Christian Fuchs Nationalism On The Internet Critical Theory and

Nationalism on
the Internet
In this timely book, critical theorist Christian Fuchs asks: What is nationalism and
what is the role of social media in the communication of nationalist ideology?
Advancing an applied Marxist theory of nationalism, Fuchs explores nationalist dis-
course in the world of contemporary digital capitalism that is shaped by social media,
big data, fake news, targeted advertising, bots, algorithmic politics, and a high-speed
online attention economy. Through two case studies of the German and Austrian 2017
federal elections, the book goes on to develop a critical theory of nationalism that is
grounded in the works of Karl Marx, Rosa Luxemburg, and Eric J. Hobsbawm.
Advanced students and scholars of Marxism, nationalism, media, and politics won’t
want to miss Fuchs’ latest in-depth study of social media and politics that uncovers the
causes, structures, and consequences of nationalism in the age of social media and fake
news.
Christian Fuchs is a professor of media and communication studies and a critical theor-
ist of communication and society. He is a co-editor of the journal tripleC: Communication,
Capitalism & Critique (www.triple-c.at) and the author of many books, including Social
Media: A Critical Introduction, Digital Demagogue: Authoritarian Capitalism in the Age of
Trump and Twitter, Digital Labour and Karl Marx, and Internet and Society: Social Theory
in the Information Age.
Nationalism on the
Internet
Critical Theory and Ideology in the Age of
Social Media and Fake News
Christian Fuchs
First published 2020
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
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Typeset in Univers
by Swales & Willis, Exeter, Devon, UK
“I feel at home in the entire world wherever there are clouds and birds and human
tears.”
– Rosa Luxemburg
“Those who do not move, do not notice their chains.”

– Quote attributed to Rosa Luxemburg
This book is dedicated to the socialists, humanists, anti-authoritarians, anti-fascists,

and anti-nationalists of the world. If they unite, they can save humanity from the
dangers of barbarism and war that are immanent to capitalism.
Contents
List of Figures ix
List of Tables xi
Chapter One – Introduction: Nationalism Today 1
PART I – Foundations of a Marxist Theory of Nationalism 19

Chapter Two – Bourgeois Theories of Nationalism 21
Chapter Three – Marx’s Concept of Nationalism 33
Chapter Four – Otto Bauer’s and Rosa Luxemburg’s Opposing Theories of the
Nation and Nationalism 43
Chapter Five – Contemporary Marxist Theories of Nationalism 79
PART II – Nationalism on Social Media 123

Chapter Six – German Nationalism on Social Media in the 2017 Elections to the
Bundestag 125
Chapter Seven – Online Nationalism and Social Media Authoritarianism in the

Context of the ÖVP/FPÖ Government in Austria 179
Chapter Eight – Conclusion: Towards a Society of the Commons beyond

Authoritarianism and Nationalism 245
References 285
Index 303
Figures
1.1 A model of right-wing politics 3

5.1 Five types of communications/mediated communication 114
5.2 @RoyalFamiliy’s tweet about the Queen’s Christmas Message 2017 120
6.1 Right-wing politics 160
7.1 The FPÖ’s results in Austrian federal elections 184
7.2 Facebook posting by Heinz-Christian Strache 199
7.3 Facebook posting by Herbert Kickl 200
7.4 Facebook posting by Sebastian Kurz 201
7.5 Development of the wage share in Austria and the EU-15 countries 209
8.1 The antagonism between the capitalist empire and the multitude 278
8.2 Political convergence of movements for the commons 280
Tables
1.1 Number of Twitter and Facebook followers in far-right politics, accessed

on 29 January 2018 and 2 May 2019 14
2.1 Five theories of nationalism, based on Smith (1998) and Özkirimli (2010) 22
4.1 A comparison of Otto Bauer’s and Rosa Luxemburg’s concepts of the
nation and nationalism 71
5.1 Number of empires and nation-states with more than 1 million
inhabitants 97
5.2 Types of nationalism’s ideological discourse structures 110
5.3 Social forms of nationalism (media types, entities, social relations/
practices, events) 116
6.1 Composite indicator for a country’s reasonable share of asylum permits
in the EU 126
6.2 Results of the 2017 Bundestag elections 128
6.3 Overview of collected social media data 131
6.4 Most frequently mentioned words in the Twitter dataset 133
6.5 The political Twitter accounts posting most frequently about Germany,
the nation, refugees, migrants, the EU, and Islam 134
6.6 The ten most frequently mentioned users in politicians’ tweets about
Germany, the nation, refugees, migrants, the EU and Islam in the
Twitter-politician dataset 135
6.7 Users mentioning Alice Weidel in the Twitter-politician dataset 136
6.8 Users mentioning Martin Schulz in the Twitter-politician dataset 136
6.9 Users mentioned most frequently in the Twitter-television debate
dataset 136
6.10 The users with the largest number of postings made in the
Twitter-television debate dataset 137
6.11 Selected spending items of the German federal budget 148
6.12 The development of the share of the members of specific religions in
the total German population 151
6.13 Age groups in Germany 152
6.14 ISIS supporters’ terror attacks in Germany 157
6.15 A typology of racism’s friend/enemy logic along societal dimensions 163
6.16 Twitter profiles used in the analysis 167
xii Tables
6.17 Facebook pages used in the analysis 168

6.18 YouTube channels used in the analysis 168
7.1 Results of the 2017 Austrian federal elections 180
7.2 Voting behaviour of various groups in the 2017 and 2013 Austrian
federal elections (per cent of total voters) 181
7.3 FPÖ parliamentarians and ministers who are members of organisations
that belong to the milieu of the Burschenschaften 187
7.4 Main donors of the ÖVP’s 2017 election campaign 190
7.5 Audience rates of main television debates in the 2017 Austrian federal
elections that involved Sebastian Kurz and/or Heinz-Christian Strache 197
7.6 Facebook postings and online newspaper articles selected for analysis 198
7.7 Nationalist discourse topics used in the analysis 202
7.8 The development of the share of the members of specific religions in
the total Austrian population (in per cent) 207
7.9 Analysis of reactions to Facebook postings of the frontrunners in the
2017 Austrian federal elections 211
7.10 Share of specific types of postings in the analysed dataset, N = 2,367 213
7.11 Dimensions of authoritarianism in the analysed dataset among postings
supporting the ÖVP/FPÖ government, N = 1,607 214
7.12 The mentioning of specific enemies in the analysed dataset 219
7.13 Asylum seekers in Austria 222
7.14 Asylum applications in the EU 223
7.15 Reported crimes in Austria 224
7.16 Number of intentional homicides per hundred thousand inhabitants 226
7.17 Share of population aged 65/75 or older, in per cent 227
7.18 Share of pensioners in total population, in per cent 227
Chapter One
Introduction: Nationalism Today
1.1 Nationalism Today

1.2 Studying Nationalism
1.3 This Book’s Structure
1.1 Nationalism Today

Right-wing politicians and parties have in recent years had success in a significant number
of countries. Examples include:
• the Alliance of Patriots of Georgia;

• the Alternative for Germany;
• the Bharatiya Janata Party under Narendra Modi in India;
• Boris Kollár’s We Are Family, Marian Kotleba’s People’s Party Our Slovakia,
and Andrej Danko’s Slovak National Party in Slovakia;
• Brexit, UKIP, the Brexit Party, and Nigel Farage in the UK;
• the Conservative People’s Party of Estonia in Estonia;
• the Croatian Party of Rights in Croatia;
• the Danish People’s Party in Denmark;
• the Democratic Centre in Colombia;
• Donald J. Trump in the USA;
• the Finns Party in Finland;
• the Freedom Party, Heinz-Christian Strache, Norbert Hofer, and Sebastian Kurz
in Austria;
• Geert Wilders and the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands;
• the Golden Dawn in Greece;
• the Great Indonesia Movement Party in Indonesia;
• Jair Bolsonaro and the Social Liberal Party in Brazil;
• Jarosław Kaczyński’s Law and Justice party in Poland;
2 Introduction
• Jobbik and Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz in Hungary;

• the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan;
• Marine Le Pen and the National Front in France;
• Matteo Salvini’s Northern League, Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy, and
Beppe Grillo’s Five Star Movement in Italy;
• the National Alliance in Latvia;
• the National Popular Front in Cyprus;
• One Nation in Australia;
• Prayut Chan-o-cha’s military junta governing Thailand;
• the Progress Party in Norway;
• Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s rule of Turkey;
• Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines;
• Santiago Abascal’s Vox in Spain;
• the Serbian Radical Party in Serbia;
• the Slovenian National Party in Slovenia;
• Svoboda in the Ukraine;
• the Sweden Democrats in Sweden;
• the Swiss People’s Party in Switzerland;
• Tomio Okumura’s Freedom and Direct Democracy party and Andrej Babiš’
Action of Dissatisfied Citizens in the Czech Republic;
• the United Patriots, Attack, Bulgarian National Movement, and Volya in
Bulgaria;
• the United Romania Party in Romania;
• United Russia, Vladimir Putin’s All-Russia People’s Front, and the Liberal
Democratic Party in Russia; and
• Vlaams Belang in Belgium.
This list is not complete, but shows that right-wing politics plays a role in many
countries and parts of the world. Many of these parties are characterised by top-
down leadership, nationalism, the use of the friend/enemy scheme for scapegoating
minorities and political opponents, and law and order politics. These four elements
interact and together constitute right-wing politics (Fuchs 2018a). Figure 1.1 visual-
ises a model of right-wing politics. In right-wing politics that operates based on and
accepts the democratic state, the elements of patriarchy and militarism take on the
Chapter One | Introduction 3
Right-Wing Politics
Individual Group Institution Society
RWA’s social role: Deflection of attention from structures
of class, capitalism, and domination
Authoritarian Leadership Nationalism
(in economic, political, and cultural systems) (political fetishism, constructs fictive ethnicity)
“WE”=
Leader
People “WE”
Friend/Enemy Scheme Patriarchy and Militarism
“WE” “THEY”
“THEY” Anti-fascist,
Authoritarian, right-wing, far- socialist
Nationalism Today
right, right-wing extremist, praxis

fascist ideological practice communication
FIGURE 1.1 A model of right-wing politics
form of law and order politics (the belief that crime and social problems can be
solved by policing, surveillance, and tough prison sentences) as well as material
investments and an ideological stress on the importance of repressive state appar-
atuses (the police, the army, the judicial system, the prison system). Such politics
can also be termed conservative politics. In contrast, fascist forms of right-wing pol-
itics oppose and want to abolish the democratic state. They want to organise soci-
ety as a dictatorship that is built on and uses means of terror. Terror is used
4 Introduction
against political opponents and other identified enemies and scapegoats in order to
try to annihilate them. Far-right politics operates based on the democratic state, but
its boundaries to fascism are more fluid than in the case of conventional right-wing
politics. In far-right politics, violent political rhetoric and communication that can
imply and lead to physical violence against opponents is fairly common. In right-
wing extremist politics, the boundary to fascism is even more crossed than in far-
right politics. This means that in right-wing extremist political groups, parties,
ideology, and practices, there are individuals who advocate the use of physical
violence against opponents.
All right-wing politics has in common that it sees inequality between humans as
a natural feature of society and therefore considers an egalitarian society as utopian
and unrealistic (Bobbio 1996). In contrast, the political left sees inequality as
a result of social contradictions and therefore argues that equality between humans
can and should be established politically. Right-wing practices always contain vari-
ous degrees of the four dimensions of right-wing politics. These elements define
a group identity (nationalism), a method for organising the relationship between
leaders and followers in the political group itself and society (leadership principle),
an antagonistic relationship between citizens of the nation and enemies that is built
on hatred (friend/enemy scheme), and methods of dealing with enemies (law and
order politics, militarism). All right-wing politics denies the class conflict and
advances the ruling class’ interests. It reifies and fetishises private property of the
means of production and the existence of class society and class relations, which
means that the economy is based on the leadership principle so that a small minor-
ity owns, controls, and governs the economy, whereas others are compelled to pro-
duce goods they do not own. Right-wing politics favours undemocratic models of the
economy, where one class exploits the labour of another class.
Let us have a look at some political quotes:
• Donald Trump on Twitter: “The only way to stop drugs, gangs, human traffick-
ing, criminal elements and much else from coming into our Country is with
a Wall or Barrier.”1
• Jair Bolsonaro: “The scum of the earth is showing up in Brazil, as if we didn’t
have enough problems of our own to sort out.”2
• Heinz Christian Strache in a newspaper interview: “That’s why we conse-
quently continue our path for our home country of Austria, the fight against
population exchange, just like the people expect it from us. […] We do not
want to become a minority in our own homeland.”3
• Marine Le Pen on Twitter: “By attacking the idea of the Nation and the con-
trol of immigration you let communitarianism, Islamism and terrorism grow.”4
• Recep Erdoğan on Twitter: “One nation. One flag. One fatherland. One state.”5
• Viktor Orbán on Facebook: “Nowadays, Hungary and the Hungarian people rep-
resent order in an increasingly disorderly Europe. Many of the leaders of
Europe do not undertake the fight against modern mass migration and the
incoming flood of illegal and law violating migrants.”6
• Nigel Farage on Twitter: “NHS should be a National, not International Health
Service. £181,000 bill for one illegal migrant is madness.”7
• Matteo Salvini on Facebook: “While the Pope calls for welcoming all the
migrants, 700 illegal immigrants have landed in Calabria and another 3,000
will arrive in Italy in the next few hours. Immigration? No, INVASION organ-
ized and financed by the new slavers.”8
Nationalism is a common element of all of these examples. Protecting a unitary

nation is presented as important. Nationalism ideologically constructs a collective
cultural and political identity by referring to “our Country”, “our home country”, “our
homeland”, “the idea of the Nation”, “one nation”, “one flag”, “one fatherland”,
“one state”, “Hungary and the Hungarian people”, or the National Health Service.
Right-wing ideology understands the nation as a cultural and/or biological commu-
nity that it presents as a people. Nationalism not just wants to establish a nation-
state, where the imagined members of the nation live, but also strives for purity of
Nationalism Today
the nation. In reality, societies are never homogeneous because there are different
ways of life and nation-states are the outcome of conflicts, wars, imperialism, and
colonialism.
All nationalism presents the nation as being threatened by aliens and as needing
to be protected in order to secure purity that needs to be protected from aliens.
In the examples, immigrants, refugees, Muslims, drug dealers, and organised
criminals are presented as enemies of the nation. The cultural and biological
nation is an ideological construct that serves to distract attention from actual
exploitation and domination. In the age of digital capitalism, nationalist ideology
is frequently communicated over social media platforms such as Facebook, Twit-
ter, or YouTube.
6 Introduction
1.2 Studying Nationalism

This book asks: What is nationalism? What is the role of social media in the com-
munication of nationalist ideology?
This work advances an applied Marxist theory of nationalism that revives classical crit-
ical theories of nationalism by using them as tools for studying nationalism in contem-
porary digital capitalism that is shaped by social media, big data, fake news, targeted
advertising, bots, algorithmic politics, and a high-speed online attention economy. The
book develops a critical theory of nationalism that is grounded in the works of Karl
Marx, Rosa Luxemburg, and Eric J. Hobsbawm. Their theories are applied to two case
studies that analyse how nationalism was in the year 2017 communicated on social
media in the context of the German and Austrian federal elections.
Critical studies that compare nationalism in different countries, analyse how nation-
alism is communicated, and apply Marxist theory for understanding nationalism are
needed. The reason why I have chosen Austria and Germany as two case studies is
that I know these two countries well and speak German, which allows me to under-
stand social media content posted in these nation-states. Austria and Germany are
interesting cases because both countries together gave under Hitler rise to Nazi-
fascism and are today again haunted by the rise of the far-right – the Alternative
for Germany (AfD) and the far-right ÖVP/FPÖ coalition government led by Sebastian
Kurz and Heinz-Christian Strache in Austria.
We certainly need more international comparative studies of nationalism and how it

is communicated. Given the diversity of the world’s languages and the lack of diver-
sity of funding sources, conducting comparative social research based on projects
that provide funding to scholars in different countries located not just in Europe or
North America is a difficult but nonetheless important task. National funding agen-
das are mostly nationalist in character, which means that they want to advance sci-
entific progress, which is often seen as a foundation of economic growth and
innovation, in just one country or region (such as the European Union). There is
a lack of true internationalisation of research and international funding.
Marxist Theories of Nationalism

Many thought that the increasing levels of economic, political, and cultural global-
isation since the 1970s would bring an end to nationalism. Marxist historian Eric
J. Hobsbawm (1992b), who was a political optimist, argued, for example, that the
“owl of Minerva which brings wisdom, said Hegel, flies out at dusk. It is a good
sign that it is now circling round nations and nationalism” (192). Writing in 1996,
Jürgen Habermas (1998) was confident that “the catastrophes of two world wars
have taught Europeans that they must abandon the mind-sets on which nationalistic,
exclusionary mechanisms feed. Why should a sense of belonging together culturally
and politically not grow out of these experiences” (152). Such assessments have
unfortunately proven historically false. More than 100 years after the First World
War, nationalism has returned.
Writing about the owl of Minerva, Hegel (1820/2008) stresses that philosophy can
only interpret history ex post:
When philosophy paints its grey in grey, then has a shape of life grown old.
By philosophy’s grey in grey it cannot be rejuvenated but only understood.
The owl of Minerva begins its flight only with the falling of dusk.
(16)
In Roman mythology, Minerva was the goddess of wisdom, who was equated with
the Greek goddess Athena. Athena was often either imagined and pictured as an
owl or portrayed together with an owl. The owl of Minerva is therefore a symbol of
wisdom.
Hegel (1820/2008) stresses that philosophy cannot give
instructions as to what the world ought to be. Philosophy in any case

Studying Nationalism
always comes on the scene too late to give to it. As the thought of the
world, it appears only when actuality has completed its process of forma-
tion and attained its finished state.
(16)9
On the one hand, Hegel is right in stressing that thought alone is not a political
force. At the same time, we of course have to see, especially today, in an age we
can describe as digital and communicative capitalism, that intellectual strategies are
key aspects of politics and the realm of intellectual production has become a key
site of class struggle. But also in the digital age, it holds true that thinking the
world is not sufficient for changing it. Marx (1845) said that the “philosophers have
only interpreted the world in various ways, the point is to change it” (5). Politics
also needs to be put into action through social praxis conducted in social relations.
8 Introduction
On the other hand, one should also be quite cautious about Hegel’s assessment of philoso-
phy in the preface to his Philosophy of Right. Herbert Marcuse (1941/1955) argues in this
context that Hegel’s preface “renounces critical theory”, assumes that society “as actually
constituted” had already “brought to fruition the material conditions for its change” so
that the “truth that philosophy contained at its core” had already been realised (183). The
Philosophy of Right would “mark the resignation of a man who knows that the truth he
represents”, i.e. “the philosophy of middle-class society”, had “drawn to its close and that
it can no longer invigorate the world” (Marcuse 1941/1955, 183). In contrast to Hegel,
Marx saw a clear political role of theory, namely its task as critical theory to help guiding
praxis and social struggles. Marx (1844a) argued that critical theory
becomes a material force as soon as it has gripped the masses. Theory is

capable of gripping the masses as soon as it demonstrates ad hominem,
and it demonstrates ad hominem as soon as it becomes radical. To be rad-
ical is to grasp the root of the matter. But for man the root is man himself.
[…] The criticism of religion ends with the teaching that man is the high-
est being for man, hence with the categorical imperative to overthrow all
relations in which man is a debased, enslaved, forsaken, despicable being.
(182)
Critical theory analyses the structures and status of power, and by doing so illumin-
ates potentials for praxis, social struggles, and alternatives.
A critical theory of contemporary nationalism has two tasks: (a) it needs to analyse
what nationalism is, in what political-economic contexts it stands, and why it exists;
and (b) it needs to analyse how the ideological structure of contemporary national-
ism is communicated. This book contributes to both tasks by: (a) elaborating founda-
tions of a Marxian theory of nationalism based on the works of Karl Marx, Rosa
Luxemburg, and Eric J. Hobsbawm; and (b) presenting the results of two empirical
case studies that analyse how nationalism was communicated on social media in
the context of federal elections in Germany and Austria.
Nationalism is an ideological, dominative class project. Nationalism, racism, and

xenophobia are closely related. Nationalism defines the inner ideological identity of
a nationalist collective. Racism and xenophobia present certain groups and cultures
as outsiders who are said to threaten the national collective: “Racism is constantly
emerging out of nationalism. […] And nationalism emerges out of racism. [Racism
is] a supplement internal to nationalism” (Balibar and Wallerstein 1991, 53, 54).
At the time of Nazi-Germany, nationalism was predominantly defined biologically.

The Nazis saw the German nation and the German people as a purist project of
white, Aryan blood that aimed at annihilating those who were defined as non-
Aryans. White supremacism and nationalism have taken on new forms today. Often,
nationalism is today defined culturally. The enemies of the nation are presented as
having a different culture, religion, lifestyle, language, worldview, different morals,
etc. This is why critical theories of nationalism and racism speak of new racism
(Balibar and Wallerstein 1991; Barker 1981), racism type 2/differentialist racism
(Taguieff 2001), or neo-nationalism (Banks and Gingrich 2006).
The book at hand takes a Marxist-humanist approach for understanding national-

ism. In doing so, it especially builds on the works by Karl Marx, Rosa Luxemburg,
C.L.R. James, and Eric Hobsbawm. These approaches share the insight that
nationalism is not an inherent feature of humanity and society, but is an ideo-
logical construct arising in the context of class, capitalism, colonialism, and
imperialism. In understanding nationalism, critical humanism challenges the fetish-
ism of the nation. It stresses that the nation as cultural or biological community
is artificial and that societies are never unitary, but that humans living in society
have commonalities as well as differences. Marxism adds to this understanding
that nationalism as an ideology tries to distract attention from actual power
differentials between the capitalist class and the working class, as well as the
powerful and the powerless, by constructing an illusionary common national inter-
est of these groups. Nationalism presents outsiders as enemies of the nation in
order to legitimate class, capitalism, exploitation, and domination. Rosa Luxemburg Studying Nationalism
stressed how nationalism operated in the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies as the ideology of imperialism that advanced hatred that led to the First
World War. For her, the struggle for the creation and defence of nations is
always ideological and only the working class has a right to self-determination
(Luxemburg 1976, 108). The book at hand takes a Luxemburgist position on
nationalism, which implies that it is critical of approaches such as left populism
and left-wing nationalism. In classical Marxism, Luxemburg’s approach to national-
ism is quite distinct. As part of its discussion of Marxism and nationalism, the
book at hand shows that Luxemburg’s understanding of nationalism differs espe-
cially from her contemporaries Otto Bauer and Lenin. Whereas Bauer reified
nationalism, Lenin saw it as a necessary complementary tool of class struggles
and anti-imperialist struggles. Luxemburg reminds us today that left nationalist
strategies such as a left Brexit (“Lexit”) are confronted with the dangers of
10 Introduction
supporting the same agenda as the far-right. C.L.R. James stresses that anti-
colonial struggles often did not result in democratic socialism, but privileged
nationalist and militarist agendas so that “military dictatorship after military dicta-
torship has succeeded to power” (James 2012, 116). Pitting one nation against
another and demanding the establishment of new nations faces the danger of
overlooking the fundamental character of class antagonisms. Transnational capital-
ism and national capital are the sources of exploitation of workers in different
countries, regions, cultures, and societies. Capital has nothing in common with
workers, but workers in different parts of the world have in common that they
are exploited by capital and have a universal objective interest in overcoming cap-
italism. The contemporary rise of new nationalisms shows how the fetishism of
the nation and the scapegoating of migrant workers, refugees, and certain cul-
tures serves ideological purposes.
So, for example, the Leave campaigns in the Brexit referendum were entirely
focused on creating fears of immigrants, presenting the EU as a cause of immigra-
tion and immigrants as a financial burden for the social system who undercut wages
and destroy jobs. So, for example, UKIP created a poster showing a migrant caravan
together with the following text: “BREAKING POINT: The EU has failed us. We must
break free of the EU and take back control of our borders. Leave the European
Union. ON 23rd JUNE.” The poster works with the symbol of the mass in order to
try to create fear. Speaking of a “breaking point” shall create negative feelings and
associations of a fragile society whose cohesion and social system is under threat.
This example shows exactly how racism and nationalism work: they create fear by
scapegoating weak groups or minorities who are blamed for society’s problems so
that attention is distracted from the political-economic causes of social problems.
Far-right demagogues do not speak about the exploitation of labour by capital, class
relations, or capitalism’s contradictions, but construct an imaginary conflict between
immigrants (or other scapegoats) and the citizens of a nation-state. While being
silent on the class antagonism between capital and labour and often favouring and
advancing politics that deepen the gap between capital and labour and between the
rich and the rest, the far-right ideologically nationalises social conflicts. It claims
that there is a common national interest of capital and labour that are imagined and
presented to be both under threat by foreigners. That capital often exploits both
workers in its home country and abroad is concealed. The far-right claims to speak
for the common interest of everyone, but in reality advances partial interests and
conceals actual class antagonism by artificially creating imaginary antagonisms

between “the people” and foreigners.
Right-wing ideology pretends to represent the interest of the working class by ideo-
logically “nationalising” the class conflict so that the latter is presented as an antag-
onism between workers and the nation on the one side and immigrants on the other
side. So, for example, in her 2016 Conservative Party conference, Theresa May10
claimed:
And if you’re one of those people who lost their job, who stayed in work
but on reduced hours, took a pay cut as household bills rocketed, or – and
I know a lot of people don’t like to admit this – someone who finds them-
selves out of work or on lower wages because of low-skilled immigration,
life simply doesn’t seem fair.
She presented the Tories as “the party of the workers” and a party that has the
responsibility to “represent and govern for the whole nation”. Workers and capital
are seen as part of a national collective that is under threat by foreign forces – the
EU and immigrants. The foreign threat to the nation is not just presented in the
form of immigrants, but also by linking and associating multiculturalism, internation-
alism, and global capital and arguing that these phenomena are unrooted: “But if
you believe you’re a citizen of the world, you’re a citizen of nowhere. You don’t
understand what the very word ‘citizenship’ means.”11 “Citizenship” is here used as
a word appealing to nationalist sentiments and claiming that there is an antagonism
between national and international life (not between human life and capital).
The rise of imperialism as a phase of capitalist development was a reaction to the

Long Depression, an economic crisis of capitalism that started in 1873. Nationalism
intensified as an ideology and political practice of imperialism. Rosa Luxemburg
points out the connection of nationalism and imperialism and that nationalist logic
fosters the potential for warfare. She stresses that class struggles are not just
struggles for democracy and socialism, but require international solidary and are
also struggles for an international socialist democracy without borders, states, and
nationalism. She reminds us that socialism is either international or cannot be at
all. Luxemburg’s humanist-socialist position on nationalism is summarised by the fol-
lowing words:
Imperialism in all countries has no “understanding”, it knows only one

right: capital profit, only one language: the sword, only one means:
12 Introduction
violence. […] Socialism alone can accomplish the great work of lasting
peace, to heal the thousand bleeding wounds of mankind, to transform the
fields […] that have been stamped down by the Apocalyptic Horsemen of
War into flourishing gardens, to conjure up tenfold new productive forces
instead of the destroyed ones, to awaken all physical and moral energies
of mankind and to replace hatred and discord with fraternal solidarity, har-
mony and respect for everything that bears human dignity. If representa-
tives of the proletarians of all countries join hands under the banner of
socialism to make peace, then peace is made in a few hours. […] The
International will be humanity! Long live the world revolution of the prole-
tariat! Proletarians of all countries, unite!
(Liebknecht et al. 1918)
Rosa Luxemburg’s works tell us that we should never forget that an increase of
nationalism in a phase of capitalist crisis can unfold into major wars. We can learn
from her that democratic socialism is the only viable alternative to nationalism,
imperialism, war, and capitalism. “The consistent internationalism of her life and
work” (Geras 1976/2015, 45) is a role model for the contemporary critique of nation-
alism. “She remains the most important representative of a libertarian socialist trad-
ition inspired by internationalism, economic justice, and a radical belief in
democracy” (Bronner 2013a, 12). “Her internationalist and cosmopolitan convictions
are also important for interpreting globalization and confronting narrow forms of
identity politics” (Bronner 2013b, 187).
Nationalism 2.0
Social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube have become
important spheres of political communication that have added a new level of com-
munication to traditional media of the public sphere such as newspapers and televi-
sion. Social media feature:
• user-generated content;
• the convergence of the production, consumption, and circulation of information
in one technology;
• the convergence of self-, interpersonal, group, organisational, and mass com-
munication on one platform;
• the convergence of communication (traditionally the realm of the media) and

cooperation (traditionally the realm of labour and production) in one social
system;
• the convergence of social roles on profiles and platforms;
• opportunities for the fast spreading of information through networks of
contacts;
• the collection, processing, storage, assessment, and monitoring of big data;
• the convergence of cognition, communication, and cooperation in one system;
• the algorithmic control of information flows; and
• the algorithmic creation of attention and visibility (that has in recent times
resulted in the critique of fake news and its threats to democracy), etc. (Fuchs
2017b).
In the 1990s and early 2000s, many observers assumed that the far-right hated digi-
tal technologies, was a digital Luddite and bad at adopting new technologies, and
that the left, because of its affinity to grassroots politics, was at the forefront of
adopting digital media. Twenty years later, these assumptions have been proven
wrong. Far-right movements, groups, parties, and individuals are among the most
widely followed social media profiles (for some examples, see Table 1.1).
This book is structured into two parts, each dealing with one of the two main ques-
tions (see p. 6). First, foundations of a Marxian theory of nationalism are
elaborated. Second, two case studies are presented that are based on the theory
foundations and make use of them in empirical analysis. Austria and Germany are
suited case studies for the study of nationalism on social media because these two
countries have together given rise to Nazi-fascism, have been confronted with post-
fascist conditions, and have in recent years seen significant electoral gains of far-
right parties.
The Rise of New Nationalisms

How can we explain the recent rise of new nationalisms? A Marxist theory of
nationalism situates nationalism in the context of capitalism. This does not mean an
economic reductionist approach, but rather a materialist and dialectical theory of
society, in which various societal realms are grounded in the material phenomenon
of social production and have their own relative autonomy. Any society consists of
TABLE 1.1 Number of Twitter and Facebook followers in far-right politics, accessed on 29 January 2018 and 2 May 2019
Name Country Twitter (29 January 2018) Facebook (29 January 2018) Twitter (2 May 2019) Facebook (2 May 2019)
Donald Trump USA 47mn 24.5mn 59.9mn 25.3mn
Narendra Modi India 40mn 43mn 47.1mn 43mn
Recep Erdoğan Turkey 12.52mn 9mn 13.7mn 9mn
Rodrigo Duterte Philippines 170k 4.3mn 183k 4.3mn
Marine Le Pen France 2mn 1.5mn 2.23mn 1.5mn
Geert Wilders Netherlands 950k 260k 811k 321k
Nigel Farage UK 1.1mn 790k 1.3mn 850k
Boris Johnson UK 400k 535k 551k 550k
Viktor Orbán Hungary - 550k - 653k
Heinz-Christian Strache Austria 40k 750k 57.5k 780k
Sebastian Kurz Austria 280k 740k 334k 802k
Alternative for Germany (AfD) Germany 105k 400k 134k 470k
the realms of the economy, politics, and culture as distinct spheres of the production
of use-values, collectively binding decisions and meanings. Capitalism is not just
a general economic realm of commodity production, the exploitation of surplus-value
generating labour, and the accumulation of monetary capital. It is a societal forma-
tion (Gesellschaftsformation) that is based on the logic of accumulation. The eco-
nomic feature of all societal realms under capitalist rule is that they are shaped by
the instrumental logic of accumulation. But accumulation takes on different logics in
the various realms of society. Capitalist society is a society that is based on the
logic of the accumulation of monetary capital, political influence, and cultural visibil-
ity/reputation. Competing collective and individual actors struggle for the accumula-
tion of these resources. Accumulation tends to result in inequalities and crises.
Capitalism is based on antagonisms between capital and labour in the economy, polit-
ical elites and citizens in the political economy, and celebrities and the invisible in the
cultural system. In recent decades, capitalist development has intensified the gaps
between the two sides of these contradictions, which has resulted in deepening
socio-economic inequality (a gap between the shares of wealth controlled by the rich
and the non-rich), increasing political alienation (the degree of political influence of
a small number of people on the one side, and the feeling of not being able to have
political influence, to have a political voice, and to be politically recognised on the
other side), and deepening cultural alienation (the fragmentation of life that is based
on a culture of individualisation that gives visibility and attention to a small number of
celebrities and renders large groups of people isolated, ignored, and on their own).
Economic accumulation has in the past decades advanced the global outsourcing of
labour, wage repression (the decline and stagnation of the share of wages in total
economic value), an increasing organic composition of capital (increasing investments
into new technologies that substitute and automate labour), and the financialisation
of the economy. In 2008, these changes resulted in a large economic crisis. The
globalisation of politics has resulted in fast changes that have increased the polar-
isation of society and have given many individuals the feeling they are not in control
of society and do not have influence on it. It became difficult for everyday people to
understand the dynamics of global capitalism. Neoliberalism advanced the individual-
isation of social risks, the privatisation of commodification of (almost) everything,
and the tendential collapse of traditional collective milieus of socialisation that have
been replaced by consumer and celebrity culture, mobile privatisation, mediated iso-
lation, and the tendency of the colonisation and collapse of the public sphere. The
16 Introduction
crisis of politics has expressed itself as the declining trust in political institutions
and declining participation in elections and political life. After the start of the new
world economic crisis, a new phase of hyper-neoliberalism followed that bailed out
banks and corporations by taxes and at the same time advanced social cuts to
finance these measures. Established parties, politics, and state institutions’ reputa-
tion thereby suffered, which intensified the political crisis. Finally, an ideological
crisis emerged in the context of the rise of new nationalisms and authoritarianism
that threaten to undermine democracy and the rule of law.
The rise of new nationalisms and authoritarian capitalism emerged from widespread
economic, political, and cultural alienation. Far-right demagogues seized the phase
of crisis and widespread socio-economic, political, and cultural discontent for con-
structing immigrants, refugees, Muslims, and other minorities as scapegoats that are
blamed for the crises and associated problems. They have promised top-down lead-
ership, law and order politics, and defending the nation against the constructed
enemies who are blamed for society’s problems. They have also instrumentalised
the fear of Islamist terrorism that has emerged in the context of 9/11, al-Qaida, and
the Islamic State by constructing the image that all Muslims are potential terrorists
and claiming there is a cultural conflict between Western culture and Arab culture.
The far-right has also used the refugee crisis that has emerged in the context of the
political crisis of the Middle East as an opportunity for creating fears of refugees
and presenting refugees as terrorists, criminals, extremists, social parasites, and cul-
tural aliens.
1.3 This Book’s Structure

Part I focuses on the “Foundations of a Marxist Theory of Nationalism”. Chapter 2
discusses bourgeois concepts of nationalism by engaging with the approaches of
Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson. These two theories have often been considered
as being part of critical theories of nationalism. I argue that Gellner and Anderson
have not properly analysed the role of nationalism in capitalism. Chapter 3 focuses on
foundations of establishing an alternative critical theoretical approach for the analysis
of nationalism by engaging with Marx’s concept of nationalism. Chapter 4 compares
two specific classical Marxist theories of the nation, the ones by Otto Bauer and Rosa
Luxemburg. Chapter 5 engages with newer Marxist theories of nationalism and
stresses the connections of anti-nationalist Marxist thought that exists between the
approaches of Karl Marx, Rosa Luxemburg, and Eric J. Hobsbawm.
Part II, “Nationalism on Social Media”, applies the theoretical foundations to two case
studies in the context of social media. On the one hand, it analyses, in the first case
study (Chapter 6), how Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube were used for communicating
nationalism in the context of the German federal elections in 2017. On the other hand, it
focuses, in Chapter 7, on how nationalism was communicated on social media in the
context of the new right-wing coalition government formed by the Austrian People’s
Party (ÖVP) and the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) after the Austrian federal elections in
2017. In Chapter 8, broader conclusions about nationalism, nationalism 2.0, and fake
news are drawn.
Notes
1 Twitter, @RealDonaldTrump, 23 December 2018, https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/

status/1076844349860823042
2 Who is Jair Bolsonaro? Brazil’s Far-Right President in his Own Words. The Guardian
Online, 29 October 2018, www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/06/jair-bolsonaro-brazil-
tropical-trump-who-hankers-for-days-of-dictatorship
3 Translation from German: „Deshalb gehen wir den Weg für unser Heimatland Österreich,
den Kampf gegen den Bevölkerungsaustausch, konsequent weiter, wie es die Menschen
von uns auch erwarten. […] Wir wollen nicht zur Minderheit in der eigenen Heimat
werden.” Interview mit Heinz-Christian Strache. Kronen Zeitung Online, 28 April 2019.
This Book’s Structure
4 Translation from French: “En attaquant l’idée de Nation et la maîtrise de l’immigration vous
laissez grandir le communautarisme, l’islamisme et le terrorisme.” Twitter, @MLP_officiel,
11 March 2018, https://twitter.com/mlp_officiel/status/972856348319731713
5 Translation from Turkish: “Tek Millet. Tek Bayrak. Tek Vatan. Tek Devlet.” Twitter,
@RTErdogan, 10 March 2019, https://twitter.com/rterdogan/status/1105007951109148672
6 Viktor Orbán, 26 June 2016, www.facebook.com/orbanviktor/videos/10154194245626093/
7 Twitter, @Nigel_Farage, 21 March 2016, https://twitter.com/nigel_farage/status/
711873806395019264
8 Translation from Italian: “Mentre il Papa invita ad accogliere tutti i migranti, 700 clandestini
sono sbarcati in Calabria e altri 3.000 arriveranno in Italia nelle prossime ore. Immigrazione?
No, INVASIONE organizzata e finanziata dai nuovi schiavisti.” Matteo Salvini, 16 April 2017,
www.facebook.com/salviniofficial/posts/10154691216098155?comment_tracking=%7B%22tn
%22%3A%22O%22%7Da
9 Italic emphasis in all quotes throughout the book taken from original sources.
18 Introduction
10 Theresa May, Conservative Party conference speech, 5 October 2016, www.telegraph.co.uk

/news/2016/10/05/theresa-mays-conference-speech-in-full (accessed 2 May 2019).
11 Theresa May’s Conservative Party Conference Speech 2016, transcript: https://blogs.specta
tor.co.uk/2016/10/full-text-theresa-mays-conference-speech/
Part I
Foundations of a Marxist
Theory of Nationalism
Chapter Two
Bourgeois Theories of Nationalism
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Ernest Gellner’s Nations and Nationalism
2.3 Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities
2.4 Conclusion
2.1 Introduction
Five Types of Theories

Anthony D. Smith (1998) and Umut Özkirimli (2010) identify five types of theories of
nationalism: primordialism, perennialism, ethno-symbolism, modernism, and postmod-
ernism. Table 2.1 gives an overview of features of these approaches.
Fetishist Theories of Nationalism
An important way of distinguishing theories of nationalism is to ask the question

whether they see nationalism and the nation as immanent in human existence and
society as such, or as historical phenomena that only exist in particular societies
that are shaped by certain class distinctions and forms of domination. Depending on
whether the first or second answer is given, we can distinguish between fetishist
and critical theories of nationalism. Fetishist theories reify nationalism, whereas crit-
ical theories stress the ideological, constructed, invented, fabricated, and illusionary
character of nationalism.
For Marx, ideology is a form of practice, experience, discourse, and consciousness that
distorts reality by presenting it in false ways. He therefore speaks of ideology as “a
camera obscura” that makes “men and their relations appear upside-down” (Marx and
Engels 1845/46b, 36). Marx characterises ideologies as “phantoms” (Marx and Engels
1845/46b, 36) – he uses the term Nebelbildungen (Marx and Engels 1845/46a, 26) in
the German original, which can literally be translated as “misty creatures”. In Capital
Volume 1, Marx introduces the notion of commodity fetishism, by which he indicates
that the commodity and capital advance a commodity ideology, in which social relations
22 A Marxist Theory of Nationalism
TABLE 2.1 Five theories of nationalism, based on Smith (1998) and Özkirimli (2010)
Approach Basic understanding of the nation and Example representatives

nationalism
Primordialism Nation and nationalism are immanent in Clifford Geertz, Steven Grosby, Adrian
human biology or culture and expressions Hastings, Edward Shils, Pierre van den
of language, religion, territory, or kinship. Berghe
Perennialism Nations and nationalism are perennial, per- John Armstrong, Walker Connor, Joshua
sistent, recurrent, and continuous features Fishman, Donald Horowitz, Hugh Seton-
of humankind that develop historically over Watson
long periods of time and derive from myths,
language, and ethnic ties.
Ethno- Myths, symbols, memories, values, and tra- John Armstrong, Frederic Barth, John
Symbolism ditions produce ethnic communities that Hutchinson, Anthony D. Smith
can turn into nations and whose national-
ism refers to their ethnic past and ethnic
authenticity.
Modernism Nations and nationalism are distinct Benedict Anderson, Paul Brass, John
modern phenomena that are created Breuilly, Karl Deutsch, Ernest Gellner,
together with the formation of nation- Anthony Giddens, Michael Hechter, Eric
states, capitalism, industrialism, bureau- J. Hobsbawm, Miroslav Hroch, Elie
cracy, and modern communication Kedourie, Hans Kohn, Daniel Lerner,
technologies. Michael Mann, Tom Nairn, Charles Tilly
Postmodernism Nations and nationalism are social con- Homi Bhabha, Michael Billig, Rogers Bru-
structs serving dominant purposes. Their baker, Partha Chatterjee, Stuart Hall,
existence is challenged by migrant labour, Deniz Kandiyoti, George Mosse, Nira
globalisation, multiculturalism, global com- Yuval-Davis
munication, and entertainment. National
identities are fragmented, diverse, hybrid,
ambivalent, fluid, constructed, and shaped
by cultural differences.
assume “the fantastic form of a relation between things” (Marx 1867, 165). The com-
modity hides the social relations producing it and makes things (commodities and
money) appear as natural and eternal properties of society.
In the realm of modern politics, we find forms of fetishism such as nationalism, anti-
Semitism, and racism. These are specific types of political fetishism. Rosa Luxemburg
(1976) stresses in her critique of nationalism that the latter is a “misty veil” that “con-
ceals in every case a definite historical content” (135). Nationalism fetishises the
nation in the form of a “we”-identity (a national people) that is distinguished from
enemies (outsiders, other nations, immigrants, refugees, etc.) who are presented as
Chapter Two | Bourgeois Theories of Nationalism 23
intruders, aliens, subhumans, uncivilised, parasites, criminals, terrorists, etc. in order

to deflect attention from class contradictions and power inequalities.
Primordialism, perennialism and ethno-symbolism in different ways reify the nation, and
thereby also nationalism, by assuming that the nation is part of human essence. They
advance a “retrospective nationalism” (Özkirimli 2010, 69; Puri 2004, 44; Smith 1998, 196)
that is “projecting back onto earlier social formations the features peculiar to nations and
nationalism” (Smith 1998, 196). The nation and nationalism always define an alien and
enemy outside, from which national identity differs and against which it has to be
defended. The problem of essentialist theories of the nation and nationalism is that they
imply that in the last instance, war is a central and unavoidable feature of all societies.
They advance a negative picture of the human being and cannot imagine a peaceful soci-
ety. Fetishising the nation and nationalism means fetishising warfare and militarism. The
argument that armament is necessary for national defence has historically resulted in
arms races that have created the possibility of nuclear extinction of life on Earth.
Let us consider an example. Anthony D. Smith, in his ethno-symbolist approach, defines

the nation as “a group of human beings, possessing common and distinctive elements
of culture, a unified economy system, citizenship rights for all members, a sentiment of
solidarity arising out of common experiences, and occupying a common territory” (Smith
1998, 188). All societies and all human groups have a culture, an economy, a system of

decision-making, membership rules, common experiences, some cohesion, and common
space. Smith’s definition of the nation is a definition of society. And as a consequence,
he reifies the nation by equalising the nation and society. Smith’s concept of the nation
is expansive: he expands the concept in time and space so that he cannot adequately
distinguish between society and the nation. But declaring particular phenomena as nat-
ural properties of society is precisely the definition of fetishism. In fetishism and reified
consciousness, isolated parts of society appear “as a timeless law valid for every human
society” (Lukács 1971, 9) and take on the “fetishistic semblance of autonomy” (Lukács
1971, 231). Smith advances a fetishist theory of the nation and nationalism.
The distinction between fetishist and critical theories of nationalism does not imply
that all modern and postmodern approaches are critical. Some of them fetishise the
nation and nationalism as being necessary for and immanent in all modern societies
or they fetishise subaltern nations and nationalisms.
I will in the following sections discuss some of the most influential theories of national-
ism, and will in this analysis use the distinction between fetishist and critical theories
of nationalism. A search on Google Scholar for the keyword “nationalism” shows that
Ernest Gellner’s Nations and Nationalism (18,166 citations), Benedict Anderson’s
Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (82,172 cit-
ations), and Eric J. Hobsbawm’s Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth,
Reality (11,652 citations) are among the most well-known and cited books analysing
nationalism.1 Section 2.2 focuses on Gellner’s approach and Section 2.3 on Anderson’s.
2.2 Ernest Gellner’s Nations and Nationalism
Defining Nationalism
For Ernest Gellner (2006), nationalism is the “political principle, which holds that the polit-
ical and the national unit should be congruent”, that “ethnic boundaries should not cut
across political ones” (1). It is “the striving to make culture and polity congruent” (42). For
Gellner, language is the central aspect of culture (42). The principle of nationalism is
expressed in national sentiments and nationalist movements. Gellner considers both the
definition of the nation as: (a) shared culture; and (b) shared consciousness of belonging to
a nation as inappropriate (6–7). The territorial unit can only become “ethnically homoge-
neous […] if it either kills, or expels, or assimilates all non-nationals” (2).
Gellner argues that life in agricultural society was too differentiated, inward-turned,
isolated, dispersed, and locally contained for nationalism and national consciousness
to emerge. There was hardly lateral communication between communities (11). He
stresses that bureaucracy, entrepreneurial spirit, the rationality of orderliness and effi-
ciency, and the ideas of perpetual growth and progress are characteristic for industri-
alism. Gellner bases his understanding of industrialism on Max Weber. Nationalism
would be a central feature of modernity and industrialism. “Nationalism, the organiza-
tion of human groups into large, centrally educated, culturally homogeneous units”, is
for Gellner a “distinctive structural requirement of industrial society” (34). Modern
organisations (corporations, bureaucracies) are according to this argument based on
a division of labour that requires cooperation, specialisation, standardisation, and com-
munication enabled by cultural homogeneity that is achieved by universal, compulsory,
formalised, codifiable education. General education and the school system guarantee
the “employability, dignity, security and self-respect of individuals” (35). Nationalism
is “the general imposition of a high culture on society” that replaces the reproduction
of detached “local groups” by “folk cultures” and “low cultures” (56). “Homogeneity,
literacy, anonymity are the key traits” (132) of nationalism.
The Missing Link: Nationalism and Class Society
Gellner advances a liberal theory of nationalism, in which nationalism is independent

of capitalism and class structures and a positive and necessary feature of modernity
and industrialism. Class societies require violence in order to guarantee their exist-
ence. In slave-holding societies and feudal societies, labour-power and the products
of labour are fully or partly owned by the slave-master and feudal lord, respectively.
Such a class structure can only be upheld by direct violence, i.e. the whip, the
sword, the noose, and the gun. In capitalism, violence in addition to direct violence
takes on the form of structural and ideological violence. Structural violence means
that the dull compulsion of the labour-market forces the “double free” wage-worker
into exploitation. The wage-worker is “free” in the
double sense that as a free individual he can dispose of his labour-power

as his own commodity, and that, on the other hand, he has no other com-
modity for sale, i.e. he is rid of them, he is free of all the objects needed
for the realization of his labour-power.
(Marx 1867, 272–273)
The gender division of labour is an older structural form of violence that continues to exist
in capitalism, where it takes on new forms. Ideological violence tries to naturalise class

relations and exploitation, and tries to “convince” workers and other subalterns that their
exploitation and domination is natural and without alternative and that social problems
have other roots than the class structure. Nationalism is one of the ideologies that tries to
construct a feeling of unity between the subaltern classes and the capitalist class in order
to distract attention from class differences, the class structure, and the power inequalities
entailed in the class structure. Ernest Gellner presents a unitary concept of the nation that
overlooks that within modern nations, there are class differences that create power imbal-
ances that also, but not exclusively, have to do with the access to culture and education.
So, ideology, violence, difference, conflict, and classes are rather absent from Gellner’s
concept of nationalism. Nationalism constructs a unity that is opposed to an outside.
This outside can be constructed as inner and/or outer enemies of the nation. Whereas
the inner enemies typically are foreigners, immigrants, minorities, and socialists, the
outer enemies tend to be other nations and groups at the international level. National-
ism as ideology not just justifies a national society’s (i.e. a society bound by national
borders) class structure, but also its imperialist, colonial, or neo-colonial expansion and
wars, which tend to be justified by the ideology of the “national interest” and “national
security” that claim that the nation needs to be defended against foreign enemies and
by the ideology of “national superiority” that claims that the superior nation must “civil-
ise” and thereby “help” the world’s “primitive”, “underdeveloped”, and “backward”
regions. War is an inherent potential and implication of nationalism. Gellner largely
leaves out aspects of imperialism in his theory of nationalism.
Those making arguments similar to Gellner can respond to my criticism that, for
example, the Soviet system and Maoist China were also nationalist, and that therefore
nationalism is not limited to capitalism. But by doing so, they fall into the Stalinist
trap, namely the argument that Stalinism and Maoism were non-capitalist societies
and forms of socialism. The 1936 Constitution of the USSR that was drafted under
Stalin claimed in article 4 that the Soviet Union had abolished capitalism:
The socialist system of economy and the socialist ownership of the means
and instruments of production, firmly established as a result of the abolition
of the capitalist system of economy, the abrogation of private ownership of
the means and instruments of production and the abolition of the exploitation
of man by man, constitute the economic foundation of the U.S.S.R.
(Stalin 1936)
Liberal theories of nationalism that see nationalism as a necessary feature of both

capitalist and socialist modernity overlook that Stalinist society, Maoist society, and
comparable systems are specific forms of capitalism. Marxist critics of Stalinism
stress that the Soviet system was a form of state capitalism in which the bureau-
cracy acted as collective capitalist (James 2013b).
Nationalism and the Media
Gellner (2006) argues that the media are not systems that distribute nationalist
ideology, but that the “most important and persistent [nationalist] message is gener-
ated by the medium itself”, i.e. by the media’s structure of “abstract, centralized,
standardized, one to many communication” that uses the nation’s formal, national
language so that “only he who can understand” the transmitted language is included
in the national community (122). Gellner is political theory’s Marshall McLuhan. He
applies McLuhan’s dictum that the “medium is the message” because “it is the
medium that shapes and controls the scale and form of human association and
action” (McLuhan 1997, 149) to the theory of nationalism and argues that national
media are nationalism’s message. If this were true, then the emergence of global
communication systems, such as the Internet, would have to bring about an end of
nationalism that is, however, nowhere in sight. Global, digital media use a global
networked system of communication that combines one-to-one, one-to-many, and
many-to-many communication. Nationalism continues to be expressed and chal-
lenged in novel ways through such means of communication, which shows that
nationalism is a political-economic and ideological phenomenon, and not one impli-
cated by the technical structure of media systems.
2.3 Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities
The Nation as Imagined Community
For Anderson (2006), the nation “is an imagined political community” (6). It is
imagined because “the members of even the smallest nation will never know most
of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each
lives the image of their communion” (6). He explicitly opposes “imagining” and “cre-
ation” to “fabrication” and “falsity” (6), which implies that the nation for Anderson
does not have an ideological character. For Anderson, the nation is limited by bound-
aries and has cultural roots (7). Anderson shares with Gellner the assumption that

nationalism is a modern phenomenon. Nationalism is for Anderson a secular form of
religion. It is for him not ideological in character, but a quasi-religion (12).
For Anderson, nationalism arose together with the rise of print capitalism, i.e. the
invention and diffusion of “the novel and the newspaper” that allowed “the tech-
nical means for ‘re-presenting’ the kind of imagined community that is the nation”
(25). Modern media would allow the national aggregation of media consumption “in
silent privacy”, a “ceremony” that is repeated day by day by the media consumer
and “simultaneously by thousands (or millions) of others of whose existence he is
confident, yet of whose identity he has not the slightest notion” (35). Together,
these anonymous individuals who perform the same media practice form for Ander-
son the nation as imagined community by imagining each other as the nation with-
out knowing and experiencing each other. According to Anderson, print capitalism
that is based on “print-as-commodity” (37) has made the nation and nationalism
possible. Print capitalism “gave a new fixity to language, which in the long run
helped to build that image of antiquity so central to the subjective idea of the
nation” (44). Print capitalism required the standardisation of language into a national
literary language that could be written, printed, read, and communicated in formal
contexts. For Anderson, “the convergence of capitalism and print technology” (46)
created the nation. The national print language became the “[l]anguage-of-state”,
“the language of business, of the sciences, of the press, or of literature” (78). Not
just the media, but also other institutions and structures such as the census, the
map, and the museum, would help to construct the nation (163).
Anderson argues that nationalism is not necessarily racist, pathological, and rooted
“in fear and hatred of the Other” (141). His argument is directed against Marxist
theories of nationalism, as represented by Rosa Luxemburg and Eric Hobsbawm, that
stress the ideological and therefore manipulative character of nationalism. Anderson
makes this point because he believes in the power and importance of anti-colonial
and anti-imperialist nationalism that he terms “popular nationalism” (161) and that
he sees emerging from self-defence. He dismisses Eric Hobsbawm’s (1977) argument
that “Marxists as such are not nationalists” (9) as “fiction” (Anderson 2006, 16).
Anderson claims that “nations inspire love” in the form of “poetry, prose fiction,
music, plastic arts” (141), “political love” of the homeland (143), etc. He also doubts
that nationalism is a cause of racism and anti-Semitism (148).
The Missing Link: Nationalism and Ideology
By focusing on the construction of community, Anderson only looks at the inner

dynamic of nationalism. He overlooks the dialectic of inner identity and outer con-
text, from which identities differ and against which they define themselves. He
leaves open the question why exactly there is a need for nationalism. In doing so,
he, just like Gellner, ignores the fundamental role of class structures in the emer-
gence and reproduction of nationalism. Modern class society requires nationalism as
ideology in order to justify the exploitation of workers, the domination of consumers,
and the geographic expansion of capitalist production and markets. In capitalist soci-
ety, love for the nation comes along with the exclusion of those who are not seen
as members of the nation and are presented as opponents, competitors, foreigners,
aliens, scapegoats, enemies, etc. Other than Anderson, Étienne Balibar points out
that there is a necessary dialectic of racism and nationalism: “Racism is constantly
emerging out of nationalism […] and nationalism emerges out of racism” (Balibar
and Wallerstein 1991, 53). Racism calls for the preservation of the nation’s fictive
ethnicity, its proclaimed cultural and/or biological origin and purity (59). Racism
“constantly induces an excess of ‘purism’ as far as the nation is concerned: for the
nation to be itself, it has to be racially or culturally pure” (59–60).
When Anderson (2006) argues that “from the start the nation was conceived in lan-
guage, not in blood” (145), he overlooks that nationalist language is war by other
means, intellectual warfare that often aims at denigrating the foreign by the nation’s
positive self-presentation or negative othering. Anthony W. Marx (2003) argues that
Anderson’s imagined community approach incorrectly assumes that printing’s
“spreading communication brings inclusive solidarity” (16) and ignores that “amid
religious, elite, and economic conflicts this was not possible […]. Indeed, the con-
tent or messages so spread were often divisive rather than necessary unifying” (16),
so that exclusion was the basis of nationalist unity.
Nationalism and Print Capitalism

Anderson’s account creates the impression that technology and the economy develop
independently, which becomes evident when he says that nations emerged as
a result of the interaction and convergence of capitalism and print technology
(Anderson 2006, 42–43, 46). He does not ask why printing developed.
Printing first served the purpose of communicating religious rule, which is why it is

no accident that the first woodblock-printed book was The Diamond Sutra, an
important Buddhist text, and the Gutenberg Bible became the first major book
printed in Europe with the help of the metal movable-type printing press. News-
papers emerged in the context of the transformation of the class structure from feu-
dalism to capitalism, i.e. the emergence of the bourgeoisie and the modern working
class and the decline of aristocratic and religious rule. Marx (1857/58, 160–161)
argues that the publication of lists of current prices was an early role of the news-
papers in emerging capitalism.
The nineteenth-century newspaper played the role of an instrument of communica-

tion that helped inform and organise the bourgeois class and the working class. The
bourgeois public sphere (Habermas 1991) and the proletarian or radical public
sphere (Curran 1991; Negt and Kluge 1993) emerged along with the emergence and
consolidation of capitalism. Modern information and communication technologies
and capitalism did not develop independently, as technological determinists claim.
Rather, new technologies assert themselves because there is a political-economic
intention and a need for them that has to do with the transformation of political
economy and class structure and associated contradictions and struggles.
Raymond Williams (2003a) describes the emergence of the press as standing in the
context of the rise of capitalism and its contradictions and struggles:
The development of the press gives us the evidence for our first major
instance. It was at once a response to the development of an extended
social, economic and political system and a response to crisis within that
system. The centralisation of political power led to a need for messages
from that centre along other than official lines. Early newspapers were
a combination of that kind of message – political and social information –
and the specific messages – classified advertising and general commercial
news – of an expanding system of trade. […] But for the transmission of
news and background – the whole orienting, predictive and updating pro-
cess which the fully developed press represented – there was an evident
need for a new form, which the largely traditional institutions of church
and school could not meet. And to the large extent that the crises of gen-
eral change provoked both anxiety and controversy, this flexible and com-
petitive form met social needs of a new kind. As the struggle for a share
in decision and control became sharper, in campaigns for the vote and
then in competition for the vote, the press became not only a new commu-
nications system but, centrally, a new social institution. […] New relations
between men, and between men and things, were being intensely experi-
enced, and in this area, especially, the traditional institutions of church and
school, or of settled community and persisting family, had very little to say.
(14–15)
Benedict Anderson: Nationalism Theory’s Marshall

McLuhan?
Anderson, in contrast to Williams, gives the impression that printing became a popular
technology by accident and by chance co-joined with capitalism. Anderson’s position is
much closer to Marshall McLuhan (1997), who claims that “print fostered nationalism”
(55), “print causes nationalism” (141), print “created individualism and nationalism”
(157), or that “nationalism and industrialism […] both derived directly from the explosion
of print technology in the 16th Century” (233). Williams (2003a) criticises that in
McLuhan’s approach, “intention […] is irrelevant” (130) and that McLuhan ideologically
represents “technology as a cause” (131).
2.4 Conclusion
This chapter showed that Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson’s theories conceive
nationalism as a modern project, but do not adequately relate it to class structures
and ideology.
Ernest Gellner presents a unitary concept of the nation that overlooks that within
modern nations, there are class differences that create power imbalances that also, but
not exclusively, exist in regard to the access to culture and education. Ideology, violence,
difference, conflict, and classes are rather absent from Gellner’s concept of nationalism.
Benedict Anderson, like McLuhan, overestimates technological development and sees it

as an independent, accidental factor that is autonomous from political economy, social
and class structures, and ideology. Print technology proliferated and became a mass phe-
nomenon in the context of the rise of capitalism and its contradictory public sphere, in
which class struggle manifested in the form of the antagonism between the bourgeois
and the proletarian public spheres. Nationalism in this context arose as an ideology and
movement that aimed at creating the unity and reproduction of the nation-state, the sta-

bilisation of class structure, and the enablement of imperialism.
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 aim to show that Marxist theory poses a viable alternative to
bourgeois theories of nationalism.
Note
1 Data source: Google Scholar, accessed on 25 December 2017.

Chapter Three
Marx’s Concept of Nationalism
3.1 Marx’s Concept of Nationalism

3.2 Edward Said’s Critique of Marx
3.3 Key Aspects of Nationalist Ideology
This chapter focuses on foundations of a critical theory of nationalism in Marx’s works.
Mike Davis (2018) argues that too many Marxist analyses of nationalism have incor-
rectly assumed “the autonomy of the discursive, the cultural, or the ethnic” and
have not put nationalism into the context of “property relations” (178). We “need
more economic interpretation, not less” (178). The point of this chapter is that we
can gain much for a dialectical and materialist analysis of nationalism by engaging
with Marx’s writings on the nation and nationalism. Kevin Anderson (2016) writes in
his book Marx at the Margins: On Nationalism, Ethnicity, and Non-Western Societies
that Marx’s analyses of nationalism and non-Western society have often been neg-
lected or misinterpreted, including in radical scholarship:
Marx’s life exemplified his ideal of internationalism, for by the end he was
neither German nor British, but a European or even a global intellectual.
[…] Marx’s lifelong intellectual project centered on the critique of political
economy – on the elaboration of a model of the structure of modern capit-
alist society and of the potential for its positive transformation through the
movement for self-emancipation of the modern working class. […] his writ-
ings on nationalism, ethnicity, and non-Western societies constituted an
important, albeit neglected, part of that effort.
(4)
Anderson (2016) argues that much can be gained for critical theory by engaging
with Marx’s writings on nationalism:
Marx’s critique of capital, it has been shown, was far broader than is
usually supposed. To be sure, he concentrated on the labor-capital rela-
tion within Western Europe and North America, but at the same time,
he expended considerable time and energy on the analysis of non-
Western societies, as well as that of race, ethnicity, and nationalism.
[…] I argue for a move toward a 21st century notion of Marx as

a global theorist whose social critique included notions of capital and
class that were open and broad enough to encompass the particularities
of nationalism, race, and ethnicity, as well as the varieties of human
social and historical development, from Europe to Asia and from the
Americas to Africa.
(237, 6)
The chapter first discusses some key aspects of Marx’s concept of nationalism (Sec-
tion 3.1). Second, it engages with Edward Said’s criticism of Marx (Section 3.2).
Third, some conclusions are drawn (Section 3.3).
3.1 Marx’s Concept of Nationalism
Internationalism Instead of Nationalism
For Marx, the working class has to take an internationalist perspective in its
struggles in order to succeed:
The Communists are further reproached with desiring to abolish countries

and nationality. The working men have no country [Vaterland in the
German original]. We cannot take from them what they have not got. Since
the proletariat must first of all acquire political supremacy, must rise to be
the leading class of the nation, must constitute itself the nation, it is so
far, itself national, though not in the bourgeois sense of the word.
(Marx and Engels 1848, 502–503)
Erica Benner (1995, 53–56) argues that this passage should not be interpreted
as meaning that the working class shall only fight internationally and globally
because it has no national interest, but rather as meaning that conservative pat-
riotism and belief in the fatherland (Vaterland) form an ideology alien to the
working class’ interests and that the working class also has to struggle at the
level of the nation state in combination with struggles at the international level.
The working class has no true interest in “ethnic nationality” (Benner 1995, 54),
but in struggles at the level of the nation-state. Marx “pointed out in his writ-
ings on populist nationalism, intense feelings of physical or material insecurity
furnish an important set of prudential reasons for supporting nationalist leaders”
(Benner 1995, 234).
Chapter Three | Marx’s Concept of Nationalism 35
Marx played a key role in the founding of the International Workingmen’s Associ-
ation, also known as the First International. In the International’s Inaugural Address,
he stresses that working-class politics needs to oppose nationalist warfare and
conquest:
If the emancipation of the working classes requires their fraternal concur-

rence, how are they to fulfil that great mission with a foreign policy in pur-
suit of criminal designs, playing upon national prejudices, and squandering in
piratical wars the people’s blood and treasure? [Nationalist wars and con-
flicts] […] have taught the working classes the duty to master themselves
the mysteries of international politics; to watch the diplomatic acts of their
respective Governments; to counteract them, if necessary, by all means in
their power; when unable to prevent, to combine in simultaneous denunci-
ations, and to vindicate the simple laws of morals and justice, which ought
to govern the relations of private individuals, as the rules paramount of the
intercourse of nations. The fight for such a foreign policy forms part of the
general struggle for the emancipation of the working classes. Proletarians of
all countries, Unite!
(Marx 1864, 13)
Marx here argues that nationalism (“national prejudices”) tends to be used as an

ideology for justifying wars and conquest. Counteracting it requires internationalist

politics. In 1864, Marx had not changed his position on internationalism in compari-
son to 1848, when the Manifesto was published.
Benner, in her detailed study of Marx and Engels’ writings on the nation and national-
ism, challenges the often repeated claim that the two favoured colonialism as a means
of advancing modernisation, industrialisation, and the formation of a proletariat. Marx
encouraged “the emergence in India of indigenous social movements opposed at once
to colonial exploitation and to the traditional ‘despotism’” (Benner 1995, 176).
According to this analysis, self-determination for a colonized people cannot

be achieved simply through the obdurate assertion of what has been sup-
pressed by the colonizers. The real work of building a self-determining soci-
ety must go beyond a separatist politics of identity, and concern itself with
advancing the freedom and material welfare of people who, before the
colonial era, had been demeaned and exploited by their own rulers.
(179)
Marx’s Critical Concept of Ideology
Marx critically theorised ideology and practised the ideology critique of religion,
bourgeois thought, and capitalism. In his very early works, he stressed that ideolo-
gies create illusions and deceive, and criticised religion as ideology:
Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world,
just as it is the spirit of spiritless conditions. It is the opium of the people. To
abolish religion as the illusory happiness of the people is to demand their real
happiness. The demand to give up illusions about the existing state of affairs
is the demand to give up a state of affairs which needs illusions.
(Marx 1844a, 175–176)
For Marx, the belief in religion is an ideological expression of a dominative society.

