Global Money Dispatch: Credit Suisse Economics
Global Money Dispatch: Credit Suisse Economics
Global Money Dispatch: Credit Suisse Economics
Important Information
THIS IS NOT RESEARCH. PLEASE REFER TO THE IMPORTANT DISCLOSURES AND CONTACT YOUR CREDIT SUISSE
REPRESENTATIVE FOR MORE DETAILS. This report represents the views of the Investment Strategy Department of Credit Suisse and
has not been prepared in accordance with the legal requirements designed to promote the independence of investment research. It is not a
product of the Credit Suisse Research Department and the view of the Investment Strategy Department may differ materially from the views
of the Credit Suisse Research Department and other divisions at Credit Suisse, even if it references published research recommendations.
Credit Suisse has a number of policies in place to promote the independence of Credit Suisse’s Research Departments from Credit Suisse’s
Investment Strategy-and other departments and to manage conflicts of interest, including policies relating to dealing ahead of the
dissemination of investment research. These policies do not apply to the views of Investment Strategists contained in this report.
27 February 2022
Gold can be pledged under repo operations to cover one’s dollar needs with
a willing, collateral-rich central bank that has enough Treasuries to repo, or
perhaps even the BIS (which owes its origin to reparation payments), and one
can accumulate dollar surpluses anew through ongoing commodity exports
away from financial centers in the West by seeding financial centers in the East.
The options appear limitless:
U.S. dollars from Treasuries via repos.
U.S. dollars from local currency via FX swaps.
U.S. dollars from gold via whatever we’ll end up calling that…
But make no mistake: transitions are never smooth.
Banking is about double entry bookkeeping. My assets are your liabilities…
…like the blue and red veins in a body in one’s elementary biology book.
If you jam the flows by making banks unable to receive and send payments,
you have a problem, much like when a tri-party clearing bank did not return
cash to money funds for fear of ending up with an intraday exposure to Lehman.
In physics, knowledge is cumulative.
In finance, knowledge is cyclical – people come and go, we tend to forget…
We believe there is no difference between Lehman unable to pay back money funds
because its tri-party clearing agent is unwilling to unwind o/n repo trades, and
banks unable to receive and make payments because they are out of SWIFT.
The Herstatt risk – settlement risk – owes its name to a mishap at a single bank.
The risk in the current scenario involves an entire country’s banking system.
Banks’ inability to make payments due to their exclusion from SWIFT is the same
as Lehman’s inability to make payments due to its clearing bank’s unwillingness
to send payments on its behalf. History does not repeat itself, but it rhymes…
The consequence of excluding banks from SWIFT is real, and so is the need
for central banks to re-activate daily U.S. dollar funds supplying operations.
Excess reserves and o/n RRP balances won’t be enough.
And so the Fed’s balance sheet might expand again before it contracts via QT
– and not just because of the swap lines. The FIMA repo facility is also there to
turn collateral into dollars – anonymously, away from the prying eye of dealers,
if a central bank becomes a friendly correspondent for a sanctioned central bank
turning gold into cash. That, or an unforeseen call on unwanted reserves in the
o/n RRP facility as the correspondents flood the repo market with collateral…
…before QT even began.
150
1
140
130
1
120
0
110
100
0
90
80 0
70
0
60
50
0
40
-1
30
20
-1
10
0 -1
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
140
1
130
120 1
110
0
100
90 0
80
0
70
60 0
50
0
40
30 -1
20
-1
10
0 -1
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22