of adult suffrage subject
to a simple literacy test And Whereas the Secretary of State has
agreed to the removal of the property qualification for a candi-
date subject to further examination of the present arrangements
for deposits which candidates are required to make And Whereas
this Council is of the opinion that the introduction of adult
suffrage might appropriately be accompanied by an increase in the
number of Elected Members: Be it therefore resolved that a Com-
mittee of this Council be appointed to examine and report on the
following:- (a) the nature of the literacy test and the manner
in which it shall be conducted; and any other matters relevant
thereto; (b) the present arrangements for deposits by candidates
for election; (c) an appropriate increase in the number of elec-
ted members consequent upon the increase in the number of voters
which is anticipated upon the introduction of adult suffrage
(subject, however to the Secretary of State's statement as to
wholly elected legislatures in the Windward and Leeward Islands);

1. Sir Eric Gairy secured self-government in 1974 but his corruption led to
a coup by the Marxist, Maurice Bishop in 1979 who ruled without election. In
1983 an economic crises led to a challenge by Bernard Coard; in the distur-
bance Bishop was killed. Then U.S. forces with the support of most of the
smaller British Caribbean islands invaded and imposed free elections. Even in
Trinidad and Jamaica where there were governmental doubts, over 60% supported
U.S. action.
2. [See Vol.VII, No.521 St. Vincent Leg. Co. Mins. for July-December 1949
pp.24-5. The Committee met in Government House, St. Vincent.
304
(d) the delimitation and representation of constituencies in the
1ight of (c) above.
The question of the Literacy Test was first considered. The
Chairman said that the simplest form of literacy test he could
suggest was one which obtains in the case of one of the Canadian
Provinces. The voter, before balloting is required to show his
name on a list presented. On his doing this he is given a ballot
paper and told to sign his name opposite that of the candidate
for whom he wishes to vote.
The majority of members agreed that a Literacy Test was desir-
able, but Mr. Mclntosh was strongly opposed to any form of Liter-
acy Test....
The meeting finally recommended, by a majority vote, on motion
by Mr. Hughes and seconded by Mr. De Freitas, that 'No person
shall be registered as a voter unless he shall with his own hand
have subscribed his name to his claim to be registered and writ-
ten thereon the date of such subscription in the presence of a
person appointed by the Governor-in-Counci1 for the purpose, or
of the officer charged with the duty of registering voters; or,
if he is incapacitated by blindness or other physical cause from
so doing, such subscription and writing shall be performed on his
behalf by the officer charged with the duty of registering
voters.'....

Qualifications and Arrangement for Deposits by Candidates for

Election:
All (but two of) the members disagreed with the entire aboli-
tion of the income and property qualifications. The majority...
recommended that both income and property qualifications should
be reduced by fifty per cent., and that the amount of deposit
should remain as at present....
Increase of Elected Members:
There was unanimity on this question. The meeting recommended
an increase of three in the present number of elected mem-
bers, . . .1

(b) CONSTITUTIONAL PROGRESS: REPORT OF DISCUSSIONS, March 19672

[The agreement reached with the St. Vincent delegation at the Windward
Islands constitutional conference in May 19663 had provided for St. Vin-
cent to become an Associated State.] At the time of the Conference
it was known that the statutory life of the St. Vincent Legisla-
ture was about to expire and that a general election would have
to be held before the new constitutional arrangements could be
introduced. General agreement could not be reached at the Confer-
ence on two features of the proposed constitution. These related
to the establishment of a second Chamber in the Legislature and
the voting age. The Secretary of State for the Colonies accord-

1. This recommendation for an elected majority was accepted. The reforms of

1951, see Antigua Ordinance No.10: [see No.83] were indeed more liberal than
those suggested here.
2. P.P.1966-7 XXV (3219) p.1003. The grant of associated statehood to St.
Vincent had been delayed.
3. P.P.1966-7 XXV (3021) p.1009.
 305
ingly stated at the Conference that these questions could be re-
examined if the election resulted in a change of government. The
general election was held in August, 1966. It resulted in the
ruling Government party (the People's Progressive Party, led by
Mr. E.T. Joshua, the Chief Minister) gaining five of the nine
elected seats, the remaining four being won by the St. Vincent
Labour Party, led by Mr. R.M. Cato.
Following the election two election petitions were entered by
each party, in respect of which various procedural and legal dif-
ficulties later developed. It became clear towards the end of
1966 that the petitions would not be determined by the end of
February, 1967, when it had been expected that six West Indian
territories including St. Vincent (the others being Antigua,
Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and St. Lucia), would proceed to
Assoc i ated Statehood.1
Although the British Government were anxious to see St. Vincent
proceed to Associated Statehood as early as possible, the situa-
tion resulting from the elections posed a number of difficulties
in relation to the timing of the introduction of the new consti-
tution. A major difficulty was the proposed transitional provi-
sion referred to in paragraph 12 of Appendix III to Cmnd.3021,
by which the St. Vincent Legislature would have been authorised
by the constitution to provide for four additional elected mem-
bers to be elected in existing constituencies during the life of
the first Legislature. It would not have been appropriate to have
invoked this far-reaching provision while the issue of the elec-
tion petitions was still in doubt, yet the British Government
were unwilling to delay the grant of Statehood to the people of
St. Vincent longer than was absolutely necessary.
Apart from the questions of the establishment of a second Cham-
ber and the voting age, a number of other advantages were to be
gained by the Government in office from the powers to be given
to the Premier under the proposed constitution. Of particular re-
levance in the context of the electoral uncertainty were the pro-
visions for the appointment of members of the Constituency Boun-
daries Commission by the Governor on the advice of the Premier
and the appointment of a Supervisor of Elections by the Public
Service Commission acting after consultation with the Premier.
In an endeavour to reach general agreement on measures to re-
solve these difficulties in a way which would not unduly delay
St. Vincent's constitutional progress, the Secretary of State for
the Colonies invited the Chief Minister and the Leader of the
Opposition to meet him in London in mid-January....
After detailed study and discussion of a number of alternative
solutions with the Government and Opposition delegations, the
difficulties referred to...above were resolved, by both delega-
tions agreeing to the appointment of a Constituency Boundaries
Commission by the British Government whose task would be to pre-
pare for fresh general elections on revised electoral rolls for
13 (instead of 9) constituencies not later than the end of 1968;
and the general acceptance by all parties of a date not later
than 1 June 1967 by which the process of conferring Associated
Statehood on St. Vincent should be completed.

1. [See A(l) (b)]

306
The following is the text of the document signed on 1 February
by the Minister of State for Commonwealth Affairs, Mrs. Judith
Hart, and for the St. Vincent delegations by the Chief Minister,
the Minister for Trade, Production, Labour and Tourism, the Lea-
der of the Opposition and the Opposition Member for the Grena-
dines.... 'A number of possible course of action were fully and
frankly discussed and eventually, because of the wish of all the
delegations to find a solution, and in a spirit of compromise,
it was agreed that St. Vincent would become an Associated State
not later than the 1st June 1967, and that the constitutional
proposals set out in Appendix III of Cmnd.3021 should be modified
in the following manner:- (a) The Secretary of State, after con-
sultation with the Administrator, would appoint a Boundary Com-
mission to delimit 13 constituencies, (b) The Government of St.
Vincent and the Opposition would undertake to accept the report
of the Boundary Commission, (c) The Secretary of State would
appoint a Supervisor of Elections to prepare new electoral rolls
on the basis of 13 constituencies, (d) A general election on the
basis of 13 constituencies would be held not later than the 31st
December, 1968. Until this general election there will be no inc-
rease in the size of the Legislature, (e) If the Supervisor of
Elections appointed under (c) above was no longer available, the
Secretary of State would appoint a new Supervisor of Elections
to carry out any revision of the electoral rolls and to supervise
the general election. The Premier of St. Vincent would inform the
Secretary of State, in confidence, two months in advance of the
proposed date for the dissolution of the legislature to enable
the Secretary of State to make the necessary appointment in time.
(f) The new constitution would contain dormant provisions to per-
mit the establishment of a Senate and the lowering of the voting
age to 18 years, by a simple majority of the votes of the elected
members of the legislature, (g) There will be a Public Service
Board of Appeal whose function will be to hear and determine ap-
peals from decisions of the Public Service Commission in discip-
line cases. The Board will consist of a Chairman appointed by the
Governor in his discretion, one member who is or has been an of-
ficer in the St. Vincent Civil Service on the recommendation of
the St. Vincent Civil Service Association and one member appoin-
ted on the advice of the Premier.
The provisions listed from (a) to (e) above would be transi-
tional provisions in the new constitution, while those in (f) and
(g) would be permanent provisions.'

(c) JUDITH HART: STATEMENT, 12 April 19671

The present difficulties in St. Vincent arose when an elected
Minister crossed the Floor on 16th March. The Government Party
previously held a 5-4 majority of the elected members. As the
situation developed, it appeared that the correct first step in
resolving the situation was that the elected members should be
asked to show whether or not they retained confidence in the
Government. It appeared from an exchange of messages with the
Chief Minister that the business of the Legislature was unlikely

1. Hansard Comm. 744 207-8. Mrs. Hart was minister of state at the Common-
wealth Relations Office, the C O . having been abolished in January 1967.
 307
to be arranged so that a motion of no confidence would be given
priority. An Order-in-Counci1 was made on 5th April empowering
the Administrator to summon a meeting of the Legislature for the
purpose of hearing such a motion. On the same day a message was
received from the Chief Minister advising the immediate dissol-
ution of the Legislature to be followed as soon as possible by
fresh elections on the existing nine-constituency basis. I agree
that this was the right solution and the Legislature was dissol-
ved on 7th April. I considered it right, however, that in the
circumstances there should be complete political impartiality in
the administration of the territory during the election period.
An Order-in-Council has been made today dissolving the Executive
Council and conferring sole responsibility for the administration
of St. Vincent on the Administrator. He will retain these powers
until a new Government is formed immediately after the election,
which is expected to be held on 16th May, but will consult with
the leaders of both parties represented in the last Legislature
on all significant matters within the responsibilities hitherto
allocated to Ministers.
In the Agreement signed with the Chief Minister and Leader of
the Opposition of St. Vincent on 1st February, published as a
White Paper [No.,,,], it was envisaged that Associated Statehood
would be conferred on St. Vincent not later than 1st June this
year, and provisional arrangements had in fact been made for
Statehood Day on 29th May. While it remains our objective that
St. Vincent should become an Associated State as soon as circum-
stances permit, it is now clear that it will not be practicable
to keep to this date.1

(d) ELECTORAL PROVISIONS ORDER-IN-COUNCIL, 22 February 19672

2.(1) The Administrator, acting in his discretion, may by regula-
tion make provision, for the purposes of the election of members
of the proposed House of Representatives, for - (a) the division
of Saint Vincent into thirteen constituencies; (b) the qualifica-
tion of electors; (c) the registration of electors; and (d) any
matter that appears to him to be incidental thereto or consequen-
tial thereon.
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the preceding sub-
section, regulations made thereunder may make provision - (a) for
the division of Saint Vincent into constituencies to be carried
out by a Commissioner or Commissioners appointed for that pur-
pose; (b) for the registration of electors to be carried out
under the supervision of a Supervisor appointed for that purpose;
(c) for applying the provisions of any law in force in Saint
Vincent for the purposes of the regulations with such adaptation,

1. Cato's Labour Party won the general election in May 1967 with 6 seats to
Joshua's People's Progressive Party 3 but in June 1969 at the Marlborough
House conference the parties could not agree whether another general election
should precede associated statehood and whether there should be 13 or 9
constituencies. Joshua refused to sign any agreement and Michael Stewart,
secretary of state at the F.C.O. (the C.R.O. and F.O. had been merged in
October 1968) ruled that the St. Vincent legislature should run its full
course till 1972, that until then there should be 9 seats but thereafter 13.
2. Stat.R. No.240.
308
modifications and exceptions as may be specified in the regula-
tions; and (d) for charging any expenditures required for the
purposes of the regulations upon the revenue or public funds of
Saint Vincent.

(e) CONSTITUTION AMENDMENT ORDER-IN-COUNCIL (No. 2), 5 April 19671

5. The following section shall be inserted in the principal Order
[of 1959] 12 immediately after Section 40 -
'40A(1) If-
(a) the Administrator is satisfied that a motion of no confidence
given in accordance with the Standing Orders of the Legislative
Council has been received by the Clerk of the Council; or
(b) the Administrator is given notice in writing by any elected
member of the Council that that member proposes a motion of no
confidence for debate in the Council in terms specified in the
notice;
and the Administrator is satisfied that the public interest re-
quires that the motion should be debated in the Council as a mat-
ter of urgency, the Administrator may, if he shall think fit, by
Proclamation summon a special meeting of the Council at such time
and place as may be specified in the Proclamation for the purpose
of debating and disposing of the motion. Provided that the Coun-
cil may be so summoned notwithstanding that it stands prorogued.
(2) Where the Legislative Council meets, in pursuance of a Pro-
clamation under subsection (1) of this Section, for the purposes
of debating and disposing of a motion of no confidence, the fol-
lowing provisions shall apply - (a) such member of the Council
(not being an elected member) as may be specified by the Adminis-
trator by writing under his hand shall preside at the meeting;
(b) no business shall be transacted at the meeting other than
debating and disposing of the motion (including an amendment to
the motion); (c) no person who is not an elected member of the
Council shall vote in any proceedings at the meeting; (d) the
Standing Orders of the Council shall apply in relation to any
proceedings at the meeting with such adaptations, modifications,
and exceptions as may be prescribed by the Administrator by
Order; (e) if at the meeting a motion of no confidence is duly
passed by a majority of all elected members of Council in accor-
dance with the provisions of this Section, the member presiding
shall transmit to the Administrator a certificate in writing
under his hand to that effect; and, for the purposes of Section
14(1) of this Order, the certificate shall be conclusive evidence
that the motion was so passed and shall not be questioned in any
Court.
(3) In this Section 'motion of no confidence1 means a motion
that the Legislative Council should declare a lack of confidence
in the Government of Saint Vincent.
(4) In the exercise of the powers conferred upon him by this
Section the Administrator shall act in his discretion.'

(f) CONSTITUTION AMENDMENT ORDER-IN-COUNCIL (No.3), 12 April 19673

2.(1) The Executive Council constituted at the commencement of

1. Stat.R. No.547. 2. Stat.R. 1959 No.2201 dated 21 Dec. 1959.

3. Stat.R. No.587.
 309
this Order in accordance with the provisions of the principal
Order is hereby dissolved.
(2) Without prejudice to anything previously done thereunder
and until such day (being after the holding of the poll in the
general election of elected members of the Legislative Council
next following the commencement of this Order) as the Administra-
tor may appoint by proclamation published in the Gazette -
(a) the operation of sections 12 to 21 of the principal Order is
suspended; [providing for the composition and constitution of the Executive
Council, the Chief Minister and other Ministers]
(b) the operation of subsections (1) to (5) of Section 6 of the
principal Order and, to the extent that it requires the Administ-
rator in the exercise of any function to act in accordance with
the advice or, or after consultation with, the Executive Council
or any Minister, of any other provision of that Order or of any
other law in force in Saint Vincent is suspended; and
(c) any provision of any such law that confers any power or
imposes any duty upon any Minister shall be construed as if it
conferred that power or imposed that duty upon the Administrator.
(3) Until the day appointed under the last foregoing subsec-
tion, the Administrator shall exercise his functions after con-
sultation with the persons who, in his opinion, are the leaders
of the political parties which were represented in the Legislat-
ive Council last dissolved before the commencement of this Order:
Provided that -
(a) he shall not be obliged to consult with those persons -
(i) in the exercise of any function conferred upon him by the
principal Order which is expressed to be exercisable by him in
his discretion or in accordance with the advice of, or after con-
sultation with, any person or authority other than the Executive
Council or a Minister;
(ii) in the exercise of any function conferred upon him by any
other law in terms which authorise him to exercise that function
without obtaining the advice of the Executive Council or a
Minister;
(iii) in the exercise of the powers conferred upon him by the
Emergency Powers Order-in-Council 1939, as from time to time
amended;
(iv) concerning any matter which, in his judgement, is a matter
relating to the maintenance of law and order in Saint Vincent or
to the judiciary or the public service;
(v) in any case in which, in his judgement, the urgency of the
matter requires him to act before those persons can be consulted
or the question for decision is too unimportant to require such
consultation;
(vi) in any case in which, in his judgement, it would not be
in the public interest to consult those persons.
3. The following section shall be inserted in the principal Order
immediately after section 47:-
'47A Whenever any person vacates his seat as an elected member
of the Legislative Council for any reason other than a dissolu-
tion of the Council or whenever the election of any person as an
elected member of the Council is determined under section 48 to
be invalid the Administrator, acting in his discretion, shall,
unless the Council is sooner dissolved, issue a writ for the el-
ection of a member to fill the vacancy returnable within sixty
310
days from the vacation of the seat or the determination, as the
case may be.'
4.(1) Section 48 of the principal Order is amended by renumbering
subsection (2) as subsection (7) and by substituting the follow-
ing subsections for subsection (1):-
'(1) The High Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and deter-
mine any question whether -
(a) any person has been validly elected as a member of the Legis-
lative Counci1;
(b) any elected member of the Council has vacated his seat there-
in or is required by virtue of section 29(4) of this Order to
cease to perform his functions as a member; or
(c) any person has been validly elected as a member of the Coun-
cil from among persons who are not members of the Council or,
having been so elected, has vacated the office of Speaker.
(2) An application to the High Court for the determination of -
(a) any question under paragraph (a) of the last foregoing sub-
section may be made by any person entitled to vote in the elec-
tion to which the application relates or by any person who was
a candidate in that election or by the principal law officer;
(b) any question under paragraph (b) of that subsection may be
made by any elected member of the Council or by any person regis-
tered in some electoral district as a voter in elections of elec-
ted members of the Legislative Council or by the principal law
officer;
(c) any question under paragraph (c) of that subsection may be
made by any elected member of the Council or by the principal law
officer;
and if such an application is made by a person other than the
principal law officer, the principal law officer may intervene
and may then appear to be represented in the proceedings.
(3) The Administrator acting in his discretion may by regula-
tion make provisions with respect to -
(a) the circumstances and manner in which and the imposition of
conditions upon which any application may be made to the High
Court for the determination of any question under this section;
(b) the powers and practice and procedure of the High Court in
relation to any such application; and
(c) the powers and practice and procedure of the Court of Appeal
in proceedings under the next following subsection.
(4) An appeal shall lie as of right to the Court of Appeal from
any final decision of the High Court determining such a question
as is referred to in subsection (1) of this section.
(5) No appeal shall lie from any decision of the Court of Ap-
peal in exercise of the jurisdiction conferred by the last fore-
going subsection and no appeal shall lie from any decision of the
High Court in proceedings under this section other than a final
decision determining such a question as is referred to in subsec-
tion (1) of this section.
(6) In the exercise of his functions under this section the
principal law officer shall not be subject to the direction or
control of any other person or authority.'...
5. The Administrator, acting in his discretion, may by regulation
provide that any law relating to the election of persons as mem-
bers of the Legislative Council (whether enacted before or after
the commencement of this order shall have effect with such adap-
 311
tations, modifications or exceptions as may be specified in the
regulations; and the provisions of the principal Order shall have
effect subject to the provisions of this section.
(7) THE BAHAMAS
88. CONSTITUTION ORDER-IN-COUNCIL, 19631
Allocation of Portfolios to Ministers
73.(1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the Gover-
nor, acting in accordance with the advice of the Premier, may by
directions in writing charge any Minister with responsibility for
any matter or any department of government and designate the
style by which any Minister so charged shall be known.
(2) In pursuance of the powers conferred by subsection (1) of
this section, the Governor may direct that a Minister shall be
assisted in the exercise of his responsibilities for any matter
or department of government by a Board consisting of such persons
as the Governor, acting in accordance with the advice of the Pre-
mier, may appoint.
(3) Any such Board as is referred to in subsection (2) of this
section shall have such consultative and administrative functions
as may be assigned to it by a law of the Legislature or by direc-
tions of the Minister concerned but, in exercising any functions
so assigned to it, the Board shall be subject to the directions
of the Minister, who shall remain responsible to the Cabinet and
the Legislature for all the business of the Board.
(4) Nothing in this section shall empower the Governor to con-
fer on any Minister authority to exercise any power or discharge
any duty that is conferred or imposed by this Constitution or any
other law on the Governor or any person or authority other than
a Minister.
(5) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (4) of
this section, except for the purpose of submitting questions re-
lating to such matters to the Cabinet and conducting government
business relating to such matters in either chamber of the Legis-
lature and subject to the provisions of section 74 of this Cons-
titution a Minister shall not be charged with responsibility for
- (a) the discharge by the courts of the Bahama Islands of their
judicial functions; (b) the initiation, conduct and discontinu-
ance of criminal proceedings; (c) the audit of the accounts of
the Bahama Islands; (d) the making of appointments (including ap-
pointments on promotion, appointments on transfer and the confir-
mation of appointments) to offices in public service, the removal
or disciplinary control (including the withholding of increments
of salary) of persons holding or acting in such offices and the
grant of any benefits in relation to pensions and gratuities in
pursuance of section 109 of this Constitution; or (e) the exer-

1. Stat.R. No.2084. [See also pp.38ff] The Bahamas had provided the first
landfall in the New World for Columbus - San Salvador (12 Oct. 1492). Though
settled in 1646, it was not formally a colony till 1783. With Bermuda and
Barbados the archipelago had retained the old representative form of
government [see Vol.VII, p.111]. But on 10 July 1973 the islands acquired
independence and full membership of the Commonwealth. This order-in-council
introduced semi-responsible government.
312
cise of the Prerogative of Mercy.
(6) For the purposes of subsection (5)(d) of this section, the
office of a judge of the Supreme Court or a member of the person-
al staff of the Governor shall be deemed to be an office in the
public service.
(7) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, where any
Minister has been charged with the responsibility for a matter
or department of government in pursuance of this section, he
shall exercise general direction and control over the work relat-
ing to that matter and over that department and, subject to such
direction and control by the Minister, the work and the depart-
ment shall be under the supervision of a public officer appointed
for the purpose: Provided that for the purpose of this subsection
a public officer may be appointed to supervise the work relating
to several matters and departments.
74.(1) The Governor, acting in his discretion, shall be respon-
sible for the following matters:- (a) external affairs, that is
to say, such matters relating to external affairs as may be spe-
cified in any Instructions given to him by Her Majesty under Her
Majesty's Sign Manual and Signet or through a Secretary of State;
(b) defence, including the armed forces; (c) internal security;
and (d) all matters relating to the Police Force; Provided that
the Governor shall keep the Cabinet informed of any matters rela-
ting to external affairs or defence which may involve the econo-
mic or financial interests of the Bahama Islands or the enactment
of laws by the Legislature of the Bahama Islands.
(2) The Governor, acting in his discretion, may from time to
time - (a) designate a Minister with whom he may consult on mat-
ters relating to the Police Force; or (b) delegate, with prior
approval of a Secretary of State, to a Minister designated by him
after consultation with the Premier such responsibility for mat-
ters relating to internal security and the Police Force as the
Governor may think fit upon such conditions as he may impose.
75. The Governor shall, for the due exercise of his functions,
be entitled to all papers which are available to the Cabinet and
to any other information concerning the government of the Bahama
Islands which is so available.1

1. At independence the Bahamas were governed by a governor-general, a senate

of 16 and an elected house of assembly of 43 members. In 1999 there was still
no suggestion that the Commonwealth of the Bahamas would wish to become a
republic (contrast Barbados). Only 50 miles from Florida, the retention of the
monarchy was a means of trying to be culturally different and non-American.
 313

B. BRITISH HONDURAS
89. ACTING-GOVERNOR EVELYN HONE TO OLIVER LYTTELTON, 15 July 19521
[The governor, Sir Ronald Garvey had reported that a select committee
of the legislative council had reviewed all the recommendations of the
Courtenay constitutional reform commission (9 Jan. 1952 [VII, p.173]).
On the proposals for the reform of the council itself, the principle of
universal adult suffrage had been conceded 1n October 19472 by Rees-
Williams as under-secretary and Its extension 'could no longer be
postponed' given the constitutional developments elsewhere.] The Con-
stitutional Reform Commission had proposed that, in view of the
'political inexperience of the majority' in the district
constituencies, the extension of universal suffrage should be

1. C.0.1031/323 [For B.H. see Vol. VII pp.171-4: and above pp.38ff] The ten-
sions over Guatemalan threats in 1948 which had prompted a unanimous resolu-
tion of B.H. loyalty to the Crown had been followed by strong anti-British
reaction in December 1949 to the devaluation of the B.H. dollar which raised
the cost of U.S. imports - a devaluation which made worse an already serious
economic slump and was the more damaging because only in October Listowell had
reassured the legislative council and the public that no change was contempla-
ted in the exemption of the B.H. dollar from the British devaluation of the
£ sterling done in September. Only a few weeks after similar assurances were
made in Parliament, Governor Garvey had to announce devaluation. The colonial
dependence on Britain rankled. The council refused to pass the bill and Garvey
had to use his reserve powers as he had in 1946 over income tax. A people's
council, fore-runner of the People's United Party, with support from the Gene-
ral Workers Union, sought to terminate colonial rule - even secession to the
U.S. or (in George Price's view) to Central America. The anniversary of the
naval skirmishes at St. George's Cay on 10 September 1798 was elevated into
a national day. Hone, a Bhodesian Rhodes scholar, had served in Tanganyika,
the Seychelles and Palestine, and was now (1948-53) colonial secretary of B.H.
and the acting-governor. Lyttelton was secretary of state (1951-4) in Chur-
chill's government. In a separate private despatch (1 July) Hone showed con-
cern at the delays in the drafting of the report of the legislative council-
lors due to an inability to make up their minds on details in the Courtenay
report, over which there was radical differences of opinion.
2. In July-August 1947 constitutional proposals from an elected legislative
councillor had been discussed with the C.O. A commission under the Colony's
A.G. was appointed to make recommendations, but it was under W.H. Courtenay,
an unofficial member of both councils, that the report was presented in April
1951. The commission had consisted of 2 officials and 3 unofficials and its
attitude had been appreciative of, and deferential to, British colonial rule
which had provided stable authority, tranquillity, a just administration and
an upright judiciary. Any reform must secure to all citizens these rights and
benefits: 'we conceive it to be most desirable to avoid the errors made in
other Colonies where the apparent premature extension of political responsi-
bility has resulted in frequent political upheavals and given the impression
to the outside world of instability in the Government. ' What was most needful
was that the benefits of education enjoyed by the majority should be spread
more widely over all races in the colony. Furthermore the paternalism of the
system which did not 'engender a proper system of political responsibility by
members of the Legislature', required some provision for delegating responsi-
bility to train councillors in its use.
314
accompanied by an arrangement whereby d i s t r i c t representatives
would be elected by an e l e c t o r a l college i n each d i s t r i c t t o be
composed of the Members of the Town Boards and V i l l a g e Councils
of the D i s t r i c t . (Report paragraphs 89 and 900.) In a d d i t i o n i t was
recommended t h a t three elected members should be added t o the
L e g i s l a t i v e Council, to represent the Colony as a whole: these
members t o be elected on one r o l l f o r a l l d i s t r i c t s except
B e l i z e . (Report paragraph 103.) As you w i l l observe, these two
proposals have not found favour w i t h the m a j o r i t y of members of
the present L e g i s l a t i v e Council, who have decided t h a t a l l
elected members should be chosen by d i r e c t vote. The reasons f o r
t h i s a r e , I understand, as f o l l o w s : - (a) the e l e c t o r a l college
proposal i s a complicated one f o r which the country i s not yet
ready. No elected D i s t r i c t Town Boards (except Stann Creek) or
V i l l a g e Councils yet e x i s t , and a considerable time would have
t o elapse before these bodies were properly established and in
a p o s i t i o n t o deal w i t h the matter of the e l e c t i o n of d i s t r i c t
representatives to the L e g i s l a t i v e Council; (b) i t might be
easier i n c e r t a i n areas f o r one p o l i t i c a l party t o 'pack' the
Boards and Councils than t o secure the e l e c t i o n of i t s nominee
by d i r e c t v o t e ; and representatives on these bodies might tend
t o be put up f o r e l e c t i o n more because they would vote i n a
c e r t a i n way f o r the L e g i s l a t i v e Council representative than
because they had any real i n t e r e s t i n local a f f a i r s .
In my opinion these o b j e c t i o n s t o the Commission's proposals
are v a l i d ones, and I consider t h a t the Select Committee's
recommendation t h a t a l l elected representatives should be chosen
by d i r e c t vote i s a desirable s i m p l i f i c a t i o n . . . . [He saw no
objection to the Speaker being a non-member and without a vote as in
Trinidad. He considered that i t was 'about right' on census figures for
Belize to have 4 seats. The proposed reduction of nominated members to
3 from 4 was a move towards the elimination of nominees and the elected
majority proposed by Rees-Williams in 1947: nominees should represent
'special interests pending the time when the whole population was in a
position to take part in elections' - p a r t i c u l a r l y in respect of the Maya
Indians. On the reconstitution of the Executive Council (3 ex officio,
4 chosen from the l e g i s l a t i v e ) he f e l t that the selection of the u n o f f i -
c i a l s had been l e f t 'too much' in the hands of the l e g i s l a t i v e council-
lors and i t would be d i f f i c u l t for the Governor to secure Maya represen-
t a t i o n . The precise functions of the Executive Council were vague in the
Courtenay report - 'the principal instrument of policy' - and i t s members
were quasi ministers with p o r t f o l i o s , though the Governor should have
reserved discretion in allocation of law and order and finance, he would
l i k e to know whether H.M.'s G.'s overall control in finance had now been
removed. In i t s recommendation for D i s t r i c t Town Boards, the select
committee had departed from the Courtenay proposals for elections by
electoral colleges in preferring election by ratepayers and not by adult
suffrage. On i t s recommendation that the head teacher and senior
policeman should be ex officio members of the village councils, there was
some question whether they would have time to get involved in v i l l a g e
p o l i t i c s and whether they would thereby lose t h e i r status as impartial
supporters of the law. Finally the select committee had decided against
a second chamber.]
 315

( b ) . STEPHEN LUKE TO ACTING-GOVERNOR EVELYN HONE, 3 August 19521

v i . <?i/as7-Ministers ( C o m m i s s i o n ' s Report - Paragraph 1 4 1 - 3 ) .
I t seems t o us premature a t t h e p r e s e n t s t a g e o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
development to consider charging unofficial members of the
Executive Council with the administration of departments of
government, which t h e Commission presumably mean when t h e y speak
o f a l l o c a t i n g p o r t f o l i o s . As a s t e p t o w a r d t h e e v e n t u a l c r e a t i o n
o f such a m i n i s t e r i a l system t h e Governor m i g h t a s s i g n t o c e r t a i n
u n o f f i c i a l members o f E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l t h e f u n c t i o n o f s t e e r i n g
the business of certain departments through the Legislative
C o u n c i l , and perhaps o f b e i n g p r i m a r i l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r r a i s i n g
questions r e l a t i n g t o those departments i n Executive C o u n c i l .
( T h i s may be what t h e Commission means by t h e i r r e f e r e n c e t o
' q u a s / - m i n i s t e r s ' . ) We t h i n k , however, t h a t such a system s h o u l d
be l e f t t o be e s t a b l i s h e d a t your d i s c r e t i o n by a d m i n i s t r a t i v e
arrangement and t h a t no r e f e r e n c e t o i t s h o u l d be made i n t h e
Constitutional Instruments.
The e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f a p r o p e r m i n i s t e r i a l s y s t e m , under which
members o f E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l would become M i n i s t e r s charged w i t h
t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f d e p a r t m e n t s , i s i n our v i e w , a q u e s t i o n
which should await review of constitution proposed after five
years.2

1. C O . 1031/323. Luke was an a s s i s t a n t under-secretary and became comptroller

for W.I. development and welfare and co-chairman of the Caribbean Commission
in 1953. 2. As a r e s u l t of the 1951 report and the s e l e c t committee's recom-
mendations thereon t h e r e was universal adult suffrage, a s i n g l e l e g i s l a t i v e
assembly (replacing the century-old l e g i s l a t i v e council) of 15 members (9
elected, 3 ex officio, and 3 nominated unofficials) and the executive council
of the governor, 3 ex officio and 6 unofficials elected (2 nominated, 4 elec-
ted) by t h e i r colleagues in the assembly to executive c o u n c i l l o r s , purely as
an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e matter for the p r e s e n t , some r e s p o n s i b i l i t y would be delega-
ted (to Renison, 17 Jan. 1953: No. 34) and the governor should, subject to h i s
reserve powers, consult with and act with the advice of the council. The need
for the governor's emergency power was also addressed (to Renison, 14 Nov.
1953: C O . 1031/323). On 2 June 1952 the l e g i s l a t i v e council resolved unani-
mously to defer federation with the B r i t i s h Caribbean t e r r i t o r i e s ' i n d e f i n i t e -
ly' (CO. 1031/1698) and Renison warned (to Mayle, 31 Jan. 1955: ibid.) that
though federation might not be ' t h e unmitigated e v i l ' the P.U.P. had d e s c r i -
bed, i t would be unwise to encourage any change of p o l i c y , for there was great
fear t h a t unemployed Jamaicans would flood i n t o B.H. if the colony joined.
Richardson r e j e c t e d any consideration of federation without guaranteed inde-
pendent powers - dominion s t a t u s - so t h a t immigration would be controlled by
the separate u n i t s : but he came to believe t h a t B.H, should develop i t s econo-
mic l i n k s with B r i t a i n and the West I n d i e s , while George Price urged a pro-
Central America policy and indeed v i r t u a l l y opposed p a r t i c i p a t i o n in any ' c o -
l o n i a l ' executive, taking only a minor post and r a r e l y speaking. (Governor S i r
Colin Thornley noted the strong prejudice in B.H. against federation, though
he a l s o f e l t t h a t with the limited sources a v a i l a b l e , B.H. would be wise to
make use of some of the f e d e r a t i o n ' s f a c i l i t i e s - federal c o u r t , i n t e r n a t i o n a l
missions, t e c h n i c a l s e r v i c e s , u n i v e r s i t y college and h o s p i t a l , a g r i c u l t u r a l
advisory departments etc. (to Thomas, 30 Dec. 1960: C O . 1031/ 4279). In Sep-
tember 1956 Price and Pollard of the General Workers Union won control of the
P.U.P. and Richardson was expelled (Thornley to Sandys, 29 Sept: C O . 1031/
21797). The P.U.P. won a l l 9 s e a t s in March 1957 with a diminished 53% of the
316

9 0 . OLIVER LYTTELTON TO GOVERNOR SIR PATRICK RENISON, 17 January 19531

The p r o p o s a l o f t h e S e l e c t C o m m i t t e e t h a t one o f t h e U n o f f i c i a l
Members of the Executive Council should be elected by the
L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l a s l e a d e r o f t h e E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l i s , i n my
o p i n i o n , p r e m a t u r e . I f i t p r o v e s d e s i r a b l e t h a t t h e r e s h o u l d be
a l e a d e r o f t h e u n o f f i c i a l s e c t i o n o f t h e E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l , who
would form a link between the Governor and his non-official
C o u n c i l l o r s , i t s h o u l d be p o s s i b l e f o r t h e G o v e r n o r t o s e l e c t
such a p e r s o n w i t h o u t f o r m a l i t y , i n a g r e e m e n t w i t h t h e u n o f f i c i a l
members o f h i s c o u n c i l .
The t e r m s o f r e f e r e n c e o f t h e Commission i n c l u d e d a c l a u s e
which d i r e c t e d t h e i r a t t e n t i o n t o t h e d e s i r a b i l i t y o f a f f o r d i n g
e l e c t e d members o f t h e L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l t h e o p p o r t u n i t y o f
participating in the work of Government. I have carefully
considered the Commission's recommendation on this point, that
c e r t a i n U n o f f i c i a l Members o f t h e E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l s h o u l d be
a c c o r d e d a s t a t u s w h i c h a p p r o x i m a t e s , i n some r e s p e c t s , t o t h a t
o f M i n i s t e r s . I t w o u l d , i n my v i e w , be o u t o f k e e p i n g w i t h t h e
p r e s e n t s t a g e o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l development i n B r i t i s h Honduras
to make specific provision in the Constitutional Instruments
c h a r g i n g U n o f f i c i a l Members o f t h e E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l w i t h t h e
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f Departments o f Government. I suggest t h a t t h e
G o v e r n o r , i n h i s d i s c r e t i o n , s h o u l d a s s i g n t o U n o f f i c i a l Members
of h i s Executive Council the f u n c t i o n of s t e e r i n g t h e business
of c e r t a i n Departments through t h e L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l . Such
members m i g h t a l s o be p r i m a r i l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r r a i s i n g i n t h e
Executive Council questions r e l a t i n g t o those Departments. This
w o u l d be an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a r r a n g e m e n t , n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y p r o v i d e d
for in the Constitutional Instruments....
[Though i t might be inappropriate that a nominated member should be
subject t o the vote of L e g i s l a t i v e Councillors f o r appointment t o the
Executive Council, he would accept t h i s proposal. The Governor's reserve
powers should be as defined f o r Trinidad. There should be a review of
t h i s new c o n s t i t u t i o n in 5 y e a r s . 2 There could be a general e l e c t i o n f o r
the new Assembly by January 1954. 3
91. PHILIP ROGERS TO SIR THOMAS LLOYD, 10 November 19534
[He outlined the events since 1948 and the provisions of the new

t o t a l p o l l . But P r i c e ' s i n t e r e s t in the Organisation of Central American s t a -

t e s and h i s t a l k s with the Guatemalan m i n i s t e r in London led to the breakdown
of the C O . meetings in November and h i s d i s m i s s a l from the executive c o u n c i l :
when 2 P.U.P. members defected he led only a minority g r o u p ; . His opponents
under Herbert F u l l e r then formed a National Independence P a r t y , but in the af-
termath of the Blood r e p o r t in 1959 and the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l conference in Lon-
don in February 1960 the P.U.P. and N . I . P . formed a United Front. This convin-
ced H.M.'s G. t h a t the B.H. l e a d e r s could a c t r e s p o n s i b l y : the 1960 c o n s t i t u -
t i o n was comparatively quickly replaced on 1 January 1964 by a concession of
f u l l i n t e r n a l self-government, P r i c e becoming premier of the f i r s t P.U.P. go-
vernment. [See below No. 97] 1. CO.1031/323. Renison was governor (1952-5).
(This despatch was regarded as more s u i t a b l e than t h a t of 21 November 1952 for
publication.) 2. This was undertaken by S i r Hilary Blood.
3. The royal a s s e n t was given on 28 J u l y , 1953.
4. C O . 1031/324. Rogers was now a s s i s t a n t u n d e r - s e c r e t a r y : Lloyd was permanent
u n d e r - s e c r e t a r y (1947-56).
 317

constitution. The proceedings had taken place in B.H. 'in a rather

leisurely fashion' and elections with f u l l adult franchise were due now
in January 1954.]
The local p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n i s d i s t u r b i n g . The leading
p o l i t i c a l p a r t y , 7.e. the Peoples United Party, i s the usual
mixture of p o l i t i c s and trade unionism, i t s leaders being
n a t i o n a l i s t , d i s t i n c t l y a n t i - B r i t i s h and probably supported by
Guatemalan money. We are, however, informed t h a t i t i s not l i k e l y
t o develop i n t o a Communist movement s t r i c t l y speaking, because
of the support which i t draws from the Roman Catholics i n the
community (there are some American Jesuits who have a strong1
i n f l u e n c e , though u n f o r t u n a t e l y i t i s an a n t i - B r i t i s h one).
E a r l i e r t h i s year, I was perturbed at the mention i n one of the
monthly i n t e l l i g e n c e reports t o the e f f e c t t h a t the P.U.P. was
the only party which was e s t a b l i s h i n g some kind of organisation
f o r e l e c t i o n e e r i n g in the country d i s t r i c t s and I wrote t o the
Governor to ask whether there was not an ominous p a r a l l e l in t h i s
respect with the P.P.P. in B r i t i s h Guiana and the C.P.P. i n the
Gold Coast. His reply shows t h a t there i s a d i s t i n c t l i k e l i h o o d
t h a t the P.U.P. w i l l capture at least 7 of the 9 elected seats
i n the next L e g i s l a t i v e Council and even a p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t they
might take the whole 9. With the lessons of B r i t i s h Guiana before
us t h i s i s a d i s t u r b i n g p o s s i b i l i t y .
There i s an a d d i t i o n a l complication in t h a t the Legal Advisers
have now t o l d us t h a t p a r t l y because of the pressure of work i n
connection w i t h B r i t i s h Guiana, they w i l l not be able t o d r a f t
the necessary instruments in time t o enable e l e c t i o n s t o be held
i n January, as we are p u b l i c l y committed t o doing. I t i s tempting
t o take advantage of t h i s t o review the whole p o s i t i o n in B r i t i s h
Guiana, as Mr. Mayle suggests should be done i n his minute of
9.10.53. We must c e r t a i n l y be prepared f o r the strong l i k e l i h o o d
t h a t i f e l e c t i o n s are held i n the course of next year we s h a l l
be faced w i t h the l e g i s l a t u r e being dominated by a v i o l e n t l y
n a t i o n a l i s t and d i s t i n c t l y a n t i - B r i t i s h party which has almost
c e r t a i n l y received money from Guatemala, while f u r t h e r t h a t Party
might well capture the 4 elected seats on the Executive Council
where they would be in an extremely strong p o s i t i o n , even
although not i n the m a j o r i t y , because of t h e i r control of the
Legislature....
[But in relation to the Governor's reserve powers (1) the situation in
B.H. was different from that 1n B.G. before its constitution was
suspended - e.g. the Governor would s t i l l have a majority in the
Executive Council, the 'ministers' had only an administrative association
with their departments and the Governor's reserve powers could override
a vote in the legislative; (2) the racial divides were more scattered in
B.H. and there was less likelihood of the predominance of a single party.
There was traditionally much pro-British sentiment, though this had been
dented by the devaluation of sterling. (3) The P.U.P. did not have links
with international Communism nor any leader of the calibre of Mrs. Jagan.
Moreover] i f we go back on our commitment, i t w i l l be univer-
s a l l y assumed t h a t the action we have j u s t taken i n B r i t i s h

1. I t was suggested t h a t a B r i t i s h order of J e s u i t s should replace the Ameri-

can as in B.G. (Rawle Earley, president of the W.I. students union in London
to Lady Gore, 16 Feb. 1953: CO. 1031/325).
318

Guiana represents not a measure against Communism and the d e c l i n e

of the territory economically and administratively, but a
reversal of the p o l i c y of p o l i t i c a l advance i n the Colonies.
Whatever may be said about the merits and demerits of that
p o l i c y , there i s no doubt t h a t i t has had a considerable measure
of success i n convincing many of the Colonial peoples of our
s i n c e r i t y . I b e l i e v e t h a t the whole of t h a t gain would be
completely undone, and that there would be really serious
p o l i t i c a l repercussions throughout the Caribbean and p o s s i b l y i n
West A f r i c a , i f we were t o go back on our commitment t o p o l i t i c a l
advance i n B r i t i s h Honduras, j u s t a f t e r we had taken s t e r n a c t i o n
in B r i t i s h Guiana....
[The d i f f i c u l t y of the backlog in drafting instruments should not be
allowed to be interpreted as a going back on our intentions. At most the
drafting would be finished by May. The Governor should be supported in
his view 'that whatever the cost the Government has to keep out of
electioneering p o l i t i c s ' . 1 ]

9 2 . GOVERNOR SIR PATRICK RENISON TO OLIVER LYTTELTON, 24 November 19532

The s i t u a t i o n i s n o t ( r e p e a t n o t ) p a r a l l e l w i t h B r i t i s h Guiana
as t h e w i n n i n g p a r t y w i l l n o t w i e l d t h e same power. There w i l l
be a dominated and o f f i c i a l m a j o r i t y on t h e E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l and
any association of its members with Administration will not
(repeat not) involve ministerial powers. Administration will
t h e r e f o r e remain under my d i r e c t c o n t r o l . However much t h e y a r e
a s s i s t i n g communist a i m s , P.U.P. depend l a r g e l y on t h e Roman
C a t h o l i c s u p p o r t and c o u l d n o t r i s k p r o o f t h a t t h e y had d e f i n i t e
communist c o n n e c t i o n s . I f t h e y c a n n o t g e t t h e i r own way t h e y w i l l
p r o b a b l y t r y t o f r u s t r a t e t h e normal b u s i n e s s o f government by
b l o c k i n g Finance B i l l s etc. b u t l e a d e r s have n e i t h e r e d u c a t i o n
no o r g a n i s i n g powers o f P . P . P . l e a d e r s . They must w i n a minimum
of 8 seats t o o b t a i n a m a j o r i t y i n the L e g i s l a t i v e Council and,
i f c o n t i n u i n g e f f o r t s t o organise opposition are s u c c e s s f u l , I
do n o t t h i n k t h a t t h e y w i l l do t h i s . . .
Any w i t h h o l d i n g o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n f o r any purpose would be
d i s a s t r o u s i n i t s e f f e c t on a l l o p i n i o n i n t h e c o u n t r y e x c e p t
s m a l l group o f d i e h a r d s . R e p e r c u s s i o n s i n C e n t r a l America and
among o t h e r i n t e r e s t e d a n t i - c o l o n i s t powers would be u n f o r t u n a t e .
Guatemala would e x p l o i t i t . I t would s t r e n g t h e n P.U.P. and t h e
G.W.U. would be l i k e l y t o c a l l f o r p r o t e s t s t r i k e s . R e a c t i o n s i n
o t h e r emergent C o l o n i e s w o u l d , I suppose, be e q u a l l y u n f o r t u n a t e .

93. GOVERNOR SIR PATRICK RENISON TO OLIVER LYTTELTON, 10 June 19543

[A Royal message would be welcome and h e l p f u l . ]
I suggest the Royal message might mention Her Majesty's
p l e a s u r e i n m e e t i n g r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f B r i t i s h Honduras a t t h e
t i m e o f t h e C o r o n a t i o n and d u r i n g t h e Royal V i s i t t o Jamaica and
might express the hope that increased association and co-

1. Renison reported (8 April 1954: CO. 1031/1299) on the number of v o t e r s and

t h e i r d i s t r i b u t i o n : the e l e c t i o n took place on 28 April and the P.U.P. won 8
of the 9 s e a t s with 61% of the vote, p a r t i c u l a r l y necessary in r e l a t i o n t o the
reform of the executive council. The new l e t t e r s patent and i n s t r u c t i o n s were
issued 26 May 1954 a f t e r ' s a t i s f a c t o r y assurances' from the P.U.P.
2. CO.1031/324. 3. C O . 1031/1361.
 319

operation which the new C o n s t i t u t i o n w i l l bring between represen-

t a t i v e s of Her peoples and Her o f f i c i a l s at home and abroad who
are working w i t h the same object of welfare and development of
B r i t i s h Honduras, w i l l lead t o a more widespread awareness and
c l e a r e r evaluation of the t i e s of f e l l o w s h i p and C h r i s t i a n
t h i n k i n g w i t h a l l t h e i r importance t o peace and the progress{??}
of mankind, which binds together even the f u r t h e s t country of the
Commonwealth and of which Her Majesty received such loyal and
v i v i d proof on her recent world wide t o u r .
On t h i s ceremonial occasion I t h i n k the note t o be struck must
be hope. I intend my own address t o be on the f u t u r e of B r i t i s h
Honduras - what we may be able t o achieve i f we continue the
popular appeal of P.U.P. w i t h the experience of sincere Govern-
ment. But i t w i l l be a sober warning of what may be the conse-
quence not only to Caribbean and more widespread o p i n i o n , but
more important t o the p r o s p e r i t y and prospects of the people i f
we f a i l . I intend t o say c l e a r l y t h a t i n the B r i t i s h Commonwealth
there i s and w i l l remain freedom of r e l i g i o n and there i s nothing
incompatible w i t h f u l l association and eventual f u l l membership
i n the Commonwealth through f e d e r a t i o n or any other p r a c t i c a b l e
means which can be devised, i n the conception of B r i t i s h Honduras
as, amongst other t h i n g s , a centre of Roman Catholic education
f o r the whole of Central America; indeed I hope t h a t the
s t a b i l i t y which membership of the B r i t i s h Commonwealth can ensure
w i l l provide the foundation f o r such bastion against tyranny or
communism and any other ism which may threaten mankind.
I do not doubt, and indeed I hope t h a t in our circumstances
your own message without casting too much gloom, w i l l be
r e a l i s t i c a l l y admonitory. I should be g r a t e f u l i f you would not
mention f e d e r a t i o n , immigration or possible withholding of C D .
and W. grant. I w i l l address you on those subjects s h o r t l y . You
w i l l no doubt mention proposed v i s i t of representatives of
Executive Council to London. I am working t o ensure t h a t P.U.P.
representatives w i l l be Price and Richardson, who are the only
ones worth tuppence, even i f the former i s almost psychotic. 1

1. Discussions began in the C O . on 18 October 1954 (CO. 1031/1798). Delegates

were reassured t h a t policy towards B.H. was governed by H.M.'s G. general co-
l o n i a l policy but c o n s t i t u t i o n a l advance was accompanied by r i s k s and some f i -
nancial d i f f i c u l t i e s . The way the P.U.P. members had responded in drawing up
the development plan had been encouraging. They should remember the millions
of pounds contributed to B.H. by the B r i t i s h taxpayer when the imperial power
was accused of e x p l o i t a t i o n . Leigh Richardson acknowledged t h i s and promised
t h a t the present c o n s t i t u t i o n would be worked whether c o n s t i t u t i o n a l reforms
were made immediately or not. But the B.H. delegation urged t h a t a fully r e s -
ponsible m i n i s t e r i a l system should be e s t a b l i s h e d with, as a f i r s t s t e p , a l l
6 u n o f f i c i a l s being given f u l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for departments (Mins., 2 Nov.
ibid.). By January 1955 a system of quasi serai-ministerial government was est-
ablished - 3 e l e c t e d members of the executive became responsible for n a t u r a l
resources, public u t i l i t i e s and s o c i a l services while t h e i r 3 e l e c t e d c o l l e a -
gues acted as a s s i s t a n t s : the nominated members s t i l l having a majority of one
over the u n o f f i c i a l s . But the P.U.P. leaders in power found i t more d i f f i c u l t
to get things done than they had imagined (Rogers, Min. 26 Sept. 1955: C O .
1031/1362) and in August 1955, long before the 5-year review, there was a fur-
ther delegation of r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s to elected members - labour, local govern-
320
94. GOVERNOR SIR COLIN THORNLEY: THE OBJECTIVES OF CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM,
8 July 19591
1. The primary objective must be to build up a sound system of
Parliamentary Government in British Honduras as that term is
understood in the United Kingdom.
2. This primary objective must embrace a series of secondary
objectives designed to achieve success with the primary objec-

ment, and development (Morris, Min., 13 Sept. ibid.) and Richardson pressed
for further reforms - an increase in elected members in the assembly, a limi-
tation of the governor's reserve powers, and a replacement of the 'membership
system' in the executive with full ministerial responsibility: (to Lennox
Boyd, 8 Nov. 1955: ibid.). When Richardson was expelled, and Price succeeded,
the P.U.P. was demanding a fully elected assembly and executive council and
self-government by a fixed date, Sir Colin Thornley (governor 1955-61) consi-
dered it all Price's work and with no evidence of colony-wide support; but all
unofficials wanted 'ministerial' portfolios and he would be ready to re-style
'members' as 'ministers': (to Kennedy, personal; 6 Oct. 1957: C.0.1031/2256).
1. C.0.1031/2258 enclosed Thornley to Lennox-Boyd, 18 July. Sir Hilary Blood
had been appointed to review the working of the constitution. The governor was
setting out what he saw as the objectives. Blood's report was received on 10
November. He felt that the modest success of the guasi-ministerial system jus-
tified further reforms but that a grant of full internal self-government would
be premature because (1) B.H. was grant-aided; (2) there were too few in an
educated middle-class to staff the government; (3) the P.U.P. dominated poli-
tics to a degree making alternation in a 2-party system impossible; (4) there
were threats from Guatemala. The reaction in the C.O. to the report was fa-
vourable: 'although all three political parties have really no alternative but
to take the line that the report does not go far enough, there were signs
[from the governor] that it would probably be accepted with a fairly good
grace'. Some modifications would be proposed - e.g. that the governor would
consult the leader of the majority party on all nominations to the executive,
though elsewhere Rogers argued that he should be consulted only on a limited
number; and that the governor should distribute portfolios at his discretion
(J. Baker, Min. 14 Dec. 1959: C.O.1031/2258). On 18 December the assembly ad-
opted the report but with some additional proposals, though Price had earlier
(Tel. 28 Oct. 1959: C.O.1031/2259) denounced it as consolidating more powers
in the colonial governor. In February 1960 a constitutional conference took
place in London, the P.U.P. and N.I.P. having united: Blood's proposals were
considered as 'falling short of the aspirations' of B.H., but substantial
agreement was reached on the next constitution, a little more advanced than
Blood had proposed. The conference rejected his recommendation for postal and
proxy voting, agreed on 18 M.L.A.'s elected in single member constituencies
and a reduction of ex officio to 2, compromised on an elaborate procedure for
the 5 nominees (2 by consultation of the governor and first minister, one of
the opposition leader and 2 of all the party leaders: see Ian Macleod's com-
ment, 29 Nov. I960: C.O.1031/3093 - the main principle was to prevent nomina-
tions frustrating the outcome of elections) and on a 4-year life of the assem-
bly. In the executive only 2 were ex officio while 6 would be unofficial as-
semblymen (one a nominated member). There would be 5 ministerial portfolios
(incl. finance and first minister), the leader of the majority party whom the
governor would support: and the assembly would elect the remaining 5 executive
councillors. The governor would distribute portfolios on the advice of the
first minister. This new constitution came into effect after the elections in
March 1961.
 321

t i v e . These a r e : -
( 1) To promote a system of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s i n c l u d i n g the two
p a r t y system and an e f f e c t i v e opposition in the L e g i s l a t u r e .
( 2) To ensure t h a t m i n o r i t y p a r t i e s are represented in the
Legislature.
( 3) To maintain the d i g n i t y , independence and i m p a r t i a l i t y of
the O f f i c e of Speaker.
( 4) To promote the s u b s t i t u t i o n of p o l i c i e s f o r p e r s o n a l i t i e s
in p o l i t i c s and t o get away from the c u l t of p e r s o n a l i t y .
( 5) To promote and increase genuine p o l i t i c a l consciousness and
a sense of n a t i o n a l u n i t y amongst the e l e c t o r a t e .
( 6) To increase the p r o p o r t i o n of popular r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in the
Assembly as against the Ex Officio and Nominated Members.
( 7) To encourage more men and women t o e n t e r p o l i t i c s as a
c a r e e r , and in p a r t i c u l a r the b e t t e r educated c l a s s .
( 8) To ensure t h a t only genuine B r i t i s h Hondurans should be
e l e c t e d to the L e g i s l a t u r e and the Government.
( 9) To r a i s e the standard of debates and committee work in the
L e g i s l a t i v e Assembly.
(10) To reduce the size of the Executive Council so that it
becomes a m i n o r i t y and does not remain, as i t i s under the
present C o n s t i t u t i o n , a m a j o r i t y in the L e g i s l a t u r e .
( 1 1 ) To ensure the best possible f i e l d of candidates f o r e l e c t i o n
as Members of the Assembly and M i n i s t e r s of the Crown.
( 1 2 ) To maintain a system of checks and balances i n the C o n s t i t u -
t i o n : in p a r t i c u l a r t o leave the balance of power in Executive
Council w i t h the Nominated element as a t p r e s e n t .
(13) To make the maximum possible further advance towards
i n t e r n a l s e l f - G o v e r n m e n t as i s c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e s t a b i l i t y and
s e c u r i t y and o t h e r i n t e r e s t s o f t h e c o u n t r y .

95. THOMAS VICKERS: MEMORANDUM, 7 January I9601

(a) Transitory Article No. 1 of the Guatemalan national
territory makes the Executive in Guatemala responsible for its
r e c o v e r y . . . . [ I n the U.N. assembly in September 1958 and September 1959 i t
had repeated i t s claim, supported by the Central American republics;
though Mexico had a counter claim to Northern B.H. But the president of
Guatemala was unpredictable and senior o f f i c i a l s were determined ' t o get
B.H. by hook or by c r o o k ' . ] T h e r e i s n e x t t o no l o c a l s u p p o r t f o r

1. CO, 1031/3192. Vickers was colonial s e c r e t a r y . He had been asked to write

a background paper on B.H. for the forthcoming conference on c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ,
economic and f i n a n c i a l reforms. This e x t r a c t was from the section t i t l e d
'international*. He used material from the Blood and Downie r e p o r t s . A g r e a t e r
measure of i n t e r n a l self-government could be granted while r e t a i n i n g adequate
safeguards in H.M.'s G. h a n d s ^ n d *to take the wind out of the Guatemalan
s a i l s ' , B.H. should cease to be a colony, should have i t s flag, should have
4 elected m i n i s t e r s ( i n c l . a Chief Minister) with r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for as much
i n t e r n a l self-government as i t had capacity for while the remaining subjects
(esp. defence and foreign a f f a i r s ) would remain under the s e c r e t a r y of s t a t e
through the governor and 3 o f f i c i a l members. There might be a council of s t a t e
divided into a governor's council of government (3 ex officio and 2 nominated
u n o f f i c i a l s ) and a council of ministers under the chief minister (elected
m i n i s t e r s for inland revenue, local government, education, h e a l t h , labour and
works). Vickers published The legislature of B.H. (1958).
322

t h e Guatemalan c l a i m . 1

96. E.R. HAMMER: MINUTE, 11 September 19622

[ I t would certainly be better i f a t e r r i t o r y wished to become a re-
public to make the change at independence not l a t e r . But i t would be
d i f f i c u l t to impose a republican form of constitution 1f that were not
the general wish of the people. The independence constitutions of Jamaica
and Trinidad and that of the f e d e r a t i o n of the e i g h t ' 3 as proposed, was
monarchial: B.G. intended to establish a republic, but he thought that
the impression B.H. gave at the 1960 conference4 was monarchial. But he
would make the following comments on the Governor's proposal.]
(a) I know of no precedent i n our Colonial C o n s t i t u t i o n s f o r
a Premier t o be e l e c t e d by the people instead of appointment by
the Governor and I am d o u b t f u l of the advantages of such an a r -
rangement. The present monopoly of the Peoples United Party might
not continue i n d e f i n i t e l y , and i f there were two f a i r l y w e l l -
balanced p a r t i e s i t i s conceivable t h a t an awkward s i t u a t i o n
might a r i s e whereby the Leader of one party was e l e c t e d Premier
w h i l e the other party captured the m a j o r i t y of seats i n the
Legislature.
(b) I am not sure t h a t i t would be r i g h t t o give the Premier
the whole say i n the s e l e c t i o n of nominated members a t the i n -
t e r n a l self-government stage. One may perhaps compare t h i s p r o -
posal w i t h the arrangements f o r appointments t o the Upper House
i n the i n t e r n a l self-government C o n s t i t u t i o n s of other Caribbean
t e r r i t o r i e s ( t h e Governor himself says t h a t the nominated members
are a kind of S e n a t e - s u b s t i t u t e ) . I n Jamaica a t t h a t stage two
or three members of the Upper House were appointed on the advice
of the Premier and eighteen a f t e r c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h such persons
as the Governor considered could speak f o r the d i f f e r i n g p o l i t i -
cal p o i n t s of view of groups represented in the House of Repre-

1. At t h e conference in February 1960 (CO. 1031/3193: Cmd.984) Rogers had t o

reprove Price from the chair for r e f e r r i n g to the colony as Belize in defe-
rence t o the Guatemalan claim. The c o r r e c t t i t l e was s t i l l B r i t i s h Honduras:
(Rogers. Min. 11 Feb. also Pollard t e l . 9 Feb: C O . 1031/3194). The new c o n s t i -
t u t i o n came i n t o effect by l e t t e r s patent and i n s t r u c t i o n s (16 November 1960)
on 3 March 1961 by proclamation - with Price as f i r s t m i n i s t e r .
2. C O . 1031/3191. S i r Peter S t a l l a r d (governor 1961-6) had w r i t t e n to R.W.
Piper a s e c r e t and personal l e t t e r (20 August) mulling over an a r t i c l e by S i r
Conrad Corfield (with Indian experience) on Nkrumah's option for p r e s i d e n t i a l
r u l e in Ghana: he wondered whether, to prevent the upset involved in a colony
having further changes a f t e r independence, i t might be wise t o e s t a b l i s h such
a form a t independence i t s e l f . S t a l l a r d had outlined various proposals - but
he favoured e l e c t i o n of a president by the whole e l e c t o r a t e not by the assemb-
ly alone: he hoped the president would be l a r g e l y a figurehead and r e a l power
would l i e with the premier and c a b i n e t . But generally he saw the snag was t h a t
B.H. might suspect it was being * fobbed off with less than the complete de-
sign for a Western Democracy and demand ' t h e facade of Westminster democracy'
though ' i t s r e a l i t y w i l l be m i s s i n g ' . But since Nkrumah was i d o l i s e d by the
P.U.P. they might accept something along the l i n e s of the Gold Coast c o n s t i t u -
t i o n . Piper asked Hammer to comment. 3. [See above, Nos.l8f/J
4. At the request of a l l the u n o f f i c i a l s the B.H. delegation had in 1960 asked
t h a t the conference report should include a d e c l a r a t i o n approving B.H.'s
d e s i r e t o remain within the Commonwealth.
 323

s e n t a t i v e s . I n T r i n i d a d t w e l v e members o f t h e Upper House were

a p p o i n t e d on t h e a d v i c e o f t h e P r e m i e r , two on t h e a d v i c e o f t h e
l e a d e r o f t h e o p p o s i t i o n , and seven a f t e r c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h such
persons as t h e Governor c o n s i d e r e d c o u l d speak f o r t h e r e l i g i o u s ,
economic and s o c i a l i n t e r e s t s o f t h e t e r r i t o r y . I n B r i t i s h Guiana
e i g h t members o f t h e Upper House a r e a p p o i n t e d on t h e a d v i c e o f
t h e P r e m i e r , t h r e e a f t e r c o n s u l t i n g such persons as t h e Governor
c o n s i d e r s can speak f o r t h e p o l i t i c a l p o i n t s o f view o f m i n o r i t y
groups i n t h e L e g i s l a t i v e Assembly, and two by t h e Governor i n
h i s d i s c r e t i o n . I s h o u l d have t h o u g h t t h a t , u n l e s s i t i s our o b -
j e c t t o s t r e n g t h e n t e n d e n c i e s towards t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f a o n e -
p a r t y s t a t e i n B r i t i s h Honduras, n o t more t h a n t h r e e o f t h e n o m i -
n a t e d members a t t h e most s h o u l d be a p p o i n t e d on t h e a d v i c e o f
the Premier.
( c ) The p r o p o s a l t h a t M i n i s t e r s need n o t be members o f t h e A s -
sembly i s , o f c o u r s e , unusual i n our C o l o n i a l C o n s t i t u t i o n s , and
e x e m p l i f i e s t h e G o v e r n o r ' s i n c l i n a t i o n towards a g r e a t e r degree
o f s e p a r a t i o n between t h e E x e c u t i v e and t h e L e g i s l a t u r e .
( d ) The Governor seems t o r e g a r d as an i n n o v a t i o n t h e idea t h a t
a ' c a s u a l ' d e f e a t i n t h e L e g i s l a t u r e need n o t e n t a i l t h e r e s i g n a -
t i o n o f t h e Government. There i s , however, good U.K. p r e c e d e n t
for t h i s . . . .
( e ) The p r o p o s a l t h a t t h e Governor s h o u l d have a d i s c r e t i o n a r y
r i g h t t o d i s s o l v e t h e L e g i s l a t u r e i f i t appears t o him t h a t t h e
Government and Assembly a r e f o l l o w i n g a course o f a c t i o n c o n t r a r y
t o t h e wishes o r i n t e r e s t s o f t h e c o u n t r y i s somewhat unusual a t
t h e i n t e r n a l s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t s t a g e . The i n t e r n a l s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t
C o n s t i t u t i o n s i n Jamaica, T r i n i d a d and B r i t i s h Guiana p r o v i d e d
t h a t t h e Governor s h o u l d e x e r c i s e t h e power o f d i s s o l u t i o n as
n e a r l y as may be i n accordance w i t h U.K. c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n v e n -
t i o n s ; and w h i l e t h e r e i s room f o r argument as t o whether t h e
Sovereign could i n exceptional circumstances refuse a d i s s o l u -
t i o n , i t i s r e c o g n i s e d t h a t t h e S o v e r e i g n cannot d i s s o l v e P a r l i a -
ment u n l e s s a d v i s e d t o do so by Her M i n i s t e r s .
( f ) The p r o p o s a l a b o u t an A d v i s o r y Committee on t h e P r e r o g a t i v e
of Mercy is broadly in line with recent precedents else-
where. . . .*

97. LETTERS PATENT, 1 January 19642

15. The Governor, a c t i n g i n h i s d i s c r e t i o n , s h a l l be r e s p o n s i b l e
f o r t h e f o l l o w i n g m a t t e r s - ( a ) e x t e r n a l a f f a i r s ; ( b ) defence

1. A c i r c u l a r despatch on the working of the m i n i s t e r i a l system o r i g i n a l l y

drafted in 1954 (but revised) was sent to B.H. (28 April 1960) and, as
amended, (26 Jan. 1969).
2. Stat.R. 1964. The 1961 constitution, extending the ministerial system al-
ready in operation, was c l e a r l y only accepted as a temporary measure for the
United Front was now agreed on independence and Courtenay asked for the next
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l conference to be brought forward. But Price was r e l u c t a n t to
submit to new e l e c t i o n s which he was told would be normal following a confer-
ence. There was also another p i l e up of work in 1962 in the C.O.'s d r a f t i n g
department and a 2-year period of working the 1961 c o n s t i t u t i o n before proce-
eding to f i n a l r a d i c a l changes was advisable: (Ivor Thomas to S t a l l a r d , 7 June
1962: CO.10311/3197). Sir Peter S t a l l a r d ( l a t e r l i e u t . - governor of the I s l e
of Man) was governor (1961-6). At a London conference in July 1963 (P.P.1963
324

( i n c l u d i n g the armed f o r c e s ) ; (c) i n t e r n a l s e c u r i t y ; and (d) the

terms and conditions of service ( i n c l u d i n g leave and passages)
of p u b l i c o f f i c e r s .
16.(1) In the exercise of h i s f u n c t i o n s under these Our L e t t e r s
or any other law the Governor s h a l l o b t a i n , and act i n accordance
w i t h , the advice of the Cabinet or a M i n i s t e r a c t i n g under the
general a u t h o r i t y of the Cabinet.
(2) The provisions of paragraph (1 ) of t h i s A r t i c l e s h a l l not
apply i n r e l a t i o n to the exercise by the Governor of - (a) any
f u n c t i o n conferred upon him by these Our L e t t e r s or any other law
t h a t i s expressed t o be exercisable by him i n h i s d i s c r e t i o n or
in accordance w i t h the advice of or a f t e r c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h any
person or a u t h o r i t y other than the Cabinet; or (b) any f u n c t i o n
conferred on him by these Our L e t t e r s or any other law w i t h r e s -
pect t o any matter s p e c i f i e d i n A r t i c l e 15 of these Our L e t t e r s
(which r e l a t e s t o matters f o r which the Governor has special
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ) ; or (c) any f u n c t i o n conferred upon him by any
law other than these Our L e t t e r s t h a t he i s authorized by such
law t o exercise without o b t a i n i n g the advice of the Cabinet.
(3) Where the Governor i s d i r e c t e d by these Our L e t t e r s or any
other law to exercise any f u n c t i o n a f t e r c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h any
person or a u t h o r i t y other than the Cabinet, he s h a l l not be o b l i -
ged t o exercise t h a t f u n c t i o n i n accordance w i t h the advice of
t h a t person or a u t h o r i t y .
(4) Where the Governor has obtained the advice of the Cabinet
or a M i n i s t e r in pursuance of paragraph (1) of t h i s A r t i c l e , he
may act otherwise than in accordance w i t h t h a t advice i f i n h i s
judgement i t i s necessary or expedient so to act f o r the purpose
of a matter f o r which the Governor i s responsible under A r t i c l e
15 of these Our L e t t e r s .
(5) Where any f u n c t i o n i s vested by any law other than these
Our L e t t e r s in any person or a u t h o r i t y other than the Governor
(not being a court of law), the Governor may exercise t h a t func-
t i o n i n such circumstances and t o such extent as he may consider
necessary or expedient f o r the purposes of any matter t h a t i s
s p e c i f i e d i n A r t i c l e 15 of these Our L e t t e r s .
(6) Where the Governor i s required by these Our L e t t e r s or any
other law to act in accordance w i t h the advice of or a f t e r con-
s u l t a t i o n w i t h any person or a u t h o r i t y the question whether he
has i n any matter so acted s h a l l not be c a l l e d i n question in any
court of l a w . . . .
24.(1) There s h a l l be an External A f f a i r s Committee which s h a l l

(2124)) i t was decided to introduce a fully i n t e r n a l self-governing c o n s t i t u -

tion on 1 January 1964 in place of the serai-ministerial system f i r s t i n i t i a t e d
in 1955 and s u b s t a n t i a l l y extended s i n c e . The governor's powers were reduced,
a cabinet and premier replaced the executive council and f i r s t m i n i s t e r , and
a bicameral l e g i s l a t u r e (Senate of 8 nominees: 2 s t i l l o f f i c i a l s : and House
of Representatives of 18 e l e c t e d members with no nominees or o f f i c i a l s ) . On
1 June 1971 the colony was officially named Belize. Though the territorial
dispute with Guatamala was not yet settled, on 21 September 1981 Belize became
an independent member of the Commonwealth - with a governor-general. Price was
s t i l l the prime m i n i s t e r . Independence would have been granted as soon as the
Belize government considered i t a p p r o p r i a t e . But Price delayed, wanting ade-
quate guarantees of defence and e x t e r n a l a f f a i r s and continuing f i n a n c i a l a i d .
 325
consist of - (a) the Governor as Chairman; (b) the Premier; and
(c) such other Ministers as the Governor, acting in accordance
with the advice of the Premier, may from time to time appoint.
( 2 ) Any appointment made under sub-paragraph (c) of the last
foregoing paragraph may be revoked by the Governor acting in
accordance with the advice of the Premier.
(3) The Committee shall be a consultative Committee on exter-
nal affairs, and the Governor may consult the Committee on any
matter relating to external affairs, but he shall not be obliged
to act in accordance with the advice of the Committee.
(4) The Governor may summon a meeting of the Council whenever
he considers it desirable to do so or whenever the Premier re-
quests that a meeting shall be held.
(5) The Council may act notwithstanding any vacancy in its
membership and its proceedings shall not be invalidated by the
presence or participation of any person not entitled to be pre-
sent at or to participate in those proceedings.
(6) Subject to the provisions of this Article the Council may
regulate its own procedure.
25.(1) There shall be a Security Council which shall consist of
the Governor and such other members as the Governor, acting in
his discretion, may from time to time appoint.
(2) The Governor, acting in his discretion, may revoke any
appointment made under the last foregoing paragraph.
(3) The function of the Security Council shall be to advise
the Governor, at his request, on the discharge of his responsi-
bilities for internal security under Article 15 of these Our
Letters.
(4) The Council shall not be summoned except by the authority
of the Governor who shall as far as practicable attend and pre-
side at all meetings of the Council.
(5) The Governor may summon a meeting of the Council whenever
he considers it desirable to do so or whenever the Premier re-
quests that a meeting shall be held.
(6) The Governor may consult the Council on any matter if he
considers such consultation will assist him in the discharge of
his responsibilities for internal security under Article 15 of
these Our Letters, but he shall not be obliged to consult the
Council before discharging his responsibilities as aforesaid, and
when he does consult the Council he shall not be obliged to act
in accordance with its advice.
(7) The Council may act notwithstanding any vacancy in its
membership and its proceedings shall not be invalidated by the
presence or participation of any person not entitled to be pre-
sent at or to participate in those proceedings.
(8) Subject to the provisions of this Article the Council may
regulate its own procedure1...

1. George Price became premier of a People's United Party government and

sought to create an atmosphere of national unity in which independence within
the Commonwealth (as affirmed at the request of all the unofficials at the
1960 conference) could be secured. He had wanted to be sure that certain safe-
guards in regard to defence and external affairs and assistance for economic
development must be ensured, or independence would 'rest on a weak shifting
foundation': (Speech 12 May 1968). As Belize in 1973, it became independent
326

C. HONG KONG

98. ( a ) GOVERNOR SIR ALEXANDER GRANTHAM: SPEECH, 31 March, 19491

. . . T h e S e n i o r U n o f f i c i a l Member [D.F. Lansdale] r e f e r r e d t o t h e
proposed c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m s o r changes. As Honourable Members
a r e aware t h e p r o p o s a l s a r e t o s e t up a M u n i c i p a l C o u n c i l and t o
e s t a b l i s h an U n o f f i c i a l m a j o r i t y i n L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l . The two
a r e t i e d t o g e t h e r t o t h i s e x t e n t t h a t i t i s proposed t h a t some
o f t h e U n o f f i c i a l Members o f L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l s h o u l d be n o m i -
n a t e d by t h e M u n i c i p a l C o u n c i l . So f a r as t h e M u n i c i p a l C o u n c i l
p r o p o s a l s o n l y a r e c o n c e r n e d , t h e y can o n l y be b r o u g h t i n t o e f -
f e c t by an O r d i n a n c e - i n f a c t , p o s s i b l y t h r e e o r f o u r O r d i n a n c e s
a r e n e c e s s a r y . That i s n o t t h e case f o r changes i n t h e c o n s t i t u -
t i o n o f t h e L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l . T h a t i s done by Royal I n s t r u c -
t i o n s w h i c h a r e made under H i s M a j e s t y ' s Sign Manual and S i g n e t .
I t w i l l be r e c o l l e c t e d t h a t t h e p r o p o s a l s were p u b l i s h e d i n
J u l y , 1947 i n t h e l o c a l Press i n f u l l w i t h c o p i e s o f t h e d e s p a t c h
f r o m S i r Mark Young t o t h e S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e and o f t h e r e p l y
o f t h e S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e t h e r e t o . But I t h i n k t h e Press would
be d o i n g t h e community g e n e r a l l y a p u b l i c s e r v i c e i f a t some
l a t e r s t a g e t h e y were t o r e p r i n t t h o s e two d e s p a t c h e s .
Now, what i s t h e n e x t s t e p w i t h r e g a r d t o t h o s e p r o p o s a l s ? The
next step i s the p u b l i c a t i o n of the d r a f t B i l l s f o r the Municipal
C o u n c i l . The Honourable t h e S e n i o r U n o f f i c i a l Member has i n d i -
c a t e d t h a t t h e p r e s e n t p r o p o s a l s may n o t be a c c e p t a b l e e i t h e r t o
h i m s e l f o r h i s c o l l e a g u e s o r t o t h e p e o p l e o f Hong Kong a t l a r g e .
I f t h a t i s so t h e n I hope t h a t he and h i s c o l l e a g u e s w i l l b r i n g
f o r w a r d a l t e r n a t i v e p r o p o s a l s . As t o t h e b e s t method o f d o i n g

and s t i l l a monarchy on 21 September 1981, with a governor-general, a bicamer-

a l National Assembly of House of 18 Representatives and a Senate of 8 nominees
of the governor-general and a c a b i n e t . The long-standing dispute with Guate-
mala, s t i l l unresolved, had delayed the claim for independence. 1. [For H.K.
see Vol.VII, F] H.K. Leg. Co. Deb. pp.136-8. Creech Jones had in July 1947
approved, with minor modifications, S i r Mark Young's plan - a municipal coun-
c i l of 30 (8 Chinese and 2 non-Chinese nominees of recognised u n o f f i c i a l bod-
i e s : 20 e l e c t e d - 6 wards on the i s l a n d , 4 from Kowloon and 10 non-Chinese in
a s i n g l e ward covering the whole Colony) with a l l e x i s t i n g urban council func-
t i o n s but with several important a d d i t i o n s , the r i g h t to make bylaws, impose
r a t e s and c o l l e c t i t s own revenues; and a l e g i s l a t i v e council of 7 o f f i c i a l s
and 8 u n o f f i c i a l s ; [Vol.VII pp.389-94]. The new governor in h i s summary here
of the annual budget debate was d i s c r e e t l y continuing to make i t appear t h a t
the u n o f f i c i a l s had taken the i n i t i a t i v e in making counter-proposals to the
Young plan. D.F. Lansdale had urged t h a t money should not be earmarked for the
municipal c o u n c i l , and t h a t ' a l a r g e r and more r e p r e s e n t a t i v e L e g i s l a t i v e
C o u n c i l ' , working a more r e p r e s e n t a t i v e urban council was a p r i o r i t y p r e f e r -
able to *the cumbersome machinery' of the proposed municipal council; (ibid.
p. 91). N.B. In 1946 the possible redrawing of the northern boundary along the
ridge of the Kowloon h i l l s had been considered to avoid the surrender of the
New T e r r i t o r i e s lease in June 1997. But even then a p a r t i t i o n was u n r e a l i s t i c ,
and the massive growth of Kowloon and the new c i t i e s of Tsuen Wan and Sha Tin
made i t even more so. The remainder of the colony, if the N.T. were given up,
could not survive the loss of water supply and generating p l a n t .
 327

t h a t any U n o f f i c i a l Member a t any t i m e c o u l d b r i n g a r e s o l u t i o n

forward i n t h i s Council w i t h those a l t e r n a t i v e p r o p o s a l s , but
perhaps U n o f f i c i a l Members m i g h t c o n s i d e r i t more s u i t a b l e t o
w a i t u n t i l t h e B i l l s a r e p u b l i s h e d and t h e n t o b r i n g f o r w a r d
s h o r t l y a f t e r w a r d s t h e i r a l t e r n a t i v e p r o p o s a l s . There may, o f
course, be more than one set of alternative proposals, but it
would o b v i o u s l y be b e t t e r , I t h i n k , i f t h e U n o f f i c i a l Members
c o u l d agree amongst t h e m s e l v e s as t o what a l t e r n a t i v e p r o p o s a l s
t h e y would l i k e . I c a n , however, a s s u r e t h i s C o u n c i l t h a t i t i s
not the i n t e n t i o n t o s t e a m - r o l l e r through the L e g i s l a t i v e Council
t h e e x i s t i n g p r o p o s a l s and any a l t e r n a t i v e p r o p o s a l s t h a t have
the backing of the Unofficial Members of this Council will re-
c e i v e my f u l l e s t c o n s i d e r a t i o n and w i l l be f o r w a r d e d t o t h e Sec-
r e t a r y o f S t a t e f o r t h e C o l o n i e s w i t h my r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s . . . .
[The present interest shown in constitutional reform contrasted 'very
pleasingly with the apathy...displayed when these proposals were f i r s t
published in July of 1949'.]

( b ) SIR MAN KAM LO: RESOLUTIONS PROPOSED IN THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL

22 JUNE 19491
[Since Creech Jones' despatch (3 July 1947) substantially approving Sir
Mark Young's recommendations (22 Oct. 1946) i t had become Increasingly
evident that in the view of the general public of Kong Kong']
( a ) The p r o p o s a l s o f S i r Mark Young i n v o l v i n g t h e c r e a t i o n o f
a M u n i c i p a l C o u n c i l and minor m o d i f i c a t i o n s o f t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n
o f t h e L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l a r e no l o n g e r c o n s i d e r e d t o be t h e
b e s t means o f g i v i n g t o t h e i n h a b i t a n t s o f t h e Colony a f u l l e r
and more r e s p o n s i b l e share i n t h e management o f t h e i r own a f -
f a i r s ; ( b ) S u f f i c i e n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n was n o t g i v e n t o a l t e r n a t i v e
methods o f a c h i e v i n g t h i s o b j e c t ; ( c ) The most e f f e c t i v e means
o f a c h i e v i n g t h i s o b j e c t i s a more fundamental m o d i f i c a t i o n o f
the Constitution of the Legislative Council. Therefore in order
t o make known t o H i s M a j e s t y ' s Government as soon as p o s s i b l e t h e
p r e s e n t v i e w s o f t h e Colony 7*t is hereby moved t h a t f o r t h e p u r -
pose o f a f f o r d i n g t h e i n h a b i t a n t s o f t h e Colony a f u l l e r and more
r e s p o n s i b l e share i n t h e management o f t h e i r own a f f a i r s :
(1) The present proposals f o r the establishment of a Municipal
Council be abandoned;
(2) The L e g i s l a t i v e Council should be c o n s t i t u t e d as f o l l o w s : -
A Council of 17 w i t h an O f f i c i a l membership of 6, including His
Excellency the Governor, and an U n o f f i c i a l membership of 11 con-
s i s t i n g p a r t l y of members elected by q u a l i f i e d residents of B r i -
t i s h N a t i o n a l i t y and p a r t l y of members nominated by the Governor.
The Governor t o have an o r i g i n a l and casting vote and the usual
reserve power.
(3) A f t e r the c o n s t i t u t i o n of the L e g i s l a t i v e Council has been

1. H.K. Leg. Co. Deb. 1949 pp. 188-204. Lansdale had a f t e r many meetings given
n o t i c e on 27 April of the r e s o l u t i o n s agreed by the u n o f f i c i a l s and proposed
to move them a f t e r an i n t e r v a l of 2 months to allow for general discussion.
In h i s absence Lo - an England-educated s o l i c i t o r , l e g i s l a t i v e c o u n c i l l o r
(1935-49) and executive councillor (1946-59) - moved these s l i g h t l y amended
r e s o l u t i o n s in which the o f f i c i a l membership (9 i n c l . the governor, as propo-
sed by Lansdale) was to be reduced to 6. Grantham announced t h a t o f f i c i a l s
would not vote in the debate.
328
m o d i f i e d as above i n d i c a t e d t h e new L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l s h o u l d
c o n s i d e r whether and, i f so t o what e x t e n t , t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n o f
t h e Urban C o u n c i l s h o u l d be m o d i f i e d w i t h t h e view t o s e c u r i n g
f o r t h e Urban C o u n c i l a g r e a t e r measure o f d i r e c t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n
and an i n c r e a s e i n i t s f i n a n c i a l and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e powers i n
municipal a f f a i r s . . . .
[The object had been to get a clear expression of colonial opinion that
(1) the Young Plan be abandoned and (2) the composition of the Legislat-
ive Council be amended. I t had been d i f f i c u l t to estimate opinion: the
Chinese Chamber of Commerce, the Kowloon Residents' Association and the
Kowloon Chamber of Commerce were ' c e r t a i n l y not at one in regard to
either of the p o i n t s ' ; and the Reform Club and Chinese Reform Club were
not in agreement, valuable as they were but not in fact representing 'the
quintessence of wisdom or even common sense' or 'any substantial section
of the community'. On the whole he believed that these present proposals,
especially the enlargement of the Legislative Council, had majority sup-
port; but opinion differed on (1) whether a l l members should be elected;
(2) the nature of the electorate and (3) whether the Young Plan should
be abandoned. The intention was not to reject a municipal council f i n a l -
l y , but to allow the Urban Council gradually and orderly to expand i t s
functions t i l l a municipality had evolved. The 'immediate creation' of
a municipal council would mean the duplication of o f f i c e r s and much more
expensive administration. Reform of the Legislative Council was more
appropriate and desirable than Young's proposal for a Municipal Council
as an 'experimental prelude' to more substantial reforms.
The Colony had a legislature of o f f i c i a l s and nominees] - t h e f u n -
damental c o n s i d e r a t i o n w h i c h shaped t h i s f o r m o f Government was
o f c o u r s e t h a t t h e Government must be one w h i c h s h o u l d c o n c e r n
i t s e l f w i t h t h e w e l f a r e o f t h e Colony as a whole and w i t h o u t s e c -
t i o n a l o r r a c i a l p r e j u d i c e o r d i s t i n c t i o n , and i n w h i c h t h e Unof-
f i c i a l Members, s i n c e no e l e c t o r a t e c o u l d be d e v i s e d t o do j u s -
t i c e t o a l l s e c t i o n s o f t h e community, s h o u l d be nominated t o
r e p r e s e n t t h e i n t e r e s t s o f t h e Colony as a w h o l e . I s u g g e s t t h i s
was t h e f u n d a m e n t a l i d e a ; I do n o t say t h a t i t has been r e a l i s e d
to the f u l l at a l l times.
But I s u b m i t t h a t t h i s was and remains t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r
t h e n o m i n a t i o n o f members. And a l t h o u g h t h e f u n d a m e n t a l b a s i s o f
t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n o f t h i s C o u n c i l has remained as i t was up t o
d a t e , i t s c o m p o s i t i o n has been changed and e n l a r g e d w i t h t h e p r o -
g r e s s o f t h e t i m e s . Even i n my own memory t h i s C o u n c i l was e n l a r -
ged by t h e a p p o i n t m e n t o f a P o r t u g u e s e , and t h e number o f Chinese
members was i n c r e a s e d f r o m two t o t h r e e . . . . [ I n the t o t a l population
of 850,000, there were 370,000 of local b i r t h of which 61,000 claimed to
be B r i t i s h subjects. There were 6,600 Europeans, 3,300 Indians and 1,000
Portuguese. On the resumption of c i v i l government in H.K. in May 1946
[ V o l . V I I , p.388] H.M.'s G. contemplated as elsewhere in the colonial
empire, means whereby the inhabitants of the territory, not only British
subjects, could be given 'a f u l l e r and more responsible share' in the
management of t h e i r internal a f f a i r s . ]
The whole difficulty about an electorate at the Legislative
C o u n c i l l e v e l i s o f course t h e f a c t t h a t Hong Kong i s n o t a homo-
geneous community. Hong Kong i s a t r a d i n g c e n t r e i n w h i c h t h e
m a j o r i t y o f t h e r e s i d e n t s t h i n k i n t e r m s o f t h e i r o b l i g a t i o n s and
a l l e g i a n c e t o t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e c o u n t r i e s , r a t h e r than of t h e i r
d u t i e s t o Hong Kong. . . . [This was not so 30 years ago. I f , to avoid ar-
gument and delay the franchise were only to B r i t i s h subjects, how could
 329

an electorate of only 73,000 represent a community of over 10 times that

number. I t had been argued that the u n o f f i c i a l s represented nobody. They
held t h e i r position by no mandate from any particular section of the com-
munity.] But we do c o n c e i v e i t our d u t y t o r e p r e s e n t t h e b e s t
i n t e r e s t s o f t h e Colony as a w h o l e . How w e l l o r how b a d l y we
d i s c h a r g e o u r d u t i e s i s a m a t t e r o f o p i n i o n . But t o suggest t h a t
members e l e c t e d by a f r a c t i o n a l e l e c t o r a t e and pledged t o d i s -
charge t h e mandate o f t h i s f r a c t i o n a l e l e c t o r a t e can and w i l l
more a d e q u a t e l y r e p r e s e n t t h e Colony as a whole t h a n nominated
members i s a p r o p o s i t i o n w i t h w h i c h I p r o f o u n d l y d i s a g r e e .
I t has a l s o been suggested t h a t nominated members a r e m e r e l y
' y e s - m e n ' . I f t h i s s u g g e s t i o n were c o n f i n e d t o t h e p r e s e n t n o m i -
n a t e d members, I would n o t waste t h e t i m e o f t h i s C o u n c i l by even
r e f e r r i n g t o i t , f o r we s h o u l d be c o n t e n t t o l e a v e i t t o t h e j u d -
gement and f a i r sense o f t h e p u b l i c . But i f i t were meant t o
a p p l y t o nominated members as a c l a s s I r e s e n t t h e s u g g e s t i o n as
an u n j u s t i f i e d s l u r on t h e memory o f a l l our d i s t i n g u i s h e d p r e d e -
c e s s o r s who graced t h i s C o u n c i l and gave o f t h e i r b e s t i n t h e
i n t e r e s t o f t h e p u b l i c . That t h e s u g g e s t i o n i s a base calumny can
be shown by a c a s u a l p e r u s a l o f any o f t h e Hansard r e p o r t s o f ,
s a y , t h e p a s t 50 y e a r s . Indeed even i n my t i m e - though newcomers
t o t h e Colony may n o t know t h i s - t h e Press has made r e f e r e n c e s
t o t h e M i g h t y G i a n t s o f t h e p a s t who dominated t h i s C o u n c i l and
t o t h e i r legendary f i g h t s a g a i n s t the G o v e r n m e n t ! . . . .
[An elective element should now be introduced and though he recognised
the undesirable features of communal representation, he though i t i n e v i t -
able 1n H.K. and favoured separate Chinese and non-Chinese electorates.
So he proposed a Legislative Council of 17 (the governor, 5 o f f i c i a l s ,
11 u n o f f i c i a l s ; 6 Chinese, 5 non-Chinese). Of the 6 Chinese 4 would be
elected and 2 nominated by the governor. Of the non-Chinese 2 elected and
3 nominated by the governor (one a Portuguese 1f no Portuguese were elec-
ted): a majority of Chinese u n o f f i c i a l s . The electorate would be of B r i -
t i s h subjects only with separate Chinese and non-Chinese constituencies.
The governor would have an original and a casting vote and the usual
reserve powers.
Such a scheme of constitutional reform, unanimously agreed by the unof-
f i c i a l s , would not completely s a t i s f y the aspirations of a l l , but repre-
sented 'a f a i r and acceptable compromise' commanding 'a general measure
of popular support'. I t should be possible to implement i t within a few
months. M.M. Watson seconded, noting the somewhat surprising lack of i n -
terest 1n the subject generally and suggesting that a Municipal Council
should emerge by evolution. Chau Tsun-Nin, Dr. Chau Sik-N1n, Leo D'Alm-
ada, and C. Blaker Indicated t h e i r support; a l l u n o f f i c i a l s voted for the
motion; and the Governor declared i t carried. He commented that the Sec-
retary of State would have to decide whether the Young Plan which he had
approved would now be replaced by the Unofficials proposal which had rev-
ersed the order of establishing a Municipal Council f i r s t and then recon-
s t i t u t i n g the Legislative Council with an u n o f f i c i a l majority. The Young
Plan had not restricted the franchise to B r i t i s h subjects, but the Unof-
f i c i a l s had a l l voted for such a r e s t r i c t i o n (though Dr. Chau S1k-Nin had
argued for a wider representation of the population as a whole and also
for the early enlargement of the Urban Council with extended powers.)
330
99. ERNEST BEVIN AND ARTHUR CREECH JONES: RECOMMENDATION TO THE CABINET,
29 August 19491
While we should be prepared to discuss the future of Hong Kong
with a friendly [and democratic]2 and stable Government of a uni-
fied China, the conditions under which such discussions could be
undertaken do not exist at present and are unlikely to exist in
the foreseeable future. Until conditions change, we intend to re-
main in Hong Kong and should so inform other Commonwealth Govern-
ments and the United States, while refraining in public from pro-
nouncements which exacerbate our relations with China.3
100. GOVERNOR SIR ALEXANDER GRANTHAM: STATEMENT, 22 October 19524
Honourable Members w i l l have seen reports of the statement by

1. CAB. 128/16: CM54(49)2. The cabinet decided to accept this as H.M.'s G.'s
'interim policy'. It had agreed on 26 May to reinforce the colony substanti-
ally, but the decision had not been made public till Commonwealth countries
had been consulted. 2. Deleted in cabinet.
3. Generally the Chinese Communists, now on the point of victory over Kuomin-
tang, were adopting 'a scrupulously correct attitude' towards the British co-
lonial government inH.K. and making no propaganda against British imperialism
save over their support for the squatters on the Kowloon Walled City incident.
Mao Zedong in September 1949 intimated indirectly that the status of H.K. was
secure at least in the short term. In Jan. 1950 H.M.'s G. recognised the Com-
munist government of China. Only in January 1952 did a brief propaganda cam-
paign begin, though notably more restrained from Beijing than Canton.
4. H.K. Leg. Co. Deb. 1952, p.252. There had been no urgency since 1949 to im-
plement reforms. The problem was how to fulfil in some minor way the promise
of constitutional progress without lessening C.O. control. The victory of the
Communists over the Kuomintang on the mainland, the fear of provoking the vic-
tors into a propaganda campaign, blockade or even invasion into the Colony,
the influx of immigrants flooding over the frontier in 1949 and subsequently,
and the outbreak of the Korean war in 1950 provided reasons for delay, even
retreat from reform: though there was no public pronouncement by Mao or any
leader in the Peoples' Republic forbidding democratisation, it was well known
that the reaction would be strong if H.M.'s G. instituted widespread general
elections in the Colony. There was moreover no general agreed demand for such
constitutional change: the executive council and the unofficial legislative
councillors were jealous of an enlarged urban council; and Grantham had conc-
luded that no major reform was appropriate or even 'safe'. But, however, James
Griffiths was reluctant to abandon the principle of direct election, at least
to the urban council and to approve Grantham's revised proposals: the compro-
mise reached in Oct. 1950 envisaged minor reforms to both councils - the legi-
slature of 16 members (governor, 3 officials, 5 unofficial nominees and 6 in-
directly elected - 2 by the J.P.s, 2 by the urban council, and 2 by the two
chambers of commerce, British and Chinese) and the urban (2, not 4, ex offic-
io; 4, not 2, directly elected; and still 6 nominees). But the F.O. told the
C.O. that the proposals would be criticised by China as 'brutally crushing the
rightful interests' of the H.K. Chinese and as 'an example of hypocritical in-
sincerity of the imperialist oppressors' and (though democratisation would be
anathema to the Communists) the F.O. advised strongly against any provocation
of China when the Far East situation was 'particularly serious". Griffiths ac-
cepted that advice and Grantham welcomed delay, though in 1948 he had made
minor reforms adding 3 to his executive (1 official, 1 British ex-patriot and
1 Chinese British unofficial, and in 1951 he appointed an additional official
 331

the Secretary of State for the Colonies in the House of Commons

on Monday 20 October on the subject of constitutional reform in
Hong Kong.1 I should like to take this opportunity of supple-
menting that statement by an assurance that I am at all times
ready to consider further proposals for constitutional changes
provided they are not of a major character. Indeed in this con-
nection a number of recommendations made by the Urban Council are
at present receiving the consideration of Government.2
101. GOVERNOR SIR ROBERT BLACK: SPEECH, 6 March 19583
[He had to report a recent decision of the Secretary of State,
approving a considerable relaxation in his financial control of H.K.]
In 1948 the Colony was released from Treasury control and given

and an additional Chinese-British unofficial to the legislative council).

1. Hansard. 505.70. In reply to a question by Bernard Braine, Lyttelton had
stated that Grantham had been authorised to add 2 more elected members to the
urban council, but that the present time was 'inopportune for other constitu-
tional changes of a major character'.
2. This supplementary statement, giving the impression that it was not Govern-
ment House, but H.M.'s G. which had broken the promise of 1946 for greater
local self-government, annoyed the C.O. for Grantham had thus disregarded the
instruction to make an identical announcement in H.K. But there was little
immediate adverse reaction, largely fatalist indifference. Grantham and the
unofficials realised that they could get away with a mere gesture and had sei-
zed the chance: the franchise was slightly widened to admit those ignorant of
English and the tenure of urban councillors doubled from 1 year to two. With
the minor changes of 1948 and 1953, the urban council consisted of 5 offic-
ials, 8 unofficials (4 elected, 4 nominated); the legislature of 9 officials
and 7 unofficials (incl. 4 Chinese and 1 Portuguese); and the executive of the
governor, 6 officials and 6 unofficials (incl. 3 Chinese and 1 Portuguese).
In 1955 and 1956 the urban council was further increased: still 5 officials,
then 6; 10 unofficials (4 elected), then 16 unofficials (8 elected). With the
Young plan now abandoned and in the new climate any such step towards H.K.'s
self-determination now quite implausible, urban councillors saw their role as
constituting the elected government of the Colonys but even that was improb-
able and the parity of nominees and elected members persisted. But its size
could be discreetly increased without provoking Beijing's wrath and its expan-
sion, though largely a government agency with an advisory role, was publicised
as a constitutional development rather than administrative adjustment. Indeed
until the mid-60s H.K. was too preoccupied with the problems posed by floods
of refugees from the mainland and the need to adjust its economy after loss
of the China entrepot trade, to spare time for constitutional reform. Even
thereafter changes took place for the most part in the urban, not the legis-
lative, council. The urban council had included elected members since 1885
when almost by chance they were added to the sanitary board which was renamed
[Vol.VII p.382] the urban council. After the Japanese occupation elected mem-
bers were not restored till 1952 and 2 more were added in 1953 as consolation
for the abandonment of the Young plan.
3. H.K. Leg. Co. Deb. 1958, pp.46-7. Though by the letters patent ultimate
responsibility was retained (through disallowance and reservation), in fact
the financial control of the secretary of state was, subsequent to this
decision, restricted only to cases of raising loans and to matters involving
important points of principle. The finance committee of legislative council
on which the unofficials had a majority, became a more influential body.
332
a large measure of autonomy over its own finances. The control
which the Secretary of State still retained at that time was that
his approval was required for the annual Estimates, for supple-
mentary provisions exceeding $1 million in the case of capital
expenditure and $i million in the case of recurrent expenditure,
for the issue of any loan and for any expenditure involving
important points of principle. The Secretary of State has now
informed me that, in view of the good standing, financial and
administrative, of the Colony, he will further relax his control
and will no longer require the Estimates to be submitted for his
approval; nor will he require supplementary provisions to be
authorized by him. On the other hand, he wishes to extend the
principle of demi-official consultation which is already in use,
and I have agreed that the Financial Secretary will keep the
Finance Department of the Colonial Office regularly and fully
informed about this Government's financial policy and about the
way that this policy works out in practice. The Financial Secre-
tary will take account of the views of the financial advisers of
the Secretary of State in advising this Government on policy.
This is a very important and considerable extension of our
financial independence, and of course it brings with it its res-
ponsibilities; but I am confident that honourable Members will
gladly share in these responsibilities, particularly in the
sphere of examination of the Government's proposals for expendi-
ture in Appropriation Bills, so as to ensure that we employ the
Colony's resources in the best possible manner for its develop-
ment and for the benefit of its people. . . . [The people of the Colony
deserved admiration for their achievement in tackling their economic and
social problems.]
102. EARL OF PERTH: STATEMENT, 29 October I9601
'Her Majesty's Government consider it undesirable that there
s h o u l d be any r a d i c a l o r m a j o r change i n t h e p r e s e n t c o n s t i t u -
t i o n a l p o s i t i o n i n Hong K o n g ' , a d d i n g t h a t ' T h i s does n o t , how-
e v e r , p r e c l u d e t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of minor m o d i f i c a t i o n s , w i t h i n t h e
framework of e x i s t i n g p r i n c i p l e s , in t h e composition o f t h e L e g i -
s l a t i v e C o u n c i l or t h e Urban C o u n c i l ' .

1 0 3 . GOVERNOR SIR DAVID TRENCH: SPEECH, 24 February 19662

[Local government, local i n i t i a t i v e in the management of purely local
a f f a i r s , was a valuable, almost e s s e n t i a l , adjunct to the government of
any country. A local authority was a body, l i k e the Urban Council, to
which the L e g i s l a t i v e Council a l l o t t e d ' c e r t a i n prescribed powers and
duties to be exercised within a s p e c i f i c geographical a r e a ' . This was 'an
e f f e c t i v e method of providing controlled channels for the exercise of
local i n i t i a t i v e ' . ] The p o w e r s e n j o y e d by a l o c a l a u t h o r i t y o f
t h i s type d e r i v e s o l e l y from the L e g i s l a t u r e . I t f o l l o w s t h a t the
L e g i s l a t u r e r e t a i n s t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and t h e n e c e s s a r y a u t h o r -
i t y f o r r e v i e w i n g a n d , when o c c a s i o n a r i s e s , m o d i f y i n g t h e powers

1. South China Morning Post, 30 October. Perth, minister of s t a t e for c o l o n i a l

a f f a i r s (1957-60) was on a v i s i t to the Colony.
2. H.K. Leg. Co. Deb. pp. 50-3. Trench (governor 1964-70) had served in s e v e r a l
i s l a n d s in the Pacific and in various posts ( i n c l . deputy c o l o n i a l s e c r e t a r y )
in H.K.
 333

e x e r c i s a b l e by the body which i t c r e a t e s . The p o s i t i o n of l o c a l

a u t h o r i t i e s t h e r e f o r e i s not b a s i c a l l y d i s s i m i l a r from t h a t of
other s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t i e s - such as, f o r example, the T o u r i s t
Association or the Housing A u t h o r i t y - a number of which have
been c r e a t e d i n recent years f o r the purpose of managing c e r t a i n
of the a f f a i r s of the community. These and l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s of
the Urban Council type a l l have the common f e a t u r e of providing
scope f o r p a r t i c i p a t i o n by members of the community in the admi-
n i s t r a t i o n of a f f a i r s : but whereas the general run of s t a t u t o r y
a u t h o r i t i e s are b a s i c a l l y f u n c t i o n a l in n a t u r e , l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s
are both m u l t i - f u n c t i o n a l and r e g i o n a l . . . .
[In addition to the twin cities of Victoria and Kowloon, there would soon
be Tsuen Wan, Castle Peak and Sha Tin - and ultimately Yuen Long. In
these circumstances some changes in the Urban Council might be desirable
to function more vigorously. But there was l i t t l e agreed consensus, even
much division. He had consulted widely. The Secretary of State would
raise no objections to a review of the existing local authority administ-
ration since no major reform of the Legislative or Executive Councils was
contemplated. H.M.'s G. would not however act until concrete and agreed
recommendations were forthcoming. To achieve that the debate must con-
tinue: any firm and general views must be explicitly focused to the rea-
l i t i e s in H.K.]
Here I must emphasize t h a t in a matter so complex as t h i s t h e r e
i s no room f o r vagueness. General ideas must be t r a n s l a t a b l e i n t o
law and e f f e c t i v e p r a c t i c e . P r a c t i c a l q u e s t i o n , indeed, are a t
the root of most of the problems; and no discussion of t h i s sub-
j e c t i s of g r e a t value unless p o s i t i v e views are expressed on
such s u b j e c t s - which I mention in no p a r t i c u l a r order - as the
composition of l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s and the method of s e l e c t i o n of
t h e i r members; the r e l a t i o n s h i p of l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s t o Executive
Council and t o t h i s C o u n c i l ; t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p t o Heads of
Departments; t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p t o e x i s t i n g and spontaneous l o c a l
bodies of longer f o u n d a t i o n ; and the means by which t h e i r f u n c -
t i o n s are t o be c a r r i e d out - t h a t is t o say, whether by e x i s t i n g
departments or through t h e i r own employees. Other p r a c t i c a l ques-
t i o n s are the degree of f i n a n c i a l autonomy t o be granted to l o c a l
a u t h o r i t i e s and how the proper f i n a n c i a l safeguards are to be ap-
p l i e d ; and, in the case of the new towns, how t o bear in mind the
l e g i t i m a t e i n t e r e s t s of the o r i g i n a l i n h a b i t a n t s of the New T e r -
r i t o r i e s who a r e , or w i l l l a t e r be, l i v i n g in an urban a r e a . Fur-
t h e r s i m i l a r problems w i l l occur t o anyone who t h i n k s over these
matters c a r e f u l l y . We w i l l be t r y i n g t o get views on a l l these
t h i n g s in the months t o come, and we s h a l l in p a r t i c u l a r take
s p e c i a l steps t o seek the views of t h a t l a r g e s e c t i o n of the com-
munity which i s not normally given to p u b l i c expressions of o p i n -
i o n . I make no apology f o r suggesting we hasten reasonably slowly
in t h i s m a t t e r . What we do, we must do r i g h t ; good judgement i s
much more important than haste h e r e . . . . 1

1. The u n o f f i c i a l s gave Trench's i n i t i a t i v e a guarded welcome as providing for

*wider p a r t i c i p a t i o n ' by the public but emphasised t h a t the local councils
should not become 'debating s o c i e t i e s or public platforms for p o l i t i c a l gam-
b i t s ' . The urban council s e t up an ad hoc committee to formulate proposals,
and in August produced a report expanding the urban council with an elected
majority and with subordinate d i s t r i c t councils making ' v i r t u a l take-over of
334

104. (a) REPORT OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON THE FUTURE SCOPE AND OPERATION OF
THE URBAN COUNCIL, 27 August 19661
7. Our aim was to suggest the form of local government best
suited to Hong Kong. We took into account Hong Kong's unique po-
sition and sought the views and wishes of leading political, civ-
ic, professional, commercial, industrial and other interested
organizations (Appendices I and II). We also examined the special
position of the New Territories. We studied too the statements
made by His Excellency the Governor and the Honourable the Colon-
ial Secretary in their addresses at the 1966 Budget Debate which
referred to the development of local government in Hong Kong.

half the colonial secretariat and its departments together with the N.T. and
the Heung Yee Kuk rural communities'. In November a working party of offic-
ials, under W.V. Dickinson, produced a report virtually dividing the work of
the urban council among three or more local councils. The confrontation bet-
ween these two reports - the one envisaging a reduced central government, a
new powerful city council (with its own revenues, ultimately an elected
majority, and a wider franchise, though still only 20% of the population)
(elaborated in a further March 1969 report under W.S.B. Wong, then P.P.K. Ng
as chairman), and the other the existing central government with new local
bodies replacing the urban council and the Heung Yee Kuk - halted theorising
for five years. [As in Gibraltar, did the Colony require both legislative and
municipal councils? Vol.VII p.643.] A white paper on The Urban Council was
published in Oct. 1971 arguing that devolution to local representative bodies
would be inefficient and was unnecessary since the network of advisory bodies
provided sufficiently for participation. In 1973 the six officials were remo-
ved from the urban council, leaving 12 appointed and 12 elected unofficials.
Not till 1977 was provision made by the creation of district advisory boards
to address the problem of local administration of the new townships in the
N.T. which had inspired Trench's initiative. In so heavily populated an area
it was difficult indeed to devolve and delegate from the centre. There was a
strong case against fragmentation - a warning which was repeated in the 1980
green and the 1981 white papers. There were also doubts about more representa-
tive local bodies: would the subordination of C.D.O. and D.O.s to elected au-
thorities lead to greater efficiency or improvement? At every stage civil ser-
vants were busy promoting consultation, seeking reaction and advice, persuad-
ing, acquiring intimate local knowledge from communities before any proposed
action or legislation was taken. Where democracy was ruled out by the brooding
presence of Communist China, this process, if second best, was based, as it
must be, on the widest understanding and support, carefully assured in advan-
ce. The many advisory committees, the councillors, the pressure groups,
U.M.E.L.C.O., the D.O.s and C.D.O.s all played a part in this process. Since
1965, in addition, ward councillors and local officers had operated, organised
by the urban council and exercised considerable influence. From March 1983 all
adults with over 7 years residence could vote for the urban council.
1. Govt. Printer: signed by A. de 0. Sales (chairman), Hilton Cheong-Leen, Dr.
Alison Bell and Wilson Wong of the urban council. This report was broadly (un-
der the guise of the Greater Hong Kong Council) a resurrection of the Young
proposals and constituted a take-over bid by the urban council of much of the
work of the colonial secretariat and its departments, not only in the Colony
and Kowloon but in the N.T. as well. When Trench set up a study group of offi-
cials and civil servants, under W.V. Dickinson, to consider the future of lo-
cal government, the urban council (6 official and a maximum of 20 unofficials)
had promptly established this ad hoc committee of its members.
 335
S. To assist us in our deliberations we tried to draw on the
experience of other more politically developed countries and ter-
ritories, although we fully realized that the unique geo-poli-
tical position of Hong Kong would make it necessary for us to
find a different solution altogether as our own circumstances
would require. Accordingly we studied the constitutions of other
territories such as Antigua, Barbados, the Bahamas, Bermuda and
British Honduras. Manifestly, they were designed to meet the
particular needs of these territories. Still they made useful
comparisons.
9. Our study of the Greater London Council proved invaluable
in our consideration of local administration even though certain
features appeared to us to have arisen from historic development
and long tradition rather than what might have been the best
solution.
10. It is said that by comparison with many countries, Hong
Kong is politically backward in development. This is not without
some advantage for our purpose. Apart from the peculiar position
of the New Territories, we were not inhibited in our delibera-
tions by having to make concessions to overcome long entrenched
traditions of local administration. Such traditions as might
exist rest with the Urban Council itself, as the only body in the
Colony with statutory functions and elected members.
11. At present the territorial scope of the Urban Council is
limited to the urban areas, i.e. the Island of Victoria, Kowloon
and New Kowloon....
12. There is the anomaly in that the Urban Services Department,
which is the executive arm of the Council, operates in the New
Territories as a separate entity actually divorced from control
of the Council. On the other hand, Unofficial Members of the
Urban Council, by virtue of their being Members of the Hong Kong
Housing Authority, have responsibility in the New Territories for
the building and management of Housing Authority Estates as well
as for the management of Government Low Cost Housing Estates. The
responsibility for managing Resettlement Estates is again divi-
ded: the Council's policies are applied throughout Hong Kong, yet
in the New Territories the Commissioner for Resettlement is the
sole competent authority. In such a compact area and with the
people frequently moving from one part to another for work, study
or play, the Council has experienced time and again the drawback
of the present anachronistic system which handicaps its ability
to serve the public properly.
13. We are unanimous in the view that the Council has a func-
tion to perform over the whole territory, now so unrealistical1y
divided. With the growth of population and the development of
industrial and residential towns in the New Territories, rural
conditions tend to disappear, giving way to the same demand for
services as are required in urban districts. Reasons of custom
and politics usually advanced for not putting into practice any
change in the form of government carry little weight or logic
particularly as force of circumstances has long since compelled
most Government departments to exercise their functions increas-
ingly in the New Territories. So, preserving an archaic form of
colonial administration even as window dressing serves no purpose
except to inhibit the effective participation of the people liv-
ing there in the administration of their own affairs side by side
336
with the rest of Hong Kong.
14. The necessity to be in close and direct contact with the
people is of paramount importance. We do not believe that there
is sufficient contact between the Government and the people at
the present time. Indeed, as the Urban Council is presently cons-
tituted, with its very limited jurisdiction, it is inhibited from
properly representing the interests of the people. We are convin-
ced that the educational opportunities increasingly afforded to
the up and coming generation in Hong Kong must necessarily also
arouse in young people an interest for political participation.
The time to allow the people of Hong Kong to take a more active
part in their own affairs is already long overdue. Therefore we
believe that it is vital to the well-being of the Colony...

Part X. Summary of main recommendations.

