169 Satye Singh V State of Uttarakhand 15 Feb 2022 409839
169 Satye Singh V State of Uttarakhand 15 Feb 2022 409839
169 Satye Singh V State of Uttarakhand 15 Feb 2022 409839
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for the offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 and Section 201 of
the IPC and were sentenced to undergo life imprisonment and pay fine of
Rs. 20,000/- for the offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 and to
undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of six years and pay fine of
Rs.10,000/- for the offence under Section 201 of the IPC.
2. The case in nutshell of the prosecution before the Trial Court was that
Smt. Shashi Devi had married the accused- Satye Singh four years prior to
the date of incident which had taken place any time between the evening of
27.06.2009 to the morning of 28.06.2009. The accused- Indra Devi
happened to be the mother of the accused-Satye Singh. On 28.06.2009 at
about 8.40 a.m., Rai Singh (PW-8), Pradhan of the village-Ger of the
accused informed Virendra Raj (PW-11), Naib Tehsildar, Revenue Police
telephonically that one lady had died due to burns. The Naib Tehsildar -
Virendra Raj (PW-11) therefore reached at the spot i.e. Chhan (hut) of the
accused, after making an entry of the said information in the G.D. vide Rapat
No. 28/42, and saw that the dead body of the deceased was lying in the room
of Chhan in the burnt condition. It was the further case of the prosecution
that Sharad Singh, father of the deceased, on receiving the phone call from
the accused-Satye Singh had also arrived on the spot. The said Sharad
Singh gave a written complaint to the Naib Tehsildar against the accused-
Satye Singh (husband), Indra Devi (mother-in-law), and Sangeeta Devi
(sister-in-law) of the deceased, which was registered as the Case Crime No.
16/2009 on 28.06.2009 at about 4.50 p.m., at the Revenue Police Station
Bayargaon, District Tehri Garhwal. After the inquest proceedings were
conducted, the dead body was sealed and taken to the Baushari Hospital for
the postmortem. The said Naib Tehsildar after drawing the panchnama and
other proceedings, arrested the accused- Satye Singh. He also recorded the
statement of other witnesses. Thereafter, he having been transferred, the
further investigation was handed over to the Naib Tehsildar, Gunanand
Bahuguna (PW-10). The said Investigating Officer after completing the
investigation filed charge-sheet against the accused- Satye Singh and Indra
Devi showing the accused Sangeeta Devi as absconding, for the offences
under Sections 302 and 201 of the IPC in the Court of Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Tehri Garhwal.
3. The said case being triable by the Court of Sessions was committed to the
Sessions Court, Tehri Garhwal for trial. Both the accused having denied the
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charges levelled against them, the prosecution to prove the charges, led oral
evidence by examining 11 witnesses and also adduced documentary
evidence. After the completion of the evidence of prosecution, the accused-
Satye Singh in his further statement before the Trial Court recorded under
Section 313 of Cr.P.C. stated inter alia that there was no custom of dowry in
their society and that he did not know how his wife Shashi died. He further
stated that he along with other people of the village had kept on searching
Shashi for the whole night but she was not found. According to him, Shashi
had possibly committed suicide. The accused- Indra Devi had stated that
since she was the mother of Satye Singh, she was falsely implicated in the
case. The Trial Court after appreciating the evidence on record convicted
and sentenced both the accused as stated hereinabove, vide order dated
11.10.2010, which came to be upheld by the High Court vide the impugned
order.
4. The learned Advocate Mr. Shikhil Suri appearing on behalf of the
appellants-accused through Supreme Court Legal Services Committee
vehemently submitted that both the Courts i.e., the Trial Court and the High
Court had committed gross error in convicting the appellants though there
was no cogent evidence adduced by the prosecution to prove the charges
levelled against the appellants. According to him, neither the manner in
which the alleged incident had taken place was proved nor the place at which
the deceased was allegedly killed and burnt was proved by the prosecution.
He further submitted that since the appellants happened to be the husband
and mother-in-law of the deceased, they were arrested and convicted,
merely on the basis of suspicion, conjectures and surmises. Taking the court
to the evidence of witnesses recorded during the course of trial, he submitted
that the case was based on the circumstantial evidence as there was no eye
witness to the alleged incident and the prosecution had failed to prove the
entire chain of circumstances leading to the guilt of the accused.