He criticised left-wing thinkers such as Bruno Bauer and Ludwig Feuerbach for stop-
ping at the critique of religion and not seeing how it is related to capitalism and
necessitates the critique of capitalism. For Marx, “the criticism of heaven” has to
turn “into the criticism of the earth, the criticism of religion into the criticism of law
and the criticism of theology into the criticism of politics” (Marx 1844a, 176).
The German Ideology is a draft book that Marx and Engels wrote for gaining self-
understanding of contemporary German philosophy and left-wing critique of their
time. In The German Ideology, Marx argues that in “all ideology men and their rela-
tions appear upside-down as in a camera obscura” and that “this phenomenon
arises just as much from their historical life-process as the inversion of objects on
the retina does from their physical life-process” (Marx and Engels 1845/46b, 36).
Ideology constructs illusions and tries to make them appear as the true status of
reality. It here becomes evident that Marx conceives ideology based on Hegel’s dia-
lectic of essence and appearance: ideologies make existence appear different from
how it really is. It hides the true essence and state of the world behind false
appearances and communicates these false appearances as truths and nature. Ideol-
ogy makes being appear as immediate, but illusionary reality whose simplicity hides
the underlying complexity of the world that cannot always be experienced directly.
Hegel (1991) argues that the “immediate being of things is […] represented as
a sort of rind or curtain behind which the essence is concealed” (addition to §112).
For Hegel, the truths hidden behind appearances are part of the world’s logic. In
contrast, for Marx, the process of hiding, naturalising, concealing, and making truth
disappear is an immanent expression of and practice in class societies.
Economic and Political Fetishism
With his notion of commodity fetishism, Marx (1867), in Capital, shows that capitalism has
an inherent ideological tendency to reify capitalist phenomena by making them appear as
natural features of all societies. One cannot see the social relations of production behind
the commodity. As a consequence, the commodity “stands on its head” and produces “gro-
tesque ideas” (163). Marx (1867, 163–177) developed the insight that ideology hides
power relations and naturalises domination into the concept of commodity fetishism. The
commodity is a “mysterious” and “a very strange thing” (Marx 1867, 163).
The mysterious character of the commodity-form consists therefore simply in

the fact that the commodity reflects the social characteristics of men’s own
labour as objective characteristics of the products of labour themselves, as the
socio-natural properties of these things. Hence it also reflects the social rela-
tion of the producers to the sum total of labour as a social relation between
objects, a relation which exists apart from and outside the producers. Through
this substitution, the products of labour become commodities, sensuous things
which are at the same time supra-sensible or social.
(Marx 1867, 164–165)
The very structure of capitalism makes commodities, capital, money, classes, etc.
appear as natural properties of society. Because of the division of labour and the
mediated character of capitalism, producers and consumers do not directly experi-

ence the whole production process of the commodity. In everyday capitalist life, we
are primarily confronted with commodities and money as things, whereas the pro-
duction process and its class relations remain hidden. Capitalism is thereby in itself
ideological in the very practices of capitalist production. Fetishism is ideological just
like ideology is fetishist: ideology fetishises certain changeable social relations as
static, unchangeable, natural, thing-like entities.
Social relations between humans appear as a “relation between physical things” (Marx
1867, 165). All ideology tries to naturalise domination or exploitation. Fetishism also
takes on the form of political fetishism. Nationalism naturalises and fetishises the exist-
ence of nations. It is a form of political fetishism. Nationalism fetishises the nation in
the form of a “we”-identity (a national people) that is distinguished from enemies (out-
siders, other nations, immigrants, refugees, etc.) that are presented as intruders, aliens,
subhumans, uncivilised, parasites, etc. in order to deflect attention from class contradic-
tions and power inequalities.
Marx on Nationalism
Marx did not limit the analysis of ideology and fetishism to the economy, but also
criticised political fetishisms such as nationalism. He did not explicitly speak of pol-
itical fetishism, but he discussed the role of ideology in distracting attention from
class struggle and benefiting the ruling class. For example, in 1870, he analysed the
role of nationalism in distracting attention from class struggle and benefiting the
ruling class. He analysed the creation of false consciousness among the working
class in one country so that it hates immigrant workers and workers in the colonies.
He specifically addresses this issue in respect to Ireland as a British colony and
gives a precise analysis of the role of nationalism and xenophobia that is also valid
in the context of today’s new nationalisms:
Ireland is the BULWARK of the English landed aristocracy. The exploitation of

this country is not simply one of the main sources of their material wealth; it
is their greatest moral power. […] And most important of all! All industrial
and commercial centres in England now have a working class divided into
two hostile camps, English PROLETARIANS and Irish PROLETARIANS. The
ordinary English worker hates the Irish worker as a competitor who forces
down the STANDARD OF LIFE. In relation to the Irish worker, he feels himself
to be a member of the ruling nation and, therefore, makes himself a tool of
his aristocrats and capitalists against Ireland, thus strengthening their domin-
ation over himself. He harbours religious, social and national prejudices
against him. […] This antagonism is kept artificially alive and intensified by
the press, the pulpit, the comic papers, in short by all the means at the dis-
posal of the ruling class. This antagonism is the secret of the English working
class’s impotence, despite its organisation. It is the secret of the maintenance
of power by the capitalist class. And the latter is fully aware of this.
(Marx 1870, 473, 474, 475)
A similar passage can be found in a piece from 1869:
The “English bourgeoisie has not only exploited Irish poverty to keep down
the working class in England by forced immigration of poor Irishmen, but it
has also divided the proletariat into two hostile camps. […] The average Eng-
lish worker hates the Irish worker as a competitor who lowers wages and the
STANDARD OF LIFE. He feels national and religious antipathies for him. He
regards him somewhat like the POOR WHITES of the Southern States of
North America regarded black slaves. This antagonism among the proletarians
of England is artificially nourished and kept up by the bourgeoisie. It knows
that this scission is the true secret of maintaining its power”.
(Marx 1869, 88)
Bonapartism and Nationalism
Marx (1852) introduced the term Bonapartism for analysing Napoleon III’s dicta-
torial rule in France. Napoleon III staged a coup d’état and gained power in
1851. A feature of Bonapartism is that “the state seem[s] to have made itself
completely independent” (Marx 1852, 186). Nationalism is an important ideo-
logical feature of Bonapartism:
[Bonapartism] professed to save the working class by breaking down Par-

liamentarism, and, with it, the undisguised subserviency of Government
to the propertied classes. It professed to save the propertied classes by
upholding their economic supremacy over the working class; and, finally,
it professed to unite all classes by reviving for all the chimera of
national glory.
(Marx 1871, 330)
Marx stresses the role of nationalism as ideology that constructs fictive ethnicity of

a people and the nation in order to deflect political attention from the class contradiction.
Internationalist Socialist Politics
But what should be done in a situation where nationalism, racism, xenophobia, or

other ideologies divide dominated groups? Marx argues that it is the task of the
political left to draw attention to how ideology works and to undermine its founda-
tions in order to advance solidarity and alternatives. Internationalist socialist politics
is the best answer to nationalism. At the time when Marx wrote the cited passages
about Ireland, the First International had been formed. Marx saw practical ideology
critique as one of its tasks:
Thus, to hasten the social revolution in England is the most important

object of the International Working Men’s Association. The sole means of
doing so is to make Ireland independent. It is, therefore, the task of the
“INTERNATIONAL” to bring the conflict between England and Ireland to the
forefront everywhere, and to side with Ireland publicly everywhere. The

special task of the Central Council in London is to awaken the conscious-
ness of the English working class that, for them, the national emancipation
of Ireland is not a QUESTION OF ABSTRACT JUSTICE OR HUMANITARIAN
SENTIMENT, but THE FIRST CONDITION OF THEIR OWN SOCIAL
EMANCIPATION.
(Marx 1870, 475)
In Capital Volume I, Marx argues that emancipation requires solidarity between the
exploited workers in different contexts, including issues of colour and geography:
“Labour in a white skin cannot emancipate itself where it is branded in a black
skin” (Marx 1867, 414). He points out that the formal abolishment of slavery in the
USA helped advance more radical demands of the US working class movement, spe-
cifically the demand for the eight-hour working day. The point is that class solidarity
that emancipates one group in one context is an impetus for class struggles and
radical demands in other contexts. Different struggles can enrich each other through
solidary action. This requires unity in diversity of social struggles.
3.2 Edward Said’s Critique of Marx
Edward Said: “Marx’s Economic Analyses are […]

a Standard Orientalist Undertaking”
Edward Said (1979) claims that Marx “returned with increasing conviction to the idea
that even in destroying Asia, Britain was making possible there a real social revolution”
(153). “Marx’s economic analyses are perfectly fitted thus to a standard Orientalist
undertaking, even though Marx’s humanity, his sympathy for the misery of people, are
clearly engaged. Yet in the end it is the Romantic Orientalist vision that wins out” (154).
Kevin B. Anderson (2016) acknowledges that there are certain problems in Marx’s
concept of development, but argues that this “in no way implies a lack of sympathy
for the human beings suffering” (20). Marx (1853), in his articles on India, indeed
wrote that “the English interference” destroyed Indian communities and their econ-
omy. It thereby brought about “the only social revolution ever heard of in Asia”
(131–132). Marx said that “England has to fulfil a double mission in India: one
destructive, the other regenerating the annihilation of old Asiatic society, and the
laying the material foundations of Western society in Asia” (217).
Chapter Three | Edward Said’s Critique of Marx 41
In his 1853 articles on India, Marx also writes that in India and other places of the
world, the bourgeoisie is “dragging individuals and people through blood and dirt,
through misery and degradation” (221). In very clear terms, Marx argues that coloni-
alism is a form of barbarism: “The profound hypocrisy and inherent barbarism of
bourgeois civilization lies unveiled before our eyes, turning from its home, where it
assumes respectable forms, to the colonies, where it goes naked” (222). As
a consequence, radical social change would be needed both in India and Britain:
The Indians will not reap the fruits of the new elements of society scat-
tered among them by the British bourgeoisie, till in Great Britain itself the
now ruling classes shall have been supplanted by the industrial proletariat,
or till the Hindus themselves shall have grown strong enough to throw off
the English yoke altogether.
(221)
Kevin B. Anderson’s Defence of Marx in

Response to Edward Said
This passage shows that Marx anticipated and supported the “rise of an Indian liber-
ation movement” (Anderson 2016, 24). He sympathised with the idea of anti-
imperialist liberation movements. At the same time, he stresses that ideally radical
social change works best when there is international solidarity in class struggle. Marx
Edward Said’s Critique of Marx

did not see the Indian people as passive and did not think they were incapable of
conducting a revolution. He rather stresses that all bourgeois rule brings about misery,
violence, degradation, and murder, and that the Indian case verifies this assumption.
He argues that the Indians did not benefit from capitalist and colonial rule. Given
capitalism’s exploitative character, only radical social transformations can establish
a humane society. For Marx, this is true for India, Britain, and the rest of the world.
The need for revolution is the ultimate conclusion of Marx’s writings on India.
That Marx (1853) speaks of colonialism as creating “blood and dirt, […] misery and deg-
radation” (221) shows how wrong postmodernists and post-Marxists are when they
claim that Marx assumed “that the capitalist penetration would lead directly to positive
economic development in what are now known as Third World countries” (Jameson
1990, 47). Anderson (2016), in a detailed study of all of Marx’s writings on nationalism,
ethnicity, non-Western and colonised societies (including Algeria, China, Egypt, India,
Indonesia, Ireland, Latin America, Poland, and Russia), colonialism, slavery, and racism
(including rather unknown works such as the Ethnographical Notebooks), shows that
Marx saw different development paths of different societies, including the possible
development from village communities to modern communism under specific circum-
stances, analysed “the complexities and differences of non-Western societies”, and
showed “the intersectionality of class with ethnicity, race, and nationalism” (237) with-
out taking a postmodern perspective, as is so common today.
3.3 Conclusion: Key Aspects of Nationalist

Ideology
Marx stresses key aspects of nationalist ideology that one can still observe in con-
temporary capitalism:
• Division: Nationalism is an ideology that divides subordinated classes and

groups and benefits the ruling class.
• Distraction: Nationalism distracts attention from class conflict and the class
foundation of social problems by constructing scapegoats who are blamed for
these problems and about whom prejudices and false claims are spread.
• Hegemony: By falling into the nationalist ideological trap of nationalism, sub-
ordinated classes advance not just the exploitation and domination of other
classes, but also their own exploitation and domination. The dominated class
agrees to its own domination and exploitation.
• The media: The tabloid press often advances and keeps alive nationalism and
ideologies in general.
• Reproduction of capitalism: Via nationalism and other ideologies, the power of
the capitalist class is maintained and its effects are hidden.
Chapter Four
Otto Bauer’s and Rosa Luxemburg’s Opposing
Theories of the Nation and Nationalism
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Otto Bauer’s Concept of the Nation
4.3 The Political Impacts of Austro-Marxism and Otto Bauer’s Theory
4.4 Rosa Luxemburg’s Critical Theory of Nationalism
4.5 Conclusion
4.1 Introduction
Otto Bauer (1881–1938) was a leading theorist of Austro-Marxism and in the years
1918–1934 deputy chairman of the Austrian Social Democratic Workers Party. His
most well-known work and only book translated into English is The Question of
Nationalities and Social Democracy. Rosa Luxemburg (1871–1919) was a co-founder
of the party Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania. She became
one of the leaders of the left-wing faction of the Social Democratic Party of Ger-
many that she left because of the party’s support of the First World War. She,
together with Karl Liebknecht, founded the Spartacus League, which later became
the Communist Party of Germany. Luxemburg also theorised nationalism and the
nation from a Marxian perspective.
This chapter asks: What are the differences between Otto Bauer’s and Rosa Luxem-
burg’s theories of the nation and nationalism? What are the foundations of
a Marxist theory of nationalism?
We today experience a surge of new nationalisms. Donald Trump, Brexit, Recep

Tayyip Erdoğan, Marine Le Pen, Viktor Orbán, Heinz Christian Strache, Geert Wilders,
the Alternative for Germany (AfD), Narendra Modi, Rodrigo Duterte, or Vladimir Putin
are some of the symbols of contemporary nationalisms. One hundred years ago, the
combination of imperialism and nationalism led to the First World War. Bauer and
Luxemburg lived, wrote, and struggled at that time.
If one wants to contain nationalism, then an adequate understanding of how it

works is needed. Looking at aspects of the history of theorising nationalism may
provide historical and theoretical insights that are still relevant today. If it is true
that nationalism stands in a complex relation to capitalism, then Marxist theories of
nationalism can help produce such insights. Based on this assumption, it is therefore
feasible to look at Bauer’s and Luxemburg’s approaches because both advanced
influential understandings of the nation and nationalism. It is also interesting to
compare these two approaches because they advance fairly different, opposing
understandings of the nation and nationalism that have in common that Marx is the
main reference and starting point.
The chapter has the following structure: Section 4.2 discusses and reflects on Otto
Bauer’s concept of the nation; Section 4.3 analyses the political implications of
Bauer’s approach; Section 4.4 builds on Marx and focuses on Rosa Luxemburg’s
theory of nationalism; and Section 4.5 draws some conclusions.
4.2 Otto Bauer’s Concept of the Nation
Marxist Affirmations of Bauer’s Approach

Quite some Marxist literature has either neutrally discussed or uncritically supported
Bauer’s theory of nationalism. Forman (1998) argues that “Bauer thought socialism
intimately linked with the national community” and “rejected the proposition that the
socialist project was inherently at odds with a properly conceived program of national
cultural development” (106). Ephraim Nimni (1991), who translated Bauer’s book The
Question of Nationalities and Social Democracy into English, argues, “The characteris-
tics of the phenomenon described by Bauer as community of fate are useful in under-
standing the national community both as a multidimensional and as a developmental
process” (194). For Nimni, Bauer’s approach is “a useful initial step in the process of
deconstructing the relationship between nation and state” (194). Avineri (1991) calls
Bauer’s approach to nationalism “a sophisticated historical approach” (652). Ronald
Munck (2000), based on Bauer, reifies nationalism: “As with Gramsci’s much more influ-
ential work on the national-popular, we find with Bauer a welcome move beyond most
Marxists’ continuous understanding of nation and nationalism as ‘problems’ and not
just an integral element of the human condition” (133). Michael Löwy (1998) also views
Bauer’s concept positively when he speaks of the latter’s “original concepts and lucid
analyses that he developed in order to make the national phenomenon intelligible and
do justice to its socio-historical nature” (46). For Löwy, Bauer’s work on nationalism is
“a monument of critical intelligence and humanist rationalism” (46).
Chapter Four | Theories of the Nation and Nationalism 45
Such analyses mostly ignore that Bauer, from 1918 onwards, propagated pan-
Germanism and the Anschluss of Austria to Germany (unification of Austria and Ger-
many). The chapter at hand argues that this move was not an accident, but was
based on Bauer’s nationalist views and his theory of nationalism.
Otto Bauer established an Austro-Marxist theory of the nation that stood in the context
of the Austro-Hungarian Empire’s specific structure. In 1910, the Austro-Hungarian
Empire consisted of 18 countries. According to the 1910 Census, 23.4 per cent of the
Empire's population spoke German, 19.6 per cent Hungarian, 12.5 per cent Czech,
9.7 per cent Polish, 8.6 per cent Serbian and Croatian, 7.8 per cent Ukrainian,
6.3 per cent Romanian, 3.8 per cent Slovakian, 2.4 per cent Slovenian, and 1.5 per cent
Italian.1
Karl Renner’s Theory of the Nation

Bauer built his theory on Karl Renner’s approach. Renner (1899) argued for minority
rights on the territories of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. A nationality is “determined
by a spiritual and cultural community with an appreciable national literature that
expresses this cultural community” (Renner 1899, 376). The nation is, for Renner, “a
spiritual and cultural community” (377), “a community of thinking and feeling life”
that holds a “national and ethnic-community consciousness”, “the feeling of belong-
Otto Bauer’s Concept of the Nation

ingness” (376), and has common “expressions of thought and feeling” that are
expressed “in the national literature” (380).
Renner’s definition is quite unitary and disregards that modern society is a class and
stratified society, in which experiences, thought, feelings, and culture are not unified,
but diverge and are shaped by differentiations and conflicts of attitudes, tastes, and
political opinions. So, for example, we, to varying degrees, find communists, social-
ists, conservatives, liberals, fascists, apolitical citizens, etc. within one and the same
local community, region, and nation-state.
The Nation as Community of Character
Bauer (1924/2000), based on Renner, defines the nation as “a community of charac-

ter that has grown out of a community of fate” (7). “The nation is the totality of
human beings bound together by a community of fate into a community of charac-
ter” (117). We “will call the complex of physical and intellectual characteristics that
distinguishes one nation from another its national character” (20). A “range of
corresponding characteristics can be observed among the great majority of the

nation’s members” (22). “The fact of national character, the commonality of character
among the members of a nation, is obvious from experience” (26). Bauer argues for
seeing “the nation as a community of culture or, in other words, considering how the
national character is determined by the shared tradition of cultural elements passed
down from earlier generations” (36). He suggests one should see “common history as
the [nation’s] effective cause, common culture and common descent as the means by
which this cause becomes operative, common language as the mediator of the
common culture, simultaneously its product and its producer” (114).
Bauer never explains why he uses the term “fate” for defining the nation. The
notions of fate and destiny have the religious connotation of a predetermined future
and history that is external to and independent of human beings. It is not clear why
Bauer uses such a problematic term as part of his of definition of the nation as
“community of fate”. The deterministic aspect of this nation concept is that it
assumes that a person born into a specific nation necessarily shares specific forms
of thought and behaviour. Bauer’s concept of the nation is fetishist because it sees
the nation as immanent to all societies, even socialist societies. It disregards the
inherent connection of the modern state and the nation.
Alfred Klahr’s Critique of Bauer
The Austrian communist Alfred Klahr (1937) argues that Bauer’s concept of the
nation is idealist and unhistorical:
Otto Bauer’s notion is idealist because he explains the ideological feature

of the national community of character as the nation’s decisive feature
without setting it in relation to other features, the community of territory
and economic life, from which it emerges.2
Bauer holds “the idea that the Germans already in the age of kinship communism
and the feudal society of the Middle Ages formed a nation and thereby anticipates
curious modern theories of the Nazis!”3 (Klahr 1937). Writing in 1937, Klahr argues
that Austrians and Germans never formed a nation because they lived under differ-
ent political and economic conditions of life. Klahr and the Communist Party of Aus-
tria (KPÖ) rejected Bauer’s and the Social Democrats’ German nationalist idea of
a unification of Germany and Austria. They argued for Austria’s independence as
part of the anti-fascist struggle against the Nazis.
Klahr (1937) argues that the Austrian nation is a bounded unity consisting of an eco-
nomic system, a political territory (the state), a language community, and a national
cultural character, which was Stalin’s (1913, 307)4 definition of the nation. He argues
that language, Austrian literature, and art constitute the “Austrian national culture”5
(Klahr 1937). In the context of anti-fascism, the struggle for an Austrian democratic,
anti-fascist nation-state was certainly appropriate. But for doing so, one does not need
the notion of an Austrian nation, but only of an Austrian political nation-state that is
built on an anti-fascist constitution and does not see itself as part of the German
nation and the political project of German nationalism.
The problem is that the stress on the Austrian nation can turn into chauvinism and xeno-
phobia. In its party programme, the Freedom Party of Austria defines itself as
a “patriotic Austrian force” (FPÖ 2011, 2) and defines “our homeland of Austria as part
of the German-speaking linguistic and cultural community” (2). The ideology of the Aus-
trian cultural nation is used for the political demand “Austria First” (2), which means for
the FPÖ that “Austria is not a country of immigration” (5) and that it rejects “forced
multiculturalism, globalisation and mass immigration” (17). The conclusion is that Austria
has a unitary language and culture and that immigrants, Muslims, and other minorities
have to assimilate or be kept out because it is assumed that multiculturalism destroys
the Austrian nation. The example shows that the combination of German language and
Austrian-German culture as definition criterion of the nation can turn into chauvinist

understandings of the nation. Klahr would probably answer to such claims that anti-
fascism is part of the political culture of his own understanding of the Austrian nation.
One, however, needs to add that Austrian culture and the languages spoken in Austria
have never been unitary, but always diverse. Multiculturalism has always been an imma-
nent aspect of Austrian culture. It makes sense to speak of a diverse Austrian culture.
Speaking of a unitary Austrian national culture in contrast opens up possibilities for
abuse. The nation consists in the form of a nation-state and people living in it, which
inevitably results in diverse ways of life that have some minimal common core (such as
a common educational system, media system, etc.) that constitutes a unity in diversity.
But the nation is first and foremost a political concept. Overstressing the level of culture
poses the danger of chauvinist understandings of the nation.
Nationality as Radical Cultural Difference

In the last instance, Bauer (1924/2000) propagates that there are radical cultural
differences between different cultures:
Over and above these differences, all peoples share certain characteristics that
identify us as human beings. On the other hand, classes, professions, and individ-
uals within each nation exhibit distinctive qualities, particular features that distin-
guish them from one another. But the fact remains that the average German is
different from the average Englishman, although they may well have much in
common as human beings and as members of the same class or profession, and
that the English share with one another a range of characteristics, however much
they are distinguished from one another by individual and social differences.
(20)
Thus, community of fate does not refer to subjection to the same fate, but
to the common experience of the same fate in the context of constant rela-
tions, of continual interaction. The English and the Germans both experi-
enced capitalist development, but at different times, in different places,
and in the context of only a loose relationship to each other.
(100–101)
Bauer underestimates the cultural opening that modernity has enabled and that has given
everyday people more access to education, universities, museums, culture, etc. This open-
ing came along with the expansion of commodity culture, mass production, and consumer
culture. Generalised commodity culture requires general education for skills development
of the workforce and culture as realm of commodity consumption. In many countries, most
people have access to culture and education today, but there are qualitative differences
between classes in terms of the education they get, educational success, and cultural
tastes. Culture is in capitalism, as Bourdieu (1984) says, a culture of class distinction.
“Non-Historical Nations”
Bauer (1924/2000, Chapter 4) speaks of “non-historical nations” as language groups
that consist of peasants and workers in a society, where the aristocratic or bour-
geois ruling class do not speak the mother tongue of the peasants and workers. As
examples, he mentions the Slovenes in Austria from the ninth century onwards (158,
159) and the Czechs between 1620 and 1740 (171, 177). Bauer distinguishes
between historical nations that he sees as “civilised” because they have
a developed economy and a ruling class, and “uncivilised” nations that he considers
as backwards and undeveloped. He therefore characterises the “non-historical
nations” as being “devoid of culture” (159) and having no “living culture” (159). In
what Bauer terms the non-historical Czech nation, “Czech became the language of
the despised and the exploited classes” (172). But any group having a common lan-
guage has some common aspects of life, at least in production and culture. Produc-
tion, language, and culture evolve historically. The distinction between historical and
non-historical nations is certainly a political-moral judgement. It is no wonder that
Bauer’s unitary concept of culture and the nation also resulted in prejudices and
racist stereotypes: “The beautiful women of Italy might attract me for the moment
with their unusual charms, but I will soon yearn again for the blonde beauties of my
own land” (122). The “difference in anthropological features is accompanied by
a difference in psychological features” (100).
Modern culture and the nation-state are not unified and unitary, but contradictory
and class-stratified. There are conflicting centrifugal and centripetal cultural forces.
Centrifugal cultural forces are sources of cultural differentiation in modern society.
They include class differentiation/conflict, political conflict/struggles, ideological con-
flict/struggles, local life, local culture, local media, local entertainment, urban/rural
differentials, educational differences, gender relations, flexible accumulation that
produces a diversity of commodities and commodity cultures and therefore niche
tastes, etc. Centripetal cultural forces provide common experiences and references.
They include the nation-state, citizenship, wage-labour, shared experiences of
exploitation, general education, the political and legal system, global culture, global

media, global entertainment, consumer culture, legal rights, dominant religion, public
service media, the monopolisation of private media, the teaching of language, litera-
ture, philosophy, history, politics, art, culture, and science in schools and univer-
sities, state-sponsored and award-winning art and culture, healthcare systems,
national sports teams, dominant parties and ideologies, the public transport system,
etc. Modern culture consists of a dialectic of attraction and repulsion that has to do
with the stratified, contradictory, and class character of modern society.
Let us take an example from Austria, the country Bauer predominantly writes about.
People living in Austria’s very west, in Vorarlberg, speak a dialect that is close to
Swiss German. In contrast, many people living in Austria’s most eastern region, Bur-
genland, speak a dialect called Hianzisch that originated in East-Central Bavaria. An
Austrian speaking heavy Vorarlbergian dialect and one speaking heavy Burgenlandian
dialect will first hardly be able to understand each other. The person from Burgen-
land is likely to be unfamiliar with the habit of eating Hafaloab in parts of Vorarl-
berg (a dumpling made out of corn, potatoes, and eggs, often filled with bacon,
smoked meat, or sausage), just like the person from Vorarlberg may be unfamiliar with
eating Umurkensuppe, a soup typical in Burgenland made from cucumbers, chicken,
mint, sour cream, yoghurt, and paprika. Both individuals may have fairly different eating
habits and dialectics, but both of them are by many considered to be Austrians. What
unites them is Austrian citizenship and Austrian institutions such as public education
and the media. But they are not really part of a German or Austrian community of fate
or a German or Austrian community of culture or an Austrian or German language com-
munity, but part of an imaginary political community that was created as a result of the
First World War when Burgenland became part of the Austrian state. The nation is not
a metaphysical category, but exists only in the form of the nation-state and nationalist
and patriotic consciousness. It is tied to politics and ideology.
Karl Kautsky’s Review of Bauer’s Book

Kautsky (1908) critically reviewed Bauer’s book on the nationality question:
Every entity in society is a community of fate. Each society has its own
common fates and traditions. This is true of the gens, the municipality, the
state, the guild, the party, and even the joint stock company. And many of
these entities are also cultural communities that build on the common culture
of its member to whom they convey a common culture. […] On the other hand
a human group’s commonality of fates and culture does not strictly distinguish
one nation from another one. Despite the difference of their nationality, the
German and the French Swiss are united by a much closer community of fate
and culture than the German Swiss, the Viennese or someone from Holstein.
And where large class differences emerge within a nation, cultural differences
also arise that go much deeper than many cultural differences between
nations, while the commonality of class often also produces a cultural commu-
nity among the members of the same class who belong to different nations.
The German and the Danish peasant in Schleswig in any case stand in
a closer cultural community than the German peasant and the German journal-
ist and artist from Western Berlin, while the two latter stand in a closer cul-
tural community with journalists and artists from Paris.6
(3)
Bauer (1924/2000) argues that the feudal nation was defined by knights’ and aristo-
crats’ culture and the capitalist nation is defined by the bourgeois class’ culture
(107). Everyday people would be excluded from defining the nation and would only
in socialism be able to collectively define the nation: “The human beings of the
future will thus create their own culture […] Only socialism can integrate the broad
mass of working people into the national community of culture” (94).
Ruling Culture and Lived Culture

Culture is, for Bauer, limited to the ruling class. However, all subordinate classes
also communicate in everyday life and develop traditions, habits, tastes, and ways
of life. Culture is not the realm of the privileged few, but exists wherever humans
interact in society and thereby produce meanings of the world in everyday life.
Given that Bauer does not tie the notion of the nation to the nation-state, but to
culture, he ends up idealising the role of the bourgeoisie and ruling classes in gen-
eral in the formation of culture. For E.P. Thompson (1978), culture is the lived experi-
ence of a class or group. Experience includes culture, ideas, instincts, feelings,
norms, obligations, values, beliefs, affects, morals (171), needs, interests, conscious-
ness (164), myth, science, law, ideology (9), and thought (98). Experience in relation
to class has to do with class consciousness expressed in a class’ culture, traditions,
values, ideas, and institutions (Thompson 1963, 10). Popular culture derives from
common experience and customs in common (Thompson 1993).

Language and the Nation
Language is, for Bauer (1924/2000), not a foundational aspect of the nation, but an
epiphenomenon:
The nation can thus be defined as a community of character that has grown not
out of a similarity of fate, but out of a community of fate. This fact also consti-
tutes the significance of language for the nation. I create a common language
together with those individuals with whom I most closely interact; and I interact
most closely with those individuals with whom I share a common language.
(101)
The nation is a community of language, says Kautsky. This is undoubtedly

true. But can we be satisfied with this statement? […] We want to under-
stand the community of language itself as a historical phenomenon, lan-
guage itself as within the flow of historical development. We must
therefore comprehend the linguistic community as emerging from the commu-

nity of culture and fate, the specificity of the individual linguistic community as
emerging from the specificity of the community of culture and character. This
is why it seems to me inadequate to regard the nation as a community of lan-
guage, and why I have attempted to derive the linguistic community itself from
the community of fate, culture, and character.
(16–17)
Nationalism and the Nation-State
Bauer (1924/2000) is certainly right when he argues that the “modern state was born as
a child of commodity production” (139) and that capitalism requires “a large, populous,
economically unified region; the necessity of capitalist development therefore argued
against the political fragmentation of the nation” (148). The capitalist state helps with
organising a territory for the control of labour-markets, commodity markets, and the
exploitation of labour. It supports the organisation of capital with the help of property
laws, the army, the police, and the judicial and penalty systems that enforce private
property and class relations. It also supports capital by building and maintaining infra-
structures (transport, science and technology, utilities, communications, cities, etc.) and
institutions that support the development and reproduction of labour-power (schools, uni-
versities, state support for families, healthcare system, pension system, etc.).
There is no doubt that social institutions have been established as a result of the
working class’ struggles. But that the bourgeois state accepted the establishment of
these institutions also has to do with the insight that they benefit capital. The
modern state is a bureaucratic state that organises citizenship and the rule of polit-
ical groups. The capitalist state is also a bureaucratic state that interrelates the
interests of factions of the capitalist class, subordinated classes, dominant political
groups, and subordinated political groups. The nation-state needs an ideology that
justifies its existence. The modern nation has an objective existence in the form of
the nation-state and a subjective existence in the form of national consciousness
and nationalism. Nationalism is an ideology that propagates pride in the cultural,
political, and economic belonging to a constructed nation in order to justify the
existence of the actual or prospective nation-state and class relations organised
within (and beyond) the nation-state. The nation is an objective (the nation-state)
and subjective (nationalist ideology and consciousness) aspect of class societies.
Bauer’s fetishisation of the nation risks fetishising the violence, imperialism,
exclusion, warfare, and genocides that have come along with the existence of
actual existing nation-states.
Otto Bauer’s German Nationalism
Bauer’s culturally essentialist and unitary concept of the nation was the underlying
reason why he saw Austria as part of the German nation. This means that he saw
Austrian and German culture as unitary. As a consequence, he argued for the polit-
ical unification of Austria and Germany. Bauer saw peasants as too silly to be
German nationalists, whereas he argued that workers were more developed and
therefore more inclined to take on the ideology of German nationalism:
Today, the Tyrolean peasant is closely tied to his compatriots by the particular
peasant culture of the region and clearly distinguished from the Germans outside
the region. This fact of national being is reflected in the national consciousness.
The Tyrolean peasant feels himself in the first instance to be a Tyrolean and
seldom recalls his Germanness. For the Tyrolean worker the situation is already
quite different; he shares less in the particularity of the Tyrolean peasant and is
tied to the German nation by far stronger bonds. By making every German
a product of German culture and providing all Germans with the possibility of
enjoying the progress of German culture, socialist society alone will eliminate

the particularism within the nation. Without doubt, this development will
strengthen the power of the political principle of nationality.
(Bauer 1924/2000, 406)
The [Austrian] workers are not good Germans, but we are struggling to
make them into good Germans!
(420)
Bauer and the Demand for Austria’s Anschluss to

Germany
In 1919, Bauer argued for the unification of Austria and Germany. He thought that
the Anschluss of Austria to Germany would create a large working class that would
be so powerful that it would be able to create socialism:
Our prospects are completely different if German-Austria becomes a limb of

the great German republic. The great German republic will not be a loose
federation of states, but a tight-knit federal state with a strong unified gov-
ernment and a common legislative parliament […] That this state power will be
governed by the will to socialism is guaranteed by the German workers’ quantity,
the spiritual maturity and the revolutionary determinedness. The Anschluss to
Germany thus initiates the way to socialism. It is the first precondition for social-
ism’s realisation. Therefore the struggle for socialism must in this country at first
be carried out as the Anschluss to Germany.7
(Bauer 1919/2017, 34)
Bauer overlooks that socialism is not simply a matter of the quantitative size of ter-
ritory and the total number of workers, but one of the quality of class struggle, pol-
itical tactics and strategies, the role of ideologies and their deconstruction, public
discourse, the interaction of crises and political agency, the development of the pro-
ductive forces, etc. (Bauer 1919/2017, 54).
In the eighth century, wide parts of today’s Austria belonged to the Bavarian duchy. In
1156, Austria became a duchy independent from Bavaria. It was first ruled by the
House of Babenberger, and from 1246 onwards until the end of the Austro-Hungarian
Empire in 1918 by the House of Habsburg. The territory of today’s Germany was not
ruled by the House of Habsburg, but by royal houses such as the House of Wittelsbach,
the House of Luxembourg, and the House of Hohenzollern. Given that Austria became
independent from Bavaria in 1156 and has ever since had its own history as a state
relatively independent from the rule on the territory of today’s Germany (with the
exception of the years between 1938 and 1945 under Hitler), Bauer’s claim that Austria
is German is somewhat odd. What he means is that Austria and Germany share
a similar culture, including the German language. But this does not constitute, even in
Bauer’s own theory, a joint nation of Austria and Germany.
Max Adler on Bauer’s Concept of the Nation
Max Adler was Austro-Marxism’s most important philosopher. He engaged with

Bauer’s theory of the nation. Adler (1932, 125) argues that the nation is not
a natural or biological, but a social phenomenon. To say that the nation is
a biological, racial community is racist, whereas defining it as a linguistic community
cannot, according to Adler, explain why individuals speaking the same language
form different nation-states (126). Adler characterises Bauer’s concept of the nation
the following way: “Historical fate has bound together groups of humans in common
work and common experiences, whereby they have obtained a common physical and
psychological character and finally also a common cultural heritage”8 (126). Adler
argues that Bauer’s assumptions are too generalising. The notion of the national
character is a very imprecise generalisation (127). “So for example someone from
Berlin and someone from Munich do not have a common national character. And
a naïve East Prussian for example considers the Schuhplattler folk dances performed
in Schliersee [Bavaria] as foreign customs”9 (127). Adler stresses that Bauer is right
in defining the nation historically in order to oppose its biological definition.
Although Adler sees Bauer’s nation concept as too unitary, he does not drop it as
ideological, but rather introduces a distinction between a nation-in-itself bound
together by historical fate and a nation-for-itself that develops a national conscious-
ness as its ideology (129). He argues that thus far, it has always been the dominant
class that has defined national consciousness (129).
The Political Impacts of Austro-Marxism and Otto Bauer’s Theory

Adler defines the nation as “a community of will that has emerged from the historical com-
munity of fate for the maintenance of a community of interest or culture that has been
defined linguistically or as state”10 (128). The nation-in-itself is, for Adler, defined by
“common historical experience that has resulted in a common physical and spiritual
manner and a common community of interests”11 (130).
Adler sees Bauer’s nation-concept as too objectivist and reifying. But he does not
drop it, but adds to the reified notion of the nation a subjective one (the nation-for-
itself) and argues that in a class society, the dominant class defines national con-
sciousness. This assumption also disregards that workers, to a significant degree,
have throughout modern history been nationalist. A significant degree of workers
supported Hitler and today support right-wing extremists (Fuchs 2018a). Adler tries
to combine a reified and a critical concept of the nation into one overall nation con-
cept instead of extending critique of the nation to the objective dimension.
4.3 The Political Impacts of Austro-Marxism

and Otto Bauer’s Theory
The two largest failures of Austro-Marxism were its lack of political determination
against fascist and imperialist forces and its German nationalism. Whereas some of its
rhetoric sounded radical, the politics of the Austrian Social Democrats were largely prag-
matic and reformist. At the outbreak of the First World War, the Austro-Marxists did not
oppose the war, but supported the Austro-Hungarian Empire’s war against Serbia.
The 1919 Peace Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye
After the First World War, the First Austrian Republic was formed. The Social Demo-
crat Karl Renner became the first chancellor and negotiated a peace treaty with the
Allied Forces. Given their German nationalist worldview, the Austrian Social Demo-
crats did not accept the establishment of an Austrian nation-state, but argued for
Austria’s unification with Germany in the negotiations.
Bauer characterised the Peace Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye from 1919 as

“a horrible document”12 (Bauer 1923, 151).
The Peace Treaty robbed our republic of territories inhabited by more than
three million Germans. A third of the Austro-German people fell under foreign
rule. […] The day the Treaty of Saint Germain had to be ratified was the day
of the end of proletarian hegemony in German-Austria.13
(Bauer 1923, 159)
Also here, Bauer’s assessment and idiom is not different from Hitler, who spoke of
“the disgraceful treaties [Schandverträge] of Versailles and St. Germain” (Hitler
1988, 561) and saw the peace treaties of the First World War as “a scandal and
a disgrace” and “an act of highway robbery against our people” (420). Both Bauer
and Hitler use the metaphor of the robbery in order to oppose the peace treaties
and both employ a nationalist logic for arguing in favour of the Anschluss.
As a consequence of the German nationalist ideology of leading Social Democrats,

the 1926 Linz Programme of the Social Democratic Workers’ Party of Austria (SDAP)
demanded the unification of Austria and Germany: “Social Democracy sees the unifi-
cation of German-Austria and the German Reich as necessary completion of the
national resolutions made in 1918. It strives for the Anschluss to the German Repub-
lic by peaceful means”14 (SDAP 1926, 401).
Austrian Social Democracy and the Anschluss
Bauer (1923) describes how during the course of the First World War, Austrian Social
Democracy developed the position of demanding Austria’s unification with Germany:
Since 1899, we have demanded the transformation of Austria into

a federal state of free nations. But it became evident during the War that
the Czechs, the Poles, and the Southern Slavs would no longer be content
with this solution of their national problem if the revolution breaks out and that
they would fight for full national autonomy in the revolution. […] It was already
clear in 1917 that the transformation of the monarchy into a federal state of
autonomous nations would become a counter-revolutionary slogan. […] Our con-
siderations led to the following conclusion: if the revolution comes, then we
must not defend the existence of Austria hand in hand with the counter-
revolutionary powers – the dynasty, the Austro-German bourgeoisie, and the
Magyar gentry – against the revolutionary nations. We must accept the Slavic
nations’ unlimited right to self-determination. And we have to draw the conclu-
sion that if we accept the Slavic nations’ right to self-determination, then we
must demand the same right to self-determination for the Austro-German
people. If the Slavic nations realise their unity and freedom in the form of new
nation-states, then we must try to realise the unity and freedom of the German

people by the unification (Anschluss) of German-Austria and Germany. If the
Slavic nations’ national revolution blows up the empire, then we must utilise the
moment of the revolutionary crisis for the purpose of the social revolution, then
we must overthrow the empire also on our soil, erect the democratic republic,
and start the struggle for socialism on the democratic republic’s soil.15
(61–62)
Bauer’s argumentation is based on the assumption that cultural nations exist, that
German culture is fundamentally different from Slavic cultures and therefore should
be organised in different nation-states, that German-speaking Austrians and Germans
form one people that should live together in one state, and that Austria and Ger-
many should therefore be unified. Bauer advances a particular form of German
nationalism. Already in The Question of Nationalities and Social Democracy, which
was first published in 1907, he spoke of the existence of Aryans (Bauer 1924/2000,
302, 305) and “Aryan blood” (308). Austro-Marxism had an inadequate analysis of
anti-Semitism and there were aspects of anti-Semitism within Austro-Marxism
(Peham 2008). It also favoured aspects of eugenics (Trallori 2008).
Bauer and Hitler
Bauer certainly did not like Hitler and the Nazis’ belief in the racial superiority of
Germans. He rather saw the unification of Austria and Germany as a strategy for
the success of the proletarian revolution. It is, however, not clear why a revolution
should be more successful in a larger than in a smaller country. Bauer held
a nationalist concept of society, like Hitler demanded the Anschluss of Austria to

Germany, and spoke of the defence of the nation’s soil and the existence of Aryans.
He disregards in his writings and politics that for Marx and Engels, social revolution
and socialism have to have an international character:
The Communists are further reproached with desiring to abolish countries and
nationality. […] National differences and antagonisms between peoples are
daily more and more vanishing, owing to the development of the bourgeoisie,
to freedom of commerce, to the world market, to uniformity in the mode of
production and in the conditions of life corresponding thereto. The supremacy
of the proletariat will cause them to vanish still faster. United action, of the
leading civilised countries at least, is one of the first conditions for the emanci-
pation of the proletariat. In proportion as the exploitation of one individual by
another is put an end to, the exploitation of one nation by another will also be
put an end to. In proportion as the antagonism between classes within the
nation vanishes, the hostility of one nation to another will come to an end.
(Marx and Engels 1848, 502–503)
Josef Strasser’s Critique of Bauer and

Austro-Marxism
Josef Strasser (1982), a communist critic of Austro-Marxism, argues that nationalist

ideology can best be challenged by “intransigent internationalism”16 (67). Bauer
(1923) saw Austria as unliveable and as too small to be able to survive:
German-Austria is not a structure that has organically grown. It is nothing but

the old empire’s remainders after the other nations seceded. It has remained as
a loose bundle of diverging countries whose common political solidarity and eco-
nomic means of existence have been destroyed by the breakup of the old empire
and the old economic territory. In the old empire, the Austro-Germans were the
politically ruling and economically dominant people. […] Therefore the dissol-
ution of the old empire had to result in a severe shock to the Austro-German
industry and had to severely complicate the nourishment of the Austro-German
industrial people. During the time of the revolution, nobody believed that these
remainders of the old monarchy that had been torn out of their economic body
by a violent operation could autonomously lead a tolerable life.17
(113–114)
Schutzbund and Heimwehr
In the 1920s and 1930s, a political-ideological struggle between socialists and con-
servatives dominated in Austrian politics. Both had armed forces, namely the Social
Democrats’ Schutzbund and the clerical-fascist Heimwehr. On 30 January 1927,
Heimwehr members, in a conflict with Schutzbund members in Schattendorf, a small
town in Burgenland, shot Matthias Csmarits and the 6-year-old Josef Grössing.
When a court acquitted Josef Tscharmann, Hieronymous Tscharmann, and Johann

Pinter of not having murdered Csmarits and Grössing, the Austro-Marxists did not
call for a general strike. On 15 July, workers organised a spontaneous uprising in
Vienna and set the Palace of Justice (Justizpalast), which they saw as a symbol of
class injustice, on fire. The police responded by shooting into the masses, which
killed 89 protesters and injured more than 1,000.

Bauer and other leaders of the Social Democrats even condemned the spontaneous upris-
ing of Viennese workers, who saw the Schattendorf-verdict as class injustice. They
watched as workers were killed and did not consider arming the Schutzbund to defend
the protesting workers who were being shot at (Fischer 1969, 161–186). Bauer explained:
We had experienced the spontaneous demonstration on the day when the

Schattendorf-offences became known to the public. So it was evident that
there would be a big upheaval and the following thought was obvious: a big
upheaval can arise, so let us not wait until a spontaneous demonstration
emerges, but let us ourselves organise a demonstration with all possible
safety measures so that public order is not disrupted. […] we […] at that time
considered it wiser not to do that, but rather to undertake efforts to calm
down our comrades in the workshops and that is also what happened.18
(cited in Hoke and Reiter 1993, 591)
One can see here that Bauer put order and stability over class struggle and favoured
politics that appeased and pacified the working class. There had been political kill-
ings of workers before that had resulted in no or just minor punishment. In the First
Austrian Republic, “killing workers […] [was] a peccadillo” (Fischer 1969, 163).
The Dangers of Political Pragmatism

Unitary thinking that overlooks differences was not just a feature of Bauer’s concept
of the nation, but also shaped his political pragmatism that avoided class struggles,
uprisings, general strikes, and armed struggles. It is therefore also no surprise that
when Dollfuß’ clerical-fascists eliminated the Austrian Parliament in March 1933,
the Austro-Marxists first thought their party could continue to legally exist and
everything would be back to normal within a couple of weeks. Consequently, the
Austro-Marxists did not call for and did not organise armed resistance. Dollfuß
erected a clerical-fascist regime and outlawed communist and socialist organisa-
tions, as well as the trade union movement.
The clerical-fascists dissolved the Schutzbund in early April 1933. Again, the Social
Democratic Party’s leaders simply accepted this fact and did not call for or organise
armed resistance. The party’s mouthpiece, the Arbeiterzeitung, simply cited from a party
bulletin: “The government has dissolved the Schutzbund. […] The reactionaries want to
hit the working class. They can dissolve organisations, but not the spirit that animates
this organisation. The spirit of struggle is alive!”19 (cited in Hoke and Reiter 1993, 522).
The Austro-Marxists not just advanced idealist, Kantian philosophy in Marxian clothes.
In decisive political situations, such as the moment of the abolishment of democracy,
they advanced political idealism instead of materialist anti-fascist resistance.
Richard Bernaschek was the Social Democratic Party’s leader in Upper Austria and
also a leader in the Schutzbund. On 12 February 1934, Schutzbund members under
Bernaschek’s leadership started armed resistance against the Austro-fascist regime in
Linz. The armed struggle expanded to other parts of Upper Austria and to Vienna. It
was defeated on 15 February. This was the only significant armed socialist resistance
against Austro-fascism. Bernaschek (1934) assessed the failures of Austrian Social
Democracy: “Austrian Social Democracy was worn down. Worn down by its own
indecisiveness and its opponents’ resoluteness. […] The mass of the workers […]
could not understand that they were prepared for revolution and at the same time
appeased.”20 These failures had a longer history. When, at the end of the First World
War, strikes broke out in Austria, the Social Democrats “did everything in their power
to slow down and stop”21 the strike movement (Baier 2009, 20). After the events of
February 1934, many left socialists, including intellectuals such as Ernst Fischer and
many members of the Schutzbund, because of their disappointment with Social Dem-
ocracy, joined the illegal Communist Party of Austria, whose number of members as
a consequence increased from 4,000 to 16,000 (Baier 2009, 40). Fischer, who was
a member of the Social Democratic Party and a journalist of the party’s newspaper
Arbeiter-Zeitung, writes in his memoirs that there was “a contradiction between
words and deeds immanent in Austro-Marxism”22 (Fischer 1969, 183).
Austro-Marxism and Nazi-Fascism
In 1928, Renner and Bauer signed the Confession of Leading Men and Women of
German-Austria to the Idea of the Anschluss 23 (Steingress 2008). Shortly before the
1938 referendum on Austria’s Anschluss to Germany (10 April 1938), Karl Renner
(1938) gave an interview, in which he said:
I would have to deny my whole past as theoretical pioneer of the nations’

right to self-determination and as German-Austrian statesman, if I did not
welcome the reunification of the German nation wholeheartedly. […] As
Social Democrat I advocate the right to self-determination of the nation. As
the first Chancellor of the Republic of German-Austria and as former Presi-
dent of the Republic’s Peace Delegation in St. Germain, I will vote in
favour of the Anschluss.24

Karl Renner (1952, 317) still wrote in publications released after the Second World
War that Germany without Austria and the Sudeten territories was a “mutilated
nation”.25 Otto Bauer also continued to hold a German nationalist position after
Hitler had come to power (Baier 2008). In 1936, Bauer (1936) characterised Austria
as an “entity not capable of developing”26 (338), doomed (338), and an “impotent,
miserable state”27 (340). More than 100 years later, Austria is yet smaller than after
the First World War, but has managed to successfully survive economically and pol-
itically since 1945. It is an ideological myth motivated by German nationalism that
the small state of Austria is not able to survive. Out of such complaints speaks the
political inferiority complex of nationalists who could not accept that the Austrian
Empire came to an end.
Also, Hitler (1988) characterised Austria as not “durable” (nicht lebensfähig) and
despised the Austro-Hungarian regime not because of the monarchy, but because
of its “babel of tongues” and because he saw a “long and slow Slavization of the
Austrian Germans” under way (46). As a consequence, he was in favour of and
worked towards what he saw as the “liberating of my German-Austrian people
[…] [so that it] would […] become possible for them to be reunited to the
Motherland” (46). The Austrian Social Democrats during the time of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire demanded a multi-linguistic state. So, Bauer certainly saw Slavs
not as an inferior people, but he nonetheless was a German nationalist, who in
the last instance preferred a unified German state to a multi-linguistic state.
Bauer (1938a) without a doubt was an anti-fascist and Marxist who saw democratic
socialism as the antidote to fascism. He analysed fascism and Nazi-fascism as a system
that is “filled with […] nationalism” (169), “annihilates all individual liberty, abolishes
free elections, destroys the proletarian organizations. […] Class rule restrained by demo-
cratic institutions is replaced by ‘totalitarian’ dictatorship, that is, by unrestricted class
rule” (179). Fascism’s “aggressive nationalist foreign policies […] threaten to end in
war” (182). Bauer (1936) saw that fascism tries to make “national consciousness and
national sentiments stronger than class consciousness and class struggle”28 (329).
Ernst Fischer, who knew Bauer in person, shifted sides from Social Democracy to
the Communist Party of Austria (KPÖ) after the events of 1934. While in exile during
the Nazi period, he was the KPÖ’s representative in the Communist International
(Komintern). He argues against the view that Otto Bauer betrayed the working class.
At the time of Austro-fascism, Fischer saw it, like Bauer, as important that Austria’s
revolutionary socialists and communists cooperate and therefore help initiate a joint
platform (Fischer 1969, 315). Fischer (1969) writes that not the social democrats, but
the Austro-fascists, led by Ignaz Seipel and Engelbert Dollfuß, and the Nazis posed
the real political threat in Austria in the 1920s and 1930s:
Social democratic politics prevented the proletarian revolution, saved the

bourgeoisie and has bred fatal revolutionary ideas in the working class.
Nevertheless, it would be wrong to describe all leaders of social democ-
racy as traitors […] Austrian social democracy has to be blamed for
a major defeat of the working class, but it has at the same time kept alive
the idea, or, if you please to say so, the feeling of socialism among the
masses. […] Otto Bauer is not a traitor. It is true that he has failed in
a decisive situation, but he has not betrayed us.29
(332, 353)
In the light of fascism, Bauer (1936) called for a new revolutionary socialist strategy
that would establish an integral socialism that united socialist and communist posi-
tions as well as reformist and revolutionary politics. But he nonetheless shared
nationalism and essentialism with fascist ideology. Of course, it makes a difference
that his nationalist essentialism was not biological, but cultural in character. But his
nationalist ideology and politics also made him misjudge the Anschluss of Austria to
Germany. He argued that Austria had no future, welcomed the Anschluss, and
argued for a pan-German revolution against Hitler (Bauer 1938b, 1938c). Given the
party that represented working-class interests had for a long time favoured the
Anschluss, was it not likely that this class voted for the actual Anschluss when
Hitler and the Nazis advanced this agenda? And maybe parts of the working class
even assumed there is some joint agenda of socialist and the Nazis because they
both favoured German nationalism. Even worse, some former members of the Social
Democratic Party may have felt encouraged to join the Nazi Party. Bauer did not see
that the assumption of the unity and superiority of Germans was an inherent and
central feature of Nazi-ideology.
Austro-Marxism’s Willingness to Servitude and

Submission
A certain willingness to servitude and submission that lacked determinateness and the
willingness to call for the organisation of resistance in decisive moments when democ-

racy was under threat seems to have been an inherent feature of Austro-Marxism. This
attitude stands in a psychological relationship to German nationalism. Nationalism is
an expression of the worldview that individuals are part of and should submit to myth-
ical collectives. Erich Fromm (1942/2001) characterises authoritarian and nationalist per-
sonalities as sadomasochistic. Their ideology is based on the “lust for power” (183),
“sadistic craving for power” (191), the “projection of social inferiority to national infer-
iority” (186), sadistic hatred against constructed enemies (194), “the wish to have
power over helpless beings” (200), and the masochistic proclamation that “the individ-
ual is nothing and does not count” (200). By submitting and sacrificing themselves to
the power of the leader and the national community, nationalists see themselves as
dying psychologically as weak individuals and as being reborn as Volk. Authoritarian-
ism’s sadistic side is “the craving for power over men”; its masochistic side is “the
longing for submission to an overwhelmingly strong outside power” (204). According to
Fromm’s theory, the Austro-Marxists’ politically sycophantic and servile political behav-
iour that was not the cause of, but favoured the rise of, clerical-fascism and Nazi-
fascism in Austria, stands in relation to their German nationalist ideology.
The Austrian communist Josef Strasser (1982) criticised Austro-Marxism’s

defencelessness:
Here and there the Heimwehr killed a worker. After each of these murders,
the Arbeiter-Zeitung declared that if something like that happened again,
then … What would happen ‘then’ became evident on July 15, 1927. When
on that day the workers of Vienna, who were exacerbated about the acquittal
of some fascist murders of workers, set the Palace of Justice on fire, the
Social Democrats thought nothing less was appropriate than to offer to the
Conservatives to form a coalition government. […] And now, after Dollfuss,
encouraged and alarmed by the events in Germany, set about to provide
advantages to the Austrian bourgeoisie that a fascist regime can pose, Social
Democracy remains idle. […] Austro-Marxists face fascism just as clueless as
the reformist theoreticians and practitioners face war.30
(98)
At the time of Otto Bauer, the following joke was told among radical socialist and commun-
ists: If the fascists kill Otto Bauer, the Social Democratic Party’s leadership and the Arbei-
ter-Zeitung will release a statement saying, “The fascist reactionaries have killed our
leader Otto Bauer. We warn them: If they murder Otto Bauer a second time, then we will
organise armed resistance.” This piece of black humour contains a bitter truth: Austrian
Social Democracy’s German nationalism, passiveness, and political pragmatism and ideal-
ism supported first the rise of clerical-fascism and then the rise of Nazi-fascism in Austria.
4.4 Rosa Luxemburg’s Critical Theory of

Nationalism
Rosa Luxemburg’s Radical Internationalism

Rosa Luxemburg’s (1976, 101–287) The National Question and Autonomy was first pub-
lished in Polish as a series of articles in 1908 and 1909. Luxemburg was a representative
of “radical internationalism” (Forman 1998, 12). “Luxemburg’s argument was that democ-
racy had to be based not in nations, but in popular institutions that recognized political
rights” (Forman 1998, 87). She was critical of Lenin’s notion of the nation because in her
view, he had betrayed democracy and capitulated to nationalism (Forman 1998, 86).
At the end of the eighteenth century, the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth was

undergoing partition and ceased to exist. The Commonwealth’s territories became
part of Austria, Prussia, and Russia. At the end of the nineteenth century, the Polish
Socialist Party advanced Polish nationalism as a strategy for creating a Polish
nation-state that was independent from Russia. Rosa Luxemburg’s Social Democracy
of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania was critical of these nationalist politics and
argued for internationalist politics. This political situation was the background of
Luxemburg’s The National Question and Autonomy.
The Right to National Self-Determination and

Nationalism as Ideologies
Otto Bauer argued for the nations’ rights to self-determination. He saw anti-imperialist
politics, working-class politics, and the struggle for new nations as inherently inter-
twined: “In the struggle against a violent, genocidal imperialism that increases its
exploitation, reduces its political power, and does harm to its class morale, the working
class announces its demand for the liberty and self-determination of all nations” (Bauer
1924/2000, 392). Luxemburg (1976) sees the demand for national self-determination as
a nationalist ideology that distracts from class issues and the need for class struggle.
She argues that not nations, but only the working class, has a “right to self-
determination” (108). She sees nationalism as “a metaphysical cliché” (110).
One of the reasons why Luxemburg rejects the demand of the right of nations to
self-determination is that she thinks the underlying concept of the nation “ignores
completely the fundamental theory of modern socialism – the theory of social class”
(135). Those talking about the nation often use it as “a homogeneous social and
political entity” that is a “misty veil” concealing “a definite historical content” (135).
Rosa Luxemburg’s Critical Theory of Nationalism

“In a class society, ‘the nation’ as a homogeneous socio-political entity does not
exist” (135). Rather, in a class society, there are historically developing dominating
and dominated classes with certain compositions as well as rulers and the ruled.
Whereas Bauer stresses that the nation culturally, psychologically, and spiritually
constructs society’s unity, Luxemburg argues that such an assumption is a myth and
ideology that overlooks class society’s divisions.
As a consequence, Luxemburg says that “Social Democracy is called upon to realize

not the right of nations to self-determination but only the right of the working class,
which is exploited and oppressed, of the proletariat, to self-determination” (140).
Whereas for Bauer socialism means “national separation”, for Luxemburg it means the
emergence of an “international culture in which distinct nationalities will disappear”
(263). For Luxemburg, the true workers-in-and-for-themselves do not know a national
fatherland: “The workers’ fatherland, to the defense of which all else must be subordin-
ated, is the socialist International” (Luxemburg 1970, 477). “I feel at home in the entire
world, wherever there are clouds and birds and human tears” (Luxemburg 2013, 376).
For Luxemburg (1976), the nation exists as the modern nation-state and as national-
ist ideology that helps organising exploitation and imperialism. Nation-states “are
today the very same tools and forms of class rule of the bourgeoisie as the earlier,
non-national states, and like them they are bent on conquest” (172). The nation-
state is “a tool of domination (or control) and conquest” (175).
Other than Bauer, Luxemburg stresses the ideological character of the nation and national-
ism and that nationalism plays a role in the bourgeoisie’s attempt to distract attention
from class conflicts by trying to construct a national ideological unity of capital and labour
that is opposed to an outside enemy. Luxemburg, in contrast to Bauer, grounds her ana-
lysis of the nation in Marx’s theory of ideology. When Luxemburg speaks of nationalism
as a misty veil, then she means that nationalism is a political fetishism that tries to dis-
tract attention from how social problems are grounded in class and capitalism.
Rosa Luxemburg and the First World War

The First World War showed that nationalism has an inherent militarist potential and
that the idea of national unity beyond class-boundaries can easily result in workers of
different nations hating and killing each other. Rosa Luxemburg (1918) characterised
the First World War as the “world’s explosion of nationalism” (370).31 Nationalism is
ideological diversion from class-structures and class conflict. It is an ideology that acts
as a form of political psychology, constructs a national cross-class unity, and directs
aggression, hatred, and dissatisfaction against other imaginary nations. In imperialist
conquest, the coloniser or imperialist presents the conquered groups inhabiting the
colony as backward, inferior, or as being in need of help that advances modernisation,
democratisation, development, etc. The ideological argument justifying conquest and
oppression is frequently that a common national culture that helps all groups to
develop can be established and that this common culture overcomes alleged tribal
“primitivism” and “backwardness”. Cultural claims justify the establishment of the con-
trol over resources, power, people, labour-power, and markets.
Luxemburg (1913/2003) stresses that militarism, nationalism, and war are intercon-
nected features of capitalism:
Militarism fulfils a quite definite function in the history of capital, accom-

panying as it does every historical phase of accumulation. It plays
a decisive part in the first stages of European capitalism, in the period of
the so-called “primitive accumulation”, as a means of conquering the New
World and the spice-producing countries of India. Later, it is employed to
subject the modern colonies, to destroy the social organisations of primitive
societies so that their means of production may be appropriated, forcibly to
introduce commodity trade in countries where the social structure had been
unfavourable to it, and to turn the natives into a proletariat by compelling
them to work for wages in the colonies. It is responsible for the creation and
expansion of spheres of interest for European capital in non-European regions,
for extorting railway concessions in backward countries, and for enforcing the
claims of European capital as international lender. Finally, militarism is
a weapon in the competitive struggle between capitalist countries for areas of
non-capitalist civilisation. In addition, militarism has yet another important
function. From the purely economic point of view, it is a pre-eminent means
for the realisation of surplus value; it is in itself a province of accumulation.
(434)
Luxemburg argues that in the First World War, the ideology of the national father-
land forced “the masses to slaughter each other”,32 which would not correspond to
“human culture”33 (Luxemburg 1914a, 847).
We rather think that all nations independent of ethnicity, language and

beliefs can live in complete peace and friendship with one another and can

vie in the fulfilment of their cultural tasks. Naturally we do not surrender
to the illusion that this ideal can be realised as long as capitalism exists.
[…] As long as capitalism prevails, wars are inevitable.34
(Luxemburg 1914b, 444)
There will be no more war, as soon as the masses declare: We do not

want any genocide!35
(Luxemburg 1914b, 445)
Lenin’s Critique of Luxemburg
Lenin (1914) published a critique of Luxemburg’s analysis of the nation. He draws

a distinction between an “oppressor nation” and an “oppressed nation” (412). Lenin
says that nationalist mass movements should be supported to the extent they are
progressive (437). The problem of this position is that there is no clear boundary
between what Lenin terms progressive nationalism and bourgeois, reactionary, chau-
vinist nationalism. Nationalism tends to grow especially in the context of capitalist
crises. In such situations, radical events tend to occur that force radical decisions
that can have substantial consequences. For example, in 1938, there was
a plebiscite on whether Austria should become part of Nazi-Germany. The Nazis initiated
this plebiscite because they saw Austrians as part of the self-proclaimed “Aryan” nation
Germany. Social Democrats such as Renner and Bauer favoured the Anschluss because
they thought class struggle could better be organised in a larger country. But the conse-
quence of both types of nationalism was the same: Austria and Austrians became part
of the Nazi-regime’s annihilation machinery and an imperialist World War. In the British
Brexit referendum, leftist nationalists opposing the EU stood on the same side as right-
wing extremists and conservatives who used xenophobic rhetoric for arguing against
immigration. Progressive nationalism turns out to often share elements of reactionary
nationalism, which renders the distinction between both superfluous.
Jürgen Habermas on Nationalism

Jürgen Habermas (1998) takes a position that is comparable to Luxemburg. He argues
that the nation is invented and imaginary (130) and that national identity has again and
again been mobilised in the fight against constructed “enemies of the fatherland” (131).
Nationalism “is not a necessary or permanent precondition of a democratic process”
(132). The constitution of the nation does not precede the formation of states; rather, by
the founding of a state, “the participants constitute themselves as a nation of citizens”
(140). Nationalism typically expresses itself as the demand of national self-
determination (141). Ernest Gellner (2006) argues in this context that nationalism is
a particular modern endeavour and political principle that wants “to make culture and
polity congruent” (42), holds that “the political and the national unit should be congru-
ent” (1), and aims at the “fusion of will, culture and polity” (54). The problem is that the
formation of nation-states under the banner of ethnonationalism has almost

always been accompanied by bloody purification rituals, and it has generally
exposed new minorities to new waves of repression. In late 19th and 20th
century Europe it left in its wake a horrific legacy of emigration and expul-
sion, of forced resettlement, disenfranchisement, and physical extermination,
up to and including genocide. Often enough the persecuted themselves
mutated into persecutors once they succeeded in emancipating themselves.
(Habermas 1998, 142)
In general, discrimination can be eliminated not through national independ-

ence but only through a process of inclusion that is sufficiently sensitive to
the cultural background of individual and group-specific differences.
(145)
Habermas argues that society needs the protection of minorities as well as

a common culture. He argues for a cultural politics of unity in diversity.
Writing in 1998, Habermas was confident that “the catastrophes of two world wars
have taught Europeans that they must abandon the mind-sets on which nationalistic,
exclusionary mechanisms feed. Why should a sense of belonging together culturally
and politically not grow out of these experiences” (Habermas 1998, 152). A European
public sphere would not emerge from the construction of a “European people” (153),
but from a shared political culture, a common civil society, a European party system,
European citizen initiatives, European NGOs, European interest groups, etc. (152). The
dilemma of the European Union is that it has in the past decades predominantly been
an economic union that fostered neoliberal capitalism, not a strong social and political
union. Through increasing fears of social decline and inequalities, neoliberal capitalism
backfired in the EU and created new nationalisms that resulted in a political and legit-
imacy crisis of the EU. The EU was not prepared and did not have the political mech-
anisms to deal with the refugee crisis, which added to opportunities for nationalists to
advance anti-refugee ideology and nationalist sentiments. In the Greek debt crisis, the

EU advanced a combination of neoliberal austerity and economic nationalism spurred
by Germany with false and ideological arguments such as the one that “hard-working
Germans” fund “lazy Greeks”. In the UK, Thatcher and Thatcherite Eurosceptics por-
trayed the EU as too “socialist” and as undermining the British nation and British
democracy. With increasing inequalities in the UK, nationalist anti-immigration rhetoric
gathered momentum and was a major factor influencing Brexit. Brexit in turn advanced
the crisis of the EU and right-wing nationalist movements within the EU.
A Neoliberal European Union Instead of the United

States of Europe
Rosa Luxemburg warned in 1911 that a capitalist United States of Europe would mean
an “imperialist abortion” and “a colonial race war” (Luxemburg 1970, 369). One hun-
dred years later, it has become evident that the European Union was realised as
a neoliberal capitalist project of a new imperialism that advanced accumulation by dis-
possession (Harvey 2003). Many international institutions today “express the prevailing
political, economic, and social inequalities at every level” (Forman 1998, 188). “The
efforts of today’s Left must be directed toward making these international institutions
accountable to the citizens of the world” (Forman 1998, 188). The creation of the
Socialist United States of Europe could have prevented the EU’s crisis and the threat of
war and murder that the rise of new nationalism as the negative dialectic of the EU’s
neoliberal capitalism entails. But of course, the creation of one Socialist United States
does not suffice in a global political economy. The struggle for socialism has to be
embedded into the creation of one, two, many Socialist United States that aim at over-
coming nationalism and capitalism and work towards global socialism.
4.5 Conclusion
Comparing the Approaches of Otto Bauer and Rosa

Luxemburg
As a summary of this chapter’s results, Table 4.1 presents a summary of the differ-
ences between Bauer’s and Luxemburg’s concepts of the nation.
Whereas Bauer advances a cultural, spiritual, psychological notion of the nation, Luxem-
burg’s notion is materialist and a form of ideology critique: she sees the nation as
a question of concrete individuals living in modern capitalist society and their social rela-
tions. For Luxemburg, the nation takes on the form of the nation-state and nationalist ideol-
ogy. Whereas Bauer was a German nationalist who argued for the Anschluss of Austria to
Germany and saw socialism as a form of people-nationalism, Luxemburg sees nationalism
in contrast to Bauer and Lenin as a form of political fetishism that does not have
a progressive dimension.
New Nationalisms on Social Media
More than 100 years after Bauer and Luxemburg wrote about the nation, we today
experience the rise of new nationalisms that could very well lead up to a new
global war or nuclear annihilation of life on Earth. Let us consider two examples of
how nationalism is expressed on social media: Twitter posts by Alice Weidel (Alter-
native for Germany) and Donald Trump:
Merkel’s refugee policies destroy the welfare state. The #AfD will make
sure that has an end!37
(Twitter, @Alice_Weidel, 3 September 2017)
Refugees from Syria are now pouring into our great country. Who knows
who they are – some could be ISIS. Is our president insane?
(Twitter, @RealDonaldTrump, 17 November 2015)
TABLE 4.1 A comparison of Otto Bauer’s and Rosa Luxemburg’s concepts of the nation and nationalism
Dimension Otto Bauer Rosa Luxemburg

Political Multi-linguistic Austro-Hungarian Empire Russian Poland
context
Nation Culture: nation as community of fate and The nation as nationalist ideology and
culture imperialist nation-states; building and
maintaining communications is “one of the
most urgent economic needs of bourgeois
society” (Luxemburg 1976, 217) as well as
“the object of international conventions”
(190) because capitalism requires global
communications
Society Unification of modern society by culture, Differentiation of modern society by class
spirit, psychology, and fate structures and domination
Language, Language communities and communication The modern nation-state organises the
communication are epiphenomena of national communities reproduction of a national language36 and
of fate the “uniform arrangement of roads and
communications” (Luxemburg 1976, 189)
that is necessary for the transportation of
commodities, information, workers, com-
mands, ideologies, etc.
Political Right to and struggles for national self- International solidarity, opposition to the
strategy determination national right to self-determination, only
the working class has such a right
Socialism In socialism, nation and nationalism will Socialism does not need the nation and
be defined not just by the ruling class’ cul- nationalist ideology; after an international
ture, but the people’s culture and life revolution, together with capitalism and
imperialism, the nation and nationalism
disappear
Political German nationalism, demand for the unifi- Opposition to the First World War
impacts cation of Austria and Germany, opposition
to the Peace Treaties of the First World
War
Conclusion
In December 2017, Trump’s tweet had more than 26,000 likes, Weidel’s tweet more
than 750. Both tweets communicate a combination of nationalism and the friend/enemy
scheme. Refugees are presented as a social threat in the one tweet and as a terrorist
threat in the other. Weidel symbolises the German nation by using the German flag,
Trump the US nation by calling it a “great country”. The symbol of the flag and linguistic
intensification are used for communicating nationalism. The nation is opposed to refu-
gees in both cases. The outsider group is characterised negatively as dangerous, which
is a typical xenophobic ideological strategy (Reisigl and Wodak 2001, 55).
Bauer’s theory does not pose any tools for a theoretical analysis of such forms of
nationalism. For Bauer, the nation is a cultural phenomenon. Today, nationalism is
expressed via popular cultural communication tools such as Twitter, Facebook, and
YouTube. But given that Bauer naturalises the cultural dimension of the nation and
does not provide an ideology critique of the nation and nationalism, his approach
seems to be unfit for helping us to understand contemporary nationalism and its
mediation. Luxemburg’s approach in contrast allows a theoretical interpretation:
Weidel and Trump communicate nationalism that constructs refugees as scapegoat
in order to distract attention from the circumstance that not refugees, but neoliberal-
ism, destroys the welfare state and that refugees are not automatically terrorists
and criminals. The tweets construct a “misty veil” that conceals “a definite historical
content” (Luxemburg 1976, 135). Weidel leaves out any discussion of German neo-
liberalism and Trump does not discuss the complex historical-political cause of ISIS.
Both veil the complexity of refugees’ situation and the true causes of the dismant-
ling of the welfare state and terrorism. Such nationalist veiling strategies have in
recent years been ideologically and politically relatively successful in both Germany
and the USA, where individuals and groups afraid of social decline have in the past
years to a significant degree voted for and supported nationalists.
One, Two, Many Socialist United States
Rosa Luxemburg builds on Marx’s theory of ideology and fetishism. Her approach
allows us to understand that twenty-first-century nationalism is an ideology and polit-
ical fetishism. She saw internationalism as the only correct answer. The alternative to
neoliberal capitalism is not the strengthening of any form of right-wing or allegedly
left-wing nationalism, but the political strategy and goal of advancing a socialist
world society as well as the creation of one, two, many Socialist United States.38
Notes
1 https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C3%96sterreich-Ungarn#Sprachen_und_Religionen
2 Translation from German: „Otto Bauers Begriff ist idealistisch, denn er erklärt das ideolo-
gische Merkmal der nationalen Charaktergemeinschaft als das ausschlaggebende Merk-
mal der Nation, ohne es in den notwendigen Zusammenhang mit den anderen
Merkmalen, mit der Gemeinschaft des Territoriums und des Wirtschaftslebens zu bringen,
aus denen es erwächst.”
3 Translation from German: „Bei ihm ergibt sich daraus die kuriose, moderne Nazitheorien
vorwegnehmende Idee, dass die Germanen schon im Zeitalter des Sippschaftskommunis-
mus und in der feudalen Gesellschaft des Mittelalters eine Nation bildeten!”
4 “A nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on, the basis
of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in
a common culture.”
5 Translation from German: „österreichischen nationalen Kultur”.
6 Translation from German: „Eine Schicksalsgemeinschaft ist jedes gesellschaftliche
Gebilde; jede Gesellschaft hat ihre gemeinsamen Schicksale und Traditionen; die
Gens, die Gemeinde, der Staat, die Zunft, die Partei, selbst die Aktiengesellschaft.
Und viele dieser Gebilde bedeuten auch eine Kulturgemeinschaft, bauen sich auf
der gemeinsamen Kultur ihrer Mitglieder auf, denen sie wieder eine gemeinsame
Kultur vermitteln. […] Andererseits aber bildet die Gemeinsamkeit der Schicksale
und der Kultur einer Menschengruppe nichts, was eine Nation streng von der ande-
ren sonderte. Den deutschen und französischen Schweizer verbindet trotz der
Verschiedenheit ihrer Nationalität eine weit engere Schicksals- und Kulturge-
meinschaft, als den deutschen Schweizer und den Wiener oder den Holsteiner. Und
wo sich innerhalb einer Nation große Klassenunterschiede herausbilden, erwachsen
in ihr auch Kulturunterschiede, die weit tiefer gehen, als viele Kulturunterschiede
zwischen Nationen, indes die Gleichheit der Klasse oft auch eine Kulturge-
meinschaft zwischen den Angehörigen der gleichen Klasse verschiedener Nationen
herstellt. Der deutsche und der dänische Bauer in Schleswig stehen jedenfalls in
engerer Kulturgemeinschaft, als der deutsche Bauer und der deutsche Journalist und
Künstler in Berlin W., während diese in engerer Kulturgemeinschaft mit den Jour-
nalisten und Künstlern von Paris stehen.”
7 Translation from German: „Ganz anders sind unsere Aussichten, wenn Deutschöster-
reich zu einem Gliedstaat der großen Deutschen Republik wird. Die große Deutsche
Republik wird kein lockerer Staatenbund sein, sondern ein fest gefügter Bundesstaat
Conclusion
mit starker einheitlicher Regierung und gemeinsamen gesetzgebenden Parlament; […]

Und dass diese Staatsgewalt vom Wollen zum Sozialismus beherrscht sein wird,
dafür bürgen uns die Zahl, die geistige Reife und die revolutionäre Entschlossenheit
der deutschen Arbeiter. Der Anschluß an Deutschland bahnt uns also den Weg zum
Sozialismus. Es ist die erste Voraussetzung zur Verwirklichung des Sozialismus. Darum
muß der Kampf um den Sozialismus hierzulande zunächst geführt werden als ein
Kampf um den Anschluß an Deutschland.”
8 Translation from German: „Durch gemeinsames geschichtliches Schicksal sind Gruppen
von Menschen zu gemeinsamer Arbeit und gemeinsamen Erleben zusammengeschmiedet
worden, die dadurch einen gemeinsamen physischen und psychischen Charakter und
schließlich auch einen gemeinsamen Kulturbesitz erworben haben.”
9 Translation from German: „So ist z.B. der gemeinsame Nationalcharakter zwischen einem
Berliner und einem Münchner […] [nicht] vorhanden. Und ein naiver Ostpreuße sieht z.
B. die Schuhplatter-Tänze der Schlierseer wie die Gebräuche eines fremden wilden
Volkes an.”
10 Translation from German: „die aus historischer Schicksalsgemeinschaft entstandene
Willensgemeinschaft zur Erhaltung einer in der Regel sprachlich oder staatlich bestimm-
ten Interessen- und Kulturgemeinschaft.”
11 Translation from German: „Verbundenheit durch gleiches geschichtliches Erleben, gleiches
daraus enstandenes Wesen in körperlicher und geistiger Art und gleiche
Interessensgemeinschaft.”
12 Translation from German: „ein furchtbares Dokument”.
13 Translation from German: „Der Friedensvertrag raubte unserer Republik Gebiete, die mehr als
drei Millionen Deutsche bewohnen; ein Drittel des deutschösterreichischen Volkes fiel unter
Fremdherrschaft. […] Der Tag, an dem der Vertrag von St.-Germain ratifiziert werden mußte,
war der Tag des Endes der proletarischen Vorherrschaft in Deutschösterreich.”
14 Translation from German: „Die Sozialdemokratie betrachtet den Anschluß Deutschöster-
reichs an das Deutsche Reich als notwendigen Abschluß der nationalen Resolutionen von
1918. Sie erstrebt mit friedlichen Mitteln den Anschluß an die Deutsche Republik.”
15 Translation from German: „Wir forderten seit 1899 die Umbildung Österreichs zu einem Bundes-
staat freier Nationen. Im Verlaufe des Krieges war es klar geworden, daß sich Tschechen, Polen,
Südslawen mit dieser Lösung ihres nationalen Problems nicht mehr begnügen werden, wenn die
Revolution ausbricht; daß sie in der Revolution um ihre volle nationale Unabhängigkeit kämpfen
werden. […] 1917 aber war es schon klar: Kommt die Revolution, dann wird die Umbildung der
Monarchie zu einem Bundesstaat autonomer Nationen zur Parole der Konterrevolution werden.
[…] Unsere Erwägungen führten zu dem Schluß: Kommt die Revolution, so dürfen wir nicht Arm
in Arm mit den konterrevolutionären Mächten, mit der Dynastie, mit der deutschösterreichischen
Bourgeoisie, mit der magyarischen Gentry die Existenz Österreichs gegen die revolutionären
Nationen verteidigen. Wir müssen das uneingeschränkte Selbstbestimmungsrecht der sla-
wischen Nationen anerkennen. Und müssen aus dieser Anerkennung unseren Schluß ziehen:
Erkennen wir das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der slawischen Nationen an, so müssen wir dasselbe
Selbstbestimmungsrecht für das deutschösterreichische Volk fordern. Verwirklichen die sla-
wischen Nationen ihre Einheit und Freiheit in neuen Nationalstaaten, so müssen wir die Einheit
und Freiheit des deutschen Volkes zu verwirklichen versuchen durch den Anschluß Deutschöster-
reichs an Deutschland. Sprengt die nationale Revolution der slawischen Nationen das Reich,
so müssen wir die revolutionäre Krise ausnützen für die Sache der sozialen Revolution; müssen
wir auch auf unserem Boden die Dynastie stürzen, die demokratische Republik aufrichten, auf
dem Boden der demokratischen Republik den Kampf um den Sozialismus beginnen.”
16 Translation from German: „intransigenter Internationalismus”.
17 Translation from German: „Deutschösterreich ist kein organisch gewachsenes Gebilde. Es

ist nichts als der Rest, der von dem alten Reich übriggeblieben ist, als die anderen Natio-
nen von ihm abfielen. Es blieb zurück als ein loses Bündel auseinander strebender
Länder, deren politisches Zusammengehörigkeitsgefühl und deren ökonomische Existenz-
grundlagen durch den Zerfall des alten Reiches und des alten Wirtschaftsgebietes zerstört
worden waren. Die Deutschösterreicher waren im alten Reich das politisch herrschende
und das wirtschaftlich führende Volk gewesen. […] Die Auflösung des alten Reiches
mußte daher die deutschösterreichische Industrie schwer erschüttern und die Ernährung
des deutschösterreichischen Industrievolkes empfindlich erschweren. Daß dieser Rest der
alten Monarchie, durch eine gewaltsame Operation aus ihrem Wirtschaftskörper heraus-
gerissen, selbständig ein erträgliches Leben zu führen imstande sein werde, hat in der
Zeit der Revolution niemand geglaubt.”
18 Translation from German: „Wir hatten die spontane Demonstration an dem Tage
erlebt, wo die Schattendorfer Taten in Wien bekanntgeworden waren. Es war also
klar, daß eine ungeheure Aufregung kommen werde, und es war naheliegend, den
Gedanken zu haben: Da kann eine ungeheure Aufregung entstehen, warten wir
nicht, ob eine spontane Demonstration entstehen wird, veranstalten wir lieber
selber eine Demonstration unter allen möglichen Sicherungen, daß die Ordnung
nicht gestört wird. […] wir haben […] es damals für klüger gehalten, es nicht zu
tun, sondern uns zu bemühen, unsere Genossen in den Betrieben zu beruhigen, wie
es auch geschehen ist.”
19 Translation from German: „Die Regierung hat den Schutzbund aufgelöst. […] Die Reaktion
will die Arbeiterklasse treffen. Sie kann Organisationen auflösen – nicht den Geist, der
diese Organisation beseelt. Der Kampfgeist lebt!”
20 Translation from German: „Die österreichische Sozialdemokratie ist zermürbt worden. Zer-
mürbt durch die eigene Unentschlossenheit und durch die Entschlossenheit des Gegners.
[…] Die Arbeitermassen […] konnten es nicht verstehen, dass man […] sie auf die Revo-
lution vorbereitete und gleichzeitig beschwichtigte.”
Conclusion
21 Translation from German: „alles in ihrer Macht stehende zu unternehmen, um sie zu

bremsen und abzubrechen”.
22 Translation from German: „[…] Widerspruch von Wort und Tat, der dem Austromarxismus
innewohnte”.
23 Translation from German: „Bekenntnis führender Männer und Frauen Deutschösterreichs
zum Anschlussgedanken”.
24 Translation from German: „Ich müßte meine ganze Vergangenheit als theoretischer Vorkämp-
fer des Selbstbestimmungsrechtes der Nationen wie als deutsch-österreichischer Staatsmann
verleugnen, wenn ich die große geschichtliche Tat des Wiederzusammenschlusses der
deutschen Nation nicht freudigen Herzens begrüße. […] Als Sozialdemokrat und somit als
Verfechter des Selbstbestimmungsrechtes der Nationen, als erster Kanzler der Republik
Deutschösterreich und als gewesener Präsident ihrer Friedensdelegation zu St.-Germain

werde ich mit Ja stimmen.”
25 Translation from German: „verstümmelte Nation”.
26 Translation from German: „kein entwicklungsfähiges Gebilde”.
27 Translation from German: „ohnmächtige, armselige Staat”.
28 Translation from German: „Nationalbewußtsein und Nationalgefühl stärker als Klassenbe-
wußtsein und Klassengegnerschaft”.
29 Translation from German: „Die sozialdemokratische Politik hat die proletarische Revolution
verhindert, hat die Bourgeoisie gerettet und in der Arbeiterschaft verderbliche reformis-
tische Illusionen großgezüchtet. Trotzdem wäre es falsch, sämtliche Führer der Sozialde-
mokratie als Verräter zu bezeichnen […] Die österreichische Sozialdemokratie hat eine
schwere Niederlage der Arbeiterklasse verschuldet, aber sie hat gleichzeitig in den
Massen den Gedanken, oder wenn Sie wollen, das Gefühl des Sozialismus wachgehalten.
[…] Otto Bauer ist kein Verräter. Er hat in entscheidender Situation versagt, das ist
wahr, aber verraten hat er uns nicht.”
30 Translation from German: „Bald da, bald dort ermordeten sie [die Heimwehren] einen
Arbeiter. Nach jedem solchen Mord erklärte die Arbeiter-Zeitung: wenn noch einmal so
etwas vorkommt, dann … Was ‚dann’ geschehen sollte, zeigte sich am 15. Juli 1927.
Als an diesem Tage die Wiener Arbeiter, erbittert über die Freisprechung einiger faschis-
tischer Arbeitermörder, den Justizpalast in Brand steckten, glaubten die Sozialdemokraten
nichts besseres tun zu können, als den Christlichsozialen die Bildung einer Koalition vor-
zuschlagen. […] Sie tut auch jetzt nichts, nachdem Dollfuß, durch die Vorgänge in
Deutschland ebenso ermuntert wie erschreckt, daran gegangen ist, der österreichischen
Bourgeoisie die Vorteile zu verschaffen, die ihr ein faschistisches Regiment zu bieten hat
[…] Der Austromarxismus steht dem Faschismus genauso ratlos gegenüber, wie die The-
oretiker und Praktiker des Reformismus dem Krieg gegenüberstehen.”
31 Translation from German: „Weltexplosion des Nationalismus”.
32 Translation from German: „daß man die Massen gegenseitig zur Abschlachtung zwingt”.
33 Translation from German: „Menschenkultur”.
34 Translation from German: „Wir glauben vielmehr, daß alle Völker ohne Unterschied der
Rasse, der Sprache und des Glaubens in völligem Frieden und in Freundschaft miteinander
leben und in der Erfüllung ihrer Kulturaufgaben wetteifern. Wir geben uns natürlich nicht der
Täuschung hin, dieses Ideal könne verwirklicht werden, solange der Kapitalismus noch bes-
teht […] solange der Kapitalismus herrscht, sind Kriege unvermeidlich.”
35 Translation from German: „Es wird kein Krieg mehr stattfinden, sobald die Massen erklä-
ren: Wir wollen keinen Völkermord!”
36 “However, capitalism does not create that intellectual spirit in the air or in the theoret-
ical void of abstraction, but in a definite territory, a definite social environment, a definite
language, within the framework of certain traditions, in a word, within definite national
forms. Consequently, by that very culture it sets apart a certain territory and a certain
population as a cultural national entity in which it creates a special, closer cohesion and
connection of intellectual interests” (Luxemburg 1976, 253).
37 Translation from German: „Merkels Flüchtlingspolitik zerstört den Sozialstaat. Die #AfD
wird dafür sorgen, dass das ein Ende hat!”
38 So for example, the only feasible answer to the crisis of Europe is not the attempt to strengthen
the nation state and destroy the EU, but to create the Socialist United States of Europe.
Conclusion
Chapter Five
Contemporary Marxist Theories of Nationalism
5.1 Anti-Colonial Nationalism and Internationalism