(i ) We recommend that a strong administrative Council be for-
med. It could suitably be called lThe Greater Hong Kong Council'
or 'The Hong Kong Municipal Assembly' as a Member has suggested.
(ii) The Council should cover the whole of Hong Kong and be gi-
ven the administrative responsibility for strictly internal mat-
ters. . .. [Details of the functions and the composition of the Council were
given, §§19, 31-48.]
(iii) The Council should be served by three District Councils,
one for Hong Kong, one for Kowloon (including New Kowloon) and
one for the New Territories, except that in the New Territories
the Heung Yee Kuk should assume the role of a District Coun-
cil.... [Details of the functions recommended and the composition of the
District Councils, except for the New Territories, were given, §§21, 49-56.]
(iv) We consider the newly introduced franchise to be suitable
as the national franchise. However, it would be necessary to sti-
pulate a residential qualification for district elections and for
this we recommend twelve months residence in the district prior
to the elections.
(v) We recommend that the Chairman of the Greater Hong Kong
Council should hold the title of Mayor, and that there should
also be a Deputy Mayor. The Mayor, the Deputy Mayor and the
Chairmen of all Committees or Boards should be unofficial mem-
bers, and not civil servants. As an immediate step we recommend
that the Chairmen of the present Urban Council and of the Stand-
ing Committee of the Whole Council should not be the Director or
Urban Services or any other civil servant, but unofficial members
of that Counci1.
(vi) The formation of a Greater Hong Kong Council would change
the character of the Colonial Secretariat as it exists at pre-
sent. We recommend that the opportunity be taken, if it is not
done before, to change the title of the Colonial Secretariat and
that of the Colonial Secretary. We believe this change to be de-
sirable and politically sound.
(vii) We recommend that the Greater Hong Kong Council should de-
termine rates in Hong Kong and should control expenditure from
rates. The various Government Departments coming under the Grea-
ter Hong Kong Council should be financed by votes made by the
Legislature, the amount voted at present being considered as the
minimum allocations for service such as housing, medical, educa-
tion, urban services etc. The Treasury would collect rates for
the Greater Hong Kong Council and the rating and valuation depar-
 337

tment would c o n t i n u e t o assess rateable values.

( b ) WORKING PARTY ON LOCAL ADMINISTRATION: MINORITY RESERVATION,

November 19661
[The principles and practice of democratic local government were not
applicable to Hong Kong. Popular representation determined by b a l l o t box
on a very wide franchise would not be understood by the great majority
and would not command public support and confidence. Fear of loss of face
by f a i l u r e at the polls would deter the best q u a l i f i e d and I n f l u e n t i a l
c i t i z e n s from seeking to p a r t i c i p a t e in local government. There was a
risk that unscrupulous or corrupt power seekers would soon control the
system of popular representation. There was a small turn out at Urban
Council elections and poor response t o the recent r e g i s t r a t i o n under an
enlarged franchise. This demonstrated lack of understanding or d i s t r u s t .
The Urban Council had done valuable work, but councillors had no sub-
s t a n t i a l following among ordinary c i t i z e n s . Even in the U.K. a singular
local government system, recommended by the ad hoc committee of the Urban
Council, was generally acknowledged to be unsatisfactory, was being i n -
vestigated by a Royal Commission and the National Association of Local
Government o f f i c e r s recommended a b o l i t i o n of county, borough and rural
councils.] C a u t i o n s h o u l d be e x e r c i s e d i n i m p o s i n g upon H . K .
a s y s t e m w h i c h has n o t p r o v e d s a t i s f a c t o r y and w h i c h has been
evolved in a s o c i e t y w i t h a t o t a l l y d i f f e r e n t p o l i t i c a l , econo-
m i c , s o c i a l , c u l t u r a l and h i s t o r i c a l b a c k g r o u n d . I t must a l s o be
b o r n e i n mind when c o n s i d e r i n g t h e r e a c t i o n s o f a C h i n e s e commun-
i t y t o m a t t e r s r e l a t i n g t o Government and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n t h a t t h e
f a m i l i a r p a t t e r n i s t h a t o f s t r o n g b u r e a u c r a t i c c o n t r o l by s c h o -
l a r s d i s c i p l i n e d by s t r i c t m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s . . .
Hong Kong s o c i e t y i s accustomed t o o r g a n i s e i t s e l f i n t o g r o u p s
based n o t upon i d e n t i t y o f community i n t e r e s t i n a g i v e n a r e a b u t
upon t r a d i t i o n a l l y c h a r i t a b l e o b j e c t i v e s , l a n g u a g e , p l a c e o f o r i -
g i n , o c c u p a t i o n , b u s i n e s s , p r o f e s s i o n etc. I t i s l a r g e l y w i t h i n
g r o u p i n g s based upon such common i d e a l s and i n t e r e s t s t h a t i n d i -
v i d u a l c i t i z e n s g i v e community s e r v i c e . Members o f t h e s e g r o u p s
g e n e r a l l y choose f o r t h e i r l e a d e r s t h o s e who t h e y know p e r s o n a l l y
and b e l i e v e t o be s h r e w d , a b l e , r e s o u r c e f u l and e f f e c t i v e o r g a n i -
sers f o r a c t i o n .
The c o m p l e x i t y o f t h e s e g r o u p i n g s i s such t h a t t h e y do n o t p r o -

1. Govt. P r i n t e r pp.82-5. Paul Tsui, the senior Chinese a d m i n i s t r a t i v e o f f i -

c e r , K. Waldon, Stewart Webb-Johnson and other s e n i o r c i v i l s e r v a n t s signed
t h i s note of r e s e r v a t i o n . The working p a r t y of o f f i c i a l s was chaired by W.V.
Dickinson: i t s r e p o r t answered t h a t of the ad hoc committee of the urban coun-
c i l which sought powerfully t o expand the functions of the council a t the ex-
pense of the d e b i l i t a t e d c e n t r a l government. The Dickinson r e p o r t demonstrated
t h a t in the unique context of H.K. h i s t o r i c a l , p o l i t i c a l , a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and
geographical f a c t o r s imposed o b s t a c l e s to the normal development of local go-
vernment: i t was within l i m i t e d space, highly c e n t r a l i s e d and since the war
even i n c r e a s i n g l y i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t . A white paper in Oct. 1971 disparaged the
devolution of power t o l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s , though the reforms i t proposed, ef-
f e c t i v e from April 1973, did provide for g r e a t e r f i n a n c i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s
and the power t o r a i s e a l o c a l r a t e by the urban c o u n c i l . In April 1986 a r e -
gional council for the N.T. was e s t a b l i s h e d (12 d i r e c t l y e l e c t e d , 9 i n d i r e c t l y
elected by district boards, 13 appointed, and 3 ex officio from the Heung Yee
Kuk - the advisory body of indigenous i n h a b i t a n t s of the N.T.
338
vide a practicable organisational basis for regional local admi-
nistration as recommended in this report. However, the members
feel that until such time as the public has gained confidence in
a system of election by popular vote, it is essential to draw
upon this valuable reserve of respected, able and public-spirited
community leaders by tapping it for participation in the adminis-
tration of the Colony at the local level as well as at the cent-
ral level. The members consider that most of the functions recom-
mended earlier in this report for transfer to local authorities
should first be operated on a regional basis by Government depar-
tments and achieved by a process of departmental decentralisa-
tion. This would ensure continuity in the provision of efficient
services throughout the transitional phase.
At the same time the members consider it essential that there
should be effective co-ordination and control of Government
operations within the locality by a Regional Administrator opera-
ting on lines comparable with the District Officers of the New
Territories Administration.1 The holders of these offices on the
one hand personalise the 'authorities' working in the area, and
on the other, with the assistance of their unofficial advisory
councils ensure that the total Government effort is guided in the
direction that seems to provide the best compromise between the
wishes of the people of the locality and the overall public inte-
rest. There should be a statutory obligation for the Regional Ad-
ministrator to consult the Regional Council on all matters sche-
duled for adoption by the future local authority and non-statu-
tory arrangements for consulting the council on all matters of
concern to citizens, excluding defence, foreign affairs and other
reserved subjects. The feed-in of the Regional Councils' views
into the Government organisation would be effected through the
Regional Administration either direct to the departments working
within their area of control or to Central Government....
There is some feeling amongst people living in the Urban areas
that they are too much out of touch with authority and lacking
sufficient access to it to ensure that their points of view are
sufficiently considered. A number of grave misconceptions also
exist such as, for example, that taxes or at least a substantial
portion of the taxes levied are drained off to the United King-
dom. They question whether Chinese views are properly represented
on the councils of government, and they seek improvements over
a wide range of public services without much thought as to how
this is to be achieved.2
These are not surprising in a dependent territory, where many
senior civil servants are expatriates and the language of admini-
stration and the courts of law is foreign to the majority of the
population. As a result the extent of the actual separation in
such matters as finance and administration between the Hong Kong
Government and the United Kingdom Government is not well under-
stood. Nor is it to be supposed that in other countries where
elected representation is a long-standing tradition and all speak
the same language, these same feelings do not exist. Nevertheless

1. [see No.104(c) - the model for the City District Officers in 1969.]
2. Surely this is in no way a characteristic peculiar to the people of Hong
Kong.
 339

t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s a r i s i n g f r o m t h e n a t u r e and p o l i t i c a l s t a t u s o f
Hong Kong a r e g r e a t e r t h a n e l s e w h e r e and g r e a t e r e f f o r t s t o o v e r -
come them a r e i n consequence d e m a n d e d . . . .
[ I n the present social conditions, the dangers arose less from the
shortcomings of the system than what the public believed them to be.
Intermediary Regional Councils as recommended in t h i s Report should
improve understanding between Government and people; and help to remedy
*the inadequacies which often arise from lack of departmental co-ordina-
t i o n and the unwillingness of C i v i l Servants, who in a l l other respects
are dedicated to t h e i r work, to seek the advice of the public they are
supposed to be s e r v i n g ' . ] 1

( c ) GOVERNOR SIR DAVID TRENCH: SPEECH, 26 April 19692

[He had in 1966 expressed his concern for improving the local authority
system. In 1968 fresh proposals had been considered by Interested parties
including the Urban Council and progress was desirable on those minor but
important changes where there was general agreement.] I w o u l d , as an
example, like to see instituted a separation of the Urban
C o u n c i l ' s f i n a n c e s f r o m t h o s e o f Government, by means o f a
s e p a r a t e budget approved by t h i s C o u n c i l , w i t h some p r o v i s i o n t o
e n a b l e t h e Urban C o u n c i l t o r a i s e and d i s p o s e o f i t s own r e v e -
nues. Other d e s i r a b l e changes would a l s o , I would hope, prove
p o s s i b l e even i f t h e i r e x t e n t i s , a t t h i s s t a g e , l i m i t e d : b u t
whatever we do, we must above a l l see t h a t t h e powers o f l o c a l
authorities and their responsibilities are co-terminous. We
cannot have the exercise of power without acceptance of full
responsibility. . . . [Should there be an ombudsman- similar to the Parlia-
mentary Commissioner in N.Z. rather than the more restricted U.K. model?
He was not an all-powerful r e c t i f i e r of a l l grievances but could i n v e s t i -
gate in many prescribed cases but often had no executive power, nor power
to compel witnesses so there was public disappointment and d i s i l l u s i o n . ]
On t h e o t h e r hand h o n o u r a b l e Members h e r e , f o r example, h e a r i n g
c o m p l a i n t s i n t h e U.M.E.L.C.O o f f i c e , 3 may n o t be empowered by

1. The whole network of c o n s u l t a t i v e machinery - U.M.E.L.C.O,; C.D.O.'s, and

advisory committees - sought to answer t h i s c r i t i c i s m .
2. H.K. Leg. Co. Deb. pp.62-4. In October Trench reported to the council
(ibid. pp. 10-11) that various suggestions had been made and were being
prepared for p r e s e n t a t i o n to the executive council.
3. The u n o f f i c i a l members of the executive and l e g i s l a t i v e councils had had
an office since August 1963 providing them with c l e r i c a l and research a s s i s -
tance to deal with complaints and s p e c i f i c grievances against the administra-
tion - unfair treatment, incompetence, unreasonable d e l a y s , discrimination,
f a i l u r e to note relevant f a c t o r s etc. - and having access to relevant f i l e s
and policy documents (save confidential r e p o r t s and s e c r e t s e c u r i t y f i l e s ) .
As an a l t e r n a t i v e to the ombudsman which had been suggested and which Trench
thought would achieve l e s s than a s u i t a b l y a s s i s t e d U.M.E.L.C.O., the office
was strengthened in 1970 with a senior c i v i l servant as administrative s e c r e -
t a r y - R.W. Primrose. His f i r s t report was published on 30 June 1971. Since
August 1965 one u n o f f i c i a l from each council had been on duty *one week a t a
time' in the o f f i c e ; and by 1970 the average number of cases was 19 a month
and by 1971 80 a month. The s t a f f was increased and by 1980 consisted of 50
and was dealing with some 2,500 cases a year, a quarter of which could be
d e a l t with by general advice or r e f e r r a l to the appropriate department, while
of the remainder about 78% were reasonably s a t i s f i e d , 13% were reconsidered
340
law to investigate; but in practice I am assured they are not
hampered by this, and receive all the official co-operation they
require. This can be, and is, assured to them administratively,
as a matter of courtesy, without recourse to a legal power. More-
over, they do not have to refuse to hear any complaint: and they
can seek solutions to a complainant's problems in ways quite
other than those which have actually been sought, which is some-
thing a Commissioner could not do. Much the same is true of other
channels of complaint that we 1have, for example through the Dist-
rict Officers and the C.D.O. organization, or, indeed, merely

or rectified, and 9% were found unjustified or proper within the rules. Maxi-
mum benefit in public relations was thus achieved with the minimum inconven-
ience and confrontation to the government. There was indeed little rivalry or
cross purposes with the urban council: later two legislative councillors were
also members of the urban council. In 1977 there was a standing group of
U.M.E.L.C.O. to investigate complaints against the police and a similar group
to do the same for complaints against the Independent Commission against Cor-
ruption, established in 1974 when Chief Superintendent Godber sought to escape
justice by taking refuge in the U.K.
1. The three day disturbances in April 1966, which, though inspired from out-
side, were largely due to internal causes - delay in the government's sanction
for the rise in Star Ferry fares, allowing anti-government resentment to build
up, the complacent lack of communication, creating a gap between government
and people, excessive centralisation provoking frustration and decline of con-
fidence locally - had led to reports recommending the establishment of some
intermediary agency to reassure the people in urban areas of the government's
benevolence and to improve efficiency. (The attack on the frontier of the N.T.
at Sha Tau Kok the following year was really a spill-over from the Cultural
Revolution in China - as the faction fight in Kowloon between Kuomintang and
Communists in 1956 had been - and, though there was large-scale external bri-
bery, had little spontaneous support internally.) The object of the City
District Officer scheme - 10 were appointed in 1968 - was to create for the
urban areas 'a regionalised approachable local manifestation of the central
government to carry out the same political and co-ordinating functions which
were the responsibility of the District Officers in the N.T.' - and of course
as provided throughout the colonies by 'indirect rule'. Indeed, the C.D.O.
scheme was an adjustment to urban conditions of that long established instru-
ment. (The N.T. had been administered by 3 D.O.s [Vol.VII p.361] who also act-
ed as magistrates in both civil and criminal matters and collected Crown rents
and controlled the land. But with the influx of refugees from China, the grow-
ing prosperity, the rural development, new housing and new towns, central de-
partments took over some of the D.O.'s functions and by 1959 they had lost
their magisterial powers and their role was primarily political, though still
consulted on all matters affecting the rural communities. By 1974 there were
5 D.O.s under a District Commissioner, later the Secretary for the N.T. They
gathered intelligence, explained government programmes, represented N.T. inte-
rests, administered the land, controlled squatters, arbitrated informally in
disputes, supervised the development of education, social welfare, emergency
relief, and advised on the plans for new towns - Tsuen Wan, Sha Tin, Tuen Mun
and Tai Po: they were themselves advised by elected village representatives
and elders on 27 Rural Committees and above all by the advisory rural consul-
tative committee, the Heung Yee Kuk (established in 1926 and renewed and made
statutory as advisers in 1957: it consisted of the chairmen of the rural com-
mittees, the unofficial J.P.s and specially elected councillors, elections
 341

by w r i t i n g t o Heads o f Department o r t o me. Moreover many comp-

l a i n t s r e c e i v e d i n t h i s way can be t a k e n n o t i c e o f a l t h o u g h mere-
l y v e r b a l o r even anonymous, whereas a Commissioner c o u l d n o t
countenance e i t h e r .
The f i r s t c o n c l u s i o n one must come t o t h e r e f o r e i s t h a t t h e
e x i s t e n c e o f a Commissioner would n o t i n any way reduce t h e need
t o r e t a i n a l l our e x i s t i n g c h a n n e l s o f c o m p l a i n t . But t h a t l e a v e s
open t h e q u e s t i o n whether we need a Commissioner as w e l l . P e r s o n -
a l l y , I t h i n k i t i s a q u e s t i o n which must s t a y open u n t i l we have
improved t h e e x i s t i n g c h a n n e l s t o t h e maximum e x t e n t . I n t h i s
c o n n e x i o n I would l i k e t o r e p e a t my p r e v i o u s o f f e r t o h o n o u r a b l e
Members: which was, t h a t I would be g l a d t o recommend any f u r t h e r
f u n d s t h a t may be needed, o r t o h e l p i n any o t h e r way, t o f u r t h e r
t h e work o f t h e U.M.E.L.C.O. o f f i c e . I b e l i e v e t h a t h o n o u r a b l e
Members a l r e a d y have under c o n s i d e r a t i o n ways i n which t h e i r work
m i g h t be a s s i s t e d and I s h a l l a w a i t t h e i r recommendations w i t h
much i n t e r e s t . By n e x t year I would l i k e t o f e e l t h a t t h i s and
s i m i l a r mechanisms have e v e r y t h i n g needed t o make them work as
e f f e c t i v e l y as p o s s i b l e , and t h a t we a r e , by t h a t much a t l e a s t ,
c l e a r e r on t h e need for a C o m m i s s i o n e r . . . .

105. SIR YUET-KEUNG KAN: SPEECH, 20 October 19691

[He spoke with pride of the work of the Unofficials: they had proved
that the people of Hong Kong were *well capable of handling our own
a f f a i r s ' . First they had no longer need of the obsolete 'remote c o n t r o l '
from the U.K. but had substantial freedom to decide for themselves what
was best for H.K.]
The second p o i n t i s t h i s . We a r e c o n s t a n t l y c r i t i c i z e d by Mem-
b e r s o f P a r l i a m e n t i n t h e U n i t e d Kingdom. However, t h o s e who a r e
prone t o f i n d f a u l t w i t h us have l i t t l e o r no knowledge o r u n d e r -
s t a n d i n g o f our p r o b l e m s . 2 I n c r e d i b l e as i t may seem, a f t e r a

being more vigorous and a t t r a c t i n g a much higher turnout than in the Colony).
Accordingly the C.D.O.s had to be a c c e s s i b l e to the people in t h e i r d i s t r i c t s
and to keep in touch with a l l local o r g a n i s a t i o n s : they should explain govern-
ment p o l i c i e s , d i f f i c u l t i e s and achievements, assess t h e i r impact, advise on
co-ordination and new i n i t i a t i v e s , and receive complaints and l i s t e n to g r i e -
vances: *they are expected to become aware of problems and c o n f l i c t s and
trends in public thinking before a t t i t u d e s have been s t r u c k ' . Instead of c i v i l
servants defensively giving 'No comment' or r e f e r r i n g i n q u i r i e s by press or
media to the Information Services Department, they would be answered publicly
(The C.D.O. Scheme: 1st r e p t . of the s e c r e t a r y for Chinese a f f a i r s , 24 Jan.
1969: Govt. P r i n t e r . H.K.). 1. H.K. Leg. Co. Deb. pp.20-1. Kan was an unoffi-
c i a l member of the l e g i s l a t i v e (1960-72) and executive (1966-80) councils. In
;the next decade h i s questions on government p o l i c i e s were to become notably
more b i t i n g in t h e i r c r i t i c i s m . 2. The u n o f f i c i a l s continued to be p i l l o r i e d
both as puppets j u s t agreeing with government p o l i c i e s and as e v i l geniuses
blocking o f f i c i a l i n i t i a t i v e s for progress. They were c e r t a i n l y r i c h and inf-
l u e n t i a l , hardly r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the mass of H.K. people, but then what l e -
g i s l a t u r e ever was? In 1970 ten of the 13 were i n d u s t r i a l i s t s , merchants, ban-
kers and 3 were from the professional c l a s s e s . Not t i l l 1972 did Governor Mac-
Lehose begin to appoint u n o f f i c i a l s from a wider background, but Communist
t r a d e s union leaders (representing some 70% of workers) refused appointment.
Probably t h e i r most valuable contribution was to t e l l government c i v i l s e r -
vants what the public would t o l e r a t e and what not - the function p o l i t i c a l
342
s h o r t v i s i t o f a few days t h e y p r o f f e r f a c i l e s o l u t i o n s t o d i f f i -
c u l t i e s which we have been t r y i n g t o s o l v e f o r y e a r s . One would
have t h o u g h t t h a t t h e y c o u l d p r o f i t a b l y l e a r n a g r e a t deal o f
Hong Kong's success - our i n i t i a t i v e , our w i l l i n g n e s s t o work and
our d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o s t a n d on o u r own f e e t . These a r e t h e q u a l i t -
i e s w h i c h have made Hong Kong what i t i s t o d a y .
S i r , when t h e new S t a n d i n g O r d e r s were i n t r o d u c e d l a s t October
I e x p r e s s e d t h e view i n t h i s C o u n c i l t h a t t h e y would g i v e more
scope and o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r Members t o speak on m a t t e r s o f p u b l i c
i n t e r e s t . Since t h e n , U n o f f i c i a l Members have t a k e n f u l l a d v a n -
t a g e a f f o r d e d and i f our O f f i c i a l C o l l e a g u e s i n t h i s C o u n c i l
f o u n d t h e b a r r a g e o f q u e s t i o n s , n o t t o speak o f debates on a d -
j o u r n m e n t , a l i t t l e t i r e s o m e I can o n l y s a y , S i r , t h a t we were
merely taking up the challenge of the then Colonial Secretary.
You, S i r , mentioned t h e 62 p i e c e s o f l e g i s l a t i o n which were p a s -
sed i n t h i s C o u n c i l d u r i n g t h e year many o f w h i c h have p r o f o u n d
e f f e c t on t h e w e l l b e i n g o f t h i s community. The new S t a n d i n g
O r d e r s have indeed g i v e n us b e t t e r o p p o r t u n i t i e s i n d e b a t i n g on
t h e s e enactments and o t h e r i m p o r t a n t p u b l i c i s s u e s , and my Unof-
f i c i a l C o l l e a g u e s and I a r e g l a d t h a t we have been a b l e t o make
our c o n t r i b u t i o n s i n t h a t r e g a r d . . . .
[As for the creation of an ombudsman, Mr. P.O. Woo would deal with that more
f u l l y but he himself would l i k e to state t h a t ] Since t h e U . M . E . L . C . O .
O f f i c e was s e t up o v e r two y e a r s ago we have r e c e i v e d a l a r g e
number o f c o m p l a i n t s and r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s f r o m members o f t h e
p u b l i c . I n p u r s u i n g our e n q u i r i e s we have e n c o u n t e r e d no d i f f i -
c u l t y w i t h any Head o f Department. On t h e c o n t r a r y t h e y have been
most f o r t h c o m i n g and h e l p f u l i n f u r n i s h i n g us w i t h t h e i n f o r m a -
t i o n we seek. To a s s i s t us i n our t a s k and, w i t h t h e b l e s s i n g o f
t h e F i n a n c i a l Committee g i v e n y e s t e r d a y , we propose soon t o a d -
v e r t i s e f o r a person o f wide a d m i n i s t r a t i v e e x p e r i e n c e t o be our
A d m i n i s t r a t i v e S e c r e t a r y . 1 With the s t r e n g t h e n i n g of the o r g a n i -
z a t i o n o f t h e U . M . E . L . C . O . O f f i c e we can deal w i t h p u b l i c comp-
l a i n t s more a d e q u a t e l y t h a n i n t h e p a s t .
[Mr. Wong on balance favoured an ombudsman because unlike U.M.E.L.C.O.
he would have statutory authority to requisition f i l e s and because
U.M.E.L.C.O. gave 'the impression however wrongly' of being 'too much
with the government' whereas Ward o f f i c e r s had the advantage of being
'near where the people l i v e ' . Mr. Y.K. Kan spoke warmly of the streng-
thening of U.M.E.L.C.O. and the expansion of i t s s t a f f and work with
increased use and demand. There was much concern about violence in the
streets and the need for heavy punishments.2 there was a plea t h a t , as

ministers performed in the U.K. (see N. Miners: The government and politics
of H.K. p.180). With the expansion of the l e g i s l a t i v e council in the 1970s -
from 13 u n o f f i c i a l s out of 26 in 1966, 15 out of 30 in 1973, 23 out of 46 in
1976, 25 out of 50 ( a c t u a l l y 45) in 1977, and 27 out of 54 ( a c t u a l l y 49) in
1980 - t h e r e was further opportunity for members to be appointed from wider
i n t e r e s t s . In 1971 t h e r e were 2 European and 11 Chinese u n o f f i c i a l s : in 1980
6 Europeans, 1 Portuguese and 19 Chinese: no Indian had been appointed since
the retirement of Ruttoryee in 1968. In 1980 t h e r e were two women on the coun-
c i l : the Rev. Joyce Bennett, an Anglican p r i e s t and p r i n c i p a l of a g i r l s '
school, and Lydia Dunn, a d i r e c t o r of Swire P a c i f i c and l a t e r a l i f e peer.
1. R.W. Primrose was seconded to t h i s o f f i c e . 2. In face of the unanimous
opposition of the u n o f f i c i a l s , the government in 1971 swiftly withdrew i t s
 343

before 1941, the finance committee of the Council should meet in

public. 1 ]

106. GOVERNOR SIR MURRAY MacLEHOSE; SPEECH, 8 October 19752

I would l i k e t o say a word about t h e work o f t h i s C o u n c i l w h i c h
i s u s u a l l y a l l t o o s i l e n t about i t s own a c h i e v e m e n t s . The l a s t
s e s s i o n was a p a r t i c u l a r l y p r o d u c t i v e one. There were some n o t -
a b l e b i l l s p a s s e d , a l l p r o v i d i n g i n ways l a r g e o r s m a l l f o r new
and f a r - r e a c h i n g d e p a r t u r e s i n one a s p e c t o r a n o t h e r o f t h e l i f e
o f Hong Kong.
Some o f t h e s e were c o n t r o v e r s i a l and I was p a r t i c u l a r l y p l e a s e d
t o n o t e t h e way i n which p u b l i c and i n t e r e s t e d o p i n i o n made i t -
s e l f f e l t t h r o u g h u n o f f i c i a l Members o f t h i s C o u n c i l who moved
many amendments which s u b s t a n t i a l l y improved t h e proposed l e g i s -
l a t i o n . I n some cases b i l l s were d e l i b e r a t e l y p u b l i s h e d e a r l y o r
t h e i r d i s c u s s i o n d e l a y e d i n o r d e r t o encourage o r a l l o w f o r f u l -
l e r p u b l i c c o n s u l t a t i o n . S i m i l a r l y t h e r e have been some e x t r e m e l y
u s e f u l debates and m o t i o n s on a d j o u r n m e n t which c l a r i f i e d p o l i c y
on such d i v e r s e t o p i c s as a commodity exchange, t e l e p h o n e c h a r -
g e s , mass t r a n s i t r a i l w a y , and t h e p i l l .
When I was here 15 y e a r s ago I g o t t h e i m p r e s s i o n t h a t t h e r e
was a d i s t a s t e f o r p u b l i c debate i n t h i s chamber: i t was a g a i n s t
t r a d i t i o n and n o t r e a l l y done. I t i s indeed n o t t h e t r a d i t i o n
t h a t Hong Kong s h o u l d be governed by d e b a t e , o r t h a t t h e r e s h o u l d
be debate and o p p o s i t i o n f o r debate and o p p o s i t i o n ' s s a k e . Denied
as we a r e , f o r reasons w e l l u n d e r s t o o d h e r e , t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f
an e l e c t e d l e g i s l a t u r e , our t r a d i t i o n i s r a t h e r t o govern by c o n -
s e n s u s . We a t t e m p t t o a c h i e v e t h i s by many d i f f e r e n t ways. Repre-
s e n t a t i o n s t o U . M . E . L . C . O . , t h e wide use o f a d v i s o r y c o m m i t t e e s ,
green p a p e r s , t h e p e r c e p t i o n o f C i t y D i s t r i c t O f f i c e r s and t h e i r
ever w i d e n i n g c o n t a c t s w i t h mutual a i d committees and a r e a com-
mittees and of course the kaifongs. The role of the press and me-
d i a i s v i t a l . So t o o i s a w i l l i n g n e s s on t h e p a r t o f t h e Govern-
ment t o g i v e t i m e f o r c o n s i d e r e d r e a c t i o n s t o new p r o p o s a l s t o
d e v e l o p . But h a v i n g s a i d a l l t h i s I am c o n v i n c e d t h a t i t i s i n
t h e p u b l i c i n t e r e s t and i n t h e i n t e r e s t o f t h i s C o u n c i l t h a t t h e
major i s s u e s t h a t a f f e c t our l i v e s s h o u l d be b r o u g h t t o t h i s
C o u n c i l , and t h a t i f t h e r e be genuine d i f f e r e n c e s t h e y s h o u l d be
c l e a r l y s t a t e d and p u b l i c l y d e c i d e d h e r e , as t h e y have o f t e n been
i n the course of the l a s t s e s s i o n .
V i s i t o r s t o Hong Kong o f t e n f a i 1 t o grasp t h e m u l t i p l e r o l e s
o f h o n o u r a b l e Members o r t h e volume and d i v e r s i t y o f b u s i n e s s

proposals for reform based on the best modern penological t h e o r i e s of the West
(Leg. Co. Deb. 1970-1 pp.348-56): and again in 1972 over the assessment of
Crown r e n t s (Leg. Co. Deb. 1971-2 pp.754-9). 1. The c o l o n i a l s e c r e t a r y cont-
r a s t e d the volume and d e t a i l of business d e a l t with by the committee in 1970
compared with the formality and lack of debate before 1941. The recommenda-
t i o n s of the committee were fully published and open to c r i t i c i s m and r a t i -
f i c a t i o n . Under the public gaze i t s operations would be formalised and would
lose efficiency (Leg. Co. Deb. 1970-1 pp.121-3).
2. Leg. Co. Deb. 1975-6 pp.43-5. MacLehose (governor 1971-82) had been acting
consul in Hankow, then p o l i t i c a l adviser in H.K. in 1960 and ambassador to
Vietnam and Denmark. The l e g i s l a t i v e council in 1974 consisted of 15 o f f i c i a l s
and 15 u n o f f i c i a l s .
344
they are called on to transact. There are their questions and
speeches in this chamber; outside it there is their work on
Finance Committee and the Public Works Sub-Committee; for all
important and controversial legislation working groups are formed
not only to consider the drafts in detail with the officials con-
cerned, but also to receive and consider representations from the
public about them. Then the U.M.E.L.C.O. office offers the funct-
ions of what in Britain would be called a constituency 'surgery':
that is to say a place where the public can bring their problems
or complaints and be able to put them in person to a member of
U.M.E.L.C.O. However, unlike constituency surgeries in Britain,
U.M.E.L.C.O. operates for six days a week and its members can
call directly for confidential files about cases which come to
their attention, as indeed they frequently do also in preparation
of legislation. A considerable proportion of their work is thus
in confidence. Moreover they collaborate positively in the prepa-
ration of legislation and by intervention constantly influence
administration. Their work is thus more akin to that of cabinet
members than back benchers, and like a cabinet they must be able
to work as a team, though all such analogies with other forms of
Government can be highly misleading. To be able to do all this,
as well as perform their role in the chamber of opposition or
support or spur as their judgement dictates, requires very consi-
derable experience and, I should emphasize, time and stamina.
Lacking, as is unavoidable, any electoral mandate, Members are
required to try to think and plan and speak for the interests of
the community as a whole as they see it, and not, as would be so
much easier, for the narrow interests of a party, a group, a pro-
fession, an area or a class. But I believe it assists this gener-
al requirement if members are able to speak from as wide a spread
as possible not only of professional experience, but also of so-
cial background.
This is a situation which, like Hong Kong itself, has evolved,
is evolving, and can evolve further. As you know I attach the
greatest importance in the circumstances of Hong Kong to provid-
ing opportunities for public participation at all levels, and I
give all the personal support I can to the new and growing number
of bodies such as mutual aid committees catering for such parti-
cipation in the neighbourhoods. These are not only doing a great
deal of practical good, but they are also providing men and women
not previously in much contact with the Government machine or
community affairs with an opportunity to play a part, and gain
experience, with which they could make a contribution on advisory
and other committees and bodies of Government.
As I say this is an evolving not a static situation, and given
time and the right people and the will - and I believe the will
is there - there is plenty of room for change while retaining the
essential character of this Council, and subject of course to the
overriding requirement of Members having sufficient experience
of public service, and ability, to carry a fair share of the
exacting tasks that have to be shouldered by U.M.E.L.C.O....
 345

107. ( a ) BARON GORONWY-ROBERTS: REPLY, 21 July 19761

[ I n answer to a question asking what proposals were being considered
for changes in the Legislative Council] My n o b l e f r i e n d knows, o f
c o u r s e , what t h e s p e c i a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s a r e i n t h i s one c o l o n y ,
Hong Kong, where t h e t r a d i t i o n a l and e f f e c t i v e B r i t i s h p o l i c y o f
a d v a n c i n g t o e l e c t i v e s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t i s n o t p o s s i b l e . There a r e
e x t e r n a l reasons why i t i s i n t h e i n t e r e s t s o f t h e Colony t h a t
t h i s s h o u l d n o t be done, a t l e a s t a t t h e p r e s e n t t i m e .
Baron Rhodes ( L a b . ) : I s t h e m i n i s t e r aware t h a t i f he wishes t o
r e t a i n t h e f r i e n d s h i p o f m a i n l a n d China he w i l l have t o proceed
v e r y w a r i l y i n any a l t e r a t i o n t o t h e L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l ?
Baron G o r o n w y - R o b e r t s : Yes, My L o r d s . I w i s h I had p u t t h e
p o s i t i o n i n t h o s e s u c c i n c t and p r e c i s e t e r m s .

( b ) GOVERNOR SIR MURRAY MacLEHOSE; SPEECH, 6 October 19762

' F i r s t o f a l l I s h o u l d l i k e t o welcome a g a i n t o t h i s C o u n c i l
t h e e i g h t new u n o f f i c i a l s and 5 o f f i c i a l s who t o o k t h e i r o a t h s

1. Hansard. 1976 Lords 844. Goronwy-Roberts was m i n i s t e r of s t a t e a t the

F.C.O. responsible for H.K. a f f a i r s , he made a s i m i l a r remark on 22 Nov. 1978
(ibid. 975). A predecessor in the earlier Labour government, Baron Shepherd,
had s t a t e d ' P e r s o n a l l y , I do not see any real democratic government develop-
ments in Hong Kong. The presence of China and the a t t i t u d e of China will make
i t necessary for Hong Kong to r e t a i n very much the system of government which
it has today.' (ibid. 12 Jan. 1971 21). In March 1972 China informed the
chairman of the U.N. special committee on the s i t u a t i o n with regard to the im-
plementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples t h a t the question of H.K. was a matter solely of China's
sovereignty and t h a t consequently H.K. could not be included in the l i s t of
Colonial t e r r i t o r i e s covered by t h a t Declaration: any steps towards s e l f -
government were therefore p r o h i b i t e d . Even when in 1995, in s p i t e of the anger
from Beijing, somewhat wider e l e c t i o n s to the l e g i s l a t i v e council were held
and, d e s p i t e f e a r s , democratic candidates did well and pro-China ones did
badly, the People's Republic made c l e a r i t would, a f t e r 1997, immediately get
r i d of a l l such e l e c t i o n s .
2. Leg. Co. Deb. 1976-7, pp.5-7. On 26 August MacLehose had announced the ap-
pointment of 8 new u n o f f i c i a l s and 5 new o f f i c i a l s to the l e g i s l a t i v e council,
and 2 new u n o f f i c i a l s to the executive council. By royal i n s t r u c t i o n under a
new o r d e r - i n - c o u n c i l the maximum number of u n o f f i c i a l s had been increased from
15 to 23 and of officials (excluding the governor and 4 ex officio) from 10
to 18: * though the t r a d i t i o n a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l power to r e t a i n an o f f i c i a l ma-
j o r i t y has thus been maintained, a l l the o f f i c i a l s e a t s have not been f i l l e d
and one spare u n o f f i c i a l seat has been retained in case of further expansion'.
The Colonial s e c r e t a r y was now named the Chief s e c r e t a r y . I t was hoped the new
council would be seen to represent a wide cross section of the community:
(Govt. Daily Info. Bull. 26 Aug.). The South China Morning Post paid t r i b u t e
to four long-serving and experienced c o u n c i l l o r s who would no longer be coun-
c i l l o r s (31 Aug. 1976): the council would have 'a new l o o k ' . *The four new
members bring to the chamber experience in s o c i a l work, business, industry and
finance and in the realm of c r e d i t unions. Their appointments i l l u s t r a t e one
of the strong points of the way in which the administration of Hong Kong
works; not only does the Colony have a deep pool of t a l e n t in which to fish
for e x p e r t i s e to serve on advisory boards, councils and in Legco, but when the
men and women of t a l e n t are landed, they are prepared to serve. Service on the
Legislative Council is no sinecure. It is a time consuming and arduous task
346
of office this morning. I hope this enlargement would ease the
burden on Members in discharging their steadily increasing res-
ponsibilities, and I also hope that having an expense allowance
available and the services of an expanded U.M.E.L.C.O. secretar-
iat will also assist you in your duties. The opportunity enlarge-
ment offers has been taken to achieve a membership reflecting a
wider direct association with all sections of our society - as
the senior member suggested 2 years ago.1
It is the tradition in this Council that each Member speaks for
no particular group or section but in the interest of all Hong
Kong as it appears in his or her judgement. This is a good tradi-
tion, but only if it is balanced, as is now more the case, by
membership drawn from a wide range of professional expertise,
public service, and personal background. For my part, I think it
is important that significant differences between Members or bet-
ween them and the Government on matters of policy should be
brought out in public at this Council, so I continue to hope for
lively debate.
In being appointed to this Council Unofficials also become part
of the body of Unofficial Members of Executive and Legislative
Council. In this unelected government the functions of
U.M.E.L.C.O. outside the formal work of the two Councils are
vital. It is your Government's aim to make the departments of
official government as accessible and responsive to the public
as possible. But this process can be greatly assisted by Unoffi-
cials. Much good work in this respect is done by the Ward Offices
of the Urban Councillors, and by individual members of the pub-
lic. But the importance of U.M.E.L.C.O. in its function of red-
ressor of grievances and stimulant and check on the administra-
tion cannot be overstated. No one is more conscious than myself
of the immense amount of time involved for members, or the impor-
tance of the work they do.
As honourable Members know, in 1972 and '73 your Government
undertook a wide ranging review of what would be necessary in
order to eliminate the principal defects in our society within
a time-scale of about ten years, and planned accordingly. To
tackle and master all the many different problems we realized
required more revenue, the overhaul of the administration, bold
planning, and a radical new degree of contact and partnership
between Government and governed. With the support of honourable
Members and of the public your Government has persisted with
these objectives inspite of the traumatic and wholly unexpected
experience of the recession. From this experience Hong Kong has
now emerged and, as it were, changed gear. I therefore propose
to review what our economic possibilities are in the period of
renewed growth into which we have moved, and how this can best

that makes demands on those who agree to make this valuable contribution to
the community.' 1. Dr. Chung, senior unofficial, had urged the need to expand
unofficial numbers because of 'the amount of time and effort' required by
council work and because ' in the light of changing circumstances' councillors
should be appointed 'from a broader spectrum of the community' to increase
'the diversification of the social background' of the unofficials. He was
gratified that the government had acted 'with such speed and determination':
the council would gain 'greater trust and respect' thereby: (ibid. pp.75-6).
 347
be used to strengthen our economy, improve living standards and
attain our social targets.

(c) DR. CHUNG: SPEECH, 27 October 19761

[As senior unofficial he reported the great increase in the cases dealt
with by U.M.E.L.C.O.: the average of successful cases had been about 25%
for the past six years.I
The key to the U.M.E.L.C.O. complaints system is the three
Rights granted by you, Sir, to the Members of U.M.E.L.C.O. for
investigating public complaints and representations. The first
is the Right to information, including copies of Government
correspondence, policies, procedures and instructions. Secondly,
there is the Right of access to Government officers which may be
exercised either by the U.M.E.L.C.O. Office staff on behalf of
the Members or by the U.M.E.L.C.O. themselves and, if necessary,
at top level including my honourable Friend, the Chief Secretary.
The third is the Right to challenge the action taken by Govern-
ment administration.
The challenge is made in different ways. For example,
U.M.E.L.C.O. may decide to write personally to or discuss with
the Head of Department concerned, or may decide to raise the
subject matter at a higher level in the Government Secretariat
or in the Executive Council, or in certain cases may decide to
ask a question or conduct a debate in the Legislative Council.
A good case in point is the adjournment debate in February this
year on a complaint made by residents of licensed areas for the
supply of authorized electricity and reticulated tap water and
for the need of improvement in environmental conditions.
When a case of complaint is presented to U.M.E.L.C.O., particu-
larly one of a very complicated nature, the finding of facts is
crucial. Here, I must say that Government departments have been
most co-operative in reporting to U.M.E.L.C.O. their findings,
and it is by such co-operation of Government departments that the
U.M.E.L.C.O. complaints system can function as it is functioning
today.
The finding of information and facts by U.M.E.L.C.O. officers
with the aid of the departments concerned is man-power consuming
especially in those cases when the time factor is important. At
present the establishment for the U.M.E.L.C.O. complaints section
is very tight and each officer, on the average, has to handle
about 300 cases, simple and complicated, in a year. We need not
only more staff but a greater number of high-calibre staff.
Nevertheless, the problem is not financial as the Government has
been very sympathetic and generous. The difficulty lies in rec-
ruitment and equally in training.
The U.M.E.L.C.O. Office usually acts on complaints with some
speed. However, if a complaint is presented to U.M.E.L.C.O. and
proceedings are taken against the complainant in Court on the
same or a closely related matter, U.M.E.L.C.O. cannot continue

1. Leg. Co. Deb. pp. 76-8. Chung was seconding the motion of thanks to the
governor for his speech opening the session on 6 October, proposed by the
chief secretary. In 1977 the legislative council consisted of 20 officials and
22 unofficials; in 1978 21 officials and 24 unofficials. The executive council
had 6 officials and 9 unofficials.
348
to process the matter under complaint until the court proceedings
have been finished or abandoned. Although I sympathize with the
complainants who are upset by the delay, it would be wrong for
U.M.E.L.C.O. or any complaint system to operate in any other way,
for we must not be seen to be acting in conflict with the courts.
Sir, I have no doubt that the U.M.E.L.C.O. complaints system
is effective and efficient for Hong Kong residents to air their
grievances against the Government administration. Desirably and
ideally, the statistics of such complaints should gradually dimi-
nish to reflect the improvement in the administration. However,
in a fast developing and changing society like Hong Kong, new
problems are bound to rise from time to time and it is most
unlikely, in my view, that the statistics of complaints would
drop, apart from periodic fluctuations. Some thought has been gi-
ven to the need for setting up a branch office in Kowloon. Geo-
graphically and from the point of view of service to the general
public living on Kowloon an the New Territories, there is a
strong case for an U.M.E.L.C.O. Office in Kowloon to receive pub-
lic complaints. On the other hand, it is realised that the key
to our success, as we do achieve at present, lies in centraliz-
ation, speed of processing, and immediate accessibility to most
Members, all U.M.E.L.C.O. staff and many Heads of Government
Departments. There is also the consideration of increased costs
of operation resulting from duplication and internal red-tape.
It is a matter which needs further careful consideration. Sir,
before turning to the next subject, I would like to pay a tribute
to the U.M.E.L.C.O. staff for their care and dedication in hand-
ling public complaints and for their contribution in making Hong
Kong a more just and fair society.
I also wish to take this opportunity to say a few words about
the work of the Members Division of the U.M.E.L.C.O. Office.
Major representations in respect of both proposed legislation as
well as controversial public issues are handled by the staff of
that Division in addition to their day-to-day responsibility for
providing supporting services for Unofficial Members. To them I
also pay tribute for their loyalty, efficiency and dedication and
for their contribution toward the overall good of Hong Kong.
108. CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 4 December 19821
[The preamble rehearsed the long history of China, its splendid culture
and glorious revolutionary tradition; the redirection of feudal China in
1840 into a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country; the struggle for na-
tional independence and liberation and for democracy and freedom; the
abolition of the feudal monarchy by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in 1911; the over-
throw of imperialism, feudalism and bureaucratic commission by Mao Zedong
in 1949, and the final victory of the Chinese people as masters of the
country.
Under the Central Government there were autonomous cities, municipal-
ities, townships, counties, regions and prefectures.]
Art. 31. The State may establish Special Administrative Regions
where necessary. The systems to be instituted in Special Adminis-
trative Regions shall be prescribed by law enacted by the Nation-
al People's Congress in the light of the specific conditions....

1. Beijing Review No.52.

 349

[Chapter Two detailed the fundamental rights and consequent duties of

c i t i z e n s - equality before the law, suffrage at 18 regardless of nationa-
l i t y , race, sex, occupation, family background, religious b e l i e f , educa-
t i o n , property &c; freedom of person, i n v i o l a b i l i t y of home <&c.1 Chap-
ter Three dealt with the structure of the State, the People's Congress,
the President, the State Council, the Central M i l i t a r y Commission, the
local congresses, the organs of self-government in the national autono-
mous areas, the People's Courts and protectorates. Chapter Four concerned
the National f l a g , emblem and c a p i t a l . ]

109. THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT, July 19842

1. In the Introduction to the Green Paper entitled fA Pattern
of District Administration in Hong Kong' which was published in
June 1980, i t was stated t h a t 'The executive and L e g i s l a t i v e
Councils, the central organs of Government, have evolved, and
w i l l continue t o evolve as circumstances r e q u i r e , w i t h i n the im-
peratives of s t a b i l i t y and dependability which the special c i r -
cumstances of Hong Kong d i c t a t e s . ' This Green Paper f o l l o w s from
and develops on t h a t statement.
2. During the past few years, several steps have been taken t o
develop a system of representative government i n Hong Kong at the
regional and d i s t r i c t l e v e l s . In 1973, the Urban Council was r e -
c o n s t i t u t e d as a f i n a n c i a l l y autonomous body; the o f f i c i a l mem-
bers withdrew from the Council and i t s u n o f f i c i a l members increa-
sed t o 24, h a l f of them d i r e c t l y elected on a l i m i t e d f r a n c h i s e .
1982 saw the f i r s t d i r e c t e l e c t i o n s t o D i s t r i c t Boards based on
a very broad f r a n c h i s e . In 1983, the membership of the Urban
Council was f u r t h e r increased t o 30, h a l f of whom are now elected
from d i s t r i c t constituencies on the same broad franchise as f o r
D i s t r i c t Board e l e c t i o n s .
3. For many years members of the Urban Council have been ap-
pointed by the Governor to s i t on the L e g i s l a t i v e Council, and
recently some elected D i s t r i c t Board members have also been ap-
pointed to the L e g i s l a t i v e Council. This process w i l l continue.
4. In May t h i s year plans were announced to develop f u r t h e r r e -
presentative status of the D i s t r i c t Boards by doubling the number
of elected members in 1985, and to e s t a b l i s h in 1986 a new Regio-
nal Council, with a s u b s t a n t i a l elected element in i t s member-
s h i p , t o cover those areas of the t e r r i t o r y not already covered
by the Urban Council.

1. Later in 1989 came the massacres in Tiananmen Square which alarmed opinion
not only in H.K. but in the world. Were promises, and the s p e c i f i c guarantees
in the J o i n t Declaration of 1984 [No.110] only scraps of paper which the
P.R.C. would not honour? The human r i g h t s record of the P . R . C . ' s d i c t a t o r i a l
gerontocracy had never been good. Now to many i t was t o t a l l y unacceptable, and
fears of the t r a n s f e r in 1997 increased. So did the emigration of those able
to do so to Canada, A u s t r a l i a and the U.S.
2. The * green' consultative paper: the P.R.C. did not openly oppose political
reform as envisaged here but reserved i t s r i g h t to r e j e c t any change i t con-
sidered i n a p p r o p r i a t e . Previously the o f f i c i a l policy in the H.K. Government
year books had been r e g u l a r l y to s t a t e t h a t there would be no fundamental con-
s t i t u t i o n a l changes ' f o r which there i s in any event l i t t l e or no popular
p r e s s u r e ' and any reforms had been focused only on regional and d i s t r i c t coun-
c i l s (cf. H.K. Yearbook 1982).
350

5. At the same t i m e , r e c o g n i t i o n of the s i g n i f i c a n c e of the

r o l e of c o n s u l t a t i o n in the o r d e r i n g of p u b l i c a f f a i r s in Hong
Kong, and a p u b l i c e x p e c t a t i o n of c o n s u l t a t i o n in respect both
of s p e c i f i c major issues and the g e n e r a l i t y of government p o l i -
c i e s and programmes, have emerged. The Government has encouraged
t h i s p r o c e s s . T h i s in t u r n has led t o an i n c r e a s i n g number of r e p -
r e s e n t a t i o n s from i n d i v i d u a l members of the p u b l i c and v a r i o u s
i n t e r e s t groups f o r the development of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e government
a t the c e n t r a l l e v e l as w e l l as the r e g i o n a l and d i s t r i c t l e v e l s .
The development of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e government a t the c e n t r a l l e v e l
w i l l be of g r e a t s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r the f u t u r e .
6. The purpose of t h i s Green Paper i s t o suggest how the c e n t -
r a l i n s t i t u t i o n s of government in Hong Kong might be made more
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e in a way which w i l l make the Government more d i -
r e c t l y accountable to the people of Hong Kong; and t o i n v i t e pub-
l i c discussion of and comment on the proposals s e t out i n i t .
7. The main aims of the proposals are -
( a ) t o develop p r o g r e s s i v e l y a system of government the a u t h o r -
i t y f o r which i s f i r m l y rooted in Hong Kong, which i s able t o r e -
present a u t h o r i t a t i v e l y the views of the people of Hong Kong, and
which i s more d i r e c t l y accountable t o the people of Hong Kong;
( b ) t o b u i l d t h i s system on our e x i s t i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s , which
have served Hong Kong w e l l , and, as f a r as p o s s i b l e , t o preserve
t h e i r best f e a t u r e s , i n c l u d i n g the maintenance of w e l l e s t a b l i -
shed p r a c t i c e of government by consensus; and
( c ) t o a l l o w f o r f u r t h e r development if t h a t s h o u l d be t h e w i s h
of the community.1

1 1 0 . JOINT DECLARATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE

GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON THE QUESTION OF HONG KONG,
19 December 19842
The Government o f t h e U n i t e d Kingdom o f G r e a t B r i t a i n and

1. As a consequence of the new i n i t i a t i v e indicated by t h i s 1984 green paper,

the l e g i s l a t i v e council was in 1985 increased to 57, of whom 12 were e l e c t e d
by an e l e c t o r a l college and 12 by functional c o n s t i t u e n c i e s : further reforms
were envisaged in a 1985 white paper including the introduction of some d i r e c t
e l e c t i o n s in 1988. 2. In the climate of p o l i t i c a l i n s t a b i l i t y in China and
p a r t i c u l a r l y of the Cultural Revolution of 1967 there was a need, in the i n t e -
r e s t both of the colony's economy and investment, for more c e r t a i n t y about
what would happen a f t e r 1997 when the lease of the N.T. ran out: [Vol.V p.
511]. For China the B r i t i s h colony of H.K. was both an emotional and a prag-
matic i s s u e ; i t was the l a s t v e s t i g e of Western imperialism which must be e r -
adicated: i t was a valuable economic a s s e t which must be seized. The r e u n i f i -
cation of H.K. was a penultimate stage in the r e u n i f i c a t i o n of Macao and Tai-
wan. Though in 1919 China was nominally one of the v i c t o r i o u s a l l i e s , i t was
Japan, not China, which had secured the former German p r i v i l e g e s in Shandong;
and such a humiliation had played an important p a r t in the May Fourth Movement
and the foundation of the Communist party. After the Cultural r e v o l u t i o n , Deng
Xiaoping found t h a t the 'one country, two systems' formula he used for Taiwan
could accommodate the necessary reclamation of H.K. and the prudent preserva-
t i o n of i t s economic p o t e n t i a l , which he valued increasingly a f t e r the c o l -
lapse of Communism in Eastern Europe. The a u t h o r i t a r i a n Basic Law was a r e s -
ponse to the H.K. demonstrations against the massacre of Tiananmen. I t had
become c l e a r t h a t without the N.T. the colony could hardly survive and the
 351
Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of

P.B.C. was resolved to prevent any moves of the colony towards self-government
and independence. So could some Sino-British declaration smooth the transition
of sovereignty to China and provide guarantees for greater political and eco-
nomic freedom in some special autonomous district formed by the old Colony?
The open door policy presented in 1978 for Guangedong seemed to give an oppor-
tunity: so did Deng Xiaoping's return to power after 10 years disgrace follow-
ing the Cultural Revolution. Slowly by 1984 this joint declaration emerged.
The draft had been initialled on 26 Sept., published as a white paper and cir-
culated for comment: ratification had to take place before 30 June 1985.
(Though in 1969 the Gibraltar Constitution providing for an assembly of the
speaker, 2 ex officio and 12 elected from a single constituency, each voter
having 8 votes: and for locally elected ministers in charge of certain depart-
ment, the governor retaining responsibility for other matters and appointing
the A.G. and development secretary - a considerable misuse of 'democratic au-
tonomy' - the undertaking was made that the Rock would not pass under the so-
vereignty of another state [Spain] against the inhabitants' wishes; and a war
was fought to oust the Argentines in 1982 when, in claiming soverignty, they
had invaded the Falklands.) In the context of H.K. H.M.'s G. accepted that,
when the lease expired in 1997, it was impossible to retain the colony. The
introduction to the white paper of 26 Sept. 1984, explaining the background,
stated the consistent Chinese view that the whole of the territory, whether
secured by the 'unequal treaties' of Nanking (1842) ceding the island, and of
Peking (1860) ceding Kowloon in perpetuity, or the lease of the N.T. in 1998,
was Chinese. H.M.'s G. was concerned that uncertainty would erode confidence
and investment, and Mrs. Thatcher and Chairman Deng Xiaoping had agreed (24
Sept. 1982) on negotiations 'in a friendly atmosphere' to secure 'the common
aim of maintaining the stability and prosperity' of H.K.: the governor of H.K.
as member of the U.K. delegation took part in every round of formal talks.
Though H.M.'s G. explained the importance in the existing systems of 'the Bri-
tish administrative role and link', China declared the continuation of British
administration after 1997 was totally unacceptable. As the period before the
termination of the N.T. lease shortened, Britain sought some compromise which
might ensure 'a high degree of autonomy under Chinese sovereignty' which would
'preserve the way of life' in H.K. together with essentials of the present
system. A Sino-British joint liaison group would be established when agreement
was reached and would continue until 2000; and at every stage the executive
council of H.M. and U.M.E.L.C.O. had been kept confidentially informed and
consulted. In H.M.'s G. 's view, however, there was no possible alternative to
the draft initialled in Sept. 1984: China would not reopen negotiations and
would impose its own plan upon H.K. which might not include all the elements
in the draft and would not have the same status as a legally binding agreement
between the U.K. and China: the N.T. would revert to China on 1 July 1997, and
H.K. island, Kowloon and Stonecutters Island would 'not be viable alone'.
'This is not a choice which H.M.'s G. have sought to impose on the people of
H.K. It is a choice imposed by the facts of H.K. history' - and geography. The
economic miracle, a capitalist enclave on the frontier of China - was very
vulnerable: it depended on China for its water and much of its food. But under
the agreement H.K. would as a Special Administration Region of the People's
Republic, preserve its unique economic way of life as a major trading and fi-
nancial centre, its familiar legal system and laws (incl. common law), and its
right to decide its own economic, financial and trade policies and to partici-
pate in international organisations and trade agreements (such as G.A.T.T.).
H.M.'s G. would strongly commend the agreement to the H.K. people: a special
352
China have reviewed with satisfaction the friendly relations
existing between the two Governments and peoples in recent years
and agreed that a proper negotiated settlement of the question
of Hong Kong, which is left over from the past, is conducive to
the maintenance of the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong and
to the further strengthening and development of the relations
between the two countries on a new basis. To this end, they have,
after talks between the delegations of the two Governments,
agreed to declare as follows:
1. The Government of the People's Republic of China declares
that to recover the Hong Kong area (including Hong Kong Island,
Kowloon and the New Territories, hereinafter referred to as Hong
Kong) is the common aspiration of the entire Chinese people, and
that it has decided to resume the exercise of sovereignty over
Hong Kong with effect from 1 July 1997.
2. The Government of the United Kingdom declares that it will
restore Hong Kong to the People's Republic of China with effect
from 1 July 1997.
3. The Government of the People's Republic of China declares
that the basic policies of the People's Republic of China regar-
ding Hong Kong are as follows:
(1) Upholding national unity and territorial integrity and tak-
ing account of the history of Hong Kong and its realities, the
People's Republic of China has decided to establish, in accord-
ance with the provisions of Article 31 of the Constitution of the
People's Republic of China, a Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region upon resuming the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong.
(2) The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will be directly
under the authority of the Central People's Government of the
People's Republic of China. The Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region will enjoy a high degree of autonomy, except in foreign
and defence affairs which are the responsibilities of the Central
People's Government.
(3) The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will be vested
with executive, legislative and independent judicial power, inc-
luding that of final adjudication. The laws currently in force
in Hong Kong will remain basically unchanged.
(4) The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region will be composed of local inhabitants. The chief executive
will be appointed by the Central People's Government on the basis
of the results of elections or consultations to be held locally.
Principal officials will be nominated by the chief executive of
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region for appointment by
the Central People's Government. Chinese and foreign nations pre-
viously working in the public and police services in the govern-
ment departments of Hong Kong may remain in employment. British
and other foreign nationals may also be employed to serve as
advisers or hold certain public posts in government departments
of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
(5) The current social and economic systems in Hong Kong will
remain unchanged, and so will the life-style. Rights and free-
doms, including those of the person, of speech, of the press, of

assessment office and two independent monitors (Sir Patrick Nairne and Mr.
Justice Simon Li) would analyze H.K. reaction and comments.
 353
assembly of association, of travel, of movement, of correspon-
dence, of strike, of choice of occupation, of academic research
and of religious belief will be ensured by law in the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region. Private property, ownership of
enterprises, legitimate right of inheritance and foreign inves-
tments wi 1 1 be protected by law.
(6) The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will retain the
status of a free port and a separate customs territory.
(7) The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will retain the
status of an international financial centre, and its markets for
foreign exchange, gold, securities and futures will continue.
There will be free flow of capital. The Hong Kong dollar will
continue to circulate and remain freely convertible.
(8) The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will have inde-
pendent finances. The Central People's Government will not levy
taxes on the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
(9) The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may establish
mutually beneficial economic relations with the United Kingdom
and other countries, whose economic interests in Hong Kong will
be given due regard.
(10) Using the name of 'Hong Kong, China', the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region may on its own maintain and develop econo-
mic and cultural relations and conclude relevant agreements with
states, regions and relevant international organisations. The
Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may on
its own issue travel documents for entry into and exit from Hong
Kong.
(11) The maintenance of public order in the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region will be the responsibility of the Govern-
ment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
(12) The above-stated basic policies of the People's Republic of
China regarding Hong Kong and the elaboration of them in Annex
1 to this Joint Declaration will be stipulated, in a Basic Law
of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's
Republic of China, by the National People's Congress of the
People's Republic of China, and they will remain unchanged for
50 years.
4. The Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of
the People's Republic of China declare that, during the transi-
tional period between the date of the entry into force of this
Joint Declaration and 30 June 1997, the Government of the United
Kingdom will be responsible for the administration of Hong Kong
with the object of maintaining and preserving its economic pros-
perity and social stability; and that the Government of the
People's Republic of China will give its co-operation in this
connection.
5. The Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of
the People's Republic of China declare that, in order to ensure
a smooth transfer of government in 1997, and with a view to the
effective implementation of this Joint Declaration, a Sino-
British Joint Liaison Group will be set up when this Joint Decla-
ration enters into force; and that it will be established and
will function in accordance with the provisions of Annex II to
this Joint Declaration.
6. The Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of
the People's Republic of China declare that land leases in Hong
354
Kong and other related matters will be dealt with in accordance
with the provisions of Annex III to this Joint Declaration.
7. The Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of
the People's Republic of China agree to implement the preceding
declarations and the Annexes to this Joint Declaration.
8. This Joint Declaration is subject to ratification and shall
enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of
ratification, which shall take place in Beijing before 30 June
1985. This Joint Declaration and its Annexes shall be equally
binding.
Done in duplicate at Beijing on 19 December 1984 in the English
and Chinese languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the For the

Government of the United Kingdom Government of the
Of Great Britain and Northern Ireland People's Republic of China

Margaret Thatcher Zhao Ziyang

ANNEX I: ELABORATION BY THE GOVERNMENT OF

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
OF ITS BASIC POLICIES REGARDING HONG KONG
The Government of the People's Republic of China elaborates the
basic policies of the People's Republic of China regarding Hong
Kong as set out in paragraph 3 of the Joint Declaration of the
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on
the Question of Hong Kong as follows:

I. The Constitution of the People's Republic of China stipulates

in Article 31 that 'the state may establish special administra-
tive regions when necessary. The systems to be instituted in
special administrative regions shall be prescribed by laws enac-
ted by the National People's Congress in the light of the speci-
fic conditions'. In accordance with this Article, the People's
Republic of China shall, upon the resumption of the exercise of
sovereignty over Hong Kong on 1 July 1997, establish the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of
China. The National People's Congress of the People's Republic
of China shall enact and promulgate a Basic Law of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China
(hereinafter referred to as the Basic Law) in accordance with the
Constitution of the People's Republic of China, stipulating that
after the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region the socialist system and socialist policies shall not be
practised in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and that
Hong Kong's previous capitalist system and life-style shall re-
main unchanged for 50 years.
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be directly
under the authority of the Central People's Government of the
People's Republic of China and shall enjoy a high degree of auto-
nomy. Except for foreign and defence affairs which are the res-
ponsibilities of the Central People's Government, the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region shall be vested with executive,
legislative and independent judicial power, including that of
 355

f i n a l a d j u d i c a t i o n . The C e n t r a l P e o p l e ' s Government s h a l l a u t h o r -

i s e t h e Hong Kong S p e c i a l A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Region t o c o n d u c t on i t s
own t h o s e e x t e r n a l a f f a i r s s p e c i f i e d i n S e c t i o n X I o f t h i s Annex.
The government and l e g i s l a t u r e o f t h e Hong Kong S p e c i a l A d m i n i -
s t r a t i v e Region s h a l l be composed o f l o c a l i n h a b i t a n t s . The c h i e f
e x e c u t i v e o f t h e Hong Kong S p e c i a l A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Region s h a l l
be s e l e c t e d by e l e c t i o n o r t h r o u g h c o n s u l t a t i o n s h e l d l o c a l l y and
be a p p o i n t e d by t h e C e n t r a l P e o p l e ' s Government. P r i n c i p a l o f f i -
c i a l s ( e q u i v a l e n t t o S e c r e t a r i e s ) s h a l l be nominated by t h e c h i e f
e x e c u t i v e o f t h e Hong Kong S p e c i a l A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Region and
a p p o i n t e d by t h e C e n t r a l P e o p l e ' s Government. The l e g i s l a t u r e o f
t h e Hong Kong S p e c i a l A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Region s h a l l be c o n s t i t u t e d
by e l e c t i o n s . The e x e c u t i v e a u t h o r i t i e s s h a l l a b i d e by t h e law
and s h a l l be a c c o u n t a b l e t o t h e l e g i s l a t u r e .
I n a d d i t i o n t o C h i n e s e , E n g l i s h may a l s o be used i n organs o f
government and i n t h e c o u r t s i n t h e Hong Kong S p e c i a l A d m i n i s t r a -
t i v e Region.
A p a r t f r o m d i s p l a y i n g t h e n a t i o n a l f l a g and n a t i o n a l emblem o f
t h e P e o p l e ' s R e p u b l i c o f C h i n a , t h e Hong Kong S p e c i a l A d m i n i s t r a -
t i v e Region may use a r e g i o n a l f l a g and emblem o f i t s own.
II. After the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administra-
tive Region, the laws previously in force in Hong Kong (i.e. the
common l a w , r u l e s o f e q u i t y , o r d i n a n c e s , s u b o r d i n a t e l e g i s l a t i o n
and customary law) s h a l l be m a i n t a i n e d , save f o r any t h a t c o n t r a -
vene t h e B a s i c Law and s u b j e c t t o any amendment by t h e Hong Kong
S p e c i a l A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Region l e g i s l a t u r e .
The l e g i s l a t i v e power o f t h e Hong Kong S p e c i a l A d m i n i s t r a t i v e
Region s h a l l be v e s t e d i n t h e l e g i s l a t u r e o f t h e Hong Kong Spe-
c i a l A d m i n i s t r a t i v e R e g i o n . The l e g i s l a t u r e may on i t s own a u t h o -
r i t y e n a c t laws i n accordance w i t h t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e B a s i c
Law and l e g a l p r o c e d u r e s , and r e p o r t them t o t h e S t a n d i n g Commit-
t e e o f t h e N a t i o n a l P e o p l e ' s Congress f o r t h e r e c o r d . Laws enac-
t e d by t h e l e g i s l a t u r e which a r e i n accordance w i t h t h e Basic Law
and l e g a l p r o c e d u r e s s h a l l be regarded as v a l i d . . . .
[The laws of the S.A.R., laws previously enacted in H.K and subsequen-
t l y enacted by the S.A.R. legislature, would be the Basic Law. §111. The
j u d i c i a l system previously practised would be maintained. The Courts
would be independent and free from interference and would divide cases
according to S.A.R. law and common law. Judges would be chosen for t h e i r
j u d i c i a l q u a l i t i e s and be appointed by the chief executive of the S.A.R.
on recommendations of an Independent commission. Final appeal would be
to the court of f i n a l appeal in the S.A.R. As previously the S.A.R.
Government would provide for local lawyers and those outside the S.A.R.
to work and practice in H.K. §IV. Public servants, police and judges
would continue in employment and a l l pensions, allowances and benefits
would be paid. While B r i t i s h and foreign nationals would not head major
government departments and the police, they could be recruited and could
advise departments. The previous system of appointment and promotion on
the basis of q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , experience and a b i l i t y would be maintained.
§V. 'The S.A.R. would deal with i t s own finances, resources, budgets and
accounts. The Central People's Government would not levy taxes in the
S.A.R., nor would H.K. revenues be handed over to the Central Government.
§VI. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall maintain the capi-
talist economic and trade systems previously practised in Hong Kong....
[ I t ] shall decide i t s economic and trade policies on i t s o w n . . . . ' [Rights
 356

concerning the ownership, acquisition, use, disposal, inheritance and

compensation for lawful deprivation, of land would continue to be protec-
ted by law. The S.A.R.] ' s h a l l retain the status of a free port and con-
tinue a free trade policy, including the free movement of goods and capi-
t a l . . . [and] may on i t s own maintain and develop economic and trade r e l a -
tions with a l l states and regions. The Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region shall be a separate customs u n i o n . . . . ' [enabled t o participate 1n
relevant international organisations and trade t r e a t i e s , such as G.A.T.T.
to enjoy exclusive preferences and quotas negotiated by the S.A.R., and
to establish economic and trade missions in foreign countries]. §VII. I t
would retain i t s status as an international finance centre and decide i t s
own monetary and financial policies without any exchange controls. The
H.K. dollar would continue as the local legal tender, managed by the H.K.
Exchange Fund. § V I I I . The previous system of shipping management would
be maintained and a l l but foreign warships would have free access to the
S.A.R. ports. §IX. The S.A.R. would retain i t s status as a centre for
international and regional a v i a t i o n , with i t s own a i r c r a f t register,
subject to the arrangements made by the Central People's Government for
f l i g h t s to other parts of China. §X. The H.K. educational system would
continue; the S.A.R. would on i t s own decide i t s p o l i c i e s , exams, awards
and recruit s t a f f . ]

XI. S u b j e c t t o t h e p r i n c i p l e t h a t f o r e i g n a f f a i r s a r e t h e r e s p o n -
s i b i l i t y o f t h e C e n t r a l P e o p l e ' s Government, r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f
t h e Hong Kong S p e c i a l A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Region Government may p a r t i -
c i p a t e , as members o f d e l e g a t i o n s o f t h e Government o f t h e Peop-
l e ' s Republic of China, in n e g o t i a t i o n s at the d i p l o m a t i c level
d i r e c t l y a f f e c t i n g t h e Hong Kong S p e c i a l A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Region
c o n d u c t e d by t h e C e n t r a l P e o p l e ' s Government. The Hong Kong
S p e c i a l A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Region may on i t s own, u s i n g t h e name,
'Hong Kong, China, ' m a i n t a i n and d e v e l o p r e l a t i o n s and c o n c l u d e
and implement agreements w i t h s t a t e s , r e g i o n s and r e l e v a n t i n t e r -
national organisations in the appropriate f i e l d s , including the
economic, t r a d e , f i n a n c i a l and m o n e t a r y , s h i p p i n g , communica-
t i o n s , t o u r i s t i c , c u l t u r a l and s p o r t i n g f i e l d s . . . .
[S.A.R. representatives as members of the Chinese Government delegation
might participate in appropriate organisations and conferences, and with
the permission of the Chinese Government, might express t h e i r views in
the name of 'Hong Kong, China'. The application of international agree-
ments to which China was a party would be decided by the Chinese Govern-
ment, but the Chinese Government might permit the S.A.R. to continue to
Implement agreements to which China was not a party and would, where
necessary, f a c i l i t a t e that continued p a r t i c i p a t i o n . With the approval of
the Chinese Government foreign consular missions with formal diplomatic
relations with China, might be established in the S.A.R. The U.K. might
establish a Consulate General in the S.A.R.
§XII. The H.K.S.A.R. would be responsible for i t s own maintenance of
public order and Chinese Government forces stationed in H.K for defence
and paid for by the Chinese Government would not interfere in the i n t e r -
nal a f f a i r s of the S.A.R.]

XIII. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government

s h a l l p r o t e c t t h e r i g h t s and freedoms o f i n h a b i t a n t s and o t h e r
persons i n t h e Hong Kong S p e c i a l A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Region a c c o r d i n g
t o l a w . . . [ I t ] s h a l l m a i n t a i n t h e r i g h t s and freedoms as p r o v i d e d
f o r by t h e laws p r e v i o u s l y i n f o r c e i n Hong Kong, i n c l u d i n g f r e e -
 357
dom of the person, of speech, of the press, of assembly, of A s s o -
ciation, to form and join trade unions, of correspondence, of
travel, of movement, of strike, of demonstration, of choice of
occupation, of academic research, of belief, inviolability of the
home, the freedom to marry and the right to raise a family free-
ly.... [All should be guaranteed the right to confidential legal advice and
judicial remedies and access to the courts and appeals against executive
action. Religious organisations, schools and hospitals would maintain
their status and suffer no subordination nor Interference from similar
bodies in China. International Covenants on civil and political rights
and on economic, social, and cultural rights as applied to H.K. would
continue in force. §XIV guaranteed the rights of abode, for those Chinese
or non-Chinese who had resided continuously for 7 years in H.K.; it pro-
vided for Chinese passports to all S.A.R. citizens, for travel, for immi-
gration controls for those from other parts of China, and for freedom to
leave the S.A.R.
Annex II provided for a Sino-British Joint Liaison Group 'to continue
their discussions in a friendly spirit and to develop the co-operative
relationship which already exists between the two Governments over Hong
Kong with a view to the effective implementation of the Joint Declarat-
ion'. It envisaged two periods before 1 July 1997 - in the first the
objective being the maintenance of H.K. 's economic position as a separate
customs territory (e.g. in relation to G.A.T.T. and the application of
international rights and obligations to H.K.); in the second closer co-
operation to enable the smooth transition in 1997 and assistance for the
S.A.R. to develop economic and cultural relations and agreements with
states, regions and international organisations. The Liaison Group was
an organ for liaison, not of power: it would play no part or supervisory
roll in the administration of H.K. or the S.A.R.: it might consist of a
representative of ambassadorial rank, 4 other members and 20 supporting
staff for each side, and would continue working till 1 Jan. 2000, meeting
in confidence once a year at least in Beijing, London and H.K. Annex III
dealt with Land Leases expiring no later than 30 June 2047 and the imme-
diate establishment of a Land Commission until 30 June 1997.
There was also an exchange of memoranda. The U.K. government recognised
that those holding British Dependent Territories citizenship would cease
to be so from 1 July 1997 but would be eligible 'to retain an appropriate
status which, without conferring the right of abode 1n the United King-
dom, will entitle them to continue to use passports' issued by H.M.'s G.
if issued before 1 July 1997. The Chinese memo, declared that whether
holders of the B.D.T.C. passport or not, all were Chinese nationals but
could use such documents on foreign travel but would have no British con-
sular protection in the S.A.R. or in China. The white paper concluded
with explanatory notes on each Annex and section.]1

1. But even before the Tianamen Square massacre of June 1989 there were grow-
ing doubts whether in practice China could be trusted to abide by the agree-
ment after 1997. There were fears of interference, intrusion and intolerance
from Beijing and governors and the F.C.O. seemed too deferential and too ready
to appease the P.R.C. and reluctant to play the strong card which the H.K.
economic miracle seemed to provide. There was a slow exodus, a brain drain.
On the other hand the F.C.O. felt bound by the need to secure China's consent
to every move, notably on democratisation, in the belief that in the long run
H.K. could be best protected by not offending the P.R.C. The joint liaison
group in fact aborted U.K. initiatives and vetoed all moves by demanding a
358

111. THE DEVELOPMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT; THE WAY FORWARD,

F e b r u a r y 1988 1
2. Hong Kong has evolved over the years a system of government
which d i f f e r s from those elsewhere i n the w o r l d . This has r e f l e c -
ted the special circumstances of Hong Kong, i n c l u d i n g i t s s t a t u s
as a non-sovereign t e r r i t o r y ; i t s small area w i t h a l a r g e , r a p i d -
l y growing and i n c r e a s i n g l y educated p o p u l a t i o n ; i t s f a s t pace
of economic and s o c i a l development; and i t s p o s i t i o n as a major
business and f i n a n c i a l c e n t r e . These f a c t o r s have required the
Government t o develop the system of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n t o meet the
growing needs and expectations of society, while maintaining
p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y , economic p r o s p e r i t y and e f f e c t i v e adminis-
tration.
3. This requirement continues t o shape the Government's t h i n k -
ing on the system of government. The system has t o evolve as Hong
Kong s o c i e t y develops, so as t o ensure t h a t the Government c o n t i -
nues t o have the support of the community. At the same t i m e , the
need t o maintain s t a b i l i t y and p r o s p e r i t y under an e f f e c t i v e ad-
m i n i s t r a t i o n remains as strong as ever.
4. These c o n s i d e r a t i o n s p o i n t towards the value of developing
a more r e p r e s e n t a t i v e system, so as t o improve the responsiveness
of the Government t o s o c i e t y ' s needs. I t should also be r e c o g n i -
sed t h a t Hong Kong's s t a b i l i t y and p r o s p e r i t y owe much t o c o n s i s -

p r o c r a s t i n a t i n g discussion. The basic law when published in 1990 l e f t law to

be i n t e r p r e t e d by the People's Congress, not by the j u d i c i a r y . The China News
Agency, a de facto Chinese embassy, kept files on individual H.K. leaders and
in January 1992 the appointment by the P.R.C. of local ' c o n s u l t a n t s ' showed
the determination to rule through i t s nominees not the e l e c t e d r e p r e s e n t a -
t i v e s , as i t had a l s o warned the governor not to appoint elected l e g i s l a t i v e
c o u n c i l l o r s to h i s executive. The i n t e r n a t i o n a l commission of j u r i s t s in April
1992 noted t h a t H.K. had been denied the r i g h t of s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n , i t s
people had been given no referendum before the d e c l a r a t i o n was signed, no pro-
v i s i o n was made for the chief executive t o be elected and accountable to t h e
people of H.K., and B r i t i s h dependent t e r r i t o r i e s c i t i z e n s had not been given
the r i g h t of abode in the U.K. The P.R.C. spoke often of i t s policy of *one
country, two systems' but used i t s influence t o l i m i t autonomy and p r o t e s t e d
strongly t h a t t e n t a t i v e moves towards democratisation were contrary t o the d e -
c l a r a t i o n and the basic law. Nevertheless in 1991 there were the f i r s t d i r e c t
e l e c t i o n s to the l e g i s l a t i v e council - 18 out of 60 s e a t s - and in 1995 t h e
e l e c t o r a t e was considerably widened to 2m. v o t e r s . However Chris Patten (go-
vernor 1992-7) managed t o secure these limited reforms by comparatively small
m a j o r i t i e s in the l e g i s l a t i v e council, the majority of nominees being alarmed
a t P.R.C. t h r e a t s and p r e f e r r i n g opulence t o democracy [Vol.VII p . 3 9 4 ] .
1. A H.K. government white paper. By 1987 t h e P.R.C. had made i t c l e a r t h a t
d i r e c t e l e c t i o n s as promised for 1988 would be unacceptable. But the H.K.
government was s t i l l committed. As a compromise i t was agreed to assess public
opinion and a s p e c i a l office was e s t a b l i s h e d t o do so. But the i d e n t i c a l p r i n -
ted l e t t e r s opposing d i r e c t e l e c t i o n s organised by the P.R.C. - front o r g a n i -
s a t i o n s were regarded by the office as individual submissions, while p e t i t i o n s
with many s i g n a t u r e s (backed by i d e n t i t y card numbers) c o l l e c t e d on the s t r e -
e t s by pro-democratic supporters were considered only as * s i n g l e submission'.
The o f f i c e was able to avoid confrontation with the P.R.C. by concluding t h a t
a majority might prefer d i r e c t e l e c t i o n s but not in 1988. They were delayed
t i l l 1991 when 18 s e a t s were d i r e c t l y e l e c t e d .
 359
tent policies and prudent development. This points to the need
to evolve gradually from the unique system that has served Hong
Kong well until now, and not to force the pace of reform to an
extent that might introduce instability and uncertainty into the
administration of the territory. In this connexion, it is parti-
cularly important that the people of Hong Kong should have confi-
dence in the system of government during the period leading up
to the restoration of Hong Kong to China in 1997, and in contin-
uity after 1997 when Hong Kong will be a Special Administrative
Region of the People's Republic of China.
5. The Government's objectives with regard to the system of
representative government in Hong Kong are therefore as follows:
(a) that it should continue to evolve to suit Hong Kong's
circumstances;
(b) that its development should be prudent and gradual;
(c) that any reforms should have the widest possible support
so as to command the confidence of the community as a whole; and
(d) that the system in place before 1997 should permit a smooth
transition in 1997 and a high degree of continuity thereafter.1

112. DOUGLAS HURD TO QIAN QICHEW, 12 February 19902

As you know, I attach great importance to achieving an under-
standing between our two Governments on Hong Kong's future poli-
tical structure and to re-establishing the atmosphere of mutual
trust in which our two Governments have worked together in the
past to promote Hong Kong's stability and prosperity. I recognise
that the Chinese government have approached this matter in the
same spirit and have made serious efforts to identify a mutually
satisfactory way forward.
Against this background, I am now prepared to confirm an under-
standing with the Chinese Government on the following lines. If
the final version of the Basic Law provides for 20 directly elec-
ted seats in the SAR (Special Administrative Region) legislature
in 1997, 24 in 1999, and 30 in 2003, the British Government will
be prepared to limit to 18 the number of directly elected seats
to be introduced in 1991.
You will, however, be aware from my previous messages that this
rate of progress in introducing directly elected seats would not
be as rapid a many people in Hong Kong or we ourselves would have
liked. I therefore very much hope that as you observe the 1991
legislature in operation you will come to share our view that a
faster pace would be both manageable and desirable, and that, by
agreement with you, an appropriate increase might be made in 1995
to create a steeper slope which could continue after 1997. On
this basis, I propose at this stage to confine myself to saying,
as far as 1995 is concerned, that there will be no fewer than 20
seats in the legislature. But you may be sure that the British
Government will continue to recognise the advantage of continuity

1. As a consequence only minor reforms to the legislative council were made

in 1988 - the reduction of nominated members from 22 to 20 and with the
balance (2 seats) filled by functional constituencies. The introduction of
direct elections was deferred till 1991.
2. The British foreign secretary was writing to his opposite number in the
People's Republic of China.
360

between arrangements before and a f t e r 1997.

113. THE BASIC LAW OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 4 A p r i l 19901
[Hong Kong had been part of the t e r r i t o r y of China since ancient times;
i t was occupied by B r i t a i n a f t e r the Opium War in 1840. In accordance
with the Joint Declaration of December 1984, on 1 July 1997 'the long-
cherished common aspiration of the Chinese people f o r the recovery of
Hong Kong would be f u l f i l l e d by the P.R.C. resuming the exercise of
sovereignty'.]
U p h o l d i n g n a t i o n a l u n i t y and t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y , m a i n t a i n i n g
t h e p r o s p e r i t y and s t a b i l i t y o f Hong Kong, and t a k i n g a c c o u n t o f
i t s h i s t o r y and r e a l i t i e s , t h e P e o p l e ' s R e p u b l i c o f C h i n a has d e -
c i d e d t h a t , upon C h i n a ' s r e s u m p t i o n o f t h e e x e r c i s e o f s o v e r e i g -
n t y o v e r Hong Kong, a Hong Kong S p e c i a l A d m i n i s t r a t i v e R e g i o n
w i l l be e s t a b l i s h e d i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f A r t i c l e
31 o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n o f t h e P e o p l e ' s R e p u b l i c o f C h i n a , and
u n d e r t h e p r i n c i p l e o f ' o n e c o u n t r y , two s y s t e m s ' , t h e s o c i a l i s t
system and policies will not be practised in Hong Kong.2 The
b a s i c p o l i c i e s o f t h e P e o p l e ' s R e p u b l i c o f C h i n a r e g a r d i n g Hong
Kong h a v e been e l a b o r a t e d by t h e C h i n e s e Government i n t h e S i n o -
British Joint Declaration....
[Accordingly the National People's Congress herewith enacted the Basic
Law of the H.K.S.A.R., proscribing the systems to be practised there to
ensure the basic p o l i c i e s of the P.R.C. regarding H.K.]
Chapter 1. General principles.

1. Adopted by the 7th National People's Congress of the P.R.C. - 3rd s e s s . and
promulgated on signature of Yang Shangkum, the p r e s i d e n t , to be put i n t o ef-
fect on 1 July 1997 when H.K. became a s p e c i a l a d m i n i s t r a t i v e region of China.
The National People's Congress would in 1996 e s t a b l i s h a preparatory committee
for the S.A.R. to provide for the f i r s t government and l e g i s l a t i v e council.
H.K. was guaranteed no l e s s than 50% membership of t h i s preparatory committee;
a l l members of the s e l e c t i o n committee must be permanent r e s i d e n t s and would
include H.K. deputies to the N.P.C., H.K. members of the National Chinese
p e o p l e ' s p o l i t i c a l c o n s u l t a t i v e committee and persons with p r a c t i c a l experien-
ce of H.K.'s executive, l e g i s l a t i v e and advisory governments; a q u a r t e r would
represent the i n d u s t r i a l , commercial and f i n a n c i a l s e c t o r s , another the p r o -
f e s s i o n s , another ^labour, grass r o o t s , r e l i g i o n s and other s e c t o r s ' , and the
f i n a l q u a r t e r former p o l i t i c a l f i g u r e s , H.K. deputies to the N.P.C. and H.K.
members of the n a t i o n a l committee of the Chinese p e o p l e ' s c o n s u l t a t i v e commit-
t e e . This body would choose the chief executive and the f i r s t 2 year l e g i s l a t -
ive council of 60 members would have 20 from geographical c o n s t i t u e n c i e s d i -
r e c t l y e l e c t e d , 10 returned by an e l e c t i o n committee, and 30 returned by func-
t i o n a l c o n s t i t u e n c i e s . If the composition of the l a s t H.K. l e g i s l a t i v e council
conformed to the Basic Law and members pledged a l l e g i a n c e to the S.A.R. they
might be confirmed by the preparatory committee, to become members of the
f i r s t l e g i s l a t i v e council of the S.A.R. - t h a t was the c a r r o t !
2. Indeed t h e r e was a strong argument t h a t if China's s o c i a l i s t system was
abolished, Hong Kong's special p o s i t i o n and p r o s p e r i t y would be ruined: but
f
a strong s o c i a l i s t China needed a c a p i t a l i s t Hong Kong' and vice versa:
China's cheap labour had enriched H.K.'s investment: H.K. would remain, if
c a p i t a l i s t , a bridge to a t t r a c t foreign funds, science and technology. After
the a b s o r p t i a n of H.K. into China - a f i r s t s t e p at u n i f i c a t i o n - would come
Macao and the more complex problem of Taiwan.
 361

Art. 1. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Regions is an

i n a l i e n a b l e p a r t of the People's Republic of China.
Art. 2. The National People's Congress authorises the Hong Kong
S p e c i a l A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Region t o e x e r c i s e a h i g h degree o f a u t o -
nomy and e n j o y e x e c u t i v e , l e g i s l a t i v e and independent j u d i c i a l
power, i n c l u d i n g t h a t o f f i n a l a d j u d i c a t i o n , i n accordance w i t h
the p r o v i s i o n s of t h i s L a w . . . .
[Executive and l e g i s l a t i v e power would be exercised by permanent H.K.
residents; t h e i r freedoms and rights would be safeguarded (3, 4 ) . ]
Art. 5. The socialist system and policies shall not be practised
i n t h e Hong Kong S p e c i a l A d m i n i s t r a t i v e R e g i o n , and t h e p r e v i o u s
c a p i t a l i s t system and way o f l i f e s h a l l remain unchanged f o r 50
y e a r s . . . . [The right of private ownership of property 1n accordance with
law would be protected (6). The land and natural resources within the
S.A.R. would be State property under the management, use and development
of the S.A.R. Government, the revenues deriving therefrom would be exclu-
sively at the disposal of the S.A.R.'s Government (7). The existing com-
mon law, rules of equity, ordinances, subordinate l e g i s l a t i o n and custo-
mary law would be maintained subject to amendment by the S.A.R.'s l e g i -
slature (8). In addition to Chinese, English might be used as an o f f i c i a l
language (9). In addition to the national f l a g and emblem of the P.R.C,
the S.A.R. might use a regional f l a g and emblem with 'Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China' in Chinese and
/Hong Kong' in English (10).]
Art. 11 . In accordance with Article 31 of the Constitution of the
P e o p l e ' s R e p u b l i c o f C h i n a , t h e systems and p o l i c i e s p r a c t i s e d
i n t h e Hong Kong S p e c i a l A d m i n i s t r a t i v e R e g i o n , i n c l u d i n g t h e
s o c i a l and economic s y s t e m s , t h e system f o r s a f e g u a r d i n g t h e
fundamental r i g h t s and freedoms o f i t s r e s i d e n t s , t h e e x e c u t i v e ,
l e g i s l a t i v e and j u d i c i a l s y s t e m s , and t h e r e l e v a n t p o l i c i e s ,
s h a l l be based on t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h i s Law. No law e n a c t e d by
t h e l e g i s l a t u r e o f t h e Hong Kong S p e c i a l A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Region
s h a l l contravene t h i s L a w . . . .
[Chapter I I dealt with the relationship between the Central Authorities
and the S.A.R. The H.K.S.A.R. would be a local administrative region of
the P.R.C, enjoying 'a high degree of autonomy.. . d i r e c t l y under the Cen-
t r a l People's Government (12). The Central People's Government would be
responsible for the foreign a f f a i r s of the S.A.R. with an o f f i c e of the
P.R.C ministry of foreign a f f a i r s established in H.K. The S.A.R. might
be authorised to conduct relevant external a f f a i r s on i t s own in accor-
dance with t h i s law (13). The Central People's Government would be res-
ponsible for the defence of the S.A.R., but the government of the S.A.R.
would be responsible for the maintenance of order in the Region. Central
Government forces stationed in the S.A.R. would not interfere in the Re-
gion's local a f f a i r s , though the S.A.R. Government could ask for assis-
tance in the maintenance of public order and disaster r e l i e f . The Central
Government would bear the expenses for the garrison (14). The Chief Exe-
cutive and principal o f f i c i a l s of the S.A.R. would be appointed by the
Central People's Government (15). The S.A.R. would be vested with legis-
l a t i v e power and laws passed must be reported to the standing committee
of the National People's Congress which could invalidate them if ultra
vires or not conforming to the provisions relating to the relationship
(Ch-III:17). Chinese national laws (save those in Annex I I I relating to
f l a g , calendar, and anthem of the P.R.C, i t s national day, and emblem,
n a t i o n a l i t y , t e r r i t o r i a l - j u r i s d i c t i o n and diplomatic privileges and any
additions made after consultation with the S.A.R. government, particular-
 362

or emergency the Central Government could impose relevant national laws

on the S.A.R. (18).]
Art. 19. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be
vested with independent judicial power, including that of final
adjudication. . . . [the courts in the S.A.R. would retain jurisdiction over
all cases (save over Acts of state e.g. defence and foreign affairs) and
except where limited by the previous legal system and principles. The
National People's Congress, Its standing committee and the Central
People's Government might grant further powers to the S.A.R. (20).
Chinese citizens resident 1n the S.A.R. were entitled, within the pro-
vision for the assigned seat and for selection methods prescribed, to
participate In the management of state affairs (21).]
Art. 22. No department of the Central People's Government and no
province, autonomous region, or municipality directly under the
Central Government may interfere in the affairs which the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region on its own in accordance with
this Law. . . . [but with the consent of the S.A.R.'s government and the Cent-
ral People's Government they could set up office there which must abide
by the Region's laws. The Central People's Government in consultation
with that of the S.A.R. would control applications for entry from other
parts of China. The S.A.R. might have an office in Beijing. The S.A.R.
should enact its own laws to prohibit treason &c., the theft of state
secrets, foreign political organisations and activities (23).
Chapter III detailed the fundamental rights and duties of residents -
permanent and non-permanent as defined - equality before the law, fran-
chise, freedom of speech, publication, assembly, association and demonst-
ration: freedom of persons, household, communication, movement and tra-
vel, freedom of conscience: freedom to choose occupation, research and
creation: freedom of marriage and of access to courts (incl. redress for
acts of the executive), right to social welfare. International covenants
on civil, political, economic, social, cultural and labour rights would
continue to apply. The traditional rights of N.T. inhabitants would be
protected (24-42).]

Chapter IV - Political Structure

Section 1. The Chief Executive

Art. 43. The Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administra-
tive Region shall be head of the Hong Kong Special Administration
Region and shall represent the R e g i o n . . . [ H e ] shall be accountable
to the Central People's Government and the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region in accordance with the provisions of this
Law. . .. [He must be a Chinese citizen over 40, permanently resident 1n H.K.
and having resided there continuously for over 20 years (44). He would
be selected by elections or consultations locally and be appointed by the
Central People's Government] The method for selecting the Chief
Executive shall be specified in the light of the actual situation
in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and in accordance
with the principle of gradual and orderly progress. The ultimate
aim is the selection of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage
upon nomination by a broadly representative nominating committee
in accordance with democratic procedures. ... [Annex I prescribed the
method of selection. The Election Committee of 800 would be composed of
200 members from the industrial, commercial and financial sectors, 200
from the professions, 200 from labour, religious and social service
sectors and 200 from the Legislative Council, district organisations, and
 363

H.K. deputies to the National People's Congress and the National Commit-
tee of the Chinese People's P o l i t i c a l consultative conference: a l l
appointed for 5 years. A H.K. electoral law would prescribe the various
sectors and d i s t r i b u t i o n of seats. Candidates would be nominated by at
least 100 members. The committee would elect by secret b a l l o t . Any change
in the method of selection post-2007 would require a two-thirds majority
of a l l Legislative Councillors and the consent of the Chief Executive.]
Art. 46. The term of office. . .shall be five years. He or she may
s e r v e f o r n o t more t h a n two c o n s e c u t i v e t e r m s . . . . [and must be a
person of i n t e g r i t y dedicated to the duties.]
Art. 48. The Chief Executive...shall exercise the following
powers and f u n c t i o n s : ( 1 ) t o l e a d t h e government o f t h e R e g i o n :
( 2 ) t o be r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f t h i s Law and
o t h e r laws w h i c h , i n accordance w i t h t h i s Law, a p p l y t o t h e Hong
Kong S p e c i a l A d m i n i s t r a t i v e R e g i o n : ( 3 ) t o s i g n b i l l s passed by
t h e L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l and t o p r o m u l g a t e l a w s ; t o s i g n budgets
by t h e L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l and r e p o r t t h e budgets and f i n a l
a c c o u n t s t o t h e C e n t r a l P e o p l e ' s Government f o r r e c o r d : ( 4 ) t o
d e c i d e on government p o l i c i e s and t o i s s u e e x e c u t i v e o r d e r s : ( 5 )
t o nominate and r e p o r t t o t h e C e n t r a l P e o p l e ' s Government f o r
a p p o i n t m e n t , and r e m o v a l , o f a l l p r i n c i p a l d e p a r t m e n t a l s e c r e -
t a r i e s [and deputies, bureaux directors, commissioners against corruption,
for police, for customs and excise, directors of audit and of immigration]:
( 6 ) t o a p p o i n t and remove j u d g e s . . . : ( 7 ) t o a p p o i n t and remove
h o l d e r s o f p u b l i c o f f i c e . . . : ( 8 ) t o implement t h e d i r e c t i o n s
i s s u e d by t h e C e n t r a l P e o p l e ' s G o v e r n m e n t . . . : ( 9 ) t o conduct on
b e h a l f o f t h e Hong Kong S p e c i a l A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Region e x t e r n a l
a f f a i r s and o t h e r s as a u t h o r i s e d by t h e C e n t r a l A u t h o r i t i e s : ( 1 0 )
t o approve t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f m o t i o n s r e g a r d i n g revenues o r
e x p e n d i t u r e t o t h e L e g i s l a t i v e Counci 1 . . . [(11) to decide in the l i g h t
of security and v i t a l public interests whether o f f i c i a l s should t e s t i f y
before the Legislative Council or I t s committees]: (12) to pardon or
commute: (13) to handle petitions and complaints. He might delay b i l l s
for reconsideration by the Legislative Council but, i f passed again by
a two-thirds majority, he must sign them. (49) He might dissolve the
Legislative Council once only in his term i f the Council refused a budget
or other important b i l l . (50) He must resign i f he could not discharge
his duties or when after a new Council was installed and the Chief
Executive refused to approve a b i l l passed by two-thirds majority there-
i n , or i f the new Council s t i l l refused to pass the original b i l l . (52)
He would be assisted by an Executive Council (54) appointed by himself
from the principal departmental o f f i c i a l s and Legislative Councillors.
I f he did not accept i t s majority opinion he must put his reasons on
record. (56) The executive authorised would include departments of
administration, finance and j u s t i c e and various bureaux and commissions
(60) which would be empowered to formulate and implement policies, to
conduct administrative a f f a i r s , to conduct external a f f a i r s as authorised
by the Central People's Government, to draw up budgets and to draft
b i l l s , and to designate o f f i c i a l s to s i t and speak on behalf of the
S.A.R. government. (62) the government of the S.A.R. must observe the law
and be accountable to the Legislative Council, implement i t s laws, answer
i t s questions and obtain approval of i t s proposals for taxation and
expenditure (64).]
[Section 3. The Legislature. The Legislative Council would be the
legislature of the S.A.R.: composed of Chinese citizens and other
permanent residents, ultimately elected by universal suffrage - (Annex
 364
II prescribed the method for its formation. 60 members - in the second
term 30 returned by functional constituencies, 6 by the election
committee and 24 by direct election in geographical constituencies - and
in the third term half by the functional and half directly by the
geographical constituencies. The division of the geographical constitu-
encies and procedure for direct elections, for the functional and
corporate bodies would be specified by a S.A.R. electoral law; procedure
in the Council in relation to bills and motions would be passed by simple
majorities; for procedures after 2007 any amendment of the existing
system would be only by a two-thirds majority). The first Council would
last 2 years, subsequently all would be 4 yearly (69): it would elect its
president and, if dissolved, must be replaced within 3 months (70). The
president's duties and the Council's powers were defined (72, 73). Half
the councillors would constitute a quorum: the council would regulate its
own procedures: speeches in Council would be immune from legal action and
councillors would be immune from arrest on their way to or from meetings
(75-8). Reasons for disqualification from membership (incl. appointment
to government office) were listed.
Section 4. The Judiciary. Magistrates, districts, High and Final Appeal
courts would exercise judicial power in the S.A.R. - the pre-existing
system, with an additional Court of Final Appeal, would continue and
common law precedents would apply.]
Art. 85. The courts of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region shall exercise judicial power independently, free of any
interference. Members of the judiciary shall be immune from legal
action in the performance of their judicial f u n c t i o n s .
Art. 86. The principle of trial by jury, previously practised in
Hong Kong, shall be maintained. .. [and in civil and criminal proceedings
previous principles and rights by parties would continue. Fair trial
without delay and the presumption of Innocence till convicted would be
continued (87). Judges would be appointed by the Chief Executive on the
recommendation of an independent local commission: and be removed only
for inability or misbehaviour by a tribunal of local judges (88-89).
Existing judges could retain their posts or retire with pensions on no
less favourable terms than before (93).
Section 5. District organisations would have consultative and executive
functions.
Section 6. Public servants (incl. British and other foreign nationals in
post) could retain their offices, save that secretaries and deputy
secretaries of departments, director of bureaux, audit and immigration,
and commissioners of police, customs and excise and against corruption,
must be Chinese permanent residents. Promotion would be on the basis of
qualifications, experience and ability: oaths for all officers would be
to the Basic Law and allegiance to the S.A.R. of the P.R.C. (104). On the
Economy (Chap. V) - public finance, money, trade, industry and commerce
(Section 1) the right of property and fair and immediate compensation
were guaranteed; the S.A.R. would have independent finances to be used
exclusively for S.A.R. purposes; the C.P.G. should not tax the S.A.R.;
its government should be balanced and taxes would, as in H.K., be low;
the maintenance of its status as an international financial centre and
a free port would continue; the H.K. $ would remain legal tender and be
freely convertible and the S.A.R. would issue certificates of origin for
its produce: investment, technological progress, new industries would be
promoted (105-119): existing land leases would be extended: a separate
S.A.R. shipping register would be maintained and free access to shipping
and business. There were similar guarantees for civil aviation but the
 365

C.P.G. would have overall control of f l i g h t s over Chinese t e r r i t o r y (128-

135). On the basis of the existing educational system the S.A.R. would
develop i t s own policies in science, culture and sport: schools and
universities would retain t h e i r autonomy and academic freedom: western
and Chinese medicine (?) would be developed. Religious belief would not
be restricted and churches might retain t h e i r overseas contacts.]
Art. 148. The relationship between non-governmental organisations
i n f i e l d s such as e d u c a t i o n , s c i e n c e , t e c h n o l o g y , c u l t u r e , a r t ,
s p o r t s , t h e p r o f e s s i o n s , m e d i c i n e and h e a l t h , l a b o u r , s o c i a l
w e l f a r e and s o c i a l work as w e l l as r e l i g i o u s o r g a n i s a t i o n s i n t h e
Hong Kong S p e c i a l A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Region and t h e i r c o u n t e r p a r t s
i n t h e m a i n l a n d s h a l l be based on t h e p r i n c i p l e s o f n o n - s u b o r d i -
n a t i o n , n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e and mutual r e s p e c t . . . . [ I n External A f f a i r s
(Chap. VII) S.A.R. representatives might, as delegates of the P.R.C,
participate in diplomatic negotiations of C.P.G. affecting H.K. as 'Hong
Kong, China'. The P.R.C would determine whether international agreements
applied to the S.A.R. and authorise S.A.R. passports. In Chap. V I I I the
interpretation of the Basic Law was vested in the standing committee of
the National People's Congress and courts 1n the S.A.R. would follow i t s
decision (158, 159).]

114. LETTERS PATENT, June 19911

The provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, adopted by the General Assembly of the United
Nations on 16 December 1966 as applied to Hong Kong shall be
implemented through the laws of Hong Kong. No law of Hong Kong
shall be made after the coming into operation of the Hong Kong
Letters Patent 1991 (No.2) that restricts the rights and freedoms
enjoyed in Hong Kong in a manner which is inconsistent with that
Covenant as applied to Hong Kong.

115. GOVERNOR CHRISTOPHER PATTEN: SPEECH, 7 October 19922

[In preparing for H.K.'s future under the concept of 'one country, two

1. Stat.R. 1991. A bill of rights ordinance had been passed the same day in
an attempt to restore some confidence in H.K. after the vehement reactions to
the massacres in Tianamen Square in June 1989. It incorporated most of the
provisions of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(to which China was not a signatory) and made them justiciable in H.K. courts.
China expressed its reservations and announced its intention to review the
legislation after 1997. These letters patent sought to entrench the bill of
rights but like other British laws would cease to have unchallengeable effect
after 1997. However, since the Basic Law stipulated that the I.C.C.P.R. would
remain in force after 1997, it would be difficult to attack the bill of rights
on the grounds that it did not conform to Basic Law: §39 of the Basic Law
would have similar effect.
2. Leg. Co. Deb. 1992-3: Patten spoke on 'Our Next Five Years: the agenda for
H.K.' during the last years of British rule: so titled in the separate publi-
cation by the government printer. Patten, a former U.K. cabinet minister and
chairman of the victorious Conservative party, and with direct friendship with
the P.M. and foreign secretary could assume much greater initiative than was
usual for a colonial governor; but his position was, it was alleged, continu-
ally undermined by old Beijing hands in the F.C.O. who seemed, in trying to
appease the obdurate old men who ruled in China, to be negotiating, not for
the U.K. or the long term interests of the people of H.K., but for the Peo-
366
systems', the first concern must be to preserve H.K.'s way of life. - the
impressive material and cultural benefits which were founded on its sta-
bility and prosperity: its remarkable economic success derived from a
policy of 'minimum interference and maximum support' both in businesses
and in individual and family lives which would continue: as would the
guarantee for 'the rule of law with an independent judiciary enforcing
laws democratically enacted', an unremitting attack on crime and corrup-
tion, and the 'widest possible democratic participation of the people of
H.K. in the running of their own affairs'. The success of a free, compe-
titive economy run by business men, not politicians or officials, low and
predictable taxation and the control of government spending by economic
growth was central. Amid the 'trade wind' promising immense economic
revolution in Asia and the Pacific, there were dangers beyond control,
including U.S.A.-China trade relations, and a governor's advisory council
of distinguished business members of the H.K. community would help him
on sustaining economic growth, maximising potential at the heart of the
Asian economy and developing 'a comprehensive competition policy'. While
the H.K. government did not manage the economy or fix prices, wages and
profits, it had traditionally accepted a special responsibility for main-
taining a stable exchange rate linked with the U.S.$ which must be retai-
ned to preserve the stability of H.K. currency beyond 1997. To fight in-
flation monetary weapons could be used; so could improved efficiency,
savings, stoutly controlled expenditure, co-operation over increases in
wages. Nor would social security payments be permitted to be gnawed by
inflation. There was serious pressure on manpower with the workforce
growing far more slowly than the economy: there was great need for ret-
raining in education for productivity, particularly in the tertiary
sphere. There must be more teachers and smaller classes. The phenomenal
rate of building would continue. The new airport would confirm H.K. as
Asia's premier business city at the cross-roads and would relieve Kowloon
residents from having 'aircraft flying in and out of their laundry all
day': it was essential, it would not be financed at the expense of key
social programme but by loans raised on the world markets where the Multi
Transit Railway Company had won a worldwide reputation as a responsible
borrower. Delays over negotiations with China would raise costs.
H.K. was a territory thriving through hard work; it was not a welfare
state but a society which cared deeply about welfare and social responsi-

ple's Republic. Sir Percy Cradock, who had been ambassador to China (1978
-83), led the negotiating team from 1983 and he seemed to make it clear
from the first day that what was paramount was a peaceful transition,
whatever concessions had to be made. But Patten had to strike a balance
between the greater democracy which he and many in H.K. wanted and the
more restrictive approach which the P.R.C. demanded: after all the die
was cast and Beijing would be the rulers in 1997. In line with British
common law tradition that what was not prohibited by law was permitted,
he used the Basic Law as his parameter for his proposals. Though the let-
ter of that Law was not violated, it was debatable whether his proposals
did breach its spirit. The P.R.C. sought to argue that Patten's sincerity
was only a device to disguise his real conspiratorial designs. China ag-
reed temporarily to negotiate with Britain as to how Patten's proposals
could be modified. These discussions proved tortuous and towards the end
of 1993 the U.K. government broke off negotiations. The necessary instru-
ments for the replacement of all nominees on the district boards for the
September 1994 local elections had to be prepared and legislated upon.
 367

b i l i t y . Spending on welfare would be increased by 26% and on health care

by 22%: a new comprehensive social security assistance scheme would be
established; 4,200 additional hospital beds would be provided; waiting
time would be reduced. More owner-occupier housing would be b u i l t : an
average 100 new f l a t s a day would be b u i l t 'between now and 1997'; a new
middle class housing scheme f o r those with Incomes above the l i m i t s for
public housing but s t i l l unable to buy on the private market would be set
up.
The level of p o l l u t i o n had been f a r too high and must be tackled at
once 'the muck stops h e r e ' . A s i g n i f i c a n t beginning had been made in the
ten-year plan envisaged in 1989.
Law and order must be enforced: there must be more police on the
s t r e e t s , over smuggling there should be j o i n t consultation with P.R.C.
Corruption would continue to be tackled. The right to protest peacefully
must be balanced with the need of the police to uphold law. A code of
performance pledges with clear targets which would be monitored would be
adopted by a l l departments serving the community: freedom of the press
must be preserved; the commissioner f o r administrative complaints would
be able to investigate and publish his reports.]

The Constitutional package

The best guarantee of Hong Kong's p r o s p e r i t y f o r as f a r ahead
as any of us can see or envisage i s t o p r o t e c t our way of l i f e .
The c o n t i n u a t i o n of Hong Kong's way of l i f e i s a major concern
of the J o i n t D e c l a r a t i o n , which my predecessor, the l a t e S i r
Edward Youde, played such a prominent p a r t in n e g o t i a t i n g . An
i n t e g r a l p a r t of t h i s way of l i f e - of what i s c a l l e d our
'system' - i s the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l c i t i z e n s in the
conduct of Hong Kong's a f f a i r s . The pace a t which we broaden t h i s
p a r t i c i p a t i o n , and the bounds t o which we can extend i t , l i e a t
the h e a r t of much p u b l i c debate here and elsewhere. This
discussion about democracy in Hong Kong i s one on which I wish
to make my own b e l i e f s and o b j e c t i v e s c l e a r . The sooner we can
resolve the important issues a t stake in a way which s a t i s f i e s
our own community, and - I hope - our f r i e n d s in China and the
United Kingdom, the b e t t e r . But I begin w i t h the assumption t h a t
unless the people of Hong Kong are content w i t h the f i n a l o u t -
come, i t i s u n l i k e l y t o work as well as everyone, from here t o
Peking and London and back a g a i n , would s u r e l y wish.
I n the debate about the pace of d e m o c r a t i s a t i o n , t h e r e are two
sides. First, there are those who demand the maximum immediate
progress, appealing t o Hong Kong's obvious s o p h i s t i c a t i o n and
m a t u r i t y , whether measured in terms of economic achievement,
educational standards, or any other index of development. Second,
we have those who argue t h a t every s o c i e t y must develop i t s
democratic i n s t i t u t i o n s a t i t s own pace - t h a t t o f o r c e the pace
w i l l put a s t r a i n on our unique c o n s t i t u t i o n a l arrangements and
make convergence d i f f i c u l t in 1 9 9 7 . . . .
[He quoted Sir Isaiah Berlin's description of representative democracy
that 'the promotion of social justice and individual liberty does not
necessarily mean the end of a l l efficient government, that power and
order are not identical with a straitjacket of doctrine, whether economic
or political; that i t 1s possible to reconcile Individual liberty - a
loose texture of society - with the Indispensable minimum of organising
and authority'. These opinions had to be applied to H.K. where 'the ink
of international agreements and the implacable realities of history,
 368

geography and economics' necessarily shaped and constrained the pace of

democratisation, as the people of H.K. understood better than those who
wished them to become 'the heroic pawns' of their well-meaning preconcep-
tions. But, i f constrained i t had not stopped dead.]
There a r e , of course, those who say t h a t whatever may happen
elsewhere, Hong Kong, doesn't need any f u r t h e r p o l i t i c a l develop-
ment. They o f t e n make an impressive case. The T e r r i t o r y i s
already honestly and decently governed. I t s economy f l o u r i s h e s .
Personal freedoms are extensive by any standards. While I
recognise the special nature of Hong Kong's unique h i s t o r i c a l
experience, these arguments are a l l f o r standing s t i l l .
And standing s t i l l i s not an a v a i l a b l e o p t i o n . The Governments
of the United Kingdom and China have agreed in the J o i n t Decla-
r a t i o n t h a t democracy should be c a r r i e d forward w i t h a L e g i s l a -
t u r e c o n s t i t u t e d e n t i r e l y by e l e c t i o n s . The Basic Law provides
f o r a steady increase in the number of those d i r e c t l y elected t o
the L e g i s l a t u r e . I t does not v i s u a l i s e s t a g n a t i o n . What i s more,
and t h i s was doubtless recognised by those who d r a f t e d the Basic
Law, the community wants a greater measure of democracy. Whenever
the community i s asked, t h a t i s the answer i t g i v e s . . . . [Democracy
was indeed an essential element in pursuit of economic progress: i t
protected investors and rendered business safe from arbitrary and
whimsical political decisions. I t provided *a well tried system for a
mature and sophisticated people to have a say in how their community is
run and to t e l l those running i t without fear where and when they have
got i t wrong'.]
The ExCo-LegCo relationship
In t a c k l i n g c o n s t i t u t i o n a l development, there are some t h i n g s
we can change immediately i n order t o strengthen our representa-
t i v e i n s t i t u t i o n s . Other improvements are longer term and r e l a t e
p r i n c i p a l l y t o the 1995 e l e c t i o n s . These w i l l require discussions
w i t h the Chinese Government. They w i l l also need t o r e f l e c t the
views of the community and t o win the support of t h i s Council.
Let me begin w i t h those things we can and should do straightaway.
My i n t e n t i o n i s t o ensure t h a t we have vigorous and e f f e c t i v e
e x e c u t i v e - l e d Government t h a t i s properly accountable t o t h i s
L e g i s l a t i v e Council. I believe t h a t at the present stage of our
p o l i t i c a l development, there i s a danger of confusion and muddle
in t h e i r roles which w i l l both undermine the competence of the
Executive and i n h i b i t the e f f e c t i v e development of the L e g i s l a -
t u r e as an independent check on Government. Hong Kong has come
a long way i n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l terms i n the l a s t year. But, as I
have i m p l i e d , t h i s p o l i t i c a l development has cast doubt on the
r e l a t i o n s h i p between the Executive and L e g i s l a t i v e Councils. That
i s hardly s u r p r i s i n g . Since we have now embarked on the task of
c r e a t i n g a w h o l l y - e l e c t e d L e g i s l a t u r e , t h a t has i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r
the r o l e of the Executive Council. However, we should not lose
s i g h t of our p r i n c i p a l task. As the J o i n t Declaration and the
Basic Law both make p l a i n , i t i s the L e g i s l a t u r e which i s the
main c o n s t i t u t i o n a l element t h a t must be developed. That i s ,
t h e r e f o r e , my major c o n c e r n . . . .
[In the development of a changed and more representative legislature,
the questions arose as how the Executive Council and its advisory role
might be adjusted - by a complete separation of the members of both
Councils, or a coalition such as had been partly attempted after the 1991
 369
election when c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y and collective responsibility imposed on
the l e g i s l a t i v e councillors who were admitted to the Executive proved too
onerous and demanding. In the l a t t e r alternative the Executive might be-
come 'a mini-legco' but with a closed debate in contrast to the public
one in the Legislative Council. The balance of evidence was against any
overlapping membership: the separation of the councils to enable in the
Legislature the freedom of groups and parties to develop t h e i r programmes
and platforms in Legco without the constraints of membership of the
executive. In t h i s separation Patten paid t r i b u t e to those who would be
ceasing to be members of the Executive Council: H.K. owed them a debit
for attempting to f u l f i l the p o l i t i c a l obligations of c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y and
collective responsibility in dual membership.]

