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543 Phil. 275

THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. NO. 133743, February 06, 2007 ]

EDGAR SAN LUIS, PETITIONER, VS. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS,

RESPONDENT.

[G.R. NO. 134029]

RODOLFO SAN LUIS, PETITIONER, VS. FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS

ALIAS FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4, 1998
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and set
aside the September 12, 1995[2] and January 31, 1996[3] Resolutions of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134 in SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its May 15, 1998
Resolution[4] denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis
(Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his
lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit
on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar,
Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.

Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he
had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed
a Complaint for Divorce[5] before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii,
United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce
and Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973.[6]

On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed
Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at
Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.[7] He had no children with
respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his
death on December 18, 1992.

Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and
the settlement of Felicisimo's estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for
letters of administration[8] before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, docketed as
SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.
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Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death,
the decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang,
Metro Manila; that the decedent's surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his
six children by his first marriage, and son by his second marriage; that the decedent
left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive, valued at P30,304,178.00 more or
less; that the decedent does not have any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the
conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of administration be issued to
her.

On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by
his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss[9] on the grounds of improper venue and
failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of
administration should have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was
Felicisimo's place of residence prior to his death. He further claimed that respondent
has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of
Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry
Lee.

On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo
in seeking the dismissal[10] of the petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial court issued
an Order[11] denying the two motions to dismiss.

Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on March 5, 1994 her
opposition[12] thereto. She submitted documentary evidence showing that while
Felicisimo exercised the powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went home
to their house in New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought
sometime in 1982. Further, she presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the
Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo
to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the
legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2,[13] Article 26 of the Family Code
and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[14]

Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed
motions for reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to dismiss.[15] They
asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive
effect to validate respondent's bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would
impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256[16] of the Family Code.

On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first marriage, filed a
motion to disqualify Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos from hearing the case.

On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order[17] denying the motions for
reconsideration. It ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the
legal standing to file the petition and that venue was properly laid. Meanwhile, the
motion for disqualification was deemed moot and academic[18] because then Acting
Presiding Judge Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador S. Tensuan pending the
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resolution of said motion.

Mila filed a motion for inhibition[19] against Judge Tensuan on November 16, 1994. On
even date, Edgar also filed a motion for reconsideration[20] from the Order denying
their motion for reconsideration arguing that it does not state the facts and law on
which it was based.

On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order[21] granting the motion for
inhibition. The case was re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.

On April 24, 1995,[22] the trial court required the parties to submit their respective
position papers on the twin issues of venue and legal capacity of respondent to file the
petition. On May 5, 1995, Edgar manifested[23] that he is adopting the arguments and
evidence set forth in his previous motion for reconsideration as his position paper.
Respondent and Rodolfo filed their position papers on June 14,[24] and June 20,[25]
1995, respectively.

On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of
administration. It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected
governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have
been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was
without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration because her
marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that the decree of
absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimo's marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the
Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied because it
would impair the vested rights of Felicisimo's legitimate children.

Respondent moved for reconsideration[26] and for the disqualification[27] of Judge

Arcangel but said motions were denied.[28]

Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the orders
of the trial court in its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998, the dispositive portion
of which states:

WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and
October 24, 1994 are REINSTATED; and the records of the case is
REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.[29]

The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term
"place of residence" of the decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement
of his estate, refers to the personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or
place of abode of a person as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It noted
that although Felicisimo discharged his functions as governor in Laguna, he actually
resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of administration was
properly filed in Makati City.

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The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry respondent
by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr.[30] and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.[31] It found that the marriage between
Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly dissolved by virtue of the decree of absolute
divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a result,
under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was capacitated to contract a subsequent
marriage with respondent. Thus -

With the well-known rule - express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, of

the Family Code of the Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the
reason and philosophy behind the enactment of E.O. No. 227, - there is no
justiciable reason to sustain the individual view - sweeping statement - of
Judge Arc[h]angel, that "Article 26, par. 2 of the Family Code, contravenes
the basic policy of our state against divorce in any form whatsoever."
Indeed, courts cannot deny what the law grants. All that the courts should
do is to give force and effect to the express mandate of the law. The foreign
divorce having been obtained by the Foreigner on December 14, 1992,[32]
the Filipino divorcee, "shall x x x have capacity to remarry under Philippine
laws". For this reason, the marriage between the deceased and petitioner
should not be denominated as "a bigamous marriage.

Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the
surviving spouse can institute the judicial proceeding for the settlement of
the estate of the deceased. x x x[33]

Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration[34] which were
denied by the Court of Appeals.

On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition for review on
certiorari.[35] Rodolfo later filed a manifestation and motion to adopt the said petition
which was granted.[36]

In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue of the
subject petition for letters of administration was improperly laid because at the time of
his death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They contend that pursuant
to our rulings in Nuval v. Guray[37] and Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City,[38]
"residence" is synonymous with "domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent residence
to which when absent, one intends to return. They claim that a person can only have
one domicile at any given time. Since Felicisimo never changed his domicile, the
petition for letters of administration should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna.

Petitioners also contend that respondent's marriage to Felicisimo was void and
bigamous because it was performed during the subsistence of the latter's marriage to
Merry Lee. They argue that paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be retroactively applied
because it would impair vested rights and ratify the void bigamous marriage. As such,
respondent cannot be considered the surviving wife of Felicisimo; hence, she has no
legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration.
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The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2) whether
respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration.

The petition lacks merit.

Under Section 1,[39] Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of
the province "in which he resides at the time of his death." In the case of Garcia Fule v.
Court of Appeals,[40] we laid down the doctrinal rule for determining the residence - as
contradistinguished from domicile - of the decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of
the settlement of his estate:

[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as

distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the
terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the
light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed.
In the application of venue statutes and rules - Section 1, Rule 73 of the
Revised Rules of Court is of such nature - residence rather than domicile is
the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it
is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense.
Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and
"domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are
synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In
other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense,
meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person,
actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a
place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely
residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile.
Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place,
while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to
make it one's domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required
though; however, the residence must be more than temporary.[41](Emphasis
supplied)

It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of fixing the venue
of the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile." The rulings
in Nuval and Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case because they involve
election cases. Needless to say, there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes
of election laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election
cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed
permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of returning.[42]
However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a
person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of
abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides
therein with continuity and consistency.[43] Hence, it is possible that a person may
have his residence in one place and domicile in another.

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In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta.
Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang,
Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death. Respondent submitted in evidence
the Deed of Absolute Sale[44] dated January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased
purchased the aforesaid property. She also presented billing statements[45] from the
Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General Hospital for the period August to
December 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico, Ayala
Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented proof of membership of the deceased
in the Ayala Alabang Village Association[46] and Ayala Country Club, Inc.,[47] letter-
envelopes[48] from 1988 to 1990 sent by the deceased's children to him at his Alabang
address, and the deceased's calling cards[49] stating that his home/city address is at
"100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his office/provincial address
is in "Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna."

From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject
petition for letters of administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court[50]
which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was
filed on December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the
branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region which had
territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as per Supreme
Court Administrative Order No. 3.[51] Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.

Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad's legal personality to file the petition for letters
of administration, we must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced
by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that
Felicidad's marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the
Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we need not
retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2)
considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the
affirmative.

The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[52] involved a marriage between a foreigner and
his Filipino wife, which marriage was subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained
abroad by the latter. Claiming that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the
alien spouse alleged that his interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership
should be protected. The Court, however, recognized the validity of the divorce and
held that the alien spouse had no interest in the properties acquired by the Filipino wife
after the divorce. Thus:

In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the
marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves
the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States
in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:

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"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of

matrimony by a competent jurisdiction are to change the existing
status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them
both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to
one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a
wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law
provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not
marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely
freed from the bond of the former marriage."

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the

husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below
as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As
he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly
exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate,
he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting
his right over the alleged conjugal property.[53]

As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no
longer be considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required
to perform her marital duties and obligations. It held:

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws,

petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent
and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of
the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live
together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private
respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with
possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated
against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.[54]
(Emphasis added)

This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera[55] where the Court
recognized the validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that
the alien spouse is not a proper party in filing the adultery suit against his Filipino wife.
The Court stated that "the severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating
the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or
cast obloquy on the other."[56]

Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals,[57] the Court stated that where a Filipino is
divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn applies.[58] Although
decided on December 22, 1998, the divorce in the said case was obtained in 1954
when the Civil Code provisions were still in effect.