5.2 Eric J. Hobsbawm’s Approach: Characteristics of Nationalism
5.3 Theorising the Communication of the Nation
5.4 Conclusion
Building on the engagement with classical theories of nationalism in previous

chapters, this chapter discusses contemporary Marxist approaches to the study
of nationalism. It engages with the Marxian concepts and approaches of Étienne
Balibar, Partha Chatterjee, Vivek Chibber, Erich Fromm, Eric J. Hobsbawm, Klaus
Holzkamp, Ute Holzkamp-Osterkamp, C.L.R. James, Wilhelm Reich, David Roedi-
ger, Marisol Sandoval, and Raymond Williams.
Critical theories of nationalism have to deal with questions of whether nationalism

can have progressive political features and how it relates to internationalism and
anti-colonialism (Section 5.1). They also have to identify general features of national-
ism for identifying strategies of critique (Section 5.2). Section 5.2 engages in more
detail with Eric J. Hobsbawm’s approach on the study of nationalism. This chapter
gives specific attention to the way the nation and nationalism are communicated in
capitalism. It argues for a communicative, critical, Marxian theory of nationalism.
Section 5.3 focuses on some foundations of a communicative critical theory of
nationalism.
5.1 Anti-Colonial Nationalism and Internationalism
Raymond Williams on Nationalism and Wales as

British Colony
In Europe, movements for regional independence have defined specific regions such as the
Basque Country, Catalonia, Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, Flanders, Wallonia, Veneto,
Lombardy, Corsica, Brittany, Sardinia, and South Tyrol as colonies that should struggle for
national autonomy or for national unification with another country. Raymond Williams has
in this context given particular attention to the relationship of Wales and England. In the
English language, the word nationalist was coined in the eighteenth century and the term
nationalism in the nineteenth century (Williams 1983a, 213).
For Williams (1983b, 177–199), the nation, race, and nationalism are “divisive
ideologies” (196). Nations are frequently formed by conquest, repression, economic
domination (181), or war (182). Williams points out an inherent connection of nation-
alism and capitalism. The paradox of nationalist ideology is that whereas the nation-
alisation of industries that can benefit the broad population
can be perceived as “unpatriotic” – “unBritish”, “unAmerican” – […]

a transnational strategy, pursued even to a point where a national economy
loses heavily within unrestricted competition, is by its structural retention of the
most artificial national images perceived as the “patriotic” course.
(192–193)
The ground for hope against nationalism, racism, and xenophobia would neither be
some form of left-wing nationalism nor a liberal pluralism that points out that immi-
grants are also British, but rather the practice of “working and living together, with
some real place and common interest to identify with” (196).
It is not just a misjudgement, but also highly inappropriate, that Stuart Hall (1996) argues
that many of Williams' works on culture show a “narrow, exclusive nationalism” and are
“open to the critique of ethnocentrism” (394) and that Paul Gilroy (1987) accuses Williams
of “apparent endorsement of the presuppositions of the new racism” (50). Williams
“appears to be constitutively blind to the politics of race and gender, and the dynamics of
imperialism” (Higgins 1999, 170). One can certainly say that Williams faces some issues in
respect to the question of a left strategy against racism and xenophobia: although there
may be common social and political interests of immigrants and national citizens, the prob-
lem is that the phenomena of xenophobia without immigrants, racism in a homogenous
community, anti-Semitism without Jews, nationalism without foreigners, etc. exist. The
problem has to do with the projection of fears into an unknown Other. Common life and
work in a community are therefore not always a readily available and possible solution.
The collection of Williams’ (2003b) writings on Wales shows that he assumes that an
important way of how communal socialism can be imagined and formed is through
social struggles, including anti-colonial struggles that do not foreground language or his-
tory, but opposition to the ruling class. He argues that Wales has for a long time been
an English colony. The 1926 General Strike and the Welsh miners’ strike in 1984/85 are,
Chapter Five | Contemporary Marxist Theories 81
for Williams, important examples and experiences that matter not just for the Welsh
working class, but for social struggles in general. Williams (1968) was the primary
author of The May Day Manifesto 1968. The Manifesto argues that a post-colonial
new imperialism has emerged that is based on the dependency of developing coun-
tries on developed countries, which results in underdevelopment and transnational
corporations’ exploitation of labour in different parts of the world (Williams 1968,
Chapter 19). It also criticises that in the UK and the world, people of colour are suf-
fering from social deprivation (167–168). Given that this important manifesto-like
writing contains such a focus, it is absurd to argue that Williams’ approach ignores
or supports racism and imperialism.
Partha Chatterjee’s Critique of Anti-Colonial

Nationalism
Partha Chatterjee stresses that anti-colonial nationalism was both imported from
the West and created by indigenous elites. There are therefore both Western
and indigenous influences on the development of nationalism in India and other
former colonies. Chatterjee (1993) argues that Benedict Anderson resists the
Anti-Colonial Nationalism and Internationalism

Western contemporary tendency to see nationalism as being located in the
Global South, and having turned there from liberation into corruption, war, and
genocide, but sees nationalism purely as a phenomenon of European modernity.
He writes that both Anderson and Gellner see Third World nationalism as “pro-
foundly ‘modular’” (Chatterjee 1986, 21) and asks: “If nationalisms in the rest of
the world have to choose their imagined community from certain ‘modular’ forms
already made available to them by Europe and the Americas, what do they have
left to imagine?” (Chatterjee 1993, 5). Based on the example of India, he argues
that anti-colonial nationalism combines Western “material” elements (modern
economy, statecraft, science, technology, civil society) with non-Western spiritual
elements (cultural identity, language, aesthetic forms, family, religion, schooling).
The rising political elite would combine and transform both domains for crafting
a nationalist project. Anti-colonial nationalism cannot simply imitate “the alien
culture, for then the nation would lose its distinctive identity. The search there-
fore […] [is] for a regeneration of the national culture adapted to the require-
ments of progress, but retaining at the same time its distinctiveness” (Chatterjee
1986, 2). Anti-colonial nationalism tries to combine “the superior material qual-
ities of Western cultures with the spiritual greatness of the East”, which is an
ideal that “necessarily implies an elitist programme” (Chatterjee 1986, 51).
Vivek Chibber’s Critique of Chatterjee’s Approach
Ideas and ideology are not immaterial, but are, just like the economy and politics,
socially produced. Materialism in society means that humans co-produce the social
world (Fuchs 2017a; Williams 1977). So, Chatterjee dualistically separates the material
world from the supposedly immaterial world. Vivek Chibber (2013, Chapter 10) elabor-
ates a critique of Chatterjee that builds on the insight that dualism is a false logic. He
argues that there have been material needs for anti-colonial nationalism to establish
modernisation projects in post-colonial societies. These forces include global capital-
ism’s threat of military conflict, competition on the world market, and the subaltern clas-
ses’ demand to improve their living conditions for being willing to participate in
nationalist projects. Chibber argues that these material pressures have required post-
colonial societies to embrace “industrialization, scientific research, modern administra-
tive techniques, and similar practices” (262). The reason why anti-colonial nationalists
“took to modernization was not that they had passively accepted the Enlightenment
worldview, but because it was a rational response to their circumstances” (269). Chat-
terjee, according to Chibber, treats Reason – “rational argument, objectivity, evidence” –
as “Western and hence as colonial”, and thereby “remains trapped within colonial dis-
course” as well as “Orientalist” ideology (250). Chibber stresses that it is Orientalist to
argue that only the West, and not the Global South, is capable of Reason (262).
The key question that arises from both Chatterjee’s and Chibber’s account is how to under-
stand reason, modernity, and the Enlightenment. If we thereby (a) mean capitalist modern-
isation that entails industrialisation, rationalisation, automation, informatisation,
bureaucratisation, productivity growth, and scientific progress for the sake of capital accu-
mulation, then it is clear that Chatterjee points towards an important circumstance, namely
that under colonialism, capitalist reason used the colonies as source of resources and as
markets, whereas the logic of anti-colonial capitalist modernisation backfired and did not
abolish class rule, but just created new forms of exploitation, a new national bourgeoisie
whose rule is embedded into an international division of labour, where it interacts with the
international bourgeoisie so that the post-colonial subalterns are confronted with both
national and international capitalist rule. There is a specific negative dialectic of capitalist
enlightenment of former colonies that Chatterjee criticises.
If we, however, by modernisation, reason, and the Enlightenment in general understand (b)
attempts to establish progressive economic, political, and cultural development, then this
also entails the possibility of socialist reason and Enlightenment and a dialectical, alterna-
tive modernity, in which technology serves humans and is not a means of surplus-value
production. In such a definition, socialist and capitalist modernity are both projects aiming
at progress, but they offer two different rationalities of progress – socialism and capital-
ism. Socialist modernity entails the development of industry, the information and technol-
ogy sector, and science for the sake of socialist development, which includes collective
ownership (worker self-management of certain economic realms, state control of others),
the redistribution of wealth, the limitation of the working day to the necessary minimum,
and the importance of non-profit organisations in the economy, politics, and culture.
Class struggles between movements, parties, and tendencies that want to advance
capitalism on the one side and socialism on the other side shape modernity. There
are capitalist and socialist potentials and elements within modern societies and
there is a constant struggle about the relationship of both. Modernity contains two
contradictory modernities. Nationalism is a project underpinning the class structur-
ation of modernity; it is part and parcel of capitalist modernity.
If modernisation is understood in such a broad sense, then the argument that mod-
ernity is colonial and Eurocentric and should be overcome implies establishing an
anti-modern or premodern society that is based on hard labour and eschews modern

technologies. But Chatterjee opposes Gandhi’s anti-industrialism, which is precisely
anti-modern in the general understanding of the term because it opposes industrial-
isation and the use of modern technology.
Chibber (2013, 281–282) is aware that Chatterjee (1986) says that what he opposes is
capitalist reason, not reason as such. But Chibber (2013) thinks this argument comes at
the very end and therefore too late in Chatterjee’s (1986) book. Chibber (2017a) asks:
[H]ow do postcolonial theorists plan to get out of the current crises – not
only economic and politics, but also environmental – if they’re saying that
science, objectivity, evidence, and concerns with development are to be
ditched? Chatterjee has no way out of this.
(24–25)
Let us have a look at some of the passages about Reason in Chatterjee’s works:
Nowhere in the world has nationalism qua nationalism challenged the

legitimacy of the marriage between Reason and capital. Nationalist thought
[…] does not possess the ideological means to make this challenge. […]
Marx […] pleaded that Reason be rescued from the clutches of capital.
[…] The critique of nationalist discourse must find for itself the ideological
means to connect the popular strength of those struggles with consciousness of

a new universality, to subvert the ideological sway of the nation and to challenge
the presumed sovereignty of a science which puts itself at the service of capital,
to replace, in other words, the old problematic and thematic with new ones.
(Chatterjee 1986, 170)
Also, in another passage, there are indications that Chatterjee argues for an alterna-
tive form of universality and Enlightenment: “For Enlightenment itself, to assert its
sovereignty as the universal ideal, needs its Other; if it could ever actualize itself in
the real world as the truly universal, it would in fact destroy itself” (Chatterjee
1986, 17). Chatterjee (1986) speaks of the
bourgeois-rationalist conception of knowledge, established in the post-

Enlightenment period of European intellectual history, as the moral and epistemic
foundation for a supposedly universal framework of thought which perpetuates,
in a real and not merely a metaphorical sense, a colonial domination.
(11)
But if there is “bourgeois-rationalist knowledge”, then there must also be “socialist-

rational knowledge” that contradicts the logic of class and capital. So, there are
indications that Chatterjee already early in his book is conceptually open for an
alternative form of reason and rationality. But one can certainly criticise that he
does not define this alternative form in more detail.
Chatterjee’s Response and Chibber’s Rejoinder

In a debate with Chibber, Chatterjee (2017, 42–43) argues that Chibber’s assumption
that there are universal basic needs such as physical well-being is an expression of
the contractarian school of liberal political thought. One needs to add that physical
well-being is just an example essential human need that Chibber (2013, 197–202)
discusses, and that there are also other essential human needs, such as mental
well-being and communication (Fuchs 2016b).
One could interpose in support of Chibber that Chatterjee forgets that Marx also
assumes that there are basic human needs, but what varies are the concrete histor-
ical and social forms of needs and the way production can satisfy these needs
depending on the qualities of the mode of production (such as the level of productivity, the
use of technology, class relations, natural conditions, etc.). When Marx speaks of the
human as species-being, he stresses “the need to maintain physical existence” (Marx

1844b, 276). Only in a communist society, humans produce “in freedom” from “physical
need” (Marx 1844b, 276). So, Marx here indicates that depending on the societal context,
there are differences in how well human needs can be satisfied. And Marx ascertains that
there are different social and natural conditions of need satisfaction within global capital-
ism so that “the same quantity of labour satisfies a different mass of requirements in
different countries, and consequently under otherwise analogous circumstances, the quan-
tity of necessary labour-time is different” (Marx 1867, 650). As a consequence, less pro-
ductive countries, regions, and corporations have disadvantages on the world market,
which is one of the factors advancing uneven development. The universal similarity of
class relations is that alienated labour as “forced labour” is “not the satisfaction of
a need; it is merely a means to satisfy needs external to it” (Marx 1844b, 274).
Humans in the West and in the Global South all have to satisfy basic needs that
are not static, but develop together with production. The existence of such needs is
a human universal. In global capitalism, the existence of class relations is
a capitalist universal that takes on different forms in different contexts, in which it
results in the exploitation of human labour. Need satisfaction operates under differ-

ent conditions in various parts of the world that are related through the human uni-
versality of need satisfaction and the capitalist universals of exploitation and
alienation. Given that capitalism and domination deny and alienate need satisfaction,
it is also a universal human condition that there is a potential for resistance to
class relations and domination. Human needs are at the same time universal and
diverse, general and contextualised, anthropological and historical. Chibber (2017b),
in his response to Chatterjee, argues that many anthropologists stress what “Subal-
tern Studies scholars typically deny – that social actors are motivated by a healthy
regard for their well-being, and that this motivational structure appears to be opera-
tive across cultures” (66).
Chatterjee (2017), in his response to Chibber, stresses that there are “historical spe-
cificities of the political, economic, and cultural institutions and practices” (46). He
argues that Subaltern Studies “does not rule out the rise of new universalist prin-
ciples, but these […] must be forged anew” and that “the working classes of
Europe and North America and their ideologues can no longer act as the designated
avant-garde in the struggles of subaltern classes in other parts of the world” (47). It
here becomes clear that whereas Chibber stresses the need for global solidarity and
cooperation of the subaltern classes, Chatterjee also believes in the feasibility of
a universalist political project, but puts more stress on the need for its internal
diversity. There is certainly a danger that such a position ends up in too much diver-
sity without unity, which is what Chibber warns against.
For an Alternative, Socialist Modernity
In the last instance, both Chatterjee and Chibber seem to oppose capitalist modernity
and argue for an alternative, socialist modernity. We need to add and stress that social-
ist modernity does not need nationalist ideology, but rather can only work as a project
of the working class and other subalterns against capital, which entails the insight that
all working people are brothers and sisters who should be united in the struggle for
a just world.
Chatterjee shows that anti-colonial nationalism shares with other forms of nationalism
the attempt to ideologically and politically unify different classes by constructing
a collective identity. In the case of anti-colonial nationalism, the nation is defined
against the colonial or imperialist force. But just like in other nationalisms, the problem
is that such a construct leaves out the existence of power and class differentials. As
a consequence, newly established post-colonial nation-states based on such nationalist
projects tend to erect a new ruling class that sustains relations of exploitation. Just like
the foreign ruling class imposed imperial rule on the colony’s subordinated classes, the
new ruling class imposes a new rule. Whereas in the imperial rule of a colony, hegem-
ony – large-scale non-resistance of everyday people in the colony – tends to be
achieved by the threat of direct violence against everyday people and ideological con-
sent by a local elite, anti-colonial nationalism achieves consent from below by the ideol-
ogy of political and/or cultural unity of different classes opposed to the colonisers/
imperialists.
Gayatri Spivak on Nationalism
Gayatri Spivak (2009) argues that the nation does not exist before nationalism and
that reproductive heteronormativity is the key aspect of nationalism. At the same
time, she says that nations as “collectivities bound by birth, that allowed in strangers
gingerly, have been in existence long before nationalism came around” (79). “[M]eto-
nymized as nothing but the birth-canal, woman is the most primitive instrument of
nationalism” (80). She sees a connection between “[l]anguage, mother, daughter,
nation, marriage” (87). Reproductive heteronormativity is “the broadest and oldest
global institution” (Spivak 2005, 481). Spivak (2009) argues for de-transcendentalising
the nation by a critical regionalism and the comparative study of literature as alterna-
tives to nationalism.
Spivak and Julia Kristeva
Spivak (1981) argues that the Bulgarian-French philosopher Julia Kristeva’s (1977)
book About Chinese Women attempts to speak for Chinese women and therefore ends
up advancing an Orientalist account that is self-centred on Western women and only
asks “[W]ho am I?” (Spivak 1981, 179), instead of “[W]ho is the other woman? How
am I naming her? How does she name me? Is this part of the problematic I discuss?”
(179). Spivak concludes that Kristeva’s account is symptomatic for an “inbuilt colonial-
ism in First World feminism toward the Third” (184). The “First World feminist must
learn to stop feeling privileged as a woman” (157). Western feminists would have to
stop speaking for subaltern women, but “learn to learn from them, to speak to them”
(156). Spivak’s point, which she also stresses in the essay Can the Subaltern Speak?
(Spivak 1988), is that in trying to speak for and give voice to the subaltern, Western
intellectuals silence them.

By arguing that Western and subaltern experiences and lifeworlds are radically different
and incomparable, Spivak fetishises difference and overlooks that people exploited by cap-
ital are not just differently exploited, but share the fact of being exploited and the potential
for resistance. What matters for her and similar approaches in the end is not your political
position, but which nation you were born into. This kind of reasoning ends up in a reverse
Orientalism and reverse nationalism that reifies the subaltern in the Global South as resist-
ant and anyone in Western nations as reactionary and guilty of racism by birth. The danger
of postmodern identity politics is that it uncritically celebrates, fetishises, and essentialises
subaltern cultures as authentic and necessarily resistant. Cultural hybridisation, global com-
munication, and global entertainment have not, as some postmodernists claim, brought
about the end of the nation-state and nationalism.
The Debate between Spivak and Chibber

Vivek Chibber (2013) criticises Subaltern Studies for the assumption that post-
colonial societies are fundamentally different from Western societies and therefore
cannot “be assimilated into the same general framework” (17). He argues that Sub-
altern Studies “resurrects the worst instances of Orientalist mythology” (288) and
“relentlessly promotes Eurocentrism” (291) by assuming that “Eastern agents operate
with an entirely different political psychology than do Western agents” (288), assign-
ing “science, rationality, objectivity, and similar attributes to the West, instead of
regarding them as common to both cultures” (290), the “celebration of the local, the
particular” that “ends up justifying an exoticization of the East” (289). Chibber argues
that Marxism is not a Eurocentric theory, but a cross-cultural framework analysing
dynamics “common to East as well as West” (285). He speaks of capitalism’s two uni-
versalisms that have emerged in the West and the Global South:
the universal logic of capital […] and social agents’ universal interest in
their well-being, which impels them to resist capital’s expansionary drive.
These forces impinge on both East and West, even if they do so with dif-
ferent intensities and in different registers.
(291)
So, we can say that there is a unity in diversity of capitalisms. There are general struc-
tures of capitalism that Marx described, including the commodity form, labour-power,
money, capital, value, exchange-value, surplus-value, exploitation, profit, etc. that take
on particular forms in different contexts. The question that arises is how to explain the
relation of nationalism in the West and the Global South, nationalism’s unity in diversity.
For doing so, we need to identify general characteristics of nationalism.
Anti-Colonial Nationalism’s Faults
National liberation movements make a political mistake when they do not fight for
liberation from the rule of the international and national bourgeoisie, but for a new
nation in the name of the unity of all national classes, including the bourgeoisie and
other classes. This form of nationalism overlooks that in imperialism, not one nation
exploits another nation, but an international capitalist class supported by state and
military power and often backed by a national capitalist class exploits the dominated
classes in the colonised region (and often in the capitalist centres as well). The sub-
ordinated classes in the colonised and the ruling country have a joint class enemy,
namely international capital. If the exploited class in one region or country supports
the exploitation of workers or a group of workers (e.g. migrant workers, black work-
ers, etc.) in the same or another country, then an alliance is temporarily not possible
and the struggle must certainly then also be directed against the ideologies that
keep workers from seeing their own interests and make them support the bour-
geoisie’s interest and love the exploitation of others and/or their own.
A nationalist cross-class alliance fighting against the imperialist force risks new class
and political divisions in the newly established nation. This criticism does not imply that
cultural domination, i.e. the oppression of a group’s language, rights, and customs,
should be accepted or is unimportant. But one can doubt that fighting for the establish-
ment of new nations based on nationalist ideology is the right answer. It makes
a difference to struggle for cultural, political, and economic rights and relative autonomy
or to struggle in the name of nationalism. The problem is that nationalism is not, as
Horace Davis (1978) claims, “morally neutral” (31).1 It constructs a friend/enemy distinc-
tion along the lines of who belongs to the nation and who doesn’t, which creates
a militaristic potential and thereby a potential for annihilation and genocide in the name
of the nation. In order to be progressive, liberation struggles need to be struggles for
socialism and against class society and for a society that guarantees welfare and polit-
ical participation for all as well as the protection of minorities’ interests.
Nigeria and Rwanda
On the territory of today’s Nigeria, Europeans established slave trade in the sixteenth

century. In the nineteenth century, Britain gained economic, political, and cultural con-
trol of the region. The British Empire obtained control of Lagos in 1861 and expanded
its territorial control of the region via the Oil Rivers Protectorate and the Royal Niger
Company. In 1901, Nigeria formally became part of the British Empire as
a protectorate. At the time of the First World War, the Northern and Southern Nigeria
Protectorate were united as one administrative unit in 1914. Nigeria gained independ-
ence from the British Empire in 1960. The post-colonial phase featured a civil war
(1967–1970) that had to do with different ideas about the Nigerian nation, the rela-
tionship to Cameroon, and independence of certain parts, followed by military regimes
(1970–1999) and a fragile democracy (since 1999). Conflicts in Nigeria feature ques-
tions of control of oil-rich regions, religion (Islam, Christianity), and foreign influence.
Today’s Rwanda became a German colony in 1884. In 1916, it became, together

with Burundi, the Belgian colony Ruanda-Urundi. The German and Belgian colonisers
advanced the idea of a separation between the two groups of the Hutu and the
Tutsi. They favoured rule in collaboration with members of the Tutsi group. The Bel-
gian rulers in 1935 introduced identity cards that defined each individual as either
Hutu or Tutsi. Colonisation advanced ethnic tensions and violence between the Hutu
and the Tutsi. Hutu members organised the 1959 Rwandan Revolution that resulted
in Rwanda’s independence from Belgium in 1962. Ethnic conflict between the Hutu
and the Tutsi continued to exist, culminating in the Rwandan Civil War (1990–1994)
that featured a genocide with an estimated 1,000,000 victims, who were predomin-
antly Tutsis. After the civil war, the Congolese wars followed in the years between
1996 and 2003, resulting in several million casualties.
Nigeria and Rwanda are two good examples of how colonial forces artificially cre-
ated nations in order to rule and exploit the humans living there. Imperial power not
only resulted in exploitation and domination, but also during and after the imperial
rule reinforced tensions between groups in the region. Regional violence in the post-
colonial phase focused on the question of controlling the nation-state or creating
new nations. Imperialism created new nations and advanced ethnic tensions and
ethnic conflicts within these nations so that nationalism acted as a destructive ideol-
ogy on behalf of the colonisers and the colonised.
C.L.R. James on Anti-Imperialism and Socialism
Marxist-humanist thinker C.L.R. James (2012) asks “why in African state after African
state, with almost the rapidity with which independence was gained, military dictatorship
after military dictatorship has succeeded to power” (116). One aspect is that political inde-
pendence does not eliminate economic dependence on global capitalism and the world
market. In addition, new leaders often followed old patterns so that “the newly independ-
ent African state was little more than the old imperialist state only now administered and
controlled by black nationalists” (James 2012, 117). The new government was often
formed by “lawyers and middle-class intellectuals” whose “skins were black”, but who
“had essentially the same attitude to the great masses of the African people that a liberal
colonial official would have. Self-government for them meant the substitution of them-
selves and members of their case for the colonial officials” (James 1971, 112). Once
you are changing over from an underdeveloped colonial country, and aim at being
a modern country, straight away you have this enormous concentration of power
in the hands of the state. […] The only way it does not take place and doesn’t
overwhelm you is if the people who are taking charge of the government are
aware that this is the danger and take steps to moderate it and keep it in order.
(James 2009, 138)
James (1973) warns that capitalism can easily corrupt revolutionaries because it is
not easily abolished:
Every single African who opposed and wanted to establish political independence
somehow talked about the capitalist system which was the source of capitalistic
exploitation in the colonies. But when he comes into power, what about this cap-
italist system well, he can’t touch it. So he does something which is very strange.
He paints it up as much as he can in red and he calls it African Socialism.
C.L.R. James’ Socialist Humanism and Socialist

Internationalism
James argues for socialist humanism and socialist internationalism based on polit-
ical equality, social justice, and human dignity as the guiding forces of social strug-
gles and the establishment of new orders (James 2012, 132). He says that Marxism
must struggle for internationalism:
Mankind must leave behind the outmoded bourgeois class and all the obs-
tacles which the national state now places in the way of an international
socialist order. THAT IS MARXISM. It says: no longer the national political
state but an international social order.

(James 2013a, 92)
As a consequence, he argues for the creation of the Socialist United States of

Europe and the Socialist United States of Africa (James 1943, 2013a).
Nationalism is not inherent in human, social, and societal being. The word appeared
in the English language in the eighteenth century and became common in the nine-
teenth century (Williams 1983a, 213–214). The rise of nationalism was profoundly
associated with the establishment of modern nation-states and capitalism. The exist-
ence of the nation as national economy, the nation-state, and cultural institutions
governed by the nation-state (schools, universities, churches, museums, arts, media,
science, hospitals, families, sports, etc.) are a fact of modernity. A national econ-
omy, the nation-state, and national cultural institutions are organised as bounded
spaces that have an inside and an outside and borders that are defined by member-
ship rules. So, the nation certainly has a very real existence. But nationalism is not
the same as the nation. Membership can be fluid and more or less rigid.
That nationalism is an “ism” indicates that it is an ideology and political movement.

It is an ideological practice and movement that argues that society, the state, the
economy, and culture are the exclusive realm of a certain group and that others
need to be excluded from it. Nationalism is not morally neutral because no ideology is
morally neutral. It is a form of repressive moralism. Nationalism makes demands for
control and ownership based on the pride in collective identity as a nation that has been
invented and illusionary shared characteristics that are defined biologically, economic-
ally, politically, or culturally. Nationalism defines pride in imagined shared characteristics
of a large group as ideological justification for political-economic control of a territory
and bounded spaces. Nationalism is moral, ideological, and political devotion to the idea
of the nation. It includes the willingness to die and kill for the defence of the nation and
its human and non-human symbols. Socialist politics in modern society must take place
at the level of the nation-state just like it must take place at the local and global level.
But politics at the nation-state level is different from politics in the name of nationalism
that fights for a society determined by a unity defined by blood or culture and that
excludes others living in the same territory from membership of the nation. References
to a unity based on blood, traditions, and culture that exclude others always have
a certain potential for annihilation and mass murder.
5.2 Eric J. Hobsbawm’s Approach:

Characteristics of Nationalism
In order to arrive at general characteristics of nationalism, we will have a closer look
at Eric J. Hobsbawm’s theory and history of nations and nationalism. Hobsbawm
developed this approach out of a critique of Tom Nairn’s concept of nationalism.
Tom Nairn’s Theory of Nationalism

Tom Nairn (1977/2015) sees nationalism as the consequence of capitalism’s
uneven imperialist development. In respect to the debate between Rosa Luxem-
burg and Lenin, Nairn opposes Luxemburg’s position that there is no right to
national self-determination but rather only a right of exploited classes to self-
determination: “There had been no room for the ambiguous and yet central
phenomenon of nationalism in her heroic world-view. Nothing existed between
socialism and barbarism” (65). Nairn supports Lenin’s position and applies it to
the UK. He argues that the neo-nationalisms of Scotland, Wales, and Northern
Ireland are a result of uneven development and “could contribute to socialist
revolution”, the break-up of Britain and “the principal factor making for a political
revolution of some sort” (69).
Nairn distinguishes between progressive and reactionary nationalism and considers the
latter as “abusive versions” of nationalism that “tend towards the encouragement of social
and psychological atavism, the exploitation of senseless fears and prejudices, and so
towards violence” (298). At the same time, he acknowledges that nationalism is ideology
and false consciousness (286) and necessarily populist (291). But given this characterisation
of nationalism as containing irrational elements, Nairn’s theory and his embrace of anti-
imperialist nationalism cannot rule out that the latter develops into a new form of capital-
ism, imperialism, racism, genocide, anti-Semitism, mass extermination, or fascism. Given
the necessarily irrational elements of nationalism, there is always a fascist potential.
German, Italian, and Japanese fascism are for Nairn merely reactions to “a relatively
recent experience of ‘backwardness’” (297). He reduces Nazi-fascism and therefore also
the catastrophe of Auschwitz to a necessary consequence of “the general framework of
modern developmental history” (300). Auschwitz is then for Nairn a necessary collateral
Eric J. Hobsbawm’s Approach: Characteristics of Nationalism

damage of capitalist history that is tolerable in the light of the emergence of “the great
counter-force of anti-imperialist struggle” beyond “the wreckage” (309). Nairn simplifies
history and reduces Nazi-fascism to Germany’s defeat in the First World War and the
Treaty of Versailles. He does not take into account that Hitler and Nazi-fascism may not
have happened if the German Revolution of 1918/1919 had been successful or the
social democrats and communists had not fought each other and had united in the strug-
gle against Nazi-fascism and for turning the Weimar Republic into a socialist republic.
Nazi-fascism and Auschwitz were not a necessary, but an avoidable catastrophe that
has its immanent potential in capitalism and nationalism.
Nairn advances a metaphysical concept of history, in which nationalism in the last

instance, despite catastrophic setbacks, has progressive tendencies that will prevail
with necessity. It is nationalism, and not class struggle, that is a progressive force
for him. He argues that all nationalism “is spotted without exception” (299), but
seems to think that fascism has to be accepted as a necessary evil, an inevitable
stage, and collateral damage on the way to socialism:
It is through nationalism that societies try to propel themselves forward to

certain kinds of goal (industrialization, prosperity, equality with other
peoples, etc.) by a certain sort of regression – by looking inwards, drawing
more deeply upon their indigenous resources, resurrecting past folk heroes
and myths about themselves and so on.
(298–299)
Nairn’s assessment of Hitler and the Nazis lacks complexity. Nazi-fascism was
a mass movement that promised salvation to big and small capital, as well as work-
ers, peasants, and soldiers, by “making Germany great again” and portraying democ-
racy, the Jews, finance, and socialists as causes of social problems. Its nationalism
tried to unify German capital and German labour by constructing them as an Aryan
race that was under threat by “non-Aryans” and communism. Nazi-fascism’s rise
was favoured by several factors, including the presence of anti-Semitism, authoritar-
ianism, and hierarchic bureaucracy; the strong limitation of free speech and strong
censorship of the press during the nineteenth century; the lack of a democratic revo-
lution and the failure of the democratic revolution in 1848/49 and of the socialist
revolution in 1918/19; and the repression against socialists in the form of the Anti-
Socialist Laws under Bismarck. Last but not least, Nazi-fascism and other fascisms
were also attempts to defeat the internationalist socialist, communist, and trade
union movements in the light of events such as the Russian Revolution.
Eric J. Hobsbawm (1995) argues that fascism found fruitful soil especially in countries
where “democracy and liberalism were not dominant, or among classes which did not
identify with them, that is to say, chiefly in countries which had not undergone a French
revolution or its equivalent” (121). After 1917, right-wing forces mobilised in a militant
manner because they saw socialism as a realistic threat in the context of the October
Revolution. The Nazis’ power and influence was based on the combination of the global
capitalist crisis that started in 1929, the defeat of the left in the November Revolution,
and its resulting weakness and internal hostilities, including infighting between commun-
ists and socialists. The Great Slump transformed fascism
into a world movement, and, more to the point, a world danger. […] But as
the tide of fascism rose with the Great Slump, it became increasingly clear
that in the Age of Catastrophe not only peace, social stability and the econ-
omy, but also the political institutions and intellectual values of 19th century
liberal bourgeois society, were in retreat or collapse.
(Hobsbawm 1995, 108)
Eric J. Hobsbawm’s Critique of Nairn’s Theory of

Nationalism
Eric J. Hobsbawm (1977) questions Nairn’s position. He takes a Luxemburgist pos-

ition and therefore argues that Marxists cannot be nationalists
since nationalism by definition subordinates all other interests to those of

its specific “nation”. […] any Marxists who are not, at least in theory, pre-
pared to see the “interests” of their own country or people subordinated to
wider interests, had best reconsider their ideological loyalties.
(9)
Marxists “see nations in the modern sense as historical phenomena rather than a priori
eternal data of human society” (10). Hobsbawm argues for a realist socialist position
that sees nation-states sceptically and as facts and puts the socialist interest first. The
Leninist policy of Marxists who support the right to national self-determination has his-
torically resulted in Marxist movements becoming “subordinate to, or been absorbed by,
or pushed aside by non-Marxist or anti-Marxist nationalism. To this extent, the Luxem-
burgist case is not entirely unrealistic” (11). Hobsbawm argues against Nairn’s support
of Scottish and Welsh independence that both would probably reinforce English nation-

alism and xenophobia (17) and that it is naïve to assume that advancing Marxist nation-
alism will suddenly transform the Scottish National Party or Plaid Cymru into
revolutionary socialist parties (11). Hobsbawm warns against Nairn’s assumption that
Welsh and Scottish separatism and socialism after separation are inevitable historical
developments. History would depend on many factors and therefore be unpredictable.
Marxists will “continue to be not merely enemies of ‘great-nation chauvinism’, but also
of ‘little-nation chauvinism’” (22). Anderson (2006) speaks of “Nairn’s good nationalist
tendency to treat his ‘Scotland’ as an unproblematic, primordial given” (89).
Nairn’s Response to Hobsbawm
Nairn argues that Hobsbawm (1992b, 131) mistakes Nazi-Germany for “the apogee
of nationalism” (Nairn 1997, 51), whereas in his view it was an imperialist system.
Nairn argues that in Hobsbawm’s account of nationalism, “anything good about
national movements turns out actually to derive from some other source or inspir-
ation (quite often internationalism); everything bad is disdainfully highlighted as typ-
ical, suspect or ominous” (51).
Nairn (1977/2015) admits that nationalism has a dark side, but thinks this side must
be accepted as necessary to achieve progress in history. So, it should not be
a surprise that other historians analyse and highlight these immanent aspects of
nationalism. Hobsbawm was 16 years old when Hitler came to power in 1933 and
he and his Jewish family had to flee from Berlin to the UK. He experienced the
horrors of nationalism. Being a communist Jew, it is likely that he may not have
survived if he had not been able to flee. It is no wonder that Hobsbawm has
a different, more realist, and less romantic perspective on nationalism than Nairn.
Eric J. Hobsbawm’s History of Nationalism
Hobsbawm (1992b) argues that nations are not “as old as history” (3), but emerged
from the eighteenth century onwards as modern nation-states:
Like most serious students, I do not regard the “nation” as a primary nor
as an unchanging social entity. It belongs exclusively to a particular, and
historically recent, period. It is a social entity only insofar as it relates to
a certain kind of modern territorial state, the “nation-state”, and it is point-
less to discuss nation and nationality except insofar as both relate to it.
(9–10)
Based on Gellner, Hobsbawm defines nationalism as the principle of unifying the

political and the national unit (9). Nationalism “comes before nations. Nations do
not make states and nationalisms but the other way round” (10). Hobsbawm argues
that nations and nationalism have to be studied not just “from above”, but also
“from below” (10), the nation as seen “by ordinary persons” (11). I suggest that the
way of doing this is to study how the nation and nationalism are being communi-
cated from above and from below. As a foundation for such studies, a critical theory
of communication is needed.
Table 5.1 shows the number of empires and nation-states with more than 1 million
inhabitants in particular years. It becomes evident that nation-building has taken
place especially since the nineteenth century, which shows that the nation-state is
indeed a predominantly modern phenomenon having to do with imperialism, wars,
and rapid changes of modernity, capitalism, and class structure. Hobsbawm (1992b,
Chapter 1) argues that the Age of Revolution (1789–1848), including the French
Revolution, was quite hostile to the nationalist principle of establishing nation-states
based on “ethnicity, common language, religion, territory and common historical
memories” (20). During that time, one thought of nations primarily as national econ-
omies. Nationalism and the quest for the modern nation-state emerged, according to
Hobsbawm, from 1875 onwards with the rise of imperialism (or what Hobsbawm
terms the Age of Empire).
Hobsbawm argues that common language, religion, and political history are not sufficient
criteria for nationalism and nation-states to emerge. These factors could, however, be
mobilised by nationalist movements as proto-nationalist symbols. For making capitalism
work, institutions such as the governing elite, citizenship, print language, the modern
military, state bureaucracy, the census, the police, the school system, etc. are needed.
State institutions require a border that defines whom they serve and whom not. The
emergence of the modern state “helped to foster the emergence of nationalism” (Hobs-
bawm 1992b, 100). “The widespread progress of electoral democracy and the consequent
emergence of mass politics therefore dominated the invention of official traditions in the
period 1870–1914” (Hobsbawm 1983b, 267–268). In the formation of the nation-state
and nationalism, the invention of (a) primary education; (b) public ceremonies; and (c)
public monuments played an important role (Hobsbawm 1983b, 271–272).
According to Hobsbawm (1992b), nationalism proliferated from the 1880s onwards

and stressed differences of language, culture, and “race”. “The basis of ‘nationalism’
of all kinds was the same: the readiness of people to identify themselves emotion-
ally with ‘their’ ‘nation’ and to be politically mobilized as Czechs, Germans, Italians
or whatever, a readiness which could be politically exploited” (Hobsbawm 1989,
143). Nations and nationalism were “invented in the later 19th century” (Hobsbawm
1989, 146). Hobsbawm (1992b) argues that racism and anti-Semitism grew along
with the influence of race theories and social Darwinism. Race and nation were
increasingly used as synonyms (108).
TABLE 5.1 Number of empires and nation-states with more than 1 million inhabitants
Year Number
1700 24
1800 26
1900 87
1939 56
1989 130
Sources: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_population_in_1700,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_population_in_1800,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_population_in_1989 (accessed
30 December 2017)
The foreigner came to symbolize the disruption of old ways and the capital-
ist system which disrupted them. Thus the virulent political anti-Semitism
which we have observed spreading across the western world from the
1880s […] took aim rather against the bankers, entrepreneurs and others
who were identified with the ravages of capitalism among the “little men”.
Rapid economic change and changes of the class structure expressed themselves
increasingly in ideological, cultural, and linguistic conflicts. The Long/Great Depres-
sion (1873–1896) accelerated changes of the class structure and fears of social
decline (Hobsbawm 1992b, 109). Individuals, groups, and classes feeling economic-
ally under threat increasingly turned to nationalism, racism, anti-Semitism, chauvin-
ism, and patriotism as reactive ideologies:
Until the Great Depression something very like global free trade, while per-
haps benefiting Britain rather more than others, had been in the interest of
all. Yet from the 1870s on such claims ceased to ring true, and as a global
conflict came, once more, to be considered as a serious, if not an impend-
ing possibility, the sort of nationalism which saw other nations frankly as
menace or victims gained ground.
Imperialist rivalries for the control of markets and international sources of resources
and labour spurred nationalist ideology (Hobsbawm 1992b, 91).
Whatever the nature of the nationalism which came to the fore in the fifty
years before 1914, all versions of it appeared to have something in
common: a rejection of the new proletarian socialist movements, not only
because they were proletarian but also because they were, consciously and
militantly internationalist, or at the very least non-nationalist. […] And the
canonical view among historians is indeed that in this period mass nation-
alism triumphed against rival ideologies, notably class-based socialism, as
demonstrated by the outbreak of war in 1914.
(123)
The rise of the radical right was directed against socialism and needed scapegoats
(such as Jews and foreigners) for its mobilisation. Socialist and nationalist move-
ments competed for the same groups of people (124).
Nationalisms, competing capitalisms, and the conflict between socialism and what
now took on the form of various fascisms continued to exist in new formations after
the First World War. After 1918, the cinema, the radio, and the press acquired an
increasing role in the communication of nationalism (141). Sports became an expres-
sion of national conflict and events of national self-assertion (143). Fascists used
nationalism for mobilising against Bolshevism and socialism (143). The Great Depres-
sion increased not just social misery, but also despair (144).
After 1945, anti-colonial nationalism, decolonisation, and liberation struggles gained

momentum. Marxism-Leninism and Maoism had a major influence on such move-
ments. Hobsbawm criticises that there was not much thought put into the question
of how the “nations” that fought for freedom were defined. They often copied the
European principle of national self-determination (Hobsbawm 1992b, 152–153). So,
national liberation movements in the Global South were for Hobsbawm often “mod-

elled on the nationalism of the west” (169). When society is failed by capitalism,
then the nation and nationalism appear as all-to-easy fixes that cannot substitute
the need for socialism as an alternative to capitalism. Hobsbawm argues that anti-
capitalist and anti-imperialist movements have to be internationalist and not fall
prey to the nationalist fetishism of “ethnicity, language, culture, historical past, and
the rest” (179). Ethnicity is an ideology that “links the members of ‘we’ because it
emphasizes their differences from ‘them’. What they actually have in common
beyond being ‘them’ is not so clear. […] ethnicity is one way of filling the empty
containers of nationalism” (Hobsbawm 1992a, 4).
We can see certain parallels here between Eric J. Hobsbawm’s arguments, Partha
Chatterjee’s call for dissociating reason and modernity from capital and nationalism,
and Vivek Chibber’s insight that a new socialist universalism that transcends capital-
ism’s particularistic universalism is needed.
Hobsbawm (1992b) observes that in Germany, “the traditional 19th century concept
of ‘the nation’” as the unity of state and nation “survived most strongly in the work-
ing class” (190). Given the rise of Trump and working-class support for the far-right
in many countries, we today unfortunately have to extend this insight to other coun-
tries as well (see Fuchs 2018a) so that it is not so certain that we can hope that
the “owl of Minerva which”, according to Hegel, “brings wisdom […] is now circling
round nations and nationalism” (Hobsbawm 1992b, 192). We can only actively hope
that the owl as political principle will ascertain itself over the tendency that history
repeats itself, first as tragedy and then as farce.
Nationalism’s Psychology
Why do individuals follow nationalist and xenophobic ideologies? Crises, ideological

strategies, and authoritarian demagogy are important influencing factors, but only
lead to nationalist consciousness on the part of some and certainly not all individ-
uals. There are also psychological factors at play that need to be considered: “In
the public debate on the societal basis for racism, political consequences, societal
conditions, etc., one common deficit is frequently pointed out: a failure to include
subjective, psychological, and emotional aspects” (Holzkamp 2013, 172).
Erich Fromm (1936, 1942/2001) and Wilhelm Reich (1972) show in their analyses
how authoritarian education and authoritarian family structures create a fascist and
nationalist predisposition. They show that authoritarianism operates at the level of
society, ideology, and the individual.
Wilhelm Reich’s Political Psychology of Fascism and

Nationalism
Reich (1972) characterises fascist ideology as appeal to “personal honor, family

honor, racial honor, national honor” (55–56), and argues that fascism operates in the
individual, ideology, and society, including structures of
capitalism, or rather patriarchy; the institution of compulsive marriage;

sexual suppression; personal struggle against one’s own sexuality; personal
compensatory feeling of honor; etc. The highest position in the series is
assumed by the ideology of “national honor,” which is identical with the
irrational core of nationalism.
(56)
Fascist ideology is a way of “embedding this economic process [of capitalism] in the
psychic structure of the people who make up the society” (18). There is no automatic link
between economic position and political consciousness. Reich shows how Hitler operated
upon “the emotions of the individuals in the masses” and avoided “relevant arguments as
much as possible” (34). Authoritarian fathers, bosses, and political leaders play an import-
ant role in the formation of individuals’ authoritarian character structure. Authoritarianism
culminates in the identification with a political Führer (62–63).
The Little Man does not know that he is little, and he is afraid of knowing it.
He covers up his smallness and narrowness with illusions of strength and
greatness, of others’ strength and greatness. He is proud of his great generals

but not proud of himself. He admires the thought which he did not have and
not the thought he did have. He believes in things all the more thoroughly the
less he comprehends them, and does not believe in the correctness of those
ideas which he comprehends most easily.
(Reich 1975, 13)
Wilhelm Reich here indicates that there is a psychological dimension to authoritarian

personalities’ admiration of leaders and destruction. Authoritarians are sadomaso-
chistic personalities who do not love themselves, love the powerful, and hate the
weak. This also results in the irrational belief in unproven claims that appeal to
ideologies such as nationalism, racism, xenophobia, fascism, and anti-Semitism that
correspond to the authoritarian personality. Today, there are discussions about post-
truth knowledge, knowledge determined not by facts, but by emotional and ideo-

logical belief. Reich argues that such knowledge is not just based on ideology and
the political-economic context, but also the authoritarian psyche.
Erich Fromm’s Critical Theory of the Authoritarian

Character
Erich Fromm (1942/2001) characterises the fascist as a sadomasochistic personality, some-
one who loves to hate and to be violent and to submit to and experience authority: “He
admires authority and tends to submit to it, but at the same time he wants to be an
authority himself and to have others submit to him” (141). Fromm argues that parents’
authoritarian behaviour towards the child suppresses spontaneity, freedom, and independ-
ence. A fascist personality is not the automatic result, but authoritarian family structures
create a fascist predisposition (Fromm 1936, 86) that makes individuals prone to affirm the
authoritarian behaviour of teachers, managers, bosses, and political leaders. The “amount
of destructiveness to be found in individuals is proportionate to the amount to which
expansiveness of life is curtailed” (Fromm 1942/2001, 157). Fromm analyses how authori-
tarianism operates not just in the family, but also in fascist ideology and capitalist struc-
tures. In Nazi-ideology, “[r]acial and political minorities within Germany and eventually
other nations which are described as weak or decaying are the objects of sadism upon
which the masses are fed” (194).
Fascist ideology conveys that “the individual is nothing and does not count. The individ-
ual should accept this personal insignificance, dissolve himself in a higher power, and
then feel proud in participating in the strength and glory of this higher power” (200).
Authoritarianism also operates in capitalism’s structures, a world “in which everybody

and everything has become instrumentalized”, where the individual “has become a part
of the machine that his hands have built” (219). Authoritarianism is built into capitalism
in the form of abstraction, quantification, the division of labour, class, and exploitation
(Fromm 1956, Chapter 5). Capitalism is based on alienating structures. Alienation is “a
mode of experience in which the person experiences himself as an alien” (117).
Fromm, Reich, and other authors close to the Frankfurt School see a fascist potential
in capitalism. They therefore argue for changing society’s structures, institutions, and
forms of socialisation. This entails the strengthening of supportive instead of repres-
sive authority (Fromm 1936, 111, 135), the advancement of humanistic communitarian
socialism (Fromm 1956, 354) that is based on “active and intelligent co-operation” and
the expansion of democracy and its “principle of government of the people, by the
people, for the people […] from the formal political to the economic sphere” (Fromm
1942/2001, 235). The implication is that the struggle for socialist humanism is the
best way of undermining fascist and authoritarian potentials (see Fromm 1966).
Holzkamp’s Political Psychology
Racist and nationalist structures are possibilities to act for the subject (what Klaus
Holzkamp calls constellations of meaning), to which they respond positively if they see
advantages for their individual life-interests by being racist, nationalist, etc. Racist,
nationalist, and fascist structures invite subjects to act in racist, nationalist, and fas-
cist ways. Some subjects may accept this invitation. Life-interests are antagonistic and
interpretable in different ways. For some, repressing and discriminating others appears
as their own interest; for others, overcoming structures that favour such discrimination
appears as their own interest.
Racism, fascism, nationalism, anti-Semitism, and xenophobia operate by
repressing one’s factual dependency on capital and state through the uncon-
scious construction of a regional omnipotence at the expense of others,
“strangers” whose persecution “supersedes” conflicts with the ruling classes,
whereby this displacement also involves the repression of one’s self-harming
participation in stabilizing powers one is dependent upon; this repression, in
turn has to be kept “unconscious” by mythicizing one’s own “powerfulness”
and demonizing “others”.
(Holzkamp 2013, 202)
Holzkamp and Holzkamp-Osterkamp argue that racists and nationalists are not vic-
tims, but together with institutions co-responsible for domination. Childhood would
just be the starting point of one’s own history, not the end point and not the ultim-
ate cause of individual behaviour:
Fascist ideology exists in the promise that the individual can rapidly and
without risk overcome the helplessness and subjection of its existence;
[…] Fascism gave content, meaning, a general orientation and distinction
to existence that until then had been meaningless, empty, isolated and
insecure. It created a seeming superiority and real power over all those
who played no part. It conveyed the feeling of being needed.2
(Holzkamp-Osterkamp 1981, 157, 158)
The approaches of Reich, Fromm, Holzkamp, and Holzkamp-Osterkamp are interdiscip-

linary Marxist approaches that combine political economy, political psychology, and
ideology critique for explaining how subject and object, the individual, and society
interact. They explain nationalism as the dynamic interaction of institutions, parties,
movements, leaders, ideologies, the family, and the individual’s experiences, character
structure, and psyche. They combine political economy, ideology critique, and political
psychology for explaining how authoritarianism works in society and the individual.
David R. Roediger: Wages of Whiteness
Comparable to Holzkamp and Holzkamp-Osterkamp, David R. Roediger (2007), in his

book Wages of Whiteness, says that when white workers are racist and nationalist,
then this is a form of strategic action that aims at actual material advantages of the
individual. Basing his argument on W.E.B. Du Bois, Roediger writes that “the pleasures
of whiteness could function as a ‘wage’ for white workers. That is, status and privileges
conferred by race could be used to make up for alienating and exploitative class relation-
ships” (Roediger 2007, 13). Roediger does not really take into account that not all white
people are part of the working class because there are also white capitalists. He also
does not give so much attention to white anti-racism, non-white racism/nationalism,
and the “relationship between the struggle against male supremacism and white
supremacism” (Allen 2001).
But Roediger’s wages of whiteness approach is nonetheless an important contribu-

tion that helps us to think about how nationalism, racism, anti-Semitism, and
xenophobia are related to the structure of capitalism. We can generalise his con-
cept: whiteness, masculinity, nationality, racial/ethnic superiority, etc. are, in
a Bourdieuian understanding, forms of cultural capital that help workers to distin-
guish themselves from Others. They help to accumulate reputation, status, and
social distinction – cultural capital.
Nationalism and Psychological, Ideological,

Economic, Political, and Cultural Surplus
The motivation for individuals and groups advancing nationalist, fascist, patri-
archal, sexist, racist, etc. ideologies are often feelings of anxiety and alienation
that they want to compensate in order to feel better and channel their aggres-
sions. The pleasure derived from nationalism, degrading others, bad-mouthing
them, communicating stereotypes, discrimination, oppression, and exploitation can
be seen as a psychological “wage”. A psychological “wage” is not money,
although it might lead to monetary benefits, but a psychological surplus that
allows compensation for frustration, aggression, and anxiety. A lack of pleasure
and satisfaction is overcome by a psychological “wage”/surplus obtained from
repressing others and obtaining a feeling of superiority by downgrading, bad-
mouthing, and scapegoating the perceived enemy. Roediger (2007) says that
when he uses, based on W.E.B Du Bois, the term “psychological wage” (12),
there are parallels to the works of scholars in critical psychoanalysis such as
Wilhelm Reich and Erich Fromm (Roediger 2017, 67–69).
The pleasure derived from degrading others, bad-mouthing them, and communicat-
ing stereotypes, discrimination, oppression, and exploitation can be seen as a psy-
chological “wage”. If the practice and communication of discrimination leads to
reputation and status gains, then we can talk of a cultural “wage”/surplus
obtained from nationalism, racism, xenophobia, etc. Political advantages derived
from discrimination, oppression, and exploitation are a political “wage”/surplus. Polit-
ical and ideological capital can be transformed into economic resources when, for
example, better economic positions, higher wages, salaries, and income can be obtained
by the public, semi-public, or organisational communication and support of racism, nation-
alism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism, etc. In the capitalist economy, authority, culture, and
ideology can result in a monetary surplus-wage. And within the political and cultural
system, exploitation and oppression can result in certain individuals’ and groups’ social
advantages at the expense of others, or what could, in a metaphorical sense, be termed
an ideological wage (a surplus of pleasure, enjoyment, and status), a political wage (a

surplus of political influence), and a cultural wage (a surplus of reputation). One aspect
that Bourdieu’s and Marx’s analyses share is the stress on how the logic of accumulation
shapes capitalist society and brings about inequalities. Roediger extends this analysis by
arguing that: (a) ideology, culture, and authority result in surplus-wages in the economy;
and (b) ideology and politics in modern society are systems of accumulation, in which pol-
itical and cultural surpluses are accumulated.
W.E.B. Du Bois
The surplus that ideology can produce involves not just surplus pleasure and surplus
enjoyment in the suffering of others (the psychological wage), but it can also be
economic, political, and cultural in character (the economic, political, and cultural
wage). W.E.B. Du Bois (1935) argued in this context:

It must be remembered that the white group of laborers, while they received
a low wage, were compensated in part by a sort of public and psychological
wage. They were given public deference and tides of courtesy because they
were white. They were admitted freely with all classes of white people to
public functions, public parks, and the best schools. The police were drawn
from their ranks, and the courts, dependent upon their votes, treated them
with such leniency as to encourage lawlessness. Their vote selected public
officials, and while this had small effect upon the economic situation, it had
great effect upon their personal treatment and the deference shown them.
White schoolhouses were the best in the community, and conspicuously
placed, and they cost anywhere from twice to ten times as much per capita as
the colored schools. The newspapers specialized on news that flattered the
poor whites and almost utterly ignored the Negro except in crime and ridicule.
(700–701)
Representatives of critical theory and critical psychology, such as Neumann, Fromm, Reich,
Adorno, Holzkamp, and Holzkamp-Osterkamp, agree that the friend/enemy logic is
a crucial feature of fascism, nationalism, racism, xenophobia, and anti-Semitism. Subjects
thereby create feelings of superiority that allow them to overcome their feelings of inferior-
ity, anxiety, alienation, dissatisfaction, etc. They release anger and aggression. David
R. Roediger’s approach helps us to put these mechanisms into the language of Marxian
political economy so that a combination of political psychology and Marx’s political
economy can be created. Capitalism creates psychological defects, a loss that ideological
strategies allow to overcome in the form of psychological surplus, a surplus pleasure and
enjoyment in discrimination, scapegoating, and the communication of hatred against the
perceived enemy. Capitalism as the society built on the accumulation of surplus is not just
a society, in which money-capital is accumulated, but also one in which power structures
necessitate the accumulation of power and ideology results in the accumulation of ideo-
logical, cultural, and psychological surplus/“wages”.
Eric J. Hobsbawm on Nationalism as Invented

Tradition
Eric J. Hobsbawm (1983a) argues that traditions are often invented for serving polit-
ical and social purposes:
“Invented tradition” is taken to mean a set of practices, normally governed

by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature,
which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repeti-
tion, which automatically implies continuity with the past.
(1)
All kinds of modern organisations have invented traditions in order to create and
reproduce identity among their members and communicate power to broader society.
Hobsbawm (1983b) discusses International Workers’ Day as an example of an
invented socialist tradition that was introduced in the late nineteenth century to
symbolise and communicate the internationalism and power of the politically organ-
ised working class. Invented traditions are partly entirely new and partly build on
older practices. The national tradition is a particular kind of invented tradition that aims
at advancing the cohesion of the nation-state and nationalism. For doing so, nationalism
not only needs to be produced as ideology, but also reproduced through acts of commu-
nication. Nationalism is a social practice that produces and communicates divisive ideol-
ogy that glorifies invented national traditions and practices, creates collective identity,
and defines itself against aliens and enemies.
Hobsbawm (1983b) argues that the creation of modern nation-states was accompanied
by the mass production and mass invention of traditions. He says that national tradi-
tions are often invented from above, but aim at reaching a broad following in the popu-
lation by speaking to a felt “need among particular bodies of people” (Hobsbawm
1983b, 307). “‘Invented traditions’ have significant social and political functions, and
would neither come into existence nor establish themselves if they could not acquire
them” (Hobsbawm 1983b, 307). It is clear that nationalist traditions are invented from
above and require hegemony from below. But it is not self-evident that attempts to
impose nationalism on the population via national symbols, events, and practices
always succeed. The question is how and to which extent the encoded nationalist
meaning is decoded in the same or different manner by the audience.
General Features of Nationalism

We can learn from critical theories of nationalism, especially the ones advanced by
Eric J. Hobsbawm and Rosa Luxemburg (1976), that there are some general features
of nationalism that take on different forms in various contexts:
• Political movement and ideology, nation-state and national consciousness:

Nationalism is an ideology and political movement that sustains or aims at
building a nation-state that unites defined nation-state members (citizens form-
ing a people). Nationalism has two interconnected dimensions, a territorial-
political one (the nation-state) and an ideological one (national consciousness).
It is both a political relation and collective consciousness. Its territorial aspect
contains an actual or claimed bounded natural environment that is the space
for the organisation of the nation-state. Nations do not exist prior to national-
ism and nation-states.
• Nature and culture: Nationalism claims that there is a foundational unity of
the nation that is grounded in nature (blood, kinship, soil, “race”) and/or cul-
ture/society (common language, traditions, myths, history, wars, heroes [“great
men of history”], symbols, memories, moral practices and moral values, habits,
tastes, everyday life and ways of life, art, literature, structure of feeling, emo-
tions, worldviews, ideas, wars, philosophy, religion, education, cuisine, sports,
law, experiences, identity, means of communication, etc.). Nationalism fabri-
cates and invents fictive ethnicity (Balibar and Wallerstein 1991, 49, 96–100).
• Domination and hegemony: Nationalism is imposed and constructed from
above by political elites and intellectuals, but it is also lived and hegemoni-
cally produced and reproduced from below by everyday people in their every-
day practices and beliefs. Nationalism as ideology does not necessarily and
not automatically work. There is a continuum of reactions to nationalism, ran-
ging from active participation, on the one end, to opposition and resistance,
on the other end.
• Ideology and class: Nationalism as ideology legitimates and distracts from the
division of society into classes and relations of domination by constructing,
inventing, and fabricating a national unity of the people that is said to be
stronger than class divisions. Nationalism is a false appearance of unity that
is a feature of modern class societies. It is a political fetishism that mystifies
the nation as a natural and thing-like entity existing above and transcending
actual relations of power and exploitation. Nationalism is not just
a phenomenon of the ruling class. Groups and classes threatened by or afraid
of social decline are prone to nationalism and to leading, supporting, and join-
ing nationalist movements. Crises and rapid changes of the class structure in
light of crises and capitalist transformation increases the chance of the emer-
gence of nationalist movements.
• Enemies of the nation: Nationalism always has an outside. Its collective unity
is defined against proclaimed outsiders of and enemies to the nation. The
other of the nation and nationalism can be inner enemies and outsiders and/
or outer enemies and competitors. Nationalism is ideological violence that
tries to naturalise class relations and exploitation and tries to “convince”
workers and other subalterns that their exploitation and domination is without
alternative and natural, and that social problems have other roots than the
class structure. Nationalism is one of the ideologies that tries to construct
a feeling of unity between the subaltern classes and the capitalist class in
order to distract attention from class differences, the class structure, and
power inequalities associated with class societies. Nationalist language is war
by other means, intellectual warfare that often aims at denigrating the foreign
by the nation’s positive self-presentation or negative othering.
• Modernity: Nationalism is a feature of the modernisation of capitalist and
class societies. Modern class society requires nationalism as ideology in order
to justify the exploitation of workers, the domination of consumers, and the
geographic expansion of capitalist production and markets. Nationalism justi-
fies the nation-state that with the help of a monopoly of the means of vio-
lence and the law secures the control of a national labour-market, the rule of
the political elite, the ideological dominance of capitalism, and the biological
and social reproduction of labour-power and citizens, as well as economic and
military expansion in order to enable capital export and capital’s access to inter-
national markets for labour-power, resources, and commodity sales. Nationalism
and the nation-state enable the control of a national territory that is a power
container for the accumulation of money-capital (economic power), political deci-

sion power (political power), and ideological influence (cultural power).
• Crisis: Economic and political crises open up periods of uncertainty, in which
the future is open and rapid political change can occur. Right-wing authoritar-
ianism and associated nationalism are likely to grow in situations of capitalist
crisis, especially if the left is weak, disjointed, and disorganised.
• Forms of nationalism: Nationalism as ideology takes on four forms: biological
nationalism, economic nationalism, political nationalism, and cultural national-
ism (see Table 5.2).
• Imperialist and anti-colonial nationalism: The difference between imperialist
and anti-colonial nationalism is that the first considers the enemy as immi-
grants and other minorities in developed capitalist countries or as other competing
nations or political groups, whereas the second sees the imperial force as the
enemy. Imperialist nationalism not only justifies a national society’s class structure,

but also its imperialist, colonial, or neo-colonial expansion and wars that tend to be
justified by the ideology of the “national interest” and “national security” which
claim that the nation needs to be defended against foreign enemies and by the
ideology of “national superiority” which claims that the superior nation must “civil-
ise” and thereby “help” the world’s primitive, underdeveloped, and backward
regions. The danger of all nationalism is that as a class project, it sustains and
ideologically legitimates the power and dominance of a ruling class by eliding class
structures. When the rule of one nationalism substitutes another one, it may just
mean the shift from one ruling class to another, not the end of class society.
• Racism and nationalism: There is a dialectic of racism and nationalism.
Racism is an integral super-nationalism that calls for the preservation of the
nation’s biological and/or cultural origin, character, and purity. Racism is an
ideological construction of the out-group as an alien biological (classical
racism) or cultural (new racism) group that is not part of the illusionary
national collective.
• Ideological strategies: Nationalism requires ideological strategies that commu-
nicate and practise the feeling of superiority of the nation and its members
over the outsiders and enemies. These ideological strategies feature positive
self-presentation of the nation and negative other-presentation. Nationalism
ideologically promises a better life to members of the nation if the alien
group is subdued.
TABLE 5.2 Types of nationalism’s ideological discourse structures
Type Definition Examples of nationalist Examples of nationalist

we-identity other-presentation
Biological Nationalism that relates to “Our people are by nature “They look different from
nationalism biology, nature, blood and hard-working, decent, us”, “They are by nature
soil. It proclaims the super- peaceful, rational, winners, aggressive, dirty, criminal/
iority of and pride in an inventive, creative, superior, lazy, noisy, smelly, ill-
invented national “race” etc.” adapted,
and the inferiority of other violent, etc.”
“races”.
Economic Nationalism that relates to “Our economy is particularly “They take away our jobs/
nationalism society’s economic system competitive”, “Our workers benefits/houses/educational
and resources. It proclaims are decent and hard- or healthcare opportunities,
the superiority of and pride working individuals proud of etc.”, “They degrade our
in aspects of the national their skills and industrious- social system/wages/educa-
economic system (labour, ness”, “Our companies and tion system/pension
capital, commodity types entrepreneurs are particu- system/welfare system/
and industries, productivity, larly inventive and creative”, healthcare system/housing
technologies, entrepreneur- “German jobs for German system, etc.”
ship, etc.) and the inferiority people!”, “Buy British”
of competing economies.
Political Nationalism that relates to “We are proud of our polit- “They come from an
nationalism society’s political system ical values of freedom and authoritarian country that
and power structures. It pro- our long political history of shapes their political world-
claims the superiority of and freedom and human rights”, view and behaviours”,
pride in aspects of the “We are proud of our “They do not know/respect
national political system heroes and army who have Western political values”,
and the inferiority of other fought for the defence of “They are used to a political
political systems. our nation”, “We are proud system dominated by
of our government/head of crime”, “They are criminals/
state/political system/mon- do not follow our laws”
arch”, “We have to fight for
and maintain our independ-
ence and sovereignty from
foreign political influences”,
“I love my country and my
flag – I’d die for them”
Cultural Nationalism that relates to “We can be proud of our “They have different values
nationalism society’s cultural system. It traditions, arts, artists, lan- and morals”, “In their cul-
proclaims the pride in and guage, intellectuals, scien- ture it is usual to …”,
superiority of national cul- tists, achievements in “They speak a different lan-
ture and the inferiority of sports, celebrities, philoso- guage/have different
foreign cultures. phy, education system, cuis- habits/ways of behaviour/
ine, etc.”, “We have won mentality/symbols/tradi-
the World Cup”, “We can tions, etc.”, “They destroy
be proud that our team won our language/culture/tradi-
and because of its superior- tions/character, etc.”, “They
ity defeated the others” come from a culture of
(Continued)
TABLE 5.2 (Cont.)
Type Definition Examples of nationalist Examples of nationalist

we-identity other-presentation
aggression/laziness/crimin-
ality, etc.”, “They have
a different lifestyle”, “They
do not want to adapt”,
“They treat women badly”,
“They have too many chil-
dren”, “They wear strange
clothes”, “They have bad
food tastes/habits”, “Their
food stinks”, “Their religion
does not belong here and
threatens our culture – it is
inherently disrespectful, vio-
lent, terrorist, etc.”