5. However, the learned Advocate Mr. Krishnam Mishra appearing for the
respondent-State of Uttarakhand submitted that there being concurrent
findings of the facts recorded by the two courts, this Court exercising limited
jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India may not re-
appreciate the evidence and come to a different conclusion. Mr. Mishra
further submitted that the prosecution had examined the witnesses to prove
that there was a harassment to the deceased by the accused and on the
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previous day of the incident also a quarrel had taken place between the
deceased and the accused, which had resulted into the deceased Shashi
leaving the house. According to him, the accused had tried to mislead the
Investigating Officer by propounding the story that Shashi had committed
suicide, however, from the evidence of the doctor viz. Sanjay Kavdwal (PW-
9) and the injuries mentioned in the post-mortem report, it was duly proved
that the injuries found on the dead body of Shashi were ante-mortem, and
her death was caused due to Haemorrhage and shock on account of ante-
mortem injuries. He, pressing into service Section 106 of the Evidence Act,
submitted that there was no explanation given by the accused in their further
statement as to why did Shashi leave their home the previous day and what
they did they do for the whole night, when Shashi was not found.
6. Now it may be stated at the outset that undeniably the entire case of the
prosecution hinged on circumstantial evidence as there was no eye witness
to the alleged incident. Though the accused had tried to propound the story
of the deceased having committed suicide, both the courts had rightly not
accepted the said story, in view of the clinching evidence of the Dr. Sanjay
Kavdwal, who had carried out the post-mortem of the deceased and
recorded the injuries found on the dead body of the deceased, which were
ante-mortem in nature. The ante mortem injuries recorded in the post-
mortem report were as under:
(i) Fracture occipital bone 3CMx3CM
(ii) Fracture left humoorus (compound) lower
(iii) Abdomen was burst and intestine was protruding out, 10CM x
4CM
(iv) Entire body had blackened, charred, peeling, scaring like
parchment and the muscles were visible. Hairs of the head had burnt.
The said doctor had opined that the cause of death was Haemorrhage and
shock due to ante mortem injuries. The said doctor was cross-examined at
length to prove that the injuries were not ante mortem and were due to
burning only, however, the doctor had categorically denied the same and
had further explained as to how and when the blisters would develop on the
body on account of burning. From the said evidence of the doctor, there
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remains no shadow of doubt that the deceased Shashi had died a homicidal
death.
7. This takes the Court to the next issue as to how and who caused the death
of Shashi. The prosecution in order to prove the charges levelled against the
accused had examined 11 witnesses. However, none of witnesses had any
knowledge about the alleged incident. PW-1 viz. Jontara Devi, aunt of the
deceased had deposed, inter alia, that on 27th at about 11.00 o’clock Satye
Singh had made a phone call to her to enquire whether the Shashi had come
to her house, and that on the next day she had come to know that Shashi
was burnt to death. In the cross-examination, she had admitted that the
accused Satye Singh or all his family members had never made any demand
of dowry in her presence, nor any assault was made by them in her
presence.
8. The father of the deceased – Sharad Singh (PW-2) of course had stated
in his evidence that the accused i.e., husband of the deceased and his family
members used to harass his daughter- Shashi for dowry and, therefore,
many a times Shashi used to come his house running. He had also stated
that one month prior to the incident in question, Shashi had come to his
house and told him that she was being assaulted and abused by the accused
for the dowry. As regards the incident in question, he had stated that Satye
Singh had called him in the morning at about 10-11 o’clock to inform him that
Shashi had committed suicide by setting herself ablaze. He therefore along
with villagers had gone to the Chhan of the accused and saw that dead body
of Shashi was lying there in burnt condition. He had given the written
complaint to the police with regard to the incident in question. In the cross
examination he had admitted that he had never seen any injuries on her body
nor he had lodged any complaint about the alleged harassment by the
accused. He had further stated that the Chhan i.e. cowshed of the accused
was situated at the distance of half an hour of the house of the accused at
village Ger and that there was a forest of Baanj, Buransh in between the
village and the Chhan. He had also stated that the father of the Satye Singh
was deaf and dumb. He also admitted that on the previous evening when
Jontara Devi informed him about the phone call from Satye Singh enquiring
about Shashi, he did not go to the village of the accused, thinking that they
keep on quarrelling like that. He also admitted that Satye Singh and all his
family members were present when he reached at the spot i.e., the Chhan.
