RCBC V Magwin Marketing G.R. No. 152878 May 5, 2003

RCBC v Magwin Marketing
G.R. No. 152878 May 5, 2003
FACTS:
RCBC filed a complaint for recovery of sum of money with preliminary

attachment against respondents Marwin Marketing Corporation. The trial
court issued a writ of attachment and this was partially satisfied since only a
parcel of land purportedly owned by defendant Benito Sy was attached.
Petitioner moved for an alias writ of attachment but the trial court denied it.
No pre-trial was set by the petitioner.
Thereafter, discussions between the petitioner and respondents were

undertaken to restructure the indebtedness of respondents. Subsequently a
debt payment scheme was approved by the petitioner. However, the trial
court, on its own initiative issued an Order dismissing the case without
prejudice for failure of the petitioner to prosecute its action for unreasonable
length of time. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the said order by
informing the trial court of respondents desire to settle amicably through a
loan restructuring program.
As a result, the trial court reconsidered petitioner’s contention and issued

another Order which directed the parties to submit within 15 days a
compromise agreement otherwise shall cause the imposition of payment of
the required docket fees for re-filing the said case. Petitioner filed a
Manifestation and Motion to Set Case for Pre-Trial Conference and this was
followed by another Supplemental Motion to Plaintiff’s Manifestation and
Motion to Set Case for Pre-Trial Conference. However, in an undated Order,
the trial court denied petitioner’s motions. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal
from the said orders but the appellate court rejected the said appeal on the
ground that the said orders are mere interlocutory orders, hence, no appeal
may be taken.
Hence, this petition via Rule 65.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court can coerce the parties to execute a compromise
agreement and penalize their failure to do so by refusing to go forward with
the pre-trial conference.
HELD:
NO. There is no substantial policy worth pursuing by requiring petitioner to

pay again the docket fees when it has already discharged this obligation
simultaneously with the filing of the complaint for collection of a sum of
money. The procedure for dismissed cases when re-filed is the same as
though it was initially lodged, except for the rigmarole of raffling cases which
is dispensed with since the re-filed complaint is automatically assigned to the
branch to which the original case pertained.
It must be emphasized however that once the dismissal attains the attribute
of finality, the trial court cannot impose legal fees anew because a final and
executory dismissal although without prejudice divests the trial court of
jurisdiction over the civil case as well as any residual power to order
anything relative to the dismissed case; it would have to wait until the
complaint is docketed once again. On the other hand, if we are to concede
that the trial court retains jurisdiction over the case for it to issue the
assailed Orders, a continuation of the hearing thereon would not trigger a
disbursement for docket fees on the part of petitioner as this would
obviously imply the setting aside of the order of dismissal and the
reinstatement of the complaint.
Our ruling in Goldloop Properties, Inc., is decisive of the instant case. In
Goldloop Properties, Inc., we reversed the action of the trial court in
dismissing the complaint for failure of the plaintiff to prosecute its case,
which was in turn based on its inability to forge a compromise with the other
parties within fifteen (15) days from notice of the order to do so and held -
Since there is nothing in the Rules that imposes the sanction of
dismissal for failing to submit a compromise agreement, then it
is obvious that the dismissal of the complaint on the basis
thereof amounts no less to a gross procedural infirmity
assailable by certiorari. For such submission could at most be
directory and could not result in throwing out the case for
failure to effect a compromise. While a compromise is
encouraged, very strongly in fact, failure to consummate one
does not warrant any procedural sanction, much less an
authority to jettison a civil complaint worth P4,000,000.00 x x x
Plainly, submission of a compromise agreement is never
mandatory, nor is it required by any rule.
Petitioner cannot be said to have lost interest in fighting the civil case to the
end. A court may dismiss a case on the ground of non prosequitur but the
real test of the judicious exercise of such power is whether under the
circumstances plaintiff is chargeable with want of fitting assiduousness in not
acting on his complaint with reasonable promptitude. Unless a party’s
conduct is so indifferent, irresponsible, contumacious or slothful as to
provide substantial grounds for dismissal, i.e., equivalent to default or non-
appearance in the case, the courts should consider lesser sanctions which
would still amount to achieving the desired end.
This petition for review was granted by the Supreme Court.

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RCBC v Magwin Marketing

G.R. No. 152878 May 5, 2003

RCBC filed a complaint for recovery of sum of money with preliminary

Thereafter, discussions between the petitioner and respondents were

As a result, the trial court reconsidered petitioner’s contention and issued

Hence, this petition via Rule 65.

NO. There is no substantial policy worth pursuing by requiring petitioner to

This petition for review was granted by the Supreme Court.

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