Congress CP
Congress CP
Congress CP
The Method
INDEX
INDEX...................................................................................................1
***Congress Counterplan***...................................................................3
Congress Best.........................................................................................4
Congress Avoids/Solves Pres Powers......................................................5
Solvency Immigrants............................................................................11
Solvency Nursing Homes......................................................................12
Solvency Health Care...........................................................................13
Generic Solvency..................................................................................16
Congressional Approach Solves Better.................................................17
Solvency Edu., Health Care, Welfare....................................................19
Solvency Natives..................................................................................20
Solvency Veterans................................................................................21
Solvency Broadband.............................................................................22
Congress Can Overturn Court Decisions..............................................23
AT: Perm...............................................................................................24
AT: Courts Rollback..............................................................................25
***Presidential Powers***.....................................................................26
Uniqueness Pres Powers Low...............................................................27
Pres Powers Brink Now.........................................................................29
Pres Powers Turns Solvency.................................................................31
Generic Link.........................................................................................32
Generic Internal Link............................................................................37
Separation of Powers Good..................................................................41
Rule of Law Internal Link......................................................................44
Rule of Law Impact...............................................................................48
Nuclear War Impact..............................................................................49
Constitution Internal Link.....................................................................51
Constitution Impact..............................................................................53
Tyranny Internal Link............................................................................58
Tyranny Impact....................................................................................60
Democracy Impact...............................................................................61
***AFF Answers to Pres Powers***.......................................................63
Uniqueness Pres Powers High..............................................................64
Pres Powers Key to Separation of Powers............................................69
Pres Powers Key to Heg........................................................................70
***Judicial Activism***..........................................................................72
Uniqueness – Activism High.................................................................73
Uniqueness – Activism Low..................................................................74
Court Policy = Activist..........................................................................80
Court Action on Poverty = Activist.......................................................81
Court Action on Poverty = Activist.......................................................84
Activism Snowball Effect......................................................................85
Activism Hurts Rule of Law...................................................................86
Activism Hurts Separation of Powers....................................................87
Congress Best
[ ] Congress works best
Long, 2001: [Carolyn Long - assistant professor of political science at
Washington State University, Vancouver, Congress Confronts the
Court, 2001, p. 92-93. Google Books]
Congress brings institutional strengths to this
As a representative branch of government,
conversation about the Constitution that do not exist on the Supreme Court.
Congress can rake the pulse of the American public and reflect its will in its legislative
proposals. Moreover, its manner of deliberating legislation provides the opportunity for
groups such as the Coalition for the Free Exercise of Religion and the
American Indian Religious Freedom Coalition to also participate in the
legislative process. Ultimately, encouraging and recognizing the role of
multiple constitutional interpreters provides the country with multiple
avenues for the protection of individual rights and liberties.
executive branch - in violation of his constitutional duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed"
- he can be impeached, convicted, and removed from office for "high Crimes and Misdemeanors," and then
prosecuted criminally, not only under the laws of the United States proper but also for "Offences against
the Law of Nations" that Congress has "define[d]." That the status of commander in chief is explicitly
delegated establishes that it is not inherent in "The executive Power." Had it not been delegated, the
president could not claim it. Moreover, the president is not commander in chief of the country as a whole -
akin to some Führer or Duce - or even of the General Government. In the words of the Constitution, he is
merely "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several
This narrow specification of
States, when called into the actual Service of the United States."
authority proves how little power the president can exercise. Here, one must
contrast the executive power the king of Great Britain exercised in the late 1700s. As Sir William
Blackstone explained in his Commentaries on the Laws of England, the king enjoyed "the sole prerogative
of making war and peace"; acted "as the generalissimo, or the first in military command, within the
kingdom"; and exercised "the sole power of raising and regulating fleets and armies" and "the sole
supreme government and command of the militia."
The Constitution, however, denies the
president all of this authority, except the office of commander in chief,
assigning it instead to Congress.
