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The Philippines' National Defense Strategy

Article · December 2019

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The Philippines’ National Defense
Strategy – Analysis
December 20, 2019

By Mico A. Galang*

Philippine Navy Special Warfare Group. Credit: U.S. Navy photo by Special Warfare Operator 1st Class (SEAL)
Joel Beam

On October 31, 2018, Philippine Department of National Defense (DND) Assistant

Secretary for Plans and Programs Angelito M. De Leon presented a copy of the country’s
National Defense Strategy (NDS) to Defense Secretary Delfin N. Lorenza during the
agency’s 79th founding anniversary. Described by DND as the Manila’s “first ever” NDS,
the strategy document only became publicly available online in August 2019. The time
horizon of the NDS is from 2018 until 2022, the year President Rodrigo Duterte’s term
expires. As the Duterte administration enters its final two and half years in office, two
questions on the strategy document may be raised: 1) how does the NDS relate to other
security-related documents?; and 2) what does the NDS mean for Manila’s defense and
security relations in the Asia-Pacific region?

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The NDS is anchored on two previously released policy/strategy documents under the
Duterte administration—2017 National Security Policy (NSP), and 2018 National
Security Strategy (NSS). The NSP outlined, in broad strokes, the overall national security
objectives of the government. The NSS, on the other hand, categorized the Philippines’
national security interests into “core,” “important,” and “other.” These interests were
then harmonized into national security goals from which broad strategic courses of
action were identified. The NDS “maps the planning, prioritization, and resourcing
processes of the [DND] in line with the identified priorities and outcomes of the NSS.”
Indeed, the NDS identified six of the twelve national security goals which are most
relevant to DND’s mandate. Among others, these national security goals include: 1)
safeguard and preserve national sovereignty and territorial integrity; 2) ensure maritime
and airspace security; and 3) strengthen international relations. Anchored on the
relevant national security goals, the NDS identified two categories of defense missions:
external, and internal. The external defense missions are: 1) Maritime and Air Defense
Mission (MarAD); 2) Cyber Security Mission (CS); and 3) Security Cooperation and
Engagement Mission (SCE). The NDS will also serve as the basis for the crafting of the
National Military Strategy (NMS) by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to ensure
“coherence and alignment of important strategies for a more effective and collective
response to national security threats.”

Cognizant of the interrelatedness of Philippine security policy/strategy documents, it

appears that the NDS has three major implications for Manila’s defense and security
relations in the Asia-Pacific region. First, the NDS strategic environment assessment
situated the country’s external politico-security challenges within the broader purview
of the U.S.-China geostrategic competition, a phenomenon that will likely shape the
dynamics of Asia-Pacific in the foreseeable future. Like NSP and NSS, the NDS
underscored that the “overall strategic backdrop and geopolitical landscape of the Asia-
Pacific lies on the U.S.-China rivalry, which proves to be a vital consideration for the
strategic decisions of the country.” As the “maritime heartland of Southeast Asia,” the
South China Sea (SCS) “is crucial to the security and economy of the region.” The NDS also
underscored that sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) “must be kept open and that
freedom of navigation [in] and overflight [above] the SCS must be ensured.” In this
context, the NDS stressed that Manila “views the massive construction of artificial islands
in its maritime areas in the SCS, which may be used as military bases, as a grave threat to
its national security.” As such, echoing NSP and NSS, the NDS stressed that the dispute in
West Philippine Sea (WPS), part of the broader SCS, is the “foremost security challenge to
Philippine sovereignty and territorial integrity.”

Beyond the SCS, the NDS also took note of the other territorial and maritime disputes in
the region, particularly the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea, and the issue
of Taiwan. With respect to the former, the NDS noted that it serves “as the major point of
contention among Asia’s economic powerhouses.” Cross-Strait relations, on the other
hand, “dominate the interplay of geopolitical players in the region.” Clearly, for the NDS,
the geopolitics of the Asia-Pacific is the larger context in understanding the external
security challenges of the Philippines.