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He had admitted that he did not know as to how his daughter was burnt,
however, had denied the suggestion that Shashi had caught fire from the
Chulla (hearth). He also denied that there was no harassment by the
accused to his daughter.
9. PW -3 Bhagdeyi Devi, mother of the deceased, PW-5 (Bharat Singh) uncle
of the deceased and other villagers PW-4 (Bhagat Singh), PW-6 (Balbir
Singh) and PW-7 (Gabbar Singh) were examined by the prosecution,
however, none had any knowledge as to how, when and where the deceased
was killed and burnt.
10. It is also very pertinent to note that the entire investigation carried out by
the Investigating Officers Gunanand Bahuguna (PW -10) and Virendra Raj
(PW-11) was in a very cursory and shoddy manner. On receiving the
information from Shri Rai Singh, Pradhan of the village, the Naib Tehsildar
(Virendra Raj) had reached to the spot i.e the Chhan and registered the
complaint against the accused Satye Singh, Indra Devi and Sangeeta Devi,
at the instance of the complainant Sharad Singh, however, had not bothered
to investigate as to how the incident had taken place. There was no
investigation carried out by either of the Investigating Officers as to at which
place the deceased was killed and burnt, and how and by whom her burnt
body brought in the Chhan. Though, according to the Investigating Officer, it
was suspected that the crime was committed by Atar Singh, father of Satye
Singh, he was never implicated in the case. There was no recovery and
discovery of any incriminating articles made from the accused during the
course of investigation and no attempt was made to collect any evidence
much less cogent evidence to connect the accused with the alleged crime.
11. On the totality of circumstances and evidence on record, at the most it
could be said from the evidence of the parents of the deceased that there
was harassment by the accused to the deceased, though no charge under
section 498A of IPC was framed by the trial court against the accused. It
could be further inferred from the evidence on record that the deceased
Shashi had left the house on the previous evening of the alleged incident
and that she was not found during the whole night, nonetheless such
circumstance itself could not be said to be sufficient proof to come to a
conclusion that accused had murdered and burnt Shashi as alleged. It is
settled position of law that circumstances howsoever strong cannot take
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place of proof and that the guilt of the accused have to be proved by the
prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. At this juncture, let us regurgitate, the
golden principles laid down by this Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs.
State of Mahashtra reported in 1984 (4) SCC 116. This court while drawing
the distinction between “must be” and “may be” observed as under in para
153:
“153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following
conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be
said to be fully established:
(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be
drawn should be fully established.
It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances
concerned “must or should” and not “may be” established. There is
not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between “may be
proved” and “must be or should be proved” as was held by this
Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra [(1973) 2
SCC 793 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 1033 : 1973 Crl LJ 1783] where the
observations were made.
Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not
merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental
distance between ‘may be’ and ‘must be’ is long and divides vague
conjectures from sure conclusions.
(2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the
hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not
be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is
guilty,
(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and
tendency,
(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to
be proved, and
(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any
reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence
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of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act
must have been done by the accused.”
12. It was further observed in Para-158 to 160 as under:
“158. It may be necessary here to notice a very forceful argument
submitted by the Additional Solicitor General relying on a decision
of this Court in Deonandan Mishra v. State of Bihar [AIR 1955 SC 801
: (1955) 2 SCR 570, 582 : 1955 Cri LJ 1647] to supplement his
argument that if the defence case is false it would constitute an
additional link so as to fortify the prosecution case. With due respect
to the learned Additional Solicitor-General we are unable to agree
with the interpretation given by him of the aforesaid case, the
relevant portion of which may be extracted thus:
“But in a case like this where the various links as stated above have
been satisfactorily made out and the circumstances point to the
appellant as the probable assailant, with reasonable definiteness
and in proximity to the deceased as regards time and situation,. . .
such absence of explanation or false explanation would itself be an
additional link which completes the chain.”
159. It will be seen that this Court while taking into account the
absence of explanation or a false explanation did hold that it will
amount to be an additional link to complete the chain but these
observations must be read in the light of what this Court said earlier
viz. before a false explanation can be used as additional link, the
following essential conditions must be satisfied:
(1) various links in the chain of evidence led by the prosecution have
been satisfactorily proved,
(2) the said circumstance points to the guilt of the accused with
reasonable definiteness, and
(3) the circumstance is in proximity to the time and situation.
