ADMEL Petitioner Haydee Casimiro began her service in the government as

assessment clerk in the Office of the Treasurer of San Jose, Romblon. In

Cases to Digest: August 1983, she was appointed Municipal Assessor.
Recording 6
1. Casimiro vs Tandog, GR no. 146137, pg. 1 On 04 September 1996, Administrative Officer II Nelson M. Andres,
2. Dumarpa vs Dimaporo, 177 SCRA 478, pg. 5 submitted a report2 based on an investigation he conducted into alleged
irregularities in the office of petitioner Casimero. The report spoke of an
Recording 7 anomalous cancellation of Tax Declarations No. 0236 in the name of
3. Solid Homes, Inc. vs Payawal, 177 SCRA 72, pg. 12 Teodulo Matillano and the issuance of a new one in the name of
4. Pelaez vs Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569, pg. 15 petitioner’s brother Ulysses Cawaling and Tax Declarations No. 0380 and
5. Cruz vs Youngberg, 56 Phil 234, pg. 22 No. 0376 in the name of Antipas San Sebastian and the issuance of new
ones in favor of petitioner’s brother-in-law Marcelo Molina.

Immediately thereafter, respondent Mayor Tandog issued Memorandum

1. Order No. 133 dated 06 September 1996, placing the petitioner under
preventive suspension for thirty (30) days. Three (3) days later, Mayor
G.R. No. 146137 June 08, 2005 Tandog issued Memorandum Order No. 15, directing petitioner to answer
the charge of irregularities in her office. In her answer,4 petitioner denied
HAYDEE C. CASIMIRO, in her capacity as Municipal Assessor of San the alleged irregularities claiming, in essence, that the cancellation of the
Jose, Romblon, Province of Romblon, petitioner, tax declaration in favor of her brother Ulysses Cawaling was done prior to
vs. her assumption to office as municipal assessor, and that she issued new
FILIPINO T. TANDOG, in his capacity as the Municipal Mayor of San tax declarations in favor of her brother-in-law Marcelo Molina by virtue of
Jose, Romblon, respondent. a deed of sale executed by Antipas San Sebastian in Molina’s favor.

DECISION On 23 October 1996, thru Memorandum Order No. 17,5 respondent Mayor
extended petitioner’s preventive suspension for another thirty (30) days
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: effective 24 October 1996 to give him more time to verify and collate
evidence relative to the alleged irregularities.
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 dated 31 May
2000 of the Court of Appeals and its Resolution dated 21 November 2000 On 28 October 1996, Memorandum Order No. 186 was issued by
in CA-G.R. SP No. 46952, which affirmed in toto Civil Service Commission respondent Mayor directing petitioner to answer in writing the affidavit-
(CSC) Resolution No. 973602 dated 12 August 1997. The said CSC complaint of Noraida San Sebastian Cesar and Teodulo Matillano. Noraida
Resolution affirmed the Decision of Municipal Mayor Filipino Tandog of San Sebastian Cesar7 alleged that Tax Declarations No. 0380 and No. 0376
San Jose, Romblon, finding petitioner Haydee Casimiro guilty of covering parcels of land owned by her parents were transferred in the
dishonesty and ordering her dismissal 3from the service. name of a certain Marcelo Molina, petitioner’s brother-in-law, without the
necessary documents. Noraida Cesar further claimed that Marcelo Molina
The relevant antecedents of the instant petition are as follows: had not yet paid the full purchase price of the land covered by the said Tax
Declarations. For his part, Teodulo Matillano claimed8 that he never
executed a deed of absolute sale over the parcel of land covered by Tax
Declaration No. 0236 in favor of Ulysses Cawaling, petitioner’s brother.

1
In response to Memorandum Order No. 18, petitioner submitted a Petitioner now comes to us raising the lone issue16 of whether or not
letter9 dated 29 October 1996, stating that with respect to the complaint petitioner was afforded procedural and substantive due process when she
of Noraida San Sebastian Cesar, she had already explained her side in the was terminated from her employment as Municipal Assessor of San Jose,
letter dated 26 September 1996. As to the complaint of Teodulo Matillano, Romblon. An underpinning query is: Was petitioner afforded an impartial
she alleged that it was a certain Lilia Barrientos who executed a deed of and fair treatment? She specifically points to bias and partiality on the
absolute sale over the parcel of land subject of the complaint in favor of members of the fact-finding committee. She avers that Lorna Tandog
her brother, Ulysses Cawaling. Vilasenor, a member of the fact-finding committee, is the sister of
respondent Mayor. She further alludes that while the committee chairman,
Not satisfied, respondent Mayor created a fact-finding committee to Nelson M. Andres, was appointed by the respondent Mayor to the position
investigate the matter. After a series of hearings, the committee, on 22 of Administrative Officer II only on 01 August 1996, no sooner was he
November 1996, submitted its report10 recommending petitioner’s given the chairmanship of the Committee. Further the affiants-
separation from service, the dispositive portion of which reads: complainants were not presented for cross examination.

Evaluating the facts above portrayed, it is clearly shown that Municipal We find the present petition bereft of merit.
Assessor Haydee Casimero is guilty of malperformance of duty and gross
dishonesty to the prejudice of the taxpayers of San Jose, Romblon who are The first clause of Section 1 of Article III of the Bill of Rights states that:
making possible the payments of her salary and other allowances.
Consequently, we are unanimously recommending her separation from SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
service. due process of law, . . . .

Based on the above recommendation, respondent Mayor issued In order to fall within the aegis of this provision, two conditions must
Administrative Order No. 111 dated 25 November 1996 dismissing concur, namely, that there is deprivation of life, liberty and property and
petitioner, thus: such deprivation is done without proper observance of due process. When
one speaks of due process, however, a distinction must be made between
Upon unanimous recommendations of the fact finding committee matters of procedure and matters of substance.
Chairmained (sic) by Municipal Administrator Nelson M. Andres, finding
you (Haydee C. Casimero) guilty of Dishonesty and Malperformance of In essence, procedural due process "refers to the method or manner by
duty as Municipal Assessor of San Jose, Romblon, copy of which is hereto which the law is enforced."17
attached as Annex "A" and made as integral part hereof, you are hereby
ordered separated from service as Municipal Assessor of San Jose, The essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic
Romblon, effective upon request hereof. requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard.18 In
administrative proceedings, such as in the case at bar, procedural due
Undeterred by that setback, petitioner appealed to the CSC, which process simply means the opportunity to explain one’s side or the
affirmed12 respondent Mayor’s order of dismissal. A motion for opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
reconsideration13 was filed, but the same was denied.14 of.19 "To be heard" does not mean only verbal arguments in court; one
may be heard also thru pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either
Dissatisfied, petitioner elevated her case to the Court of Appeals, which through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of
subsequently affirmed the CSC decision.15 Her motion for reconsideration procedural due process.20
was likewise denied.

2
In administrative proceedings, procedural due process has been Nothing on record shows that she asked for cross examination. In our
recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive view, petitioner cannot argue that she has been deprived of due process
notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondent’s merely because no cross examination took place. Again, it is well to note
legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the that due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and
assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one’s favor, reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy or given
and to defend one’s rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent opportunity to move for a reconsideration of the action or ruling
jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged complained of. In the present case, the record clearly shows that
administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; petitioner not only filed her letter-answer, she also filed a motion for
and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial reconsideration of the recommendation of the committee dated 22
evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in November 1996. The essence of due process in the administrative
the records or made known to the parties affected.21 proceedings is an opportunity to explain one side or an opportunity to
seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.29
In the case at bar, what appears in the record is that a hearing was
conducted on 01 October 1996, which petitioner attended and where she The Court finds far little basis to petitioner’s protestations that she was
answered questions propounded by the members of the fact-finding deprived of due process of law and that the investigation conducted was
committee. Records further show that the petitioner was accorded every far from impartial and fair.
opportunity to present her side. She filed her answer to the formal charge
against her. After a careful evaluation of evidence adduced, the committee As to the substantive due process, it is obvious to us that what petitioner
rendered a decision, which was affirmed by the CSC and the Court of means is that the assailed decision was not supported by competent and
Appeals, upon a move to review the same by the petitioner. Indeed, she credible evidence.30
has even brought the matter to this Court for final adjudication.
The law requires that the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt
Kinship alone does not establish bias and partiality.22 Bias and partiality in administrative cases is substantial evidence or such relevant evidence
cannot be presumed. In administrative proceedings, no less than as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion.31
substantial proof is required.23 Mere allegation is not equivalent to
proof.24 Mere suspicion of partiality is not enough. There should be hard Well-entrenched is the rule that substantial proof, and not clear and
evidence to prove it, as well as manifest showing of bias and partiality convincing evidence or proof beyond reasonable doubt, is sufficient basis
stemming from an extrajudicial source or some other basis.25 Thus, in the for the imposition of any disciplinary action upon an employee. The
case at bar, there must be convincing proof to show that the members of standard of substantial evidence is satisfied where the employer has
the fact-finding committee unjustifiably leaned in favor of one party over reasonable ground to believe that the employee is responsible for the
the other. In addition to palpable error that may be inferred from the misconduct and his participation therein renders him unworthy of trust
decision itself, extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias.26 The and confidence demanded by his position.32
petitioner miserably failed to substantiate her allegations. In effect, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of duty prevails.27 In the case at bar, there is substantial evidence to prove petitioner’s
dismissal.
Neither are we persuaded by petitioner’s argument that the affidavit is
hearsay because the complainants were never presented for cross Two alleged irregularities provided the dismissal from service of herein
examination. In administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure petitioner:
and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative due process cannot
be fully equated to due process in its strict judicial sense.28