• Communicating nationalism: Nationalism is an ideology that is communicated
through events, symbols, practices, and the media system in everyday life and
in extraordinary situations (such as national holidays, commemorations, par-
ades, and wars).
• Inclusive and exclusive nationalism: The hatred of the enemy and outsiders
implies the exploitative or exclusive/exterminatory character of nationalism.
One can distinguish between inclusive nationalism that ideologically degrades
outsiders in order to justify their exploitation and exclusive nationalism that
ideologically scapegoats and debases outsiders in order to justify and organise
their exclusion and/or extermination.
• Militarism and war: Nation-states are often the historical results of wars and
political conflict. Nationalism implies the need for militarism, a police state,
and law and order policies. Nationalism has a tendency for war and
annihilation.
• Psychological aspects of nationalism: Nationalism and (new) racism appeal to
authoritarian character structures that have been acquired through socialisa-
tion. They are possibilities to act for the subject in order to feel empowered
and create meaning in a meaningless, empty, isolated, and insecure world.
Individuals may respond positively to nationalism and racism if they see
advantages for their individual life-interests. Nationalism is a complex inter-
action of political economy, ideology, and the human psyche.
• Surplus-generating nationalism: The pleasure derived from nationalism, degrad-

ing others, bad-mouthing them, communicating stereotypes, discrimination,
oppression, and exploitation can be seen as a psychological “wage” and sur-
plus. This is a surplus of pleasure, enjoyment, and status. Psychological sur-
plus allows compensation for frustration, aggression, and anxiety. Nationalism
and other ideologies can also create higher economic wages (higher monetary
income/surplus wage), a political wage (a surplus of political influence), and
a cultural wage (a surplus of reputation).
• Socialist humanism as the alternative: Nationalism can only be effectively
challenged by socialist humanism, the combination of humanism that stresses
human unity in diversity, i.e. what humans have in common despite of and
through their differences, and socialism that empowers the human self-
management of society.
• Struggles against capitalism are struggles against the nation and nationalism:
The subaltern have no need for nations and nationalism. They can only
become free through solidarity and struggles against capital and capitalism on
the local, nation-state, regional, international, and global levels.
• Nationalism and anti-imperialist struggles: In anti-imperialist struggles, there
is the danger that anti-imperialist forces advance a nationalist position and as
a consequence merely replace the foreign ruling class with a new national
ruling class.
5.3 Theorising the Communication of the Nation
A Critical Theory of Nationalism Needs to Be

Underpinned by a Critical Communication Theory of
Nationalism
Hobsbawm (1992b) argues that the national question “is situated at the point of
intersection of politics, technology and social transformation” (10). A proper critical
understanding of nationalism needs to be based on a combination of political economy,
history, ideology critique, political psychology, and communication theory. With the rise
of new technologies that stand in the context of societal transformations of politics,
economy, ideology, and class structures, the way nationalism is communicated takes on
new forms. A critical communication theory of nationalism is not a stand-alone theory of
nationalism, as claimed by Karl Deutsch (1966), but needs to interact with and underpin
the analysis of other dimensions. Marxian theory is an interdisciplinary theory approach

that allows bringing together and combining various fields in the analysis of society,
including the role of nationalism in society. A Marxian theory of communication is
a foundational aspect of a critical theory of nationalism.
Nationalism needs to be produced and then communicated. The communication

of nationalism is based on a dialectic of content/ideology and social form.
Nationalism is communicated as textual content that has particular semiotic, lin-
guistic, textual, and discursive structures of ideology. Nationalist texts are com-
municated in specific social forms. At the level of content, nationalism takes on
particular semiotic and linguistic discourse structures. Table 5.2 gives an over-
view of different types of nationalist discourse as well as typical examples. We
can distinguish between biological, economic, political, and cultural nationalism.
Nationalist ideology creates a boundary between “us” and “them” by self- and
other-presentation strategies. The dimensions shown in Table 5.2 are ideal-types.
Concrete nationalist texts can be combinations of various dimensions and elem-
ents of nationalist ideology.
Theorising the Communication of the Nation

Communicating Nationalism: Types and Structures
of Nationalist Ideology
Raymond Williams’ and Marisol Sandoval’s

Typologies of the Media
The media make “national symbols part of the life of every individual, and thus […]
break down the divisions between the private and the local spheres in which most
citizens normally lived, and the public and national one” (Hobsbawm 1992b, 142).
So, media as social forms of communication play an important role in the communi-
cation of nationalist content and ideology. Raymond Williams (1980/2005, 53–63,
1981, Chapter 4) argues that the means of communication take on particular social
forms. He distinguishes between communication that is based on immediate human
physical resources (verbal communication, non-verbal communication) and communi-
cations (= communication systems) that are based on non-human materials that are
socially produced by human labour (amplificatory communications, durative storage
communications, alternative communications; for a discussion of Williams’ theory of
communication(s), see Fuchs 2017a).
Marisol Sandoval (2014, 42–50) presents a typology of forms of media and communica-
tion that overcomes the theoretical ungroundedness and arbitrariness of most media typ-
ologies. She draws on the political economy distinction between the production,
distribution, and consumption of goods. In the case of the media, these goods are infor-
mation and symbols. She adds the prosumption of information, i.e. contexts where con-
sumers become producers of information, as a further dimension. Comparable to
Williams, Sandoval draws distinctions based on whether each of these dimensions is
organised only with the help of the human mind and body or as a combination of exter-
nal technologies and the human mind and body. This results in a distinction of five ways
of how media content can be produced, distributed and consumed (see Figure 5.1):
In the first case no media technology is involved for production, distribution, or

consumption. […] In the second case media technology is used for encoding
content, but distribution and consumption is possible without media technol-
ogy, as is the case with all print media. In the third case media technology is
PRODUCTION DISTRIBUTION CONSUMPTION

1
Media Encoding e.g. theatre,
without media R
content technology
Media content M.c. M.c. concerts,
performance
industry Decoding
Media Distribution
without
media
technology without media technology 2
technology e.g.
industry M.c. M.c.
R newspapers,
Encoding magazines
through media Media content
Media content Media content
Media content production 3
S Media content technology M.c. M.c.
R e.g. CDs, DVDs
Encoding/deco‐
ding through Decoding
media through
prosumption media
Media content Distribution
technology consumption 4
M.c. through media technology
distribution
R technology
M.c. M.c. R e.g. TV, radio,
telephone
e.g. social networking

sites, search engines,
online newspapers,
online video portals, Online Media Media
microblogging
5
media distribuon technology
industry industry industry
PROSUMPTION
FIGURE 5.1 Five types of communications/mediated communication

Source: Sandoval (2014, 47)
needed for both encoding and decoding of media content; distribution, how-
ever, takes place without the involvement of media technology. […] In the
fourth case all stages of the media production, distribution and consumption
processes are based on media technology. […] With computers and the Inter-
net a fifth way of circulating media content has emerged, which allows the
use of the same media technologies for both production and consumption of
media content. These technologies can therefore be called media prosumption
technologies. Based on these technologies a more interactive way of producing
media content has emerged in which all users have the technological means
to not only consume but also produce media content.
(48)
Social Forms of Communicating Nationalism

We can apply Sandoval’s systematic typology of media/communications types to the
realm of nationalist communication in order to distinguish different social forms of
nationalist communication (see Table 5.3).

There are five basic types of nationalist communication forms that correspond to
Sandoval’s five types. In addition, I distinguish between entities, social relations/
practices, and events that play a role in nationalist communication. Entities are spe-
cific systems that enter the communication process. These are humans, social sys-
tems, and non-human entities. Such entities enter into human beings’ social
relations, in which they socially produce and reproduce society. Events are social
practices and relations that are routinised, take place at specific times in particular
spaces, and are typically periodically repeated. Nationalist communication always
involves entities and social practices. It is also a form of ideological communication
that quite frequently is practised in the context of particular national events. In nation-
alism, entities, events, and social practices become symbols of nationalism that are
embedded into the communication of nationalism. Michael Billig (1995) argues that
nationalism is embedded into everyday life as banal nationalism, symbols, and “ideo-
logical habits” (6) that enable the reproduction of nations. Nationalism is not an
exception and extraordinary, but built into the banality of everyday life. “Daily, the
nation is indicated, or ‘flagged’, in the lives of its citizenry” (6). Such everyday symbols
and habits act as continuous “reminders of nationhood” (93). Most “of the occasions
when people become conscious of citizenship as such remain associated with symbols
TABLE 5.3 Social forms of nationalism (media types, entities, social relations/practices, events)
Entities (examples) Social relations and Events (examples)

social practices
(examples)
Primary media National heroes, sol- Teaching, learning and National events (cere-
(human body and mind, diers, national mottos, speaking the formal monies, commemor-
no media technology for head of state, presi- national language (print ations, and festivals),
production, distribution, dent, prime minister, language), participation national day, wars,
reception): theatre, con- ministers, government, in national events, bank holidays, parlia-
cert, performance, inter- parliament, ministries, basic military service, mentary sessions, elec-
personal communication public authorities, conscription, fighting as tions and election
national performing art- a soldier in a war, the campaigns, state open-
ists, national celebri- work of parliament, par- ing of parliament,
ties, entertainers and liamentary committees, sports events, national
athletes, national ministries, and other theatre and other art
museums, national public institutions, par- performances, national
sports teams, national ticipation in elections, food festivals, national
anthem, national flag, attending and organis- prize ceremonies, folk
formal national lan- ing sports events, dance festivals and
guage/print language, attending and organis- events, folk music
typical national dishes, ing artistic perform- events and festivals
folk dance, folk music ances, attending and
organising national
museums/exhibitions,
singing the national
anthem, speeches on
the occasion of national
events, government
campaigns, flag rituals,
cooking and eating typ-
ical national dishes,
folk dancing, listening
to or performing folk
music
Secondary media National flags, national Writing for the national Press reports on
(media technology for emblems and symbols, press (journalists), read- national events,
production): news- military and other ing the national press, national sporting
papers, magazines, national uniforms, reading of national lit- events, parliamentary
books, technologically national monuments, erature and government sessions, national polit-
produced arts and national artworks, literature, waving the ical events, national art-
culture public buildings, coins, national flag, wearing istic or other cultural
banknotes, national national uniforms, events, national econ-
money, stamps, national emblems, symbols, omy, national fine arts
seals, national badges badges, medals, etc., exhibitions, public read-
and medals, passport, using one’s passport at ing events
maps, government pub- border controls, working
lications, national litera- in or using national
ture and philosophy, buildings, building or
national press, national looking at national
history books, national monuments, use of
language textbooks and coins/banknotes/
(Continued)
TABLE 5.3 (Cont.)
Entities (examples) Social relations and Events (examples)

social practices
(examples)
dictionaries, national national money for com-
encyclopaedias, modity purchases,
national visual and fine organising or attending
artworks, national exhibitions of national
museums, libraries and fine arts, reading
archives national literature and
philosophy
Tertiary media Recordings of national Production and con- Events where recorded
(media technology for politics, national eco- sumption of national national politics,
production and con- nomic developments, politics, national eco- national culture, or
sumption, not distribu- and national culture dis- nomic developments, national economic
tion): CDs, DVDs, tapes, tributed on disks and national culture dis- developments are
records, Blu-ray discs, tributed on disks shown (e.g. cinemato-
hard disks graphic presentation of
the newest movie of an
acclaimed national film-
maker, national film fes-
tivals, etc.)
Quaternary media National radio and tele- Producing and consum- Broadcast of national
(media technology for vision (state broad- ing broadcasts on events, national sport-
production, distribution, caster, public service national radio and tele- ing events broadcasts,
and consumption): TV, broadcaster), national vision, use of national broadcasts of parlia-

radio, film, telephone, film, national telephone telephone and Internet mentary sessions,
Internet and Internet infrastruc- infrastructure, produc- broadcast news about
ture, web pages oper- tion, distribution, and national events, broad-
ated by national consumption of national cast of national artistic
institutions and institutions and nation- or other cultural events,
nationalists alists’ web content web content created by
national institutions on
the occasion of national
events
Quinary media Nationalist and nation- Online production, dis- User-generated nation-
(digital media prosump- related user-generated tribution, and consump- alist content on the
tion technologies, user- websites, blog posts, tion of user-generated occasion of national/
generated content): wikis, pages and groups nationalism and nation- nationalist events
Internet, social media on social networking related user-generated
sites, threads on discus- content
sion boards and mailing
lists, videos distributed
on video platforms,
microblog posts, images
spread via image sites,
memes, etc.
and semi-ritual practices (for instance, elections), most of which are historically novel
and largely invented: flags, images, ceremonies and music” (Hobsbawm 1983a, 12).
An Example: The Royal Christmas Message
Let us consider an example of how the nation is communicated at different levels

set out in Table 5.3. The Royal Christmas Message has been broadcast in the UK
annually since 1932. It started as a radio broadcast in 1932, moved to television in
1957, and is today broadcast via the Internet, television, and radio.
The evolution of the British royal family into a domestic as well as a public
icon of national identification, would have been impossible but for the
modern mass media, and its most deliberate ritual expression was actually
devised specifically for radio – later adapted to television: the royal Christ-
mas broadcast, instituted in 1932.
(Hobsbawm 1992b, 142)
In 2017, 7.6 million viewers watched the Queen’s Christmas Message broadcast on
BBC One, ITV, and Sky News (BBC 2017). In 2002, the total number of viewers was
9.3 million.3 In 1987, 28 million watched (BBC 2002; Plunkett 2011). The number of TV
channels has constantly increased, which may have been one factor influencing the
dropping numbers. But the fact that since 1997, not just the BBC, but also ITV, has
broadcast the Royal Christmas Message, and in 2011 Sky News also joined the simul-
taneous broadcast, has not stopped the trend of a decreasing number of viewers.
The Royal Christmas Message involves the Queen as main actor and other actors
such as speech-writers, technicians, producers, a public relations team, etc. The pro-
duction of the message takes place at the level of secondary media: human actors
produce a text that the Queen performs as an event on Christmas Day by reading
the speech. For reaching the public, the media event is simultaneously organised as
a secondary media event that moves to the level of a quaternary media event that
is broadcast via television and radio and on the Internet. A DVD presenting all
Christmas Messages the Queen has given since 1952 would be a tertiary media
technology. In the age of social media, the Royal Christmas Message has also
reached the level of social media: the Queen’s online team operates official social
media accounts. In August 2019, the Twitter profile @RoyalFamily had more than
4 million followers.
Figure 5.2 shows the British Royal Family’s official Twitter profile promoting the Queen’s
2017 Christmas Message. Within four days, it had reached more than 660,000 views,
23,500 likes, more than 8,000 retweets, and around 1,110 comments. The tweet also con-
tains a video of the speech, so the message’s recorded video also moves to and circulates
on social media and is thereby not limited to traditional broadcasters (BBC, ITV, Sky).
The example shows that at the level of quinary media, we both find official accounts as
well as users communicating about media events and other events in everyday life. One
user, for example, replied: “May God bless our Sovereign and keep her safe. The only
monarch I have ever known; she has been a solid thread throughout my life, a mother
figure to the Nation, a sensible head advising sometimes questionable politicians.”
Another user commented: “nothing about the e.u. only the commonwealth. that’s what
I like to hear.” The Queen’s Message communicates that the Queen is a symbol of the
British nation, cares about Britain and Britain’s citizens, and thinks of them on a day
that is special to many and a public holiday. It is a way of how the British nation is
produced and communicated to a broad public. And given quinary media technologies’
capacities for prosumption, citizens take the mediated event of the Queen’s Message as
an occasion for imagining the nation and communicating what they think about Britain
and the monarchy, sometimes in quite nationalist ways. In her 2017 speech, the 70th

anniversary of the first televised annual Royal Christmas Message, the Queen said:
My own family often gather round to watch television, as they are at this
moment. And that is how I imagine you now. Six decades on, the presenter
has evolved somewhat, as has the technology she described. Back then,
who could have imagined that people would one day be watching this on
laptops and mobile phones, as some of you are today?
One should add that mediated national events are an occasion for citizens to imagine
and communicate the nation. Raymond Williams (1974/2003) argues that radio and tele-
vision are technologies of mobile privatisation that give opportunities to individuals and
groups to satisfy their desire for mobility in the privatised context of the home and the
family, where they receive “news from ‘outside’, from otherwise inaccessible sources”
(21). Broadcasting is an individualised but “unified social intake” (21) of broadcast
reality.
National media events are particular forms of mobile privatisation, where not just the
Queen or other national actors imagine citizens, but citizens imagine and construct the
nation. National and nationalist media events are constructions of the nation from above
FIGURE 5.2 @RoyalFamiliy’s tweet about the Queen’s Christmas Message 2017
Source: Twitter, @RoyalFamily, posted on 25 December 2017
and from below. In the age of social media, it has become possible that citizens share
and communicate their images, constructs, visions, and illusions about the nation and
participate not just in the individual and mobile privatised construction of the nation, but
to a wider degree also in the social construction, invention, ideological production,
reinvention, and ideological reproduction of the nation.
5.4 Conclusion
This chapter elaborated some foundations of a critical, Marxist theory of communication.
Against approaches that welcome nationalism as anti-imperialist struggles, this book

advances an internationalist perspective grounded in the works of Karl Marx and
Rosa Luxemburg. It stresses that nationalist anti-imperialism has in history often
resulted in the mere substitution of one ruling class by another. Internationalism

requires the insight that exploitation has a structure of unity in diversity; it operates
based on diverse capitalisms that are united by the two universalisms of exploitation
and potential resistance.
Nationalism is an ideology and political movement that sustains or aims at building

a nation-state that unites defined nation-state members (citizens forming a people).
Modern class society requires nationalism as ideology in order to justify the exploit-
ation of workers, the domination of consumers, and the geographic expansion of
capitalist production and markets. Nationalism as ideology legitimates and distracts
from the division of society into classes and relations of domination by constructing,
inventing, and fabricating a national unity of the people that is said to be stronger
than class divisions. Right-wing authoritarianism and associated nationalism are
likely to grow in situations of capitalist crisis, especially if the left is weak, dis-
jointed, and disorganised. For understanding nationalism, we need to combine polit-
ical economy, history, ideology critique, and political psychology.
Nationalism is not the consequence of modern technology, as Benedict Anderson

implies, but information technologies play an important role in communicating the
nation and nationalism. A theory of nationalism requires a theory of communication.
Some foundations of theorising how the nation and nationalism are communicated
were pointed out in this chapter.
The communication of nationalism is based on a dialectic of content/ideology and social

form. At the level of content, nationalism takes on a particular semiotic and linguistic
discourse structure. At the level of the structure of ideology, we can distinguish between
biological, economic, political, and cultural nationalism. Nationalism is communicated
through different social forms. Five media types were introduced that operate on the
Conclusion
levels of symbolic entities, social relations and practices, and events.
We live in a time where new nationalisms proliferate all over the world as
a reaction to economic, political, and ideological crises of capitalism. Given that we
live in a digital age, these nationalisms are also communicated via the Internet,
social media, and mobile phones. A critical theory of nationalism and a critical com-
munication theory of nationalism are tools for better understanding what is going on
in the world and what may be done against it before it is too late.
The five chapters in Part I of this book have established some foundations of a Marxian
theory of nationalism. Part II will put these foundations to empirical work. It presents
two case studies that analyse how nationalism has been communicated on social
media. Germany and Austria, the two countries that together constituted Nazi-Germany,
form the political, historical, and contemporary background of these case studies.
Notes
1 For Davis, nationalism is an empty instrument that can be filled with content, the struggle for
something. He says that nationalism is any “resistance to alien domination” (Davis 1978, 4).
2 Translation from German: „Die faschistische Ideologie besteht also in dem Versprechen,
kurzfristig und risikolos die Ohnmacht und Ausgeliefertheit der individuellen Existenz zu
überwinden; […] Der Faschismus gab der bis dahin bedeutungslosen, inhaltsleeren, isolier-
ten, verunsicherten Existenz Inhalt, Bedeutung und eine allgemeine Ausrichtung und Aus-
zeichnung, eine scheinbare Überlegenheit und reale Macht gegenüber allen Nicht-Dazugeh
örigen. Er vermittelte das Gefühl, gebraucht zu werden.”
3 http://ukchristmastv.weebly.com/ratings.html (accessed 29 December 2017).
Part II
Nationalism on Social
Media
Chapter Six
German Nationalism on Social Media in the 2017
Elections to the Bundestag
6.1 Background
6.2 Methodology
6.3 Analysis
6.4 Conclusion
6.1 Background
The 2017 German Federal Elections
The German federal elections to the Bundestag in 2017 took place in the midst of a crisis
of the European Union, the refugee crisis, and the expansion and intensification of national-
ism and right-wing extremism throughout the world. Germany in 2015 took a leading role
when the troika of the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the Inter-
national Monetary Fund implemented harsh austerity measures in Greece. Germany also
took a leading role in Europe in respect to the refugee crisis: the number of asylum applica-
tions in the EU increased from 626,960 in 2014 to 1,322,825 in 2015. In 2016, the number
was 1,260,910. In 2016, 59.1 per cent of all EU asylum applications were made in Germany,
followed by 9.8 per cent in Italy and 6.7 per cent in France. In 2017, Germany issued
56.0 per cent of the positive asylum permits to refugees in the EU and in France
18.7 per cent. Hungary issued 0.35 per cent, Poland 0.58 per cent, the Czech Republic
0.18 per cent, and Slovakia 0.01 per cent of the permits. This means that the four countries
of the political alliance of the Visegrád Group accounted for 1.2% (Eurostat 2019).
If one assumes that in a refugee crisis, the refugees receiving asylum should be
evenly distributed across the EU based on some criteria, then one can construct,
based on population statistics, various composite indicators. One example indicator
is shown in Table 6.1.
The reasonable share of the EU’s asylum permits granted by one country is, in this
example indicator, calculated as the average of its shares of the GDP and the total
population of the EU minus the level to which unemployment exceeds the average
of the GDP and population shares. Germany, France, Sweden, and Greece are the EU
126 Nationalism on Social Media
TABLE 6.1 Composite indicator for a country’s reasonable share of asylum permits in the EU
Variable Germany France Visegrád UK

Group
EU’s GDP share (GDP) 21.2% 15% 5.4% 16.1%
EU’s population share (POP) 16.1% 13.1% 12.5% 12.8%
EU’s unemployment share (UNE) 8.5% 14.2% 8.5% 7.6%
Reasonable share of asylum permits = AVERAGE 28.8% 13.9% 9.4% 21.3%
(GDP, POP) + [AVERAGE (GDP, POP) − UNE]
Actual share of asylum permits 56.0% 18.7% 1.12% 6.2%
Source: Eurostat (2019)
countries that have provided significantly larger shares of asylum permits than they
can reasonably be expected to issue, whereas most other EU countries, including the
Visegrád Group and the UK, have much lower shares. The EU’s problem is that it is
primarily an economic union governed by neoliberalism that does not have agreed
mechanisms for dealing with social crises. The Visegrád countries have nationalist
governments that see refugees as a threat and therefore refuse to give asylum to refu-
gees. In autumn 2015, the EU came up with a relocation scheme for distributing
120,000 asylum seekers from Greece, Hungary, and Italy to the other EU countries.
The distribution key consisted of a weighted indicator taking into account 40 per cent
of a country’s population size, 40 per cent of the GDP, 10 per cent of the average
number of past asylum applications, and 10 per cent of the unemployment rate (Euro-
pean Commission 2015). In 2017, the relocation scheme practically collapsed because
countries such as the Visegrád Group and Austria had refused to host asylum seekers.
The EU’s Crisis and Rising Nationalism
Neoliberalism has divided the EU in many respects and has advanced nationalist
ideology that blames refugees and migrants for capitalism’s social problems. Ger-
many has refused nationalist responses to the refugee crisis but has at the same
time advanced neoliberal austerity logic against Greece. There seems to be a lack
of understanding that neoliberalism polarises society and fosters social crises, which
increases the risk for a rise of nationalism, xenophobia, right-wing extremism, and
in the end war and the collapse of the EU. The German elections of 2017 took
place in the context of the EU’s crisis and rising nationalism.
Chapter Six | German Nationalism on Social Media 127
This chapter asks: How has German nationalism been expressed during the 2017
German Bundestag elections on social media? For giving an answer, a critical social
media discourse analysis of political communication data collected on Twitter, Face-
book, and YouTube in the days and weeks before the election was conducted. The
chapter proceeds by introducing the study’s methodology in Section 6.2, presenting
results in Section 6.3, and drawing conclusions in Section 6.4.
The Alternative for Germany (AfD)

Alexander Häusler (2018) bases his analysis of the AfD on Ruth Wodak’s (2015) concept
of right-wing populism and Stuart Hall’s (1988) notion of authoritarian populism. He
characterises the AfD’s ideology and politics as völkisch-authoritarian populism. Features
of this concept are nationalism that distracts from the class conflict (völkisch),
a hierarchic, anti-democratic understanding of politics (authoritarian), and the combin-
ation of anti-intellectualism and the politics of scapegoating and fear (populism). The
problem is that the meanings given to the concept of populism vary widely. Its use
tends to create more confusion than theoretical revelation. Populism is, in general, asso-
ciated with making something popular to “the people”. But the concept of the people
can refer to all humans, all citizens, the members of a nation-state, or the members of
a culturally or biologically defined nation. Populism has been associated with employing
popular culture and the media for reaching out to the people. It has also been associated
with the attempt to manipulate the public by scapegoating, steering fears and simplify-
ing political reality, and the use of media strategies such as tabloidisation, scandalisa-
tion, entertainment, and banalisation. It has been associated with racist far-right politics
that scapegoat immigrants, people of colour, and refugees. In order to avoid the confu-
sion associated with the notion of right-wing populism, I prefer to use the term right-
Background
wing authoritarianism, which characterises an ideological and political practice that

combines top-down leadership, nationalism, the friend/enemy scheme, militarism, and
patriarchy (Fuchs 2018a). The AfD can better be characterised as a right-wing authoritar-
ian than a right-wing populist party.
Table 6.2 gives an overview of the 2017 Bundestag election’s results.
Angela Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and its sister party CSU together
lost 8.5 per cent of the voting share, which is for both parties the worst result since
1949. The right-wing extremist Alternative für Deutschland (AfD, Alternative for Ger-
many) became, with 12.6 per cent of the voting share, the third-largest party in the
TABLE 6.2 Results of the 2017 Bundestag elections
Party Worldview Voting Change in com- Number of MPs,

share 2017 parison to the change to previous
2013 elections Bundestag
CDU Conservatism 26.8% −7.4% 200 (−55)
SPD Social democracy 20.5% −5.2% 153 (−40)
AfD Right-wing 12.6% +7.9% 69 (+5)
extremism
FDP Liberalism 10.7% +6.0% 67 (+4)
Die Linke Socialism 9.2% +0.6% 46 (−10)
Greens Green politics 8.9% +0.5% 80 (+10)
CSU Conservatism 6.2% −1.2% 94 (-)
Voter turnout 76.2%
Source: www.bundeswahlleiter.de
Bundestag. The Social Democrats lost a significant share of voters, the liberal FDP
re-entered parliament, and the Greens and the Left Party (Die Linke) made minor
gains. It is the first time in the history of post-Nazi-Germany and the Bundestag,
which was founded in 1949, that a right-wing extremist party has entered it. Accord-
ing to post-election research, the typical AfD voter is male, between 30 and 59
years old, a blue-collar worker or unemployed, and does not have a school leaving
examination and university education (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen 2017a, 2017b)
Forty-four per cent said that refugees and foreigners were the most important election
topic, followed by pensions (24 per cent) and social justice (16 per cent) (Forschungs-
gruppe Wahlen 2017b). Sixty-eight per cent of the AfD voters say that the party is not
right-wing extremist, whereas 74 per cent of those not voting for it say it has such
a character (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen 2017b). Thirty-five per cent of AfD voters had
not voted in 2013, 24 per cent had voted for the AfD, and 21 per cent for CDU/CSU
(Forschungsgruppe Wahlen 2017b). Class, age, gender, and education are factors that
influence the likelihood that a German citizen votes for the AfD.
A study shows that a large share of AfD voters show xenophobia, nationalism, and fear
of social degradation (Hans Böckler Stiftung 2017). Eighty-three per cent of the respond-
ents who vote for the AfD say that immigration makes you feel a foreigner in your own
country (compared to 44 per cent of all respondents). Eighty-eight per cent of the AfD
respondents argue that the state should stop migration (compared to 54 per cent of all
respondents). Sixty-four per cent of the AfD-supporting respondents say that Germany
should focus on its national interests, even if this means having to harm other EU coun-
tries. AfD voters’ largest fears are bad financial security in old age (63 per cent), becom-
ing victims of crime and violence (62 per cent), the future of their kids (60 per cent), and
their financial situation (53 per cent). Seventy-two per cent of AfD-voting respondents
say that politicians do less for them than for other groups.
6.2 Methodology
The success of the AfD stands in the context of rising nationalisms, the socio-economic
crisis of capitalism, and the political crisis of the European Union. Nationalism
divides the world into “us” and “them”, “friends” and “foes”, positing a homogeneous
and fixed identity on either side and stressing the characteristics that differentiate
“us” from “them”. […] The nationalist discourse always looks back in time, seeking to
demonstrate the “linear time of the nation”, its undisputed diachronic presence. […]
The nationalist discourse is also haunted by a fixation on territory, the quest for
a “home”, actual or imagined. This involves the reconstruction of social space as
national territory.
(Özkirimli 2010, 208–209)
Nationalism is a “misty veil” that “conceals in every case a definite historical con-
tent” (Luxemburg 1976, 135). The theoretical foundations of this book have shown
that nationalism is an ideology that tries to veil class antagonisms and to distract
public attention from class structures. Nationalism is a political fetishism that natur-
alises the nation in the form of a “we”-identity (a national people) that is distin-
guished from enemies (outsiders, other nations, immigrants, refugees, etc.) that are
Methodology
presented as intruders, aliens, subhuman, uncivilised, parasites, etc. in order to

deflect attention from class contradictions and power inequalities.
Empirical Ideology Critique
Given that nationalism is a particular form of ideology, empirical ideology critique is

a suited method for studying how nationalism is expressed in the public sphere.
Empirical ideology critique analyses the structure (text) of ideological communication
in the context of society’s power structures in order to draw conclusions for political
prospects. The methodology of the presented case study proceeded in four steps:
1) Data collection, including research ethics.

2) Identification of discursive macro-topics.
3) Analysis of the structure of ideology and discourse for each macro topic; ana-
lysis and theorisation of how online discourses and ideology are related to the
broader societal context, i.e. the relations of the online-semiotic elements to
the broader societal context.
4) Prospective critique.
As a first step, data were collected from social media platforms. Online research poses
special challenges in respect to research ethics because the boundaries between private
and public communication are blurred in online spaces. Social media research ethics
guidelines suggest assuming that no informed consent for data collection is needed if
users in a certain online setting can reasonably expect to be observed by strangers
(Fuchs 2017b, 60; Townsend and Wallace 2016). For this study, data were only collected
from Twitter accounts run by politicians and parties, Twitter users posting under elec-
tion-relevant hashtags, and YouTube channels and Facebook groups run by parties and
politicians. These profiles fulfilled a public communication role. It is reasonable to
assume that users going there are aware that the information posted is intended for
achieving public visibility. Therefore, no informed consent is needed for gathering and
analysing data from such profiles. In the presentation of results in Section 6.3, the
names of users who are public figures (such as politicians and parties) have not been
anonymised. The names of other users are not mentioned.
Data were collected in the days and weeks before the German election from three data
sources: Twitter, YouTube, and Facebook. Table 6.3 provides an overview of the collected
data. Two streams of data were collected from Twitter with the help of the online data
collection tool DiscoverText. The first one collected tweets posted by the main contending
parties and politicians that mentioned keywords such as nation, Volk (the people), Germany,
migration, foreigners, Europe, Brexit, Greece, and Islam or Muslim. Appendix 6.A gives an
overview of the relevant Twitter profiles. The collection started one month before the elec-
tion (on 23 August 2017, 22:00 BST) and ended three days after it (on 27 August 2017,
15:34 BST). The result was a dataset consisting of 2,086 elements. The second Twitter
dataset used the same keywords in combination with hashtags at two key points of time
during the election campaign, when major media events took place: (a) the only TV debate
between Chancellor Angela Merkel (CDU) and SPD frontrunner Martin Schulz that ARD
broadcast on 2 September; and (b) the TV debate between the frontrunners of the other
five main contending parties: Joachim Herrmann (CSU), Christian Lindner (FDP), Cem
TABLE 6.3 Overview of collected social media data
Data Search keywords Number of data

source elements
Twitter (Nation OR Volk OR contains:Deutsch OR contains:Einwand OR contains: 2,086
migr OR contains:immig OR contains:flüchtl OR contains:auslä EU OR con-
tains:Europ OR contains:Brexit OR contains:Griech OR #TrauDichDeutsch-
land OR contains:Islam OR contains:muslim OR contains:moslem) AND
(from:RegSprecher OR from:CDU OR from:CSU OR from:MartinSchulz OR
from:SPDde OR from:AfD_Bund OR from:AfDKompakt OR from:FraukeP-
etry OR from:Alice_Weidel OR from:DieLinke OR from:SWagenknecht OR
from:DietmarBartsch OR from:Die_Gruenen OR from:Cem_Oezdemir OR
from:GoeringEckart OR from:fdp OR from:C_Lindner OR from:FrankFranz
OR from:NPDde)
Twitter Event 1 (ARD debate Merkel/Schulz): 26,468 + 5,006 =
(Nation OR Volk OR contains:Deutsch OR contains:Einwand OR contains: 31,474
migr OR contains:immig OR contains:flüchtl OR contains:auslä EU OR con-
(#tvduell OR #bundestagswahl OR #btw17)
Event 2 (ARD debate Herrmann/Lindner/Özdemir/Wagenknecht/Weidel):
(Nation OR Volk OR contains:Deutsch OR contains:Einwand OR contains:
migr OR contains:immig OR contains:flüchtl OR contains:auslä OR con-
(#fuenfkampf OR #Fünfkampf OR #5kampf OR #derfuenfkampf OR #Der-
FünfKampf OR #der5kampf)
Facebook FB1: Posting about the EU from Angela Merkel’s (CDU) Facebook page 2,689
FB2: Posting about immigration from the CSU’s Facebook page 403
FB3: Posting opposing the AfD from Martin Schulz’s (SPD) Facebook page 451
FB4: Posting about the integration of migrants from Cem Özdemir’s 584
(Green Party) Facebook page 908
FB5: Posting about the immigration of refugees’ family members to Ger- 1,387
many on Alice Weidel’s (AfD) Facebook page Total comments:
FB6: Posting about immigration on the FDP’s Facebook page 6,422
Methodology
YouTube YT1: CDU campaign video focusing on good life in Germany 91,488 views, 765
YT2: YouTube campaign video about social injustice in Germany, refu- comments
gees, and the AfD (Die Linke) 66,459 views, 267
comments
Total comments:
1,032
Özdemir (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen), Sahra Wagenknecht (Die Linke), and Alice Weidel (AfD).
ARD broadcast this debate on 4 September. Keywords focusing on Germany, migration,
foreigners, Europe, Brexit, Greece, and Islam or Muslim were combined with event-specific
hashtags. The result was a dataset consisting of 31,474 tweets. One collected Twitter
dataset focuses on politicians and parties’ tweets, the other one on citizens’ tweets.
An analysis of the Merkel/Schulz debate shows that 31.1 per cent of the discussion
time was devoted to migration and deportation, 10.8 per cent to Turkey,
9.2 per cent to terror and inner security, and 9.2 per cent to Islam (Segger et al.
2018). So, more than 60 per cent of the airtime was used for very similar topics
that often are associated with scapegoating refugees, immigrants, and Muslims.
Issues such as education, healthcare, or digital media were not at all discussed.
For collecting data from Facebook and YouTube, relevant channels of the main contending
politicians and parties were identified (see the lists in Appendix 6.A). The Facebook-based
data collection app Netvizz was used for collecting comments to specific postings made on
relevant Facebook pages. Netvizz/YouTube Data Tools was used for collecting comments
from YouTube channels. There was a focus on postings about refugees and the European
Union that attracted a relatively large number of reactions and comments in comparison to
other postings. Only postings made in August or September 2017 were considered because
these were the two main election campaign months. The collection of comments from
Facebook and YouTube was conducted on 25 September 2017, one day after the Bundestag
election. A total of 6,422 comments were collected from seven relevant Facebook postings.
A total of 1,032 comments were collected from two YouTube videos.
As a second methodological step, macro discourse topics were identified as

a preparation for the data analysis. A discourse topic is a semantic macro-proposition
that relates to a key aspect of a particular topic (van Dijk 1987, 48–50). Three macro
discourse topics were defined by the research question this chapter poses, which coin-
cided with four major themes in the election campaign – the German nation, the Euro-
pean Union, refugees and migrants in Germany, and Islam. The German nation and the
EU are two themes that have to do with citizens’ identity in Europe. These two macro
discourse topics are important because the crisis of the EU and rising nationalism were
two key contexts of the 2017 Bundestag elections. The German nation and the EU are
two contradictory poles of German citizens’ political identity. On one end of the spec-
trum are those who perceive themselves primarily as German and oppose the EU,
whereas on the other end of the spectrum are those who perceive themselves as Euro-
pean cosmopolitans. The relationship between Germany and the EU has to do with
questions of nationalism, internationalism, and how the boundaries of political identity
are drawn. The refugee crisis was another major context of the 2017 Bundestag elec-
tions and therefore constituted a macro discourse topic of the analysis. Refugees are on
the one end of the political spectrum welcomed, and on the other end seen as enemies
that should be kept out and deported. A fourth important topic in the German elections
was Islam and the question of what role it plays and should play in German society.
Refugees, migrants, and Islam pose questions for political identity and about who
should be seen as friend or enemy. Nationalism is closely connected to the friend/
enemy scheme (Fuchs 2018a).
Table 6.4 shows the most frequently mentioned words in the Facebook dataset. The
keyword Obergrenze (upper limit) refers to the suggestion that there should be
a maximum number of refugees accepted per year. The CSU in particular advanced
this idea. The table indicates that the discourse topics of Europe, Germany, and refu-
gees seem to have been of particular importance in the 2017 German election. The
issue of refugees is closely related with the discourse topic of Islam because many
refugees arriving in Europe flee from countries whose faith structure is predomin-
antly Islamic.
As the third methodological step, the application of methodological tools from

critical discourse analysis, was used in order to analyse the structure of the four
discourse topics (Reisigl and Wodak 2001; Wodak and Meyer 2016). In this ana-
lysis, for each macro discourse topic, interesting cases were identified and ana-
lysed with the help of critical theories of nationalism as well as in the context
of the broader societal context. This analysis is presented in Section 6.3. Draw-
ing political conclusions about the communication of nationalism in Germany was
the fourth step (see Section 6.4). Methodology
TABLE 6.4 Most frequently mentioned words in the

Twitter dataset
Keyword Frequency
Merkel 736
Deutschland (Germany) 548
Europa (Europe) 236
Deutsche (Germans) 153
Flüchtlinge (refugees) 132
Obergrenze (upper limit) 120
Schulz 112
Source: Generated with NVivo

6.3 Analysis
Twitter Posting Frequencies
Table 6.5 shows who posted most frequently in the Twitter dataset that features
politicians and parties’ tweets.
Most Frequently Mentioned Twitter Users
Taken together, the AfD accounts (two party accounts and the accounts by AfD poli-
ticians Alice Weidel and Frauke Petry), with 32.6 per cent of all tweets, accounted
for a relative majority, followed by SPD accounts (18.5 per cent). CDU/CSU profiles
made up 15.4 per cent of the tweets, Green Party profiles 12.0 per cent, FDP profiles
9.7 per cent, and profiles of Die Linke 9.1 per cent. It is evident that on Twitter, the
AfD dominates the discourse on migration, refugees, Islam, and the EU. Table 6.6
TABLE 6.5 The political Twitter accounts posting most frequently about
Germany, the nation, refugees, migrants, the EU, and Islam
Twitter user Tweets Relative share

@SPDde 370 17.7
@AfD_Bund 239 11.5
@CDU 213 10.2
@Alice_Weidel 182 8.7
@AfDKompakt 164 7.9
@FDP 158 7.6
@DieLinke 146 7.0
@Die_Gruenen 139 6.7
@Cem_Oezdemir 110 5.3
@CSU 97 4.7
@FraukePetry 93 4.5
@NPDde 46 2.2
@C_Lindner 43 2.1
@DietmarBartsch 26 1.2
@SWagenknecht 19 0.9
@MartinSchulz 16 0.8
@FrankFranz 14 0.7
@RegSprecher 11 0.5
shows that among the analysed tweets by politicians and political parties, AfD
accounts were, with 262 mentions, the most frequently referenced ones.
Filter Bubbles
Tables 6.7 and 6.8 indicate that Twitter communication about the nation, refugees,
migrants, the EU, and Islam form filter bubbles (Pariser 2011): both Alice Weidel (AfD)
and Martin Schulz (SPD) are predominantly referenced by their own parties’ profiles.
The AfD’s Dominance on Social Media

In the Twitter dataset collected during election TV debates, the AfD profiles also domin-
ated (see Table 6.9). They achieved a total of 3,562 direct references to their usernames.
There were 830 references to Martin Schulz’s profile, the third most referenced account.
Although the main television debate was between Merkel and Schulz and the vast major-
ity of tweets were collected during that time period, the AfD managed to be the most
frequently mentioned user. Table 6.10 shows that AfD supporters dominated Twitter post-
ings about the nation, migrants, refugees, the EU, and Islam during the TV debates.
Two hundred and nineteen of the user anonymous1’s 220 tweets in the television
debate dataset are retweets (especially of the AfD accounts @Alice_Weidel, @Frau-
kePetry, @AfD_Bund, and @AfD), either pure retweets or retweets into which
TABLE 6.6 The ten most frequently mentioned users in politicians’

tweets about Germany, the nation, refugees, migrants, the EU and
Islam in the Twitter-politician dataset
Rank User Frequency

Analysis
1 @MartinSchulz 176
2 @AfD 105
3 @Alice_Weidel 97
4 @Cem_Oezdemir 97
5 @C_Lindner 93
6 @AfD_Bund 60
7 @Die_Gruenen 49
8 @KatjaKipping 38
9 @SPDde 37
10 @GoeringEckardt 37
TABLE 6.7 Users mentioning Alice Weidel

in the Twitter-politician dataset
Username Frequency
@AfD_Bund 43
@AfDKompakt 23
@Alice_Weidel 28
@Die_Gruenen 1
@DieLinke 1
@FraukePetry 1
TABLE 6.8 Users mentioning Martin

Schulz in the Twitter-politician dataset
Username Frequency
@SPDde 173
@CSU 1
@DieLinke 1
@FraukePetry 1
TABLE 6.9 Users mentioned most frequently in the Twitter-television debate dataset
Rank Username Mentions

1 @FraukePetry 1,490
2 @Alice_Weidel 1,115
3 @MartinSchulz 830
4 @oler (Oler Reißman, journalist at Spiegel Online) 828
5 @Die_Gruenen 706
6 @Cem_Oezdemir 617
7 @AfD 587
8 @CDU 547
9 @AfD_Bund 370
10 @FDP 354
hashtags (such as #AfDwaehlen [#voteAfD] or #TrauDichDeutschland) or small com-

ments were inserted. Seventy-nine of anonymous2’s 82 tweets, 54 of 60 tweets by
anonymous5, and 46 of 53 tweets by anonymous6 were retweets. Seventy-two of 73
TABLE 6.10 The users with the largest number of postings made in the Twitter-television debate dataset
Rank Username Number of tweets

1 anonymous1 AfD supporter 220
3 @TrauDichDe AfD Niedersachsen 73
8 anonymous7 SPD supporter 50
10 @AfD_Tweets AfD support account 44
tweets by the AfD Niedersachsen were retweets. All of the postings in the dataset
made by anonymous3, anonymous4, anonymous8, and @AfD_Tweets were retweets.
Bots and Fake News
In bot analysis, Twitter accounts posting more than 50 times a day have been classified
as being automated/bots (Kollanyi et al. 2016). Other criteria have been the number of
retweets, the time distribution of tweets, linguistic cues, and sentiment features (Davis
et al. 2016). The self-description of @AfD_Tweets indicates that it is likely to be a bot.
The other pro-AfD users present themselves as regular users. But given the high share
of retweets, it is likely that at least some of them are semi-automated or automated
retweet accounts. The strong visibility of the AfD during German election TV debates
could very well be related to the activities of social media bots.
Analysis
Digital Forensic Lab (2017) during a two-week period in August 2017 analysed all
41,000 tweets mentioning the official AfD Twitter profile @AfD_Bund. Also, in this
dataset, @anonymous1 was the most active user, mentioning @AfD_Bund 225
times: “As of August 22, over 90 % of its most recent tweets were retweets, mark-
ing it as a likely cyborg account” (Digital Forensic Lab 2017). DFL’s analysis also
documented other amplification strategies, for example one that first disguised itself
by posting info about cooking recipes and lifestyle for gathering followers and
during the election campaign turned into an AfD-supporting account:
It was mentioned almost twice as often as the AfD main feed, and by more than
twice as many accounts. […] Its support base is far more international, boosted by
hyperactive (and possibly automated) users on the German, French, Dutch and
American far right, as well as probable bots which significantly amplify Kremlin
propaganda. It thus appears to be a relative rarity: an initially German account
which has attracted a following among the international far right. It is regularly
retweeted by far-right accounts in a number of other countries, including the U.S.;
it sometimes retweets far-right accounts from those countries.
(Digital Forensic Lab 2017)
Sängerlaub et al. (2018) analysed fake news in the context of the German 2017 federal
elections. They identified ten fake news stories related to the Bundestag elections and con-
ducted a telephone survey about them (N = 1,037). The maximum number of online engage-
ments (shares, likes, comments) these fake news stories achieved was 500,000. AfD
Facebook profiles, especially the ones of the federal party and the two AfD co-chairpersons
Jörg Meuthen and Frauke Petry, played a major role in the online circulation of seven of
these ten fake news stories. Five of the seven fake news stories that AfD accounts helped
circulate had to do with refugees: “The way the phenomenon presents itself empirically in
Germany is that especially the right, right-wing populists and right-wing extremists spread
fake news”1 (Sängerlaub et al. 2018, 73). “All of our fake news-cases have clearly been
disseminated by right-wing populists and right-wing extremists, including the AfD as well
as media such as Junge Freiheit or right-wing blogs such as Philosophia Perennis”2 (Sän-
gerlaub et al. 2018, 84–85). The phone survey showed that 28 per cent of all respondents
believed that the presented fake news stories were true. In the case of AfD voters, the
share was on average 42.3 per cent and therefore significantly higher than among the gen-
eral population. So, there is evidence that right-wing organisations and individuals are to
a significant degree involved in the dissemination of fake news and that supporters of
right-wing groups tend to believe to a higher degree than the average citizen in fake news.
One underlying reason might be that right-wing ideology tends to be close to conspiracy
thinking. Another one is that given that fake news tends to a significant degree to be pro-
duced and disseminated by right-wing demagogues and is to a large degree right-wing in
character, those who support this ideology tend to find them credible because they stem
from sources (individuals, organisations, media) they trust.
Neudert (2019) collected 984,713 tweets related to the Bundestag election of 2017 in the
days from 1 September until 10 September. Ninety-two automated accounts were identi-
fied that created 73,012 tweets (7.4 per cent of the total). Automated tweets were most
frequently found in tweets related to the AfD (15.0 per cent of all AfD-related tweets):
“The overwhelming majority of bot-generated posts supported views on the political
right and extreme right of the spectrum. Hateful comments on immigration, xenophobic
conspiracy theories, and racist slurs were common themes, as well as support for the
right-wing AfD” (Neudert 2019, 165). Some 32.2 per cent of a random sample of non-
professional political news and info (N = 3,277) shared on Twitter presented false news
as factual:
The right-wing, anti-Islam blog Philosphia Perennis (156 shares) leads in

shares, followed by the conservative, right-extremist Junge Freiheit (91).
Mirroring the findings from the enquiry on social bots, the majority of the
misinformation pages identified were politically right, and xenophobic, nation-
alist, pro-Pegida, pro-AfD, and Islamophobic content was common.
(172–173)
The AfD’s Social Media Strategy

Right-wing extremists often have the public image of being opposed to technology,
bad at using the newest communication tools, and not innovative and creative in
using IT. The analysed dataset showed that in contrast to all other parties, the
AfD again and again asked users to contribute by recording and posting their own
videos supporting the AfD, commenting on AfD postings, using the hashtag #Trau-
DichDeutschland (#DareYouGermany), and spreading the AfD’s YouTube videos. For
example, the main AfD account @AfD_Bund (now transformed into @AfD) posted
two user-videos accompanied by the request “Record your own video now!”3
(Twitter-politician dataset, #1480, @AfD_Bund). It also asked users to spread links
to the AfD’s YouTube videos: “Did you like our TV spot? Then please spread the
Analysis
YouTube-version – Thank you! #TrauDichDeutschland: #AfD [embedded YouTube

Video]”4 (Twitter-politician dataset, #1980, @AfD_Bund). Alice Weidel, for example,
posted the following request: “Dear supporters, participate and write your com-
ments under #Wahl2017! #TrauDichDeutschland #AfD #Btw17”5 (Twitter-politician
dataset, #1843, @Alice_Weidel). “How did you like our first TV-campaign spot?
I am very interested in your opinion”6 (Twitter-politician dataset, #2025, @Alice_-
Weidel). Part of the AfD’s high visibility on social media may have been that it
actively fostered an online culture of spreading, sharing, and commenting on right-
wing extremist ideology.
The German Nation
Communicating the German Nation on Social Media
The election campaign of Angela Merkel’s CDU focused on the image of good life in
Germany under Merkel’s rule:
A Germany, in which we have a good life and like to life. That is what Angela
#Merkel and the #CDU work for. #fedidwgugl
[CDU campaign video, shows a foetus at the start, text spoken by Angela Merkel:] In
what kind of Germany will you live? Will it be the Germany that we care about?
A country of education, where everyone can make something out of their life.
A Germany of opportunities, where more people than ever before find work. A country
that does not rest on its laurels, but rather finds new solutions for the future. It’s in
our hands! We can take this decision for Germany. For a country that already today
ensures that there is also good work tomorrow, that does not leave people alone in
old age and illness. For a country, in which we fight together against hatred and envy.
A country that resolutely defends its European values. We can choose a political pro-
gramme that respects and supports families. For an economy that creates prosperity
for all. For a homeland, where everyone can feel free and secure. Your Germany
should be a country, in which we all live well. For this Germany, I would like to con-
tinue to commit myself with all my strength. And I ask for your support of this task!
[Written text:] On September 24, with both votes for the CDU.7
(Twitter-politician dataset, @CDU, ID 1680, http://twitter.com/CDU/statuses/

908417730830852098)
In terms of predication, the CDU campaign video tries to construct a sense of solidarity
and unity of all persons living in Germany by using inclusive language and the third-
person plural (“we”, “everyone”, “for all”). The symbol of the foetus is used as
a metaphor signifying future prosperity of Germany and of those groups and individuals
living in it. The CDU also based its election programme on the image of good life in
Germany. “Germany is a loveable and livable country, where one can reside, work and
live well. […] Today, we live in the most beautiful and best Germany we ever had”8
(CDU 2017, 4, 5). The CDU’s election discourse was based on a feel-good programme
that promised long-term stability, peace, and prosperity through a social market econ-
omy. The problem of this approach is that not everyone feels like having benefited from
Merkel’s three governments in the years from 2005 to 2017. The CDU’s programme did
not speak to those who were afraid of or experienced social decline. For example, the
inequality of income distribution measured by the ratio of total income received by the
20 per cent with the highest and lowest incomes increased from 3.5 in 2005 to 4.1 in
2016. The share of people living at risk of poverty after social transfers increased from
12.2 per cent in 2005 to 16.5 per cent in 2016. The in-work at-risk-of-poverty rate
increased from 4.8 per cent in 2005 to 9.5 per cent in 2016.9
The SPD answered with a video to the CDU campaign video that it spread on Twitter
and YouTube. It presented itself as the party that would create a socially just Germany:
Replying to @CDU: In what kind of Germany do we want to live? Our answer

to your spot is a bit different. #TimeForMartin
[Video showing a foetus. Text spoken by Martin Schulz:] In what kind of country
do you want to live? Hopefully in a country that invests more money into schools
and education than into tanks and drones. Hopefully in a country, in which you can
lead a good life based on your old-age pension and do not have to work until you
are seventy. In a country, where all receive fair wages and women earn as much
as men do. Hopefully in a country, where things are tackled and not waited out. In
a just country. Fortunately, you live in a country, where your parents can put the
cross on the right place.
[SPD-logo and text “Time for more justice”]
(Twitter-politician dataset, @SPDde, ID 1256, https://twitter.com/spdde/sta

tuses/900651836537024514)
The SPD in its video also uses the foetus as symbol of prosperity and positive devel-
opment. Whereas the CDU more stresses economic development, the SPD focuses
on social justice and social development by foregrounding schools, education, pen-
sion levels, wages, and the retirement age. The SPD’s political strategy was to por-
Analysis
tray Merkel and the CDU as not doing enough for fostering social justice in
Germany and Europe. Accordingly, the title of the SPD’s election programme was
“Time for More Social Justice” (SPD 2017).
AfD supporters responded to Merkel and the CDU on social media. Here are some
typical examples:
For a Germany, where you can become everything: unemployed, destitute, with-
out a homeland!
(YouTube dataset, ID 44)
Merkel in any case fights for a future Germany, where no more Germans live, but
only Germans with migration background.
Since 2015, Europe has been overrun by terror and she talks about peace
and a country, where we live well and like to live. The security of the
nation is not on the agenda, or what?
(Facebook dataset, ID 1960)
The Friend/Enemy Scheme
The logic used in these postings uses the friend/enemy scheme that constructs
a friend and an enemy group and stresses negative things about the enemy group
(see Fuchs 2018a, Chapters 3 and 4; Reisigl and Wodak 2001, 45–46; van Dijk
2011). Migrants and foreigners are portrayed as a social, cultural, and security
threat. They are portrayed as destroying the homeland (Heimat), as being untrue
Germans, and as being terrorists. The postings operated based on ethnonyms and
nationyms (Reisigl and Wodak 2001, 50) that stress a purist concept of the German
nation by claiming that it is important that people living in Germany were born in
Germany. In nationalism, individuals are “represented in the past or in the future as
if they formed a natural community” (Balibar and Wallerstein 1991, 96).
The first tweet puts the nationalist stress on preserving the German nation on equal
grounds with solving social problems. The second example comment advances the
assumption that there are two types of citizens in Germany: Germans and “Germans
with migration background”. The first are presented as a group of superior human
beings. The argumentative structure of the third posting combines the topos of large
numbers (“Europe has been overrun”) with the topos of danger (“the security of the
nation”, “Europe has been overrun by terror”; Reisigl and Wodak 2001, 79, 77). It is
based on the assumption that masses of foreigners pose a terror threat.
The three example postings reproduce the nationalist and nativist ideology that the AfD
advanced in its election campaign. So, for example, the AfD’s election programme said:
The AfD’s goal is the self-preservation and not the self-destruction of our
nation-state and our people. The future of Germany and Europe must be
secured in the long term. We want to leave a country to our descendants that
can still be recognised as our Germany. […] The AfD avows itself to the
German lead culture […] It [the German lead culture] besides the German lan-
guage also encompasses our customs, traditions, spiritual and cultural history.10
(AfD 2017, 28, 47)
The programme advances a cultural and exclusionary form of racism that aims at
excluding elements that are perceived as non-German.
The AfD uses an ideological rhetoric that assumes there is a culturally pure German
nation that is under threat by foreigners who aim at culturally and militarily destroying
the imagined unitary German nation. The AfD’s arguments that are also used by AfD
supporters in the analysed datasets are mistaken because they overlook that nation-
states are never pure, but “are without exception ethnically hybrid – the product of
conquests, absorptions of one peoples by another” (Hall 1993, 356). Nationalism is
a political form of fetishism, a “misty veil”, as Rosa Luxemburg (1976, 135) says,
which blames society’s problems on foreign elements, in this case what is presented
as being non-German, and thereby distracts from how social problems are grounded in
class, capitalism, and domination. Part of the AfD’s success is that it speaks to the
emotions of Germans, who fear change, loss, and decline. One reaction to fear is the
search for possibilities to emotionally channel anger, hatred, and anxiety. The AfD’s
political propaganda offers opportunities for channelling negative emotions into the
hatred against foreigners who are presented as threatening the German nation.
Theodor W. Adorno warns that the friend/enemy scheme was part of Nazi-Germany’s
ideology and that Germany must be careful not to repeat its own history:
The fabrication of national collectivities, however – common practice in the abomin-

able jargon of war which speaks of the Russian, the American, and certainly also of
Analysis
the German – is the mark of a reified consciousness hardly capable of experience

[Erfahrung]. Such fabrication remains within precisely those stereotypes which it is
the task of thinking to dissolve. […] The fabrication of stereotypes, on the other
hand, promotes collective narcissism. Those qualities with which one identifies one-
self – the essence of one’s own group – imperceptibly become the Good; the for-
eign group, the others, Bad. The same thing then happens, in reverse, with the
image the others have of the German. Yet after the most heinous deeds [Unheil]
were perpetrated under National Socialism in the name of an ideology which privil-
eged the collective subject at the expense of any and all individuality, there is in
Germany a double reason to guard against relapsing into the production of ideola-
trous, self-glorifying stereotypes
(Adorno 1985, 121)
The European Union
Scapegoating Greece and the European South
The AfD presents Germany as subsidising the European Union’s Southern member states:
[Alexander Gauland:] Mrs. Merkel does not have a cash cow, but a plan. That’s
also why she keeps her plans for Europe secret. I bet with
you that after the election there will be a debt haircut for
Greece – at the expense of German citizens.
[Alice Weidel:] Not with the AfD! The Germans need a party that at last rep-
resents its interests! German interests! Not right-wing – but
for rights. And more than 15 %.
(AfD campaign video on YouTube, www.youtube.com/watch?
v=RRoHZ-QKwhk, 92,850 views [26 October 2017])
The AfD argues that under Merkel, Germans have to pay for bailing out Greece from
debt. Opposing this argument, critical economists stress that the Greek debt crisis
has to do with centre–periphery relations in Europe, in which Southern economies
depend on capital from core countries so that debt is artificially created for fostering
capitalist interests (Lapavitsas 2012; Laskos and Tsakalotos 2013). Another counter-
argument concerns the question of who is the creditor and who the debtor.
“When am I getting my money back?” (Varoufakis 2015, 6), a German junior minister
asked then-Greek finance minister Yanis Varoufakis at the latter’s first meeting with
the German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble. This question also characterises
the logic of the AfD. Nazi-Germany in 1941 forced an interest-free loan on Greece.
LSE economics professor Albrecht Ritschl says that Germany’s unpaid Nazi debt to
Greece is today worth over €2 trillion (Nevradakis 2014), which is much more than
Greece’s outstanding debt to the troika. The question about Greece’s debt therefore
needs to be reversed. One needs to ask: When will Germany pay back its debt to
Greece? When will Greece get its money back from Germany?
The EU, Immigration, and Refugees
In the analysed datasets, the discussion of Europe was dominated by immigration

and the refugee crisis. Some examples:
Europe is a peace project ?! We in Germany and Europe experience an invasion

by foreign peoples and foreign culture
Why Merkel is to blame ??? Her invitation has set off this unbelievable refugee
invasion, by which thousands of Islamist terrorists have come to Europe in an
uncontrolled manner !!! Those who do not see this, are completely blind !
We need a Fortress Europe and it will only exist under the AfD
Fortress Europe! CLOSE OFF the borders!
We need a wall around Europe!
Interdiscursivity is a feature of the first and the second example. Interdiscursivity means
the co-occurrence and combination of discourse types or discourse topics (Fairclough
2015, 38). In the first example, three of our four discourse topics are combined: Ger-
many, Europe, and foreigners. Germany and Europe are identified as political communi-
Analysis
ties the speaker identifies with, whereas “foreign peoples and foreign culture” are
characterised as threatening these communities (“invasion”). In the second example, the
three discourse topics of refugees/foreigners, Islam, and Europe are combined.
These postings use militarionyms (Reisigl and Wodak 2001, 51) for characterising the
relationships of Europe and refugees. Migrants and refugees are characterised as “invad-
ing” Europe. Invasion is a frequently used military metaphor in racist discourse (Reisigl
and Wodak 2001, 59–60). But the demand to close the EU’s borders is also formulated
in military jargon by calling for building a “wall around Europe” and the “fortress
Europe”. The friend/enemy logic is not just polarising black-and-white thinking that
dualistically opposes groups. It, in the last instance, leads to military action and calls for
military action, i.e. the willingness to kill the constructed enemies. Speaking of an inva-
sion and having to build fortresses implies military actions. Those using such language
are likely to think that the EU should let refugees crossing the sea to Europe drown, that
battleships should attack and sink such ships, or that refugees should be deported or
killed. In authoritarian politics, as conceived by the Nazi-political theorist Carl Schmitt
(1932/1996), the “foe is in the last resort anyone who must be exterminated physically”
(Neumann 1944/2009, 45).
Opposition to Nationalism on Social Media
One strategy of opposing such logic that could be identified in the dataset was the
appeal to learn from German history where right-wing extremism could lead to:
German RIGHT-WING EXTREMISTS have caused a massive bloodbath in Europe.

Only complete idiots are still right-wing today!
Refugees and Migration
Immigrants and Refugees as Constructed Social Burden
One argument that was found frequently in the analysed datasets was that
immigrants and refugees are a burden for the German state and its social
security system:
#AliceWeidelLive on the #TVDebate: Merkel’s refugee politics destroy the wel-

fare state: The #AfD will make sure that this comes to an end! Open borders
and a sustainable welfare state do not go together.
(Twitter-politician dataset, @Alice_Weidel, ID 1368, https://twitter.com/Ali

ce_Weidel/statuses/904414469090148355, 341 retweets, 768 likes
[25 October 2017])
#TVDebate Of course we have to work until we are 70. Someone must fill the
social fund for the refugees. #voteAfD #AdD
(Twitter-television debate dataset, ID 149)

We Germans need our money that we work for, for our families, the sick and
our old people, who have worked their whole life for their pensions. That is
how it looks like and not differently. The AfD has good approaches and that’s
how everything can change. In our Germany.
These examples combine the topos of burdening and the topos of finances (Reisigl and
Wodak 2001, 78), so it is claimed that refugees cost lots of money and threaten and
destroy the welfare state, the pension system, family allowance, and healthcare.
Such claims can best be tested by looking at actual budget and statistical data
(Table 6.11).
At the height of the refugee crisis in 2015, 974,551 asylum seekers received state support
in Germany. In the same year, 326,872 individuals from Syria, 94,902 from Afghanistan,
and 73,122 from Iraq were seeking refuge in Germany.11 In 2016, 728,239 received asylum
seekers’ benefits in Germany. The largest groups of recipients were refugees from Afghani-
stan (18.8 per cent), Syria (16.4 per cent), Iraq (11.5 per cent), and Montenegro/Serbia/
Kosovo (5.6 per cent) (Statistisches Bundesamt 2015). Of the 1,261,335 asylum applications
made in the EU-28 countries in 2016, 16.9 per cent were made by Syrian citizens,
14.8 per cent by Afghan citizens, and 10.3 per cent by Iraqi citizens (Eurostat 2019). The
wars in Afghanistan (since 2001) and Iraq (2003–2011) destabilised the entire region and
contributed to creating conditions that enabled the rise of ISIS. The UK, Poland, and the
Netherlands were involved in the Iraq War, and Germany, the UK, Italy, Bulgaria, Poland,
Romania, Spain, and the Czech Republic in the Afghanistan War. ISIS was founded in 1999
and became active as a terrorist group in Iraq after the NATO intervention in 2003. The
wars and the failed states created after Western interventions fostered conditions for the
growth of Islamic terrorism (Alexander 2015; Anderson 2014). These conditions and the
Analysis
role EU countries played in the destabilisation of the Western Asian region are often for-
gotten in discussions of the refugee crisis. It is not a coincidence that the largest share of
refugees coming to the EU flee from Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq.
EU countries such as Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Romania have
refused to take in refugees. The UK, Ireland, and Denmark are exempt because they have
opted out of participating in EU asylum policies. Lacking coordination and EU solidarity,
Germany was taking a leadership position and has taken in the absolute majority of refu-
gees who have fled from their countries to the EU since 2015. Have social services in Ger-
many suffered under this condition, as claimed by the AfD and its supporters?
148
Nationalism on Social Media
TABLE 6.11 Selected spending items of the German federal budget
2017 2016 2015 2014 2013

Total budget €329.1 bn €317.4 bn €311.7 bn €295.9 bn €308.2 bn
Pensions €98.3 bn (29.9%) €93.1 bn (29.3%) €90.2 bn (28.9%) €88.3 bn (29.8%) €85.2 bn (27.6%)
Military €37.0 bn (11.2%) €35.1 bn (11.1%) €34.0 bn (10.9%) €33.1 bn (11.2%) €32.8 bn (10.6%)
Health insurance €16.0 bn (4.9%) €15.4 bn (4.9%) €12.9 bn (4.1%) €11.9 bn (4.0%) €12.8 bn (4.2%)
Universities €5.7 bn (1.7%) €5.4 bn (1.7%) €5.0 bn (1.6%) €5.0 bn (1.7%) €4.9 bn (1.6%)
Family assistance €7.7 bn (2.3%) €7.5 bn (2.4%) €7.7 bn (2.5%) €7.1 bn (2.4%) €6.0 bn (1.9%)
Net benefits for asylum seekers N/A €9,234,622,000 (2.9%) €5,230,723,000 (1.7%) €2,364,284,000 (0.8%) €1,491,289,000 (0.5%)
Sources: Bundesministerium für Finanzen (www.bundeshaushalt-info.de) and Statistisches Bundesamt (www.destatis.de)

While the share of net benefits for asylum seekers in the German budget has increased
from 0.5 per cent in 2013 to 2.9 per cent in 2016, there have been no cuts to major
social services: the budget share of family assistance increased from 1.9 per cent in
2013 to 2.3 per cent in 2017, the share of universities from 1.6 per cent to 1.7 per cent,
the share of health insurance payments from 4.2 per cent to 4.9 per cent, and pension
payments from 27.6 per cent to 29.9 per cent. The German budget for military affairs
has in 2016 been four times as large as the one for asylum benefits. This circumstance
is significant because military interventions played a role in creating chaotic conditions
in the Middle East that benefited the rise of ISIS. Given that the German budget shares
for social services such as healthcare, pensions, family assistance, and education have
been rising and not shrinking, the claim of the AfD and its supporters that refugees are
destroying the German welfare state is untrue. Data expose these claims as ideologies
that aim at scapegoating and creating prejudices and negative sentiments against refu-
gees and migrants in order to blame them for social problems and portray them as dan-
gerous and a financial burden that harms society. The implication is that those voicing
anti-refugee sentiments question the human right to asylum and wish that asylum
seekers are deported to countries where they could be killed, that the boat people
perish by drowning, or that refugees are exterminated.
Überfremdung/Over-Foreignerisation
Consider the following excerpt from an AfD campaign video that is organised as
a dialogue between the two frontrunners Alice Weidel and Alexander Gauland:
[AliceWeidel:] I have dared to do lots of things in my life. I gave up my

job – in order to make politics for the AfD! They of all
people. Concerned citizens, patriots and young wild ones –
Analysis
really not easy to find a common denominator! Why are you

so worried about Germany?
[Alexander Gauland:] I was in the CDU for 40 years. When they illegally opened
the borders, it was clear to me that something was going
wrong! If we now do not dare to say “This is our country –
we say what is happening here!”, then Germany will be
erased from the map. Isn’t that true, Ms. Weidel?
[Weidel:] I rather prefer to say that all of this does not pay off. No coun-
try in the world can pay alimonies for hundred thousands of
immigrants a year. [The slogan “Millions are already here!”
appears in the video] Either Mrs. Merkel has a cash cow or

she embezzles German taxes. One of both.
[…] Dare you, Germany! AfD
[Gauland:] Citizens with (cou)rage (Mutbürger) are needed now. Take
back your country on the 24th of September!
[Other voice:] Be brave, Germany! AfD
(AfD campaign video on YouTube, www.youtube.com/watch?
v=RRoHZ-QKwhk, 92,850 views [26 October 2017])
Gauland uses German nationalism for arguing that refugees are “erasing” Germany “from
the map”. The German Volk is presented as ethnically pure and under threat. In a speech
to supporters on the election evening, Gauland said: “We will hunt them. We will hunt
Mrs. Merkel or whomever. And we will take back our country and our people (Volk).”12 To
speak of “hunting” politicians is a militaristic diction that suggests combat and war. It also
here becomes evident that Gauland sees refugees as anti-German elements that should
not be allowed into the country and that one should get rid of. Weidel uses the ideological
topoi of burdening and finances that we already discussed. The AfD in its campaign and
also in this video used the term Mutbürger (citizens with courage). Mut (courage) rhymes
on Wut (rage). Mutbürger is related to the term Wutbürger (enraged citizen). By speaking
of Mutbürger, the AfD wants to communicate that those who are enraged about refugees
should as response show the courage to vote for the AfD. Given the connotation of Mut
with Wut, we have translated Mutbürger as “citizens with (cou)rage”.
The discourse of over-foreignerisation (Überfremdung in German) could also be found

in postings by the CSU and regular users:
So that Germany remains Germany! #Integration #ElectionArena

[Video, written text]: So that Germany remain Germany! (German) lead-culture
Instead of multi-culturalism! Our country is and stays shaped by Christianity! Inte-
gration means demands and support! The Bavarian house rules: Learn German!
Respect law and order! Earn your own living! Burka – No, thanks!
(Twitter-politician dataset, @CSU, ID 1586)
Germany needs an upper limit for refugees – We will enforce it! #Fünfkampf #5Kampf

Megalomaniac and self-destructive mass immigration advanced by the CDU. The

Germans do not want Islamic terror, parallel societies and over-foreignerisation
(Überfremdung). For the future of our kids, vote AfD!!!
This is no longer to be surpassed in audacity. The world turns away in horror.