The New ExCo.

I i n t e n d t h e new E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l t o be a n o n - p a r t y p o l i t i c a l
body t o which I can l o o k f o r sound, i m p a r t i a l a d v i c e on t h e wide
range o f i s s u e s t h a t come b e f o r e t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n . I am, t h e r e -
f o r e , a p p o i n t i n g t o ExCo independent members o f t h e community,
d i s t i n g u i s h e d i n t h e i r own w a l k s o f l i f e , who can g i v e me a d v i c e
w i t h o u t the c o n f l i c t i n g l o y a l t i e s of a c t i v e day-to-day p o l i t i c a l
i n v o l v e m e n t . There w i l l a l s o be a number o f s e n i o r government
o f f i c i a l s on t h e C o u n c i l . I w i l l be announcing t h e members o f t h e
new C o u n c i l l a t e r t o d a y . I a l s o i n t e n d t h a t ExCo s h o u l d spend
more time on strategic issues, and less on the minutiae of gover-
nment, t h a n has r e c e n t l y been t h e c a s e . I s h a l l be a s k i n g i t s non
- o f f i c i a l Members f r o m t i m e t o t i m e t o d e v e l o p p o l i c i e s w i t h t h e
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n t h o s e f i e l d s where t h e y have p a r t i c u l a r e x p e r -
t i s e . Those w i l l be t h e p o l i c i e s which i t w i l l t h e n be t h e Admi-
n i s t r a t i o n ' s t a s k t o e x p l a i n t o t h i s C o u n c i l , and t o persuade
t h i s C o u n c i l t o adopt and d e v e l o p . What a c c o u n t a b i l i t y means i n
practice is creative dialogue between the Administration and you
- and t h a t i s t h e area t o which I n e x t t u r n .
S e p a r a t i n g t h e non-government membership o f t h e two C o u n c i l s
i m p l i e s t h a t LegCo must be l e f t f r e e t o run i t s own a f f a i r s a n d ,
i n the process, t o develop f u r t h e r i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the
Government. That i s t h e p o s i t i o n now l a i d down i n t h e Royal
I n s t r u c t i o n s , and wi 11 be t h e p o s i t i o n , s e t o u t i n A r t i c l e 75 o f
t h e B a s i c Law, i n t h e f u t u r e . . . .
[He would hand over the presidency of the Legislative Council as soon as
possible to a President elected from among the Legislative Councillors.
He would be answerable as head of the executive to the LegCo; would
answer members' questions at least once a month and would in addition
report major t r i p s abroad and developments where necessary. The new
l e g i s l a t i v e councillors would need clear and separate management of t h e i r
a f f a i r s and the o f f i c e of members of the executive and l e g i s l a t i v e
councils would be wound up. They had power to develop t h e i r own committee
structure to ensure the accountability of the Executive to the Legislat-
ive Council as provided in the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law. A
non-statutory Government-LegCo Committee would be set up to enable an
e f f i c i e n t relationship in which councillors would discuss with o f f i c i a l s
the administration's l e g i s l a t i v e and financial programmes, i t would be
chaired by himself or the Chief or Financial Secretary and the council-
lors would decide the members who would be invited. 1 ]

1. Unlike h i s proposals for the l e g i s l a t u r e , those for the executive were non-
370
The 1995 elections.
The reforms I have outlined will set the stage for the changes
which are needed for the 1995 elections. I know that many people
regard the key issue as being the number of directly-elected
seats.1 On present plans, this will rise from 1S to 20 in 1995,
and will increase at subsequent elections with the ultimate aim
of achieving a Council composed entirely of directly-elected Mem-
bers. For some time, it has been argued that we should seek to
quicken the pace of this development, and the British Government
has pledged to pursue this with the Chinese Government. Two weeks
ago, therefore, during their meeting in New York, the Secretary
of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs made the case to
the Chinese Foreign Minister for an expansion in the number of
Members of the 1995 Legislative Council to be chosen by direct
election. The Chinese position is that such a move would be
incompatible with the Basic Law and they have said that the Basic
Law cannot be changed before 1997.
The case for more directly elected seats in 1995 will continue
to be made with vigour. But this is not the only way of building
up democracy in Hong Kong. I am keen that we should explore in
parallel how to develop our representative institutions to the
maximum extent within the terms of the Joint Declaration and the
Basic Law. The Foreign Secretary told his opposite number, at the
New York meeting to which I referred earlier, what I have in
mind.
I want to emphasise that we have embarked upon these discus-
sions, begun by the Foreign Secretary in good faith and with a
view to demonstrating to our Chinese colleagues the benefits
which a more representative system will bring to Hong Kong. This
process will only succeed if Hong Kong's politicians display good
sense and restraint and demonstrate the substantial contribution
which greater democracy can make to the development of Hong Kong,
the well-being of its residents and the confidence of its
community.
Let us be clear why we are discussing with the Chinese Govern-
ment all these issues relating to the 1995 elections. The commun-
ity wants more representative government. But I think it is equ-
ally plain that a majority wants constitutional reforms to be
compatible, as far as possible, with the Basic Law and, accord-
ingly, to transcend 1997. I respect these views. At the same
time, we have to take account of the opinions of both the present
and the future sovereign powers. For this reason, the proposals
I am putting forward this afternoon will require serious discus-
sion with Peking.
It would be very easy diplomatically and, perhaps, politically,
to draw a line here and to declare that, in due course, this
Council will be informed of the outcome of the negotiations. I
have not been tempted, for one moment, to draw such a line. You
deserve better, and I believe my first duty is one of frankness
to this Council and to the community.
What I will therefore set out for you today is the broad shape

controversial and were implemented at once, 1. In September 1991 the number

of directly elected seats was 18: the figure had been set at 10 but was revi-
sed upwards after the Tiananmen massacre.
 371

o f t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g which I hope we can a c h i e v e b o t h w i t h i n t h e

community and w i t h t h e Chinese G o v e r n m e n t . . . .
[(1) The voting age would be reduced from 21 to 18. (2) The two-member
constituencies of the 1991 elections would be replaced by 'single vote,
single s e a t ' , as in the municipal and d i s t r i c t elections, in geographical
constituencies. (3) The 21 existing functional constituencies would be
revised to provide them with a broader based representation and 9 new
ones (including additional professional constituencies) created to
increase c r e d i b i l i t y by giving every working member of the community a
second member to represent his interest: indeed for these functional
constituencies corporate voting would be replaced by individuals who
owned or managed corporations or companies, or were o f f i c e holders in
trades unions. Altogether the franchise would thereby be expanded 5 times
to a l l e l i g i b l e workers - 2.7m.
Local administration would be strengthened by expanding the responsi-
b i l i t i e s , functions and budgets of the D i s t r i c t Boards, p a r t i c u l a r l y in
relation to environmental improvements, local public works and community
building. From 1994 with the exception of the ex officio members in the
New T e r r i t o r i e s , a l l d i s t r i c t councillors would be d i r e c t l y elected, and
on the two Municipal Councils a l l appointed seats would be abolished. An
independent Boundary and Election Commission would be set up to prepare
for the elections in 1995. The Election Committee required by the Basic
Law to elect 10 l e g i s l a t i v e councillors would be drawn e n t i r e l y from the
d i r e c t l y elected D i s t r i c t Boards.]
L e t me r e p e a t one s i m p l e p o i n t . What I have t r i e d t o do w i t h
t h e s e p r o p o s a l s i s t o meet two o b j e c t i v e s w h i c h I u n d e r s t a n d
r e p r e s e n t t h e v i e w s o f t h e community - t o e x t e n d democracy w h i l e
w o r k i n g w i t h i n t h e B a s i c Law. A l l t h e p r o p o s a l s I have o u t l i n e d
w o u l d , I b e l i e v e , be c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e B a s i c
Law. What t h e s e arrangements s h o u l d g i v e u s , t h e r e f o r e , i s a
' t h r o u g h t r a i n ' o f democracy r u n n i n g on t h e t r a c k s l a i d down by
the Basic L a w . . . .
[Much remained to be done before 1997. By then]
- our GDP per head w i l l have reached US $ 3 0 , 5 0 0 , comparable t o
I t a l i a n and Dutch n a t i o n a l income l e v e l s t o d a y , and w i t h i n 12 per
cent, o f F r a n c e ; - t h e v a l u e o f our t o t a l f o r e i g n t r a d e w i l l be
US $548 b i l l i o n , e q u i v a l e n t t o t h e t o t a l e x t e r n a l t r a d e o f France
t o d a y , and s u b s t a n t i a l l y more t h a n t h a t o f I t a l y and t h e N e t h e r -
l a n d s ; - we w i l l be s p e n d i n g a t t o d a y ' s p r i c e s $22 b i l l i o n a year
e d u c a t i n g our c h i l d r e n , $ 9 . 4 b i l l i o n a year h e l p i n g t h e d e p r i v e d ,
d i s a b l e d and d i s a d v a n t a g e d , $15.3 b i l l i o n a year p r o m o t i n g our
h e a l t h and t r e a t i n g d i s e a s e , and $ 1 . 4 b i l l i o n a year p r o t e c t i n g
the environment; - we should - if the will is there - have
constructed Asia's most modern airport, with a capacity on
opening of 35 million passengers a year and the potential for
e x p a n s i o n t o a c a p a c i t y o f 87 m i l l i o n passengers a y e a r ; and -
we w i l l have one o f t h e w o r l d ' s l a r g e s t c o n t a i n e r p o r t s , w i t h a
c a p a c i t y o f 9.2 m i l l i o n c o n t a i n e r s . We s h a l l be a community i n
w h i c h : - a l m o s t 6 o u t o f 10 f a m i l i e s own t h e i r own homes; -
a l m o s t one i n f i v e o f t h o s e aged 17 t o 20 w i l l be s t u d y i n g f o r
degrees.
This is what stability and prosperity are all about in
p r a c t i c a l t e r m s . T h i s i s what t h e Hong Kong way o f l i f e is
c a p a b l e o f d e l i v e r i n g , g i v e n mutual t r u s t and c o - o p e r a t i o n f r o m
a l 1 t h e p a r t i e s c o n c e r n e d . We a l l r e c o g n i s e t h e t r o u b l e d l e g a c y
o f h i s t o r y . We must move beyond t h e m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s i n h e r i t e d
372

f r o m t h e p a s t . My g o a l i n P e k i n g w i l l be t o p u s h f o r w a r d t h e p r o -
c e s s o f t r u s t . T h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p m u s t be b a s e d o n f r a n k d i s c u s -
sions of mutual d i f f i c u l t i e s i n order t o achieve s o l u t i o n s which
r e f l e c t o u r common g o a l s . I am c o n f i d e n t t h a t we c a n do s o b e -
c a u s e t h e C h i n e s e G o v e r n m e n t has shown a f i r m c o m m i t m e n t t o p r e -
s e r v i n g Hong Kong a s a u n i q u e c o m m u n i t y , a c o m m u n i t y w i t h m a j o r
contributions still to make to China's own development, at the
same time as it provides an increasingly attractive future for
i t s own p e o p l e .
I r e p e a t o n c e a g a i n o u r g o a l - ' o n e c o u n t r y , t w o s y s t e m s ' . What
d o e s t h a t mean i n p r a c t i c e ? I t means a p r o s p e r o u s C h i n a , made
more prosperous still by the contribution of a vigorous, tolerant
a n d o p e n Hong K o n g . We s h o u l d l o o k t o w a r d s t h e f i f t y y e a r s b e y o n d
1 9 9 7 . T h e y w i l l be e v e n m o r e s u c c e s s f u l t h a n t h e f i f t y t h a t w e n t
before. They will see our own system and our own way of life -
w h i c h y o u made a n d o f w h i c h a l l o f u s a r e p a r t - s u r v i v i n g a n d
f l o u r i s h i n g because i t w o r k s so w e l l , because i t embodies v a l u e s
we a l l h o l d d e a r , a n d b e c a u s e o f t h e e x a m p l e o f d e c e n c y a n d s u c -
cess that it offers to the rest of humanity.1

116. RESOLUTION OF THE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S STANDING COMMITTEE,

31 August 19942
C h i n a i s s u e d a l e g a l r e g u l a t i o n t o d a y t o a b o l i s h Hong K o n g ' s
political structure based on Governor Chris Patten's 'reform
package' and establish a new one, when the country regains
s o v e r e i g n t y o v e r Hong Kong o n 1 s t J u l y 1 9 9 7 .
The decision was approved by the lawmakers attending the
closing meeting of the Ninth Session of the Standing Committee
o f t h e N a t i o n a l P e o p l e ' s Congress (NPC).
The decision says that the first government and Legislative
C o u n c i l o f t h e Hong Kong S p e c i a l A d m i n i s t r a t i v e R e g i o n (SAR) w i l l
be set up in line with the NPC decision on this matter already
issued in April 1990.

1. These proposals for the reformed l e g i s l a t u r e (20 d i r e c t l y e l e c t e d by

geographical a r e a s , 30 by functional c o n s t i t u e n c i e s and 10 by an e l e c t i o n
committee) were approved by the l e g i s l a t i v e council only in June 1994 a f t e r
long-drawn and f u t i l e n e g o t i a t i o n s with the P.R.C, So the e l e c t i o n s of 1995
were held on the terms here proposed. 20 s e a t s of the t o t a l 60 were by d i r e c t
e l e c t i o n ; the o t h e r s by various forms of i n d i r e c t e l e c t i o n . The expansion of
the e l e c t o r a t e was mainly in the 10 i n d i r e c t l y e l e c t e d s e a t s . In 1995 the
balance of s e a t s won by the Democratic Party (under Martin Lee) and i t s
a l l i e s ; the pro-P.R.C. led by Tsang Yok-sing and i t s a l l i e s ; and the Liberal
party led by Allen Lee with various independents - was d i f f i c u l t to c a l c u l a t e .
At most the Democratic Party had 19 plus 9 and a possible addition of the 4
from the Association for Democracy and People's Livelihood: maybe 32. The pro-
China Democratic Alliance held only 6 but with 10 a l l i e s might t o t a l 16. The
Liberal Party of business i n t e r e s t s had 10 s e a t s and was l i k e l y to side with
the pro-P.R.C. group. But the a t t i t u d e of the remaining i n d i v i d u a l s towards
China or democracy was d i f f i c u l t to determine. The P.R.C. was, since August
1994, committed to dismissing t h i s l e g i s l a t i v e council in 1997, though the
B r i t i s h foreign s e c r e t a r y indicated (Jan. 1996) t h a t , if so, the U.K. would
take China to an i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o u r t . There would c l e a r l y be a dramatic break
in c o n t i n u i t y in 1997.
2. China Daily, 1 September. Hsin Hua News Agency r e p o r t .
 373

'The S . A . R . ' s O r g a n i z i n g Committee w i l l d e c i d e on s p e c i f i c

measures i n e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e f i r s t L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l f o r Hong
Kong S . A . R . ' , i t s a y s .
'The d u t y and f o r m a t i o n o f t h e r e g i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s o f Hong
Kong S.A.R. w i l l be d e f i n e d by i t s own laws a c c o r d i n g t o t h e
b a s i c law on t h e Hong Kong S . A . R . ' , t h e d e c i s i o n s a y s .
'The last Legislative Council, city government, district
government and D i s t r i c t Board w i l l be t e r m i n a t e d on 3 0 t h June
1997', i t says.
The l e g i s l a t u r e says i n i t s d e c i s i o n t h a t t h o s e o r g a n i z a t i o n s
u n i l a t e r a l l y s e t up by t h e B r i t i s h s i d e v i o l a t e d t h e S i n o - B r i t i s h
J o i n t D e c l a r a t i o n , t h e b a s i c law and t h e NPC d e c i s i o n .
The p r o p o s a l f o r t h e d e c i s i o n was i n i t i a t e d by 32 NPC d e p u t i e s
f r o m Guangdong and Hong Kong i n March t h i s y e a r .

117. PRINCE CHARLES' FAREWELL, 30 June 19971

I s h o u l d l i k e , on b e h a l f o f Her M a j e s t y t h e Queen and t h e e n -
t i r e B r i t i s h p e o p l e , t o e x p r e s s our t h a n k s , a d m i r a t i o n , a f f e c t i o n
and good wishes t o a l l t h e p e o p l e o f Hong Kong who have been such
s t a u n c h and s p e c i a l f r i e n d s over so many g e n e r a t i o n s .
We s h a l l n o t f o r g e t you and we s h a l l watch w i t h t h e c l o s e s t
i n t e r e s t , as you embark on t h i s new e r a o f your r e m a r k a b l e
h i s t o r y . . . China wi 11 t o n i g h t t a k e r e s p o n s i b i 1 i t y f o r a p l a c e and
a p e o p l e w h i c h m a t t e r g r e a t l y t o us a l l . Our commitment and our
s t r o n g l i n k s t o Hong Kong w i l l c o n t i n u e and w i l l , I am c o n f i d e n t ,
f l o u r i s h , as Hong Kong and i t s p e o p l e t h e m s e l v e s c o n t i n u e t o
flourish.

1. A speech, made in pouring r a i n , as B r i t a i n ' s l a s t major colony was surren-

dered on the eve of 1 J u l y . Indeed, i t could be argued t h a t H.K. was being de-
l i v e r e d over to the mercies of an a u t h o r i t a r i a n d i c t a t o r s h i p with a q u i t e
lamentable record on human r i g h t s and the likelihood of p o l i t i c a l repression
in the future. But given the s t r e n g t h , numbers and proximity of China t h e r e
was l i t t l e a l t e r n a t i v e . The major doubts were whether corruption would i n f e c t
the H.K. p o l i c e , whether the independence of the j u d i c i a r y and the r u l e of law
would be maintained, and whether the solemn d e c l a r a t i o n s made in Beijing would
become no more than l i p s e r v i c e . The s t r e n g t h of feeling by those in business,
commerce and banking was more i n f l u e n t i a l than those who wanted democracy. But
many of the former had funds outside H.K. in the U.K., in Bermuda and the
Caribbean.
374

D. FIJI

In the multi-racial context of Fiji there was considerable opposition, apart

from some leaders of the Indian community, to constitutional reform: the indi-
genous Fijians and their European allies felt threatened by the Indians whose
numbers were growing so that within a dozen years they would outnumber the Fi-
jians. So while a few Indians began to call for a common roll, the Fijians and
Europeans demanded a continuance of the separate communal franchise - the sta-
tus quo. Ragg's subcommittee of unofficial members of the legislative council
had in 1949 recommended the confirmation of the official majorities on both
councils: the only minor change was for the direct election of Fijian council-
lors by the Bose Levu Vakaturaga (the Great Council of Chiefs). Both the Go-
vernor and the C O . found the report 'disappointing': 'after all this travail
Fiji has given birth to a mouse'. The public remained indifferent to any need
for reform. It seemed that Fiji was unique in the empire: by significant majo-
rities all proposals for change were rejected [Vol.VII p.507]. So, indeed, de-
spite the build up of pressure in the U.N. assembly from the U.S.S.R. and many
ex-colonies, there were only minor reforms: in 1956 a speaker was appointed
to preside over the legislative council: in 1958 3 unofficials, one from each
major community, were introduced into the executive: in 1959 the Bose Levu
Vakaturago was permitted to elect 5 representative Fijians where previously
the governor had nominated from a panel recommended by that Great Council; and
in 1963 there was an increase in the legislative councillors but still the
official majority was retained. Governors Garvey and Maddocks did show concern
for the image of Fiji internationally and expressed interest in adopting some
measure of a common roll perhaps as being tried in Tanganyika or Malaya. Some
Indians pressed for this but others cautiously refrained from alarming the
Fijians, knowing that time would be on their side as their majority increased.
In 1964 a 'membership system' was introduced into the executive council and,
following a constitutional conference in August 1965 which sought moves to-
wards 'a greater measure of internal self-government' but ruled out discussion
of independence, in 1966-7 a 'ministerial system' with an elected majority in
the legislature, mainly on communal rolls but with 9 elected by all the three
groups voting together, and no new communal rolls for other islanders, Rotu-
mans nor Chinese. Finally on 10 October 1970 Fiji achieved independence and
full Commonwealth membership, still with predominantly communal electorates,
but with a common roll as a very long-term objective but not in the foresee-
able future: that would come only se na balabala ('when the fern flowered'
which it never did). The Fijians still accepted the British as their protect-
ors and the Indians, already outnumbering them, saw the British as their prime
adversaries. The balance of equality (22 Fijians, 22 Indians and 8 general re-
presentatives) remained precarious. The authority of the chiefs was consolida-
ted by their veto over special legislation, and their predominance in the sen-
ate, but the mass of Fijians remained unaware of the extent of their protec-
tion for no translation of the constitution into Fijian was published. Mara's
Alliance party won the 1972 election easily.and when in 1977 Koya's National
Federation won 2 more seats, the governor-general, George Cakobau, sent for
Mara not Koya to form a government; but the Federalists split and in a second
general election the same year, the Alliance won twice as many seats as the
N.F.P. However in April 1987 Dr. Bavadra's N.F.P. defeated (28-24) Mara's Al-
liance which had been in power since 1970. In fact Fijians held all the impor-
tant Fijian portfolios and Bavadra's cabinet was not controlled by the N.F.P.
or Indians. Nevertheless the next month (14 May) Colonel Rabuka lead a milit-
ary coup for restoration of indigenous Fijian dominance. The governor-general
assumed emergency powers with a government of national reconciliation in which
 375
Rabuka was prominent but which won the support of Bavadra and Mara. Then on
25 September in another coup Rabuka declared himself head of state, suspended
the 1970 constitution, proclaimed a republic and left the Commonwealth. (Aust-
ralia and N.Z. had been prepared to impose sanctions against his regime' in
May). In December 1987 however he reinstated civil government and persuaded
Mara to become P.M. in a cabinet of 10 ministers from his own military regime'
and 13 from the Alliance. In a draft constitution of September 1988 Indian
representation was reduced, and the senate and national seats abolished. But
Bavadra repudiated this and in August 1989 a constitutional enquiry and advi-
sory committee proposed a return to a bi-cameral parliament and a little more
concession to the Indians: but communal rolls persisted and Fijian governments
could be formed without the support of a single Indian representative. Fiji,
now a republic, seemed desirous of returning to the Commonwealth, but other
members, particularly India, objected effectively for a while till it was
readmitted at last in 1995.

118. GOVERNOR SIR BRIAN FREESTON, 19 December 19491

[As he had indicated (15 Sept.) in the debate on the Ragg report, he
had avoided any comment and ordered all officials similarly to limit
their remarks to suggestion and not commit themselves to any assertions
of policy. It was for the 15 unofficials alone (5 from each racial group)
to state their views on the proposals of the subcommittee. He had also
wanted discussion of female' suffrage and alterations in property
qualifications on which the report was silent. The debate in November
enabled free discussion by the unofficials and nearly every unofficial
expressed his opinion on each of the proposals viz.]
( 1) That the present official majority be retained
(Carried by 11 votes to 4; the minority consisted of 3 elected
Indian Members and 1 Nominated Indian.)
( 2 ) That, of the 5 Elected Indian seats proposed under (ii) of
the principal Motion, one be reserved for the Muslim com-
munity.
(Lost by 8 votes to 7; the minority was composed of 1 Nominated
European, 1 Elected European, 1 Nominated Indian and 4 Fijian
Members.)
( 3 ) That the Fijian Members of Legislative Council be elected

1. CO.934/13. [See Vol.VII, Nos. 141-161] Freeston (governor 1948-52) had re-
ported (15 Sept. 1949) on the report of the sub-committee of 6 unofficial le-
gislative councillors (chaired by Amie Ragg) which had recommended the confir-
mation of the official majority, an executive council of governor, 5 ex offic-
io and 1 European, 1 Fijian and 1 Indian, and - against the advice of Sir Lala
Sukuna, secretary for Fijian affairs, who pointed out the importance of loyal-
ty to clan, state, chief and governor as King's representative to Fijians
(encl. No.5) - the direct election of the 5 Fijian legislative councillors
without reference to any nomination by the governor from a panel of 10 submit-
ted names - a concession to the Fijian intelligentsia which fretted at chiefly
power: 'a disappointing document, devoid of any constructive proposals'. But
in July-August 1954 (Pol. Repts. - secret annexe: C O . 1036/9) the governor
suggested to the Council of Chiefs a broadening of the basis of representation
by the provision of 2 of the 5 ex officio Fijians by direct election by the
people: the effects of education or military service abroad suggested that 90%
of Fijians, even in areas close to those of traditional chiefly influence,
wanted an elective system: the obligation of customary services to chiefs was
resented (Speech, 4 April 1954).
376
direct by the Council of Chiefs without reference to the
Governor.
(Lost by voices - no division called for.)
(4) That European and Indian communities be each represented by
5 Elected Members (i.e., that there should be no nominated
European or Indian representatives).
(Lost by 9 votes to 6; the minority Included 1 Elected Euro-
pean, 1 Nominated Indian, 3 Elected Indians and 1 Fijian Members.)
( 5) The Resolution regarding the composition of Executive
Council ((iii) in the principal Motion).
(Withdrawn, by leave, after discussion.)
( 6) That the Letters Patent and Electoral Regulations be amended
so as to place the Indian candidate (as regards qualifica-
tions) and the Indian voter (as regards postal ballot) on
the same footing as the European.
(Carried without dissent.)
( 7) That the income and property qualifications prescribed for
electors be abolished.
(Lost; no division called for.)
( 8) That the annual income qualification prescribed for European
voters be reduced to that prescribed for Indian voters
(£75).
(Carried by 11 votes to 3; the minority comprised 1 Indian
Nominated and 2 Indian Elected Members.)
( 9) That the minimum age for Indian electors be reduced from 21
years to 18, and that the literacy test for Indians be abo-
1ished.
(Lost by voices; no division called for.)
(10) That the franchise be extended to women on the basis adopted
for men.
(Lost by 10 votes to 4; the minority consisted of 2 Elected and 2
Nominated Indian Members.)
The broad result of the debate emerges in startling form. The
Unofficial Members of the Fiji Legislative Council have resisted,
by significant majorities, all proposals for a change in the
present Constitution with the insignificant exceptions recorded
under (6) and (8) of the foregoing paragraph. I take leave to
question whether a comparable result could be looked for in any
other unit of the Colonial Empire. It is noteworthy that, al-
though in general the Indian Members showed a greater anxiety for
change than their European or Fijian colleagues, in no single
instance did the vote recorded follow a purely racial pattern.
The underlying reasons for this result can best be analysed by
a consideration of the attitude displayed in the discussions and
recorded in the votes by each of the three racial groups. The
five Fijian Member were actuated throughout by (a) fear of the
consequences to their people of any increase of the political
power exercised by the other two groups - particularly the In-
dians; and (b) by their anxiety to preserve unimpaired the tradi-
tional political structure of the Fijian race - the pyramid of
Village, Tikina, Provincial and Chiefs' Councils culminating in
the person of the King's Representative. The European attitude,
though far from homogeneous, was mainly dominated by fear of the
Indian, the proposal for women's suffrage, for example, was re-
sisted by European speakers on the ground that its introduction
would, by increasing the numerical preponderance of the Indian
 377
over the European electorate, pave the way to the introduction
of the dreaded 'common roll'. As regards the Indians, the pro-
found cleavage between Hindu and Muslim was reflected, openly or
by implication, in their inability to secure the unanimous sup-
port of all five members for any one of the proposals.
The indifference displayed by the public at large towards these
important questions may be deduced from the fact that at no time
during the three days' debate did the spectators in the public
galleries exceed half-a-dozen in number. (I do not include the
batches of school children who are led into the Council Chamber
from time to time as part of their curriculum.) Local press com-
ment has hitherto been limited to an article in the Fiji Times
and Herald of which a copy is enclosed.1

119. (a) GOVERNOR SIR RONALD GARVEY TO SIR THOMAS LLOYD, 7 May 19532
[He had been giving thought to the position of Ratu Sir Lala Sukuna -
not the highest chief but acknowledged leader of his people, partly
through rank, mainly through a b i l i t y , i n t e l l e c t and personality. Much of
the t r a n q u i l l i t y among the Fijians was due to his influence, but a search
for his successor should have begun years ago. The time had now come
when] Sukuna s h o u l d be p l a c e d upon a p e d e s t a l 3 where he w i l l
be a b l e t o m a i n t a i n h i s i n f l u e n c e over t h e F i j i a n p e o p l e , c o n t i -
nue t o a d v i s e t h e Governor i n a l l a f f a i r s F i j i a n , b u t a t t h e same
t i m e r e l i n q u i s h h i s d u t i e s as S e c r e t a r y f o r F i j i a n A f f a i r s and
g r a d u a l l y hand over h i s Lands Commission work t o a younger man.
B e f o r e I go on t o make my s u g g e s t i o n s t o you i t would be wise f o r
me t o r e c o r d t h a t t h e r e i s a young g e n e r a t i o n o f F i j i a n g r o w i n g
up which m i g h t n o t be a v e r s e t o t h r o w i n g o f f t h e Sukuna i n f l u -
e n c e ; and i t i s t h e r e f o r e a l l t h e more n e c e s s a r y , I t h i n k , t o
e s t a b l i s h him c o n c l u s i v e l y i n t h e eyes o f a l l elements o f t h e
F i j i a n p o p u l a t i o n as t h e i r l e a d e r . . . .

1. G r i f f i t h s accepted t h a t the opposition to major c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change seem-

ed total: (to Freeston, 6 Apr. 1950 ibid.). Ragg's information to Geoffrey
Cooper, M.P. [Vol.VII, p.5061 on the procedure for e l e c t i o n of Fijian l e g i s l a -
t i v e c o u n c i l l o r s by Tikina (where t h e r e was no s e c r e t b a l l o t ) and of provin-
c i a l councils (where there had been since 1948 councils as well as the Council
of Chiefs) was shown to be inaccurate (Stoddart to Sidebotham, 30 Aug. 1950,
ibid.): indeed in July 1950 the panel of 10 names submitted to Freeston inclu-
ded 3 commoners: 2 in the f i r s t 5, one 2nd on the l i s t . C O . minutes voiced
general exasperation a t the p u s i l l a n i m i t y of the Ragg r e p o r t and the debate:
*naxitur ridiculus mus' indeed. The European Electors Association was mori-
bund: the Indian problem [Vol.VII, p.5061 provoked fear and heat; but only on
the question of separate Moslem representation was there rare Hindu-Moslem
antagonism; (Political Dept. 1949, ibid.). 2. CO.1023/21. Garvey. was gover-
nor of F i j i (and governor of P i t c a i r n ) ; consul-general for Western Pacific and
senior U.K. commissioner on S. Pacific commission, 1952-8) and Lloyd was per-
manent under-secretary a t the C O . (1947-56) 3. Mara l a t e r (Hall to Maddocks,
3 Oct. 1961: CO.1036/1001) told the C O . t h a t Sukuna had wrongly given the
impression that there was a chief over all others [cf. the bretwalda among
Saxon kings or paramountcy among Zulus, but not Xhosal: Sukuna had achieved
his i n f l u e n t i a l position by h i s own strength of c h a r a c t e r . A mistake had been
made in assuming there would be a n a t u r a l successor. F i j i a n society was more
a s e r i e s of pyramids with the chiefs on the pinnacle, but t h e i r followers now
expected more of them than they could d e l i v e r .
 378
[His position might be enhanced and made absolute (1) by his receiving
a substantial honour during the Queen's visit and (2) by being appointed
permanent speaker of the Council with his long experience, debating skill
and wit. It might be a generation or more before the official majority
disappeared.] Our present constitution with its sectional rep-
resentation is the only device, as far as I can see, by which we
can retain the balance of power in the hands of the Fijian in
present circumstances; and he has a long way to go before he can
stand on his own feet when, and only when, we can safely take a-
way the official prop of support from our constitution.. . [and the
Governor would cease to preside in the Legislative Council. In other
colonies recently that responsibility of the Governor had been taken over
by an appointed Speaker. Sukuna should be granted a salary next to that
of the Governor (c. £2,500) to maintain his position among his own
people. In fact as Secretary for Fijian Affairs he had not carried out
in full the duties of that department but had2
concentrated on land.]1
(b) JUXTON BARTON: Minute, 27 September 1954
[There might be trouble as a result of the investigations being
undertaken in relation to the desire of some Fljians for direct election
to the Council.3]

I. Lloyd had recognised the need for a successor, but he questioned the appro-
priateness of Sukuna's new title: not permanent Speaker, but vice-President
of the Council - he advised that the Kenya precedent should be followed. Much
depended on whether the governor intended to preside frequently or only on im-
portant occasions; (to Garvey, 14 May 1953: C.0.1023/21). It was reported that
Sukuna thought change inopportune: it would provoke the Indians who would
achieve numerical majority by 1961; (Paskin to Garvey, 3 Sept. 1953 ibid.),
But Paskin suggested that Garvey should argue that some constitutional advance
was necessary during the years of continuing official majority and sectional
representation: Sukuna would still be chief adviser on Fijian affairs but
H.M.'s G, wanted to enhance his status; (to Garvey, 4 Sept. ibid.). Sukuna
agreed to take the vice-presidency (5 Oct.) but it was seen that his appoint-
ment could hardly enact a tradition that it would be a Fijian perquisite for
it would be long before another Fijian would be capable of stepping into his
shoes; (Sidebotham, Min. 17 July). In fact, however, on 13 December Garvey
announced that changes in the letters patent enabled him to appoint a Speaker
to preside in his absence, giving the reasons here rehearsed that there might
be inherent difficulties in the governor being head of government as well as
impartial president. 'It is considered that this Council has developed a deg-
ree of responsibility and harmony which makes it no longer necessary for the
Governor always to attend and preside throughout its meetings.' Sukuna would
be sent to Westminster for 6 months to observe the Commons (C.0.1036/8 No,
291). Garvey had taken minor initiatives in reform - the appointment of spea-
ker and consultation about direct election to the Council: but he felt both
had misfired: Sukuna was far from well and the chiefs resented scrutiny into
their support; (to Lloyd, 1 Feb. 1956: C.0.1036/10). Formally new letters pat-
ent in 1956 provided for a Speaker to preside in the legislative. 2. C.0.1036
/9: a minute on the Political Reports of July and August; Barton had served
in the colonial service: he had been colonial secretary in Fiji and Nyasaland.
3. A survey had begun to determine the strength of Fijian opinion 'not in
agreement with chiefs' conservatism and traditional loyalism'. A count in an
area of chiefly influence had suggested only 10% supported the status quo, but
that area, close to Suva, might be explained by the contrast between them and
the advantages seen in urban conditions where chiefly privilege and customary
 379

( a ) The C o u n c i l o f C h i e f s i s f o r m e d o f 13 Rokos, 6 nominees o f

t h e G o v e r n o r , 2 nominees o f t h e S e c r e t a r y f o r F i j i a n A f f a i r s , and
19 r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f P r o v i n c e s . T h e r e i s t h u s 21 members who do
n o t b e l o n g t o t h e c h i e f l y c l a s s a g a i n s t 13 who d o . I remember
that about 20 years ago the policy of 'infiltrating* non-Chiefs
i n t o t h e C o u n c i l o f C h i e f s was d e l i b e r a t e l y a d o p t e d , and i t seems
t h a t i t has been i n c r e a s i n g l y f o l l o w e d and t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f
t h e P r o v i n c e has been i n c r e a s e d , so t h e C o u n c i l i s now f a r f r o m
an aristocratic/autocratic body.1
(b) I n h i s l a s t address t o the meeting of the Council of Chiefs
the Governor suggested that the basis of Fijian representation
i n t h e L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l s h o u l d be b r o a d e n e d . I n t h e r e p l y t o
t h e a d d r e s s , t h e C o u n c i l made no m e n t i o n w h a t s o e v e r o f t h i s
i m p o r t a n t p a r a g r a p h i n t h e G o v e r n o r ' s a d d r e s s . I n i t s Recommenda-
t i o n s , t h e Council asked t h a t t h e e x i s t i n g system f o r F i j i a n
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n t h e L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l s h o u l d be m a i n t a i n e d
unamended. I n h i s r e p l y t o t h a t r e s o l u t i o n t h e G o v e r n o r s a i d t h a t
he would take their Recommendation for the status quo into
c o n s i d e r a t i o n when f u r t h e r e x a m i n i n g t h e q u e s t i o n .
The r e a s o n why I t h i n k t h i s s h o u l d be l o o k e d a t c a r e f u l l y i s
n o t o n l y on a c c o u n t o f w h a t i s s a i d a b o v e , b u t b e c a u s e t h e
F i j i a n s , one m i g h t a l m o s t s a y , d e t e s t t h e I n d i a n s and I t h i n k
t h a t i n t e r v e n i n g i n t h e t r a d i t i o n a l F i j i a n methods o f s e l e c t i o n
by s u b s t i t u t i n g methods o f e l e c t i o n may be p l a y i n g i n t o t h e hands
o f I n d i a n p o l i t i c i a n s , f o l l o w i n g on d i c t a t i o n f r o m I n d i a , i n t h a t
I n d i a n s a r e now i n a m a j o r i t y o v e r t h e F i j i a n s . I b e l i e v e t h a t
anti-Indian feeling is running high among the Fijians and if
t h e r e w e r e o u t b r e a k s o f v i o l e n c e , p r e s u m a b l y i t would be n e c e s -
s a r y t o b r i n g i n f o r c e s t o r e s t o r e o r d e r f r o m New Z e a l a n d ; and
I t h i n k t h e s y m p a t h i e s o f t h e New Z e a l a n d e r s t h e m s e l v e s w i l l be
w i t h t h e F i j i a n s as w o u l d be t h o s e o f t h e l o c a l E u r o p e a n s .

( c ) SIR THOMAS LLOYD TO GOVERNOR SIR RONALD GARVEY, 20 March 19562

[The C O . was not e n t i r e l y surprised by Garvey's reassessment (11 Feb.)
and a growing i n t e r e s t in constitutional matters had been noted. They

s e r v i c e s were not enforced. A s i m i l a r survey in r u r a l a r e a s was taking p l a c e ;

( P o l i t i c a l r e p t s . July/Aug. 1954). But i t was reported t h a t such surveys c a u s -
ed alarm, f r u s t r a t i o n and resentment and were c a l l e d off, and s p e c i a l meetings
held instead t o discover majority opinion; (Stoddart t o H a l l , 18 Feb. 1955:
C O . 1036/8), C O . minutes agreed t h a t i t was dangerous to s t i r up opinion and
give the impression t h a t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change was being considered, but a l r e -
ady in gold mining and o t h e r t y p i c a l r u r a l d i s t r i c t s a survey had shown s i m i l -
ar expressions in favour of d i r e c t b a l l o t . 1. A marginal note by J . Rednall
pointed out that this was not quite correct: some rokos were commoners, but
in 1954 the majority of the Council members were s t i l l c h i e f s .
2. CO.1036/10, personal and confid. drafted by S i r Charles J e f f r i e s . Pressure
for some c o n s t i t u t i o n a l reform was b u i l d i n g up among a few d i s p a r a t e groups.
A somewhat bibulous p r e s i d e n t of a cane farmers' a s s o c i a t i o n requested urgent
reforms on 'democratic l i n e s ' and threatened a s t r i k e if t h e r e were no a c t i o n
within 30 days: (Pol. Rept. Oct. 1955). An a l l - F i j i a n conference of 500 I n d i -
ans, opposed by Vishnu Deo, demanded an u n o f f i c i a l majority in the l e g i s l a t i v e
council but r e t e n t i o n of the present proportion of r a c i a l u n o f f i c i a l s (to Len-
nox-Boyd, 5 Sept. 1955: C O . 1036/8), while a conference of 600 Muslims pressed
for s e p a r a t e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n (18 Apr. 1954: and 22 July 1956) on the novel a r g -
 380

shared his view that i t was better for the governor to take i n i t i a t i v e s 1
rather than to be forced by pressure of events.]
As you yourself say, the interest, if growing, is growing
s l o w l y . I t seems t o us t o be v e r y unwise t o do a n y t h i n g t o
encourage i t t o grow more q u i c k l y u n l e s s we have some f a i r l y
c l e a r i d e a where we a r e g o i n g . 2 I n some r e s p e c t s F i j i i s a v e r y
d i f f i c u l t p r o p o s i t i o n f r o m t h e p o i n t o f view o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
advance. We a r e a l l , v e r y n a t u r a l l y , i n c l i n e d t o t h i n k o f such
advance i n t e r m s o f B r i t i s h i n s t i t u t i o n s , l e a d i n g i n t h e d i r e c t -
i o n o f an e l e c t e d assembly, u n i v e r s a l a d u l t s u f f r a g e , t h e p a r t y
system, the vesting of executive power in unofficial Ministers
and so f o r t h . Yet we a r e l e a r n i n g by e x p e r i e n c e e l s e w h e r e t h a t
t h e t r a d i t i o n a l B r i t i s h p a t t e r n , however s u i t a b l e f o r p l a c e s o f
a certain size, is difficult to work out in small territories,
even where t h e r e i s a homogeneous and r e l a t i v e l y w e l l advanced
p o p u l a t i o n ; i t i s s t i l l more d i f f i c u l t t o a p p l y i n such a p l a c e
as F i j i , where race means more t h a n p a r t y , and where a dilemma
i s c r e a t e d by t h e n u m e r i c a l preponderance o f t h e I n d i a n s on t h e
one hand and our o b l i g a t i o n s t o t h e F i j i a n s on t h e o t h e r . I t may
w e l l be t h a t what we ought t o aim a t i n F i j i i s some f o r m o f c o n -
stitution which differs considerably from the traditional pat-
t e r n . I n t h i s c o n n e c t i o n you may l i k e t o have a l o o k a t t h e e n c -
l o s e d document about a n o t h e r o f our problem p l a c e s - M a u r i t i u s -
n o t because t h e ideas which a r e b e i n g t r i e d o u t t h e r e a r e n e c e s -
sarily at all applicable in themselves to the very different
c o n d i t i o n s o f F i j i , b u t as an i l l u s t r a t i o n o f t h e f a c t t h a t new
ways a r e b e i n g s o u g h t t o e s t a b l i s h forms o f democracy and o f r e p -
r e s e n t a t i v e i n s t i t u t i o n s i n p l a c e s where t h e c o n d i t i o n s f a v o u r -
a b l e t o t h e ' W e s t m i n s t e r m o d e l ' do n o t e x i s t . 3
As you know, i t has been t h e a c c e p t e d view h i t h e r t o t h a t i n t h e

ument t h a t the present nomination of one Muslim deprived the Hindu Indians of
t h e i r r i g h t f u l f u l l proportion of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and was prepared to see the
o f f i c i a l majority increased to counter t h i s a d d i t i o n a l u n o f f i c i a l . This Garvey
dismissed as a retrograde step - to increase communal separation and d i v i s i o n
and to delay the eventual and i n e v i t a b l e u n o f f i c i a l majority: t h e r e was no
need for reform: the position had not a l t e r e d since G r i f f i t h ' s despatch of May
1950 agreeing t h a t no major change should be made [Vol.VII, p.501: (to Lennox-
Boyd, 16 Aug. 1954, 18 Apr. 1955). But by February 1956 Garvey thought t h a t
reform should be tackled soon: F i j i a n s and Indians were showing i n t e r e s t and
F i j i was calm, peaceful and prosperous (to Lloyd, 11 Feb. 1956: C O . 1036/10).
1. Garvey had confessed t h a t h i s two i n i t i a t i v e s had ' p a r t l y m i s f i r e d ' , [p.
3791.
2. J e f f r i e s own view (29 Feb. 1956) was t h a t Garvey had made no convincing
case for reform. The C O . must indeed act in advance of pressure but 'only
j u s t ' . 'To devise a s u i t a b l e c o n s t i t u t i o n for F i j i w i l l be one of the most
d i f f i c u l t e x e r c i s e s to which we could address o u r s e l v e s . ' Any reply should
'firmly discourage Garvey from s t i r r i n g up the mud'. Other minutes were simi-
l a r l y cautious against ' d i s t u r b i n g a content s o c i e t y ' but H.P. Hall was not
surprised t h a t further changes were needed. However a l l were agreed t h a t no
e x t e r n a l commissioner was required and t h a t Garvey, l i k e other governors,
should do h i s own homework and make proposals: (Hall, Watt, Mins. 28, 29 Feb.)
3. [See also F. Madden, Not for export: the Westminster model of government
and British colonial practice in N. Willmer and P. Wigley (eds.) The first
British Commonwealth, 1980.]
 381
special local circumstances of Fiji, the retention of an official
majority in the Legislative Council is essential. It may be that
the 'mild steps forward' which you envisage do not involve depar-
ture from this principle. What troubles me, however, is the pro-
bability that once one starts upsetting the present position, one
inevitably sets up pressure from various quarters, and it becomes
very difficult to call a halt. To appoint a Commissioner would
undoubtedly have a highly disturbing effect, and it is not a step
which the Secretary of State could be advised to take unless and
until it was clear that a position had been reached at which some
action was necessary in order to retain the initiative and to
forestall even less desirable developments.
In any case it is, I think, an illusion to suppose that any
Commissioner strange to the country could be expected to produce,
out of the blue, a solution for the very peculiar problem of
Fiji. (And I must here interpolate a word of warning that no
Commissioner would be likely to take kindly to the idea of having
his proposals vetted in draft.) You will no doubt agree that any
ultimate and lasting solution must depend upon the growth of a
consciousness of Fijian citizenship overriding differences of
race or religion; and that such a conception is scarcely likely
to be realised for a very long time indeed. The immediate quest-
ion, then, is, what kind of short-term political development is
likely to promote (or to prejudice) the realisation of that long-
term conception. It is hard to see how anyone from outside would
be in a better position than yourself and your experienced advi-
sers to provide the necessary basic assessment. When that assess-
ment has been made and the broad lines of policy have been agreed
upon, there may well then be room for the constitutional expert
to advise upon the particular devices and forms of machinery best
calculated to secure progress along the determined lines.
In short, our present view is that this is a matter to be app-
roached with the greatest caution and circumspection; that, while
we should certainly aim to keep the initiative, we should avoid
doing anything, by way of appointing a Commissioner or even of
making an announcement, to precipitate a demand for change unless
and until it becomes clear that some action is necessary in order
to forestall inconvenient pressure; and that, in the meantime,
you and we should consult together in order that we may put be-
fore the Secretary of State as clear as possible a view, based
upon your first-hand knowledge of the local situation, both of
the long-term constitutional objective and of the limited objec-
tives which might be considered at this juncture as stages on the
way.
For example it can be argued that Central Government can be
fully democratic only if supported by vigorous local government
institutions and the first stage might be to divert interest in
constitutional matters from central to local government. Local
Government, whether urban or rural, is an essential part of the
constitutional structure and affords the people an opportunity
to identify themselves more closely with, and enables them to
participate in, the actual processes of government.... [Though it
seemed from Garvey's despatch (No.543, 9 Nov. 1955) that the present un-
official legislative councillors were unlikely to approve any educative
expansion of local government, policy should be directed at diverting
interest in constitutional matters to local government and the assumption
 382

o f g r e a t e r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t h e r e - t o see t h e v a r i o u s communities working

t o g e t h e r a t t h e l o c a l l e v e l before making any major changes a t t h e
centre.1

(d) GOVERNOR SIR RONALD GARVEY: MEMORANDUM, 22 September 19562

General: There is no evidence yet of the emergence of a party
s y s t e m i n F i j i . A t t h e p r e s e n t t i m e we h a v e t h e o f f i c i a l s a n d t h e
n o n - o f f i c i a l s , the l a t t e r being i n c l i n e d t o place themselves i n
the p o s i t i o n of the loyal o p p o s i t i o n , since they are a m i n o r i t y
in Legislative Council, though they bring to bear considerably
l e s s a n t a g o n i s m t h a n t h e n o r m a l t y p e o f o p p o s i t i o n . I t w o u l d be
much healthier if they identified themselves more closely with
Government.
I t i s however p l a i n t h a t - f o r t h e p r e s e n t - any c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
change which materially alters the balance, inter se, of the
three races a t present represented i n the l e g i s l a t u r e i s imprac-
t i c a b l e . No d o u b t i n d u e c o u r s e o f t i m e , t h o u g h i t i s n o t i n e v i -
d e n c e y e t , t h e r e w i l l be p r e s s u r e b r o u g h t t o a c h i e v e r e p r e s e n t a t -
ion which i s d e m o c r a t i c i n t h e p o p u l a r sense, t h a t i s t o say r e p -
resentation by majority vote from a common roll and, as I have
s a i d i n my c o v e r i n g l e t t e r , o u r u l t i m a t e a i m m u s t be f o r a common
c i t i z e n s h i p . I n t h e g e n e r a l l i f e o f t h e community s l o w , b u t f a i r -
l y s t e a d y , p r o g r e s s i s b e i n g made i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n . B o t h c o l o u r
a n d s o c i a l b a r r i e r s a r e b e i n g b r o k e n down a n d t h e d e s i r a b i l i t y
and, indeed, i n e v i t a b i l i t y of u n i t y i s t a k i n g shape. I t i s a p o l -
i c y w h i c h I c o n s t a n t l y p r e a c h m y s e l f and i t i s h a v i n g i t s i m p e r -
c e p t i b l e e f f e c t t h r o u g h o u t t h e w h o l e c o m m u n i t y . Even s o , a t p r e -
s e n t , a l l r a c e s w o u l d o p p o s e a common r o l l : t h e E u r o p e a n s b e c a u s e
i t w o u l d mean t h a t t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n w o u l d v a n i s h : t h e F i j i a n s
because t h e y r e a l i z e t h a t European r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s a b u l w a r k
f o r them a g a i n s t any p o s s i b i l i t y o f I n d i a n d o m i n a t i o n ; and t h e
I n d i a n b e c a u s e he i s n o t p r e p a r e d , a t t h i s s t a g e , t o f o r c e t h e
issue.
While this may be an over-simplification it does serve its
purpose for consideration of the present problem of constitu-
t i o n a l p r o g r e s s . I s h o u l d n o t l i k e e v e n t o t r y t o g u e s s how l o n g

1. Garvey r e p l i e d to Lloyd's successor ( t o Macpherson, 4 Oct. 1956) t h a t he

was not s u r p r i s e d to find the C O . had ' j i t t e r s ' about c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ques-
t i o n s even in 'peaceful l i t t l e F i j i ' but f e a r s were ' g r o u n d l e s s ' : he was not
playing with the s c o r p i o n ' s t a i l . Any announcement would not p r e c i p i t a t e d e -
mand for reform but might quicken i n t e r e s t and c r e a t e r e l i e f t h a t the govern-
ment had decided t o t a c k l e the q u e s t i o n . Unfortunately a t a recent meeting to
welcome Indian l e g i s l a t i v e c o u n c i l l o r s the question of e a r l y c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
reform was r a i s e d and a sure way to v i t i a t e proposals in F i j i a n and European
eyes was t o l e t i t appear t h a t the government was submitting t o Indian p r e s -
s u r e . Of course l o c a l government was the l o g i c a l way to develop, but the new
l e g i s l a t i v e council was u n l i k e l y to change i t s p o s i t i o n and progress in l o c a l
government would take a very long time. He agreed the Westminster model should
not be ' s l a v i s h l y ' i m i t a t e d : he had suggested an o u t s i d e commissioner t o avoid
s t a l e m a t e in council - no high powered e x p e r t , but perhaps a predecessor of
Macpherson's l i k e Milverton but without ' h i s b u l l - d o z i n g t a c t i c s ' . The u l t i -
mate goal was common c i t i z e n s h i p .
2. C O . 1036/0, e n c l . in p e r s . and conf. t o Macpherson, 4 Oct: e n t i t l e d Broad
lines on which constitutional development...might proceed.
 383

t h i s phase w i l l l a s t , b u t I t h i n k t h a t i t i s d e s i r a b l e , and
e s s e n t i a l , i f our p l e d g e i n p r e s e n t c i r c u m s t a n c e s t o t h e F i j i a n s
is to be kept, that equal racial representation should be
m a i n t a i n e d f o r an i n d e f i n i t e p e r i o d .
Official Majority:1 About four years ago I said in a letter to
L l o y d t h a t I c o n s i d e r e d t h a t i t would be necessary t o r e t a i n t h e
o f f i c i a l m a j o r i t y f o r many y e a r s t o come, u n t i l i n d e e d , t h e F i j -
i a n c o u l d s t a n d on h i s own f e e t (see t h e s i x t h paragraph o f my
p e r s o n a l and c o n f i d e n t i a l l e t t e r o f t h e 7 t h A p r i l , 1953). I made
t h a t s t a t e m e n t , however, b e f o r e I had much e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e
w o r k i n g o f t h e o f f i c i a l m a j o r i t y i n F i j i . S i n c e I came here i n
1952 I have never used t h e o f f i c i a l m a j o r i t y t o push a measure
t h r o u g h , and t h e o n l y o c c a s i o n when I m i g h t have used i t t o good
e f f e c t , when we debated t h e q u e s t i o n o f l o c a l Government, I d i d
n o t - a f t e r c o n s u l t i n g t h e C o l o n i a l O f f i c e - c a l l upon i t .
[Given the divisions into d i f f e r e n t racial benches among the u n o f f i -
c i a l s , there was l i t t l e danger of government defeat i f there were no
o f f i c i a l majority, provided the Governor had normal reserve powers. To
make the u n o f f i c i a l majority just less than the number of any one unof-
f i c i a l bench would really be 'giving away nothing' and would create 'a
healthier atmosphere'.
Nominated members, always seen as 'yes men', should disappear. Choice was
now increasing, t h e i r value d i f f i c u l t to assess. To discontinue nominat-
ions would be popular. The Indian and European elected should both be
increased to 5, while the F i j i a n electeds should remain at 5 though, in
accordance with the proposals made in the Council of Chiefs, the means
of selection should be altered - that the Chiefs would elect 5 members.
The time would come when more direct F i j i a n representation would be
demanded and no doubt be conceded. On the m u l t i - r a c i a l bench he thought
that with the European, F i j i a n and Indian members, the fourth other race
member [ c h i e f l y Chinese] should be elected on a common r o l l with votes
proportionately weighed, while o f f i c i a l s suggested a fourth bench of 2
members of other races voted for by other races only. I t was feared that
Europeans and Fijians would see t h i s l a t t e r as 'the t h i n end of the com-
mon r o l l wedge'. He did not recommend concession to the Muslim request:
the Indians wanted them to be regarded as Indians and promised a working
recognition by reserving one seat for them. On the Executive Council,
each bench should elect one nominee and the governor should nominate one.
Any 'committee system' should be l e f t to a later stage: the time had not
come to experiment. 2

1. There were 16 o f f i c i a l and 15 u n o f f i c i a l l e g i s l a t i v e c o u n c i l l o r s : of the

u n o f f i c i a l s 3 Europeans and 3 Indians were elected and 2 Europeans, 2 Indians
and 5 F i j i a n s (from a panel selected by the Council of Chiefs) were nominated.
Garvey was proposing a new multi-racial bench of 4 unofficials: i.e. making
an u n o f f i c i a l majority of 3.
2. In the C O . Rogers, the a s s i s t a n t under-secretary, was far from encourag-
ing: he feared exacerbation of d i v i s i o n s by rash proposals. He believed the
o f f i c i a l majority should be retained (in E. Africa i t s a b o l i t i o n had had a
d i s t u r b i n g effect) and reserve powers were no s u b s t i t u t e . He thought nominated
members had a v i t a l r o l e in advising elected members and elected members
should only be increased on a common r o l l ; a step towards t h a t a l l - i m p o r t a n t
t a r g e t should be the next one - as a move towards F i j i a n c i t i z e n s h i p . He
recommended t h a t the Tanganyikan experiment should be imitated in e l e c t i n g
l e g i s l a t i v e c o u n c i l l o r s wherein each voter voted for members of the e x i s t i n g
384
(e) IAN WATT: MINUTE, 5 November 19561
The Governor's arguments for increasing the Elected element in
the Legislative Council are doubtless sound, and I do not think
that there need be any objection in principle to establishing
there an Unofficial majority. We would, of course, couple the
creation of an Unofficial majority with giving to the Governor
reserve legislative power.
What I have some doubts about, bearing in mind our experience
in Kenya and Mauritius, is an increase in the Elected element,
with a broadening of the franchise, and at the same time
retaining the existing essentially communal arrangements for
representation. Unless there is some acceptance of the principle
of common roll elections, there seems to me to be a danger that
communal ism will be 'hardened', and looking ahead to the time
when there will be a greater amount of representative government
on the Executive side, I foresee the difficulties of trying to
make the Unofficial Members of the Executive Council collectively
responsible to communal elements in the Legislative Council.
Thus I would suggest that we should try to work out a rather
better plan of communal and common roll representation that the
Governor's memorandum provides.
In his marginal note to paragraph 14 of the memorandum, Mr.
Rogers asks whether the Tanganyika arrangements might help. Brie-
fly, what is going to take place in Tanganyika is that there will
be 30 Unofficial Members in the Legislative Council, 10 for each
of the three races (European, African and Asian). In 27 of the
constituencies the Members will be elected communally to start
with, but in one constituency 3 Members will be elected on a com-
mon roll, with seats reserved, one for each race. It is hoped to
extend this practice in later elections. I prefer this arrange-
ment, i.e. a common roll with seats reserved racially, to that
suggested by the Governor in paragraph 11 of his memorandum,
i.e., giving the votes of the minorities an inflated weight. I
interpret the Governor's phrase 'members at large', in paragraph
11 , as meaning that, for the four seats, the whole of Fiji would
be one constituency. The idea of returning members for 'super
constituencies' like this is under consideration in Kenya, and,
I think, in Northern Rhodesia, but in neither of those territor-
ies has it been yet worked out in detail. I prefer the Governor's
idea of having the European, Fijian, and Indian representation
coming into this 'multi-racial' arrangement rather than reducing
it to accommodate what he calls 'other races' only.
As a basis for discussion - and nothing else at this stage -
I would suggest that we consider something like this:- (a) five
Elected Europeans; (b) five Elected 'Indians'. Four of the cons-
tituencies here would be for 'non-Muslims' and one for a Muslim

three seats (to Garvey, 16 Jan. 1957 ibid.).

1. C O . 1036/10. Watt (assistant secretary in the C O . ) was commenting on
Garvey's memo., and on a minute by H.P. Hall (head of the Pacific and Indian
Ocean dept.) which had favoured some specific provision for the Muslims: four
times as large for the Europeans and one-fifth of the Indian population, and
had doubted the wisdom of introducing a weighted voting system if a common
roll were the object and perhaps the Gorell Barnes plan, as suggested for
Kenya before the Lyttelton constitution, might be preferred: (Min. 2 Nov.).
 385
(there is precedent for this arrangement in Kenya); (c) five Fij-
i a n m e m b e r s , e l e c t e d a s i s now p r o p o s e d ; ( d ) f o u r members e l e c t e d
on a common r o l l , whose v o t e r s m i g h t be r e q u i r e d t o h a v e h i g h e r
q u a l i f i c a t i o n s t h a n i n t h e communal e l e c t i o n s , w i t h s e a t s r e s e r -
ved by race; (e) a 'reserve' of Nominated members to be at the
Governor's disposal, and to be used by him, in his discretion,
a f t e r a l l t h e above e l e c t i o n s , t o g i v e such a d d i t i o n a l r e p r e s e n -
t a t i o n a s he t h i n k s d e s i r a b l e t o a n y i n t e r e s t o r e l e m e n t i n t h e
c o m m u n i t y w h i c h he c o n s i d e r s h a s n o t b e e n a d e q u a t e l y r e t u r n e d i n
the e l e c t i o n s . 1

120. ( a ) GOVERNOR SIR KENNETH MADDOCKS: POLITICAL SITUATION AND TRENDS,

8 J u l y , 19592
[ A f t e r the l i v e l y p o l i t i c a l atmosphere o f West A f r i c a , he was s t r u c k
by the absence o f p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s . 'The p r o s p e r i t y and i n d i v i d u a l i s m
o f the I n d i a n and the ready acceptance by the F i j i a n o f B r i t i s h r u l e ' -
the intense l o y a l t y t o the Crown and f i r m f a i t h i n H.M.'s G. i n t e n t i o n s -
had h i t h e r t o prevented the development of p o l i t i c a l movements as i n
n e a r l y a l l o t h e r c o l o n i e s . U n t i l r e c e n t l y the issue had been s t r a i g h t f o r -
w a r d . ] - The I n d i a n v The R e s t , f o r t h e F i j i a n r e g a r d e d t h e
E u r o p e a n as h i s a l l y and p r o t e c t o r a g a i n s t t h e I n d i a n , a r o l e
w h i c h l o c a l E u r o p e a n r e s i d e n t s h a v e g l a d l y a c c e p t e d . The p o s i t i o n
h a s now become s l i g h t l y c l o u d e d by a d a w n i n g r e a l i s a t i o n a m o n g s t
t h e s m a l l body o f t h i n k i n g F i j i a n s t h a t t h e I n d i a n s a r e h e r e t o

1. The discussion continued. Garvey and Rogers corresponded r e g u l a r l y through

1957-8. Garvey reported t h a t Madhavan withdrew h i s motion (19 Aug. 1958) for
the a b o l i t i o n of nominated members, the increase of u n o f f i c i a l s and the
e l e c t i o n of 6 on a common r o l l : he had taken soundings of the 3 senior
u n o f f i c i a l s and (as expected) found the Indian, Vishnu Deo, at odds with the
o t h e r s , European and Indian, who wanted the o f f i c i a l majority to continue, an
increase in elected members but not universal franchise, and no introduction
of a common r o l l : by then (30 Aug. 1958) Garvey was ready to favour the
experiment of a qwasi-ministerial system at l e a s t with a committee system [as
in Ceylon Vol.VII, No.63bl. (Indeed i t t r a n s p i r e d t h a t without consultation
Garvey had introduced a convention whereby the 3 r a c i a l groups each elected
a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e to h i s executive council; (H.P. Hall, Min. 8 Aug. 1961:
C O . 1036/613): t h i s (said Hall) was a mistake and in the forthcoming reform
the opportunity should be taken to discontinue t h i s p r a c t i c e . The governor
must be empowered to appoint a f t e r such consultation as he thought necessary).
In 1958 5 nominees to the executive included 3 u n o f f i c i a l s from the
l e g i s l a t u r e . Madhavan again proposed the increase in e l e c t e d members of the
l e g i s l a t u r e , a l l e g e d l y because he was not l i k e l y to be r e - e l e c t e d unless more
s e a t s were created (21 Jan. 1959, 4 May: CO. 1036/307) but he was opposed to
a common r o l l and h i s motion was again withdrawn for want of support: the lack
of public or press i n t e r e s t emphasised t h a t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l reform was hardly
a burning question: the debate had only bred suspicion of the Indian
i n t e n t i o n s , not paved the way for reform. When Sir Kenneth Maddocks (governor
1958-63) replaced Garvey, he, with Nigerian experience, suggested possible
adaption of the Tanganyikan model, though would l i k e to see how e f f e c t i v e t h a t
had proved before copying i t in F i j i ; (to Rogers, 24 June 1959),
2. CO. 1036/380 s e c r e t : the permanent under-secretary, Sir Thomas Lloyd, had
invited a l l governors in a personal c i r c u l a r l e t t e r (24 June 1954) to submit
periodic r e p o r t s on t h e i r t e r r i t o r i e s . Maddocks (governor 1958-63) had j u s t
arrived from Nigeria.
386

s t a y and t h a t most o f t h e Europeans a r e n o t . They have seen a

s t e a d y r e d u c t i o n i n t h e number o f European s e t t l e r s i n t h e r u r a l
a r e a s and n o t e d t h a t t h e i r sons now t e n d t o seek employment o v e r -
seas i n s t e a d o f r e m a i n i n g i n F i j i ; and t h e y have become more c o n -
s c i o u s o f t h e f a c t t h a t t h e g r e a t m a j o r i t y o f t h e European p o p u -
lation are birds of passage and have only superficial contact
w i t h F i j i a n s . There a r e t h e r e f o r e t h e b e g i n n i n g s o f an awareness
amongst a few F i j i a n s t h a t whether t h e y l i k e i t o r n o t t h e y must
f i n d some way o f l i v i n g a m i c a b l y w i t h t h e I n d i a n ; and among t h e i r
l e a d e r s t h e r e i s a g r o w i n g sense o f u n i t y . P r o v i n c i a l j e a l o u s i e s
a r e b e i n g l a i d a s i d e so t h a t a u n i t e d f r o n t can be p r e s e n t e d when
F i j i a n r i g h t s and c u l t u r e a r e t h r e a t e n e d . . . . [Moreover the F i j i a n ' s
worry about his r e l a t i v e l y declining material and economic well-being -
due to the Indian acquisitiveness, commercial a b i l i t y and unremitting
hard work - caused alarm and bewilderment at the apparent reversal of
F i j i a n fortunes, and a more c r i t i c a l attitude to authority and question-
ing of t h e i r leadership. A separate F i j i a n administration, created on
lines l a i d down by Sir Arthur Gordon [Vol.V, Nos. 196, 197, 198], had
tended ' t o freeze custom and prevent the natural development which would
inevitably have taken place had i t not been so r i g i d l y defined and regu-
l a r i s e d ' . The growth of education and contacts with other communities
caused dissatisfaction with c h i e f l y leadership, complaints that they saw
l i t t l e for t h e i r taxes, and claims that chiefs and o f f i c i a l s were out of
touch with the common people: envy of Indian and European prosperity and
fear of the Indians hunger for land had led, especially in the densely
populated west of V i t i Levu, to such f r u s t r a t i o n as could soon be turned
against the government. The uncomfortable change from a subsistence to
a money economy had exposed Fijians to the d i f f i c u l t i e s of world demand
and embargo (e.g. the r e s t r i c t i o n on banana imports into New Zealand).
The financial d i f f i c u l t i e s of F i j i had necessitated new taxes and increa-
sed fees; a credit squeeze had caused unemployment. A F i j i a n and Rotuman
ratepayers' association had even publicly c r i t i c i s e d the chiefs - an
'unprecedented' step. But generally Fijians had l i t t l e enthusiasm for
p o l i t i c s and remained s o l i d l y l o y a l . ]
The problems o f t h e I n d i a n p o p u l a t i o n a r e more s i m p l e and
d i r e c t . C o n d i t i o n e d by c e n t u r i e s o f s t r u g g l e f o r e x i s t e n c e i n I n -
d i a , t h e y a r e i n t e n s e l y h a r d - w o r k i n g , a c q u i s i t i v e and t h r i f t y and
t h e i r one need i s f o r l a n d . So f a r t h e y have a c c e p t e d w i t h o u t u n -
due c o m p l a i n t t h e f a c t t h a t 83 per cent, o f t h e l a n d o f t h e C o l -
ony (most o f i t a d m i t t e d l y o f poor q u a l i t y ) i s owned by F i j i a n s
and t h a t t o o b t a i n l o n g - t e r m l e a s e o f F i j i a n l a n d i s becoming i n -
c r e a s i n g l y d i f f i c u l t . B i t t e r f e e l i n g s have, however, been aroused
i n a few a r e a s when I n d i a n f a r m e r s , who have been u n a b l e t o renew
l e a s e s o f p r o s p e r o u s cane farms w h i c h have been i n c l u d e d i n F i j -
i a n r e s e r v e s , have seen t h e l a n d r e v e r t t o bush t h r o u g h t h e n e g -
l e c t o f t h e F i j i a n owners; [problems being considered by the Burns
commission].
P o l i t i c a l l y t h e I n d i a n s have been c o n t e n t t o p l a y a w a i t i n g
game, knowing t h a t t i m e and i n c r e a s i n g numbers a r e on t h e i r s i d e .
The new g e n e r a t i o n i n c l u d e s a numerous m i d d l e - c l a s s o f w e a l t h y ,
w e l l - e d u c a t e d , s e l f - c o n f i d e n t and a m b i t i o u s l e a d e r s who a r e w o r k -
ing quietly but steadily for greater political authority and
power. T h e i r g r e a t weakness i s t h e i r d i s u n i t y . There i s a c h r o n i c
tendency t o f a c t i o n a l i s m i n t h e I n d i a n temperament and i t i s u n -
l i k e l y t h a t any moves t o w a r d s t h e f o r m a t i o n o f t h e I n d i a n p o l i t i -
c a l p a r t y would y e t have much success as any such o r g a n i s a t i o n
 387
would probably be split asunder by internal conflicts and rival-
ries.
Nevertheless, the changing Fijian temper has not passed unnoti-
ced by the more astute and politically-minded Indian1 who can
see in it a means of enhancing his own position at the expense
of the European community by linking his own interests and grie-
vances with those of the Fijian and thereby belabouring the Euro-
pean 'exploiter'. For example, Indian politicians have tried to
get Fijian chiefs to take office in a cane-growers' association
and in trade unions which are largely Indian in composition. This
blending of common interests is not in itself to be condemned if
it leads ultimately to a more homogeneous society, but Indian
motives are seen by Europeans, as well as by the more thoughtful
Fijian, to be directed at strengthening the Indians' own politi-
cal and economic position....
[The Indian Association, the only political body of any importance, had
become more active in requesting reform - a ministerial form of govern-
ment with unofficial majorities in legislative and executive councils but
still communal representation: it consisted of solid and reputable law-
yers and merchants.]
The Indians, because they are not land owners, are particularly
sensitive and vulnerable to unemployment. Their natural rate of
increase, one of the highest in the world, results in very large
additions each year to the numbers of those seeking employment.
The difficult financial situation at the end of 1S58 made neces-
sary a slowing down of development work and led to the reduction
of an inflated labour force to a more normal level. This involved
the laying off of a considerable number of artisans and labour-
ers. The Indian population for a time became seriously alarmed
and there was widespread criticism of the salaries and allowances
paid to civil servants at a time when many of the poorer members
of the community were being discharged. Fortunately, most of the
unemployed were soon absorbed by private contractors and the
record cane crop, which is now being harvested, will ensure full
employment until the end of the year. It is clear, however, that
any widespread unemployment, particularly during the off-season
for cane, could have serious political effects.
Only a few of the European community take much active interest
in politics, though these few are both vocal and influential. The
majority, whether employed in commerce, in industry or in the ci-
vil service, are here for only a few years and have no permanent
stake in the country. Occasionally, when common interest or their
pockets are affected, a united front is formed as instanced by
the sharp reaction to the tax increases that were announced at
the end of 1958 when a series of public meetings led to the for-
mation of a Tax Payers' Association; but for the most part they
are interested only in local development and are content to leave
the broader issues to 'Government'.
The main current of political thought among the European commu-
nity is to be found in a general support of Fijian interests due

1. B.D. Lakshman, a trades union agitator influenced by Indian Congress

demagogic techniques, had presented exorbitant demands to the Colonial Sugar
Refining Co.: he had no coherent party platform and few supporters, but the
prospect of big pay increases would increase his support.
388
to a fear of, and desire of a counterweight against, the growing
Indian economic and political power. The majority of European po-
liticians certainly voice this support at every opportunity. It
would none the less, I think, be fair to say that the marriage
is one of convenience because, despite his public protestations
to the contrary, the European - particularly the locally-born -
is racially conscious, and would much prefer to see himself in
the guise of protector than to fulfil the more humble role of
partner. It is significant that few of the larger European-owned
businesses employ Fijians (or Indians for that matter) in any
reasonably senior executive posts. This is resented by both Ind-
ians and Fijians but it appears that it may be affecting Fijians
more than Indians as the Indians have more alternatives in the
shape of self-employment or working for Indian firms. For obvious
reasons, the European community takes a conservative view about
constitutional change....
[The 8,000 Part Europeans had produced a few agitators - e.g. James
Anthony - probably the only true Communist resident in Fiji, but they
were handicapped by lack of education and money and were beset by
factionalism as were the Indians to whom they showed a 'racial disdain'.
The Chinese and Pacific islanders were politically negative, minding
their own business, taking no civic responsibility and making no demands
for a voice in government.]
Despite the apathy of large sections of the population, there
are signs of a gradual political awakening. The spread of educa-
tion; a greater knowledge of the outside world; and a more criti-
cal awareness of the activities of government, fostered by a vi-
gorous but moderate Press and an excellent broadcasting service,
are at last beginning to have their inevitable effects. Interest
in politics and in constitutional reform is still only slight but
is certain to increase. The fundamental problem is that the soc-
ial, economic and political development of the two main racial
groups is poles apart. The Indians, with a large number of weal-
thy and well-educated persons already at hand are ready now to
play a fuller part in the government of the country. Fortunately,
because of the factionalism already referred to and of a fear of
antagonising the Fijian, they are at present content to wait; and
this gives the Fijian a little more time. The Fijians, still
bound by customs and obligations that are unsuited to the modern
world, have only a handful of men with higher education and know
that they could not hold their own in open competition. It is
probable that, as in parts of Africa, most of their political
leaders will emerge from the ranks of the teaching profession
(two school-masters have already reached the Legislative Council)
but it is in the commercial sphere that they are so desperately
weak.
To obtain a sound and healthy multi-racial community, there
must be a feeling of equality of opportunity. The present need
therefore is to push the Fijians on by all possible means so that
they may be fitted to compete with the commercial know-how and
technical skills of the more sophisticated Indians; while at the
same time ensuring to the Indians an opportunity to obtain on
lease the farmland that they need. Professor Spate, of the Aust-
ralian National University, has recently completed a survey of
the Fijian economic problems and has recommended [Sept. 1959] a
gradual move away from the communal to an individual system of
 389

t e n u r e . T h i s and t h e many o t h e r f a c t o r s i n t h i s complex s i t u a t i o n

a r e now b e i n g s t u d i e d by t h e Burns Commission.
Fiji is entering upon a difficult and unsettling period. To
p r e s s on t o o f a s t w i t h d e s i r a b l e r e f o r m s w i t h o u t t h e f u l l consent
o f t h e F i j i a n s , would l e a d t o b i t t e r o p p o s i t i o n and wreck our
happy r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e s e l o y a l p e o p l e . To go t o o s l o w l y would
be f a t a l t o t h e i r l o n g - t e r m i n t e r e s t s and would a n t a g o n i s e t h e
I n d i a n s . . . . [The timing of administrative reforms and the securing of local
co-operation from the several communities would be a l l important.]

( b ) PHILIP ROGERS TO GOVERNOR SIR KENNETH MADDOCKS, 17 August, 19591

[Though the factual answer to his questions were easy, the application
of them in F i j i a n conditions had given the CO. 'much food for thought'.
He enclosed the results of the Tanganyikan elections wherein Maddocks'
suspicions were confirmed. 2 The African votes in T.A.N.U. had decisively
influenced the elections to European and F i j i a n sects.]
I t h i n k we must agree t h a t i n any common r o l l system where
there i s a great d i s p a r i t y i n the v o t i n g s t r e n g t h of d i f f e r e n t
c o m m u n i t i e s , a m a j o r i t y community w i l l i n e v i t a b l y have a d e c i s i v e
i n f l u e n c e on t h e e l e c t i o n o f m i n o r i t y r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , u n l e s s h i s
f r a n c h i s e q u a l i f i c a t i o n was made v e r y h i g h i n d e e d . I n F i j i t h e r e
m i g h t n o t be much d i f f e r e n c e between t h e numbers o f I n d i a n and
F i j i a n v o t e r s b u t t h e European v o t e r s would p r o b a b l y be many
l e s s . A European c a n d i d a t e c o u l d n o t t h e r e f o r e hope t o be s u c c e s -
s f u l o n l y on w i n n i n g a m a j o r i t y o f t h e European v o t e s and t h e
I n d i a n and F i j i a n v o t e s would c a r r y t h e day. I t m i g h t happen t h a t
European v o t e s c o u l d j u s t t i p t h e s c a l e i n f a v o u r o f one o f two
European c a n d i d a t e s - one s u p p o r t e d by I n d i a n s and t h e o t h e r by
F i j i a n s - i f t h e v o t i n g s t r e n g t h o f t h e s e two races were n e a r l y
t h e same. The s h o r t answer i s I t h i n k t h a t under t h e Tanganyika
system t h e r e i s no g u a r a n t e e whatsoever t h a t a m i n o r i t y community
would be i n a p o s i t i o n t o r e t u r n a c a n d i d a t e o f t h e i r own c h o i c e ,
though i t does o f c o u r s e ensure r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f members o f a l l
r a c e s . The c r u x o f t h e m a t t e r i s whether r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s t o be
on a r a c i a l o r a p a r t y b a s i s . I f t h e i n t e n t i o n i s t h a t t h e F i j -
i a n s , I n d i a n s and Europeans s h o u l d have t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o r e t u r n
candidates acceptable t o the m a j o r i t y of t h e i r respective races,
t h e r e b y p e r p e t u a t i n g communal d i v i s i o n s , t h e n t h e Tanganyika s y s -
tem does n o t appear t o be t h e s o l u t i o n . I f , however, some f o r m
o f p a r t y system i s t o be b u i l t up, t h e n t h e Tanganyika system i s
more l i k e l y t o encourage t h i s t h a n a communal system o f v o t i n g .
I n t h i s c a s e , however, a l t h o u g h t h e I n d i a n s and F i j i a n s , i f r e a -
s o n a b l y w e l l o r g a n i s e d , may be a b l e t o r e t u r n c a n d i d a t e s r e f l e c -
t i n g t h e i r f i r s t c h o i c e s , t h e s u c c e s s f u l European w i l l most l i k e -
l y be t h e c a n d i d a t e who has t h e s u p p o r t o f t h e I n d i a n o r F i j i a n

1. CO. 1036/307. Maddocks had asked for information on the working of the new
common r o l l system in Tanganyika and for CO. d e t a i l on t e r r i t o r i e s combining
an u n o f f i c i a l majority in the l e g i s l a t i v e council with an o f f i c i a l majority
in the executive: did t h i s give the l e g i s l a t u r e power without r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ?
(to Rogers, 24 June 1959). [See Vol.IX]
2. Maddocks had asked whether the Tanganyikan experiment was regarded as a
success: did the common r o l l provide for the wrong type of Europeans to be
elected? Garvey and his o f f i c i a l s had favoured an u n o f f i c i a l majority in the
l e g i s l a t i v e council in F i j i .
390
voters and not necessarily that of the European voters....
[As for Maddocks' request for information on territories with unoffi-
cial majorities in the legislative and official majorities in the execu-
tive councils, at present Aden, Gibraltar, Tanganyika and Uganda had
these and the Gold Coast, Nigeria, N, Rhodesia, Gambia and Singapore had
gone through this stage. It had not proved a healthy system: it had pro-
duced frustration and premature unofficial demands for greater executive
representation and authority, acerbated by the need to invest the gover-
nor with reserve legislative powers. He had told Garvey (6 Jan. 4 June
and 30 Sept, 1957) that the collective advice was against an unofficial
majority in the legislature without associating unofficials in a quasi-
ministerial system.]
Our own views now tend tentatively in the following direction.
Very difficult problems beset any attempt at present to extend
elected representation on other than a racial basis, and we would
not be in favour of any large extension on such a racial basis.
We think the important thing is to keep the way open for the
development of non-racialism in Fiji politics and not to take any
avoidable action which involves establishing or confirming insti-
tutional forms embodying the racial division. We should, on the
contrary, seek constantly to edge the community in the way of
non-racial attitudes and behaviour, political and social, and to
afford it time to develop and adopt such attitudes and behaviour.
On our reading of the situation extension of elected representa-
tion is not the really important thing for most of those who urge
constitutional advance; the difficulties and implications of this
in Fiji must be apparent. What is really wanted is the chance for
unofficial representatives to have an effective say in adminis-
tration and the opportunity of responsibility. This cannot be
given by establishing an unofficial majority in the Legislative
Council alone: it would be more valuable and acceptable that
unofficial members be associated with the work of some of the
departments of Government.
Our present feeling is, therefore, that when the time comes for
a move forward in Fiji in the constitutional sphere it would
probably be wiser to take the step of adopting a Ministerial or
Qi/as7-Ministerial system without necessari ly establ ishing an un-
official majority in the Legislative Council (or the Executive
Council) and without making any immediate change in the electoral
boundaries. In referring to the absence of an unofficial majority
in the Legislative Council, I should qualify that by saying that
we would not see objection to a move by which the Unofficials as
a whole were in the majority provided that there was also a Go-
vernment major i ty, i.e. the Unofficial Members who were Ministers
or quas7-Ministers would, together with the Official Members of
the Council form a majority of it. If this were done it might be
possible later in a few years time to experiment with a three-
member constituency for say, Suva, with elections on a common
roll.
These thoughts differ somewhat from those which we have put
forward in earlier correspondence. It is not that our essential
standpoint has been changed. This still is that we do not wish
to hasten the pace of constitutional change in Fiji for its own
sake, but we certainly on the other hand do not wish to lag
behind events and delay change until local feeling turns sour.
In other words we want to keep one pace, but not two paces, in
 391
f r o n t o f r e a l l o c a l p o l i t i c a l f e e l i n g and we c e r t a i n l y want t o
a v o i d w i d e s p r e a d f e e l i n g o f f r u s t r a t i o n . We have, however, come
t o t h e v i e w , based l a r g e l y I a d m i t , on e x p e r i e n c e e l s e w h e r e b u t
r e l a t e d , I hope, t o t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f F i j i , t h a t when t h e t i m e
comes f o r a move i t would be b e t t e r t o make t h a t move t h r o u g h t h e
a s s o c i a t i o n o f U n o f f i c i a l s w i t h t h e processes o f Government by
the introduction of a Quasf-Ministerial system rather than
t h r o u g h t h e c r e a t i o n o f an U n o f f i c i a l m a j o r i t y i n t h e L e g i s l a t i v e
Counci1.
We r e m a i n , as you w i l l remember f r o m your d i s c u s s i o n i n London,
anxious to keep the initiative in this matter and we still feel
t h a t i t i s e s s e n t i a l t o keep t h e p o l i t i c a l t e m p e r a t u r e i n F i j i
as low as p o s s i b l e and t o work o u t any c o n s t i t u t i o n a l changes
most c a r e f u l l y b e f o r e t h e y a r e made p u b l i c . . . [ I t would have been
less than 'cowardly' not to have given him the C.O.'s tentative views,
but they advised him to collect a l l relevant information and then set out
his proposals - perhaps beginning with the Executive Council and an exa-
mination of how u n o f f i c i a l s could best be associated with work in some
departments for i t was undesirable to produce p o r t f o l i o s on a racial
basis and ^Fijian a f f a i r s ' was an obvious d i f f i c u l t y . I f he decided that
an u n o f f i c i a l majority was desirable, then should t h i s be by reducing the
number of o f f i c i a l s or increasing the unofficials? This decision would
depend on the number of u n o f f i c i a l s required to support a ministerial
system (e.g. 15, i f there were only 3 u n o f f i c i a l ministers, but i n s u f f i -
cient i f you have 6 or more). I f he recommended an increase of the unof-
f i c i a l l e g i s l a t i v e councillors, t h i s should be done by increasing the
number of Europeans and Indian constituencies by one each and appointing
an additional F i j i a n or experimenting with a 3-member constituency in
Suva, for example. In the absence of p o l i t i c a l parties, objective might
be to encourage elected members to represent the Country as a whole, not
any particular party or race, and to establish a form of responsible
c o a l i t i o n government without race or party. 1

1 2 1 . JULIAN AMERY: NOTE ON POLICY, 8 November I9602

The F i j i a n s and I n d i a n s a r e more d i s t i n c t as communities t h a n
Jews and Arabs i n P a l e s t i n e , Greeks and Turks i n Cyprus o r even
Europeans and Bantu in South and Central Africa.3 Intermarriage,
b u s i n e s s a s s o c i a t i o n s , even p e r s o n a l f r i e n d s h i p s a r e r a r e .
I n t h e p a s t , so long as we have h e l d t h e u n d i s p u t e d power, r e -
l a t i o n s between t h e communities have been good i f d i s t a n t . I n t h e
l a s t few months t h i s has changed. The December r i o t s and t h e
sugar dispute have made the Fijians fear that the Indians are out
t o b r i n g t h e ' w i n d o f c h a n g e ' 4 t o F i j i and use i t t o e s t a b l i s h
I n d i a n p r e p o n d e r a n c e . T h e i r f e a r s have been f u r t h e r i n c r e a s e d by
t h e Burns r e p o r t 5 which t h e y r e g a r d as an a t t e m p t t o g i v e t h e
I n d i a n community c o n t r o l o f t h e l a n d by b r e a k i n g up t r a d i t i o n a l
F i j i a n s o c i e t y . The resentment aroused by t h e Burns r e p o r t has

1. L e t t e r s patent on 16 Nov. 1959 enabled the council of chiefs to e l e c t 5 r e -

p r e s e n t a t i v e F i j i a n s : (CO. 1036/306). 2. CO. 1036/612. Amery, son of Leo
[Vol.VI, Nos. 19 etc.; Vol.VII, Nos.7,44d etc.], was parliamentary under-sec-
r e t a r y in the CO. (1958-60): he moved to Air l a t e r in November. He had w r i t -
ten a biography of Chamberlain. He had v i s i t e d F i j i in Oct. 1960. 3. A doubt-
ful proposition. 4. His P.M.'s phrase [Vol.VI, No.41a].
5. Sir Alan Burns who had served in the Caribbean, B.H. , West Africa, the C O .
392
been to some degree extended to Government and for the first time
for many years, has shaken Fijian confidence in British inten-
tions. The point is crucial when it is remembered that the Fij-
ians are the 'loyal' community providing 75% of the security
forces. The islands could hardly be governed without them, let
alone against them.
In this climate the Fijians have become increasingly
communally-minded. They have also become more resistant than
before both to constitutional changes for the Colony as a whole
and to the modification of their own traditional system. In the
face of what they regard as the Indian threat, there has been an
instinctive closing of the ranks around their traditional Chiefs.
The Indians on their side are sharply divided over the sugar is-
sue and over the proper course to follow in their relations with
the Fijians. The more moderate leaders among them realise that
they have antagonised the Fijians and would like to heal the
breach. At the same time they are subject to fairly strong pres-
sures from within their own community; and the more extreme ele-
ments are thinking in terms of self-government on the basis of
a common roll which would enable the Indians to rule the roost.
How then should we proceed in the constitutional field and in
regard to the Burns recommendations about the Fijian administra-
tion?
To begin with, we must, I think, accept that it is impracti-
cable to think in terms of a single Fijian nation or of a common
roll at any rate for the foreseeable future. Any suggestion of
this is bound to arouse Fijian suspicions that the Indians would
dominate by counting heads. The moderate Indian leaders recognise
this. This points to the conclusion that we shall have to recog-
nise not just the equality of individuals before the law but the
equality of the Indian and Fijian communities irrespective of
their numbers. There is no other way of reconciling both the
pledges in the Deed of Cession [Vol.V, No.196] and those in Lord
Salisbury's despatch, let alone the need to keep communal peace.
We should therefore, let it be known that any constitutional
advance must be so designed as to preclude the domination of one
of the two main communities by the other.
The European Community (20,000) can hardly expect, in the long
run, to maintain their position as a community equal in import-
ance to Fijians and Indians. For the time being, however, the
Fijians insist that they should be so regarded. The Indians for
their part have not asked for any change.
Leg. Co. and Ex. Co. The Indians have asked, but not pressed,
for an unofficial majority on Leg. Co. and Ex. Co. while preser-
ving the present communal composition of both. The Fijians are
flatly opposed to any reduction in the Governor's powers.

and on the Trusteeship council of the U.N. (1947-56), had chaired a commission
of enquiry into the land and population problems of Fiji (1959-60). Somewhat
doctrinairely paternalist, he recommended that, while there was no general
desire or need for major reform, it was not in the interest of the Fijians
that they should be treated differently from other races. Though constitu-
tional matters were not in his remit, he suggested that only 2 members should
be elected by the Council of Chiefs, but 3 should be directly elected. This
had been accepted by a small majority in the Council of Chiefs in Aug. 1964.
 393
After full discussion with the Governor and his advisers we
came to the conclusion that the best way to proceed would be to
reverse the traditional Colonial pattern and introduce a quasi-
ministerial system while preserving the official majority in the
Leg. Co. The 'Ministers', who would be bound by the ordinary doc-
trine of collective responsibility, would count as officials for
the purpose of securing the official majority. They would of
course be dismissed and replaced by others if they ceased to sup-
port the Governor. Leg. Co. itself would be somewhat expanded,
though on a communal basis, to balance the expansion of Ex. Co.
resulting from the introduction of the Ministerial system. The
composition of Ex. Co. would not be laid down, so that, if all
members of the Community refused in certain circumstances to
serve, the Governor could still govern with the help of the other
two Communities and his officials.
A change of this kind is likely to be criticised by A.D. Patel
and those Indians who consider that their numbers entitle them
to a predominant position. The Governor and his advisers, how-
ever, believe that the * jobs' created by the introduction of a
ministerial system will be popular with leading men in both com-
munities and that there will be little difficulty in maintaining
the official majority in Leg. Co. They consider that such a sys-
tem might work for a number of years.
If this general principle is accepted, its implementation might
be carried out in two phases. In the first, the Governor would
simply invite existing members of Ex. Co. to assume ministerial
functions on the basis of collective responsibility. In the
second, and only after the next election the number of seats in
Leg. Co. would be increased.
The Public Service. Just as the Fijians will not accept a com-
mon roll, so they will not accept that recruitment for the public
service should be solely on the basis of merit regardless of
race. The Indians are probably abler and certainly have more gra-
duates than the Fijians. On this basis they would soon dominate
the Administration. This the Fijians will not accept. In the long
run, it will probably be necessary to have some rule - as in Cyp-
rus now [pp.458, §§11-15] or in India in the old days - under
which government jobs would be divided in some such proportion
as Indians 45%, Fijians 45%, Europeans and others 10% in each
grade of each department. For the time being there is no need to
be so precise and we can probably continue on the present basis
of promotion according to merit subject to a public assurance
that neither community will get more than 45% of the jobs in any
grade or department. It will be some time before the Fijians can
hope to provide suitable candidates to fill their quota and mean-
while Europeans will have to fill their places. Later on it will
from time to time become necessary as good Fijians come forward
to pass over Europeans who are marginally better qualified. This
will raise problems of compensation and it is for consideration
how far these could be covered under the terms of the new White
Paper as applied to Fiji.
The Fijian Administration. I see no future in the Burns recom-
mendation that the Fijian administration should be wound up as
soon as possible. The Fijians are determined to resist any move
in this direction. They realise that whatever its defects the
tribal system does provide a leadership capable of defending the
394

F i j i a n communal i n t e r e s t a g a i n s t what t h e y r e g a r d as t h e I n d i a n
t h r e a t . W i t h o u t t h e i r c h i e f s t h e y would be l e a d e r l e s s . I n many
respects, of course, the F i j i a n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i s o l d fashioned
and we s h o u l d seek o p p o r t u n i t i e s o f m o d e r n i s i n g i t . But r a t h e r
t h a n c u r t a i l i t s a c t i v i t i e s I would be i n c l i n e d t o g i v e i t more
r e s p o n s i b i 1 i t i e s p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t h e sphere o f l o c a l government.
I t may s t i l l be p o s s i b l e t o d e v e l o p m u l t i - r a c i a l l o c a l government
i n t h e main t o w n s ; b u t much o f t h e Colony i s p u r e l y F i j i a n ; and
i n t h e mixed r u r a l areas we a r e u n l i k e l y t o g e t m u l t i - r a c i a l l o c -
a l government e x c e p t i n a second t i e r ( 7 . e . d e l e g a t i o n s o f F i j i a n
and I n d i a n l o c a l government b o d i e s m e e t i n g i n j o i n t c o n f e r e n c e ) .
I n each case t h e F i j i a n A d m i n i s t r a t i o n c o u l d p l a y a v a l u a b l e
part.
I would p e r s o n a l l y be i n c l i n e d t o go f u r t h e r and encourage t h e
development o f some I n d i a n c o u n t e r p a r t t o t h e F i j i a n A d m i n i s t r a -
t i o n . T h i s would o f f e r I n d i a n s o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r p u b l i c s e r v i c e
w h i c h t h e y b o t h want and need. The e x i s t e n c e o f two communal
o r g a n i s a t i o n s moreover would h e l p us t o overcome a major p r o b l e m .
At t h e p r e s e n t t i m e , many necessary development o r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e
p r o j e c t s t e n d by t h e i r n a t u r e t o f a v o u r one community r a t h e r t h a n
t h e o t h e r . ' F a i r shares f o r a l l ' i s a s l o g a n which makes g o v e r n -
ment h e s i t a t e t o do a n y t h i n g f o r anybody. I f r o u g h l y equal s u b s i -
d i e s c o u l d be g i v e n t o b o t h c o m m u n i t i e s t o spend as each t h o u g h t
b e s t t h e r e would be l e s s cause f o r j e a l o u s y . S c h o l a r s h i p s a r e a
case i n p o i n t . A number o f I n d i a n c h i l d r e n a r e e d u c a t e d abroad
a t t h e i r p a r e n t s expense. Few F i j i a n s can a f f o r d t h i s . The F i j -
i a n s a r e t h u s keener on s c h o l a r s h i p s t h a n t h e I n d i a n s . Yet a t
p r e s e n t s c h o l a r s h i p s w h i c h a r e c e n t r a l l y a d m i n i s t e r e d have t o be
g i v e n on a b a s i s o f m e r i t ; and t h e I n d i a n s - d e s e r v e d l y on t h i s
b a s i s - t e n d t o scoop t h e p o o l . I f s c h o l a r s h i p s were a communal
m a t t e r , t h e F i j i a n s would p r o b a b l y spend more on them t h a n would
t h e I n d i a n s who c o u l d t h e n spend t h e money on o t h e r p r o j e c t s o f
which t h e y a r e i n g r e a t e r need.
H i t h e r t o we have h e l d up t h e c o n c e p t o f a s i n g l e m u l t i - r a c i a l
community as t h e goal t o w a r d s which F i j i a n s and I n d i a n s a l i k e
s h o u l d s t r i v e . The F i j i a n s w i l l no l o n g e r a c c e p t t h i s ; and t h e
more we l a y t h e emphasis on m u l t i - r a c i a l i s m , t h e more s u s p i c i o u s
t h e y w i l l become t h a t we p l a n t o s e l l them o u t t o t h e I n d i a n s .
The o n l y way, i n my v i e w , t o e x o r c i s e t h e f e a r o f communal d o m i -
n a t i o n i s t o make i t c l e a r ' a s o f now' t h a t we s t a n d f o r equal
r i g h t s f o r b o t h communities as c o m m u n i t i e s and t h a t we s h a l l n o t
p u l l o u t u n t i l b o t h ask us t o do s o . 1

1. Hilton Poynton, the permanent u n d e r - s e c r e t a r y , accepted Amery's assessment

t h a t ' f o r the foreseeable f u t u r e ' F i j i should continue to develop on communal
b a s i s but a s s e r t e d the long term objective should remain a m u l t i - r a c i a l (non-
r a c i a l ) s t a t e , accomplished by a withering away, r a t h e r than the e x t i n c t i o n
of, the communal r o o t s . Any commitment to communal r e p r e s e n t a t i o n should be
avoided. The introduction of a m i n i s t e r i a l system would be on a communal b a s i s
but should be presented as a continuation of the present, not a p a t t e r n for
a l l time. The t h r e e communities a l l agreed t h a t p a r i t y between them should be
r e t a i n e d . The p r o t e c t i o n of F i j i a n i n t e r e s t s in the c i v i l service should be
c a r e f u l l y considered, but F i j i a n administration must be streamlined and
modernised, and F i j i a n s taught to face up to modern economic r e a l i t i e s ; (to
Maddocks, 17 Nov.).
 395
122. (a) GOVERNOR SIR KENNETH MADDOCKS TO IAIN MACLEOD, 30 December I9601
[The recommendations of the Commission, chaired by Sir Alan Burns, en-
quiring into the land and population problems consisted of many straight-
forward, uncontroversial proposals, and certain major, and radical sug-
gestions attracting critical resolutions in the Council of Chiefs and
requiring careful explanation and persuasion. Among those which could be
accepted without delay were that the Fijian should enjoy as much personal
liberty as any other British subject; that the finalising of establishing
reserves should be accelerated; that landlord and tenant legislation
should be enacted; that the independent farmer should be actively encou-
raged; that there should be an overall long-term agricultural development
policy; that the replanting of coconuts should be government assisted;
that the co-operative movement should be extended to cover marketing of
Fijian produce and that a Natural Resources Council and Development Com-
mission be established. Those, which modified could be accepted, included
that Fijians could no longer occupy lands outside reserves except by
lease and rent; that leases should be defined 60 years for agriculture,
99 if tree crops; that Fijians should elect 3 legislative councillors and
their representatives on the Suva city council and that the Fijian Admi-
nistration should not be abolished immediately but certain modifications
in organisation and functions should be made. Two proposals were not ac-
ceptable - that the legislature should control the policy and work of the
Native Land Trust Board; and that the mataqali should by law be register-
ed as a corporate body and pledge its land as security for a loan. Three
proposals were deferred - that owners of land, whether freehold or commu-
nal, should be taxed for land inadequately used; that local governments
should be set up, and that where established, local Fijian administration
should cease.
The Burns report had called for major Fijian concessions (the right to
occupy communal land outside the reserves rent-free, the control of the
Native Trust Board by the Legislative Council, a penal tax on unused land
in reserves, the statutory right to declare new reserves 'from time to
time', even the total abandonment of reserves and the Fijian Administra-
tion, (their especial guardian and friend since 1874) for little more
than the prospect of greater prosperity. These could only have been 'thr-
ust through in the face of implacable hostility and unrest to the danger
of law and order' for the Fijians provided 80% of the security forces.
The proposal for a penal land tax on inadequately used land was seen

1. C O . 1036/812: P.A.C 118/294/01 conf. No.943. The report of the Burns com-
mission is in CO.85/73: Council P. No.l of 1960: the Council debate on the
statement of policy (CO.85/74) is No.31 of 1960. By dividing the recommenda-
tions into those acceptable, those to be modified,and those deferred, the pol-
icy statement was approved without a dissentient vote - a considerable achie-
vement given the doubt and mistrust, the initial reaction of the council of
chiefs and the inter-racial tensions provoked by the long sugar dispute seen
as an attempt at Indian domination. Burns had criticised the lack of elections
and claimed that the chiefs did not represent the Fijians. Maddocks had repor-
ted earlier the reaction to the Burns report - stronger, sharper and more
widespread than was expected in all age groups - chiefs and commoners. The
proposals were seen as a 'threat to the existence of the Fijians as a separate
people': (to Macleod, 14 April 1960: C O . 1036/700). Together with the Spate
report in 1959 (CO. 1036/307) which had drawn attention to the claims of the
individual farmer and criticised the communal and tribal systems, Ratuama
Vunivalu denounced it as 'a brutal attack on the Fijian way of life'.
 396

by Fijians as 'a not altogether honest device to deprive them of t h e i r

lands in default of payment of the t a x ' , and the marketing of produce
abroad (and new crops other than sugar and copra) was fraught by i n t e r -
national embargoes. The Native Land Trust Board, a statutory body, was
already s u f f i c i e n t l y within the competence of the Legislative Council,
and the unanimous registration of each mataqali was impractical in view
of the almost t o t a l opposition of the F i j i a n s . ]
The changes which a r e necessary must be b r o u g h t about by a p r o -
cess o f e v o l u t i o n , w i t h t h e c o n s e n t and c o - o p e r a t i o n o f t h e F i j -
i a n s . I t i s my b e l i e f t h a t t h i s p r o c e s s w i l l be g r e a t l y a c c e l e r -
a t e d , and t h e e m a n c i p a t i o n o f t h e F i j i a n s a c h i e v e d by t h e d e v e l o -
pment o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l f a r m e r , and by t h e p r o d u c t i o n as a r e s u l t
o f e l e c t i o n o f new l e a d e r s v o i c i n g t h e more independent views o f
i n d i v i d u a l f a r m e r s . These i n n o v a t i o n s which go t o t h e v e r y r o o t s
o f F i j i a n l i f e have now been a c c e p t e d and t h e y r e p r e s e n t a major
break i n t h e dyke o f F i j i a n c o n s e r v a t i s m .
From t h i s s o u r c e I e x p e c t t o f l o w i n c r e a s i n g demand f o r major
changes i n t h e F i j i a n A d m i n i s t r a t i o n . P r i o r t o t h e r e c e n t d i s t u r -
bances, v o i c e s were b e i n g r a i s e d i n c r i t i c i s m o f t h e F i j i a n A f -
f a i r s Board and i t s e x c e s s i v e c o n t r o l o f d a y - t o - d a y l i f e : f o r t h e
moment t h e F i j i a n s have c l o s e d t h e i r ranks i n t h e f a c e o f a com-
mon t h r e a t , b u t a l r e a d y t h e f o r c e s o f p r o g r e s s a r e coming t o t h e
f o r e a g a i n and p r o v i d e d a measure o f s t a b i l i t y and r a c i a l q u i e s -
cence can be a c h i e v e d , t h e s e f o r c e s may be e x p e c t e d t o g a t h e r
ever i n c r e a s i n g w e i g h t . I t i s here t h a t t h e hope f o r t h e f u t u r e
1 ies.
Coupled w i t h t h e s e two f a c t o r s , encouragement o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l
f a r m e r and t h e e l e c t i o n o f F i j i a n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , i t was p o s s i b -
l e t o g i v e f u r t h e r i n c e n t i v e , by t h e announcement i n L e g i s l a t i v e
C o u n c i l t h a t t h e revenues f r o m Crown Land Schedule A amounting
t o some £15,000 a y e a r , would be used f o r t h e n e x t f i v e y e a r s t o
a s s i s t i n d i v i d u a l F i j i a n s m a l l h o l d e r s , who a r e u n a b l e t o o b t a i n
l o a n s because t h e i r l a n d i s w i t h i n t h e r e s e r v e s . . . . [This firm pro-
posal was welcomed; i t contrasted with the several recent offers which
had inexplicably been as whimsically withdrawn. There was urgent need to
increase the number of o f f i c e r s on the Natives Lands Commission to expe-
d i t e the determination of the reserves and thereby the land available to
others. There was moreover similar need for land development schemes:
F i j i was importing £1.5m. foodstuffs which could be grown l o c a l l y . The
Burns detailed c r i t i c i s m of the F i j i a n Administration was insensitive and
provoked strong reaction: i t s recent removal ( i n 1967) to a separate
building from the rest of the Secretariat had seemed to emphasise i t s
isolation - imperium in imperio.] Had t h i s e x p a n s i o n been under
t a k e n i n t h e f u l l e s t c o - o p e r a t i o n w i t h c e n t r a l Government s e r -
v i c e s , i t i s l i k e l y t h a t t h e F i j i a n A d m i n i s t r a t i o n would have
been l e s s open t o c r i t i c i s m . I n t h e e v e n t t h e r e has been an
u n f o r t u n a t e tendency t o s e p a r a t i s m and indeed a l m o s t t o i s o l a -
tionism. All this has been to the liking of the inarticulate
m a j o r i t y o f F i j i a n s , a l t h o u g h f r o m t h e e a r l i e s t days t h e system
has had i t s c r i t i c s and t h e d i s s i d e n t m i n o r i t y have n o t been slow
to gain the hearing of p e r i p a t e t i c a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s , researchers
and r e p o r t e r s . I n r e c e n t y e a r s , t h i s m i n o r i t y has u n d o u b t e d l y
i n c r e a s e d i n numbers, t h e i r ranks b e i n g s w o l l e n by t h e i n c r e a s i n g
number o f urban d w e l l e r s .
Here a g a i n , I c o n s i d e r t h a t change must be b r o u g h t about by
f o r c e s o p e r a t i n g w i t h i n t h e F i j i a n community and n o t by c o m p u l -
 397
sion from without. The Council of Chiefs rejected the proposal
that the Fijian Office should return to the main Government Buil-
dings and for the time being I have felt it wise not to press the
matter but I shall seek an early opportunity to reopen the ques-
tion, although lack of physical accommodation will present a
considerable problem.
It is symptomatic of the Fijian outlook that one of the recom-
mendations which evoked the most vehement reaction was Recommen-
dation 19 (99) that the Governor should cease to be president of
the Native Land Trust Board. This recommendation makes it appar-
ent that the Commission was unable during its relatively brief
stay to fathom the unique working of the Fijian mind on the rela-
tionship between themselves, their land and the Crown. Every Fij-
ian has been taught from infancy that their land was ceded to
Queen Victoria and her heirs and he understands it to be held by
the Crown in trust for the Fijian people. They in their turn in
order to make land available for other races within their shores,
agreed that land outside the reserves could be leased by a Trust
Board to non-Fijians without reference to the owners. To the Fij-
ian it follows as the purest logic that the President of such a
trust must be Her Majesty's representative: to alter this would
be to sow the seeds of the deepest suspicion as to our intentions
and the validity of our promises. I would myself have welcomed
relinquishment of a position which could well be embarrassing in
that Fijian interests are not necessarily identical with those
of the Colony as a whole. However, in view of the strength of
feeling shown on this question, it would have been folly to have
pressed the matter. Fortunately it was a point I was able to con-
cede, because the Governor in fact very rarely presides at meet-
ings of the Native Land Trust Board, and to have the right to do
so if he wishes gives the Governor the power to intervene and to
weight the balances should occasion arise; the more attendance
of the Governor lends solemnity to the occasion and causes Fijian
members to ponder seriously whatever course is under consider-
ation. . . .
[The Government's statement of policy had proved a successful salvage
operation; giving the initial violent reaction to the Burns report. The
commission had usefully called almost every aspect of Fijian life into
question and forced a process of self-examination. Seeds had been sown
which must eventually take root. It was a pity that in the same period
the Indians (who almost universally accepted the report) had acted to
increase Fijian mistrust. But most thinking Indians recognised that
Indians had contributed to Fijian alarm and did not wish to reverse the
processes they wished to see set in train. The Europeans, to protect
their own privilege, favoured the status quo and found it convenient to
side with the Fijians.] In these circumstances, the difficult
task of providing a lead in the years ahead rests solely with the
official government. It is a task the difficulty of which I do
not under-estimate. It will demand tact, firmness, a deep and
sympathetic understanding coupled with the re-establishment and
retention of confidence. In one word, the greatest enemy to
progress in the years that lie ahead is fear.
398

( b ) GOVERNMENT PROPOSALS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM, 27 February 19611

[ I n his address opening the budget session, Governor Maddocks had
spoken of the ' d e s i r a b i l i t y of closer association of the elected
representatives...with the framing and implementation of p o l i c y ' : the
need was ' t o give more responsibility to unofficial members without
making any radical a l t e r a t i o n in the composition of the Legislative
Council'. Some wished to eliminate the o f f i c i a l majority on the l e g i s l a -
t i v e without any change in the executive council. I f u n o f f i c i a l s were to
play a greater part in administration, they must be given 'an opportunity
not merely to form an 'opposition' to Government, but to be members of
the Government'. Therefore i t was proposed to make reform in two stages:]
Stage 1. The 'Member' System.
At a time to be agreed the Governor w i l l i n v i t e u n o f f i c i a l mem-
bers of Executive Council to undertake supervisory f u n c t i o n s over
groups of Government departments: i f they decline other members
of L e g i s l a t i v e Council would be i n v i t e d to serve. There might f o r
instance be a Member f o r Natural Resources, a Member f o r Social
Services and so on. Such Members w i l l be provided w i t h o f f i c e s
i n the Government B u i l d i n g s . At t h i s stage they would have no ex-
ecutive a u t h o r i t y , but a l l p o l i c y matters r e l a t i n g t o t h e i r de-
partments would be r e f e r r e d t o them. They would have a large say
i n policy-making and would be expected to take an a c t i v e i n t e r e s t
in a l l aspects of the work of the departments i n t h e i r p o r t f o l i o .
Policy questions coming from departments which are at present
d e a l t w i t h i n the S e c r e t a r i a t would be r e f e r r e d t o the Members.
Where necessary f o r the various departments Members would take
p o l i c y matters t o Executive Council. They would be expected to
introduce B i l l s dealing with t h e i r departments in the L e g i s l a t i v e
Council and to take them through a l l stages of Council.
On appointment Members would be required t o give an undertaking
to accept c o l l e c t i v e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y : t h a t means t h a t when p o l i c y
matters are considered in Executive Council, a l l members, both
o f f i c i a l and u n o f f i c i a l , would, as at present, be f r e e t o advise
and express t h e i r views according to t h e i r conscience. Once a
decision has been taken in Executive Council, however, then a l l
would be bound by i t , whether i t represents t h e i r personal views
or not or must r e s i g n . At present only the o f f i c i a l side i s so
bound. I f an u n o f f i c i a l member of Executive Council should be
i r r e v o c a b l y opposed t o a decision of the Council on a matter of
major p o l i c y he would have no a l t e r n a t i v e but t o resign from the
Council. Given c o l l e c t i v e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y L e g i s l a t i v e Council
would then normally consist o f : - 8 o f f i c i a l s , 4 u n o f f i c i a l mem-
bers of Government, 11 other u n o f f i c i a l s . During t h i s stage the
o f f i c i a l m a j o r i t y would s t i l l be a v a i l a b l e but the other 8 o f f i c -
i a l s would not normal ly be requi red t o take t h e i r seats. . . . [Since
work would make substantial demands on members' time, they would be paid
salaries to compensate for loss of earnings.]