The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited recognition of
divorce in the Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as
severing marital ties between parties in a mixed marriage and capacitating the Filipino
spouse to remarry as a necessary consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce

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obtained abroad by the alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van
Dorn stating that "if the foreigner obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse
shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law."[59] In Garcia v. Recio,[60] the
Court likewise cited the aforementioned case in relation to Article 26.[61]

In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III,[62] the historical background and
legislative intent behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code were discussed, to
wit:

Brief Historical Background

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive
Order No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took effect on
August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:

All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws
in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35,
37, and 38.

On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code,
Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26,
36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26.
As so amended, it now provides:

ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with
the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there
as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly

celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)

xxxx

Legislative Intent

Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the
intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a
member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who,
after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.

Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985

case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a
marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held

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therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is

valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is
capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.[63] (Emphasis added)

As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code
and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already established
through judicial precedent.

Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance

intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the community,
relief in some way should be obtainable.[64] Marriage, being a mutual and shared
commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the
society where one is considered released from the marital bond while the other remains
bound to it. Such is the state of affairs where the alien spouse obtains a valid divorce
abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this case.

Petitioners cite Articles 15[65] and 17[66] of the Civil Code in stating that the divorce is
void under Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of this
Court's rulings in the cases discussed above, the Filipino spouse should not be
discriminated against in his own country if the ends of justice are to be served.[67] In
Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[68] the Court stated:

But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and
likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking
the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover
in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should
never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never
within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for
we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.

Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance
with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To
be sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary
when applied in a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In
such a situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature and
functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their
language. What we do instead is find a balance between the word and the
will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.

As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly

apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal command
without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by
sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice
Holmes again, "where these words import a policy that goes beyond them."

xxxx

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More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant
and perpetual wish to render every one his due." That wish continues to
motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law in every case
brought to it for decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its
decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way that
will render justice, presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to
begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice.[69]

Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained
by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested
Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo's surviving
spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the
validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and
Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio,[70] the Court laid down the
specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held
that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its
authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule
132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign
country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer
having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such
copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.[71]

With regard to respondent's marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California,

U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated
text[72] of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage
was done in accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court
cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved.[73]

Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of
evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent
and Felicisimo.

Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974,
nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition
for letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as
regards the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their
cohabitation.

Section 6,[74] Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may be
granted to the surviving spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof
also provides in part:

SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. - A petition for

letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and must
show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x.

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An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate,
such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The
interest must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent.[75]

In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct
interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which
was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo's
capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed
under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article
144[76] of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations between parties
who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their
marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or
both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the
property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property
acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their
joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal,
unless the contrary is proven.[77]

Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the
marriage, the applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has
filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the property
relations of couples living together as husband and wife but are incapacitated to marry.
[78] In Saguid v. Court of Appeals,[79] we held that even if the cohabitation or the

acquisition of property occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148
governs.[80] The Court described the property regime under this provision as follows:

The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of

parties who are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who
nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to properties
acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective
contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven
actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the
extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be
presumed to be equal.

xxxx

In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved

the issue of co-ownership of properties acquired by the parties to a
bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled
that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is
essential. x x x

As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as
determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an
affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and

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reliance must be had on the strength of the party's own evidence and not
upon the weakness of the opponent's defense. x x x[81]

In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent's legal capacity to file the subject
petition for letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of
Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the
Family Code.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating
and affirming the February 28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court which denied
petitioners' motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed
petitioners' motion for reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to
the trial court for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

[1] Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, pp. 45-66. Penned by Associate Justice Artemon D. Luna

and concurred in by Associate Justices Godardo A. Jacinto and Roberto A. Barrios.

[2] Records, pp. 335-338. Penned by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.

[3] Id. at 391-393.

[4] Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, p. 68. Penned by Associate Justice Artemon D. Luna and

concurred in by Associate Justices Demetrio G. Demetria and Roberto A. Barrios.

[5] Records, p. 125.

[6] Id. at 137.

[7] Id. at 116.

[8] Id. at 1-5.

[9] Id. at 10-24.

[10] Id. at 30-35.

[11] Id. at 38.

[12] Id. at 39-138.

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[13] When a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and

a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

[14] G.R. No. L-68470, October 8, 1985, 139 SCRA 139.