3
1. The cancellation of complainant Teodulo Matillano’s tax declaration and in her written answer, claimed that both Teodulo Matillano and Ulysses
the issuance of a new one in favor of petitioner’s brother Ulysses Cawaling; Cawaling have deeds of absolute sale over the same parcel of land
and (vide par. [4], Annex "G," supra). In the course of investigation, however,
petitioner claimed before the investigating body that Teodulo Matillano
2. The cancellation of the tax declaration in the name of complainant executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of her brother (vide, p. 8, Annex
Noraida San Sebastian Cesar’s parent in favor of petitioner’s brother-in- "N," supra). Thereafter petitioner claimed that it was a certain Leticia
law, Marcelo Molina. Barrientos Berbano who executed the deed of absolute sale in favor of her
brother (vide, Annex "J," supra). . . .
On these points, we quote, with approval, the findings of the Court of
Appeals for being supported by evidence on record. With respect to the irregularity involving the tax declarations of
petitioner’s brother-in-law, Marcelo Molina, no better evidence can be
Going first to the alleged irregularity accompanying the issuance of tax presented to support petitioner’s dismissal for dishonesty than the
declarations in favor of petitioner’s brother Ulysses Cawaling, the former’s questioned tax declarations themselves (vide, pp. 87 & 88, ibid.). Both tax
asseverations that she had nothing to do with the processing of the declarations indicated that the declarations therein where subscribed to
subject tax declarations is simply unacceptable. As municipal assessor, under oath by the declarant before herein petitioner on August 15, 1996,
one of petitioner’s duties was to keep a correct record of all transfers, in effect canceling Antipaz San Sebastian’s tax declaration on even date.
leases and mortgages of real property (par. [4] f, Sec. 159, Article VI, However, the same tax declarations indicate that the taxes due
Chapter 3, Title II, Book II of the Local Government Code) within her thereon (i.e., land tax, transfer tax & capital gain tax) were paid only in
jurisdiction. Thus, even if petitioner had no hand in the processing of her October of the same year or two months after the tax declarations have
brother’s tax declaration, she should have seen to it that the records already been issued in favor of petitioner’s brother-in-law. Under Article
pertaining thereto are in order. Furthermore, the annotation on her 224 [b] of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government
brother’s tax declaration that the same property is also declared in the Code, no tax declaration shall be cancelled and a new one issued in lieu
name of another person and that all of them are paying the realty taxes thereof unless the transfer tax has first been paid.
thereon should have cautioned petitioner to take the necessary steps to
set records right. Under par. [4] h, (ibid.) the municipal assessors, in such The issuance of new tax declarations in favor of petitioner’s brother and
a situation, are suppose to cancel assessments, in case several brother-in-law effectively cancels the tax declarations of the complainants.
assessments have been made for the same property, except the one Article 299[c] of the Rules of Regulations Implementing the Local
properly made, but if any assessee or his representative shall object to the Government Code, provides that:
cancellation of the assessment made in his name, such assessment shall
not be cancelled but the fact shall be noted on the tax declaration and "In addition to the notice of transfer, the previous property owner shall
assessment rolls and other property books of records. Preference, likewise surrendered to the provincial, city, or municipal assessor
however, shall be given to the assessment of the person who has the best concerned, the tax declaration covering the subject property in order that
title to the property, or in default thereof, of the person who has the same maybe cancelled from the assessment records of the LGU. x x x."
possession of the property (id.). On this score alone, petitioner is already
liable for gross neglect of duty, which is also penalized by dismissal at the Thus, the tax declaration of complainants Noraida San Sebastian and
first offense (Sec. 22 [b], Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rule [supra]). Teodulo Matillano must first be surrendered before herein petitioner
could effectively cancel their respective tax declarations and issue new
Secondly, petitioner’s vacillation on whether it was Teodulo Matillano or ones in favor of her brother and brother-in-law. Unfortunately, herein
Leticia Barrientos Berbano who executed a deed of absolute sale in favor petitioner failed to present the complainants’ cancelled tax declarations.
of her brother Ulysses Cawaling further weakens her defense. Petitioner,

4
She did not even allege that the same had been surrendered to her for 2.
cancellation.33
G.R. No. 87014-16 September 13, 1989
In addition, petitioner admitted using the deed of sale allegedly executed by
Lilia Barrientos in favor of Cawaling in transferring the Tax Declaration in SALIC B. DUMARPA, MARANAO C. DANGANAN and SAADUDDIN
the name of her brother Ulysses Cawaling. However, glaring in the record ALAUYA, petitioners,
is the admission by the petitioner in her petition34 and vs.
memorandum35 that the property was still under litigation, as both JAMIL DIMAPORO and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
Matillano and Barrientos continue to take their claims over it. Clearly,
therefore, she had no right, or reason, to pre-empt judgment on who is the Nancy H. Madarang for private respondent.
lot’s rightful owner who can legally dispose the same. Prudence dictates
that, under the situation, she should have refrained from taking any
course of action pending the court’s final determination of this matter.
NARVASA. J.:
In Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation v. Rilloza,36 dishonesty
was understood to imply a "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; By Resolution dated October 28, 1988, 1
the Commission on Elections en
unworthiness; lack of integrity." Dishonesty is considered as a grave banc 2 passed upon and disposed of---
offense punishable by dismissal for the first offense under Section 23, Rule
XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. (a) two motions for reconsideration filed by Datu Abdulmadid
292 and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws. It is beyond cavil that Panondiongan Maruhom and Monabai Panondiongan Balt, from a decision
petitioner’s acts displayed want of honesty. of the Commission (First Division) promulgated July 11, 1988, dismissing
their petitions and affirming the proclamation of Jamil Dimaporo as the
IN ALL, we affirm the finding of the Court of Appeals that petitioner is duly elected municipal mayor of Marogong, Lanao del Sur, and
guilty of acts of dishonesty. Her acts of cancelling the tax declarations of
Antipas San Sebastian and Teodulo Matillano in favor of her close relatives (b) a motion for contempt of the Commission (against) Provincial Fiscal
without complying with the requirements set under the law constitute Salic B. Dumarpa, 3rd Assistant Provincial Fiscal Maranao D. Danganan,
grave acts of dishonesty. and Vice-Governor Saaddudin Alauya, all of the Province of Lanao del Sur.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The Court of As regards the motions for reconsideration, the Resolution declared them
Appeals Decision dated 31 May 2000 and its subsequent Resolution dated to be without merit, and "sustain(ed) the decision of the First Division on
21 November 2000, dismissing petitioner from service, are hereby all cases."
AFFIRMED. With costs.
As regards the motion for contempt, said Resolution found the charge to
SO ORDERED. have been duly substantiated, pronounced respondents "Provincial Fiscal
Salic Dumarpa, 3rd Assistant Provincial Fiscal Maranao Danganan and
Austria-Martinez, (Acting Chairman), Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur. Vice-Governor Saaddudin Alauya ... in contempt ... (and) imposed (on them)
Puno, (Chairman), on official leave. a Fine of Five Hundred Pesos (P 500.00) each ...3 It is this aspect of the
Resolution and the Order subsequently promulgated on January 12,1989
denying the respondents' motion for reconsideration, that are now
challenged in the instant special civil action of certiorari.
5
The facts are not complicated. They have to be gone into in some detail, For compliance.
however, so that the issue, albeit simple, may be more accurately defined.
Evidently on the strength of the designation of the Secretary of Local
On February 3,1988, Datu Jamil Dimaporo was proclaimed by the Board of Governments and said memorandum of Governor Pangarungan, Maclis
Canvassers Mayor-elect of Marogong. Balt assumed the position and discharged the functions of OIC, Office of
the Mayor, Marogong.
The annulment of the proclamation and the canvass on which it was
based 4 was sought in two (2) separate petitions filed by defeated The petitions seeking annulment of Datu Dimaporo's proclamation were
mayoralty candidates: one filed on February 15, 1988 by Datu ultimately dismissed by the First Division of the COMELEC, by decision
Abdulmadid Panondiongan Maruhom (docketed as SPC No. 88-646), and rendered on July 11, 1988. Motions for reconsideration thereof were
the other, on February 17, 1988, by Monabai Panondiongan Balt seasonably presented by both petitioners. These were brought up to the
(docketed as SPC Nos. 88-697 and 88-697-A). Commission en banc for resolution.

While these petitions were pending adjudgment by the COMELEC First Datu Dimaporo lost no time in seeking official recognition of his status as
Division, the Secretary of Local Governments issued on May 1-.9, 1988 a mayor-elect of Marogong, as confirmed by the First Division's Decision of
memorandum addressed to the Regional Director, Region XII of the July 11, 1988. Under date of July 18, 1988, his counsel, Mangurun
Department of Local Governments, designating Maclis Balt "Officer-in- Batuampar sent a formal communication to Provincial Governor
Charge, Office of the Mayor of Marogong, Lanao del Sur vice Abdullah Saidamen B. Pangarungan, "transmitting .. the 'RESOLUTION' of the
Imam." The memorandum precisely took account of said petitions. It Honorable First Division of the Commission on Elections ..," and praying
stated that the designation of the OIC was made "(i)n view of the election "that communications and other official matters involving the affairs of
controversy that has arisen over the mayoralty race of Marogong, Lanao the Municipality of Marogong, Lanao del Sur be accorded to DATU JAMIL
del Sur, and to ensure that the democratic process is respected throughout DATU MULOK DIMAPORO whose proclamation was aimed by the
the transition period. 5 Commission on Elections as aforestated." This letter, and other related
documents collated by the Office of the Governor, were later referred to
A copy of this memorandum was furnished Governor Saidamen the Provincial Fiscal of Lanao del Sur by 3rd Indorsement dated August 1,
Pangarungan, among others. He, in turn, issued on May 23, 1988 a 1988, of Atty. Sa-Aduden Alauya, "Vice Governor-OIC Governor." The 3rd
memorandum to "All Concerned on the subject, "Lifting of Suspension Indorsement reads as follows: 7
Order," reading as follows: 6
Respectfully forwarded to the Provincial Fiscal, this province, the herein
In view of the designation of OIC-Mayors in the municipalities of Bacolod- attached basic communication, dated July 18,1988, of Atty. Mangurun
Grande and Marogong, Lanao del Sur by the Secretary of Local Batuampar, counsel of Datu Jamil .. Dimaporo with a xerox copy of the
Governments on different dates pending final resolution by the Resolution dated July 11, 1988, of the First Division of the Commission on
Commission on Elections of the mayoralty poll disputes therein, the order Elections, and the comment thereto by OIC-Mayor Maclis Balt with a xerox
issued by this Office suspending the processing of vouchers and other copy of the motion for reconsideration filed in behalf of Monorabai
financial matters as well as the encashment of pertinent checks for said Panondiongan Balt on July 1988, together with the preceding
towns is hereby lifted. indorsements thereof, for legal opinion as to who between Datu Jamil ..
Dimaporo and Maclis Balt should be recognized as the Municipal Mayor
All concerned are hereby advised to recognize the said designation of the and/or OIC-Mayor of Marogong, Lanao del Sur.
Secretary of Local Governments.
Early action on the matter is desired.