1. CO.1036/612: Council paper No.8 of 1961. The governor had already outlined
these proposals to the l e g i s l a t i v e c o u n c i l l o r s (to Hall, 17 Jan. 1961) - the
object was to a s s o c i a t e the people more c l o s e l y not only with the l e g i s l a t i v e
but with the executive ' i n i t s day-to-day f u n c t i o n s ' : the time had come for
government to be 'slowly t r a n s f e r r e d from the hands of senior c i v i l servants
to the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the p e o p l e . . . i n an orderly manner...which places
t r u e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y upon the e l e c t e d r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ' .
 399
The foregoing stage is intended purely as a preliminary stage
to give unofficials experience of working the ministerial system
and to give the Civil Service experience of working with minis-
ters. While it may be thought that unofficial members would
thereby merely be joining the Government side this is by no means
the way it works in practice. The Executive Council has at pre-
sent equal numbers of officials and unofficials, and all advise
the Governor according to their conscience and there is respect
for every view expressed. Members of Legislative Council accept-
ing Member/Minister status would therefore have a real say in
Government at policy-making level: they would also receive that
training in responsibility which is essential to a full minister-
ial system. Stage 2 cannot be operated unless there are persons
willing to accept collective responsibility.
Stage 2. The 'Ministerial' System.
The second stage which it is hoped would follow in due course
after the introduction of the first stage would be for a full
ministerial system with executive responsibility.
In this stage, Ministers will receive salaries in keeping with
their position, and full responsibility, for one or more depart-
ments. Government would retain the present ex officio posts of
Colonial Secretary, Attorney-General and Financial Secretary and
they would rank as Ministers. The number of Ministers from the
unofficial side could be either four, five or six. On the basis
of six, Executive Council would then consist of:- The Governor,
3 ex officio Ministers, 1 official Minister, 6 unofficial Minis-
ters.
Members of Executive Council would be selected by the Governor,
from the elected members of Legislative Council, and would be
required to accept collective responsibility for the decisions
of the Council and vote accordingly in Legislative Council. The
Legislative Council would then consist of:- 6 Fijians (4 elected,
2 elected by the Council of Chiefs), 6 Indians (4 elected and 2
nominated), 6 Europeans (4 elected and 2 nominated), 7 official
members.
As six of the Legislative Council unofficials would be Ministers
there would only need to be seven official members in the Legis-
lative Council who, voting with the six unofficial Ministers,
would form the Government majority. The remaining twelve unoffi-
cials would form the 'opposition'. The Governor would have re-
serve powers.
The figure of six for each group is put forward because it is
becoming evident that the present electoral boundaries are not
entirely satisfactory and some sort of boundary revision is
necessary. The Western Division, in particular, is over-large.
A further alternative which can be considered is that the Euro-
peans and Indians should have only 5 elected representatives
each, and that there should be 3 nominated members to be selected
from minority groups or others not represented in Council. These
are points for consideration....1

1. At the same time the governor's proposal for female suffrage was accepted
by all councillors. In the council debate in mid-April, however, the Fijians
(Semesa Sikivou the non-chief being the bold exception) expressed 'fear' of
Indian domination and of the repeated Indian demands for the common roll on
400

which they would not budge, and opposed the changes, demanding in turn affir-
mation of the deed of cession [1874: Vol.V, No.196], a statement on the para-
mountcy of Fijian interests [cf. Vol.VII, No.9] and a permanent link with the
U.K. and the Crown. Kamisese Mara wanted Fiji to become like another Channel
Island [Vol.1, p.178, perhaps remembering his Oxford tutor:] and regarded the
proposals as an 'unacceptable' step towards independence: George Cakobau ar-
gued that moves to self-government had succeeded elsewhere only when there was
homogeneity of race. The Europeans supported the Fijian opposition to the pro-
posals, especially regarding the executive (E. Bevington, the finance secret-
ary toH.P. Hall, 1 May 1961). The colonial secretary as acting governor, P.D.
Macdonald, took soundings and suggested 6 Fijian, 5 European and 5 Indian le-
gislative councillors (21 July: C.0.1036/612); but his despatch was in regard
to this inequality, thought 'needlessly provocative' to the Indians: 6 repre-
sentatives each, of whom 4 would be elected, but not on a common roll 'clearly
unacceptable at present' though maybe on some arrangement on East and Central
Africa lines as 'a bridge between communal roll and common roll'. Moreover,
it would be improper for the legislature to elect unofficial members to the
executive [but see Garvey, No.ll9d] for the latter was only responsive to the
former, not responsible and would make the introduction of a full ministerial
system (where the governor appointed as chief minister 'the person most likely
to command a majority and other ministers on the chief minister's advice';
(Thomas, Min. 10 Aug.). Maddocks decided not to publish Macdonald's despatch
and to substitute his own (Hall, Min. 24 Aug.). The governor and his advisers
were adamant that an assurance to the Fijians was vital if any reform was to
be made with their consent (Hall said they were 'terrified') - perhaps a
clause instructing the governor to refuse assent to any bill affecting Fijian
interests; but this was removed in the final despatch because of finding 'a
form of words which did not either promise too much or too little'. Instead
it was agreed that H.M.'s G. would continue 'to take into account the need to
safeguard legitimate Fijian interests': (Sept. draft in C.0.1036/613). So as
a result of the debate, soundings and discussion Maddocks revised his propo-
sals: no immediate change in the executive nor introduction of the 'member
system' as a training ground both for legislative councillors and civil ser-
vants, though there might be a change of view when 'it was more generally
understood that the Governor with his reserve powers can protect legitimate
Fijian interests' and a hope that 'a member system would be acceptable'. On
the legislature (apart from its composition) there was 'a complete unanimity'
- universal adult suffrage on a simple literary test, the retention of the
official majority, the extension of the life of the legislative council from
3 to 5 years, and (with all Europeans and Fijians and 2 Indians opposed to the
common roll) the continuance of communal rolls. The plea for an additional
Fijian as token recognition of 'the special position' deriving from the deed
of cession (supported by the Europeans) was hardly a real safeguard compared
with that the governor was empowered to provide. So Maddocks now recommended
4 elected members from each community, with 2 Fijians elected by the council
of chiefs, and 2 nominated Europeans and Indians (to Maudling, 28 Oct. 1961:
No.40 of 1961). Maudling accepted these proposals, regretting the opposition
to the 'member system': 'a greater degree of political responsibility and
influence can be attained by the unofficial members of the Executive Council
taking a fuller part...through the Membership system than by increasing the
number of unofficial members of the Legislative Council': (to Maddocks, 10
Nov. 1961). But next year Macdonald reported (to J. Marnham, 24 Sept. 1962)
that Fijian and European opinions were changing: they were beginning to rea-
lise that 'the winds of change' [Vol.VI, No.42a] would soon reach the Pacific
 401

( c ) GOVERNOR SIR KENNETH MADDOCKS TO SIR HILTON POYNTON, 16 February 19621

[ I n regard to Poynton's warning of U.N. intervention in the a f f a i r s of
dependent t e r r i t o r i e s , i t was unlikely that any attempt would be made ' t o
bring up F i j i in the U.N.' from the colony.] As you know, t h e
p r e s e n t mood o f t h e F i j i a n l e a d e r s i s t o r e s i s t any s u g g e s t i o n
t h a t F i j i s h o u l d o b t a i n a g r e a t e r measure o f independence because
t h e y c o n s i d e r t h a t a r e d u c t i o n i n c o n t r o l by t h e U n i t e d Kingdom
would l e a d t o an i n c r e a s e i n I n d i a n i n f l u e n c e and a weakening o f
t h e F i j i a n p o s i t i o n which depends on U n i t e d Kingdom p r o t e c t i o n .
One v a r i a t i o n t o t h i s view emerged i n a r e c e n t s e s s i o n o f L e g i s -
lative Council, when Ratu Penaia Ganilau and Ratu George Cakobau
i m p l i e d t h a t s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t , when i t comes, would be a c c e p t a b l e
t o t h e F i j i a n s , b u t o n l y on t h e c o n d i t i o n t h a t paramountcy f o r
t h e i r i n t e r e s t s i s s e c u r e d . 2 I n b r i e f , t h i s view r e s t s on t h e
argument t h a t , s i n c e F i j i was ceded t o t h e B r i t i s h Monarchy on
t h e t e r m s , s t a t e d o r i m p l i e d , i n t h e Deed o f C e s s i o n , t h e c o u n t r y
s h o u l d be handed back t o t h e F i j i a n s s h o u l d Her M a j e s t y ' s Govern-
ment d e c i d e t o r e l i n q u i s h c o n t r o l . 3
These s t a t e m e n t s were provoked by t h e b e l l i g e r e n t a t t i t u d e a d -
o p t e d r e c e n t l y i n t h e L e g i s l a t u r e by t h e I n d i a n members, p a r t i c u -
l a r l y Deoki and Lakshman, and I c e r t a i n l y do n o t t h i n k t h e y
should be interpreted as indicating any desire by the Fijian
l e a d e r s , o r indeed by t h e F i j i a n people as a w h o l e , t o sever
t h e i r c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e U n i t e d Kingdom so l o n g as i t remains
the policy of the United Kingdom to provide special protection
f o r F i j i a n i n t e r e s t s . For i n s t a n c e , Ratu George Cakobau r e c e n t l y
a t t e n d e d t h e independence c e l e b r a t i o n s i n Western Samoa as t h e

'changing from the present zephyrs to winds of possibly hurricane force fanned
by the U.N. or a t l e a s t the Afro-Asian b l o c ' . The report of the U.N. mission
to Papua-New Guinea had given impetus to t h i s . So the 'member/minister' system
might have to be introduced soon, even possibly with the new c o n s t i t u t i o n in
April 1963, which would be e x c e l l e n t for the future of F i j i . 'Once there i s
one or 2 Fijian m i n i s t e r s , drawing a generous salary and exercising power and
a u t h o r i t y , i t w i l l work wonders not only with the morale of the ministers but
also with t h e i r r a c i a l c o n s t i t u e n t s and the public g e n e r a l l y ' .
1. C O . 1036/775 s e c r e t and personal. Poynton was permanent under-secretary
(1959-66). 2. The s e c r e t a r y for Fijian a f f a i r s , A.C. Reid (previously B r i t i s h
consul in Tonga) wrote p r i v a t e l y to Ivison Macadam t h a t F i j i a n s in the b a t t a -
lion in Malaya ( i n c l . 3 members of the l e g i s l a t i v e council) had seen the Ma-
l a y ' s faced with sharing t h e i r homeland with a foreign race b e t t e r equipped
for the cold war of economics. F i j i a n s were hardly s a t i s f i e d with the gover-
n o r ' s assurance t h a t the public service commission would maintain a 50/50
balance between F i j i a n s and Indians. The additional c o u n c i l l o r asked for would
have made l i t t l e difference, but i t would have symbolised the paramountcy: i t
was a moderate request and they were ' p r e t t y h u r t ' to be r e j e c t e d . In future
they might be l e s s moderate - t h a t the l e g i s l a t i v e council should be a l l F i j -
ian as in Tonga i t was a l l Tongan. The r a p i d i t y of decolonisation in the Com-
monwealth gave them l i t t l e confidence. They did not r e f e r to themselves as F i -
j i a n s , t h e i r own name was ' t h e Owners - a proud name which f a i t h f u l l y r e f l e c t s
their thought': (10 May, 1962: ibid.).
3. Macdonald reported t h a t Ganilau, in the budget debate in May, had asked for
the government to be handed over to the F i j i a n s and Cakobau had repeated the
demand to the shock of the Indians who required assurance t h a t H.M. ' s G. would
be fair to all parties: (to Marnham, 15 May ibid.).
402

representative of Fiji, and has expressed the view, since his

r e t u r n , t h a t W e s t e r n Samoa's i n d e p e n d e n c e i s p r e m a t u r e and t h a t
Fiji should maintain the United Kingdom connection, for both
sentimental and material reasons.
Some o f t h e I n d i a n p o l i t i c i a n s a r e d e f i n i t e l y t h i n k i n g i n t e r m s
o f s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t f o r F i j i w i t h i n t h e i r t i m e , and t h e y p r o b a b l y
have the support of an increasing proportion of the Indian intel-
ligentsia. The Pacific Review, which reflects the views of A.D.
P a t e l , i s a s t r o n g s u p p o r t e r of the approach t h a t F i j i should de-
v e l o p as a s e l f - g o v e r n i n g i n t e r - r a c i a l s o c i e t y . N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e
majority of Indians continue to recognise the advantage of the
U n i t e d Kingdom m a i n t a i n i n g t h e b a l a n c e between t h e I n d i a n s and
the Fijians, and are well aware of the dangers of agitating folr
self-government against the wishes of the Fijians. I think it
reasonable to conclude, therefore, that, although there will be
s p o r a d i c o u t b u r s t s i n f a v o u r o f s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t by a m i n o r i t y o f
Indians, these will not represent the feelings of the Indian
p o p u l a t i o n as a w h o l e w h i c h , a t p r e s e n t , i s c o n t e n t t o f o l l o w t h e
Fijian line, and to adopt a cautious approach to change. The
Europeans favour the maintenance of the status quo.
For t h e t i m e b e i n g , t h e r e f o r e , I do n o t a n t i c i p a t e a n y p r e s s u r e
f r o m w i t h i n F i j i t o a c c e l e r a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c h a n g e by b r i n g i n g
the a f f a i r s of the Colony before the United N a t i o n s , a l t h o u g h the
pressure will grow from the Indian intel 1 igentsia and, if the
economic situation deteriorates, they may obtain some support
from the fringe element amongst the Fijians, i.e. Fijians who
have abandoned their traditional loyalties and way of life, and
who are developing an anti-European bias. Mohammed Tora is the
prototype of this class, and his followers mostly live in the
urban areas where they are p a r t i c u l a r l y v u l n e r a b l e t o t h e e f f e c t s
o f an e c o n o m i c d e p r e s s i o n .

(d) DUNCAN SANDYS TO GOVERNOR SIR KENNETH MADDOCKS, 31 J u l y 19621

Maddocks had (19 June: No.388) set out t h e reasons f o r concluding the
i n t r o d u c t i o n o f i n t e r - r a c i a l l o c a l government as 'unwise p o l i t i c a l l y ' a t
p r e s e n t . F i j i a n f e a r of I n d i a n domination was the main cause: they were
l i k e l y t o refuse any c o n s t i t u t i o n a l progress unless they had assurance
about t h e i r f u t u r e s t a t u s i n any reforms i n c e n t r a l government: B r i t a i n ' s
f u t u r e p a r t was c r u c i a l and an e a r l y d e c i s i o n was u r g e n t . This he accep-
t e d , but t h e r e was no easy and a t t r a c t i v e s o l u t i o n t o an i n t r a c t a b l e
problem.] There is bound to be mounting international pressure
a g a i n s t t h e i n d e f i n i t e c o n t i n u a t i o n of B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l r u l e (and
may be mounting pressure from within from the Indian community
as t h e i r numbers c o n t i n u e t o i n c r e a s e b o t h a b s o l u t e l y and r e l a -
t i v e l y t o the m i n o r i t y communities); and, although I would c e r -
t a i n l y hope t o r e s i s t s u g g e s t i o n s f o r w i t h d r a w a l so p r e m a t u r e as
to leave chaos behind us, I see little prospect that it will be
practicable for us to stay in control in Fiji for anything like
a s l o n g a s t h e m a j o r i t y o f F i j i a n s seem t o e n v i s a g e . P r o p h e c y i s
rash, but it must be doubtful whether Britain can still expect
t o be i n c o n t r o l i n F i j i t e n y e a r s h e n c e , a n d t h e t e m p o o f e v e n t s
elsewhere suggest that it is questionable whether the era of

1. C O . 1036/775 No.417. Sandys was now the s e c r e t a r y of s t a t e at the C O . and

C.R.O., united on 13 July 1962
 403

B r i t i s h c o n t r o l can be p r o l o n g e d f o r as long as t h a t .
The a l t e r n a t i v e t o i t which you m e n t i o n , namely t h e r e c o g n i t i o n
o f F i j i a n paramountcy i n some f o r m , seems t o me i m p r a c t i c a b l e .
I do n o t see t h a t we c o u l d p o s s i b l y persuade, and i t would be
wrong and i m p o s s i b l e p o l i t i c a l l y t o t r y t o c o m p e l , t h e I n d i a n s
t o a c c e p t a c o n s t i t u t i o n which r e c o g n i s e d F i j i a n paramountcy.
Even were we t o do so and however such a p r o v i s i o n was e n t r e n -
ched, I f i n d i t u n r e a l i s t i c t o t h i n k t h a t t h e y , w i t h a g r o w i n g
m a j o r i t y o f t h e p o p u l a t i o n , t h e i r economic dominance and w e l l -
known p r o p e n s i t y f o r s e l f - a d v a n c e m e n t , would a c c e p t i t a f t e r our
d e p a r t u r e , and I s h o u l d e x p e c t them t o r e c e i v e c o n s i d e r a b l e o u t -
s i d e s u p p o r t i n r e v o l t i n g a g a i n s t what would s u r e l y seem t o t h e
w o r l d a t l a r g e t o be t h e n e g a t i o n o f democracy. However i n n o c e n t
t h e F i j i a n s may be o f t h e h i s t o r i c a l developments which have
b r o u g h t t h e I n d i a n s t o t h e p o s i t i o n o f b e i n g t h e l a r g e s t commun-
i t y , t h a t i s t h e p o s i t i o n and t h e I n d i a n s a r e here t o s t a y . Any
s o l u t i o n which does n o t r e c o g n i s e t h i s i s d o o m e d . . . .
[A f o r t h r i g h t statement that a privileged position for the Fijians was
one which the modern world could not be expected to f i n d acceptable and
that the only worthy and suitable future for F i j i would be as a m u l t i -
racial state where citizens of a l l races had f u l l opportunity to play
t h e i r part, should be considered. B r i t a i n and F i j i must unite to aim for
t h i s goal. Indeed i t was not too early to begin a consideration of how
to adjust i n s t i t u t i o n s to t h i s end. Such action would be shock t a c t i c s :
timing and presentation would need careful thought, and implementation
sustained action. Sandys was reluctant to believe the end unobtainable:
to f a l l back either on entrenched separation or an indefinite continu-
ation of the status quo was a counsel of despair. Unless early steady
progress was made there would be a major explosion when the Indians
recognised t h e i r strength and decided to use i t . He wanted from Maddocks
positive recommendations for the next 5 years. 1 ]

I . The CO. was seeking to goad Maddocks and h i s advisers to more constructive
thought than they had yet evinced: (Thomas, Min. 8 July, 1962). Maddocks r e p -
l i e d t h a t , though i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y there was mounting p r e s s u r e , demand for self
-government within F i j i was ' n e g l i g i b l e ' . If l e f t to the colonial communities,
the pace would be slow and gradual. Recent external events had brought home
to some t h a t self-government, even independence, might be forced on the c o l -
ony. The F i j i a n s p a r t i c u l a r l y were worried by U.K. entry into the E.E.C. as
a turn away from Commonwealth, by the s e l l out of the Papuans, and by the U.N.
a g i t a t i o n for independence. Public discussion must be stimulated but shock
t a c t i c s would be f a t a l , causing anger and amazement, a breaking of a l l B r i t i s h
pledges. F i j i a n s would see themselves abandoned to s u i t the U.K. in face of
U.N. pressure: i t would lead to non-co-operation, prejudicing self-government
and leading to violence. Sandys statement underestimated F i j i a n opposition and
assumed i n c o r r e c t l y t o t a l Indian d e s i r e for self-government without delay: no
s e n s i b l e Indian wanted bloodshed and they were easy victims to mass h y s t e r i a :
they accepted p r o t e c t i o n for the F i j i a n s as j u s t i f i e d , but not the privileged
p o s i t i o n of the Europeans. Any such statement t h a t B r i t a i n could not continue
i n d e f i n i t e l y was best l e f t unsaid. The best progress would be to work toward
i n t e r n a l self-government, to entrench the Fijian need for protection in the
c o n s t i t u t i o n and to maintain the U.K. connection as long as p o s s i b l e , perhaps
in the form of a Treaty of Friendship as between the U.K. and Tonga. Given the
d i v i s i o n s and r i v a l r i e s within the Indian community, some compromise accept-
able to the F i j i a n s and Indians would be p o s s i b l e : many a Fijian was 'more
404
(e) I.S. WHEATLEY: MINUTE, 6 December 19631
The situation in Malaya is really very different from that in
Fiji, since most of the country consisted of a set of protected
Malay states, each with their own Malay rulers and Malay c i v i l
service. The Chinese were predominant only in commerce. Thus when
it came to the stage of making the Constitution it was really the
Malays who were making the concessions from their traditional and
actual position.
This is of course not to say that we cannot get something use-
ful out of the Malayan constitution....2

acceptable as leader than an Indian from a different faction'. But H.M.'s G.

would have to take the initiative and make proposals. The Fijians felt that
if Britain thought Fiji ready for internal self-government, it should say so
and not let it appear that it was giving in to the U.N. He had begun with a
Cession day speech (8 Oct.), warning electors in March 1963 that some unoffic-
ials elected would have to shoulder administrative responsibilities and should
be chosen to work not for sectional benefit but for the good of all in Fiji.
Haddocks contemplated a compromise to which all Indians might agree that the
chief minister should be a Fijian, that laws affecting Fijian land would req-
uire a two-thirds majority, and that a balance in the civil service (as in
Malaya) should be preserved. At present with no genuine parties in either com-
munity, it was likely that parties will develop only on racial lines and that
no representative body would emerge to whom the government could be handed
over. If so, the legislature should elect its chief minister who would be re-
quired to choose his cabinet with 'an agreed minimum number of ministers from
each of the main racial groups'. The performance of the Native Land Trust
Board would be speeded up and the ratio of Fijians in the civil service would
be protected; and the localisation of the service (now 90% local) would be
continued. Compared with many territories recently independent, Fiji was rea-
sonably well equipped to govern itself with aid from overseas, chiefly tech-
nical assistance from the U.K. As for the 5-year plan: the member system
should be introduced soon after the 1963 election, then a full ministerial
system maybe in Jan. 1965 with the governor still presiding over the executive
and with colonial secretary, A-G and financial secretary as ex officio minis-
ters; full internal self-government would follow a few years later. Fiji
should have responsible government while men of the experience and calibre of
Ganilau and Mara were available to be ministers. A first step towards self-
government created its own momentum: (to Duncan Sandys, 10 Oct. 1962). Mara
had told the C.O. he had regretted his failure to persuade his colleagues dur-
ing 1960 to accept the member system and to go as far as they could with the
Burns recommendations; he had helped to secure a majority in the council of
chiefs for 3 Fijians to be directly elected: (Hall to Haddocks, 3 Oct. 1961:
C.O.1036/1001). 1. C.O.1036/618: for John Marnham. Wheatley had consulted
C.S. Roberts in the department dealing with Malaya, on what features in the
Malay constitution had made it acceptable to the Chinese and to international
opinion, though no concessions in favour of the Chinese section of the popula-
tion had been made; where dereservation of Malay land required a % majority
in the State Legislature and in each house of the Federal Parliament and con-
sent of the (all-Malay) council of rulers; and where citizenship provisions
and maybe electoral weightings favoured the Malays? (Min, 4 Dec.). Roberts had
pointed out that the Chinese had always been a minority in Malaya (excluding
Singapore): there had been a long unbroken history of Malay rule and discrimi-
nation: the Malays were united while the Chinese were divided culturally and
ideologically - some English educated, others sympathising with the Chinese
 405

123. REPORT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE, 9 August 19651

[The Secretary of State, Arthur Greenwood, had informed the Governor
(15 Aug. 1963) that the time was approaching for future British-Fijian
relations to be classified and codified and in February 1965 it was de-
cided to hold a Conference. Preliminary discussions had taken place, but
Patel's Federation party had decided (26 April) to withdraw. There was
otherwise 2general agreement in Fiji that independence should not yet be
discussed but that it was hoped it would be possible to build...'a move

People's Republic, others were Nationalist, others neutral; the Chinese were
more interested in trade and industry than local politics: the Malayan Chinese
Association was cultivated by the dominant Malay party and was assured of rep-
resentation in the ministry and the present constitution was not unduly opp-
ressive of minorities. (In Chinese preponderant Singapore, the constitution
recognised "the special position of the Malays who are the indigenous people
of the island'.); (Min. 6 Dec.) 2. In 1963 the executive council consisted
of the governor, 3 ex officio and 7 nominees (incl. 3 unofficial legislative
councillors, one from each race, and the legislative council of the speaker,
up to 19 officials and 18 unofficials (6 Europeans and 6 Indians - 4 each
elected from constituencies and 2 each nominated - and 6 Fijians - 4 elected
from constituencies and 2 elected in secret ballot by the council of chiefs.
On 1 July 1964 a membership system was introduced - the 3 unofficials taking
natural resources, social services, communications and works while in 1966-7
orders-in-council established a council of ministers (with chief minister,
chief secretary, A-G, finance minister, minister for Fijian affairs; communi-
cations; works and tourism; commerce, industry and labour; social services;
natural resources; without portfolio, and an assistant for social services)
and legislative council (up to 4 officials and 36 elected - 9 Fijian, 7 In-
dians, 7 general on three communal rolls, and 2 Fijians elected by the council
of chiefs and 9 elected by all groups voting together for seats reserved for
3 years. In the elections of 1966 two political parties emerged which domina-
ted the next 20 years: the Federation party under A.D. Patel then Sidediq
Koya, later the Fijian National Democratic party, with minimal non-Indian sup-
port: and the Alliance party, led by Sir Kamisese Mara (P.M.1970-87 and post-
1990) based on the chiefly Fijian Association which in 1966 won 23 out of the
34 elected seats; its loyalties were the 4R's - ratuism, royalism, religion
and rugby. The Federation party, urged prior need for independence before the
Fijians and Indians could resolve their problems. 1. P.P.1964-5 XII(2783)
pp.915-929. The conference was attended inter alia by Arthur Greenwood, Eirene
White, Sir. H. Poynton, Professor S.A. de Smith and by Ratu Mara, A.D. Patel,
Ratu Ganilau, A. Deoki, J. Madhavan, Ratu Cakobau, Semese Sikivou and C.P.
Singh. A despatch from Greenwood urged moves to a greater degree of internal
self-government.
2. The U.S.S.R. was leading the drive for independence in the special commit-
tee on the situation with regard to the implementation of the U.N. declaration
on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples. In July
1963 it sought a fact-finding mission to Fiji (U.N. gen. ass. A/AC 190/105)
(also A/AC 109 petition 140), and in Nov. 1964, with a U.N. resolution demand-
ing the rights of the peoples of Fiji to self-determination and national sove-
reignty (A/AC 109, 302), a special meeting recalled previous resolutions:
1514 (XV) of 14 Dec. 1960; 164 (XVI) of 27 Nov. 1961; 1810 (XVII) of 17 Dec.
1962; 1951 (XVIII) of 11 Dec. 1963; and 1963 (XVIII) of 11 Dec. 1963. It was
regretted that no effective steps had been taken to implement resolution 1951
and demanded implementation without delay of that resolution requiring 'one
man, one vote" in the creation of representative institutions, the transfer-
 406
to greater internal self-government'; to develop the membership system;
to broaden the elected element, though without multiplying the number of
communal r o l l s (Rotumans, Chinese and other Pacific Islanders); and to
consider further safeguards for human r i g h t s . The purpose was to work out
a constitution which preserved the l i n k with B r i t a i n and within which
progress could be made towards internal self-government. The conference
agreed on the discontinuation of nomination, the introduction of an elec-
ted majority, the enfranchisement of minority groups, universal adult
suffrage, provision for a m i n i s t e r i a l system and a b i l l of r i g h t s . But
there was t o t a l disagreement on the method of election. The Indians de-
manded single member constituencies on a common r o l l , but while the F i j i -
ans and Europeans thought that 'desirable in the long term', they saw no
possibility in the foreseeable future and wanted retention of the status
quo. H.M.'s G. agreed that a common r o l l was not practicable u n t i l there
was greater integration of the communities, but i t attached great impor-
tance to a system whereby some members would be elected by and respon-
sible to voters from a l l the constituencies, a proposal accepted only by
one Indian delegate, though eventually by a l l the Fijians and Europeans.
Indians wanted f u l l internal self-government immediately while the other
delegates a l l thought i t necessary for the governor to retain a substan-
t i a l measure of discretionary power.
I t was agreed to retain the Crown and to have a Governor appointed by
the Crown. There was discussion on the judiciary and the public service
as a special responsibility of the Governor. There would be a B i l l of
Rights enumerating the usual provisions and protections, but] The
r i g h t t o freedom f r o m d i s c r i m i n a t i o n would n o t i n v a l i d a t e e x i s t -
i n g l a w s , b u t when t h e d i s c r i m i n a t o r y e f f e c t o f a p a r t i c u l a r law
had been reduced o r e l i m i n a t e d , i t c o u l d n o t be r e i n t r o d u c e d . I t
was a c c e p t e d t h a t t h e aim s h o u l d be t o e l i m i n a t e c o n f l i c t between
e x i s t i n g laws and t h e r i g h t t o freedom f r o m d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . The
I n d i a n group o f t h e F i j i d e l e g a t i o n wished t o r e c o r d t h e i r view
t h a t t h e r e s h o u l d be no s a v i n g f o r e x i s t i n g laws which were i n
c o n f l i c t w i t h t h e r i g h t t o freedom f r o m d i s c r i m i n a t i o n and w h i c h
c o u l d n o t be b r o u g h t w i t h i n one o f t h e s p e c i f i c e x c e p t i o n s s e t
o u t by t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n ; t h e s e laws s h o u l d t h e r e f o r e become v o i d
as f r o m t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n . I f , however, t h i s
was n o t p r a c t i c a b l e , t h e y suggested t h a t such laws s h o u l d be
saved o n l y f o r a s p e c i f i e d p e r i o d , w i t h o u t p r e j u d i c e t o t h e i r
e a r l i e r repeal i f p o s s i b l e .
The L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l would c o m p r i s e t h i r t y - s i x members e l e c -
t e d as d e s c r i b e d below t o g e t h e r w i t h n o t more t h a n f o u r o f f i c i a l
members. The number o f F i j i a n members e l e c t e d on t h e F i j i a n com-
munal r o l l would be i n c r e a s e d f r o m t h e p r e s e n t f o u r t o a t o t a l
o f n i n e . I n a d d i t i o n , t h e r e would c o n t i n u e t o be two F i j i a n mem-
bers e l e c t e d by t h e C o u n c i l o f C h i e f s . For t h e purpose o f t h e e l -
e c t i o n o f t h e s e n i n e members, Rotumans 1 and o t h e r P a c i f i c I s l a n -
d e r s would be g i v e n t h e o p p o r t u n i t y o f b e i n g grouped w i t h t h e
F i j i a n s and would t h u s , f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e , be e n f r a n c h i s e d and
e l i g i b l e t o be e l e c t e d t o t h e L e g i s l a t i v e c o u n c i l . The number o f

ence of a l l power to the people of the t e r r i t o r y in accordance with t h e i r f r e -

ely expressed w i l l and without any c o n d i t i o n s , the i n t e g r a t i o n of the various
communities and the reporting back by the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e power (H.M.'s G. ) of
the implementations of the U.N. demands.
1. Rotuma, an island dependency of F i j i (annexed in 1881) 400 miles from Suva
 407
Indian members elected on the Indian communal roll would also be
increased from the present four to a total of nine. Instead of
the present four European members elected on the European commu-
nal roll there would be seven members elected on a roll, on which
people of the Chinese and other communities, not at present enti-
tled to vote, would also be eligible for registration. They would
also be eligible for election to the Legislative Council.
In addition to the twenty-seven members elected as described
above, a further nine members would be elected on a system of
cross-voting1 under which, though the seats would be reserved in
equal proportions for members of the three communities (the Rotu-
mans and other Pacific Islanders being grouped with the Fijians
and the Chinese and others with the Europeans), each member would
be elected by persons of all communities. In this way each elect-
or would take part in the election of members of the other commu-
nities as well as of his own, and each member of the Council el-
ected under this system would be responsible to persons of the
other communities as well as his own. For the purpose of these
elections the colony would be divided into three constituencies,
each returning one Fijian (or Rotuman or other Pacific Islander),
one Indian and one European (or Chinese). The electoral rolls
would be made up by amalgamating the three communal rolls for the
relevant areas.
As indicated [in paragraph 5] above, the Indian group submitted
a proposal for the immediate introduction of elections on a com-
mon roll without any seats being communally reserved. When it be-
came clear that this was unacceptable to the two other communit-
ies they put forward certain alternative compromise proposals un-
der which, to the extent that elections on a fully communal basis
were to be retained, there would continue to be parity between
the Fijian and Indian communities... [These alternative proposals -
involving communal rolls, cross-voting and common roll - were summarized
below.]
The Legislative Council would contain 36 elected members.
Twelve of these would be elected on communal rolls as at present,
four members for each community. A further 18 members would be
elected by a system of cross-voting. For this purpose Fiji would
be divided into three constituencies, each returning six members.
In each constituency two seats would be reserved for Fijians, two
would be reserved for Indians, one would be reserved for a Euro-
pean and the remaining one for a member of the other communities,
e.g. Rotumans, other Pacific Islanders and Chinese. The remaining
six members would be returned by the same three constituencies,
each constituency returning two of them. The electorate would be
the same as for the 18 seats just described but there would be
no racial qualification for candidates.
It was explained that the Indian group expected that the mem-
bers of the minor communities (Rotumans, etc.) would participate
in the above non-communal elections.
Where one constituency was required to return more than one

and with its own council. 1. A new attempt to provide for cross-voting -
ensuring that Fijians would vote for Indian candidates and vice versa. It was
(as indicated in the next paragraph) a compromise. Universal adult franchise
had been introduced in 1963.
408
member in each of the above elections (e.g. two Fijians for the
racially-reserved seats on the cross-voting system or two members
for the non-reserved seats) the system used would be the 'first
past the post' system.
The Indian group explained that if these proposals, or if a
scheme worked out on similar lines, were acceptable to the dele-
gates, they recognised that certain safeguards might be consi-
dered necessary to avoid under-representation of particular
communities.
When these alternative proposals made by the Indian group fail-
ed to gain acceptance by the Fijian and European groups, the Ind-
ian group again took their stand on their original proposals for
the immediate introduction of common roll elections and made it
clear that the proposals described [in paragraphs 21 and 22] above
were unacceptable to them.
The Indian group unanimously rejected, and recorded their
strong protest against, the proposal that there should be two
more Fijian members of the legislature than Indian members. They
rejected the argument of the Fijian and European groups that the
additional representation was justified by the special position
occupied by the Fijian community in Fiji. They also rejected the
argument of the United Kingdom delegation that two extra Fijian
seats were justified by the inclusion of the Rotuman and other
Pacific Island communities in the Fijian electorate. They made
it clear that, as the Indians constituted the majority of the
population, though not necessarily of the electorate at the next
election, they were entitled to at least parity of representation
with the Fijian, the Rotuman and other Pacific Island communities
combined.
As mentioned [in paragraph 5] above, one member of the Indian
group (Mr. Singh) indicated that he could accept only in part the
proposals set out in paragraphs 21 and 22. While he would have
preferred the adoption of elections on a common roll basis, he
was prepared to accept the proposals but only in so far as they
related to the method of election. So far as the number of mem-
bers was concerned, he supported the other members of the Indian
group in contending that parity between the two major communities
should be retained....
[The only nominees in future would be officials: the Governor's power to
nominate up to 16 officials (in addition to the 3 ex officio- the chief
secretary, A.G. and finance secretary) would disappear, as would his po-
wer to nominate unofficials to represent various communities. There would
be a Speaker and the Legislative Council would have full power to make
laws, subject to the Colonial Laws Validity Act [Vol.IV, No.49]. The
Governor would be empowered to assent, refuse assent, reserve or ensure
certification: certain laws would require a % majority of the elected
members - to which the Indian delegates objected. The Council could be
prorogued but its maximum life would be 5 years.]
The executive power would remain formally vested in the Gover-
nor at all stages, although particular laws might confer certain
functions on other officers and authorities. The Governor would
continue to appoint the unofficial members of the Executive Coun-
cil in his discretion but would provide for appropriate represen-
tation of the various communities in the unofficial element of
the Executive Council. This would be regulated as at present by
 409
convention. These members1 would be drawn from the elected mem-
bers of the L e g i s l a t i v e Council. In a d d i t i o n the Governor would
be empowered t o appoint not more than four o f f i c i a l members of
the Executive Council. The C o n s t i t u t i o n would provide t h a t the
Governor might at an appropriate time appoint members of the Ex-
ecutive Council t o be M i n i s t e r s with executive powers in c e r t a i n
f i e l d s of public business, and also M i n i s t e r s without P o r t f o l i o .
The Executive council would be described as a Council of M i n i s -
t e r s when M i n i s t e r s were appointed.
The Governor would consult the Executive Council in the exer-
cise of a l l his f u n c t i o n s (except on t r i v i a l or urgent matters
or where the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t made i t undesirable). He would not
be required t o consult i n cases where he was s p e c i f i c a l l y autho-
r i s e d or required by the C o n s t i t u t i o n t o act i n h i s d i s c r e t i o n
or on the advice o f , or a f t e r c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h , some other per-
son or a u t h o r i t y . He would i n general act in accordance with the
advice of the Executive Council but could act against such advice
where he considered i t necessary in the i n t e r e s t s of public o r -
der, p u b l i c f a i t h or good government; in such cases he would be
required t o seek approval of the Secretary of State.
The Indian group of the F i j i delegation wished t o record t h e i r
view t h a t the Governor should be required t o act in accordance
with the advice of the Executive Council, except where he c o n s i -
dered t h a t he should r e j e c t i t in the i n t e r e s t s of one of his
special r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . As explained [in paragraph 6] above, one
member of the Indian group (Mr. Singh) f e l t unable to support the
other members of the group in proposing the immediate i n t r o d u c -
t i o n of f u l l i n t e r n a l self-government. He agreed with the other
members of the F i j i delegation t h a t i t would s t i l l be necessary
f o r the Governor t o r e t a i n s u b s t a n t i a l d i s c r e t i o n a r y powers.
Certain subjects would be reserved to the Governor in h i s
d i s c r e t i o n as his special r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . These would include
defence, external a f f a i r s , i n t e r n a l s e c u r i t y and the p u b l i c
service....
[An advisory committee of the A.G. and 4 others (including an executive
councillor and a G.P.) would advise the Governor on his exercise of the
prerogative of mercy. He would be required to refer all capital cases to
i t and others as he thought f i t ; but its advice would not be binding on
him. The A.G. was ultimately responsible for all criminal prosecutions.2

1. The membership system had been introduced by o r d e r - i n - c o u n c i l in July 1964

with u n o f f i c i a l s having r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for departmental administration.
2. Orders-in-council in 1966 and 1967 established a m i n i s t e r i a l system - a
council of ministers and a chief minister with 3 ex officio and 6 ministerial
heads of departments and an a s s i s t a n t minister for s o c i a l s e r v i c e s . In the e l -
ections of 1966 the two p a r t i e s emerged which dominated F i j i for the next 20
years - the National Federal and the Alliance: the l a t t e r won 23 of the 34
s e a t s (and with the support of the c h i e f s ' nominees and the independents the
e f f e c t i v e majority was 18); the F e d e r a l i s t s had only 9 s e a t s . When in Sept.
1967 the Alliance moved to introduce the m i n i s t e r i a l system the 9 F e d e r a l i s t s
walked out, boycotted two sessions and f o r f e i t e d t h e i r s e a t s (March 1968). But
the s e c r e t a r y of s t a t e for Commonwealth a f f a i r s told A.D. Patel t h a t since
1965 the c o n s t i t u t i o n was working so well there was no need for another any-
time soon (H, Bowden, 29 Aug. 1968). In Sept. though the Alliance vigorously
contested the vacancies i t l o s t with a 78.5% vote against i t s candidates with
410

1 2 4 . INDEPENDENCE ORDER-IN-COUNCIL, 30 September 19701

W h e r e a s o n 1 0 t h O c t o b e r 1874 C a k o b a u , s t y l e d T u i V i t i a n d V u n i -
v a l u , and o t h e r High C h i e f s s i g n i f i e d t h e i r l o y a l t y t o Her Most
G r a c i o u s M a j e s t y Queen V i c t o r i a a n d t h e i r d e d i c a t i o n t o God a n d
t o t h e r u l e o f l a w by t h e s o l e m n a g r e e m e n t known a s t h e Deed o f
C e s s i o n made a n d c o n c l u d e d by t h e m o f t h e o n e p a r t a n d S i r H e r c u -
l e s George R o b e r t R o b i n s o n , t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f Her M a j e s t y ,
o f t h e o t h e r p a r t : And W h e r e a s i n November 1879 t h e C h i e f s o f
Rotuma s i m i l a r l y s i g n i f i e d a d h e r e n c e t o s u c h p r i n c i p l e s by t h e
Deed o f R o t u m a C e s s i o n : And W h e r e a s many p e r s o n s o f a l l r a c e s a n d
c r e e d s h a v e come f r o m d i v e r s c o u n t r i e s a n d h a v e d e s i r e d p e a c e a n d
p r o s p e r i t y under t h e p r e c e p t s and p r i n c i p l e s o f such c e s s i o n s :
And W h e r e a s a l l t h e p e o p l e s o f F i j i h a v e e v e r s i n c e a c k n o w l e d g e d
t h e i r a l l e g i a n c e t o t h e C r o w n a n d t h e i r r e v e r e n c e f o r God a n d t h e
r i g h t s and f r e e d o m s o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l s e c u r e d and s a f e g u a r d e d by
a d h e r e n c e t o t h e r u l e o f l a w : And W h e r e a s t h o s e p e o p l e s h a v e b e -
come u n i t e d u n d e r a common b o n d , h a v e p r o g r e s s i v e l y a d v a n c e d e c o -
n o m i c a l l y and p o l i t i c a l l y and have broadened t h e i r r i g h t s and
f r e e d o m s i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e d i g n i t y o f t h e human p e r s o n a n d
t h e p o s i t i o n o f t h e f a m i l y i n a s o c i e t y o f f r e e men a n d f r e e i n s -
titutions: Now, therefore, the people of Fiji do affirm their
a l l e g i a n c e t o H e r M o s t E x c e l l e n t M a j e s t y Queen E l i z a b e t h I I , H e r
h e i r s a n d s u c c e s s o r s , t h e i r r e v e r e n c e f o r God a n d t h e i r u n s h a k e -
a b l e b e l i e f t h a t a l l a r e e n t i t l e d t o f u n d a m e n t a l human r i g h t s a n d
f r e e d o m s b a s e d u p o n a n d s e c u r e d by t h e r u l e o f l a w a n d t o t h a t
end d e s i r e t h a t t h e f o l l o w i n g p r o v i s i o n s s h a l l t a k e e f f e c t as t h e
Constitution of Fiji:—

CHAPTER I - THE STATE AND THE CONSTITUTION

1 . F i j i s h a l l be a s o v e r e i g n d e m o c r a t i c S t a t e .
2. T h i s C o n s t i t u t i o n i s t h e supreme law o f F i j i and i f any o t h e r
law i s i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h i s C o n s t i t u t i o n , t h a t o t h e r law s h a l l ,
t o t h e e x t e n t o f t h e i n c o n s i s t e n c y , be v o i d . . . . 2
[Chap. I I p r o t e c t e d t h e fundamental Rights and Freedoms o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l
- viz. t h e r i g h t t o l i f e , personal l i b e r t y , p r o t e c t i o n from s l a v e r y , from

the N.F.P. arguing ( i t seemed s u c c e s s f u l l y ) t h a t F i j i a n and Indian i n t e r e s t s

were not i r r e c o n c i l a b l e . When P a t e l died in Oct, 1969, Siddiq Koya took over
the l e a d e r s h i p of the N.F.P. and d i s c u s s i o n s on c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change began.
A v i s i t from Baron Shepherd, m i n i s t e r of s t a t e a t the F.O. , in Jan. 1970 h e l -
ped to r e s o l v e some d i f f e r e n c e s and a conference took place in London in April
-May: i t was agreed t h a t F i j i would become a dominion not a r e p u b l i c ; t h a t
t h e r e would be entrenchment of indigenous r i g h t s in the s e c t i o n p r o h i b i t i n g
c e r t a i n amendments (§68(1)): t h a t the composition of the lower house would a t
f i r s t be a p r o v i s i o n a l interim arrangement; and t h a t the new l e g i s l a t u r e would
be on the b a s i s of the recommendations of the royal commission under Professor
S t r e e t . But when the Alliance won a comfortable majority in 1972 i t refused
to implement them and confirmed the equal balance of the status quo (the com-
m i s s i o n ' s r e p o r t i s a F i j i a n parliamentary paper No.24 of 1975 app.1575).
1. Stat. R. 1970 III, Appendix pp.6630-6724. The N.F.P. had long pressed for
independence b e l i e v i n g B r i t a i n had to leave before F i j i a n s and Indians could
resolve t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e s ; and in Aug. 1969 the Alliance agreed to n e g o t i a t e
from the s t r e n g t h i t enjoyed in the l e g i s l a t i v e c o u n c i l .
2. In the 1990 constitution, following Rabuka1s coup (p.414), the Great Coun-
c i l of Chiefs was recognised (§3) and F i j i a n and Rotuman i n t e r e s t s were s p e c i -
 411

inhumane treatment, from deprivation of property, and of privacy of home;

protection of law, freedom of conscience, expression, assembly and move-
ment; protection from discrimination on grounds of race &c, of detainees
under emergency laws; and enforcement of the protective provisions (§§3-
17). Chap. I l l dealt with Citizenship - of Fijian and Commonwealth c i t i -
zens (§§19-26).]

CHAPTER IV - THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL1

27. There s h a l l be a G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l and Commander-in-Chief o f
F i j i who s h a l l be a p p o i n t e d by Her M a j e s t y and s h a l l h o l d o f f i c e
d u r i n g Her M a j e s t y ' s p l e a s u r e and who s h a l l be Her M a j e s t y ' s
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n Fi j i . . . . [H.M. would appoint an acting Governor-
General and i f not, the Chief Justice would act. The oath of allegiance
and oath of o f f i c e to serve the Queen would be taken.]

CHAPTER V - PARLIAMENT - PART 1 Composition of Parliament

30. There s h a l l be a P a r l i a m e n t f o r F i j i which s h a l l c o n s i s t o f
Her M a j e s t y , a House o f R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s and a S e n a t e . . . .
[Part 2. The House of Representatives would have 52 members elected to
represent constituencies (§32).] ( 2 ) For t h e purpose o f e l e c t i n g
t h e members o f t h e House, v o t e r s s h a l l be r e g i s t e r e d on one o f
t h r e e s e p a r a t e r o l l s , t h a t i s t o say - ( a ) a r o l l o f v o t e r s who
a r e F i j i a n s ; ( b ) a r o l l o f v o t e r s who a r e I n d i a n s ; and ( c ) a r o l l
o f v o t e r s who a r e n e i t h e r F i j i a n s nor I n d i a n s ; and a l l v o t e r s so
r e g i s t e r e d s h a l l a l s o be r e g i s t e r e d on one a d d i t i o n a l r o l l ( i n
this Constitution referred to as 'the national roll'2).
( 3 ) T w e n t y - t w o members o f t h e house s h a l l be e l e c t e d f r o m among
persons who a r e r e g i s t e r e d on t h e r o l l o f v o t e r s who a r e F i j i a n s ,
and o f t h o s e members - ( a ) t w e l v e s h a l l be e l e c t e d by v o t e r s
r e g i s t e r e d on t h a t r o l l ; and ( b ) t e n s h a l l be e l e c t e d by v o t e r s
registered on the national roll.
( 4 ) T w e n t y - t w o members o f t h e House s h a l l be e l e c t e d f r o m among
persons who a r e r e g i s t e r e d on t h e r o l l o f v o t e r s who a r e I n d i a n s ,
and o f t h o s e members - ( a ) t w e l v e s h a l l be e l e c t e d by v o t e r s
r e g i s t e r e d on t h a t r o l l ; and ( b ) t e n s h a l l be e l e c t e d by v o t e r s
registered on the national roll.
( 5 ) e i g h t members o f t h e House s h a l l be e l e c t e d f r o m among p e r -
sons who are r e g i s t e r e d on t h e r o l l o f v o t e r s who a r e n e i t h e r
F i j i a n s nor I n d i a n s , and o f t h o s e members - ( a ) t h r e e s h a l l be
e l e c t e d by v o t e r s r e g i s t e r e d on t h a t r o l l ; and ( b ) f i v e s h a l l be
elected by voters registered on the national roll.
[Disqualification for members was imposed on those with allegiance to any
state outside the Commonwealth, those bankrupt or of unsound mind, those
sentenced to death or imprisonment of more than 1 year, those g u i l t y of
electoral offences, those who held public o f f i c e (save exceptions
prescribed by law) especially on named Commissions (§33). Vacation of
seats would be on dissolution; or for ceasing to be a c i t i z e n of F i j i ,
for absence (without leave) for 3 consecutive meetings; or by resignation
in w r i t i n g (§34). An electoral commission would be established (§42).]

PART 3 The Senate

f i c a l l y protected (§21). 1. §§31-4 in the 1990 republican c o n s t i t u t i o n provi-

ded s i m i l a r l y for the President and acting-President - and for t h e i r removal
(§§35-7). 2. This was a device to compel voting across the communities.
412
45. ( 1 ) The Senate s h a l l c o n s i s t o f t w e n t y - t w o members, o f whom -
( a ) e i g h t s h a l l be a p p o i n t e d by t h e G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l 1 a c t i n g i n
accordance w i t h t h e a d v i c e o f t h e Great C o u n c i l o f C h i e f s ; ( b )
seven s h a l l be a p p o i n t e d by t h e G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l a c t i n g i n a c c o r -
dance w i t h t h e a d v i c e o f t h e Prime M i n i s t e r ; ( c ) s i x s h a l l be
a p p o i n t e d by t h e G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l a c t i n g i n accordance w i t h t h e
a d v i c e o f t h e Leader o f t h e O p p o s i t i o n ; and ( d ) one s h a l l be
a p p o i n t e d by t h e G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l a c t i n g i n accordance w i t h t h e
a d v i c e o f t h e C o u n c i l o f R o t u m a . . . . [the Council of Chiefs and of
Rotuma would determine the procedure.
Senators must be on one of the electoral r o l l s , and not a member of the
House of Representatives or disqualified as under §33. They would be
appointed f o r 6 years and t h e i r tenure not affected by dissolution (§§46,
47): the period of the f i r s t Senators appointed would however be phased
so that half the Senate would r e t i r e after 3 years. Similar provisions
were made for vacation of seats (§45) and for vacancies (§58). Part 4
dealt with the powers and procedures of law making (§§53, 54). English
would be the o f f i c i a l language but speeches could be made in Hindustani
and F i j i a n (§56). Money b i l l s could originate only in the House of Repre-
sentatives and the Senate could not amend them (§§61-3). Laws passed in
two successive sessions by the House of Representatives would, i f condit-
ions were f u l f i l l e d , became law without the approval of the Senate (§65).
Parliament could amend certain ?named? sections of the constitution but
others required three-quarters majorities in both houses and s t i l l others
two-thirds majorities 2 : the support of the six F i j i a n senators 3 would
be necessary to amend t h i s amending section, the composition of the Sen-
ate or certain sections p a r t i c u l a r l y concerned with F i j i a n land and cus-
tom (§§66, 67, 68). Parliaments would normally last for 5 years. Chap.V.
dealt with sessions, prorogation and dissolution; Chap.VI dealt with the
s t a f f i n g of the two houses.]

CHAPTER VI - THE EXECUTIVE

72 . (1 ) The executive author i ty of Fi j i is vested i n Her Majesty .
(2) Save as otherwise provided in this Constitution, that author-
ity may be exercised on behalf of Her Majesty by the Governor-
General either directly or through officers subordinate to him.
(3) Nothing in this section shall preclude persons or authorities
other than the Governor-General from exercising such functions
as may be conferred upon them by any law.
73. (1) There shall be a Prime Minister, an Attorney-General and
such other offices of Minister of the Government, not exceeding
such number, if any, as Parliament may prescribe, as may be esta-
blished by the Governor-General, acting in accordance with the
advice of the Prime Minister. (2) The Governor-General, acting
in his own deliberate judgement, shall appoint as Prime Minister
the member of the House of Representatives who appears to him
best able to command the support of the majority of the members
of that House:.... (3) The Ministers other than the Prime Minis-
ter shall be appointed by the Governor-General acting in accor-

1. In 1990 by the President (§54).

2. In the 1990 constitution (§§77, 78) all the reserved bills required two-
thirds majorities. 3. In 1990 the requirement was the support of all those
specifically appointed by the council of chiefs. In 1970 and 1990 the A.G.
could attend either house (§§60, 70).
 413

dance w i t h t h e a d v i c e o f t h e Prime M i n i s t e r : . . . . [with express con-

ditions for the A.G. The Governor-General was empowered to dismiss a P.M.
who lost a confidence motion and did not resign (§74). The reasons for
a vacancy in the P.Mship or the ministry were defined.]
The f u n c t i o n s o f t h e C a b i n e t s h a l l be t o a d v i s e t h e G o v e r n o r -
General i n t h e government o f F i j i and t h e C a b i n e t s h a l l be c o l -
l e c t i v e l y r e s p o n s i b l e t o P a r l i a m e n t f o r any a d v i c e g i v e n t o t h e
Governor-General by o r under t h e g e n e r a l a u t h o r i t y o f t h e C a b i n e t
and f o r a l l t h i n g s done by o r under t h e a u t h o r i t y o f any M i n i s t e r
in the execution of h i s o f f i c e . . . .
76. ( 1 ) The G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l , a c t i n g i n accordance w i t h t h e a d -
v i c e o f t h e Prime M i n i s t e r , may, by d i r e c t i o n s i n w r i t i n g , a s s i g n
t o t h e Prime M i n i s t e r o r any o t h e r M i n i s t e r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r
t h e c o n d u c t ( s u b j e c t t o t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h i s C o n s t i t u t i o n and
any o t h e r law) o f any b u s i n e s s o f t h e Government, i n c l u d i n g r e s -
p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f any department o f t h e Go-
v e r n m e n t . ( 2 ) W i t h o u t p r e j u d i c e t o t h e assignment o f any r e s p o n -
s i b i l i t y t o him under t h e p r e c e d i n g s u b s e c t i o n , t h e A t t o r n e y - G e -
n e r a l s h a l l be t h e p r i n c i p a l l e g a l a d v i s e r t o t h e G o v e r n m e n t . . . .
[The Governor-General would act in accordance with the advice of minis-
ters save where expressly required to act on the advice of others or on
his own deliberate judgement (§78). The P.M. must keep him f u l l y informed
(§79). There was provision for a secretary to the cabinet, a commissioner
of police, a director of public prosecutions, and a leader of the opposi-
tion (§§83-6). The exercise of the prerogative of mercy was authorised
(§87). In Chap.VII the Judicature would consist of the Supreme Court 1 :
the appointment and tenure of judges, and the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the Appeal
Court (§§89-99). There would s t i l l be an appeal to H.M.-in-council
(§100) 2 . Chap. V I I I dealt with the Public Services; Chap.IX with the om-
budsman (§112). There were sections authorising ambassadors and high com-
missioners abroad (§103) 3 . Chap.X dealt with finance, the consolidated
fund, the public debt and audit. §134 defined the word ' F i j i a n ' and
'Indian' in the constitution 4 . §138 required a l l o f f i c e r s other than the
Governor-General to exercise functions after consultation only.]
125. CONSTITUTION OF THE SOVEREIGN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, 25 July 19905
WHEREAS by Order-in-Council made the 20th day of September 1970

1. The High Court in 1990. 2. There was no such provision in 1990; but there
was a special section then for Fijian courts (§122). 3. In 1990 only for
ambassadors as Fiji was no longer a member of the Commonwealth.
4, In 1990 a definition of'Rotumarf was added and to the definition of 'Fijian'
was added need for registration in the Vola ni Kawa Bula as a property owner
(§156). 5. Fiji Republic Gazette: extraordinary No.47: Decree (Promulgation)
No.22. The emergence of a Nationalist party which in 1977 had secured one
quarter of the Fijian communal vote and a consequent large swing of Indian
voters to the already strongly Indian N.F.P. challenged the main factors which
had dominated the politics of Fiji since independence. But George Cakobau as
governor-general did not summon Koya with 26 N.F.P, seats but Mara with 24
Alliance (there were also one Nationalist and 1 Independent. The administra-
tion however was defeated. In the new election in Sept. 1977 the Alliance won
overwhelmingly - 36 to the N.F.P. 15: Koya lost his seat and there was a split
in the N.F.P. leadership. A royal commission inquired into allegations of
unconstitutional conduct following the governor-general's action (No. 74 of
1983). In the 1987 elections Bavadra*s coalition won 28 seats (incl. all the
414

Her Majesty the Queen established a Constitution for Fiji (the

1970 C o n s t i t u t i o n ) ; AND WHEREAS e v e n t s i n 1987 i n F i j i l e d t o t h e
a b r o g a t i o n o f t h e 1970 C o n s t i t u t i o n ; AND WHEREAS F i j i was d e c l a -
red a R e p u b l i c on t h e 7 t h day o f O c t o b e r , 1987 and t h e f i r s t P r e -
s i d e n t o f t h e R e p u b l i c o f F i j i was a p p o i n t e d under S e c t i o n 4 o f
t h e A p p o i n t m e n t o f Head o f S t a t e and D i s s o l u t i o n o f F i j i M i l i t a r y
Government Decree, on t h e 5 t h day o f December, 1987 who, u n t i l
a P a r l i a m e n t i s convened i n accordance w i t h a C o n s t i t u t i o n y e t
t o be adopted - ( i ) s h a l l have t h e power t o a p p o i n t t h e Prime M i -
n i s t e r by Decree; ( i i ) s h a l l have t h e power t o make laws f o r t h e
peace, o r d e r and good government o f F i j i by Decree, a c t i n g i n
accordance w i t h t h e a d v i c e o f t h e Prime M i n i s t e r and t h e C a b i n e t ;
and ( i i i ) s h a l l e x e r c i s e t h e e x e c u t i v e a u t h o r i t y o f F i j i which
i s hereby v e s t e d i n h i m ; save as o t h e r w i s e p r o v i d e d , t h a t e x e c u -
t i v e a u t h o r i t y may be e x e r c i s e d i n accordance w i t h t h e a d v i c e o f
t h e C a b i n e t o r by any M i n i s t e r a u t h o r i s e d by t h e C a b i n e t ; AND
WHEREAS t h e f i r s t P r e s i d e n t o f t h e R e p u b l i c o f F i j i had a p p o i n t e d
Ratu Sir Kamisese Kapaiwai Tuimacllai Mara G.C.M.G., Kt. of St.
John, as t h e f i r s t Prime M i n i s t e r o f t h e R e p u b l i c o f F i j i under
t h e a p p o i n t m e n t o f Prime M i n i s t e r Decree; AND WHEREAS t h e I n t e r i m
Government was s e t t h e o b j e c t i v e s t o d e t e r m i n e and implement f i -
n a n c i a l p o l i c i e s t o ensure t h a t t h e n a t i o n a l economy r e t u r n s t o
t h e economic p o s i t i o n i t e n j o y e d p r i o r t o t h e e v e n t s o f 1987 and
t o e n s u r e t h a t a new C o n s t i t u t i o n t h a t w i l l s a f e g u a r d t h e i n t e r -
e s t s o f t h e i n d i g e n o u s F i j i a n people w h i l e a t t h e same t i m e p r o -
t e c t i n g t h e r i g h t s and i n t e r e s t s o f o t h e r communities i n F i j i ;
AND WHEREAS t h e e v e n t s o f 1987 were o c c a s i o n e d by a w i d e s p r e a d
b e l i e f t h a t t h e 1970 C o n s t i t u t i o n was i n a d e q u a t e t o g i v e p r o -
t e c t i o n t o the i n t e r e s t s of the indigenous F i j i a n people, t h e i r
v a l u e s , t r a d i t i o n s , customs, way o f l i f e and economic w e l l b e i n g ;
AND WHEREAS a t t e m p t s t o reach a consensus among a l l t h e p e o p l e
o f F i j i as t o t h e method whereby t h e s a i d i n t e r e s t s a r e t o be
p r o t e c t e d have been p r o t r a c t e d and d i f f i c u l t ; AND WHEREAS i t i s
d e s i r e d t h a t F i j i s h o u l d r e t u r n t o p a r l i a m e n t a r y democracy a c c o r -
ding t o a C o n s t i t u t i o n s u f f i c i e n t t o p r o t e c t the said i n t e r e s t s
and t h e i n t e r e s t s o f a l l t h e p e o p l e o f F i j i ; AND WHEREAS i t i s
d e s i r e d t h a t f u l l c o n s u l t a t i o n s w i t h t h e people o f F i j i i s c a r -
r i e d o u t t o e n s u r e t h a t t h e v i e w s and v o i c e o f a l l t h e community,
o r g a n i s a t i o n and race i n F i j i i s heard and c o n s i d e r e d ; AND WHERE-
AS a D r a f t C o n s t i t u t i o n was p r e p a r e d by t h e I n t e r i m Government

Indian communal and 7 F i j i a n , 7 Indian and 2 on the general n a t i o n a l r o l l s )

to the A l l i a n c e ' s 24. Though there was no large inroad made into the F i j i a n
vote, and F i j i a n s s t i l l held a l l the important Fijian p o r t f o l i o s in the c a b i -
n e t , n e v e r t h e l e s s fears were inflamed t h a t an Indian-N,F.P. dominated regime
was being e s t a b l i s h e d . This led to Colonel Rabuka's m i l i t a r y coup on 14 May
and another on 25 Sept. when he proclaimed a republic with himself as p r e s i -
dent and the departure of F i j i from the Commonwealth. In December, however,
he restored c i v i l government and persuaded Mara to head an administration com-
posed of 10 m i n i s t e r s from his own m i l i t a r y regime, and 13 from Mara's p a r t y .
Bavadra rejected a d r a f t c o n s t i t u t i o n of Sept. 1988 which would have abolished
the senate and the general n a t i o n a l r o l l s , and reduced Indian r e p r e s e n t a t i o n .
In August 1989 a c o n s t i t u t i o n inquiry and advisory committee produced t h i s new
c o n s t i t u t i o n with a few concessions to the Indians and a r e s t o r a t i o n of a b i -
cameral parliament.
 415
and p u b l i c i s e d i n September, 1988 f o r p u b l i c i n f o r m a t i o n and com-
ment as t h e I n t e r i m Government was d u t y bound t o f o r m u l a t e a new
C o n s t i t u t i o n f o r F i j i b e f o r e t h e end o f i t s t e r m i n o f f i c e ; AND
WHEREAS t o ensure t h a t f u l l c o n s u l t a t i o n s w i t h a l l t h e commun-
i t i e s and i n t e r e s t s i n F i j i t h e I n t e r i m Government c o n s t i t u t e d
t h e F i j i C o n s t i t u t i o n I n q u i r y and A d v i s o r y Committee which was
g i v e n t h e f o l l o w i n g Terms o f R e f e r e n c e ; AND WHEREAS on t h e a d v i c e
and on c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h t h e f i r s t Prime M i n i s t e r . . . , t h e P r e s i -
d e n t had a p p o i n t e d M i n i s t e r s and t h e A . G . , which w i t h t h e f i r s t
P.M. c o n s t i t u t e t h e C a b i n e t ; AND WHEREAS t h e C a b i n e t , t h e P.M.
and t h e P r e s i d e n t c o n s t i t u t e t h e Committee ( i ) t o s c r u t i n i s e and
c o n s i d e r t h e e x t e n t t o which t h e d r a f t c o n s t i t u t i o n , s u b m i t t e d
by t h e C a b i n e t , meets t h e p r e s e n t and f u t u r e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l needs
of the people of F i j i , having regard i n p a r t i c u l a r the f a i l u r e
o f t h e 1970 C o n s t i t u t i o n t o p r o v i d e adequate and f u l l p r o t e c t i o n
o f t h e r i g h t s , i n t e r e s t s and concerns o f t h e i n d i g e n o u s F i j i a n
p e o p l e , and h a v i n g r e g a r d t o a l l t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s p r e v a i l i n g i n
F i j i , ( i i ) To f a c i l i t a t e t h e p o s s i b l e debate t h r o u g h o u t F i j i on
t h e terms o f t h e D r a f t C o n s t i t u t i o n and t o i n q u i r e i n t o and a s -
c e r t a i n t h e v a r i e t y o f views and o p i n i o n s t h a t may e x i s t i n F i j i
as t o t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e D r a f t C o n s t i t u t i o n , ( i i i ) To i n v i t e
and t o r e c e i v e t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t i s n e c e s s a r i l y p r a c t i c a b l e , r e -
p r e s e n t a t i o n s f r o m t h e people o f F i j i as t o t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e
D r a f t C o n s t i t u t i o n , and t o d e t e r m i n e t h e degree o f a c c e p t a b i l i t y
among t h e people o f F i j i t o t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e D r a f t C o n s t i t u -
t i o n , ( i v ) To r e p o r t f u l l y t o C a b i n e t on a l l t h e above and i n
p a r t i c u l a r t o r e p o r t upon t h e degree o f a c c e p t a b i l i t y o f t h e
terms o f t h e D r a f t C o n s t i t u t i o n found by t h e Committee among t h e
p e o p l e o f F i j i and where t h e Committee c o n s i d e r s a p p r o p r i a t e t o
recommend amendments o r a d d i t i o n s t o t h e D r a f t C o n s t i t u t i o n l i k e -
l y i n i t s view t o a c h i e v e t h e o b j e c t s o f t h e D r a f t C o n s t i t u t i o n
or i t s g e n e r a l a c c e p t a b i l i t y . . . .
[After the Committee had held 32 public hearings in 14 urban and rural
centres; and received 175 oral submissions for individuals and 174 from
various groups, and 209 written submissions (104 from individuals, 105
from groups), i t reported (30 August 1989) to the President. I t s report
was considered and amended by the Cabinet of the Interim Government (21,
28 September) and submitted and considered by the Bose Levu Vakaturaga,
(Great Council of Chiefs) on 14-16 March 1989 and 21-5 June 1990. The
l a t t e r approved the Draft Constitution, bearing in mind that the events
of 1987 had demonstrated the need for a F i j i a n Constitution ' t o take
account of i t s d i f f e r e n t racial communities', for a balanced and f a i r
protection for a l l and 'a society in which a l l can l i v e in harmony and
tolerant understanding', and for special needs and special provision in
an evolving society where attitudes and perceptions change.1
NOW THEREFORE, i n e x e r c i s e o f t h e powers v e s t e d i n me as P r e s i -
dent o f t h e S o v e r e i g n Democratic R e p u b l i c o f F i j i , and a c t i n g i n
accordance w i t h t h e a d v i c e o f t h e Prime M i n i s t e r and t h e C a b i n e t
of the Interim Government of the Republic of Fiji, I hereby
decree as f o l l o w s -
[The Constitution as set out in the schedule would come into force on 25
July 1990. Writs would be issued for the f i r s t elections within 18
months. Meanwhile the present Government would continue. The President
would continue in o f f i c e , so would the P.M. and ministers t i l l the new
Parliament met. Existing laws would have f u l l e f f e c t ; public o f f i c i a l s ,
legal proceedings and the Finance Decree of 1988 would also continue (§1-
 416
14).
Schedule: The Constitution of the Sovereign Democratic Republic.
[Preamble: Whereas Cakobau and other High Chiefs ceded Fiji to Queen
Victoria on 10 October 1874 and the chiefs of Rotuma similarly ceded that
island on November 1879; and whereas Queen Elizabeth II established a
constitution by order-in-council 20 September 1970 but events in 1987 led
to its abrogation; because these events occasioned widespread belief that
it had given 'inadequate' protection to the values, traditions, and inte-
rests to 'the indigenous Fijians' who demanded as 'the will of the peo-
ple' a new constitution which would advance their 'beliefs, rights, and
freedoms' and enshrine their hopes, aspirations and goals. So now they
re-confirmed thatl Fiji is a society in which all peoples may
to the full extent of their capacity play some part in the insti-
tutions of the national life and thereby develop and maintain due
deference and respect for each other and the rule of law; AND
WHEREAS they affirm and respect that Christianity has played and
continues to play a prominent role in the lives of the indigenous
Fijians and the enduring contribution it has had, but also accep-
ting the rights of other religious groups to practice their own
religion.. . [Furthermore they reaffirmed the rights of the indigenous peo-
ple to their lands and resources and to govern themselves for their ad-
vancement and welfare; they reasserted their recognition of the rights
of all people of Fiji to live in harmony and due deference to their cus-
toms and traditional way of life; they recognised the right of all peop-
les and institutions to be free as long as that freedom was founded upon
mutual respect for spiritual and moral values under the rule of law.
Chap.I: The constitution was the supreme law of the Sovereign Democra-
tic Republic of Fiji and all laws inconsistent with it were void. It re-
cognised the Bose Levu Vakaturaga (§§1-3). Chap.II protected fundamental
rights and freedoms of the individual: §21 provided specific new protec-
tion for and enhancement of Fijian and Rotuman interests and a commitment
for Parliament to enact laws with the object of promoting and safeguard-
ing their economic, social, educational, cultural, traditional and other
interests, and other laws to direct the Government to adopt programmes
actively to attain these objects and to monitor such directions. Chap.Ill
dealt with citizenship. Chap.V provided for the President and Commander-
in-chief to be appointed by the Bose Levu Vakaturaga for a 5-year term:
he would have a President's Council to advise on matters of national im-
portance to meet at his request (§32). There was provision for an acting
president, oaths, removal for misconduct and investigation by a tribunal
(§§33-7).
Chap.VI. Parliament consisted of the President, Senate and House of
Representatives.
The House of Representatives was composed of 70 members elected on 4
rolls - 37 Fijians, 27 Indians, 1 Rotuman and 5 others (§41): The Senate
of 34 nominated by the President, 24 Fijians by the Bose Levu Vakaturaga,
1 Rotuman by the Rotuman council, and 9 nominated by the President from
other communities; with term of office for 5 years normally but stagger-
ed. Chap.IV provided for the procedure [almost identical with that in
1970] with limitations of the Senate on appropriation and other money
bills (§§72, 73). Amendment was dealt with in §77: some amendments would
require two-thirds majorities, including a specific number (18 of the 24
in §55a) of senators. §78 defined the President's powers [verbatim as
those of the Governor-General in 1970],
•Chap.VII vested Executive power in the President or the cabinet or any
minister authorised by the cabinet (§82). The President would appoint as
 417
P.M. the Fijian member best able to command the majority in the House of
Representatives (§83). There was a new provision for ministerial tenure
of office (§84) and a special section on the President's appointment of
the military commander (§85).
Chap.VIII dealt with the Judicature - the composition of the High
Court, appeals and customary law.]
100. (1) Parliament shall make provision for the application of
laws, including customary laws. (2) In exercising its powers
under the preceding subsection, Parliament shall have particular
regard to the customs, traditions, usages, values and aspirations
of the Fijian people. (3) Until such time as an Act of Parliament
otherwise provides, Fijian customary law shall have effect as
part of the laws of Fiji: Provided that this subsection shall not
apply in respect of any custom, tradition, usage or values that
is, and to the extent that it is, inconsistent with a provision
of this Constitution or a statute, or repugnant to the general
principles of humanity. (4) For the purpose of this Constitution
the opinion or decision of the Native Lands Commission on (a)
matters relating to and concerning Fijian customs, traditions and
usages or the existence, extent, or application of customary
laws; and (b) disputes as to the headship of any division or sub-
division of the Fijian people having the customary right to oc-
cupy and use any native lands, shall be final and conclusive and
shall not be challenged in a court of law.
[There would also be Fijian Courts (§122). There was no provision for any
appeal to the Privy Council. Chap.IX dealt with the Public Service and
the Commission; Chap.X with the ombudsman, §156, defined the meaning of
'Fijian', 'Rotuman' and 'Indian'.]
156. For the purposes of this Constitution - (a) a person shall
be regarded as a Fijian if and shall not be so regarded unless
his father or any of his male progenitors in the male line is or
was the child of parents both of whom are or were indigenous
inhabitants of Fiji and his name is registered or eligible to be
registered in the Vola ni Kawa Bula and include persons who are
registered or eligible to be registered in the Vola ni Kawa Bula
by virtue of custom, tradition and practice: Provided that a per-
son's registration or eligibility for registration on the Vola
ni Kawa Bula shall be confirmed or determined as the case may be
by the Native Lands Commission whose confirmation or decision
shall be final and conclusive;1 (b) a person shall be regarded
as a Rotuman if, and shall not be so regarded unless, he is of
Rotuman descent, whether through his male progenitors or female
progenitors; the eligibility of a person under this subsection
shall be determined or confirmed, as the case may be, by the
Council of Rotuma; (c) a person shall be regarded as an Indian
if, and shall not be so regarded unless, his father or any of his
earlier male progenitors in the male line is or was the child of
parents both of whom are or were indigenous inhabitants of the
sub-continent of India; Provided that where the identity of the
father of any person cannot be ascertained, the male progenitors
of that person may instead be traced through that person's
mother....

1. This was an additional qualification to that in §134 of the 1970

constitution.
 418
[§157 provided for the functions of commissions and tribunals. There was
a section on the requirement for consultation (except by the President)
and on review of the Constitution before 7 years and thereafter at 10-
yearly intervals.]
162. (1) If an Act of Parliament recites that action has been
taken or threatened by any substantial body of persons, whether
inside or outside Fiji - (a) to cause, or to cause a substantial
number of citizens to fear, organised violence against persons
or property; (b) to excite disaffection against the President or
the Government; (c) to promote feelings of ill-will and hostility
between different races or other classes of the population likely
to cause violence; (d) to procure the alteration, otherwise than
by lawful means, of anything by law established; or (e) which is
prejudicial to the security of Fiji, any provision of that law
designed to stop or prevent that action shall be valid notwith-
standing that it is inconsistent with any of the provisions of
Chapter II, or would, apart from this section, be outside the
legislative power of Parliament.
(2) A law containing such recital as is mentioned in subsection
(1), shall if not sooner repealed, cease to have effect if a re-
solution is passed by Parliament annulling such law, but without
prejudice to anything previously done by virtue thereof or to the
power of Parliament to make a new law under this section.
163. (1) If the President is satisfied that a grave emergency
exists whereby the security or economic life of Fiji is threa-
tened, he may issue a Proclamation of Emergency.
(2) If Proclamation of Emergency is issued when Parliament is
not sitting, the President shall summon Parliament as soon as may
be practicable, and may, until Parliament is sitting, promulgate
decrees having the force of law, if satisfied that immediate
action is required.
(3) A Proclamation of Emergency and any decree promulgated un-
der subsection (2) of this section shall, if not sooner revoked
by the President, cease to have effect - (a) at the expiration
of six months from the date it was made unless in the meantime
it has been approved by a resolution of the House of Representa-
tives; or (b) if a resolution is passed by the House of Represen-
tatives annulling such Proclamation or decree, but without preju-
dice to anything previously done by virtue thereof or to the po-
wer of the President to issue a new Proclamation under subsection
(1) or promulgate any decree under subsection (2) of this
section.
(4) A resolution of the House of Representatives passed for the
purposes of approving a Proclamation of Emergency or any decree
promulgated under subsection (2) of this section shall remain in
force for such period not exceeding six months as may be speci-
fied therein:
Provided that any such resolution may be extended from time to
time by a further such resolution, each extension being for such
period not exceeding six months from the date of the resolution
effecting the extension as may be specified therein.
(5) No provision of any decree promulgated under this section,
and no provision of any Act of Parliament which is passed while
a Proclamation of Emergency is in force and which declares that
the law appears to Parliament to be required by reason of the
emergency shall be invalid on the ground of inconsistency with
 419

any p r o v i s i o n of t h i s C o n s t i t u t i o n .
(6) At the e x p i r a t i o n of a period of six months beginning w i t h
the date on which a Proclamation of Emergency ceases t o be in
f o r c e , any decree promulgated in pursuance of the Proclamation
and, t o the extent t h a t i t could not have been v a l i d l y made but
f o r t h i s s e c t i o n , any law made while the Proclamation was i n
f o r c e , s h a l l , i f i t has not already ceased to have e f f e c t , cease
to have e f f e c t , except as t o things done or omitted t o be done
before the e x p i r a t i o n of t h a t p e r i o d . . . . [§167 on rights, l i a b i l i t i e s
and obligations declared]
(1) A l l r i g h t s , l i a b i l i t i e s and o b l i g a t i o n s of Her Majesty in
r i g h t of the Government of F i j i or of the F i j i M i l i t a r y Govern-
ment, s h a l l a f t e r the commencement of t h i s C o n s t i t u t i o n be r i g h t
l i a b i l i t i e s and o b l i g a t i o n s of the State.
(2) In t h i s section r i g h t s , l i a b i l i t i e s and o b l i g a t i o n s include
prerogative r i g h t s , and r i g h t s , l i a b i l i t i e s and o b l i g a t i o n s a r i s -
ing from contract or otherwise, other than r i g h t s to which sect-
ion 166 [the succession to property] a p p l i e s .
[Chap.XIV provided for the immunity of the leader of the military coups
of 14 May and 25 September 1987 from criminal and c i v i l responsibility,
and also of members of the military forces, the police force and prison
services. This section (§164) was not subject to review or amendment by
Parliament1.]

I . The re-admission of F i j i as a member of the Commonwealth in 1995 led to

discussion of the possible r e s t o r a t i o n of the monarchy, as Rabuka, returning
from the Commonwealth summit in Edinburgh in 1997, had indicated. F i j i could
be c e r t a i n l y regarded as a r e l u c t a n t republic: there was s t i l l , 10 years a f t e r
the double coups of 1987, a Union Jack on the flag, the Queen's head on bank-
notes and hundreds of t a t t e r e d p o r t r a i t s of the royal family in v i l l a g e h u t s .
Many F i j i a n s regard the cession [Vol.V, No. 196] in 1876 as a blood pact making
Queen V i c t o r i a ' s successor t h e i r Tui Viti (chief of chiefs) for ever. Ratu
Penaia Ganilau, the l a s t governor-general and f i r s t p r e s i d e n t , always toasted
H.M, the Queen [ j u s t as Washington did George I I I each night a f t e r 1776: Vol.
I I , p.598]. The Queen would, of course, require absolute assurance t h a t such
a r e s t o r a t i o n was the wish of the mass of the people in F i j i . The Great Coun-
c i l for Chiefs, for i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l reasons, deferred the question t i l l
a f t e r the next general e l e c t i o n .
420

E. CYPRUS
126. ARCHBISHOP MAKARIOS TO GOVERNOR SIR ANDREW WRIGHT, 21 December 19491
[He had informed the governor (12 Dec.) of the Intention of the Ethnar-
chic Church of Cyprus to hold a Pancyprian plebiscite on 15 January 1950
on the subject of 'the union of the Greek island of Cyprus with the free
mother country, Greece'. The governor's reply (17 Dec.) was clearly d i c -
tated by reasons of p o l i t i c a l expediency ' . . . f a r from the real thesis'
and] we feel it our duty, for the sake of historical truth
and o u t o f r e s p e c t f o r t h e u n f l i n c h i n g w i l l o f a c i v i l i z e d p e o p l e
c l a i m i n g f o r themselves the r i g h t of t h e i r n a t i o n a l freedom, t o
dwell on certain points contained in Your Excellency's letter,
w h i c h a r e opposed t o t h a t t r u t h .
By t h a t l e t t e r t h e Government r e f u s e d t o a c c e p t t h e p r o p o s a l
made by us that it might undertake the conduct of the plebiscite,
in which case it would assume the typical form of usual plebi-
scites which are conducted for the determination of disputed
p u b l i c q u e s t i o n s , a f o r m w h i c h , o f c o u r s e , c o u l d n o t be l e n t t o
the plebiscite by the Ethnarchy as it is not possessed of the
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a u t h o r i t y w h i c h i s i n d i s p e n s a b l e t o t h a t purpose
C o n s e q u e n t l y , we a r e u n a b l e t o a c c e p t t h e c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n g i v e n
by Your E x c e l l e n c y t o t h e p l e b i s c i t e p r o c l a i m e d by us as a 'mere
amassing o f s i g n a t u r e s ' .
Indeed, we admit that this plebiscite constitutes a mass decla-
r a t i o n c a l c u l a t e d t o b l a z o n f o r t h t h e a s p i r a t i o n and t h e demand
o f t h e p e o p l e o f Cyprus t o u n i t e w i t h Greece, a g a i n s t w h i c h c l a i m
Your E x c e l l e n c y opposes t h e d e c l a r a t i o n , w h i c h i s u n a c c e p t a b l e ,
unfounded and u n j u s t b e f o r e God and men, t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t t h e
question of Enosis is closed in accordance with previous state-
ments made by G r e a t B r i t a i n , which r u l e s o v e r t h e p e o p l e o f
Cyprus a g a i n s t t h e i r own w i l l . Inasmuch as t h o s e s t a t e m e n t s ema-
n a t e d f r o m t h e s i d e o f t h e r u l i n g power o n l y , w i t h o u t t h e c o n s e n t
o f t h e p e o p l e o f Cyprus t h e m s e l v e s who a r e d i r e c t l y concerned
w i t h t h e m a t t e r , and o f Mother Greece w h i c h i s e q u a l l y c o n c e r n e d ,
t h e q u e s t i o n o f C y p r u s , by l o g i c a l p r o c e s s and i n accordance w i t h
t h e e l e m e n t a r y c o n c e p t i o n about j u s t i c e , c a n n o t be r e g a r d e d as
c l o s e d ; and i t w i l l be c l o s e d o n l y when t h e P a n c y p r i a n and Pan-
h e l l e n i c j u s t demand f o r t h e r e t u r n o f t h e i s l a n d t o Greece i s
satisfied.
As t o Your E x c e l l e n c y ' s r e c o u r s e t o t h e s t a t e m e n t made by t h e
Greek M i n i s t e r f o r F o r e i g n A f f a i r s on t h e 14th December, 1949,
we a d m i t t h a t never c o u l d we have imagined t h a t a c o n v e n t i o n a l
s t a t e m e n t made under t h e known c i r c u m s t a n c e s would have been used
as an argument w i t h a view t o h o l d i n g up o r e n f e e b l i n g t h e s t r u g -
gle of the people of Cyprus for Enosis, which is supported by the

1. CO.67/352/2 Ethnos, 22 Dec. 1949. [For Cyprus see Vols. V (V)B; and VII,
Jl As Mary Fisher noted, the governor's comment that 'a plebiscite held in the
c o n d i t i o n s proposed would be meaningless' had 'touched the Ethnarchy in a
tender spot'. (Min. 5 Jan. 1950 ibid.). Wright, governor (1949-54) had pre-
viously served in the c i v i l administration of Cyprus and had acted as c o l o n i a l
s e c r e t a r y during the 1931 d i s t u r b a n c e s . His despatch (31 Jan. 1950) in reply
to t h i s l e t t e r s e t s out the c l a s s i c o f f i c i a l view of the enosis movement and
the necessary responses to i t (CO.537/ 6228),
 421

entire Hellenic nation.

Such being the s i t u a t i o n , we can nowhere see how the contention
can be sound to the effect that the plebiscite refers to a non-
e x i s t e n t question and t h a t i t i s deprived of p r a c t i c a l e x p e d i -
ency; we a l s o regard as unfounded Your E x c e l l e n c y ' s remark t h a t
'such c o l l e c t i v e d e c l a r a t i o n would be deprived of value by the
c o n d i t i o n s in which i t had been o b t a i n e d ' , i n s o f a r as in view of
the refusal of the Government to conduct the plebiscite no other
way has been l e f t t o c a r r y i t o u t , which i s more v a l i d and does
not run counter the r e s t r i c t i v e Laws now in f o r c e .
I n s p i t e of a l l these we have no doubt a t a l l t h a t the r e s u l t s
of the plebiscite will express indeed the unforced and genuine
w i l l of the people of Cyprus, which must be respected according
t o the p r i n c i p l e s about the p e o p l e ' s s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n . 1
The Ethnarchic Church r e g r e t s t h a t i t cannot accept Your E x c e l -
l e n c y ' s proposal and d e f l e c t from the d e c i s i o n a l r e a d y taken t o
conduct the plebiscite at the fixed date, nor does it consider
t h a t i t i s possible t h a t any undesired confusion and breach of
p u b l i c order may be brought about by a p o l i t i c a l l y mature, p r u -
dent and d o c i l e people as are the Greek people of Cyprus, who are
conscious of the f a c t t h a t such m a n i f e s t a t i o n s would be out of
place and would cause harm t o the sacred cause f o r which they are
just struggling....2
F e r v e n t l y i n t e r c e d i n g w i t h God
For Your E x c e l l e n c y ,
Makarios of Cyprus. 3

1. The plebiscite by openinot secret,ballot went ahead in January 1950 and,

as expected by Makarios, enosis was supported - by 96% of the Greek Cypriots.
Congregations were vehemently instructed to vote for i t , though i t was quite
clear then and subsequently (as Greek Cypriots now t e l l ) that very many of
those who voted had very l i t t l e idea of what would be involved. Of course
Turkish Cypriots did not vote: i t was hardly 'pancyprian'.
2. The conduct of the plebiscite, Mary Fisher (Min. 13 Jan. 1950: CO.67/370/
3) found 'extremely amusing': she agreed with the governor that i t should be
'treated with kindly forbearance as belonging to the world of make-believe'.
But after the result was known she recognised the publicity value of the exer-
c i s e and the d i f f i c u l t i e s in dismissing i t . A blind eye could not be turned
to the cost of staying in Cyprus largely for reasons of strategy and the over-
riding needs of Western Europe (Min. 20 Jan. ibid.). The strategic argument
was a strong one to use with the U.S. (Mins. 21, 25 Jan. Bennett, Listowel)
where fear of communism was stronger than anti-colonialism. But, despite the
vote, i t was s t i l l believed that 'in their heart of hearts the population
generally are content that - as they expect - the present regime should con-
tinue' (Martin, Min. 23 Jan.).
3. When the results of the plebiscite were known, Makarios demanded that
H.M. 's G. should accept them and comply at once. John Bennett saw t h i s as just
another move in 'the cold war' which had gone on between Britain and the Greek
Cypriots since 1878. He thought i t best not to reply to the Archbishop. 'The
more we go on arguing the more unrealistic the correspondence becomes': 'no
amount of explaining away w i l l ever convince detached opinion that we are not
governing Cyprus against the will of the inhabitants'. Makarios had scored a
point in 'the cold war*. It was best to press on regardless (Min., 16 Jan.
ibid.). In his minute (21 Jan. CO.537/6228) he repeated some of his earlier
criticisms [see Vol.VII, pp.547-8].
422
127. COMMONS STATEMENT, 28 July 19541
[Henry Hopkinson announced that H.M. 's G. had decided on a new I n i t i a t -
ive: 'an early start 1n associating the people of Cyprus' in self-govern-
ment, but without contemplating a change of sovereignty. A vigorous pol-
icy of economic and social development would be continued - a sound bud-
getary policy with loans on favourable terms, and U.K. assistance under
the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts; while close cultural ties with
Greece and Turkey would be fully respected. In reply to questions from
James Griffiths he replied] First, he asked whether there had
been any discussions w i t h responsible p a r t y leaders i n Cyprus.
Of course, the new Governor [Sir Robert Armitage], who has been
t h e r e now f o r some s i x months, has been t a k i n g every step t o
inform himself as to opinion i n a l l s e c t i o n s of the Colony, but
t h e r e have been no discussions w i t h the leaders of the two main
p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , the N a t i o n a l i s t s and the Communists, n e i t h e r
of whom have been w i l l i n g so f a r t o operate the 1948 c o n s t i t u -
t i o n , which has been open t o them. As regards the second p o i n t ,
of course t h e r e i s always the p o s s i b i l i t y of a boycott of any new
c o n s t i t u t i o n , but we must hope t h a t enough men of good w i l l and
of moderate views w i l l come forward and take p a r t in the new con-
s t i t u t i o n , both as nominated members and as e l e c t e d members, and
t h a t t h i s , i n due course, w i l l lead t o f u r t h e r c o - o p e r a t i o n by
the p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s . The r i g h t hon. Gentleman asked me [3] f o r
c e r t a i n d e t a i l s in regard t o the new c o n s t i t u t i o n . I cannot g i v e
him those because i t has not been s e t t l e d y e t . I cannot go any
f u r t h e r than what I have s a i d , except t h a t t h e r e w i l l be a
m a j o r i t y of nominated plus o f f i c i a l members, although t h e r e w i l l
be p r o v i s i o n f o r e l e c t e d members. I n the 1948 c o n s t i t u t i o n , the
r i g h t hon. Gentleman w i l l remember, i t was the other way round
and t h e r e was a m a j o r i t y of e l e c t e d as a g a i n s t o f f i c i a l and

1. Hansard 531, 503-14. (Three papers in 1953-4 had helped define government
t h i n k i n g . The c h i e f s of s t a f f defence review r e s u l t e d in June 1954 with The
strategic importance of retaining full sovereignty in Cyprus (CO. 537/6244),
There had also been, in Oct. 1953, the brief for Sir Robert Armitage, Cyprus,
political and constitutional considerations (CO.926/91). On 29 June 1954 an
inter-departmental F.O. meeting (Note, F.O. 371/112848 WG1081/166) made the
b a s i c assumption t h a t friendly r e l a t i o n s with Greece were i n d i s p e n s a b l e . ) Eden
had j u s t reported to the house the new arrangements being made with Nasir
( r e l a t i n g to the Suez canal zone) which he hoped would lead to the development
of a r e a l friendship with Egypt: [Vol.VII pp.554, 594]. Henry Hopkinson,
m i n i s t e r a t the CO was announcing a ' f r e s h i n i t i a t i v e in Cyprus'; the 1948
offer had not been 'taken up by responsible and r e p r e s e n t a t i v e p o l i t i c a l
l e a d e r s ' : now though no change in sovereignty was contemplated, the a s s o c i a -
t i o n of Cypriots in ' t h e f u l l e r management of t h e i r own a f f a i r s ' could be
begun; but whereas in 1948 an e l e c t e d majority had been envisaged, now i t
would be an o f f i c i a l and nominated majority, hoping t h a t t h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n
' w i l l work'): t h e r e would be e l e c t e d members and some would be on the execu-
t i v e council as ' a f i r s t s t e p ' towards responsible government, ' t h e operating
of self-governing i n s t i t u t i o n s and exercising r e s p o n s i b i l i t y both in l e g i s l a -
t i o n and in the executive control of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' . (At the same time the
Cyprus government had issued an anti-sedition warning, with which Churchill was
not happy (to Lennox Boyd, 11 Aug. PREM. 11/605: see also R. Wilding Min. 7
Aug. F.O.371/112850 on the e f f e c t on adjusting r e l a t i o n s between Makarios and
the Cyprus government.))
 423

nominated members.
The last and the most important question which the r i g h t hon.
Gentleman put t o me was whether i n due course t h i s would lead t o
self-government - I t h i n k he c a l l e d i t Dominion s t a t u s - and the
r i g h t , I take i t , t o opt out of the Commonwealth. C e r t a i n l y t h i s
i s a f i r s t step on the road t o self-government and i t depends on
how the new scheme i s operated by the p a r t i e s in Cyprus as t o how
f a s t we can go along on t h a t road. At the same t i m e , my statement
has made i t q u i t e c l e a r t h a t t h e r e can be no question of any
change of sovereignty in Cyprus - [Hon. Members: 'Oh'] - no question
of any change i n s o v e r e i g n t y . T h a t , t h e r e f o r e , would a c t as a
l i m i t a t i o n on the suggestion which the r i g h t hon. Gentleman put
in the l a s t p a r t of h i s q u e s t i o n . . . .
[Griffiths then pressed him: self-government within the Commonwealth was
accepted "by both sides of the House as the object of British colonial po-
licy. Hopkinson answered] . . . i t has always been understood and
agreed t h a t t h e r e are c e r t a i n t e r r i t o r i e s i n the Commonwealth
which, owing t o t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r circumstances, can never expect
t o be f u l l y independent [Hon. Members: 'Oh']. I t h i n k the r i g h t hon.
Gentleman w i l l agree t h a t t h e r e are some t e r r i t o r i e s which cannot
expect t o be t h a t . I am not going as f a r as t h a t t h i s a f t e r n o o n ,
but I have s a i d t h a t the question of the abrogations of B r i t i s h
sovereignty cannot arise - that British sovereignty will re-
main. . . .
[Griffiths agreed that in some small territories the grant of Dominion
status 'as far as 1t 1s possible to foresee' would be 'meaningless',1
but had H.M. 's G. decided that in Cyprus i t was not intended that 'at the
appropriate stage 1n her evolution she will have conferred upon her Domi-
nion status...not because she 1s not able to do 1t for as a matter of po-
licy?' Hopkinson repeated that the question of sovereignty did not arise:
how the f i r s t step towards self-government developed would depend on the
way the Cypriots operated the new constitution: he acknowledged that the
P.M. and the U.S. President had made i t perfectly clear 'that independ-
ence should be given to those peoples who desire and are capable of sus-
taining an Independent existence' and claimed that what was now proposed
for Cyprus entirely conformed with that provision. Certain territories
had to be dealt with 1n particular ways: i t was l not possible to treat
every British Colonial Territory 1n exactly the same way'. Comparison
with Egypt was irrelevant: in Egypt British presence existed under treaty
rights, but Cyprus was a British territory. British obligations to
Europe, the Mediterranean and the Middle East required her continued
sovereignty over Cyprus.2]

1. A Labour party statement in 1943 had said that 'for a considerable time to
come' most colonial peoples 'will not be ready for self-government'. A t t l e e ' s
government had sought to identify the l i s t of such colonies, but by the mid-
508 the number had shrunk quite rapidly and the exercise of definition had
l o s t any significance [see Nos. 1-4]. 2. Hopkinson's i n i t i a l statement that
he was not proposing any change of sovereignty had been intensely questioned,
and he had l e t s l i p the fatal word 'never'. (But typically in the F.O., i t was
Lyttelton's reference in the debate to Greece as 'a friendly but unstable
country' which was regarded as the more unfortunate and caused concern -
though Eden himself privately used the same e p i t h e t . ) However, as in B.G.,
H.M.rs G. were not prepared to tolerate the establishment of Communist regimes
in British colonies. But t h i s remark of Hopkinson's provoked Cypriot and
424
128.(a) ANTHONY NUTTING: SECRET MEMORANDUM, 8 February 19551
[He had discussed the future policy in relation to Cyprus and Greece
with the Cyprus colonial secretary (Fletcher Cooke) and the counsellor
at Athens (Lambert). A paper had been prepared by the F.O. which he had
discussed with Hopkinson]
The paper proposes an important departure from the line we have
taken hitherto. It recommends that a statement should be made to
the effect that Her Majesty's Government are prepared to contemp-
late self-determination for Cyprus as an ultimate goal. At the
same time the paper recommends that we should tighten up and pos-
sibly toughen up our security measures within the island, so as
to make it quite clear that we are not going to be bundled out
by Enosis agitation.

international reaction which demanded the need for some acceptable new status
for fortress colonies - maybe a formula of full internal autonomy but with the
U.K. retaining control of defence and foreign affairs. At this juncture the
withdrawal from Egypt and the dismissal of Glubb Pasha in Jordan emphasised
the strategic importance of Cyprus, while British forces and British rule had
soon to withstand and overcome the E.O.K.A. campaign against them. Greece was
taking the Cyprus problem to the U.N. and the U.S. was refusing to back the
U.K. [see F.O. 371/112867 passim]. Turkey, however, was ready to demonstrate
its opposition to enosis. On 5 March 1956 (Cmd. 9708 pp.3-9) Lennox-Boyd
affirmed that H.M.'s G. adhered to the principles embodied in the charters of
the U.N., of Potomac and the Pacific but 'it is not therefore their position
that the principle of self-determination can never be applicable to Cyprus.
It is their position that it is not now a practical proposition in account of
the present situation in the Eastern Mediterranean.' H.M.'s G. had offered 'a
wide measure of self-government.. .and wished with co-operation of the Cypriots
to find a final solution which would satisfy the wishes of the people of Cyp-
rus, be consistent with the strategic interests of H.M.'s G. and their allies,
and have regard to the existing treaties to which H.M. 's G, are a party'. When
self-government had 'proved itself capable of safeguarding the interests of
all sections of the community' H.M.'s G. would discuss the future of the isl-
and with Cypriot representatives. (Correspondence between Harding and Makarios
(Jan.- Feb. 1956) is printed in Mansergh III, pp.218-25). 1. F.O. 371/117625:
R.G. 1081/107. Nutting was parliamentary under-secretary in the F.O. (1951-4)
and minister of state (1954-6): he was to resign in October 1956 over the Suez
crisis. The statement by Henry Hopkinson that the measures for limited consti-
tutional reform just announced for Cyprus would 'never' lead to independence
[No.127] made in the context of the continuing debate on the future of smaller
territories [Vol.VII No.l8d and above Nos. 1-4] needed adjustment: Greece had
taken the Cyprus issue to the U.N. and Britain needed US. support. So 'with
an eye to American opinion' (Wilding, Min. 19 Jan. 1955 ibid.) and to the
principle of 'self-determination', so fashionable at the U.N. among ex-colon-
ies, the unaligned and the Eastern European bloc, and now tacticly replacing
enosis in some Greek claims, Britain had begun to modify 'never' to 'not yet'.
The Cypriots would be given a more liberal constitution, and must prove by co-
operation that they could govern themselves. Thereby it was hoped that Cypr-
iots would acquire a vested interest in self-government and be less likely to
hand authority and taxes over to Athens. But Eden had reluctantly to be con-
vinced by governor, C O . and F.O. that a new policy was necessary to avert
defeat at the U.N. Meanwhile the tension in Cyprus had grown: the C O . had
refused to authorise a secret meeting between Makarios and Armitage (25 Feb.
1955: F.O. 371/117625 R.G. 1081/134).
 425

The more I see and hear of the Cyprus problem, the more c o n v i n -
ced I am of the dangers of our present p o l i c y of d r i f t . True, the
C o l o n i a l O f f i c e say t h a t they are o f f e r i n g a c o n s t i t u t i o n . But,
according t o the people on the spot, no one in Cyprus w i l l buy
the c o n s t i t u t i o n . The Turkish m i n o r i t y w i l l not buy i t because
they f e a r i t i s a step towards t h e i r u l t i m a t e s u b j e c t i o n t o Greek
r u l e ; and the Greek m a j o r i t y won't touch i t so long as the Greek
Government and Orthodox Church go on a c t i v e l y supporting Enosis
and branding as t r a i t o r s C y p r i o t s who co-operate w i t h the B r i -
tish.
At the same time the C o l o n i a l O f f i c e seem r e l u c t a n t t o take
s t e r n enough measures t o maintain law and order i f t h i n g s get
r e a l l y tough, as they are s u r e l y l i k e l y t o do i f Enosis a g i t a t i o n
continues t o i n c r e a s e .
Thus our present p o l i c y seems l i k e l y t o lead in Cyprus a t best
t o an impasse and a t worst t o f u r t h e r outbreaks of r i o t s and
bloodshed which w i l l become i n c r e a s i n g l y d i f f i c u l t f o r our autho-
r i t i e s t o keep i n c o n t r o l . . . .
[There was also a U.N. dimension. From Washington the ambassador (Sir
Roger Maklns) emphasised the popular importance of 'self-determination'
1n any struggle for U.S. support. An adverse vote 1n the U.N. Assembly
was now probable, for Greece would now present the Issue as one of 'self-
determination' and the strength of ant1-colon1al feeling would put Bri-
tain in the same position as France whose Moroccan, Tunisian and Algerian
record was raked over annually by a l l the mischief makers 1n the Assem-
bly. I t would have adverse repercussions in Cyprus i t s e l f . ]
I f t h e r e f o r e we accept t h a t a p o l i c y of d r i f t i s r u l e d o u t ,
what are the a l t e r n a t i v e s ? There seem t o be two: ( i ) t o toughen
up a g a i n s t Enosis; or ( i i ) t o toughen up a g a i n s t Enosis and a t
the same time t o hold out the prospect of u l t i m a t e s e l f - d e t e r m i -
n a t i o n provided i n the meanwhile the C y p r i o t s have shown themsel-
ves capable of working the c o n s t i t u t i o n in an o r d e r l y , proper
manner. I f I f e l t we could get away w i t h ( i ) , I should be a l l f o r
i t . But I doubt whether over a long period i t would r e a l l y put
a stop t o Greek a g i t a t i o n : and I am c e r t a i n t h a t i t would bring
us much heavier censure in the United Nations where our f r i e n d s
would be s t i l l more embarrassed, and where we should be depicted
as oppressors of colonial1 peoples.
My conclusion t h e r e f o r e i s i n favour of course ( i i ) . I am sure
t h i s i s worth t r y i n g . I t would t o a g r e a t e x t e n t cut the ground
from under the Greeks both in Cyprus and i n the United N a t i o n s .
I t would g r e a t l y strengthen our p o s i t i o n i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y and help
us and our f r i e n d s t o r e s i s t Greek attempts t o r a i s e the issue
in i n t e r n a t i o n a l g a t h e r i n g s . I t would give the Greek Government
any excuse t h a t they might be looking f o r t o withdraw from t h i s
contest w i t h a reasonable amount of f a c e - s a v i n g , 2 and so remove

1. A marginal note by Anthony Eden queried whether Greece would keep up the
agitation. Itwas'an unstable country*. 2. Eden thought that Greece would give
'a shout of triumph'. In a minute (9 Feb.) he did not agree with Nutting. A
new constitution had been recently announced which not enough people wanted
to work. Why look for another? 'We never allow our medicine time to work'.
Greece was beginning to r e a l i s e i t s behaviour was doing them no good interna-
t i o n a l l y : pressure must be maintained to make l i f e as uncomfortable as pos-
s i b l e . Britain must show no glimmer of weakness. Nutting's proposals would be
426
the deterrent which at present prevents the Cypriots co-operating
in the proffered constitution. It would finally commend itself
to parliamentary and public opinion in this country, which would
dislike a policy of mere repression and which is uneasy about our
existing approach.
There is, of course, one highly important factor which we must
not leave out of account. All this would need very careful hand-
ling with the Turks. They have stood by us firmly, and we must
seek to carry them with us in what we do. But if we take them
fully into our confidence, and above all if we show that we mean
what we say about being firm in Cyprus itself, there seems a fair
chance that they would react reasonably.

(b) F.O. DEPARTMENTAL MEMORANDUM, 8 February 19551

1. In Cyprus the Governor [Sir Robert Armitage] sees no possi-
bility of introducing a constitution this year. In spite of the
Greek failure at the United Nations, moderate Cypriots are still
afraid to commit themselves, and the propaganda of the Ethnarchy
and the Greek Government reinforces this fear. This propaganda
may also succeed in inciting the population to violence, unless
strong counter measures are taken. If on the other hand a consti-
tution could be introduced and worked successfully for some
years, the moderates in Cyprus could be expected increasingly to
support it and the extremists would become isolated.
2. The Greek Government show no signs of abandoning their Cyp-
rus campaign. Papagos himself might be glad to do so; but unless
he has some pretext for changing his policy he will remain the
servant of the extremists. Meanwhile Greek propaganda continues
and the Greek Government have announced their intention of taking
the Cyprus question before the next session of the United
Nations.
3. At the United Nations we were successful through the use of
a procedural device which enabled anti-colonial delegations and
the United States to avoid voting against self-determination. We
cannot expect to do the same trick again, and the Greeks might
well get a majority. Such a result would cause great harm in
Cyprus (as it has done in North Africa).

OUR AIMS
4. I t i s submitted t h a t these should be:
(a) To keep e f f e c t i v e c o n t r o l in Cyprus and t o persuade the
Cypriots t h a t we are not going t o be bundled o u t ;
(b) t o introduce a c o n s t i t u t i o n ;
(c) t o strengthen our p o s i t i o n i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y so as t o be able
t o defeat the Greeks i f they r a i s e Cyprus again at the United
Nations;
(d) t o keep the support and co-operation of Turkey; 2
(e) t o expose the hollowness of the Greek Government's pretence
t o support the p r i n c i p l e of s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n f o r Cyprus.

regarded as a surrender by Turks, Greeks, Spaniards. (Gibraltar would be expo-

sed.) If the constitutional offer was different from the previous one they
would be right, for ' i f t h i s i s good, why was i t not offered l a s t time?'.
1. F.O. 371/117625 Secret.
2. Eden thought this very important.
 427
POSSIBLE ACTION
5. The best chance of bringing about an improvement lies in a
policy which would aim to combine firmness in the present with
reasonableness for the future. In Cyprus strong action, unpopular
with the Greeks, must be taken now to re-assert the Government's
authority and to show that we are not to be hustled out. Interna-
tionally, our position would be much improved if we could make
it clear that, on certain conditions, Cypriots can ultimately
expect to decide their own future status.
6. The action to be taken in Cyprus will require to be consi-
dered in detail after consultation with the Governor.1 It will
probably need to include:-
(i) Immediate strengthening of the Police and Security Forces in
Cyprus. (The weaker the Police, the greater the likelihood of
troops having to be called out, and thus of bloodshed),
(ii) The taking over by the Cyprus Government of Cypriot secon-
dary schools, which are breeding grounds of Enosis agitation,
(iii) Some prosecutions under the Sedition law. Such prosecutions
could be defended successfully in this country and abroad if the
defendants could be proved to have incited Cypriots to violence.
They would do much to stop the campaign of intimidation which now
overawes most moderate Cypriots.
7. As the counterpart to this action in the island, it is sug-
gested that we should publicly accept the principle of self-de-
termination for Cyprus while accepting no commitment as regards
its timing or the exact circumstances in which it would material-
ize. We might say that:-
Although for strategic and political reasons we cannot at present
foresee when a change in the status of Cyprus will be possible,
we nevertheless see no reason why the people of Cyprus should not
ultimately be able to determine their own status when the inter-
national situation permits and provided they have first developed
those self-governing institutions through which alone such a de-
cision could properly be exercised.
We should have to make it quite clear that we do not contemplate
a plebiscite.
8. A statement on these lines, provided it were accompanied by
other action (see paragraph 6 above)
(i) Would strengthen our position at the United Nations,
particularly vis-it-vis the Americans. Having made a gesture to
the principle of self-determination, we should be in a stronger
position to resist on practical grounds any further move by the
Greeks or the anti-colonial powers.
(ii) Would give the Greek Government an opportunity to break with
the extremists and to cease active support for the Enosis
campaign. They could represent to their own public opinion that,
the principle of self-determination having been recognized, the
present world situation made it expedient to leave the question
alone for the time being.
(iii) By showing that the only way to self-determination lay
through constitutional development would give the Government of
Cyprus the chance to regain the initiative and persuade moderate
Cypriots to co-operate in the introduction and working of the

1. 'I thought we had been doing this all these months' (Eden - marginal note).
428
constitution.
9. The c h i e f d i f f i c u l t y we should face i s t h a t of c a r r y i n g the
Turkish Government w i t h us. At the l e a s t we must be sure of Turk-
ish acquiescence before embarking on a new p o l i c y . We should need
t o inform the Turkish Government i n advance about any proposed
p o l i c y statement; and i f they i n s i s t e d we might have t o make a
p u b l i c r e s e r v a t i o n about the Turkish i n t e r e s t . We would i n any
case make i t c l e a r t o them t h a t s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n f o r Cyprus can
only come about when a l l the necessary c o n d i t i o n s are f u l f i l l e d ,
i n c l u d i n g a f i r m p o l i t i c a l understanding between Greece and Tur-
key. We should put i t t o the Greek Government t h a t i t would be
t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o b r i n g t h i s about.
10. To sum up, a strong p o l i c y i n Cyprus i s e s s e n t i a l i f the
Government's a u t h o r i t y there i s t o be r e s t o r e d . But a strong
p o l i c y alone may only s t i f f e n the Greek1 determination t o con-

1. Eden did not believe t h i s . He thought the harm of a firm policy in Cyprus
was exaggerated and did not despair of persuading Greece (Papagos was already
agreeable) t o abandon t h e i r propaganda campaign. But in h i s f i n a l memo, for
cabinet he agreed generally with Alan Lennox-Boyd, the s e c r e t a r y of s t a t e for
the Colonies (Memo. 5 April C(55)92 ibid.) that a new statement must be made.
[No. 128c] Eden argued t h a t the Greek Government under domestic pressure p a r t i -
c u l a r l y from the Orthodox Church had continued, d e s p i t e rebuff a t the U.N.,
t h e i r subversive propaganda campaign for enosis and opposition to a new cons-
t i t u t i o n , and had turned a blind eye to the smuggling of explosives i n t o Cyp-
r u s . At t h i s j u n c t u r e a statement 'contemplating self-determination as a pos-
s i b l e u l t i m a t e goal to be reached through c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o c e s s e s ' would p r o -
vide Greece with ' a face-saving' p r e t e x t t a c i t l y t o drop enosis and the oppo-
s i t i o n t o a c o n s t i t u t i o n for Cyprus. At the U.N. a procedural device had ena-
bled t h e U.S. and other friendly powers t o avoid voting a g a i n s t s e l f - d e t e r m i -
n a t i o n , but if H.M.'s. G. could be represented as opposed t o t h a t p r i n c i p l e ,
a Greek r e s o l u t i o n would get a majority and the r e s u l t would be s e r i o u s
r i o t i n g in Cyprus. While Greece could not be consulted or informed in advance
of t h i s new emphasis in B r i t i s h p o l i c y , Turkey must be convinced t h a t i t did
not mean t h a t B r i t a i n could be stampeded o u t , t h a t we were resolved t o main-
t a i n our a u t h o r i t y , t h a t no change in sovereignty was contemplated in t h e
foreseeable f u t u r e , and t h a t Turkish minority i n t e r e s t s would be safeguarded.
B r i t a i n ' s purpose remained as ever t o f a c i l i t a t e the development of the c o l -
ony's self-government, and t o strengthen i t s i n t e r n a t i o n a l standing in U.N.
and U.S. opinion. The U.S. should be pressed t o use i t s influence over Greece
to drop the Cyprus campaign e s p e c i a l l y in the U.N. Eden succeeded Churchill
as P.M. two days l a t e r and Macmillan replaced him a t the F.O. Eden had f i n a l l y
and r e l u c t a n t l y agreed with the governor, h i s F.O. m i n i s t e r s and o f f i c i a l s ,
and t h e C O . : a new statement would be made t o the Commons on 19 April In h i s
accompanying memo. (5 April C(55)92: ibid.) Alan Lennox-Boyd, the secretary
of s t a t e for the colonies argued for an adjustment of policy. He r e f e r r e d t o
the L y t t e l t o n - Hopkinson statement of 21 July 1954 including the withdrawal
of the 1948 offer of a c o n s t i t u t i o n [Vol.VII pp.549-501, and the s u b s t i t u t i o n
of a 'more limited type of self-governing i n s t i t u t i o n ' (an o f f i c i a l and nomi-
nated majority over e l e c t e d l e g i s l a t i v e council members but with some u n o f f i -
c i a l s a t departments on the e x e c u t i v e ) ; and the reaffirmation t h a t no change
in sovereignty was contemplated and any reference t o 'self-government a t some
date in the f u t u r e ' t o t a l l y avoided. Since t h e r e had been ' l i t t l e response'
to t h i s i n i t i a t i v e , he was now ready t o make a more l i b e r a l offer - an e l e c t e d
majority (3 o f f i c i a l s as offered in July 1954, 10 (not 15) nominated u n o f f i -
 429

t i n u e t h e i r campaign and increase the chances of an adverse r e -

s o l u t i o n a t the United N a t i o n s . We should thus be made t o appear
t o be holding down Cyprus by f o r c e against the strong pressure
of home and f o r e i g n o p i n i o n . I f on the other hand a f i r m p o l i c y
i s combined w i t h an announcement about u l t i m a t e s e l f - d e t e r m i n a -
t i o n , we can hope t o cut the ground from under the Greek a g i t a t -
ion and t o persuade the C y p r i o t s t h a t t h e i r i n t e r e s t l i e s in co-
o p e r a t i n g i n a c o n s t i t u t i o n . We s h a l l be able t o show t h a t , on
s t r a t e g i c and p o l i t i c a l grounds, s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n i s not p r a c -
t i c a b l e in the f o r e s e e a b l e f u t u r e ; meanwhile t h e r e i s a reason-
able chance t h a t once a c o n s t i t u t i o n has been made t o work the
a g i t a t i o n f o r Enosis w i l l g r a d u a l l y d i m i n i s h .