WASHINGTON -- President Bush should stop issuing statements claiming the power to bypass parts of laws
he has signed, an American Bar Association task force has unanimously concluded in a strongly worded
32-page report that is scheduled to be released today. The bipartisan panel of legal specialists includes a
former FBI director, a former federal appeals court chief judge, former Republican officials, and leading
scholars. The panel said presidents do not have the authority to declare that
sections of the bills they sign are unconstitutional, and that they thus need
not be enforced as Congress wrote them. Bush has used these so-called
signing statements to challenge more than 750 laws that have been enacted
since he took office, more than all previous presidents combined.`` The
president's constitutional duty is to enforce laws he has signed into being,
unless and until they are held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court," the report said. ``The
Constitution is not what the president says it is." The task force will present its findings
next month in Hawaii at a meeting of the bar group's 550-member House of Delegates. The delegates will
vote on whether to adopt the recommendations. The task force chairman and a former federal
prosecutor, Neal Sonnett , said he hoped the House of Delegates would back the
panel's call to roll back the use of presidential signing statements.`` The
recommendations that we make are an effort to correct practices that, if they continue, threaten to throw
this country into a constitutional crisis," Sonnett said. ``Most of the members of the House of Delegates
are very concerned about upholding the rule of law. That is, after all, the mission of the ABA. So I'm
hopeful that we will get a resounding show of support." The ABA's board of governors created the task
force in June, at the request of the bar group's president, Michael Greco, a Boston lawyer. The move
followed the publication of a series of articles in The Boston Globe about Bush's expanded use of signing
statements. Citing an expansive theory of executive power that is not supported by most legal scholars,
the administration has declared that the Constitution puts Bush beyond the reach of Congress in military
matters and executive branch operations.The laws Bush has challenged include a ban on torturing
detainees, oversight provisions in the USA Patriot Act, restrictions against using US troops in combat
against rebels in Colombia, and numerous requirements to provide information to Congress, among many
others. At the same time, Bush has vetoed just one bill since he took office. In its report, the task force
acknowledged that its work had been prompted by ``the number and nature of the current president's
signing statements," but it emphasized that its criticism was ``not intended to be, and should not be
viewed as, an attack on President George W. Bush." The panel noted that especially since the 1980s,
previous presidents of both parties had also used signing statements to challenge laws, albeit less
frequently. President Clinton, for example, used signing statements to challenge 140 laws over his eight
years in office. The task force characterized all such statements as inappropriate.`` Our
recommendations . . . are directed not just at the sitting president, but at all
chief executives who will follow him, and they are intended to underscore the
importance of the doctrine of separation of powers," the panel wrote. Last month at a
Senate Judiciary Committee hearing, an administration lawyer, Michelle Boardman,
defended the use of presidential signing statements. Boardman argued that
the president was showing respect to Congress by using signing statements, because
a veto would take out the entire bill. But the task force said a president does
not have that option. The Constitution requires the president either to veto a
bill in its entirety -- giving Congress a chance to override his decision -- or to
sign the bill and enforce all its components as Congress wrote them, they
said.``A line-item veto is not a constitutionally permissible alternative, even when the president believes
that some provisions of a bill are unconstitutional. . . . A president could easily contrive a constitutional
excuse to decline enforcement of any law he deplored, and transform his qualified veto into a monarch-like
absolute veto," the panel wrote. At the hearing last month, Boardman also argued that presidents must
use signing statements, because it is often impractical to veto an entire bill over small constitutional
problems if the bill contains other measures that the executive branch deems are urgently needed. The
ABA task force, however, said that the Constitution's limits on presidential power trump such pragmatic
considerations.`` The Founding Fathers contemplated bills with both attractive and unattractive features
packaged in one bill with heterogeneous provisions," the panel wrote. ``The president nonetheless was
expected to veto `urgent' bills that he believed were unconstitutional in part.`` If the urgency were
genuine, Congress could either delete the offending provisions or override the president," the panel wrote
in its report. If Congress and the White House cannot reach an agreement on the signing statements, the
task force added, both sides should take steps to put the issue before a court for review. The report urged
Congress to pass legislation giving it standing to sue a president over such signing statements. The idea of
legislation allowing Congress to sue the White House over signing statements has also been floated by the
Arlen Specter, Republican of Pennsylvania, who has
Senate Judiciary Committee chairman,
accused Bush of ``a very blatant encroachment" on the constitutional
prerogative of Congress to write laws.