Second, the NDS reaffirmed the Philippines’ alliance and security partnerships, as well as
ASEAN’s centrality in the multilateral architecture. A key pillar of the NDS is the
Philippines’ security relations with other countries. After all, as the NDS noted, “it is in

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the interest of the country that security partnerships are being nurtured with other like-
minded states” since “no [single] nation has the power to overcome [complex security
challenges].” Noting that Washington “remains as the only treaty ally” of Manila, the NDS
underscored that the “stabilizing U.S. presence in the region can be further expected to
persist as it is strengthened by its continued defense engagements forged with Asia-
Pacific nations including Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Australia, and the
Philippines.” Beyond the U.S. alliance, the NDS also reaffirmed the importance of Manila’s
strategic partnerships with Tokyo, and Hanoi, the comprehensive partnership with
Canberra, as well as security ties with other countries in the region such as South Korea,
and Southeast Asian states. These security arrangements not only promote
interoperability, but also complement the efforts in enhancing the capability of the
Philippine military.

Apart from the bilateral security arrangements, the NDS also underscored the importance
of ASEAN for Philippine national security. Indeed, the NDS reaffirmed that the
“Philippines supports ASEAN’s centrality in the multilateral architecture of the region.”
For DND, the key ASEAN-led platforms include the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting
(ADMM), ADMM-Plus, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), among others.

Third, the strategy document also suggested some efforts to strike a delicate balance in
line with apparent shifts in the country’s foreign policy. While the NDS reaffirmed the
alliance and partnerships of Manila, the strategy document also identified China and
Russia as “emerging security partners.” China’s inclusion in this category is of particular
interest because, as noted earlier, the artificial islands constructed by Beijing are,
according to the NDS, pose as a “grave threat to [the country’s] national security.”
Identifying China as an emerging security partner notwithstanding its dispute with
Manila may likely be in consonance with President Duterte’s “independent foreign policy”
which in part entails enhancing ties with non-traditional countries. I have argued
elsewhere that this foreign policy shift appears to be anchored on a hedging approach.

In examining the NDS, it must be stressed that the Philippines is a relatively small power
situated in a region in which the dynamics of major power competition is the overarching
theme shaping the geopolitical landscape. The NSS, upon which the NDS is anchored,
emphasized the country’s vulnerability in this context. Indeed, the NSS noted that the
Philippines’ geographical location and natural resources have “provided a strong
temptation to expansionist powers.” It is for this reason why the NDS underscored that
the defense department will “sustain its efforts in improving capabilities for territorial
defense” through the AFP Capability Upgrade Program, and AFP Modernization Program,
as well as developing a Self-Reliant Defense Posture Program (SRDP). The NDS also
highlighted the need to, under the MarAD mission, to strengthen the AFP’s capability on
Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) over the surface, sub-surface, and air space, and Air
Domain Awareness (ADA) over the Philippine Air Defense Identification Zone (PADIZ).

As a small power, the Philippines cannot rely on its capabilities alone. As one scholar
pointed out, small powers operate on narrower margins and therefore need to broaden
their diplomatic space for maneuver and choice, and expand the resources which they
can tap in periods of stress. Hence, strengthening defense and security relations with
other countries is a key component of the NDS. In implementing the strategy, Manila will
likely encounter challenges, among them are difficulties in Philippines-China security

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 relations. As pointed out earlier, the NDS identified Beijing as an “emerging security
partner.” However, in view of China’s efforts to consolidate its position in the SCS, forging
stable a modus vivendi is an immense diplomatic task. At the same time, ensuring that
Manila’s alliance and partnerships remain in tact in the face of internal and external
pressures is likewise a challenge for the Philippine defense establishment. Moreover,
there is a need to secure resources, as well as focus and attention, for the successful
execution of the NDS.

*Mico A. Galang is a researcher at the National Defense College of the Philippines (NDCP).
The views expressed are the author’s alone and do not necessarily reflect the official position
of NDCP.

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