Merkel destroys Germany and Europe with her multicultural racial fanaticism.
The EU splinters itself. Our wives and children are sacrificed.
The CSU is the Bavarian sister party of Merkel’s CDU. Since the end of the Second
World War, the CSU has held the position of the Minister-President of Bavaria in all
but four years. In its 2017 election campaign, the CSU demanded an upper limit of
200,000 refugees in Germany per year. In the cited tweet as well as its election
programme, the party opposes the German Leitkultur (lead-culture) to other cultures.
It defines this lead-culture the following way: “Lead-culture entails the system of
values shaped by Christianity that applies here with us, our morals and traditions as
well as the basic rules of our living together”13 (CSU 2017, 13).
Speaking of “over-foreignerisation”, “multicultural racial fanaticism”, or opposing

German culture to multiculturalism, as the CSU does, is a version of nationalism and the
friend/enemy logic that opposes an imagined unitary German culture to all other cul-
tures. National unity is defined against an alien and intruding outside that should be
kept at a distance or excluded. German lead-culture is defined in terms of language,
morals, and religion.
Analysis
TABLE 6.12 The development of the share of the members of specific religions in the total
German population
1956 2011 2015

Roman Catholic 45.9% 31.2% 28.9%
Protestant 50.1% 30.8% 27.1%
Islam - - 5.4%–5.7%
No religious conviction - 33.0% 36.0%
Other (incl. no religion) 4.0% - -
Sources: Eicken and Schmitz-Veltin (2010), Forschungsgruppe Weltanschauungen in Deutschlandin

(2019), Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder (2014), Stichs (2016)
How has religious conviction changed in Germany (see Table 6.12)? In 2011,
31.2 per cent of German citizens said they were Roman Catholic and 30.8% said they
were Protestant (Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder 2014, 41). More than
26.3 million Germans (33.0 per cent) said they do not belong to or believe in any religion.
According to estimations, the share of Muslims in the German population is between
5.4 per cent and 5.7 per cent (Stichs 2016). In 2015, the share of individuals without
religious affiliation had increased to 36.0 per cent, whereas the share of Roman Cath-
olics had decreased to 28.9 per cent and the share of Protestants to 27.1 per cent.14
In 1956, 50.1 per cent of Germans were Protestant and 45.9 per cent Roman Catholic
(Eicken and Schmitz-Veltin 2010). This means that the major cultural change of Ger-
many in the past 60 years was that the country became much more secular. The main
cultural trend is not the increase of the share of Muslims that, with a total of around
5 per cent, is relatively modest, but rather the fact that those who today say that they
do not belong to and do not believe in a religion form the largest population group.
Germany has, independent of refugees, turned into a more heterogeneous culture that
is not primarily defined by Christianity, but by secularism.
Demographic development is another reason why fears about immigration are unjus-
tified. The Green Party stressed this circumstance in a campaign video:
Germany needs immigration in the long term. That is why we propound an

innovative and up-to-date immigration law. […] We want to enable immigration
for demographic purposes. Because in our ageing society, today’s immigrants
will help us tomorrow to keep up our social security systems in the long term.
(Excerpt of spoken text in campaign video by Green Party, YouTube, www

.youtube.com/watch?v=MGZc7lbW3DM, 1,166 views [26 October 2017])
In 2013, 15 per cent of the German population were aged 65 to 79 and 5 per cent were
aged 80 or older (see Table 6.13). According to estimations, given current demographic
TABLE 6.13 Age groups in Germany
2013 2060
65–79 15% 20%
>80 5% 13%
Total 20% 33%
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2015)

developments, in 2060 the German population will shrink from 80.8 million in 2013 to
67.7 million, the share of the 65–79 age group will have increased to 20 per cent, and
the share of the group aged 80 older to 13 per cent (Statistisches Bundesamt 2015). As
a consequence, the number of pensioners will increase under the given conditions. Pen-
sions already today account for 30 per cent of the German budget and this share has
increased rapidly. There are just four choices: either the pension system will in the
future become unfundable; or pension contributions are increased, which weakens
wages and thereby can have negative effects on the level of consumption, and thereby
the total economy; or the pension age is drastically increased so that citizens work until
they are dead or work until they are very old; or more immigrants and refugees are
taken into the country and are allowed to work. In 2016, 83 per cent of first-time asylum
seekers in the EU-28 countries were less than 35 years old, and 51 per cent were aged
between 18 and 34 (Eurostat 2019). Refugees and immigrants do not threaten Western
pension systems, but are an opportunity for guaranteeing these systems’ sustainability if
they are allowed to work.
Islam
Islam and Germany
We have seen in the previous section that some users and the CSU oppose German
culture and Christianity to multiculturalism. The AfD radicalises this friend/enemy
dualism by characterising Islam as not belonging to or being part of Germany. So,
for example, Frauke Petry, who was then the AfD’s federal spokesperson, tweeted:
Islam does not belong to Germany! And the Greens obviously not into the Bun-
destag! #AfD #TrauDichDeutschland ow.ly/eXNz30fgYK7
[Link to a Facebook posting by Petry, written text:]
Analysis
[…]
++ The Greens are unelectable ++
Despite all horror messages all over the world and also in Germany, evidently
the Greens hold on to the idea that Islam is part of Germany. Who does not
remember when Göring-Eckardt said in 2015: “We suddenly get humans as
a gift.” Well, thank you very much for such presents! And now she even tops this
and ridicules the victims of radical Islamism: “It would be very odd if we only had
to deal with ourselves.”
The AfD says: Islam is not part of Germany. It is time for changes. Time to
remove the Greens from the Bundestag. Time for the #AfD!
(Twitter-politician dataset, #1811, @FraukePetry, https://twitter.com/FraukePetry/

statuses/910186992993996800, 378 retweets, 1,127 likes [25 October 2017])
Intertextuality means a “combination of parts of other texts” in and with a specific text
(Fairclough 2015, 37). A text is a semiotic unit of spoken, written, audiovisual, or digital
elements that are the result of social practices and social production, enter the human
meaning-making process, and are part of the human communication process: “Texts relate
to other texts, represented by the media, through quotes or indirect references, thus already
adding particular meanings or decontextualizing and recontextualizing meanings. Media
thus produce and reproduce social meanings” (Wodak and Busch 2004, 106). Because of
the World Wide Web and therefore also web-based social media’s hypertextual, connected
nature, intertextuality is prevalent online. Online texts are “multi-semiotic” texts (Fairclough
2015, 8). Frauke Petry’s Twitter posting shows that right-wing authoritarianism online
makes use of the interlinked structure of social media so that there are intertextual cross-
references between texts published on Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, Instagram, Flickr, and
other platforms. Twitter (4,026 references), YouTube (197) and Facebook (92) were particu-
larly popular sources of interlinked social media texts in the dataset. The only traditional
news medium receiving more links than YouTube was the website of the German news-
paper Die Welt (welt.de, 285 links). Other news media mentioned as links, but much less
popular than social media links, included, for example, Deutschlandfunk (99), ARD
(daserste.de, 72), Süddeutsche Zeitung (64), Der Spiegel (50), and Die Zeit (49). There were
112 links to the news aggregation site pressportal.de. This result indicates that references
to other social media texts are a very important source of intertextuality on social media.
The AfD and Islam
In its 2017 election programme, the AfD (2017) makes clear that it sees Germany as
a religiously, culturally, morally, and linguistically unitary country and that it con-
siders Islam as intrusive and alien:
Islam does not belong to Germany. The AfD sees the expansion of Islam and the pres-
ence of 5 million Muslims, whose number is constantly growing, as a large danger to
our state, our society, and our moral order. […] The clash of cultures between the
Occident and Islam as doctrine and carrier of cultural traditions and legal norms that
are not capable of being integrated can only be averted by a bundle of defensive and
restrictive measures that prevent the further destruction of our European values based
on which enlightened citizens live together. The AfD will not allow that Germany
because of falsely understood tolerance loses its cultural face.15
(AfD 2017, 34, 47)
The AfD advances a cultural/new racism that operates with the topos of large numbers
and constructs a clash of cultures between Germany and Europe on the one side and
Islam and the Middle East on the other side. It characterises the first as enlightened,
free, and Christian, and the latter as uncivilised and barbaric. This nativist discourse also
uses the topos of culture that naturalises culture by arguing that “because the culture of
a specific group of people is as it is, specific problems arise in specific situations” (Rei-
sigl and Wodak 2001, 80). The AfD’s ideology is characterised by new racism:
[New racism] is a racism whose dominant theme is not biological heredity but the
insurmountability of cultural differences, a racism which, at first sight, does not pos-
tulate the superiority of certain groups or peoples in relation to others but “only” the
harmfulness of abolishing frontiers, the incompatibility of life-styles and traditions.
(Balibar and Wallerstein 1991, 21)
The AfD’s argumentation overlooks that this very logic of radical dualism has in Ger-
many resulted in Auschwitz as the culmination of the dialectic of the Enlightenment
(Horkheimer and Adorno 2002). To claim that Germany has been a historical project
of Enlightenment and moral progress downplays Nazi-Germany’s horrors.
By mentioning the claim that “Islam is not part of Germany” together with the “vic-
tims of radical Islamism”, Petry, on the one hand, uses a victimonym (Reisigl and
Wodak 2001, 52) that presents the Germans and Europeans as victims of Islam that
Analysis
is presented as being inherently hostile, violent, and terrorist. Many social media
postings in the analysed datasets used the same logic:
No other country in the world lets hundreds of thousands of people into the
country without any controls and registration! But the worst is that these are
people from cultures that considers us Europeans as infidels and that should
according to religious scriptures like the Koran be fought. This is exactly what
we experience in numerous terror attacks and it is far from over.
(Facebook dataset, #1130)

Do you want to live in a country whose security ranking has dropped 40 positions
behind Rwanda and Oman? That houses 5 million Muslims and builds mosques while
churches are demolished? That is not capable of deporting highly dangerous Islamists?
Where parents are afraid to send their child to the kindergarten, where hardly anyone
speaks German? Where the Romani and the Sinti inhabit whole streets, throw gar-
bage out of the window or into the garden. In an EU, where the Greeks can no longer
afford cancer medication, but rejected asylum seekers are in Germany insured at the
expense of the state? If so, then Angela Merkel is your first choice.
A country, where you must take care that there is not one who shouts Allahu
Akbar in order to drive a lorry into human beings. For a Germany where Islamic
terrorists have a good life and like to life! Thank you, Merkel.
ISIS
In such postings, Islam, Muslims, non-Europeans, and other cultures are associated with
the topos of large numbers, “numerous terror attacks”, “dangerous Islamists”, “Islamic ter-
rorists”, and driving “a lorry into human beings”. Since 2015, a number of terrorist attacks
conducted by supporters of ISIS in the name of Allah have been conducted in Germany.
ISIS’s ideology is based on a minority interpretation of Sunni Islam that wants to advance
the Ummah and create a caliphate, calls for a war against non-Muslims and Shia Muslims,
is anti-socialist and anti-Marxist, and is strongly patriarchal. It is culturally conservative and
opposes homosexuality as well as extramarital and premarital sex. ISIS wants to create
a religiously politicised economy and society, in which non-Muslims can be enslaved,
women who are polytheistic or worship representations of god can be turned into sex-
slaves, and non-Muslims can be turned into feudal serfs who have to pay rent to the
Ummah. Transforming enemies into slaves is also considered as a practice of warfare.
ISIS’s use of technology, such as social media, the Internet, the politics of mediated spec-
tacle and glossy magazines such as Dabiq, or the role of fighters who are citizens of, grew
up in, and were educated in Western countries, also shows that it is not a pre- or anti-
modern movement, but rather appropriates modernity and modern media for its own reli-
gious and political purposes: “Instead of seeing in ISIS a case of extreme resistance to
modernization, one should rather conceive of it as a case of perverted modernization and
locate it into the series of conservative modernizations” (Žižek 2014).
ISIS and its ideology certainly pose threats to humanism. But a minority ideology is not
characteristic of Islam as such. The AfD and its supporters present Islam as such as
militaristic and terrorist by, on the one hand, using militarionyms (Reisigl and Wodak
2001, 51) that associate Islam in general with violence and terror and by, on the other
hand, using generalising synecdoches. “Synecdoches (from the Greek: ‘to take up with
something else’) are substitutions within one and the same field of reference: a term is
replaced by another term” (Reisigl and Wodak 2001, 57). The generalising synecdoche is
a linguistic construct, in which a whole is presented as standing for a part. In the dis-
course of AfD supporters, Islam is presented as a whole that is characterised in general
by features of a small part, namely supporters of ISIS. In the mentioned examples, syn-
ecdoches such as “people from cultures that consider us Europeans as infidels […] that
should […] be fought […] in terror attacks” or “one who shouts Allahu Akbar in order
to drive a lorry into human beings” can be found.
The Logical Fallacy of Inductive Generalisation
It is a logical fallacy to generalise from single examples to the whole. Inductive general-
isations are logical inferences that are often incorrect. They do not abstract from single
individuals, observations, events, or experiences, but take them to be the nature and
essence of the whole. This reductionist logic fails because it reduces the complexity of
the world to individual instances of the world. Inductive generalisation and generalising
as well as particularising synecdoches are characteristic for the logic of stereotypical
ideologies such as racism, nationalism, and fascism.
Donald Trump also used the logic of inductive generalisation to argue for banning citizens
from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen from entering the United States
TABLE 6.14 ISIS supporters’ terror attacks in Germany

Analysis
Date Location Terrorist(s) Country of Lived in Ger-

origin many since …
17 September 2015 Berlin Rafik Mohamed Yousef Iraq 1996
26 February 2016 Hannover Safia S. Morocco her birth
16 April 2016 Essen Yusuf T., Mohammed O. Germany their birth
18 July 2016 Würzburg Riaz Khan Ahmadzai (also known Afghanistan 2015
as Muhammad Riyad)
24 July 2016 Ansbach Mohammed Daleel Syria 2014
19 December 2016 Berlin Anis Amris Tunisia 2015
28 July 2017 Hamburg Ahmad A. Palestine 2015
and to suspend Syrian refugees from coming to the USA. In the “100-Day Plan to Make
America Great Again”, Trump announced a plan to “suspend immigration from terror-prone
regions where vetting cannot safely occur” (Trump 2016). “Everybody is arguing whether or
not it is a BAN. Call it what you want, it is about keeping bad people (with bad intentions)
out of country!” (Twitter, @RealDonaldTrump, 1 February 2017). The basic argument is that
all citizens from certain predominantly Muslim countries are potential terrorists. Trump
uses generalising logic for ideologically justifying the “Muslim ban”.
The AfD’s inductive generalisation that ISIS’s ideology and terrorism are characteris-
tic for all of Islam disregards that it is a very small share of Muslims in Germany
who commit terrorist attacks. Table 6.14 provides an overview of terrorist attacks
committed by ISIS supporters in Germany.
About 4.7 million Muslims live in Germany (Stichs 2016). Eight of them committed terrorist
attacks since 2015, which is a share of 0.00017 per cent of the total German Muslim popu-
lation. Between January 2015 and September 2017 when the German elections took place,
1,390,500 applications for asylum were made in Germany (Bundeszentrale für politische
Bildung 2017). Four out of eight terrorists came into Germany at the time of the refugee
crisis; the other four had either been born in Germany or had lived there for a very long
time. This circumstance shows that closing off the borders and letting no refugees in is no
solution because a significant share of terrorists are citizens of the country where they
commit attacks. Four out of 1.4 million refugees, which is 0.0003 per cent, committed terror
attacks in Germany. It is a logical fallacy to assume that all Muslims in Germany are terror-
ists because 0.00017 per cent of Muslims and 0.0003 per cent of asylum seekers commit-
ted terrorist attacks. In a response to one of the above-cited social media postings, a user
stressed the absurdity of this logic:
The sentence “A country, where you must take care that there is not one
who shouts Allahu Akbar in order to drive a lorry into human beings” is
absurd because it suggests that something like that happens frequently (and
that one must be afraid of it), although just 12 people were killed in com-
parable events. Compared to other causes of death in Germany this is
extremely rare.
The problem, however, is that racist prejudices and stereotypes have an emotional
and ideological character that cannot easily be challenged by facts and numbers. In
the age of social media, right-wing authoritarian ideology that scapegoats and inten-
sifies stereotypes circulates and spreads online.
6.4 Conclusion
Global, neoliberal capitalism has in recent years experienced an economic, political, and
ideological crisis that has resulted in the strengthening of nationalist and right-wing
authoritarian movements, parties, and leaders. In the EU, the political crisis has been
worsened by the EU Commission’s predominant focus on neoliberal market policies that
rendered Europe unprepared for the refugee crisis. The institutional lack of social solidar-
ity in the EU has benefited the rise of nationalist and xenophobic sentiments against
refugees. Neoliberalism’s logic of global accumulation by dispossession (Harvey 2003)
has backfired and turned into the rise of authoritarian capitalism (Fuchs 2018a).
Right-Wing Authoritarianism
In Germany, right-wing authoritarianism was strengthened by the AfD becoming the
third-largest party in the 2017 Bundestag elections. The typical AfD voter is male,
unemployed or a blue-collar worker, and has a low level of education. The declassed
classes or those having fears of being declassed form the mass base of right-wing
authoritarian movements. The AfD appeals to these classes’ fears and emotions by
a highly polarising ideology. Figure 6.1 presents a model of right-wing politics.
The AfD and Right-Wing Authoritarianism

Authoritarian leadership, nationalism, the friend/enemy logic, and militarism interact in
Conclusion
right-wing authoritarian ideology (Fuchs 2018a). The AfD managed to achieve visibility on
social media, which has allowed it to circulate right-wing authoritarian ideology online.
In terms of leadership, the AfD has chosen the combination of a man (Alexander Gau-
land) and a woman (Alice Weidel). Weidel is a woman who lives in a relationship with
another woman and is articulate and media-savvy. Gauland was an active CDU
member for 40 years before he helped create the AfD. He is the more traditional right-
wing authoritarian leader, who uses highly polarising statements with simplified mes-
sages, whereas Weidel tries to convey the same ideological message in a calmer,
more nuanced, more intellectual, and less provocative manner.
Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA)
Individual Group Institution Society
RWA’s social role: deflection of attention from structures
of class, capitalism, and domination
Authoritarian Nationalism
Leadership
“WE”=
Leader
People “WE”
Friend/Enemy Scheme Patriarchy and Militarism
“WE” “THEY”
“THEY” Anti-fascist,
Authoritarian, right-wing socialist
extremist, fascist ideological praxis
practice communication
FIGURE 6.1 Right-wing politics
In the contemporary information society, political communication and media presence

play an important role in elections. The presented analysis provides indications that
the AfD and its supporters dominated the online discourse on refugees, migration,
the EU, and Islam by appealing to users’ fears of social decline, crime, terror, and cultural
change, using social media bots and fostering an online culture of spreading, sharing, com-
menting, and user-generated content. The AfD’s main social media accounts, such as the
Twitter profiles @AfD_Bund (now @AfD), @Alice_Weidel, and @FraukePetry, acted as
online leaders who choreographed the participation and engagement of AfD supporters in
online nationalism and online right-wing authoritarianism. The AfD used social media as
a medium where dissatisfied and anxious citizens can channel their frustrations, fears, and
disappointments into nationalism and (new) racism. Other parties and politicians largely
missed the opportunity to foster online campaigns in which activists could have challenged
the AfD’s ideology. There is also empirical evidence that the AfD and other far-right groups
are particularly active in spreading fake news and that their supporters, to a much higher
degree than the average voter, believe in the truth of fake news.
The discourse topics of Germany, the EU, refugees, and Islam were closely linked in
the analysed datasets. The typical logic of argumentation is that the German nation
and a European Occident are unitary communities that are under attack and face the
threat of being destroyed by refugees and Muslims. We have seen that the main
cultural change in Germany is not the increase of the share of Muslims, but the
weakening of Christianity by the strengthening of secularism. Germany, like other
Western countries, has for a long time been culturally heterogeneous.
Capitalist Donors and Supporters

In capitalist society, spreading ideas, worldviews, propaganda, and ideology in the
public sphere is work-intensive and expensive. It is a time-intensive activity operat-
ing in a high-speed, superficial capitalist attention economy with short attention
time, in which attention is short-lived and a key resource, time is money, and
money purchases attention time. Producing attention in the capitalist public requires
public relations labour and money invested into PR and advertising.
In late 2018, the German newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung published an article which
argued that Alice Weidel had received illegal donations from a company in Switzerland
Conclusion
(Pittelkow and Riedel 2018). The newspaper wrote that in 2017, the AfD district chapter
Bodensee, where Weidel lives, received donations amounting to a total of around €130,000
from the Swiss pharmaceutical company PWS PharmaWholeSale International AG (Pit-
telkow and Riedel 2018). According to German law, donations to parties from non-EU coun-
tries are illegal (Party Law [Parteiengesetz], §25).16 Donations by EU citizens form an
exception. The newspaper wrote that the donor indicated “campaign donation Alice
Weidel SocialMedia” (“WAHLKAMPFSPENDE ALICE WEIDEL SOCIALMEDIA”) as pur-
pose of the financial flows (Grill et al. 2018). It is not known if and how the donations
were used. According to news sources, the AfD transferred the donations back nine
months after having received them (Grill et al. 2018), which was long after the
Bundestag election, in which the AfD made major gains, had taken place. The images of
a bank statement published by German public service broadcasters ARD, WDR, and NDR
indicate that the donor intended that at least some of the money should have been used
for social media propaganda, which shows that capitalists supporting nationalists con-
sider social media an important way of influencing the public and see money as
a means for purchasing attention given to ideology. On 21 November 2018, Alice Weidel
said in a speech in the German Bundestag: “Yes, it is right that we made mistakes in
dealing with campaign donations.”17
Die Zeit reported that the shipping company owner Folkard Edler donated significant
amounts to the AfD and gave a loan to the party under very favourable conditions
(Kartheuser and Middelhoff 2017). The newspaper also wrote that former officials of the
Federation of German Industries (BDI: Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie) had sup-
ported the AfD (Kartheuser and Middelhoff 2017). News media reported that the Swiss
PR agency Goal AG helped to organise ads, election posters, papers, billboards, images,
and websites of the AfD (Bensmann and von Daniels 2017; Frontal21 2017a, 2017b). Der
Spiegel and WOZ reported that it is likely German billionaire August von Finck Jr., who
in 2018 was the world’s 167th richest person,18 indirectly supported the AfD (Jikjareva
et al. 2018; Spiegel 2018). AfD politicians Alice Weidel, Peter Boehringer, and Beatrix
von Storch are members of the Hayek Gesellschaft (Hayek Society) that spreads the
economist Friedrich Hayek’s neoliberal ideology (Riedel and Pittelkow 2017), which
shows an ideological affiliation of key AfD politicians with neoliberalism. The far-right
has historically always supported capitalism and has depended on capitalist support.
The Logic of Nationalism and Racism
All forms of racism and nationalism define a national community in opposition to an

outside. The friend/enemy logic is closely interlinked with nationalism. Table 6.15
provides a systematic overview of nationalism and racism’s friend/enemy logic.
In the analysed dataset, the AfD and AfD supporters especially used cultural and
socio-economic forms of racism. The duality of cultural and socio-economic racism,
for example, is evident in the AfD campaign video, in which Gauland says that refu-
gees are erasing Germany from the map, whereas Weidel claims that Germany
cannot pay “alimonies for hundred thousands of immigrants a year”. In the socio-
economic form of the friend/enemy scheme, refugees were presented as a financial
burden for Germany. In reality, Germany’s welfare budget for pensions, education,
TABLE 6.15 A typology of racism’s friend/enemy logic along societal dimensions
Type of ascertained difference in Examples

nationalism and racism
Natural “They look different”, “They are by nature aggressive/dirty/criminal/
lazy/noisy/smelly/ill-adapted/violent, etc.”, etc.
Socio-economic “They take away our jobs/benefits/houses/educational or healthcare
opportunities, etc.”, “They degrade our social system/wages/educa-
tion system/pension system/welfare system/healthcare system,
etc.”, etc.
Political “They come from an authoritarian country”, “They do not know/
respect Western political values”, “They are used to a political
system dominated by crime”, “They are criminals/do not follow our
laws”, etc.
Cultural “They have different values and morals”, “In their culture, it is
usual to …”, “They speak a different language/have different
habits/ways of behaviour/mentality/symbols/traditions, etc.”, “They
destroy our language/culture/traditions/character, etc.”, “They
come from a culture of aggression/laziness/criminality, etc.”, “They
have a different lifestyle”, “They do not want to adapt”, “They treat
women badly”, “They have too many children”, “They wear strange
clothes”, “They have bad food tastes/habits”, etc.
Source: Based on van Dijk (1987, 59)
healthcare, etc. has not been reduced in recent years. Given its demographic devel-
opment, Germany needs immigrant workers in order to be able to fund its pension
system in the future. The cultural version of the friend/enemy scheme characterises Ger-
many and Europe as humane, civil, democratic, and enlightened, and Islam and refugees as
holding an inhumane, uncivil, backward, and barbaric religious ideology, culture, and life-
style that fosters terror and threatens the existence of German culture. This new cultural
Conclusion
racism uses generalising synecdoches and the logic of inductive generalisation in order to
construct the stereotype that all refugees and all Muslims are violent and terrorists. Single
examples of religiously motivated terrorists are generalised, and it is claimed that violence
and terror form an inherent and natural essence of the refugees’ culture and religion.
The friend/enemy logic tends to be combined with calls for the defence of the friend com-
munity against the constructed enemies. Militarism is the practical political-ideological
expression and the friend/enemy scheme’s logic. In the final instance, militarism sees war
as the appropriate response to conflict. In the analysed datasets, militarist discourse was
present in calls for building a wall around Europe, constructing a fortress Europe, or hunting
people.
The communication of right-wing authoritarianism online was a significant element in

the AfD’s 2017 election campaign. Social media accounts were used for communicating
right-wing authoritarianism online and for leading and choreographing the engagement
of supporters in communicating nationalism, friend/enemy logic, and militarism online.
Whereas social media as means for communicating right-wing authoritarianism are rela-
tively new, the ideology itself is as old as capitalism. Right-wing authoritarianism tries
to distract from the complex causes of society’s problems and how they are grounded in
structures of class and domination by constructing scapegoats, nationalism, and blaming
certain groups for social problems and the alleged threats to the nation. Karl Marx, in
1870, discussed the role of ideology in distracting attention from class struggle and
benefiting the ruling class. Marx dealt with the question of nationalism’s creation of
false consciousness among the working class in one country so that it hates immigrant
workers and workers in the colonies. He specifically addressed that question in respect
to Ireland, which he saw as a British colony:
Ireland is the BULWARK of the English landed aristocracy. The exploitation of this
country is not simply one of the main sources of their material wealth; it is their
greatest moral power. […] And most important of all! All industrial and commercial
centres in England now have a working class divided into two hostile camps, Eng-
lish PROLETARIANS and Irish PROLETARIANS. The ordinary English worker hates
the Irish worker as a competitor who forces down the STANDARD OF LIFE. In rela-
tion to the Irish worker, he feels himself to be a member of the ruling nation and,
therefore, makes himself a tool of his aristocrats and capitalists against Ireland,
thus strengthening their domination over himself. He harbours religious, social and
national prejudices against him. […] This antagonism is kept artificially alive and
intensified by the press, the pulpit, the comic papers, in short by all the means at
the disposal of the ruling class. This antagonism is the secret of the English work-
ing class’s impotence, despite its organisation. It is the secret of the maintenance
of power by the capitalist class. And the latter is fully aware of this.
(Marx 1870, 473, 474, 475)
Opposition to the AfD on Social Media
In the analysed datasets, there were different reactions of the AfD’s opponents to
right-wing authoritarianism. The first reaction was the call for ignoring or closing
right-wing extremist comments and threads:
Maybe one should turn off the comment section on YouTube. Only insults and
insinuations of the worst kind can be found there.
The second reaction was that users stressed facts as counter-evidence to right-wing
authoritarian ideology:
Facts instead of horror scenarios. #TVDuell #Refugees

[Image showing a family, the Earth, and migration flows, written text:]
65 million people worldwide are currently seeking refuge. Developing countries
take in 90% of them.
(Twitter-politician dataset, @Die_Gruenen, ID 1735)
The third reaction was that users and politicians characterised ideological claims
as racism and Nazi-ideology:
#Gauland talks like a Nazi. The #AfD is a disgrace for Germany.

[Excerpt from a speech by Martin Schulz, in which he says:] We are a country,
where there will never ever again be room for Nazi-ideology. But we have guys of
this type. Guys, who hold the opinion that nobody wants to be the neighbour of
Jérôme Boateng.19 This organisation of agitators is not an alternative for Ger-
many, but a disgrace for the Federal Republic.
(Twitter-politician dataset, @SPDde, ID 1386, http://twitter.com/spdde/sta

tuses/902424311625113600, 140 retweets, 399 likes [25 October 2017])
[Anonymous] what do you have against refugees? They are only human beings.
Conclusion
Oh, I forgot that you are a racist XD
The fourth reaction was the attempt to deconstruct ideology by arguing that the
topic that really matters is social (in)justice:
The tax refugees are the most expensive refugees. @DietmarBartsch #btw17
#linke
(Twitter-politician dataset, @DieLinke, ID 1654)
Let us take back the country!. Socially. Just. Peace. For all.
[Dietmar Bartsch]: Comrades, Die Linke will never put up with politics that
washes dead children up to the beaches.
[Bernd Riexinger:] For those who have a bit of reason it must be the most
important goal to keep the AfP out of the Landtage [regional parliaments] and the
Bundestag.
[Dietmar Bartsch:] Comrades, the fact remains: The tax refugees are the most
expensive refugees.
(Excerpt of spoken text in campaign video by Die Linke, YouTube, www

.youtube.com/watch?v=wddS9dCXXGc)
Such communicative strategies can to a certain degree appeal to those who already
oppose right-wing authoritarianism. But they have a limited capacity to convince AfD
supporters because right-wing authoritarianism does not operate with facts and
rational arguments. It operates with emotions and appeals to fears and hopes. Coun-
ter-strategies therefore need to take political psychology into account.
Appendix 6.A
Social Media Data Collection
Tables 6.16–6.18 show the relevant political profiles on Twitter and the relevant
Facebook pages and YouTube channels that were used for data collection.
TABLE 6.16 Twitter profiles used in the analysis
Party Worldview Twitter profile

CDU Conservativism @RegSprecher @CDU
CSU Conservativism @CSU
SPD Social democracy @MartinSchulz @SPDde
AfD Right-wing extremism @AfD_Bund @AfDKompakt @FraukePetry @Alice_Weidel
Die Linke Socialism @DieLinke @SWagenknecht @DietmarBartsch
Die Grünen Green politics @Die_Gruenen @Cem_Oezdemir @GoeringEckart
FDP Liberalism @FDP @C_Lindner
NPD Right-wing extremism @FrankFranz @NPDde
TABLE 6.17 Facebook pages used in the analysis
Party Worldview Facebook page

CDU Conservativism www.facebook.com/AngelaMerkel
www.facebook.com/CDU
www.facebook.com/Bundesregierung/
CSU Conservativism www.facebook.com/HorstSeehofer
www.facebook.com/joachim.herrmann.csu
https://de-de.facebook.com/CSU/
SPD Social democracy https://de-de.facebook.com/martinschulz/
https://de-de.facebook.com/SPD/
AfD Right-wing extremism www.facebook.com/alternativefuerde
www.facebook.com/afdkompakt/
www.facebook.com/Dr.Frauke.Petry
www.facebook.com/aliceweidel/
Die Linke Socialism https://de-de.facebook.com/linkspartei/
www.facebook.com/sahra.wagenknecht/
www.facebook.com/DietmarBartschMdB
Die Grünen Green politics www.facebook.com/B90DieGruenen
www.facebook.com/Cem
https://de-de.facebook.com/GoeringEckardt/
FDP Liberalism www.facebook.com/FDP
https://de-de.facebook.com/lindner.christian/
TABLE 6.18 YouTube channels used in the analysis
Party Worldview YouTube channel

CDU Conservativism www.youtube.com/user/bundesregierung
www.youtube.com/user/cdutv
www.youtube.com/user/cducsu/
CSU Conservativism www.youtube.com/user/csumedia
SPD Social democracy www.youtube.com/channel/UCZxdUyoP3mJY496WCjVKgBQ
www.youtube.com/user/SPDvision
AfD Right-wing extremism www.youtube.com/channel/UCq2rogaxLtQFrYG3X3KYNww
Die Linke Socialism www.youtube.com/user/dielinke
Die Grünen Green politics www.youtube.com/user/GRUENE
FDP Liberalism www.youtube.com/user/FDP
Appendix 6.B
German Originals of the Analysed

Social Media Postings
Ein Deutschland, in dem wir gut und gerne leben. Dafür arbeiten Angela
#Merkel und die #CDU. #fedidwgugl
[CDU campaign video, shows a foetus at the start, text spoken by Angela
Merkel:] In welchem Deutschland wirst Du einmal leben? Wird es das Deutschland
sein, das uns am Herzen liegt? Ein Land der Bildung, in dem jeder etwas aus einem
Leben machen kann? Ein Deutschland der Chancen, in dem mehr Menschen Arbeit
haben als je zuvor? Ein Land, das sich nicht aus seinen Erfolgen ausruht, sondern
immer neue Lösungen für die Zukunft findet? Es liegt in unserer Hand! Wir können
uns für dieses Deutschland entscheiden. Für ein Land, das schon heute dafür sorgt,
dass es auch morgen gute Arbeit gibt, das Menschen im Alter und bei Krankheit
nicht alleine lässt. Für ein Land, in dem wir gemeinsam gegen Hass und Neid ein-
treten. Ein Land, das seine europäischen Werte entschlossen verteidigt. WIr können
uns für eine Politik entscheiden, die Familien respektiert und unterstützt. Für eine
Wirtschaft, die für alle Wohlstand schafft. Für eine Heimat, in der sich jeder Ein-
zelne frei und sicher fühlen kann. Dein Deutschland soll ein Land sein, in dem wir
alle gut und gerne leben. Für dieses Deutschland möchte ich auch in Zukunft mit
ganzer Kraft einsetzen. Dafür bitte ich um Ihre Unterstützung!
[Written text:] Am 24. September mit beiden Stimmen CDU.
(Twitter-politician dataset, @CDU, ID 1680, http://twitter.com/CDU/statuses/

908417730830852098)
In welchem Deutschland wir leben wollen? Unsere Antwort auf Euren Spot fällt
etwas anders aus. #ZeitFürMartin
[Video showing a foetus. Text spoken by Martin Schulz:] In welchem
Land möchtest Du mal leben? Hoffentlich in einem Land, das mehr Geld in
Schulen und Bildung investiert als in Panzer und Drohnen. Hoffentlich in einem
Land, in dem du von deiner Rente gut leben kannst und nicht bis Siebzig arbei-
ten mußt. In einem Land, in dem alle gerechte Löhne bekommen und Frauen so
viel verdienen wie Männer. Hoffentlich in einem Land, in dem Dinge angepackt
statt ausgesessen werden. In einem Land, in dem es gerecht zugeht. Zum Glück
lebst du in einem Land, in dem deine Eltern das Kreuz an der richtigen Stelle
machen können
[SPD-Logo and text „Zeit für mehr Gerechtigkeit”]
(Twitter-politician dataset, @SPDde, ID 1256, https://twitter.com/spdde/statuses/

900651836537024514)
Für ein Deutschland, in dem man alles werden kann: arbeitslos, mittellos, heimatlos!
Auf jeden fall kämpft merkel dafür, daß im zukünftigen deutschland keine
deutschen mehr leben, sondern nur noch deutsche mit migrationshintergrund.
Seit 2015 wird Europa vom Terror überrannt und sie redet von Frieden und
einem Land, in dem wir gern und gut leben. Sicherheit des Volkes steht nicht
auf der Agenda, was ?
[Alexander Gauland:] Frau Merkel hat keinen Goldesel, doch einen Plan.
Deshalb hält sie auch ihre Europapläne geheim. Ich wette mit Ihnen, dass es
nach der Wahl einen Schuldenschnitt Griechenlands gibt – zu Lasten der
deutschen Bürger.
[Alice Weidel:] Nicht mit der AfD! Die Deutschen brauchen eine Partei, die
endlich wieder ihre Interessen vertritt! Deutsche Interessen! Nicht rechts – son-
dern rechtens. Und größer als 15 Prozent.
(AfD campaign video on YouTube, www.youtube.com/watch?v=RRoHZ-QKwhk,

92,850 views [26 October 2017])
Europa ist ein Friedensprojekt ?! Wir in Deutschland und in Europa erleben eine
Invasion fremde Völker und fremde Kultur
Was Merkel dafür kann ??? Sie hat durch ihre Einladung erst diese unglaubliche
Flüchlingsinvasion in Gang gesetzt, wodurch zig tausende islamistische
Terroristen unkontrolliert nach Europa gekommen sind !!! Wer das nicht sieht
ist völlig blind ! (Facebook dataset, ID 1127)
Festung Europa! Macht die Grenzen DICHT!
Wir Brauchen eine Festung Europa und die wird es nur mit der AfD geben
Wir brauchen eine Mauer um ganz Europa!
Deutsche RECHTSRADIKALE haben in Europa ein gewaltiges Blutbad angerich-

tet. Nur Vollidioten sind heute noch rechts!
German Originals of the Analysed Social Media Postings

#AliceWeidelLive zum #TVDuell: Merkels Flüchtlingspolitik zerstört den
Sozialstaat : Die #AfD wird dafür sorgen, dass das ein Ende hat!
[Video showing Alice Weidel, saying:] Merkels Flüchtlingspolitik zerstört den
Sozialstaat der Bundesrepublik Deutschand. Wir als #AfD werden dafür sorgen, dass
das ein Ende hat! Denn offene Grenzen und ein nachhaltiger Sozialstaat funktioniert
nicht.
(Twitter-politician dataset, @Alice_Weidel, ID 1368, https://twitter.com/Alice_

Weidel/statuses/904414469090148355, 341 retweets, 768 likes
[25 October 2017])
#TVDuell Natürlich müssen wir bis 70 arbeiten. Irgendjemand muss die Sozialkas-
sen für die Flüchtlinge ja füllen. #AfDwaehlen #AfD
(TV-debate Twitter dataset, ID 149)
Wir Deutsche selber brauchen unser Geld dafür wir auch arbeiten gehen für
unsere Familien und Kranke und unsere Alten Leute die ihr Leben lang gearbei-
tet haben für ihre Rente. So sied es aus und nicht anders die Afd hat gute
Ansetze und so kann sich alles Ändern. In unserem Deutschland.

[Alice Weidel:] Ich hab mich einiges in meinem Leben getraut. Meinen Job
an den Nagel gehängt – um Politik zu machen für die AfD! Ausgerechnet
für die. Besorgte Bürger, Patrioten und junge Wilde – wirklich nicht leicht
hier einen Nenner zu finden! Warum machst du dir überhaupt so viele
Gedanken um Deutschland?
[Alexander Gauland:] Ich war 40 Jahre in der CDU. Die illegale Öffnung der
Grenzen, da war mir klar: Hier läuft etwas schief! Wenn wir uns jetzt nicht
trauen zu sagen: „Das ist unser Land – wir bestimmen hier!”, dann wird
Deutschland von der Landkarte verschwinden. Nicht wahr, Frau Weidel?
[Weidel:] Ich sage lieber, das rechnet sich nicht. Kein Land der Welt kann
jährlich hunderttausende Zuwanderer alimentieren. [Slogan „Millionen sind
schon hier!” erscheint im Video] Entweder hat Frau Merkel einen Goldesel oder
sie veruntreut deutsches Steuergeld. Eins von beidem.
[…]
[Gauland:] Die Mutbürger sind jetzt gefragt. Holen Sie sich am 24. September
Ihr Land wieder zurück!
[Other voice:] Trau dich Deutschland! AfD
(AfD campaign video on YouTube, www.youtube.com/watch?v=RRoHZ-QKwhk,

92,850 views [26 October 2017])
Damit Deutschland Deutschland bleibt! #Integration #Wahlarena

[Video, written text:] Damit Deutschland Deutschland bleibt! Leitkultur statt
Multikulti! Unser Land ist und bleibt christlich geprägt! Fordern & Fördern bei
der Integration! Bayerische Hausordnung: Deutsch lernen! Recht & Gesetz
achten! Lebensunterhalt verdienen! Burka – Nein Danke!,
Deutschland braucht eine Obergrenze für Flüchtlinge – Wir werden das durch-
setzen! #Fünfkampf #5Kampf
größenwahnsinnige und selbstzerstörerische Masseneinwanderung der CDU. Die

Deutschen wollen keinen Islamistischen Terror, keine Parallelgesellschaften und
keine Überfremdung. Für die Zukunft unserer Kinder AfD wählen!!!

Das ist an dreistigkeit nicht mehr zu übertreffen. Die Welt wendet sich mit
entsetzen ab. Merkel zerstört Deutschland und Europa mit ihrem multi kulti
Rassenwahn. Die EU zersplittert sich. Unsere Frauen und Kinder werden
geopfert.
Deutschland ist langfristig auf Einwanderung angewiesen. Deshalb legen wir

ein innovatives und zeitgemäßes Einwanderungsgesetz vor. […] Wir wollen
demografische Zuwanderung ermöglichen. In unserer alternden Gesellschaft
werden uns die Einwanderer von heute nämlich morgen dabei helfen, unsere
sozialen Sicherungssysteme langfristig zu behalten.
(Excerpt of spoken text in campaign video by Green Party, YouTube, www

.youtube.com/watch?v=MGZc7lbW3DM, 1,166 views [26 October 2017])

Islam gehört nicht zu Deutschland! und Grüne offenbar nicht in den
Bundestag! #AfD #TrauDichDeutschland ow.ly/eXNz30fgYK7
[Link to a Facebook posting by Petry, written text:]
++ Grüne unwählbar ++
Trotz aller Horrorbotschaften weltweit und auch in Deutschland halten die
Grünen offenbar daran fest, dass der Islam zu Deutschland gehöre. Wer erinnert
sich nicht an den Ausspruch von Göring-Eckardt aus 2015: „Wir kriegen jetzt
plötzlich Menschen geschenkt.” Na, vielen Dank für solche Geschenke!
Nun setze Sie noch einen drauf und verhöhnt die Opfer des radikalen Islamis-
mus: “Es wäre sehr langweilig, wenn wir nur mit uns zu tun hätten”
Die AfD erklärt: Der Islam gehört nicht zu Deutschland. Es ist Zeit für Verän-
derungen. Zeit, die Grünen aus dem Bundestag zu entfernen. Zeit für die #AfD!
(Twitter-politician dataset, #1811, @FraukePetry, https://twitter.com/FraukePetry/

statuses/910186992993996800, 378 retweets, 1,127 likes [25 October 2017])
Kein anderes Land der Welt lässt hunderttausende Leute völlig unkontrolliert
und ohne Registrierung in sein Land! Das Schlimme ist noch, dass es Leute aus
Kulturkreisen sind, für die wir Europäer Ungläubige sind, die es laut religiöser
Schriften wie dem Koran zu bekämpfen gilt. Genau das erleben wir in zahlrei-
chen Terroranschlägen und es ist noch lange nicht vorbei.
(Facebook dataset, #1130)

Wollen Sie in einem Land leben, das im Sicherheitsranking 40 Plätze hinter

Ruanda und Oman gefallen ist? Welches 5 Millionen Muslime beherbergt und
Moscheen errichtet, wÃhrend Kirchen abgerissen werden? Welches nicht in der
Lage ist, brandgefährliche Islamisten abzuschieben? In welchem Eltern Angst
haben ihr Kind in einen Kindergarten zu stecken, in dem kaum jemand deutsch
kann? In welchem ganze Straßenzüge von Roma und Sinti bewohnt werden,
die Müll aus dem Fenster oder in den Garten werfen. In einer EU, in dem sich
Griechen keine Krebsmedikamente mehr leisten können, abgelehnte Asylanten
aber auf Staatskosten in D versichert sind? Dann, ja dann, ist Angela Merkel
ihre 1.Wahl.
Ein Land in dem man sich umgucken muss das nicht einer Allahu Akbar ruft um
kurz danach mit einerm LKW in Menschen reinzurasen. Für ein Deutschland in
dem Islamische Terroristen gut und gerne leben! Danke Merkel
Der Satz “Ein Land in dem man sich umgucken muss das nicht einer Allahu
Akbar ruft um kurz danach mit einerm LKW in Menschen reinzurasen.” ist
absurd, da er suggeriert, so etwas würde häufig passieren (und man müsse
Angst davor haben), tatsächlich jedoch nur 12 Menschen bei vergleichbaren Vor-
fällen umgekommen sind. Verglichen mit anderen Todesursachen in Deutschland
ist das extremst selten.
Vielleicht sollte man einfach auf Youtube den Kommentarbereich ausschalten.

Nur Beleidigungen und Unterstellungen schlimmster Sorte sind hier zu finden.
Fakten statt Horrorszenarien. #TVDuell #Flüchtlinge

[Image showing a family, the Earth, and migration flows, written text:] 65 Mil-
lionen Menschen sind derzeit weltweit auf der Flucht. 90% von ihnen werden
von Entwicklungsländern aufgenommen.
(Twitter-politician dataset, @Die_Gruenen, ID 1735)

“#Gauland redet wie ein Nazi. Die #AfdD ist eine Schande für Deutschland.
[Excerpt from a speech by Martin Schulz, in which he says:] Wir sind ein Land, in
dem die Nazi-Ideologie nie wieder einen Platz haben wird. Aber Typen dieser Art,
die haben wir auch. Typen, die der Meinung sind, keiner wolle Jérôme Boateng
zum Nachbarn haben. Diese Organisation der Hetzer ist keine Alternative für
Deutschland, sondern sie ist eine Schande für die Bundesrepublik.
(Twitter-politician dataset, @SPDde, ID 1386, http://twitter.com/spdde/statuses/

902424311625113600, 140 retweets, 399 likes [25 October 2017])
[Anonymous] was hast du gegen Flüchtlinge? Sind doch nur Menschen. Ach
stimmt ja, du bist ein Rassist XD
Die Steuerflüchtlinge sind die teuersten Flüchtlinge. @DietmarBartsch #btw17 #linke

(Twitter-politician dataset, @DieLinke, ID 1654)
Holen wir uns das Land zurück! Sozial. Gerecht. Fieden. Für alle.
[Dietmar Bartsch:] Die Linke wird sich nie mit einer Politik abfinden, die tote
Kinder an Strände spült, liebe Genossinen und Genossen.
[Bernd Riexinger:] Wer etwas Verstand besitzt, für den muss es das wichtigste
Ziel sein, die AfD aus den Landtagen und den Bundestagen herauszuhalten.
[Dietmar Bartsch:] Es bleibt dabei, die teuersten Flüchtlinge sind die Steuer-
flüchtlinge, liebe Genosinnen und Genossen.
(Excerpt of spoken text in campaign video by Die Linke, YouTube, www

.youtube.com/watch?v=wddS9dCXXGc)
Notes
1 Translation from German: „Fake News, so wie sich das Phänomen in Deutschland empirisch
darstellt, werden vor allem von den Rechten, Rechtspopulist:innen und Rechtsextremen
verbreitet.”
2 Translation from German: „Eindeutig werden alle unsere Fake-News-Cases durch Rechtspo-
pulist:innen und Rechtsextremist:innen verbreitet, wir zählen hierunter sowohl die AfD, als
auch Medien, wie die Junge Freiheit, oder rechte Blogs wie Philosophia Perennis.”
3 Translation from German: „Nimm jetzt Dein eigenes Video auf!”

4 Translation from German: „Unser TV-Spot hat Ihnen gefallen? Dann verbreiten Sie bitte
die YouTube-Version – Danke! #TrauDichDeutschland: #AfD [embedded YouTube Video].”
5 Translation from German: „Liebe Unterstützer, macht mit und schreibt Eure Kommentare
unter #Wahl2017! #TrauDichDeutschland #AfD #Btw17”.
6 Translation from German: „Wie hat Ihnen unser 1. TV-Wahlspot gefallen? Ihre Meinung
würde mich sehr interessieren!”
7 The original German postings of all cited and analysed social media content can be
found in Appendix 6.B. They were translated into English by the author.
8 Translation from German: „Deutschland ist ein liebens- und lebenswertes Land, in dem
man gut wohnen, arbeiten und leben kann. […] Heute leben wir im schönsten und
besten Deutschland, das wir je hatten.”
9 Source of all data: Eurostat (2019).
10 Translation from German: „Ziel der AfD ist Selbsterhaltung, nicht Selbstzerstörung
unseres Staates und Volkes. Die Zukunft Deutschlands und Europas muss langfristig gesi-
chert werden. Wir wollen unseren Nachkommen ein Land hinterlassen, das noch als
unser Deutschland erkennbar ist. […] Die AfD bekennt sich zur deutschen Leitkultur. […]
Sie umfasst neben der deutschen Sprache auch unsere Bräuche und Traditionen, Geistes-
und Kulturgeschichte.”
11 Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2015).
12 Translation from German: „Wir werden sie jagen. Wir werden Frau Merkel oder wen
auch immer jagen. Und wir werden uns unser Land und unser Volk zurückholen”, www
.youtube.com/watch?v=48Z4H2pRw4w
13 Translation from German: „Leitkultur umfasst die bei uns geltende Werteordnung christli-
cher Prägung, unsere Sitten und Traditionen sowie die Grundregeln unseres Zusammenle-
bens. Leitkultur ist das Gegenteil von Multikulti und Beliebigkeit.”
14 https://fowid.de/meldung/religionszugehoerigkeiten-deutschland-2015
15 Translation from German: „Der Islam gehört nicht zu Deutschland. In der Ausbreitung des
Islam und der Präsenz von über 5 Millionen Muslimen, deren Zahl ständig wächst, sieht die
AfD eine große Gefahr für unseren Staat, unsere Gesellschaft und unsere Werteordnung. […]
Der in Europa bereits stattfindende Kulturkampf zwischen Abendland und dem Islam als Heil-
slehre und Träger von nicht integrierbaren kulturellen Traditionen und Rechtsgeboten kann
nur abgewendet werden durch ein Bündel von defensiven und restriktiven Maßnahmen, die
eine weitere Zerstörung der europäischen Werte des Zusammenlebens aufgeklärter Bürger
verhindern. Die AfD wird nicht zulassen, dass Deutschland aus falsch verstandener Toleranz
sein kulturelles Gesicht verliert.”
16 www.gesetze-im-internet.de/partg/__25.html, accessed 24 December 2018.
17 “Ja, es ist richtig, dass bei uns Fehler im Umgang mit Wahlkampfspenden gemacht
wurden”, Deutscher Bundestag, 21 November 2018. Stenografischer Bericht, 64. Sitzung,
Plenarprotokoll 19/64, http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/19/19064.pdf, accessed

24 December 2018.
18 www.forbes.com/profile/august-von-finck/?list=billionaires#26de781c7327, accessed 24
December 2018.
19 Jérôme Boateng is a football player at FC Bayern München. He was part of the German
national team that won the FIFA World Cup in 2014. Boateng was born and grew up in
Berlin. His mother is German, his father from Ghana. In 2016, Gauland said about Boateng:
“People are fond of him as footballer. But they do not want to have one like Boateng as
their neighbour” (Translation from German: „Die Leute finden ihn als Fußballspieler gut.
Aber sie wollen einen Boateng nicht als Nachbarn haben”; Wehner and Lohse 2016).

Chapter Seven
Online Nationalism and Social Media
Authoritarianism in the Context of the ÖVP/FPÖ
Government in Austria
7.1 Introduction
7.2 The Austrian Political Context
7.3 Methodology
7.4 Analysis of Debate Excerpts
7.5 Social Media Analysis
7.6 Conclusion
7.1 Introduction
After the coalition government of the Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ) and
the conservative Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) collapsed, snap parliamentary elec-
tions took place in October 2017. The results are shown in Table 7.1.
The People’s Party under Sebastian Kurz’s leadership made strong gains and became
the largest party, putting the Social Democrats under Chancellor Christian Kern
into second position. The far-right Freedom Party (FPÖ) under the leadership of
Heinz-Christian Strache increased its voting share by 5.5% and achieved 26.0% of
the votes. The liberal NEOS party made slight gains. Before the election, the Green
Party split, which resulted in the formation of a new party (“Peter Pilz List”) led by
former Green MP Peter Pilz. It crossed the 4% threshold and made it into
parliament.1 The Greens suffered a major loss and fell out of parliament.
On 18 December, ÖVP and FPÖ formed a new government that formulated

a right-wing working programme for its five-year period of governance. Aged 31,
Sebastian Kurz took on the role of Chancellor and became the world’s youngest
serving state leader. Heinz-Christian Strache became Vice-Chancellor. ÖVP and
FPÖ had already formed a coalition government in 2000 under ÖVP Chancellor
Wolfgang Schüssel. The EU in February 2000 reduced its diplomatic relations
with Austria as protest against the inclusion of the far-right FPÖ in the Austrian
government.
TABLE 7.1 Results of the 2017 Austrian federal elections
Party Percentage Change of % compared to Number Change

of votes the 2013 elections of MPs of MPs
Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) 31.5% +7.5% 62 +15
Social Democratic Party of 26.9% ±0.0% 52 ±0
Austria (SPÖ)
Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) 26.0% +5.5% 51 +11
NEOS 5.3% +0.3% 10 +1
Peter Pilz List 4.4% +4.4% 8 +8
The Greens 3.8% −8.6% 0 −24
Voter turnout: 80.0%
Source: https://wahl17.bmi.gv.at/
The 2017 Austrian election debates were dominated by the European refugee crisis
and the question of if and how many refugees and migrants should be allowed to
come to Austria. The FPÖ repeatedly argued that Kurz copied its programme and
demands in respect to asylum seekers and Islamism.
Table 7.2 shows that in 2017, the typical ÖVP voter was self-employed or a white-
collar worker and the typical FPÖ voter a younger, male blue-collar worker. The typ-
ical SPÖ voter was a pensioner. An important change was that in 2013, the relative
majority of white-collar workers and pensioners voted for the SPÖ, whereas in 2017
many white-collar workers shifted to the ÖVP. The latter’s voting share increased
from 19 per cent to 31 per cent among white-collar workers. It is therefore interest-
ing to observe that workers in Austria in 2017 did not predominantly vote for the
Social Democrats, but for the two right-wing parties. Whereas in 2017 the Social
Democratic Party of Austria had been the dominant party among pensioners and
white-collar workers, in 2017 it was no longer dominant among any faction of the
working class, but only among pensioners.
In 2017, 53 per cent of those voters, who thought that Austria is a rather unjust
country, voted for the FPÖ, 24 per cent for the ÖVP, and only 4 per cent for the
SPÖ. This shows that in Austria, the Social Democrats are not perceived as the
party of social justice among those who have fears of social decline. Forty-two
per cent of ÖVP voters said they primarily voted for that party because of the fron-
trunner, and 15 per cent because of the party’s political standpoints. Five per cent
of FPÖ voters primarily cast their ballot for that party because of the frontrunner,
Chapter Seven | Social Media-Authoritarianism 181
TABLE 7.2 Voting behaviour of various groups in the 2017 and 2013 Austrian federal elections (per cent of total
voters)
ÖVP FPÖ SPÖ NEOS Greens Pilz List

Blue-collar workers, 2017/2013 15/18 59/33 19/24 4/3 1/5 2/-
White-collar workers, 2017/2013 31/19 26/25 26/26 7/6 4/15 5/-
Self-employed, 2017/2013 41/35 23/18 14/5 10/13 4/12 6/-
Pensioners, 2017/2013 33/31 16/17 39/34 2/2 2/6 5/-
Men, 2017/2013 33/19 29/28 25/22 5/5 2/10 4/-
Women, 2017/2013 30/29 22/16 29/29 5/5 6/13 5/-
Age group 16–29, 2017/2013 28/21 30/22 17/20 9/6 7/21 5/-
Age group 30–59, 2017/2013 31/22 28/24 27/25 5/6 4/11 5/-
Age group 60+, 2017/2013 36/30 19/18 34/33 3/3 2/5 4/-
University-educated voters, 2017/2013 32/29 7/4 31/9 9/12 10/30 9/-
Voters who only completed compulsory 25/23 33/15 33/34 2/5 3/8 2/-
education, 2017/2013
Source: SORA (2013, 2017)
and 34 per cent because of its standpoints. Twenty per cent of SPÖ voters primarily
supported the Social Democrats because of frontrunner Christian Kern, and
22 per cent because of their political programme (SORA 2017). These data provide
indications that many voters supported the ÖVP because of the relative youthfulness
of its party leader.
According to respondents in a post-election survey, asylum and integration was the

most discussed election topic, followed by social benefits and security (SORA 2017).
The three main themes (asylum/integration, social benefits, security) are interlinked
Introduction
because social security and terrorism were often discussed in the context of refu-
gees, migration, and Islam. The public service broadcaster ORF and the private chan-
nels Puls 4, ATV, and Ö24-TV broadcast dozens of television debates featuring
different combinations of frontrunners. Given the prominence of TV in political com-
munication, it is evident that refugees and migration must have played a major role
in the broadcast debates. So, the media certainly played an important role in provid-
ing a forum for Strache and Kurz’s radical anti-refugee positions.
The new ÖVP/FPÖ government formulated a 180-page programme for its five-
year period of government. Key points of policy plans include the following
ones (ÖVP/FPÖ 2017):
• Popular petitions signed by more than 100,000 voters shall be discussed by

parliament and the responsible minister and committees. The initiator shall be
allowed to speak in parliament on the petition topic. A popular petition signed
by more than 900,000 voters shall result in a plebiscite.
• Law and order policies; upgrade of the security apparatus; extension of sur-
veillance capacities.
• Confiscation of asylum seekers’ cash and mobile phones and access to their
social media profiles; expedited deportation of illegal migrants and rejected
asylum seekers; cuts of social welfare benefits for refugees; shift from monet-
ary to in-kind social welfare benefits for refugees.
• Strict upper limit of social welfare benefits per family; access to social wel-
fare benefits only for those who have paid into the contribution system for at
least five years during the past six years.
• Abolition of emergency benefit (Notstandshilfe), a social welfare benefit for
the long-term unemployed. It is planned to replace this type of benefit by
access to a needs-based minimum benefit (Bedarfsorientierte Mindestsicher-
ung). The state can seize the wealth of recipients of the second type of bene-
fit (such as savings or an owner-occupied dwelling), but not of those who
receive the first type. In 2016, there were 167,075 recipients of emergency
benefits (Statistik Austria 2019) whose wealth could be seized under the
planned rules.
• Award of Austrian citizenship to South Tyroleans in addition to their Italian
citizenship.
• Compulsory German tests before children start attending school; children with
insufficient German skills shall attend separate school classes; stronger control
of Islamic organisations, kindergartens, schools, and mosques.
• Introduction of university tuition fees; maintenance and deepening of the
Austrian dual secondary school system; marking at all levels of schooling;
advancement of entrepreneurial thought as part of education.
• Increase of the minimum pension for those with 40 contribution years; reduction
of income tax for families with children.
• Reform of the structure of public social insurance agencies.
• Reduction of ancillary wage cost and the corporation tax level; flexibilisation
of maximum daily and weekly working time; reduction of the public expend-
iture quote to 40 per cent of the GNP.
Overall, the ÖVP/FPÖ programme focuses on the restriction of the rights of refu-
gees and immigrants, law and order politics, control, commitment to performance
and entrepreneurship, stricter rules for the long-term unemployed, and the
strengthening of capital’s interests. Such measures construct refugees, immi-
grants, and the unemployed as problem groups who can easily be mobilised as
scapegoats. The ÖVP/FPÖ agenda clearly is a right-wing government programme.
Reducing taxes and public expenditures will very likely result in cuts to social
services. Often one can then hear the argument that the state “has lived beyond
its means”, although tax gifts have been made to corporations and the wealthy.
The ÖVP/FPÖ government may well privatise and commodify parts of public ser-
vices in order to reduce state expenditures. If this happens, then one can expect
that it will argue that the concerned services (e.g. healthcare, education, public
housing, public transportation) can no longer be funded because allegedly so
many immigrants and long-term unemployed are overburdening them. Such argu-
ments would then aim at distracting attention from the political project of sup-
porting the interests of capital and the wealthy. ÖVP Finance Minister Hartwig
Löger announced shortly after the government had commenced its work: “We
will now have to make restrictive savings for the next budgets. We have an
excessive debt level”2 (Pink and Rief 2017).
This chapter asks: How was nationalism expressed in the 2017 Austrian federal
elections? Empirical ideology critique was used as method for the analysis of rele-
The Austrian Political Context

vant texts gathered from television and social media.
Section 7.2 explains the political context and Section 7.3 the case study’s methodology.
Sections 7.4 and 7.5 present results. Section 7.6 draws conclusions.
7.2 The Austrian Political Context
The FPÖ
The FPÖ was founded in 1955. It was the successor party of the Association of the
Independents (Verband der Unabhängigen, VdU) that was created in 1949. Many former
Nazis were VdU supporters. The FPÖ had German nationalist and liberal wings. In 1983,
the FPÖ, under its liberal leader Norbert Steger, formed a coalition government with the
SPÖ. In 1986, Jörg Haider replaced Steger as FPÖ leader. SPÖ Chancellor Franz Vranitzky
ended the coalition government because he saw Haider becoming the party leader as the
FPÖ’s political shift to the far-right. Since 1986, the FPÖ has continuously focused on for-
eigners as the main theme in its election campaigns. When Sebastian Kurz became ÖVP
leader in 2017, observers argued that this meant a shift of the party from the centre-right
to the right, and that Kurz in the election campaign adopted parts of Strache’s positions
and arguments. Figure 7.1 shows the FPÖ’s results in federal elections.
Haider was a controversial politician, which, for example, became evident in 1991
when he said about the employment policies in Nazi-Germany: “In the Third Reich,
they carried out an orderly employment policy, which is not even accomplished by
your government in Vienna.”3 Haider simply ignored that these policies served the
purpose of imperialist warfare and armament: “This respectable occupation of
people, which is described here in such positive terms, served, as we all know, to
prepare for a war of extermination” (Wodak 2002, 40). Brigitte Bailer-Galanda and
Wolfgang Neugebauer (1997) hold the view that the “FPÖ represents a successful
new adaptation of old right-wing extremism” (102).
Under Haider, the FPÖ vastly increased its share of the votes from election to election,
and in 1999 reached 26.91 per cent. In its campaigns, it used slogans such as “Stop
der Überfremdung!” (Stop the overforeignisation!). In 1993, Haider and the FPÖ, under
the title “Österreich zuerst!” (Austria first!), initiated an anti-immigration popular peti-
tion that was supported by 416,531 voters (7.35 per cent of the electorate). The
The FPÖ's Results in Austrian Federal Elections, in % of votes

27
26
25
24
23
22
21
20
19
18
17
16
15
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
1956 1959 1962 1966 1970 1971 1975 1979 1983 1986 1990 1994 1995 1999 2002 2006 2008 2013 2017
6.52 7.70 7.04 5.35 5.52 5.45 5.41 6.06 4.98 9.73 16.63 22.50 21.89 26.91 10.01 11.04 17.54 20.51 25.97
FIGURE 7.1 The FPÖ’s results in Austrian federal elections

petition, for example, demanded fully ceasing immigration to Austria and wanted to
amend the Austrian Constitution by a passage saying that “Austria is not an immigra-
tion country”. After the 1999 elections, the ÖVP and FPÖ formed a government that
was isolated in the European Union. In 2005, the FPÖ split into two parties: Haider
founded the Alliance for the Future of Austria (Bündnis Zukunft Österreich, BZÖ) and
Strache became the new leader of the FPÖ. The split weakened both parties in the
following elections. Jörg Haider died in a car accident in 2008. Strache became the
new uncontested leader of the parliamentary far-right that he rebuilt, so that in 2013
the FPÖ again reached more than 20 per cent of the votes in the federal elections.
In elections, the FPÖ under Strache campaigned with slogans such as „Daham statt Islam.
WIR für EUCH” (“Homeland instead of Islam: WE are for YOU”), „Wien darf nicht Istanbul
werden” (“Vienna must not turn into Istanbul”), „Mehr Mut für unser ‚Wiener Blut’: Zu viel
Fremdes tut niemandem gut” (“More courage for our ‘Viennese Blood’: Too much foreign-
ness is not good for anyone”), „Die Islamisierung gehört gestoppt” (“Islamisation must be
stopped”). Strache also used slogans such as „Willst Du eine soziale Sonderleistung
haben, musst Du nur ein Kopftuch tragen” (“If you want to have extra-welfare aid, just put
a veil on your head”) or „Willst du eine Wohnung haben, brauchst du nur ein Kopftuch
tragen” (“If you want to have a flat, just put a veil on your head”) (Kleine Zeitung 2015;
Lagler 2008). Michał Krzyżanowski (2013) writes that the FPÖ has ideologically transformed
itself from radical opposition to immigration while Haider was its leader (1986–2005) to
Islamophobia.
Austria is one of EU countries that was least hit by the new economic crisis that started The Austrian Political Context
in 2008. While Austria’s unemployment rate has since 2008 stayed around 5 per cent, it
increased in Greece from 7.8 per cent in 2008 to 23.6 per cent in 2016 and from
11.3 per cent to 19.6 per cent in Spain (Eurostat 2019). The example of Austria shows that
support for the far-right has not necessarily directly to do with citizens’ socio-economic
decline, but with fears of potential social decline in the context of crises, social change,
and globalisation that are projected into foreigners and minorities. Heribert Schiedel (2007,
49–50, 59) writes that capitalist crises pose a potential for the increase of fears of social
degradation. Therefore, it would in such situations be a key question if meaningful alterna-
tives existed to far-right ideology. The far-right offers surrogate objects for the projection
of fears.
FPÖ politician Norbert Hofer became Minister for Infrastructure in the ÖVP/FPÖ gov-
ernment. In 2016, he achieved 46.2 per cent of the votes in the Austrian presidential
elections (see Fuchs 2016a). He co-authored the 2011 party programme of the FPÖ.
This programme defines Austria as a nation that is culturally German:
We are committed to our homeland of Austria as part of the German-

speaking linguistic and cultural community, to the groups of people native
to our country and to a Europe of free peoples and fatherlands. […] The
language, history and culture of Austria are German. The vast majority of
Austrians are part of the German peoples’ linguistic and cultural commu-
nity. […] Austria is not a country of immigration.
(FPÖ 2011, 2, 5)
It becomes evident in this passage that the FPÖ defines the nation as a linguistic, cul-
tural, and historical community and sees Austria as belonging to the German cultural
nation. It opposes multiculturalism and thinks that “nations” should be kept separate.
Austria was part of Nazi-Germany from 1938 until 1945, but has outside of this period
had its own distinct history. At the time of the Habsburg Empire, there were many
multicultural influences that have shaped Austrian culture until today.
The FPÖ and the Burschenschaften
Burschenschaften are right-wing fraternities. Table 7.3 shows that 20 of the FPÖ’s
51 parliamentarians who were elected in 2017 are members of organisations that
belong to the milieu of the Burschenschaften. In addition, Norbert Hofer, the FPÖ’s
candidate in the 2016 Austrian presidential election and Minister for Infrastructure
in the ÖVP/FPÖ government, is a member of the Burschenschaft Marko-Germania zu
Pinkafeld. Vice-Chancellor Strache is a member of the Burschenschaft Vandalia
Wien.
Bernhard Weidinger (2015) analysed the role of the Burschenschaften in Austria

since 1945. He argues that Burschenschaft members “rather possess best pro-
spects in Strache’s FPÖ as long as they are ready to take a certain distance from
the folkish doctrine in their external appearance”4 (555). Hans-Henning Scharsach
(2017) argues the Burschenschaften have quietly conquered power in Austria. He
characterises their milieu as the “folkish-German national spearhead of the FPÖ”5
(9) and writes that this milieu features individuals who “downplay the Nazis’
crimes”, “promote right-wing extremist and racist activities of young people”, and
“carry out neo-Nazi indoctrination”6 (18).
TABLE 7.3 FPÖ parliamentarians and ministers who are members of organisations that belong to the milieu of
the Burschenschaften
Member of Parliament Organisation

Hannes Amesbauer Oberösterreicher Germanen Wien
Reinhard Eugen Bösch Teutonia Wien
Hermann Brückl Scardonia Schärding, Markomannia Eisenstadt
Martin Graf Olympia Wien
Johann Gudenus Vandalia Wien und Aldania Wien
Christian Hafenecker Nibelungia Wien
Roman Haider Donauhort Aschaach
Christian Höbart Tauriska Baden
Hans-Jörg Jenewein Nibelungia Wien
Gerhard Kaniak Albia Wien
Axel Kassegger Germania Graz, Thessalia Prag in Bayreuth
Anneliese Kitzmüller Iduna Linz
Wendelin Mölzer Vandalia Graz
Werner Neubauer Gothia Meran, Markomannia Graz
Walter Rosenkranz Libertas Wien
Carmen Schimanek Sigrid Wien
Philip Schrangl Oberösterreicher Germanen Wien
Harald Stefan Olympia Wien
Heinz-Christian Strache Vandalia Wien

Wolfgang Zanger Vandalia Wien
Minister:
Norbert Hofer, Minister for Transport, Innovation,
and Technology Marko-Germania Pinkerfeld
Sources: FIPU (2016), Kurier (2017), Scharsach (2017, 14–15)
Germania zu Wiener Neustadt is a high school Burschenschaft based in Wiener

Neustadt, Austria’s eleventh largest city and the second largest city in the federal
state of Lower Austria. Udo Landbauer was the FPÖ’s frontrunner in the 2018 elec-
tions to Lower Austria’s regional parliament (Landtag), where the FPÖ achieved
14.76 per cent of the votes. Landbauer was a member of Germania zu Wiener Neus-
tadt since the year 2000 and its deputy chairman. Shortly before the regional elec-
tions, a songbook appeared in public that the fraternity had published in 1997 for its
members. The book contained the lyrics of a version of the Burschenschaft drinking
song „Es lagen die alten Germanen”, to which new anti-Semitic, racist, and neo-
Nazi verses were added:
Then the Jew Ben Gurion stepped into their middle: “Step on the gas, old
Teutones, we’ll accomplish the seventh million”. […] Then a slit-eyed Chin-
ese stepped into their middle: “We are also Indo-Germanic and want to
join the Waffen-SS”.7
(Horaczek 2018)
The song verse calls for the continuation of the Shoah. Facing public pressure, Land-
bauer stepped down as a member of Lower Austria’s regional parliament and made
his FPÖ membership dormant. The songbook affair gives an impression of the mind-
set that can be found in the milieu of the Burschenschaften.
Sebastian Kurz and the ÖVP
The journalists Nina Horaczek and Barbara Tóth (2017) argue in their book on
Sebastian Kurz that the Austrian Chancellor is strongly focused on his image and
on marketing himself in the traditional media and on social media such as Face-
book, Twitter, Instagram, and YouTube. They characterise Kurz as a “more polite
Strache” (32) who “adopted FPÖ-positions and presented them less aggressively,
even politely” (118) and advances neoliberal policies of performance, individual
responsibility, and entrepreneurship that lack a sense for solidarity. Isolde Charim
(2017) argues that Kurz’s combination of youthfulness and the stress on image,
appearance, and change is the “embodiment of the neoliberal ideal”. Ruth Wodak
(2017) characterises Kurz’s policies the following way:
At the end of September 2015, the ÖVP changed to the tracks of the FPÖ.
[…] There is a major difference in perception if I call humans, who flee from
death, war and torture, refugees or if I call them illegal migrants or economic
migrants, which denies them the legal status of refugees. Repeated often
enough and propagated by the media, this image solidifies collectively. […]
Kurz’s ÖVP has given up certain traditional characteristics of the ÖVP and
has taken on characteristics of right-wing populist parties such as the
emphasis on border protection, the stop of “illegal migration”, the tightening
of asylum conditions, as well as the law and order orientation and the
party’s strong hierarchisation.8
Table 7.4 gives an overview of the largest donors of Kurz and the ÖVP’s 2017 elec-
tion campaign. The largest donor was Stefan Pierer, CEO of the motorcycle and
sports car manufacturer KTM. Individuals and companies representing the following
industries in particular have supported Kurz: the transport, mobility, fuel, and auto-
motive industries; the real estate industry; the hotel and leisure industry; the finance
industry; and the manufacturing industry. The data show that big capital supports
Sebastian Kurz’s election campaign. It may therefore not come as a surprise that
the reduction of the corporation tax, the flexiblisation of working hours, and the
deregulation of the economy are part of the ÖVP/FPÖ government programme.
Why has the far-right become so strong in Austria? There are several influencing
factors that form a complex whole.
Austria’s Incomplete Denazification

The first dimension has to do with incomplete denazification. Austria’s Second
Republic, which was created after the Second World War, is based on the myth
that Austria was Hitler’s first victim, which resulted in its incomplete denazification.
Far-right ideology could thereby continue to exist.
The myth of Austria as Hitler’s first victim can also be found in the Austrian State
Treaty that established Austria’s sovereignty as an independent state. It says that
“on March 13, 1938, Hitlerite Germany annexed Austria by force and incorporated
its territory in the German Reich” (United Nations 1955, 225). But in the April 1938 The Austrian Political Context
referendum, 99.73 per cent of the voters opted for Austria becoming part of the
German Reich. There was a voter turnout of 99.71 per cent. The Austrian population
overwhelmingly welcomed the country’s Anschluss to Germany. Austria was not
Hitler’s victim. It played a very active role in the Nazi-regime.
Today there is a widespread political tendency that Austrians tend to see them-
selves as victims of alleged “foreign forces” and do not want to see that Austrian
right-wing extremism has to do with anti-democratic tendencies in the country itself.
In 1986, Kurt Waldheim, a member of the Nazi Sturmabteilung (SA) during

the Second World War, became Austria’s President. During his presidency, the USA
declared him a persona non grata so that he was not allowed to enter the country.
Waldheim’s diplomatic contacts and travels as Austrian President remained limited.
Conservative politicians at that time often portrayed Waldheim as a victim of
TABLE 7.4 Main donors of the ÖVP’s 2017 election campaign
Donor Industry Amount (€)

Stefan Pierer Motorcycles and automotive 436,563
Rudolf Gürtler Lawyer, hotel and food industries 50k
M. Kaindl KG Manufacturing industry 50k
Martin Böhm Transport and mobility technologies 40k
Dr Markus Braun Finance industry 40k
MAM Babyartikel GesmbH Clothing industry 40k
Happy-Foto GmbH Photo industry 35k
Markus Braun Finance industry 30k
GMIM Immobilienmanagement Real estate sector 30k
Senger-Weiss GmbH Transport industry 30k
IGO Industries GmbH Building equipment 30k
Richard Ramsauer Consultancy 25k
BM 454 GRA GmbH Equipment rental and leasing 20k
Benedikt Abensperg Agriculture 20k
Vitalis Food VertriebsgmbH Food industry 20k
Supernova Baumärkte Holding GmbH Real estate sector 20k
Dorit Muzicant Real estate sector 20k
Georg Muzicant Real estate sector 20k
Teresa Pagitz Hotel industry, real estate sector 14k
Allinvest Unternehmensbeteiligung Real estate sector 11k
Kurt Mann Food industry 10k
Wilhelm Klepsch Plastics processing industry 10k
Münzer Bioindustrie GmbH Biofuel industry 10k
Harald Hild Real estate sector 10k
MRP Investmentmanagement Real estate sector 10k
Gottfried Wurpes Leisure industry 10k
SMILE GmbH Manufacturing industry 10k
Nikolaus Goriany Real estate sector 10k
Bettina Glatz-Kremsner Gambling industry 10k
Martin Kurschel Real estate sector 10k
Sources: www.sebastian-kurz.at/spendenuebersicht, https://kontrast.at/das-sind-die-kurz-spender/

a foreign conspiracy against Austria. One of the slogans in his 1986 campaign read
„Wir Österreicher wählen wen wir wollen! Jetzt erst recht Waldheim” (“We Aus-
trians vote for whom we want! Now more than ever Waldheim”).
Austrian Nationalism: Mia San Mia, Vernaderer, and

Nestbeschmutzer
A second dimension is Austrian nationalism. Austria’s status as a small country in

Europe that was a former superpower and now often stands in the shadow of Ger-
many has resulted in a schizophrenic national identity. Identity-building of in-groups
often makes use of the negative definition of out-groups.
In Austria, this political schizophrenia tends to be expressed by nationalists in the

form of an “us versus them” ideology that lacks the capacity of self-criticism and
in situations of political crisis blames Europe, immigrants, the USA, Jews, socialists,
liberals, everything foreign („das Ausland”), etc. Linguistically, this repressive nation-
alist inwardness and isolationism is known as the „Mia san Mia” (“we are we”)
ideology that opposes Austrian patriots to imagined foreign enemies and what this
ideology terms „Vaterlandsvernaderer” (“denouncers of the fatherland”, “traitors”) or
„Nestbeschmutzer” (“denigrators”, “defilers of their own country”).