( c ) EDEN - LENNOX-BOYD DRAFT STATEMENT, 4 April 19551

Her M a j e s t y ' s Government have given f u r t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n t o
t h e i r plans f o r p o l i t i c a l advance in Cyprus and have decided t h a t
the new l e g i s l a t u r e s h a l l from the f i r s t c o n t a i n a m a j o r i t y of
e l e c t e d members. This w i l l be the f i r s t stage i n the c l o s e r asso-
c i a t i o n of the people of Cyprus w i t h the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the

c i a l s , and as in 1954 12 e l e c t e d Greeks and 3 e l e c t e d Turks) to encourage more

moderates to stand while the 3 Turks could be r e l i e d to vote with the o f f i c -
i a l s and nominees against any Enosist motions, though the governor opposed any
pledge on nominees to support government policy. The agitation for enosis,
a r t i f i c i a l l y fomented by the Orthodox church with support from Greece, might
provoke inter-communal disorder and i t might prove necessary to prosecute some
bishops for treason. The governor, S i r Robert Armitage, believed i t necessary
to r a l l y moderates by an improved c o n s t i t u t i o n a l offer and a bolder statement
of ' u l t i m a t e aims of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l development': more Cypriots would be put
in charge of departments and placed on the executive. Neither Lyttelton nor
he himself had used the word ' n e v e r ' , but refused to prophesy about ' t h e d i s -
t a n t future a t a time when we s t i l l cannot see c l e a r l y the outcome of our
fresh s t e p towards c o n s t i t u t i o n a l advance' (Hans. 29 Oct 1954). But any sug-
gestion to the Turks that we have 'sold out' to the enosists must also be
avoided. Therefore he proposed t h i s new statement of general aims - the con-
cession of an elected majority - which Eden approved. The U.S. government
whose concern was primarily s t r a t e g i c and the prevention of Greece becoming
communist and leaving N.A.T.O., supported t h i s new formula with enthusiasm,
but before these memos. and t h i s d r a f t were put to c a b i n e t , E.O.K.A. (the
National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters) had begun t h e i r 'armed s t r u g g l e '
against B r i t i s h r u l e . Eden's cabinet (19 April: Cab.128/29) considered the two
memos. and the d r a f t statement in the l i g h t of the d i s t u r b a n c e s : i t was not
easy t o take further s t e p s towards c o n s t i t u t i o n a l advance in the immediate
future, and they would c e r t a i n l y prove a b o r t i v e . If the proposals were 'not
s u f f i c i e n t l y imaginative' i t might not be possible to combine the statement
with ' a c u l t u r a l convention or dual n a t i o n a l i t y ' . But the new foreign s e c r e -
t a r y , Macmillan, was opposed to any change t i l l a favourable i n t e r n a t i o n a l
atmosphere was assured though some move would be necessary before the next
U.N. general assembly meeting. So the cabinet agreed to defer any fresh i n -
i t i a t i v e . 1. Cab. 129/74 C(55)92, also 93. This i s the d r a f t proposed by Alan
Lennox-Boyd, a t the C O . and accepted by Eden a t the F.O. I t avoided the use
of ' s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n ' (which Churchill had f a i l e d to exclude from the Pacif-
i c Charter in Manila in Sept. 1954) though policy was already focused on t h a t
e v e n t u a l i t y and was a phrase more acceptable to the U.K., U.S. and the U.N.
than enosis, and it acknowledged the future right of Cypriots to a voice in
430
i s l a n d , and i t w i l l , i f s u c c e s s f u l , be f o l l o w e d by f u r t h e r a d v a n -
ces i n t h e same d i r e c t i o n , l e a d i n g f i n a l l y t o f u l l i n t e r n a l s e l f -
government, s u b j e c t t o t h e s a t i s f a c t o r y s a f e g u a r d s f o r m i n o r -
i t i e s . A t p r e s e n t i t i s i m p o s s i b l e f o r s t r a t e g i c 1 and p o l i t i c a l
reasons t o c o n t e m p l a t e a change i n t h e s t a t u s o f t h e i s l a n d , b u t
once s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t has been e s t a b l i s h e d and p r o v e d t o be w o r k -
i n g s u c c e s s f u l l y , t h e means w i l l e x i s t whereby t h e C y p r i o t p e o p l e
can c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y be c o n s u l t e d a b o u t t h e i r f u t u r e s t a t u s . When
t h i s s t a g e has been reached and i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n d i t i o n s p e r m i t ,
t h e r e i s no reason why agreement on t h i s m a t t e r s h o u l d n o t be
a r r i v e d a t between Her M a j e s t y ' s Government and t h e c o n s t i t u -
t i o n a l l y e l e c t e d r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the Cypriot people.

129. DRAFT 'POSSIBLE PLAN' FOR TRIPARTITE CONFERENCE, 17 August 19552

[H.M.'s G. believed the restoration of harmony required the 'progress-
ive advance towards self-government with proper regard to the rights and
Interests of a l l interested p a r t i e s ' . ] To t h i s end Her M a j e s t y ' s
Government propose t h e e a r l y i n t r o d u c t i o n o f a new and l i b e r a l
c o n s t i t u t i o n , l e a d i n g as soon as p o s s i b l e t o t h e f u l l e s t measure
of i n t e r n a l self-government compatible w i t h the s t r a t e g i c r e q u i -
rements o f t h e p r e s e n t i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n . The c o n s t i t u t i o n
would p r o v i d e f r o m t h e o u t s e t f o r an Assembly w i t h an e l e c t e d
m a j o r i t y , a p r o p o r t i o n a t e quota o f s e a t s b e i n g r e s e r v e d f o r t h e
T u r k i s h - s p e a k i n g m i n o r i t y . A l l Departments o f t h e Cyprus G o v e r n -

the f i n a l s t a t u s of the i s l a n d . 1. The s t r a t e g i c importance of Cyprus had

been increased r e c e n t l y by the B r i t i s h withdrawal from Egypt in 1954. In Aug-
u s t the Cyprus d i s p u t e was placed on the U.N. agenda by Greece, and Macmillan
a t the F.O. now sought to r a i s e the p o l i t i c a l cost to Greece i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y
of supporting Greek Cypriots. The U.K. had now joined Turkey in the Baghdad
pact. Greece too came to fear supporting Makarios - in case the Greek minority
in Istanbul should be endangered (see Michael Stewart to Macmillan, 22 Sept.
1955: F.O, 371/117111 R.G. 10233/50 on the anti-Greek r i o t s ) . But before the
Cabinet could consider t h i s memo., violence had broken out in Cyprus (Armitage
to Lennox-Boyd, 1 April 1955: F.O. 371/117628 R.G. 1081/214). So the announce-
ment was shelved t i l l law and order were r e s t o r e d . The E.O.K.A. campaign for
liberation from imperial rule and the achievement of enosis, by sniping and
bombs, delayed the independence of Cyprus. Given the circumstances, progress
towards f u l l self-government could not be as simple as in some other c o l o n i e s .
The d i r e c t i o n of policy was reasonably c l e a r , but violence and bloodshed only
succeeded in postponing the i n e v i t a b l e .
2. Cab.130/109: approved by the m i n i s t e r i a l committee on Cyprus. The governor
had proposed an elected l e g i s l a t u r e with s e a t s reserved for the Turkish minor-
i t y and for members nominated by the governor on the assumption t h a t a vote
by reserved and nominated members would defeat enosis. Macmillan 'questioned
whether a balanced l e g i s l a t u r e of t h i s type was l i k e l y to be acceptable to a
population of European descent; i t seemed more appropriate to a backward
people who were unqualified for f u l l self-government. Against t h i s i t was a r -
gued t h a t , without some arrangement for nominating members the more respon-
s i b l e members of the community would be unwilling to stand for e l e c t i o n to the
l e g i s l a t u r e and t h a t only in such a way could balanced r e p r e s e n t a t i o n be
a c h i e v e d ' . I t was also argued t h a t t h e r e might be a case for more than 3 Cyp-
r i o t m i n i s t e r s , maybe including Communists. The Ethnarchy might then be forced
to recognise the fundamental divergence of i n t e r e s t between the two extremes
of Greek opinion and decide to contest future e l e c t i o n s themselves.
 431

ment would be p r o g r e s s i v e l y t r a n s f e r r e d t o C y p r i o t M i n i s t e r s , r e -
sponsible t o the Assembly, w i t h the exception of Foreign A f f a i r s ,
Defence and P u b l i c S e c u r i t y which would be reserved t o the Gover-
nor. As p a r t of the safeguards t o be provided f o r the T u r k i s h -
speaking m i n o r i t y , a p r o p o r t i o n of the M i n i s t e r i a l p o r t f o l i o s
would be reserved f o r t h a t community. A C y p r i o t Chief M i n i s t e r
t o head the new C y p r i o t a d m i n i s t r a t i o n would be chosen by the
Assembly w i t h the approval of the G o v e r n o r . . . . [This would set Cyp-
rus on 'the normal path of democratic development! The approval of Greece
and Turkey would be Important 1n securing the f u l l co-operation of the
Cypriot people'.]
When self-government has been achieved in t h i s way and has p r o -
ved t o be working s u c c e s s f u l l y , the means w i l l e x i s t whereby the
people of Cyprus can be c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y consulted about t h e i r
f u t u r e . Her M a j e s t y ' s Government w i l l , in any e v e n t , review the
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p o s i t i o n in ten y e a r s ' time together w i t h the r e p -
r e s e n t a t i v e s of the C y p r i o t people pand in c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h
the Governments of Greece and T u r k e y ] .
Her M a j e s t y ' s Government recognize the s p e c i a l c u l t u r a l and
other l i n k s which Greece and Turkey have w i t h Cyprus. They are
w i l l i n g t o discuss w i t h the Greek and Turkish Governments matters
a r i s i n g out of such i n t e r e s t s [and, i f so d e s i r e d , the conclusion
of a p p r o p r i a t e inter-Governmental agreements],
[Such agreements, w h i l e recognising t h a t the sovereignty of
Cyprus remains w i t h the B r i t i s h Crown, should include p r o v i s i o n s
f o r the f o l l o w i n g :
( i ) The r i g h t of the Greek Government and the Turkish Government
each t o appoint a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n Cyprus having a grade e q u i v a -
l e n t t o t h a t of Ambassador, w i t h the t i t l e of Special Commission-
e r . The Greek and Turkish r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , though not associated
w i t h the Governor in the discharge of h i s f u n c t i o n s , would have
s p e c i a l r i g h t s of access both t o the Governor and t o the f u t u r e
C y p r i o t Prime M i n i s t e r . T h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s would include the
p r o t e c t i o n of Greek and Turkish i n t e r e s t s in Cyprus and the admi-
n i s t r a t i o n of any c u l t u r a l agreements which may be concluded b e t -
ween Her M a j e s t y ' s Government on the one hand and the Greek and
Turkish Governments on the o t h e r , in r e l a t i o n t o Cyprus, ( i i ) The
Greek and Turkish f l a g s t o f l y o f f i c i a l l y alongside the Union
Jack i n Cyprus.]

130. (a) CYPRUS INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE: MEMORANDUM, 18 October 19552

I t i s concluded t h a t : -

1. These square brackets were in the original. The London Tripartite confer-
ence met in Sept. (CO. 926/371).
2. CO.926/455. The committee consisted of government o f f i c i a l s including the
colonial secretary and John Reddaway. I t s report, however, was somewhat inade-
quate. Makarios was himself deeply involved in E.O.K.A. and in the campaign
against the government led by Grivas though in public he denied complicity.
But the seizure of his papers after deportation and Grivas' diary exposed his
duplicity though the A.-G. (30 May 1958: PREM 11/2249) advised that the e v i -
dence was too shaky to warrant prosecution. The British ambassador in Athens,
Sir C Peake, (18 Jan. 1956: CO.371/123865) reported on the Harding-Makarios
talks: 'On one side was a servant of the Crown with a splendid record and on
the other a c l e r i c on whose veracity the [Greek] Minister for foreign a f f a i r s
432

( a ) E.O.K.A. i s a c l a n d e s t i n e n a t i o n a l i s t t e r r o r i s t o r g a n i s a t i o n
which aims at leading the struggle for Enosis. It has recruited
i t s a c t i v e membership l a r g e l y from middle c l a s s youth and has
drawn on the former n a t i o n a l i s t youth movement P . E . O . N .
( b ) E.O.K.A. i s anti-communist, but i s c a r e f u l not t o antagonise
T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s . I t has received m a t e r i a l support from t h e
Ethnarchy, from a complementary o r g a n i s a t i o n in Greece and
s u f f i c i e n t popular support in Cyprus t o make i t i m p o l i t i c f o r the
Greek Orthodox h i e r a r c h y t o condemn i t openly.
( c ) E.O.K.A. i s b e l i e v e d t o be led by a Greek s u b j e c t of C y p r i o t
b i r t h . I t s a c t i v i t i e s and i t s d i r e c t i o n are based on experience
in the Greek armed f o r c e s and the Khi o r g a n i s a t i o n i n Greece.
( d ) The v i r i l e d i r e c t i o n e x h i b i t e d by E.O.K.A. suggests o t h e r
than l o c a l C y p r i o t i n f l u e n c e and some a d d i t i o n a l persons of Greek
n a t i o n a l i t y and C y p r i o t s w i t h Greek army experience have been
t e n t a t i v e l y i d e n t i f i e d in leading positions.

( b ) GOVERNOR FIELD MARSHAL SIR JOHN HARDING TO ALAN LENNOX-BOYD,

31 May 19561
[After Makarios' deportation (9 March) certain documents were seized
including minutes of the Ethnarchy Council and Bureau,2 his letters to
the Greek P.M. and the archbishop of Athens, and his speech for his
arrival 1n Athens on 9 March.]
I am of the opinion t h a t , i f p o s s i b l e l e g a l o b j e c t i o n s t o the
use and p u b l i c a t i o n of these documents can be overcome, 3 the
m a t e r i a l in these minutes should be v a l u a b l e , both here and
abroad, f o r the purposes of (1 ) r e v e a l i n g the i n s i n c e r i t y of the
Archbishop and h i s a d v i s e r s i n p r e s e n t i n g as a genuine demand f o r
self-government t h e i r i n s i s t e n c e on a form of c o n s t i t u t i o n which
would have given them complete c o n t r o l of the I s l a n d ' s i n t e r n a l
a f f a i r s , ( 2 ) j u s t i f y i n g our d e c i s i o n not t o accede t o the Arch-
b i s h o p ' s demands, and ( 3 ) showing t h a t the t r u e aims of the E t h -
narchy i n demanding complete i n t e r n a l self-government were not
compatible w i t h our long-term s t r a t e g i c aims h e r e . S k i l f u l l y used
i t might a l s o be useful l o c a l l y as a means of s t i m u l a t i n g c o n t r o -
versy over the Ethnarchy's handling of the n e g o t i a t i o n s on the
f u t u r e of Cyprus. I should expect a l s o t h a t Her M a j e s t y ' s Govern-
ment would f i n d t h i s m a t e r i a l of assistance i n convincing t h e
S t a t e Department t h a t our s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s i n the Eastern
M e d i t e r r a n e a n , w i t h which t h e i r s are now c l o s e l y bound, would
have been hopelessly compromised by the acceptance of the c o n s t i -

had himself on a number of occasions.. .cast the strongest doubt.' 1. CO.

926/450: secret, priority telegram (923) (reported confidentially to Ambas-
sadors in Athens, Ankara, Washington and British delegates at U.N. and
N.A.T.O.). Harding had been chief of the imperial general staff (1952-5) and
was posted as governor (1955- Nov. 1957) to defeat E.O.K.A. He persevered in
negotiations with Makarios (Oct. 1955 - Feb. 1956) - crucially on 21 Nov.
when, by rejecting Harding's offer, Makarios confirmed the deep d i s t r u s t the
f i e l d marshal had of the archbishop (to Lennox-Boyd, 22 Nov. F.O. 371/117672
R.G. 1081/1514). 2. The Ethnarchy Council of some two dozen included 3 bish-
ops and the abbot of Kykko; an inner committee including Anthimos, bishop of
Kyrenia, constituted the Bureau. Makarios presided over both. Photios of Pa-
phos alone was considered ' r e l i a b l e ' and was sent abroad by Makarios. 3. Doc-
uments could be seized l e g a l l y (under Reg.67) if there was 'evidence of an of-
 433
tutional demands put forward by the Archbishop.... [But disclosure
of the opposition of certain members of the Ethnarchy Council to any
Turkish participation in self-government might confirm Turkish apprehen-
sions about constitutional development: Turks could use this to justify
a boycott of constitutional reform.1 The letter to the Greek P.M. (1
December 1955) established beyond dispute the attitude of the Archbishop
and the Ethnarchy towards E.O.K.A. proscribed as a terrorist organisation
since mid-September but referred to by Makarlos as 'the natural resistan-
ce movement': in 'the struggle for liberation' Makarlos asked the Greek
government to intensify Its anti-British broadcasts,]
131. GOVERNOR FIELD MARSHAL SIR JOHN HARDING: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM IN
CYPRUS, 18 January 19562
[The problem of getting a constitution going by agreement with Makarlos

fence'. 1. One of the Ethnarchy councillors argued that the acceptance of

self-government was the only way to 'neutralise the Turkish factor'; and that
any representation of the Turks in the cabinet must be avoided at all costs.
In a printed enclosure of minutes (Oct. 1955 - Feb. 1956) it was clearly im-
plied that thanks to E.O.K.A. Makarios' negotiating position was strengthened,
that H.M.'s G. offer should be exploited solely to secure enosis: (C.0.926/
450). On 21 May (ibid.) it was reported that extremists in Athens planned the
formation of a 'government of free Cyprus' with Grivas as premier and a cabi-
net from Athens, Alexandria and the Middle East seeking Arab recognition and
by-passing Greece. Reddaway wrote to the mayor of Nicosia (9 July) exposing
the insincerity of Makarios, his intransigent bargaining tactics, his invita-
tion of Grivas to Cyprus, and encouragement of communal violence by Greek
attacks on Turkish police. In the Church and Terrorism, a paper put together
when Grivas' diary had been captured, the central position of Makarios was
revealed: he had inspired the government of Greece to conspire with E.O.K.A.,
had sought to indoctrinate children, and had brought 'in January 1958 a bruta-
lised and disappointed soldier', Grivas, to terrorise his compatriots into
acquiescence of Makarios' ambitions: passages in the diary made clear that he
was the master in preparing, funding and ordering the start of violence, Griv-
as 'his obedient servant' (ibid. pp.131-60). On 23 July 1954 Makarios, addres-
sing the national assembly, said only through violence could the 'British be
made to understand'. The oath of the youth organisation of E.O.K.A. (p.134)
was ministered by priests and monks; and the Church was used as a cover, and
fear of communism and of its eclipse by the left strengthened its support (p.
154). The deportation of Makarios was not a blow to Christianity (as Arch-
bishop Fisher seemed to imply when asserting that he was doing what a church-
man should do: Lords, 15 March 1956) but because he had foresaken Christian
teaching by encouraging violence in support of his own political ambitions and
forecasting rebellion. E.O.K.A. indeed was guilty of shooting not only a few
Turkish Greeks for show, but many fellow Greeks whom they felt unreliable or
just got in the way - so much for the later Greek concern with Greek Cypriot
'missing'. 2. C.0.926/548: top secret. The new formula of not 'never' but
'not yet1 envisaged a period of preparation for self-government, but the Eden-
Lennox-Boyd new drive had been' blunted*by the E.O.K.A. campaign. Greece,
which with Turkey had in 1952 entered N.A.T.O., had in internationalising the
Cyprus question at the U.N. in 1954 deftly replaced 'enosis' with 'self-deter-
mination', a fashionable word in the U.N. assembly. By then British withdrawal
in 1954 from Egypt (and later in March 1955 the dismissal of Glubb pasha from
Jordan) had emphasised the importance of Cyprus to the U.K. and the West. Mac-
millan astutely raised the political cost to Greece of support for enosis and
 434
bristled with difficulties. The need was to turn the minds of the Greek
Cypriot elected representatives into channels other than Enosis and that
would take some time to achieve.] To achieve our long term aim our
guiding principle must be to defeat Enosis... [to] create a poli-
tical situation...which will ensure that when self-determination
is applied the outcome will be a decision to remain within the
Commonwealth with Enosis finally rejected.... [If we failed, we
would have wasted much money and resources now devoted to Cyprus: we
would have 'shattered' our prestige and Influence 1n the Eastern Mediter-
ranean and the Middle East; and we would be no longer able to make any
serious military effort 1n the Middle East. The evolution of a constitu-
tion was not merely a political exercise but a critical phase in British
Middle East policy. To defeat Enosis Greek Cypriot mentality must be
changed. To do so, Greek irredentist propaganda must be effectively coun-
tered: the political power of the Greek Orthodox Church 1n Cyprus must
be neutralised by the development of Independent and moderate secular
political leadership; E.O.K.A. must be utterly destroyed; the Communists
must be kept powerless; the Greek Cypriot majority must be convinced that
the material advantages of the British connection substantially outweigh
anything Greece could offer. To do this a reliable, non-pol1t1cal police
force, and professional non-political public service must be created;
non-political information, publishing and propaganda services retained;
secondary, technical and university education reformed and provided, and
an extensive development plan devised for soil, agricultural, geological
research, water and housing. The island economy must be put on a sound
and viable long term basis, and a comprehensive modern system of local
representative government must be developed. These measures will be cost-
ly but the Issues at stake are large. They would take time to produce re-
sults. 'We shall need every day we can beg, borrow, steal or buy. But we
must also need power to use the time well. It would be Illusory just to
hope that the passage of time would Incline Greek Cypriot minds to other

supported the interest of Turkey in the island's future. The violent cam-
paign by E.O.K.A. against British rule (officials, police, soldiers)
which many Greek Cypriots were later to acknowledge (often privately) as
delaying the independence of Cyprus, demanded a military response. Field
Marshal Harding's priority was to defeat E.O.K.A., but for many months
he strove in vain for the participation of Makarios in the policy for
more liberal constitutional progress. Makarios was however too deeply in-
volved with Grivas and E.O.K.A. to repudiate violence as Harding deman-
ded. Repeatedly (November 1955, January - February 1956) Harding sought
new formulae from H.M.'s G. to embrace 'self-determination' while secur-
ing necessary safeguards and a repudiation of E.O.K.A. To his dismay and
frustration Makarios rejected them and any concessions were claimed as
proof of E.O.K.A. success. In Greece itself Makarios' close intrigues
with the opposition to Karamanlis and the latter's fears for Greeks in
Istanbul weakened the cause of enosis there. And Grivas and the Kyrenia
clique were resolved to wreck any negotiations. The dialogue of Harding
and Makarios became one of 'the d e a f . By the end of February 1956 when
amid bombs in Nicosia, Lennox-Boyd came into direct discussions with
Makarios, he departed with the words 'God save your people'. (For the
breakdown of negotations on the 29th see Harding to Lennox-Boyd, 1 March
1956: C O . 926/426.) At this juncture Harding was empowered to deport
Makarios to the Seychelles^and Harding's sole purpose was now to destroy
E.O.K.A., which indeed was largely achieved in months.
 435
interests and lower the Intensity of the drive for Enosis. It would be
a political impossibility to refuse now the liberal constitution and
self-government at an early date' to which H.M.'s G. was committed.1]
If we had a longish period of constitutional government free
from Enosis agitation then perhaps time might produce this desi-
red result. But there is not the slightest chance of getting Eno-
sis off the centre of the political stage unless we have first
created a different climate of opinion from that which exists
today.
Everything points to an intensification rather than a dimin-
ution of political agitation for Enosis if we introduce a cons-
titution with the present climate of opinion among the Greek
Cypriots. Indeed it can be argued that our present policy puts
a premium on Enosis agitation both within the legislature and
outside. With the principle of self-determination recognised as
applicable to Cyprus agitation for its application naturally
becomes the next objective. Our opposition will lead to increased
suspicion of our sincerity. In fact by holding out promises to
discuss the Island's future with its elected representatives we
make it certain that Enosis will become the principal subject of
debate in the legislature. We give point to parliamentary pres-
sure for Enosis which it would not otherwise have. This argument
leads to the question whether when we set up the constitution we
should not at the same time set a time limit before which we will
not consider the application of self-determination.
The combination of our recognition of the principle, our refus-
al to set a time for discussing its application, our insistence
on a very liberal constitution leading to internal self-govern-
ment at an early date and our undertaking to discuss the Island's
future with its elected representatives seems practically certain
to produce a situation in which we shall be extremely hard put
to it to maintain British rule for even as long as five years.
Unless H.M.G. is prepared to contemplate some reshaping of its
declared policy for Cyprus, I do not at present see how we can
extricate ourselves from the situation with which we shall be
faced if an agreement is reached with the Archbishop. If we stick
by our constitutional offer, we must be prepared for an intensi-
fication of Enosist agitation on the political plane, increasing
pressure on H.M.G. through the elected representatives of the
Greek Cypriot people and, in the end, a situation where we shall
have to choose between abdicating or a head-on collision with
those elected representatives. I do not see how this dilemma is
to be avoided except by introducing some new element into the
situation in one or more of the following ways:-
(1) Retracting in some measure from the liberality of our consti-
tutional offer. This could be defended by reference to the aggra-
vation of violence and disorder, particularly in the secondary
schools, since the offer was made at the Tripartite Conference.
But by thus restricting our offer we would almost certainly des-
troy any hope of an agreement with the Archbishop. At this stage
that would appear to be politically impossible for H.M.G.
(2) Withdrawing our offer to discuss the Island's future with the
elected representatives and substituting from that an undertaking

1. [See Listowel, 19 January 1948: Vol.VII p.549.]

436
t h a t a f t e r a f i x e d period the people would be allowed t o decide
for themselves by means of a plebiscite. In the meantime Enosist
a g i t a t i o n through the l e g i s l a t u r e would be curbed on the grounds,
inter alia, that it could have no practical effect. The fixing
of a p e r i o d would o f f e n d Turkey but would probably render the
c o n s t i t u t i o n acceptable t o a l a r g e body of Greek C y p r i o t s ,
i n c l u d i n g perhaps the Archbishop.
( 3 ) I n s e r t i n g in the c o n s t i t u t i o n , when d r a f t e d , such o v e r - r i d i n g
safeguards f o r the Turkish m i n o r i t y as t o give them v i r t u a l l y a
power of veto over the outcome of the promised discussions b e t -
ween H.M.G. and the e l e c t e d r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s regarding the I s l -
and's f u t u r e . I f t h i s i n t e n t i o n were made c l e a r a t the o u t s e t ,
i t would destroy a l l hope of an agreement. I f i t were l e f t u n t i l
l a t e r , we should expose ourselves t o charges of bad f a i t h . I n
e i t h e r case we should soon be faced w i t h a head-on c o l l i s i o n w i t h
the Greek C y p r i o t s and t h e i r e l e c t e d r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .
( 4 ) Reviving the suggestion made a t the T r i p a r t i t e Conference
t h a t a t r i p a r t i t e committee should 'examine d e t a i l e d proposals
to be drawn up by H.M.G. f o r new c o n s t i t u t i o n a l instruments f o r
Cyprus and should r e c e i v e r e p o r t s regarding the development of
self-government and should a c t as a c e n t r e f o r discussing prob-
lems or d i f f e r e n c e s a r i s i n g out of self-government which i t had
not been p o s s i b l e t o r e s o l v e l o c a l l y i n C y p r u s . ' This would e n -
a b l e us t o go forward i n good f a i t h w i t h concluding an agreement
w i t h the Archbishop w h i l e s t i l l keeping in reserve a powerful
brake on both the c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g process and on the e x p l o i -
tation of the liberality of the constitution for Enosist pur-
poses. I t would moreover be a brake which could be a p p l i e d w i t h -
out i n v o l v i n g H.M.G. in d i r e c t c o n f l i c t w i t h the e l e c t e d r e p r e -
s e n t a t i v e s of the Greek C y p r i o t people.
There may be other ways i n which the dangers i n our c o n s t i t u -
t i o n a l o f f e r which I have described could be circumvented. I
should welcome an o p p o r t u n i t y of discussing the problem and
possible solutions with M i n i s t e r s .
I n view of the s t r a t e g i c i m p l i c a t i o n s of the whole of t h i s
problem I would suggest t h a t a copy of t h i s paper might be sent
t o the Chairman of the C h i e f s of S t a f f Committee. 1

132. GOVERNOR FIELD MARSHAL SIR JOHN HARDING TO ALAN LENNOX-BOYD,

31 January 19562
[Makarios might accept the new formula proved his 'constitutional
principles' were recognised, but any declaration against violence 'the
most powerful weapon 1n his armoury against us' would be withheld until
he had firmly established himself 1n his new 'constitutional position'.
Therefore four principles should govern H.M.'s G.'s policy.]
( a ) We should s t e a d f a s t l y refuse t o discuss c o n s t i t u t i o n a l deve-
lopment w i t h any i n d i v i d u a l or group who refuse t o d e c l a r e them-

1. Some of the subsequent correspondence between Harding and Makarios was

printed in P.P.1955-6 XXV(9708) pp.71/Y. On 28 January Harding enclosed the
statement against terrorism which he wanted Makarios to make, and on 25
February Makarios complained that assurances were not adequate for his
conditions had not been met.
2. CO.926/548: top secret. New statements by Lennox-Boyd (29 Feb.; 5 March)
were published in P.P.1955-6 XXV (9708).
 437

selves p u b l i c l y a g a i n s t v i o l e n c e and d i s o r d e r , ( b ) We should a l s o

refuse t o e n t e r i n t o p r i v a t e discussion w i t h any i n d i v i d u a l s or
groups on questions a f f e c t i n g the form of c o n s t i t u t i o n t o be
granted t o Cyprus. We should i n s i s t t h a t a l l such discussions
take place on a wide basis r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of a l l sections of the
community and shades of o p i n i o n , and be held i n p u b l i c . N a t u r a l l y
t h i s would not preclude p r i v a t e discussion or lobbying between
i n d i v i d u a l s or groups, ( c ) We should s t i c k t o our idea of sound-
ing opinion by means of a c o n s u l t a t i v e conference, and reserve
t o ourselves the sole r i g h t t o formulate and present the a c t u a l
c o n s t i t u t i o n in the l i g h t of the views and opinions expressed i n
the c o n s u l t a t i v e conference, ( d ) We should a b s o l u t e l y refuse t o
hold e l e c t i o n s of any kind u n t i l I can r e p o r t t o you t h a t i n my
opinion c o n d i t i o n s have been e s t a b l i s h e d here which w i l l permit
of r e a l l y ' f r e e ' e l e c t i o n s . . . . [ I f the secretary of state agreed with
these principles, should they be announced?]

133. JOHN WESTON TO JOHN REDDAWAY, 2 July 19561

[He had tried to Insert answers to the secretariat's questions 1n a
letter substantially already written. Hardlng's v i s i t to London had
roused the wildest speculation that a fixed period of 10-20 years for
eventual self-determination would be announced. But this was quite 'un-
real' 1n the present conditions. To most Greek Cypriots the constitution
was a 'secondary consideration' to the return from exile of Makarios and
amnesty to the terrorists 'bus 11 y engaged in shooting the British 1n the
back'. Self-determination was seen as *a stepping stone' to enosis acc-
laimed by the Greeks, rejected by the Turks, both stubbornly determined
not to contribute or compromise for a settlement yet hoping that 'by some
miracle a settlement will be reached'. For himself, he believed no solu-
tion short of enosis - at least in the long term - and direct British
rule as long as terrorism was used as a political weapon was likely.
There were no signs of moderates breaking the deadlock and tackling the
island's problems constructively. Clerldes' comments were accurate and
well received but his motive was to clear himself of the taint of being
pro-British and to pave the way for his re-emergence as a political lea-
der. The murder of a Turkish policeman had led to 1nter-rac1al rioting
1n Famagusta, demonstrating to the Greeks the Intensity of Turkish feel-
ing and leading to a degree of reconciliation, but mistrust prevailed and
the Improvement could not withstand the strain of more Turkish casualties
by Greek terrorists. Responsible elements in both communities recognised

1. CO.926/209 No.6: secret. Weston was commissioner in Famagusta. A.F.J. Red-

daway was acting administrative secretary in the secretariat: he later publi-
shed Burdened with Cyprus: the British connection (1985) in which he charac-
terised the Makarios-Harding talks as 'a dialogue of the d e a f . Harding did
not believe, as Reddaway did, that a deal could be made with Greek Cypriot
leaders more moderate than Makarios. But the decision on 6 March 1956 to de-
port Makarios gave the U.K. government the i n i t i a t i v e as to any time to repat-
riate him and renew t a l k s . By deporting him the British Cabinet was simply re-
peating what had been so successful in 1931. He was not detained without t r i a l
and was free to move elsewhere (PREM. 11/48). But when Harding seemed ready
to resign over the issue, the Cabinet gave way. The disturbances in the
schools in support of E.O.K.A. caused Harding much concern and d i s t r e s s (see
his Chronological record of the part played by students, 1 Apr. 1955 - 1 Jan.
1956: CO. 926/166)
 438
this; but, as i t was Greek irresponsible elements which sponsored terror-
Ism in the f i r s t place, so 1t will be 'lower forms of l i f e among the
Turks' who would demand 'an eye for an eye'. The Greeks s t i l l entirely
underestimate the depth of Turkish fears over enosis and they believe
Turkish opposition was 'neither genuine nor spontaneous but Inspired by
the British Government for its own nefarious purposes'.
The neutralisation of E.O.K.A. ambush positions, the road blocks and
searches in the Famagusta area - 'a Herculean task' - had paid dividends
and lowered E.O.K.A. morale: the current phase of attacks on N.A.A.F.I.
and British cars seemed to show that the fighting was now by a 'second
eleven' of 'juvenile delinquents from the secondary schools'. Though
people were t i r i n g of emergency restrictions and the sacrifices demanded
1n support of E.O.K.A., there was l i t t l e sign of change of heart towards
E.O.K.A.] I do not t h i n k our chances of s p l i t t i n g E.O.K.A.
from the general p u b l i c are very b r i g h t . I t may be t r u e t h a t the
moderate elements are not the ardent supporters of the i l l e g a l
o r g a n i s a t i o n they were s i x months ago, but i t cannot be s a i d t h a t
a t l e a s t i n t h i s D i s t r i c t , t h a t they are t u r n i n g a g a i n s t E.O.K.A.
I s t i l l m a i n t a i n t h a t we s h a l l get nowhere on the p o l i t i c a l , or
any o t h e r , f r o n t u n t i l we have knocked E.O.K.A. r i g h t o u t . . . .
[E.O.K.A. actively spread rumours to denigrate the British, but the
agitation to bring back Makarios and boycott negotiations without him
stemmed from the Ethnarchy Council. The effect of British propaganda was
negligible. There was not much likelihood of the Turks resorting to
organised terrorism.] I t seems u n l i k e l y t h a t they have the r e -
sources; but t h e r e would almost c e r t a i n l y be f u r t h e r disturbances
which could become s e r i o u s and these would continue u n t i l the
Turks r i d themselves of the idea t h a t the S e c u r i t y Forces are
t u r n i n g a b l i n d eye t o t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s . That t h i s idea does
e x i s t was very e v i d e n t during the t r o u b l e s here a t the beginning
of the month. 'We are on your s i d e . Why are you stopping us?' And
i n t h i s connection I should say t h a t the b e l i e f t h a t Government
shows f a v o u r i t i s m t o the Turks i s a b s o l u t e l y widespread among the
Greek C y p r i o t p u b l i c . Complaints about the A u x i l i a r y P o l i c e (most
of whom are Turks) mainly stem from t h i s source. Many of i t s r e c -
r u i t s come from the lowest stratum of C y p r i o t Turkish s o c i e t y and
are known not t o have been beyond c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t i e s i n t h e
p a s t . And since i t i s p a r t of E . O . K . A . ' s 'war e f f o r t ' t o make
complaints a g a i n s t the S e c u r i t y Forces a t every conceivable
o p p o r t u n i t y , i t i s not s u r p r i s i n g t h a t such complaints should
e x i s t . . . . [ I t was d i f f i c u l t to say how far claims of petty thefts committed
during searches and general Impolite behaviour were justified. The police
who Investigated them a l l 1n detail would be able to state an opinion,
but he did not doubt that some had substance.]
The danger of serious i n t e r - r a c i a l disturbances i n the s o r t of
s i t u a t i o n foreshadowed i n the previous paragraph i s , in my mind,
so g r e a t t h a t I t h i n k i t provides another very good reason f o r
l e a v i n g any attempt a t a p o l i t i c a l s e t t l e m e n t alone u n t i l we have
defeated E.O.K.A. and r e s t o r e d law and o r d e r . At the moment we
have enough on our p l a t e d e a l i n g w i t h E.O.K.A. w i t h o u t having t o
deploy our inadequate resources t o deal w i t h inter-communal
s t r i f e . . . . [The murder of the American vice-consul by E.O.K.A. had been
regarded as 'a regrettable error' and had had l i t t l e effect on U.S.
opinion: i t was reported that the U.S. would express 'concern at the
Cyprus Government's apparent Inability to maintain law and order!' The
campaign of passive resistance continued and mainly effected villages.
 439
The murder of the Greek mukhtar 1n Patrlke was due to a personal feud and
had not led to a renewed flush of resignations. Indeed government busi-
ness proceeded much as usual but perhaps with a l i t t l e delay - certainly
not with anything approaching disruption.]

134. BARON RADCLIFFE: REPORT ON CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS, 12 November 19561

[He had been commissioned to recommend a new constitution of Cyprus as
an Island under British sovereignty, with bases to help H.M.'s G. f u l f i l
Its International obligations and interests, and with external affairs,
defence and Internal security 1n the hands of H.M.'s G.; but a constitu-
tion 'based on the principles of liberal democracy' and 'a wide measure
of responsible self-government' for the elected representatives but with
'such reservations, provisions and guaranties as may be necessary to give
a just protection to the special Interests of the various communities,
religions and races 1n the Island'. He had not drafted the Instruments,
for the constitution envisaged could hardly be put into operation 1n Cyp-
rus 'as 1t is today'.] I t i s a C o n s t i t u t i o n a p p r o p r i a t e t o a
s t a t e of a f f a i r s in which men may express t h e i r w i l l by v o t i n g
and t h e i r views by speaking w i t h o u t f e a r of t e r r o r i s m or i n t i m i -
d a t i o n : in which, on the other hand Government does not have t o
impose or maintain those emergency measures, d i s t o r t i n g o r d i n a r y
l i f e , which are the unavoidable c o u n t e r p a r t of t e r r o r i s m i t s e l f .
I n other words, my proposals contemplate a Cyprus i n which i t has
been possible t o d e c l a r e t h a t the present emergency has come t o
an end. I have no views as t o when t h a t time may come. Organised
murder and v i o l e n c e have thrown a shadow over the I s l a n d which
w i l l only l i f t w i t h the goodwill of many people. But i t i s poss-
i b l e t o hope t h a t the prospect of a C o n s t i t u t i o n w i t h i t s f r u i t -
f u l p o s s i b i l i t i e s of peaceful self-government may do something
t o b r i n g nearer the end of the emergency i t s e l f
The other p o i n t i s t h a t the C o n s t i t u t i o n which I am d e a l i n g
w i t h i s the C o n s t i t u t i o n of a t e r r i t o r y which i s under the
sovereignty of Her Majesty The Queen - t h a t , i n f a c t , i s what i s
l a i d down i n the f i r s t of my Terms of Reference. I t i s not t h e r e -
f o r e w i t h i n the province of such a C o n s t i t u t i o n t o provide f o r
or t o provide a g a i n s t the p o s s i b i l i t y of a change i n the i n t e r -
n a t i o n a l s t a t u s of Cyprus or t o p r e s c r i b e c o n d i t i o n s or guaran-
tees a t t e n d a n t upon the occurrence of such an e v e n t . On the con-
t r a r y , I t h i n k i t p l a i n law t h a t t h e r e i s no power in the L e g i s -
l a t u r e of a s e l f - g o v e r n i n g dependency t o change the s t a t u s of the
t e r r i t o r y by union under a d i f f e r e n t s o v e r e i g n . Acts or r e s o l -
u t i o n s d i r e c t e d t o such a purpose would be n u l l . I f such changes
were t o come about, they would have t o come about by other means
and by instruments designed f o r the purpose. The C o n s t i t u t i o n as
t o which I am t o make proposals i s not one of them and I do not
r e f e r t o the matter f u r t h e r . . . .
[His proposals were a general outline - Instructions for a legal drafts-

! • Radcliffe had been appointed constitutional commissioner in June 1956: a

barrister, Fellow of All Soul's Oxford, he had been director-general of the
Ministry of Information during the war, and chairman of the Punjab and Bengal
boundary and other commissions. He had made his proposals 'within as short a
time as p o s s i b l e ' , for a long comprehensive survey would hardly add much to
what was well known. (For his v i s i t to the island (Jul. - Aug. 1956) see CO.
926/255)
 440

man: diarchy with the reservation of certain powers, was a complicated

conception; but he had sought to make 1t as clear, simple and precise and
as untechnical as possible for a written constitution was no more than
a legal framework for a political body to develop and could not provide
answers for a l l questions. Cyprus had been governed without responsible
or elective Institutions (save 1n certain Institutions of local govern-
ment). No political tradition could have evolved and those undertaking
the responsibilities of democratic self-government for the f i r s t time
needed as clear a picture of the range and limits of their functions
rather than that frontiers should be left to t r i a l and error and consti-
tutional convention. Moreover, the distribution of political power and
the guarantees and fundamental rights for the different communities must
be framed in 'as rigid and as Inflexible a manner as possible' for Greeks
and Turks would scrutinise them 'with suspicious care'. These must be
protected against change by the Legislative Assembly and would be 'reser-
ved' for H.M. Effective protection 'with teeth' for the minorities must
recognise that they possessed historical, religious, cultural and social
bonds different from the majority race. The reservation of external af-
f a i r s , defence and internal security from the Assembly meant diarchy -
two distinct law-making and administrative authorities.] The idea of
diarchy i s f a m i l i a r enough i n the h i s t o r y of the developing r e l a -
t i o n s h i p between the United Kingdom as an i m p e r i a l Power and the
overseas t e r r i t o r i e s which have come w i t h i n or passed w i t h o u t her
c e n t r a l c o n t r o l . 1 There i s g r e a t v a r i e t y in the forms i n which
i t has been expressed - by s u b j e c t i n g B i l l s i n the popular Assem-
bly t o the n e c e s s i t y of the Governor's consent before they can
be introduced by the use of an o f f i c i a l m a j o r i t y , by l e a v i n g the
Governor f r e e t o withhold assent from numerous c a t e g o r i e s of
B i l l s i f he considers t h a t any one of them p r e j u d i c e s reserved
or p r o t e c t e d i n t e r e s t s , by g i v i n g the Governor power t o enact
l e g i s l a t i o n on c e r a t i n s u b j e c t s i n the name of the popular
L e g i s l a t u r e i f the L e g i s l a t u r e i t s e l f w i l l not t a k e the a c t i o n
required.
I n the present case I have come t o the conclusion t h a t the most
s u i t a b l e form i s t h a t which recognises most e x p l i c i t l y the e x i s -
tence of the diarchy and i t s consequences. Accordingly I have
proposed t o i n v e s t the Governor w i t h f u l l law-making and execu-
t i v e power f o r h i s reserved f i e l d , and t o leave the l o c a l L e g i s -
l a t u r e correspondingly f u l l master in i t s own f i e l d . There w i l l
thus be two systems of law-making e x i s t i n g side by s i d e but sepa-
r a t e d according t o the d i f f e r e n c e of s u b j e c t w i t h which they
d e a l . I regard t h i s as the system of diarchy which i s s i m p l e s t
t o present as a conception and which i s most e a s i l y understood
by those not concerned w i t h the n i c e t i e s of i t s a p p l i c a t i o n . I f
a p u b l i c emergency should a r i s e t h a t of course must be d e a l t w i t h
by s p e c i a l p r o v i s i o n s but i t i s b e t t e r t h a t the Crown should not
r e t a i n any f u r t h e r reserved or supplemental powers of making laws
f o r Cyprus by O r d e r - i n - C o u n c i l , except the unavoidable power t o
a l t e r t h e O r d e r - i n - C o u n c i l i t s e l f which s e t s up the C o n s t i t u t i o n .
I t i s b e t t e r , I t h i n k , t h a t the Governor and the l o c a l L e g i s l a -
t u r e should be able t o f e e l t h a t , between them, they possess the
f u l l law-making powers f o r Cyprus, so long as the C o n s t i t u t i o n
i s i n being and i s honoured by observance.

1. [cf. Durham V o l . I l l p.566; IV p.833; India Vol.VI pp.690, 717-20.]

 441
I do not mean it as a hollow phrase when I say that under my
proposals the local Legislature and, as a consequence, the Minis-
ters responsible to it, are intended to be masters in their own,
the non-reserved, field. It seems to me that a generous interpre-
tation of my terms of reference in this respect is a fair exch-
ange for the considerable reduction of the full possible scope
of responsible self-government which results from the reservation
of defence and internal security. Self-government is not, of
course, a phrase with a single precise meaning nor does it con-
note a single identifiable form of government. It has in fact
been used to cover a wide gradation of limited political systems
amounting to less than full self-government. But in considering
the possible application of such measures to a Constitution for
Cyprus I have deliberately rejected schemes of 'phasing', the
progressive release of selected departments by stages into the
hands of the self-governing side, each stage measured by proved
success in the responsible handling of its predecessor. I do not
think such an approach, however appropriate in other circum-
stance, is appropriate to this Cyprus Constitution. The people
of Cyprus, I have reminded myself, are an adult people enjoying
long cultural traditions and an established educational system,
fully capable of furnishing qualified administrators, lawyers,
doctors and men of business. It is a curiosity of their history
that their political development has remained comparatively im-
mature. It is owed, I think, to a people so placed that, when
they are invited to assume political responsibility, the offer
should be generous in the sense that, within the field offered
no qualification or restriction should be imposed that is not
honestly required by the conditions of the problem.
Consistently with this I have pared away from my proposals a
number of those features that are often present in colonial cons-
titutions, even those which represent a comparatively advanced
stage of development. I have not proposed the introduction of any
official members into the Legislative Assembly. I have proposed
so restricted a number of nominated members, 6 out of a total of
36, that no one can suspect that they represent an obscure attem-
pt to give the Governor a residual influence upon the elected
body. On the other hand, nominated members do serve at least the
convenient purpose of allowing the smaller minorities to obtain
some representation without the formalities of separate communal
rolls. In addition I propose that the categories of legislation
as to which the Governor is to be free to reserve assent for Her
Majesty's pleasure should be reduced to the bare minimum of four:
Bills that seek to alter the Constitution in some respect, Bills
affecting currency, coinage or foreign exchange, Bills affecting
the Royal prerogative, and Bills affecting the trustee status of
Cyprus Government stock. In all other matters that come within
the self-governing field the Governor is to have the duty of a
constitutional head of government to assent according to his Mi-
nisters' advice subject to reference to the Supreme Court for a
judicial ruling upon any Bill that may appear to be itself repu-
gnant to the various guarantees or restrictions which the Cons-
titution imposes. Lastly, I have omitted altogether any provision
for disallowance of Cyprus legislation by Her Majesty's Govern-
ment except in the single case of legislation prejudicing the
trustee status of Cyprus Government stock. In fact the retention
442
of this particular power is needed for purely technical reasons
in relation to such Government stock....
[In all, especially federal, constitutions difficulties often arose 1n
deciding to which field a piece of legislation or executive action belon-
ged. 'Defence' and 'internal security' were not precise connotations, it
would get rid of troublesome disputes if there could be more clear defi-
nition, but particularly in Cyprus where military and air Installations
depended on general roads, ports, harbours, water and power supplies, 1t
would be no good by exhaustive definition to confine the general 11st not
to include many matters which were 'the normal preserve of Internal self-
government'. Many matters were not of exclusive concern for either autho-
rity and could concern both - e.g. acquisition of land, importation of
goods, and Immigration. The balance of advantage was therefore against
further definition.] For either external affairs, defence and
internal security are defined by a long list of matters which
covers all the things capable of coming within their range, even
if ordinarily many of them will not: in which case the range of
self-governing matters is materially reduced in order to take
care of the exceptional occasion. Or, to avoid the inconvenience
and unfairness of this, the interests of defence and internal
security are to some extent jeopardised by tying them down to a
limited range of matters which does not do justice to their pos-
sible legitimate range.
The solution which I propose involves three provisions which
should be considered as interdependent upon each other.
(a) The Governor must be the final judge both upon the question
whether action that he feels it necessary to take in the interest
of any of his reserved subjects is properly within their range
and upon the obverse of this, whether a Bill of the Legislative
Assembly presented for assent does or does not trench upon his
reserved field. It is not possible to provide for the reference
of such questions to an outside referee, such, for instance, as
the Supreme Court. Defence and internal security involve matters
which cannot be reasonably exposed or debated in public proceed-
ings: moreover, they generally require positive and effective
action, and it is not good sense that the validity of such action
should be in suspense during the pendency of judicial proceed-
ings.
(b) There should be a consultative body, formed on the highest
level, for the purpose of keeping each side - the reserve side
and the self-governing side - currently informed as to what the
other is doing and, perhaps more important, what it proposes to
do and why. Such a body should meet under the chairmanship of the
Governor himself and from the start it should aim to meet freq-
uently and to discuss fully. The membership that I propose would
consist of Governor and Deputy Governor, Chief Minister and
another Minister nominated by him, Minister of Turkish Cypriot
Affairs, a representative of the Defence Forces, Legal Secretary
and Attorney-General. In a body of this kind criticisms can be
made and policies explained with a freedom and lack of reserve
that could not be expected in an open deliberative Assembly. I
have suggested that this body should be styled the Joint Council
of Cyprus and I suggest that name in order to mark the importance
that I attach to its existence and its functions. Given reason-
able good will on the two sides I believe that such an institu-
tion could be effective to iron out the many possible causes of
 443
friction to which a diarchy gives rise and of which the greater
part has its origin in each side's ignorance of what the other
is up to and the suspicions and lack of confidence arising from
such ignorance.
(c) It is only a development of the idea which lies behind the
Joint Council of Cyprus to propose, as I do, that the Governor
should have constitutional power to invite the Legislative Assem-
bly to take over from him any particular piece of law-making
which, though formally within his reserved field, he can conve-
niently commit to the self-governing side. A power of this kind
seems to me a valuable one. It provides the flexibility along
that difficult frontier between what is reserved and what not
that everyone would wish to see so long as it is felt that no
true interest of defence or internal security is prejudiced by
looseness of definition. And it affords a means by which to
avoid, again given good will, what might otherwise look like an
unexpected inroad by the reserved side into the normal field of
self-government. It is my hope that as confidence grows, this
power might be increasingly resorted to.
I have been critical to examine whether the scheme that I
propose for regulating the relations between the reserved side
and the self-governing side does in any true sense deny to the
latter a generous opportunity of occupying the field of self-
government. I am satisfied that it does not. It would be a
distortion of the picture to allow the circumstance that at some
places and on some occasions the Governor may have to deal with
matters that would normally be self-governing matters to suggest
that in most places or on most occasions the self-governing field
will be invaded in this way. There is no reason why it should be.
It will be the Governor's duty to promote the most harmonious re-
lationship that he can achieve between the two sources of author-
ity in the Island, sources which unite him in his two capacities,
in one capacity as constitutional head, in the other as autocra-
tic delegate of the Imperial Government.
Perhaps the simplest test of the reality of self-government
under the system I have envisaged is to recite the names of the
Ministries which I have provided for on the self-governing side
(apart from the Chief Minister's Office and the Office of Minis-
ter for Turkish Cypriot Affairs): Development, Interior and Local
Government, Finance, Communications and Works, Social Services,
Natural Resources. It is true that these do not correspond to the
existing Departments of Government, though they provide conveni-
ent groupings of them. But, to translate them into the Depart-
ments or Branches of Government as known to the Cypriot today I
have invited the Administration of Cyprus to draw up a provi-
sional list of those departments or branches which under my
scheme might be expected to pass into the self-governing field
and so under the Ministerial control of persons responsible to
the elected Assembly. I set it out accordingly in the Appendix
to this Covering Note.
I turn now to the problems of the self-governing side itself,
having explained my proposals as to its relationship with the
reserved powers. One thing I can draw attention to at once. My
general conception is that the Governor should withdraw from ac-
tive intervention in the work of the self-governing side, assum-
ing instead the important, but different, status of the constitu-
444
tional 'head' on Her Majesty's behalf. Generally speaking, there-
fore, he will act on the advice of his Ministers, he will not
preside at or take part in meetings of the Cabinet or of the
Legislative Assembly. Certain decisions must be taken and acts
performed on his own authority, as in the case of any other cons-
titutional head. They will all however be found explicitly iden-
tified in my proposed scheme. Thus only he can decide on such
matters as proroguing and dissolving the Assembly, relieving a
Chief Minister of his office, the making of certain appointments,
the reference of doubtful Bills to the Supreme Court for advice,
the power of pardon. These citations are not exhaustive, but the
full list is not a long one.
With this said, the chief problem in finding a suitable frame-
work for the powers of self-government is so to design them that
on the one hand self-government becomes a means of reflecting
truly the will and purpose of the people of Cyprus and on the
other it does not become an instrument by which a majority drawn
from one community overrides the legitimate claims of a minority
community to maintain its own life and customs as an integral
part of the life and customs of Cyprus....
[With 80% Greek and 18% Turkish Cypriots (2% British civilian residents,
Armenians and Maronltes) discussions on religions, educational, traditio-
nal and cultural were dominant: separate quarters in towns and separate
villages; though there were a few joint schools, some mixed villages,
many Greek speaking Turks, and English a common language.]
How far this separation would be reflected in ability of the
Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities to work politically, I
could not say. I am conscious that I do not know enough about the
problem. Their representatives have worked together in the past
in the service of the Government, in municipal administration,
in the activities of co-operative societies and of district
improvement boards. In some cases the combination seems to have
been happy and unresentful; in others there seem to have been
recurring suspicions and complaints on the side of the Turkish
Cypriots that discrimination has been practised against them.
Whatever the truth of the matter, I have no doubt at all that the
circumstances of the last 18 months and the pressure of the Greek
Cypriot campaign for Enosis have done much to sharpen the sense
of alienation between the two communities, and I think that any
plan for the future must accept the fact of this alienation as
present now and in the future.
The problem comes down to the political relations between these
two communities. The figures that I have given show that the re-
maining communities are too small in numbers for it to be reason-
able that they should expect to have anything more than the right
to have their voices heard in an elected Assembly and the right
to share in the protection of any guarantees that limit the pow-
ers of the majority in that Assembly. In fact the representatives
of the Armenian community told me that they did not desire to
have any special arrangements made for their representation as
a community. Their best protection lay in good government for all
rather than in separate identification of different interests....
[He well understood the Turkish Cypriot misgivings but could not accept
their demand for equal representation with the Greek Cypriots which would
not be consistent with liberal and democratic principles save in a feder-
al state, but in Cyprus there was no pattern of territorial separation
 445
which would make federal government appropriate: equal communal division
would cause stagnation and frustration. Nor was there no alternative
means of preventing oppression by the majority and the validity of the
majority principle 1n self-government would be denied.
What therefore he proposed as safeguards for Turkish interests and po-
l i t i c a l status was (1) that 6 seats 1n the Legislative Assembly should
be elected on a separate Turkish Cypriot roll with 24 elected on a gene-
ral (effectively Greek Cypriot) r o l l : the 6 nominated members must also
Include representatives of the other communities: (2) that the consent
of two-thirds of the Turkish members would be necessary for any legisla-
tion affecting Turkish domestic affairs, marriage, divorce, Eukof and
Vakfoor their educational, religious, charitable, or cultural institu-
tions: (3) that a permanent office for Turkish affairs under a minister,
appointed by the governor from among the Turkish Cypriot members of the
Assembly, who would have an ex officio seat 1n the cabinet and membership
of the Joint Council of Cyprus: (4) that no legislative and executive act
could conflict with the guaranteed rights of the Turkish Cypriots and
there must be no discrimination on grounds of birth, nationality, langu-
age, race or religion. Independent tribunals - the Supreme Court for le-
gislative and a Tribunal of Guarantees for executive acts - would decide
on violation of these. He hoped that these safeguards would effectively
prove to be more than mere paper guarantees. He had considered the value
of a second Chamber however functionally representative of various Inter-
ests - municipalities, churches, schools, companies, unions- would not
be appropriate as a check on the Assembly unless the two main opposing
communities were balanced and therefore Its formation would be as contro-
versial as in the Assembly - was i t right to deny validity to the will
of the majority for general political purposes. I t was best to concen-
trate available talent in one deliberative and law-making body which
would be responsible for its own decisions. A revising function could be
made over to a committee of the Assembly with or without expert assis-
tance: its protection of minority rights could be better effected, as he
proposed, and by resort to the Independent tribunals.]
With regard t o the f r a n c h i s e I recommend the s i m p l e s t scheme
t h a t i s p o s s i b l e . I b e l i e v e t h i s t o be the best way t o launch the
Cyprus C o n s t i t u t i o n among £11 the c o n t r o v e r s i e s t h a t w i l l a t t e n d
i t s b i r t h . Accepting as I do the necessity of a separate communal
r o l l f o r Turkish C y p r i o t s , I have enquired whether i t would be
p o s s i b l e t o propose some m i t i g a t i o n of the drawbacks of thus p e r -
p e t u a t i n g communal s e p a r a t i o n by i n t r o d u c i n g i n t o Cyprus some
scheme f o r a common r o l l upon which both Turkish C y p r i o t and a l l
other votes would have an a d d i t i o n a l vote f o r a l i m i t e d number
of c a n d i d a t e s . Such c a n d i d a t e s , i t might be hoped, conscious of
t h e i r dependence upon a mixed constituency of v o t e r s , would be
less l i k e l y t o pursue s t r i c t l y communal p o l i c i e s than candidates
e l e c t e d on separate r o l l s . I t h i n k t h a t perhaps they would, and
the idea t h a t l i e s behind such schemes may w e l l commend i t s e l f
t o C y p r i o t statesmen of the f u t u r e . I f so, measures can be taken
t o introduce i t , i f i t has the necessary support. But t h e r e i s
l i t t l e experience a v a i l a b l e as t o how such schemes have worked
out i n p r a c t i c e , and any v e r s i o n of t h i s double f r a n c h i s e would
present the v o t e r i n Cyprus w i t h a more complicated e l e c t i o n
issue than I t h i n k a p p r o p r i a t e f o r the opening stages of popular
self-government. Besides, theory i s one t h i n g and e l e c t o r a l mana-
gement i s another, and in the shortage of e x p e r i e n c e , I do not
f e e l any s u f f i c i e n t confidence as t o the r e s u l t s of such a scheme
446

in p r a c t i c e . A s i m i l a r c o n v i c t i o n of the importance of i n s i s t i n g
on a l l p o s s i b l e s i m p l i c i t y i n the f r a n c h i s e arrangements has led
me t o propose t h a t t h e r e should be no o p t i o n f o r T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s
t o r e g i s t e r on the general r o l l . I t seems t o m e i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h
the plan of guaranteeing the community a number of seats propor-
t i o n a t e to i t s t o t a l numbers t h a t i t should be p o s s i b l e f o r mem-
bers of the community t o leave the necessary minimum on the sepa-
r a t e r o l l t o cover those seats and t r a n s f e r the residue of t h e i r
v o t i n g power t o the e l e c t i o n on the general r o l l . . . . [On his own
i n i t i a t i v e he proposed that female suffrage should be Introduced, for 1t
operated in the U.K., Turkey and Greece. He stressed the Importance of
the judiciary system - the Supreme Court and the Tribunal of Guarantees -
in resolving the inevitable inter-communal disputes, and crucial in
smoothing the working of self-government: a grave responsibility indeed,
to confirm or annul the laws and executive actions of Government, but one
the judiciary elsewhere had discharged so acceptably and regularly in
many countries (incl. U.S., Canada, Australia, Eire.)]
I t may be s a i d t h a t Cyprus i s a small stage when compared w i t h
these t e r r i t o r i e s , and I have asked myself c r i t i c a l l y whether the
duty t h a t I seek t o lay upon i t s Judges i s not too heavy f o r the
circumstances of the case. Can they not only achieve the d e t a c h -
ment r e q u i r e d but a l s o o b t a i n from the p u b l i c the c r e d i t f o r t h a t
detachment? Both are necessary, i f t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s t o be
discharged. I can only say, a f t e r going i n t o the m a t t e r , t h a t I
b e l i e v e t h a t both o b j e c t s can be r e a l i s e d , provided t h a t one con-
d i t i o n i s accepted. The Chief J u s t i c e himself must be appointed
from o u t s i d e Cyprus and the number of Supreme Court Judges from
i n s i d e Cyprus must always be e q u a l l y balanced between Greek Cyp-
r i o t and Turkish C y p r i o t . Given a President of the Court who by
v i r t u e of h i s o r i g i n i s uncommitted t o e i t h e r community in the
eyes of the p u b l i c , I do not f e e l any misgivings as t o the t r u s t
which could be placed i n the Judges' i m p a r t i a l i t y . The Cyprus
j u d i c i a r y enjoys a high r e p u t a t i o n f o r conscientious performance
of i t s d u t i e s and I t h i n k t h a t , so formed, the Supreme Court can
s a f e l y be e n t r u s t e d w i t h the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t h a t I p r o p o s e . . . .
[The Tribunal of Guarantees, a sort of Consul d'Etat, was new in the
British context, but there might be Inter-communal discrimination 1n the
executive and administrative f i e l d as well as in legislation: and he did
not wish to overload the Supreme Court in matters which were not strictly
legal.
I t was v i t a l l y necessary that broadcasting should be kept 'secure from
the impact of party or political controversy and above a l l from any ten-
dency to favour one community at the expense of another'. That would be
best guaranteed by making i t Into 'a chartered public Institution like
the B.B.C., charged with an Independent public responsibility so to con-
duct the service as to hold a f a i r balance between the Interests and
claims of the different communities'. The governors must be equally rep-
resentative of Greek and Turkish Cypriots with an independent chairman:
i t must be genuinely free of a l l outside control (1ncl. that of the Go-
vernor, but its costs must continue to be met from Cyprus revenues as 'a
necessary service'.
Similarly there must be government aid not just to communal, but to
inter-communal education: there were very few institutions which provided
such education and 1t was much prized by parents: 1n such an area lay
'one of the most hopeful paths toward a mitigation of the racial separa-
tions which are at the bottom' of the Cyprus problem - a path not compul-
 447
sory but entered by free parental choice: children mixing in a formative
period of their development. But such a policy would hardly be enthusi-
astically implemented by Greek or Turkish education ministers: this must
be undertaken by a separate Independent board responsible to the Gover-
nor: this would have financial implications but since 1t was not 'a ne-
cessary service' 1t should be funded by H.M.'s G. as a 'worthwhile g i f t '
to the people of Cyprus. Indeed the diarchy itself would require two pu-
blic funds for Cyprus - one relating to the Governor's responsibilities,
the other to the self-governing ministers and Assembly. The Imperial go-
vernment would be, apart from a Cypriot contribution of £10,000, respon-
sible for the costs of Imperial defence. Though internal security would
remain reserved to the Crown, 1t was f a i r that such a necessity - police
and prisons - for civilised self-government must be funded both imperi-
ally and locally.]
I t h i n k t h a t i t would be a bad t h i n g t o t r y t o s t a r t c o n s t i t u -
t i o n a l self-government on a f i n a n c i a l basis t h a t i s i t s e l f un-
f a i r . I n t e r n a l s e c u r i t y and defence are separate s u b j e c t s , but
they are not e n t i r e l y d i s t i n c t . I t seems t o me only reasonable
t o say t h a t the n e c e s s i t y t o c r e a t e and t o maintain a thoroughly
e f f e c t i v e p o l i c e f o r c e in Cyprus i s i n p a r t a r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t
we must be secure i n the use of our base. What I recommend t h e r e -
f o r e i s t h a t a sum should be f i x e d as an annual c o n t r i b u t i o n from
the Cyprus revenues towards the t o t a l cost of P o l i c e and P r i s o n s ,
t o be paid i n t o the Defence Fund, and t h a t the balance should be
provided by Her M a j e s t y ' s Government out of United Kingdom funds.
I thought i t reasonable, i f a formula had t o be found, t o t u r n
t o 1954, the year before the emergency broke o u t , t o f i n d a ' n o r -
mal' basis f o r p o l i c e expenditure in Cyprus and then t o w r i t e the
f i g u r e up t o the higher scales p r e v a i l i n g i n 1956. That has p r o -
duced the f i g u r e of £750,000 f o r P o l i c e and Prisons t h a t I use
i n my proposals. I ought t o add t h a t , though I am f i r m l y commit-
ted t o the p r i n c i p l e of s h a r i n g , I am not committed t o the a c t u a l
f i g u r e . Considering how d e f i c i e n t even the 1954 establishment ( i t
was not f i l l e d ) may be thought t o have been shown t o be in the
l i g h t of what has happened s i n c e , my f i g u r e may be r a t h e r too
favourable to C y p r u s . . . .
[These were his own recommendations, not the result of negotiations or
agreed representation by various parties since the reasons against gener-
al formal discussions or a round-table conference were familiar. But he
was conversant with the Constitutional history, the arguments and the
proposals since 1878, and he had talked with Greek, Turkish and other
leaders.]

135. GOVERNOR FIELD MARSHAL SIR JOHN HARDING: INTERVIEW, 4 December 19561
[The B.B.C. Interviewer, Richard GooId Adams, suggested that the Suez
crisis and the withdrawal of many British troops had given the E.O.K.A.
terrorists 'a new lease of l i f e ' . Harding denied this, arguing that after
the successful British operations 1n the early summer the terrorists nee-

1. This represents a new form of documentary evidence. Harding had returned

to London for talks to ask for more extended powers, and privately to warn
that a new p o l i t i c a l move was now required 'before the sands of good w i l l run
out'. (Cyprus Policy: note by governor 23 Nov. 1956: CO. 926/553). This
emphasised the considerable contrast between the views of H.M.'s G. and the
Cyprus government.
 448

ded 'a breathing space' and called a halt 1n August, though thereafter,
temporarily to coincide with the U.N. General Assembly, they hoped to
give 'an impression of strength' in 'a spate of the most brutal and sav-
age murders'. But most of the victims were 'unarmed civilians' and the
few trained assassins picked off 'any soft-exposed targets'. The part
Cyprus troops had to play 1n the Suez crisis had set the anti-terrorist
programme back by several months. Goold Adams then asked somewhat stupid-
ly 'Why, 1f the terrorists were not winning greater success, was the
Government insisting' on the death penalty? Harding answered:]
I d o n ' t f i n d anything d i f f i c u l t t o understand i n t h i s a t a l l .
I n t h e i r attempt t o draw a t t e n t i o n t o themselves and g i v e t h e im-
pression of s t r e n g t h , t h e t e r r o r i s t s have taken t o murdering d e -
f e n c e l e s s members of t h e p u b l i c i n a most b r u t a l and savage way.
The p u b l i c has got t o be p r o t e c t e d a g a i n s t t h i s and I wish t h a t
people who t a l k about t h e ruthlessness of these p e n a l t i e s would
remember the wanton inhumanity of t h e crimes they a r e intended
t o p r e v e n t . I am s a t i s f i e d t h e more severe p e n a l t i e s t h a t have
now been introduced a r e both necessary and j u s t i f i e d . . . .
[To a question about Greek Cypriot press accusations of British troops
'harsh and brutal methods', Harding sought to explode 'this lying
propaganda'.]
Every complaint or a l l e g a t i o n a g a i n s t troops or p o l i c e t h a t has
been made by anyone who i s prepared t o put h i s name t o i t and t o
give d e t a i l s has been and w i l l be f u l l y and f a i r l y i n v e s t i g a t e d .
So f a r , a l l of them have been shown t o be grossly exaggerated and
most of them t o be completely f a l s e . There has been a spate of
anonymous complaints and a l l e g a t i o n s which have been seized upon
and published i n t h e l o c a l press w i t h o u t any r e a l attempt t o
check t h e f a c t s . They have been c l e a r l y i n s p i r e d by people who
sympathise w i t h t e r r o r i s t s w i t h t h e s o l e purpose of d i s c r e d i t i n g
the s e c u r i t y f o r c e s and c r e a t i n g i l l w i l l . I t i s t o put a stop
t o t h e i r wicked d e l i b e r a t e attempts t o c r e a t e i l l w i l l between
the people of t h e i s l a n d and our troops t h a t I have introduced
recent l e g i s l a t i o n r e q u i r i n g the press i n Cyprus t o a c t w i t h more
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and d i s c r e t i o n than they have shown i n t h e
past....
[The behaviour of the troops under very trying conditions had been
admirably restrained. Goold Adams asked about Lord Radcliffe's proposals
for a new constitution. 1 Harding refused to disclose them. They would
soon be available for Cypriots to see for themselves.]
Goold Adams: Do you have any reason t o expect t h e C y p r i o t s t o be
more w i l l i n g t o accept self-government now than t h e y ' v e been
before?
Harding: As far as I've been able to judge during the fourteen
months I've been in Cyprus there has always been a number of
people in Cyprus genuinely interested in self-government. But
they have been shouted down and crowded out by demagogues and
extremists. The difference between the present offer of self-
government and any made in the past is that, thanks to the work
of Lord Radcliffe, we shall have a set of constitutional propo-
sals which have been tailormade to suit the very special condi-
tions of Cyprus. For that reason I hope that when they are pub-
lished, the people in Cyprus will study the proposals very

1. [See No.134]
 449

thoroughly and give them the c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n they m e r i t .

Goold Adams: Would we o f f e r the same terms as we d i d i n the
spring - f o r i n s t a n c e , over i n t e r n a l s e c u r i t y , e l e c t e d Greek
m a j o r i t y and amnesty f o r a l l t e r r o r i s t s ?
Harding: I can't anticipate the publication of Lord Radcliffe's
proposals. But what I can say i s t h i s : Lord R a d c l i f f e ' s terms of
r e f e r e n c e made i t c l e a r t h a t i n t e r n a l s e c u r i t y i s t o be reserved
e n t i r e l y t o the Governor. As f o r the question of an e l e c t e d
m a j o r i t y in the l e g i s l a t u r e I b e l i e v e Lord R a d c l i f f e ' s s o l u t i o n
should commend i t s e l f t o everyone except e x t r e m i s t s on e i t h e r
s i d e . The g r a n t i n g of an amnesty i s not a matter which Lord Rad-
c l i f f e , as c o n s t i t u t i o n a l commissioner, was c a l l e d upon t o deal
w i t h . However, the very generous surrender terms which were pub-
l i s h e d l a s t August showed our readiness t o go t o a l l reasonable
lengths t o remove any such o b s t a c l e t o peaceful s e t t l e m e n t .
[No political opportunity was missed, as this interview suggested, by
opting for a military one since the 'so called truce' was no genuine
contribution towards settlement: i t was E.O.K.A.'s attempt to gain time
temporarily. Cyprus s t i l l had a military value in giving confidence to
countries in the E. Mediterranean and Middle East in standing up to
Communist pressure.]
Goold Adams: How f a r do you t h i n k Cyprus has now become a ques-
t i o n t h a t can be s e t t l e d only by i n t e r n a t i o n a l agreement r a t h e r
than what happens on the spot?
Harding: There are two major aspects of the problem. First, the
i n t e r n a l problem of r e s t o r i n g law and order and c r e a t i n g c o n d i -
t i o n s in which the two main communities i n the i s l a n d can l i v e
i n harmony t o g e t h e r , and progress can be made w i t h the i n t r o d u c -
t i o n of self-government and the improvement of s o c i a l and econo-
mic c o n d i t i o n s f o r the b e n e f i t of everyone t h e r e . Then t h e r e ' s
the problem on the i n t e r n a t i o n a l plane - the problem of s e l f -
d e t e r m i n a t i o n . That c a r r i e s w i t h i t the p o s s i b i l i t y of a f u t u r e
change in s t a t u s of the i s l a n d and n a t u r a l l y has very important
i n t e r n a t i o n a l i m p l i c a t i o n s . That i s where the need f o r i n t e r n a -
t i o n a l agreement comes i n . Although the U.K has r e s p o n s i b i l i t y
f o r s o l v i n g both the i n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l aspects of the Cyprus
problem, and t h e y ' r e very c l o s e l y i n t e r - r e l a t e d , i t would be
f o l l y t o suppose t h a t a l a s t i n g s o l u t i o n can be found without
goodwill and c o - o p e r a t i o n on the p a r t of both Greece and Turkey.

136. CABINET COLONIAL POLICY COMMITTEE: CYPRUS - A Study of Partition,

22 May 19571
[Division Into two zones would, 1n each of the two plans (X and Y) 2
considered, result in a drop 1n living standards by some 20% by the end
of a changeover period, and there might be another 15%-20% decline there-

1. CAB. 134/1556: CPC (57)15 top secret: a Cyprus government paper (C.R.O.,
F.O., CO. and Treasury) prepared for the cabinet committee by o f f i c i a l s in
Cyprus. Following discussions in Ankara (Record of conversation, 16 Dec. CO.
926/353) Lennox-Boyd's statement to the Commons, 19 Dec. 1956 had put the
option of partition on the agenda.
2. Both schemes suggested for a geographical partition in 2 zones gave the
Turks Famagusta and more territory in the S.E. than they got in 1974. In one
scheme Kyrenia became Turkish, in the other not. In neither scheme was Morphou
Turkish.
 450
after, depending on the policies Greece and Turkey adopted to their new
provinces. In general 1t was agreed]
(a) that partition should be regarded very much as a solution
faute de mieux and should be contemplated only after more sen-
sible solutions have had to be discarded;
(b) that the preferable solutions to partition are (i) self-go-
vernment on the Radcliffe pattern, (ii) independence under inter-
national guarantee with some international authority holding the
ring, and (iii) the half-way house of a federal system with sepa-
rate Greek and Turkish zones;
(c) that partition will represent a deliberate decision to prefer
the friendship of Turkey and to incur the enmity of Greece and
that therefore it could be argued that on grounds of expediency
the partition line ought to favour Turkish interests; but there
is no guarantee that Turkish support could be secured for any
line that could conceivably be sponsored as fair and reasonable
by H.M.G.;
Partition Lines
(d) that, subject to consideration of military factors and of the
factor at (c) above, the partition lines which are least open to
objection are those shown in Schemes X and Y;
Methods
( e ) t h a t the physical s e p a r a t i o n of the two communities c o u l d ,
t h e o r e t i c a l l y , be c a r r i e d out e i t h e r ( i ) by o u t r i g h t p a r t i t i o n
or ( i i ) by gradual p o l a r i s a t i o n ;
( f ) t h a t , i n p r a c t i c e , the f i r s t method i s probably not a p p l i -
cable because i t would i n v o l v e the compulsory, r a p i d t r a n s f e r of
some 150,000 people, because the m a j o r i t y of these would be unco-
o p e r a t i v e and o b s t r u c t i v e , because, i n the end, f o r c e would have
t o be employed t o e v i c t them and because i t i s not p o s s i b l e t o
foresee from where t h a t f o r c e could be s u p p l i e d ;
(g) t h a t in p r a c t i c e t h e r e f o r e p a r t i t i o n would have t o be e f f e c -
ted g r a d u a l l y and i s bound t o take time (some t e n years or s o ) ,
and cannot t h e r e f o r e be regarded as a quick s o l u t i o n of the Cyp-
rus q u e s t i o n ; even o u t r i g h t p a r t i t i o n would probably take f o u r
years t o e f f e c t on a planned b a s i s . . . .
[There would be heavy direct costs to H.M.'s G. and the Cyprus
Government as the authorities responsible for effecting the necessary
exchange of population - £16.5m in X and £42.m in Y, on the basis of the
total removal of a l l Greeks from the Turkish zone and vice versa; to
H.M.'s G. for troops to maintain peace and order during the transfer (a
very large commitment lasting for 4 years); and to both H.M.'s G. and the
Cyprus Government for working capital to deal with property exchange &c.
More preferable solutions were the Radcliffe pattern of self-govern-
ment; Independence under an international guarantee with some interna-
tional authority holding the ring; or a halfway house of a federal system
with many and smaller Greek and Turkish zones.
Partition would be seen as a deliberate decision to favour Turkey and
incur the enmity of Greece. Therefore on grounds of expediency the par-
t i t i o n line in X and Y ought to favour Turkish interests. But there would
be no guarantee that Turkish support would be forthcoming for any line
conceivably sponsored as f a i r and reasonable by H.M.'sG. Partition could
not be regarded as a quick solution and would involve heavy direct char-
ges by both governments and a large military commitment by H.M.'s G.]
 451

137. D. SMITH: MINUTE ON HARDING'S MEMORANDUM, 4 December 19571

[Before the meeting of Harding with Lennox-Boyd on 5 December, Harding
had prepared a memo, of some 400 pages exclusive of appendices beginning
with Storrs' despatch on the 1931 disturbances2 but substantially deal-
ing with Hardlng's attempts (Oct. 1955 - Oct. 9157) to secure a settle-
ment in tortuous discussions with Makarios - with a 'fascinating study'
of the Archbishop. Smith conveniently summarised Harding's conclusions.]
( a ) An i n t e r n a t i o n a l s o l u t i o n i s indispensable t o a l a s t i n g
s e t t l e m e n t and must precede the i n t r o d u c t i o n of a c o n s t i t u t i o n .
( b ) Our p o l i c y aims should be t o meet s t r a t e g i c needs, f u l f i l
o b l i g a t i o n s t o C y p r i o t s , e s p e c i a l l y m i n o r i t i e s , good r e l a t i o n s
w i t h Turkey, and r e c o n c i l i a t i o n between Greece and Turkey.
( c ) We should go i n t o any f u t u r e discussions w i t h Makarios w i t h
our eyes open. He should not be allowed t o r e t u r n t o Cyprus be-
f o r e a general s e t t l e m e n t , ( d ) P a r t i t i o n should not be a c t i v e l y
supported unless the Greeks as w e l l as the Turks agree t o i t .
( e ) The U.S. and N.A.T.O. ' s support i s necessary f o r a successful
s e t t l e m e n t p l a n , ( f ) We should t r y t o achieve b i p a r t i s a n s h i p i n
Cyprus p o l i c y , ( g ) I f we cannot get the R a d c l i f f e s o l u t i o n , which
i s the i d e a l , we should continue t o go f o r t r i d o m i n i u m . ( h ) Some
method of speeding up i n t e r n a t i o n a l business must be found.
F i n a l l y i f we cannot solve the problem o t h e r w i s e , we must go
on w i t h d i r e c t r u l e , so we had b e t t e r spend on p o l i c e now so as
t o save money on m i l i t a r y l a t e r on.

138. HAROLD MACMILLAN: COMMONS STATEMENT, 19 June 19583

[H.M.'s G. had four aims 1n Cyprus - to serve the best Interests of all
the Cypriots, to achieve a permanent settlement acceptable to the two

1. CO.926/859: top secret. Smith in the C O . found the field marshal somewhat
lacking 'in the experience of the traditions of developing self-governments
which the normal colonial Governor enjoys': he seemed relieved when he reali-
sed he had failed to secure agreement and could devote himself to the military
defeat of E.O.K.A. which, indeed, apart from their attacks on the soldiers,
officials, and civilians of the 'occupying power', killed many fellow Greeks
whom they felt 'unreliable', others just at random and a few token Turks for
show: indeed over the whole campaign they shot more Greeks than Turks. Very
many of 'the missing' were victims of E.O.K.A. 2. Vol.VII, pp.536-8.
3. Hans. H.C589 1315-20. Harding had resigned in October 1957 believing he
had effectively defeated E.O.K.A., though no conclusive military victory was
possible. Sir Hugh Foot, a civilian, arrived in December. In the interim
N.A.T.O. had offered to broker a tripartite settlement, and Greece had failed
again to secure a two-thirds majority at the U.N. general assembly for a reso-
lution in favour of self-determination. International opinion was firmly in
favour of independence, and Greece recognised that enosis was now an impos-
sible goal. Foot wanted an E.O.K.A. cease fire, and in return would permit
Makarios (in Greece since April - when the chairman of the conservative party
resigned over the termination of his deportation) back into Cyprus; an interim
constitution for 5-7 years before the exercise of self-determination - separa-
tely, by the two communities. Macmillan (P.M. since January) reported that
partition was technically possible, but would be an intolerable hardship and
the worst possible solution. (See also Record of a meeting between ministers
and Sir Hugh Foot, 1 Jan. 1958: F.O. 371/136361 R.G. 1081/2). Lennox-Boyd and
Foot visited Ankara in Feb. 1958 and there were simultaneous Turkish Cypriot
riots orchestrated from Turkey. The threat of a collapse of the co-operation
 452

communities, and to Greece and Turkey; to secure the British bases ne-
cessary for International obligations; and to strengthen peace, security
and co-operation with allies 1n a vital area. Violence and conflict had
continued because of the failure to obtain agreement. An obligation rest-
ed with the U.K. government to give a clear firm lead in the deadlock.
Therefore H.M. 's G. declared 'a new policy which represents an adventure
in partnership' of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots and of the governments
of the U.K., Greece and Turkey.]
The f o l l o w i n g i s an o u t l i n e of the p a r t n e r s h i p p l a n : -
( I ) Cyprus should enjoy the advantages of a s s o c i a t i o n not only
w i t h the United Kingdom, and t h e r e f o r e w i t h the B r i t i s h Common-
w e a l t h , but a l s o w i t h Greece and Turkey. ( I I ) Since the t h r e e
Governments of the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey a l l have an
i n t e r e s t i n Cyprus, Her M a j e s t y ' s Government w i l l welcome the co-
o p e r a t i o n and p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the two other Governments i n a
j o i n t e f f o r t t o achieve the peace, progress and p r o s p e r i t y of the
I s l a n d . ( I l l ) The Greek and Turkish Governments w i l l each be i n -
v i t e d t o appoint a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e t o co-operate w i t h the Governor
i n c a r r y i n g out t h i s p o l i c y . ( I V ) The I s l a n d w i l l have a system
of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e Government w i t h each community e x e r c i s i n g a u t o -
nomy i n i t s own communal a f f a i r s . (V) I n order t o s a t i s f y the de-
s i r e of the Greek and Turkish C y p r i o t s t o be recognised as Greeks
and Turks, Her M a j e s t y ' s Government w i l l welcome an arrangement
which gives them Greek or Turkish n a t i o n a l i t y , w h i l e e n a b l i n g
them t o r e t a i n B r i t i s h n a t i o n a l i t y . ( V I ) To a l l o w time f o r the
new p r i n c i p l e of p a r t n e r s h i p t o be f u l l y worked out and brought
i n t o o p e r a t i o n under t h i s plan in the necessary atmosphere of
stability, the international status of the Island will remain
unchanged for seven years. (VII) A system of representative
government and communal autonomy w i l l be worked out by c o n s u l t a -
t i o n w i t h r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the two communities and w i t h the
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the Greek and Turkish G o v e r n m e n t s . . . .
[This plan would provide ( V I I I ) in the next 7 years for two Houses of
Representatives with final legislative authority 1n communal affairs; a l l
internal administration (save internal security and communal affairs) by
a Governor's Council of representatives of the Greek and Turkish Govern-
ments and 6 elected members from the House of Representatives (4 Greek
and 2 Turkish). The governor's power to ensure the protection of the In-
terests of both communities after consulting the representatives of Gre-
ece and Turkey were reserved; so too, after similar consultation, would
a l l powers of external affairs, defence, and national security be reser-
ved to the governor. The representatives of Greece and Turkey could re-
quire any legislation they considered discriminatory to be reserved for
consideration by an impartial tribunal.]
( I X ) I f the f u l l b e n e f i t s of t h i s p o l i c y are t o be r e a l i s e d , i t
i s e v i d e n t t h a t v i o l e n c e must cease. Subject t o t h i s , Her Majes-
t y ' s Government intend t o take progressive steps t o r e l a x the Em-
ergency Regulations and e v e n t u a l l y t o end the S t a t e of Emergency.
This process would include the r e t u r n of those C y p r i o t s who a t

of Turkey and of Turkish Cypriots in the Emergency transformed the whole

situation for the worse (Foot to Lennox-Boyd, 31 Jan. 1958: CO. 926/
1074.) Meanwhile there was no cease f i r e t i l l August 1958 and the i n t e r -
communal and inter-Greek Cypriot c o n f l i c t s continued. Macmillan was pro-
posing home rule and partnership - a condominium.
 453
present are excluded from the I s l a n d under the Emergency Regula-
t i o n s . (X) A p o l i c y based on these p r i n c i p l e s and proposals w i l l
give the people of the I s l a n d a s p e c i a l l y favoured and p r o t e c t e d
status.
Through r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n s t i t u t i o n s they w i l l e x e r c i s e a u t h o r -
i t y i n the management of the I s l a n d ' s i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s , and each
community w i l l c o n t r o l i t s own communal a f f a i r s . While the people
of the I s l a n d enjoy these advantages, f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s and
p r a c t i c a l c o - o p e r a t i o n between the United Kingdom, Greece and
Turkey w i l l be maintained and strengthened as Cyprus becomes a
symbol of c o - o p e r a t i o n instead of a cause of c o n f l i c t between the
t h r e e A l l i e d Governments.
Her M a j e s t y ' s Government t r u s t t h a t t h i s i m a g i n a t i v e plan w i l l
be welcomed by a l l concerned i n the s p i r i t i n which i t i s put
f o r w a r d , and f o r t h e i r p a r t they w i l l lend a l l e f f o r t s t o ensur-
ing i t s success. Indeed, i f the Greek and Turkish Governments
were w i l l i n g t o extend t h i s experiment i n p a r t n e r s h i p and co-
o p e r a t i o n , Her M a j e s t y ' s Government would be prepared, a t the
a p p r o p r i a t e t i m e , t o go f u r t h e r and, subject t o the r e s e r v a t i o n
t o the United Kingdom of such bases and f a c i l i t i e s as might be
necessary f o r the discharge of her i n t e r n a t i o n a l o b l i g a t i o n s , t o
share the sovereignty of the I s l a n d w i t h t h e i r Greek and Turkish
A l l i e s as t h e i r c o n t r i b u t i o n t o a l a s t i n g s e t t l e m e n t . 1

139. SIR ROGER ALLEN TO SIR FREDERICK HOYER-MILLAR, 17 January 19592

[The F.O. had assured both Greece and Turkey that 'provided our

1. This statement was well received - and with r e l i e f - by British opinion

though there were doubts in the CO that i t simplified the real complexity of
the problem (D. South, Min., 18 Aug: CO. 926/1096). Makarios in Athens con-
demned i t as unacceptable, 'a gross violation of j u s t i c e ' : Denktash described
i t as a stepping stone to enosis. The reaction of Turkey was negative. Greece
rejected i t . There was renewed violence. After v i s i t i n g Athens and Ankara,
Macmillan made modifications (15 August): electoral r o l l s would be prepared;
Greek and Turkish Cypriot municipal councils would be established, and e l e c -
tions to the two houses of representatives would be held. If violence ceased,
deportees could return to play their part in elections and consultations.
After a period of calm and a search for 7 years of a lasting solution, there
would be consultation on the final constitution. There were two modifications
to the plan - the representatives of Greece and Turkey would not be members
of the Governor's council but would have direct access to him on foreign pol-
icy, defence, security and discriminatory l e g i s l a t i o n ; and the idea of dual
nationality (§V) was dropped. Instead of one colonial master, the island would
be governed by three governments, 'unelected and unrepresentative'. Indeed the
i n i t i a t i v e seemed now to pass to Greece and Turkey. The U.K. s t i l l clung to
the Macmillan plan because i t was feared that, if i t l e t go, Athens and Ankara
would press ahead with some bilateral deal which took no account of residual
British i n t e r e s t s . (Turkish pressure caused the abandonment of the report on
separate municipalities: see Foot's despatch 4 Jan. 1959: CO. 926/805.) By
December 1958 s u f f i c i e n t common ground had been established between Greece and
Turkey for a meeting of Averoff (Greek foreign minister) and Zorlu (Turkish).
This led to the Zurich agreement on 11 February 1959. Neither H.M.'s G., nor
the Greek Cypriots, knew anything about what was decided in Zurich t i l l Aver-
off and Zorlu arrived in London. (Record of meeting at Carlton House Gardens,
11 Feb: F.O. 371/144640 R.G. 1073/28.) 2. CO.926/837: secret and private.
 454
strategic Interests are safeguarded, we shall probably be able to agree
to any arrangement which is acceptable to both communities 1n Cyprus and
the Greek and Turkish governments'. But the Greek and Turkish foreign
ministers were hardly talking the same language. Zorlu wanted something
which Averoff could not give without being repudiated by his own P.M.
'who swings about like a pendulum'. Allen wondered why the Turks were
'thus leading the Greeks up the garden path': 'one result however will
be that i t will be d i f f i c u l t for the Greeks ever again to contend that
the Turks have no legitimate interest in Cyprus'. The most striking
feature at this moment was that 'the Greeks want a settlement provided
i t f a l l s within certain l i m i t s ' . There was now a better chance for a
compromise than at any time since 1956.]
I f so, I t h i n k t h a t t h i s r a i s e s a fundamental q u e s t i o n . I t i s
t h i s : how can we best work f o r agreement amongst the p a r t i e s , and
what should be the p a r t played in t h i s by the Macmillan Plan?
The advantage of the Plan i s t h a t i t does give us something
d e f i n i t e t o hold t o , a p o l i c y which can be e x p l a i n e d and a
d e f i n i t e a t t i t u d e which compels r e a c t i o n . I t has succeeded i n
g i v i n g the Greeks a shock and has brought home t o them the need
t o make genuine e f f o r t s t o reach agreement w i t h us and the Turks.
But i t cannot i n i t s present form i t s e l f provide the basis of an
agreement, because the Greeks w i l l not accept i t v o l u n t a r i l y so
long as E.O.K.A. e x i s t s , nor can t h e i r acceptance be compelled,
since i t cannot be e f f e c t i v e l y brought i n t o f o r c e a g a i n s t t h e i r
w i l l . Surely t h e r e f o r e we must consider s e r i o u s l y how our present
course of proceeding w i t h the implementation of the Plan w i l l
a f f e c t the chances of u l t i m a t e agreement.
Here we are faced w i t h two d i f f i c u l t i e s . F i r s t , the f u r t h e r we
go w i t h the P l a n , the s t i f f e r becomes Greek o p p o s i t i o n t o i t ,
because ( a p a r t from e v e r y t h i n g e l s e ) questions of p r e s t i g e are
i n v o l v e d . Moreover, i f we go on, the moment w i l l s u r e l y come when
i t may be impossible t o make a new s t a r t . The Greeks f e a r t h a t
i t w i l l be very d i f f i c u l t t o undo what w i l l have been done, be-
cause the Turks w i l l be a l r e a d y too deeply entrenched as a separ-
a t e community; and the Greeks themselves may be e m b i t t e r e d t o the
p o i n t where i t i s very d i f f i c u l t t o handle them. Secondly, our
p o l i c y of implementing the Plan has a l r e a d y given the Greeks the
impression t h a t we want only the Plan and are not prepared t o a c -
cept any a l t e r n a t i v e ; t h i s n a t u r a l l y discourages them from making
e f f o r t s t o f i n d an a l t e r n a t i v e . The f u r t h e r we go in implementa-
t i o n , the more r e l u c t a n t w i l l they become t o make concessions t o
the Turks which, in t h e i r view, can lead t o nothing and may w e l l
p r e j u d i c e t h e i r own p o s i t i o n s . On the other hand, the Turks a l s o
are deprived of an i n c e n t i v e t o reach agreement, because they
f e e l t h a t they are g e t t i n g what they want without the n e c e s s i t y
of reaching agreement. The conclusion t h e r e f o r e seems t o me t o
be t h a t we should not take any f u r t h e r steps in implementation
of the Plan u n t i l we can see more c l e a r l y t h a t t o do so w i l l
serve a p o s i t i v e purpose. What we should aim a t i s t o make the

Allen, the B r i t i s h ambassador in Athens, was reporting to 'Derick' Hoyer-

Millar in the F.O. h i s doubts whether the present discussions between
Greece and Turkey would end successfully in a compromise and cautioned
a g a i n s t the immediate implementation of the Macmillan plan which could
be r e t a i n e d as a useful weapon if both c o u n t r i e s f a i l e d to agree.
 455
Greeks f e e l t h a t the implementation of the Plan w i l l be the
penalty of f a i l u r e by them t o reach agreement.
This agreement may take a long time t o a c h i e v e . I f the present
Greco-Turkish discussions f a i l , and i f we have not a l r e a d y queer-
ed the p i t c h by implementation of the P l a n , then the moment may
w e l l be r i p e f o r us t o step i n , and t o step in q u i c k l y . I t would
be l o g i c a l f o r us t o say t h e n : 'We are sorry you have not been
able t o reach agreement, but you were o v e r - a m b i t i o u s . Your f a i l -
ure confirms the r i g h t n e s s of our view t h a t only an i n t e r i m s o l u -
t i o n i s possible a t p r e s e n t . Let us have an i n t e r i m s o l u t i o n
which takes account of what you have been able t o agree on ( i f
a n y t h i n g ) , which w i l l be the Plan modified s u f f i c i e n t l y (but not
much) i n order t o enable i t t o be c a l l e d something new, which
w i l l permit the r e t u r n of Makarios, and which no one can say w i l l
p r e j u d i c e the f u t u r e . I n order t o make sure i t does n o t , we p l e d -
ge ourselves not t o allow any f i n a l s o l u t i o n u n t i l both Greek and
Turkish C y p r i o t s agree on i t . S e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n i s the goal but
i t can only be a p p l i e d when both sides agree on the manner of i t s
a p p l i c a t i o n . Meanwhile B r i t i s h sovereignty w i l l continue f o r a
minimum period of seven years a t any r a t e , in order t o allow
every chance f o r the p a r t i e s t o s e t t l e down p e a c e f u l l y together
and agree on a f i n a l s o l u t i o n . ' I t i s a t t h i s stage t h a t the
t h r e a t t o implement the Plan may w e l l come i n handy. We might
have t o t h r e a t e n t o f a l l back on i t from time t o time in order
t o put pressure on the Greeks t o come t o terms; and we might have
t o t h r e a t e n the Turks w i t h a formal r e n u n c i a t i o n of the statement
of December 19, 1956, i f they were i n t r a c t a b l e . I t would not
[work]....
[Agreement on such a basis would not be easy, but even i f we failed, we
would be in a better position in respect of public opinion and would not
be l e f t in a situation where we had to govern in Cyprus but were not
necessarily committed to a plan which could be wrecked by non-co-
operation. Allen thought that as far as the Greeks were concerned the
probability was that we might not f a i l . 1 ]

140. ( a ) ZURICH AGREEMENT, 11 February 19592

[The basic structure of the republic of Cyprus: a presidential regime

1. Hoyer-Miliar's reply (5 Feb. 1959) thought Allen 'rather grudging' of the

merits of the Macmillan plan of June-August 1958 - designed as a middle way
between Greeks and Turks where they had failed to find common ground in b i -
lateral discussions,and the worsening situation made a course of action neces-
sary. The plan was an interim measure only designed to leave the final s o l u t -
ions open. The F.O. never expected Greek support and even Turkish support
which had been won - even reluctantly as a second best, - was not a foregone
conclusion. So the plan could not be abandoned as there was s t i l l room for
discussion and amendment. Of course i t could seem as a threat which was useful
but might, i f implemented, be an obstacle. The F.O. was prepared to withhold
implementation, but not indefinitely. Generally the F.O. agreed that any com-
mon ground would be accepted as a basis for settlement. Allen's suggestion
that i f the present talks f a i l e d , Greece would be more ready than before to
secure an interim agreement - he thought that would be 'another good mark* for
the Macmillan plan. Every effort would be made to exploit favourable opportu-
n i t i e s for a settlement. 2. P.P. 1958-9 XXX (679) pp.217ff: also CO.926/837
for summary i n t e l . (12 Feb.). Since April 1955 some Greek Cypriots had revol-
 456

with the President Greek and the Vice-President Turkish, both elected on
universal suffrage by the Greek and Turkish communities respectively for
5 years. The official languages and a l l legislative and administrative
documents in both languages - would be Greek and Turkish. Greek and
Turkish communities could f l y Greek and Turkish flags, and celebrate
Greek and Turkish national holidays. The President and Vice-President
would jointly choose the Republic's flag of neutral design and colour.
They must take an oath of loyalty and respect for the constitution. They
would have a Council of Ministers (7 Greek ministers designated by the
President and 3 by the V-P). Decisions would be made by absolute
majorities and be promulgated immediately in the official Gazette. The
President and Vice-President shall have the right of veto and the right
to refer decisions back to the Council under the same conditions (§9) as
those laid down for laws and decisions of the House of Representatives.]
6. L e g i s l a t i v e a u t h o r i t y s h a l l be vested in a House of Represen-
t a t i v e s e l e c t e d f o r a p e r i o d of f i v e years by u n i v e r s a l s u f f r a g e
of each community separately in the proportion of 70 per cent.
f o r the Greek community and 30 per cent, for the Turkish commu-
n i t y , t h i s p r o p o r t i o n being f i x e d independently of s t a t i s t i c a l
data. (N.B.- The number of Representatives shall be fixed by
mutual agreement between the communities).
The House of Representatives s h a l l e x e r c i s e a u t h o r i t y in a l l
matters other than those expressly reserved t o the Communal Cham-
b e r s . I n the event of a c o n f l i c t of a u t h o r i t y , such c o n f l i c t
s h a l l be decided by the Supreme C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Court which s h a l l
be composed of one Greek, one Turk and one n e u t r a l , appointed
j o i n t l y by the P r e s i d e n t and the V i c e - P r e s i d e n t . The n e u t r a l
judge s h a l l be p r e s i d e n t of the Court.
7. Laws and decisions of the House of Representatives s h a l l be
adopted by a simple m a j o r i t y of the members p r e s e n t . They s h a l l
be promulgated w i t h i n 15 days i f n e i t h e r the P r e s i d e n t nor the
V i c e - P r e s i d e n t r e t u r n s them f o r r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n as provided i n
P o i n t 9 below.
The c o n s t i t u t i o n a l Law, w i t h the exception of i t s basic a r t i c -
l e s , may be modified by a m a j o r i t y comprising t w o - t h i r d s of the
Greek members and t w o - t h i r d s of the Turkish members of the House

ted against the British colonial regime and after a four-year struggle
independence was now granted in 1960. This agreement between the govern-
ments of Greece and Turkey, signed by Karamanlis and Menderes, was incor-
porated in those reached between those two governments and that of the
U.K. on 19 Feb. in London. At Lancaster House (F.O. 371/144641) Makarios
raised his objections there, but Selwyn Lloyd pressed r e l e n t l e s s l y for
his acceptance of the Zurich Agreement as 'the agreed foundation of a
settlement'. The tense atmosphere in Cyprus in the wake of the Lancaster
House conference was wewll conveyed in Lennox-Boyd's l e t t e r from Nicosia
(to Macmillan, 2 Mar. 1959: CO. "926/806) and H.M.'s G. pressed the Greek
government to 'tone down' the welcome given to Grivas on his return to
Athens (Selwyn Lloyd to Averoff, 15 Mar.: F.O. 371/144595 R.G. 1016/14).
When the Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus accepted the accords
reached i t became the base of the constitution of the Cyprus republic
duly signed on 16 August 1960. The question was whether i t was imposed
or freely accepted as a compromise which as usual pleased no one but was
the best available. (Record of the meetings on 16 and 18 Feb. 1959 are
in CO.926/838: R.G.C1073/40, 54.)
 457
of Representatives.
Any modification of the electoral law and the adoption of any
law relating to the municipalities and of any law imposing duties
or taxes shall require a simple majority of the Greek and Turkish
members of the House of Representatives taking part in the vote
and considered separately.
On the adoption of the budget, the President and the Vice-Pre-
sident may exercise their right to return it to the House of Rep-
resentatives, if in their judgement any question of discrimina-
tion arises. If the House maintains its decisions, the President
and the Vice-President shall have the right of appeal to the Sup-
reme Constitutional Court.
8. The President and the Vice-President, separately and conjoin-
tly, shall have the right of final veto on any law or decision
concerning foreign affairs except the participation of the Repub-
lic of Cyprus in international organisations and pacts of allian-
ce in which Greece and Turkey both participate, or concerning
defence and security as defined in Annex I.
9. The President and the Vice-President of the Republic shall
have, separately and conjointly, the right to return all laws and
decisions, which may be returned to the House of Representatives
within a period of not more than 15 days for reconsideration.
The House of Representatives shall pronounce within 15 days on
any matter so returned. If the House of Representatives maintains
its decisions the President and the Vice-President shall promul-
gate the law or decision in question within the time-limits fixed
for the promulgation of laws and decisions.
Laws and decisions, which are considered by the President or
the Vice-President to discriminate against either of the two com-
munities, shall be submitted to the Supreme Constitutional Court
which may annul or confirm the law or decision, or return it to
the House of Representatives for reconsideration, in whole or in
part. The law or decisions shall not become effective until the
Supreme Constitutional Court or, where it has been returned, the
House of Representatives has taken a decision on it.
10. Each community shall have its Communal Chamber composed of
a number of representatives which it shall itself determine.
The Communal Chambers shall have the right to impose taxes and
levies on members of their community to provide for their needs
and for the needs of bodies and institutions under their supervi-
sion. The Communal Chambers shall exercise authority in all reli-
gious, educational, cultural and teaching questions and questions
of personal status. They shall exercise authority in questions
where the interests and institutions are of a purely communal
nature, such as sporting and charitable foundations, bodies and
associations, producers' and consumers' co-operatives and credit
establishments, created for the purpose of promoting the welfare
of one of the communities. (N.B.- It is understood that the pro-
visions of the present paragraph cannot be interpreted in such
a way as to prevent the creation of mixed and communal institu-
tions where the inhabitants desire them. These producers' and
consumers' co-operatives and credit establishments, which shall
be administered under the laws of the Republic, shall be subject
to the supervision of the Communal Chambers.) The Communal Cham-
bers shall also exercise authority in matters initiated by muni-
cipalities which are composed of one community only. These muni-
458
cipalities, to which the laws of the Republic shall apply, shall
be supervised in their functions by the Communal Chambers.
Where the central administration is obliged to take over the
supervision of the institutions, establishments, or municipal-
ities mentioned in the two preceding paragraphs by virtue of
legislation in force, this supervision shall be exercised by
officials belonging to the same community as the institution,
establishment or municipality in question.
11. The Civil Service shall be composed as to 70 per cent, of
Greeks and as to 30 per cent, of Turks. It is understood that
this quantitative division will be applied as far as practicable
in all grades of the Civil Service. In regions or localities
where one of the two communities is in a majority approaching 100
per cent, the organs of the local administration responsible to
the central administration shall be composed solely of officials
belonging to that community....
[The deputies of the A-G., the Inspector General, the Treasurer and
Governor of the Issuing Bank must not belong to the same community as
their principals. Their appointments would be made by the President and
V-P acting in agreement. The heads and deputies of the Armed Forces,
Gendarmerie and Police would be appointed by the President and V-P acting
in agreement. One of these heads shall be Turkish and where the head
belongs to one community, his deputy must be from the other (§12, 13).
The President and V-P could jointly institute compulsory military ser-
vice: an army of 2,000 of whom 60% shall be Greek and 40% Turkish: the
security services (gendarmerie and police) of 2,000, which might be
reduced or increased by agreement of the President and V-P, 70% Greek to
30% Turks, after an initial period 1n order not to discharge Turks now
serving (§14). If forces were stationed in parts of the Republic, up to
100% would belong to the appropriate community (§15).]
16. A High Court of Justice shall be established, which shall
consist of two Greeks, one Turk and one neutral, nominated joint-
ly by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic. The
President of the Court shall be the neutral judge, who shall have
two votes. This Court shall constitute the highest organ of the
judicature (appointments, promotions of judges, &c).
17. Civil disputes, where the plaintiff and the defendant belong
to the same community, shall be tried by a tribunal composed of
judges belonging to that community. If the plaintiff and defend-
ant belong to different communities, the composition of the tri-
bunal shall be mixed and shall be determined by the High Court
of Justice.
Tribunals dealing with civil disputes relating to questions of
personal status and to religious matters, which are reserved to
the competence of the Communal Chambers under Point 10, shall be
composed solely of judges belonging to the community concerned.
The composition and status of these tribunals shall be determined
according to the law drawn up by the Communal Chamber and they
shall apply the law drawn up by the Communal Chamber.
In criminal cases, the tribunal shall consist of judges belong-
ing to the same community as the accused. If the injured party
belongs to another community, the composition of the tribunal
shall be mixed and shall be determined by the High Court of
Justice.
18. The President and the Vice-President of the Republic shall
each have the right to exercise the prerogative of mercy to
 459
persons from their respective communities who are condemned to
death. In cases where the plaintiffs and the convicted persons
are members of different communities the prerogative of mercy
shall be exercised by agreement between the President and the
Vice-President. In the event of disagreement the vote for clemen-
cy shall prevail. When mercy is accorded the death penalty shall
be commuted to life imprisonment.
19. In the event of agricultural reform, lands shall be redistri-
buted only to persons who are members of the same community as
the expropriated owners. Expropriations by the State or the Muni-
cipalities shall only be carried out on payment of a just and
equitable indemnity fixed, in disputed cases, by the tribunals.
An appeal to the tribunals shall have the effect of suspending
action. Expropriated property shall only be used for the purpose
for which the expropriation was made. Otherwise the property
shall be restored to the owners.
20. Separate municipalities shall be created in the five largest
towns of Cyprus by the Turkish inhabitants of these towns.
However:-
(a) In each of the towns a co-ordinating body shall be set up
which shall supervise work which needs to be carried out jointly
and shall concern itself with matters which require a degree of
co-operation. These bodies shall each be composed of two members
chosen by the Greek municipalities, two members chosen by the
Turkish municipalities and a President chosen by agreement bet-
ween the two municipalities.
(b) The President and the Vice-President shall examine within
four years the question whether or not this separation of muni-
cipalities in the five largest towns shall continue.
With regard to other localities, special arrangements shall be
made for the constitution of municipal bodies, following, as far
as possible, the rule of proportional representation for the two
communities.
21. A Treaty guaranteeing the independence, territorial integrity
and constitution of the new State of Cyprus shall be concluded
between the Republic of Cyprus, Greece, the United Kingdom and
Turkey. A Treaty of military alliance shall also be concluded
between the Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey. These two
instruments shall have constitutional force. (This last paragraph
shall be inserted in the Constitution as a basic article.)
22. It shall be recognised that the total or partial union of
Cyprus with any other State, or a separatist independence for
Cyprus ( i . e . the partition of Cyprus into two independent
States), shall be excluded.
23. The Republic of Cyprus shall accord most-favoured-nation
treatment to Great Britain, Greece and Turkey for all agreements
whatever their nature. This provision shall not apply to the
Treaties between the Republic of Cyprus and the United Kingdom
concerning the bases and military facilities accorded to the
United Kingdom.
24. The Greek and Turkish Governments shall have the right to
subsidise institutions for education, culture, athletics and
charity belonging to their respective communities.
Equally, where either community considers that it has not the
necessary number of schoolmasters, professors or priests for the
working of its institutions, the Greek and Turkish Governments
460
may provide them to the extent strictly necessary to meet their
needs.
25. One of the following Ministries - The Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, the Ministry of Defence or the Ministry of Finance -
shall be entrusted to a Turk. If the President and the Vice-
President agree they may replace this system by a system of
rotation.
26. The new State which is to come into being with the signature
of the Treaties shall be established as quickly as possible and
within a period of not more than three months from the signature
of the Treaties.1

1. Only after 11 February were the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders informed
and brought into the picture. Makarios at a meeting with the Greek government
accepted, if reluctantly, the Zurich agreement since it was evident that re-
jection of Zurich and the continuation of the armed conflict would mean parti-
tion. At a London Conference he did raise some 'objections'. But the U.K. and
Greek governments refused to negotiate further: Greece had committed itself
and would not reneage on its word and would abandon him and Cyprus if he did
not accept the Zurich agreement: Britain would withdraw from the island. While
he still hesitated, Karamanlis warned that failure to sign would bring unpre-
dictable and disastrous consequences for Cyprus and he would not be held res-
ponsible for any repercussions. Makarios therefore claimed he had no alterna-
tive but to sign, which he did in a declaration 'as the agreed foundation for
the final settlement of the problem of Cyprus' on 19 February. At the same
tine Dr. Kutchuk made a similar declaration. The three treaties - an inter-
national dimension - were incorporated in the constitution of establishment
between U.K. and Cyprus setting up the republic and the British sovereign
bases, of alliance between Cyprus, Greece and Turkey to resist attack on the
independent integrity of Cyprus with 950 Greek and 650 Turks stationed in the
island, and of guarantee by the U.K. , Greece and Turkey which explicitly exc-
luded both enosis and partition and reserved to the 3 guarantors the right to
take steps to restore Cyprus' status in case of change, disturbance or breach
of the provisions after consultation between the guarantors and 'in so far as
common or concerted action may prove impossible, each of the three guarantee-
ing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establi-
shing the state of affairs established' (Art. III). The Act (849 Eliz. II
cap.52) enabling an order-in-council to establish the independent sovereign
republic of Cyprus became law on 29 July 1960: the order-in-council was S.I.
No.1638 and the treaties of the three powers with the government of Cyprus
were signed on 16 August 1960: (Mansergh III pp.272-6). On 20 January 1960 at
London Makarios and Kutchuk had asked Home to prepare the independence Act to
make possible membership of the Commonwealth (Cmnd.1093: [p.lt67]); on 16 Feb.
1961 the house of representatives by 41 to 9 requested membership for 5 years;
and on 13 March 1961 the president, Makarios, was invited to join the Common-
wealth P.M.s meeting. [For Cyprus and the problem of small territories, see
pp. 36, 46, 52-6] The 1960 settlement was indeed a complex and deliberately
involved compromise, detailing (where there was such lack of trust) inter-com-
munal issues as meticulously as possible: therefore inevitably with the lowest
common factor of expected consent, based on the need to insure both communit-
ies participated at every level, and enforced by a veto by both President and
Vice-president separately: an attempt to institutionalise bi-communal co-oper-
ation, vulnerable to the charge of being 'undemocratic' with its checks on
majority power, and to being 'imposed' by Zurich and London without initial
Cypriot involvement. The 1960 constitution was advisedly difficult to work
 461
27. A l l the above Points s h a l l be considered t o be basic a r t i c l e s
of the C o n s t i t u t i o n of Cyprus.

