Filamer Christian Institute Vs Iac, 212 Scra 637
Filamer Christian Institute Vs Iac, 212 Scra 637
Filamer Christian Institute Vs Iac, 212 Scra 637
FACTS:
Funtecha was a working student, being a part-time janitor and a scholar of petitioner Filamer was, in
relation to the school, an employee even if he was assigned to clean the school premises for only two (2)
hours in the morning of each school day.
One later afternoon, Funtencha was allowed by the driver, Allan, to take over the vehicle on their
way home to which they accidentally hit herein respondent Potenciano.
Petitioner contend that it cannot be held liable for the act of Funtecha was done beyond the scope of
his janitorial duties. That Funtecha was merely a working scholar who, under Section 14, Rule X, Book III
of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code is not considered an employee of the petitioner.
On the other hand, private respondent assert that the circumstances obtaining in the present case call
for the application of Article 2180 of the Civil Code since Funtecha is no doubt an employee of the
petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is liable for the injuries caused by Futencha, its working scholar, in
furtherance of the business of the former.
RULING:
Yes. The petitioner is liable for the injuries caused by Futencha, its working scholar, in furtherance
of the business of the former.
Under Article 2180 an injured party shall have recourse against the servant as well as the petitioner
for whom, at the time of the incident, the servant was performing an act in furtherance of the interest and for
the benefit of the petitioner. In the absence of evidence that the petitioner had exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in the supervision of its employees, the law imposes upon it the vicarious liability for
acts or omissions of its employees. Supervision includes the formulation of suitable rules and regulations for
the guidance of its employees and the issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the
public and persons with whom the employer has relations through his employees.
The reliance on the implementing rule on labor to disregard the primary liability of an employer
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is misplaced. An implementing rule on labor cannot be used by an
employer as a shield to avoid liability under the substantive provisions of the Civil Code.
Futencha, an employee, was not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a "frolic of his own"
but ultimately, for the service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner school. He was engaged in
an act not for an independent purpose of his own but in furtherance of the business of petitioner. Petitioner
has failed to show proof of its having exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over its
employees Funtecha and Allan when it has failed to prove that it had imposed sanctions or warned its
employees against the use of its vehicles by persons other than the driver.
The liability of the employer is, under Article 2180, primary and solidary. However, the employer
shall have recourse against the negligent employee for whatever damages are paid to the heirs of the
plaintiff.