The more determinedly a president seeks power, the more he contributes to the energy of government. In
Congress and the agencies and in the national parties, energy is generated
by support or opposition. But first there must be something to support or to
oppose. Most Washingtonians look to the White House for it. There often is no
other place to look. Not just any initiatives are acceptable. A president's fortunes depend on the
"viability" of the initiatives launched, and thus in Neustadt's view presidential ambitions converge with
sound policy, with both shaped by the president's unique place as the only officer with a national
constituency. The things a president must think about if he would build his influence are not unlike those
bearing on the viability of public policy. The very breadth and sweep of his
constituencies and of their calls upon him, along with the uncertainty of their
response, will make him keen to see and weigh [the] balance of political,
managerial, psychological and personal feasibilities. And because the president's own
frame of reference is at once so all-encompassing and so political, what he sees as a balance for himself is
likely to be close to what is viable in terms of public policy
legislate it away, if there are more than 2/3rds of the members of Congress
who agree.
However, there are important issues regarding the delegation of the standard setting function as well.
Under the predominant model for use of private accreditors in government
health insurance programs, such as the Medicare program, the standards of
private accreditors can serve only as the basis of the Medicare program's
quality definition and assurance function if they track the Medicare
Conditions of Participation.'63 For example, as discussed above, HCFA deferred recognition of
two private accreditors for home health agencies after Congress changed the conditions of
participation for home health agencies, because the standards of the private
accreditors needed revision to comport with the revised federal standards.'64
Thus, even though the Medicare statute ostensibly encourages the use of private accreditation to define
quality, the pressure on private accreditors to be recognized by the Medicare program results in a
convergence of the standards of private accreditors with the Medicare Conditions of Participation. This
phenomenon is unfortunate. According accrediting bodies the imprimatur of
government approval when their standards conform to govern- ment
standards for government health insurance programs has a potentially
undesirable impact on the development of new quality standards and
measures. It is significant that the JCAHO, the predominant accreditor for health care institutions, has
really not been the leader in developing quality standards for any health care institution. Indeed, the two
major quality assurance movements of the last twenty years, the emphasis on outcomes as the definitive
feature of quality165 and the total quality management movement,66 developed first within health
institutions and the health services research community. Only later, and then only in response to pressure
from these constituencies, did JCAHO standards incorporate these innovative developments into quality
assurance in the health care field.167 Now the JCAHO sees outcomes and other similar clinical indicators
as crucial components of quality assurance that serve to meet the public accountability needs of health
care institutions:
consumers. Specifically, due process protections are really only available to parties challenging the
compliance determination function of an accrediting body, an adjudicative activity, and not the standard
Generally, individuals have greater rights to
setting function, a legislative activity.
protection under due process when government or its delegates are
adjudicating rights and responsibilities under existing laws and policy than when
government and its delegates are engaged in the legislative function of policymaking. The Supreme Court
has been quite emphatic in its declaration that legislative decisions do not warrant the provision of an
individual process for those who would challenge the decision.
While top Republican leaders say government cannot run a health care system a well as private sector
businesses, we have decades of evidence that governments in other countries
are running their health care systems more effectively than the combined
governments and private sector businesses management pattern in our
country. American private sector businesses failed badly in recent years in
managing the real estate market, banking, hedge fund investments,
automobile manufacturing and marketing, high tech corporations, utilities
distribution and insurance businesses. Why should we buy the old saw that private industry
can manage health care better than governments?
Generic Solvency
[ ] Non-governmental legal aid groups cannot solve
Laura MacCleery, 06-16-09 (NYU Press, “A Legal Practice Well Worth
Doing” http://www.brennancenter.org/blog/category/civil_legal_aid/)
The decline in interest rates undercuts the interest earned on a key kind of
account maintained by lawyers, called the Interest on Lawyers Trust Accounts (IOLTA), a major source of
funding for legal aid organizations. Cash-strapped legal aid groups may be
fielding more demands than ever, yet find themselves less able to provide
services than they were even just last year. And it is no secret that, even in flush times,
the best efforts of these groups barely scratch the surface of the legal needs of poor communities and
families. While the victims of Bernie Madoff will almost certainly have their day in court, it's clear that for
many victims of mortgage fraud and predatory lending schemes, workplace harassment, landlord-tenant
disputes, credit problems, or those grappling with mental illness, securing a lawyer with the
time and inclination to properly address their needs remains a pipedream.