6
The Provincial Fiscal acted promptly on the request. The opinion sought 10. That the aforestated improper conduct ... causes chaos sand confusion
was communicated to the Vice Governor by 4th Indorsement dated August among the National, Provincial, Municipal officials and the general public
5, 1988. It was signed by 3rd Assistant Provincial Fiscal Maranao C. on who is really the legal Mayor of Marogong, Lanao del Sur, considering
Danganan, with the conformity ("conforme") of Provincial Fiscal Salic B. the conflict of the defendants' legal opinion and the 'Resolution' of the
Dumarpa. The indorsement reads as follows: COMELEC Division, as aforesaid, resulting to damage; injury and prejudice
not only upon the complainant but to public service, particularly the
Respectfully returned to the Honorable Vice Governor-OIC Governor, this people of Marogong, Lanao del Sur;
province, the herein attached 3rd Indorsement together with its
enclosures, with the legal opinion that Datu Maclis Balt is still the Mayor of 11. That defendants are good lawyers and know very well that resolutions,
the Municipality of Marogong, Lanao del Sur, pursuant to Sec. 3, paragraph orders or decisions of this Honorable Commission can only be reviewed
C, Article IX of the Constitution which mandates that motions for by the Supreme Court as indicated in Exhibit '2' (legal opinion), and the
reconsideration from a decision of a Division of the Commission on issuance of the legal opinion is indeed with evil motive and tainted with
Elections shall be decided En Banc by the Commission. Considering that a malice;
injunction for reconsideration was timely filed by the OIC 8 the decision of
the Division is not final and executory. The decision of the Commission En 12. That the aforesaid improper conduct of the defendant if not timely
Banc is not yet even final until and after 5 days whenever no restraining corrected by severely punishing them in contempt of this Honorable
order is issued by the Supreme Court. Commission will be establishing a very bad precedence because such
improper conduct amounts to a REVIEW by a Provincial Fiscal of
On learning of this legal opinion, Datu Dimaporo filed with the whatever resolution, order or decision of this Honorable Commission.
COMELEC en banc a motion to hold Fiscals Dumarpa and Danganan, as
well as Vice-Governor Alauya, in contempt. 9 His motion, dated August 22, Responses to the motion for contempt were separately filed by the fiscals
1988, inter alia drew attention to the inaccuracy in the 4th Indorsement -- and by the Vice-Governor. In a pleading entitled 'Vigorous Opposition to
that OIC Maclis Balt had filed a motion for reconsideration of the Decision Motion ..' dated September 15,1988, 11 Vice- Governor Alauya declared
of the First Division of the COMELEC 10 --and pointed out that the that---
respondents should have known "that M ACLIS BALT has never been a
candidate for Mayor in Marogong during the February 1, 1988 local 1) Datu Maclis Balt as an OIC Mayor of the Municipality (of Marogong) is
elections and therefore, cannot file a motion for reconsideration in the religiously performing the prescribed duties, powers and responsibilities
above-entitled cases not being a party therein." The motion theorized that of the mayor of the town until the final adjudication of the mayoralty
the act of Vice-Governor Alauya in seeking legal opinion of the Office of the election cases, hence, it is not true that defendants' act causes chaos and
Provincial Fiscal, and the formulation and communication of the confusion in said Municipality;
requested opinion by Fiscals Dumarpa and Danganan, constituted
"indirect contempt as it is clearly an improper conduct tending, directly or 2) in the situation that he had found himself--- confronted by the letter of
indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice Datu Dimaporo's counsel requesting recognition by the Office of the
(Sec. 3-d, Rule 71, Revised Rules of Court), and is also an unlawful Governor as Mayor of Marogong pursuant to the Decision of the COMELEC
interference with the processes or proceedings of this Honorable First Division, the comment of OIC Mayor Balt, and the motion for
Commission en banc (Sec. 3-c., Rule 71) .. where the above-entitled cases reconsideration filed by defeated candidate Monarabai Balt and in his
are now pending for decision ..." In exposition of this thesis, the motion desire to act safely and correctly and to be in good faith all along, he
made the following assertions: indorsed .. (the) documents .. to the Provincial Fiscal in his capacity as a
legal counsel of the province in the absence of the Provincial Attorney for
legal opinion;

7
3) said legal opinion has not disputed or contradicted the force and effect 3) the counsel for the complaint has put down the Commis sion to the
of the said resolution (of the First Division) ..; (o)n the contrary, the level of the Provincial Fiscal in alluding to a conflict of the defendants'
defendants recognize and respect the force and effect of said resolution opinion and the Resolution of the COMELEC Division, (thus) displaying his
and because a motion for reconsideration was timely filed on July 19, apparent oblivion of the bureaucratic set-up and the jurisprudence
1988, then it has not become final and executory, hence, it is not true that prevailing in this country.
the defendants' act resulted to damage, injury and prejudice upon
anybody in said Municipality of Marogong; The fiscals also submitted a Memorandum, bearing the same date as their
answer,13 in which, among other things, they expressed the view that since
4) the opinion .. does not constitute a review of the aforesaid resolution of the First Division had assumed jurisdiction over the petitions questioning
the .. Comelec First Division in the sense that the defendant-Fiscals did not the proclamation of Datu Dimaporo indeed, "it took the Honorable First
affirm or reverse said resolution. They did not even say anything against it. Division ..considerable time and effort to resolve the controversy-- the
They merely opined that because a motion for reconsideration was timely presumption was that the proclamation must have appeared invalid to the
filed, then said resolution has not become final and executory. This is First Division, otherwise it "could not have acquired (assumed)
known to any student of law. Actually, these are the off-shoots of the letter jurisdiction over the .. cases because the remedy of the petitioners-
of movant's counsel to the Governor ... If the herein defendant did not take appellants was a regular protest before the Regional Trial Court of Lanao
such an appropriate action, possibility is not remote that he will be del Sur." They "were forced to assume that the proclamation of Jamil
charged of negligence of duty. Suffice it to state that the herein defendant Dimaporo was irregular because the First Division heard the petition to
acted honestly, dedicatedly and without any iota of malice or evil motive annul the said proclamation," and this left them "no other option than
in his heart and mind. It is hoped with defendant's prayer to Allah that all affirm the jurisdiction of the First Division over the cases by stating the
his action will not help throw this province into blood bath. law sanctioning its authority and that is article IX of the Constitution."

For their part, the respondent fiscals asserted the following pertinent In its Resolution of October 28, 1988 anent the contempt incident, the
propositions in their Answer dated September 12, 1988 (in addition to Commission en banc condemned the fiscal's conception of "the First
substantially the same arguments set forth in the Vice- Governor's Division's jurisdiction of the pre- proclamation controversy" as a
"Opposition" above adverted to): 12 "distortion of the law and jurisprudence." It said: "The propriety and
legality of proclamations already made or about to be made are precisely
1) in their written opinion, they had "just humbly stated in three the issues in pre-proclamation controversies over which the Commission
sentences the provision of law on the subject of the query of the Office of has exclusive jurisdiction. It is a rule so consistent and well established in
the Provincial Governor..; that such statements.., briefly stating the this jurisdiction that even the Commission itself cannot disturb a
provision of the Constitution particularly Sec. 3, paragraph c of Article IX proclamation made by a Board of Canvassers without notice and hearing.
thereof in relation to See. 246 of the Omnibus Election Code, are not This rule we hold respondents bound by judicial notice." Stressing that
directed against the authority, dignity and majesty of the Commission on under the law "it is solely the Commission that can suspend or annul any
Elections so as to constitute a contumacious attitude and flouting or proclamation made," the Resolution pointed out that the respondents
arrogant belligerence against it that the act may constitute contempt; Alauya, Dumarpa and Danganan in effect did was to suspend the effects of
the proclamation of intervenor Dimaporo made by the Municipal Board of
2) said opinion "has no punitive values that could interfere with the Canvassers of Marogong, to prevent him from discharging the duties of his
process or proceedings of the Commission," and could not be deemed a office, and pave the way for the appointment of or assumption to office by
contempt thereof; and an Officer-in-Charge, who is the wife of one of the parties to the instant
petitions' which are acts constituting 'unauthorized and illegal
assumption of powers that pertain exclusively to the Commission, an

8
unlawful interference with its processes and proceedings, and improper have refused without incurring liability "for dereliction of a defined duty;"
conduct that tends directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct or degrade and
the administration of justice in this case." Brushing aside, too, the
respondents' argument "that they were merely seeking and rendering an 4) with or without the fiscal's opinion, "Maclis Balt would still (have)
opinion ... and therefore the same was not directed against the authority continue(d) discharging the duties of the mayor, at least, until October
and dignity of the Commission" as being "devoid of merit," the Resolution 28,1988 (when the Resolution of the COMELEC en banc was promulgated).
declared the respondents guilty of contempt and sentenced each of them
to pay a fine of P 500.00. By Resolution dated January 12, 1989 the COMELEC en banc not only
denied the motion for reconsideration, but also "rebuked' the movants "for
The fiscals and the Vice-Governor filed a motion for reconsideration dated insisting upon an erroneous legal position." According to the COMELEC ---
November 9, 1988, depositing at the same time "the amount of One
Thousand Five Hundred (P l,500.00) with the Provincial Election Normally, there is nothing objectionable in seeking a legal opinion and in
Supervisor in Marawi City as and by way of penalty if finally adjudged rendering it. But what transpired in connection with these cases were not
guilty without prejudice to ventilate their rights in the appropriate innocent acts that were intended to guide official action. Rather, they were
forum ." 14 They stated among other things that-- a deliberate contrivance that were meant to undetermine the efficacy of
official acts of the Commission from the municipal board of canvassers to
1) Acting Gov. Alauya was faced with a case needing 'urgent action the First Division of the Commission and even the Commission en banc
because both parties are claiming the fund releases of Marogong and the which had not in any way issued any restraining order to suspend the
tension between the protagonists in SPC Nos. 88-646, 88-697 and 88-697- proclamation of the winning candidate. If clarification had to be made in
A has reached its boiling point so volatile that without settling the legal connection with the proclamation and the decision of the First Division, it
issue the mayorship of Marogong could have been contested by the sound should have been sought in the Commission itself, for movants knew, or
of guns and thus a resultant bloodshed." Thus, "his act of referring the should have known, that the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over
legal controversy to the legal adviser of the province" was, to him, "the pre-proclamation controversies. That they attempted to settle the matter
most appropriate under the circumstances;" .. (and the) act of not among themselves demonstrates the intention to effect disobedience to
implementing the decision of the Commission, if at all such decision is due and defiance of the lawful acts and orders of the Commission.
for implementation, is at all mistake and, which act did not constitute
contempt (citing Asociacion de Agricultores de Talisay-Silay, Inc. v. The convicted contemners have instituted the instant special civil action
Talisay-Silay Mining Co., Inc., 88 SCRA 294); of certiorari in this Court to bring about the nullification of the Resolution
of October 28, 1988 "as regards the findings for contempt."
2) no suspension of the effects of Dimaporo's proclamation was or could
have been effected by them since Dimaporo had never "enjoyed the Required to comment in behalf of the public respondent, 15 the Office of
powers and functions appurtenant to the Office of the mayor," had never the Solicitor General begged to "be discharged from the duty to ... (do so as
been paid his salary as mayor, and had not as yet "been accorded it) maintains a position different from that taken by respondent
recognition as elected mayor .. by the provincial and national government; COMELEC ." 16 This Court granted the request and accorded to "the
indeed, "long before the query for legal opinion was lodged, Balt was respondent COMELEC itself a period of ten (10) days from notice within
already designated as Officer-in-Charge; which to file the required comment, if it so desires." 17 Respondent Datu
Dimaporo has not done so, despite notice. The COMELEC filed its own
3) the fiscals had merely performed "a legal duty reposed upon them comment on July 25,1989.
when they rendered the questioned legal opinion," a duty they could not