Austrian Neoliberalism
Third, Austrian Neoliberalism plays a role. In the 1970s, Austria was under Bruno
Kreisky’s (SPÖ) chancellorship one of the world’s leading welfare democracies. The
rise of neoliberalism has also shifted social democracy in Austria towards the right.
Right-wing populists have used citizens’ fears of social decline and projected them
into racist ideology. Many citizens who traditionally identified with the Social Democrats
felt that this party no longer represents the interests of ordinary people and therefore
looked for alternatives. The FPÖ has presented itself as such an alternative, as a party
that listens to the fears of ordinary people. It tries to project the population’s fears of
social decline into the construction of immigrants as scapegoats.
Kronen Zeitung
Right-wing media form the fourth dimension. Austria has a highly concentrated
press system. The right-wing Kronen Zeitung is the most widely read newspaper. In
2005, it had around 3 million readers, which means a reach of almost 45 per cent.
In 2015, its reach was 30.1 per cent.9 The Kronen Zeitung has for a long time sup-
ported the FPÖ and has practised anti-immigrant rhetoric.
An example of Kronen Zeitung’s coverage: in the days before the 2017 elections,
Krone ran stories with headlines such as:
• “People smuggler lived underground” („Schlepper lebte als ‘U-Boot’”,

15 October 2017);
• “Upper Austria: 26-year-old rioted in asylum accommodation” („OÖ: 26-Jähri-
ger randaliert in Asylunterkunft”, 13 October 2017);
• “Totally sloshed: Moroccan smashed everything to bits in asylum seekers’
hostel” („Im Vollrausch: Marokkaner schlug in Heim alles kurz und klein”,
15 October 2017); and
• “Viennese ‘Islamic State bride’ (39) flown home from Kabul!” („Wiener ‚IS-Braut’
(39) aus Kabul heimgeflogen!”, 13 October 2017).
Such headlines create the impression that Austrians are surrounded and under con-
stant threat by violent and criminal asylum seekers, people smugglers, and Islamic
terrorists.
Al-Youssef (2018) conducted a data analysis of all content that FPÖ leader Heinz-Christian
Strache posted on his Facebook profile from 24 December 2017 until 24 April 2018. During
that period, Strache made 232 postings that contained links. A relative majority of 111
(47.8 per cent) posts linked to articles published in Kronen Zeitung’s online version. Post-
ings on the Facebook page of Kronen Zeitung reach on average 240 reactions (“like”,
“wow”, “haha”, “sad”, “angry”) and 53 comments, and are on average shared 45 times
(Al-Youssef 2018). If Strache links to a Kronen Zeitung article, the average response is
multiple times larger: 1,965 reactions, 199 comments, and 354 shares. “Angry” accounted
for 60.1 per cent of all analysed reactions on Strache’s page. Strache often links to Krone
articles about refugees and migrants that have to do with crime and other problems and
portray migrants and refugees negatively. Often he adds populist comments and demands.
That the share of angry reactions to his postings is so large is an indication that most
readers of Strache’s page are supporters who buy into the scapegoating of migrants and
refugees and support xenophobic policies.
Strache’s social media presence and Kronen Zeitung’s articles are mutually benefi-
cial: (1) Kronen Zeitung provides material for Strache that allows him to create,
mobilise, and reinforce anti-refugee sentiments. Krone’s articles are Strache’s every-
day political “capital” that enter into his political propaganda as ideological informa-
tion. They form a basic building block that he uses for inductively generalising from
single examples to the groups of refugees and migrants as a whole, who are often
presented as criminals and benefit scroungers. (2) Kronen Zeitung benefits from
Strache’s social media links: many more users read Krone articles when Strache
shares and comments on them. As a result, Krone reaches wider attention and
higher reputation in the public, which translates not only into higher reputational
and symbolic capital, but also into more profit reached via the increase of the
amount of advertising clicks, subscriptions, and paper copies sold.
The Containment of Class Struggle
The institutional containment of class struggle is the fifth dimension. Austria’s polit-
ical system is based on the consensus culture of consociationalism: in industrial
policy, there is a social partnership (Sozialpartnerschaft) between the organised rep-
resentatives of capital and labour that negotiates compromises on wages and work-
ing conditions. As a result, Austria has hardly seen strikes since 1945. Class
struggles have remained contained. Long-term containment of class struggles can
explode into the wrong direction and be turned against scapegoats such as migrants
and refugees. The Austrian class system has undergone changes so that a new
middle class has emerged and the blue-collar working class has decreased in num-

bers, which has strengthened blue-collar labour’s fears of social decline.
The Weakness of the Left

The weakness of the Austrian political left is the sixth dimension. The political left
has in Austria been traditionally very weak, which has to do with the containment
of class struggle and the fact that during the time of the Cold War, Stalinism was
widely spread in the Austrian left, but unappealing to ordinary citizens. Given
a weak left, it is easier for the far-right to strive.
Low Level of General Education and Hauptschule
The low level of general education in Austria is the seventh dimension. According to
a study of the Austrian federal election of 2013, where the FPÖ achieved
20.5 per cent of the vote, it was the strongest party among men (28 per cent), blue-
collar workers (33 per cent), those aged 16–29 (22 per cent), and those whose
highest educational attainment is a polytechnic school (35 per cent; a one-year prac-
tical education that prepares pupils at the age of 14 for starting an apprenticeship;
SORA 2013). The typical FPÖ voter is a young, male blue-collar worker with a low
level of education. In 2014, the EU-wide average share of those who were aged 25
or above and held at least a bachelor’s degree was 22.3 per cent. Austria had, with
12.25 per cent, the lowest share of all 22 EU countries for which data are
available.10
In Austria, there has been a long-standing political debate about the abolishment of
the Hauptschule (secondary modern school). Secondary school is a dual system in
Austria: pupils aged 10–13 have to decide if they either attend grammar school (the
so-called Gymnasium) or secondary modern school (Hauptschule, now called Neue
Mittelschule [new secondary school]). Often this choice is one that has to do with
the children’s family and class background. There is a tendency that especially chil-
dren from lower-income families attend secondary modern school and that those
attending the Gymnasium are much more likely to later attend university. Austrian
Social Democrats and Greens tend to criticise that the dual secondary school system
fosters an educational gap, whereas the Austrian Conservatives paint fears of the
end and decline of education if a combined secondary school system for all children
aged 10–14 were introduced. Austria’s dual secondary school system is one of the
reasons why the level of higher education is very low in the population. A reform
has resulted in the stepwise transition of secondary modern schools into new
middle schools (Neue Mittelschule) that use new forms of teaching and learning.
But the basic distinction between the Gymnasium and a less demanding type of sec-
ondary school has not been abolished. There is a relationship between parents’
class and educational status and the educational achievements of their children
(Volkshilfe 2015). Austria’s dual secondary education system not only creates educa-
tional gaps and is a system divided by social class, but can also contribute to the
prevalence of political support for far-right movements.
Education is one of the factors that influences political worldviews. In the 2016
presidential election, such divisions of the social structure of voters became evi-
dent (SORA 2016). In the second round, 60 per cent of male voters cast their
ballot for FPÖ candidate Hofer, but only 40 per cent of women voters. Eighty-six
per cent of blue-collar working-class voters supported Hofer, whereas 60 per cent
of white-collar working-class voters opted for the Green candidate Alexander van
der Bellen. Fifty-five per cent of voters who only completed compulsory education
cast their vote for Hofer. The same can be said about 67 per cent of those
voters who completed apprenticeships and about 58 per cent of those whose
highest educational attainment is the completion of a vocational school (Berufsbil-
dende mittlere Schule, BMS). In contrast, 73 per cent of voters who had passed
school leaving examinations and 81 per cent of university-educated voters opted
for van der Bellen. Class and education are key influencing factors on voting
behaviour in Austria.
Proporz: The Austrian Patronage System
The Austrian patronage system forms the eighth dimension. In the Austrian polit-
ical system, the Conservative Party ÖVP traditionally represented capital and
farmers, and the Social Democratic Party SPÖ represented labour. A particular
system of clientelism, called the Proporzsytem (patronage system), developed, in
which the ÖVP and the SPÖ divided power. Getting and keeping the job one
wants to hold has often been a question of party membership and having the
right kind of political connections. There is even a term in everyday language
that characterises the specific Austrian system of patronage: Parteibuchwirtschaft
(party book economy).
It is therefore no accident that in Austria, the population’s relative level of party

membership is the highest in Europe: a study showed that whereas the average

share of political party members in the total electorate was 4.7 per cent in the
European Union, this ratio was 17.27 per cent in Austria in the year 2008 (Van
Biezen et al. 2012). In 1980, the share was around 28.5 per cent in Austria. The
existence of Austrian clientelism has political reasons: both the Social Democrats
and the Conservatives have seen it as a way of avoiding a repetition of the mili-
tary conflict and civil war between conservative and socialist forces in the 1920s
and early 1930s and as a means for containing the power of the far-right. The
FPÖ has presented itself over the decades as the one force that can end the
Proporz system’s dual concentration of power in the hands of the Conservatives
and the Social Democrats.
The interaction of these eight factors has, over the decades, again and again
resulted in electoral successes of the far-right. Economic and political crises in
Europe and the world do not determine the strength of far-right movements, but
have in political history often been important contexts of its popularity and support.
7.3 Methodology
Empirical ideology critique analyses the structure (text) of ideological communication
in the context of society’s power structures in order to draw conclusions for political
prospects. The research was conducted by adopting a methodology consisting of
four steps:
1) Data collection, including research ethics.

2) Identification of discursive macro-topics.
3) Analysis of the structure of ideology and discourse for each macro-topic; ana-
lysis and theorisation of how online discourses and ideology are related to the
broader societal context, i.e. the relations of the online-semiotic elements to
political economy.
4) Prospective critique.
Data collection was the first step. Nationalist ideology operates from above and
below. It is therefore important to study how politicians communicate ideology “from
above” and how citizens respond to it “from below”. The analysis therefore focused
on material from the main television debate as well as on online comments.
Table 7.5 gives an overview of the audience rates of the main television debates that
involved Kurz and/or Strache. The so-called “round of elephants” (Elefantenrunde) is
a television debate of all frontrunners of parties represented in parliament. Whereas
the round of elephants shown by the public service broadcaster (Austrian Broadcasting
Corporation, ORF) only featured the frontrunners of the five elected parliamentary par-
ties, the ones on private channels also included Peter Pilz, the frontrunner of the Pilz
List, a new party that had split off from the Green Party. ORF argued that it only fea-
tures representatives of elected parties. The round of elephants shown by Austria’s
public service broadcaster ORF was the debate that achieved the highest rating. In
general, election debates on ORF were watched by more viewers than on private chan-
nels such as Puls 4 or ATV.
Given that the ORF round of elephants was the most watched election debate, we
can assume that it had significant influence. For the purpose of the analysis in this
chapter, we therefore focus on excerpts from this debate, where Kurz and Strache
talk about Austria, refugees, migrants, and Islam.
Given that social media enable user-generated content, social media critical discourse
analysis is a good way of analysing ideology from below. The analysis focused on all
TABLE 7.5 Audience rates of main television debates in the 2017 Austrian federal elections that involved
Sebastian Kurz and/or Heinz-Christian Strache
Debate TV channel Date Audience rate

Round of elephants (Elefantenrunde): ORF 12 October 2017 1,210,00
Christian Kern (SPÖ), Sebastian Kurz (ÖVP),
Ulrike Lunacek (Greens), Heinz-Christian
Strache (FPÖ), Matthias Strolz (NEOS)
Kurz/Kern ORF 10 October 2017 970,000
Strache/Kurz ORF 10 October 2017 904,000
Kern/Strache ORF 9 October 2017 887,000
Strache/Irmgrad Griss (NEOS) ORF 27 September 2017 697,000
Kurz/Lunacek ORF 28 September 2017 636,000
Kurz/Kern Puls 4 8 October 2017 623,000
Strache/Kurz Puls 4 8 October 2017 587,000
Round of elephants: Kern, Kurz, Lunacek, Puls 4 24 September 2017 560,000
Peter Pilz (Pilz List), Strache, Strolz
Round of elephants: Kern, Kurz, Lunacek, ATV 1 October 2017 526,000
Pilz List, Strache, Srolz
Source: Der Standard (2017)
comments posted to three Facebook postings and two online newspaper articles that
dealt with the topics of immigrants, refugees, and Islam and were published in the days
after the ÖVP/FPÖ government assumed office (for an overview, see Table 7.6). We
selected one relevant Facebook posting each by Sebastian Kurz (Chancellor, ÖVP), Heinz-
Christian Strache (Vice-Chancellor, FPÖ), and Herbert Kickl (Minister of the Interior, FPÖ).
In addition, we collected comments from two online articles in Kronen Zeitung, Austria’s
main tabloid, which often runs stories having to do with migrants and refugees. Data
Methodology
collection resulted in a dataset of 2,367 comments.
Kurz and Strache are the two Austrian politicians with the highest number of followers
on Facebook: on 4 January 2018, Kurz’s page had around 720,000 followers and 717,000
likes, and Strache’s page around 746,000 followers and 772,000 likes. Kickl’s PR team
created a Facebook profile on 19 December 2017, one day after the ÖVP/FPÖ govern-
ment’s inauguration. Given that he attracted a lot of media attention, the page quickly
achieved 10,000 followers. Kronen Zeitung is Austria’s most read newspaper. In 2017, it
had an average of 2.2 million daily readers (30.1 per cent of all readers) and 2.8 million
(37.2 per cent of all readers) at weekends.11 Kronen Zeitung is a tabloid that very fre-
quently publishes stories about crimes committed by foreigners. Its coverage was clearly
TABLE 7.6 Facebook postings and online newspaper articles selected for analysis
Posting Source Date of posting Number of comments

Posting about criminal foreigners H.-C. Strache’s 2 January 2018 717
Facebook page,
www.facebook.
com/HCStrache/
Posting about criminal refugees Herbert Kickl’s Face- 30 December 2017 90
book page,
www.facebook.
com/herbertkickl/
Posting about illegal migration Sebastian Kurz’s 24 December 2017 831
and refugee policies in Europe Facebook page,
www.facebook.com/
sebastiankurz.at/
Article titled „Türkis-blaue Pläne: Kronen Zeitung 19 December 2017 428 (4 January 2018)
Neu: Asylwerber müssen Handy Online, www
und Bargeld abgeben” (“New .krone.at/604492
ÖVP/FPÖ Plans: Asylum Seekers
Must Hand in Their Mobile
Phones and Cash”)
Interview with Herbert Kickl: „Das Kronen Zeitung 31 December 2017 301 (4 January 2018)
große Interview: Wird Österreich Online,
jetzt sicherer, Herr Kickl?” (“The www.krone.at/
Great Interview: Will Austria Now 1603409
Become More Secure, Mr Kickl?”)
Total: 2,367
favourable to Jörg Haider during his political rise. During the 2017 election campaigns,
it gave significant positive attention to both Kurz and Strache.
Figures 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4 show the three selected Facebook postings and provide
translations of the main posting texts.
I watched an online video of the selected ORF debate and identified passages where
Strache and Kurz talked about migrants, refugees, or Islam. These excerpts were tran-
scribed. The Facebook app Netvizz was used for collecting all comments posted
under the three chosen Facebook postings, which resulted in three Excel files
that were merged into one file. The text of the comments to two articles in
Kronen Zeitung were collected manually because there was no automated data
collection possibility. All comments were copied into an Excel sheet. The result-
ing file was merged with the Facebook file, which resulted in one analysis file
with a total of 2,367 comments.
FIGURE 7.2 Facebook posting by Heinz-Christian Strache

Translation: No misconceived tolerance for foreign criminals! [Image text: Consequent deportation
of foreign violent criminals! FPÖ – The party for a social homeland]
Social media research ethics guidelines suggest informed consent for data collection
is not needed if users in a certain online setting can reasonably expect to be
observed by strangers (Fuchs 2017b, 60; Townsend and Wallace 2016). For this
study, data were only collected from public sources, including Facebook profiles of
politicians, online newspaper articles, and television debates. If you post a political
opinion on the public Facebook profile of a politician or to an online newspaper art-
Methodology
icle, then you certainly take into account that others will have public access to it
and you have to expect that such texts may be analysed and quoted by others. One
can therefore assume that in these cases, no informed consent needs to be
obtained. Usernames have in the analysis been anonymised.
As a second methodological step, discourse topics were identified as

a preparation for the data analysis. A discourse topic is a macro-topic (Reisigl
2018) and a semantic macro-structure (van Dijk 2018). The discourse topics
were chosen according to the structure of nationalist ideology identified in the
book at hand: nationalism defines a “we”-identity that is posited against out-
siders and enemy groups. We can distinguish between biological, socio-economic,
FIGURE 7.3 Facebook posting by Herbert Kickl

Translation: To Chechens just like to all others, who abuse the right to asylum in Austria, it
applies that we will exhaust all legal means in order to end the stay of criminals [Link to an
article posted on the news platform Ö24 titled “Chechens: Will Deportation Come Now?” (www
.oe24.at/oesterreich/chronik/wien/Tschetschenen-Kommt-jetzt-Abschiebung/315071148) that reports
on the injury of three police officers at the arrest of Chechens]
political, and cultural nationalism. (New) racism is an inherent characteristic of national-

ism. Table 7.7 presents an overview of nationalist macro discourse topics and identifies
typical examples of nationalist attitudes. In addition to different forms of nationalism,
other elements of authoritarianism were also used as macro discourse topics: top-down
leadership, the friend/enemy scheme, and law and order-politics (see Fuchs 2018a).
As a third methodological step, methodological tools from critical discourse analysis

were used in order to analyse the structure of the nationalist discourse topics (Rei-
sigl and Wodak 2001; Wodak and Meyer 2016). In this analysis, for each macro
discourse topic, typical cases were identified and analysed with the help of critical
theories of nationalism as well as in the context of the broader societal context.
FIGURE 7.4 Facebook posting by Sebastian Kurz

Translation: We need a united, strong Europe in order to preserve affluence in Germany & Austria.
First, we must correct refugee- & migration-policies’ aberrations & especially stop illegal migration Analysis of Debate Excerpts
to Europe [Image of an interview with Kurz conducted by Germany’s largest newspaper, the tabloid
Bild (The article holds the title “Chancellor Kurz Exclusively in Sunday Bild!”, online version: www
.bild.de/bild-plus/politik/ausland/angela-merkel/soll-kanzlerin-bleiben-54290876)]
Drawing political conclusions about the communication of nationalism in Austria

was the fourth step.
7.4 Analysis of Debate Excerpts

Let us first have a look at the ORF election debate excerpt that is the source of
analysis. Appendix 7.A shows the German original that was translated into English.
HEINZ-CHRISTIAN STRACHE (FPÖ):

The reality is that we want that those who have not paid
into the system receive benefits in kind instead of cash benefits because then the
TABLE 7.7 Nationalist discourse topics used in the analysis
Type of nationalism We-presentation (ideal-type) Other-presentation (ideal-type)

Biological “We are a superior race.” “They are an inferior race that shows nega-
nationalism tive characteristics and behaviour.”
Socio-economic “We are a hard-working and “They are lazy and social parasites who live
nationalism industrious nation.” from our money. They take away our jobs and
houses and are a burden to our healthcare
system, our education system, our social ser-
vices, etc.”
Political nationalism “We are a democratic nation “They are undemocratic and are in favour of
that values freedom.” dictatorship. They pose a terrorist and crim-
inal threat and a threat to our nation’s
security.”
Cultural nationalism “Our nation’s culture, lan- “Their culture, language, and religion is dif-
guage, and religion have ferent from ours and threatens the survival of
a long history and traditions our culture, language, and religion. If they
that need to be preserved.” want to live here, then they have to adopt
our culture, speak our language, and accept
our religion. Their culture is uncivilised.”
knock-on effect of economic refugees can certainly be clearly reduced. […] This is
something that nobody in Austria, who is full-time employed and earns a bit more
than the minimum benefit, understands. All of this is not fair.
And if you have worked for 40 or 45 years and then you receive a minimum
pension of €940, then that’s not fair. That’s something nobody understands. And
then there are women, who are so often referred to in Sunday-speeches and who
are left alone in poverty with just €250 or €350 when they are old. These are
unfair systems. The system needs to be made fair and changed so that minimum
pensioners who have worked 40 or 45 years then really receive €1,200 and
mothers’ child-rearing time is taken into account in the calculation of their pen-
sion so that they receive at least the minimum pension. That would mean that
one shows respect and decency towards the people.
[…]
SEBASTIAN KURZ (ÖVP):In Vienna, there is the situation that in the meantime every other
recipient of needs-based minimum benefit is a foreign national. A family with
three children receives in Vienna €2,500 of minimum benefits and other social
benefits such as child support. That is a sum that somebody who works does not
earn that easily. You have to earn pretty well in order to get that. And in this
respect we need a change. We spend billions on refugee support, in the mean-

time 1 billion on minimum benefits alone, and we transfer 300 million of family
aid to foreign countries. If we do not counteract, then it will become ever harder
to finance our social system.
STRACHE: And we have aberrations that are due, as I mentioned, to the lack of border
control in 2015. And there have been developments that have taken place not just
since then, but that also took place earlier on. And there one has to be honest
and has to say correctly that in the year 1973 we had 73,000 fellow Muslim citi-
zens in Austria, and a very, very undifferentiated policy of mass immigration has
over the past decades resulted in today already more than 700,000. And also
schools in Vienna experience in the realm of primary education that we already
have more Muslim than Catholic children.
And then there are structures of associations and Islamic kindergartens and
mosques that have been concretely observed by the authorities for the protection
of the constitution not just since a year, but over more than 15 years. And it is
suggested that there are radical Islamist aberrations.
Very dangerous developments take place that also concern recruitment. This
has led to the point that now one fortunately could a couple of days ago discover
an IS-guy in a refugee home in Salzburg who was in touch with the Paris assas-
sins. This means that there is a need for action.
KURZ: Anyone who sets off to illegally enter Europe by human trafficking should not
have a chance to file an asylum request, but has to be returned. And at the same
Analysis of Debate Excerpts
time we have to extend development cooperation and help on the ground because
this way we can help substantially more people and in a substantially more sus-
tainable manner with the same amount of money.
STRACHE: We must start here in order to avoid conditions like in Vienna. And that is
necessary. Due to the aberration that has already been caused, our children here
in Vienna have become a minority in their own city. And you please have to recog-
nise that circumstance. And then there is the political question if you want to
further promote this development or not. Not with us.
Nationalist ideology works with positive presentations of the nation and negative
presentations of foreigners. Let us therefore look at how Strache and Kurz predicate
Austrians and non-Austrians.
Foreigners and refugees are referred to as “foreign countries” that receive

“300 million of family aid” from Austria (Kurz) or a “foreign national” who is
a “recipient of needs-based minimum benefit” (Kurz). These predications combine

the xenonym (see Reisigl and Wodak 2001, 48) of being foreign with negatio-
nyms (52) that make a negative statement about a certain group in the form of
problematisations (50). Foreigners are presented as passive objects who are not
active subjects, but receivers and recipients of money. They are thereby declared
to be a social problem. Other negationyms that construct foreigners as a social
problem and as passive include the use of the formulations “those who have not
paid into the system” (Strache) and that a “family with three children receives
in Vienna €2,500 of minimum benefits and other social benefits such as child
support” (Kurz).
In contrast, Austrians are referred to as those who are “full-time employed and
earn a bit more than the minimum benefit” (Strache), those who “worked for 40
or 45 years” (Strache), those who “receive a minimum pension of €940”
(Strache), “minimum pensioners who have worked 40 or 45 years” (Strache), or
“somebody who works” (Kurz). In the speech that opened the ÖVP’s 2017 elec-
tion campaign, Kurz (2017a) made a similar argument, saying that a poor retired
peasant woman who has worked her whole life finds it unfair that refugees
receive minimum benefits:
I have for example met a peasant woman in Salzburg, who told me that
with her small pension, she can hardly make ends meet although she has
worked her whole life long hard and even physically hard. And she quite
rightly does not understand why a refugee receives the full minimum bene-
fit from the start.12
Professionyms present humans in terms of their work (Reisigl and Wodak 2001, 50),
and victimonyms in terms of being a victim. The mentioned predications combine
professionyms and victimonyms. They present Austrians as hard-working and receiv-
ing little for their work. Another predication that was employed uses a combination
of a victimonym and an origionym (reference in terms of origin; Reisigl and Wodak
2001, 48) when speaking of “our children here in Vienna” who are a “minority in
their own city” (Strache). “Our children” is a reference in terms of family origin that
communicates particular vulnerability.
Taken together, the combination of the construction of Austrian victims and foreign
recipients of Austrian money and benefits results in a sharp us/them difference that
presents foreigners as “social parasites” and Austrians as victims of foreigners.
A consequence is that refugees are not seen as individuals who predominantly flee
from war, murder, and terror, but as “parasites” who come to Austria in order to
exploit Austrians by living from taxes.
Kurz says directly that he fears that given immigration and refugees, “it will become
ever harder to finance our social system”. That foreigners get more out of the
system than they pay in is not just an idea advanced by politicians, but also
believed by a significant share of the population. In the 2014 wave of the European
Social Survey, 55.9 per cent of the Austrian respondents said that immigrants took
out more from the social system than they put in, 17.3 per cent held the opposite
opinion, and 26.7 per cent said that neither of both was true.13 The reality looks
different than the majority thinks: according to data, in 2015, non-Austrian citizens
paid €5.3 billion into the social security system and received services and benefits
for the total amount of €3.7 billion. Their contributions amounted to 9.5 per cent of
the social system’s budget, and the benefits that they got out of the system to just
6.1 per cent. As part of these payments and benefits, non-Austrian citizens paid
€2.8 billion in pension contributions and received pensions in the amount of
€1.1 billion (John 2016).
Strache combines the topos of numbers and the topos of culture (Reisigl and
Wodak 2001, 79, 80) in order to present Muslims as a threat. The first uses the
logic of large numbers in order to construct a problem, and the second fetishises
cultural difference in order to argue that there is a problem. Strache criticises
that there are “more than 700,000 Muslims” (Strache) and says there are “more Analysis of Debate Excerpts
Muslim than Catholic children” in Vienna and that “our children here in Vienna
have become a minority in their own city”. He uses the possessive determiners
“our” and “their” in order to express the claim that Muslim children are aliens
and only non-Muslim children of Austrians (“our children”) belong to the in-group
of Austrians. He implies that Islam is non-Austrian and Christianity Austrian.
A split between religions is constructed and one side is identified with the
nation and the other side split off the nation. Being Muslim is presented as
a cultural problem and the presence of Muslims in Austria as cultural destruction
and as a threat to language, religion, and culture. Strache argues that these per-
ceived problems are the results of “a very, very undifferentiated policy of mass
immigration”. He here uses the strategy of linguistic intensification (“very, very”,
“mass”) in order to try to communicate that there is a threat and an urgent need
for political change.
In a speech at the 2017 FPÖ New Year Meeting, Norbert Hofer (2017), who was the
party’s candidate in the 2017 presidential election and became Minister for Trans-
port, Innovation, and Technology in the ÖVP/FPÖ government, said:
Our traditions apply. Our culture applies. Our unnegotiable community of

values, my dear friends, applies. And he who does not like that may
ultimately return to his Islamic country. […] Not we Austrians have to
adapt, but rather those immigrated guests who want to live with us
permanently. And they have to accept that Christianity has shaped Aus-
tria’s culture and its way of life. […] We need a commitment to our
culture, our history, our identity, and our way of life. And I am tired of
us Austrians having to constantly worry about whether some people,
who have migrated to us, agree or not. The one who does not like it,
dear friends, does not have to be here. We have our rules, our culture,
our language, here. And we predominantly speak German, not Arabic
and not Turkish or other languages.14
In this short passage, Hofer uses the possessive pronoun “our” 14 times and the
personal pronoun “we” four times. He makes clear that “we” and “our” stands for
Austria, German, and Christianity. By “he”, “they”, “them”, and “his”, he refers to
Muslims, Arabs, and Turks, who in his opinion should go home if they do not
assimilate their culture to the dominant one. Hofer constructs an us/them differential
and codes this differential as Austrian on the one side and as Islamic, Arabic, and
Turkish on the other side.
In its party programme, the FPÖ defines “our homeland of Austria as part of the
German-speaking linguistic and cultural community. […] The language, history and
culture of Austria are German” (FPÖ 2011, 2, 5). One of the FPÖ policy guidelines is
that “we are committed to protecting our homeland of Austria, our national identity
and autonomy as well as our natural livelihood” (FPÖ 2011, 3). Christianity and
German language are, for the FPÖ, inherent parts of the Austrian nation. It is there-
fore no surprise that the party and its representatives see Muslims and those who
speak another language than German as un-Austrian and as a threat to the con-
structed German nationhood of Austria.
In September 2017, Austrian tabloid media reported that there are more Muslim
than Catholic pupils in Vienna’s schools (Heute 2017; Kronen Zeitung 2017; Öster-
reich 2017). Kronen Zeitung ran an article with the title “32,000 in the Schools:
More Muslims Than Catholics in Vienna”. Strache may have taken this information
from tabloid media. The tabloids only focused on primary schools (Volksschule) and
new secondary schools (Neue Mittelschulen), but left out pupils aged 10–14 who
attend secondary academic schools (Gymnasium, Allgemeinbildende Höhere Schulen
[AHS]). The majority of pupils in new secondary schools are Muslims, which has to
do with the fact that Austria’s secondary school system is class-structured and there
is a tendency that traditional working-class parents tend to send their children to
this type of school. According to data, in the school year 2016/17, there were
47,132 Roman Catholic children, 31,984 Muslim children, 29,395 other Christian chil-
dren, and 22,133 children of no conviction in Vienna’s schools (Katholische Kirche
Österreich 2017). The claim that there is a majority of Muslim school children seems
to be fake news.
Table 7.8 shows the development of religious conviction in Austria. Although the
share of Muslims has increased, the major tendency is that Austria has in the
past 50 years become a much more secular country. The share of people without
religious conviction has increased from 3.8 per cent in 1961 to 16.9 per cent in
2011. Austria’s major religious trend is not, as claimed by the FPÖ, a supposed
“Islamisation”, but rather the trend of secularisation. The cultural change that
far-right observers whine about has, to a significant degree, to do with the cir-
cumstance that fewer and fewer individuals find the idea of god meaningful and
perceive religious faith and communities as not giving adequate answers to con-
temporary society. Atheism and agnosticism are, just like Christianity and Islam,
important parts of Austrian culture and world culture. Analysis of Debate Excerpts
In its political handbook, the FPÖ (2013) argues: “Islam is a religion that sees the world
as a war zone – until the whole of humanity is Islamic”15 (53). This is a generalising
statement that subsumes all members and versions of Islam into a whole that is
TABLE 7.8 The development of the share of the members of specific religions in the total Austrian population
(in per cent)
Religion 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001 2011

Roman Catholic 89.0 89.0 87.4 84.3 78.0 73.6 64.2
Protestantism 6.2 6.2 6.0 5.6 5.0 4.7 4.8
Islam - - 0.3 1.0 2.0 4.2 7.9
No religious conviction 3.8 3.8 4.3 6.0 8.6 12.0 16.9
Sources: Österreichischer Integrationsfonds (2017), Statistik Austria (2019)

presented as violent. In its 2017 election programme, the FPÖ (2017) says that “Islam is
not part of Austria”16 (3). The FPÖ has a nativist understanding of culture. It sees Austria
as part of the “German linguistic and cultural community”17 (FPÖ 2013, 3). It considers
language, religion, art, tradition, morals, customs, songs, prayers, literature, poesy,
music, and thought as forming the nation (FPÖ 2013, 258). By defining Austria’s nation
as German and excluding Islam from Austria, the FPÖ presents a static and one-
dimensional understanding of culture. Austria has been a multicultural social formation
since the time of the Austro-Hungarian Empire so that its culture has never been homo-
geneous. All social groups living in Austria shape a certain part and play a certain role
in Austria’s culture.
Kurz and Strache also refer to refugees by using criminonyms (Reisigl and Wodak
2001, 52), i.e. linguistic constructs that communicate that there is the threat of
crime or terror. Strache speaks of the “IS-guy in a refugee home in Salzburg” who
“was in touch with the Paris assassins”, and Kurz of those who “set off to illegally
enter Europe”. Strache, by evoking the terror of the Islamic State in the context of
a refugee home, not just uses a criminonym, but also the fallacious logic of induct-
ive generalisation, i.e. a “hasty generalisation” known as secundum quid, which
argues “on the basis of a quantitative sample that is not representative” (Reisigl
and Wodak 2001, 73). By mentioning terrorism and the refugee home together, the gen-
eralisations that refugee homes give shelter to terrorists and are breeding grounds for
terrorism are constructed. Strache underlines this meaning by saying that “very danger-
ous developments take place that also concern recruitment”. Kurz constructs refugees
as “illegals”, which does not take into account that there are people fleeing from war,
persecution, and terror. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights defines the right for
everyone “to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution”18 (§14). The
UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees specifies persecution of refugees as
the “fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of
a particular social group or political opinion”.19 All EU countries have ratified both con-
ventions. Therefore, those arriving in Europe and declaring to seek asylum shall be trea-
ted as asylum seekers and not as illegal immigrants.
The overall effect of nationalist ideology, as communicated by Strache and Kurz, is

that attention is distracted from real economic power differentials between capital
and labour as well as the rich and the poor. A study estimates that in Austria, the
richest 1 per cent owns 37.0 per cent of the wealth, whereas the share of the poor-
est 50 per cent in total wealth is just 2.2 per cent (Eckerstorfer et al. 2013).
Figure 7.5 shows the development of the wage share (at market prices) in Austria
and the EU-15 countries in the period from 1960 until 2019. The wage share is the
share of total wages in the gross domestic product.
In Austria, the wage share dropped during the period of analysis from a height of
66.1 per cent in 1978 to a level of 54.3 per cent in 2019. In the EU-15 countries, the
highest level of 65.5 per cent was reached in 1975. Ever since, there was, just like in
Austria, a drop to 55.5 per cent in 2019. The drop of the wage share means an increase
of the capital share, the share of capital in the gross domestic product. Many societies
have, after the economic crisis of the mid-1970s, introduced neoliberal policies that
have privileged capital at the expense of labour. The dropping wage share is an expres-
sion of the class conflict at the macro-economic level. Capital has expanded its share of
the economy, whereas the share of the collective worker has significantly dropped.
The data show that the increasing gap between capital and labour and the inequality
between the rich and the poor is a real social problem. Nationalist ideology that pits
Wage Share, 1960-2019

67.0
66.0
65.0
64.0
Analysis of Debate Excerpts

63.0
62.0
61.0
60.0
59.0
58.0
57.0
56.0
55.0
54.0
53.0
52.0
51.0
50.0
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
EU-15 Austria
FIGURE 7.5 Development of the wage share in Austria and the EU-15 countries
Source: AMECO (2019)
Austrians (or members of another nation) as a hard-working nation against immigrants

and refugees who are presented as a social burden that negatively impacts the living
conditions of common people distracts attention from the class conflict. By construct-
ing and presenting refugees and immigrants as a social burden and “scroungers” who
live from the wealth of national citizens, right-wing demagogues “nationalise” social
problems and circumvent discussions of the huge wealth differentials and deepening
inequalities that exist in contemporary capitalist countries. Right-wing politicians such
as Strache and Kurz fulfil an ideological role that serves the interest of capital.
Nationalist ideology is not just produced from above, but also finds responses from below.
Social media is a realm of communication, where such responses can be observed.
7.5 Social Media Analysis

Heinz-Christian Strache and Sebastian Kurz are the two Austrian politicians with the
highest number of followers and likes on their Facebook pages. In the middle of
January 2018, Strache’s Facebook page had around 780,000 likes and 750,000 fol-
lowers, and Kurz’s Facebook page around 720,000 likes and approximately the same
number of followers.
Austrian data journalists captured all comments made on 40 Austrian political Face-
book pages from August to October 2017 (Khomenko 2018). The resulting dataset
consists of 2.9 million comments posted by 400,000 users. Some 8,900 power users
(2 per cent) posted around half of all comments (49 per cent). Some 400 users
(0.1 per cent) who posted at least 500 comments accounted for 18.9 per cent of all
comments. The results show that political commenting on Facebook tends to be
dominated by a group of small, highly active users. The study did not analyse if
there were bots among this commenting elite and if the dominant users’ comments
received significant attention (views, likes, referencing comments).
The Austria Press Agency (2017) analysed 4.2 million user reactions to Facebook post-
ings of the main parties’ frontrunners during the 2017 Austrian federal elections. Sixty-
four per cent of the followers of Pilz List’s frontrunner Peter Pilz were also active on
other frontrunners’ pages. The activity share was 59 per cent for followers of NEOS fron-
trunner Matthias Strolz, 58 per cent in the case of Green Party frontrunner Ulrike Luna-
cek, 37 per cent in the case of SPÖ frontrunner Christian Kern, 29 per cent in the case
of Sebastian Kurz (ÖVP), and 22 per cent in the case of Heinz-Christian Strache (FPÖ).
The analysis shows that the pages of Kurz and Strache are, to a much higher degree
than the other frontrunner pages, self-contained filter bubbles.
Data journalist Muzayen Al-Youssef (2017) gathered reactions (comments, shares, emoti-
cons – “like”, “love”, “haha”, “wow”, “sad”, “angry”) from the pages of the frontrunners
of Austria’s major parties from 1 August until 28 September 2017 (see the overview in
Table 7.9). Strache received the largest number of reactions, followed by Kurz and Kern.
The average number of reactions per posting was largest for Kurz, followed by Strache
and Kern. Given that Strache and Kurz are the two Austrian politicians with the largest
number of Facebook followers, this result is not surprising. Strache received by far the
highest average number of “angry” reactions to his postings, which may have to do with
the fact that opponents of the ÖVP and the FPÖ are less organised in filter bubbles and
therefore tend to also react to FPÖ and ÖVP postings. It may also indicate that Strache’s
politics and postings are especially polarising.
The FPÖ also produces, maintains, and uses its own media, such as Unzensuriert.at
and FPÖ TV. Unzensuriert.at (“Uncensored”) is a news platform that was founded in
TABLE 7.9 Analysis of reactions to Facebook postings of the frontrunners in the 2017 Austrian federal elections
Politician Number of Number of Average number of Average number of “angry”

reactions postings reactions per posting emotions per posting
Heinz-Christian 677,789 313 2,165 216
Strache (FPÖ)
Sebastian Kurz 565,309 200 2,826 43 Social Media Analysis
(ÖVP)
Christian Kern 395,429 230 1,719 7
(SPÖ)
Matthias Strolz 31,489 201 157 2
(NEOS)
Peter Pilz (Pilz List) 26,939 52 518 5
Ulrike Lunacek 10,142 141 72 0.3
(Green Party)
Barbara Rosenk- 8,277 135 61 4
ranz (FLÖ)
Mirko Messner 418 9 46 0
(KPÖ)
Isabella Heydarfa- 178 29 6 0.03
dai (Die Weißen)
Source: Al-Youssef (2017)

2009 by people around FPÖ politician Martin Graf, who was then the Third President
of the Austrian Parliament. FPÖ TV is a YouTube channel that in January 2018 had
about 19,000 followers. Alexander Höferl, Fritz Simandl, and Walter Asperl have
played important roles at Unzensuriert. On 12 January 2018, Unzensuriert was the
746th most accessed web platform in Austria.20 In December 2017, Höferl switched
from his work for Unzensuriert and as the FPÖ’s director of communication to the
job of the communication director of FPÖ Minister of the Interior Herbert Kickl.
Unzensuriert also spreads links to its articles via social media, especially on Face-
book, where it had more than 60,000 followers in January 2018.
In 2017, the German investigative journalist Stefanie Albrecht made an under-

cover report about Unzensuriert. She applied to work at Unzensuriert and docu-
mented how fake news was adopted from the blog Philosophia Perennis for an
article without checking for correctness. Höferl told Albrecht: “We do not make
this medium because we feel so strongly about independent journalism, but
rather because we want to support this political movement in a certain way.
[…] We report purely positively about it”21 (RTL Extra 2017). In 2016, the Aus-
trian Office for the Protection of the Constitution and the Suppression of Terror-
ism assessed that Unzensuriert “publishes content that is partly extremely
xenophobic und has anti-Semitic tendencies. Also conspiracy theory approaches
and pro-Russian ideology are represented”22 (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz
und Terrorismusbekämpfung 2016).
The journalists Jakob Winter and Ingrid Brodnig (2016) analysed all 124 articles
published by Unzensuriert during a two-week period in 2016. Whereas the cover-
age of refugees, migrants, Muslims, the EU, presidential candidate Alexander
van der Bellen, and the left was purely negative, reports about FPÖ presidential
candidate Norbert Hofer, the FPÖ, Donald Trump, and Russia were almost
entirely positive.
An analysis has documented nationalist reactions to Strache’s and Hofer’s Facebook

postings during the 2016 Austrian presidential elections (Fuchs 2016a). Hans-Henning
Scharsach (2017) argues that three types of violent comments can be found among the
reactions to Strache’s Facebook postings: “insults”23 (122), “calls for violence”24 (123),
and “fantasies of violence expressed in typical Nazi-diction”25 (123).
Strache often posts links to online articles from Kronen Zeitung, especially those
that focus on crimes committed by asylum seekers and immigrants: “It is
a business based on reciprocity, in which both sides win: Strache benefits polit-
ically. […] Krone profits economically”26 (Scharsach 2017, 130). And the FPÖ
also supports Krone by buying ad space: according to a report, over a six-week
period during the Austrian 2017 election campaign phase, the FPÖ was, with
€953,778, the party that invested the highest amount of money into newspaper
ads. The largest share of this sum, namely 33 per cent, was spent on ads in
Kronen Zeitung (Dossier 2017).
Table 7.10 shows that the postings in the analysed dataset predominantly communicate
support for the ÖVP/FPÖ coalition government. A small minority of 14.1 per cent voiced
opposition.
Authoritarianism is a character structure, ideology, and mode for the organisation of

society that is shaped by the belief in top-down leadership, nationalism, the friend/
enemy scheme, and militarism/law and order politics (for a detailed elaboration of this
model, see Fuchs 2018a). In the analysed dataset, all four elements could be found to
a significant degree in the ideological structure of postings supporting the ÖVP/FPÖ gov-
ernment (see Table 7.11). Top-down leadership is an authoritarian organisation principle
of social systems and society that is anti-democratic and believes in centralising power
in the hands of single persons or groups. Whereas nationalism is an ideology that organ-
ises the inner identity and self-understanding of nationalist groups, the friend/enemy
scheme is a corresponding ideological principle that defines the inner identity (“we”,
“us”) against outer enemies (“they”, “them”). The law and order principle and militarism
are modes of dealing with the identified enemies. They suggest repressing the enemy Social Media Analysis
by direct, structural, or symbolic violence.
Table 7.11 shows that all four principles of authoritarianism could be identified in
the analysed dataset. The friend/enemy scheme was the discourse principle used
most frequently for justifying support for the ÖVP/FPÖ government: 65.2 per cent of
all postings supporting the right-wing Austrian government employed a reference to
TABLE 7.10 Share of specific types of postings in the analysed dataset,

N = 2,367
Position Absolute number Relative share

Support 1,607 67.9%
Opposition 334 14.1%
Unclear 426 18.0%
TABLE 7.11 Dimensions of authoritarianism in the analysed dataset among postings sup-
porting the ÖVP/FPÖ government, N = 1,607

Leadership 387 24.1%
Nationalism 193 12.0%
Friend/enemy scheme 1,047 65.2%
Law and order 615 38.3%
enemies. Law and order discourse was the second most frequently employed dis-
course principles used for justifying support, followed by references to strong leader-
ship and nationalism. The four discursive elements of authoritarianism cannot
always be clearly separated; there are cases where they appear in combined forms.
We will now have a look at examples found in the analysed dataset for each of the four
dimensions of authoritarianism. The examples have been translated from German to
English.
The Leadership Discourse
Consider the following example postings from the analysed dataset:
A young man who has more intellect than the current rulers who are out of touch
with reality. Hope he remains healthy and can implement the signs that he
sets.27 (#968)
Dear Mr Minister of the Interior, please redeem the Austrian people from
this plague …28 (#757)
Thank you, Sebastian Kurz. Finally steps into the right direction are taken
in respect to the topic of ‘refugee policy’. Please close down the borders
and control closely who comes into our country!29 (#1057)
A new government that also translates its election promises into action is
something entirely new. That’s almost like President Donald Trump.
BRAVO, just keep it up.30 (#1967)
If Mr Kickl as minister clamps down just half as hard as he did as oppos-

itional politician, then he is a big gain for Austria’s security.31 (#2187)
Dear Sebastian, please come to Berlin and rule us as well! Otherwise

Merkel will soon turn Germany into an Islamic caliphate.32 (#877)
Maybe Germany and Austria can form a grand coalition and Mr Kurz then
rules both countries!!!!!!!33 (#1773)
In these passages, Sebastian Kurz is predicated by anthroponyms. An anthroponym is

a characterisation that uses human capacities, such as references to the human body or
mind. Kurz is presented as a “young man” with “intellect”. In a similar vein, other postings
characterise Kurz, for example, as “a 31-year-old politician in Europe, who recognises the
sorrows and hardships of the people”34 (#277), a “reasonable, routinised and convincing
[…] 31-year-old, young politician”35 (#1281), or a “young, dynamic man”36 (#1095).
Such anthroponyms reproduce the tendency that in contemporary politics, the focus
on personality, personal life, and looks replaces the engagement with political topics
and causes of society’s problems. Politics has become a marketplace where politi-
cians try to present and sell themselves as brands and celebrities. In his government
declaration to the Austrian Parliament, Kurz stressed that his team consists of
“younger ones and the ones who are young at heart”37 (Kurz 2017b, 4). Neoliberalism
has advanced the ideal of everyone being an entrepreneur of the self, who is respon-
sible for him or herself, has to dynamically adapt to changes, and is individually respon-
sible for failure just like for success. In order to find work and stay in work, the
neoliberal entrepreneurial subject, who often works as precarious freelancer, has to sell
not just his services, but him or herself, in order to attract clients. Being young is, in the
context of neoliberalism, a symbol of agility, strength, and hard, productive labour,
Social Media Analysis
whereas old age is, in the same context, a symbol of unproductiveness and dependence:
“Human capital’s constant and ubiquitous aim, whether studying, interning, working,
planning retirement, or reinventing itself in a new life, is to entrepreneurialize its
endeavors, appreciate its value, and increase its rating or ranking” (Brown 2015, 36).
The effect of neoliberal entrepreneurialism is the stepwise destruction of the welfare
state. Sebastian Kurz is a manifestation of neoliberal subjectivity. In reality, the age and
look of a politician say nothing about the policies he or she stands for. The focus on
personality distracts public attention from and destroys the potential dedication of time
to a thorough analysis of society’s problems.
In authoritarian thought, leaders are often seen as both close to the people and
godlike. A clear example is the posting that speaks of Kickl as being able to
“redeem the Austrian people from this plague” of refugees. Using the topos of
the saviour (Wodak 2015, 10), Kickl is presented as the godlike redeemer and the
hatred of refugees as a holy, religious struggle. It almost seems like their hatred
of refugees has, for many citizens, the status of a twenty-first-century crusade.
God stands for love, whereas the characterisation of refugees and migrants as
a disease (the plague) expresses absolute hatred. Authoritarianism preaches love
for the leader and the fictive collective of the nation and hatred against con-
structed enemies. Also, the logic of comparison is used for stressing the leader-
ship qualities of Kurz, Strache, and Kickl. The government is, for example,
compared to Trump.
Authoritarian leaders are not only religiously worshiped by their followers. The latter
also stress that powerful leaders are required to bring about change by taking harsh
measures. In the examples, this becomes evident in the formulations that Kurz
should “close down” and “closely control” the borders, that Kickl will “clamp down”
on foreigners and is “a big gain for Austria’s security”, that the government takes
“action”, and that Kurz immediately brings about “steps in the right direction”.
Strong leadership is, on the one hand, envisioned as the centralisation of power
and, on the other hand, as the use of that power for implementing law and order
politics.
There were also postings that called for a reunification of Austria and Germany
under Sebastian Kurz’s rule. Kurz is, in this context, posited as a strong leader and
is positioned against Angela Merkel, who is presented as refugee-friendly chancellor
destroying Germany: “Merkel will soon turn Germany into an Islamic caliphate” (see
above), Sebastian Kurz “could spare us mummy Merkel”38 (#922), “The delusion of our
mummy must be confronted by competent, fresh leaders”39 (#1330), “Your mummy never-
theless wants to again fly in around 2 million Muslim asylum seekers on planes (on your
costs !) !! The decline is already predetermined. One wants a complete substitution of
the people !!”40 (#838). Users who employ the genderonym “mummy” for characterising
Angela Merkel want to express that in their view, she shows love for refugees and
thereby hatred for the German nation. Refugees are defined as not belonging to the
nation and as un-German. It is a tragedy of history that 73 years after the end of
the Second World War and Nazi-Germany’s terror, some Germans and Austrians take
Kurz’s politics as an opportunity for demanding an Anschluss, this time not of Austria to
Germany, but of Germany to Austria (“Kurz then rules both countries”, “come to Berlin
and rule us as well”).
Nationalism
Let us have a look at some examples of nationalism in the analysed dataset:
At last Austrian politics is being made!41 (#1851)
Bravo, finally politics is being made for the Austrians.42 (#1876)

43
Please only look out for Austria and its people! (#2112)
The first difference to the red government of Kern is that politics is first of
all made for the Austrians and not for the refugees.44 (#1830)
First we are tolerant, and then we are foreign in our own country.45 (#600)
Austria first! Thereby I mean the autochthonous Austrians who are in need
and not some Chechen guardians of public morals, criminals committing
violence against our police and other migrating criminals.46 (#190)
In the next 10 years, we want to again feel like Austrians and masters of
our own country.47 (#1727)
Restore a liveable, secure Austria for its citizens! That’s only possible
through harshness!48 (#2347)
Kickl was the best choice! He is tough, correct and loves Austria!49 (#2297)
The nation is, in these postings, characterised as a political unit (“our own country”, “Aus- Social Media Analysis
trian politics”, “Austrian citizens”), an economic unit (“a liveable, secure Austria for its
citizens”), and a people (“the Austrians”, “Austria and its people”). In some of
the examples, the use of the first-person plural pronoun “we” (“We are toler-
ant”, “we are foreign in our own country”) and of the possessive personal pro-
noun “our” (“Our own country”, “our police”) marks a nationalist in-group
identity that is defined against an alien outside against which it closes itself
off and that it considers as enemy. The postings show the close relationship
of nationalism, (new) racism, and the friend/enemy scheme. The Austrian
nation is defined against refugees and migrants, who are seen as intruders
and aliens against whom the nation must be defended by political measures.
As a consequence, there are calls for toughness, harshness, and law and order
politics. The nation is imagined as culturally pure, homogenous, and unitary.
There is a call to an imagined lost origin. Migrant and refugees are blamed
for this loss. In reality, Austria has never been culturally homogenous, but has
since the time of the Austrian Empire been a multicultural society.
Among the 200 most widely used family names in Austria, one finds not just names
whose linguistic origin is German (such as Wagner, Gruber, or Winkler), but also Hungar-
ian names such as Horvath and Toth, Czech names such as Novak, and Serbian names
such as Jovanović.50 In the Austrian online phone book, one can find 9,210 entries for
Gruber, 6,939 for Wagner, and 4,499 for Winkler, but also 3,280 families named Horvath
or Horvat.51 Families originally speaking Hungarian, Czech, Slovakian, Slovenian, Croatian,
Serbian, or Polish have been settling and living in cities such as Vienna for hundreds of
years. Austria is not and has never been an originally and purely German country.
Nationalist rhetoric that is quite similar to the rhetoric found in the analysed dataset
and that defines Austria as a homeland against migrants can also be found in the
ÖVP/FPÖ government programme: “We protect our welfare state from abuse and will
stop illegal migration to Austria”52 (ÖVP/FPÖ 2017, 7). “We want to preserve our
homeland Austria as liveable country with all its cultural amenities. This includes to
decide on our own who is allowed to live with us as immigrants and to stop illegal
migration”53 (ÖVP/FPÖ 2017, 9). Social protection (the welfare state, good livelihood)
and culture are defined as being part of the nation (“our”, “we”). Both sequences
oppose the nation and its claimed ownership of culture and the welfare state to
migrants, implying that they are a threat to welfare, uncivilised and uncultured.
The Friend/Enemy Scheme
The friend/enemy scheme was the most frequently employed ideological discourse
principle in the analysed dataset. Table 7.12 provides an analysis of specific
enemies mentioned in the dataset.
Migrants and refugees (70.6 per cent of all mentions of enemies) are by far the
most common enemy mentioned by those who employed the friend/enemy scheme
in the dataset. The political left and Angela Merkel are the second and third most
mentioned enemies. Given that the refugee topic dominated the 2017 Austrian par-
liamentary election campaigns and debates, this result is not a surprise.
Those who advance nationalist, xenophobic, or racist arguments do so by using spe-

cific ideological forms of communication (see Table 7.7) – biological, socio-economic,
political, and cultural discourse themes. Biological arguments, namely the claim that
TABLE 7.12 The mentioning of specific enemies in the analysed dataset

Migrants and refugees 814 70.6%
The political left 97 8.4%
Angela Merkel 90 7.8%
Political opposition 63 5.5%
EU 44 3.8%
Islam and Muslims 33 2.9%
Criminals and terrorists 6 0.5%
The media and journalists 4 0.3%
The unemployed and welfare recipients 2 0.2%
Total number of times specific enemies were mentioned 1153
refugees and immigrants are an inferior race, could, with some exceptions, hardly
be found in the dataset. In contrast, socio-economic, political, and cultural forms of
nationalism and new racism prevailed. Let us have a look at some examples:
It can also not be right that in Vienna council flats are filled with foreign-
ers! And Austrians do not get a flat!54 (#191)
50% foreigners is cool! Keep it up … 90% of the school children do not

speak our language.55 (#146)
And then Europe is soon just as overpopulated, impoverished, violent, ghetto- Social Media Analysis
ised as well as economically and educationally run down as the countries of
origin of the skilled workers seeking asylum. Then patriarchal ways of thinking,
the oppression of women, religious fanaticism and ethnic conflict prevail
here again; a really nice future for Austrian children.56 (#944)
The central problem is not just illegal immigration ! Also official immigration
from the Arab region is no longer bearable !! Alien to our culture, – An innate
aversion to our lifestyle respectively our culture and religion, – Therefore they
have already a long time ago begun to create their own society. They live
according to their own laws and rules, – We and our country are only there to
guarantee them a convenient and carefree and socially secure existence !! The
‘con’ of multiculturalism has been unmasked, – at the latest since the rapes,
robberies, etc., etc., etc. …! In 2016, asylum seekers committed more than
15,000 crimes !! THAT is the reality !! And every sceptic should once look
over the border, – In Berlin, Arab clans call the shots and have practically elim-
inated the rule of the state. When will we have the same problems ?? Or is it
already happening ??57 (#1083)
I do not want to go to work for supporting people, who do not learn our
language, do not integrate and do not even remotely accept our values and
our culture. Furthermore, many of them will never contribute something to
the functioning of our welfare state, but will forever ‘remain stuck’ on min-
imum benefits. Unfortunately this problem, as described above, concerns
many refugees58 (#1057)
We can find a number of claims in these examples that dominate not just the
discourse structure of the dataset, but contemporary discussions about migra-
tion and refugees in general:
• Discourse topic of economic enemies: “They are social parasites who live
from our money. They take away our jobs and houses and are a burden to our
healthcare system, our education system, our social services, etc.”
• Discourse topic of political enemies: “They pose a terrorist and criminal threat
and a threat to our nation’s security. We have to be afraid about what could
happen to our children.”
• Discourse topic of cultural enemies: “Their culture, language, and religion are differ-
ent from ours and threaten the survival of our culture, language, and religion. If they
want to live here, then they have to adopt our culture, speak our language, and
accept our religion. Their culture is uncivilised, and they come from countries where
religious fundamentalism is prevalent. They oppose our culture and language and
are a threat to the development of our children and the survival of our nation.”
The first example focuses on constructing immigrants as a socio-economic problem. The

use of the verb “filling” (befüllen in German) for characterising immigrants living in council
flats communicates that there is a mass of people that constitutes a burden to the housing
system. The posting combines the topos of (large) numbers and the topos of burdening
(Reisigl and Wodak 2001, 78–79) for arguing that the insinuated large number of immi-
grants results in problems for Austrians. The second example uses the same logic and
claims that there is a very large share of immigrants in the population, resulting in a vast
majority (90 per cent) of children not speaking German. Immigrants are presented as con-
stituting a cultural problem.
The third example combines the socio-economic, the political, and the cultural dis-
course topics. Immigrants are presented as a socio-economic problem (overpopula-
tion, impoverishment, ghettos), a political problem (violence, oppression of women,
fanaticism, ethnic conflicts), and a cultural problem (educational decline). The topos
of threat, which argues that “if a political action or decision bears specific danger-
ous, threatening consequences, one should not perform or do it” (Reisigl and Wodak
2001, 77), is used by claiming that refugees and immigrants pose a large threat to
society and “Austrian children”. Both the second and third examples refer to chil-
dren, which is a rhetoric strategy that plays with the fear of parents that something
could happen to their children.
Also, the fourth example uses the topos of immigrants as threat to culture (“aversion
to our lifestyle” and “religion”), political life (“they live according to their own
laws”, “rapes, robberies”, “asylum seekers committed more than 15 000 crimes”,
“Arab clans” eliminate “the rule of the state”), and the economy (we “guarantee
them a convenient and carefree and socially secure existence”). Immigrants and
Muslims are presented as criminals, social “parasites”, and cultural aliens. The
example combines socio-economic, political, and cultural themes, and advances cul-
tural nationalism (“our culture”) and political nationalism (“our country”).
The fifth example constructs refugees as a socio-economic problem (“I […] work for
supporting [these] people”, they “never contribute something to the functioning of
our welfare state”, they “remain stuck” on “minimum benefits”) and as a cultural
problem (they “do not learn our language, do not integrate and do not even remotely Social Media Analysis
accept our values and our culture”). By making use of the topos of threat, refugees
are presented as a socio-economic burden and cultural threat.
All five examples use the logic of the friend/enemy scheme for constructing an us/
them difference between Austrians and foreigners. We-identity is expressed by
reference to the ethnonyms “Austrians” and “Austrian children” and the use of col-
lective nouns and possessive pronouns as in “we and our country”, “our lifestyle”,
“our religion”, “our language”, “our culture”, “our welfare state”, etc. Refugees and
immigrants are purely negatively characterised as “parasites”, criminals, and cultural
aliens.
It was already shown in Section 7.4 that immigrants contribute more to Austria’s wel-
fare system than they take out, and that secularisation is one of the largest cultural
changes. Austria is not on the way to becoming a predominantly Muslim country, but is
becoming an ever-more secular country. How has the number of asylum seekers coming
to Austria developed in recent years? Table 7.13 shows an overview.
The year 2015 saw the peak of asylum seekers in recent years. At that time, the Islamic
State had captured significant parts of Syria and Iraq. By 2017, the number was lower
than in 2014. The majority of asylum seekers have been coming from Syria, Afghanistan,
and Iraq, from where many families and individuals had to flee because of war and the
Islamic State’s terror. The whole region has been politically destabilised by the wars in
Afghanistan (since 2001) and Iraq (2003–2011), in which EU countries such as the
United Kingdom, Poland, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Bulgaria, Romania, Spain, and
the Czech Republic participated. The political turmoil and chaos benefited the rise of the
Islamic State. Given the falling levels of asylum seekers after the 2015 peak, to speak
directly or metaphorically of masses of refugees is certainly a gross exaggeration that
does not correspond to reality.
Table 7.14 shows that in 2015, Germany was the country that received the largest share
of asylum application, followed by Hungary, Sweden, Austria, Italy, and France. In 2016,
the countries with the largest shares were Germany, Italy, France, Greece, and Austria.
Paragraph 18 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union defines
a right to asylum under the rules of the Geneva Convention (Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees 1951). The implication is that denying refugees the right to flee from
persecution, hindering them to do so, or setting a maximum limit to the annual number
of asylum application denies them human rights and the right to life. The problem the
EU has faced is that it does not have a quota system that regulates the distribution of
refugees and asylum seekers in a legally binding manner. As a result, some countries
have very low shares of the overall number of asylum seekers.
TABLE 7.13 Asylum seekers in Austria
2017 2016 2015 2014

Asylum seekers 24,296 42,285 88,340 28,452
Positive asylum decisions 29,588 26,517 19,003 11,535
Negative asylum decisions 27,474 25,487 24,017 14,596
Top four countries of origins of asylum Syria Afghanistan Afghanistan Syria
seekers Afghanistan Syria Syria Afghanistan
Pakistan Iraq Iraq Russia
Iraq Pakistan Iran Kosovo
Source: BMI, www.bmi.gv.at/301/Statistiken/, accessed 28 January 2017

TABLE 7.14 Asylum applications in the EU
Asylum applicants Asylum applicants Share of EU Share of EU

2015 2016 total 2015, in % total 2016, in %
EU-28 1,322,825 1,260,910 - -
Belgium 44,660 18,280 3.4 1.4
Bulgaria 20,365 19,420 1.5 1.5
Czech Republic 1,515 1,475 0.1 0.1
Denmark 20,935 6,180 1.6 0.5
Germany 476,510 745,155 36.0 59.1
Estonia 230 175 0.0 0.0
Ireland 3,275 2,245 0.2 0.2
Greece 13,205 51,110 1.0 4.1
Spain 14,780 15,755 1.1 1.2
France 76,165 84,270 5.8 6.7
Croatia 210 2,225 0.0 0.2
Italy 83,540 122,960 6.3 9.8
Cyprus 2,265 2,940 0.2 0.2
Latvia 330 350 0.0 0.0
Lithuania 315 430 0.0 0.0
Luxembourg 2,505 2,160 0.2 0.2
Hungary 177,135 29,430 13.4 2.3
Malta 1,845 1,930 0.1 0.2
Netherlands 44,970 20,945 3.4 1.7
Austria 88,160 42,255 6.7 3.4 Social Media Analysis
Poland 12,190 12,305 0.9 1.0
Portugal 895 1,460 0.1 0.1
Romania 1,260 1,880 0.1 0.1
Slovenia 275 1,310 0.0 0.1
Slovakia 330 145 0.0 0.0
Finland 32,345 5,605 2.4 0.4
Sweden 162,450 28,790 12.3 2.3
United Kingdom 40,160 39,735 3.0 3.2

It is in this context surprising that Sebastian Kurz sees the attempt to establish EU-wide
quotas as a failure and argues that “the member states should decide themselves if and
how many people they take in. […] To force states to admit refugees does not help
Europe”59 (Die Welt 2017). Implicitly, this implies that he thinks that EU member states
have the right to say they want to accommodate no refugees and to deny asylum
seekers the right to life by sending them collectively back or not letting them in.
Table 7.15 shows that the rate of violent crime in total crime has in Austria in the past
ten years had a relatively constant value between 7.5 per cent and 8.0 per cent. The abso-
lute number of violent crimes has in 2015 and 2016 been lower than in 2009, 2011, and
2012. Table 7.16 shows that the murder rate (the number of intentional homicides per
hundred thousand inhabitants) has in the years 2009, 2014, and 2015 been the lowest in
the EU-28 countries. Overall, one cannot observe a drastic rise of crime and violent crime
in Austria in the context of an increased number of refugees. Tabloid media report daily
about single acts of violent crimes, often those committed by foreigners. Single examples
are used for stoking fear and distracting attention from the circumstance that Austria is
one of the securest countries in the world. The result is that the subjective feeling of
being threatened by crime increases and citizens become more prone to right-wing propa-
ganda that constructs asylum seekers and immigrants as criminals.
Tables 7.17 and 7.18 show some aspects of Austria’s demographic development. Austria
has an ageing population. The share of people aged 65 or older will, according to fore-
casts, increase from 18.5 per cent in 2017 to 28.1 per cent in 2060. Between 1951 and
TABLE 7.15 Reported crimes in Austria
Annual number of crimes Annual number of violent crimes Share of violent crimes in
reported to the police reported to the police total crimes reported
2008 570,952 43,090 7.5%
2009 589,961 43,447 7.4%
2010 534,351 40,532 7.6%
2011 539,970 43,353 8.0%
2012 547,764 44,290 8.1%
2013 546,396 42,344 7.7%
2014 527,692 40,184 7.6%
2015 517,869 40,333 7.8%
2016 537,792 43,098 8.0%
Source: Bundeskriminalamt (2016)

2017, the average population age in Austria has increased from 35.7 to 42.5 years. If
this trend continues at the same pace, then the average age will be 49.0 years in 2080.
That we live longer on average is a positive development that has to do with medical
and social progress. At the same time, given that the share of pensioners increases,
there is a danger that the pension system will be difficult to fund in the future. If the
pension age is further increased, then this would mean that more people may work until
they die and not be able to enjoy life as pensioners. In order to secure the pension
system, countries such as Austria need immigrants, who tend to be younger and to be
part of the workforce. Enabling refugees who have come to Austria in recent years to
learn German, to engage in education and skills development, and to become part of the
workforce is a positive investment in the future of the Austrian population and its social
conditions. Seen from this point of view, migration and refugees may be seen not as
a threat, but as an opportunity. In contrast, the ÖVP/FPÖ government programme defines
migration explicitly as a security threat:
Because of the changed geopolitical situation in and around Austria, the

government however also requires a security architecture that is adapted
to new threats and challenges (transnational terrorism, foreign agitation,
migration), in the context of which in the future much higher priority needs
to be given to prevention.60 (ÖVP/FPÖ 2017, 31)
Law and Order Politics

Authoritarianism does not stop at defining the nation in opposition to enemies and as Social Media Analysis
being best organised top-down and by strong leaders. It often argues in addition for
repressing the constructed enemies, i.e. for law and order politics, militarism, or militancy.
Calls for law and order politics were widely present in the analysed dataset. The
basic logic or argument is that refugees, Muslims, and immigrants pose a threat to
Austrian society, its economy, political system, and culture, and that the presence of
threats justifies repressive measures.
First, there were general calls for law and order in the dataset that did not further
specify specific measures:
The dogs must feel that they are not wanted here!61 (#48)
Ultimately those who just want to nest with us are sorted out.62 (#714)
TABLE 7.16 Number of intentional homicides per hundred thousand inhabitants
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Belgium 1.90 1.76 1.74 1.95 1.85 1.84 1.86 1.96
Bulgaria 2.29 2.01 1.99 1.74 1.92 1.50 1.60 1.79
Czech Republic 1.09 1.01 1.00 0.79 0.90 0.87 0.80 0.80
Denmark 0.99 0.85 0.89 0.88 0.77 0.73 1.05 0.81
Germany 0.80 0.88 0.85 0.86 0.77 0.77 0.80 0.81
Estonia 6.28 5.24 5.25 4.89 4.75 3.94 3.12 3.19
Ireland 2.00 1.95 1.96 1.44 1.72 1.81 1.74 1.32
Greece 1.24 1.29 1.58 1.65 1.49 1.28 0.96 0.79
Spain 0.89 0.89 0.86 0.82 0.78 0.65 0.69 0.65
France 1.60 1.27 1.23 1.32 1.20 1.18 1.20 1.53
Croatia 1.65 1.14 1.44 1.14 1.19 1.08 0.85 0.88
Italy 1.05 1.00 0.89 0.93 0.89 0.84 0.78 0.77
Cyprus 1.16 2.38 0.85 0.95 2.20 1.27 1.17 1.42
Latvia 4.52 4.99 3.30 3.33 4.74 3.41 3.85 4.08
Lithuania 8.90 7.54 6.33 6.19 6.03 5.79 5.27 5.75
Luxembourg 1.45 1.01 1.59 0.78 0.57 0.19 0.73 0.89
Hungary 1.46 1.39 1.33 1.42 1.14 1.39 1.31 1.00
Malta 1.47 0.97 0.97 0.72 2.39 1.42 1.41 0.93
Netherlands 0.91 0.93 0.87 0.86 0.87 0.74 - -
Austria 0.70 0.61 0.73 0.96 1.05 0.73 0.47 0.49
Poland 1.21 1.29 1.15 1.18 0.99 0.78 0.74 0.75
Portugal 1.17 1.23 1.17 1.08 1.16 1.37 0.88 0.96
Romania 2.28 1.94 1.88 1.56 1.88 1.68 1.49 1.46
Slovenia 0.55 0.64 0.54 0.83 0.68 0.58 0.82 0.97
Slovakia 1.75 1.56 1.65 1.78 1.39 1.44 1.33 0.89
Finland 2.51 2.25 2.22 2.05 1.63 1.66 1.63 1.61
Sweden 0.89 1.00 0.97 0.86 0.72 0.91 0.90 1.15
England and Wales 1.17 1.08 1.14 0.94 0.97 0.92 0.91 -
Scotland 1.83 1.61 1.91 1.76 1.19 1.15 1.11 -
Northern Ireland 1.36 1.62 1.28 1.27 1.15 1.09 0.93 1.25
EU-28 average 1.90 1.78 1.65 1.56 1.63 1.43 1.39 1.44

TABLE 7.17 Share of population aged 65/75 or older, in per cent
Year Share of population Share of population Average population age

aged 65 or older aged 75 or older
1869 5.2% 1.2% 29.6
1900 5.7% 1.5% 29.3
1934 7.9% 2.2% 33.5
1951 10.6% 3.2% 35.7
1971 14.2% 4.7% 36.1
1991 15.0% 6.7% 38.1
2011 17.8% 8.1% 41.7
2017 18.5% 9.1% 42.5
2025 (forecast) 20.7%
2030 (forecast) 23.0%
2040 (forecast) 26.0%
2050 (forecast) 27.2%
2060 (forecast) 28.1%
Source: Statistik Austria (2019)
TABLE 7.18 Share of pensioners in total population, in per cent
Year Share of pensioners in total population