( b ) 'THE GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENTS', 11 February 19591

1 . Greece and Turkey w i l l support the e n t r y of the Republic of
Cyprus i n t o the North A t l a n t i c Treaty O r g a n i s a t i o n . The e s t a b -
lishment of N.A.T.O. bases i n the I s l a n d and t h e i r composition
r e q u i r e the agreement of the two Governments.
2. I t was agreed between the two Prime M i n i s t e r s t h a t they
would make r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s t o the President and the V i c e - P r e s i -
dent of the Republic of Cyprus r e s p e c t i v e l y i n order t h a t the
Communist Party and Communist a c t i v i t i e s may be p r o h i b i t e d .
3. The f i r s t commander of the t r i p a r t i t e Headquarters envisaged
i n A r t i c l e 3 of the T r e a t y of A l l i a n c e between the Republic of
Cyprus, Greece and Turkey s h a l l be chosen by l o t .
4 . I t was agreed t h a t immediately a f t e r the s i g n a t u r e of the
T r e a t i e s a l l the emergency measures now imposed in Cyprus should

with i t s equalisation of status and powers to two unequal communities, but

with good w i l l (Clerides op. cit. pp.131-3) the main problems (e.g. the re-
quirement for separate majorities in the tax l e g i s l a t i o n ) were not beyond
solution and very few were in urgent need of amendment. Indeed (as Clerides
t e s t i f i e d ) i t was never proved unworkable, for Makarios did not wish to work
i t . From the f i r s t he wanted drastic amendment. So the three years of the i n -
dependence of the Republic of Cyprus were not devoted to the e s s e n t i a l task
of bridge building and creating t r u s t , but to wrangling and uncertainty. I t
could be argued that the constitution stood up remarkably well given the atmo-
sphere. But if there were to be a new focus - a pan-Cypriot nationalism - to
be created, these three l o s t years did not contribute to i t : rather the older
l o y a l t i e s to Greece and Turkey were emphasised. Then in 1963 came the shatter-
ing blow of Makarios' unilateral 13 points and the sharp reaction of Turkey
leading to the f i r s t steps towards partition. But a year e a r l i e r meetings
(Oct.- Nov. 1962) between the leaders (especially Clerides and Denktash) were
proceeding quite well. Inter-communal tension was hardly increasing (Fort-
nightly summary, 8, 21 Jan. 1963). Denktash had firmly rejected Makarios'
March 1962 proposals but thought Clerides 'alternative solution of mixed, not
separated' worthy of further study. But Makarios was increasingly suspicious
of their success: he was suspected of 'acting unconstitutionally', to seeking
to destroy the constitution by disregarding i t and of facing the Turkish Cyp-
r i o t s with a fait accompli: (Cleary to Hamilton, 31 Dec. 1962: Rept. to F.O.,
9 Jan. 1963: F.O.371/168964). Delay meant opportunity l o s t : hope rested on
Clerides and Denktash finding common ground before Kutchuk returned: the press
stirred up tensions and attitudes hardened. Kutchuk, then Denktash reverted
to their previous demand for geographical separation: Makarios claimed (26
Sept. 1963) the Greek Cypriot majorities right to amend the constitution with
consent of the minority and approval of the guarantors. Then when Karamanlis,
with his repeated cautions against any substantial amendments of the 1960 ac-
cord, f e l l in Athens, Makarios thought he had a chance to effect what he had
always intended (Clerides op. cit. p. 150) - the modification of the main
structure - the safeguards - in the constitution.
1. CO.926/839: secret, reached by the P.M.s of Greece and Turkey, Karamanlis
and Menderes at Zurich. Julian Amery, the Parliamentary under-secretary, had
some concern l e s t 'in doing an Attlee' by announcing a date for independence
they did not 'produce another Punjab massacre': (Min. 17 August 1959:
CO.926/839).
462

be l i f t e d and a general amnesty should be proclaimed.

5. The C o n s t i t u t i o n s h a l l be drawn up w i t h i n the s h o r t e s t pos-
s i b l e time by a committee c o n s i s t i n g of a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the
Greek C y p r i o t community, a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the Turkish C y p r i o t
community and two r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s who s h a l l be appointed by the
Governments of Greece and Turkey r e s p e c t i v e l y .
This committee, which s h a l l be a s s i s t e d by a l e g a l e x p e r t , in
the c a p a c i t y of a d v i s e r , chosen by the M i n i s t e r s f o r Foreign A f -
f a i r s of Greece and Turkey, s h a l l i n i t s work have regard t o and
s h a l l scrupulously observe the p o i n t s contained i n the documents
of the Zurich Conference and s h a l l f u l f i l i t s task in accordance
w i t h the p r i n c i p l e s t h e r e l a i d down.

( c ) THE EARL OF PERTH TO ALAN LENNOX-BOYD, 12 February 19591

[The drafts did not contain provisions for U.K. bases and access but
i t was clear from the text that these were contemplated and would be
worked out in conjunction with H.M.'s G. The texts of the proposals were
indeed very lengthy but the main points were] i ) t r e a t y guaranteeing
independence t o be signed by Cyprus and t h r e e Powers i n c l u d i n g
United Kingdom. I t would be recognised t h a t union in whole or
p a r t of Cyprus w i t h any other S t a t e would be excluded,
i i ) A l l i a n c e f o r common defence t o be concluded between Cyprus,
Greece and Turkey. Greece and Turkey would s t a t i o n f o r c e s of 950
and 650 s o l d i e r s r e s p e c t i v e l y . A C y p r i o t army of 2,000 comprising
6 0 * Greek and 4 0 * Turks t o be e s t a b l i s h e d ,
i i i ) Cyprus t o be supported f o r membership of N.A.T.O.
iv) Internal security force (police and gendarmerie) of 2,000
comprising 7 0 * Greek, 3 0 * Turks.
v) A House of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s t o be e l e c t e d on u n i v e r s a l s u f f r a g e
by each community v o t i n g s e p a r a t e l y in p r o p o r t i o n 70* Greek, 3 0 *
Turks. Same p r o p o r t i o n i n e x e c u t i v e and in a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,
vi ) Each community t o have communal houses of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s
also,
v i i ) A Greek P r e s i d e n t and a Turkish V i c e - P r e s i d e n t , both t o have

1. CO.926/837. A good summary of the proposals made a t the Zurich conference.

I n v i t a t i o n s were sent out next day for a t r i p a r t i t e conference a t London on
17 February: George S i n c l a i r acting in F o o t ' s absence commented (14 Feb.) t h a t
t h e r e was not s p e c i f i c mention of ' B r i t i s h sovereignty' over the bases in the
d r a f t s . Allen telegraphed from Athens t h a t the Greek P.M., Karamanlis, was
annoyed by Makarios' behaviour in London and was determined to stand by the
agreements 'whatever Makarios says or d o e s ' : Karamanlis was an honest man and
i t should be p o s s i b l e to n a i l him down f i n a l l y and avoid a s i t u a t i o n where
Greece put a l l the blame on the U.K. for i n s i s t i n g on sovereignty over the
B r i t i s h bases. George S i n c l a i r reported to Foot t h a t the speed of events had
caught the Cypriots by s u r p r i s e but the majority were r e l i e v e d by the p r o s -
pects of peace. Greek Cypriots were somewhat dismayed a t the separation of
m u n i c i p a l i t i e s : many were afraid of the economic consequences of leaving the
Commonwealth; some wanted delay of change-over from the B r i t i s h administration
to ensuring the emergence of moderate leaders and to remaining in the Common-
wealth. Turkish Cypriots were disappointed t h a t there was no p a r t i t i o n . The
r i g h t wing Greek Cypriots claimed i t as an E.O.K.A. triumph but Grivas was
s i l e n t . John Clerides had misgivings t h a t the proposals would perpetuate d i v i -
sions and f r i c t i o n s and would have preferred a period of self-government be-
fore independence (18 Feb. ibid.).
 463

r i g h t of veto on decisions of Council of M i n i s t e r s , t o be e l e c t e d

by the Greek and Turkish C y p r i o t communities. Also reserved po-
wers i n respect of l e g i s l a t i o n , veto over laws or decisions on
f o r e i g n a f f a i r s and d i s c r i m i n a t o r y laws and d e c i s i o n s ,
v i i i ) Separate Turkish municipal councils i n f i v e main towns,
i x ) The new S t a t e to be c o n s t i t u t e d as q u i c k l y as p o s s i b l e ,
x ) Greek and Turkish Premiers would i n t e r v e n e w i t h President and
V i c e - P r e s i d e n t t o get communist party and a c t i v i t y p r o h i b i t e d ,
x i ) Amnesty a f t e r t r e a t y .

( d ) F.O.MEETING, 16 February 19591

M. Averoff [the Greek foreign minister] apologised for having
postponed the time of the meeting. He had been having g r e a t
t r o u b l e w i t h Archbishop Makarios who was in d i f f i c u l t i e s w i t h h i s
own s u p p o r t e r s . I t had been f o o l i s h of the Archbishop t o b r i n g
so many Greek C y p r i o t s t o London t o advise him: they were now
back o b j e c t i n g t o i n d i v i d u a l aspects of the s e t t l e m e n t and d e s t -
roying h i s power of s o l e l e a d e r s h i p . As a r e s u l t the Conference
of Five due t o open the f o l l o w i n g day might f a i l to produce a
c l e a r r e s u l t . I n those circumstances he, M. A v e r o f f , would do
whatever the B r i t i s h and Turkish Foreign M i n i s t e r s wished. He had
spoken t o h i s Prime M i n i s t e r [Constantino Karamanlis] and had
a u t h o r i t y t o commit the Greek Government which had pledged t h e i r
word and would stand by i t in a l l circumstances. One p o s s i b i l i t y
would be f o r the t h r e e governments a t the end of the Conference
to make a declaration that their policy was as agreed i.e. the
Zurich Agreements, together w i t h the proposed U.K. d e c l a r a t i o n ,
and t o leave the C y p r i o t s t o make what d e c l a r a t i o n they c o u l d .
The Greek Government would be ready t o s t a t e c l e a r l y and p u b l i c l y
t h a t they had a r r i v e d a t t h i s p o l i c y because i t was a good one
and the best a v a i l a b l e in the circumstances; t h a t before doing
so they had e x p l a i n e d the p o l i c y t o the Archbishop, who had
agreed; and t h a t t h i s represented f o r the Greek Government the
end of the Cyprus question i.e. that in their future foreign po-
l i c y they would take no f u r t h e r a c t i o n on behalf of the C y p r i o t s ,
n e i t h e r a t the U.N. nor in the Council of Europe nor e l s e w h e r e . . .
[He] 'thanked M. Zorlu f o r h i s c o - o p e r a t i v e a t t i t u d e . . . [his support
and understanding. He thought Makarios' difficulties stemmed more from
presentation than substance - his exclusion from the earlier negoti-
ations. But i f the three governments stuck to their agreement Makarios
would have to go back to Cyprus and work on his own people: there would
be delay but the same result would ultimately be achieved as i f the Con-
ference had succeeded.
Selwyn L loyd declared i t could not be assumed that Makarios would be
allowed to return i f he did not accept the agreement. In the new circums-

1. CO.926/838: secret No.68. Selwyn Lloyd (the foreign secretary), Lennox-

Boyd at the C O . , Sir Hugh Foot and a dozen U.K. ministers and o f f i c i a l s , five
Greek ministers and four Turks were at t h i s preliminary meeting to the London
'conference of f i v e ' - the t r i p a r t i t e powers plus the Greek and Turkish Cyp-
r i o t s who were formally involved for the f i r s t time. Agreement between Greece
and Turkey had already been reached and Averoff and Zorlu were firmly commit-
ted to i t : the U.K. had joined in the t r i p a r t i t e agreement. But Makarios re-
sented being faced with proposals already agreed, and he was not a free agent,
for Grivas, his eminence grise, was a powerful factor off stage.
 464
tances it might be undesirable to hold the Conference at all. The three
Governments could not negotiate a compromise with Makarios. If there were
no agreement of the Five then 1t might be necessary to revert to the Mac-
millan plan or to implement the practicable parts of the Tripartite plan.
M. Zorlu said that if Makarios would not accept the present plan, Turkey
would oppose his return to Cyprus where his presence would be most dan-
gerous: he would seek to whittle down the agreement. M. Averoff opposed
any partial implementation of the Tripartite plan if the Greek Cypriots
opposed: they could go no further than the terms already agreed as a
whole. Selwyn L loyd proposed that the Conference should proceed as arran-
ged if the three foreign ministers confirmed the Tripartite Agreement,
and that the maximum pressure be put on Makarios.
The meeting then discussed and verbally amended the unilateral declara-
tion of the U.K. Government concerning the bases: and agreed that the
British Government would never give them up except to the Republic of
Cyprus. Selwyn Lloyd would make the U.K. declaration next day at the Con-
ference and the other foreign ministers would accept it. A new draft for
Article 2 of the Treaty of Guarantee was accepted as was the British pro-
posal for procedure and continuing machinery to Implement the decisions
of the Conference. Averoff wanted transfer of power to Cypriots to start
immediately after the Initialling of all the documents by all Five par-
ties - the drafting of the constitution, the elections for the three
assemblies in Cyprus and for the President and Vice-President, the final
hand over perhaps on 1 January 1960, but Selwyn L loyd thought the elect-
ions to the assemblies should follow those of the President and Vice-
President. The Conference would open at 11 a.m. next morning. Selwyn
Lloyd was anxious that the P.M.s of Greece and Turkey should come to
London in case Makarios refused to sign: he and Sir Hugh Foot emphasised
that if he did refuse, his return to Cyprus would be out of the question
and the emergency could not be lifted and the amnesty would not be
declared.]
(e) F.O. MEETING, 18 February 19591
M. Averoff said he had been doing his best to reach agreement
with the Greek Cypriot Delegation but had no success.... [Makarios
had definitely refused to sign.] It had been made clear to the
Cypriots that the Greek Government's support for the Zurich
Agreements and the Governmental Declarations was final and there
could be no further changes in Greece's foreign policy over Cyp-
rus. They had also been told in strict confidence that the Greek
Government would hold elections in Greece on this issue, so as
to demonstrate that the people of Greece agreed with them in re-
fusing to support the Cypriots further. The Cypriots had appeared
shaken by these categorical pronouncements... . [The question whether
Makarios should be permitted to state his position at the conference's
final session was discussed. Selwyn L loyd thought he should, but Averoff
felt his views had already been expressed 1n the first session and he
should not be given a further chance to denounce the Conference propo-
sals. Zorlu agreed that further argument with the Cypriots should not
undermine the Tripartite agreement: the Zurich Agreements must stand or
fall as a whole and were not negotiable to suit the Greek Cypriots: Maka-
rios could not be enabled to criticise points of details: he had been

1. CO.926/838: secret. Selwyn Lloyd, Duncan Sandys, Hugh Foot and 14 other
ministers and officials were present with the same number of Greeks and Turks.
 465
consulted at every stage and could only be asked whether he accepted the
Agreements or not. Selwyn L loyd persuaded them to give Makarios a final
chance to make a statement to get his position on the record: If he re-
jected the Zurich documents, there would be an Immediate recess without
allowing him any further debate. Then the three P.M.s would meet, affirm
their agreed position and emphasise Makarios' isolation. It was agreed
that when agreement with the Cypriots was reached, a transfer of sove-
reignty would be "as soon as practicable' for delay would create diffi-
culties.]
(f) C.R.O. SECRET TELEGRAM TO FULL MEMBERS OF THE COMMONWEALTH,
16 February 19591
Averoff, the Greek foreign minister, and Zorlu, the Turkish,

1. C.0.926/837 No.107 to the high commissioners in Ottawa, Canberra, Welling-

ton and Cape Town, repeated to Delhi, Karachi, Colombo, Accra, Kuala Lumpur
and Salisbury and copied for F.O., C.O. and U.K. embassies in Dublin, Washing-
ton, U.K. and Lagos. The rest of the Commonwealth was being kept informed of
the process of negotiations. A further telegram (No.116) on 19 Feb. gave an
account of the first three plenary sessions: the approval of the U.K. declara-
tion of the basis for accepting the Zurich agreements by Averoff and Zorlu,
and Kutchuk on behalf of the Turkish community, but Makarios' call for further
delay to study them: and Makarios' reservations. Averoff and Zorlu emphasised
that 'the Zurich agreements consisted of carefully balanced series of compro-
mises reached after much long and arduous bargaining between their two Govern-
ments. In course of this both sides made considerable sacrifices. To remove
any one of the major conclusions at this stage would be equivalent to bring
down the whole carefully constructed edifice.' Finally Makarios had agreed
'under pressure from most of his advisers'. As for the amnesty terms, Makarios
would now be permitted to return very soon to Cyprus with other exiles. At the
final session, in the presence of the P.M.s of the U.K. and Greece and Aver-
off, Makarios formally confirmed his acceptance of the settlement and initial-
led the necessary documents. Selwyn Lloyd made a final declaration (No.117)
referring to the British Sovereign Areas, the protection of fundamental human
rights of the various Cypriot communities, the interest of Cypriot public ser-
vants, the problem of nationality, the assumption by the new Republic of the
existing obligations (including the settlement of claims) and the transfer of
sovereignty when the new constitution came into effect. Makarios had been pre-
pared to accept the Greek-Turkish accord at Zurich (11 February) as a basis,
but not the detail in which he had not participated. Karamanlis was firm that
Greece was committed to the terms as they had been agreed, and he would aban-
don Makarios and Cyprus. Selwyn Lloyd told Makarios at the last meeting that
no further discussion of his criticisms was possible. "You can take it or
leave it.' If he rejected the agreement, Britain would withdraw and Cyprus
would be partitioned. Makarios still sought delay. 'If you want my answer now,
it is No,' Overnight Karamanlis warned Makarios of the disastrous consequences
for Cyprus for which the Archbishop would be held responsible. Makarios felt
that he had 'no alternative but to sign' if a worse outcome were to be avoid-
ed. He had indeed been fully briefed as had Grivas (G. Clerides op. cit, pp.
72-4) and had indeed issued a statement congratulating Karamanlis on the agre-
ements which would establish 'an independent sovereign state opening up a per-
iod of freedom and progress for the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots':
(G. Clerides op.cit. I p.71). But he then had a crisis of conscience. He did
not seek to build up confidence between the two communities as 'a statesman
president of a bicommunal state', but as 'the nationalist leader of one commu-
466
arrived here last Wednesday bringing with them the documents app-
roved and initialled by their Prime Ministers at Zurich. Briefly,
these comprise essential articles of Constitution for Republic
of Cyprus, together with draft Treaty of Alliance between Greece,
Turkey and Cyprus, and draft Treaty of Guarantee to which United
Kingdom would be party as well as other three.
Constitution is of 'presidential' type and provides for Greek
Cypriot President and Turkish Cypriot Vice-President who, among
other things, would both have right of absolute veto over legis-
lation on foreign affairs, defence and security, and suspensory
power over other legislation. There would be single House of
Representatives (with 70 per cent, of its members Greek Cypriots
and 30 per cent. Turkish Cypriots) and Communal House for each
community. There would be separate Turkish municipalities in five
main towns, but this provision would be reviewed within four
years. Cyprus would have Army of 2,000 men and, in addition, Se-
curity Forces (gendarmerie and police) of 2,000 men. Balance bet-
ween two communities would be preserved throughout, normally in
proportion 70:30, but 60:40 in Army. These are broad lines of
document which goes into considerable detail.
Treaty of Alliance binds Greece, Turkey and Cyprus to protect
independence and territorial integrity of Republic. For this pur-
pose there will be tripartite headquarters in Cyprus including
950 Greek officers and men and 650 Turkish officers and men,
whose duties will include supervising training of Cypriot Army.
Command of headquarters would rotate annually between Greek,
Turkish and Cypriot General.
Treaty of Guarantee is aimed at preventing partition of Island
or its union with any other State and at ensuring respect for
Constitution. Greece, Turkey and United Kingdom are empowered
jointly, or in emergency separately, to act to safeguard provi-
sions of Treaty.
The two Foreign Ministers have informed us that they intend to
propose Cyprus as member of N.A.T.O.
It is clear that both sides at Zurich were anxious to maintain
United Kingdom connection with Cyprus and to allow for United
Kingdom sovereign bases on Island. They have left it to us to lay
down how our requirements are to be met. We shall put forward a
document for this purpose. Apart from bases to be retained under
United Kingdom sovereignty (which will be confined to two relati-
vely small areas) we shall, of course, want full use of our ne-
cessary installations elsewhere in Island and facilities such as
communications for use of our bases and installations. We also
need unrestricted use of Nicosia Airport which would not be Uni-
ted Kingdom sovereign base. It is important to us that these re-
quirements should be guaranteed by Greece and Turkey as well as
by new Republic. We are also concerned to ensure by agreement
with Greece and Turkey that transition to independence is orderly
but also speedy, and that interests of all categories of Cypriots
and residents in Cyprus are cared for.
We are now hoping that the three Foreign Ministers can agree

nity embarked on a struggle to free it from the shackles of agreements he had

accepted out of necessity'. He felt guilty about abandoning enosis, he avoided
implementing the agreements, and he waited his opportunity to seek amendments.
 467

l a t e r today t h a t various documents s h a l l be accepted as basis of

f i n a l s e t t l e m e n t . I t i s i n t e n t i o n t h a t these documents s h a l l then
be endorsed by a f u r t h e r Conference which i s t o open i n London
tomorrow, February 1 7 t h , a t which Archbishop Makarios and Dr.
Kutchuk, r e p r e s e n t i n g Greek and Turkish C y p r i o t communities, w i l l
also be p r e s e n t . I t i s our hope t h a t Greek and Turkish Prime M i -
n i s t e r s w i l l be present a t f i n a l stages of Conference, which we
hope t o complete i n time f o r statements in t h r e e Parliaments on
February 1 9 t h .
Please inform Commonwealth a u t h o r i t i e s in s t r i c t e s t confidence,
adding t h a t we hope t o keep them c l o s e l y informed of f u r t h e r
developments.

141. JOHN HIGHAM, MINUTE, 15 April 19591

[ I t would be unrealistic to suppose that even a modified form of the
proposed Commonwealth Statehood would satisfy Cypriot leaders, though
f u l l membership of the Commonwealth would not be appropriate.]
I f a S t a t e so d o u b t f u l l y worthy of independence as Cyprus could
be admitted as a Commonwealth member i t i s bound t o be an o b j e c t
of envy of those Commonwealth S t a t e s on the b o r d e r l i n e of i n d e -
pendence-worthiness. Yet I cannot r e a d i l y see t h a t anything short
of f u l l membership i s going t o do more than i r r i t a t e f e e l i n g i n
Cyprus, unless we say o u t r i g h t t h a t we are not prepared t o accede
Cyprus any of the advantages commonly b e l i e v e d t o a t t a c h t o Com-
monwealth a s s o c i a t i o n unless Cyprus accepts whatever Commonwealth
s t a t u s we are prepared t o accord. . . . [But external association on the
Irish model would only lure other territories to seek similar economic
and social privileges with increasing obligations. Moreover, to satisfy
their consciences that 'we have given the new god-child a good start in
l i f e ' by conceding Cyprus more than was ' s t r i c t l y necessary' would give
the U.K. no political advantage.2]

1. CO. 1032/132 [For the debate over the question of f u l l membership for small
t e r r i t o r i e s ( i n c l . Cyprus) see Nos. 1-10] Higham. who had served in the Admir-
a l t y , as clerk to Parliament and as chief secretary in Singapore, was in the
Mediterranean department of the CO. 2. In the event Makarios and Kutchuk
insisted to Home on nothing l e s s than f u l l membership at a meeting in London
(20 Jan. 1960: Cmnd.1093 p.177): i t would be subject to confirmation by the
house of representatives after independence, and by a l l Commonwealth P.M.s.
A C.R.O. note commented (30 March C P . C (60) l.A. Cab. 134(1552)) that with
a population of only half a million, l i t t l e sense of mutual British heritage,
and a doubtful record of p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y and financial v i a b i l i t y , the ad-
mission of Cyprus destroyed 'our previous c r i t e r i a for membership': such was
the dynamic of anti-imperialism that 'independence has to be conceded before
certain at l e a s t of the accepted c r i t e r i a for membership have been attained'.
If the Commonwealth became 'both unwieldy and heterogeneous', some 'inner
c i r c l e ' no doubt would emerge, but dilution of the association by a 'flock of
small and insignificant members' seemed inevitable. Though Home foresaw that
Cyprus would 'almost certainly be a nuisance' and f e l t that otherwise the
shape of the Commonwealth could be preserved for some years (to Macmillan, 8
July 1960: Prem. 11/3220), he accepted Macmillan's opinion that the balance
of advantage lay in accepting Cyprus as a f u l l member and the cabinet colonial
policy committee accepted Macmillan's recommendation on 27 April 1960. The
other members of the Commonwealth were unanimously reconciled to accede to
Cyprus' request for f u l l membership and at independence on 16 August 1960 i t
468
142. ARCHBISHOP MAKARIOS: STATEMENT, 21 May 19591
I signed the London Agreements fully conscious of my responsi-
bilities towards the people of Cyprus. Failure of the London
Conference on Cyprus because of refusal to sign would have had
catastrophic consequences for the future of Cyprus.... [He alone
took responsibility, leaving the people of Cyprus who have the sovereign
right to accept or reject the agreement signed uncommitted:] Because
it has been said that I signed after strong pressure from the
Greek Government, I declare that no power on earth could have
compelled me to sign the agreements if I had believed them to be
contrary to the interests of the people of Cyprus. In the confer-
ence room I fought to the last moment to achieve better terms in
the proposed agreement. Finally, however, refusal to sign, I
repeat again, would have heaped many aggravated troubles on the
people of Cyprus...
With regard to the Greek Government, I honestly believe that
it made every effort to achieve the best that was possible under
the given circumstances. The fact that the Greek Prime Minister
and the Foreign Minister drew my attention to the consequences
which would result from the refusal to sign the agreements did
not constitute pressure on their part, but the performance of a
duty.
I put my signature to the London Agreement; I do not repent,
I do not retract.2

143. JOHN ADDIS: MEMORANDUM, 15 October 19593

The main developments over Cyprus in the past few weeks have
concerned:- (a) the work of the Constitutional Commission

was secured when Cyprus became independent. But the essential character of the
Commonwealth was radically changed when Makarios attended the P . M . ' s meeting
in March 1961. The old frankness and trust had gone. So in the context of
British foreign affairs and the P.O., its significance rapidly diminished.
1. Much speculation on his behaviour at the London conference prompted Makar-
ios to make this statement: it seemed necessary to cover the Greek government
against accusations of forcing him to sign, derides (op.cit. pp.77-81) detai-
led the stages of Makarios' crisis of conscience and had no doubt that he ne-
ver intended to wreck the agreements by refusing to sign. With Karamanlis so
obdurate, he really had no alternative: but he had to posture and bluff. In
Greece itself as Clerides showed (p.82) the issue was purely an internal poli-
tical weapon to unseat Karamanlis' government and a vote of no confidence fai-
led. In Turkey the agreements were overwhelmingly accepted, but Zorlu warned
that while Turkey had no intention of imposing its will on Cyprus by force of
arms, if there were violation of the treaties or constitution, there would be
immediate military intervention. 2. When Makarios returned to Cyprus, Grivas
went back to Athens, and E.O.K.A. held a parade and deposited their arms at
pre-arranged 'dumps' presided over by Cypriot policemen. (Grivas had insisted
that British personnel should not be involved in this exercise, though for
obvious reasons, expatriate explosives experts were kept on call: a precedent
for decommissioning in N. Ireland?). Makarios formed a government strongly re-
presentative of ex-E.O.K.A. members; and the group surrounding the bishop of
Kyrenia, a hard core enosist and pro-Grivas, opposed Makarios' election to the
presidency. 3. C.0.926/703: secret. Addis had served in China and was now
back in the P.O. The various agreements reached in February required further
discussion and detailed definition which meant the postponement of indepen-
 469

(Greece, Turkey and Cyprus) on which Her Majesty's Government are

not represented; (b) the n e g o t i a t i o n s in the London Committee;
(c) r e l a t i o n s between Makarios and Grivas.
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Commission
Not being on the Commission, we have no f i r s t - h a n d knowledge
of its work. It is clear, however, that it has been hav i n g
t r o u b l e , i n p a r t i c u l a r , about the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of paragraph 5
of the 'Basic S t r u c t u r e ' , which s t a t e s t h a t ' e x e c u t i v e a u t h o r i t y
s h a l l be vested i n the President and V i c e - P r e s i d e n t ' . The Turks
and Turkish Cypriots have claimed equal powers f o r the Vice-Pre-
s i d e n t w i t h the President; the Greeks and, more e s p e c i a l l y , the
Greek Cypriots maintain t h a t the V i c e - P r e s i d e n t ' s powers are
l i m i t e d t o those e x p l i c i t l y defined i n the Basic S t r u c t u r e . There
i s no agreement y e t , but i t seems possible t h a t agreement may
soon be reached on the basis of v e s t i n g some powers i n the Coun-
c i l of M i n i s t e r s as such.
The disagreement over the C o n s t i t u t i o n has held up a c t i o n on
the separate Turkish M u n i c i p a l i t i e s , which have e x i s t e d w i t h o u t
legal sanction since the intercommunal t r o u b l e s of 1958. They are

dence from 19 February 1960 to 18 August. The constitution was f i n a l l y signed

by the joint constitutional commission and representatives of Greece, Turkey
and both Cypriot communities on 6 April. It included unalienable basic a r t i c -
l e s guaranteed by external powers with a right to intervene; communal separat-
ion in representation, courts, local government; ratios in public and security
s e r v i c e s , and weightage for the minority community and inequality within the
majority. The main points of controversy were the delimitation of the British
Sovereign Areas which was resolved in mid-February by a British unilateral
declaration of intent (which did not constitute a limitation on sovereignty)
to transfer them ultimately only to the republic of Cyprus (16 Feb. CO.926/
1194; also white paper C0.526/1184); the s i t i n g of the Greek and Turkish con-
tingents; the issue of executive powers by president (Makarios) and vice-pre-
sident (Kutchuk) j o i n t l y , or overall by the council of ministers; the question
of most-favoured nation t a r i f f s ; the separate municipalities; the provision
for funding separate communal services; the rights of minor religions (Armen-
ians, Maronites, Catholics); and the d i f f i c u l t i e s of accommodating English,
Greek and Turkish t e x t s . From the f i r s t Greek Cypriots claimed the agreements
were 'unworkable' especially the financial provisions for communal services;
(Delegation to F.O. 18 March: CO. 926/1200). The C.R.O. was concerned l e s t
H.M.'s G. should be associated with a constitution the U.K. had no hand in
framing: 'we've been under sufficient fire already from Ghana for having f o i -
sted a constitution on her before independence' (John Chadwick to John Higham
at CO. 12 Jan: CO. 926/1197). Later (25 April, ibid.) Higham minuted that as
a guarantor Britain should s a t i s f y i t s e l f that i t was not asked to underwrite
'any unreasonable and obnoxious provisions; that there were reasonable safe-
guards for minorities; that the i n t e r e s t s of the public servants were protec-
ted; that the t a r i f f provisions did not adversely affect the U.K. and that
Makarios and Kutchuk could have f u l l authority to sign the various t r e a t i e s . '
A quick glance at the constitution showed 'deplorable' drafting, ' f u l l of
ambiguities'; 'they aren't, however, our affair and we need not comment'. But
while the Turkish Cypriots wanted more precise constitutional demarcations and
job quotas in army and c i v i l service, Makarios s t i l l saw independence only as
a step towards enosis. He celebrated the s a c r i f i c e of enosis martyrs on state
occasions and alienated the western powers (and Greece) by his non-aligned
stance and his covert f l i r t a t i o n s with the Communists and the Soviet.
470
authorised by the Basic Structure in the five main towns of Cyp-
rus for a trial period of four years. Archbishop Makarios and Dr.
Kutchuk have now both agreed to the enactment by the Governor of
interim legislation to authorise action by the Turkish municipal
authorities in the five towns. The legislation was accordingly
enacted on October 12....
[The London joint committee was considering various drafts of the trea-
ties and papers on military requirements. On the first there was little
difficulty in agreeing; the proposed reduction of the military demands
on agricultural land and underground water were being considered by a
committee of officials under the Cabinet secretary Sir Norman Brook.]1
Relations between Archbishop Makarios and General Grivas
It has been clear for some months that Grivas has been inter-
fering in Cyprus and trying to undermine Archbishop Makarios'
authority. His main line has been to represent Archbishop Makar-
ios as making concessions adversely affecting the interests of
Cyprus. Grivas is, in fact, trying to exploit the Cyprus question
in the interests of his own political ambitions in Greece. Arch-
bishop Makarios has handled these intrusions with skill and dig-
nity and finally, in order to satisfy those Cypriots who deplored
the differences between their two former leaders, he agreed to
meet Grivas in Rhodes. We have few details of the meeting yet
beyond press reports, but there is now some hope that Grivas'
efforts at backseat driving will be neutralised and that Arch-
bishop Makarios will have a freer hand in negotiating the settle-
ment. So far it seems that he has been so preoccupied with the
row with Grivas and with the difficulties over the Constitution
that he has not been able to give detailed thought to the sub-
jects before the London Committee. (It seems that at the Rhodes
meeting Grivas did agree that the E.O.K.A. arms still in Greek
Cypriot hands should be collected under Archbishop Makarios'
authority; and the Governor has undertaken to help Makarios in
this.)
[Other matters included the size of the British garrison after indepen-
dence, the administration of the B.S.A.s, the amount of aid promised in
the Commons on 25 June (any bargaining 1n relation to defence require-
ments should be resisted 2 ); membership of the Commonwealth (most member
countries 1n favour) to be left to Cypriot parliament to decide; the need
to have elections prior to independence; and the end of emergency and the
proscription of the communist A.K.E.L.]
Conclusion
I t w i l l be seen t h a t t h e r e are a g r e a t many questions on which
d e c i s i o n s w i l l have t o be reached before independence can become
e f f e c t i v e . Under the London Agreement t h i s has t o happen not l a t -
er than February 19, 1960. There i s some reason t o t h i n k t h a t the
Greek C y p r i o t s b e l i e v e t h a t time i s on t h e i r s i d e and t h a t they
only have t o p r o c r a s t i n a t e in order t o persuade us t o accept a
compromise. We t h e r e f o r e have t o bear i n mind the need t o b r i n g
m a t t e r s t o a head before very long. From some p o i n t s of view
t h e r e would be advantages i n l e a v i n g matters of d e t a i l u n s e t t l e d
r a t h e r than accepting a bad compromise. On the other hand, i f we

1. These discussions are in CO.926/1224-5, 526/1184, 1195, 1525, 1526.

2. If were seen as a payment for sites and installations, Malta, Singapore and
Malaya would be in the queue.
 471

were to conclude an outline agreement leaving the details to be

negotiated later there would be no incentive left to the Cypriots
to reach satisfactory agreements once they had achieved indepen-
dence, and the risk would always remain of a new E.O.K.A. attempt
to harry us into accepting unreasonable demands. It therefore
seems essential that we should in the next three months achieve
a workable settlement on which can be based genuinely friendly
relations with the new Republic for the first few years of its
existence.'
144. (a) ARCHBISHOP MAKARIOS III TO DR. FAZIL KUTCHUK, 29 November 19632
[The 1960 balanced constitution had all the difficulties of a comp-
romise: there were many discontents 1n both communities; but it did begin

1. Glafkos Clerides, whom Makarios chose to lead the Greek Cypriot delegation
to the constitutional commission and was elected the first president of the
house of representatives, noted (G. Clerides op. cit. p.134) in relation to
the fundamental articles of the constitution, Makarios as President of the
republic knew he was bound by the limits of the constitution, but believed as
Ethnarch-Guardian of his peoples he had duties beyond and above the constitu-
tion. So he had waited for his opportunity to amend the constitution unila-
terally. 2. P.O. 371/168975 also communicated to the P.M.s of the guaran-
teeing powers (incl. Sir Alec Douglas-Home) and to Sir Arthur Clark (H.C.) who
had commented on and amended an earlier draft. (The detailed text is printed
in G, Clerides op. cit. pp.176-193). Makarios. ethnarch since 1950 and presi-
dent of Cyprus since 1960, was proposing a radical amendment of the 1960 cons-
titution to which he had long been obsessively committed - to remove the ex-
cessive safe-guards and rights of the Turkish Cypriots as a paramount 'cause
of friction between the two communities': a precipitate and tactless move
which proved in the long run counter-productive and ended in invasion and par-
tition: an arrogant miscalculation as some colleagues had warned. For others
(incl, G. Clerides) saw no need and no urgency: the constitution had as yet
not been proved unworkable (indeed, in some ways Makarios had showed little
respect for it: Clerides op. cit. p.134): minor impractical difficulties could
be worked out by negotiation: what Cyprus needed was a period in which mutual
trust could be permitted to grow and build bridges of confidence between the
communities (op. cit. p.130); but Makarios, sensitive to guilt at betraying
enosis and to criticisms by a small vociferous minority, had been steering a
collision course for several months (op. cit. p.211). Paramilitaries on both
sides, dissatisfied with the restrictions in the 1960 agreements, were drawing
up hard line plans - the Abritas (op. cit. pp.212-9) and the Kutchuk-Denktash
(14 Sept: op. cit. pp.203-7). Makarios was now chancing his luck by attempting
unilaterally to undermine the agreements so painstakingly reached three years
before: the 13 points were 'only the first steps' towards abolishing excessive
Turkish rights (op. cit, p.210) not an 'opening bid' to start discussion. He
should have been stopped in his tracks at once: tripartite treaties could not
be waived aside unilaterally. But Clark's personal and friendly reaction and
polite benevolent toleration was read by Makarios as encouragement and support
from H.M.'s G.: Clark reported Makarios' case as 'reasonable', 'well argued'
and 'convincing' making 'a good impression'. Moreover, though he virtually
knew the details on 12 November he did not comment on them by despatch or te-
legram to London for 19 days after Makarios had sent off these copies. Even
then in C.R.O. and F.O. there was initial complacency, waiting fuller explana-
tion from Clark. While the Turkish Cypriots were insisting that counter propo-
sals and a considered reply were being prepared, the Turkish government flatly
 472
to work and not badly. However the joint consultative committee set up
to implement to 70:30 ratio of Greeks to Turks in the public service
found the guidelines difficult to interpret clearly and on the 5 of the
27 cases taken to the supreme constitutional court, it gave no ruling.
Similarly when Kutchuk rejected Makarios' demand for a completely integ-
rated army (60:40 ratio as in the agreement), the latter refused to take
any further steps for implementation and when communal fighting broke out
in 1963, the remaining members of both the army and security forces were
absorbed de facto into separate ethnic forces. Furthermore the Turkish
members tried to bring pressure by using their vote on laws dealing with
general taxes and municipalities, even proposing approval of income tax
only on a 3 year basis which the Greeks refused and the stalemate depri-
ved the central government of income which was absorbed by the commercial
chambers. The administrations of justice must be unified. Even in the su-
preme constitutional court decisions were made, as over the extension of
the power of the separate municipalities, by the judges divided on commu-
nal lines; the administration of justice must be unified.]
1. The right of veto of the President and the Vice-President of
the Republic to be abolished.
2. The Vice-President of the Republic to deputise for or replace
the President of the Republic in case of his temporary absence
or incapacity to perform his duties. In consequence, therefore,
all the constitutional provisions in respect of joint action by
the President and the Vice-President of the Republic to be modi-
fied accordingly.

rejected the 13 points. Kyprianou and Vassiliou even contemplated the

possibility of reducing the tripartite agreements to a bilateral Anglo-
Cypriot one to diminish outside interference (to Allen, 23 Dec: F.O.
168979). British troops were containing the civil bloodshed (Douglas-Home
to Sandys, 30 Dec. ibid.) for on 26 Dec. communal fighting had broken out
and this continued through the early months of 1964. The Turkish Cypriots
were now being driven from their position and share in government. Grivas
had launched a major attack causing the deaths of several hundreds and
driving 20,000 refugees into enclaves in North Nicosia and Kyrenia. But
Greece refused to support Makarios - Cyprus was beyond the range of its
fighters. So the 1960 constitution had now become a dead letter. The Tur-
kish Cypriots were withdrawn to their own enclaves and the Republic of
Cyprus was effectively only Greek. On 26 Dec. the Cyprus government ap-
pealed to the U.N. security council: a temporary cease fire was negotia-
ted; the 'green line' authorised - the basis of the later U.N.P.A. neut-
ral zone drafted by General Young on the diningroom table in the old
H.C.'s Residence in Shakespeare Avenue now in the North (after 1974 only
Stephen Oliver (H.C. 1973-5) has resided there) (30 D e c ) . In late Jan.
1964 a proposed N.A.T.O. peace-keeping force was rejected by Makarios,
but in March a U.N. one was agreed. At any moment the situation was grave
enough to provoke intervention by Greece or Turkey. The scattered Turkish
Cypriot minority, indeed, had more reasons internally for fear (Clerides
op. cit. p.196) but externally Turkey was closer as the Greek Cypriots
were deeply aware and Turkish bombings reminded them. Of course the 1960
package could not be legally amended without consent of all 4 signator-
ies: §182 enumerated some 48 provisions classified as 'basic articles
which might not be altered at all - including the executive final veto,
the separate majority vote in the house of representatives, the 70:30 ra-
tio in the same house and public service and the 60:40 ratio in the army.
 473
3. The Greek President of the House of Representatives and its
Turkish Vice-President to be elected by the House as a whole and
not as at present the President by the Greek Members of the House
and the Vice-President by the Turkish Members of the House.
4. The Vice-President of the House of Representatives to
deputise for or replace the President of the House in case of his
temporary absence or incapacity to perform his duties.
5. The constitutional provisions regarding separate majority for
enactment of Laws by the House of Representatives to be abol-
ished.
6. The constitutional provision regarding the establishment of
separate Municipalities in the five main towns to be abolished.
Provision should be made so that:
(a) The Municipal Council in each of the aforesaid five towns
shall consist of Greek and Turkish Councillors in proportion to
the number of the Greek and Turkish inhabitants of such town by
whom they shall be elected respectively.
(b) In the Budget of each of such aforesaid towns, after deduct-
ing any expenditure required for common services, a percentage
of the balance proportionate to the number of the Turkish inhabi-
tants of such town shall be earmarked and disposed of in accor-
dance with the wishes of the Turkish Councillors.
7. The constitutional provision regarding Courts consisting of
Greek Judges to try Greeks and of Turkish Judges to try Turks and
of mixed Courts consisting of Greek and Turkish Judges to try
cases where the litigants are Greeks and Turks to be abolished.
8. The division of the Security Forces into Police and Gendarme-
rie to be abolished. (Provision to be made in case the Head of
the Police is a Greek the Deputy Head to be a Turk and V7'ce
versa).
9. The numerical strength of the Security Forces and of the Army
to be determined by Law and not by agreement between the Presi-
dent and the Vice-President of the Republic.
10. The proportion of the participation of Greek and Turkish Cyp-
riots in the composition of the Public Service and of the Forces
of the Republic, i.e. the Police and the Army, to be modified in
proportion to the ratio of the population of Greek and Turkish
Cypriots.1
11. The number of the members of the Public Service Commission
to be reduced from ten to either five or seven.
12. All the decisions of the Public Service Commission to be
taken by simple majority. If there is an allegation of discrimi-
nation on the unanimous request either of the Greek or of the
Turkish members of the Commission, its Chairman to be bound to
refer the matter to the Supreme Constitutional Court.
13. The Greek Communal Chamber to be abolished.2

1. Such ratios were found restrictive on both sides. Greek Cypriots felt that
Turks with lesser qualifications were depriving them of jobs in the civil ser-
vice, while some Turkish Cypriots would welcome this modification of the ratio
as 'liberating' the young for enterprises more important to the community than
being office clerks. 2. These demands constituted a radical challenge to the
1960 settlement - one of careful, deliberated compromise - a political, regio-
nal and ethnic balance in power-sharing. But at first they were not taken as
seriously as they should have been. As we have noted Clark did not use the
474
(b) SIR FRANK SOSKICE: OPINION, 1 December 19631
The basic question on which, as I understand it, my opinion is
asked is as follows: Serious difficulties have arisen with refer-
ence to the implementation of Articles 123 and 173 of the Consti-
tution, and also of Article 78 in relation to the imposition of
taxes. Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee provides that each
guaranteeing power in the event of breach of the Treaty, if com-
mon or concerted action proves impossible 'reserves the right to
take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of
affairs created by the Treaty'. In these circumstances has Turkey
the right under Article IV of the Treaty as one of the guarantee-
ing powers, if Articles 123 and 173 of the Constitution are not
in due course implemented, and should concerted action not prove
possible, herself to embark upon unilateral military intervention
without authority from the Security Council?
International treaties unavoidably in general embody provisions
expressed in terms less precise and less exactly formulated than
domestic legislation. They are the result in the majority of
cases of hard bargaining between representatives of conflicting
national interests, and it is in the nature of things in general
impossible to achieve complete precision when the intentions of
the parties are written into the letter of the treaties. It has
therefore been accepted that somewhat greater latitude is permis-
sible in the interpretation of international treaties than of
domestic legislation, and the general circumstances in which the
treaty was entered into may be taken into consideration, as well
as the written word of the parties. In particular there has been
much difference of opinion about the legal effect of the many
treaties of Guarantee which have been entered into over the last
century and a half.
Furthermore, international law as a whole is subject to a pro-
cess of constant evolution, as new international situations pre-
sent themselves. It is,therefore, unwise to attempt to formulate
principles in general terms applicable to hypothetical future
situations. The view I express in this opinion should therefore
be regarded as applicable only to the actual situation envisaged
in the previous paragraph and the precise question asked in that
paragraph with reference to Turkey's right to embark unilaterally
upon a course of military intervention, and not to other hypothe-
tical situations that might arise in the future.
The Treaty of Guarantee itself contains as its last paragraph
an undertaking by the High Contracting Parties as soon as pos-
sible to register it with the Secretariat of the United Nations
Charter. This, in my opinion, as well as the general background

time between 12 Nov. when he knew their scope and the 29th, when this official
communication was sent to H.M.'s G., to warn the C.R.O. and F.O: and in the
F.O., the junior members in the department were too casual, waiting for fuller
explanation and cautiously arguing against the U.K. taking a lead among the
guarantors. To blame them as lacking in vigilance may be hindsight; but the
consequences were drastic -Turkish intervention and partition of the island.
!• Soskice had been solicitor general in the Attlee administration and would
be home secretary under Wilson. Clerides had instructed him to give an opinion
on various questions (5 Oct. 1963) primarily relating to the threat of Turkish
military intervention.
 475
against which the Treaty was entered into is an indication that
the parties intended the Treaty to be construed as containing
only such obligations and conferring only such rights as would
not conflict with the obligations and restrictions imposed by the
United Nations Charter. Article 103 of the Charter must I think
be considered together with the Treaty, and Article 103 provides
as follows: 'In the event of a conflict between the obligations
of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter
and their obligations under any other international agreement,
their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail'.
In this context a number of Articles of the Charter of the Uni-
ted Nations would be relevant notably those contained in Chapter
VIII under the heading 'Regional Arrangements', that is to say,
Articles 52 to 54, and also Article 51 which deals with the in-
herent right of self-defence, as well, of course, as the general
Articles in Chapter I setting out the purposes and principles of
the United Nations, and those contained in Chapters VI and VII
dealing with the pacific settlement of disputes and the general
enforcement powers of the Security Council. It is a feature of
these Articles that they prohibit the use of force by Member Nat-
ions except in the most limited range of circumstances such as
actual self-defence, unless with the authority of the Security
Counci1.
In my opinion, in these circumstances, the words in Article IV
of the Treaty of Guarantee 'each of the three guaranteeing powers
reserves the right to take action' should not be construed in any
sense which would involve a conflict with the restriction imposed
by the Articles of the Charter to which I have made reference.
I will assume the absence of any 'threat to' or 'breach of the
peace' within Article 39 of the Charter such as might bring into
operation Articles 43 and 44. These Articles are in any event
irrelevant to the present question; since even if a Member Nation
used force in pursuance of these Articles, such use of force
would not be pursuant to any Treaty, but in fulfilment of the
duty to assist the Security Council imposed by these Articles of
the Charter itself.
Furthermore, I will assume that no situation has or could, in
relation to the basic question put to me, arise such as might
bring into operation what are in effect the emergency provisions
as to self-defence contained in Article 51 of the Charter of the
United Nations.
The words 'reserves the right to take action' do not, as I
understand them purport to create a new right to take some action
which would otherwise, apart from those words, not be permiss-
ible. In my opinion, they are more appropriate to keep in being
some right to take action which would have existed independently
of the Treaty under international law, in case, in the absence
of such a saving provision, the right which a guaranteeing Power
would under international law in any event have possessed might
be extinguished by the Treaty. A situation is envisaged in Arti-
cle IV of the Treaty in which a breach of the Treaty has taken
place and concerted action by the guaranteeing Powers has proved
impossible. The effect of the words, in my opinion, is to preser-
ve in such a situation such powers as each guaranteeing Power
might individually have exercised under the general principles
of international law even if there had been no Treaty of Guaran-
476
tee. The question, if this view is correct, then arises whether
in the actual circumstances envisaged in what I have above desc-
ribed as the basic question asked by Mr. Clerides any right to
embark upon unilateral military intervention would have ensured
to Turkey apart from the Treaty. There has for example been a
right generally recognised in international law in one nation to
use force to rescue or protect its own nationals in the territory
of another State if that State treats them contrary to basic
international legal principles, for example, by using unlawful
violence against them. Article IV of the Treaty however only pre-
serves the right to take action 'with the sole aim of re-establi-
shing the state of affairs created by the Treaty'.
It is open to question how wide is the scope of the words in
Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee 're-establishing the state
of affairs created by the present Treaty'. Clearly the 'state of
affairs' includes the independence, territorial integrity and
security of the Republic of Cyprus. It may be asked, however,
whether it includes the fulfilment of such Articles of the Cons-
titution as Articles 123 and 173, both of which are under Article
108 declared (in the case of Article 173 subject to some limita-
tions) to be Basic Articles. Article II of the Treaty includes
within those things that the Treaty guarantees 'the state of af-
fairs established by the Basic Articles of the Constitution'. It
seems to me necessary to read the words 'the state of affairs
created by the present Treaty' in Article IV of the Treaty as
including, besides the independence, territorial integrity and
security of the Republic of Cyprus, also 'the state of affairs
established by the Basic Articles of the Treaty' referred to in
Article II. On the other hand I do not think the words in Article
IV 're-establishing the state of affairs' read with the words in
Article II 'established by the Basic Articles' are equivalent to
words such as 'secure exact compliance with the requirements of
the Basic Articles'. They are in my view quite inappropriate for
that purpose. The expression 'the state of affairs' is I think
a general phrase, descriptive of a broad situation and in my view
in its application to Articles 123 and 173 of the Constitution
could only permit of action under Article IV of the Treaty if the
substance of the protection for the Turkish minority created by
Article 123 and 173 were (unless by general agreement) overset
or removed. What constitutes the 'substance' of this protection
must involve a question of degree and cannot I think be further
defined. In order to answer what I have called the basic question
put to me the words in Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee
'with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs crea-
ted by the present treaty' in effect have to be read as if they
were 'with the sole aim of re-establishing the substance of the
position created by Articles 123 and 173 of the Constitution'.
Apart from the right to use force which I have just mentioned
I do not know of any other right relevant in this context of
forceful intervention independently of treaty. It is not easy to
conceive of a practical situation in which the right of a guaran-
teeing power to use force to rescue its own nationals from unlaw-
ful treatment could be in a real sense relevant to the 'sole aim'
of preserving the state of things set up by the two relevant
Basic Articles of the Constitution; and in my opinion this right
to use force in the very limited circumstances I have described
 477
can be disregarded.
But in my view, in any case, even if the words in question
could be construed as creating a right unilaterally to use force,
(and as stated I think they are not appropriate for this purpose)
if the Treaty of Guarantee is a 'regional arrangement' falling
within the scope of Article 52 of the Charter of the United
Nations, it is in my view impossible to disregard Article 53 of
the Charter which requires that any forceful intervention can
only take place with the authority of the Security Council.
The question thus arises whether the Treaty of Guarantee whe-
ther considered separately or as forming part of a wider arran-
gement brought into being by the Treaty of Guarantee read toge-
ther with the Treaty of Establishment and the Treaty of Alliance
should be regarded as such a 'regional arrangement'. The answer
to this question, in my opinion, depends on the nature and con-
tent of these Treaties and in particular the Treaty of Guarantee,
the history of events which preceded their making, and the cir-
cumstances in which they are made. So considered, in my opinion,
there is no reason why the Treaty of Guarantee should not be re-
garded as constituting or, forming part of a 'regional arrange-
ment'. It followed after and was clearly designed to put an end
to the unhappy events which had taken place in Cyprus and to re-
concile and put an end to sharp conflicts of opinion both inside
and outside Cyprus, which if unresolved could have led to situa-
tions of increasing danger. In order that it may fall within the
description of a 'regional arrangement' within paragraph 1 of
Article 52 of the Charter, it must be an arrangement 'for dealing
with such matters relating to the maintenance of international
peace and security as are appropriate for regional action provi-
ded that such arrangements and their activities are consistent
with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations'. It seems
to me that the Treaty does comply with these requirements. It re-
cognizes and is designed to perpetuate a state of affairs relat-
ing to Cyprus which had emerged as the agreed solution of diffe-
rences negotiated after prolonged periods of acute tension and
disturbance; and its obvious objective is to re-introduce and
maintain stability and peaceful relationships in Cyprus itself
and generally in that part of the Mediterranean area. It enjoins
consultation in the event of a breach of the Treaty and records
the desire of the High Contracting Parties to co-operate. Those
features seem to me to bear in every sense the hall-mark of such
a regional arrangement as is contemplated in Article 52 of the
Charter.
For the reasons have given, in my opinion, the words in quest-
ion in Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee, even if they could
be said in any relevant circumstances to permit of unilateral
military intervention, would not, in the circumstances which have
arisen, allow of such action by Turkey unless authorised by the
Security Counci1.
It is to be observed that the rights to take action conferred
by Article IV are in another sense limited. Such as they are they
only arise if there has been a breach of the Treaty. If Turkey
should claim the right to resort to such unilateral action as the
Security Council may authorise she must in my opinion be able to
demonstrate that she has made genuine and reasonable endeavours
to deal with the situation by concerted action with the other
478
High Contracting Parties. She could not in my view lawfully main-
tain that a situation had arisen in which the Security Council
might authorise unilateral action unless she had genuinely sought
to bring the other guaranteeing Powers into consultation with a
view to concerted action, and not even then if she had put for-
ward only arbitrary or unreasonable proposals from which she
refused to depart despite representations made in the course of
such consultations by the other Powers.
Mr.Clerides in his letter dated September 14th 1963 asks whe-
ther, in my opinion, the terms of the Treaty of Alliance can be
said in any sense to modify the Treaty of Guarantee or to assist
in the interpretation of the words 'take action' in Article IV
of the Treaty of Guarantee. I do not think they do and they do
not in my opinion, require a meaning to be attributed to those
words different from that which earlier in this opinion I have
said I think is the right meaning. The Treaty of Alliance itself
has to be registered under Article 102 of the Charter of the
United Nations, and must and can, I think, be read as requiring
and authorising only such action as is permissible in accordance
with the Articles of the Charter of the United Nations to which
I have earlier made reference, in particular Articles 51 and 53.
Mr. Clerides in his letter of September 14th 1963 asks whether
upon the principle ' conventio omnis intel1igitur rebus sic stan-
tibus' it could be successfully argued that circumstances have
arisen which would justify Turkey in withdrawing from the Treaty
of Guarantee unilaterally without the consent of the other Powers
and would discharge her from any duty of further compliance with
the Treaty. As is well-known there is the most acute difference
of opinion amongst international jurists, in the first place,
whether such a doctrine exists at all as part of international
law, and secondly, if it does exist as to what is its scope.
Those writers who propound the doctrine, however, do not, as I
understand, envisage that it would justify unilateral repudiation
of a treaty obligation by one party to it except upon the happen-
ing of some change in the circumstances which was basic to the
situation in the light of which the treaty obligations were nego-
tiated and undertaken. In the case of the Treaty of Guarantee it
could not be argued that any such change has in present circum-
stances supervened, relevant to any provision of the Treaty,
other than that relating to the maintenance of 'the state of
affairs established' by the Basic Articles of the Constitution
in Article IV. There could be no question, therefore, of the re-
pudiation of any provision of the Treaty other than this provi-
sion. In my opinion, however, the serious difficulties that have
arisen in the implementation of Articles 123 and 173 of the Cons-
titution could not be regarded as constituting such a vital
change of circumstances as would justify repudiation of the pro-
vision. The differences between the Greek and Turkish authorities
in Cyprus though no doubt intractable and difficult of solution
do not in my opinion represent a new element which can be fairly
said to invalidate the basic assumptions upon which this provis-
ion of the Treaty was negotiated. On the contrary in my opinion
they are difficulties inherent in the nature of the Constitution
and the Treaty obligations themselves. I do not myself think
that, at any rate so far, anything has taken place which would
justify repudiation in terms of the doctrine 'rebus sic stanti-
 479
bus1 as that doctrine is propounded by those who assert that it
is an established principle in the field of treaty interpreta-
tion. It is not easy to answer the further question asked by Mr.
Clerides in his letter, what, within the sphere of practical pos-
sibility, might constitute such a new supervening circumstance
as might justify unilateral repudiation. Conceivably, as an ex-
ample, the appearance and growth through immigration or otherwise
of some other minority group which could not be assimilated
either into the Greek or Turkish community and made wholly unre-
alistic the existing balance of numbers of the population, might
constitute such a supervening change; but this is no more than
purely hypothetical and in the highest degree unlikely as a
practical example.
In view of the considerations above indicated I will set out
by way of summary the questions which I understand to be asked
and the answers which I think should be given, as follows:-
1. Does the Treaty of Guarantee give the right to intervene in
the event of amendment of Articles 123 and 173 of the Constitu-
tion? Yes, if the amendments are made without general agreement;
but only if the amendments in substance disturb the protection
afforded to the Turkish minority. Failure literally to comply
with these Articles would not give such a right.
2. Does the Treaty of Guarantee, considered alone, or read with
the other Treaties, constitute or form part of such a regional
arrangement as is envisaged in Article 52 of the Charter of the
United Nations? Yes.
3. Do the words 'take action' contained in Article IV of the
Treaty of Guarantee in the circumstances which have arisen en-
title Turkey to embark upon unilateral military intervention
without the authorization of the Security Council? No, and the
Security Council could not authorise such intervention unless
Turkey could demonstrate that she had made genuine endeavours to
secure concerted action with the other Guaranteeing Parties to
the Treaty.
4. Do the difficulties which have arisen in connection with
implementation of the provisions in the Constitution which give
protection to the Turkish minority and notably Articles 123 and
173, entitle Turkey under the 'rebus sic stantibus' principle to
withdraw from the Treaty unilaterally and repudiate the obliga-
tions it imposes? No.

(c) SIR ARTHUR CLARK (H.C.) TO DUNCAN SANDYS, 6 December 19631

In Turkish eyes Archbishop Makarios' proposals were bound at
first sight to appear simply an endeavour to reduce if not to

1. F.O.371/168975 C1015/238, secret - copies went to the F.O. and to embassies

in Athens, Ankara and Washington. Sandys was secretary of state for Common-
wealth relations since July 1960, and the C.R.O. and the C O . had been united
in July 1962. The U.K. ambassador in Turkey, Sir Denis Allen, had sought imme-
diately to calm the Turkish foreign minister (Erkin) by representing Makarios'
proposals only as 'an opening bid' requiring 'constructive counter-proposals'.
Erkin recognised the U.K. as a partner in the matter and as having no intent-
ion or commitment to mediate, but wanted H.M.'s G. reaction: though he had no
illusions about the Greek Cypriots or confidence in their good faith, he was
indeed 'shocked' by Makarios' 'effrontery' in attempting to abolish all Turk-
480

remove many of the safeguards which they secured at Z u r i c h . But

these safeguards went f a r beyond anything comparable i n other
c o n s t i t u t i o n s which we have framed elsewhere i n the expanding
Commonwealth and we were not at Zurich nor were the C y p r i o t s ,
Greek or Turk. 1 Three and a h a l f years of independence have
since demonstrated t h a t Zurich Conference in f a c t r e s u l t e d i n a
h a s t i l y c o n t r i v e d c o n s t i t u t i o n which has proved unworkable,
uneconomic and capable of abuse.
Admittedly Archbishop's proposals aim not only a t removing the
f r i c t i o n s and d i f f i c u l t i e s which have emerged i n l a s t three years
but also at making Cyprus a more u n i f i e d s t a t e enjoying a more
workable system of government and many economies. Indeed
proposals studied together w i t h the powerful c a r e f u l l y reasoned
arguments accompanying them would s t r i k e most i m p a r t i a l informed
observers as a l o g i c a l and f a i r l y balanced settlement of today's
problems. Nor I am convinced t h a t Archbishop's proposals
represent a s u b t l e step towards c r e a t i n g a s i t u a t i o n i n which
Enosis could eventually be achieved as Turks may a l l e g e . Were
Enosis still his aim (and I am sure that it is not) Archbishop's
t a c t i c s would surely be e i t h e r : (1) t o continue demonstrating how
unworkable and uneconomic present c o n s t i t u t i o n i s u n t i l adminis-
t r a t i o n breaks down completely and communal chambers i f not the
s t a t e reach verge of bankruptcy, or (2) t o denounce c o n s t i t u t i o n
completely and attempt to abrogate t r e a t i e s of guarantee and
al1iance?.. .
[Makarios and the majority of his Greek ministers had opted for
independence and membership of the Commonwealth and the Council of
Europe, and he wanted to make all this a reality before elections in 18
months. But his past history of slipperiness and total disregard of
Turkish psychology made Turks misrepresent his motive and fear his
subtlety: he and Dr. Kutchuk were 'thoroughly allergic' to each other:
Kutchuk with limited intelligence, stubborn and narrow in outlook,
suffering an inferiority complex: Makarios arrogant and over confident.
But 'what was best for Cyprus as a whole' and for the U.K. with its
costly and important Investment 1n the B.S.A.?]
P o l i t i c a l l y the republic cannot go on as i t i s rent by constant
tensions and c r i s e s burdened by c o s t l y d u p l i c a t i o n s of p u b l i c
services and i n s t i t u t i o n s and i n c r e a s i n g l y s e p a r a t i s t . That way
l i e s d i s a s t e r because some s t u p i d move by one side or the other
could with these emotional people spark o f f r i o t and commotion
i f not c i v i 1 w a r . . . .
I f we cannot now promote and achieve a more l a s t i n g and sens-

ish Cypriot safeguards and to reduce them to a minority a t the mercy of the
majority. He was prepared to avoid p u b l i c l y recognising the dangers of the
s i t u a t i o n , but he f e l t t h a t if these demands represented Makarios' t r u e aims
t h e r e was 'nothing for i t but p a r t i t i o n ' (Allen to R.A. Butler, 3 Dec. 1963:
F.0.371'168975). On 26 Nov. a c o n f i d e n t i a l note from the U.N. to the C.R.O.
(Scott to Burns ibid.) had warned that the Cypriot permanent U.N. representa-
t i v e had s t a t e d in a d r a f t d e c l a r a t i o n on r a c i a l discrimination t h a t any a t -
tempts in c o n s t i t u t i o n s to p r o t e c t m i n o r i t i e s should ' i n no circumstances have
as a consequence the maintenance of unequal or separate r i g h t s for d i f f e r e n t
r a c i a l groups' as they injured the nation and created u n r e s t . 1. A marginal
F.O. note commented acutely 'So w h a t ? ' . These absences did not void, annul or
render i l l e g a l agreements and t r e a t i e s made in 1959-60.
 481
i b l e settlement than Zurich (so h a s t i l y done) between Greeks and
Turks here our i n t e r e s t s and those of Greece and Turkey w i l l s u f -
f e r and a l l (repeat a l l ) three guaranteeing powers w i l l be the
l o s e r s . The consequences are l i k e l y t o b e : - (1) a complete and
f i n a l breakdown between Greeks and Turks l o c a l l y a t top p o l i t i c a l
l e v e l , (2) r i o t s and commotion, i f not c i v i l war, (3) renewed
c r i s i s i n r e l a t i o n s between Greece and Turkey at a time when both
countries face domestic p o l i t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s , (4) our i n v o l v e -
ment t o restore s i t u a t i o n (see a r t i c l e 4 of t r e a t y of guarantee)
j u s t as we have reduced our m i l i t a r y forces here t o a level only
barely s u f f i c i e n t t o cope w i t h s e c u r i t y of the S.B.A.'s and pro-
t e c t i o n of B r i t i s h c i t i z e n s ' l i v e s i n r e p u b l i c : t h i s w i l l mean
considerable reinforcement at heavy c o s t , (5) United Nations w i l l
be i n v i t e d t o i n t e r f e r e i n some way or other.
Whatever the f i n a l outcome a f u r t h e r legacy of great b i t t e r n e s s
would remain. The Communists would b e n e f i t perhaps even t o the
point of winning the next e l e c t i o n . Our comfortable tenure of the
B.S.A.'s would be jeopardised.
Unfortunately Dr. Kutchuk looks at things very d i f f e r e n t l y . His
real fear i s a u n i f i e d Greek republic i n which Turks would be do-
minated by Greek m a j o r i t y . He now i n t e r p r e t s c o n s t i t u t i o n as mak-
ing Turkish community a separate e n t i t y enjoying separate i n s t i -
t u t i o n s a l l along the l i n e . Helped by our pounds, one and a h a l f
m i l l i o n independence grant, and by aid from Turkish Government
Turkish community has so f a r been able t o meet cost of separate
development and Dr. Kutchuk would l i k e t o enhance present dicho-
tomy. In f a c t I doubt whether he seeks any longer a settlement.
I suspect he would almost welcome some rash a c t i o n by Makarios
which would give him the excuse t o embark on physical p a r t i t i o n
of the Island w i t h Turkish Government f i r m l y committed t o t h i s
and behind him. He would not (repeat not) care much what blood
flowed i n process and he i s o b l i v i o u s t o the wider consequences.
So he may advocate r e j e c t i o n of Makarios' proposals and a p o l i c y
of w a i t i n g t o see what he does next.
I hope t h a t wiser counsels w i l l p r e v a i l i n Ankara. 1
(d) C.R.O. MEMORANDUM ON GREEK DEMAND FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION,
17 December 19632
[Makarios' 13 points presented to Dr. Kutchuk (30 Nov.) with copies to
the Guaranteeing Powers ' f o r information' Involved amendment of some of
the Basic A r t i c l e s of the Constitution: Kutchuk had been 'taken aback'

1. But, while i n i t i a l l y Kutchuk was ready to consider Makarios' proposals

(though soon h i s reply accused Makarios of i n t e n t i o n a l l y never implementing
the constitution particularly those provisions favouring the Turk i s h
community), the Turkish government dismissed them a t once as u t t e r l y
unacceptable, on the grounds indicated to Sir Denis Allen on 29 Oct. t h a t
Turkey could not accept ' t h a t the amendment of the Basic A r t i c l e s of the
c o n s t i t u t i o n ' could be 'made a matter of n e g o t i a t i o n ' , but would always be
ready to enter into conversations designed to solve e x i s t i n g d i f f i c u l t i e s in
Cyprus: (Conf. Rept. to P.M. F.O.371/168975). The C.R.O. legal department was
already considering the extent to which Makarios' proposals involved amendment
of the Basic A r t i c l e s : ' a t f i r s t g l a n c e . . . t h e y will n e c e s s i t a t e considerable
amendments of t h i s k i n d ' .
2. F.O.371/168976: s e c r e t .
 482
by their scope but undertook to consider producing counter-proposals. The
Turkish Government had indicated earlier that the Basic Articles were not
'negotiable' but 'were prepared to contemplate conversations designed to
resolve the existing difficulties in Cyprus'. On 6 December they publicly
rejected discussions based on proposals which would 'abolish all safe-
guards for the Turkish community'.1 It was hoped that the Foreign Secre-
tary, R.A. Butler, might persuade Turkish, Greek and Cypriot foreign
ministers 'not to close the door on the continuation of the dialogue bet-
ween both sides in Cyprus'. Makarios had been prepared to wait for Kut-
chuk 's counter-proposals but if these went no way in meeting Makarios'
demands or if he rejected Turkey's report, an explosive situation could
result, leading probably to 'a breakdown of law and order' and demands
for U.K. intervention either as a Guaranteeing Power or as a member of
the Commonwealth.]
The legal opinion on our rights or obligations to intervene is
at Annex A. 2 Briefly, under Article IV of the Treaty of Guaran-
tee we are under an obiigation to consult with Greece and Turkey
with respect to the representations or measures necessary to
maintain the state of affairs established by the Cyprus Constitu-
tion. We have a right, as one of the three Guaranteeing Powers
and in so far as common or concerted action among the Guarantee-
ing Powers proves impossible, to take action independently 'with
the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by'
the Treaty of Guarantee. . . . [Chiefs of Staff should be asked to plan for

1. The British ambassador to Turkey reported that the Turkish government had
not expected proposals as bad as these: that government was weak; Makarios had
chosen the worst moment to make these demands: instead of leaving the door
open to discuss ways and means of making the constitution work better, Turkey
had then rejected the proposals 'lock, stock and barrel': (to Butler, 11 Dec.
1963: ibid.). But the British ambassador in Greece, Sir Ralph Murray, reported
that Venizelos was convinced that H.M. 's G. backed Makarios and that Clark had
approved the 13 proposals; for it seemed that either by confidential means or
direct contact Clark had been in such close relations with the Greek Cypriots
during the drafting of the proposals that the latter could quite genuinely
suppose that they had consulted the British government and obtained its appro-
val. It was an old trick to get someone to view the proposals and then say he
had raised no objection: Murray assumed this was what Kiprianou had done. It
seemed clear that Clark had seen the proposals but it was not stated he had
discussed them. Murray found it 'incredible' that he should have done so.
Whereas he was alarmed and dismayed at the scope of Makarios' demands, Clark
had found them 'reasonable' though with the phrase 'from what I know of them'
which reinforced Murray's conviction that Clark had not seen them in toto, nor
discussed, less approved them. Murray could not see them as 'reasonable' when
viewed in the context of the tactical problem of getting the Turks to negoti-
ate on them: (to D. Dodson, 23 Dec: ibid.). Dodson had noted (Min., 29 Nov:
ibid.) the unlikelihood of any acceptance by Turkey of such radical demands.
2. Annex A. stated that Art. I of the Treaty of Guarantee would be breached
by the outbreak of serious inter-communal violence. Only if the Cyprus
Government asked for armed assistance from the U.K., would it consult with
Greece and Turkey and its case indeed 'to act alone' would be strong at the
U.N. under art. 51 of the U.N. charter: otherwise any unilateral action would
certainly attract the Soviet veto and fail to get majority support in the U.N.
assembly. Fighting did break out on 21 Dec. and the Cypriot government invited
the Guarantor Powers to intervene under British command to restore order.
 483

the emergency evacuation of British and friendly nationals and the pro-
tection of the B.S.A.s. The Cyprus government would be unable to maintain
law and order: Greeks and Turks would not co-operate. If the U.K. inter-
vened, British forces would be opposed by Greek and Turkish forces - our
N.A.T.O. allies. It was rumoured that Turkish 'volunteers' would rein-
force Turkish Cypriots and demand partition. If serious Internal distur-
bances occurred and Greece and Turkey lent their nationals in Cyprus
overt or covert support, H.M.'s G. might be confronted by]
(a) a demand by both Greek and Turkish Governments for assistance
in re-establishing the status quo;
(b) a demand from the Government of Cyprus for military assist-
ance in our capacity as a Guaranteeing Power;
(c) a demand by the Greek or Turkish Government for military
intervention in our capacity as a Guaranteeing Power to re-
establish the status quo;
(d) a demand from the Government of Cyprus for military assist-
ance as a fellow-member of the Commonwealth.
In any of the situations at ( b ) , (c) or (d) we should find our-
selves in an extremely embarrassing political situation, since
it is difficult to see how we could contemplate acceding to any
request which placed us in the position of fighting one or the
other of our N . A . T . O . allies. ... [The Chiefs of Staff contingency plan-
ning should therefore be limited to protecting British nationals and the
B . S . A . ' s and securing suitable bridgeheads for landing any peace-keeping
forces which it might be decided to sent to Cyprus. The P.O. agreed.1]

( e ) MERVYN BROWN: MINUTE, 18 December 1963Z

This and other recent telegrams from Nicosia show that the High
Commissioner has misunderstood the aims of H . M . G . ' s policy as
worked out between the Foreign Office and the C . R . O . and approved
by Ministers. The main aim of this policy was to prevent Arch-

J.. F.O. minutes (17 Dec: ibid,) were agreed that Britain should stand by the
Zurich-London agreements or 'the whole Cyprus settlement" would be thrown
open. Makarios' thesis that constitutional revision was 'a purely internal
matter' could not be accepted: 'it is in the interest of H . H . ' s G. at present
to keep out of the ring and to exercise its influence, together with the U.S.
government, from the background. If the Treaty of Guarantee were invoked we
would have to descend into the ring, but...a meeting of the Guarantor Powers
would be likely to result in deadlock or worse'. Clark however felt that re-
cent events had proved Makarios' contention that Cyprus' independence in 1960
was 'incomplete if not a mockery': how long could things go on with a foreign
government (presumably Turkey) without ever consulting the two other guarante-
eing powers? 2. F.O.371/168975: C.1015/238. At last the crucial nature of
Makarios' challenge was being recognised: the departmental officials, bullied
by Clark's benign complacency, were now at last alerted - more than a month
after Makarios told Clark of his general intention to seek amendment of the
Agreements. Brown had served in Buenos Aires, the U . N . and Singapore, and was
now back at the F.O. as assistant head of the central Western and Middle East
department. Previously the reaction among junior officials in the department
had been cautious, even supine: "careful neutrality" must be preserved (Wood,
Min. 6 Dec: ibid.) but they had been somewhat lulled by what Clark claimed as
informal internal discussions in Cyprus "successful beyond expectation' and
his advice to avoid any statement of H . M . ' s G. attitude (Wood, Min. 16 Aug,
19 Sept: 168970,2).
484
b i s h o p M a k a r i o s f r o m t a k i n g u n i l a t e r a l a c t i o n t o amend t h e Cons-
t i t u t i o n and so u p s e t t h e Z u r i c h S e t t l e m e n t . The agreed method
was t o promote t h e s o l u t i o n t o t h e most o b v i o u s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
d i f f i c u l t i e s . T h i s i n v o l v e d a c t i o n i n N i c o s i a t o persuade A r c h -
b i s h o p M a k a r i o s t o p u t f o r w a r d r e a s o n a b l e p r o p o s a l s , and a c t i o n
i n Ankara t o p r e s s t h e T u r k s t o agree t o d i s c u s s r e a s o n a b l e
proposals.
I n f a c t t h e r e i s no e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e High Commissioner e v e r
d i s c u s s e d A r c h b i s h o p M a k a r i o s ' p r o p o s a l s w i t h him i n advance w i t h
a v i e w t o m o d i f y i n g them. I n s t e a d , when t h e p r o p o s a l s were commu-
n i c a t e d t o u s , S i r A. C l a r k welcomed them as ' a r e a s o n a b l e b a s i s
f o r d i s c u s s i o n ' d e s p i t e t h e f a c t t h a t t h e y were so f a r - r e a c h i n g
that they would obviously be completely unacceptable to the
T u r k s . And when t h e p r o p o s a l s were c r i t i c i s e d i n Ankara he d e f e n -
ded them i n t h i s t e l e g r a m by a r g u i n g , q u i t e i r r e l e v a n t l y i n t h e
c i r c u m s t a n c e s , t h a t t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n agreed a t Z u r i c h was an
unhappy compromise and needs t o be m o d i f i e d c o n s i d e r a b l y t o meet
t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s o f a modern d e m o c r a t i c s t a t e . I t would seem,
t h e r e f o r e , t h a t S i r A. C l a r k c o n c e i v e s h i s r o l e as b e i n g t o h e l p
t h e A r c h b i s h o p t o amend t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n i n t h e way he w a n t s .
The s i t u a t i o n which has now been c r e a t e d need n o t be c o m p l e t e l y
beyond r e p a i r i f Dr. Kutchuk can be persuaded t o produce s e n s i b l e
c o u n t e r - p r o p o s a l s on t h e main c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s s u e s . I f he d o e s ,
t h e y a r e bound t o be v e r y modest compared w i t h t h e A r c h b i s h o p ' s
f a r - r e a c h i n g s u g g e s t i o n s . I t w i l l t h e r e f o r e be n e c e s s a r y t o p u t
p r e s s u r e on A r c h b i s h o p M a k a r i o s t o agree t o d i s c u s s on t h e b a s i s
o f t h e T u r k i s h c o u n t e r - p r o p o s a l s . I f e a r , however, t h a t by h i s
a c t i o n so f a r and h i s o b v i o u s sympathy w i t h A r c h b i s h o p M a k a r i o s ,
t h e H i g h Commissioner would n o t be i n a p o s i t i o n t o e x e r c i s e t h e
necessary p r e s s u r e .

145. DUNCAN SANDYS: COMMONS STATEMENT, 17 February 19641

[When there was serious f i g h t i n g in December 1963, the U.K., Greece and
Turkey had a l l offered troops to restore law and order. President Makar-
ios and Vice-President Dr. Kutchuk accepted and the j o i n t force under a
B r i t i s h commander had some success 1n halting the f i g h t i n g and the Secre-
tary-General of the U.N. sent General Gyani to observe the peace-keeping
operation.]
W h i l e t h e immediate t a s k was t o s t o p t h e b l o o d s h e d , i t was
c l e a r t h a t t h e r e c o u l d be no peace i n Cyprus w i t h o u t a s e t t l e m e n t
o f t h e intercommunal p r o b l e m . I t seemed w i s e , i n t h e f i r s t i n s -
t a n c e , t o t r y and a c h i e v e such a s e t t l e m e n t t h r o u g h d i r e c t nego-
t i a t i o n between t h e p a r t i e s c o n c e r n e d ; and a c o n f e r e n c e was c o n -
vened i n London f o r t h i s p u r p o s e . . . . [but during the conference renew-
ed violence caused deterioration of the position and a l l the parties of
the conference agreed in principle that a more broadly based Interna-

1. Hansard 689 840-7. Delegations from the t h r e e guarantor powers and from
both Cypriot communities f a i l e d to agree a t a London conference in mid-Jan.
though Duncan Sandys managed to move the main e f f o r t from peace-making to
peace-keeping. A j o i n t Anglo-American proposal for N.A.T.O. forces was unac-
ceptable to Makarios and was r e j e c t e d (22 J a n . ) : t h i s move was to f o r e s t a l l
the l i k e l i h o o d of a Turkish invasion. But when the U.K. approached the secur-
i t y council of the U.N. in March a U.N. force, not confined t o N.A.T.O.
f o r c e s , was e s t a b l i s h e d .
 485
tional force was urgent. They could not agree on its composition, terms
of reference and method of control however: the U.K., Greece and Turkey
agreed on N.A.T.O. force as Immediately available and directly of inter-
est to N.A.T.O. members, as too easily leading to a clash between two
N.A.T.O. a l l i e s . I t would not be a N.A.T.O. operation or under N.A.T.O.
control. The U.S. supported the plan and Dr. Kutchuk approved.]
However, Archbishop Makarios f e l t unable t o agree t o t h i s p l a n .
Although he accepted in p r i n c i p l e the need f o r an i n t e r n a t i o n a l
f o r c e , he i n s i s t e d t h a t i t should be under the d i r e c t control of
the United N a t i o n s . He a l s o i n s i s t e d t h a t , as a f i r s t s t e p , the
S e c u r i t y Council should pass a r e s o l u t i o n designed t o deter
Turkey from e x e r c i s i n g her r i g h t of i n t e r v e n t i o n under the t r e a t y
of guarantee, which he would wish t o be regarded as an act of
aggression.
While we are a d v i s i n g r e s t r a i n t t o a l l concerned, we would n o t ,
of course, be prepared t o support a r e s o l u t i o n i n the S e c u r i t y
Council which could be i n t e r p r e t e d as an accusation of aggressive
i n t e n t i o n a g a i n s t any of the guarantor powers or o v e r r i d i n g any
of the t h r e e t r e a t i e s concluded a f t e r Cyprus received her
independence....
[Furthermore that the U.N. should be asked to assume f u l l responsibility
for creating and controlling the international force was objectionable.
Decisions would become more d i f f i c u l t in the Security Council i f count-
ries 'with no direct interest in the maintenance of stability 1n Cyprus
and who would not necessarily be unhappy to see differences develop bet-
ween two N.A.T.O. a l l i e s ' were involved. There would also be the need for
finance and that might mean delay for the General Assembly to be reconve-
ned. To meet Makarios' wishes the original plan was amended to provide
a U.N. link and the inclusion of non-N.A.T.O. forces. Makarios remained
dissatisfied while further violence at Limassol intensified concern.]
While we have sent some f u r t h e r reinforcements we have through-
out made i t c l e a r t h a t B r i t a i n i s not only unable, but also un-
w i l l i n g , t o bear i n d e f i n i t e l y almost the whole burden of the
peace-keeping o p e r a t i o n s , more e s p e c i a l l y i f the two communities
are not prepared t o give us t h e i r f u l l c o - o p e r a t i o n . . . .
[H.M.'s G. remained convinced that the revised plan was the most
reasonable and rapid means of creating the force urgently needed i f the
danger of conflict, 'both Internal and external', was to be avoided. The
most practical course was 1n the f i r s t instance to seek agreement between
the parties concerned. This was also in f u l l accord with the U.N. Char-
ter. But since there was deadlock and the situation in Cyprus was deteri-
orating, H.M.'s G. had nevertheless decided to bring the Issue immediate-
ly to the Security Council. Meanwhile all would be done to reconcile
differences to establish an effective International peace-keeping force
and to appoint a mediator.]
146. ARCHBISHOP MAKARIOS I I I TO SAKARI TUOMIOJA, 13 May 19641
I n A p r i l 1955, the Greek C y p r i o t s , a f t e r numerous unsuccessful

1. Secret. Tuomioja was the U.N. mediator and with Dean Acheson, the U.S.
secretary of s t a t e , was seeking to find a solution based on double enosis or
partition. (Indeed by the end of 1964 an 'ethnic cleansing' had taken place.
The Turkish Cypriots were concentated in a dozen enclaves, protected against
blockade and persecution by their own councils and fighters. It i s estimated
that some 20,000 were driven from their homes in Dec. '63 - Jan. '64.) But
486
efforts over many years to attain their freedom by peaceful
means, revolted against the British colonial regime.
After a four-year struggle Cyprus was proclaimed an independent
State. Such independence was not, however, a full one. The Repub-
lic of Cyprus was founded on the Agreements of Zurich and London
which did not emanate from the free will of the people but were
imposed on them.
The Agreements were signed by the Governments of Great Britain,
Greece and Turkey, by Archbishop Makarios on behalf of the Greek
Cypriots and by Dr. Kutchuk on behalf of the Turkish Cypriots.
When Archbishop Makarios was invited to London in February,
1959, for the purpose of signing the Agreements on behalf of the
Greek Cypriots, he expressed great misgivings and raised a number
of objections to certain provisions of the Agreements. He tried
very hard to bring about at least certain changes, but he failed
in his efforts.
In the circumstances, the only alternatives open to him were
either to sign the Agreements as they stood or reject them enti-
rely. In view of the grave situation which would have ensued upon
the rejection of the Agreements the first alternative was, for
all practical purposes, non-existent, and he had, therefore, to
sign the Agreements as the only course dictated by necessity.
The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus was based on these
two agreements and was put into force on the 16th August, 1960,
when the Republic of Cyprus was established, without being
approved either by the people of Cyprus directly or in Constitu-
ent Assembly by representatives duly elected for the purpose.
At the same time when the Constitution was signed the Treaty
of Establishment, the Treaty of Guarantee and the Treaty of Al-
liance were also signed and put into force. The last two afore-
mentioned Treaties were given constitutional force.
In spite of its numerical strength, its proportion in the land
ownership and its contribution to public expenditure, the Turkish
minority, against any precedent and contrary to every democratic
principle, apart from having its minority rights fully safeguar-
ded by the Constitution, was put on the same level with regard
to the exercise of political powers in the state with the Greek
majority. In many respects it was even put in a more advantageous
position, as it was given the means to over—ride the will of the
majority.
The frequently cited argument that the Turks of Cyprus must be
treated differently from other minorities because they form part
of the Turks of the mainland and their language, religion, cus-
toms and national aspirations are different from those of the
Greeks of Cyprus, is not a valid argument since those differences
are the usual characteristics of every minority in any other

these talks were terminated by the colonels coup in Greece in April 1967
which, when Panayiotis Pipinelis became Greek foreign minister in November,
caused Greek policy to shift towards some accommodation with Turkey as the
price for U.S. support and in the interests of NATO. Seven years later, in
1974, the overthrow of Papadopoulos in Athens by a more extremist junta,
hostile to Makarios, led to the storming of the presidential palace and the
formation of a puppet E.O.K.A. government under Nicos Samson and the ensuing
Turkish intervention of 20 July.
 487

country. . . . [Of a population of 577,615, only 104,350 were Turks and 24,408
of other races: 81.1% Greeks to 18.9% Turks; the Greeks owned 80.6% of
the land, the Turks only 16.6%; and the Greeks contributed 92.4% of taxa-
tion and the Turks only 7.6%. In Turkey Itself there had never been sepa-
rate political treatment for the Kurds, Arabs, Circasians, Armenians,
Georgians, Greeks, Bulgarians and Jews.]
The existence of m i n o r i t i e s , i n close p r o x i m i t y w i t h t h e i r
mother country, i s not a p e c u l i a r phenomenon of Cyprus. One comes
across s i m i l a r s i t u a t i o n s in many other countries i n the w o r l d .
The e x t r a o r d i n a r y p r o p o s i t i o n has never been put forward, how-
ever, t h a t such m i n o r i t i e s should be given a p r i v i l e g e d p o s i t i o n
with regard t o t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the exercise of the p o l i t i -
cal power i n the State or t h a t they should be under the protec-
t i o n of the f o r e i g n country from which they derive t h e i r ethnic
o r i g i n . What i s usually claimed i n favour of m i n o r i t i e s i s pro-
t e c t i o n of t h e i r m i n o r i t y r i g h t s and no d i s c r i m i n a t i o n in the
matter of p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s .
From the moment t h a t a section of the community i s singled out
and t r e a t e d d i f f e r e n t l y from the r e s t , t h a t section automatically
acquires a 'separateness' which makes of i t an object apart. I f
such section i s given d i f f e r e n t r i g h t s from those of the r e s t of
the community, as happened in the case of Cyprus, then a r t i f i -
c i a l , u n r e a l i s t i c and t h e r e f o r e unworkable means have t o be
devised in order t o implement and safeguard such r i g h t s . Such a
system i s e s s e n t i a l l y u n j u s t , i n t h a t c i t i z e n s are given unequal
treatment and the i n e v i t a b l e consequence i s c o n f l i c t . The major-
i t y f e e l s u n f a i r l y t r e a t e d , and t h e r e f o r e aggrieved, while the
m i n o r i t y i s forever suspecting the m a j o r i t y of endeavouring t o
take i t s p r i v i l e g e s away.
Separate treatment of a m i n o r i t y prevents i n t e g r a t i o n and the
development of u n i t y and of a p u b l i c conscience, accentuates d i f -
ferences and perpetuates c o n f l i c t . . . . [Under the League of Nations
provisions were made for minority rights and similarly in peace treaties
with Hungary, Romania, Italy and Trieste after 1945 - these concerned
equality of c i v i l and political rights, the use of the mother tongue, and
equal rights to maintain charities, churches and schools, especially in
areas where the minority constituted a considerable proportion of the
population. But never did any such safeguards compare with the enormous
privileges granted to Turkish Cypriots.]
The p r i v i l e g e d treatment of the Turkish m i n o r i t y regarding i t s
p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the exercise of the p o l i t i c a l power a f f o r d s i t
the means not only of o v e r - r i d i n g the w i l l of the m a j o r i t y but
also of preventing the smooth government of the country.
The Constitution of the Republic contains many sui generis pro-
v i s i o n s based on the concept of p o l i t i c a l communal segregation.
Apart from a l l the s e p a r a t i s t and negative elements, the C o n s t i -
t u t i o n s u f f e r s from a f u r t h e r fundamental d e f e c t . A number of i t s
A r t i c l e s , and e s p e c i a l l y those c r e a t i n g such elements, are decla-
red t o be unchangeable, being considered as Basic or Fundamental
A r t i c l e s ( A r t i c l e 182). Such a p r o v i s i o n may have a p o l i t i c a l
s i g n i f i c a n c e , but i t i s of no legal value because the present
c o n s t i t u e n t power has no r i g h t t o r e s t r i c t the c o n s t i t u e n t power
of the f u t u r e . Furthermore, t o preclude amendment of a C o n s t i t u -
t i o n , i s t o ignore r e a l i t y and t o deny progress.
I t i s not only the aforementioned c o n s t i t u t i o n a l provisions
which f e t t e r the exercise of the sovereign powers of the Republic
488
of Cyprus.
By the Treaty of Guarantee, an obligation was imposed on the
Republic not to alter the Basic Articles of the Constitution. The
same Treaty affords the Guaranteeing powers an opportunity to
interfere with the domestic affairs of Cyprus.
Under the Treaty of Alliance Greek and Turkish contingents were
permitted to be stationed in Cyprus under a Tripartite Headquar-
ters for the purpose of defending Cyprus against aggression. This
Treaty, however, was considered as terminated by the Government
of the Republic owing to its violation by Turkey in an essential
part, and this fact was communicated to the Turkish Prime Minis-
ter by a letter of the President of the Republic dated 4th April,
1964.
All the aforesaid constitutional and treaty barriers restrict
the Republic of Cyprus from exercising its full sovereign powers
and fetter its people from deciding its own affairs and determin-
ing its own future and destiny.
The Security Council, before which the problem of Cyprus was
brought, in two resolutions (S/5575 of the 4th and 13th March,
1964), recognized the continuation of the existence of the Repub-
lic of Cyprus as a sovereign state and of its government and re-
commended that a mediator be designated by the Secretary-General
in agreement with the Government of Cyprus and the Governments
of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom -
'for the purpose of promoting a peaceful solution and an agreed
settlement of the problem confronting Cyprus, in accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations, having in mind the well-being
of the people of Cyprus as a whole and the preservation of
international peace and security.'
The present anomalous situation in Cyprus has its origin in the
Cyprus Constitution, the numerous separatist elements of which
create friction between the Greeks and Turks of Cyprus and pre-
vent the smooth functioning of the State. It is not only certain
elements of the Constitution which are defective. The whole con-
cept on which the Constitution is based is entirely wrong. For
this reason it is necessary to lay completely *new foundations.
Furthermore, the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance constitute
an unacceptable limitation of the independence of Cyprus, in that
they allow interference with the domestic affairs of the Republic
of Cyprus.
Certain general principles, on which the solution of the Cyprus
problem should be based, are set out below. It will be observed
that one of these principles is that the Constitution must be
approved by the people of Cyprus. It would, therefore, be cont-
rary to this general principle to formulate details of the
Constitution at this stage, since that would be the work of a
Constituent Assembly.
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
(1) Cyprus to become a completely independent, unitary, integ-
ral, sovereign State, all the powers to emanate from the Cypriot
people, who will be entitled to decide the future of their
country on the basis of the internationally accepted principle
of self-determination.
(2) No Treaties with Greece or Turkey or any other country to
form part of the solution of the Cyprus problem which would in
any way limit the independence or sovereignty of the State and
 489
which would prevent the people of Cyprus from amending, modifying
or altering the Constitution or from deciding in a free and sove-
reign way upon their future.
(3) The Constitution of the State must be approved by the people
of Cyprus either in Constituent Assembly elected by the people
or in any other internationally accepted democratic manner, such
as a referendum.
(4) The Constitution of the State to be based on the democratic
principle that the political majority at any election should
govern and the political minority constitute the Opposition.
(5) Elections to be by general suffrage on a common electoral
roll.
(6) The Executive Power to be answerable to Parliament.
(7) All Legislative Power to be exercised by a Parliament con-
sisting of one elected Chamber.
(8) The Judicial Power to be exercised by an independent, uni-
fied judiciary, exercising the jurisdiction conferred either by
the Constitution or by Law, irrespective of race, religion, lan-
guage, or community of the litigants.
(9) The universally accepted human rights such as those contain-
ed in the Declaration of Human Rights, the European Convention
on Human Rights and the European Social Charter to be incorpor-
ated in the Constitution. Details of the provisions on human
rights to be incorporated in the Constitution and of the manner
of their entrenchment are given in this paper under the heading
'Human Rights Safeguarded for all Persons'.
(10) In addition to any municipal remedies, redress to lie by
recourse by individuals to international bodies, such as the
European Commission and European Court of Human Rights.
(11) All communities and minorities to have complete autonomy in
religious matters and certain aspects of personal status, such
as marriage and divorce, and in the administration of properties
belonging to religious foundations or institutions. Details of
the above rights and of their entrenchment in the Constitution
are given in this paper under the heading 'Communal Rights'.
(12) The Constitution to contain provisions with regard to the
manner of constitutional amendments. No constitutional amendment
to be possible unless the relevant Bill is passed by a two-third
majority of the total number of Members of Parliament. The amend-
ment not to become effective unless approved by an absolute
majority of the total number of Members of Parliament after a
general election.
HUMAN RIGHTS SAFEGUARDED FOR ALL PERSONS
The internationally recognized human rights as provided by the
European Convention on Human Rights and all its Protocols, supp-
lemented as necessary by rights included in the European Social
Charter and by rights provided in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, to be incorporated and entrenched in the Constitu-
tion.

Entrenchment of Human Rights

Any amendment of any provision relating to human rights to be

made by the same procedure as is applicable in the case of any
other amendments of the Constitution.
490
Provided that in the case of any amendment necessary in order
to bring the Human Rights Provisions into conformity with any
amendment to the European Convention on Human Rights, the Euro-
pean Social Charter or with any obligation of Cyprus as a member
of the United Nations, a two-third majority of the total number
of Members of Parliament shall be sufficient to make the amend-
ment in question effective, without the necessity of approval by
a subsequent Parliament after a General Election.

Remedies in respect of the Human Rights

to be Safeguarded in the Constitution.
(1) Municipal Remedies: There should be made -
(a) provision for the determination by a competent court of the
constitutionality of legislation vis & vis the Human Rights
Provisions in the Constitution;
(b) provision for recourse to a competent court on a complaint
that a decision, an act or omission of any organ, authority or
person, exercising any executive or administrative authority, is
contrary (inter alia) to any of the Human Rights Provisions in
the Constitution; and
(c) provision to the effect that the Human Rights Provisions of
the Constitution may be raised before any court in any proceed-
ings in which this may be relevant to the issue to be determined.
(2) International Remedies:
(a) Cyprus, through being a Contracting Party to the European
Convention on Human Rights and its Protocols, to submit to the
competences of the European Commission of Human Rights and the
European Court of Human Rights in respect of -
(i) State applications (as per Art. 24 of the European
Convention on Human Rights).
(ii) Individual applications (as per Art. 25 of the European
Convention on'Human Rights). (It is to be noted that there exists
a scheme for free legal aid to individual applicants under Art.
25).
(b) By becoming a Contracting Party to the European Social Char-
ter, 1961, Cyprus would submit to the international supervisory
competence provided thereunder.
(c) Cyprus, being a member of the United Nations, is already
subject to any supervisory machinery that may be applicable in
respect of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

COMMUNAL RIGHTS
(A) Education and Culture.
(B) Religious matters, administration of religious property and
certain aspects of personal status, i.e. marriage and divorce.

Education and Culture

(1) The general responsibility for the education of the citizens
of the Republic shall lie with the Government.
(2) The Government shall provide free elementary education for
all the citizens of the Republic.
(3) Turkish Cypriots shall be taught in the schools provided for
them in their own language and the curricula of such schools
shall, in addition to other subjects, include subjects relating
to religion, history and other cultural matters approved by a
Turkish educational authority to be set up under the Constitu-
 491
tion.
(4) Provision to be made with regard to Turkish Cypriot secondary
education that there shall be appropriated in every year a sum
bearing the same proportion to the sum appropriated for Greek
secondary education as the proportion which the number of pupils
or students receiving instruction in Turkish secondary schools
or institutions bears to the number of pupils or students receiv-
ing instruction in Greek secondary schools or institutions, at
the close of the previous year under the same conditions (if any)
as may be imposed by the Government in making grants or subsi-
dies, in respect of Greek secondary schools or institutions.
(5) All persons acting individually, in association, or as a
community, will be entitled to establish, maintain, manage and
control at their own expense any educational or cultural institu-
tions, and any schools and other instructional establishments,
provided that such institutions, schools and establishments are
so conducted as to be compatible with public order and good
morals, with the right to use their own language and to exercise
their own religion freely therein.

Religious Matters and certain Aspects

of Personal Status, i.e. Marriage and Divorce
(1) All religious matters to be within the exclusive province of
the religious authorities of the communities concerned.
(2) Matters of marriage and divorce to be governed by the Family
Law of the respective community and to be administered by the
Ecclesiastical or other Family Court of such community.
(3) Constitutional provision to be made for Councils elected by
the communities concerned to legislate on matters of marriage,
divorce, Family Courts and the administration of ecclesiastical
or other religious properties.
Note: Insofar as the Greek Orthodox, the Armenians and the Maro-
nites are concerned, the Constitution may recognize the existing
Ecclesiastical Courts and church authorities legislating on such
matters.
Insofar as Turks are concerned, in view of the fact that the
aforesaid matters are dealt with by civil authorities, an elected
Council by the Turkish community to be set up to deal with such
matters.
Entrenchment of Communal Rights in the Constitution
Any proposal for any constitutional amendment of communal
rights as defined above to require to be adopted by a two-third
majority of the total number of the Members of Parliament. The
amendment not to become effective until it has been approved by
a five-sixth majority of the total number of Members of Parlia-
ment after a general election.