9
The COMELEC counsel submits that the facts "manifest the firm resolve the National, Provincial, Municipal officials and the general public," or (2)
(on petitioners') part to delay, if not totally prevent, the assumption of "suspension of the effects of the proclamation of intervenor Dimaporo ..(in
office by private respondent Dimaporo .., a scheme to shroud with doubt order to) pave the way for the appointment of or assumption to office by
the validity and force of a proclamation while trifling with public an Officer-in-Charge," or (3) that the latter 'is the wife of one of the parties
respondent's discretion on when to annul a proclamation or suspend its to the instant petitions;" or (4) that the legal opinion was "a deliberate
effects;" that the only perceived purpose of the request for opinion was "to contrivance .. meant to undermine the efficacy of official acts of the
provide an aura of legality to the continuity in office of the designated Commission from the municipal board of canvassers to the First Division
officer-in-charge, to the exclusion of the proclaimed winner in the of the Commission and even the Commission en banc which had not in any
election;" that "from an overview of the acts of petitioners and the way issued any restraining order to suspend the proclamation of the
situation in which all parties found themselves thereafter, petitioners' winning candidate."
pretensions to good faith recede to a wantonly subtle interference with
matters within the exclusive competence of public respondent," and that On the other hand, there are the facts asserted by the petitioners--- never
petitioners' acts were in fact "a deliberate interference with the process or denied or disputed by respondents --- that as of the time that the fiscal's
proceedings before respondent Commission ..." opinion was solicited and even thereafter, Datu Dimaporo had never yet
"enjoyed the powers and functions appurtenant to the Office of the
Upon the facts above narrated at some length, the Court is constrained to mayor," had never been paid his salary as mayor, and had not as yet "been
nullify and set aside the conviction by the COMELEC en banc of the accorded recognition as elected mayor ... by the provincial and national
petitioners for contempt. government; and that indeed, "long before the query for legal opinion was
lodged, (Maclis) Balt .. (had been) already designated as Officer-in-Charge"
The essential accusation against the petitioners was that the rendition by and since then and during an the time material to the inquiry, had been
the petitioner fiscals of a legal opinion upon request of petitioner Vice discharging the functions of mayor of Marogong.
Governor had caused "chaos and confusion among the National, Provincial,
Municipal officials and the general public on who is really the legal Mayor It thus appears that the Resolution in question not only lacks factual
of Marogong, Lanao del Sur, considering the conflict of the defendants' foundation of any sort but is contradicted by such of the relevant facts as
legal opinion and the 'Resolution' of the COMELEC Division, as aforesaid, may be discerned from the record.
resulting to damage, injury and prejudice not only upon the complainant
but to public service, particularly the people of Marogong, Lanao del It appears furthermore that the Fiscals are being sanctioned for rendering
Sur." 18 This was implicitly sustained by the COMELEC when it ruled that-- an opinion that in the view of the COMELEC en banc was "a distortion of
19
law and jurisprudence." But what is it in that legal opinion that the
COMELEC deemed so offensive to its authority and dignity as to move it to
What respondents Alauya, Dumarpa and Danganan in effect did was to punish its authors? That opinion was rendered in answer to the inquiry of
suspend the effects of the proclamation of intervenor Dimaporo made by the Acting Governor as to whether or not, in view of the judgment by the
the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Marogong, to prevent him from First Division of the COMELEC upholding the proclamation by the Board of
discharging the duties of his office, and pave the way for the appointment Canvassers of Datu Dimaporo as Mayor-Elect of Marogong, the duly
of or assumption to office by an Officer-in-Charge, who is the wife of one designated OIC Mayor, therefore acting as such, Datu Maclis Balt, could
of the parties to the instant petitions. still be recognized as the Mayor of the Municipality. The inquiry had been
made necessary in view of the conflict in claims to the mayoralty then
The trouble is, there is nothing in the challenged Resolutions of the being asserted by both Datu Dimaporo and Datu Balt, which conflict had
COMELEC en banc, or anywhere else in the record, for that matter, to to be swiftly and legally resolved to prevent its resolution by arms and
demonstrate the actuality of the alleged (1) "chaos and confusion among bloodshed. The fiscals' opinion was based on "Sec. 3, paragraph C, Article

10
IX of the Constitution which mandates that motions for reconsideration record that it was prompted by a deliberate intent to affront the
from a decision of a Division of the Commission on Elections shall be Commission or ignore or belittle its judgment and orders, be considered
decided En Banc by the Commission." They declared that since "a motion contumacious.
for reconsideration was timely filed by the OIC, the decision of the
Division is not final and executory. The decision of the Commission En The Court is somewhat intrigued by the statement in the challenged
Banc is not yet even final until and after 5 days whenever no restraining Resolution which "... hold(s) respondents bound by judicial notice" to the
order is issued by the Supreme Court." The Court, quite frankly, sees in the rule "... that even the Commission itself cannot disturb a proclamation
text of the opinion nothing even remotely resembling an affront to the made by a Board of Canvassers without notice and hearing." Interpreted
COMELEC, or a criticism of the First Division's judgment. On the contrary, in consonance with its context, the statement would appear to charge the
the opinion simply paraphrases --- correctly, it would appear the respondents with judicial notice of the cited rule. But surely it could not
COMELEC's own Rules of Procedure 20 on the subject it addresses. But have been meant to be taken in that sense because the rule of judicial
even if, as the questioned Resolution declares, the views therein notice binds only courts acting as such and, moreover, it is doubtful if the
expressed are clearly wrong, it cannot for that reason alone be considered precept referred to is a proper subject of judicial notice. One would,
contumacious otherwise, liability for contempt would invariably attach to however, be hard put to give the statement any other meaning that would
every declared instance of orders or judgments rendered without or in not in one way or another contradict the ordinary intendment of its
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, or otherwise language.
attended by serious error of one kind or another. The absurdity of such a
rule or policy need not be belabored. The respondent Commission would have it that if need was felt for any
clarification in connection with the proclamation and the Resolution in
Nor may the Acting Governor be faulted for consulting the lawyers of the question, it should have been sought with said Commission itself since the
province as to the effects of a judgment on the authority and actuations of petitioners knew, or should have known, that it has exclusive jurisdiction
municipal or provincial officials, or the fiscals for advising him on such over pre-proclamation controversies. It fails to explain, however, how the
matters. The law implicitly authorizes the former to seek such advice and Acting Governor could have done this, not being a party to that particular
expressly imposes upon the latter the duty to give it on request. Section controversy. And even had that step been feasible, it does not appear that
1682, first paragraph, of the Revised Administrative Code provides: said respondent has jurisdiction to render an advisory opinion or
declaratory judgment.
SEC. 1682. Duty of fiscal as legal adviser of province and provincial
subdivisions.-The provincial fiscal shall be the legal adviser of the The power to hold in contempt, it has time and again been held, must be
provincial government and its officers, including district health officers, exercised, not on the vindictive, but on the preservative principle. 21 It is
and of the mayor and council of the various municipalities and municipal not to be meted out of pique, or from an imperial sense of the nature and
districts of the province. As such he shall, when so requested, submit his functions of judicial office. What appears to be an honest difference of
opinion in writing upon any legal question submitted to him by any such opinion has been blown up into something that it is not --- a direct and
officer or body pertinent to the duties thereof. confrontational challenge to the puissance and prerogatives of the
Commission. In a word, petitioners have been found in contempt because,
Thus, all that the respondent fiscals did was perform a duty specifically to put it baldly, their opinion did not sit well with the Commission and
enjoined by law, for the failure or refusal to do which they could failed to conform to its own views. Judicial sensibilities should not become
appropriately have been called to account. It may be that the opinion they too tender or self-protective. All things considered, the contempt ruling
submitted was erroneous, though this is by no means certain and is not here cannot be justified on the preservative principle, there being no clear
here fully inquired into, there being no need to do so. As already observed, showing, either in the terms of the allegedly contumacious opinion or
it cannot, on the ground of error alone and absent any indication in the from the circumstances that led to its issuance, of any intent to denigrate