[15] See Records, pp. 155-158, 160-170 and 181-192.

[16] This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair

vested rights or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.

[17] Records, p. 259.

[18] Id. at 260.

[19] Id. at 262-267.

[20] Id. at 270-272.

[21] Id. at 288.

[22] Id. at 301.

[23] Id. at 302-303.

[24] Id. at 306-311.

[25] Id. at 318-320.

[26] Id. at 339-349.

[27] Id. at 350-354.

[28] Id. at 391-393.

[29] Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, p. 66.

[30] Supra note 14.

[31] G.R. No. 80116, June 30, 1989, 174 SCRA 653.

[32] Parenthetically, it appears that the Court of Appeals proceeded from a mistaken

finding of fact because the records clearly show that the divorce was obtained on
December 14, 1973 (not December 14, 1992) and that the marriage of Gov. San Luis
with respondent was celebrated on June 20, 1974. These events both occurred before
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the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988.

[33] Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, p. 65.

[34] See CA rollo, pp. 309-322, 335-340, and 362-369.

[35] Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, pp. 8-42.

[36] Id. at 75.

[37] 52 Phil. 645 (1928).

[38] G.R. No. 104960, September 14, 1993, 226 SCRA 408.

[39] SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons be settled. - If the decedent is an

inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his
will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the
Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, x x
x. (Underscoring supplied)

[40] G.R. Nos. L-40502 & L-42670, November 29, 1976, 74 SCRA 189.

[41] Id. at 199-200.

[42] Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, supra note 38 at 415.

[43] See Boleyley v. Villanueva, 373 Phil. 141, 146 (1999); Dangwa Transportation Co.

Inc. v. Sarmiento, G.R. No. L-22795, January 31, 1977, 75 SCRA 124, 128-129.

[44] Records, pp. 76-78.

[45] Id. at 60-75.

[46] Id. at 79.

[47] Id. at 80.

[48] Id. at 81-83.

[49] Id. at 84.

[50] The Regional Trial Court and not the Municipal Trial Court had jurisdiction over this

case because the value of Gov. San Luis' estate exceeded P200,000.00 as provided for
under B.P. Blg 129, Section 19(4).

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[51] SC Administrative Order No. 3 dated January 19, 1983 states in part:

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 18 of B.P. Blg. 129, and Section 4 of

the Executive Order issued by the President of the Philippines on January
17, 1983, declaring the reorganization of the Judiciary, the territorial
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts in the National Capital Judicial Region
are hereby defined as follows:

xxxx

5. Branches CXXXII to CL, inclusive, with seats at Makati - over the

municipalities of Las Pinas, Makati, Muntinlupa and Parañaque. x x x

[52] Supra note 14.

[53] Id. at 139, 143-144.

[54] Id. at 144.

[55] Supra note 31.

[56] Id. at 664.

[57] G.R. No. 124862, December 22, 1998, 300 SCRA 406.

[58] Id. at 414; See also Republic v. Orbecido III, G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005,

472 SCRA 114, 121.

[59] Tolentino, Arturo M., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the

Philippines, Vol. I, 1990 ed., p. 263.

[60] G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001, 366 SCRA 437.

[61] Id. at 447.

[62] Supra note 58.

[63] Id. at 119-121.

[64] Goitia v. Campos Rueda, 35 Phil. 252, 254-255 (1916).

[65] ART. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and

legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad.

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[66] Art. 17. x x x Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those

which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be
rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

[67] Supra note 14 at 144.

[68] G.R. No. L-72873, May 28, 1987, 150 SCRA 259.

[69] Id. at 264-265, 268.

[70] Supra note 60.

[71] Id. at 448-449.

[72] Records, pp. 118-124.

[73] Supra note 60 at 451.

[74] SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. - If x x x a person

dies intestate, administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both,
in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife,
or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve; x x
x.

[75] Saguinsin v. Lindayag,116 Phil. 1193, 1195 (1962).

[76] Article 144 of the Civil Code reads in full:

When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not
married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by
either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

[77] Valdes v. RTC, Br. 102, Quezon City, 328 Phil. 1289, 1297 (1996).

[78] Francisco v. Master Iron Works & Construction Corporation, G.R. No. 151967,

February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA 494, 506.

[79] G.R. No. 150611, June 10, 2003, 403 SCRA 678.

[80] Id. at 686.

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[81] Id. at 679, 686-687.

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