Vinuya V Romulo

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Vinuya v Romulo

GR No 162230 ; Apr 28, 2010

FACTS: Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit
organization registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, established for
the purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the
Philippines during the second world war. Petitioners narrate that during the second
world war, the Japanese army attacked villages and systematically raped the women as
part of the destruction of the village. Their communities were bombed, houses were
looted and burned, and civilians were publicly tortured, mutilated, and slaughtered.
Japanese soldiers forcibly seized the women and held them in houses or cells, where
they were repeatedly raped, beaten and abused by Japanese soldiers. As a result of the
actions of their tormentors, the petitioners have spent their lives in misery, having
endured physical injuries, pain and disability, and mental and emotional suffering.
Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department
through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the
Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the establishment of the “comfort
women” stations in the Philippines. However, officials of the Executive Department
declined to assist the petitioners and took the position that the individual claims of the
comfort women for compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japan’s
compliance with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan.

ISSUE: Did the Executive Department commit grave abuse of discretion in not
espousing petitioners’ claim for official apology and other forms of repatriation against
Japan?

RULING: NO. This is a political question. In Tañada v Cuenco, the Court held that
political questions refer “to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It
is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom not legality of a particular
measure.”

It is well-established that “the conduct of the foregin relations of our government is


committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative - the political -
departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise
of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.” To be sure, not all
cases implicating foregin relations present political questions, and courts certainly
possess the authority to construe or invalidate treaties and executive agreements.
However, the question whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its
nationals against a foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for
which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political
branches.
In the present case, the Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best
interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for repatriation against Japan in
the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to
question. Neither could petitioners herein assail the said determination by the Executive
Department via the instant petition for certiorari. The Executive Department has
determined that taking up petitioners’ cause would be inimical to our country’s foreign
policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby creating serious
implications for stability in this region.

From a municipal law perspective, that certiorari will not lie. As a general principle - and
particularly here, where such an extraordinary length of time has lapsed between the
treaty’s conclusion and our consideration - the Executive must be given ample
discretion to assess the foreign policy considerations of espousing a claim against
Japan, from the standpoint of both the interests of the petitioners and those of the
Republic, and decide on that basis if apologies are sufficient, and whether further steps
are appropriate or necessary. In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means
available for individuals to bring a claim within the international legal system has been
when the individual is able to persuade a government to bring a claim on the individual’s
behalf. By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action
or international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own
right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law.
Furthermore, it has been argued that, as petitioners argue now, that the State has a
duty to protect its nationals and act on his/her behalf when rights are injured. However,
at present, there is no sufficient evidence to establish a general international obligation
for States to exercise diplomatic protection of their own nationals abroad. Though,
perhaps desirable, neither state practice nor opinion juris has evolved in such a
discretion. If it is a duty internationally, it is only a moral and not a legal duty, and there
is no means of enforcing its fulfillment.

Thus, for us to overturn the Executive Department’s determination would mean an


assessment of the foreign policy judgments by a coordinated political branch to which
authority to make that judgment has been constitutionally committed. Hence, it is not
within the power of this Court to order the Executive Department to take up the
petitioners’ cause. The Court only has the power to urge and exhort the Executive
Department to take up petitioners’ cause.

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