11
the authority of the respondent Commission or erode the faith and respect monthly installments and interests. Solid Homes subsequently executed a
due its decisions, orders or other actuations. Said ruling is, therefore, deed of sale over the land but failed to deliver the corresponding
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and petitioners are absolved of the contempt certificate of title despite her repeated demands because, as it appeared
charge. No costs. later, the defendant had mortgaged the property in bad faith to a financing
company. The plaintiff asked for delivery of the title to the lot or,
SO ORDERED. alternatively, the return of all the amounts paid by her plus interest. She
also claimed moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and the costs
Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, of the suit.
Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño- Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Solid Homes moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court
Feliciano, J., is on leave. had no jurisdiction, this being vested in the National Housing Authority
under PD No. 957. The motion was denied. The defendant repleaded the
objection in its answer, citing Section 3 of the said decree providing that
"the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to
3. regulate the real estate trade and business in accordance with the
provisions of this Decree." After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of
G.R. No. 84811 August 29, 1989 the plaintiff and the defendant was ordered to deliver to her the title to
the land or, failing this, to refund to her the sum of P 38,949.87 plus
SOLID HOMES, INC., petitioner, interest from 1975 and until the full amount was paid. She was also
vs. awarded P 5,000.00 moral damages, P 5,000.00 exemplary damages, P
TERESITA PAYAWAL and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. 10,000.00 attorney's fees, and the costs of the suit.1

Solid Homes appealed but the decision was affirmed by the respondent
court, 2 which also berated the appellant for its obvious efforts to evade a
legitimate obligation, including its dilatory tactics during the trial. The
CRUZ, J.:
petitioner was also reproved for its "gall" in collecting the further amount
of P 1,238.47 from the plaintiff purportedly for realty taxes and
We are asked to reverse a decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining the registration expenses despite its inability to deliver the title to the land.
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City over a complaint
filed by a buyer, the herein private respondent, against the petitioner, for
In holding that the trial court had jurisdiction, the respondent court
delivery of title to a subdivision lot. The position of the petitioner, the
referred to Section 41 of PD No. 957 itself providing that:
defendant in that action, is that the decision of the trial court is null and
void ab initio because the case should have been heard and decided by
what is now called the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. SEC. 41. Other remedies.-The rights and remedies provided in this Decree
shall be in addition to any and all other rights and remedies that may be
available under existing laws.
The complaint was filed on August 31, 1982, by Teresita Payawal against
Solid Homes, Inc. before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-36119. The plaintiff alleged that the and declared that "its clear and unambiguous tenor undermine(d) the
defendant contracted to sell to her a subdivision lot in Marikina on June 9, (petitioner's) pretension that the court a quo was bereft of jurisdiction."
1975, for the agreed price of P 28,080.00, and that by September 10, 1981, The decision also dismissed the contrary opinion of the Secretary of
she had already paid the defendant the total amount of P 38,949.87 in Justice as impinging on the authority of the courts of justice. While we are

12
disturbed by the findings of fact of the trial court and the respondent court (2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real
on the dubious conduct of the petitioner, we nevertheless must sustain it property, or any interest therein, except actions for forcible entry into and
on the jurisdictional issue. unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is
conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
The applicable law is PD No. 957, as amended by PD No. 1344, entitled Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
"Empowering the National Housing Authority to Issue Writs of Execution
in the Enforcement of Its Decisions Under Presidential Decree No. 957." xxx xxx xxx
Section 1 of the latter decree provides as follows:

SECTION 1. In the exercise of its function to regulate the real estate trade
and business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential (8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest and cost
Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive or the value of the property in controversy, amounts to more than twenty
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature: thousand pesos (P 20,000.00).

A. Unsound real estate business practices; It stresses, additionally, that BP No. 129 should control as the later
enactment, having been promulgated in 1981, after PD No. 957 was issued
B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or in 1975 and PD No. 1344 in 1978.
condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer,
broker or salesman; and This construction must yield to the familiar canon that in case of conflict
between a general law and a special law, the latter must prevail regardless
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractuala statutory of the dates of their enactment. Thus, it has been held that-
obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against
the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman. (Emphasis supplied.) The fact that one law is special and the other general creates a
presumption that the special act is to be considered as remaining an
The language of this section, especially the italicized portions, leaves no exception of the general act, one as a general law of the land and the other
room for doubt that "exclusive jurisdiction" over the case between the as the law of the particular case. 4
petitioner and the private respondent is vested not in the Regional Trial
Court but in the National Housing Authority. 3 xxx xxx xxx

The private respondent contends that the applicable law is BP No. 129, The circumstance that the special law is passed before or after the general
which confers on regional trial courts jurisdiction to hear and decide cases act does not change the principle. Where the special law is later, it will be
mentioned in its Section 19, reading in part as follows: regarded as an exception to, or a qualification of, the prior general act; and
where the general act is later, the special statute will be construed as
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.-Regional Trial Courts shall exercise remaining an exception to its terms, unless repealed expressly or by
exclusive original jurisdiction: necessary implication. 5

(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of It is obvious that the general law in this case is BP No. 129 and PD No.
pecuniary estimation; 1344 the special law.

13
The argument that the trial court could also assume jurisdiction because the subdivision condominium buyer who wins a case in the HSRC and who is
of Section 41 of PD No. 957, earlier quoted, is also unacceptable. We do thereby deemed entitled to claim damages and attorney's fees would be
not read that provision as vesting concurrent jurisdiction on the Regional forced to litigate in the regular courts for the purpose, a situation which is
Trial Court and the Board over the complaint mentioned in PD No. 1344 if obviously not in the contemplation of the law. (Emphasis supplied.)7
only because grants of power are not to be lightly inferred or merely
implied. The only purpose of this section, as we see it, is to reserve. to the As a result of the growing complexity of the modern society, it has become
aggrieved party such other remedies as may be provided by existing law, necessary to create more and more administrative bodies to help in the
like a prosecution for the act complained of under the Revised Penal regulation of its ramified activities. Specialized in the particular fields
Code. 6 assigned to them, they can deal with the problems thereof with more
expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the legislature or the
On the competence of the Board to award damages, we find that this is courts of justice. This is the reason for the increasing vesture of quasi-
part of the exclusive power conferred upon it by PD No. 1344 to hear and legislative and quasi-judicial powers in what is now not unreasonably
decide "claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision called the fourth department of the government.
lot or condominium unit buyers against the project owner, developer,
dealer, broker or salesman." It was therefore erroneous for the Statutes conferring powers on their administrative agencies must be
respondent to brush aside the well-taken opinion of the Secretary of liberally construed to enable them to discharge their assigned duties in
Justice that- accordance with the legislative purpose. 8 Following this policy in Antipolo
Realty Corporation v. National Housing Authority, 9 the Court sustained
Such claim for damages which the subdivision/condominium buyer may the competence of the respondent administrative body, in the exercise of
have against the owner, developer, dealer or salesman, being a necessary the exclusive jurisdiction vested in it by PD No. 957 and PD No. 1344, to
consequence of an adjudication of liability for non-performance of determine the rights of the parties under a contract to sell a subdivision
contractual or statutory obligation, may be deemed necessarily included lot.
in the phrase "claims involving refund and any other claims" used in the
aforequoted subparagraph C of Section 1 of PD No. 1344. The phrase "any It remains to state that, contrary to the contention of the petitioner, the
other claims" is, we believe, sufficiently broad to include any and all claims case of Tropical Homes v. National Housing Authority 10 is not in point. We
which are incidental to or a necessary consequence of the claims/cases upheld in that case the constitutionality of the procedure for appeal
specifically included in the grant of jurisdiction to the National Housing provided for in PD No. 1344, but we did not rule there that the National
Authority under the subject provisions. Housing Authority and not the Regional Trial Court had exclusive
jurisdiction over the cases enumerated in Section I of the said decree. That
The same may be said with respect to claims for attorney's fees which are is what we are doing now.
recoverable either by agreement of the parties or pursuant to Art. 2208 of
the Civil Code (1) when exemplary damages are awarded and (2) where It is settled that any decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total
the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the nullity and may be struck down at any time, even on appeal before this
plaintiff 's plainly valid, just and demandable claim. Court. 11 The only exception is where the party raising the issue is barred
by estoppel, 12 which does not appear in the case before us. On the
xxx xxx xxx contrary, the issue was raised as early as in the motion to dismiss filed in
the trial court by the petitioner, which continued to plead it in its answer
Besides, a strict construction of the subject provisions of PD No. 1344 which and, later, on appeal to the respondent court. We have no choice, therefore,
would deny the HSRC the authority to adjudicate claims for damages and for notwithstanding the delay this decision will entail, to nullify the
damages and for attorney's fees would result in multiplicity of suits in that proceedings in the trial court for lack of jurisdiction.

14
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the respondent court is Respondent maintains the contrary view and avers that the present action
REVERSED and the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in is premature and that not all proper parties — referring to the officials of
Civil Case No. Q-36119 is SET ASIDE, without prejudice to the filing of the the new political subdivisions in question — have been impleaded.
appropriate complaint before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. Subsequently, the mayors of several municipalities adversely affected by
No costs. the aforementioned executive orders — because the latter have taken
away from the former the barrios composing the new political
SO ORDERED. subdivisions — intervened in the case. Moreover, Attorneys Enrique M.
Fernando and Emma Quisumbing-Fernando were allowed to and did
Narvasa, Gancayco, Griñ;o-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur. appear as amici curiae.

The third paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370, reads:

4. Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names
changed except under the provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress.
G.R. No. L-23825 December 24, 1965
Pursuant to the first two (2) paragraphs of the same Section 3:
EMMANUEL PELAEZ, petitioner,
vs. All barrios existing at the time of the passage of this Act shall come under
THE AUDITOR GENERAL, respondent. the provisions hereof.