APPENDIX
The Turkish Government and the Turkish Cypriots, following in
its footsteps, suggest that the only solution would be the par-
tition of the island into two regions - the Turkish and the Greek
region, and then a confederation. It has been suggested that the
Turkish region should comprise the northern part of the island,
starting from Yialia near Chrysochou Bay, passing through what
is called the Turkish sector of Nicosia and ending in what is
492
called the Turkish sector of Famagusta.
In this way the Turkish Cypriots claim an area of 1,292 square
miles in extent, that is to say 36.2% of the total area of the
island. Within that area, land, to the exclusion of Government
land, is owned 80.4% by Greeks, 18.9% by Turks and 0.7% by
others. It should be noted that the proportion of land ownership
of Turks throughout the island amounts to only 16.6% by area, and
13.1% by value.
Within that area there are 114 Greek villages with a population
of 86,944 (out of the 392 Greek villages of the whole island) 53
Turkish villages with a population of 18,028 (out of 120 Turkish
villages of the whole island) and 49 mixed villages with a popu-
lation of 46,524 Greeks and 41,314 Turks (out of 113 mixed vil-
lages of the whole island). Thus 69.2% Greeks will be included
in that area as against 30.8% Turks. Furthermore, if a compulsory
movement of populations were effected, as suggested, the numbers
of the population to be so moved would be greater than the whole
Turkish population of the island.
Such a scheme, ostensibly proposed on the pretext of the secur-
ity of life and property of the Turks, has no other purpose than
to promote the partition of the island, and the formation of a
sort of confederation (not even a federated state) and eventual
satisfaction of the expansionist aims of Turkey by annexation of
the Turkish region.
This is not the first time that Turkey has aspired at setting
a foothold on Cyprus. Turkey's intentions in this respect have,
often in the past, transpired through Turkey's foreign policy.
The Turkish Cypriots, at the instigation of Ankara, put forward
similar claims to Lord Radcliffe, the Constitutional Commissio-
ner, who was appointed in 1956 by the British Government to
report on the Cyprus question.
Lord Radcliffe, in rejecting the claim of Cypriot Turks to be
accorded equal political representation, observed that such a
claim could not be acceded to, as it was 'a claim of 18 per cent.
of a population to share political power equally with 80 per
cent.1 and that a federation in such a case was inconceivable 'as
there was no pattern of territorial separation between the two
communities and apart from other objections, federation of commu-
nities which does not involve also federation of territories
seems to be a very difficult constitutional form'. He concluded
that 'it cannot be in the interests of Cyprus as a whole that the
Constitution should be formed on the basis of equal political re-
presentation for the Greek and the Turkish Cypriot Communities'.
It should be noted that there is no precedent in existence
where populations in a unitary state have been moved for the
purpose of creating separate areas in order to apply a federal
system. Where federal systems have been introduced there were
already in existence separate territorial entities which were
brought under a federal system for the purpose of creating a
single state.
It is obvious that the proposals of the Turkish Government,
instead of promoting the well-being of the people of Cyprus as
a whole as required by the resolution of the Security Council,
would create a really unhappy people, kept divided by enmity and
hatred and permanently apart, the communities looking upon each
other across their artificial borders as antagonists instead of
 493
working together for their common interest and well-being.
Furthermore such a scheme, involving compulsory movement of po-
pulations, offends against the fundamental human right of freedom
of movement and residence and is against the spirit of the reso-
lution of the Security Council as it destroys the existence of
the sovereign Republic of Cyprus.
147. DR. GALO PLAZA: REPORT TO THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY GENERAL,
26 March 19651
[The constitution of the Republic of Cyprus (16 August 1960) was based
on the Greece-Turkey agreement at Zurich (11 February 1959) and the tri-
partite agreement (with the U.K. also) at London (19 Feb.) which both
communities 1n Cyprus accepted as 'the agreed foundation for the final
settlement' of the Cyprus problem, embodied in the Treaties and Constitu-
tion signed at Nicosia (16 August 1960). The Greek majority and Turkish
minority, though in religion, education and culture distinct, were physi-
cally not separated but Intermingled in many villages spread over the
island. British colonial rule was however a focus for Greek Cypriot, not
Turkish Cypriot, resistance for their goal was not independence but eno-
sis which meant Greek domination and therefore prompted Turkish claims
for protection (taksim) and an equal right for union with Turkey. The
U.K., Greece and Turkey all claimed vital stakes 1n the outcome. The 1959
settlement envisaged a r4gime adapted to the ethnic communities and the
special relationships and interrelationships of three external states:
a multi-lateral guarantee, the prohibition of external union or partition
and U.K. sovereign bases. The 1960 constitution consisted of 4 groups of
provisions:] The first group consists of those that recognize
to each of the two communities a separate existence. 2
The second consists of constitutional devices assuring the par-
ticipation of each community in the exercise of the functions of
government, while seeking in a number of matters to avoid supre-
macy on the part of the larger (Greek Cypriot) community, and
assuring also a partial administrative autonomy to each commun-
ity. 3 In the third group of provisions, the Constitution sets

1. U.N. doc. S/6253. When Greek Cypriots had taken over the government insti-
tutions of the republic, the 1960 constitution was effectively dead. The secu-
rity council (4 March 1964) had finally recommended the appointment of a medi-
ator: Makarios made new proposals (13 May) which Kutchuk countered (2 June).
In August 1964 Turkish planes had bombed Greek Cypriot villages, and the next
month (16 Sept.) Dr. Galo Plaza was agreed and designated mediator. In six
months he produced this report. 2. Arts. 1 and 2 identified and defined the
communities: Arts. 3 and 180 recognised the official languages and the choice
of its flag and right to the Greek and Turkish flag and national holidays (4,
5); separate communal electoral lists for election (1, 39, 62, 86, 173 and
178) and separate voting (1, 39, 62, 86, 173, 178). Art. 108 accorded special
relationships with Greece and Turkey for subsidies to education, culture,
charities &c.; and Art. 1 allotted powers between the communities - Greek
President, Turkish Vice-President elected by their communities, designating
separately 7 Greeks and 3 Turks to Council of Ministers (Art. 46) while the
Greek presiding and his Turkish deputy in the house of representatives would
also be elected by his own communal group of representatives (Art. 72).
3. These included provisions for numerical or functional equality, deputies
to be appointed from the other community, fixed ratios in army and police
(60:40) to civil servants (70:30) to the Council of ministers and house of
494

f o r t h a t some l e n g t h t h e human r i g h t s and f u n d a m e n t a l freedoms

g u a r a n t e e d by i t . 1 The f o u r t h main s e r i e s o f p r o v i s i o n s c o n s t i -
t u t e s a complex system o f g u a r a n t e e s o f t h e supremacy o f t h e
Constitution....2
[These complex and unique/special arrangements encountered d i f f i c u l t i e s
from the f i r s t . Repeated constitutional crises led to Makarios' 13 propo-
sed amendments in November 1963: for example, the vice-president had
vetoed the majority decision of the Council of Ministers in favour of
mixed, not separate, units in the army: the house had f a i l e d to enact an
income tax law; separate communal municipalities in the 5 main towns had
proved unworkable since the President and Vice-President could not agree.
The Turkish view was that the Greek Cypriots had never attempted 'with
s i n c e r i t y and goodwill' to implement the 1960 c o n s t i t u t i o n ; that since
the republic consisted of 2 communities (not of 'majority' and 'minor-
i t y ' ) ; that Makarios' amendments were directed only on those parts of the
constitution which recognised the existence of the Turkish community; and
that his examples were each the result of the Greeks attempted d i s c r i m i -
nation. The London Conference in January 1964 f a i l e d in the midst of ext-
reme tension and h o s t i l i t y to effect any compromise and only proved that
the two communities could no longer l i v e together and must physically be
segregated. Since then, without Turkish Cypriot p a r t i c i p a t i o n , the Cyprus
government and the house of representatives purported to pass important
l e g i s l a t i o n and made crucial decisions, and even on 4 April to declare
the treaty of alliance to be no longer in force. The atmosphere was 'most
unfavourable t o e f f o r t s at mediation'.]
The c o n s p i c u o u s f a c t o f l i f e i n Cyprus was t h a t l a r g e numbers
o f armed men, i n and o u t o f u n i f o r m and a p p a r e n t l y under w i d e l y
v a r y i n g degrees o f c o n t r o l , were f a c i n g one a n o t h e r f r o m f o r t i -
f i e d p o s i t i o n s i n many p a r t s o f t h e i s l a n d . T h e i r numbers had
been g r e a t l y i n c r e a s e d and t h e i r armament g r e a t l y e n l a r g e d ,
e s p e c i a l l y on t h e Greek C y p r i o t s i d e , and w i t h a s s i s t a n c e f r o m
Greece i n p a r t i c u l a r , by t h e end o f t h e p e r i o d . W h i l e , as you
have s t a t e d , t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s O p e r a t i o n c o u l d c l a i m no s m a l l
c r e d i t f o r h a v i n g c o n t a i n e d s e v e r a l s i t u a t i o n s w h i c h m i g h t have
led to major military clashes, almost every day of the period saw
one o r more i n c i d e n t s o f one k i n d o r a n o t h e r . . . . [reaching a peak
early in August with a Turkish bombardment. In practice there were
already two 'green l i n e s ' 1n Cyprus - the physical which became an

r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s (70:30) entrenched clauses on e l e c t o r a l law and t a x a t i o n

r e q u i r i n g majority in both communal groups (Art. 78). Both the President and
Vice-president could delay or veto in various matters - the general e f f e c t
being t h a t on major issues j o i n t consensus of both communities was necessary
which a l s o meant deadlock. The two Communal Chambers were of course e l e c t e d
exclusively from i t s own community - with r e l i g i o n , c u l t u r e , education, c h a r i -
t i e s , c o - o p e r a t i v e s &c. with power to tax t h e i r own members (Art. 87, 88).
1. These (Arts. 6-35) were protected by the supreme c o n s t i t u t i o n a l court of
one n e u t r a l , one Greek Cypriot and one Turkish Cypriot judge (Art. 133) and
the high court of a n e u t r a l with 2 votes and 2 Greek Cypriot and 1 Turkish
Cypriot judge (Art. 153).
2. These included the supreme c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o u r t , the basic Zurich-London
A r t i c l e s which could not be amended a t a l l (Art. 182) and the i n t e r n a t i o n a l
t r e a t y of guarantee (Art. 181) by the U.K., Greece and Turkey which had the
e f f e c t of providing an immediate m i l i t a r y guarantee of 950 Greek and 650
Turkish s o l d i e r s and the B r i t i s h Sovereign b a s e s .
 495

economic blockade by Greek Cypriots against Turkish Cypriots and a

barrier to Turkish Cypriots from government o f f i c e s , cabinet and house
of representatives; and the psychological which prevented intercourse;
the movement of ideas, and the growth of t r u s t and compromise.
Since December 1963 Greek Cypriots had had effective control of the
central organs of the Republic; the Turks had been ' i n a condition of
r e b e l l i o n ' with the p o s s i b i l i t y of m i l i t a r y force from Turkey; and the
Greek Cypriots had been prompted t o raise a national guard by conscrip-
t i o n . Any proposals were not discussed but rejected 'out of hand on the
basis not of merit but of suspicion and m i s t r u s t ' . Though there had been
some relaxation of tension recently under the U.N. Operation,] c o n c e s -
s i o n s seemed t o have been r u l e d o u t by t h e Cyprus Government
because t h e y m i g h t be c o n s i d e r e d as r e s t o r i n g t h e p o s i t i o n under
the Zurich and London Agreements and by the Turkish Cypriot
l e a d e r s h i p because t h e y m i g h t t e n d t o c o n s o l i d a t e what t h e y
considered as the illegal situation created by the Greek
C y p r i o t s . . . . [Basically 'an uneasy truce' continued as both sides b u i l t up
t h e i r m i l i t a r y strength, while the U.K., Greece and Turkey a l l seemed
anxious for a peaceful solution.
The Greek Cypriot case was that the Zurich-London terms were Imposed
on Makarios, that the 1960 constitution and the Treaties of Guarantee and
Alliance were approved neither by a referendum nor a constituent assemb-
l y , that the equal rights of the Turkish 'minority' were t o t a l l y u n j u s t i -
f i e d ; and that the concept that the 'Basic A r t i c l e s ' could not be amended
had no legal value. In i t s place a new constitution must be formulated
by a constituent assembly.]
I n summary, t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s e n v i s a g e d Cyprus becoming ' a
completely independent, unitary, integral, sovereign State',
u n f e t t e r e d by any t r e a t i e s and w i t h a l l powers emanating f r o m t h e
p e o p l e , who would be e n t i t l e d t o d e c i d e t h e f u t u r e o f t h e i r c o u n -
t r y on t h e b a s i s o f ' t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y a c c e p t e d p r i n c i p l e o f
s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n ' . The c o n s t i t u t i o n s h o u l d be founded on t h e
p r i n c i p l e t h a t t h e p o l i t i c a l m a j o r i t y a t any e l e c t i o n s h o u l d g o v -
e r n and t h e p o l i t i c a l m i n o r i t y c o n s t i t u t e t h e o p p o s i t i o n . E l e c t -
i o n s would be by g e n e r a l s u f f r a g e on a common r o l l ; a l l l e g i s l a t -
i v e power would be e x e r c i s e d by a s i n g l e - c h a m b e r e l e c t e d p a r l i a -
ment, t o w h i c h t h e e x e c u t i v e power would be a n s w e r a b l e ; and t h e
j u d i c i a l power would be v e s t e d i n an i n d e p e n d e n t , u n i f i e d j u d i -
ciary.
Human r i g h t s s h o u l d be s a f e g u a r d e d f o r a l l persons and e n t r e n -
ched i n t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n . Some domestic j u d i c i a l remedies would
be e s t a b l i s h e d , as w e l l as a r i g h t o f i n d i v i d u a l appeal t o t h e
European Commission on Human R i g h t s . A l l ' c o m m u n i t i e s and m i n o r -
i t i e s ' s h o u l d have c o m p l e t e autonomy i n r e l i g i o u s m a t t e r s and
c e r t a i n a s p e c t s o f p e r s o n a l s t a t u s , such as m a r r i a g e and d i v o r c e ,
and i n t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f r e l i g i o u s p r o p e r t i e s . I n t h e r e a l m
o f e d u c a t i o n and c u l t u r e t h e y s h o u l d a l s o be g u a r a n t e e d c e r t a i n
r i g h t s , but the general r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r education should l i e
w i t h t h e Government.
Most amendments t o t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n s h o u l d r e q u i r e a t w o - t h i r d s
m a j o r i t y v o t e o f t h e t o t a l membership o f t h e p a r l i a m e n t , f o l l o w e d
by a p p r o v a l by an a b s o l u t e m a j o r i t y ( f i v e - s i x t h s m a j o r i t y i n t h e
case o f communal r i g h t s o f t h e t o t a l membership a f t e r a new gene-
ral e l e c t i o n , . . .
[The Turkish Cypriot case as put by the Vice-President, Dr. Fazil
Kutchuk, was that they were 'not a mere minority but a d i s t i n c t community
 496
in their own right'. They did not object to the 1960 constitution, only
to the way it had been misapplied by the Greek Cypriots and additional
and more effective guarantees were proved to be necessary' - for example
the provision of a geographical basis for the state of affairs created
in Zurich and London.] In short, they wished to be physically
separated from the Greek community. Their first inclination had
been to seek this separation through the outright physical parti-
tioning of Cyprus between the Turkish and Greek nations of which
in their opinion the Turkish and Greek communities constituted
an extension. However, 'considering that this would not be will-
ingly agreed to by Greek and Cypriot-Greeks', they modified this
concept to that of creating a federal State over the physical
separation of the two communities.
Their proposal envisaged a compulsory exchange of population
in order to bring about a state of affairs in which each commun-
ity would occupy a separate part of the island. The dividing line
was in fact suggested: to run from the village of Yalia on the
north-western coast through the towns of Nicosia in the centre,
and Famagusta in the east. The zone lying north of this line was
claimed by the Turkish-Cypriot community; it is said to have an
area of about 1,084 square miles or 38 per cent, of the total
area of the Republic. An exchange of about 10,000 Greek families
for about the same number of Turkish families was contemplated.
Each of the two separate communal areas would enjoy self-
government in all matters falling outside federal affairs. Each
could have cultural and economic relations directly with Greece
or Turkey as the case might be. Each area could also enter into
international agreements with Greece or Turkey as the case might
be to regulate 'relations of neighbourhood such as the provision
of a certain special pass system' between that area and Greece
or Turkey.
To the federal authorities would be reserved the subjects of
foreign affairs, defence, the federal budget, customs; commerce,
banking currency, standards of measurement, nationality, passport
matters, post and telecommunications services and criminal legis-
lation and jurisdiction. The federal legislature would consist
a House of Representatives composed of 30 per cent. Turkish and
70 per cent. Greek community representatives, and a Senate divid-
ed equally between the two. The federal President and Vice-Presi-
dent would be elected by the Greek and Turkish communities res-
pectively. The 30-70 ratio would be maintained for the Council
of Ministers and the Public Service, and the 40-60 ratio for a
small federal army and a police force for customs, traffic and
tourist affairs.
Among other general principles reflecting those of the existing
Constitution, the union of the Federal Republic with another
State, or the partitioning of the island, would be prohibited
under national and international undertakings. The provisions of
the Treaties of Alliance and Guarantee would continue to form an
integral part of the Constitution.... [as for Greece and Turkey.]
Of the other parties whom the Mediator's terms of reference re-
quire him to consult, the Government of Greece gave my prede-
cessor to understand that it considered the Zurich and London
Agreements to have proved in practice to be unworkable. In its
view at that time, the only possible and lasting solution was the
application of the principles of international justice and of
 497

t r u e democracy, w i t h t h e f u l l s a f e g u a r d i n g o f t h e r i g h t o f t h e
m a j o r i t y t o r u l e and o f t h e m i n o r i t y t o c r i t i c i z e . I n a d d i t i o n ,
on a c c o u n t o f t h e s p e c i a l c o n d i t i o n s o f t h e c a s e , and i n o r d e r
t h a t t h e r e s h o u l d be no f e a r o f any p o s s i b l e abuse o f t h e power
o f t h e m a j o r i t y , i t would be p o s s i b l e t o a r r a n g e t h a t t h e r i g h t s
o f t h e T u r k i s h - C y p r i o t m i n o r i t y s h o u l d be s a f e g u a r d e d by t h e
U n i t e d N a t i o n s . The Greek Government s t a t e d f u r t h e r t h a t f u l l and
u n t r a m m e l l e d independence a l l o w i n g t h e C y p r i o t p e o p l e i n f r e e
e x e r c i s e o f t h e i r s o v e r e i g n r i g h t s t o d e c i d e t h e i r f u t u r e was t h e
only s o l u t i o n .
The Government o f T u r k e y , f o r i t s p a r t , i n d i c a t e d t h a t i t c o n -
s i d e r e d a s o l u t i o n t o t h e Cyprus problem t o l i e a l o n g t h e l i n e s
o f a f e d e r a l S t a t e , and i t communicated t o t h e M e d i a t o r an i n f o r -
mal n o t e c o n t a i n i n g g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e s s i m i l a r t o t h o s e r e f e r r e d
t o above i n r e g a r d t o t h e p o s i t i o n o f t h e T u r k i s h - C y p r i o t commun-
i t y . The p r e s e n t g u a r a n t e e s , i n c l u d i n g t h o s e a g a i n s t e i t h e r u n i o n
o r p a r t i t i o n , would be m a i n t a i n e d .
The Government o f t h e U n i t e d Kingdom i n d i c a t e d t o t h e M e d i a t o r
i t s s u p p o r t f o r h i s endeavours t o h e l p t o promote a p e a c e f u l
s o l u t i o n and an agreed s e t t l e m e n t o f t h e problem i n accordance
w i t h h i s t e r m s o f r e f e r e n c e , and i t s d e s i r e t o s u p p o r t such a
settlement....
[His predecessor as U.N. mediator, Sakari Tuomioja, had concluded that
the extreme and r i g i d positions of the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cyp-
r i o t s were 'wholly irreconcilable because t h e i r points of departure were
e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t , and, at least under the prevailing circumstances,
they chose not even to meet together to discuss t h e i r differences'. More-
over he could see no solution either 1n 'uninhibited democracy' as propo-
sed by one side nor a federal regime as suggested by the other and he had
considered other options including various wholesale exchanges of t e r r i -
tories and populations which proved u n r e a l i s t i c . There was s t i l l the pos-
sibility of enosis: though that was formally set aside 1n 1959-60 many
Greek Cypriots s t i l l wished for that solution: i t would have to permit
of course a Turkish national presence in Cyprus on either a sovereign or
a leasehold basis and provide adequate guarantees f o r Turkish Cypriots
under Greek rule.
When Dr. Plaza succeeded as mediator 1n September 1964 he thought 1t
necessary to secure direct talks between the two communities as a f i r s t
step, but he realised that without some minimum common understanding as
a preliminary, talks would decline into b i t t e r wrangling. No such p r e l i -
minary understanding was possible. Makarios demanded unfettered indepen-
dence and self-determination, but was ready to agree that Cyprus would
be a demilitarised and non-aligned country and to make additional guaran-
tees to protect human and minority rights - viz.] Provisions should
be made i n t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n f o r t h e e x e r c i s e o f human r i g h t s and
fundamental freedoms n o t l e s s t h a n t h o s e s e t f o r t h i n t h e Europ-
ean C o n v e n t i o n f o r t h e P r o t e c t i o n o f Human R i g h t s and Fundamental
Freedoms, t o w h i c h Cyprus i s a p a r t y , and i n c o n f o r m i t y w i t h
t h o s e s e t f o r t h i n t h e U n i v e r s a l D e c l a r a t i o n o f Human R i g h t s . The
c o n s t i t u t i o n s h o u l d d e c l a r e t h e s e r i g h t s and freedoms t o be imme-
d i a t e l y a p p l i c a b l e i n t h e i n t e r n a l law o f C y p r u s . Under t h e Cons-
t i t u t i o n p r o p e r , t h e s t r i c t e s t r e s p e c t f o r human r i g h t s and f u n -
damental freedoms f o r a l l persons r e g a r d l e s s o f r a c e , e t h n i c a l
o r i g i n , language and r e l i g i o n s h o u l d be g u a r a n t e e d by a p p r o p r i a t e
j u d i c i a l p r o c e d u r e s p e r m i t t i n g e v e r y a g g r i e v e d person t o o b t a i n
r e d r e s s by means o f a s i m p l e and prompt a c t i o n .
498
Each of the 'minorities' should be permitted to continue to
enjoy a broad autonomy, to be guaranteed by the constitution and
by legislation, in special matters of religion, education and
personal status.
Provisions should be made by the Government of Cyprus to
prevent discrimination on account of race, ethnical origin or
religion in the appointment and treatment of members of the
Public Service.
For the purpose of restoring confidence between Greek and Turk-
ish Cypriots, the Government of Cyprus, as one of its first offi-
cial acts after agreement was reached, should decree a general
amnesty in respect of all crimes and offences related to the
events beginning in December 1963, except for certain expressly
defined crimes in common law.
For a purely transitional period of defined duration and again
for the purpose of helping to restore confidence between the
Greek and Turkish Cypriots, the Government of Cyprus should
invite the United Nations to appoint a Commissioner who, assisted
by a staff of observers and advisers, would observe on the spot
the application of the foregoing provisions.
The foregoing guarantees notwithstanding, each Turkish Cypriot
should be entitled to decide freely whether he wishes to remain
in Cyprus or to be resettled in Turkey. The Government of Cyprus
should, in co-operation with the Government of Turkey and during
an initial period of fixed duration, give adequate compensation
and all other possible assistance to those who would opt for
resettlement.
The demand of the Greek-Cypriot community for the right of
self-determination requires certain clarifications. Its leaders
have indicated that the exercise of the right of self-determina-
tion should be taken in the sense that, once fully independent,
it will be for the Cypriot people alone to decide their political
status and enter into relationships with any other State or
States. It has usually been taken for granted that this will
mean, in practical terms, a choice by the Cypriot people, by such
means as a referendum, between continued independence and union
with Greece, (Enosis) and past discussions have proceeded on that
basis. But the leaders of the Greek-Cypriot community have remai-
ned vague both as regards the timing of the proposed referendum
and the form of Enosis. On the timing of the referendum, Arch-
bishop Makarios has indicated that it is a decision for the peo-
ple of Cyprus to take and that the proposed referendum could, for
example, take place either immediately, or in a year, or in five
years. On the form of Enosis, Archbishop Makarios has merely said
that this would be decided by the Government of Cyprus in agree-
ment with Greece before the Cypriot people are consulted on the
subject. He has also left it to be understood that in the event
that Enosis is chosen, any arrangements to be made after it has
taken place would fall under the exclusive responsibility of
Greece. . . [He was prepared to permit the British Sovereign bases to be put
on a leasehold tenure for a fixed duration only. But he was totally oppo-
sed to multilateral talks for the future of Cyprus was a matter only for
the Government and people of Cyprus: and any bilateral talks with the
Turkish Cypriot minority must be limited to their minority rights and any
proposals for partition or federation would terminate such discussions
abruptly.
 499
Such renewed threat of enosis strengthened Kutchuk's demand for the
geographical separation of the two communities for from bitter experience
paper guarantees' would be inadequate in preventing the Greeks from
destroying or enslaving the Turkish Cypriots: (Memo. 22 Feb. 1965): a
voluntary agreed exchange of population under U.N. supervision would be
possible: multilateral talks would be desirable but bilateral only under
pre-conditions which would Include the constitutional status quo ante the
breakdown of the constitution in Dec. 1963. Kutchuk protested that it
would be unfair to expect the Turkish Cypriots to engage in bilateral
talks with the Greek Cypriot leaders when Cyprus was under 'the military
occupation of Greece' with an armed force of 30,000 Greek Cypriots and
15,000 Greeks.
The Greek Government now was squarely behind that of Cyprus and in the
event of enosis would make concessions to the Turks. The Turkish Govern-
ment was maintaining its support for the prohibition of enosis and for
a geographic separation under a federal system; furthermore 1t would ex-
ercise its treaty right of intervention: self-determination demanded by
Makarios was only a cloak for enosis. It was ready however to agree to
a reduction of the Turkish area from the 38% demanded by Kutchuk to 20*.
it was concerned with the equilibrium in the eastern Mediterranean and
considered multi-lateral talks indispensable. The U.K. Government just
wished to facilitate mediation and would not stand in the way of any
solution agreed on by the other parties.
The U.N. had indeed prevented further fighting, but 'a peaceful solu-
tion and agreed settlement' in the security council resolution (4 March
1964) was certainly no nearer. With such the peace in the eastern Medi-
terranean was threatened. Cypriots lived in uncertainty, tension, hosti-
lity and fear of external Intervention. The Greek Cypriots had almost
exclusive authority in government, and overwhelming armed force, by which
it controlled all save a few scattered areas where maybe 30% to 50% of
the Turkish Cypriots lived. There was no willingness on either side for
agreed political settlement. Relations between Greece and Turkey were
bitter and the support of the rival communities was a burden on both
countries. Leaders of the two communities would agreed 1n principle to
talks but not in practice, unwilling to modify their basic positions. In
these circumstances no likelihood of an agreed settlement existed. 'Both
sides have brought themselves to positions to which for one reason or
another, they feel publicly committed and which they cannot volunteer to
modify.' If he made his own proposals, they would bear the stamp and mor-
al force of the U.N. and he would cease to be a mediator and become an
arbitrator which was beyond his terms of reference. Perhaps he might put
forward his own conclusions of their separate basic needs and aspira-
tions: his analysis might demonstrate that their real interests were not
beyond reconciliation and create the conditions for constructive discus-
sions.
Though there were two communities and four Governments legally with
equal Interest in the settlement, and an agreed solution must involve
all, the agreement must in the first instance come from the Cypriot
people themselves and be accepted by both communities. Only thus could
the renewed criticism be avoided that it was imposed from outside.
There was the problem of the status of the Treaties and Constitution
of 1960] the Turkish-Cypriot leadership and also the Turkish
Government have attached particular importance to this question
and have insisted on the validity of the Treaties and the Consti-
tution, declaring that it is the fault of the other side that
their implementation has been prevented. On the other hand, the
500
Greek-Cypriots and the Greek Government regard them as not being
in effect because they are unworkable; and the Government of
Cyprus, as I have recorded earlier, has gone so far as to declare
formally that it considers the Treaty of Alliance to have been
terminated, basing this position on the refusal of the Turkish
Government to order its national contingent in Cyprus to return
to its barracks. I do not myself feel called upon to make any
judgement on these matters. At the same time, having taken it to
be the clear intention of the Security Council that the 'agreed
settlement' of the Cyprus problem should be one agreed upon by
the very parties which adhered to the Treaties of 1960, I think
it logical to expect that the agreed settlement will not be one
which merely restores the situation existing before 1963 and
that, by agreeing to the settlement, the parties would necessar-
ily agree also formally to abrogate or at least modify those
Treaties. It is obvious that the Cyprus problem cannot any longer
be solved by trying to implement fully the Nicosia Treaties and
the Constitution governed by the Treaties. The succession of
events, as well as the points of view held by the parties concer-
ned, have left no doubt that the existence of the Treaties and
the difficulties encountered in applying them constituted the
origin of this crisis and have continued to influence its develo-
pment. It is of no great importance to try to determine whether
the Treaties were in fact incapable of being applied or whether
their application was made impossible through the fault, deliber-
ate or otherwise, of one or more of the parties concerned. It is
enough to observe that the difficulties in implementing the Trea-
ties began almost immediately after independence and became inc-
reasingly serious. The events which have taken place in Cyprus
since December of 1963 have created a situation which makes it
psychologically and politically impossible to return to the prev-
ious situation. Moreover, the very act of appointing a Mediator
in order to help bring about 'an agreed settlement of the problem
confronting Cyprus' can be said to indicate the conviction of the
Security Council that some new solution would have to be found
in order to bring an end to the existing crisis....
[On the matters of independence, self-determination and the interna-
tional peace the Greek Cypriots and Greece itself claim that these were
impaired by the Treaties of 16 August 1960 by forbidding amendment, pro-
hibiting enosis and proscribing partition. The Turkish Cypriots and Tur-
key believed that these limitations were essential for the Turkish commu-
nities rights and for equilibrium in the eastern Mediterranean which
enosis would seriously disturb: if self-determination were granted, it
must be so equally to the Turks.
Thus enosis remained the most divisive and explosive aspect of the
problem which the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey would actively resist.]
The question of Enosis itself has several aspects. If its impo-
sition in present circumstances would be judged from the Turkish
side as tantamount to an attempt at annexation to be resisted by
force, it is also a question which, to the best of my understand-
ing, does not enjoy unqualified support among the Greek-Cypriots
as a whole. It is true that among them, as among many people in
Greece, the word and the thought of Enosis have a highly emotio-
nal quality: it serves to some as a symbol of Pan-Hellenistic
ideals, to others as the battle-cry of the resistance against
colonial rule, and in the worst times of the present crisis it
 501
seemed like a banner under which the Greek-Cypriot community as
a whole found their railying-point. But as a practical step in
the political evolution of Cyprus it has struck me, in dis-
cussions with a wide range of Greek-Cypriot opinion, as having
a much less united and imperative driving force behind it.
This may be in part because there have been few precise indica-
tions of the form which Enosis should take and of the economic,
social and political consequences which would flow from it. I
understand Enosis to mean in its literal sense the complete ab-
sorption of Cyprus into Greece, but I would hesitate to say that
this is what every Greek-Cypriot favouring it intends it to mean.
The Greek-Cypriot leaders in the Government of Cyprus - main-
taining the position that Enosis would be a matter purely for
Cyprus and Greece to decide - could tell me nothing about the
form in which they envisaged it taking place except that this
would be determined by the Cyprus Government in agreement with
Greece before the Cypriot people were consulted on the subject.
I had sought clarification of this question not only because of
the existing Turkish opposition to the idea but also because I
had no doubt that the implementation of Enosis, even should it
be accepted as an element of the settlement of the Cyprus prob-
lem, would entail many complex problems, political, economic,
financial and other. For example, Cyprus and Greece have now
different bases for their systems of law and administration of
justice; Cyprus, which produces essentially the same sorts of
agricultural commodities as Greece, now exports most of its
products to the United Kingdom under conditions of commonwealth
preferences; it has a higher standard of living and a higher wage
level, a different tax structure and a more comprehensive social
security system; it also has a different currency system and,
being a member of the sterling bloc, its pound is maintained on
a parity with the pound sterling and under present arrangements
is freely convertible into any other sterling bloc currency and
relatively freely convertible for dollars.
All such matters would require adequate adjustment should
Enosis be brought about. Their effects would vary widely depend-
ing upon whether Enosis would take the form of a complete union
with Greece, in the sense that Cyprus would become one or more
provinces of Greece, or whether Cyprus would be given some privi-
leged status within the Kingdom of Greece. In either case, a num-
ber of complex problems would arise and require urgent solutions
and it seems to me indispensable that the Cypriot people should
be fully informed of them if they were to be called upon to make
their choice. To the best of my knowledge, there is no common
understanding on either the Greek-Cypriot or the Turkish-Cypriot
side, nor between the Cyprus and Greek Governments, of what form
Enosis would take and what its effects and implications would
be . . . .
[Makarios and the Greek Cypriot ministers acknowledged that enosis had
been the original aim for the uprising against British rule and remained
a strong aspiration: they even thought that if a choice were required,
the majority of the Greek Cypriots would favour enosis rather than in-
dependence. But at present their prime object was 'unfettered Indepen-
dence'. He believed that the government of Cyprus would respect its com-
mitments to the U.N. Charter and to international peace and security, and
that, in claiming self-determination, it would recognise the well-being
 502
of its citizens and seek to heal, not aggravate, internal dissensions.
In his view he found it difficult] to see how any pro-
posed settlement which leaves open the possibility of Enosis
being brought about against the will of the Turkish-Cypriot
minority can secure agreement at present or in the foreseeable
future. Serious warnings have been given that an attempt to
impose such a solution would be likely to precipitate not only
a new outbreak of violence on Cyprus itself but also a grave
deterioration in relations between Turkey on the one hand and
Cyprus and Greece on the other, possibly provoking actual hosti-
lities and in any case jeopardizing the peace of the eastern
Mediterranean region. The question can be raised, consequently,
whether it would not be an act of enlightened statesmanship - as
well as a sovereign act of self-determination in the highest
sense - if the Government of Cyprus were in the superior inter-
ests of the security of the State and the peace of the region to
undertake to maintain the independence of the Republic. This
would imply, of course, a decision on the part of the Government
to refrain, for as long as the same risks persisted, from placing
before the population the opportunity to opt for Enosis. Should
the Government of Cyprus undertake such a course of action, I am
confident that the Government of Greece, in the same spirit,
would be prepared to respect it. I must emphasize again that in
view of the sovereign prerogatives which the Cyprus Government
would enjoy, this decision would naturally take the form of a
voluntary act on its part. To maintain the independence of Cyprus
would have to be a free undertaking on the part of the Government
and people of Cyprus and not a condition to be imposed upon them.
It would remain open to the Government, if it wished the popula-
tion as a whole to share directly in this exercise of the right
of self-determination, to seek through some such means as a re-
ferendum its approval of the proposed terms of settlement inclu-
ding the undertaking to maintain the independence of Cyprus. I
should like to emphasize here my view that the whole of any pro-
posed settlement based on continued independence, and not the
question of independence alone, should in that case be put to the
people. . . . [perhaps, if this were a referendum monitored by the U.N..
Makarios had already as a contribution to the peace and security of the
region, declared his readiness to demilitarise the island, and to refrain
from aligning it with any group of nations. On the structure of the state
the Greek Cypriots insisted on a unitary form based on majority rule with
protection for the minority, while the Turkish Cypriots envisaged a fede-
ration of autonomous and geographically separate Turkish Cypriot and
Greek Cypriot states with consequent migration of people.]
The reason why the Turkish-Cypriot leadership seeks a geo-
graphical separation, which does not now exist, of the two
communities should, also been understood. If the fear of Enosis
being imposed upon them is the major obstacle to a settlement as
seen from the Turkish-Cypriot side, one reason for it is their
purported dread of Greek rule. Their leaders claim also, however,
that even within the context of an independent Cypriot State,
events have proved that the two communities, intermingled as they
are now, cannot live peacefully together. They would meet this
problem by the drastic means of shifting parts of both commun-
ities in order to create two distinct geographical regions, one
predominantly of Turkish-Cypriot inhabitants and the other of
 503

G r e e k - C y p r i o t s . They c l a i m t h a t t h i s would now be m e r e l y an

e x t e n s i o n o f t h e p r o c e s s t h a t has been f o r c e d on them by e v e n t s :
t h e g r e a t e r c o n c e n t r a t i o n t h a n usual o f t h e i r p e o p l e i n c e r t a i n
p a r t s o f t h e i s l a n d , n o t a b l y around N i c o s i a and i n t h e n o r t h -
w e s t . . . . [But i t was d i f f i c u l t to see how the Greek Cypriot objections could
1n practice be overcome. The Turkish side denied that federation meant
p a r t i t i o n ; but there were serious economic, social and moral objections
to the compulsory removal of thousands of Cypriots with severe hardship
imposed on many families in both communities. In his opinion i t would
lead inevitably to disruption, discontent, and f r i c t i o n and to p a r t i t i o n
with a new national front and between Greece and Turkey endangering i n -
ternational peace. This would be 'a desperate step in the wrong d i r e c t -
I o n ' . He did not believe in the ' i m p o s s i b i l i t y ' of the two communities
learning to l i v e together again in peace: where there had been free
movement and reduced tension, they already did so.
The Turkish Cypriots saw such separation not as an end but as a means
to ensure adequate protection. That there should be some effective safe-
guards was indeed agreed on a l l sides, even the most rigorous possible
guarantees against discrimination: i t would be 'an indispensable condi-
t i o n for the progressive rebirth of confidence and the re-establishment
of social peace', but there were possibly other less drastic means than
separation. Indeed there would be considerable d i f f i c u l t i e s in securing
i m p a r t i a l i t y and understanding over the period of discussion. To overcome
d i s t r u s t certain international guarantees must be provided: the Turkish
Cypriots would have to forego some of those rights secured in the Zurich
London agreements 'greatly superior' to those which they could r e a l i s t i -
c a l l y expect for the future, and they must be helped to resettle in
Turkey and to be compensated i f the new guarantees did not win t h e i r
confidence.]
I have shown e a r l i e r i n t h i s r e p o r t t h a t t h e 1960 C o n s t i t u t i o n
went t o unusual l e n g t h s i n t r y i n g t o meet t h i s s i t u a t i o n by c o n -
f e r r i n g on t h e T u r k i s h - C y p r i o t community, as s u c h , a number o f
political rights designed to allow it to protect itself from
being completely subjugated by the majority community, it is,
however, t h i s f e a t u r e o f t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l system which has been
most s e v e r e l y c r i t i c i z e d and which has g i v e n r i s e t o t h e most
s e r i o u s d i f f i c u l t i e s o f i m p l e m e n t a t i o n , i t seems i m p o s s i b l e t o
o b t a i n agreement on m a i n t a i n i n g such a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l o d d i t y i n
t h e f u t u r e a g a i n s t t h e w i l l o f t h e m a j o r i t y . Yet t h e problem
b e h i n d i t c a n n o t be i g n o r e d , and t h a t problem - t h e hard f a c t o f
t h e d i s t i n c t i v e c h a r a c t e r o f t h e two c o m m u n i t i e s , sharpened by
t h e r e c e n t e v e n t s - r e q u i r e s t h a t some s p e c i a l measures s h o u l d
be a p p l i e d i n o r d e r t o ensure t o t h e members o f t h e m i n o r i t y
community a p r o p e r v o i c e i n t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l l y communal a f f a i r s
and a l s o w i t h o u t weakening t h e u n i t y o f t h e S t a t e , an e q u i t a b l e
p a r t i n t h e p u b l i c l i f e o f t h e c o u n t r y as a w h o l e . Such measures
w i l l be a necessary c o n d i t i o n f o r any s e t t l e m e n t t h a t must t a k e
a c c o u n t , as t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l ' s r e s o l u t i o n r e q u i r e s , o f t h e
' w e l l - b e i n g o f t h e p e o p l e o f Cyprus as a w h o l e ' . They need o n l y
be t r a n s i t i o n a l : indeed t h e y s h o u l d be c l e a r l y u n d e r s t o o d by a l l
s i d e s t o be s o ; b u t t h e y seem t o me i n f a c t t h e o n l y p r a c t i c a l
way t o e n s u r e i n t h e l o n g e r r u n , t h e p o l i t i c a l u n i t y o f t h e c o u n -
t r y . F a i l u r e t o p r o v i d e a t r a n s i t i o n a l means o f e n s u r i n g a s h a r e
by the Turkish-Cypriot community in the political life of the
S t a t e c o u l d o n l y , I am c o n v i n c e d , have t h e o p p o s i t e e f f e c t f r o m
a c c e l e r a t i n g t h e i r i n t e g r a t i o n . I t would o n l y p e r p e t u a t e t h e i r
504

s e p a r a t e n e s s , - because i t i s i n t h e g e n e r a l n a t u r e o f t h i n g s
t h a t t h e l a r g e r community t e n d s t o dominate and t h a t t h e s m a l l
t o be d o m i n a t e d ; and i t i s i n t h e p r e s e n t n a t u r e o f t h i n g s i n
Cyprus t h a t t h i s c o u l d p r o l o n g t h e f e r m e n t o f h o s t i l i t y between
them and t h e r i s k o f e n d l e s s a c t s o f v i o l e n c e . I c a n n o t emphasize
t h i s matter too s t r o n g l y , i t i s not a question of denying the
r i g h t o f a p o l i t i c a l m a j o r i t y t o r u l e , b u t a q u e s t i o n o f t h e need
t o a v o i d t h e e x c e s s i v e dominance o f one p r e s e n t l y d i s t i n c t commu-
n i t y o v e r a n o t h e r , t o an e x t e n t and i n manner l i k e l y t o d e l a y
i n d e f i n i t e l y the unity of the p o p u l a t i o n . . . .
[Makarios had recognised the need for such guarantees- the Incorporation
of the U.N. Universal Declaration on Human Rights into the c o n s t i t u t i o n ,
vigilance on equal treatment in public service appointments, the appoint-
ment of a U.N. commissioner and s t a f f to monitor safeguards, and a Gener-
al Amnesty and provision for the resettlement of Turkish Cypriots who
l e f t and r e h a b i l i t a t i o n for those who remained. He was also ready to per-
mit them autonomy in certain f i e l d s of r e l i g i o n and education, and repre-
sentation in government i n s t i t u t i o n s by proportional representation or
reserved seats and a special Turkish Cypriot minister for community
a f f a i r s . Other matters - the o f f i c i a l languages, the police, and local
government might s i m i l a r l y be dealt with s a t i s f a c t o r i l y by negotiation.
The question would arise how best permanently to guarantee such safe-
guards. The use of treaty arrangements was anathema to the Greek Cypr-
i o t s ; and the 1960 guarantees had proved unsatisfactory to the Turkish
Cypriots when they had been disregarded and suspended without interven-
t i o n by the Guarantor Powers. Perhaps the U.N. i t s e l f could act as
guarantor.
In the f i r s t instance he thought the prime need was for the leaders of
the two communities to meet and t a l k . Perhaps his report might be the
basis for a valuable exchange of views.]
Should t h i s p r o c e d u r e l e a d t h e way e v e n t u a l l y t o an agreement
on a l l major i s s u e s a t t h e l e a d e r s h i p and governmental l e v e l , and
s h o u l d i t t h e n be found n e c e s s a r y t o r e f e r t h e terms o f s e t t l e -
ment t o t h e p e o p l e o f Cyprus d i r e c t l y , I c o n s i d e r t h a t i t would
be e s s e n t i a l t o p u t t o t h e p e o p l e t h e b a s i c s e t t l e m e n t as a
w h o l e . They s h o u l d be asked t o a c c e p t o r r e j e c t i t as a s i n g l e
package, and n o t i n i t s v a r i o u s p a r t s . T h i s i s because any s e t t -
lement w h i c h m i g h t be a r r i v e d a t w i l l n e c e s s a r i l y be i n t h e
n a t u r e o f a compromise i n v o l v i n g c o n c e s s i o n s t o be made by b o t h
s i d e s f r o m t h e i r o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n s . I t seems t o me i n e v i t a b l e
t h a t i t w i l l have t o be a c a r e f u l l y b a l a n c e d s e r i e s o f a g r e e -
ments, each r e l y i n g on t h e o t h e r and a l l o f them on t h e w h o l e .
I t w i l l a l s o be a c c e p t e d , I b e l i e v e , t h a t s h o u l d t h e r e be a ma-
j o r i t y vote a g a i n s t the terms of the s e t t l e m e n t , t h i s should not
be c o n s t r u e d as a v o t e i n f a v o u r o f any o t h e r p a r t i c u l a r s o l u t -
i o n . I n s t e a d , i t would o n l y s i g n i f y t h a t t h e p r o c e s s o f s e e k i n g
an a c c e p t a b l e f o r m o f s e t t l e m e n t would have t o b e g i n anew.
I r e i t e r a t e and emphasize my c o n v i c t i o n t h a t e v e r y endeavour
must c o n t i n u e t o be made t o b r i n g a b o u t a p e a c e f u l s o l u t i o n and
agreed s e t t l e m e n t o f t h e Cyprus p r o b l e m . By any and a l l a p p r o p r i -
a t e means, t h e s e a r c h must go o n , w i t h p a t i e n c e , t o l e r a n c e and
good f a i t h . The w e l l - b e i n g o f t h e C y p r i o t p e o p l e demands i t ; so
does t h e cause o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace and s e c u r i t y . 1

1. The Turkish Government and Turkish Cypriots, however, r e j e c t e d the report

 505

148. AGREEMENT BETWEEN PRESIDENTS MAKARIOS AND RAOUF DENKTASH,

12 February 19771
(1) We are seeking an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal fede-

as going beyond Plaza's functions as mediator. This U Thant rejected with

regret and asked him to continue his work. (Makarios in a letter to U Thant
(2 October) set down a declaration of intent about the measures he was ready
to adopt to protect the minority.) But Turkey refused to recognise him and his
mediation came to a premature end. Meanwhile bilateral talks between Greece
and Turkey continued - without the participation of the Cyprus government -
until September 1967 when they collapsed. In April 1967 a military junta had
taken power in Greece and from July, initially over Turkish Cypriot opposition
to Greek Cypriot police in Ayios Theodhoros on the Nicosia-Limassol highway,
the tension increased till in mid-November the commander of the National
Guard, General Grivas, took excessive retaliatory action against Turkish
Cypriot provocation, seeking ambitiously to stem Makarios' 'drift to indepen-
dence', maybe by bringing about a full scale war between Greece and Turkey as
the way to enosis to which he was obsessively committed. Meanwhile Turkey
refrained (under U.S., U.K. and U.S.S.R. pressure) from aggressive action
against the gratuitous policy of the Greek Cypriot government to intimidate
the Turkish Cypriots - even to restrict their movement and to boycott them
commercially. Only by the involvement of the U.N. secretary general, the Cana-
dian P.M., Lester Pearson, and the U.S. president's representative Cyrus
Vance, was that war averted by 3-4 December and Greek and Turkish troops were
withdrawn. Grivas had been recalled by the junta in mid-November (though later
in 1971 he re-established E.O.K.A. B. to reassert the need for enosis, while
in 1973 rival bishops sought to defrock Makarios and undermine his authority.)
The appointment of the pro-N.A.T.O., Panayiotis Pipinelis as Greek foreign
minister on 20 November 1967 also helped. 1. In July 1974 the new junta in
Athens was tempted to intervene (through the Greek officers of the Greek Cyp-
riot National Guard) to overthrow Makarios and instal a puppet, the notorious
Nicos Samson, in his place (15 July). Makarios was rescued ignominiously by
theR.A.F. Five days later Turkish intervention/invasion took place (20 July)
allegedly acting under the treaty of guarantee - though the treaty did not
give such a unilateral right, nor was Turkey concerned to re-establish consti-
tutional legitimacy. (On 23 July the junta fell in Athens. ) Effectively there
was partition: the U.N. negotiating a cease fire (22 July) which the Turkish
forces immediately disobeyed and by 30 July had increased the area of the Tur-
kish occupied federated state to about 38% of the island. After the breakdown
of the Geneva conference (10-13 August) the Turkish forces continued their
operations and the Greek armed forces were, after seven years of dictatorial
mismanagement, quite incapable of providing even token support to the Greek
Cypriots. Following the events of July-August 1974 some 550 Turkish Cypriots
and three times that number of Greeks were declared 'missing', many of the
latter victims of the E.O.K.A. B. coup. A U.K. parliamentary select committee
subsequently (Apr. 1976) and with hindsight criticised Britain for not using
its "legal right, moral obligation and military capacity to intervene during
July and August 1975 - a report rightly rejected by the Callaghan government
(Hans. 19 May 1976: 1399-1403). (Later it was alleged that the U.S. vetoed a
U.K. plan to attempt to prevent a Turkish invasion while, at the same time,
the U.S., fearing a communist takeover, panicked at a possible pull out by the
British. No doubt Cyprus was still strategically important, but the actions
of the Greek Cypriots and of the junta won little sympathy - and no aid.) U.N.
resolutions (5 Nov. 1974, Nov. 1978) demanding respect for the sovereignty,
independence and territorial integrity of the island, the withdrawal of for-
506
rat 1 republic. (2) The territory under the administration of
each community should be discussed in the light of economic via-
b i l i t y or productivity and land ownership. (3) The questions of
principles like freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, the
right of property and other specific matters are open for discus-
sion taking into consideration the fundamental basis of a bi-com-

eign forces and the right of refugees to return safely to their homes were
disregarded. On 13 Feb. 1975 an independent state as the Turkish wing of the
future federation of Cyprus was proclaimed. Federation of some sort was now
seen to be inevitable by Makarios and Clerides (who had acted when he was
deposed and now became his chief mediator): but Makarios wanted a tight
federation, Denktash a loose confederation. By 1977 Makarios was ready to make
considerable concessions to win over President Carter to use his influence on
Turkey, but many Greek Cypriots felt he would give away too much without
reciprocal concessions from the Turks. On 3 Aug. 1977 Spyros Kiprianou (1977-
88) succeeded Makarios as president. Denktash had succeeded Kutchuk in 1973.
These four guidelines were agreed in Nicosia on the initiative of the U.N.
secretary general, Dr. Kurt Waldheim. . Denktash, even at Geneva in August
1964 - 'the Attila plan' - had insisted on a very loose confederal solution
with two (probably more) geographical administrative regions, while Turan
Gunes, the Turkish foreign minister, had proposed a number of settled commune-
based cantons. At Vienna in February 1976 the Greek Cypriots, now recognising
that only by a federal solution could the island remain a single state, had
advocated a bi-communal multi-regional constitution - a number of areas
including a substantial one in the north-east (of about 20% of the island) for
the Turkish Cypriots and with their freedom of movement from other parts to
that region: a final acceptance of a geographical federation, though a strong
central government consisting of both communities was also necessary. At
Vienna, a year later, the Greek Cypriots submitted a map suggesting two main
administrations but no division into political and economic zones in the
interests of economic viability, productivity and cohesion. But the Turkish
Cypriots remained inflexible over the next years and the Waldheim initiative
collapsed in April 1978, though a year later he was still trying to begin
fresh negotiations on the basis, now reaffirmed (19 May 1979), of these
February 1977 guidelines. The search for a viable and durable politi-cal
settlement still continued with most ostensible chance of agreement since
Clerides (president since 1993) and Denktash had been acquaintances at inns
of court in London together. But after two decades the boundary lines seemed
set in stone: when progress appeared likely and a settlement not impossible,
demonstrations by hardline extremist minorities (particularly on the Greek
Cypriot side) could destroy the result of much confidential and painstaking
work: years of careful building lost within a day. Once more, amid new suspic-
ions aroused on both sides, the slow process of establishing some trust began
again. Fundamentally the Greek Cypriots demanded the withdrawal of Turkish
forces, the recovery of some of the 38% occupied territory, and the rights for
Greek refugees to return to their previous homes and live safely under the
Turkish Cypriot administration: while the Turkish Cypriots wanted equal status
in the island with the 78% Greek majority, a very loose federation with power-
sharing at the centre but a substantial amount of autonomy in local administ-
ration; a maintenance of a guarantee and right of armed intervention by Tur-
key; and little or no return of refugees save in the very long term. In Nov.
1983 the Turkish Federated State in the north east became the Turkish Republic
of Northern Cyprus - the Declaration of Statehood, but it was condemned by the
U.N. Security Council and only Turkey recognised the new 'state'.
 507

munal f e d e r a l s y s t e m and c e r t a i n p r a c t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s w h i c h may

a r i s e f o r t h e T u r k i s h C y p r i o t c o m m u n i t y . ( 4 ) The powers and f u n c -
t i o n s o f t h e c e n t r a l f e d e r a l g o v e r n m e n t w i l l be such as t o s a f e -
guard t h e u n i t y o f t h e c o u n t r y having r e g a r d t o t h e bi-communal
character of the s t a t e .

1 4 9 . TEN-POINT AGREEMENT, 19 May 1979

1 . I t was a g r e e d t o resume t h e i n t e r c o m m u n a l t a l k s on 15 June
1979.
2. The basis for the talks will be the Makarios-Denktash
g u i d e l i n e s o f 12 F e b r u a r y 1977 and t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s r e s o l u t i o n s
r e l e v a n t t o t h e Cyprus q u e s t i o n .
3 . T h e r e s h o u l d be r e s p e c t f o r human r i g h t s and f u n d a m e n t a l
freedoms of a l l c i t i z e n s of t h e R e p u b l i c .
4 . The t a l k s w i l l d e a l w i t h a l l t e r r i t o r i a l and c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
aspects.
5 . P r i o r i t y w i l l be g i v e n t o r e a c h i n g a g r e e m e n t on t h e r e s e t t l e -
ment o f V a r o s h a u n d e r U n i t e d N a t i o n s a u s p i c e s s i m u l t a n e o u s l y w i t h
t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n by t h e i n t e r l o c u t o r s o f t h e
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and t e r r i t o r i a l a s p e c t s o f a c o m p r e h e n s i v e s e t t l e -
m e n t . A f t e r a g r e e m e n t on V a r o s h a 1 has been r e a c h e d , i t w i l l be
i m p l e m e n t e d w i t h o u t a w a i t i n g t h e outcome o f t h e d i s c u s s i o n on
o t h e r a s p e c t s o f t h e Cyprus p r o b l e m .
6 . I t was a g r e e d t o a b s t a i n f r o m any a c t i o n w h i c h m i g h t j e o p a r -
dize the outcome of the talks, and special importance will be
g i v e n t o i n i t i a l p r a c t i c a l m e a s u r e s by b o t h s i d e s t o p r o m o t e good
w i l l , m u t u a l c o n f i d e n c e and t h e r e t u r n t o normal c o n d i t i o n s .
7 . The d e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n o f t h e R e p u b l i c o f C y p r u s i s e n v i s a g e d ,
and m a t t e r s r e l a t i n g t h e r e t o w i l l be d i s c u s s e d .
8 . The i n d e p e n d e n c e , s o v e r e i g n t y , t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y and n o n -
a l i g n m e n t o f t h e R e p u b l i c s h o u l d be a d e q u a t e l y g u a r a n t e e d a g a i n s t
u n i o n i n w h o l e o r i n p a r t w i t h any o t h e r c o u n t r y and a g a i n s t any
form of p a r t i t i o n or s e c e s s i o n .
9 . The i n t e r c o m m u n a l t a l k s w i l l be c a r r i e d o u t i n a c o n t i n u i n g
and s u s t a i n e d m a n n e r , a v o i d i n g any d e l a y .
1 0 . The i n t e r c o m m u n a l t a l k s w i l l t a k e p l a c e i n N i c o s i a . 2

1. A newly b u i l t - u p d i s t r i c t of Famagusta, almost e n t i r e l y of Greek Cypriot

r e s i d e n t s and h o t e l s , deserted by them when they fled west, and preserved
behind barbed wire as a bargaining counter by the government of the North. I t s
return with t h e i r property, now decaying and r a t - i n f e s t e d , was a major demand
of the refugee lobby.
2. Inevitably the Agreements of 1977 and 1979 were foci of legal semantics,
for the Greek and Turkish Cypriots had quite contrasted concepts of a possible
'federation*. For the Greek Cypriots envisaged a centralised federation [cf.
B.N.A. in 1867: Vol.IV, p.7441 with the federal government securing a maximum
of power and the u n i t s enjoying l i t t l e more than county a u t h o r i t y - ' a s u b s i -
d i a r i t y ' l i k e Oxfordshire or Berkshire; while the Turkish Cypriots had some-
thing in mind which resembled more closely the status quo with e x i s t i n g separ-
ate autonomy and a minimum of federal intervention (perhaps l i k e the proposed
Caribbean federation - so weak i t f e l l a p a r t . [Nos. 11-35]) The Greek Cypriots
wished to define the ' s o v e r e i g n t y ' of the new s t a t e in such a way t h a t i t
would preclude, so far as p o s s i b l e , any future secession of the Turkish Cyp-
r i o t e n t i t y with any separate ' s o v e r e i g n t y ' - even the U.N. s e c r e t a r y - g e n e r -
a l ' s 'Set of I d e a s ' , including a s i n g l e and i n d i v i s i b l e ' s o v e r e i g n t y ' deriving
508

from both communities, would need more refinement to satisfy them; though they
would be content with his definition of 'political equality' as effective par-
ticipation in the federal government rather than numerical equality. The Turk-
ish Cypriots would stress that 'sovereignty' must 'emanate' from both communi-
ties and would wish for what they called 'real' political equality - i.e. for
example, a requirement for consensus in decision making. So once more the con-
cept of 'autochthony' became a matter of concern - the source of authority.
Whence would the new sovereignty itself derive? A big bang or virgin birth,
which would come into existence at the -moment when the two communities voted
for it and would die if either side seceded or asserted a claim to assume con-
trol? So were raised the usual problems in a federation of dividing powers
between the federal government and the units, and the question of whether the
unit's powers were co-equal or subsidiary. On the size of the territories
there might be possible agreement that the present Turkish Republic of North-
ern Cyprus could relinquish some of the 38% of the island it governed. Denk-
tash did propose '29% plus' while the Greek Cypriots envisaged '29% minus':
of course some land (e.g. Morphu citrus plantations) was more desirable than
other. But any settlement capable of being accepted in the South must allow
most Greek refugees to return to their homes. On this freedom of movement then
there would seem to be no major difficulty. There would have to be some tran-
sitional arrangements, but the Turkish Cypriots would seem reasonably comfor-
table with the general idea. The real problem concerned the freedom to settle
and to own property. The Turkish Cypriots would find it difficult to live with
the idea of Greek Cypriots settling and buying land in the North: while there
was in the south a well-organised refugee lobby demanding a return to their
own property (some 160,000 had fled west). [About 50,000 Turks had fled
north.] The North would also require assurances that they would not be under-
mined by possible E.U. membership with its appetite for centralised and uni-
form rights. Of course the need for security was paramount. The Greek Cypriots
felt threatened by the proximity of Turkey, by the presence of many Turkish
troops on the island and by the Treaty of Guarantee which seemed to give them
some legitimacy: just as the Turkish Cypriots could not forget the persecution
they endured in the early 70's from Grivas and the National Guard. Placards
and photos on either side of the crossing by the Ledra Palace draw attention
to the mutuality of atrocities meted out to one community by the other. A
Greek Cypriot proposal for a new international force, incorporating Greek and
Turkish elements, was an unlikely attempt to bridge the divide and allay
fears. An interim draft agreenent in April 1986 was accepted by Denktash but
not by Kyprianou. Indeed in 1994 direct face-to-face talks between the leaders
closed, though indirect weekly contacts through the U.K. High Commission, the
U.N. and eventually the E.I), continued. Only Turkey had recognised the Repub-
lic of the North. In his isolation and fear of an E.U. embargo Denktash insis-
ted more strongly on equality of recognition. The E.U.'s decision to go ahead
with the unilateral Greek Cypriot government's application for membership cer-
tainly made any settlement harder, though to have refused might seem to give
the Turkish Cypriots a veto. But by feebly selling the pass to the Greek Cypr-
iots, it removed any incentive for them to reach accommodation with the North.
The E.U. would seem to have rewarded Greece for its intransigence in threaten-
ing to veto any enlargement of the E.U. to include Turkey, while Turkey had
withdrawn its opposition to the expansion of N.A.T.O. Turkish Cypriots resen-
ted the legerdemain whereby Greek Cypriots have ultimately, though rejecting
the carefully balanced agreement of 1960, assumed the inheritance of legiti-
macy - and universal recognition. Now by falling for the Greek Cypriot case,
Brussels has been pressed into creating a situation where Turkey has 'occupied
 509

F. GIBRALTAR

In the final stages of decolonisation the future constitutional development

of small colonies was becoming a problem [See Vol.vil, pp.52-3: also above Nos.
1-10, esp. 5(b). Also F. Madden Imperial constitutional documents, 1765-1965,
pp. 103-5]. In Gibraltar the question was whether the establishment of a le-
gislative council, urged informally by the Governor, Sir Kenneth Anderson, to
give Gibraltarians a 'say 1n their own affairs', would, 1n parallel with the
municipal council, make the Rock over-governed: for a population of some
17,000 it was 'over-elaborate' to have [as in Hong Kong] two councils: [see
Vol.VII, pp.642-3]. Though there had been a city council since the 1920s its
functions had been limited and 1t was not till a legislative council was esta-
blished in 1950 that there was any real participation of the civilian popula-
tion 1n the administration and government of the fortress colony. Thereafter
gradually a series of minor reforms led the dependency to internal responsible
government with a chief minister and a ministerial system. At the end of the
century Its chief ministers were pursuing a goal as a mini-state within the
European Union. But a main issue between the council of ministers and H.M.'s
G. concerned who was responsible for Gibraltar's implementation of E.U. direc-
tives. Gibraltar claimed this under Its reserved rights; H.M.'s G. under its
responsibility for Gibraltar's external relations. Gibraltar saw the E.U. as
a threat while Spain saw it as a final opportunity. Meanwhile the Rock was
developing from a fortress city into a tourist holiday centre.

150. O.E.S. LLOYD: NOTE ON THE GIBRALTAR CITY COUNCIL, 3 August 19481
[I.The city council was composed of 7 elected, 4 nominated (3 by the

E.U. territory'. Though the Northern Republic was becoming increasingly a vir-
tual province of Turkey (with which it already shared money, postal and tele-
communication links), in April 1998 Denktash proclaimed a move into 'a joint
economic zone' with Turkey. Richard Holbrooke, the U.S. president's special
envoy (who had succeeded in brokering the Dayton accord on Bosnia in 1995) had
to admit failure in Cyprus. He blamed Denktash's demand for the cancellation
of the E.U.'s talks on the membership of Cyprus, and the E.U.'s insensitivity
towards Turkey: the E.U. should have put Turkey's application 'on the same
basis as the other eleven countries' including Cyprus for 'it is clear...Cle-
rides does not represent the Turkish Cypriots' and he could not persuade the
two Cypriot leaders to meet even if accompanied by the P.M.s of Greece and
Turkey. Moreover, as for the Cyprus application for E.U. membership, Article
22 of the 1959-60 accord would seem to forbid Cyprus 'to participate in whole
or in part in any political or economic union with any state whatever', or in
Denktash's gloss 'any group of states to which Greece and Turkey do not bel-
ong'. So it could be argued that the very constitution which provides Clerides
with the source of his government's claim to the whole island, actually pro-
hibits E.U. membership. (It might be noted that while Greece [like Ireland,
Vol.VI, p.610] was overwhelmingly a net beneficiary in the E.U., Cyprus with
a prosperous economy would be a net contributor.) Meanwhile the Clerides go-
vernment had ordered some S.300 rockets from Russia. Still behind the scenes
considerable progress might seem to have been made, even in recent years. Both
sides are, of course, conscious of agitation from extremists and are aware of
the need for caution. As always sporadic attacks across the 'green line' (as
in 1996) and demonstrations, counter-demonstrations and their consequences
will threaten to unravel the laborious achievements of quiet diplomacy.
i. CO.91/527/1 [see also Vol.VII, pp.542-3: min. by W. Dale, 12 Aug. and
 510
services, one by the governor) and two ex officio members (the chief me-
dical officer and the director of education) for a 3-year term. Electors
must be British subjects over 21, continually resident - apart from com-
pulsory evacuation- for 12 months and not in the services or wife of a
service man, or insane. Councillors must be a qualified elector and able
to speak, read or write English.]
2. Powers: (a) Needing consent of the Governor:1
(1) May make Standing Orders (C1.78). (2) May make contracts with
Military (C1.78). (3) May make bye-laws (C1.82) (4) May appoint,
employ and fix salaries of all persons, except the Auditor, as
may be necessary to enable them to exercise and carry into effect
powers and authorities created by the Ordinance when salaries
proposed exceed £200 per annum (C1.89). (5) May appoint Consta-
bles (C1.90). (6) May appoint Secretary and Treasurer (C1.92).
(7) May grant pensions, gratuities and other allowances payable
from the Council's revenue (C1.102). (8) May undertake public
works for which it is necessary to raise capital exceeding £1,000
(C1.104). (9) May abandon or suspend construction of works

cabinet Commonwealth affairs mins. 29 Oct.] Lloyd was a temporary administra-

tive assistant in the C.O. The governor, Sir Kenneth Anderson, had in a semi-
official letter to Creech Jones argued that the chief cause for antagonism to
government on the Bock was that peoples of all classes resented having no say
in their own affairs. He had tried to let representative bodies, including the
city council, know what was going on and to give them a feeling they were not
cyphers. But the grant of a legislative council was a matter of urgency, 'Do
please help to get a move on': (13 Jan. 1948: C.O.91/536/3). In a letter to
Sir Thomas Lloyd, the permanent under-secretary, Lieut. General Anderson, had
put a strong case against service representation for that would bring defence
matters gratuitously within local politics: the governor's presence should
guarantee adequate presentation of defence issues. The essential co-ordination
between the services would not be improved by such representation: that should
be secured before measures reached the legislature. He saw no need for the
transfer of any government functions to the city council apart from town plan-
ning. The functions of the city council were mainly executive: those of a le-
gislature would be to make and monitor laws. He favoured proportional repre-
sentation, for the only real party was the Association for the Advancement of
Civil Rights and it would win all seats: where there was not responsible go-
vernment, the elected members had no responsibility for governing and could
only represent to government (the governor and officials) the feelings of the
electorate and not merely of the majority but of all significant bodies of
political opinion. This was better done by election under P.R. not by nomina-
tion: (4 March 1948: C.O.91/536/3). It was decided that there should be a le-
gislative council with an unofficial majority from the first to avoid frustra-
tion, and without specific service representation (Bennett to Ellner at the
Admiralty, 22 April, ibid.) but there was still doubt about 'over-government'
and the possibility of a single council, legislative and municipal: (20 July,
ibid.). But Anderson regarded the pledge as unchangeable: there was no alter-
native to which objections were not stronger. If Listowel came to promote the
single council, Anderson would try to convince him rather than be converted:
(to Bennett, 5 Aug.: C.O. 91/536/4). JL. Mary Fisher minuted that, though in
theory this sanction was 'necessary for all major operations of the Council,
in practice this was largely a formality and the city councillors do pretty
well what they like" and without the council secretary, the A.G. , and the
financial secretary having 'any finger within their pie': (4 Aug. ibid.).
 511

a l r e a d y u n d e r t a k e n ( C l . 1 0 9 - 1 1 0 ) . ( 1 0 ) May s e l l o r exchange any

highway o r any s u r p l u s lands v e s t e d i n them ( C 1 . 1 1 4 ) . ( 1 1 ) May
c o n s t r u c t o r a c q u i r e houses and o f f i c e s ( C 1 . 1 1 6 ) . ( 1 2 ) May t a k e
up i n t e r e s t on s e c u r i t y o f t h e G.S.P. r a t e s o r any o t h e r monies
a u t h o r i s e d t o r e c e i v e , p r o v i d e d t h a t t h e t o t a l amount borrowed
s h a l l n o t exceed t h e a s s e s s a b l e v a l u e f o r two y e a r s o f t h e p r o -
p e r t y s u b j e c t t o payment o f r a t e s ( C 1 . 1 2 4 ) . . . .
[The governor's sanction was not required for buying or h i r i n g carts
or carriages, for making contracts; for appointing to posts salaried
under £200, or rate collectors, engineers or medical o f f i c e r s of health;
for undertaking works under £1,000, for balances of c a p i t a l , and for
appointing sub-committees. The annual estimates would be presented to the
Council's auditor.]

1 5 1 . MARY FISHER: MINUTE, 3 August 19481

[ I t seemed to her ' u n l i k e l y ' that the current City States might provide
some useful precedents for Gibraltar's problems.] I n t h e f i r s t p l a c e
t h e C i t i e s were s o v e r e i g n S t a t e s t h e r e was no d i f f i c u l t y about
r e s e r v e d m a t t e r s . (No comparison can be made w i t h t h e C i t y S t a t e s
when t h e y were i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o t h e Roman E m p i r e , s i n c e t h e y
t h e n d e c l i n e d i n t o m u n i c i p a l i t i e s w i t h v e r y few powers i n d e e d .
I n c i d e n t a l l y , when i n t h e Empire f o r t h e g r e a t e r p a r t o f t h e i r
p u b l i c u t i l i t i e s and s o c i a l s e r v i c e s , t h e y r e l i e d on t h e p r i v a t e
purse o f t h e i r M a g i s t r a t e s , a system t h a t would h a r d l y commend
i t s e l f t o t h e G i b r a l t a r Chamber o f Commerce! ) I n t h e second p l a c e
t h e y were i n g e n e r a l f a r f r o m w e l l r u n . I n t h e t h i r d p l a c e t h e i r
C o n s t i t u t i o n s were h a r d l y models o f s i m p l i c i t y - S p a r t a , f o r i n s -
t a n c e , which had fewer r e v o l u t i o n s t h a n most, had two K i n g s , a
Board o f f i v e M a g i s t r a t e s w i t h g e n e r a l powers o f s u p e r v i s i o n o v e r
t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n , a C o u n c i l o f E l d e r s , and an Assembly; Rome when
s t i l l p r i m a r i l y a C i t y S t a t e had t h r e e s e p a r a t e L e g i s l a t u r e s ,
each concerned w i t h a d i f f e r e n t t y p e o f law, as w e l l as t h e Sen-
a t e w h i c h d e a l t p r i m a r i l y w i t h f o r e i g n r e l a t i o n s and f i n a n c e and
o f c o u r s e t h e v a r i o u s e l e c t e d m a g i s t r a t e s . G r a f t i n g even t h e s i m -
p l e s t f o r m o f a n c i e n t C o n s t i t u t i o n on t o G i b r a l t a r would I s u p -
pose mean t h a t t h e C i t y C o u n c i l l o r s would f o r m u l a t e and propose
l e g i s l a t i o n , w h i c h , a f t e r d e l i b e r a t i o n i n an E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l
r e i n f o r c e d by a number o f ex-Chairmen o f t h e C i t y C o u n c i l , would
be ratified by a plebiscite of the whole body of electors. Such
an e x p e r i m e n t would be e n t h r a l l i n g t o t h e h i s t o r i a n b u t s c a r c e l y
s a t i s f a c t o r y t o the a d m i n i s t r a t o r .
I must apologise for this pedantic paragraph; but I think it
i s as w e l l t o g e t r i d o f t h i s s t r a n g e p r o p o s a l .
The d i f f i c u l t i e s b e f o r e us seem t o me t o be as f o l l o w s : - ( 1 )
The p r i d e t a k e n by t h e G i b r a l t a r i a n s , and p a r t i c u l a r l y by t h e
G i b r a l t a r i a n L e f t Wing, i n t h e C i t y C o u n c i l as i t f u n c t i o n s a t
p r e s e n t . I f o r e s e e s t r o n g o p p o s i t i o n t o any p r o p o s a l s which would
a l t e r e i t h e r t h e powers o f t h e C i t y C o u n c i l o r i t s method o f

1. CO.91/536/4. Mary Fisher was in the Mediterranean department [see Vol.VII

pp.299, 302-3, 551]. The cabinet Commonwealth Affairs committee concerned a t
the possible 'over-government' in a small t e r r i t o r y had suggested an
i n v e s t i g a t i o n into the c o n s t i t u t i o n s of current City S t a t e s as providing a
possible s o l u t i o n : [see also W. Dale, min. 12 Aug. Vol.VII, No.208(a) on
Danzig, Luxembourg and T r i e s t e ] ,
512
election. (At the moment each elector votes for all the elected
members of the Council, the result being that the largest and
best-organised Party - The Association for the Advancement of
Civil Rights - secures all elected seats.) (2) The fact that
while the Service Departments have representation on the City
Council they are extremely anxious to avoid having representation
on the Legislature so as not to get involved in the major and
more acrimonious issues of local politics. (3) The hostility bet-
ween the A.A.C.R. and the other main bodies of Gibraltar opinion.
Apart from the three unofficial nominated members of Executive
Council, all men of substance (the leader of the Jewish commun-
ity, a prominent non-political business man, and a member of the
Chamber of Commerce), this opinion will be centralised in the
Chamber of Commerce and the local branch of the Transport and
General Workers' Union, neither of which is at all well disposed
to the A.A.C.R. The situation with which we shall have to cope
is likely to be dominated by the fact that the A.A.C.R. will wish
to have a Constitution built up from the City Council elected as
at present, thus securing all power for itself, while the other
bodies will wish to subordinate the City Council to the new
Legislature and will be largely concerned with seeing that the
A.A.C.R. gets as little out of the transaction as possible. (4)
I suspect that we are unlikely to be able to get anything through
that does not leave the City Council much as it is. I wonder whe-
ther it would not be possible to use the elected members1 of the
City Council as a nucleus of a Legislature, re-inforcing them by
an agreed number of other members (elected by proportional repre-
sentation or any other system that commends itself) plus the
necessary off icials, i.e. Colonial Secretary, Financial Secretary
and Attorney-General. City Council elections are held every three
years; there might possibly be something to be said for electing
the non-City Council members not simultaneously but half way
through the three year period on the American pattern. I should
myself like to see an arrangement of this sort coupled with one
by which say two of the City Council members and one of the other
members were also members of Executive Council. An arrangement
of this sort would, I think, have the advantage that some sort
of embryonic Ministerial system (as originally proposed for Cyp-
rus) could be worked. The City Councillor who was for instance
Chairman of the Health Committee might be expected to concern
himself in the Legislature more particularly with general quest-
ions of health not at present falling within the City Council's
territory, e.g. the administration of the Colonial Hospital,
registration of doctors, etc. and might be brought still more
closely into touch by being made a member of the Executive Coun-
cil. By this means the two bodies (for there can be no denying
that there would in fact still be two) might, I think, gradually
be fused.
(5) I put up this proposal very tentatively and mainly as a cock-
shy. I should like to add, however, it does seem to me that it
is likely to be a waste of time for us to go to Gibraltar2 until

1. 'Possibly not all of them (not all 7) but e.g. the Chairman, Vice-Chairman
and the Chairmen of the Housing and Health Committees'. 2. With Listowel. The
announcement that H.M. 's G. was contemplating a fresh approach caused 'genuine
 513

we have t h o u g h t o u t t h i s problem r a t h e r c a r e f u l l y here f i r s t ; a l l

the more in view of the political difficulties, already men-
t i o n e d , t h a t we a r e l i k e l y t o f i n d when we g e t t h e r e . . . .

152. GOVERNOR SIR KENNETH ANDERSON TO JOHN MARTIN, 20 May 19491

[The l e t t e r (5 May) that ' i n view of the unexpectedly strong line taken
by the Admiralty' the CO. had ' l i t t l e choice but to add a naval repre-
sentative' to the Executive Council, was I t s e l f 'unexpected' and 'rather
unwelcome'.]
Perhaps t h e most i m p o r t a n t f u n c t i o n o f an E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l
under a C o n s t i t u t i o n which i n c l u d e s a L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l i s t o
s e r v e as l i a i s o n between t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n and t h e L e g i s l a t u r e .
T h i s a s p e c t i s l i a b l e t o become o b s c u r e d , i t seems t o me, i f
e x t r a n e o u s p e r s o n a l i t i e s f i n d a p l a c e on t h e E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l .
(The presence o f t h e S e n i o r Combatant M i l i t a r y O f f i c e r i s e x p -
l a i n e d by t h e f a c t t h a t he i s c a l l e d upon t o a d m i n i s t e r t h e
Government i n t h e G o v e r n o r ' s absence and t o my mind i s j u s t i f i -
a b l e s o l e l y on a c c o u n t o f t h a t f a c t . )
As t o t h e reasons advanced by t h e A d m i r a l t y ; t h e f a c t t h a t t h e y
a r e l a r g e employers o f l a b o u r (perhaps m o m e n t a r i l y t h e l a r g e s t )
i s n o t c o n c l u s i v e , f o r t h e A d m i r a l t y a r e and w i l l be r e p r e s e n t e d
on Bodies d e a l i n g w i t h s p e c i f i c a l l y l a b o u r m a t t e r s .
The argument c o n c e r n i n g c o - o r d i n a t i o n i s o b v i o u s l y on t h e f a c e
o f i t a s t r o n g one, though i t has v e r y l i t t l e s u b s t a n c e i n f a c t .
As I s a i d i n my l e t t e r o f t h e 12th J a n u a r y , t h e o c c a s i o n s on
which m a t t e r s i n t i m a t e l y a f f e c t i n g t h e naval a u t h o r i t i e s come
b e f o r e t h e E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l a r e r a r e a n d , when t h e r e i s advan-

dismay' among the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e bodies and charges of 'bad f a i t h ' : (Anderson,

9 Aug. ibid.). These bodies unanimously demanded elected representation and
public debate in a l e g i s l a t u r e , and the maintenance of the c i t y council as an
independent body: and the u n o f f i c i a l s on the executive council agreed t h a t any
suggestion other than 2 separate councils was open to g r e a t e r objection. Meet-
ings with Listowel demonstrated opposition to a l l other C O . proposals. In
Sept. Mary Fisher s t a t e d the only possible course was to persuade the cabinet
committee to adhere to the o r i g i n a l proposals: G i b r a l t a r i a n s long suffering
tolerance was being s t r a i n e d by serious doubt about H.M.'s G. goodwill: (Min.
18 Sept. Ibid.). In October Creech Jones reported to the cabinet committee
t h a t Listowel had found Gibraltarean opinion unanimous against any attempt to
modify the c i t y council: t h e r e was no evidence of overlapping between the
functions of the government and the c i t y council and no reason to suppose t h a t
duplication would become cumbrous. No s i m p l i f i c a t i o n or economy would r e s u l t
from combining legislative and municipal functions; (Memo. 14 Oct. ibid.). The
cabinet was not persuaded but r e l u c t a n t l y accepted Creech Jones proposals:
[Vol.VII, No.208(b)]. 1. CO.91/536/6. Lieut.-general Anderson, writing here
to the a s s i s t a n t under-secretary in the C O . , had already dismissed the demand
by the Admiralty for a naval r e p r e s e n t a t i v e on the executive council, the
seventh member of which who administered the government in the governor's
absence - the senior m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r - was c l e a r l y the b e t t e r choice; (to
Creech Jones, 12 Jan. ibid.). But the Admiralty had persisted on grounds of
' p r i n c i p l e ' (Abercrombie, 9 Feb; Lang, 15 March), and Martin had seemed to
cave in: the C O . had ' l i t t l e choice' but to comply. Anderson had said he
would not w i l l i n g l y agree ( p r i v a t e , 20 May): the admiral was now increasing
his demand, wanting to deputise in the governor's absence instead of the
senior military officer; (17 May, ibid.).
514
tage in so doing, the Flag Officer can be, and is, invited to
attend the relevant meeting.
In practice the vast bulk of the business dealt with by the
Executive Council has no interest for the naval authorities; and
on the other hand there are plenty of matters which do intimately
concern the naval authorities which never come near the Executive
Council because they do not need to.
The object of the new Constitution is, as I understand it, to
give to Gibraltar a constitution which is so far as possible
civilian in its character and gives to the people of the place
as large a share in the direction of their fortunes as the pecu-
liar circumstances of Gibraltar permit. It seems to me that in
these circumstances it would be a pity, as well as somewhat illo-
gical, to introduce at this precise juncture into the very centre
of Government an element of Service representation which was not
there before. And the fact that a naval representative will be
able in the supreme policy-framing body of the Colony to pass
judgement on a multiplicity of questions of no naval concern
whatsoever (whether, in fact, he avails himself of the opportun-
ity or not) cannot fail, as I see it, to produce the impression
that His Majesty's Government is fighting a kind of rather grudg-
ing rear-guard action in order to minimise the civilian control
of affairs civilian. If there had been many and glaring examples
of non-co-ordination of the type that naval representation on
Executive Council might have been expected to prevent, the desire
of the Admiralty to secure representation on that body would have
been appreciated and indeed shared. But such is not the case.
I am therefore not a partisan of naval representation on
Executive council. If, however, it is nevertheless felt that the
Admiralty's wishes must be met over this matter, I consider that
it is preferable that the Flag Officer Gibraltar (and no other
naval officer) should be the representative. The Executive Coun-
cil is supposed to be an assembly of persons holding the highest
rank in their respective spheres; and I consider it to be most
desirable that the naval representative should belong to this
category, should be able to speak (save where reference to the
Commander-in-Chief or to the Admiralty itself might be required)
with full personal responsibility, and should not be the mouth-
piece for some superior officer whose views it may subsequently
be found he has not adequately reflected. The circumstances of
Malta are no doubt different, and the fact that the Commander-in-
Chief is from time to time absent on other duties quite likely
makes it inconvenient that he should be a member of the council
there. That however is not relevant to the case of Gibraltar
where the Flag Officer's duties are of a stationary nature....
[It was 'unwise and unnecessary, indeed 'a serious mistake', to
introduce a naval executive councillor: the present practice of
consultation with the Admiralty on all matters within its concern had
worked 'efficiently and smoothly'.1]

1. At a meeting with the Admiralty in the C O . (5 Aug.) Lloyd declared it out

of the question politically to add the admiral to the executive. On 18 Aug.
John Lang, secretary to the Admiralty seemed ready to compromise: the flag
officer should receive executive council agenda and minutes and be entitled
to attend when items affected admiralty interests, not 'too narrowly' interp-
 515

153. ARTHUR CREECH JONES TO GOVERNOR SIR KENNETH ANDERSON, 30 July 19491
I t was announced on t h e 2 4 t h November, 1948, t h a t a L e g i s l a t u r e
would be e s t a b l i s h e d i n G i b r a l t a r , as soon as t h e necessary
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l I n s t r u m e n t s c o u l d be p r e p a r e d , t o c o n s i s t o f t h e
Governor as President, three Ex Officio Members, two Nominated
Members ( o f whom b o t h may, and one must, be u n o f f i c i a l ) and f i v e
E l e c t e d Members. I t was f u r t h e r s t a t e d t h a t power would be r e s e r -
ved t o t h e Governor t o pass i n t o law any measure necessary i n h i s
o p i n i o n i n t h e i n t e r e s t s o f p u b l i c o r d e r , p u b l i c f a i t h o r good
government, i n c l u d i n g d e f e n c e . The g e n e r a l o u t l i n e o f t h e new
c o n s t i t u t i o n i s t h e r e f o r e a l r e a d y f a m i l i a r t o y o u . I now have t h e
honour t o l a y b e f o r e you a more d e t a i l e d a c c o u n t o f t h e p r o v i -
s i o n s which i t i s proposed t o i n c o r p o r a t e i n t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
i n s t r u m e n t s and o f c e r t a i n o t h e r measures necessary t o b r i n g t h e
new c o n s t i t u t i o n i n t o o p e r a t i o n . . . . [New constitutional instruments and
l e t t e r s patent would be issued. Royal instructions would not need much
amendment. The electoral law would be prepared. On the governor's recom-
mendation proportional representation on a single transferable vote
system would be adopted in the f i r s t instance. The Legislative Council
might amend some parts of the electoral law and decide on the electoral
system. The electorate for the Legislative and City Councils would be the
same.2 On whether Gibraltarians resident outside the colony who owned
property there, or came regularly to work there should be qualified to
vote (though not at present qualified for City Council elections) he
would be guided by public opinion in Gibraltar. Elections would take
place every 3 years. The Governor would have a casting but no original
vote. The Colonial and Financial Secretaries and the A.G. should be the
ex officio members. There would be 5 elected members. The 2 nominated
members must be unconnected with any party or interest, but by character,
attainment or association capable of valuable public service. The Gover-
nor would be as normally empowered to veto, or reserve (at discretion)
b i l l s and s p e c i f i c a l l y b i l l s concerning external a f f a i r s , religious disc-
rimination, m i l i t a r y d i s c i p l i n e , and t r e a t i e s . The Governor would in
emergency have reserved powers of l e g i s l a t i o n , as would H.M.-in-Counc1l.
The Governor's prior consent would be required for money b i l l s . Standing
Orders should provide for question time.]
The E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l 3 i n a Colony p l a y s a p a r t comparable t o ,
though i n many ways d i f f e r e n t f r o m , t h a t o f t h e C a b i n e t i n t h i s
c o u n t r y . I t i s t h e body i n w h i c h p o l i c y i s c r y s t a l l i s e d and which
must be l a r g e l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r f r a m i n g t h e l e g i s l a t i v e p r o g r a m -
me. These d u t i e s i t w i l l c o n t i n u e t o p e r f o r m i n G i b r a l t a r . The

reted; (to Lloyd, 18 Aug. ibid.) - a position interpreted by Lloyd as virtu-

a l l y the same as a f u l l executive c o u n c i l l o r , 'though not physically p r e s e n t ' ;
(to Anderson, 5 Oct.). 1. CO.91/541/3. Gibraltar Gazett e E x t r a o r d i n a r y , 4
Aug. 1949, No.101. This new c o n s t i t u t i o n came into effect against Spanish pro-
t e s t s on 7 Nov. 1950; (CO. 91/541/4). Income tax proved an i n i t i a l d i v i s i v e
i s s u e : the l e f t and the A.A.C.R. voted in Jan. 1952 for an income tax b i l l ,
but the r i g h t opposed vigorously and i t s postponement (1 Apr. 1953) was regar-
ded as a v i c t o r y of the local champions over the government. 2. But Anderson
and h i s executive disapproved of the customary d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n of 'holders
of any public o f f i c e ' , public s e r v a n t s , and service employees which might exc-
lude candidates of q u a l i t y . 3. The executive, in 1950, would c o n s i s t of 4 of-
f i c i a l s and 3 u n o f f i c i a l s selected from the elected l e g i s l a t i v e c o u n c i l l o r s ;
(Anderson, 12 Jan. 1949: C O . 91/536/16).
516

Governor w i l l s t i l l be r e q u i r e d t o c o n s u l t t h e E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l
on a l l major i s s u e s and i n any case i n which he does n o t t a k e i t s
advice to report the matter to the Secretary of State. It is
c l e a r l y , t h e r e f o r e , o f g r e a t i m p o r t a n c e t h a t c o n t a c t between t h e
E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l and t h e L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l s h o u l d be c l o s e and
t h a t each s h o u l d be f u l l y aware o f t h e o t h e r ' s v i e w s on a l l s u b -
j e c t s w i t h w h i c h b o t h a r e c o n c e r n e d . To a c o n s i d e r a b l e degree
t h i s w i l l be a c h i e v e d by t h e presence i n b o t h C o u n c i l s o f t h e
C o l o n i a l S e c r e t a r y , t h e A t t o r n e y - G e n e r a l and t h e F i n a n c i a l S e c r e -
t a r y . I hope, however, t h a t a n o t h e r l i n k w i l l be f o r g e d by f i l -
l i n g a t l e a s t one, and p o s s i b l y more, o f t h e t h r e e u n o f f i c i a l
p l a c e s on t h e E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l f r o m t h e L e g i s l a t i v e c o u n c i l .
T h i s m a t t e r must remain w i t h i n t h e G o v e r n o r ' s d i s c r e t i o n ; no
r e q u i r e m e n t s wi 11 be i n s e r t e d i n t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n s t r u m e n t s .
N e v e r t h e l e s s I t h i n k , and I know t h a t you a g r e e , t h a t t h e m a c h i n -
e r y o f government w i l l be g r e a t l y eased i f i n p r a c t i c e t h e L e g i s -
l a t i v e C o u n c i l i s a d e q u a t e l y r e p r e s e n t e d on t h e E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l
f r o m t h e u n o f f i c i a l as w e l l as f r o m t h e o f f i c i a l s i d e . To t h i s
e n d , p r o v i s i o n w i l l be made i n t h e i n s t r u m e n t s t h a t t h e new Exe-
c u t i v e C o u n c i l w i l l o n l y come i n t o b e i n g a f t e r t h e f i r s t e l e c t -
i o n s have t a k e n p l a c e . U n t i l t h a t d a t e , t h e e x i s t i n g C o u n c i l w i l l
be p r e s e r v e d . 1

154. D.M. SMITH TO WILLIAM MORRIS, 12 August 19552

You w i l l now w i s h t o s u b m i t t h i s f i l e w i t h t h e two d r a f t s oppo-
s i t e t o h i g h e r a u t h o r i t y . I t h i n k t h a t t h e e l e c t e d members i n
G i b r a l t a r displayed i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y in attempting to force the
i s s u e o v e r t h i s revenue o r d i n a n c e i n t h e L e g i s l a t i v e c o u n c i l . I t
i s p o s s i b l e t h a t t h e r e may be a c e r t a i n amount o f r i g h t on t h e i r
s i d e so f a r as t h e u n d e r l y i n g economics o f t h e i r o b j e c t i o n s t o
t h e o r d i n a n c e i s c o n c e r n e d ; we must be v e r y c a r e f u l n o t t o k i l l

1. In Jan. 1954 the B r i t i s h ambassador in Madrid reported v i o l e n t demonstra-

tions, even threats on his life, by the Falange if the Queen visited
G i b r a l t a r , though the embassy had received messages of sympathy from 'more
s e r i o u s n o n - o f f i c i a l S p a n i a r d s ' ; (to Eden, 28 J a n . : CO.926/231).
2. C O . 926/281. Smith, a p r i n c i p a l in the Mediterranean department, was for-
warding two d r a f t s to Morris, head of the department. L i e u t . - g e n e r a l Redman
had informed Lennox-Boyd t h a t he had f e l t i t necessary t h a t same day (27 J u l y ,
1955) to use h i s reserve powers to declare a revenue amendment ordinance law,
though the council had f a i l e d to pass i t : i t imposed a 10% ad valorem duty on
c e r t a i n goods: i t was needed because the revenue r e c e i p t s had f a l l e n . The
u n o f f i c i a l s had voted against i t ' a s a stop g a p ' , arguing t h a t the d e f i c i t
should be met from the resources and a 'long-term s o l u t i o n ' must be negotiated
with the imperial government. Redman took the view t h a t immediate action was
necessary (no time to inform Lennox-Boyd) to prevent importers building up
s t o c k s , and t h a t G i b r a l t a r should help i t s e l f before i t could expect outside
help. He had provided Lennox-Boyd with a fuller account (5 Aug. ibid.) and the
s e c r e t a r y of s t a t e agreed the tax was necessary and the e l e c t e d members had
not made an acceptable case against i t (15 S e p t . ) . In response to t h i s the
e l e c t e d members resigned (30 Sept. ) a t the use of reserve power to impose t a x -
a t i o n against the w i l l of the people: the 2 e l e c t e d executive c o u n c i l l o r s also
resigned. Both governor and C O . recognised the d e s i r a b i l i t y , if the use of
reserve powers were thought l i k e l y , t h a t the s e c r e t a r y of s t a t e should be
informed (to Redman, 15 Sept.)
 517
the 'free port' goose that lays the golden eggs. The principal
factors in this to my mind are that the elected members decided
to make this a trial of strength between themselves and the
official side of the Gibraltar Government, and they chose to do
this in a public meeting of the Legislative Council, where it
was, I consider, essential that the Governor should display that
ultimate power remained in his hands; and they arrived at the
decision to force matters on this issue because they had argued
themselves into a state of mind where they considered (quite un-
justifiably) that H.M.G.'s policies were responsible for their
financial troubles, and that H.M.G. were not paying enough to get
them out of those troubles, and should pay more.
Quite apart from our need to back the Governor in his use of
his powers, unless they should have been used most outrageously,
I think that there is therefore strong reason for our backing him
in the quite difficult decision with which he was faced and which
he took, to use his reserved powers, in this particular case. We
discussed with the Governor the terms of a reply to his despatch,
the bulk of which reply will necessarily have to be shown to the
elected members, and he said that he would find it helpful to
have something in the terms of the draft reply now submitted,
which I hope it will be agreed may be sent....

155. D.M. SMITH: MINUTE, 3 October 19551

[The advancement of the date for Lennox-Boyd's visit would tie in well
with the need to determine the direction of policy on Constitutional
issues at this juncture.]
The case for making a concession may be summarised as follows:-
(a) Gibraltar's population is loyal to the British connexion, and
its leaders reflect that loyalty. They have been close enough to
Britain and British ways of thought for the constitution which
was introduced in 1950 to have developed harmoniously and succes-
sfully. The use of reserve legislative powers two months ago by
the Governor was in fact the first time Governor had needed to
have recourse to his powers to take action in opposition to the
elected representatives. It would be unfortunate and probably un-
necessary for the constitutional development of Gibraltar to be
halted by any striking of attitudes by the official and unoffi-
cial sides, (b) Internationally it would do us no good to have
a constitutional crisis in Gibraltar now. The Spaniards have
already made a certain amount of capital out of the fact that the
Governor used his reserved powers to carry through a taxation
measure against the votes of the elected members. They also of
course made capital out of the light which this taxation measure
threw on the success of their economic pressure on Gibraltar by
restrictions on the frontier. I have not consulted the Foreign
Office on this constitutional crisis in Gibraltar nor sent them
copies of the telegram but I feel sure that their advice would
be that anything resembling a constitutional crisis in Gibraltar
would be reckoned by the Spaniards as a success for their policy
against Gibraltar and could only serve to stimulate the Spani-
ards' further efforts, (c) It would appear that the concessions
which are needed to avoid this threatened constitutional crisis

1. CO.926/281.
518

a r e i n f a c t o f a v e r y m i n o r n a t u r e . T h i s i s n o t t o s a y t h a t we
s h o u l d n o t have t o be w a r y t h a t c o n c e s s i o n s a t t h i s s t a g e m i g h t
n o t be t a k e n a s a s i g n o f weakness i n H . M . G . , w h i c h m i g h t t h e r e -
f o r e be f o l l o w e d by a t t e m p t s t o o b t a i n c o n c e s s i o n s i n o t h e r
s p h e r e s , and a t a l a t e r d a t e , i n o t h e r a s p e c t s o f t h e c o n s t i t u -
t i o n . B u t i n g e n e r a l t h e t a s k w h i c h we f a c e i n G i b r a l t a r p o l i t i c s
is the task of explaining H.M.G.'s p o l i c i e s , the l i m i t s t o the
c o n c e s s i o n s w h i c h H . M . G . c a n make, and t h e e n c o u r a g e m e n t o f t h e
n a t u r a l l o y a l t y of t h e G i b r a l t a r i a n s t o m a n i f e s t i t s e l f i n forms
o f a c t i v e c o - o p e r a t i o n t o o u r m u t u a l b e n e f i t . So l o n g a s we make
s u r e t h a t t h i s t a s k i s c a r r i e d o u t , we need have no g r a v e f e a r s ,
I s u g g e s t , t h a t concessions a t t h i s s t a g e would prove a f i r s t
s t e p on t h e s l i p p e r y downward p a t h . . . .
[The resignation of the elected members was of course unfortunate and
somewhat i l l advised. But they had been growing increasingly uneasy a t
the progress of the Spanish campaign agajnst G i b r a l t a r and the lack of
success by H.M.'s G. in countering i t : the A.A.C.R. members have found
themselves v i r t u a l l y taken over by Mr. I s o l a , an independent who forced
them t o resign with him; and Joshua Hassan, who was in chambers in London
with Mr. Marshall, the chief minister of Singapore, had been persuaded
that there was no reason f o r him not t o follow the Singapore precedent
and stage a c r i s i s immediately before the Secretary of S t a t e ' s v i s i t .
An e a r l y v i s i t by Lennox-Boyd might dispel the c r i s e s : otherwise the
governor would have to issue w r i t s f o r new elections and cope with the
1956 estimates without any consultation with the people's representa-
t i v e s . The use of reserved power would be a major issue in the e l e c t i o n
and almost c e r t a i n l y the new l e g i s l a t i v e council would be faced by the
attempt by the elected members t o force a new c r i s i s . 1 ]
1 5 6 . GOVERNOR SIR HAROLD REDMAN TO WILLIAM MORRIS, 30 September 19552
I t now seems l i k e l y b u t n o t ( r e p e a t n o t ) c e r t a i n t h a t , a s a
r e s u l t o f t h e S. o f S . ' s despatch No.351 o f t h e 15th September,3
t h e s u b s t a n c e o f w h i c h was c o m m u n i c a t e d t o p e t i t i o n e r s on t h e
19th September, the Elected Members will resign en bloc in the
n e x t day o r s o . The r e a s o n w h i c h w i l l be g i v e n i s n o t so much
d i s a g r e e m e n t o v e r f i s c a l p o l i c y a s o b j e c t i o n t o my use o f t h e r e -
s e r v e d powers and y o u r r e j e c t i o n o f t h e i r p e t i t i o n on t h i s p o i n t .
I f t h e y do d e c i d e t o r e s i g n we t h i n k , h o w e v e r , t h a t i f I , o r
p r e f e r a b l y t h e S . o f S . , w e r e t o s u g g e s t t o them t h a t t h e y s h o u l d

1. Lennox-Boyd met Joshua Hassan again (mayor s i n c e 1953, executive c o u n c i l -

l o r , and chief e l e c t e d member of the l e g i s l a t i v e council s i n c e 1950) on 13
Dec. Hassan sought assurance t h a t because Cypriot methods were not being emp-
loyed, c o n s t i t u t i o n a l reform would not be slow. Lennox-Boyd declared he was
taking the A.A.C.R. memo, s e r i o u s l y but in some t e r r i t o r i e s (with only 5 e l e c -
ted members as in G i b r a l t a r ) t h e r e were d i f f i c u l t i e s in introducing systems
of m i n i s t e r i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , Hassan wanted some a s s o c i a t i o n of members with
departments, was prepared to continue with P.R., and wanted a s t a g g e r i n g of
e l e c t i o n s t o the c i t y and t o l e g i s l a t i v e c o u n c i l s . 2. C O . 9 2 6 / 2 8 1 : t e l . emer-
gency s e c r e t . L i e u t - g e n e r a l Redman (governor 1955-8) was w r i t i n g to Morris on
the problem a r i s i n g from h i s use of h i s r e s e r v e powers.
3. Lennox-Boyd had i n d i c a t e d t h a t he had no i n t e n t i o n of revoking the
ordinance, that the need for the tax had been examined by officials and
approved, and t h a t the e l e c t e d members had not made out a case t h a t an e x t r a
duty was not the answer to the problem: (to Redman, 15 Sept. ibid.).
 519
withdraw t h e i r r e s i g n a t i o n s u n t i l the S. of S . ' s v i s i t , t h i s
might w e l l avoid the f u l l consequences of an over hasty and some-
what L a t i n gesture. Reason f o r t h i s suggestion i s t h a t we now
f e e l t h a t the S. of S. might be a b l e , i f he agrees, t o s e t t l e the
present impasse on the f o l l o w i n g l i n e s : -
(a) To agree t h a t , i n p r a c t i c e , reserved powers should not
(repeat not) normally be used by the Governor w i t h o u t p r i o r
approval of the S. of S. (b) To accept the p r i n c i p l e t h a t , when-
ever p o s s i b l e , Nominated Members should be informed i n advance
of d e t a i l s and reasons of any important measure, f o r which t h e i r
support i s needed. Bates, 1 who saw Russo i n London, believes
t h a t i t was f a i l u r e t o do t h i s which led Russo t o vote against
the Government on the 27th J u l y , which i s , of course, the main
cause of the present s i t u a t i o n , (c) I n r e t u r n t o r e q u i r e from
Elected Members of the Executive Council and from Nominated Mem-
bers of the L e g i s l a t i v e Council an assurance t h a t they would i n -
form the Government before the relevant meeting of the L e g i s l a t -
ive Council i f they intended t o vote against any important meas-
ure, so t h a t , should use of reserved powers be l i k e l y t o a r i s e ,
f u r t h e r a c t i o n could be deferred u n t i l question had been r e f e r r e d
to you.. . .2

1. J.D. Bates was colonial s e c r e t a r y in G i b r a l t a r . The nominated members had

also voted against the t a x . 2. In t h e i r l e t t e r of resignation (30 Sept.
ibid.) the elected members represented the use of the reserve power as taxa-
t i o n without consent of the people, rejected Lennox-Boyd's proposition t h a t
a difference between the government and a majority of l e g i s l a t i v e c o u n c i l l o r s
on the appropriate answer to a problem e n t i t l e d the governor to exercise h i s
reserve power, and claimed t h a t such a proposition rendered the existence of
the council as 'nothing short of a f a r c e ' . Lennox-Boyd v i s i t e d G i b r a l t a r (9-10
O c t . ) , endorsed Redman's a c t i o n , but decided t h a t for the smooth working of
the c o n s t i t u t i o n i t was d e s i r a b l e in future to a s s o c i a t e t h e standing finance
committee of the l e g i s l a t i v e more c l o s e l y in the formulation of financial p o l -
icy both in revenue and in expenditure. To enlarge the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of the
standing committee, he proposed t h a t a l l financial proposals should f i r s t be
considered in p r i n c i p l e by the executive council which would then remit them
with recommendation in p r i n c i p l e t o the standing committee, t h a t the standing
committee should prepare d e t a i l e d measures for the executive to implement the
agreed policy, and t h a t t h a t committee should be provided with opportunity for
further and f i n a l comment on the recommendations of the executive. At a meet-
ing which Lennox-Boyd held in G i b r a l t a r with Redman and the 3 elected and 2
nominated members who had voted against the t a x , Redman denied he had been
given any i n d i c a t i o n t h a t they would vote in t h a t way; he asked for f u l l e r mi-
nutes, an arrangement to ensure dual r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and a c l e a r d e c l a r a t i o n
of voting i n t e n t i o n s so t h a t he could consult the s e c r e t a r y of s t a t e : he c l a i -
med t h a t the use of reserve powers must be *a very exceptional measure'. Len-
nox-Boyd pointed out t h a t the new tax could be re-examined a t the end of the
year: he appreciated much in the A.A.C.R, memo, on c o n s t i t u t i o n a l reform (e.g.
t h a t t h e governor should no longer preside in the councils) and in Redman's
proposals (e.g. the widening of the functions of the standing finance commit-
t e e ) . I t was emphasised by a C O . o f f i c i a l (Rushford) t h a t executive govern-
ment resided, not in the governor alone, but in the executive council which
was no mere rubber stamp but must normally be consulted by the governor and
put forward i t s own proposals. Several of the elected members indeed expressed
admiration for Redman and h i s behaviour in the c r i s i s , feeling he had been
520

157. POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE; REPORT, April 19561

We have been sounding public opinion this month on the propo-
sals for Constitutional Reform which the A.A.C.R. submitted to
the Secretary of State at the end of last year. Generally speak-
ing there is little desire for any major move in this direction
except among politicians with personal ambitions. There is, how-
ever, a widespread feeling that it would be right and politic to
grant a small overall majority of elected members in the Legisla-
ture and that if this were done, the City Council should be mer-
ged with the Central Government in the interests of economy.
There seems to be no wish for any limitation of the Governor's
Reserved Powers, and one's feeling is that the good people of
Gibraltar look to these to preserve them against one another and
against the vagaries of their Latin temperament as much as to
secure Gibraltar as a base for the Services and for N.A.T.O.
which they realise is the basis of their security and their pros-
perity. It was interesting to note that the most reactionary of
all those who were invited to express their opinion on this sub-
ject was the District Organiser of the local branch of the Trans-
port and General Workers' Union. His view, which was of course
dictated largely by his dislike of the rival Union, the G.C.L.
and its political Party, the A.A.C.R., was that the people of
Gibraltar were quite unfitted to have any greater say in govern-
ing themselves.

158. GOVERNOR SIR HAROLD REDMAN TO ALAN LENNOX-BOYD, 17 May 19562

[He had consulted widely on the demand for reform made by the Associa-
tion for the Advancement of Civil Rights and now reported on his imp-
ressions. ]
I t h i n k i t would be best i f I s t a r t e d by dealing w i t h those
p o i n t s on which there has been general agreement. In the f i r s t
place i t has been widely represented t o me t h a t there should be
a small but c l e a r o v e r a l l m a j o r i t y of Elected Members i n the
L e g i s l a t u r e . Even those l i k e the Heads of Services, who are some-
what apprehensive of the e f f e c t of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l changes on Ser—
v i c e and on Imperial i n t e r e s t s do not s e r i o u s l y contest t h i s view
e s p e c i a l l y as the p o s i t i o n now i s i n p r a c t i c e i f not i n law t h a t
the two Nominated Members of the L e g i s l a t u r e are U n o f f i c i a l s and
t h a t they are f r e e t o vote as they wish. Bearing i n mind t h a t
there i s now and t h a t there i s l i k e l y t o be i n the foreseeable
f u t u r e a roughly equal d i v i s i o n of the E l e c t o r a t e between those
who vote f o r p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s sponsored and d i r e c t e d mainly by
Trade Unions on the one hand, and f o r groups or i n d i v i d u a l s of
assorted Right Wing and Centre complexion on the o t h e r ; the f a c t
that everyone has agreed that the three ex officio Official Mem-
bers should continue t o s i t i n the L e g i s l a t u r e : and assuming the
continued existence of adequate and e f f e c t i v e Reserved Powers I

wrongly advised and was shielding h i s o f f i c i a l s , but J.O. Moreton ( p r i v a t e

s e c r e t a r y t o Lennox-Boyd 1955-9) noted t h a t ' a s a s o l d i e r with no experience
of the working of c o l o n i a l c o n s t i t u t i o n s ' Redman had no concept of the impli-
cations of using reserve powers: (Min., 13 Oct. ibid.). 1. CO.926/280 sec-
r e t , 8 6 / 7 / 0 1 . 2. CO.926/280, No.291. Redman had reported the A.A.C.R. memo.
on c o n s t i t u t i o n a l reform (published on 5 Apr. 1956) and had been asked to con-
s u l t l o c a l opinion widely and to make recommendations.
 521

myself believe t h a t i t would be r i g h t and p o l i t i c t h a t t h i s p r i n -

c i p l e should be conceded.
Although opinions vary on whether or not Nominated Members
should be retained I myself t h i n k t h a t the pros, of the case o u t -
weigh the cons. On the one hand i t has been represented t h a t so
long as those who are r e l u c t a n t to enter the p o l i t i c a l f r a y know
t h a t they may be able t o remain in or enter the p o l i t i c a l arena
by way of nomination, they may be d i s i n c l i n e d t o take the plunge
and t h a t i t i s i n the best i n t e r e s t s of G i b r a l t a r t h a t persons
of t h i s kind should be encouraged a c t i v e l y t o enter p o l i t i c s . On
the other hand, I f e e l t h a t G i b r a l t a r i s s t i l l too p o l i t i c a l l y
immature and not s u f f i c i e n t l y organised on properly representa-
t i v e Party l i n e s t o ensure t h a t a l l those i n t e r e s t s which should
be represented are in f a c t represented. G i b r a l t a r i s a community
of i n d i v i d u a l i s t s , and many persons of c a l i b r e and independent
views are r e l u c t a n t t o associate themselves w i t h such organised
p a r t i e s as now e x i s t and t h e i r chances of being elected are
thereby diminished. In these circumstances, I recommend t h a t the
two Nominated Members should be r e t a i n e d .
There was a general f e e l i n g t h a t U n o f f i c i a l representation on
Executive Council should be increased, but not t h a t there should
be an o v e r a l l U n o f f i c i a l m a j o r i t y . Although many persons of ex-
perience and wisdom i n p u b l i c a f f a i r s here were t o s t a r t with op-
posed t o a representative of the Services continuing t o s i t as
a permanent Member of Executive Council, they have a l l , I be-
l i e v e , now been persuaded t h a t the Services are so i n t i m a t e l y
concerned w i t h so many matters t h a t a r i s e i n Council t h a t i t i s
desirable t h a t the Service Member should be r e t a i n e d . Although
Admiral Currey has urged t h a t the Flag O f f i c e r G i b r a l t a r should,
as the Senior Service o f f i c e r a f t e r the Governor, represent the
Services on Executive Council, I do not myself believe t h a t a
case has been made out f o r any change in t h i s respect and f o r
your information I have also attached copies of l e t t e r s we have
exchanged on t h i s s u b j e c t . As regards the claim f o r an increase
of one i n the u n o f f i c i a l membership of the Council, I t h i n k t h a t
t h i s should be accepted i f only as a means of securing a wider
and more representative body of u n o f f i c i a l advice on t h i s impor-
tant body....
[The A.A.C.R. memo, advocated an independent Speaker in the Legislative
Council. He had long believed i t wrong for the Governor to be involved
in such proceedings and incompatible with his position as representative
of the Queen. Most Glbraltarians agreed that while he might continue to
be President, normally there should be a Speaker: the difficulty would
be to find f1n the narrow confines of Gibraltar a person of the status
and Independence from past political affiliations...essential for this
position'. The Governor may not be empowered to invite the Council to
recommend one of their number, or outside the Council, or even from the
U.K. as his deputy. The A.A.C.R. memo, was also concerned with the exis-
ting disqualifications of service employees from standing as Councillors
in a colony where the Service Departments were the major employers. The
heads of the services saw no strong objection to a change. The question
whether the same person could not be both city and legislative councillor
had also been raised, but was not urgent and could be considered by a
select committee of the next legislature. There was no support for the
A.A.C.R. request for 'ministers' and a 'chief minister' since Gibraltar
was too small for politicians to give up their professions to become
 522

ministers; but he proposed to continue and extend the existing practice

of informally associating u n o f f i c i a l s with departments which had proved
successful. Redman could not see how collective cabinet responsibility
could be possible u n t i l 2 or more parties emerged. He f e l t the two coun-
c i l s was ' r i d i c u l o u s and uneconomic' and thought that in a merger c i t y
matters could be dealt with by a l e g i s l a t i v e council committee under a
mayor. But i t would not be easy to define ' l o c a l ' a f f a i r s , and the Gover-
nor's responsibility to N.A.T.O. and service matters might regularly con-
f l i c t with the local desire f o r f u l l and unfettered control over domestic
matters. He thought that the proportion of o f f i c i a l s to non-officials was
too large.
Therefore he would recommend no change in the reserve powers as a pro-
tection 'against p o l i t i c a l inexperience and temperamental vagaries' and
he would accept that such powers should in principle (but not in consti-
tutional requirement) be used after prior consultation. The Governor
should be empowered to appoint a Speaker; there should be 7 (not 5)
elected members of the Legislative Council (uneven numbers would l i m i t
divided votes); and 4 (not 3) u n o f f i c i a l s in the Executive Council. He
suggested a reduction in size of the City Council - 11 (not 13) members,
4 (not 5) nominated, and one (not 2) appointed by the Governor.1

159. WILLIAM MORRIS TO DARRELL BATES, 31 October 19562

[The department had discussed the issues raised by the Governor (No.
291) in the relationship between the Colonial Government and the City
Council.] We q u i t e agree t h a t t h e f u t u r e o f t h e C i t y C o u n c i l
has t o be c o n s i d e r e d a g a i n s t t h e background o f t h e l i n e s on w h i c h
we can e x p e c t t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n t o d e v e l o p and t h e f u t u r e r e l a t -
i o n s h i p between t h e p e o p l e o f G i b r a l t a r , on t h e one hand, and t h e
U n i t e d Kingdom Government and t h e S e r v i c e s on t h e o t h e r . Much
seems t o us t o t u r n on t h e p r e s e n t s t r e n g t h o f ' t h e d e s i r e o f t h e
l o c a l p e o p l e t o have i n due c o u r s e f u l l and u n f e t t e r e d c o n t r o l
o v e r a l l d o m e s t i c m a t t e r s ' . We know t h a t Mr. Hassan and h i s c o l -
leagues r e a l i s e d on f u r t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s i n t h e
way o f i n t r o d u c i n g a f u l l - d r e s s m i n i s t e r i a l system a t t h i s s t a g e
b u t t h e y s t i l l i n c l u d e d r e f e r e n c e s t o t h e i r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l memo-
randum i n t h e i r e l e c t i o n a d d r e s s . Do you t h i n k , n e v e r t h e l e s s ,
t h a t f o r two o r t h r e e y e a r s a t l e a s t , we can e x p e c t t h a t t h e r e
will be no great pressure for any developments along these
l i n e s ? . . . . [ I f so, no radical readjustment of the relationship would be ne-
cessary, perhaps an increase 1n the powers of the City Council. The opin-
ion of the u n o f f i c i a l s might be focused on the economics, not the p o l i -
t i c s , of administration, by considering] ( a ) How uneconomical i t i s
i n f a c t t o have two e l e c t e d b o d i e s and two a d m i n i s t r a t i v e mach-
i n e s ? ( b ) Would any economy which m i g h t be e f f e c t e d by t h e f u s i o n
o f t h e f u n c t i o n s o f t h e C i t y C o u n c i l i n t o a Department o f G o v e r n -
ment l i k e l y t o be o f f s e t by any c o r r e s p o n d i n g d i s a d v a n t a g e , a n d ,
i f s o , t o what e x t e n t ? ( c ) would t h e r e be advantages a n d , i f s o ,

1. Lennox-Boyd approved these reforms: he was impressed by the results of

consultation and by the smooth functioning of the Executive, Legislative and
City Councils: (to Redman, 26 July, 1956: CO. 926/280). New l e t t e r s patent
were accordingly prepared; but the relationship between the l e g i s l a t i v e and
c i t y councils continued to provoke discussion.
2. CO. 926/280: Med. 86/7/01. W.A. Morris was head of the Mediterranean
department and J.D. Bates was colonial secretary (1953-64).
 523
what would they be, in transferring any functions, (and, if so,
which) at present performed by Government in the City Coun-
cil? . . . .
[If however there were to be increased pressure for devolution of power
to the local people, this might be 1n the demand either for greater cont-
rol over more matters by the City Council, or (as the Governor had indi-
cated) for a merger of the two councils when no doubt the new Legislative
Council would seek to expand its executive powers. What was needed at
this stage was some estimate of the strength and direction of demands for
further devolution: it could be no more than a broadening of the funct-
ions of the City Council, or a more radical constitutional reform.1

160. GOVERNOR SIR HAROLD REDMAN TO ALAN LENNOX-BOYD, 8 February 19572

[After 4 months of the new Legislative Council, he reported on the way
'things are going'. The new Executive and Legislative Councils had justi-
fied Lennox-Boyd's expectations in his despatch (No. 265) of 26 July
1956.] Business has been conducted in a smooth, amicable and
expeditious manner and the unofficials have generally acted in
a reasonable and responsible way...anxious to demonstrate that
they are to be trusted with increased powers and responsibilities
and that they will not abuse them. The A.A.C.R. Members are, I
think, all the better for having three Members instead of one in
opposition to them and they have not so far lent themselves to
any irresponsible and extravagant measures or promises. ... [Of the
3 new elected members, Mr. J.J. Triay had been 'more skilful and zealous
in criticism than in facing the facts or accepting responsibility' and
in October Redman would probably replace him by Mr. Isola who had proved
more 'prepared to learn and gain experience before committing himself.
Mr. Seruya had proved 'energetic and public spirited' if over self-con-
fident. Mr. P.G. Russo fulfilled all expectations as 'the most valuable
and independent-minded' of all the unofficials. Capt. Gareze was doing
quite well.
In accordance with the proposals 1n despatch No.265, the City Council
had been amended, though with a majority of new members, it did not be-
have very differently from its predecessor. Hassan, re-elected mayor, was
undoubtedly the most able of the unofficials, but Redman hoped that with
responsibilities on the Executive and Legislative Councils as well, a new
mayor might be found as replacement. In compliance with the recommenda-
tion to appoint a Speaker, he contemplated in the next 2-3 months a local
unofficial but not yet to Invite the Legislative Council to select from

1. Bates reply indicated that he thought there was no widespread support for
the A.A.C.R. demand for the abolition of nominated members, given the genuine
independence of men like P.G. Russo, and the transfer of a few more functions
to the City Council (gardens, cemeteries, playgrounds &c.) would be sufficient
in the next 3 years. On the governor's reserve powers Bates advised that it
would be prudent to write into the constitution that these should be used only
with the secretary of state's approval, that they should be removed in matters
of taxation; and that they should be limited for imperial and defence reasons.
He did not think there would yet be much pressure for full ministerial
responsibility. Finally on the continuing separation or fusion of the two
councils, they might be able to decide on the economies and efficiency likely
from a merger, but on such issues of constitutional policy, they would
appreciate the advice of an outside expert; (to Morris, 19 Nov. ibid.).
2. CO.926/768 confidential.
 524

among themselves: he would propose Mr. E.B. Cottrell. He had set up a se-
lect committee on disqualifications for membership1 and another on rules
of procedure. As for the question of 'Ministers', he had proposed to de-
velop and extend the existing system of associating unofficials individu-
ally with the work of particular departments, but had taken no action
t i l l he knew more of the interests and capabilities of the new unoffic-
ials. He f e l t now that he should begin to move in that direction.] My
plan i s t h a t i n i t i a l l y I should do not more than a l l o c a t e various
Departments of Government t o the U n o f f i c i a l Members i n accordance
as f a r as possible with t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t s , and t h a t I
should continue t o appoint U n o f f i c i a l Members of the L e g i s l a t u r e
to the various Committees and Boards, s t a t u t o r y and otherwise,
which have been established in G i b r a l t a r t o deal w i t h a great
v a r i e t y of s u b j e c t s . In t h i s i n i t i a l stage, I would not attempt
t o give Members any o f f i c i a l t i t l e s or t o define t h e i r d u t i e s .
I would l i m i t the association of any p a r t i c u l a r member w i t h any
p a r t i c u l a r Department t o a period of say a year, so t h a t gradu-
a l l y a l l Members should acquire some knowledge and experience of
several d i f f e r e n t Departments. At a l a t e r stage I t h i n k t h i s
informal arrangement could properly be extended t o give members
d i s t i n c t i v e t i t l e s and t o attempt t o define more exactly t h e i r
duties and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , which I t h i n k should include dealing
with some Questions and Motions i n the L e g i s l a t i v e c o u n c i l . At
t h i s stage i t would probably be necessary t o confine t h i s measure
of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n so f a r as the major Departments of Govern-
ment are concerned t o U n o f f i c i a l Members who are members of Exe-
c u t i v e Council i n order t o t r y and ensure t h a t an U n o f f i c i a l
acted as a member of a team and i n accordance w i t h p o l i c y agreed
upon i n Executive c o u n c i l . This should then pave the way f o r the
development of a proper form of c o l l e c t i v e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i f and
when a party system i s evolved i n G i b r a l t a r . On present form,
however, I think that this is still some considerable way
ahead. . . . [These proposals were 'somewhat vague and tentative' but he would
welcome comments on them and also any recommendations as promised in
No.265 on the relative functions of the Legislative and City Councils.2]

1. The major issue was the exclusion of employees of the Crown - on the long-
standing p r i n c i p l e against holders of o f f i c e s of p r o f i t . Were a l l i n d u s t r i a l
employees of the service department, and a l l c l e r k s employed in Government
departments d i s q u a l i f i e d ? ; (General Charles Keightley to Lennox-Boyd, 26 June
1958: C O . 926/768). 2. The c o l o n i a l s e c r e t a r y wrote to John Higham, head of
the Mediterranean department almost a year l a t e r in the same vein. A c i r c u l a r
had been sent to department heads in 1953 s t r e s s i n g how important i t was for
u n o f f i c i a l l e g i s l a t i v e c o u n c i l l o r s to be encouraged to feel responsible p a r t -
ners not i r r e s p o n s i b l e c r i t i c s : t h i s had worked quite well. In 1955 the two
e l e c t e d members had been p a r t i c u l a r l y t a r g e t e d and as with the l i a i s o n o f f i -
c e r s he had seen in Mauritius in 1957 t h i s had been reasonably successful. Now
in Oct. 1958 nearly a l l departments (not p o l i c e , a u d i t , customs but probably
not p r a c t i c a b l e i n d e f i n i t e l y ) would be covered (8 Feb. 1957): he and Redman
involved u n o f f i c i a l s in work, v i s i t s , press conferences &c. But at t h i s stage
t h e r e could be no question of them assuming any departmental r e s p o n s i b i l i t y
but departmental heads were expected to consult members before important d e c i -
sions were made so t h a t the c o u n c i l l o r s could a s s i s t in answering questions:
t h i s procedure had proved most e f f e c t i v e in the standing finance committee on
e s t i m a t e s . D i f f i c u l t i e s could be worked out by t r i a l and e r r o r between o f f i c -
 525
1 6 1 . JOSHUA HASSAN TO DARRELL BATES, 26 June 19581
[He was reporting on his consultations with fellow l e g i s l a t i v e council-
lors and A.A.C.R. members whose memo. (Oct. 1955) had been recognised by
Lennox-Boyd (30 March 1956) as a reasonable basis for constitutional re-
forms, then and 1n the future. Some changes had been implemented. I t was
now time for the next step.] The p o s i t i o n w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e a s -
sociation of Members with Departments must be clarified and
indeed extended i n o r d e r t o g i v e Members e x e c u t i v e powers. The
e x p e r i e n c e g a i n e d so f a r has c l e a r l y shown t h a t Members a r e
capable of assuming full responsibility for and control over
Departments. We do not want to dwell on the difficulties that
have been e n c o u n t e r e d by some Members, which must be w e l l known
t o y o u , b u t we a r e s a t i s f i e d t h a t t h e s e d i f f i c u l t i e s a r i s e b e -
cause o f t h e u n c e r t a i n p o s i t i o n o f Members i n r e s p e c t o f t h e i r
r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e Heads o f t h e p a r t i c u l a r D e p a r t m e n t s . I n d e e d ,
i f something i n t h i s c o n n e c t i o n i s n o t done t h e p r e s e n t a r r a n g e -
ments c a n n o t c o n t i n u e t o work s a t i s f a c t o r i l y f o r much l o n g e r . We
c o n s i d e r t h a t a C o u n c i l f o r M i n i s t e r s as s e t o u t . . . o f our Memo-
randum should now be created. If it is the intention to continue
a s s o c i a t i n g a l l Members w i t h Departments we propose t h a t t h e
C o u n c i l o f M i n i s t e r s s h o u l d be c r e a t e d as suggested i n our Memo-
randum and that those Members not belonging to the Council should
be c o - o p t e d t h e r e t o f o r m a t t e r s connected w i t h t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r
Departments....
[Furthermore, the l i f e of the Legislative Council should be extended to
5 years (as in most parts of the Commonwealth) to enable members to plan
ahead without having to f i g h t elections within a b r i e f period and to
ensure more s t a b i l i t y of policy where actions might not be immediately
popular. The requirement of prior consent by the Secretary of State for
estimates of expenditure ran counter to the s p i r i t of the October 1955
agreement anent the Standing Finance Committee and was inconsistent with
'the measure of financial devolution already granted' in many colonies

i a l s and u n o f f i c i a l s : the l a t t e r had said t h a t they f e l t the c i v i l servants

had gone out of t h e i r way to show how things worked and the departmental heads
reported t h a t u n o f f i c i a l s had avoided c r e a t i n g d i f f i c u l t i e s . Those members i n -
volved in preparing estimates strongly opposed t h e i r reduction and t h e i r c o l -
leagues were r e l u c t a n t to i n t e r f e r e in estimates framed by t h e i r fellows. Un-
doubtedly t h i s was an anomaly to expect u n o f f i c i a l s to act as members of the
government on some matters and as c r i t i c a l opponents on o t h e r s . But in a small
f o r t r e s s colony where a v a i l a b l e professional manpower was l i m i t e d , where few
could be involved f u l l time in government, and individual i n t e r e s t s were domi-
nant, the development towards m i n i s t e r i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y would be slow. There-
fore i t was a l l important to give u n o f f i c i a l s ' t h e outward appearance' of i t :
if not the r e a l i t y a t l e a s t the s t a t u s to s a t i s f y reasonable a s p i r a t i o n s and
d i g n i t y - with t i t l e s l i k e the 'member for education' &c. To prevent continual
obsession with e l e c t i o n s , the extension of the l e g i s l a t u r e ' s l i f e to 5 years
might help to make members 'more l i k e statesmen, l e s s l i k e p o l i t i c i a n s ' . This
was indeed a fascinating experiment a l l the more as one was breaking new
ground. The r e s u l t s were already encouraging: with patience and willingness
to admit mistakes a f a i r and e f f i c i e n t solution could be achieved; (Bates to
Higham, 31 Jan. 1958). 1. CO.926/768, written from the A.A.C.R. premises in
Governor's Parade. Hassan also r a i s e d the revision of the d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n s
for e l e c t i o n to the l e g i s l a t i v e council following the recommendations of the
committee; (Keightley, No.308: 16 June).
 526

with no more representation than Gibraltar. These were necessary steps

towards complete self-government in internal a f f a i r s 'which should be
taken before the next e l e c t i o n ' . As always, the A.A.C.R. were asking for
'the minimum at each stage' and trusted these reasonable proposals were
acceptable in the s p i r i t of co-operation between o f f i c i a l s and u n o f f i -
c i a l s during the last few years.]