1971 17.3%
1981 18.2%
Social Media Analysis
1991 19.8%
2001 21.5%
2011 22.1%
Source: Statistik Austria (2019)
A second demand found in the dataset was that the borders should be closed and
no asylum seekers should be let in:
Asylum needs to be categorically abolished.63 (#2349)
I still do not understand that they simply come into our country, do not let
them in, that all costs mega bucks.64 (#224)
A third demand was the mass deportation of refugees and criminal migrants. The
Austrian military owns three C-130 Hercules transport planes. In 2008, Strache
demanded that these planes should be used for deportations so that the deportees
would not be on regular flights together with other passengers: “And do you know
how deportation works today? In civil aviation planes, where passengers go off on
holiday, the deportee flies along. Well, what approach to deportation is this?
What for do we have military transport planes such as the Hercules? I say: The
Hercules needs to be converted into a departure plane. That’s where they can
then scream and pee themselves. Nobody is disturbed then. And then they are
deported”.65 Echoing Strache, similar demands could be found in the analysed
dataset:
Put them into the next Hercules, make it fully occupied, and one needs
a great many planes.66 (#24)
Immediate changes of the law, please, and fill up the Hercules.67 (#260)
The Hercules is just waiting for its use.68 (#395)
I wish that 2018 will become the year of deportations!69 (#2307)
Fourth, there was the demand to dispossess refugees:
Seizure of cash, yes of course, they partly have more in their rucksacks
than some might think.70 (#1779)
Seizure of cash, screening of mobile phone data, that’s all completely appro-
priate. That’s how one immediately identifies various criminals and
terrorists.71 (#1786)
Why not also watches and necklaces, let’s go the whole hog.72 (#1725)
Fifth, there was the demand to build internment camps for refugees in the analysed
dataset:
Even if other states do not take back their citizens, one can intern them in
order to protect citizens from danger.73 (#301)
Maybe one can talk to Putin, Siberia would lend itself.74 (#254)
FPÖ politicians have demanded using mass quarters or barracks for “concentrating”
asylum seekers. In December 2017, FPÖ parliamentarian Johann Gudenus demanded
the creation of “mass quarters” (Massenquartiere) for refugees (Facebook, www
.facebook.com/pg/jgudenus, 18 December 2017). Minister of the Interior Herbert
Kickl argued in January 2018 for “holding asylum seekers concentrated in one
place”75 (Facebook, www.facebook.com/herbertkickl/posts/1998249077120059,
11 January 2018). The BBC reported that “Austria’s far-right interior minister has
caused outrage by using a term associated with Nazi death camps to say asylum
seekers should be concentrated in one place” (BBC 2018). The New York Times
wrote that for “many observers, Kickl’s wording evoked Nazi-era concentration
camps, where Nazis held and killed millions of Jews, political dissenters, disabled
people, Roma and Sinti during World War Two” (New York Times/Reuters 2018).
In January 2018, Heinz-Christian Strache suggested the “state supervision”76 of

asylum seekers, including in military barracks. This would concern those who live in
private accommodations supervised by NGOs. He said: “And it is definitely worth
considering that it can make sense here and there to use vacant barracks.”77 He
furthermore argued that one should think about curfews for asylum seekers:
Already in the past there was a discussion on whether it should be the

case that from a certain evening time onwards all have to be back in the
barracks. There needs to be order as long as there is an open asylum pro-
cedure. Also you will certainly be aware of the existence of problems in
our society.78 (ORF Wien Heute, 4 January 2017) Social Media Analysis
Such logic generalises that all asylum seekers are a security threat because some
are, and that therefore special control is needed.
The constitutional jurist Heinz Mayer argues that such suggestions violate the Con-
stitution: “To lock them in at night is a problem. It is a restriction of freedom. One
cannot lock in asylum seekers for no reason just because they are asylum
seekers”79 (ORF Wien Heute, 5 January 2017).
Sixth, there were suggestions in the analysed dataset to kill refugees and Muslims:
In an emergency, drop them from the air …80 (#26)
Deportation is of no use as they come back around another corner. My

opinion is that we should let them swim back, these animals.81 (#196)
The Muslims are in a ‘holy war’ with us. So proclaim martial law for a week
and ask the Austrians to take matters into their own hands!82 (#747)
Everyday right-wing constructions of dangerous refugees and immigrants in tabloid

media and politics have radicalised Austrian citizens’ fears of change, difference, and
decline. They try to cope with this fear by externalising it communicatively: they formu-
late violent fantasies on social media that range from tough laws to mass murder. By
imagining the suffering of others, nationalists derive pleasure and feelings of superiority
and omnipotence over their illusionary enemies. They act like online soldiers who con-
stantly fight a war of words against illusionary enemies. According to Klaus Theweleit
(1989), authoritarians aim at the symbolic or physical creation of a “bloody miasma, the
empty space, the blackout” as “a moment of survival devoid of threat” by which they
guarantee their “own survival, […] self-preservation and self-regeneration” (221).
The key quality of the blow as an act of physical violence is its capacity to
break and crack open, to smash to pieces. It produces the man as “I,” not
by “switching him in” to some different reality, but by an eruption of mus-
cular activity whose goal is to crush all existing distinction and to raise the
man above the undifferentiated miasma. The civilian forms of the physical
blow are many. They include verbal annihilation – also most often in
revenge for “insults” […] The movement toward miasma may also be dis-
guised as criticism: the “searing critique,” a rude encroachment that ren-
ders its objects unrecognizable, ripping them apart till they begin to
resemble the critic’s image of them as “bloody crap.” (274).
7.6 Conclusion
Main Results
The analysis of speeches, interviews, discussions, programmes, and citizens’ online
and social media comments that stand in the context of Austria’s ÖVP/FPÖ govern-
ments and its political plans has shown several tendencies:
• The friend/enemy scheme: A widespread use of the friend/enemy scheme was

identified that presents refugees and immigrants as socio-economic, political,
and cultural threats to Austrian society. At the socio-economic level, refugees
and immigrants were presented as benefit “scroungers” (Sozialschmarotzer)
living from Austrians’ taxes and as a threat to employment, wages, funding,

and the maintenance of the healthcare system, the housing system, and the
pension system. At the political level, refugees and immigrants were pre-
sented as criminals, rapists, and terrorists who pose threats to Austrian citi-
zens, public life, democracy, children, and women. At the cultural level,
migrants and refugees were constructed as posing a threat to German lan-
guage, Christianity, and established traditions such as Christmas.
• Nationalism: Widespread nationalism was identified as the flip side of the
new racist friend/enemy scheme. Nationalism today mostly takes on non-
biologistic forms that do not argue that there are biologically inferior and
superior nations and races. Rather, nationalism today tends to take on cultural,
political, and socio-economic forms: migrants and refugees are culturally pre-
sented as threats to “our culture”, “our language”, “our traditions”, and “our
lifestyle”; politically as threats to “our state”, “our country”, “our democracy”,
and “our security”; and economically as threats to “our jobs”, “our economy”,
“our resources/infrastructures”, and “our social system”. Cultural, political, and
socio-economic nationalisms are not strictly separate ideological topics, but
often appear in combined forms.
• Authoritarian leadership: Followers of the ÖVP and the FPÖ expressed their
admiration of these parties’ leaders Sebastian Kurz and Heinz-Christian
Strache. They especially admire Kurz’s youthfulness and see Strache, Kurz,
and Kickl as political leaders and godlike political figures who will use their
power to “redeem” Austria from refugees, immigrants, and Muslims.
• Law and order politics: Many followers of the FPÖ and the ÖVP called in the
analysed online comments for law and order politics directed against refugees,
immigrants, and Muslims. In order to counter their own fears, they argued for
Conclusion
taking tough measures. Six types of favoured law and order politics were
identified: general calls for law and order, the closure of all borders to refu-
gees, mass deportation of refugees and criminal migrants, the dispossession
of refugees, the creation of internment camps for refugees, and the killing of
refugees and Muslims. There was a continuum of law and order politics with
increasing levels of violence that start at the tightening of laws and end at
the fascist mass extermination of perceived enemies.
Taken together, empirical research shows indications that among supporters of the
ÖVP/FPÖ government, there is a significant degree of right-wing authoritarian
ideology that combines the friend/enemy scheme, nationalism, the belief in the need
for top-down leadership, and law and order politics.
Both parties have managed to convince a significant proportion of the Austrian popu-
lation that refugees, immigrants, and Muslims constitute a major problem of society,
to which right-wing responses are required. In this ideology, social problems derive
from cultural, political, and socio-economic conflicts between Austrians on the one
side, and refugees, immigrants, and Muslims on the other side. There are no class
conflicts in the ideologies of the ÖVP and the FPÖ. But at the same time, the ÖVP
in particular has been supported by big capital and both parties advance policies
that favour capitalist interests.
The conducted case study shows how authoritarian capitalism uses nationalist ideol-
ogy, the friend/enemy scheme, the leadership ideology, and law and order politics
for distracting attention from the class conflict. The class conflict is ideologically
“nationalised”, which means that social problems are explained in terms of
a conflict between nations. Refugees and immigrants are constructed as scapegoats:
“Important fissures and divides within a society, such as class […] are neglected in
focusing on such ‘Others’” (Wodak 2015, 4).
Challenging Authoritarianism
Some 14.1 per cent of the analysed online comments opposed the ideology of the
followers of the FPÖ and the ÖVP, which shows that there are significant attempts
to challenge authoritarian ideology on the online profiles and social media pages of
right-wing politicians and groups. The key question that arises in this context is
whether rational counterarguments that use logic, statistics, and reason can con-
vince nationalists, racists, xenophobes, authoritarians, and fascists to take on
a different opinion.
One critic commented on Kurz’s Facebook posting that claimed that one must “cor-
rect refugee- & migration-policies’ aberrations & especially stop illegal migration” in
order to “preserve affluence in Germany & Austria”. The critic indicated, like many
others who formulated doubts, that given the history of Austria and Germany, it is
problematic that an Austrian politician makes claims about both Germany and Aus-
tria by evoking negative sentiments directed against refugees and migrants: “It is
impudent to mention Germany in the same breath with Austria when it comes to
Europe. The majority of Germans do not want a nationalist and xenophobic
Europe”83 (#1638). Another comment put this critique more directly: “Anyone who
wishes that once again an Austrian rules in Berlin has not paid attention to
history!”84 (#826).
The critic’s posting resulted in 73 replies, of which 58 were right-wing in character

and defended xenophobia. Many of them also attacked the critic:
Shut your trap.85 (#1605)
We can fairly well dispense with the agitation by a left-wing German, who
stands for even more migration.86 (#1569)
I am sure that your flat has a door with a lock, right? Otherwise, please
reveal your address. We would then immediately accommodate two refu-
gee families there on your costs. Of course without identity checks because
that would be racist.87 (#1574).
You and the established parties are the problem, simply shut your trap.
Not everyone is as silly as you and considers the flood of illegal immi-
grants from all over the world as acceptable.88 (#1616)
A 20 metre high ring of fire around Europe!89 (#1621)
These responses are indicative of the tendency that the attempt to use logical,
empirical, or historical arguments to challenge xenophobia and nationalism often
result in an intensification of these very ideologies. Given that these ideologies are
irrational and operate with emotions, it is hard to challenge them with rational
arguments.
Conclusion
One question that arises is if satire and humour can challenge xenophobia, racism,
and nationalism. The German satirical magazine Titanic printed cartoons that por-
trayed Sebastian Kurz as “Baby Hitler”, which resulted in the creation of the hashtag
#BabyHitler. The ÖVP in turn considered taking the magazine to court, which
reminded some observers of the Turkish President Recep Erdoğan’s attempt to
silence the German comedian Jan Böhmermann’s artistic critique of Turkey’s presi-
dent by legal means.
Satire and humour are certainly means for creating attention for the critique of
nationalism, racism, xenophobia, and authoritarianism and unifying oppositional
movements by cultural means. But a proper anti-fascist politics requires a new

socialism that advances policies that establish alternatives to neoliberalism and
show that the real causes of social problems have to do with class and capitalism.
In addition, we also required new forms of political debate, such as Club 2.0, that
overcome the acceleration, superficiality, and anonymity of discussion and give time
and space to the exploration of the causes of society’s problems.
#IbizaGate
On 17 May 2019, the German newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung, the German weekly
magazine Der Spiegel, and the Austrian weekly Der Falter published excerpts of
a secretly taped video showing Strache and FPÖ parliamentarian Johann Gudenus in
discussion with an alleged Russian oligarch in a finca in Ibiza. The video was recorded
shortly before the 2017 Austrian general election. The published excerpt shows
a discussion about how the oligarch could unofficially donate large sums to the FPÖ’s
election campaign and in return benefit from reciprocal deals with the Austrian state
initiated by the party. Mentioned deals include state building contracts, the privatisation
of water, corporate tax cuts, and the privatisation of one of the channels of Austria’s
public service broadcaster ORF.90 In the video, Strache also suggests that the oligarch
buys Austria’s largest newspaper Kronen Zeitung and that people who are critical of the
FPÖ are fired and the party installs supporters as journalists. Strache says:
Look, if she [the oligarch] really does take over the newspaper first, if there's
really a chance to push us in this newspaper two or three weeks before [the
election], then there's an effect that others will not get. If the medium
pushes us two, three weeks before the election, if this medium suddenly
pushes us […] Then we do not make 27, then we male 34 [percent] […] As
soon as she takes over the Kronen Zeitung, as soon as she does, we have
to talk openly. Then we must talk completely openly and sit down together:
With us at the Krone – Chop! Chop! Chop! – there are three, four people
whom we have to push; three, four people that we have to throw out. And
we bring in five new ones that we build up. And that's the deal.91
The video shows how right-wing politicians favour corruption and illegal financial
flows and their disrespect for the freedom of the press. It shows that they are will-
ing to use economic and political means for manipulating democracy. The video was
widely shared on Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube. Twitter users used the hashtag
#IbizaGate for spreading the video and commenting on it. FPÖ critics also used the
Vengaboys’ 1999 hit song “We’re Going to Ibiza!” as a protest song at demonstra-
tions and on social media. As a consequence, the song became number 1 on iTunes
Austria’s download charts. On 18 May, both Strache and Gudenus resigned, the
ÖVP/FPÖ coalition government collapsed, and Chancellor Kurz called for a snap elec-
tion in September.
Information technology played a dual role in Strache’s fall. First, the video docu-
mented ideas about political corruption. Second, social media helped spread the
information. Right-wing authoritarians often keep their real faces and true nature
hidden from the public. In public appearances, they often talk about how they repre-
sent the interest of everyday people. The secretly recorded video reveals how
a politician talks about abusing taxpayers’ money for his own political advantage,
turning public services into private assets as a return favour for large donations, and
manipulating the public sphere. It documents a deeply authoritarian mindset that dis-
respects democracy. “Ibiza-gate” shows how political power, ideological power, and
economic power intersect. The scandal makes evident that the power of the far-
right can be challenged by documenting how it advances the political economy of
corruption for ideological reasons. Video surveillance and social media were not the
cause of Strache’s fall, but helped to publish information on how the mindset and
potential actions of a politician diverge from the interests of the common people
that he pretends to represent in his public appearances. The general lesson that can
be learned from Ibiza-gate is that right-wing demagogues’ ideology can best be
unmasked by showing how they betray the interests of everyday people by favouring
the interests of the rich, corporations, and the powerful and their own interests at
the expense of the public interest and democracy.
Conclusion
Notes
1 In German, Liste Peter Pilz. The party’s name was changed to JETZT – Liste Pilz in
December 2018.
2 Translation from German: „Wobei wir jetzt einmal restriktiv Einsparungen für die nächsten
Budgets vornehmen werden müssen. Wir haben einen Schuldenstand, der überbor-
dend ist.”
3 Translation from German: „Im Dritten Reich haben sie ordentliche Beschäftigungspolitik
gemacht. was nicht einmal Ihre Regierung in Wien zusammenbringt” (Protokoll der Sit-
zung des Kärntner Landtags, 13 June 1991).
4 Translation from German: „Korporierte verfügen in der Strache-FPÖ vielmehr über beste
Zukunftsaussichten – solange sie im Auftreten nach außen zu gewissen Abstrichen von
der völkischen Lehre bereit sind.”
5 Translation from German: „völkisch-deutschnationale Speerspitze der FPÖ”.
6 Translation from German: „verharmlosen die Verbrechen der Nazis”, „fördern rechtsex-
treme und rassistische Aktivitäten der Jugend”, „betreiben neonazistische Indoktrination”.
7 Translation from German: „Da trat in ihre Mitte der Jude Ben Gurion:Gebt Gas, ihr alten
Germanen, wir schaffen die siebte Million. […] Da schritt in ihre Mitte ein schlitzäugiger
Chines’: Auch wir sind Indogermanen und wollen zur Waffen-SS.”
8 Translation from German: „Die ÖVP schwenkte Ende September 2015 auf den Kurs der
FPÖ um. […] Es macht einen großen Unterschied in der Wahrnehmung, ob ich Menschen,
die vor Tod, Krieg und Folter flüchten, als Flüchtlinge bezeichne. Oder ob ich sie als ille-
gale Migranten oder Wirtschaftsmigranten bezeichne und ihnen damit auch den rechtli-
chen Flüchtlingsstatus abspreche. Wenn das oft genug wiederholt und von den Medien
propagiert wird, dann verfestigt sich dieses Bild kollektiv. […] die Kurz’sche ÖVP hat bes-
timmte traditionelle Merkmale der ÖVP aufgegeben und Charakteristika rechtspopulis-
tischer Parteien angenommen, wie die Betonung des Grenzschutzes, den Stopp der
‚illegalen Migration’, die Verschärfung von Asyl. Ebenso die Law-and-Order-Ausrichtung
und starke Hierarchisierung innerhalb der Partei.”
9 Data source: www.media-analyse.at
10 Data source: http://uis.unesco.org
11 Data source: Media Analyse 2016/2017, www.media-analyse.at/
12 Translation from German: „Ich hab zum Beispiel in Salzburg eine Bäuerin kennengelernt,
die mir erzählt hat, dass sie mit ihrer knappen Pension fast nicht über die Runden
kommt, obwohl sie ein Leben lang hart und sogar körperlich hart gearbeitet hat. Und sie
versteht zu Recht nicht, warum ein Flüchtling die volle Mindestsicherung von Anfang an
erhält.”
13 Data source: ESS Data, http://nesstar.ess.nsd.uib.no/webview/, accessed 10 January 2018.
14 Translation from German: „Es gilt unsere Tradition. Es gilt unsere Kultur. Es gilt unsere
Wertegemeinschaft, liebe Freunde, die nicht verhandelbar ist. Und wem das nicht passt,
der möge letztlich in sein islamisches Land zurückgehen. […] Nicht wir Österreicher
haben uns anzupassen, sondern jene zugewanderten Gäste, welche auf Dauer bei uns
leben wollen. Uns sie müssen akzeptieren, dass Österreichs Kultur und Lebensart die vom
Christentum geprägt ist. […] Ein Bekenntnis zu unserer Kultur, zu unserer Geschichte, zu
unserer Identität und zu unserer Lebensweise. Und ich hab es daher satt, wenn wir
Österreicher uns ständig Sorgen machen müssen, ob das irgendwelchen Leuten, die zu
uns zugewandert sind, passt oder nicht. Wem’s nicht passt, liebe Freunde, der braucht
nicht hier sein. Hier haben wir unsere Regeln, unsere Kultur, unsere Sprache. Und wir
sprechen überwiegend Deutsch, nicht Arabisch und nicht Türkisch oder andere Sprachen.”
15 Translation from German: „Der Islam ist eine Religion, die die Welt als Kriegsschauplatz
ansieht – und zwar solange, bis die gesamte Menschheit islamisch ist.”
16 Translation from German: „Der Islam ist kein Teil Österreichs”.
17 Translation from German: „deutschen Sprach- und Kulturgemeinschaft”.
18 www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/
19 www.unhcr.org/uk/3b66c2aa10
20 www.alexa.com/siteinfo/unzensuriert.at, accessed 12 January 2018.
21 Translation from German: „Wir machen ja nicht dieses Medium, weil uns am unabhängi-
gen Journalismus so sehr gelegen ist, sondern weil wir diese politische Bewegungen in
gewisser Weise unterstützen wollen. […] Eine rein positive Berichterstattung zu fahren.”
22 Translation from German: „veröffentlichten Inhalte sind zum Teil äußerst fremdenfeindlich
und weisen antisemitische Tendenzen auf. Es werden auch verschwörungstheoretische
Ansätze und eine pro-russische Ideologie vertreten.”
23 Translation from German: „Beschimpfungen”.
24 Translation from German: „Gewaltaufrufe”.
25 Translation from German: „Gewaltfantasien in typischer NS-Diktion”.
26 Translation from German: „Es ist ein Geschäft auf Gegenseitigkeit, bei dem beide Seiten
gewinnen: Strache profitiert politisch. […] Die Krone profitiert wirtschaftlich.”
27 Translation from German: „Ein junger Mann mit mehr Verstand als die realitätsfremden
aktuellen Bestimmer. Hoffentlich bleibt er gesund und kann die Zeichen die er setzt
umsetzen.”
28 Translation from German: „Bitte Herr Innenminister erlösen sie das Österreichische Volk
von dieser Plage …”
29 Translation from German: „Danke Sebastian Kurz. Endlich werden Schritte in die richtige
Richtung zum Thema ‚Flüchtlingspolitik’ gesetzt. Bitte macht die Grenzen dicht und kon-
trolliert genau, wer in unser Land hineinkommt!”
30 Translation from German: „Eine neue Regierung welche ihre Wahlversprechen auch umsetzt,
ganz was neues. Das ist ja fast wie bei Präsident Donald Trump. BRAVO, nur weiter so.”
Conclusion
31 Translation from German: „Falls Herr Kickl als Minister nur halb so hart durchgreift wie
er als Oppositionspolitiker aufgetreten ist, dann ist er ein großer Gewinn für die Sicher-
heit Österreichs!”
32 Translation from German: „Lieber Sebastian, bitte komm nach Berlin und regiere uns
gleich mit! Ansonsten macht Merkel aus Deutschland bald ein islamisches Kalifat.”
33 Translation from German: „Vielleicht können Deutschland und Österreich eine GroKo
bilden und Herr Kurz regiert dann beide Länder!!!!!!!”
34 Translation from German: „einen 31 jährigen Politiker in Europa der die Sorgen und Nöte
der Menschen erkennt”.
35 Translation from German: „Schon Irre wie vernünftig, routiniert und überzeugend ein 31
jähriger junger Politiker sein kann.”
36 Translation from German: „jungen dynamischen Mann”.

37 Translation from German: „Es ist ein breites Team aus Männern und Frauen, aus Jünge-
ren und jung Gebliebenen, ein Team, das bereit ist, für unser Land zu arbeiten.”
38 Translation from German: „Er könnte uns Mutti Merkel ersparen!”
39 Translation from German: „Dem Wahn unserer Mutti müssen fähige unverbrauchte Köpfe
entgegentreten.”
40 Translation from German: „Trotzdem will eure Mutti nochmals ca. 2 Millionen mosle-
mische Assys per Flugzeug (auf eure Kosten !) einfliegen !! Der Untergang ist schon vor-
bestimmt. Man will einen kompletten Volksaustausch !!”
41 Translation from German: „Na Endlich wird eine Österreichische Politik gemacht”.
42 Translation from German: „Bravo endlich wird Politik für die Österreicher gemacht”.
43 Translation from German: „Nur auf Österreich und sein Volk schauen, bitte!”
44 Translation from German: „Der erste Unterschied zur roten Kern-Regierung ist, dass Politik
zuerst für die Österreicher gemacht wird und nicht für die Flüchtlinge.”
45 Translation from German: „Erst sind wir tolerant dann sind wir fremd im eigenen Land.”
46 Translation from German: „Austria first! Damit meine ich die bedürftigen autochthonen
Österreicher und nicht irgendwelche tschetschenische Sittenwächter, Gewalttäter gegen
unsere Polizei und noch andere zugewanderte Verbrecher.”
47 Translation from German: „Wir wollen uns die nächsten 10 Jahre wieder als Österreicher
und Herren im eigenen Land fühlen.”
48 Translation from German: „Ein lebenswertes, sicheres Österreich für seine Staatsbürger
wiederherstellen! Das geht nur mit Härte!”
49 Translation from German: „Kickl war die beste Wahl! Er ist hart, korrekt und liebt
Österreich!”
50 Data source: http://namenskarten.lima-city.at/oesterreichs-haeufigste-nachnamen.php?p=0,
accessed 26 January 2018.
51 Data source: www.herold.at/telefonbuch/(Personensuche), accessed 26 January 2018.
52 Translation from German: „Wir schützen unseren Sozialstaat vor Missbrauch und werden
die illegale Migration nach Österreich stoppen.”
53 Translation from German: „Wir wollen unsere Heimat Österreich als lebenswertes Land mit
all seinen kulturellen Vorzügen bewahren. Dazu gehört auch, selbst zu entscheiden, wer als
Zuwanderer bei uns leben darf, und illegale Migration zu beenden.”
54 Translation from German: „Es kann auch nicht sein, daß in Wien die Gemeindewohnun-
gen mit Ausländern befüllt werden! Und Österreicher bekommen keine Wohnung!”
55 Translation from German: „50 % Ausländer geil! weiter so. 90 % der Kinder in der
Schule sprechen unsere Sprache nicht.”
56 Translation from German: „Dann ist Europa bald ebenso überbevölkert, verarmt, gewalttä-
tig, ghettoisiert sowie wirtschaftlich und bildungsmäßig heruntergewirtschaftet wie die
Herkunftsländer der Asyl-Fachkräfte. Dann herrschen hier wieder patriarchale Denkweisen,
Frauenunterdrückung, religiöser Fanatismus und ethische Konflikte, eine wirklich schöne

Zukunft für österreichische Kinder.”
57 Translation from German: „spätestens nach den Vergewaltigungen, Raubüberfällen,und,
und,und..! 2016 wurden von Assys über 15 000 Straftaten verübt !! DAS ist die Realität
!! Und jeder Skeptiker soll einmal über die Grenze schauen,-In Berlin haben Arabische
Clans das Sagen und praktisch die Staatsmacht ausgeschaltet. Wann haben wir die
selben Probleme ?? Oder ist es gar schon soweit ??”
58 Translation from German: „Ich möchte nicht arbeiten gehen, um Menschen mitzutragen, die
unsere Sprache nicht lernen, sich nicht integrieren ja noch nicht einmal im Entferntesten
unsere Werte, unsere Kultur akzeptieren. Weiters werden viele von ihnen nie etwas zum
Funkltionieren unseres Sozialstaates beitragen, sondern ewig in der Mindestsicherung
‚hängen’. Leider sehe ich das Problem bei einer Vielzahl der Flüchtlinge wie oben geschildert”
59 Translation from German: „Die Mitgliedstaaten sollten selbst entscheiden, ob und wie
viele Menschen sie aufnehmen. […] Staaten zur Aufnahme von Flüchtlingen zu zwingen,
bringt Europa nicht weiter.”
60 Translation from German: „Aufgrund der veränderten geopolitischen Lage in und um
Österreich braucht die Regierung aber auch eine auf die neuen Bedrohungen und Heraus-
forderungen (transnationaler Terrorismus, ausländische Agitation, Migration) angepasste
Sicherheitsarchitektur, in deren Rahmen der Prävention in Zukunft eine wesentlich höhere
Bedeutung zukommen muss.”
61 Translation from German: „Die Hunde müssen spüren dass sie hier nicht gewollt sind!”
62 Translation from German: „Endlich werden jene aussortiert die sich bei uns nur einnisten
woollen.”
63 Translation from German: „Asyl gehört grundsätzlich abgeschafft.”
64 Translation from German: „i vasteh nu imma ned das de afoch in unsa Laund kumman,
gor ned einalossn, kost ois nur mega Kohle !!!”
65 Translation from German: „Und wissen Sie, wie der Abschub heute funktioniert? In zivilen
Luftfahrmaschinen, wo heute Passagiere auf Urlaub fliegen, wird daneben der Abzuschie-
Conclusion
bende mitgeflogen. Ja, was ist denn das für eine Abschubvorgangsweise? Für was haben
wir militärische Transportflugzeuge wie die Hercules? Ich sage: Die Hercules umrüsten zu
einer Abflugmaschine. Da können sie dann schreien und sich anurinieren. Da stört’s dann
niemanden. Da werden sie abgeschoben”, www.youtube.com/watch?v=0iym1miowSU,
accessed 28 January 2018.
66 Translation from German: „in die nächste Herkules und zwar vollbesetzt und da braucht
es noch sehr viel Maschinen.”
67 Translation from German: „Bitte sofortige Gesetzesänderung und die Hercules volltanken.”
68 Translation from German: „Die Hercules wartet nur auf ihren Einsatz.”
69 Translation from German: „Wünsche mir, dass das Jahr 2018 das Jahr der Rückführungen
wird!”
70 Translation from German: „Bargeldabnahme, na selbstverständlich, die haben teilweise

mehr im Rucksack als so mancher glaubt.”
71 Translation from German: „Abnahme von Bargeld, Handy Daten durchleuten alles völlig
richtig. So erkennt man diverse Kriminelle und Terroristen sofort.”
72 Translation from German: „Warum nicht auch Uhr und Halsketten, wenn schon, denn
schon.”
73 Translation from German: „Selbst wenn andere Staaten ihre Mitbürger nicht zurückneh-
men,so kann man sie doch Internieren um die Bürger vor Gefahren zu schützen.”
74 Translation from German: „Vielleicht kann man mit Putin reden, Sibirien würde sich
anbieten.”
75 Translation from German: „Asylwerber konzentriert an einem Ort halten.”
76 Translation from German: “staatliche Betreuung”.
77 Translation from German: “Und dass es da oder dort auch Sinn ergeben kann, vielleicht
die eine oder andere leerstehende Kaserne auch zu nutzen, das ist durchaus
überlegenswert.”
78 Translation from German: “Es ist ja bereits in der Vergangenheit darüber diskutiert
worden, ob es nicht so sein soll, dass ab einer gewissen Abendzeit alle wieder in der
Kaserne zu sein haben. Es braucht ja auch Ordnung, so lange es ein offenes Asylverfah-
ren gibt. Und dass es Probleme gibt in unserer Gesellschaft, das wird sicherlich auch
Ihnen schon durchaus bewusst sein.”
79 Translation from German: „Sie in der Nacht einzusperren, ist ein Problem. Das ist eine
Freiheitsbeschränkung. Und man kann Asylwerber nicht ohne Grund, nur deshalb einsper-
ren, weil sie Asylwerber sind.”
80 Translation from German: „Notfalls Luftabsetzung …”
81 Translation from German: „Abschieben bringt doch nichts denn die kommen doch über ne
andere Ecke wieder. Ich bin der Meinung lasst die zurück schwimmen das viehzeug.”
82 Translation from German: „Die Moslems befinden sich mit uns im ‚heiligen Krieg’. Also
ruft für eine Woche das Kriegsrecht aus und fordert die Österreicher auf, das Problem
selber in die Hand zu nehmen!”
83 Translation from German: „Schon dreist Deutschland in einem Atemzug mit österreich zu
nennen,wenn es um Europa geht. Die Mehrzahl der Deutschen möchte kein nationalis-
tischen und fremdenfeindliches Europa.”
84 Translation from German: „Wer sich wünscht, dass wieder mal ein Österreicher in Berlin
regiert, der hat in Geschichte nicht aufgepasst!”
85 Translation from German: „Halt den Schnabel”.
86 Translation from German: „wir können sehr gut auf die Hetze eines Linken Deutschen,
der für noch mehr Zuwanderung steht verzichten.”
87 Translation from German: „Ich bin sicher, dass Ihre Wohnung auch eine Tür mit Schloss
hat, oder? Sonst geben Sie doch Ihre Adresse preis. Wir würden dann gleich zwei
Flüchtlingsfamilien auf Ihre Kosten bei Ihnen einquartieren. Natürlich ohne Identitätsprü-
fung, das wäre ja sonst rassistisch.”
88 Translation from German: „du und die etablierten Parteien sind das Problem, halt einfach
deinen Schnabel wenn nicht jeder so blöd ist wie du und die Überflutung mit illegalen
Immigranten aus aller Herren Länder noch für tragbar hält.”
89 Translation from German: „Feuerring um Europa, 20 Meter hoch !”
90 Data source: www.spiegel.de/video/fpoe-chef-heinz-christian-strache-die-videofalle-video
-99027174.html, https://orf.at/stories/3122824/, accessed 28 May 2019.
91 Translation from German: „Schau, wenn sie wirklich die Zeitung vorher übernimmt.
Wenn's wirklich vorher, um diese Wahl herum, zwei, drei Wochen vorher die Chance
gibt, über diese Zeitung uns zu pushen, dann passiert ein Effekt, den die anderen ja nicht
kriegen. Wenn das Medium zwei, drei Wochen vor der Wahl, dieses Medium, auf einmal
uns pusht […] Dann machen wir nicht 27, dann machen wir 34. […] Sobald sie die
Kronen Zeitung übernimmt, sobald das der Fall ist, müssen wir ganz offen reden,
da müssen wir uns zusammenhocken. Da gibt es bei uns in der Krone: Zack, zack, zack.
Drei, vier Leute, die müssen wir pushen. Drei, vier Leute, die müssen abserviert werden.
Und wir holen gleich mal fünf Neue herein, die wir aufbauen. Und das ist der Deal”.
Video source: www.spiegel.de/video/fpoe-chef-heinz-christian-strache-die-videofalle-video-
99027174.html, accessed 28 May 2019.
Conclusion
Appendix 7.A
German original of an excerpt

from the main ORF election
debate, 12 October 2017
SEBASTIAN KURZ (ÖVP): Ich glaub, das große Thema, das wir haben, ist: Wir haben
ein starkes Sozialsystem geschaffen, aber dieses Sozialsystem wird weiter
nur existieren können, wenn wir einerseits es sicherstellen, im System spar-
samer zu werden, Stichwort 21 Sozialversicherungsträger, die viel Geld brau-
chen, das in Wahrheit dann bei den Betroffenen, bei den Patienten, fehlt.
Und zum Zweiten braucht es aus meiner Sicht dringend auch einen Stopp
der Zuwanderung ins Sozialsystem. Warum? Weil sonst vieles einfach nicht
finanzierbar sein wird. Und da sollten wir eine Trendwende schaffen, wenn
wir unser Sozialsystem von den Spitälern bis hin zu den Pensionen auch
langfristig absichern woollen.
[…]
HEINZ-CHRISTIAN STRACHE (FPÖ):
Wir wollen in Wahrheit Sachleistungen statt Geldleistungen
für jene, die nicht in das System eingezahlt haben, weil dann diese Sogwirkung
von Wirtschaftsflüchtlingen sicherlich deutlich zurückgehen wird. […] Denn es
versteht ja niemand in Österreich, der heute Vollzeit beschäftigt ist und dann ein
bisschen mehr als heute eine Mindestsicherung verdient. Das ist ja alles nicht
mehr gerecht.
Und wenn man 40 und 45 Jahre gearbeitet hat und dann durchschnittlich
eine Durchschnittspension von 940 Euro erhält. Das ist ja nicht gerecht. Das
versteht ja niemand. Bis hin auch zu den Frauen, die immer wieder auch in
Sonntagsreden bemüht werden, aber die man dann gerade im Alter oftmals
in der Altersarmut alleine lässt mit 250/350 Euro. Und das sind unfaire Sys-
teme. Da gehört das System fair gestaltet und geändert, sodass Mindestpen-
sionisten, die 40/45 Jahre gearbeitet haben, dann wirklich 1,200 Euro
bekommen und Mütter ihre Kindererziehungszeit angerechnet kriegen und
zumindest eine Mindestsicherung erhalten im Alter. Das wäre Respekt und
Anstand gegenüber den Menschen
[…]
KURZ: Wir haben in Wien die Situation, dass mittlerweile jeder zweite Mindestsicher-
ungsempfänger ein ausländischer Staatsbürger ist. Eine Familie mit drei Kindern
bekommt in Wien an Mindestsicherung und an anderen Leistungen wie Kinderbei-
hilfe insgesamt 2,500 Euro netto pro Monat. Das ist eine Summe, die muss
jemand, der arbeiten geht, einmal verdienen. Da muss man schon ziemlich gut
verdienen. Und insofern braucht es hier eine Veränderung. Wir geben Milliarden
aus für die Flüchtlingsversorgung, eine Milliarde mittlerweile für die Mindestsi-
cherung und wir überweisen 300 Millionen an Familienbeihilfe ins Ausland. Also
wenn wir hier nicht gegensteuern, dann wird unser Sozialsystem immer schwerer
German original of an excerpt from the main ORF election debate, 12 October 2017
zu finanzieren.
STRACHE: Und wir haben Fehlentwicklungen, wie ich angesprochen habe, durch die feh-
lende Grenzsicherung 2015, wo ja natürlich hier auch Entwicklungen passiert sind

nicht nur seit dieser Zeit, sondern auch davor, da muss man ehrlich sein, wo wir
alleine im Jahr 1973, um das auch korrekt zu sagen, 73,000 muslimische Mitbür-
ger in Österreich hatten, und durch eine sehr sehr undifferenzierte Massenzuwan-
derungspolitik der letzten Jahrzehnte heute über 700,000 bereits haben, und auch
Schulen in Wien erleben, wo wir insgesamt in den Volksschulbereichen schon
mehr muslimische Kinder als katholische Kinder haben.
Und da gibt’s dann Vereinsstrukturen und islamische Kindergärten und auch
Moscheen, die unter der konkreten Beobachtung des Verfassungsschutzes stehen,
nicht erst seit diesem Jahr, seit über 15 Jahren, und darauf hingewiesen wird, da
gibt’s radikal-islamistische Fehlentwicklungen.
Da passieren ganz gefährliche Entwicklungen, auch der Rekrutierung bis hin,
dass man jetzt auch in einem Flüchtlingsheim vor kurzen Tagen in Salzburg einen
IS-Mann auch zum Glück entdecken konnte, der mit den Paris-Attentätern auch in
Verbindung stand. Das heißt, wir haben hier Handlungsbedarf.
KURZ: Wer sich illegal auf den Weg macht nach Europa mit dem Schlepper, der soll
keine Chance haben, bei uns einen Antrag zu stellen, sondern er muss zurückges-
tellt werden. Und gleichzeitig müssen wir die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit und
die Hilfe vor Ort ausbauen, weil wir so mit demselben Geld wesentlich mehr
Menschen und wesentlich nachhaltiger helfen können.
STRACHE: Wir müssen hier ansetzen, dass wir nicht so wie in Wien, und das bitte ist
notwendig. Durch die Fehlentwicklung, die schon verursacht wurde, sind unsere
Kinder hier in Wien zur Minderheit in der eigenen Stadt geworden. Und das muss
man bitte schon erkennen. Und da ist dann die politische Frage, will man das
weiter fördern oder nicht. Wir nicht.
KURZ: Ich glaub, das große Thema, das wir haben, ist: Wir haben ein starkes Sozialsys-
tem geschaffen, aber dieses Sozialsystem wird weiter nur existieren können,
wenn wir einerseits es sicherstellen, im System sparsamer zu werden, Stichwort
21 Sozialversicherungsträger, die viel Geld brauchen, das in Wahrheit dann bei
den Betroffenen, bei den Patienten, fehlt. Und zum Zweiten braucht es aus meiner
Sicht dringend auch einen Stopp der Zuwanderung ins Sozialsystem. Warum?
Weil sonst vieles einfach nicht finanzierbar sein wird. Und da sollten wir eine
Trendwende schaffen, wenn wir unser Sozialsystem von den Spitälern bis hin zu
den Pensionen auch langfristig absichern wollen.
Chapter Eight
Conclusion: Towards a Society of the Commons
beyond Authoritarianism and Nationalism
8.1 Theorising Nationalism

8.2 The Communication of Nationalism in the Age of Social Media
8.3 Fake News
8.4 Authoritarian Capitalism, Authoritarian Movements, Authoritarian Communication
8.5 From the Antagonism of the Empire and the Multitude Towards a Society of
the Commons
8.1 Theorising Nationalism

We today experience a surge of new nationalisms. Donald Trump, Brexit, Recep
Tayyip Erdoğan, Marine Le Pen, Viktor Orbán, Heinz-Christian Strache, Geert Wilders,
the Alternative for Germany (AfD), Narendra Modi, Rodrigo Duterte, and Vladimir
Putin are some of the symbols of contemporary nationalisms. Far-right movements
and new nationalisms are the “cicatrices and scars of a democracy […] that until
today has still not lived up to its own concept”1 (Adorno 1967). They are the result
of the negative dialectic of neoliberal capitalism and the new imperialism. The com-
modification of everything, entrepreneurialism, privatisation, deregulation, financialisa-
tion, globalisation, deindustrialisation, outsourcing, precarisation, and the new
individualism, have backfired, and extended and intensified inequalities and crisis
tendencies, which created a futile ground for new nationalisms, right-wing extrem-
ism, and new fascism. Eric Hobsbawm (1983a, 1983b, 1992a, 1992b) has, based on
Marx and Luxemburg, shown that nationalism is an ideology that is invented for
political purposes and invents everyday symbols through which nationalism is com-
municated. That nationalism is invented means that it is constructed, fabricated,
inculcated, illusionary, false, and ideological. In the age of digital capitalism, nation-
alist ideology and nationalist symbols are constantly invented and reinvented online,
on social media, and as user-generated content.
Understanding contemporary nationalism and how it is communicated on social

media, the Internet, and other media requires a critical theory of nationalism that
can be put to use as a theoretical foundation for empirical studies in order to

inform political praxis that is directed against authoritarianism.
Approaches to the study of nationalism include primordialism, perennialism, ethno-

symbolism, modernism, and postmodernism. This book has argued that such approaches
are often fetishist and/or do not adequately explain the role of nationalism in capitalist
society. A Marxian theory of nationalism grounded in the works of Karl Marx, Rosa Lux-
emburg, Eric J. Hobsbawm, and other critical thinkers has been suggested.
Marx’s contribution to the study of nationalism is often overlooked. Too many obser-
vers consider him as a purely economic theorist and underestimate the relevance of
his thought for the critique of politics. It has been argued that especially Marx’s
concepts of ideology, fetishism, Bonapartism, internationalism, and his critique of
nationalism as ideology can inform the contemporary critique of nationalism. Marx
allows us to understand nationalism as an ideology that divides and distracts, is
communicated over the media, and reproduces capitalism and the hegemony of the
ruling class and dominant elites.
The First World War was an expression of the culmination of the combination of
imperialism and nationalism. Marxist theorists living at that time tried to make
sense of nationalism’s role in political economy. Otto Bauer and Rosa Luxemburg
both established profound analyses of nationalism that are grounded in Marx’s
works. The main difference between the two approaches is that Bauer sees the
nation as a community of fate and culture, whereas Luxemburg characterises the
nation as both nationalist ideology and imperialist nation-states. Whereas Bauer,
just like Lenin, believes in the existence of a national right to self-determination,
Luxemburg characterises national liberation struggles as part of nationalist ideol-
ogy and stresses the importance of international solidarity. Whereas for Bauer
the nation and nationalism are democratically defined by the people in a socialist
society, Luxemburg stresses that society is not socialist if it advances national-
ism. Whereas Bauer was a German nationalist who argued for the Anschluss of
Austria to Germany and saw socialism as a form of people-nationalism, Luxem-
burg saw nationalism, in contrast to Bauer and Lenin, as a form of political fet-
ishism that could not have a progressive dimension. For Luxemburg, nationalism
is a misty veil, a form of ideological politics that fetishises the nation in order to
distract attention from class conflicts and the fundamental causes of capitalism’s
problems.
Chapter Eight | Conclusion 247
For developing a critical theory of nationalism, this book has built on the approaches
of Marx and Luxemburg. It has furthermore taken up elements from the approaches
of Eric J. Hobsbawm, Étienne Balibar, Partha Chatterjee, Vivek Chibber, Erich Fromm,
Klaus Holzkamp, C.L.R. James, Ute Holzkamp-Osterkamp, Wilhelm Reich, David Roe-
diger, Marisol Sandoval, and Raymond Williams.
Nationalism is an ideology and political movement that sustains or aims at building

a nation-state that unites defined nation-state members (citizens). Nationalism has
two interconnected dimensions, a territorial-political one (the nation-state) and an
ideological one (national consciousness). It is both a political relation and collective
consciousness. Nationalism claims that there is a foundational unity of the nation
that is grounded in nature and/or culture/society. Nationalism as ideology legitim-
ates and distracts from the division of society into classes and relations of domin-
ation by constructing, inventing, or fabricating a national unity of the people that is
The Communication of Nationalism in the Age of Social Media

said to be stronger than class divisions. Nationalism is a false appearance of unity
that is a feature of modern class societies. Nationalism’s collective unity is defined
against proclaimed outsiders of and enemies to the nation. There is a dialectic of
racism and nationalism. That new nationalisms have emerged in the context of
a large capitalist crisis validates the assumption that right-wing authoritarianism and
associated nationalisms are likely to grow in situations of capitalist crisis.
8.2 The Communication of Nationalism in the Age

of Social Media
Today, nationalism is expressed via popular cultural communication tools such as Twit-
ter, Facebook, and YouTube. Two case studies that put the Marxist theory of nationalism
to empirical use were presented in this book. The first case study analysed the commu-
nication of nationalism on social media during the 2017 German federal election cam-
paigns. The analysis focused on a dataset consisting of 31,474 tweets collected during
television debates, 6,422 comments posted to the Facebook profiles of German politi-
cians, and 1,032 comments posted to YouTube videos generated by political parties.
The second case study focused on authoritarianism and nationalism in the context of
the right-wing ÖVP/FPÖ government formed in late 2017. The study analysed the main
television debate and 2,367 comments posted by users to the profiles of ÖVP Chancellor
Sebastian Kurz, FPÖ Vice-Chancellor Heinz-Christian Strache, FPÖ Minister of the Interior
Herbert Kickl, and comments posted on online articles of Austria’s most widely read
newspaper, the tabloid Kronen Zeitung.
Nationalism is imposed and constructed from above by political elites and intellec-
tuals, but it is also lived and hegemonically produced/reproduced from below by
everyday people in their everyday practices and beliefs. The two presented case
studies show how on social media, far-right political influencers (politicians, parties,
right-wing media, etc.) communicate nationalism from above, to which users respond
by reproducing and spreading nationalist ideology and adding specific elements to it.
Communicating nationalism requires both discursive structures as well as social

forms. Four types of nationalist discourse have been identified and analysed: bio-
logical nationalism, socio-economic nationalism, political nationalism, and cultural
nationalism. Nationalism is an ideology that is communicated through social
forms such as events, symbols, practices, and the media system in everyday life
and in extraordinary situations (such as national holidays, commemorations, par-
ades, and wars). The mediation of nationalist symbols, nationalist practices/rela-
tions, and nationalist events takes place through different types of media. One
can distinguish the communication of nationalism via primary media (based on
the human body), secondary media that uses media technology for the production
of nationalist information, tertiary media that uses media technology for the pro-
duction and consumption of nationalist information, quaternary media that uses
media technology for the production, distribution, and consumption of nationalist
information, and quinary media where digital technologies are used in such
a way that the production, distribution, and consumption of nationalist ideology
can all be organised via converging digital media technologies and platforms
that enable prosumption (productive consumption) and user-generated content
production.
The two critical discourse analyses of nationalism online show that contemporary
nationalism stands in a relation to top-down leadership, the friend/enemy scheme,
and militarism/law and order politics. Together, these four interlinked elements form
the ideology of right-wing authoritarianism. Far-right social media profiles act as
media that choreograph the online nationalism of dissatisfied and anxious citizens
who channel their frustrations, fears, and disappointments into online nationalism
and (new) online racism. Social media’s anonymity, high speed, superficiality, person-
alisation, individualisation, interactivity, attention economy, structures of reputation
accumulation, and its networked and multimedia character support the spreading of
far-right ideology online.
The analyses also provide empirical indications for the use of social media bots,
fake accounts, and fake attention in social media politics. Fake news has become
an important aspect of contemporary right-wing online politics.
8.3 Fake News

The Collins English Dictionary named “fake news” as Word of the Year 2017. Collins
defines fake news as “false, often sensational, information disseminated under the
guise of news reporting”.2 Here are some more definitions of fake news:
• Fake news is news that has “deliberately misleading elements incorporated

within its content or context. A core feature of contemporary fake news is
that it is widely circulated online” (Bakir and McStay 2018, 154).
• “We define ‘fake news’ to be fabricated information that mimics news media con-
tent in form but not in organizational process or intent. Fake-news outlets, in turn,
lack the news media’s editorial norms and processes for ensuring the accuracy and
credibility of information. Fake news overlaps with other information disorders, such
as misinformation (false or misleading information) and disinformation (false infor-
mation that is purposely spread to deceive people)” (Lazer et al. 2018, 1094).
• “We define ‘fake news’ to be news articles that are intentionally and verifi-
ably false, and could mislead readers” (Allcott and Gentzkow 2017, 213).
• Fake news is “the deliberate presentation of (typically) false or misleading claims as
news, where the claims are misleading by design. […] That is to say, the originator
of an instance of fake news either intends a specific claim to be misleading in
virtue of its specific content, or deliberately deploys a process of news production
and presentation that is designed to result in false or misleading claims. What
makes contemporary fake news a novel phenomenon, and gives it its significance,
Fake News
is the extent to which systemic features inherent in the design of the sources and
channels through which fake news is disseminated ensure its proliferation. The
latter, I wish to suggest, adds a sense of urgency to the recent spate of fake news,
as propagated especially on electronic social media” (Gelfert 2018, 85–86, 111).
According to these definitions, fake news is factually false, circulated online predom-
inantly on social media, lacks journalistic professional norms, and tries to systemat-
ically and deliberately mislead and misinform.
But “fake news” is not new. It started much earlier than the age of the Internet and
social media. For example, in August 1835, the New York Sun ran a six-part story
that claimed that life on the Moon had been discovered, including “a small kind of
rein-deer, the elk, the moose, the horned bear, and the biped beaver” and human
bats that were “doubtless innocent and happy creatures”. The Great Moon Hoax
increased the newspaper’s circulation.
Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky (1988) argue in their propaganda model that the
capitalist and ideological character of the media results in biases and the reflection of
partial interests in the news (for a discussion on the topicality of this model, see the
contributions in Pedro-Carañana et al. 2018). They argue that there are five factors that
act as filters creating news biases: (a) private ownership, profit orientation, and monop-
olies; (b) advertising; (c) powerful actors as news sources; (d) “flak”: the lobbying oper-
ations of powerful organisations; and (e) ideology (understood in a Lukácsian sense as
attempts to create false representations of reality in order to legitimate class, domin-
ation, and capitalism). If, in a class society, political economy and ideology result in cer-
tain biases of capitalist media, then all media operated as for-profit businesses show
some aspects and degrees of falseness. Public service media and community media are
alternative media that try to avoid such biases. Given they also have to operate in
a capitalist society, they are also facing issues such as resource precarity or attempts of
political actors to influence reporting and decision-making. In digital capitalism, the
propaganda model needs to take phenomena such as algorithm-driven news and visibil-
ity, targeted and algorithmic online advertising, native online advertising, branded online
content, the online attention economy, political bots, online hate speech, filter bubbles,
ideologies of and on the Internet, digital labour, digital surveillance, digital warfare, and
the tabloidisation and acceleration of online information into account (see Fuchs 2018b).
So, fake news is not new. It is at least as old as the tabloid press, for which it
serves as a means for increasing its audience, sales, advertising rates, and profits.
Lies, scandalisation, and tabloidisation are profit strategies. Fake news is news that
pretends to give a true picture of the world but does not correspond to reality. It is
a way of trying to misinform citizens and to manipulate reality by spreading lies.
Fake news can better be characterised as false news in the sense of the Marxist
term “false consciousness”, i.e. ideologies that take on the form of lies and manipu-
lated information in order to disguise the true condition of certain aspects of society.
False consciousness is consciousness that “by-passes the essence of the evolution
of society and fails to pinpoint it and express it adequately” (Lukács 1971, 50).
Claire Wardle (2017) argues that there are different types of mis- and disinformation:
misleading information that frames issues in a biased manner, the impersonation of
sources, the fabrication of content, the misleading use of headlines, visuals, and cap-
tions in manners not supported by the content, the use of false contextual information,
and the manipulation of information, sound, or images. The falseness of false news
can relate to the informational content, context, presentation style, and use of text,
visuals, sounds, or audiovisuals.
Wardle (2017) also includes news satire and news parody that have “no intention to
cause harm” but have “potential to fool” into a typology of mis- and disinformation.
Tandoc et al. (2018) include news satire and news parody besides news fabrication,
photo manipulation, advertising and public relations (including native advertising),
and propaganda into their typology of fake news. They make clear that news satires
and news parodies do not have the intention to deceive, but given that these genres
aim at making clear to the average audience members that false and overdrawn
claims are not presented as news, but are used as artistic means of entertainment
and critique whose ultimate aim is to create laughter, news satire and news parody
should not be characterised as being “fake”/false news. They are forms of art and
not news. Both news and art are forms of culture. Comedy is a form of art that aims
to make people laugh, whereas the goal of news is to report novel factual develop-
ments about society that matter to a large public.
The use of the term “fake news” is somewhat problematic because Donald Trump
and other right-wing demagogues have adopted it in order to try to discredit criti-
cism of their political programmes. Factually true information is thereby often pre-
sented as “fake”, whereas real fake news that is factually false is presented as
true. Lies are presented as truth, truth as lies. For example, Trump tweeted about
media that have reported critically about him – the New York Times, NBC, ABC,
CBS, and CNN – that they spread fake news and were enemies of the American
Fake News
people: “The FAKE NEWS media (failing @nytimes, @NBCNews, @ABC, @CBS,
@CNN) is not my enemy, it is the enemy of the American People!”3
False news is as old as tabloid media. What is new is the way false news is organ-
ised: they have moved from traditional media to the networked online and social
media environment, where false news created in troll factories by low-paid false
news labour spreads through targeted advertisements, personal networks, false pro-
files, and bot-generated attention and likes.
It is a mistake to assume that false news has technological causes and exists because of
the technological possibilities for creating and spreading digital content that tries to
deceive, manipulates reality, and reports invented/fictive stories as facts. Technologies do

not determine society and human behaviour, but are rather embedded into society’s contra-
dictions and complexities (Fuchs 2017b). There are therefore no technological fixes to the
problems associated with false news, political bots, and false social media accounts. Solu-
tions need to focus on changing society by legislation, regulation, and media reforms.
Empirical Research of False News on Social Media
Empirical research has provided indications that the content of false news that
humans and bots spread on social media tends to more support right-wing than left-
wing and centrist politics (Allcott and Gentzkow 2017; Kollanyi et al. 2016, Silver-
man 2016; Woolley and Guilbeault 2019). Right-wing voters seem to believe more in
the truth of false news stories when confronted with them than other voters (Silver-
man and Singer-Vine 2016).
A study analysed false news stories collected over 114 days from 70 domains known for
spreading such stories (Fourney et al. 2017). It found that social media platforms were
the source of 68 per cent of all visits to these stories, which shows that social media is
an important medium fostering access to false news. An analysis of 14 million tweets
found that super-spreaders of false news were more likely to be bots than humans and
that such bots frequently mentioned usernames that had a large amount of followers in
order to attract visibility and attention (Shao et al. 2018).
The Cambridge Analytica Scandal

According to reports by the Guardian, Cambridge Analytica paid Global Science Research
(GSR) for conducting fake online personality tests on Facebook via the Facebook Developer
Platform in order to obtain personal Facebook data of almost 90 million users,4 including
likes and friendships (Cadwalladr 2018 ; Cadwalladr and Graham-Harrison 2018; Kang and
Frenkel 2018; Rosenberg et al. 2018). The New York Times reported that the data breach
“allowed the company to exploit the private social media activity of a huge swath of the
American electorate, developing techniques that underpinned its work on President
Trump’s campaign in 2016” (Rosenberg et al. 2018). According to the reports, the data
were used for targeting political advertisements in various elections. Steve Bannon, who in
2017 was Donald Trump’s White House Chief of Staff and was involved in forming and
managing the far-right website Breitbart, is also a former vice-president of Cambridge
Analytica.
In the US presidential election of 2016, Trump’s digital election campaign was called Pro-
ject Alamo. Theresa Hong, who worked for the digital arm of Donald Trump’s election
campaign, said in a BBC interview that Cambridge Analytica “came up with the Alamo
data set” that was used for targeting ads on Facebook.5 In the US Senate Select Commit-
tee on Intelligence (2017), Facebook’s Vice-President and General Counsel Colin Stretch
stated that the Trump and Clinton campaigns purchased targeted ads on Facebook for
a total of US$81 million. Trump’s digital director Brad Parscale said in an interview that
the Trump campaign had targeted ads on Facebook, Google, and Twitter, with 80 per cent
of them on Facebook (CBS 2017). According to campaign finance data from the Federal
Election Commission, Trump’s campaign spent a total of US$361,671,328.40.6 According to
the data, US$6.3 million was spent on data services, of which US$5.9 million went to
Cambridge Analytica. Brad Parscale’s company Giles-Parscale received a total of
US$87.8 million for website development, digital consulting, and online advertising. Some
US$85.3 million of this sum was spent on online advertising. In addition, the data indicates
that Trump’s campaign directly paid US$300,000 to Twitter and US$79,717.60 to Facebook
for online advertising. If Parscale’s information that around 80 per cent of the online ads
were run on Facebook is correct, then Trump’s campaign must have spent around
US$70 million on Facebook ads. If the estimation of a total of US$85.7 million paid for
online ads is correct, then this means that almost a quarter of Trump’s campaign budget
was spent on online ads.
The Canadian company AggregateIQ (AIQ) worked on building the Ripon tool. Christopher
Wylie, who had been employed by Cambridge Analytica and is the whistle-blower whose
information sparked off the scandal, characterises Ripon as “the software tool that utilised
the algorithms from the Facebook data” (Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee
2019, 45). According to Facebook, AIQ ran 1,398 ads with a total ad value of US
$2,032,860 for the pro-Brexit campaigns Vote Leave, BeLeave, Veterans for Britain, and
Fake News
DUP Vote to Leave (Facebook Ireland 2018). Some 88.3 per cent of the ads and
79.7 per cent of the ad value was related to Vote Leave, the campaign where politicians
such as Boris Johnson and Gisela Stuart were involved (Facebook Ireland 2018). According
to AggregateIQ’s COO, the total amount these organisations paid to the company was
more than £3.6 million, of which around 80 per cent was paid by Vote Leave (Digital,
Culture, Media and Sport Committee 2019, 50)
The Cambridge Analytica data breach has caused concerns about social media cor-
porations’ business model of targeted advertising and its dangers to democracy. The
Cambridge Analytica scandal was possible because the regulation of data processing
for corporate purposes is lax and based on the idea of corporate self-regulation,
which invites Facebook, Google, and other digital companies to gather massive
amounts of user data and use them for achieving profits. Facebook is built on the
idea that gathering and storing as much data as possible about users is good for its
profits. Personal data as a big data commodity that is used for selling and targeting
personalised online advertisements is the underlying business principle of corporate
social media, including Facebook, Google, and Twitter.
The Cambridge Analytica scandal seems to have influenced the Trump campaign’s
capacity to target social media users. On the one hand, it is certainly one-
dimensional to assume that social media is the cause of the rise of Trump because
there are many factors that play a role in the rise of right-wing authoritarianism,
including changes of the class structure, rising inequalities, crises, increasing eco-
nomic, political, cultural, and social alienation, the weakness of the political left, the
spread of ideology and political anxiety, the antagonisms of capitalist globalisation,
etc. (Fuchs 2017c, 2018a). On the other hand, it is also short-sighted to argue that
social media does not play any role in political changes. In an antagonistic, class-
based society, social media has an antagonistic character and is a field of social
struggles in which society’s antagonisms express themselves. It is no surprise that
in digital capitalism, groups, movements, parties, and politicians from the political
right, left, and centre try to utilise social media as a means of political communica-
tion. That it is especially the far-right that has utilised social media for spreading
false news and ideology might have to do with a combination of several factors,
such as the general rise of the far-right in the context of capitalism’s general crisis,
its unscrupulousness in manipulating the public sphere, significant monetary and
resource investments into online media campaigns, and the receptiveness of their
followers for emotionally laden, ideological stories that are not built on facts, but on
the moral and political values of right-wing authoritarianism.
Cambridge Analytica is a story about how the combination of far-right ideology, digi-
tal capitalism, and neoliberal politics threatens democracy:
1. Far-right activists and movements advance use of dubious and manipulative

information and communication strategies in politics. Far-right ideologues will
do everything necessary and use all means necessary in order to win elections
and increase their power.
2. Capitalist social media platforms operate based on the logic “the more
data and engagement on our platform, the more ads can potentially be
sold”. Their for-profit character has led them to opening interfaces to third-
party data use that was used for privacy-violating data collection. Targeted
ads and ad algorithms are programmed to maximise profits. Targeted ads
are not controlled by humans, but by algorithms. Their fetishistic character
is blind to the content of ads. It does not matter to these software pro-
grammes if ads are about chocolate cake, diapers, or far-right ideology.
Social media corporations have no interest in human control because it
costs money and means less profits.
3. Proponents of the neoliberal state believe that self-regulation of companies is
the best form of regulation, which has, especially in the USA, resulted in lax
data protection regulation and privacy-invading practices of corporations in
general and online companies in particular.
The Internet Research Agency
The US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence investigated Russian interferences

into the 2016 US presidential election. It gave special attention to the activities of
the Internet Research Agency (IRA), a troll farm based in Saint Petersburg that,
according to the Mueller Report, was “funded by Yevgeniy Viktorovich Prigozhin and
companies he controlled, including Concord Management and Consulting LLC and
Concord Catering” (Mueller 2019, 14).
By early to mid-2016, IRA operations included supporting the Trump Cam-

paign and disparaging candidate Hillary Clinton. The IRA made various
expenditures to carry out those activities, including buying political advert-
isements on social media in the names of U.S. persons and entities. Some
Fake News
IRA employees, posing as U.S. persons and without revealing their Russian
association, communicated electronically with individuals associated with
the Trump Campaign and with other political activists to seek to coordinate
political activities, including the staging of political rallies.
(Mueller 2019, 14)
Two teams of researchers analysed data posted by the IRA on Twitter, YouTube,
Instagram, and Facebook for the period from 2013 until 2018 (Howard et al. 2018;
New Knowledge 2018). The social media companies provided these data to the US
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, which enabled the researchers to conduct
analyses. According to these reports, the IRA invested US$25 million into targeting
US voters and reached 77 million engagements on Facebook, 187 million on Insta-

gram, and 73 million on Twitter (New Knowledge 2018, 6–7). Facebook estimated
that 126 million users were reached on its platform (Isaac and Wakabayashi 2017;
New Knowledge 2018, 8). A total of 10.4 million tweets, 1,110 YouTube videos,
116,000 Instagram posts, and 61,500 unique Facebook posts (New Knowledge 2018,
7) originated from the IRA. In 2016, there was a monthly average of 564 IRA Face-
book ads, 2,442 Facebook posts, 2,611 Instagram posts, and 57,247 tweets (Howard
et al. 2018, 5). On Facebook and Instagram, black voters in particular were targeted
by trying to suppress their votes, but left-wing and right-wing voters were also tar-
geted. There was a pro-Trump and an anti-Clinton bias of the content. On Facebook,
3.3 million page followers, 30.4 million shares, 37.6 million likes, and 3.3 million
comments were reached (New Knowledge 2018, 21, 32). On Instagram, 3.4 million
followers, 183 million likes, and 4.0 million comments were achieved (New Know-
ledge 2018, 32). Some 3,519 ads were run on Instagram and Facebook (New Know-
ledge 2018, 34).
The IRA was also active on Twitter:
Individualized [Twitter] accounts used to influence the U.S. presidential

election included @TEN_GOP […]’ @jenn_abrams (claiming to be
a Virginian Trump supporter with 70,000 followers); @Pamela_Moore13
(claiming to be a Texan Trump supporter with 70,000 followers); and
@America_1st_ (an anti-immigration persona with 24,000 followers). In
May 2016, the IRA created the Twitter account @march_for_trump, which
promoted IRA-organized rallies in support of the Trump Campaign.
(Mueller 2019, 27)
The IRA also organised pro-Trump rallies (Mueller 2019, 29, 31, 32).
The highest peak of IRA Facebook ads was reached at the time of the first US presi-
dential debate between Clinton and Trump on 26 September 2016 (Howard et al.
2018, 15). Some 1,087 (38.1 per cent) of a sample of 2,855 analysed targeted ads
focused on African Americans (Howard et al. 2018, 23). The analysed ads reached
a total of 3,136,946 ad clicks (Howard et al. 2018, 23) and 33,679,119 ad impressions
(Howard et al. 2018, 23). These ads cost a total of RUB 4,911,680 (around US$75,000;
Howard et al. 2018, 23). Facebook says “that fake accounts associated with the IRA
spent approximately $100,000 on more than 3,000 Facebook and Instagram ads
between June 2015 and August 2017” (Stretch 2018, 4). On Twitter, the IRA operated
bots in order to intensify reactions to posts (Mueller 2019, 26; see also Isaac and
Wakabayashi 2017).
Whereas the number of targeted ads and YouTube videos was comparatively low, the
number of tweets and Facebook and Instagram posts was relatively high. It “is likely that
the organic posts on Facebook, not the ads, had the most reach” (Howard et al. 2018,
13). The amounts the IRA invested into social media ads are rather low in comparison to
the Trump campaign’s investments. But the company’s total investment of US$25 million
into US operations is 29 per cent of the Trump campaign’s estimated US$85.7 million
investment into social media ads. Most of the Russian activity and investment seems not
to have gone into algorithmic activities (such as targeted ads or bots), but into human
troll labour that generates and spreads false and misleading content:
At the height of the 2016 campaign, the effort employed more than 80
people, who used secure virtual private network connections to computer
servers leased in the United States to hide the fact that they were in
Russia. From there, they posed as American activists, emailing, advising
and making payments to real Americans who were duped into believing
that they were part of the same cause.
(Shane and Mazzetti 2018)
Dozens of IRA employees were responsible for operating accounts and personas
on different U.S. social media platforms. […] Initially, the IRA created social
media accounts that pretended to be the personal accounts of U.S. persons. […]
By early 2015, the IRA began to create larger social media groups or public social
media pages that claimed (falsely) to be affiliated with U.S. political and grass-
roots organizations. In certain cases, the IRA created accounts that mimicked real
U.S. organizations. […] More commonly, the IRA created accounts in the names
Fake News
of fictitious U.S. organizations and grassroots groups and used these accounts to
pose as anti-immigration groups, Tea Party activists, Black Lives Matter pro-
testors, and other U.S. social and political activists.
(Mueller 2019, 22)
The Implications of Cambridge Analytica and the

Internet Research Agency
We can draw four lessons from the Cambridge Analytica data breach and the IRA’s
attempts to influence elections:
• The political economy of online visibility: The two cases show that creating
visibility on social media is a question of political economy, i.e. a question of
mobilising resources, especially money, labour-time, digital skills, people,
investment possibilities into advertising, etc. There are different ways
resources can be used for creating visibility on social media. In a capitalist
society, money is the key resource because it can purchase labour-time and
commodities. In the case of the Trump campaign, there were huge invest-
ments into targeted advertisements, especially Facebook-ads, whereas in the
case of the IRA ad spend was much lower, but large investments were made
into paying people who managed social media groups and created contacts to
activists, who did not know that they were contacted by people working for
the IRA. Both investments into labour-time and ads are important ways of
achieving online visibility.
• Unequal online visibility: Right-wing authoritarian groups often have rich
donors such as the US billionaire Robert Mercer, the CEO of the hedge fund
Renaissance Technology, in the case of Cambridge Analytica, and Russian bil-
lionaire Yevgeny Prigozhin, who controls a range of companies, in the case of
the IRA. For everyday users, who earn average salaries, garnering high online
visibility is difficult. The capitalist Internet is divided and unequal.
• Digital capitalism fails democracy: Capitalist social media platforms are
driven by the logic of capital accumulation, which makes them want to
reduce labour-time and labour-costs and rely as much as possible on algo-
rithms and artificial intelligence. The profit logic makes them to a certain
degree blind to data breaches and far-right ideology that is spread in the
form of false news. Targeted political ads are a matter of money. Those
who have more money available can reach more users on social media.
Democracy, elections, and campaigns thereby become an issue of money,
not of arguments.
• The need for an alternative Internet: Given that the for-profit logic of these
platforms has failed democracy, it is time to establish alternative social
media platforms that are not-for-profit public services that foster the
common good.
The proliferation of far-right ideology online, false news, political bots, and false
accounts on social media has interacting political, economic, and ideological
causes.
Political Causes of False News
We live in a politically highly polarised world that is shaped by constant political

crises, in which the friend/enemy logic that does not advance engaging with, but
harming political opponents proliferates. False news, political bots, and false
accounts are political strategies indicative of a highly aggressive and polarised polit-
ical context, in which political dialogue fails and forms of symbolic, ideological, cul-
tural, structural, and direct violence flourish.
Economic Causes of False News
In the past decades, the news industry has experienced increasing commercial-
isation, monopolisation, financialisation, and the rising precariousness of labour.
It has become more difficult to finance news by advertising, especially in an
environment where digital advertising has accounted for a rising share of total
advertising revenues and is controlled by Google and Facebook’s duopoly (Kellner
2003; McChesney 2013, 2015). Given the increased competition about profits in
the news media environment, funding the time and resources needed for investi-
gative journalism has become difficult and the drive to automate news produc-
tion has increased. These tendencies have in general advanced the tabloidisation
and acceleration of news.
Dominant social media platforms are driven by the logic of algorithms, algorithmic
automation, targeted advertising, and big data (Fuchs 2017b). Facebook, Twitter,
and Google/YouTube achieve profits by selling targeted advertisements that are
based on algorithms highly targeted to users’ interests and behaviours, engaging
in constant big data generating real-time surveillance of users, the commodification
Fake News
of users’ online activities (“digital labour”), and the sale of ad space through algo-
rithmic auctions (Fuchs 2017b). Targeted ad algorithms are blind to ethics, morals,
and politics and are programmed to sell ads in order to achieve profits. On the
dominant social media platforms, not humans but algorithms sell advertisements.
News presented on newsfeeds, social media profiles, and walls are not checked
by humans, but published based on algorithmic logic. Given that targeted advertis-
ing outsources value-generation to users’ digital labour and uses algorithmic auto-
mation, it is no surprise that the number of social media companies’ employees
are relatively low: in 2016, Google had 72,053 employees, Facebook 17,048, and
Twitter 3,583.
Not humans, but algorithms, decide which ads are featured and which contents pre-
sented on social media. The algorithm does not discern if an ad’s content is about
detergent or a false news story aimed at manipulating election results. It is blind to
politics and morals because it is programmed to sell ads. As a consequence of algo-
rithmic advertising, Alphabet/Google, in 2016, achieved profits of US$19.5 billion.
Advertising accounted for 87.9 per cent of the search giant’s total revenues. Face-
book, in the same year, made profits of US$10.2 billion and advertising accounted
for 97.3 per cent of its revenue. In 2016, 88.9 per cent of Twitter’s revenue
stemmed from selling advertisements. Facebook, Google, and Twitter are among the
world’s largest advertising agencies. According to estimations, Google and Facebook
together control more than two-thirds of the worldwide online advertising revenues
and thereby constitute a duopoly in the online ad market. The monopolistic market
structure of social media and the Internet aggravates the false news problem
because single platforms via their (non-transparent, secret) algorithms control vast
amounts of users that can be targeted and profiled.
The profit logic of algorithmic, targeted advertising and algorithmic automation is

the underlying economic factor that has enabled the emergence of false news, polit-
ical bots, and false social media accounts.
Ideological Causes of False News
False news is an expression of a high degree of instrumental reason in society.

Instrumental reason is an ideology that presents and aims at treating humans as
things, resources, and instruments for advancing particularistic interests. The prolif-
eration of instrumental reason has advanced social inequalities, fears of social
decline, new nationalisms, the domination of the public sphere by tabloid media, the
logic of advertising, branding and consumer culture, sensationalism, entertainment,
and an accelerated and superficial news culture that leaves no time and does not
foster adequate spaces for political engagement and political debate (Fuchs 2014,
2017b, 2018a). Social media news culture is a culture of acceleration, brevity, and
superficiality that is prone to false news. The crisis of the public sphere expresses
itself as the combination of the lack of time and space for political debate; the cul-
ture and politics of short sound bites; unreal reality TV; mediated spectacles;
unsocial social media, short online attention span; personalised politics instead of
issue-based politics; one-dimensional, superficial, tabloid, and “post-truth” politics;
automated, algorithmic politics; and fragmented publics.
Problems and Impacts of False News, Political Bots,

and False Accounts
There are a number of potential problems associated with false news, political bots,
and false accounts that can limit and negatively impact the public sphere:
• The undermining of human communication’s validity claims: In the age of false

news, humans cannot trust that the news they receive is true; that the
sources and producers are known, truthful, sincere, and credible; and that pol-
itical communication follows rightful norms of behaviour and communication.
False news, political bots, and false social media accounts violate what
Jürgen Habermas (1984) calls the validity claims of communication (under-
standability, propositional truth, normative rightness, subjective truthfulness).
As a consequence, it has become more difficult to discern what political com-
munications, political communicators, and attentions given to political commu-
nication are factual or simulated.
• Threats to democracy: The logic of algorithms, big data, and targeted advertis-
ing threatens to undermine democracy. When false news, political bots, and
false accounts proliferate because the profit interests of social media compan-
ies tolerate, are blind to, and cannot tackle powerful political interests that
aim at manipulating political communication in the public sphere, then democ-
racy is in danger.
• One-dimensional, instrumental, highly polarised, and symbolically/communica-
tively violent politics: Algorithms do not have feelings, sentiments, affects,
morals, or ethics, and do not understand meanings. They are not human. They
process the syntax of data but have no semantics and pragmatics. They do
not understand jokes, sarcasm, humour, love, care, or empathy. They try to
Fake News
make a complex world one-dimensional and organised in the form of informat-

ics’ if-then-else logic. The trouble of big data analytics is that it approaches
and assesses a contradictory world with statistical and mathematical models
that are blind to the complexity and dialectics of society and human behav-
iour. When algorithms displace human decisions and human behaviour, we
end up in a highly instrumental world. Given that algorithms disregard ethics,
morals, and sentiments, there is a danger that they are programmed to polar-
ise political communication and foster symbolic and communicative violence.
• Spirals of intensifying political aggression and violence: False news tends to
be sensationalist and can spread at extremely high speed online. Combined
with false news’ often polarising character and the impossibility of fact-
checking news in real time, there is a danger that in the age of false social
media news, political communication between political opponents breaks
down and that spirals of intensifying political aggression and violence emerge.
What Can Be Done against False News Culture?

In discussions about what can be done against false news culture, one should always
bear in mind that the dominant social media companies (Facebook, Twitter, Google,
etc.) profit from targeted advertising, algorithms that substitute human behaviour, and
big data, and that they are therefore likely to come up with very limited suggestions
that put the burden on users, suggest technological fixes to political problems that –
because of the complex interaction of technology and society – can never work, or
suggest to only intervene after the damage has already been done. Given that false
news poses threats to democracy, superficial measures will not be sufficient to over-
come the negative impacts on the public sphere that have emerged.
Twitter has, for example, recently said that it would no longer accept political ads
from Russia Today and Sputnik. Social media companies confronted with false news
often argue that they close false news accounts when the latter are reported. But
given the global, complex, and dynamic character of the Internet, false news sources
can easily be geographically and organisationally shifted and be multiplied (the so-
called “Streisand effect”, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Streisand_effect). Banning
certain organisations from political ads, banning accounts ex post after false news
has been posted, purely relying on users reporting false news, etc. are superficial
measures that will not overcome the threats to democracy that false news culture
poses.
There are a number of feasible measures that can be taken in order to challenge
false news culture:
• Outlawing targeted and behavioural political online advertising is a legal

measure that any parliament can introduce. Practically speaking, this means
that if such a ban is introduced, Facebook, Google, Twitter, etc. are no longer
allowed to technically enable that users who access the Internet from the IP
addresses associated with the specific country are targeted by political ads.
Introducing such a measure is only effective if it is accompanied by penalties
for violations of the political online ad ban. Such penalties can only be
reasonably enforced if legislation does not define the advertising client, but
the ad-selling online platform, as the offender. Ad clients can be located any-
where in the world, which makes enforcing penalties from one country diffi-
cult. If an online platform does not adequately disable targeted political online
advertising and does not properly check whether a targeted online ad is polit-
ical in nature, then a penalty should be due. In order to be effective, the pen-
alty fare should be set at a significant share of the offending online
company’s worldwide annual revenue. Given that false news has become
a global problem, it is likely that other countries will follow suit once one
country starts outlawing targeted and behavioural political online advertising.
• Substituting algorithmic activity by paid human work of fact-checkers and
knowledge professionals can help to reduce the dangers to democracy posed
by false news. False news is not limited to political online ads, but also
appears on social media newsfeeds, profiles, walls, and in other online
spaces. Checking the facticity of news and content can only work if it is con-
ducted by humans, not machines or algorithms. Fact-checking is a professional
activity organised by independent organisations that specialise on conducting
analyses of the truth, truthfulness, and rightness of claims.7 Fact-checking is
a complex, time-intensive, highly skilled work conducted by professionals who
have a research background. Fact-checking does not work if it is simply crowd-
sourced, but rather requires adequate funding for sustaining full-time jobs of
fact-checkers.
• It makes sense that large social media companies are by law required to
either, depending on their number of active monthly users, directly hire
a specific number of fact-checkers or to cooperate with and pay for the ser-
vices of a specific number of employees of independent, non-profit fact-
Fake News
checking organisations.
• If social media platforms are by law required to introduce a false news
alert button that triggers a fact-check when a specified number of users
click the button in respect to a specific content item, then progress could
be achieved.
• False news culture can only be overcome if alternative forms of political
online communication are actively fostered. This requires new types of
online platforms and new formats that decelerate news and political com-
munication and act as slow media. I have, in this context, suggested reviv-
ing the concept of the political debate format of After Dark/Club 2 (for
a detailed overview of this suggestion, see Fuchs 2017d). After Dark (see
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/After_Dark_(TV_series) was an uncensored live
discussion programme with open-ended debate broadcast on Channel 4
between 1987 and 1997 and on the BBC in 2003. The format originated in
Austria, where the public service broadcaster ORF (Austrian Broadcasting
Corporation) broadcast Club 2 between 1976 and 1995. Club 2.0 is
a concept that updates this format by using social media (Fuchs 2017d). It
aims at fostering political debate and providing adequate space and time
for such discussions with the help of public service media and social
media. Twitter, YouTube, and Facebook are manifestations of a fast media
culture originating in Silicon Valley. Alternative social media are needed in
order to challenge false news culture.
• In Europe, there is a long tradition of public service media. There is no Euro-
pean equivalent of Twitter, YouTube, and Facebook because in Europe there
are different media traditions that are to a significant degree based on public
service media. Regulatory changes that allow public service broadcasters to
offer online formats and social media platforms (such as Club 2.0 and other
formats), aimed at advancing political communication and slow media that are
advertising-free and adequately funding such activities, form a good way of
establishing an alternative culture of political communication that weakens
false news culture. Advancing public service Internet platforms is a step
towards overcoming false news culture.
• Public service media can play an important role in advancing public service
Internet platforms that foster advertising-free political debate that challenges
false news.
• Advancing alternatives to false news culture requires funding. False news is
the consequence of a media and political culture that is based on tabloidisa-
tion, for-profit culture, and advertising culture. An alternative logic should
therefore be non-profit and advertising-free. Introducing an online advertising
tax on all ads targeted at users accessing the Internet and a digital services
tax on all digital services conducted for profit would provide a resource base
for funding public service and alternative Internet platforms that foster a new
culture of political debate capable of challenging false news culture. Such an
online advertising tax could furthermore fund the strengthening and develop-
ment of fact-checking as a new knowledge profession that actively works
against false news culture.
False news is a serious and complex problem that has complex societal causes and
threatens to undermine democracy. There are no technological fixes and superficial
measures that can overcome false news culture. Challenging false news culture
requires legal, political, economic, and media innovations that foster a culture of
slow media, public service Internet platforms, fact-checking, and new forms of polit-
ical engagement and debate.
8.4 Authoritarian Capitalism, Authoritarian
Authoritarian Capitalism, Authoritarian Movements, Authoritarian Communication8

Movements, Authoritarian Communication8
We live in times of rapid political and social change that are highly complex and
unpredictable. The 2008 crisis of the capitalist economy constituted a societal water-
shed. Rebellions, uprisings, occupations, revolutions, and counter-revolutions have
become more frequent in the years since the crisis. Austerity measures, as well as
short-sighted, uncoordinated responses to the plight of refugees and to wars, have
resulted in crises of national and transnational state power. In respect to ideologies
and worldviews, socialism, nationalism, and right-wing radicalism have been strength-
ened. New technologies and popular culture have been embedded into these changes.
The far-right is successful in using social media for political communication. The far-
right’s use of the Internet has been much less studied than progressive movements’
communication. W. Lance Bennett and Alexandra Segerberg’s (2013) book The Logic of
Connective Action mentions Occupy 70 times. It does not mention the Golden Dawn,
Jobbik, the National Front, UKIP, Svoboda, Nigel Farage, the FPÖ, the Sweden Demo-
crats, the Finns Party, Marine Le Pen, Geert Wilders, etc. a single time. The Encyclopedia
of Social Movement Media (Downing 2011) presents 600 pages of analyses of “alterna-
tive media, citizens’ media, community media, counterinformation media, grassroots
media, independent media, nano-media, participatory media, social movement media,
and underground media” (xxv). The focus is on all sorts of progressive, left-wing media,
from the likes of the Adbusters Media Foundation to Zapatista media. The editor John
Downing admits that “much less examination of media of extreme right movements
occurs in this volume than there might be” (xxvi), but he does not explain why this might
be the case, why it is problematic, and how it could be changed.
My argument is that we should not just study what we like, but also what we
really dislike. Critical research is not a Facebook or Twitter “like” button, but must
try to impart insights that can inform changes in the world. This does not simply
require construction and positivism. It requires negative dialectics that hinders, and
at the same time requires, determinate negations, positive negations of the
negative.
Populism
I do not find the concept of populism theoretically meaningful. Its uses are too confused,
meaning that the term requires constant explanation when employed in academic
research. In the broadest sense, populism is the movement of making something popu-
lar, such as in popular culture. Etymologically, the term “popular” stems from the Latin
word popularis, which designates that something is prevalent in the public (Williams
1983a, 236). In a more political understanding, populism means the movement of
making something appealing to the people. The problem of this second meaning is that
by “the people”, one can refer to: (a) all humans; (b) all citizens; or (c) the nation and
those belonging to it. There is a variety of meanings of the term “the people” as the
populace that ranges from universalism on one end to nationalist particularism on the
other end. Populism as a political movement goes back to revolutionary movements in
nineteenth-century Russia (Labica 1987, 1026). But the term has also become associated
with nationalist and right-wing extremist forces and ideology that try to appeal to preju-
dices, and conceive of the people as an “undifferentiated unity” so that classes and
their antagonisms are “denied and downplayed” (Labica 1987, 1028). Populism is there-
fore often associated with “demagogy, which has moved from ‘leading the people’ to
‘crude and simplifying agitation’” and with “rightist and fascist movements which exploit
‘popular prejudices’” (Williams 1983a, 238). In addition, populism is also used as a term
for a particular style of politics that uses tabloidisation, scandalisation, entertainment,
ridicule, simplification, one-dimensionality, and banalisation. Using a term such as “left-
wing populism” is confusing because it can have many meanings: it can mean
a political strategy that aims at ownership and control of society by all (self-
management), a left strategy that uses popular culture, one that denies the existence of
classes in a class society, one that uses tabloid politics, or one that resorts to tradition-
alist, nationalist, or xenophobic rhetoric and prejudices.
Whereas for Gramsci (2000) the “national-popular” as populism has to do with popu-
lar culture, organic intellectuals, the cultural dimension of class struggle, the popular
university, and the formation of a collective socialist will, Hitler (1988), in Mein
Kampf, understands populism as the popularisation of the anti-Semitic Nazi
movement:
Later on the National Socialist Movement presented the Jewish problem in

a new light. Taking the question beyond the restricted circles of the upper
classes and small bourgeoisie we succeeded in transforming it into the
driving motive of a great popular movement.
That both Gramsci and Hitler embraced the notions of the popular and of populism
shows that these are not well-suited terms for a socialist strategy. Populism is not
a clearly delineated, but rather a politically confusing, term.