Zulueta, Gonzales, Paculdo and Associates for petitioner. Upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected, a new barrio
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent. may be created or the name of an existing one may be changed by the
provincial board of the province, upon recommendation of the council of
CONCEPCION, J.: the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is
stipulated. The recommendation of the municipal council shall be
During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President of embodied in a resolution approved by at least two-thirds of the entire
the Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised membership of the said council: Provided, however, That no new barrio
Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 may be created if its population is less than five hundred persons.
to 129; creating thirty-three (33) municipalities enumerated in the
margin.1 Soon after the date last mentioned, or on November 10, 1964 Hence, since January 1, 1960, when Republic Act No. 2370 became
petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as effective, barrios may "not be created or their boundaries altered nor their
taxpayer, instituted the present special civil action, for a writ of names changed" except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding
prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, to provincial board "upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas
restrain him, as well as his representatives and agents, from passing in affected" and the "recommendation of the council of the municipality or
audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated." Petitioner argues,
orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities. accordingly: "If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a
barrio, can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios,
Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the since barrios are units of municipalities?"
ground that said Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act
No. 2370 and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.
15
Respondent answers in the affirmative, upon the theory that a new recommended by the (Insular Auditor) Auditor General and approved by
municipality can be created without creating new barrios, such as, by the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines.
placing old barrios under the jurisdiction of the new municipality. This
theory overlooks, however, the main import of the petitioner's argument, Respondent alleges that the power of the President to create
which is that the statutory denial of the presidential authority to create a municipalities under this section does not amount to an undue delegation
new barrio implies a negation of the bigger power to create municipalities, of legislative power, relying upon Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality
each of which consists of several barrios. The cogency and force of this of Binañgonan (36 Phil. 547), which, he claims, has settled it. Such claim is
argument is too obvious to be denied or even questioned. Founded upon untenable, for said case involved, not the creation of a new municipality,
logic and experience, it cannot be offset except by a clear manifestation of but a mere transfer of territory — from an already existing municipality
the intent of Congress to the contrary, and no such manifestation, (Cardona) to another municipality (Binañgonan), likewise, existing at the
subsequent to the passage of Republic Act No. 2379, has been brought to time of and prior to said transfer (See Gov't of the P.I. ex rel. Municipality of
our attention. Cardona vs. Municipality, of Binañgonan [34 Phil. 518, 519-5201) — in
consequence of the fixing and definition, pursuant to Act No. 1748, of the
Moreover, section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon which the common boundaries of two municipalities.
disputed executive orders are based, provides:
It is obvious, however, that, whereas the power to fix such common
The (Governor-General) President of the Philippines may by executive boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between
order define the boundary, or boundaries, of any province, subprovince, adjoining municipalities, may partake of an administrative nature —
municipality, [township] municipal district, or other political subdivision, involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into
and increase or diminish the territory comprised therein, may divide any effect the law creating said municipalities — the authority to create
province into one or more subprovinces, separate any political division municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. In the language
other than a province, into such portions as may be required, merge any of of other courts, it is "strictly a legislative function" (State ex rel. Higgins vs.
such subdivisions or portions with another, name any new subdivision so Aicklen, 119 S. 425, January 2, 1959) or "solely and exclusively the exercise
created, and may change the seat of government within any subdivision to of legislative power" (Udall vs. Severn, May 29, 1938, 79 P. 2d 347-349).
such place therein as the public welfare may require: Provided, That the As the Supreme Court of Washington has put it (Territory ex rel. Kelly vs.
authorization of the (Philippine Legislature) Congress of the Philippines Stewart, February 13, 1890, 23 Pac. 405, 409), "municipal corporations
shall first be obtained whenever the boundary of any province or are purely the creatures of statutes."
subprovince is to be defined or any province is to be divided into one or
more subprovinces. When action by the (Governor-General) President of Although1a Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government
the Philippines in accordance herewith makes necessary a change of the the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or
territory under the jurisdiction of any administrative officer or any administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the
judicial officer, the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines, with principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself
the recommendation and advice of the head of the Department having — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or
executive control of such officer, shall redistrict the territory of the several implemented by the delegate2 — and (b) fix a standard — the limits of
officers affected and assign such officers to the new districts so formed. which are sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the
delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.2a Indeed,
Upon the changing of the limits of political divisions in pursuance of the without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would in effect,
foregoing authority, an equitable distribution of the funds and obligations make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and,
of the divisions thereby affected shall be made in such manner as may be without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to
determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted

16
within or beyond the scope of his authority.2b Hence, he could thereby respectively, as sufficient standards for a valid delegation of the authority
arrogate upon himself the power, not only to make the law, but, also — to execute the law. But, the doctrine laid down in these cases — as all
and this is worse — to unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent with judicial pronouncements — must be construed in relation to the specific
the end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the facts and issues involved therein, outside of which they do not constitute
principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances, precedents and have no binding effect.4 The law construed in the Calalang
and, consequently, undermining the very foundation of our Republican case conferred upon the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the
system. Secretary of Public Works and Communications, the power to issue rules
and regulations to promote safe transit upon national roads and streets.
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well Upon the other hand, the Rosenthal case referred to the authority of the
settled requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details Insular Treasurer, under Act No. 2581, to issue and cancel certificates or
in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried permits for the sale of speculative securities. Both cases involved grants
out or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard to administrative officers of powers related to the exercise of their
sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to. In this administrative functions, calling for the determination of questions of fact.
connection, we do not overlook the fact that, under the last clause of the
first sentence of Section 68, the President: Such is not the nature of the powers dealt with in section 68. As above
indicated, the creation of municipalities, is not an administrative function,
... may change the seat of the government within any subdivision to such but one which is essentially and eminently legislative in character. The
place therein as the public welfare may require. question of whether or not "public interest" demands the exercise of such
power is not one of fact. it is "purely a legislative question "(Carolina-
It is apparent, however, from the language of this clause, that the phrase Virginia Coastal Highway vs. Coastal Turnpike Authority, 74 S.E. 2d. 310-
"as the public welfare may require" qualified, not the clauses preceding 313, 315-318), or a political question (Udall vs. Severn, 79 P. 2d. 347-349).
the one just quoted, but only the place to which the seat of the government As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has aptly characterized it, "the
may be transferred. This fact becomes more apparent when we consider question as to whether incorporation is for the best interest of the
that said Section 68 was originally Section 1 of Act No. 1748,3 which community in any case is emphatically a question of public policy and
provided that, "whenever in the judgment of the Governor-General statecraft" (In re Village of North Milwaukee, 67 N.W. 1033, 1035-1037).
the public welfare requires, he may, by executive order," effect the changes
enumerated therein (as in said section 68), including the change of the For this reason, courts of justice have annulled, as constituting undue
seat of the government "to such place ... as the public interest requires." delegation of legislative powers, state laws granting the judicial
The opening statement of said Section 1 of Act No. 1748 — which was not department, the power to determine whether certain territories should be
included in Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code — governed the annexed to a particular municipality (Udall vs. Severn, supra, 258-359); or
time at which, or the conditions under which, the powers therein vesting in a Commission the right to determine the plan and frame of
conferred could be exercised; whereas the last part of the first sentence of government of proposed villages and what functions shall be exercised by
said section referred exclusively to the place to which the seat of the the same, although the powers and functions of the village are specifically
government was to be transferred. limited by statute (In re Municipal Charters, 86 Atl. 307-308); or
conferring upon courts the authority to declare a given town or village
At any rate, the conclusion would be the same, insofar as the case at bar is incorporated, and designate its metes and bounds, upon petition of a
concerned, even if we assumed that the phrase "as the public welfare may majority of the taxable inhabitants thereof, setting forth the area desired
require," in said Section 68, qualifies all other clauses thereof. It is true to be included in such village (Territory ex rel Kelly vs. Stewart, 23 Pac.
that in Calalang vs. Williams (70 Phil. 726) and People vs. Rosenthal (68 405-409); or authorizing the territory of a town, containing a given area
Phil. 328), this Court had upheld "public welfare" and "public interest," and population, to be incorporated as a town, on certain steps being taken

17
by the inhabitants thereof and on certain determination by a court and code making authority thus conferred is an unconstitutional delegation of
subsequent vote of the inhabitants in favor thereof, insofar as the court is legislative power.
allowed to determine whether the lands embraced in the petition "ought
justly" to be included in the village, and whether the interest of the If the term "unfair competition" is so broad as to vest in the President a
inhabitants will be promoted by such incorporation, and to enlarge and discretion that is "virtually unfettered." and, consequently, tantamount to
diminish the boundaries of the proposed village "as justice may require" a delegation of legislative power, it is obvious that "public welfare," which
(In re Villages of North Milwaukee, 67 N.W. 1035-1037); or creating a has even a broader connotation, leads to the same result. In fact, if the
Municipal Board of Control which shall determine whether or not the validity of the delegation of powers made in Section 68 were upheld, there
laying out, construction or operation of a toll road is in the "public would no longer be any legal impediment to a statutory grant of authority
interest" and whether the requirements of the law had been complied to the President to do anything which, in his opinion, may be required by
with, in which case the board shall enter an order creating a municipal public welfare or public interest. Such grant of authority would be a
corporation and fixing the name of the same (Carolina-Virginia Coastal virtual abdication of the powers of Congress in favor of the Executive, and
Highway vs. Coastal Turnpike Authority, 74 S.E. 2d. 310). would bring about a total collapse of the democratic system established by
our Constitution, which it is the special duty and privilege of this Court to
Insofar as the validity of a delegation of power by Congress to the uphold.
President is concerned, the case of Schechter Poultry Corporation vs.
U.S. (79 L. Ed. 1570) is quite relevant to the one at bar. The Schechter case It may not be amiss to note that the executive orders in question were
involved the constitutionality of Section 3 of the National Industrial issued after the legislative bills for the creation of the municipalities
Recovery Act authorizing the President of the United States to approve involved in this case had failed to pass Congress. A better proof of the fact
"codes of fair competition" submitted to him by one or more trade or that the issuance of said executive orders entails the exercise of purely
industrial associations or corporations which "impose no inequitable legislative functions can hardly be given.
restrictions on admission to membership therein and are truly
representative," provided that such codes are not designed "to promote Again, Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law ordains:
monopolies or to eliminate or oppress small enterprises and will not
operate to discriminate against them, and will tend to effectuate the The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus,
policy" of said Act. The Federal Supreme Court held: or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may
be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
To summarize and conclude upon this point: Sec. 3 of the Recovery Act is
without precedent. It supplies no standards for any trade, industry or The power of control under this provision implies the right of the
activity. It does not undertake to prescribe rules of conduct to be applied President to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested
to particular states of fact determined by appropriate administrative by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of
procedure. Instead of prescribing rules of conduct, it authorizes the the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This
making of codes to prescribe them. For that legislative undertaking, Sec. 3 power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local
sets up no standards, aside from the statement of the general aims of governments are concerned. With respect to the latter, the fundamental
rehabilitation, correction and expansion described in Sec. 1. In view of the law permits him to wield no more authority than that of checking whether
scope of that broad declaration, and of the nature of the few restrictions said local governments or the officers thereof perform their duties as
that are imposed, the discretion of the President in approving or provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the President cannot interfere
prescribing codes, and thus enacting laws for the government of trade and with local governments, so long as the same or its officers act Within the
industry throughout the country, is virtually unfettered. We think that the scope of their authority. He may not enact an ordinance which the
municipal council has failed or refused to pass, even if it had thereby