162. GOVERNOR SIR CHARLES KEIGHTLEY TO ALAN LENNOX-BOYD, 3 November 19581

[Before submitting the A.A.C.R.'s proposals for the next step in cons-
t i t u t i o n a l reform, he had submitted them to the other u n o f f i c i a l l e g i s -
l a t i v e councillors. Three of the recommendations were ' f a i r and reason-
able' and should be accepted.]
Now t h a t t h e L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l i s f i r m l y e s t a b l i s h e d and t h e
U n o f f i c i a l Members have had a r e a s o n a b l e p e r i o d o f e x p e r i e n c e o f
i t s w o r k i n g s , I agree t h a t t h e t i m e has come t o i n c r e a s e t h e l i f e
o f t h e L e g i s l a t u r e . A t p r e s e n t Members a r e i n c l i n e d t o spend much
of t h e i r time e i t h e r l o o k i n g over t h e i r shoulder a t the undertak-
i n g s t h e y gave when t h e y s o u g h t e l e c t i o n , o r l o o k i n g f o r w a r d t o
t h e a c c o u n t t h e y w i l l have t o r e n d e r a t t h e n e x t e l e c t i o n . I n
these circumstances they sometimes feel unduly restricted in
r e a c h i n g w i s e and d i s p a s s i o n a t e d e c i s i o n s on m a t t e r s t h a t come
b e f o r e them. A l l t h e U n o f f i c i a l Members seem t o a p p r e c i a t e t h i s
and, I b e l i e v e t h a t t h e y would welcome a change which t h e y f e e l
would make i t e a s i e r f o r them t o what i s r i g h t and f a r - s i g h t e d
r a t h e r t h a n what i s m e r e l y p o p u l a r and o f immediate advantage t o
them, w i t h o u t , o f c o u r s e , i n any way a f f e c t i n g t h e i r u l t i m a t e
a c c o u n t a b i l i t y t o the e l e c t o r a t e . . . .
[The grant to the u n o f f i c i a l s of power over the estimates had proved
successful. Redman had not recommended Hassan's claim for a ' m i n i s t e r i a l
system', but in the event had continued to develop the informal system
of 'association' and had gone a long way in making the Unofficials feel
they had an important share in the work of Government. I t was ' i m p r a c t i -
cable, dangerous, and wrong' to give part-time p o l i t i c i a n s with t h e i r own
businesses f u l l - t i m e powers as ministers, as the Unofficials on the Exe-
cutive Council recognised. I t was d i f f i c u l t to envisage a time and c i r -
cumstances when in a small place l i k e Gibraltar there would be a s u f f i -
cient number of capable p o l i t i c i a n s able to devote t h e i r whole time to
p o l i t i c s . But as he sympathised with the desire of the elected represen-
tatives for 'an increasing say', he proposed to give formal status and
t i t l e to members 'associated' with departments - (e.g. the Member for
Education) and to recognise the one with most votes (though quite i l l o g i -
cal under P.R.) and most seats not as 'chief minister' ( f o r he was not)
but as 'senior member' who would have no formal responsibility but would
be 'associated' with the more important departments and be regularly
consulted by the colonial and financial secretaries. Hassan might refuse
t h i s new t i t l e and Lennox-Boyd might feel that he should discuss the mat-
ter personally with the Unofficials on his next v i s i t . The non-A.A.C.R.
members were much more concerned with relations between the Legislative
and City Councils. 2 ]

1. CO.926/768, No.532. General Keightley was governor (1958-62). 2. Robert-

son summarised the governor's despatch and minuted t h a t some t r a n s f e r of func-
tions [e.g. gas and electricity) might be transferred to the city on adminis-
t r a t i v e and economic grounds, but emphasised t h a t ' t o s t e e r a middle course
 527
163. D.M. SMITH TO JOHN HIGHAM, 24 November 19581
[There should be no d i f f i c u l t y in accepting Keightley's proposals for
the next stage in constitutional reform. An early decision was desirable.
Lennox-Boyd could discuss the question of a 'Council of Ministers' with
the Unofficials on his v i s i t in January 1959 and the extensions of the
l i f e of the Legislative Council must be ordered before the summer re-
cess.] T h i r d , as a g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e , we aim t o a r r a n g e t h a t
r e q u e s t s o f t h i s s o r t f r o m G i b r a l t a r s h o u l d be d e a l t w i t h no l e s s
e x p e d i t i o u s l y t h a n s i m i l a r r e q u e s t s f r o m C y p r u s , on t h e b a s i s
t h a t t h e good s h o u l d g e t equal f a v o u r a b l e t r e a t m e n t t o t h a t a c -
corded t o t h e bad. A l t h o u g h t h e s e v e r a l p r o p o s a l s r e q u i r e d i f -
f e r e n t degrees o f p r i o r i t y c o n s i d e r a t i o n , and i t i s perhaps o n l y
t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e C o u n c i l o f M i n i s t e r s w h i c h r e q u i r e s t o be
decided t o the p o i n t of b r i e f i n g the Secretary of State f o r h i s
v i s i t , i t would o b v i o u s l y be t a c t i c a l l y h e l p f u l t o t h e S e c r e t a r y
o f S t a t e i f he were i n a p o s i t i o n t o concede t h e o t h e r p r o p o s a l s
w h i l e a r g u i n g a g a i n s t t h e C o u n c i l o f M i n i s t e r s . I hope, t h e r e -
f o r e , t h a t as i t seems t o me t h a t t h e r e i s no good reason f o r n o t
c o n c e d i n g t h e e x t e n s i o n o f t h e l i f e o f t h e C o u n c i l and f i n a n c i a l
d e v o l u t i o n , t h a t t h e S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e w i l l a t l e a s t be a b l e t o
say t h a t he agrees t o t h o s e ; and I have d r a f t e d a f o l l o w - u p t o
(31) w i t h a view t o e n s u r i n g t h a t i f p o s s i b l e t h e S e c r e t a r y o f
S t a t e w i l l be a b l e a l s o t o announce d u r i n g h i s v i s i t agreement
i n p r i n c i p l e t o r a t h e r t h e more awkward q u e s t i o n o f c a n d i d a t u r e
f o r t h e C o u n c i l o f t h e c i v i l i a n employees o f t h e S e r v i c e s i n
Gibraltar....
[ I f there were a formal request for an extension of the l i f e of the Le-
g i s l a t i v e Council, there would be l i t t l e opposition in H.M.'s G. or in
the Colony. Since steps in constitutional advance took place in colonies
towards the end of the l i f e of l e g i s l a t i v e councils, i t would help post-
pone the next instalment thereafter to over 5 years ahead. As for finan-
c i a l devolution, there was no good reason to object to the application
of this principle to Gibraltar.2] It has a very substantial gene-
r a l revenue b a l a n c e , i t has had e i g h t y e a r s e x p e r i e n c e o f o p e r a -
t i n g t h e p r e s e n t r e p r e s e n t a t i v e system o f Government, i t s p r o s -
p e r i t y shows no r e a l s i g n o f d i m i n u t i o n , t h e e x t e n t t o which i t
i s dependent on Spain and on t h e S e r v i c e Departments has been
c o n s i d e r a b l y reduced i n t h e l a s t t h r e e y e a r s , and though G i b r a l -
t a r i a n s h a t e d t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f income t a x as much as E n g l i s h -
men d i d , t h e r e i s no l i k e l i h o o d o f t h i s s t a p l e o f t h e i r revenue
being done away with in a display of financial irresponsibil-
i t y . . . . [The comparative inexperience of the present Financial Secretary was
his only doubt: 3 but a week or two of secondment to London to discuss

p o l i t i c a l l y ' such a process must be ' l i m i t e d ' . By c o n t r a s t I sola had proposed

a l e g i s l a t i v e council committee to keep an eye on municipal o f f i c e r s as p r e -
viously suggested by P.G. Russo; (17. Nov. 1958: CO.926/768). In the C O . Ian
Watt had also argued t h a t functions might preferably be t r a n s f e r r e d from the
City to a committee of the L e g i s l a t i v e Council, and the non-A.A.CR. l e g i s l a -
t i v e c o u n c i l l o r s and Bates, the colonial s e c r e t a r y , were coming independently
to a s i m i l a r view. 1. CO.926/768. 2. At the end of 1954 H.M.'s G. had assu-
red G i b r a l t a r t h a t B r i t a i n would ' s t a n d behind G i b r a l t a r f i n a n c i a l l y ' on deve-
lopment proposals. 3. The C O . had considered h i s appointment on a probation-
ary 6 months only. He seemed slow to grasp arguments on loans and had habitu-
a l l y authorised expenditure in a n t i c i p a t i o n of proper parliamentary approval.
 528
with the C O . , the Crown Agents and the Treasury the implications of the
substitution of informal consultation for formal control must be helpful.
When the A.A.C.R. proposed a Council of Ministers in 1955, the C O . had
agreed with Redman, but Keightley's 'ingenious compromise' of a senior
member and members associated with named departments was probably as far
as 'we ought to go'.1 The other concessions might blunt Hassan's disap-
pointment.
On the relationship between the City and Legislative Councils and the
question of the transfer of powers from or to one or the other, the
Secretary of State should consult with A.A.C.R. and independent members
without venturing an opinion of his own.]

164. MEDITERRANEAN DEPARTMENT: BRIEF FOR LENNOX-BOYD'S VISIT, 2 January

19592
[The rejection of a 'Council of Ministers' was supported by 3 indepen-
dent elected members of the Executive Council, but the Governor wished
to increase the part played by representatives and had proposed formal
titles for the senior members and 'associates'. The Secretary of State
might consult with all members and maybe indicate possible future deve-
lopments towards fuller responsibility within the 'member' system, for
the existing informal position was anomalous. There was much to be said
for legislative councillors being given a stake in administration and an
increase in elected members of the Executive Council, all from the Legis-
lative Council; but further progress was scarcely possible unless there
was a departure from the system where legislative councillors had no
voice in the Executive Council but had quas/-executive responsibilities.
If all unofficials had departments there might be need for a reduction
of their number. At present 9 unofficials were concerned with depart-
ments, and it would be 'unwieldy' to have so many in the Executive Coun-
cil, and that would create an unofficial majority, though that was not
important. The proposal that only unofficials of the majority party
should be given portfolios and that only elected legislative councillors
should be unofficial executive councillors should be resisted. The Gover-
nor must retain a discretion to move anyone to his Executive Council,
provided a minimum of maybe 3 executive councillors should be elected
legislative councillors. The Governor no doubt would consult on such
appointments with the members of the leading party as a matter of cour-
tesy and common sense, but it would be 'undesirable' (if there were no
Chief Minister nor Council of Ministers3) to make such consultation

The C O . must be sure it was given proper information of what was afoot;
(Min., 27 Nov. ibid.). 1. E.R. Hammer also opposed a council of Ministers and
preferred 'informal association' of unofficials with departments: Ian Watt had
pointed out that elsewhere it had been 'very unusual' to extend this 'associa-
tion' to members not on the executive council. Aden was an exception where
legislative council-lors were included; (Min., 28 Nov.).
2. CO.926/768: prepared by Ian Watt and John Higham.
3. The colonial secretary, Bates, wrote almost 2 years later (to Higham, 12
Dec. 1960: CO.926/1227) that the idea of a Chief Member had been under the
counter for 3 years. There was no 'fully fledged party system': 'a sort of
hybrid permanent coalition' had evolved which worked very successfully. The
real obstacle was the lack of numbers to man a larger council. That a member
was associated with a department had not in practice hampered him 'in the
slightest' as far as matters outside that department were concerned. It was
necessary to sort out [with Hassan] the practical means of emphasising the
 529
legally necessary.]
As r e g a r d s t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s o f ' M e m b e r s ' , what seems t o be
r e q u i r e d i s something h a l f - w a y between t h e p r e s e n t system and
t h a t w h i c h has j u s t been i n t r o d u c e d i n t o Aden (under which Mem-
b e r s o f E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l w i l l be a p p o i n t e d i n charge o f c e r t a i n
D e p a r t m e n t s ) . There s h o u l d a t t h i s s t a g e i n G i b r a l t a r be no q u e s -
t i o n o f e x e c u t i v e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , b u t Members m i g h t , as t h e Go-
v e r n o r s u g g e s t s , be d e s i g n a t e d as 'Member f o r E d u c a t i o n ' , 'Member
f o r H e a l t h ' , e t c . The e x e c u t i v e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y s h o u l d be v e s t e d
i n E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l as a whole and n o t i n i n d i v i d u a l members who
would t h u s have no power t o o v e r r i d e t h e Heads o f Departments
u n l e s s E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l a d j u d i c a t e d on an i s s u e . . . .
[On the relationship of the City and Legislative Councils, the creation
of 'two parallel executive bodies' must be resisted] t h e aim o f
p o l i c y s h o u l d be t h a t as t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f U n o f f i c i a l Members
o f E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l i n c r e a s e s so t h e C e n t r a l Government s h o u l d
g r a d u a l l y resume a u t h o r i t y o f t h e C i t y C o u n c i l . A l t h o u g h Mr. Has-
san has h i t h e r t o been a s t r o n g proponent o f t h e independence o f
the C i t y Council, there i s c l e a r l y equally strong opposition t o
t h e p e r p e t u a t i o n o f t h e p r e s e n t d u a l i s m , and i t may be t h a t t h e
S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e c o u l d c a s t a f l y over Mr. Hassan and t h e o t h e r
Members i f i t were n o t t o be r e c o g n i s e d as r e a s o n a b l e t h a t t h e
n a t u r a l p r o c e s s o f e v o l u t i o n i n G i b r a l t a r s h o u l d be t o w a r d s one
r e s p o n s i b l e E x e c u t i v e body w h i c h s h o u l d be t h e C e n t r a l Govern-
ment.
I t i s o f s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t t h a t t h e A . A . C . R . has n o t proposed
a t t h i s s t a g e t h e amendment o f t h e G o v e r n o r ' s r e s e r v e d l e g i s l a t -
i v e powers, as i t had been t h o u g h t t h e y i n t e n d e d t o do once S i r
H a r o l d Redman r e t i r e d .

165. THE CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION: NOTE FOR REGINALD MAUDLING,

31 October 19611
[Under the 1950 order-in-council as amended, l e t t e r s patent and royal
instructions the Governor was assisted by an Executive Council (the
governor, fortress commander, 3 ex officio (colonial and financial
secretaries and the A.G.) and 4 unofficials) and a Legislative Council
(Governor nominally, Speaker, the 3 ex officio, 2 nominees of the
Governor and 7 members elected by P.R.] I n t h e o r y t h e c o n s t i t u -
t i o n a l s e t - u p i n G i b r a l t a r i s n o t v e r y advanced, b u t i n p r a c t i c e
i t o p e r a t e s much on t h e l i n e s o f a more advanced c o n s t i t u t i o n .
By a l o c a l c o n v e n t i o n t h e Governor does n o t t a k e d e c i s i o n s u n l e s s
he can c a r r y h i s u n o f f i c i a l s on E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l w i t h h i m , and
t r i e s t o ensure t h a t u n o f f i c i a l s a p p o i n t e d t o E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l
can command a m a j o r i t y i n L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l . By a n o t h e r l o c a l
convention the leader of the largest faction in Legislative
C o u n c i l s i t s i n E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l and i s known as t h e C h i e f
Member. T h i s i s a c o u r t e s y t i t l e . Another c o n v e n t i o n t h a t has
grown up has been t h a t o f a s s i g n i n g as many u n o f f i c i a l members

s t a t u s of Chief Member, how he could be reasonably transformed into a leader

of government business and the further development of the s p e c i a l r e l a t i o n s
with the ex officio members. Hassan's proposals almost a year later were
modest and seemed acceptable; (Keightley to Maudling, 3. Oct. 1961: ibid.).
1. CO. 926/1223: a paper prepared for the new s e c r e t a r y of s t a t e who had
succeeded Iain Macleod on 9 Oct.
530

o f L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l as p o s s i b l e w i t h t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r
a n s w e r i n g f o r one o r more Government Departments i n L e g i s l a t i v e
C o u n c i l . A t p r e s e n t s i x o u t o f t h e seven e l e c t e d members and b o t h
e l e c t e d Nominated members c a r r y such r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . I n a l l ,
t h e system i s a c u r i o u s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l h y b r i d w h i c h works w e l l
because i t i s i n t h e hands o f a p r a c t i c a l and p u b l i c - s p i r i t e d
business o l i g a r c h y . . . .
[Of the 7 u n o f f i c i a l l e g i s l a t i v e councillors, 3 belonged to the A.A.C.R.,
3 were Independents, and one represented the Gibraltar branch of the
Transport and General Workers' Union. Joshua Hassan, leader of the
A.A.C.R. and mayor of Gibraltar, was chief member: a successful
b a r r i s t e r , he brought his legal competence and conservatism to bear on
his chief interest - constitutional advance in the Colony, for which
there was l i t t l e interest. The pace recently made - 'small changes at 2
or 3 yearly i n t e r v a l s ' - s a t i s f i e d everybody 'not least the Services'
which had run Gibraltar since 1922 when the f i r s t nominated c i v i l
administration was established.]
I n view o f G i b r a l t a r ' s p r o x i m i t y t o Spain and t h e Spanish
c l a i m s t o t h e Rock, G i b r a l t a r i a n s a r e i n c l i n e d t o be nervous
about the future and to set very great store by visits from
M i n i s t e r s i n t h i s c o u n t r y . On t h e o c c a s i o n s when c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
change has been i n t h e a i r t h e U n o f f i c i a l s have tended t o w a i t
f o r a v i s i t by a C o l o n i a l O f f i c e M i n i s t e r b e f o r e a i r i n g t h e i r
p r o p o s a l s , w h i c h have u s u a l l y been c l e a r e d u n o f f i c i a l l y b e f o r e -
hand w i t h t h e Governor and t h e C o l o n i a l O f f i c e . The o b j e c t i s o f
c o u r s e t o g i v e t h e modest changes proposed t h e maximum sex appeal
vis-a-vis the Gibraltar pub! ic. . . . [Iain Macleod had hoped to visit the
Rock and Hassan hoped for further minor constitutional reforms -
p a r t i c u l a r l y to give the Chief Member the status of Leader of Government
Business - i.e. responsibility for a l l Government business apart from
that under the 3 ex officio members. The Governor and the Chief Member
hoped that Reginald Maudling would accept the i n v i t a t i o n . 1 ]

1. Correspondence between the head of the Mediterranean department, John

Kisch, and Bates, the colonial s e c r e t a r y , in mid-1962 concerned a p o s s i b l e
future r e l a t i o n s h i p between G i b r a l t a r and the U.K. on l i n e s s i m i l a r to t h a t
of the Channel I s l e s or the I s l e of Man [Vol. I , Nos. 113-143]: i t was not
c l e a r whether t h i s had been Hassan's idea. The C O . was r e l u c t a n t to oppose
Hassan's proposals. There were p r a c t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s in increasing the number
of u n o f f i c i a l s on the executive c o u n c i l . The governor t h e r e f o r e was consider-
ing using more frequently the clause in h i s i n s t r u c t i o n s to summon individuals
to a t t e n d p a r t i c u l a r meetings on p a r t i c u l a r items, and to enable them to a t -
tend more r e g u l a r l y , but t h i s was ruled out as beyond the scope of the i n s t -
ruction; (Bates to Kisch, 15 June; Kisch to Bates, 16 July 1962 ibid.) Bates
reported t h a t before the next e l e c t i o n s in 1964 one more e l e c t e d member would
be added to the executive council and t h a t Hassan was happy with t h i s ; (to
Kisch, 24 July ibid.). Duncan Sandys, now secretary of state in the CO. and
C.R.O., wrote to the governor Sir Dudley Ward (13 Sept. 1962 ibid.) that an
a d d i t i o n a l e l e c t e d member would be in the executive a t the beginning of the
next l e g i s l a t i v e council: he also accepted t h a t much day-to-day business of
the executive council should be r e f e r r e d by the governor-in-council to the
council of members, provided the governor r e t a i n e d the d i s c r e t i o n to decide
which matters should be delegated and a l l recommendations of the council of
members were r e f e r r e d back to the executive council. In August 1964 the coun-
cil of government consisted of the governor, 4 ex officio and the chief minis-
 531
166. GOVERNOR SIR CHARLES KEIGHTLEY TO DUNCAN SANDYS, 28 June 19621
Gibraltar is still styled a fortress and in view of her
v a l u a b l e s t r a t e g i c p o s i t i o n w i t h a f i n e d o c k y a r d and a most
u s e f u l a i r f i e l d , s i t u a t e d g e o g r a p h i c a l l y a l o n g s i d e an e n v i o u s
S p a i n , t h i s d e s c r i p t i o n i s no misnomer. But u n l i k e most f o r -
t r e s s e s , t h e l o c a l p o p u l a t i o n have a l a r g e say i n t h e i r Govern-
ment, t h r o u g h P a r l i a m e n t a r y i n s t i t u t i o n s on B r i t i s h l i n e s . I n
p r a c t i c e t h i s goes f u r t h e r i n some ways t h a n a s t u d y o f t h e
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l I n s t r u m e n t s s u g g e s t s . A f t e r f o u r y e a r s as Governor
I am g l a d t o be a b l e t o r e c o r d t h a t t h e powers and r e s p o n s i b i l -
i t i e s o f t h e e l e c t e d l o c a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , w h i c h have been
i n c r e a s e d and extended d u r i n g my t e r m o f o f f i c e , have i n g e n e r a l
been e x e r c i s e d w i t h a z e a l and a competence tempered by r e s t r a i n t
and realism which provide an encouraging background to the
f u t u r e . I t i s a l s o b o t h p l e a s a n t and s a t i s f a c t o r y t o f i n d t h a t
t h e p e o p l e o f G i b r a l t a r a r e n o t o n l y among Her M a j e s t y ' s most
l o y a l s u b j e c t s , b u t t h a t t h e y want n o t h i n g more t h a n t h a t t h e y
s h o u l d so r e m a i n . . . .
[Until late 1940s the Colony was essentially a f o r t r e s s , the interests
of the c i v i l i a n population were in general subordinate and the c i v i l i a n s
had ' l i t t l e or no say' in i t s administration. The City Council of elected
representatives had functions limited mainly to public health and
u t i l i t i e s , while the Executive Council with some u n o f f i c i a l nominees
hardly represented or influenced the interests of Gibraltar as a whole.
The Colonial Government i t s e l f assumed only very limited c i v i l responsi-
bilities. Expenditure on social services and housing, now over £1m p.a.,
was less than £40,000 in 1939. The people were certainly loyal B r i t i s h
subjects but f e l t they existed on sufferance and as 'an appendage to
purely m i l i t a r y requirements' and were noticeably less cordial to the
U.K. and the Services than now.
Since the war, and p a r t i c u l a r l y since the creation of a Legislative
Council in 1960, a remarkable revolution had taken place 'gradually and
painlessly and in an atmosphere of almost unique good w i l l and amity'.
4 u n o f f i c i a l s sat in the Executive Council (with a Chief Minister
regularly consulted on policy and other members with named responsibil-
i t i e s 1n Education, Hospitals, Labour, Social Security &c.) and the
Legislature had an elected majority.]
The U n o f f i c i a l Members o f t h e E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l a r e drawn f r o m
all sections of the Legislature, partly in order that the
Governor can have t h e b e n e f i t o f a wide and f u l l y r e p r e s e n t a t i v e
range o f o p i n i o n , and p a r t l y t o ensure as f a r as p o s s i b l e t h a t
d e c i s i o n s made i n E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l a r e s u p p o r t e d , f i n a n c i a l l y
and o t h e r w i s e , i n L e g i s l a t i v e c o u n c i l . T h i s means o f c o u r s e t h a t
i n c e r t a i n r e s p e c t s t h e s e Members a r e p a r t o f t h e Government. The
same a p p l i e s t o i n d i v i d u a l Members i n so f a r as t h e d e p a r t m e n t s
w i t h w h i c h t h e y a r e charged a r e c o n c e r n e d , w h i l s t l e a v i n g them
free to act as Members of the Opposition as far as all other
m a t t e r s are concerned. This d i v i s i o n of f u n c t i o n s i s p a r t i c u l a r l y
and h e a l t h i l y o b v i o u s a t Q u e s t i o n t i m e . At one moment a Member
w i l l be d e f e n d i n g Government's a c t i o n s o r p o l i c y i n r e g a r d t o h i s

t e r responsible to a l e g i s l a t i v e council of 11 members, e l e c t e d by P.R., and

2 ex officios.
1. CO.926/1227: C O . MED. 124/41/01. CO. p r i n t : a l s o CO.926/1437 but
missing. A review of affairs written from The Convent, distributed 31 Aug.
532
own department and at the next he will be questioning and
criticising them on another.
It will be seen from this that an unorthodox but workable
solution has been found at any rate for the time being. Gibraltar
is, however, with a total area of less than 3 square miles and
a permanent resident population of about 22,000 people, a case
all on its own. It is generally appreciated I think that it is
not really practicable for a place of this size to develop a
system of representative party government on orthodox lines. It
is difficult enough as it is to find a sufficient number of
public-spirited men and women of the right calibre who are able
and willing to devote a large part of their time to public
affairs, and with a total of seven Elected Members (which is in
any case a large number for the population), it is clearly
impossible for any one party to form a Government in the accepted
sense of the word. It would be even more difficult to find a
sufficient number of people who would be prepared to give up
their occupations and professions entirely in order to devote all
their time and attention to politics, and without this any
orthodox system of party government or ministerial responsibility
is clearly out of the question.
In recent years there has been a tendency among those who think
seriously and constructively about future developments to think
that the solution to this problem might lie in the fusion of the
powers and responsibilities of the Central Government and the
City Council. It is felt that, if this happened, the size of the
Legislature could reasonably be increased and that this might in
due course provide the background against which further c o n s t i -
tutional development could take place on more orthodox lines. Mr.
Hudson came out from the Colonial Office to advise us on this
problem a few years ago, and he recommended that such a fusion
should in fact take place. Owing to the fact, however, that the
largest party in the Legislature, the Association for the
Advancement of Civil Rights, also controls the City Council and
that its leader, Mr. Hassan, is not only Chief Member but Mayor,
there seems little likelihood that a majority to give effect to
this recommendation can be found at present. I believe, however,
that in a few years time opinion generally will swing in this
direction particularly when it becomes realised that it is in
effect the only way in which further constitutional progress can
be made.. . .
[Recently nearly all posts had been opened to locals and only a handful
of expatriates from the U.K. remained, with public opinion strongly
favouring that these key administrative and judicial posts were filled
from outside. There had been some concern that the reforms might weaken
the position of the Services, but in fact the need for the 'fortress' had
been much increased post war and the constitutional changes had streng-
thened the position of Gibraltar.] The best guarantee in these
days of our continued ability to use Gibraltar as a military base
in its widest sense lies in fact as much in the loyalty and co-
operation of the local population as it does on its physical
defences. The people of Gibraltar know that both their political
security and their economic prosperity depend basically on our
continued use of Gibraltar as a military base; and I do not think
therefore, that however much power in domestic matters is
conceded to them, they would use it in such a way as to make it
 533
impossible or even less attractive for us to continue to use
Gibraltar for military purposes. Indeed, the chief concern of
people here is lest circumstances should ever arise which would
result in a diminution of Gibraltar's value or use as a fortress
base to the United Kingdom. If that happened, not only would the
whole basis of their economy be undermined, but they fear that
it might imperil Gibraltar's very existence as a free and
independent entity. Their worst fear is that they should be left
as a free and independent entity at the mercy of Spanish claims
with which no one in Gibraltar has any sympathy and which no one
wishes should be conceded.... [The reassessment of
H.M. 's G. 's defence policy alarmed opinion, when the complete elimination
of Gibraltar as an army base was contemplated, for it would have
disastrous effect on morale and economy, undermine confidence in H.M.'s
G. and stimulate the Spanish claim; but the retention of an infantry
battalion and a fortress engineer squadron mitigated these dangers. There
would be unemployment and some Spaniards would be discharged. The
continued restrictions Imposed on the occasion of the Queen's visit in
1954 by Spain seriously affected the labour supply. 'The unwillingness
or the inability' of H.M.'s G. to get these harmful restrictions removed
was damaging to the morale and loyalty of the civilian population.
Despite recent representation in Madrid and London, Spain had imposed new
restrictions, even to strangling the legitimate ferry service to Tangier.
The dockyard would die unless young Spaniards could be permitted to cross
the border. The European Common Market would have serious repercussions
in Gibraltar's status as a free port, but it was yet unknown under what
conditions British dependencies might join.1]

1. In November 1964 the process of negotiating for Gibraltar and also with
Spain was agreed at Brussels. There was also some discussion of integra-
tion/merger within the U.K., though memories of the disruption at Westminster
caused by Irish M.P.s [Vol.V, pp.,759, 859 ft] were a warning. (So too were
Mintoff's costly demands from Malta [Vol.VII, p.304 and Vol IX] for the exten-
sion of full welfare and social security provisions from the U.K. to the
island. The integration into the U.K. welfare state was far too expensive.)
When, in 1968, a vote in the U.N. general assembly demanded that all colonies
should be given independence, a resounding negative was given in a referendum
in Gibraltar the next year. Almost all voters wanted to remain British. In
1969 the dualism of city and legislative councils was removed and formal pro-
vision was made for certain domestic affairs to devolve on Ministers, appoin-
ted from the elected members of the new 'House of Assembly' which replaced the
legislative council. The assembly consisted of an independent Speaker, 15
elected members and 3 ex officio - the A.G. and the Financial and Development
Secretaries. Sir Joshua Hassan remained Chief Minister. In 1995 Joe Bossano,
the chief minister, was seeking self-sufficiency for the Rock and self-deter-
mination as a city state: the constitutions of Andorra, Liechtenstein and
Monaco were considered. Three years later his successor, Peter Caruana, affir-
med that the issue of sovereignty was a matter exclusively between the U.K.
and Gibraltar, and not one to discuss with Spain. Tony Blair was alleged to
regard British control of the Rock as an irritating anachronism causing ill-
feeling between Madrid and London. The Spanish foreign minister, Abel Matutes,
had proposed a sharing of sovereignty for a transitional period but guaran-
teeing the 30,000 Gibraltarians self-government and tax privileges within the
E.U.. Caruana's counter proposals envisaged the Rock continuing as a British
dependency with a status similar to that of the Channel Islands and the Isle
534

I f pressure on the Spanish Government t o remove the present

f r o n t i e r r e s t r i c t i o n s can be increased and e v e n t u a l l y succeed and
i f Her M a j e s t y ' s Government continues t o make the f u l l e s t use of
G i b r a l t a r as a m i l i t a r y base, then I consider t h a t the f u t u r e of
G i b r a l t a r and the continued l o y a l t y of i t s people w i l l be f i r m l y
assured.

of Man [Vol.1, Nos. 113-153]: he claimed t h a t S p a i n ' s s t r i n g e n t f r o n t i e r cont-

r o l infringed E.U. r u l e s on free movement of c i t i z e n s . Spain threatened t o
veto Gibraltar's participation in E.U. elections (30 Apr. 1998) and Labour
peers (12 Aug.) rejected a motion t o give B r i t i s h subjects on t h e Rock such
a r i g h t t o vote as a breach of t h e U.K.'s i n t e r n a t i o n a l o b l i g a t i o n s . There
were increasing signs t h a t the Labour government was seeking t o get r i d of t h e
Rock as j u s t an inconvenience. Indeed, by the end of the century the main
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l dispute between H.M, ' s G. and G i b r a l t a r was over r e s p o n s i b i l i t y
for G i b r a l t a r ' s implementation of E.U. d i r e c t i v e s . G i b r a l t a r claimed t h i s
under her reserved r i g h t s : the U.K. under i t s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for G i b r a l t a r ' s
e x t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s . ( I t might be noted t h a t in t h i s same period there were
moves in the I s l e of Man, [see Vol.1, 4 ( e ) ] another dependency relying on the
U.K. for defence and r e p r e s e n t a t i o n abroad, to r e j e c t E.U. d i r e c t i v e s . A
motion in the House of Keys proposed a d e c l a r a t i o n of independence if t h e U.K.
moved towards European monetary union. Tax harmonisation was feared. A link
with the U.S. d o l l a r was preferred to the euro. The chief minister promised
t h a t independence would be determined by 72,000 i s l a n d e r s in a referendum.)
 535

G. THE FALKLAND ISLANDS

167. JOHN BENNETT: MINUTE, 29 March 19491

The Falkland Islanders seem to have displayed no great enthusi-

1. C O . 78/242/9: [see Vol. VII, pp. 544-7]. Bennett was an assistant secretary
in the C O . In 1942 when the legislative council consisted of 4 official and
4 nominated unofficials, the governor's plea for 'as full a measure of democ-
racy as possible is essential to the just government of this Colony which
should approximate to that of rural communities in England rather than to a
Colony where the majority of the people are of another race' seemed to have
been approved in principle (Batterskill, Min., 15 Oct.: C O . 78/216/11) - an
unofficial majority with the reduction of the nominees to 2 and the addition
of 4 elected on a property qualification which the C O . disliked and indeed
removed as against all recent trends; (Cranborne, Min., 25 Oct.). But there
were delays. Had there been any or sufficient consultation? There might be
resentment if reform was seen to be imposed. Was it wise to raise the issue
now? There was little desire for change. A committee should be appointed (18
July 1945). There was lack of able and intelligent candidates. The potential
electorate of c.1125 was 'hopelessly unlike' that in other colonies: the Falk-
lands was 'entirely peopled by British, most thinking of retiring to the home-
land' if taxation were not a deterrent: some favoured incorporation [cf. Mal-
ta; see Cmmd. 9657, Sept. - Oct. 1955: also Vol. IX] with the U.K. - their
links being largely with Ross, Cromarty and Inverness-shire; [Bennett, Min.,
3 Jan. 1948: Vol.VII, pp.646-7], Governor Cardinall himself, unwell and isola-
ted in Stanley, reversed his advocacy for immediate reform between March and
May 1945: (Mins. on Cardinall, 28 May and the legal department in the C O .
claimed it was so overloaded, that reform should be postponed.) His successor,
Miles Clifford (governor 1946-54) began with zeal to press the proposed con-
cession of elections and a nomination of unofficials to his executive, dismis-
sing Cardinall's claim that there was no local support for change (to Creech
Jones, 5, 15 Dec. 1946) but soon realising that the division between Stanley
and the Camp made for difficulties: A.G. Barton's acceptance of nomination to
the executive was churlish: there was a strong case to give left-wing critics
a change 'to blow off steam' in the legislative council once or twice a year
and on a Stanley town council with daily knowledge (30 Dec.). At last he pro-
posed a legislature of 6 officials (3 ex officio), 2 appointed members (the
chairman and deputy of the elected Stanley council), 2 unofficial nominees and
2 members elected for East and West Falklands respectively; (26 June 1947:
C O . 78/242/7). But again there were delays. Creech Jones wanted assurance
about local consultation on an elected majority and the new proposal for equa-
lity between officials and unofficials (to Clifford, 9 Oct. 1947) and he found
the automatic appointment of two councillors 'as an electoral college' to the
legislative council 'unusual'. Why not direct election? Clifford expatiated
on the 'unique' potential electorate: in Stanley 411 adult males of which 150
were government employees and 70 dependent on the Falkland Island Company; and
on E. Falkland only 9 of the 217 adult males were not 'navvies or shepherds'
and on W. Falkland similarly all but 15 out of 145. On the Stanley municipal
appointees he wanted to avoid two elections (to Creech Jones, 13 Oct. 1947)
and he anticipated difficulty in getting any candidates; (Carter, Min., 27
July 1948). Juxon Barton, who had been surprised that in a colony of Europeans
no unofficial was on the executive (Min., 12 July 1945), now urged successful-
ly that the unofficial majority on the legislature should be complemented with
the nomination of 4 unofficials [Vol.VII, p.646]. In June 1948 however 1,132
536

asm f o r t h e i r new r e p r e s e n t a t i v e c o n s t i t u t i o n . I suppose t h a t a

century of autocracy, benevolent or o t h e r w i s e , has a t r o p h i e d
t h e i r p o l i t i c a l s e n s e so t h a t t h e y p r e f e r t o c r i t i c i s e ( t h e p e t i -
t i o n a g a i n s t t h e G o v e r n o r ) t h a n t o t r y t o change p o l i c y c o n s t r u c -
t i v e l y . I d o n ' t r e g a r d a p a t h y a t t h e e l e c t i o n as a c r i t i c i s m o f
t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n nor a s i g n t h a t i t was u n n e c e s s a r y . On t h e c o n t -
r a r y , t h e f a c t t h a t t h e p e o p l e d o n ' t seem t o w a n t i t makes i t a l l
t h e more i m p o r t a n t t h a t t h e y s h o u l d have i t and be made t o s t a r t
l e a r n i n g a l i t t l e e l e m e n t a r y democracy and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . The
hope was t h a t as t i m e goes by t h e y may be s t i m u l a t e d t o make b e t -
t e r use o f t h e i r v o t e s .

1 6 8 . GOVERNOR SIR MILES CLIFFORD TO JAMES GRIFFITHS, 17 May 1951 1

[He had reported (No.102: 1 May) t h a t A.G. Barton, the f i r s t nominated
u n o f f i c i a l of the Legislative Council, had led the 5 remaining u n o f f i -
c i a l s in a premeditated resignation on 24 A p r i l over 3 government resolu-
tions when he had used his casting vote to carry two (on communications
and on the wool export duty) and to carry the amendment ( t o an honorar-
ium) proposed by the u n o f f i c i a l s themselves. Their reasons were ' e i t h e r
n i l or groundless', but in subsequent discussion (26 A p r i l ) i t had emer-
ged t h a t the o f f i c i a l majority (secured by the casting vote 'which I
r a r e l y use') was 'the hard core of d i s c o n t e n t ' . When C l i f f o r d undertook
to put that demand to the Secretary of State they agreed not to withdraw
t h e i r resignations but to put them into abeyance. 2 Barton had resented
the facts t h a t the Government had f o r long always had the power to put
through any measure and that with the casting vote, the new constitution
had done nothing to r e l i e v e ' t h i s deep-rooted f e e l i n g of f r u s t r a t i o n ' .
He himself shared that opinion and indeed (on 20 Oct. 1948) had reminded
them that an u n o f f i c i a l majority was 'the ultimate o b j e c t i v e ' - a f t e r a
proper t r i a l of the present experiment and clear evidence of the develop-
ment of a sense of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . ] H o w e v e r , t o r e t u r n t o t h e

s i g n a t o r i e s p e t i t i o n e d for C l i f f o r d ' s removal: he was a u t o c r a t i c , h i s American

wife was a malignant influence: t h e r e was discontent a t the lack of r e s p o n s i -
b i l i t y . Indeed though an o r d e r - i n - c o u n c i l ( S . I . No.2575) was put before the
Commons (26 Nov. 1948) Clifford neglected to issue the proclamation bringing
i t i n t o e f f e c t ; and the need for r e t r o s p e c t i v e amendment from 1 Jan. 1949 to
23 July 1950 caused questions to be asked in Parliament. F i n a l l y , the sealed
documents were l o s t in an a i r crash en route to Montevideo. The 1949 c o n s t i t u -
tion provided for a legislative council of 6 officials (3 ex officio - the co-
l o n i a l s e c r e t a r y , the chief medical o f f i c e r and the a g r i c u l t u r a l adviser - 3
nominated) and 6 u n o f f i c i a l s (2 nominated and 4 e l e c t e d ) with the governor
presiding with a c a s t i n g but no o r i g i n a l vote. The f i r s t e l e c t i o n had now been
held (17 Feb.) and the inaugural session (4 March). The members for E. and W.
Falklands were returned unopposed. There were 3 candidates in Stanley for 2
s e a t s ; and C l i f f o r d ' s nomination of the one unsuccessful candidate was r e g a r -
ded in the C O . as ' u n f o r t u n a t e ' and ' i l l - a d v i s e d ' ; (Mins. on Clifford, 4
Feb., 7 March: C O . 78/242/9). B e n n e t t ' s somewhat schoolmasterly c r i t i c i s m of
the i s l a n d e r s was c l e a r l y fuelled by the demands of colonial n a t i o n a l i s t s and
a n t i - c o l o n i a l a g i t a t o r s elsewhere. I t had been agreed t h a t since the Falkland
I s l a n d s Dependencies were not and could not be represented, the l e g i s l a t i v e
council could not l e g i s l a t e for them: the governor himself would act as s o l e
l e g i s l a t o r ; (26 June 1947: C O . 78/242/7). 1. CO.78/255/9, Conf. No.35.
2. But the C O . ruled t h a t they were in fact e f f e c t i v e from the day they
resigned.
 537
m e e t i n g , [on 26 A p r i l ] some Members f e l t t h a t our p r e s e n t p r o c e d u r e
was t o o f o r m a l and i n t r i c a t e and a l t h o u g h i t d i f f e r s i n no e s s e n -
t i a l way f r o m what has been f o l l o w e d i n t h e p a s t and i s t h e gene-
r a l r u l e e l s e w h e r e , I u n d e r t o o k t o do whatever m i g h t be p o s s i b l e
t o s i m p ! i f y m a t t e r s . . . . [No one raised any of the issues on which he had
used his casting vote, but Barton asked him i f he would 'view with con-
cern an Unofficial M a j o r i t y ' . C l i f f o r d had reminded him again of his
public statement, but f e l t that the unofficials had 'done l i t t l e to
commend such a s t e p ' . ] I a d m i t t e d a l s o t h a t t h e g e n e r a l a p a t h y ,
t h e d e a r t h o f men p r e p a r e d t o come f o r w a r d and t a k e a r e s p o n s i b l e
p a r t i n p u b l i c l i f e , whether on t h e Town C o u n c i l o r on l o c a l Com-
m i t t e e s - w h i c h he and o t h e r s conceded - o c c a s i o n e d me some m i s -
g i v i n g s . For h i s p a r t he f e l t t h a t t h e i r c o n c e r t e d a c t i o n ( l i k e
t h e r e c e n t e p i s o d e o f t h e C o r o n a t i o n Stone 1 ) would f o c u s a t t e n -
t i o n on t h e i r l e g i t i m a t e a s p i r a t i o n s ; he spoke o f h i s s a t i s f a c -
t o r y d e a l i n g s as Chairman o f t h e l o c a l branch o f t h e Sheep
Owners' A s s o c i a t i o n , w i t h t h e Labour F e d e r a t i o n , and f o r h i m s e l f
had no qualms t h a t a C o n s t i t u t i o n , so amended would be abused;
he t h e n appealed t o h i s c o l l e a g u e Mr. J . F . Bonner ( E a s t F a l k l a n d )
who echoed h i s o p i n i o n . . . .
[Barton and Bonner had long experience of the islands and more know-
ledge of local p o l i t i c s than he or his o f f i c i a l s and C l i f f o r d had pro-
mised to place t h e i r opinion before G r i f f i t h s along with that of his
executive council who apart from Clement, an islander and farm manager
from the west, were dismayed at the prospect of an u n o f f i c i a l majority,
feared the 'hot-heads' the Labour Federation, were impressed by the
' i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ' of the u n o f f i c i a l s and f e l t the Colony 'best served
by a firm but benevolent Governor who w i l l hold the balance f a i r l y as
between Sheep Owners and Labour'. They were convinced t h a t ] i n a s m a l l
community where i t i s hard t o f i n d one man who w i l l say what he
t h i n k s and s t a n d by i t , where p e r s o n a l p r e j u d i c e governs a l m o s t
every thought and there is a complete absence of public spirit,
t h a t an U n o f f i c i a l m a j o r i t y can l e a d o n l y t o c h a o s . . . . [But that
a Government could impose taxation ' w i l l y - n i l l y ' was, in a settled Colony
of Britons, ' l i k e an aching t o o t h ' . ]
B e f o r e s t a t i n g my recommendations, I t h i n k i t p r o p e r t o remark
t h a t i t i s much e a s i e r i n t h e s e t i m e s f o r a Government O f f i c i a l
t o a s s e n t t o t h a n t o oppose a demand o f t h i s n a t u r e and t h e f a c t
t h a t i t has been opposed r e f l e c t s t h e honesty and c o n s c i e n t i o u s -
ness o f my o f f i c i a l a d v i s e r s who have c e r t a i n l y l i t t l e enough t o
encourage them i n t a k i n g a l e s s p e s s i m i s t i c v i e w . There has been
l i t t l e i n t e r e s t i n e l e c t i o n s w h i c h , w i t h one e x c e p t i o n , ( S t a n l e y ,
where the Labour Federation's nominee beat Mr. Hardy for first
p l a c e ) have been a complete f o r m a l i t y ; t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f
t h e two S t a n l e y Members was w e l l demonstrated by t h e i r r e c e n t o p -
p o s i t i o n t o t h e e x t e n s i o n o f t h e Wool Tax, such o p p o s i t i o n b e i n g
d i r e c t l y a g a i n s t t h e i n t e r e s t s o f t h o s e whom t h e y r e p r e s e n t ; t h e
Town C o u n c i l , which we a l l hoped would s e r v e as a t r a i n i n g ground

1. For p u b l i c i t y i t had been stolen temporarily from beneath the Coronation

chair in Westminster Abbey by S c o t t i s h N a t i o n a l i s t s . Edward I had seized the
stone in 1297 when John B a l l i o l abdicated [Vol.1, pp.138-9]. I t was formally
restored to Scotland and i n s t a l l e d in Edinburgh Castle seven hundred years
l a t e r . There i s some doubt whether Edward I r e a l l y took what had been the
Stone of Destiny.
538
for service on Legislative Council, has been most disappointing -
under Mr. Hardy's Chairmanship it was a 'one man band', and
neither in his regime nor in that of his successor has there been
any evidence of willingness to take unpopular decisions. The
field is small, and the material is frankly sub-standard.
My own view is that there is no possible alternative to what
is now sought that we cannot conceivably revert to Government by
Executive Council which has been suggested to me as an alterna-
tive; that once a true Legislative Council with popular represen-
tation was introduced, an Unofficial majority must logically and
necessarily follow. It is only a question of timing. As to that,
if you should refuse their request it is quite certain no one
else would come forward either for election or for nomination,
and I can therefore only advise you to accede to it. It may well
be that we shall have two or three difficult years to begin with
and that, as my official advisers fear, some good may be undone
in the process, but this is a risk we must face; thereafter, I
believe that the various interests will emerge and that the Col-
ony may be able to look for more balanced and enlightened parti-
cipation by the public in its affairs. And if we can thereby put
an end to this wearisome ritual of 'ganging up against the Gover-
nment' much will have been gained. A letter from Mr. Barton which
I have just received by the s.s. 'Fitzroy' echoes this thought.
'I look forward', he writes, 'to a real arousing of civic sense
as soon as the Unofficial Members are given their heads, but not
before'. I can only hope that he is right.1
It remains now to consider the manner in which effect can best
be given to the request, should you accede to it. One additional
Unofficial Member was proposed [by the Unofficials on 26 April] and he
must of course be nominated as anything else would upset the ba-
lance of representation as between Stanley and the Camp which is
undesirable. I have no doubt that this would be acceptable. A
simpler alternative, as proposed by me in the address to which
I have referred, would be to reduce the Official strength by one
seat, but Mr. Barton expressed the opinion that 'the more heads
the better' and I am quite indifferent....

169. PETER CARTER; MINUTE, 28 June 19512

The Argentine Government has maintained claims to ownership of
this Colony over a long period. They indulge in various administ-
rative pinpricking acts, particularly in the field of postal mat-
ters, which have been going on for some time. The tempo of this
activity has increased slightly over the past few years under the
Peron regime, as it pays the Argentine President to distract pub-
lic attention and make the transfer of sovereignty over this col-
ony to their Government appear as an issue of prime political
importance. Our claim to sovereignty rests on proof of over a
hundred years undisputed (physical) possession and development.
To justify our title, we are to some extent obliged to present

1. But in the event, this was 'conspicuous by its absence': even Barton dec-
lined to stand for election in January 1952; (to Griffiths, 22 Jan: C O . 1024/
66. 2. CO. 78/255/9. Carter was posted from the CO. to Nyasaland in 1951,
worked in the C.R.O. (1960-1) and headed the H.C residual staff in Rhodesia
during U.D.I.
 539
to the world and to the S. American continent in particular, a
picture of satisfactory administration, and also to show that we
are consistent, even in the care of this tiny Colony in our pol-
icy of granting Home Rule wherever it can be justified. The situ-
ation is slightly different from that of most other colonies
where the question of political independence is not complicated
by the territorial claims of other Governments.
The present Constitution has been in operation only since the
1st January, 1949, when the elective principle was first introdu-
ced. There is in the Colony a limited supply of educated persons.
In the areas outside Port Stanley, apart from the farm managers,
the standard of intelligence is definitely low. The demand for
self-government comes from a comparatively small group of citi-
zens. As the Governor states in his despatch, it is not a sponta-
neous expression of public opinion. There is no indication that
the resigned elected Members consulted their constituents before
they took the steps which have precipitated this crisis. Normally
one would take such behaviour for granted; but in the Falklands
not so. The Governor's contention that the grant of an unofficial
majority is merely a question of timing is, I feel, incontest-
able. It should be realised, however, that this proposal has been
presented to us without prior discussion with bodies representa-
tive of public opinion. There are unfortunately few such bodies
in this tiny community, but it might not have been inappropriate
to have sought the view of the Sheep Owners Association and the
local Labour Federation.
It is, moreover, remarkable that opinion even amongst the land
owners is by no means unanimous. There are some, such as Mr.
Cameron, one of the unofficial members on the Executive Council,
who foresee trouble ahead, in that the control of Government may
become vested in the labour federation. That is purely an indivi-
dualistic standpoint, but whether the controlling authority were
to be the property owners or the local trade union, it is doubt-
ful whether the present progress of economic and social develop-
ment will be maintained. The farmers will demand diminished rates
of taxation and neglect the need to maintain the rate of economic
and social development. The Labour Federation will stand a great-
er chance of successfully obtaining improved conditions of hous-
ing and higher wages, but they will almost certainly oppose any
measures designed to encourage the migration of labour into the
Colony, where lack of manpower is a fundamental weakness. From
the developmental aspect there is, therefore an advantage in
having an official majority which can take a more impartial view.
The demand for independence springs mainly from a feeling that
the Colony has lagged behind other Colonies; it is not motivated
by a sense of confidence among the inhabitants that they have the
will and the skill to manage their own affairs satisfactorily.
Yet now that this request has been put forward, an unfavourable
reply would in this extremely narrow minded community be almost
certain to give rise to a complete and permanent withdrawal of
support from the unofficials and thus vitiate the object of the
present Constitution. The situation seems to be that although the
Colony is not really ripe for self-Government, it is ripe for a
far greater degree of political upheaval than would be justified
if this demand is refused.
To my mind, the inescapable conclusion is that the request must
540

be met. The q u e s t i o n i s how b e s t can i t be met. The Governor i s

p r e p a r e d t o a c c e p t t h e s u g g e s t i o n t o i n c r e a s e t h e number o f n o m i -
n a t e d u n o f f i c i a l s by o n e , on t h e ground t h a t r a i s i n g t h e number
o f e l e c t e d members by one would t h r o w o u t o f b a l a n c e t h e d i s t r i -
bution of seats as between Port Stanley and the country dist-
r i c t s . (To ensure an even d i s t r i b u t i o n a c c o r d i n g t o p o p u l a t i o n
one would have t o i n c r e a s e t h e e l e c t e d membership by f o u r , two
For P o r t S t a n l e y , and one f o r West and East F a l k l a n d r e s p e c t i v e -
l y . ) The a l t e r n a t i v e p o s s i b i l i t y would be t o decrease t h e number
o f o f f i c i a l members. W i t h a p o p u l a t i o n o f under 2 i thousand i n h a -
b i t a n t s , a L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l o f 11 members under a Chairman
seems t o be l a r g e enough. I t s h o u l d be remembered t h a t t h e r e i s
a l r e a d y a P o r t S t a n l e y Town C o u n c i l w i t h 6 e l e c t e d members and
3 members a p p o i n t e d by t h e G o v e r n o r . I t i s a l m o s t i m p o s s i b l e ,
owing t o t h e l a c k o f i n t e r e s t , t o g e t enough c i t i z e n s t o o f f e r
their services.
I t would appear t h a t t h e Governor does n o t see any need t o g i v e
t h e e l e c t e d members any e x e c u t i v e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . That would p r o -
b a b l y n o t be p r a c t i c a b l e as members would n o t be a b l e t o d e v o t e
t h e t i m e r e q u i r e d f o r such an o f f i c e . . . .
[Before the u n o f f i c i a l majority was conceded, C l i f f o r d should be asked
whether local opinion generally was in favour, whether a reduction of 6
o f f i c i a l s to 5 would not be preferable, and whether local opinion might
support that a l t e r n a t i v e . ]

170. JOHN BENNETT: MINUTE, 30 June 19511

[He was convinced that the concession of an u n o f f i c i a l majority could
hardly be withheld from s e t t l e r s e n t i r e l y of European stock; though
i n i t i a l l y i t might set back development, i t would be ' u n j u s t i f i a b l e and
probably impracticable to perpetuate o f f i c i a l predominance for the sake
of additional emphasis on development'. He preferred the reduction of
o f f i c i a l s by 1 to the addition of 1 u n o f f i c i a l nominee, and pointed out
that a reserve power enabling the Governor to declare a b i l l law, despite
the refusal of the Legislative Council, i f he considered i t 'expedient
in the interests of public order, public f a i t h , or good government' (as
for example, in the Gibraltar order-in-council, 1950).] Unless t h i s
s a f e g u a r d i s i n s e r t e d , you c a n n o t i n f a c t s t o p s h o r t o f c o n c e d i n g
f u l l y r e s p o n s i b l e government.
To make an O r d e r - i n - C o u n c i l d e p r i v i n g t h e Governor o f h i s power
t o c a r r y o f f i c i a l measures by c a s t i n g v o t e i n t h e C o u n c i l b u t
g r a n t i n g him a new power t o c e r t i f y measures o v e r t h e heads o f
t h e C o u n c i l m i g h t w e l l seem t o t h e F a l k l a n d I s l a n d e r s , a g a i n s t
t h e background o f t h e r e c e n t d i s p u t e , t o be s i m p l y g i v i n g w i t h
one hand and t a k i n g away w i t h t h e o t h e r . I have t h e r e f o r e e x a m i -
ned whether t h e power o f c e r t i f i c a t i o n c o u l d n o t be l i m i t e d . Un-
f o r t u n a t e l y I cannot see a way t o do t h i s . The power must c l e a r l y
exist in respect of international relations and defence (for
w h i c h H.M.G. a r e r e s p o n s i b l e ) ; f o r i n t e r n a l s e c u r i t y ( w h i c h t h e
Governor must i n t h e l a s t r e s o r t e n s u r e ) ; and f o r ' p u b l i c f a i t h '
(because t h e F a l k l a n d s s t i l l r e l y on e x p a t r i a t e o f f i c i a l s r e c r u i -
t e d by t h e S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e , much t h o u g h i t would l i k e t o prune
t h e i r s a l a r i e s ) . A l l t h e s e c o u l d r e a s o n a b l y be j u s t i f i e d t o l o c a l
o p i n i o n . The d i f f i c u l t and t e s t case i s t a x a t i o n . I t was t h e use

1. CO.78/255/9
 541
of the Governor's casting vote t o pass a measure increasing t a x a -
t i o n (the wool export duty) which provoked the recent resigna-
t i o n s . The l o c a l s c l e a r l y regard t a x a t i o n as a matter of domestic
p o l i c y , and would read the grant of an u n o f f i c i a l m a j o r i t y as
conceding t h i s p o i n t . The Governor's l e t t e r . . . records the Colon-
i a l Secretary's well-founded fear t h a t the u n o f f i c i a l s would
attempt to reduce t a x a t i o n . 1 I f they do, i s the Governor t o be
armed w i t h a power of c e r t i f i c a t i o n t o override them in the
i n t e r e s t s of 'good government'? I f t h i s power e x i s t e d and were
used, the u n o f f i c i a l s would presumably resign again and the im-
passe would be repeated. On the other hand i t can be argued t h a t
the power must e x i s t in the background because in the l a s t r e s o r t
H.M.G. have an o b l i g a t i o n t o come to the assistance of Colonies
which mismanage t h e i r finances. Moreover I cannot devise a form
of word which would exempt 'domestic issues' of f i n a n c i a l p o l i c y
from the sphere of the reserved powers without also depriving the
Governor of the powers in finance which he might need in order
t o discharge h i s unquestionable reserve powers f o r public order
and defence e t c .
The issue i t s e l f cannot be unique. But i t i s perhaps presented
unusually acutely in the Falklands f o r three reasons: reform of2
the C o n s t i t u t i o n has been p r e c i p i t a t e d over a f i n a n c i a l issue;
there i s no real l i k e l i h o o d in t h i s i s o l a t e d European community
of the reserved powers being needed (as in other Colonies) f o r
the other purposes l i k e p u b l i c order; and the form of the new
Order-in-Counci 1 would s p o t l i g h t the a n t i t h e s i s between removing
the casting vote and granting the reserved powers. The best s o l u -
t i o n I can suggest i s t h a t we must have the standard reserved
powers clause but t h a t : - (a) There should be a public statement
(possibly a despatch) emphasising t h a t i t i s no more than a safe-
guard and i s not a casting vote i n another form, (b) The Governor
should be i n s t r u c t e d not t o use i t i n f i n a n c i a l matters except
when the solvency of the Colony i s genuinely i m p e r i l l e d . This
means g i v i n g the u n o f f i c i a l m a j o r i t y t h e i r heads f o r a few years,
i n the hope t h a t they w i l l acquire r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n the process.
The Governor w i l l also have t o be t o l d t h a t he cannot (as he
seems t o imply at X in his l e t t e r ) r e l y on the S. of S. as umpire
i n f i n a n c i a l matters. In p r a c t i c e i t i s v i r t u a l l y impossible f o r
the S. of S. t o refuse t o approve Estimates passed by a Colonial
L e g i s l a t u r e w i t h an u n o f f i c i a l m a j o r i t y . Even i f he d i d , he has
no p o s i t i v e power t o enact increases in local t a x a t i o n ; t h i s w i l l
have t o 3 be done, i f at a l l , by the Governor under his reserved
powers.

1. The imposition of taxation not assented by r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s had been a sen-

s i t i v e colonial issue since 1765 [ V o l . I I , PP.528, 532-3, 544-; also I , p p . 2 - 3 ,
366-8]. 2. The p e t i t i o n against Clifford had been i n i t i a l l y against h i s a l l e -
gedly a u t o c r a t i c abuse of powers over taxation and expenditure, though the
confrontation in April 1951 had been p r e c i p i t a t e d by h i s i n s i s t e n c e on the
wool duty. 3. General agreement was reached a t the C O . in John Martin's room
with the governor (6 July) t h a t the u n o f f i c i a l majority should be accepted de-
s p i t e the r i s k to development, t h a t i t should be secured not as the unoffic-
i a l s wanted by an a d d i t i o n a l nominee but by the s u b t r a c t i o n of an o f f i c i a l ;
t h a t the ' u s u a l ' reserve powers of c e r t i f i c a t i o n should be given the governor
but t h a t they should be used in f i s c a l matters only if the actual solvency of
542

171 . REVISED POLITICAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR FALKLAND ISLANDS DEPENDENCIES SURVEY

PARTIES, 31 December 19521
The p r i m a r y o b j e c t o f t h e S u r v e y i s t o m a i n t a i n Her M a j e s t y ' s
t i t l e t o t h a t s e c t o r o f t h e A n t a r c t i c k n o w n a s t h e F a l k land
I s l a n d s Dependencies (which a r e d e f i n e d in the L e t t e r s P a t e n t of
2 1 s t J u l y 1 9 0 8 , as amended by t h e L e t t e r s P a t e n t o f 2 8 t h M a r c h
1 9 1 7 ) by k e e p i n g B r i t i s h o c c u p a t i o n p a r t i e s based t h e r e . C h a l l e n -
ges t o o u r t i t l e w i l l be d e a l t w i t h b e t w e e n t h e g o v e r n m e n t s c o n -
c e r n e d , b u t y o u r d u t y i s t o m a i n t a i n o u r p o s i t i o n and by y o u r
b e h a v i o u r t o a v o i d , as f a r as p o s s i b l e , t h e c r e a t i o n o r e x a c e r b a -
tion of any controversy. The secondary object of the Survey is
to continue scientific work in the Antarctic. It is important
that in any conversations you have with foreign parties you
s h o u l d e m p h a s i z e t h a t i t i s t h e p o l i c y o f Her M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n -
ment i n t h e U n i t e d Kingdom t o c a r r y o u t u s e f u l s c i e n t i f i c work
in the Dependencies and not simply to maintain 'prestige'....
[Generally, where, despite protest l o c a l l y or at an inter-governmental
l e v e l , Argentine or Chilean bases had been long established in the v i c i -
n i t y of a B r i t i s h port, there was no need to continue protesting. But
where there were attempts to e s t a b l i s h new bases or to equip abandoned
posts, an immediate protest, in w r i t i n g , should be lodged at the occupa-
t i o n of Crown property and the senior o f f i c e r t o l d t h a t H.M.'s G. would
be informed to take up the matter with the foreign government.] S h o u l d
t h e l e a d e r o f t h e p a r t y r a i s e t h e q u e s t i o n o f s o v e r e i g n t y you
s h o u l d f o r m a l l y d e c l i n e t o d i s c u s s i t i n any a s p e c t , s a y i n g t h a t

the colony was threatened or to p r o t e c t public servants - with an explanation

in a public despatch ( ' n o t too e l a b o r a t e an apology' for the usual provision:
J . Martin, side n o t e ) , - and t h a t the new o r d e r - i n - c o u n c i l would be made bef-
ore the next e l e c t i o n s in 1952. 'The Colony should have the level of t a x a t i o n
and public s e r v i c e s i t chooses'; (Bennett, Min., 6 July: C O . 78/255/9). In the
o f f i c i a l ' p u b l i s h e d ' despatch (No.46) G r i f f i t h s acknowledged the f r u s t r a t i o n
of the u n o f f i c i a l s over the c a s t i n g vote: so, though the period since the 1949
reform was 'so s h o r t ' , he was n e v e r t h e l e s s ready to concede an o f f i c i a l major-
i t y . To preserve the balance between Stanley and the Camp (2 e l e c t e d for both,
2 nominated for both) - on which local feeling and public i n t e r e s t were firmly
agreed, i t was impracticable to add one u n o f f i c i a l member, and the o f f i c i a l s
would instead be reduced to 5. The customary and e s s e n t i a l power of the gover-
nor to c e r t i f y would be reserved though ' i n p r a c t i c e the power i s seldom invo-
ked'; (3 Aug.: C O . 7 8 / 2 5 5 / 9 ) . The o r d e r - i n - c o u n c i l was amended (14 Nov.), the
council dissolved (30 Nov.) and the new order brought into force (15 D e c ) .
Clifford reported (5 Oct.) t h a t the 'lower o r d e r s ' were 'shaking t h e i r heads'
over the new reform. They had counted the b l e s s i n g s which had occurred in
recent years and wondered whether they would be ' a s fortunate under the new
regime1. Indeed, though he tried to stimulate interest, he had to report total
apathy: only 2 nominations had been received for Stanley, one for W. Falkland,
and none for E. Falkland: no e l e c t i o n was required and the governor had the
d i f f i c u l t task of nomination; (to G r i f f i t h s , 22 Jan. 1952: C O . 1024/66)/ The
unwillingness to take a responsible p a r t in managing t h e i r own a f f a i r s was
regarded as a ' s o r r y s t a t e ' - 'indeed d e p r e s s i n g ' . What the Colony needed was
' a period of misgovernment' by t h e i r own e l e c t e d r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s or 'by as
many as they would bother to elect'; (Bennett, Min., 15 Feb. ibid.).
1. C O . 1024/2: s e c r e t - given under the a u t h o r i t y of S i r Miles Clifford as
governor and d i s t r i b u t e d to the bases (A, B, D, F, G and H) and to S.V. 'John
Riscoe' and H.M.S. Snipe.
 543

t h i s c a n o n l y be d i s c u s s e d b e t w e e n G o v e r n m e n t s , and you s h o u l d
make i t c l e a r t h a t i t i s y o u r d u t y t o m a i n t a i n B r i t i s h s o v e r -
e i g n t y i n t h e t e r r i t o r y . Your a t t i t u d e i n g e n e r a l s h o u l d be f i r m ,
y e t c o u r t e o u s , and you s h o u l d make no o f f e r o f a s s i s t a n c e , n o r
g i v e any u n t i l a s k e d , u n l e s s t h e r e a r e h u m a n i t a r i a n r e a s o n s . ( I f
t h e p a r t y c o n c e r n e d s h o u l d p r o v e t o be A m e r i c a n , 1 y o u r a t t i t u d e
s h o u l d be a s a l r e a d y i n d i c a t e d t h o u g h much l e s s f o r m a l and e v e n ,
should the opportunity present itself, co-operative.)....
[Permission should be refused f o r any permanent camp and H.M.'s G. informed.]
You s h o u l d r e s t o r e any B r i t i s h marks o f o c c u p a t i o n w h i c h a r e
f o u n d t o have been o b l i t e r a t e d and you s h o u l d o b l i t e r a t e any
foreign emblems or marks of occupation or claims. Obliteration
should not, however, be effected while the parties responsible
for setting up the emblems are still in the locality. In the
e v e n t o f f o r e i g n emblems b e i n g f o u n d , w h i l e p a r t i e s r e s p o n s i b l e
a r e s t i l l i n t h e l o c a l i t y , you s h o u l d a t once make f o r m a l p r o t e s t
i n w r i t i n g t o t h e l e a d e r o f t h e p a r t y r e s p o n s i b l e , and s t a t e t h a t
you a r e r e p o r t i n g t o me f o r f u r t h e r i n s t r u c t i o n s . Emblems a c t u -
a l l y on h u t s o r b u i l d i n g s i n w h i c h f o r e i g n p a r t i e s a r e l i v i n g c a n
be t r e a t e d as m e r e l y d e n o t i n g t h e n a t i o n a l i t y o f t h e p a r t i c u l a r
e x p e d i t i o n and c a n be d i s r e g a r d e d . . . . 2
[You should state your rank and magisterial authority from the Governor
and Chief Justice of the Falkland Islands Colony and Dependencies: you
should emphasise the s c i e n t i f i c work done by H.M.'s G. greater than any
other country in the A n t a r c t i c . Interference should be resisted without
force i f possible, but 'you should not give way t o any force but armed
f o r c e ' . ] Once a r e p o r t has been made t o Her M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n -
ment and s u b j e c t t o t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f t h e a c t i o n r e p o r t e d ,
t h e r e i s no o b j e c t i o n t o r e a s o n a b l e f r a t e r n i s a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e
p a r t i e s on a p e r s o n a l b a s i s w h i l e d i s c u s s i o n s p r o c e e d b e t w e e n t h e
Governments c o n c e r n e d .
[ A l l foreign a c t i v i t i e s should be reported at once through the Governor.]

1 7 2 . R.H.D. MAUNDERS TO SIR HILTON POYNTON, 1 October 19623

[ I n the absence of the Governor, S i r Edwin Arrowsmith (1957-64), he
would comment rather than make recommendations. There were c e r t a i n points
to consider.]
Population:
We must remember t h a t t h e r e i s no i n d i g e n o u s p o p u l a t i o n i n t h e
F a l k l a n d s s i n c e t h e i s l a n d s w e r e o r i g i n a l l y u n i n h a b i t e d . The p o -
p u l a t i o n i s a l m o s t e n t i r e l y B r i t i s h and such F o r e i g n e r s as have
s e t t l e d i n t h e I s l a n d s may be c o n s i d e r e d t o have become A n g l i c i -
sed. The Census taken in March revealed only 36 non-British

1. A c a u t i o u s d i s t i n c t i o n : though of doubtful s i g n i f i c a n c e in t h i s c o n t e x t ,
i t was an American who had in 1831 destroyed the Argentine base e s t a b l i s h e d
in 1826, and declared the i s l a n d s ' f r e e of a l l governance'. In 1833 Captain
Onslow (R.N.) had reclaimed them in the name of the B r i t i s h Crown [Vol.V,
p.512: a l s o I I I , p . 8 4 4 ] .
2. Clearly an i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n c i d e n t should be avoided.
3. C O . 1024/325: s e c r e t and p e r s o n a l . Maunders was c o l o n i a l s e c r e t a r y in the
Falklands and Poynton was permanent u n d e r - s e c r e t a r y (1959-66). The only
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l amendment since 1952 had taken place (5 J u l y ) in 1954 when the
l e t t e r s p a t e n t provided for the overlapping of appointments when o f f i c i a l s
were on leave pending retirement or relinquishment of o f f i c e ; (CO, 1024/187).
544
Subjects living in the Colony. Although we speak and talk of
'Falkland Islanders' as opposed to Englishmen it is very diffi-
cult to find any definition of 'Falkland Islander'. There are
people who have come out from England who have married and set-
tled down here; there are people whose fathers either came out
and married here or came out already married and settled down,
and then there are those who go further back, though I believe
there are very few who can go further back than a grandfather or
a great-grandfather who has come from England. There are also of
course people who have been born and spent all their lives in the
Falklands who have settled in England. There are also a certain
number who have settled in Australia and New Zealand. It must be
rare even in the case of those whose families are most firmly
established in the Falklands for a person living here not to have
a very close relation, brother, sister, uncle or aunt in England.
A very large proportion of the population consists of people who
have come out on temporary contracts from England to work on the
farms or in Government Service.
With modern conditions making travel easier and with the enlar-
gement of people's visions the number of people leaving the Falk-
lands is increasing and the consequent need to import new people
on a temporary basis is constantly increasing too.... [The March
census noted the increase of persons from the U.K.: twice the number in
1946 while those born in the islands had fallen by c. 13%. Moreover, with
a population so small, so fluctuating and so dependent on sheep farming,
a comparatively large influx from S. America would upset the balance.
Government had retained powers to prevent this: it was not a serious dan-
ger now; but altering economic conditions might bring the question to a
head. In manpower there were enough settlers with additional labour from
the U.K. to run the farms. But both the Government and the Falkland
Islands Company required imported artisans and officials for the higher
administrative posts (incl. the Governor) from Britain.]
Political Considerations:
It has been said that there are no politicians in the Falkland
Islands. Uncontested elections are by no means uncommon though
for the last election in Stanley there was a contest and contes-
ted elections will perhaps be more usual in future. On the other
hand one would be quite mistaken if one thought that the elected
members were in any way apathetic about their duties. The prob-
lems of the country being of a limited nature and known to all,
the members of Executive Council, the nominated unofficials of
Legislative Council and the elected members of the Legislative
Council all take a keen interest in all the details of the mat-
ters which they have to consider. It is possible to transact
Government business in the Executive and the Legislative Councils
in perhaps half a dozen meetings or less during the year, and it
would indeed be impracticable to hold very many more meetings
than that since all members have their own jobs which it is
difficult for them to leave, and also since communications bet-
ween Stanley and the places outside are very uncertain. A large
number of the more educated classes, when they have retired from
active work go and live in England. There is therefore no mater-
ial from which anything approaching a Cabinet and Prime Minister
could possibly be formed. It seems therefore that the political
setup must always remain somewhat akin to what it is now, that
is to say there must be a supreme administrative officer with his
 545
assistants and councils including elected councils to advise him.
I do not think that there is any discontent with the present
constitution. There was some discontent, when Sir Miles Clifford
was Governor, with the power of the Governor to over-rule the
opinions of the elected members of the Legislative Council and
this resulted in the present setup whereby the unofficials have
a majority in the Legislative Council. It seems possible that the
present position whereby an elected majority meeting at long
intervals could refuse to vote money for Government expenditure
might lead to an awkward situation but at present relationship
between the official Government and the unelected unofficials is
harmonious and such awkward situations are not envisaged....
[Financially the colony had a surplus, but annual estimates generally
provide for an increase in expenditure over revenue and many executive
councillors and others would support still greater expenditure (e.g. a
full road-making programme) if money were available. If the price of wool
fell, the colony would soon become bankrupt. Some felt that the U.K.
under the Overseas Aid Scheme should have done more. But nevertheless 'it
is in matters of finance more than anything else that the Falkland
Islands can envisage itself as potentially independent'.]
You have said that it is desirable that a solution should be
found as soon as possible which will enable a declaration to be
made that the various territories are non-colonial. Apart from
reasons given by you I think it is desirable that some such dec-
laration should be made in respect of the Falklands to bring to
an end the Argentine claim. As long as the Falklands is regarded
as a British Colony, the Argentine will go on claiming that it
should be an Argentine Colony. What seems necessary before we
consider making any change, if indeed any change is necessary,
is a full recognition by all concerned of what the present posi-
tion is. I think one might roughly sum it up as follows:-
1. The Falkland Islands is not a Colony in the accepted sense
since there is no subject race. Paradoxically when I look at the
first definitions of a Colony in my Nuttall's Dictionary I wonder
whether one might not say that the Falklands is the only pure
Colony which Britain has ever had. The definition which I refer
to is 'a section of the community settled in a distant land owned
by the mother country; the settlement so formed'.
2. When considering the three possibilities in your memorandum
viz. sovereign independence, free association and integration,
one may say that the Falklands can never be wholly independent
because of its need for manpower and administrators from England.
The same reason it would appear to argue against its becoming a
free associated country. When considering the question of integ-
ration, that is, making the Falklands part of England it is de-
sirable to consider whether the Falklands is not in fact, leaving
aside geographical considerations, an integral part of England
already. My present purely personal and tentative idea is that
the solution for the future may lie in a formal recognition and
acceptance of this fact. It may be mentioned that members of
Executive Council have recently expressed views in favour of in-
tegration. What they were thinking of chiefly was that their wool
should be sold on the same terms as wool produced in England,
that they should have the same social amenities in return for
which they would be prepared to accept the English level of taxa-
tion. Before accepting this however the implications not only as
546

r e g a r d t o t h e f a r m s b u t r e g a r d i n g t h e g e n e r a l p u b l i c would have
to be very carefully considered. Another important point is that
i n t e g r a t i o n w i t h E n g l a n d w o u l d remove t h e n e c e s s i t y f o r t h e r e s t -
rictions imposed by the New Immigration Act which have caused
f e e l i n g h e r e a s e x p l a i n e d i n my S a v i n g r a m N o . 1 2 9 o f 2 3 r d A u g u s t ,
1 9 6 2 . I t h i n k i t i s s a f e t o s a y t h a t p r o v i d e d t h e r e w e r e no a d -
v e r s e e c o n o m i c e f f e c t s and p r o v i d e d t h a t t h e C o l o n y r e t a i n e d t h e
same p o w e r s t o manage i t s d o m e s t i c a f f a i r s w h i c h i t now p o s s e s s e s
i n t e g r a t i o n w o u l d be w e l c o m e d .
I f t h e p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e F a l k l a n d s was t o be r e g a r d e d a s an
i n t e g r a l p a r t o f B r i t a i n was r e c o g n i s e d t h e m e a s u r e s w h i c h w o u l d
h a v e t o be t a k e n c o u l d be c o n s i d e r e d l a t e r . I f i t was c o n s i d e r e d
reasonable that representatives of the Falklands should sit in
t h e B r i t i s h P a r l i a m e n t i t i s q u i t e p o s s i b l e t h a t t h i s c o u l d be
arranged. It would not of course be possible for persons in
continuous employment in the Falklands to go to Westminster to
a t t e n d d e b a t e s a n d t o r e t u r n , b u t t h e r e w o u l d p r o b a b l y be l i t t l e
difficulty in finding a suitable person who had spent his life
i n t h e F a l k l a n d s a n d who h a d r e t i r e d t o E n g l a n d a n d who c o u l d
make i t s i n t e r e s t known i n E n g l a n d . We w o u l d p r e s u m a b l y c o n t i n u e
t o p a s s o u r own l e g i s l a t i o n w h i c h w o u l d be s u b j e c t t o t h e R o y a l
Assent as at present. I do not think objection to the Royal
A s s e n t i s i n a n y way r e s e n t e d o r h a s c a u s e d a n y t h w a r t i n g o f t h e
will of our legislators here. What the Colonial Office control
has resulted in is correction of certain errors in our legisla-
t i o n w h i c h h a v e b e e n r e s e n t e d by n o b o d y . W h e t h e r t h e l e g i s l a t i o n
w o u l d be s u b m i t t e d t o t h e S o v e r e i g n s t h o r o u g h t h e C o l o n i a l O f f i c e
or some other office would no doubt be considered in due course.
There remains the q u e s t i o n of a c o n s t i t u t i o n here. Since t h e r e
i s a l r e a d y an u n o f f i c i a l m a j o r i t y i n t h e L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l t h e
m a c h i n e r y w o u l d e x i s t f o r i n i t i a t i n g any r e f o r m s t h a t were d e s i -
red in future. It may perhaps be said that we are getting on
q u i t e n i c e l y a t p r e s e n t a n d t h a t t h e r e i s no n e e d f o r a n y a m e n d -
ment until somebody expresses a desire for it. In any case I
would certainly not make any recommendations on this question in
t h e a b s e n c e o f t h e G o v e r n o r . . . . [The advice and i n f o r m a t i o n o f H.M.'s
G. on how t o approach the matter would be welcome. 1 ]

1 7 3 . JOHN MARNHAM: MINUTE, 21 November 1962 2

[Governor Arrowsmith had asked f o r an urgent r e p l y t o h i s request (1
November) f o r the modest step o f i n t r o d u c i n g an e l e c t i o n process i n t o t h e
s e l e c t i o n o f the Executive C o u n c i l . No change i n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n s t r u -
ments would be necessary, but he must c o n s u l t w i t h the u n o f f i c i a l s who
would come (on 27 Nov.) t o Stanley ' f r o m t h e remote c o u n t r y s i d e and o u t e r
islands'.]
The Falklands Constitution is a splendid example of the kind
of British institution which is 'odd, but it works' There

1. Arrowsmith suggested t h a t the time had come - to prevent any future row
between the executive and the standing finance committee of the l e g i s l a t i v e
council - to ask the 6 u n o f f i c i a l s (elected and nominated) to s e l e c t 2 of
t h e i r number to s i t on the executive council; (to Marnham, 1 Nov. 1962: C O .
1024/325.) 2. CO.1024/303. Marnham was an a s s i s t a n t s e c r e t a r y in the C O .
and would be promoted the a s s i s t a n t under-secretary in 1964, l a t e r (1966) in
the F.O. He was writing to Ambler Thomas, an a s s i s t a n t u n d e r - s e c r e t a r y .
 547
are unofficial majorities in both Councils (if the Governor, as
President, is not counted), but if the full 5 unofficials are
nominated to Ex. Co. the unofficial majority is bigger there than
in Leg. Co., and Ex. Co. contains nearly as many people as Leg.
Co. (7 or 8 against 11, again excluding the Governor). And none
of the unofficials in Ex. Co. is at present a member of Leg. Co. !
There are reasons for some of these oddities. You need the 3
key officials (the S.M.O., in the Falklands, is one) in Ex. Co.
so you need at least 4 unofficials to give a majority. Leg. Co.,
if it were much bigger, would be disproportionate to the needs
and resources of the tiny community of 2,230. What is harder to
explain is the fact that at present none of the unofficials in
Ex. Co. is a member of Leg. Co., and vice versa. I commented on
this during my visit, and was told that they lied it that way:
it was otherwise in the past, but the unofficials who were mem-
bers of both Councils found it embarrassing at times to have to
defend publicly in Leg. Co. decisions taken in Ex. Co. of why
they disapproved! (This is, or used to be, a common disease in
small West Indian legislatures. The Falkland Islanders would not
like to see themselves compared with these, but it is curious to
find them taking the same line.)
The Governor proposes now to engineer a second vacancy on Ex.
Co. (there is one already, and Mr. GiTruth has agreed to resign
and make another) and fill both vacancies with two of the elected
members of Leg. Co. chosen by all 6 unofficials (4 elected and
2 nominated) in Leg. Co. He can do this with no change in the
instruments, since subject formally to H.M.'s approval...he is
free to nominate to Ex. Co. whom he will; but the convention will
be established and in practice can hardly be rescinded, so to
that extent I suppose one can speak of constitutional change.
I am sure this is right so far as it goes. It is really rather
absurd that what is probably the most down-to-earth, moderate and
commonsensible community among the remaining dependencies should
have no elected representatives in its Executive Council. The
only reason this has lasted so long is that they haven't wanted
it - or at least not enough to say so audibly. But there are
signs now that the underdogs - farm-hands, shop assistants and
the like - are beginning to murmur against the continued domina-
tion of the farm managers; squirearchy. The Governor has spotted
this and sensibly persuaded his squires to anticipate the demand
for change....
[The progressives might resent the voice in the selection by nominated
unofficials ('the squires') as a device to preserve the influence of the
squirearchy in choosing 'safe men', but since the Governor had had 'some
difficulty in carrying his squires with him', he ought not to be pressed
further at the moment.]
The change will leave untouched the anomaly whereby the remain-
ing 3 unofficials in Ex. Co. are none of them members of Leg.
Co., and conversely the nominated unofficials in Leg. Co. are
neither of them in Ex. Co. But this is so largely a question of
personalities, and all concerned get on so well together, that
it would in my view be idiotic to press for this to be altered
for the sake of theoretical tidiness. We might well ask the
Governor, or his successor, to consider tidying this up in 1964
when the present Council is dissolved; but I wouldn't urge him
to if he judges it best not to. In a small community of this kind
548
the essential is to have machinery that (a) is simple, (b) w o r k s ,
(c) is generally accepted....
[Legal advice confirmed that no change in constitutional instruments
would be needed if the proposal remained for informal recommendation of
those the unofficials had selected - approval by the Palace was purely
formal anyway. He could take his proposed informal action without
troubling Ministers.1]

1. Marnham wrote to Arrowsmith (26 Nov.) suggesting informal action to speed

the process, and not to wait for formal instruments. If the progressives cri-
ticised the involvement of the nominated unofficials, then perhaps the 4 elec-
ted members alone should select. But the governor reported no such difficulty.
The unofficials, elected and nominated, chose 2 executive councillors. At
present they worked well together, the nominees were not regarded as govern-
ment stooges. A permanent formal amendment of instructions could wait his
successor; (to Marnham, 21 D e c ) . Ambler Thomas thought that 'ideally' they
should move to a position where all unofficial executive councillors should
be drawn from the legislature - at least 4 or 5 by 1964; but he agreed that
what was important for a small community was machinery which was simple, wor-
ked and was generally accepted; (to Arrowsmith, 12 Feb. 1963).
Following the recapture of the islands from Argentina (14 June 1982)
[Vol.Ill, p.845; VII, p.647] a civil commissioner governor, advised by an
executive of 2 ex officio, 2 nominees, and 2 elected from the elected legis-
lative councillors - and a legislative council consisting of 2 ex officio and
6 elected representatives - was established. The Argentine government did not
drop its tendentious claim to the islands, while the Falkland islanders did
not falter in their desire to remain British.
 INDEX
A.A.C.R. 5 1 2 , 5 2 0 , 525 Bavadra, Dr. 374, 413
A c h e s o n , Dean 485 Bechuanaland 43
Adams, S i r Grantley 1 , 69, 87 Beckett, Harold 131, 134, 138
97-8, 11 4 , 2 3 6 Beetham, Sir Edward 190, 192, 196-7
Addis, John 468 Beijing 345
Aden 13, 22-3, 27, 3 1 , 44, 58 Belize 175, 322
390, 528-9 Belgian Congo 49
Admiralty 513-4 Bennett, John 421, 510, 535, 540-1
Africa 1 Berlin, Sir Isaiah 367
Algeria 425 Bermuda 10, 13, 17, 22-3, 38, 44
A l l e n , S i r Dennis 479 65, 67, 134
A l l e n , S i r Roger 453, 462 Bevan, Aneurin 238
ALPHA 88, 90 Bevin, Ernest 330
Amery, Julian 461 Bird, Vere 93, 104, 121
Amery, Leo 148 Bishop, Maurice 303
Anderson, S i r Kenneth 509-10, 513 Black, Sir Robert 331
515 Blackburne, Sir Kenneth 154, 160
Andorra 533 163, 168, 283, 287
Anguilla 67, 80, 102, 115, 120 Blair, Anthony 3, 533
124, 126, 187, 284, 287-8 Blood, Sir Hilary 79, 315-6, 320
Antigua 65, 69, 80, 93, 95, 102 Bookers 264
104, 106, 111, 115, 120, 122 124 Borneo 17, 33, 44
126, 128, 187, 282, 284, 288 Bose Levu Vakaturago 374, 415
Arden-Clarke, Sir Charles 33 Botswana 34
Arundell, Sir Robert 282 Bourdillon, Henry 133
Argentina 40, 538, 542, 545 Bowden, Herbert 121, 128, 409
Armitage, Sir Robert 422, 426, 428 Bradshaw, R.L. 104
430 Bramole, W.H. 104
Arrowsmith, Sir Edwin 543, 546 548 Bridges, Sir Edward 5
Ascension Island 12, 22, 40, 44 67 Bridgetown 110
Association for the Advancement of British Council 21
Civil Rights 512, 520, 525 532-3 British Guiana 44, 57, 62, 65, 76
Attila Plan 506 78, 80-1, 87, 138, 163, 187, 317
Attlee, Clement 3, 8-10, 28, 30 318, 423
Australia 9-10, 14-5, 33, 44 British Honduras 38, 44, 57, 65
52-3, 56, 63-4, 79, 544 76, 78, 80-1, 87, 187, 196, 391
Averoff 453-4, 463-4 British Nationality Acts 115
Baghdad 430 British Solomon Islands 42
Bahamas 13, 17, 22-3, 37-8, 44 British Somaliland 22-3
134, 163 British Virgins 67
Baker, Shirley 27 Brook, Sir Norman 5, 8, 10, 15, 28
Barbados 10, 34, 68-9, 76, 78-80 32-3, 43, 45, 54-7, 63-4, 470
84, 87, 91, 93, 95-6, 98, 100-4 Brown, Mervyn 483
106, 110-15, 134, 163, 175-6 Brussels 533
178, 194, 202, 208, 236, 282 312 Burma 2, 3, 5-6, 47, 181
Barbuda 65 Burnham, Forbes 233, 257, 264-5
Barrow, E.W. 104 267-8, 281
Barton, A.G. 535-6, 538 Burns, Sir Alan 1, 386, 389, 391
Barton, Juxon 378, 535 395, 397, 403
Basutoland 43, 62 Bustamante, Sir Alexander 94, 131
Bates, J. Darrell 519, 522, 524-5 133, 136-7, 140-1, 143, 157, 170
528, 530 172, 236
550

Butler, R.A. 482 Cranborne, Viscount 535

Butler, Uriah 78, 185, 190, 200 Creech Jones, Arthur 8, 10-11, 22
292 68, 136, 181, 183, 281, 326, 330
Byng-King 239 513, 515, 535
Caine, Sir Sydney 79, 82, 87, 181 Cripps, Stafford 9
Cakobau, Ratu George 374, 399 401 Cromarty 535
405, 413 Cyprus 11, 16, 22-4, 33-4, 36, 43,
Camp 535 45-8, 53-7, 62, 63, 94, 113, 136
Canada 4, 6, 10, 15, 33, 41, 44 183, 266, 391-2, 467, 518
52, 54, 56, 62-4, 81 d'Aguiar, Peter 264-5, 267-8
Capildeo, Dr. Rudranath 206 Danzig 511
Cardinall, Governor 535 Denktash, Rauf 506-7
Caribbean 1, 44 De Valera, Eamon 9
Caribbean Commission 68, 282 Dehkelia 36
Caribbean Federation 14 Deng Xiaoping 350
Carleton, Guy 1 Deo, Vishnu 379, 385
Carter, Peter, 538 Dickinson Report 333-4, 337
Carter, President Jimmy 506 Dominica 65, 80, 95, 102, 104
Caruana, Peter 533 106, 111-12, 115, 124, 126, 284
Castle, Barbara 238 288
Castro, Fidel 202 Dominican Republic 11
Cato, R.M. 305, 307 Dominions Office 3
Cayman Islands 67, 131, 153, 160 Donoughmore Report 8, 190, 216
162-3, 167, 169 Dorman, Maurice 191
Central Africa 2, 14, 30, 44, 55 Douglas-Home, Sir Alec 471
391, 399 Duke, Mortimer 200
Central African Federation 17-8 Dunn, Lydia 341
32-4, 58, 62 Durham 440
Ceylon 3, 7, 14-5, 17, 32, 34, 113 East Africa 44, 384, 400
140, 141, 143, 181, 190, 385 East Africa Federation 2, 14, 17-8
Chadwick, John 34, 43, 46, 63, 65 44
Channel Islands 399 Eastern Caribbean Federation 69
Chase, Ashton 233, 249 93 97, 100, 105
Chile 542 Eden, Sir Anthony 33, 424-6, 428-
China 330, 333, 350, 468 9, 516
Chung, Dr. 346-7 Egypt 36, 423, 433
Churchill, Winston 32, 196, 422 Eire 4-5, 7, 9, 29, 33
City District Officer Scheme 340 Eisenhower, Dwight 31
Clark, Sir Arthur 471, 479, 483-4 Enosis 421, 425, 428, 433, 435
Clerides, Glafkos 468, 471, 507 437 498, 500-1
Clerides, John 462 E.O.K.A. 428, 432, 438, 451, 454
Clifford, Sir Miles 535-6, 540-2 462, 468, 470-1
545 Episcope 36
Coard, Bernard 303 Ethnarchy 420, 430, 432
Cohn, Andrew 13 European Economic Community 3, 403
Collymore, H.B. 104 European Union 67, 533
Colombo Plan 19 Evatt, Dr. 9
Colonial Development and External Relations Act 5
Welfare Acts 21, 69, 81, 422 F.O. 30, 94
Colonial Office 11, 16, 47 Falklands 10, 12, 16, 22-3, 39, 44
Colonial Laws Validity Act 125 67
Commonwealth Relations Office 3 Falkland Islands Dependencies 536
11, 15-6, 30, 47, 94 542
Commonwealth Secretariat 64 Famagusta 437, 449, 496, 507
Cook Islands, The 65 Fiji 22-4, 41, 44, 55, 374
Coupland, Professor Reginald 4 Fisher, Archbishop 433
136 Fisher, Mary 420-1, 510-11, 513
Courtenay Commission 313-4 Fisher, Nigel 102
 551

Fletcher Cooke 424 Hare, J. 82

Foot, Sir Hugh 134, 136, 138-9 Harlow, Professor Vincent 10, 12
142, 148, 153-4, 156, 191, 451 212
453, 462-4 Hart, Mrs Judith 306
France 67 Hassan, Joshua 518, 525-6, 528
Freeston, Sir Brian 375 530, 532
Fuller, Herbert 315 Hastings, Lord 136
G.A.T.T. 16 Heinemann, H.F. 138
Gairy, Sir Eric 292-3, 303 Heung Yee Kuk 333, 336, 340
Gaitskill, Hugh 31 High Commission 33
Gambia 17, 22-3, 34, 44, 55, 65 High Commission Territories 43
390 192
Ganilau, Ratu Penaia 401, 403, 405 Higham, John 467, 524-5, 527-8
419 Hinden, Dr. Rita 212, 237
Garvey, Governor Sir Ronald 313 Hochoy, Sir Solomon 200, 204
374, 377-9, 380-2, 385 Holland [S.G] 33-4, 67
Ghana 33-4, 49, 52-4, 56, 64, 92 Home, Earl of 34, 45, 53, 63, 467
113, 200, 322 Hone, Evelyn 313-4
Gibbs, C.B. 289 Hong Kong 11-13, 22-3, 24, 36, 44
Gibraltar 8, 10-11, 16, 22-4, 26 Hopkinson, Henry 30, 422-4
34, 44, 55, 67, 334, 390, 425 Hoyer-Millar, Sir Frederick 453
529, 540 455
Gilbert and Ell ice 22-3, 42 Huggins, Sir Godfrey 18
Gober, Chief Superintendent 340 Huggins, Sir John 131-2, 136
Gold Coast 10, 13-8, 28-9, 31-3 Hurd, Douglas 359
149, 190, 251, 390 Iceland 44
Gomes, Albert 87, 99, 183, 185 202 India 3-5, 7-9, 14-15, 30, 31, 34
Gordon, Sir Arthur 386 52-3, 56, 181, 440
Gordon-Walker, Patrick 8-9 Intermediate Territories 17
Gorell Barnes 384 Inverness 535
Goronwy-Roberts, Baron 344 Iran 31
Gough Island 40 Iraq 31
Grantham, Sir Alexander 326-7, 330 Ireland 44, 46, 507
Greece 36, 49, 53, 57, 420, 422-5 Isola, Mr. 523, 527
428, 430, 433, 450, 452-3, 460 Israel 33
462, 468, 483, 496, 499, 505 Istanbul 430
Greenwood, Arthur 109, 405 J.C.P.C 181
Grenada 65, 69, 78, 80, 101, 115 Jagan, Dr. Cheddi 65, 230, 233
124, 126, 130, 284, 288 236 248, 257-9, 263-5, 267-8, 273
Grenadines 306 Jagan, Mrs. Janet 264, 317
Grey, Sir Ralph 262 Jakeway, Derek 257
Griffiths, James 24, 138, 188 Jamaica 34, 61, 63, 65, 69 76, 78
212, 247, 330, 377, 380, 422-3 80, 82-4, 86, 87, 90 91, 93-5 99
431, 433, 462, 465, 468, 470 100, 113, 176, 181, 183-4 186-7
536, 538 541 191, 194, 200-02, 206, 208, 222
Grivas, General 433, 463, 468-9 229, 236, 253, 300, 303, 315 322
505 Jamaica Labour Party 138
Guatemala 39, 58, 313, 320-1, 325 Japan 350
Gunes, Turan 506 Jeffries, Sir Charles 1, 10-11, 13
Guyana 34, 57, 176, 178, 208, 274 19, 28, 30, 147-9, 190, 380
Haiti 11 Jordan 423, 433
Hailes, Baron 84, 96-7 Jones, Aubrey 191
Hall, George 77 Joseph, Roy 185
Hall, H.P. 380, 384-5, 398 Joshua, E.T. 305
Hammer, E.R. 61, 202, 322, 528 Karamanlis, Constantine 460, 462-3
Harare 3 465, 468
Harding, Field Marshal Sir John Keightley, Gen. Sir Charles 524
423, 432-3, 436-7, 447, 450-1 526, 528, 531
552
Kenya 10, 30, 34, 55, 57, 61-2 MacLehose, Sir Murray 341, 343 345
192, 378, 384 Macleod, Iain 43, 93-4, 163
King 233 168, 202, 261, 320, 395, 529-30
Kisch, John 530 Macmillan, Harold 30, 33-4, 43
Korea 330 45, 53-4, 56, 61, 63, 93, 428
Kowloon 330, 333-4, 336, 348 430, 433, 451, 453-4, 464, 467
Koya, Siddiq 374, 404, 409, 413 Macpherson, Sir John 68, 382
Krishna Menon 9 Maddocks, Governor Sir Kenneth 374
Kutchuk, Dr. Fazil 53, 460, 465 389, 395, 399, 402-3
467, 470-2, 480, 484, 493, 495 Madhavan, J. 385, 405
499 Makarios, III Archbishop 2, 46, 53
Kyrenia 449 61, 65, 420-1, 423, 433, 436-7
Lachhmansingh, Dr. 234, 249 451, 455, 460, 462-5, 467-71
Lakshman, B.D. 387, 401 479-80, 483-5, 493-4, 497-8
Lancaster House 90 501-2, 504-6
Lang, John 514 Makins, Sir Roger 425
Lansdale, D.F. 326-7 Malan, Dr. Daniel 2, 14-6, 26, 33
Le Blanc, E.O. 104 Malawi 34
Lee, Alan 372 Malaya 4, 10, 14, 17, 34 44, 49 52
Lee, Martin 372 54, 92, 114, 131, 374, 403-4, 470
Leewards and Windward Islands 68 Maldives 114
77 79, 93, 95, 98, 100, 110, 113 Malta 10, 12, 16, 22-4, 32-5, 44
188, 281, 282 46-7, 55, 57, 62, 114, 138, 143
Lennox-Boyd, Alan 33, 79, 80, 82 470
190, 192, 196, 254, 258, 422-3 Man Kam Lo, Sir 327
428, 430, 432, 436, 451, 462-3 Manila 429
516, 518-20, 522-26, 528 Manley, Norman 83, 94, 133, 136-7
Lesotho 34 141, 143, 145, 147, 154, 168, 169
Levu, Viti 386 172, 236
Lewis, Arthur 97 Mansergh, Professor Nicholas 5
Liberia 11 Mantelow, Sir Richard 104, 107
Libya 11, 31 Mao Zedong
Liechtenstein 533 Mara, Ratu Sir Kamisese 330, 374
Liesching, Sir Percivale 18 377, 399, 403-5, 413-4
28-30, 33 Maraj, Bhadase 191
Limassol 485 Marcy, B.S. 190
'Limbo' 14 Marlborough House Conference 103
Lister, Brigadier 264-5 207
Listowel, Earl of 131, 183, 313 Marnham, John E. 84, 160, 399, 401
421, 435, 510, 513 404, 546, 548
Lloyd, James 292, 300 Marshall, David 34
Lloyd, O.E.S. 509, 514 Martin, John 513, 541
Lloyd, Selwin 32, 463-5 Martinique 67
Lloyd, Sir Thomas 28, 133, 316 Matutes, Abel 533
377, 379, 383, 385 Maude, Sir John 10
London 493, 503 Maudling, Reginald 63, 96, 97, 110
London Declaration 8, 49 168, 170, 172, 205, 399, 528-9
Luke, Stephen E.V. 133, 136, 138 Maunders, R.H.D. 543
191, 314-5 Mauritius 10, 16, 22, 23, 41, 44
Luxembourg 44, 511 55, 321, 384, 524
Lyttelton, Oliver 26, 28, 32, 134 Menzies, Sir Robert 33, 63
142 230, 233, 236, 313, 316, 318 Mexico 321
331, 384, 428 Middle East 30, 434
Macadam, Ivison 401 Miller, Bruce 2
Macao 350, 360 Milner, Lord 261
MacDonald, Malcolm 4 Milverton, Baron (Sir Arthur
Macdonald, P.D. 399, 401 Richards) 382
MacKintosh, Angus 261 Mlntoff, Dom 35
 553
Monaco 533 Patten, Christopher 365
Moncton Commission 32, 62 Peake, Sir Charles 431
Montague-Chelmsford 1 People's National Party 138
Montego Bay Conference 73, 87, 184 Perham, Margery 10, 24
Montevideo 536 Peron 538
Montreal 105 Perth, Earl of 332, 462
Montserrat 67, 78, 80, 84, 90-1 Pinard, Lionel 292
95 102, 104-5, 111 115, 124, 130 Piper, R.W. 265, 322
282, 287-8 Pipinelis, Panayiotis 505
Morocco 92 Pitcairn 22-3, 42, 67
Moreton, J.O. 519 Plaza, Dr. Galo 493, 497
Morocco 425 Port Stanley 539
Morphou 449 Portugal 67
Morris, William 516, 518, 522 Potomac 423
Moyne 68, 287 Poynton, Hilton 170, 262, 265
Mozambique 2, 64, 67 394, 401, 405, 543
Munster, Earl of 134, 142, 148 Pretoria 33
Murray, Sir Ralph 482 Price, George 87, 313, 315, 325
N.A.T.O. 29, 31, 35, 44, 451, 483 Primrose, R.W. 339, 342
Nasser, Gamal Abdul 31 Proportional representation 271
Nauru 65 Punjab 461
Nehru, Jawaharlal 2, 9 Qian Qichew 359
Nevis 80, 102, 115, 120, 124, 126 Quebec 3
187, 282, 288 Queen Elizabeth II 2
New Hebrides 23 Queen Victoria 397
New Territories 36, 333, 334 Rabuka, Col. 374, 419
336-7, 348 Radcliffe, Baron 439, 450
New Zealand 10, 14-5, 33-4, 41 Ragg, Amie 374-5
42, 44, 52, 56-7, 59, 63-4, 339 Ranee, Sir Hubert 68-9, 190
379, 386, 544 Reddaway, John 431, 433, 437
Newfoundland 51 Redman, Sir Harold 516, 518, 520
Nicosia 496 522-4, 526, 528
Nigeria 10, 12, 14, 17-8, 31-2 Rees, Sir Frederick 10, 26, 28
34, 44, 49, 54-5, 62, 92, 113, Rees-Will1ams D.R. 314
138, 202, 206, 385, 390 Reid, A.C. 401
Niue 65 Renison, Sir Patrick 258, 260, 261
Nkrumah, Kwame 2, 26, 28, 33 315-6, 318
North Hebrides 22 Rhodes, Cecil 470
North Rhodesia 10, 62, 230, 385 Rhodesia 57, 62, 538
390 Richardson, Leigh R. 315, 319
Norway 33 Roberts, C S . 404
Nutting, Anthony 424 Roberts-Wray, Sir Kenneth 10 12 13
Nyasaland 57, 62, 282, 378, 538 Robertson, Sir James 233, 255
O'Loughlin, Dr. 107 Rodwell, Sir Cecil 213
Onslow, Captain (R.N.) 543 Rogers, Philip 84, 98, 143, 153
O'Reilly, Sir Lennox 181 191, 196, 200, 202, 250, 255, 260
ORION 88 316, 320, 322, 383, 385, 389
Orthodox Church 428, 434 Rome 511
Ottawa 33, 94 Rose, D.J.G. 129
Pacific 12 Ross 535
Pacific Charter 429 Rotuma 406
Pakistan 3, 5, 9, 14-5, 30, 34 Rowlatt, Sir John 9
52, 59 Ruanda 64
Palestine 183, 313, 391 Russia 11
Papagos 426, 428 Russo, P.G. 519, 523, 527
Papua-New Guinea 42, 399, 403 Sales, A. de 0. 334
Paskin, John 378 Salisbury, 3rd Marquess of 31-4
Patel, A.D. 402, 404, 405, 409
554

Sandys, Duncan 63, 101-2, 104-5 106, 115, 124, 284, 288-9
111, 267, 269, 300, 402, 464, 479 Stallard, Sir Peter 322-3
484, 530-1 Stanley 535, 537
Sarawak 44 Statute of Westminster 4, 121
S.C.A.C 76 Stephen, James 1
Sangster, D.B. 140, 143, 145, 154 Stewart, Michael 307, 430
157 Stow, Sir John 102, 104
Savage, Sir Alfred 230, 242, 250 Sudan 28, 31-3, 92
254 Suez 31, 34, 424, 447
Sedgwick, Richard 28, 30 Sukuna, Ratu Sir Lala 375, 377-8
Seel, George 181 Suva 378, 391
Seychelles 16, 22-3, 40, 44, 55 Swaziland 43, 62
313 Swinton, Viscount 30-3
Sha Tau Kok 340 T.A.N.U. 389
Sha Tin 326, 333 Taiwan 350, 360
Shandong 350 Tanganyika 10, 34, 44, 55, 57, 61
Shaw, Sir John 181, 183 282, 313, 374, 383-4, 389, 390
Shepherd, Baron 345, 409 Tangier 533
Sierra Leone 2, 10, 22-3, 34 Tannis, C.L. 104
44, 54, 57, 61-2, 94, 192, 206 Taylor, Gordon 148
Sikivou, Semese 399, 405 Thatcher, Margaret 354
Sinclair, George 462 Thomas, Ambler R. 27, 95, 97, 154
Singapore 3, 10, 33-5, 43-4, 47 170, 204, 546, 548
50, 55-7, 64, 190, 196, 201, 390 Thomas, Ivor 323
404, 470, 518 Thornley, Sir Colin 315, 320
Singh, Mr. 408 Tiananmen Square 349-50, 357, 365
Smaller Territories Committee 370
19-20 Tobago 61, 79, 93, 100, 183, 187
Smith, Sir Alan 79 204, 212
Smith, Arnold 64 Tonga 22-3, 27, 42, 56-7, 401, 403
Smith, D.M. 450, 516-7, 527 Transjordan 92
Smith, George 1 Trench, Sir David 332-3, 339
Snelling, Arthur 43, 53 Trieste 511
Solomon, Dr. Patrick 181, 183 Trinidad 34, 61-5, 69, 76, 78-9
185, 197, 199 82-4, 87, 90, 92-6, 99-101, 106
Solomons 22-3, 44 110, 112, 114, 131, 133, 138, 163
Somalia 33 168-70, 176, 178, 181, 208, 236
Somali land 11, 13, 44, 65 288, 303, 314, 322
Soskice, Sir Frank 474 Trinidad and Tobago 80, 84, 91
Soul bury Commission 10, 17 Tripartite Conference 430-1, 436
South Africa 3, 4, 6, 14-5, 17 Tristan da Cunha 12, 22, 40, 67
29-31, 52-4, 59, 61, 391 Tsang Yok-sing 372
South East Asia 1 Tsuen Wan 326, 333
South Pacific Commission 377 Tsui, Paul 337
Southern Rhodesia 14-7, 32, 57, 62 Tunisia 425
Southgate, S.J.E. 131 Tuomioja, Sakari 485, 497
Spain 515, 527, 530 Turkey 36, 49, 53, 57, 422-3, 426
Sparta 511 428, 430-1, 433, 450-3, 462, 468
St. Christopher 80, 95, 102, 104-6 483, 497, 499, 505-6
111, 115, 120, 124, 126 Turks 67
St. Helena 10, 22-3, 40, 44, 67 Turks & Caicos Islands 131, 153
St. Kitts 282, 288 160, 162-3, 167, 169
St. Kitts - Nevis 65, 287 Tuvalu 65
St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla 284 U Thant 505
St. Lucia 65, 80, 87, 95, 102 U.M.E.L.C.O. 333, 339, 344, 346
104-6, 111-12, 115, 124, 126,284 347
288 U.N.E.S.C.O 11
St. Vincent 65, 80, 95, 102, 104 U.S.S.R. 3, 30, 374, 405
 555

Uganda 34, 55, 57, 62, 64, 282, Western Pacific 42, 377
390 Western Pacific H.C.
United Nations 2, 7, 11, 16, 30-1 Territories 22
44, 113, 374, 399, 401, 403, 405 Western Samoa 57, 65, 401
423-6, 428, 433, 484-5, 494 Westminster 10
United States 3, 11, 30-1, 81, 421 Westminster model 26
423, 425, 428, 438, 451, 485 Weston, John 437
Varosha 507 Wheatley, I.S. 404
Verwoerd, Hendrik 61 Wilding, R. 422
Vickers, Thomas 321 Williams, Dr. Eric 83, 93, 95, 97
Victoria 333 168, 190, 196, 200, 202, 206
Virgin Islands 39, 78, 124, 130 Windward Islands 68, 77, 79, 93
287 95, 98, 100, 112-3, 120, 122
Vunivalu, Ratuama 395 187-8, 192, 281, 292
Waddington Commission 243, 247 Wong, W.S.B. 333
Waddington, Sir John 212, 219, 234 Wood, Andrew 483
Waldheim, Dr. Kurt 506 Woolley, Sir Charles 230
Wallace, Ian 190-1 Wright, Sir Andrew 420
Ward, Sir Dudley 530 Yang de-Pertuan Nagara 201
Washington 94, 258 Young, Sir Mark 326, 329, 331
Watt, Ian 53, 259, 384, 527-8 Yuet-Keung Kan, Sir 341
Webb-Johnson, Stewart 337 Zambia 34
West Africa 18, 385, 391 Zanzibar 13, 17, 22-3, 34, 44, 62
West Indies 7, 10, 44, 54-5, 57 Zhao Ziyang 354
West Indies Federation 17, 34 Zorlu 453-4, 463-4, 468
Western Europe 6-7 Zurich Agreement 49, 453, 455
462, 464, 480-1, 484, 493, 503
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About the Editor

FREDERICK MADDEN was Professorial Fellow at Nuffield College, Oxford, from

1958 to 1984, and held the university post of Reader in Commonwealth Government for
all but one of the twenty-eight years of its existence. He has now published eight vol-
umes with Greenwood covering the constitutional history of the British Empire and the
Commonwealth from the 12th century to the end of the 20th century.