Authoritarianism
Instead, the notion of authoritarianism is a more suitable concept for explaining con-
temporary far-right practices. The critical theory of authoritarianism advanced by the
Frankfurt School and related authors on fascism, Nazism, and the authoritarian per-
sonality is a helpful tool for understanding authoritarian capitalism. In this context,
particularly works by Franz L. Neumann, Erich Fromm, Theodor W. Adorno, Herbert
Marcuse, Leo Löwenthal, and Willhelm Reich matter (Fuchs 2018a). Seen as
a totality, the body of works of these authors has the advantage that by combin-
ing political economy, ideology critique, and critical psychology, it enables an
integrative analysis of society. Furthermore, it combines the social sciences and
humanities, social analysis and philosophy, empirical social research, and socio-
logical theory. These authors start from Karl Marx’s notions of alienation and
Georg Lukács’ (1971) concept of reification. They see exploitation, domination,
and ideological manipulation as types of instrumental reason, as forms of asym-
metric power that instrumentalise labour power (exploitation), citizens (domin-
ation), and consciousness (ideology).
A first important insight of the Frankfurt School authors is that political economy
and ideology critique are not enough to fully understand right-wing authoritarianism.
The combination of both can explain why right-wing authoritarianism emerges in
particular contexts, but not why individuals and groups follow it. Wilhelm Reich
(1972) argued that the left and left analysis in the period form 1918 until 1933 only
focused on “objective socio-economic processes at a time of crisis” and failed “to
take into account the character structure” and the “social effect of mysticism” (5). In
order to produce proper understandings, critical theory and critical empirical research
need to combine political economy and ideology critique with critical psychology. The
success of far-right authoritarian populism is not just a matter of political-economic
crisis and nationalist ideology. A significant dimension is that it appeals to people’s

everyday affects, emotions, desires, instincts, and drives.
Franz L. Neumann is one of the rather forgotten thinkers of the Frankfurt School. His
works managed to combine political economy, ideology critique, and critical psych-
ology in the critical analysis of authoritarianism (see Fuchs 2018a, 2017c; Neumann
1944/2009, 1957/2017). Neumann (1957/2017) argues that destructive collective anx-
iety that generates large-scale support for far-right movements, groups, parties, insti-
tutions, and systems can emerge when six conditions coincide: (a) the alienation of
labour; (b) destructive competition; (c) social alienation; (d) political alienation in
respect to the political system; (e) the institutionalisation of anxiety; and (f) destruc-
tive psychological alienation and persecutory anxiety.
These categories can be applied to an analysis of the links between current forms
of neoliberal capitalism and the rise of right-wing authoritarianism. Neoliberal capit-
alism has resulted in the intensification of labour’s alienation, the destructiveness of
competition, the great fear of social decline, political apathy, and a lack of trust in
the political institutions of democracy and politicians. Neoliberalism has advanced
wide socio-economic, political, and cultural alienation. Contemporary far-right politics
stands in the context of alienation’s economic, political, and cultural moments. Neo-
liberalism is a politics of social anxiety (precarious labour and precarious life) that
can backfire and turn into fascist politics of political anxiety. In this political void,
nationalist and xenophobic far-right movements and their authoritarian leaders have
not only stoked fears by constructing scapegoats, but have also promised alterna-
tives in the form of nationalism, strong leaders, and authoritarian rule. They advance
persecutory anxiety by creating and supporting the unleashing of aggressions in col-
lective forms, and direct these at scapegoats. Contemporary societies can come to
tipping points where quantity turns into new qualities that may take on the form of
authoritarian capitalism and the undermining of democracy. Neoliberal capitalism
has experienced its own negative dialectic of the enlightenment and has increasingly
been sublated into authoritarian capitalism (Fuchs 2018a).
However, authoritarianism is multi-layered. It can operate at the levels of: (a) an indi-
vidual’s psychology and behaviour; (b) groups/movements/parties; (c) institutions; or
(d) society. We must distinguish between right-wing authoritarian personalities,
groups, institutions, and society. These levels are nested, meaning that an upper level
always contains and requires all necessary preceding levels. Each level is a necessity
but not a sufficient condition for the next level. There is not deterministic or automatic
development from one level to the next, only the possibility of emergence under spe-
cific conditions.
There are four elements of authoritarianism: (a) authoritarian leadership; (b)

nationalism; (c) the friend/enemy scheme; and (d) patriarchy/law and order/mili-
tarism. Nationalism is the construction of fictive ethnicity that tries to unite
people around the ideological belief in a commonality organised through elem-
ents such as blood, traditions, language, origin, and/or culture. Nationalism has
a necessary outside from which it distinguishes itself. The friend/enemy scheme

constructs scapegoats, typically minorities, that are presented as society’s ills
and as the causes of social problems. The inclusive form of the friend/enemy
scheme argues for the inferiority of the enemy group in order to exploit it, and
the exclusive form constructs the enemy as inferior for the purpose of deport-
ation, imprisonment, or extermination. In authoritarianism, “[h]atred, resentment,
dread, created by great upheavals, are concentrated on certain persons who are
denounced as devilish conspirators”. In such situations, the “fear of social deg-
radation […] creates for itself ‘a target for the discharge of the resentments
arising from damaged self-esteem’” (Neumann 1957/2017, 624).
Right-wing authoritarianism is a type of political fetishism that idolises the nation

as a mythical collective that is directed against perceived outsiders who must be
contained, purged, or eliminated in order to achieve greatness. Its ideological role is
that it distracts attention from, and dissimulates, the complex structural causes of
capitalism’s social problems that have to do with class structures and social domin-
ation. Nationalism tries to construct an ideological unity of capital and labour in the
form of the national collective that is said to share a national interest that is under
threat by foreigners and foreignness. The world is presented as a struggle between
nations, a view that fetishises and naturalises the nation and disregards the realities
of class conflicts and power inequalities. There is a difference between right-wing
authoritarianism, right-wing extremism, and fascism. Whereas right-wing authoritar-
ianism violates democracy, opposition is still possible and to a certain extent toler-
ated, whereas right-wing extremism propagates and practices direct violence against
opponents, and fascism institutionalises it in the form of a system of terror. Authori-
tarian capitalism is a form of capitalist political economy in which the principles of
right-wing authoritarianism – authoritarian leadership, nationalism, the friend/enemy
scheme, militarism, patriarchy, etc. – are, to a specific degree, practised by the
state in order to organise capitalism and assert capitalist interests. In authoritarian
capitalism, nationalism, political fetishism, and scapegoating are politically practised

as ideology put into legal form in order to distract attention from class
contradictions.
Authoritarianism involves the belief in, and the practice of, hierarchic social struc-
tures dominated by the leadership principle. Leadership is applied as a principle of
totality that has no respect for individuality in the organisation of the political
system, the capitalist economy, the army, the family, and the cultural organisation.
Erich Fromm pioneered the study of the authoritarian personality. He describes the
right-wing authoritarian leader and his followers as sadomasochistic personalities
characterised by the simultaneous “striving for submission and domination” (Fromm
1942/2001, 122). A sadomasochistic individual “admires authority and tends to
submit to it, but at the same time […] wants to be an authority himself and have
others submit to him” (141). Under the accumulated experience of particular condi-
tions, the psychological striving for freedom and solidarity is suspended by negative
dialectics of superiority/inferiority, love/hate, construction/destruction, and submis-
sion/aggression. One psychological dimension of authoritarianism is that it is a form
of collective narcissism. The vision of the strong leader produces the psychological
“enlargement of the subject: by making the leader his ideal he loves himself, as it
were, but gets rid of the stains of frustration and discontent which mar his picture of
his own empirical self” (Adorno 1951, 140). “The narcissistic gain provided by fascist
propaganda is obvious” (145). An authoritarian leader presents himself as superman
and ordinary, as a “great little man” (142). The image of the superman allows projec-
tion and submission – the sadomasochistic desire to be a superman and to be dom-
inated by a superman.
Militarist patriarchy combines the gender division of social life with the fetishisa-
tion of the male soldier as the ideal human being. Competition, egoism, violence,
and, in the final instance, physical destruction, war, and imperialism are seen as
natural features of the human being and as appropriate solutions for social con-
flict. According to Klaus Theweleit (1987),“Under patriarchy, the productive force
of women has been effectively excluded from participating in male public and
social productions” (272). In patriarchy, leaders are typically male. The friend/
enemy scheme in the final instance leads to wars. Patriarchy entails militarism,
the glorification of the male soldier, surveillance, the police, imperialism, and
warfare. The figures of the soldier and the policeman are also bound up with
nationalist ideology. The soldier and the policeman are in nationalist ideology
seen as the defenders of the nation against foreigners and enemies. Authoritarians
“destroy others to create themselves; they destroy things in the alien object-world and
metamorphose into killing-machines and their components: a ‘baptism of fire.’ Wreaking
revenge is their way of becoming one with themselves” (Theweleit 1989, 382). Militarist
ideology and practice aims at annihilating the perceived enemies.
Speaking of right-wing authoritarianism implies that there is also left-wing authori-

tarianism. Stalinism was the best example of left-wing authoritarianism. It employed
a socialist rhetoric and language, but used the leadership principle, nationalism, mili-

tarism, patriarchy, and a repressive state apparatus for the organisation and defence
of a state-capitalist regime (James 2013b). Only Stalinism’s rhetoric was socialist.
The Stalinist bureaucracy acted as a collective capitalist controlling the economy
and exploiting waged and unwaged labour. In addition, the Stalinist economy was
ideologically legitimated by a protestant ethic of toil, the idealisation of manual
labour and abstinence (Marcuse 1958). Thus, the opposite of Stalinism is not “left
populism”, but democratic socialism.
Frankfurt School authors’ analysis of right-wing authoritarianism remains crucial today

for understanding phenomena such as Donald Trump and their use of digital media.
Authoritarian Social Media

Authoritarian populism appeals to emotions partly via public communications, includ-
ing entertainment formats and social media. Among the reasons of the success of
the authoritarian right is that the simplicity and aggressiveness of its ideology
appeals to those who feel politically left alone, disenfranchised, disappointed, and
anxious. Media-savvy right-wing leaders “instrumentalize such disenchantment in
text, image and talk, via many discursive and material practices” (Wodak 2015, 182).
Social media is, just like the beer tent, the pub, and the public assembly, a space in
which right-wing authoritarianism is communicated. Right-wing authoritarianisation
is based on the Haiderisation and the Berluconisation of politics (Wodak 2013) –
two forms of far-right authoritarian politics using entertainment and media publicity
that were pioneered by Jörg Haider in Austria and Silvio Berlusconi in Italy.
Right-wing authoritarian communication is a semiotic strategy that publicly communi-

cates right-wing authoritarianism’s four elements. Based on critical theory, we can
study how right-wing authoritarianism is communicated in public, such as on social
media.
Towards Chaplin 2.0, Brecht 2.0, Verfremdung 2.0,

Critical Data Visualisation, Slow Media, and Critical
Public Sociology
One of the problems of the left is that it has lost its appeal to blue-collar and other
workers who fear or experience social degradation, and who are, despite automation,
computerisation, and deindustrialisation, large enough in numbers to tip election results
towards the right and the far-right. This is especially the case when voter turnouts are
low, when the left is disorganised, factionalised, and weak, and when social democracy
imitates neoliberalism and entrepreneurialism in an attempt to appeal to the new
“middle class”.9 “It is only by offering that vision of expanded welfare provision and
justice for all that the left will be able to break apart today’s alliance of conservatives
and those further to their right” (Renton 2019, 237).
Corporate media monopolies and the logic of the acceleration, spectacularisation,

and tabloidisation of the media are part of the reason why we see a rise in
right-wing authoritarianism. The left therefore needs to struggle for media
reforms that advance slow media, non-commercial media, public interest media,
a public service Internet, the digital and communicative commons, and platform
cooperatives (Fuchs 2018a).
Part of the problem of the left is that it has more problems in appealing to the
psyche, emotions, affects, and desires of those who feel politically anxious and
disenfranchised than the right does. It would be wrong to imitate the communi-
cation strategies and elements of right-wing authoritarianism. But the left can
also not leave political psychology entirely to the right. Those who feel politic-
ally anxious and disenfranchised need to express their desires for love and hate.
The key question is then how the left can manage to turn a disenfranchised
group’s love for the authoritarian leader and nationalism into a love for partici-
patory democracy and socialism, and its hatred of immigrants and foreigners into
the hatred of capitalism and inequality. Part of the problem is that prejudices
can often not be countered by rational arguments and citing statistical data,
because they operate at the psychological level of hopes and fears that are the
psychological material of post-truth politics. The solution, then, is not that the
left gives up the use of well-thought-out arguments and debates. On the con-
trary, the point is to understand the complexity of the world and come up with
proper responses that are supported by visual and argumentative strategies that
bring the problem to the point.
Critical Data Visualisation
Critical visualisations of data, studies, and statistics can form one important element of
how to popularise progressive thought so that it challenges right-wing authoritarian-
ism’s prejudices, nationalism, scapegoating, and leadership ideology. An interesting way
of responding to right-wing authoritarianism’s irrationality is by political humour, satire,
and parody. Horkheimer and Adorno (2002) wrote about the “ambiguity of laughter”:
If laughter up to now has been a sign of violence, an outbreak of blind,

obdurate nature, it nevertheless contains the opposite element, in that

through laughter blind nature becomes aware of itself as such and thus
abjures its destructive violence.
(60)
Humour is part of oppression itself, but may also be turned into challenging
oppression. Left critique can be simultaneously enlightening, humorous, and ser-
ious. There is much to learn in this respect from Charlie Chaplin and Bertolt
Brecht. The left 2.0 requires Chaplin 2.0 and Brecht 2.0 for the age of social
media and big data. The right-wing authoritarian spectacle staged via social
media and reality TV needs to be challenged by the Brechtian epic and dialect-
ical theatre 2.0, and the Boalian theatre of the oppressed 2.0.
Chaplin described the communicative approach of his movie The Great Dictator (1940):
Pessimists say I may fail – that dictators aren’t funny any more, that the
evil is too serious. That is wrong. If there is one thing I know it is that
power can always be made ridiculous. The bigger that fellow gets the
harder my laughter will hit him.
(Van Gelder 1940)
Brechtian Verfremdung
Brecht speaks of Verfremdung as opposed to Entfremdung (estrangement, alienation)

as the principle of the dialectical theatre:
Verfremdung estranges an incident or character simply by taking from the

incident or character what is self-evident, familiar, obvious in order to pro-
duce wonder and curiosity. […] The V-effect consists in turning the object
of which it is to be made aware, to which one’s attention is to be drawn,
from something ordinary, familiar, immediately accessible, into something

peculiar, striking and unexpected.
(Brecht 2015, 143, 192)
Verfremdung is a negation of the negation that creates feelings, emotions, and

affects of curiosity, surprise, and wonder. Verfremdung is the alienation of alienation
and the estrangement of estrangement. By Verfremdung 2.0, we mean equivalents
of the Brechtian dialectical principle in the digital age.
Semiotic Struggles
Ernst Bloch10 suggests fighting the Nazis and fascism should also entail symbolic struggles
over words so that communists and socialists appropriate the words that fascists use and
give them a different meaning. He argued that the words home and homeland (Heimat)
should not be left to the fascists, but be used differently. Capitalism alienates humans
from society, nature, and themselves as their home. Socialism (or what today we could
call commonism or a commons-based democracy) is in contrast for Bloch a true homeland
that overcomes capitalism and the particularism of nationalist homeland ideology:
But the root of history is the working, creating human being who reshapes
and overhauls the given facts. Once he has grasped himself and estab-
lished what is his, without expropriation and alienation, in real democracy,
there arises in the world something which shines into the childhood of all
and in which no one has yet been: homeland.
(Bloch 1995, 1375–1376)
Heimat (homeland) is an emotional category that appeals to humans’ desire for

community, friendship, family, well-being, and stability. Trying to semiotically
recode the meaning of the category of the homeland as social security, social
justice, and solidarity that is opposed to exploitation and class structures can be
one of the strategies used for countering right-wing extremist homeland-ideology.
Hardt and Negri (2017) understand politics as not just taking place on the
streets, in factories, squares, and offices, but also in the realm of language and
communication. They argue that we must politically take and transform the
meaning of words and argue that “transforming words themselves, giving them
new meanings” (151) is part of political struggle. “Sometimes this involves coin-
ing new terms but more often it is a matter of taking back and giving new sig-
nificance to existing ones” (151). “Indeed one of the central tasks of political
thought is to struggle over concepts, to clarify and transform their meaning”

(xix). Semiotic guerrilla warfare needs to be part of the struggle against right-
wing extremism:
In an era in which mass communication often appears as the manifestation

of a domination which makes sure of social control by planning the sending
of messages, it remains possible (as in an ideal semiotic “guerilla war-
fare”) to change the circumstances in the light of which the addressees
From the Antagonism of the Empire and the Multitude Towards a Society of the Commons
will choose own ways of interpretation.
(Eco 1976, 150)
The intellectual’s task in the times we live in is to be a critical, public intellectual. The
Jewish socialist intellectual Franz L. Neumann, who fled from Nazi-Germany to the USA,
stressed the task of critical public social science in his essay Anxiety and Politics:
Hence there remains for us as citizens of the university and of the state the
dual offensive on anxiety and for liberty: that of education and that of politics.
Politics, again, should be a dual thing for us: the penetration of the subject
matter of our academic discipline with the problems of politics […] and the
taking of positions on political questions. If we are serious about the human-
ization of politics; if we wish to prevent a demagogue from using anxiety and
apathy, then we – as teachers and students – must not be silent.
(Neumann 1957/2017, 629)
8.5 From the Antagonism of the Empire and the

Multitude Towards a Society of the Commons
Empire, Multitude, and the Commons
Hardt and Negri, in their tetralogy Empire (2000), Multitude (2004), Common-
wealth (2009) and Assembly (2017), analyse the antagonism between capital and
labour in contemporary capitalism as the antagonism between empire and multi-
tude. Empire is a form of capitalism that is based on the cooperative labour of
the social worker (the multitude) that creates social, cultural, educational,
technological, and communicative commons:
Production based on cooperation and communication makes perfectly clear

how the common is both presupposition and result: there can be no
cooperation without an existing commonality, and the result of cooperative

production is the creation of a new commonality; similarly, communication
cannot take place without a common basis, and the result of communica-
tion is a new common expression. The production of the multitude launches
the common in an expanding, virtuous spiral.
(Hardt and Negri 2004, 349–350)
Within the global capitalism that Hardt and Negri (2000) have termed empire, capital
exploits the common that the multitude produces. In their book Commonwealth,
Hardt and Negri (2009) envision an alternative to capitalism – the commonwealth.
Commonwealth is “a world of common wealth” that expands “our capacities for col-
lective and production and self-government” (xiii).
Hardt and Negri analyse capitalism as a contradictory open totality that in its devel-
opment has become ever-more social and cooperative, but is subject to the domin-
ant class’ and political elites’ control. A dialectic of crises and struggles drives the
development of these contradictions.
The social production of the commons that are exploited by capital is a key feature
of the contemporary economy and society:
Today production is increasingly social in a double sense: on one hand,

people produce ever more socially, in networks of cooperation and inter-
action; and, on the other, the result of production is not just commodities
but social relations and ultimately society itself.
(Hardt and Negri 2017, xv; see also 78)
The common consists, for Hardt and Negri (2017), of two main forms, the nat-
ural and the social commons (166), that are divided into five types: the earth
and its ecosystems; the “immaterial” common of ideas, codes, images, and cul-
tural products; “material” goods produced by cooperative work; metropolitan
and rural spaces that are realms of communication, cultural interaction, and
cooperation; and social institutions and services that organise housing, welfare,
health, and education (166). Contemporary capitalism’s class structure is, for
Hardt and Negri (2017), based on the extraction of the commons, which
includes the extraction of natural resources, data mining/data extraction, the
extraction of the social from the urban spaces on real estate markets, and
finance as extractive industry (166–171).
Hardt/Negri and David Harvey
Hardt and Negri (2017) analyse capitalism as having developed in three phases: the
phase of primitive accumulation, the phase of manufacture and large-scale industry, and
the phase of social production. In Chapter 11 of their book Assembly, they provide
a typology of ten features of these three phases. In this analysis, a difference between
Hardt/Negri’s and David Harvey’s approach becomes evident: whereas Harvey character-
ises capitalism’s imperialistic and exploitative nature, based on Rosa Luxemburg, as
ongoing primitive accumulation, primitive accumulation is, for Hardt and Negri, a stage
of capitalist development. Hardt/Negri prefer Marx’s notions of formal and real sub-
sumption for characterising capitalism’s processes of exploitation and commodification.
In an interlude, Hardt and Negri explicitly discuss this difference of their approach to the
one by David Harvey (Hardt and Negri 2017, 178–182).
David Harvey uses the notions of formal/real subsumption and primitive accumulation in
a converse manner to Hardt/Negri: whereas primitive accumulation is, in his theory, an
ongoing process of accumulation by dispossession, formal and real subsumption charac-
terise two stages in the development of capitalism, one dominated by absolute surplus-
value production, the other by relative surplus-value production. Harvey (2017), in his
book Marx, Capital and the Madness of Economic Reason, says that Marx describes
a “move from a formal (coordinations through market mechanisms) to a real (under the
direct supervision of capital) subsumption of labour under capital” (117). “All the fea-
tures of primitive accumulation that Marx mentions have remained powerfully present
within capitalism’s historical geography up until now” (Harvey 2003, 145).
Whereas there are commonalities of Harvey’s and Hardt/Negri’s analysis of the com-
mons and urban space (see Harvey et al. 2009), it is evident that there are also
differences. There is certainly not one correct or valid interpretation of Marx. The
decisive circumstance is that Marx, 200 years after his birth, remains the key influ-
ence for understanding capitalism critically. Both Harvey’s and Hardt/Negri’s works
are updates of Marx’s theory under the conditions of twenty-first-century capitalism.
The Dialectic of Multitude and Empire
Hardt and Negri (2000, 51) consider Hegelian dialectics as deterministic and teleological.
They use Spinoza’s immanentism rather than Hegel’s dialectics. But Hegelian dialectics has
shaped Hardt’s and Negri’s works behind their back. Figure 8.1 visualises Hardt and Negri’s
concepts of empire (Hardt and Negri 2000), the multitude (Hardt and Negri 2004), and
The Hegelian Dialectical Triad of Multitude, Capital (Empire), and Commonwealth
Nuclear Hyper- Authoritarian

capitalism, Commonwealth =
extinction neoliberalism
fascism commonism
AUFHEBUNG 1 AUFHEBUNG 2 AUFHEBUNG 3 AUFHEBUNG 4:

Produces surplus Digital
commonism
value, a world of common wealth, [...]
commons expanding our capacities for collective
(knowledge, language, affects, production and self-government (Hardt
Negative dialectic or and Negri 2009, Commonwealth: xiii),
communication, education, care,
technology, digital knowledge, determinate negation? what the private is to capitalism, [...]
user-generated Internet content, the common is to communism (Hardt
Internet-mediated and Negri 2009: 273) => FOR A
communication, etc.) COMMONIST INTERNET IN A
COMMONIST SOCIETY
Capital exploits surplus value and the commons
V = c + v + s The multitude resists against capital M-C..P..C -M
= actuality: necessary for capitalism

MULTITUDE = potentiality CAPITAL, EMPIRE
FIGURE 8.1 The antagonism between the capitalist empire and the multitude
commonwealth (Hardt and Negri 2009) as a dialectical triad. The multitude produces the
commons. Capital organises itself as a global empire for exploiting the commons. There
is an antagonism of capital and the multitude. Capital requires the multitude that pro-
duces the commons, but at the same time capital exploits and excludes the multitude.
Commonwealth is a new self-managed form of the commons that emerges from the neg-
ation of the negative relation of capital and the multitude.
In Empire, Multitude, Commonwealth, and Assembly, Hardt and Negri (2000, 2004,
2009) describe a stage in capitalist development in which global capital (the empire)
faces a new working class (the multitude). New common potentials emerge that could
become the foundation of a society of the commons, the commonwealth. Common-
wealth is, however, just one possible outcome of twenty-first-century society’s devel-
opment. There could also be negative developments such as a new fascism or the end
of humanity. Which option prevails depends on how social struggles will develop. The
truth of what Rosa Luxemburg wrote in 1918 has today again become very urgent: “In
this hour, socialism is the only salvation for humanity” (Luxemburg 1971, 367).
Right-wing authoritarian movements advance particularistic politics of nature, of the

social, and of communication. In respect to nature, they fetishise national identity, the
family, and conservative traditions, and see immigrants and global identity as environ-
mental problems disrupting the nation. Right-wing authoritarianism’s social policies are
a combination of neoliberal ideology that propagates survival of the fittest and a national
“socialist” rhetoric that reserves welfare for the autochthonous, national population. In
respect to communication, right-wing authoritarianism combines conservative techno-
pessimism that sees traditional values under threat on the Internet and argues in favour
of law and order control of the Internet, combined with a neoliberal techno-capitalist
ideology that celebrates the corporate media and the corporate Internet.
Hardt and Negri (2017, Chapter 4) analyse contemporary far-right politics. The aim of
contemporary right-wing movements is to “restore an imagined national identity that is
primarily white, Christian, and heterosexual” (50). Hardt and Negri argue that contempor-
ary far-right politics often imitates left-wing movements and are organised as leaderless
and structureless movements so that they are different from classical right-wing move-
ments. Donald Trump is arguably the most influential far-right politician today. Trump
certainly undermines established party structures. But at the same time, he has used
money, ideology, and popularity to build new structures. And he constitutes a new form
of authoritarian right-wing leadership, in which the power of big politics and big capital
are fused in one person, the authoritarian spectacle mobilises citizens via reality TV and
social media, and a narcissistic self-branding machine engages in constant friend/enemy
politics that takes symbolic political violence to a new level (see Fuchs 2018a). Trump is
a non-trivial far-right phenomenon that is neither completely new nor completely old,
but a development of the strategy and tactics of the far-right.
Progressive forces are today often split and fragmented. The commons consist of social,
natural, and communicative commons. All of these commons have become increasingly
commodified and privatised. Left-wing parties and movements predominantly struggle
for the defence of the social commons, green movements for the defence of the natural
commons, and tech movements for the defence of the communicative commons. In order
to challenge right-wing authoritarianism, progressive forces should learn from the fail-
ures of the left in the 1920s when various factions, especially social democrats and
communists, opposed each other and did not unite against the fascist threat. We need
a united political front against right-wing authoritarianism where the defence of the
social, natural, and communicative commons becomes one movement associated with
one progressive party and an associated movement. Social democracy needs a renewal
in the form of social democracy 2.0, a movement for socialist democracy and democratic
socialism. To the convergence of capital and the convergence of the non-progressive
political landscape, the only feasible answer is left-wing convergence into an inter-
nationalist progressive movement (see Figure 8.2).
The Appropriation of Fixed Digital Capital
In respect to communications, the perspective of the commons-based society stands

for the advancement of the digital commons, platform cooperatives, and a public
service Internet. Democratic communications shape and are shaped by “an associ-
ation of free men, working with the means of production held in common, and
expending their many different forms of labour-power in full self-awareness as one
single social labour force” (Marx 1867, 171).
Digital technologies are ambivalent and through the contradictory development of

the productive forces also advance the socialisation of work and increase the
cooperative character of life and society. Hardt and Negri (2017) therefore oppose
smashing digital machines. They argue for the “reappropriation of fixed capital,
taking back control of the physical machines, intelligent machines, social machines,
and scientific knowledges that were created by us in the first place, is one daring,
powerful enterprise we could launch in that battle” (120). Appropriating fixed capital
Natural Commons Social Commons Communication Commons
Political Convergence =>

International Progressive Movement &
Party for the Commons, Social
Democracy 2.0: Socialist Democracy &
Democratic Socialism
FIGURE 8.2 Political convergence of movements for the commons

“is not a matter of struggling against or destroying machines or algorithms or any

other forms in which our past production is accumulated, but rather wresting them
back from capital, expropriating the expropriators, and opening that wealth to soci-
ety” (287). Hardt and Negri stress the insight that given that technologies are made
by humans, they shouldn’t be left to capital and the state as tools of domination,
but should be transformed into tools of emancipation.
In the age of algorithms, social media, big data, and digital machines, the relation-
ship of fixed constant capital and variable capital has become more dynamic. Trad-
itionally, engineers created machines that were used in the production process over
a longer time period until they became physically or morally depreciated and had to
be replaced. Digital machines operate on binary data. Digital capitalism has datafied
our lives. Our online activities are to a significant degree digital labour that creates
data that are both a commodity and become part of fixed capital. Data storage is an
inherent element of the digital machine. Once created, data in digital capitalism
become fixed constant capital. They are stored on servers as part of the digital
machine that enables digital capital accumulation. But data are also the building
blocks, the circulating constant capital, based on which digital labour creates new
content and data. In the realm of big data, circulating constant capital and fixed
constant capital show a tendency of convergence. Data are the objectification of
digital labour, of human subjectivity that goes online. Data as constant capital is
therefore an objectification of the general intellect. Datafication generalises human
knowledge and fixes it in databases stored on servers.
When human subjects become political subjects, then commonist digital appropri-
ation is the potential answer of political resistance they can give to digital capital-
ism. Hardt and Negri (2017) remind us that algorithms and digital machines are not
intelligent. Only humans have intelligence. And it is their political intelligence that
gives them the capacity to turn digital capital into digital commons, the capitalist
digital machine into digital machines of commoning and social cooperation.
Are the big data commons the alternative to big data capitalism? On the one hand,
amassing, leaking, and publishing big data about capitalist power and state power
has become a strategy of resistance. On the other hand, one must see that big data
generation and big data storage serves the interests of capital and the state. Big
data has emerged from capitalist control (big data-based capital accumulation) and
state control (state-surveillance of citizens because of the false surveillance ideology
that not socialism, but surveillance and a police state, are the best means against
political and social problems). In addition, big data capitalism requires massive
amounts of energy that is predominantly based on non-renewable sources and it
advances climate change. Big data commons therefore aim to reduce the amount of
data stored to necessary data and to get rid of surplus data that today become sur-
plus-value and surplus-power.
But how do you appropriate an algorithm, Google, YouTube, or Facebook? There are
different strategies. The first strategy is capital taxation. Global Internet giants con-
stantly avoid paying taxes, which is supported by the contradiction between the
global Internet and regulation at the level of the nation-state. Taxing global corpor-
ations and online advertising can create state income that can be distributed to citi-
zens via participatory budgeting. The participatory media fee taxes global
corporations, and it gives everyone a citizens’ communication income that is donated
to non-profit media projects. Alternative media often lack resources. Via participatory
budgeting and capital taxation, the alternative media sector could be strengthened
in order to weaken the corporate character of the Internet and the media in general.
Wages for Facebook is in general not a feasible strategy because it does not ques-
tion the dominant character of digital monopoly capital. A universal basic income for
universal labour, which includes unpaid digital labour and other unpaid reproductive
labour, is in contrast a better political strategy.
Platform co-ops and peer-to-peer production are a second strategy. These are civil
society projects that organise online platforms and digital machines as user-
controlled and digital worker-controlled organisations that do not operate for-profit
and for the interests of the few, but for the benefit of all and the common good.
Resource precarity is one of the main problems alternative economy projects tend to
face. Combining the first and the second strategies allows generating a resource
base for platform co-ops and peer-to-peer projects. If they can expand, then they
can create an economic realm that poses an alternative to digital capital and is in
itself a form of digital class struggle against digital capitalism.
The left has traditionally been afraid of conquering state power. To a certain
degree, the Stalinist experience justifies such scepticism. But the anarchist rejection
of appropriating the state in order to transform and transcend it often leaves alter-
native projects powerless, marginalised, and confronted with a political economy of
precarity (of voluntary labour and resources) that fosters sectarianism and anarchist
versions of Stalinist orthodoxy and hierarchy. In the realm of communications, we
should not forget that besides citizens’ media, there is the realm of public service
media (PSM). Especially in Europe, there is a strong PSM-tradition that operates to

a significant degree outside of the logic of capital. Political clientelism is the problem that
PSM faces. But just like there can be struggles for more autonomous realms from capital in
the economy, there can be struggles for more autonomous realms from the state in the
public sphere. PSM are today by legal frameworks kept from becoming public digital ser-
vices and public service Internet platform providers. Monopoly media capital sees PSM as
competitors and has influenced legislation that in the end helps advance the economic
interests of digital monopoly capital (Google, Facebook, Amazon, Microsoft, Apple, etc.).
I am not arguing in favour of a state-controlled Internet, as we already can find it where
secret services implement a surveillance-industrial Internet complex (as revealed by
Edward Snowden), but for independent, critical public service media that offer specific
online services, such as Club 2.0 (Fuchs 2017d) or a public service YouTube that offers all
archived public service television and radio content to the public as common good (using
Creative Commons licences) that can be appropriated and remixed.
What does the appropriation of the capitalist digital machine mean? It means the
struggle for alternatives to digital capitalism, the de-commodification, de-
capitalisation, and de-commercialisation of the digital and the Internet. Today, we
often find private–public partnerships that foster commodification. Digital appropri-
ation promises to be an effective form of digital struggle when organised as com-
mons–public partnerships that negate the logic of digital capital and aim at
a negation of digital capitalism’s negativity in processes of struggles that, as deter-
minate negations, advance the digital commons in order to transcend and abolish
digital capitalism. The broader context of such digital struggles is the renewal of
the left as dialectic of movement and party (Dean 2016).
We need a kind of Luxemburgism 2.0 in the age of the social production of the
common. Rosa Luxemburg in her time argued against Eduard Bernstein’s pure parlia-
mentary social democratic reformism. She opposed anarchist individualism and
propagated using the mass strike as political tactic. Luxemburg neither rejected nor
fetishised parliamentary politics. She rejected Leninist vanguard party politics and
argued for organising the spontaneity of protest. She opposed war, imperialism, and
nationalism with internationalist politics. She saw that the limitation of democracy
in post-revolutionary Russia was a serious shortcoming that would create major
problems. Luxemburg argued for dialectics of party/movements, organisation/spon-
taneity, and leader/masses (see Luxemburg 2008). The point, where we need to
transcend Luxemburg’s politics today, is that she was very sceptical about the
feasibility of autonomous projects, especially cooperatives. Self-management cannot

begin from nothing in the creation of a novel society. It requires forms that develop
within, against and beyond capitalism and produce commons that transcend
capitalism.
Notes
1 Translation from German: „Die faschistischen und rechtsextremen Bewegungen sind die
‚Wundmale und die Narben einer Demokratie […], die ihrem eigenen Begriff eben doch
bis heute noch nicht voll gerecht wird’.”
2 www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/fake-news
3 Twitter, @RealDonaldTrump, 17 February 2017, https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/
status/832708293516632065
4 Journalists first estimated that the data breach affected around 50 million Facebook
users. A bit later, Facebook indicated that almost 90 million users’ personal data may
have been accessed and collected (Kang and Frenkel 2018).
5 BBC Stories, tweet from 21 March 2018, https://twitter.com/bbcstories/status/
976415490993283073
6 2016 US Election: Donald J. Trump For President Inc., campaign finance data obtained
and exported from: Federal Election Commission, www.fec.gov/data/candidate/
P80001571, time period: all years (2013–2016).
7 See the International Fact-Checking Network Fact-Checkers’ Code of Principles: www
.poynter.org/international-fact-checking-network-fact-checkers-code-principles
8 A slightly longer version of this section has been published as a discussion piece in the
journal Media, Culture & Society: Christian Fuchs. 2018. Authoritarian Capitalism, Authori-
tarian Movements and Authoritarian Communication. Media, Culture & Society 40 (5):
779–791. Reproduced with permission.
9 This paragraph as well as the following five paragraphs were first published in the article
“Authoritarian Capitalism, Authoritarian Movements and Authoritarian Communication” in
the journal Media, Culture & Society. Reproduced with permission.
10 Parts of the following paragraphs and the following section (8.5) were first published as
part of the following article: Christian Fuchs. 2017. Reflections on Michael Hardt and
Antonio Negri’s Book “Assembly”. tripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique 15 (2):
851–865. Reproduced with permission.
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References
Index
Locators in italics refer to figures, those in bold refer to tables
accounts: false 261–262; social media appearance 36, 188

160, 164 Arbeiter-Zeitung 60, 64
accumulation 13, 15, 159, 276, 281 Aryans 9, 57
actors 15, 250 Assembly (Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri)
Adler, Max 54–55 275, 276
Adorno, Theodor W. 143–144, asylum applications 125–126, 147, 158,
267, 273 222, 223
advertising (ads) 213, 250–253, asylum seekers 126, 147, 149, 153, 158
255–264, 282 attacks, terror 157–158
AfD (Alternative für Deutschland, Alternative audiences 196, 250–251; see also users;
for Germany) 6, 127–129, 142–143, viewers
149–150, 153–156, 159–161; social media austerity 125–126, 265
opposition to AfD 164–166 Austria 126, 179–183; education and
Afghanistan 222 Hauptschule 193–195; incomplete
After Dark 264 denazification 189–191; Kronen Zeitung’s
AggregateIQ (AIQ) 253 role in Austria 191–193; Kurz and ÖVP in
algorithms 250, 253, 255, 258–262, Austria 188–189; law and order politics in
281, 282 Austria 225–230; leadership discourse in
alienation 15–16, 28, 102, 205, 221 the Austrian case study 214–216;
alternative economy projects 282 methodology of the Austrian case study
Alternative for Germany/Alternative für 196–201; nationalism in Austria 217–218;
Deutschland (AfD) see AfD Proporz 195; social media analysis of the
alternative media sector 282 Austrian case study 210–214
Anderson, Benedict 27–31, 30–31 Austrian Press Agency 210
Index
Anderson, Kevin B. 33, 40, 41–42 Austro-Marxism 61–63

annihilation 4, 271; see also killings authoritarianism 213, 214, 265–266,
anonymity 24, 248 267–271; challenging 232–234; populism
Anschluss 53–55, 56, 62–63, 68, 216; see and authoritarianism 266–267; right-wing
also unification authoritarianism 109, 159–161, 166,
antagonism 10, 129 247–248, 254, 279; semiotic struggles in
anthroponyms 215 the context of authoritarianism 274–275;
anti-Semitism 22, 28, 57 social media and authoritarianism
Anxiety and Politics (Franz L. Neumann) 275 271–272
304 Index
Balibar, Étienne 28, 247 Burschenschaften 186–188

banalisation 127, 266
Bauer, Otto 9, 43–44, 55, 71, 72, 246; 1919 Cambridge Analytica 252–255
peace treaty 56; Alfred Klahr on Bauer campaigns, election 140–142, 149–150, 161,
46–47; Anschluss 53–55, 56–57; Austro- 198, 258; USA 257
Marxism and Nazi-Fascism 61–63; Bauer camps, concentration (internment) 229, 231
and Luxemburg 45–47, 49, 53–57, 56, capital 10, 15, 144; Austria 193, 208–210,
61–63, 63–64, 68; culture 51; European 232; Bauer and Luxemburg 52, 66
Union (EU) 70; Hitler 57–58; Josef Strasser capital, global 11, 278
on Bauer 58; Karl Kautsky on Bauer 50–51; capitalism 9–13, 16; Austria 232, 234;
language 51–52; Marxism 44–45; Bauer and Luxemburg on capitalism
nationalism 52–53; nationality 47–48; 52, 66, 69, 72; contemporary Marxist
nations 44–45; non-historical nations theories 101–102; Germany 126,
48–50; political pragmatism of Bauer 129, 143, 159, 162; Marx 36–37, 41–42;
59–60; Schutzbund and Heimwehr 59; nationalism theories 25, 27–30,
servitude and submission 63–64 28–30; see also authoritarianism; digital
belonging 7, 45 capitalism
benefit scroungers see scroungers, benefit capitalism, global 15, 82, 85, 90
biases 250, 256 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
big data 259, 261, 281–282 European Union 222
Bonapartism 39 Chatterjee, Partha 81–86, 247
borders 145, 158, 216, 231 Chibber, Vivek 84–88, 247
bots 6, 137–139, 160, 210; political 261–262 children (kids) 129, 204, 205, 220,
boundaries 4, 24, 27, 67, 130, 132 221, 231
breaches, data 253, 258 Christian Democratic Union (CDU) 127
Brecht, Bertolt 273 Christian Social Union (CSU) 151, 153
Benner, Erica 34, 35 Christianity 206, 231
Brexit 9, 10, 68, 69 citizens 4, 15; Austria 191, 193, 216,
Britain see United Kingdom (UK) 224, 230; Germany 138, 142, 153,
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) 156–158, 161
118–120, 229, 253, 264 citizenship 11, 23, 52, 127, 182
broadcasters 181, 196, 234; see also public class 9, 21, 23; Austria 194–195, 234; Bauer
services and Luxemburg on class 55, 65; Germany
budgeting, participatory 282 164; Marx on class 36–37; theories of
budgets 147, 148, 149, 162 nationalism 28–29
Bündnis Zukunft Österreich (BZÖ) 185 class conflicts 11, 42, 66, 127; Austria
burdening, ideological discourse of 147, 149, 209–210, 232
150, 162, 210, 220, 221 class contradictions 23, 37, 39, 129, 270
bureaucracy 24, 26 class, social 65, 143, 194
Index 305
class structures 66, 129, 207; theories of crime 3, 129, 160; Austria 192, 197, 208,
nationalism 25, 28–31 212, 224
class struggles 7, 9, 11, 31; containment in criminals 5, 23, 221, 224, 231
Austria 193; Germany 164; Marx 38, criminonyms 208
40–41 crises 11–12, 15–16; Austria 185, 195, 209;
clientelism 195, 283 Bauer and Luxemburg 67, 69; Germany
climate change 282 125–126, 132, 159
Cold War 193 critical theory 8
colonialism 5, 9, 10, 25, 35, 41; Nigeria and culture 16; Bauer and Luxemburg 46–49, 51,
Rwanda 89–90 54–55, 57, 66; Germany 151, 155;
colonialism (anti-colonialism) 28 online 139, 160; theories of nationalism
commercialisation 259, 283 23–25
commodification 245, 259, 276, 279, 283
commodities 21–22, 37, 52, 258 data, big 6, 13
commons 275–276, 276, 279–280 Davis, Mike 33
commonwealth 276, 278 democracy 11–12, 16, 63–64; Austria 231,
Commonwealth (Michael Hardt and Antonio 234–235; Germany 127
Negri) 275 demographic development 224, 227
communication 4, 6–7, 12; types and denazification 189–191
structures of nationalist communication deportation 132, 182, 228, 231, 269
113–120 deregulation 189, 245
communication, political 3–5, 12 development 141; demographic 152
communism 42, 46, 94 dialects 49–50, 270
Communist Party of Austria (KPÖ) 46, 60, 62 dialogues 259
consciousness 143, 267; Bauer and dictatorships 3, 10
Luxemburg 45, 50–51, 55; Marx 38, 40; Die Linke 128, 131, 134, 166, 175
theories of nationalism 21, 23–24 differences 9, 25, 59; cultural 47–48; radical
consciousness, false 38, 93, 164, 250 cultural 47–48
consciousness, national 24, 52–53, 55, 62, digital capitalism 5–6, 245, 250, 254, 258,
107, 247 281–283
Index
consent 130, 199 Digital Forensic Lab 137–138

conspiracy theories 138–139, 212 digital media 13, 27, 132, 248, 271
consumers 15, 28, 37, 260 discourses, nationalist 83, 113, 129,
consumption 12, 27, 48, 114–115, 153, 248 200, 248
convergence 12–13 discourses, online 130, 160, 196
cooperation 24, 275–276, 280, 281 disenfranchisement 271, 272
cooperatives 282, 284 dispossession 159, 231, 276
corporations 15, 24 diversity 6, 47, 69
corruption 234, 235 Dollfuss, Engelbert 60, 62, 64
306 Index
domination 5, 37, 66; Germany 143, 164; ethnicity 28, 41–42

theories of nationalism 21, 25, 28 ethno-symbolism 23, 246
donors 161–162, 189, 235, 258 ethnonyms 142
Du Bois, W.E.B. 105–106 eugenics 57
European Central Bank 125
education 24–25, 276; Austria 183, 193–195, European South 144–146
221, 225; Germany 132, 141, 149, 162 European Union (EU) 11, 69–70; Austria 185,
election campaigns 247, 253; see also Aus- 212, 222, 224; Germany 125–127, 132,
tria; Germany 134–135, 144–146, 160
election programmes 140–143, 151, 154, 208 events, media 130, 248
election results 127, 128, 260, 272 evidence 161, 165
elections 162, 179–180, 184, 235, 253–255, exclusion 29, 53
258, 272 experiences 21, 55
elites 15, 210 exploitation 5, 10, 65; Marx 35, 37; theories
elites, political 81, 107–108, 248 of nationalism 25, 28
emancipation 40, 281 extermination 269; see also killings
emotions 166, 274 extremism 4, 126, 269
empire 275–276, 277–280
Empire (Michael Hardt and Antonio Facebook 12; Germany 127, 130, 132,
Negri) 275 138, 154
employability 24 fact-checking 263, 264
employment policies 184–185 fake news 6, 137–139, 161, 207, 212,
employment (unemployment) 125–126, 249–252; Cambridge Analytica 252–255;
182–183, 185, 231 causes 259–260; implications 257–258;
enemies 4–5, 9, 37, 66; Austria 213, 218, 220, Internet Research Agency 255–257;
225; Germany 129, 133, 163; theories of problems and impacts 261–262; what can
nationalism 22, 25, 28; see also friend/ be done? 262–265
enemy scheme Falter, Der 234
engagement 138, 160, 164, 215, 254, 256; families 30; Austria 182, 194, 203–204, 218;
political 260, 265 Germany 147, 149, 165, 174
Engels, Friedrich 34, 36, 58 fascism 4; Austrian 60, 64; Nazi- 6, 13, 61–63,
Enlightenment 155 93–94, 157
entertainment 127, 251, 260, 266 feelings 261, 274
entrepreneurs (entrepreneurial spirits) 24, 98, fetishism 9–10; Bauer and Luxemburg
182–183, 188, 215, 245, 272 66, 70, 72; Germany 129, 143,
equality 4, 15, 91, 93, 141, 209, 272; see also 246; Marx 37–38; theories of nationalism
inequality 21–23
Erdogğan, Recep Tayyip 5, 233, 245 filter bubbles 135, 211, 250
ethics 130, 259, 261; research 199 finances (financial situation) 129, 147, 150
Index 307
financialisation 15, 245, 259 140–144; refugees and migration 146–153;

First International 35, 39 Twitter 134–135
First World War 9, 43, 50, 56, 66–67, 246 Global Science Research (GSR) 252
Fischer, Ernst 60, 62 globalisation 6, 12, 15, 47, 185, 245, 254
foreigners 10, 271; Austria 184–185, 197, Google 253, 254, 259, 260
203–205, 216; Germany 128, 142–143; governments 126, 185
theories of nationalism 25, 28 governments, coalition 179, 183, 213, 235
FPÖ (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs) see Free- Gramsci, Antonio 266–267
dom Party of Austria Greece 125, 144–146
France 125 Green Party: Austria 173, 179, 194, 196, 210;
Frankfurt School 267–268, 271 Germany 134, 152–153
freedom 229, 234, 270 Guardian, The 252
Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) 6, 47, Gudenus, Johann 229, 234, 235
183–186; FPÖ and Burschenschaften
186–188; see also Gudenus, Johann; Habermas, Jürgen 7, 68–69, 261
Haider, Jörg; Kickl, Herbert; Hofer, Norbert; Haider, Jörg 183, 184, 185, 198, 271
Strache, Heinz-Christian Hardt, Michael 274, 275, 280–281
friend/enemy scheme: Austria 200, 213, #IbizaGate 234–235
217–225, 230, 232; Germany 127, hatred 4, 9, 66, 143, 216, 272
142–144, 162, 163; society of the Hauptschule 193–195
commons 248, 259, 269–270, 279; see also Hayek Gesellschaft 162
enemies headlines 192, 251
Fromm, Erich 63, 101–102, 247, 267, 270 healthcare 276; Austria 183, 231; Germany
132, 147, 149, 163
Gauland, Alexander 149–150, 159 Heimat (homeland) 274
Gellner, Ernest 24–27, 68 Heimwehr 59
gender 25, 270 hierarchies 127, 270
genderonyms 216 history 7, 21, 22, 46, 143–144, 186
generalisation 208; inductive 157–159 Hitler, Adolf 57–58, 61
Geneva Convention 222 Hobsbawm, Eric J. 6, 6–7, 9, 28, 245, 246,
Index
genocide 53 247; critique of Nairn’s theory 94–95;

German Ideology, The (Karl Marx and history of nationalism 96–99; Nairn 92–94;
Friedrich Engels) 36 Nairn’s response 95–96; nationalism as
Germany 43, 45–47, 53–55, 57, 61–62, 72 invented tradition 106–107
Germany, elections 125–126, 129–133, Hofer, Norbert 185, 186, 194–195, 206, 212
159–166; AfD 127–129, 135–137, Holzkamp, Klaus 102–103, 247
139; bots and fake news 137–139; homicides, intentional 224, 226
European Union (EU) 126–127, housing 220, 231, 276
144–146; Islam 153–159; nationalism humour (comedy) 233, 251, 273
308 Index
identity 4–5, 8, 28, 37, 68, 129, 217; global Islam: Austria 181, 196–198, 205, 208;
279; inner 213; national 191, 206, 278, 279; Germany 132–135, 153–160
political 132–133 Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) 16, 147,
ideology 36, 50, 248 149, 156–157, 222
images 188, 276 Islamophobia 185
Imagined Communities: Reflections on the
Origin and Spread of Nationalism (Benedict James, C.L.R. 9, 10, 90–92, 247
Anderson) 27–31 journalism 212, 259
immigrants 5, 10–11, 16, 25, 37, 127, 132, journalists 210, 212, 234
146–153, 279 Junge Freiheit 138
immigration (anti-immigration) 47, 68, 128,
138, 145, 184–185, 205 Kautsky, Karl 50–51
imperialism (anti-imperialist) 5, 9, 11–12, 28; Kern, Christian 179, 210
Bauer and Luxemburg 43, 52, 65; theories keywords 130, 131
of nationalism 25–26 Kickl, Herbert 197, 215–216, 229
in-groups 205, 217 killings 59, 229, 231
income 141, 282; see also wages Klahr, Alfred 46–47
India 35, 40–41 knowledge 280, 281
indicators 125, 126 Kristeva, Julia 87
individualisation 15, 248 Kronen Zeitung 191–193, 197, 212, 234
industrialism 24, 25 Kurz, Sebastian 6, 179, 231; #IbizaGate 235;
industries 189, 276 debates excerpts 201–203, 208; FPÖ 184;
inequality 4, 15, 23, 37, 69, 141, 209–210; friend/enemy scheme 224; leadership 215;
society of the commons 245, 254, ÖVP 188–189; social media 210–211
260, 272
information 13, 250, 251, 254 labour 4, 10, 15, 24–25, 161; Austria 193,
Instagram 154, 188, 255, 256, 257 208–209; Bauer and Luxemburg 52, 66
institutions 28, 52 languages 269; Austria 206, 220, 231; Bauer
International Monetary Fund (IMF) 125 and Luxemburg 46–49, 51–52, 54; Germany
International Workingmen’s Association 35 140, 146, 151; theories of nationalism 24,
internationalism 11, 12, 34–35, 64, 72, 79–81, 26–29
132; intransigent 58 law and order policies/politics 182, 200, 213,
Internet Research Agency 255–257 216–217, 225–232, 248, 269
intruders 23, 37, 129, 217 Le Pen, Marine 5, 245
invasion 145, 146 leadership 2, 4, 16, 160, 271; Austria 179,
investment 254, 257, 258 181, 200, 213, 215–216, 231–232; Germany
Iraq 222 127, 147, 159
Iraq War 147 leadership discourse 214–216
Ireland 38, 164 legislation 252, 262–263
Index 309
Lenin, Vladimir I. 9, 67–68 migration 181, 225; Germany 128, 132, 134,
Liebknecht, Karl 11–12, 43 146–153, 160
likes (social media) 71, 119, 138, 197, 210, militarionyms 145, 157
251–252, 256 militarism 2, 4, 23, 66, 146, 149; Austria 213,
Lithuania 64 225; Germany 127, 16
lobbying 250 minorities 10, 16, 25, 185, 269; Bauer and
Löwenthal, Leo 267 Luxemburg 47, 69
Löwy, Michael 44 modernization 35, 156
Lukás, Georg 267 money 161, 204, 258, 279
Luxemburg, Rosa 6, 9, 11–12, 22, 43–44, 71, morals 151, 259, 260, 261
72; European Union (EU) 69–70; First World multiculturalism 11, 47, 151, 153,
War 66–67; Germany 143; Habermas 186, 218
68–69; internationalism 64; by Lenin multitude 275–276, 277–280
67–68; self-determination 65–66; Multitude, War and Democracy in the Age
society of the commons 245–247, of Empire (Michael Hardt and Antonio
276, 278, 283 Negri) 275
Muslims 5, 16, 132, 205, 206, 212, 221, 232
machines 280–281 Mutbürger 150
manipulation 127, 235, 254, 267
Marcuse, Herbert 8, 267 Nairn, Tom 92–96; see also Hobsbawm,
markets 52, 66, 140 Eric J.
Marx at the Margins: On Nationalism, nation-states 5, 34, 52–53, 143; see also
Ethnicity, and Non-Western Societies nation
(Kevin B. Anderson) 33 National Question and Autonomy, The (Rosa
Marx, Karl 6–9, 13, 21, 33–34, 39–40, 58, Luxemburg) 64
164; Bonapartism 39; Edward Said 40–41; nationalism 52–53, 66, 67–68; 2.0 12–13;
fetishism 37; ideology 36; internationalism Benedict Anderson 27–31; communication
34–35; Kevin B. Anderson 41–42; theory 112–113; Ernest Gellner 24–27;
nationalism 38–39; society of the commons forms of 110–111; general features
245–247, 267, 276 107–109, 111–112; Jürgen Habermas
Index
McLuhan, Marshall 26, 30 68–69; Karl Marx 34–40; new 70–72; new
media 12, 26–27, 42, 127, 154, 206, 211; see nationalisms 13–16; society of the
also digital media; slow media; social commons as alternative to nationalism 269,
media 270, 273, 283; studying 6–12; surplus
Merkel, Angela 130, 140, 216, 218 104–105; today 1–5; types and structures
Mia san Mia 191 112–120; types of theories 21–24; see also
Middle East 16 Bauer, Otto; Luxemburg, Rosa
migrants 10; criminal 228; Germany 126, 133, nationalism, Austrian 191, 199–200, 217–218,
135, 142, 145; see also Austria 231, 233
310 Index
nationalism, contemporary 120–122; anti- news 154

colonial and internationalism 79–92; Eric news, fake see fake news
J. Hobsbawm 92–112; national news media 259
communication theory 112–120 newspapers 12, 27, 29, 154, 161, 191, 250;
nationalism, German 140–144, 157; AfD and online articles 197, 198
authoritarianism 159–161; AfD (Alternative Nigeria 89–90
for Germany) dominance on social media 9/11 16
135–137; AfD social media strategy 139; North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 147
background 125–129; bots and fake news numbers, large 205, 220
137–139; capitalist donors and supporters
161–162; empirical ideology critique Obergrenze 133
129–133; European Union 144–146; Islam old age 129, 215; see also pensioners
153–159; logic of nationalism and racism Orbán, Viktor 5, 245
162–164; opposition to AfD on social origionyms 204
media 164–166; refugees and migration outsiders 8, 9, 22–23, 37, 71, 247, 269
146–153; Twitter 134–135 outsourcing 15, 245, 259
nationality 45, 47–48 over-foreignerisation (Überfremdung) 149–153
Nations and Nationalism (Ernest Gellner) ÖVP (Österreichische Volkspartei) 6; see also
24–27 Austria; Kurz, Sebastian
nation (nation-states) 5, 9, 11, 22–23, 37, 247; Özdemir, Cem 130–131
Austria 186, 208, 217, 231–232; community Özkirimli, Umut 21–24, 129
of character 45–46; Germany 127; Karl
Renner 45; see also Bauer, Otto; Luxem- parasites 205, 220, 221
burg, Rosa; nation-states; nationalism, parody 251, 273
German Parscale, Brad 253
nationyms 142 participation 15, 160, 222, 270
nature 247, 274, 278 patriarchy 2, 127, 269, 270
Nazi-Fascism 6, 61–63 patronage system, Austrian 195
Nazi-Germany 9 peace (peace treaties) 56, 140
Nazism 165 peasants 48, 53
negationyms 204 peers (peer-to-peer production) 282
Negri, Antonio 274, 275, 280–281 penalties 262–263
neoliberalism 162, 268, 272; Austria 191, pensioners 152–153, 180, 225
215, 234 pensions 182, 204–205; Germany 128, 141,
Nestbeschmutzer 191 147, 149, 153, 162–163
networks 13, 27, 251 perenialism 23, 246
Neumann, Franz L. 267–268, 275 petitions 182, 184
New York Sun, The 249 Petry, Frauke 138, 153–154, 155
New York Times, The 229, 252 Philosophia Perennis 138, 212
Index 311
philosophy 7, 8 prosperity 140, 141

Philosophy of Right (Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Provisional Irish Republican Army see Irish
Hegel) 8 Republican Army (IRA)
Pilz, Peter 179, 210 public attention 129, 215
platforms 211–212; see also society of the public expenditures 182–183
commons public interest media 272
Poland 64 public relations (PR) 118, 161, 251
police (policemen) 59, 270 public service media (PSM) and public service
politicians 215, 235, 248, 268 Internet 49, 250, 264, 282–283
politics 215, 259–260, 283; algorithmic 6, 50; public services 183, 235, 258, 264, 272, 280
right-wing 2–3 public spheres 12, 15, 29, 69, 235; Germany
populations 189, 225, 232; aging 224; 129, 161; society of the commons 254,
Germany 126, 138, 152–153 260–262, 283
postings (posts) on social media 134, 192, public visibility see visibility
198, 199, 200, 201, 211, 213, 256 purity 5, 28
postmodernism 246
poverty 38, 141, 202 quarters, mass 229
power 8–9, 37, 129; Bauer and Luxemburg 63, Question of Nationalities and Social
65–66; state 282; theories of nationalism Democracy, The (Otto Bauer) 43,
23, 28; see also Austria 44, 57
practices 21, 248
prejudices 38, 49, 149, 158 racism 8–10, 22, 28, 41, 233, 247; Germany
presentation styles (presentations) 138, 143, 155, 157, 162–165
203, 251 racism (new) 111, 161, 200, 217
press 30, 191, 234, 250; see also newspapers reactions 210, 211, 212, 257
primordialism 23, 246 reality 21, 36
print capitalism 27, 29–30 refugees 5, 10, 16, 37, 265; Bauer and
privatisation 15, 245, 279 Luxemburg 69, 71–72; Germany 126–128,
problems, social 25, 164; see also social 132–135, 138, 145–153, 158–160, 162; see
problems also Austria
Index
production 4, 37, 49 regulation 252, 253, 282

professionyms 204 Reich, Wilhelm 100–101, 247, 267
profiles, social media 13, 14, 199, 232 relationships 4, 44, 144, 194; social 22
profits 248, 254, 255, 259 religion 36, 46, 151–152; Austria 205, 207,
programmes, election 151, 154, 186, 208 220; theories of nationalism 27, 29
programmes, government 218, 225 Renner, Karl 45, 61
Project Alamo 253 repression 3, 213, 225
propaganda 143, 162, 193, 224, 250 reputations 193, 248
Proporz 195 resistance 60, 63
312 Index
resources 66, 254, 258, 276, 282 Smith, Anthony, D. 21–24

retirement age 141 social burdens 146–153
retweets 135–137 social decline: Austria 180, 185, 191, 193;
revenues 260, 263 Bauer and Luxemburg 69, 72; Germany
revolution 41, 57, 57–58 140, 160
rhetoric, political 4 social democracy 2.0 279
rights 183 Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ) 180
Roediger, David R. 103–104, 247 Social Democratic Party of Germany (SDP)
Royal Christmas message 118–120 134–135, 141, 165, 170, 175; see also
Russia 212; see also Soviet Union Schulz, Martin
Rwanda 89–90 social justice 91, 128, 141, 165, 180, 274
social media 5–6, 8, 12–13, 16; Bauer and
Said, Edward 40–42 Luxemburg 70–72; Germany 162, 164–166;
Saint-Germain-en-Laye 56 see also nationalism, Austria; nationalism,
Sandoval, Marisol 113–115, 114–115, 247 German; society of the commons
satire 233, 251, 273 social problems 3, 10, 25, 42, 66; Austria 204,
scandalisation 127, 266 234; Germany 126, 142–143, 149, 164
scapegoats (scapegoating) 2, 4, 10, 16, 28, 72; social services 147, 149, 183, 220
Austria 183, 191–193, 232; Germany 127, social systems 10, 12, 115; Austria 203, 205,
132, 149, 159, 164; society of the commons 213, 231
268–270, 273; see also Greece socialism 10–12, 143; Marx 39–40; society of
Scharsach, Hans-Henning 186, 212 the commons 246, 265, 271–272, 274,
schools 141, 194, 206–207 278–279, 281; theories of nationalism 26;
Schulz, Martin 130, 135 see also Bauer, Otto; Luxemburg, Rosa
Schutzbund 59, 60 society 3–4, 8–10, 15–16; Marx 35–37,
scroungers, benefit 193, 210 40–41; society of the commons 281–282,
secularism (secularisation) 152, 161, 207, 221 284; theories of nationalism 21–26, 28; see
security 24, 156, 216, 229, 231; financial 129; also Austria; Bauer, Otto; Germany; Luxem-
inner 132; national 25–26, 220; social 274 burg, Rosa; nationalism, contemporary
self-determination 57, 68, 246; national 65–66 society, ageing 152; see also pensioners
self-regulation 254, 255 society, class 4, 25–26, 250, 266
sentiments 24, 137, 149, 261 society of the commons 245–247, 275–284;
servitude 63–64 authoritarianism 265–275; fake news
shares (sharing) 138–139, 192–193, 211, 256 249–265; nationalism and social media
simplification 127, 266 247–249
skills 225, 258 solidarity 11, 39–41, 188; Germany 140, 147,
slavery 40, 41, 156 159; society of the commons 246, 270, 274
slogans 184, 185 songs (songbooks) 187–188, 235
slow media 263–265, 272 sovereignty 84, 189
Index 313
Soviet Union 26; see also Russia tabloidization, tabloids 127, 250, 259, 266
spaces 23; advertising (ads) 213, 259; Austria taxes 182, 183, 189, 205, 264; corporate 234
230, 234; Germany 129; online 130, 263; technologies 13, 28–29, 138, 156; society of
society of the commons 260, 264, 271, 276, the commons 248, 251–252, 280–281
276–277 television 12, 279; see also debates, TV
Spartacus League 43 terror (terrorism) 3–4, 16, 269; Austria 181,
Spiegel, Der 162, 234 208, 222; Germany 132, 142, 147, 157, 160
Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty 86–88 terrorists 23, 142, 156, 158, 163, 192, 231
stability 59, 140, 274 Theweleit, Klaus 230, 270
standpoints 180–181 thought, bourgeois (theories) 21–24, 36;
states see nation-states Benedict Anderson 27–31; Gellner 24–27
status 194, 216 thought, political 274–275
stereotypes 49, 158–159, 163 threats 142, 143, 220, 221, 225
storage, data 281 time 23, 161, 260, 264
Strache, Heinz-Christian 4, 6, 179, 231, topics, discourse 199–200, 202
234–235; debates 201–203, 208; law and topics, election 128, 181
order 228–229; political context 185, 192; traditions 46, 231, 269, 279, 281
social media 210–212 trolls 255, 257
Strasser, Josef 58, 63–64 Trump, Donald 4, 70–72, 157, 212
strategies 127; political 259 trust 15, 138, 261, 268
strikes 60, 193 Turkey 132
struggles 30; Bauer and Luxemburg 49, 60; tweets 132, 134, 135, 256, 257;
Marx 34, 38; society of the commons 246, automated 138
276, 283 Twitter 12; Austria 188, 234; Germany 127,
struggles, class 7, 9, 11; Austria 193; Bauer 130, 132, 134–135, 141, 154
and Luxemburg 59; Marx 40, 52, 59
struggles, social 8, 40, 80–81, 91, 254, 278 Überfremdung see over-foreignerisation
subhumans 23, 129 UKIP (UK Independence Party) 10
submission 63–64, 270 understanding 126
Süddeutsche Zeitung 161, 234 unification 45, 46, 53, 56, 57; see also
Index
superiority 26, 230 Anschluss

support 194, 212 United Kingdom (UK) 40–41, 125
supporters 137, 192, 231, 234; see also United States of America (USA) 40, 72, 158,
Germany 189, 253, 255
surveillance 3, 259, 270, 281, 283 unity 25, 29, 140, 247
Sweden 125 universal basic income 282
symbols 10, 71, 140, 141, 245, 248 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 208
synecdoches 157, 163 Unzensuriert.at 211
Syria 222 uprisings 59, 60
314 Index
users: Austria 193, 199, 210, 216, 234; Weidel, Alice 70–72, 131, 135; bots
Germany 130, 137–139, 150, 153, 160, 165; and fake news 138; donors and supporters
see also audiences; content, user- 161–162; refugees and migration 149–150,
generated; society of the commons; 159
viewers welfare 162, 218, 272, 276, 279
welfare states 147, 149, 215, 218
Verfremdung 273–274 Welt, Die 154
Vernaderer 191 Williams, Raymond 30, 113–115, 247
victimonyms 155, 204 Wodak, Ruth 127, 188
victims 129, 155, 189, 204 women 156, 194, 221, 231, 270
videos 140, 141, 149–150, 152, 234, 256 words 274; see also language
viewers 118, 196; see also audiences; users workers (workforce) 10–11, 28, 163; Austria
violence 4, 25, 52; Austria 192, 221; Germany 180, 193, 225; Bauer and Luxemburg 48,
129, 157, 163; society of the commons 53–55, 59–60; Marx 38, 40; society of the
261–262, 269, 279 commons 272, 275
Visegrád Group 125 working classes 9, 34, 65
visibility 13, 138, 159, 252, 258; public 130 working conditions (time) 182, 189, 193
voters: Austria 180, 189, 194; Germany worldviews 194, 265
127–129, 159, 161; society of the commons WOZ 162
252, 256, 272
votes (voting) 128, 184, 195 xenonyms 204
xenophobia 8, 38, 268; Austria 192, 212, 233;
wages 15, 282; Austria 182, 193, 209, 231; Bauer and Luxemburg 47, 71; Germany 126,
Germany 141, 153; see also incomes 128, 138, 159
Wales 79–81
walls, building of 145 YouTube 12; Austria 188, 212, 234; Germany
wars (warfare) 5, 7, 12, 35, 53, 66–67; Austria 127, 130, 132, 138, 141, 154; society of the
195, 222; Germany 126, 147, 150, 156, 163; commons 247, 255, 257, 259
society of the commons 265, 270, 283;
theories of nationalism 23, 25–26, 29 Zeit, Die 162

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Nationalism on

ISBN: 978-0-367-36038-2 (hbk)

“Those who do not move, do not notice their chains.”

This book is dedicated to the socialists, humanists, anti-authoritarians, anti-fascists,

Chapter One – Introduction: Nationalism Today 1

PART I – Foundations of a Marxist Theory of Nationalism 19

Chapter Three – Marx’s Concept of Nationalism 33

Chapter Five – Contemporary Marxist Theories of Nationalism 79

PART II – Nationalism on Social Media 123

Chapter Seven – Online Nationalism and Social Media Authoritarianism in the

Chapter Eight – Conclusion: Towards a Society of the Commons beyond

1.1 A model of right-wing politics 3

1.1 Number of Twitter and Facebook followers in far-right politics, accessed

6.17 Facebook pages used in the analysis 168

1.1 Nationalism Today

1.1 Nationalism Today

• the Alliance of Patriots of Georgia;

• Jobbik and Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz in Hungary;

Friend/Enemy Scheme Patriarchy and Militarism

right, right-wing extremist, praxis

FIGURE 1.1 A model of right-wing politics

Let us have a look at some political quotes:

Nationalism is a common element of all of these examples. Protecting a unitary

1.2 Studying Nationalism

We certainly need more international comparative studies of nationalism and how it

Marxist Theories of Nationalism

Hegel (1820/2008) stresses that philosophy cannot give

instructions as to what the world ought to be. Philosophy in any case

becomes a material force as soon as it has gripped the masses. Theory is

Nationalism is an ideological, dominative class project. Nationalism, racism, and

At the time of Nazi-Germany, nationalism was predominantly deﬁned biologically.

The book at hand takes a Marxist-humanist approach for understanding national-

conceals actual class antagonism by artiﬁcially creating imaginary antagonisms

The rise of imperialism as a phase of capitalist development was a reaction to the

Imperialism in all countries has no “understanding”, it knows only one

• the convergence of communication (traditionally the realm of the media) and

The Rise of New Nationalisms

1.3 This Book’s Structure

1 Twitter, @RealDonaldTrump, 23 December 2018, https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/

10 Theresa May, Conservative Party conference speech, 5 October 2016, www.telegraph.co.uk

Five Types of Theories

Fetishist Theories of Nationalism

An important way of distinguishing theories of nationalism is to ask the question

Approach Basic understanding of the nation and Example representatives

intruders, aliens, subhumans, uncivilised, parasites, criminals, terrorists, etc. in order

Let us consider an example. Anthony D. Smith, in his ethno-symbolist approach, deﬁnes

Bourgeois Theories of Nationalism

2.2 Ernest Gellner’s Nations and Nationalism

The Missing Link: Nationalism and Class Society

Gellner advances a liberal theory of nationalism, in which nationalism is independent

double sense that as a free individual he can dispose of his labour-power

(Marx 1867, 272–273)

Bourgeois Theories of Nationalism

Liberal theories of nationalism that see nationalism as a necessary feature of both

Nationalism and the Media

2.3 Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities

The Nation as Imagined Community

Bourgeois Theories of Nationalism

The Missing Link: Nationalism and Ideology