18
violated a duty imposed thereto by law, although he may see to it that the There are only two (2) other points left for consideration, namely,
corresponding provincial officials take appropriate disciplinary action respondent's claim (a) that "not all the proper parties" — referring to the
therefor. Neither may he vote, set aside or annul an ordinance passed by officers of the newly created municipalities — "have been impleaded in
said council within the scope of its jurisdiction, no matter how patently this case," and (b) that "the present petition is premature."
unwise it may be. He may not even suspend an elective official of a regular
municipality or take any disciplinary action against him, except on appeal As regards the first point, suffice it to say that the records do not show,
from a decision of the corresponding provincial board.5 and the parties do not claim, that the officers of any of said municipalities
have been appointed or elected and assumed office. At any rate, the
Upon the other hand if the President could create a municipality, he could, Solicitor General, who has appeared on behalf of respondent Auditor
in effect, remove any of its officials, by creating a new municipality and General, is the officer authorized by law "to act and represent the
including therein the barrio in which the official concerned resides, for his Government of the Philippines, its offices and agents, in any official
office would thereby become vacant.6 Thus, by merely brandishing the investigation, proceeding or matter requiring the services of a lawyer"
power to create a new municipality (if he had it), without actually creating (Section 1661, Revised Administrative Code), and, in connection with the
it, he could compel local officials to submit to his dictation, thereby, in creation of the aforementioned municipalities, which involves a political,
effect, exercising over them the power of control denied to him by the not proprietary, function, said local officials, if any, are mere agents or
Constitution. representatives of the national government. Their interest in the case at
bar has, accordingly, been, in effect, duly represented.8
Then, also, the power of control of the President over executive
departments, bureaus or offices implies no more than the authority to With respect to the second point, respondent alleges that he has not as yet
assume directly the functions thereof or to interfere in the exercise of acted on any of the executive order & in question and has not intimated
discretion by its officials. Manifestly, such control does not include the how he would act in connection therewith. It is, however, a matter of
authority either to abolish an executive department or bureau, or to create a common, public knowledge, subject to judicial cognizance, that the
new one. As a consequence, the alleged power of the President to create President has, for many years, issued executive orders creating municipal
municipal corporations would necessarily connote the exercise by him of corporations and that the same have been organized and in actual
an authority even greater than that of control which he has over the operation, thus indicating, without peradventure of doubt, that the
executive departments, bureaus or offices. In other words, Section 68 of expenditures incidental thereto have been sanctioned, approved or passed
the Revised Administrative Code does not merely fail to comply with the in audit by the General Auditing Office and its officials. There is no reason
constitutional mandate above quoted. Instead of giving the President less to believe, therefore, that respondent would adopt a different policy as
power over local governments than that vested in him over the executive regards the new municipalities involved in this case, in the absence of an
departments, bureaus or offices, it reverses the process and does the exact allegation to such effect, and none has been made by him.
opposite, by conferring upon him more power over municipal corporations
than that which he has over said executive departments, bureaus or WHEREFORE, the Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null
offices. and void ab initio and the respondent permanently restrained from
passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said
In short, even if it did entail an undue delegation of legislative powers, as Executive Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities above
it certainly does, said Section 68, as part of the Revised Administrative referred to. It is so ordered.
Code, approved on March 10, 1917, must be deemed repealed by the
subsequent adoption of the Constitution, in 1935, which is utterly Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera and Dizon, JJ., concur.
incompatible and inconsistent with said statutory enactment.7
Zaldivar, J., took no part.

19
 is invalid or, at the least, already repealed, in light of the Philippine
Constitution and Republic Act 2370 (The Barrio Charter).

Separate Opinions Section 68 is again reproduced hereunder for convenience:

BENGZON, J.P., J., concurring and dissenting: SEC. 68. General authority of [Governor-General) President of the
Philippines to fix boundaries and make new subdivisions. — The [Governor-
A sign of progress in a developing nation is the rise of new municipalities. General] President of the Philippines may by executive order define the
Fostering their rapid growth has long been the aim pursued by all three boundary, or boundaries, of any province, subprovince, municipality,
branches of our Government. [township] municipal district, or other political subdivision, and increase
or diminish the territory comprised therein, may divide any province into
So it was that the Governor-General during the time of the Jones Law was one or more subprovinces, separate any political division other than a
given authority by the Legislature (Act No. 1748) to act upon certain province, into such portions as may be required, merge any of such
details with respect to said local governments, such as fixing of subdivisions or portions with another, name any new subdivision so
boundaries, subdivisions and mergers. And the Supreme Court, within the created, and may change the seat of government within any subdivision to
framework of the Jones Law, ruled in 1917 that the execution or such place therein as the public welfare may require: Provided, That the
implementation of such details, did not entail abdication of legislative authorization of the [Philippine Legislature] Congress of the Philippines
power (Government vs. Municipality of Binañgonan, 34 Phil. 518; shall first be obtained whenever the boundary of any province or
Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of Binañgonan, 36 Phil. 547). subprovince is to be defined or any province is to be divided into one or
Subsequently, Act No. 1748's aforesaid statutory authorization was more subprovinces. When action by the [Governor-General] President of
embodied in Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code. And Chief the Philippines in accordance herewith makes necessary a change of the
Executives since then up to the present continued to avail of said territory under the jurisdiction of any administrative officer or any
provision, time and again invoking it to issue executive orders providing judicial officer, the [Governor-General] President of the Philippines, with
for the creation of municipalities. the recommendation and advice of the head of the Department having
executive control of such officer, shall redistrict the territory of the several
From September 4, 1964 to October 29, 1964 the President of the officers to the new districts so formed.
Philippines issued executive orders to create thirty-three municipalities
pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code. Public funds Upon the changing of the limits of political divisions in pursuance of the
thereby stood to be disbursed in implementation of said executive orders. foregoing authority, an equitable distribution of the funds and obligations
of the divisions thereby affected shall be made in such manner as may be
Suing as private citizen and taxpayer, Vice President Emmanuel Pelaez recommended by the [Insular Auditor] Auditor General and approved by
filed in this Court a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction the [Governor-General] President of the Philippines.
against the Auditor General. It seeks to restrain the respondent or any
person acting in his behalf, from passing in audit any expenditure of public From such working I believe that power to create a municipality is
funds in implementation of the executive orders aforementioned. included: to "separate any political division other than a province, into
such portions as may be required, merge any such subdivisions or
Petitioner contends that the President has no power to create a portions with another, name any new subdivision so created." The issue,
municipality by executive order. It is argued that Section 68 of the Revised however, is whether the legislature can validly delegate to the Executive
Administrative Code of 1917, so far as it purports to grant any such power, such power.

20
The power to create a municipality is legislative in character. American only in specific instances therein provided, but the power of the Chief
authorities have therefore favored the view that it cannot be delegated; Executive over local governments suffered an explicit reduction.
that what is delegable is not the power to create municipalities but only
the power to determine the existence of facts under which creation of a Formerly, Section 21 of the Jones Law provided that the Governor-General
municipality will result (37 Am. Jur. 628). "shall have general supervision and control of all the departments and
bureaus of the government in the Philippine Islands." Now Section 10 (1),
The test is said to lie in whether the statute allows any discretion on the Article VII of the Philippine Constitution provides: "The President shall
delegate as to whether the municipal corporation should be created. If so, have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise
there is an attempted delegation of legislative power and the statute is general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law,
invalid (Ibid.). Now Section 68 no doubt gives the President such and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
discretion, since it says that the President "may by executive order"
exercise the powers therein granted. Furthermore, Section 5 of the same In short, the power of control over local governments had now been taken
Code states: away from the Chief Executive. Again, to fully understand the significance
of this provision, one must trace its development and growth.
SEC. 5. Exercise of administrative discretion — The exercise of the
permissive powers of all executive or administrative officers and bodies is As early as April 7, 1900 President McKinley of the United States, in his
based upon discretion, and when such officer or body is given authority to Instructions to the Second Philippine Commission, laid down the policy
do any act but not required to do such act, the doing of the same shall be that our municipal governments should be "subject to the least degree of
dependent on a sound discretion to be exercised for the good of the supervision and control" on the part of the national government. Said
service and benefit of the public, whether so expressed in the statute supervision and control was to be confined within the "narrowest limits"
giving the authority or not. or so much only as "may be necessary to secure and enforce faithful and
efficient administration by local officers." And the national government
Under the prevailing rule in the United States — and Section 68 is of "shall have no direct administration except of matters of purely general
American origin — the provision in question would be an invalid attempt concern." (See Hebron v. Reyes, L-9158, July 28, 1958.)
to delegate purely legislative powers, contrary to the principle of
separation of powers. All this had one aim, to enable the Filipinos to acquire experience in the
art of self-government, with the end in view of later allowing them to
It is very pertinent that Section 68 should be considered with the stream assume complete management and control of the administration of their
of history in mind. A proper knowledge of the past is the only adequate local affairs. Such aim is the policy now embodied in Section 10 (1), Article
background for the present. Section 68 was adopted half a century ago. VII of the Constitution (Rodriguez v. Montinola, 50 O.G. 4820).
Political change, two world wars, the recognition of our independence and
rightful place in the family of nations, have since taken place. In 1917 the It is the evident decree of the Constitution, therefore, that the President
Philippines had for its Organic Act the Jones Law. And under the setup shall have no power of control over local governments. Accordingly,
ordained therein no strict separation of powers was adhered to. Congress cannot by law grant him such power (Hebron v. Reyes, supra).
Consequently, Section 68 was not constitutionally objectionable at the And any such power formerly granted under the Jones Law thereby
time of its enactment. became unavoidably inconsistent with the Philippine Constitution.