160. If these conditions are fulfilled only then a court can use a false
explanation or a false defence as an additional link to lend an
assurance to the court and not otherwise. On the facts and
circumstances of the present case, this does not appear to be such
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a case. This aspect of the matter was examined in Shankarlal case
[(1981) 2 SCC 35, 39 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 315, 318-19 : (1981) 2 SCR 384,
390 : 1981 Cri LJ 325] where this Court observed thus : [SCC para 30,
p. 43 : SCC (Cri) p.
322]’’
“Besides, falsity of defence cannot take the place of proof of facts
which the prosecution has to establish in order to succeed. A false
plea can at best be considered as an additional circumstances, if
other circumstances point unfailingly to the guilt of the accused.”
13. The said principles have been restated in catena of decisions. In State
of U.P. vs. Ashok Kumar Srivastava (1992) 2 SCC 86, it has been
observed in para 9 that:
’’9. This Court has, time out of number, observed that while
appreciating circumstantial evidence the Court must adopt a very
cautious approach and should record a conviction only if all the links
in the chain are complete pointing to the guilt of the accused and
every hypothesis of innocence is capable of being negatived on
evidence. Great care must be taken in evaluating circumstantial
evidence and if the evidence relied on is reasonably capable of two
inferences, the one in favour of the accused must be accepted. The
circumstance relied upon must be found to have been fully
established and the cumulative effect of all the facts so established
must be consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt. But this is not
to say that the prosecution must meet any and every hypothesis put
forward by the accused however far-fetched and fanciful it might be.
Nor does it mean that prosecution evidence must be rejected on the
slightest doubt because the law permits rejection if the doubt is
reasonable and not otherwise.’’
14. Again in Majendran Langeswaran vs. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
(2013) 7 SCC 192, this court having found the material relied upon by the
prosecution inconsistent and the infirmities in the case of the prosecution,
considered number of earlier decisions, and held that the conviction can be
based solely on circumstantial evidence but it should be tested on the
touchstone of law relating to the circumstantial evidence that all
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circumstances must lead to the conclusion that the accused is the only one
who has committed the crime and none else.
15. Applying the said principles to the facts of the present case, the Court is
of the opinion that the prosecution had miserably failed to prove the entire
chain of circumstances which would unerringly conclude that alleged act was
committed by the accused only and none else. Reliance placed by learned
advocate Mr. Mishra for the State on Section 106 of the Evidence Act is also
misplaced, inasmuch as Section 106 is not intended to relieve the
prosecution from discharging its duty to prove the guilt of the accused. In
Shambu Nath Mehra vs. State of Ajmer , AIR (1956) SC 404, this court
had aptly explained the scope of Section 106 of the Evidence Act in criminal
trial. It was held in para 9:
“9. This lays down the general rule that in a criminal case the burden
of proof is on the prosecution and Section 106 is certainly not
intended to relieve it of that duty. On the contrary, it is designed to
meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible, or
at any rate disproportionately difficult, for the prosecution to
establish facts which are “especially” within the knowledge of the
accused and which he could prove without difficulty or
inconvenience. The word “especially” stresses that. It means facts
that are preeminently or exceptionally within his knowledge. If the
section were to be interpreted otherwise, it would lead to the very
startling conclusion that in a murder case the burden lies on the
accused to prove that he did not commit the murder because who
could know better than he whether he did or did not. It is evident that
that cannot be the intention and the Privy Council has twice refused
to construe this section, as reproduced in certain other Acts outside
India, to mean that the burden lies on an accused person to show
that he did not commit the crime for which he is tried. These cases
are Attygalle v. Emperor [AIR 1936 PC 169] and Seneviratne v. R.
[(1936) 3 All ER 36, 49]”
16. In the case on hand, the prosecution having failed to prove the basic
facts as alleged against the accused, the burden could not be shifted on the
accused by pressing into service the provisions contained in section 106 of
the Evidence Act. There being no cogent evidence adduced by the
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prosecution to prove the entire chain of circumstances which may compel
the court to arrive at the conclusion that the accused only had committed the
alleged crime, the court has no hesitation in holding that the Trial Court and
the High Court had committed gross error of law in convicting the accused
for the alleged crime, merely on the basis of the suspicion, conjectures and
surmises.
17. In that view of the matter, the impugned judgments deserve to be
quashed and set aside and are hereby set aside accordingly. The accused
are acquitted from the charges levelled against them and are directed to be
set free forthwith.
18. The appeal stands allowed accordingly.
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