The advent of the Philippine Constitution in 1935 however altered the It remains to examine the relation of the power to create and the power to
situation. For not only was separation of powers strictly ordained, except control local governments. Said relationship has already been passed
upon by this Court in Hebron v. Reyes, supra. In said case, it was ruled that

21
the power to control is an incident of the power to create or abolish because the President could not create a barrio under Republic Act 2370,
municipalities. Respondent's view, therefore, that creating municipalities a fortiori he cannot create a municipality.
and controlling their local governments are "two worlds apart," is
untenable. And since as stated, the power to control local governments It is my view, therefore, that the Constitution, and not Republic Act 2370,
can no longer be conferred on or exercised by the President, it follows repealed Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code's provision giving
a fortiori that the power to create them, all the more cannot be so the President authority to create local governments. And for this reason I
conferred or exercised. agree with the ruling in the majority opinion that the executive orders in
question are null and void.
I am compelled to conclude, therefore, that Section 10 (1), Article VII of
the Constitution has repealed Section 68 of the Revised Administrative In thus ruling, the Court is but sustaining the fulfillment of our historic
Code as far as the latter empowers the President to create local desire to be free and independent under a republican form of government,
governments. Repeal by the Constitution of prior statutes inconsistent and exercising a function derived from the very sovereignty that it
with it has already been sustained in De los Santos v. MaIlare, 87 Phil. 289. upholds. Executive orders declared null and void.
And it was there held that such repeal differs from a declaration of
unconstitutionality of a posterior legislation, so much so that only a Makalintal and Regala, JJ., concur.
majority vote of the Court is needed to sustain a finding of repeal.

Since the Constitution repealed Section 68 as far back as 1935, it is

academic to ask whether Republic Act 2370 likewise has provisions in 5.
conflict with Section 68 so as to repeal it. Suffice it to state, at any rate,
that statutory prohibition on the President from creating a barrio does not, G.R. No. L-34674 October 26, 1931
in my opinion, warrant the inference of statutory prohibition for creating
a municipality. For although municipalities consist of barrios, there is MAURICIO CRUZ, petitioner-appellant,
nothing in the statute that would preclude creation of new municipalities vs.
out of pre-existing barrios. STANTON YOUNGBERG, Director of the Bureau of Animal
Industry, respondent-appellee.
It is not contrary to the logic of local autonomy to be able to create larger
political units and unable to create smaller ones. For as long ago observed Jose Yulo for appellant.
in President McKinley's Instructions to the Second Philippine Commission, Office of the Solicitor-General Reyes for appellee.
greater autonomy is to be imparted to the smaller of the two political
units. The smaller the unit of local government, the lesser is the need for
the national government's intervention in its political affairs. Furthermore,
for practical reasons, local autonomy cannot be given from the top
OSTRAND, J.:
downwards. The national government, in such a case, could still exercise
power over the supposedly autonomous unit, e.g., municipalities, by
exercising it over the smaller units that comprise them, e.g., the barrios. A This is a petition brought originally before the Court of First Instance of
realistic program of decentralization therefore calls for autonomy from Manila for the issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction against the
the bottom upwards, so that it is not surprising for Congress to deny the respondent, Stanton Youngberg, as Director of the Bureau of Animal
national government some power over barrios without denying it over Industry, requiring him to issue a permit for the landing of ten large cattle
municipalities. For this reason, I disagree with the majority view that imported by the petitioner and for the slaughter thereof. The petitioner

22
attacked the constitutionality of Act No. 3155, which at present prohibits The appellee contends that even if Act No. 3155 be declared
the importation of cattle from foreign countries into the Philippine Islands. unconstitutional by the fact alleged by the petitioner in his complaint, still
the petitioner can not be allowed to import cattle from Australia for the
Among other things in the allegation of the petition, it is asserted that "Act reason that, while Act No. 3155 were declared unconstitutional, Act No.
No. 3155 of the Philippine Legislature was enacted for the sole purpose of 3052 would automatically become effective. Act No. 3052 reads as follows:
preventing the introduction of cattle diseases into the Philippine Islands
from foreign countries, as shown by an explanatory note and text of SECTION 1. Section seventeen hundred and sixty-two of Act Numbered
Senate Bill No. 328 as introduced in the Philippine Legislature, ... ." The Act Twenty-seven hundred and eleven, known as the Administrative Code, is
in question reads as follows: hereby amended to read as follows:

SECTION 1. After March thirty-first, nineteen hundred and twenty-five "SEC. 1762. Bringing of animals imported from foreign countries into the
existing contracts for the importation of cattle into this country to the Philippine Islands. — It shall be unlawful for any person or corporation to
contrary notwithstanding, it shall be strictly prohibited to import, bring or import, bring or introduce live cattle into the Philippine Islands from any
introduce into the Philippine Islands any cattle from foreign foreign country. The Director of Agriculture may, with the approval of the
countries: Provided, however, That at any time after said date, the head of the department first had, authorize the importation, bringing or
Governor-General, with the concurrence of the presiding officers of both introduction of various classes of thoroughbred cattle from foreign
Houses, may raise such prohibition entirely or in part if the conditions of countries for breeding the same to the native cattle of these Islands, and
the country make this advisable or if decease among foreign cattle has such as may be necessary for the improvement of the breed, not to exceed
ceased to be a menace to the agriculture and live stock of the lands. five hundred head per annum: Provided, however, That the Director of
Agriculture shall in all cases permit the importation, bringing or
SEC. 2. All acts or parts of acts inconsistent with this Act are hereby introduction of draft cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture of
repealed. serum: Provided, further, That all live cattle from foreign countries the
importation, bringing or introduction of which into the Islands is
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect on its approval. authorized by this Act, shall be submitted to regulations issued by the
Director of Agriculture, with the approval of the head of the department,
Approved, March 8, 1924. prior to authorizing its transfer to other provinces.

The respondent demurred to the petition on the ground that it did not "At the time of the approval of this Act, the Governor-General shall issue
state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The demurrer was regulations and others to provide against a raising of the price of both
based on two reasons, namely, (1) that if Act No. 3155 were declared fresh and refrigerated meat. The Governor-General also may, by executive
unconstitutional and void, the petitioner would not be entitled to the relief order, suspend, this prohibition for a fixed period in case local conditions
demanded because Act No. 3052 would automatically become effective require it."
and would prohibit the respondent from giving the permit prayed for; and
(2) that Act No. 3155 was constitutional and, therefore, valid. SEC. 2. This Act shall take effect six months after approval.

The court sustained the demurrer and the complaint was dismissed by Approved, March 14, 1922.
reason of the failure of the petitioner to file another complaint. From that
order of dismissal, the petitioner appealed to this court. The petitioner does not present any allegations in regard to Act No. 3052
to show its nullity or unconstitutionality though it appears clearly that in
the absence of Act No. 3155 the former act would make it impossible for

23
the Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry to grant the petitioner a In his third assignment of error the petitioner claims that "The lower
permit for the importation of the cattle without the approval of the head court erred in not holding that the power given by Act No. 3155 to the
of the corresponding department. Governor-General to suspend or not, at his discretion, the prohibition
provided in the act constitutes an unlawful delegation of the legislative
An unconstitutional statute can have no effect to repeal former laws or powers." We do not think that such is the case; as Judge Ranney of the
parts of laws by implication, since, being void, it is not inconsistent with Ohio Supreme Court in Cincinnati, Wilmington and Zanesville Railroad
such former laws. (I Lewis Sutherland, Statutory Construction 2nd ed., p. Co. vs. Commissioners of Clinton County (1 Ohio St., 77, 88) said in such
458, citing McAllister vs. Hamlin, 83 Cal., 361; 23 Pac., 357; Orange case:
Country vs. Harris, 97 Cal., 600; 32 Pac., 594; Carr vs. State, 127 Ind., 204;
11 L.R.A., 370, etc.) The true distinction, therefore, is between the delegation of power to
make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be,
This court has several times declared that it will not pass upon the and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be
constitutionality of statutes unless it is necessary to do so (McGirr vs. exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to
Hamilton and Abreu, 30 Phil., 563, 568; Walter E. Olsen & Co. vs. Aldanese the latter no valid objection can be made.
and Trinidad, 43 Phil., 259) but in this case it is not necessary to pass upon
the validity of the statute attacked by the petitioner because even if it Under his fourth assignment of error the appellant argues that Act No.
were declared unconstitutional, the petitioner would not be entitled to 3155 amends section 3 of the Tariff Law, but it will be noted that Act No.
relief inasmuch as Act No. 3052 is not in issue. 3155 is not an absolute prohibition of the importation of cattle and it does
not add any provision to section 3 of the Tariff Law. As stated in the brief
But aside from the provisions of Act No. 3052, we are of the opinion that of the Attorney-General: "It is a complete statute in itself. It does not make
Act No. 3155 is entirely valid. As shown in paragraph 8 of the amended any reference to the Tariff Law. It does not permit the importation of
petition, the Legislature passed Act No. 3155 to protect the cattle industry articles, whose importation is prohibited by the Tariff Law. It is not a tariff
of the country and to prevent the introduction of cattle diseases through measure but a quarantine measure, a statute adopted under the police
importation of foreign cattle. It is now generally recognized that the power of the Philippine Government. It is at most a `supplement' or an
promotion of industries affecting the public welfare and the development `addition' to the Tariff Law. (See MacLeary vs. Babcock, 82 N.E., 453, 455;
of the resources of the country are objects within the scope of the police 169 Ind., 228 for distinction between `supplemental' and `amendatory'
power (12 C.J., 927; 6 R.C.L., 203-206 and decisions cited therein; Reid vs. and O'Pry vs. U.S., 249 U.S., 323; 63 Law. ed., 626, for distinction between
Colorado, 187 U.S., 137, 147, 152; Yeazel vs. Alexander, 58 Ill., 254). In this `addition' and `amendment.')"
connection it is said in the case of Punzalan vs. Ferriols and Provincial
Board of Batangas (19 Phil., 214), that the provisions of the Act of The decision appealed from is affirmed with the costs against the
Congress of July 1, 1902, did not have the effect of denying to the appellant. So ordered.
Government of the Philippine Islands the right to the exercise of the
sovereign police power in the promotion of the general welfare and the Avanceña, C.J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Romualdez, Villa-Real,
public interest. The facts recited in paragraph 8 of the amended petition and Imperial, JJ., concur.
shows that at the time the Act No. 3155 was promulgated there was
reasonable necessity therefor and it cannot be said that the Legislature
exceeded its power in passing the Act. That being so, it is not for this court
to avoid or vacate the Act upon constitutional grounds nor will it assume
to determine whether the measures are wise or the best that might have
been adopted. (6 R.C.L., 243 and decisions cited therein.)1awphil.net

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