After losing many of the struggles to enshrine social entitlements that were
part of the so-called "War on Poverty," immediate goals for legal practitioners
did - and had to - rise to the forefront as part of a far more piecemeal
approach to legal practice.Particularly against the current legal backdrop of
largely conservative courts, as well as federal funding restrictions that prohibit
many legal aid lawyers from bringing class actions and other important types of cases, it became
more crucial for legal services and community-based lawyers to ensure that
their work did not re-victimize poor clients as those clients sought
justice.Scores of law review articles were published as part of what Shdaimah calls the
"progressive lawyering" approach, which encouraged legal services lawyers to use
opportunities to listen more closely to clients, to maximize client autonomy and lawyer-
client collaboration, and to gain self-awareness about the limitations of lawyerly expertise in telling
client stories. The obvious class divisions among lawyers and poor clients were also highlighted.As a
conversation, it revealed a clear need for community-based and more holistic, inclusive approaches to the
practice of law that included access to non-legal help as well as self-help, and
justified organizations' attempts to transcend a narrowly legal approach by grappling with at least some
other negative pressures in clients' lives.Most
of these insights are now accepted widely
by legal services lawyers. They are an important aspect of both aspirations
and achievements of legal services organizations, including such local, multi-
dimensional organizations such as Make the Road by Walking or The Neighborhood Defender
Service of Harlem.
The role of state power in maintaining institutional control and this important
relationship with legitimacy emphasized by Stinchcombe (1968) have received little
attention from organizational scholars. In large part this is because studies of institutions
previously have been carried out in contexts with stable institutional structures and where state autonomy
to control critical sectors of society is rarely challenged (Simons and Ingram 2003). In these settings,
states seek to maintain institutional control primarily through securing
legitimacy. When we study contexts with less stable institutional environments, such as postcolonial
states, we see a much greater role for the use of state power in the
maintenance of institutional control. These contexts provide an opportunity to learn more about
the state’s use of coercive strategies to maintain institutional patterns of control and authority when
directly challenged by organizations attempting to disrupt existing institutions such as constitutions, laws,
and property rights (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006; North 1990). These settings also allow researchers to
direct attention to those challenging powerful states and attempting to limit the use of state coercion and
power. The use of power and coercive actions represent important and
The book also prompts questions about the continued success of the Canadian model. Bloemraad
observes, for example, that government funding has been significantly cut back in recent years, and as a
result, relations between government agencies and community organizations in Canada are increasingly
strained. One might also ask whether the more bureaucratic Canadian model risks
undermining the cultural vitality of ethnic groups as it increases their political participation.
Canadian multicultural policies might also risk reifying ethnic and racial identities and hardening divisions
that in practice, a more
in society. The author acknowledges such concerns but contends
benign and fluid dynamic develops. Specifically, immigrants are provided
resources to shoulder some of the responsibility for their own integration, and
just as important, are seen to be doing so. In addition, Canadians’ broad support for
public institutions (such as schools), as well as for health and welfare
benefits, makes it easier for immigrants to become integrated as full citizens.
Solvency Natives
[ ] Empirically proven- Congress can solve for Native health
services
M.T. Allison et al. 2007 (Native American Liaison, Arizona Department
of Health Services, “Future public health delivery models for Native
American tribes” The Royal Institute of Public Health)
In 1975, the US Congress passed P.L. (public law) 93-638, the Indian Self-Determination
and Education Assistance Act. Among other provisions, this act allowed the contracting of IHS
and Bureau of Indian Affairs functions by federally recognized Native
American tribes and tribal organizations. Since the passage of this act, Native American
tribes and tribal organizations have contracted a majority of the IHS functions and facilities, with
approximately 44% of the existing IHS budget now being contracted to tribes and tribal organizations. In
1997, a study conducted by the National Indian Health Board (a national Native American health care
advocacy entity) showed that a majority of the Native American tribes receiving their
health care from tribally contracted entities rated their health care as now
being better than it was under direct IHS management. Moreover, as Table 3
indicates, 74% of the total health care facilities are tribally operated. The IHS program is
delivered to a service population of 1.4 million American Indians/Alaska
Natives through 155 service units composed of 594 direct health care
delivery facilities, including 49 hospitals, 231 health centers, five school
health centers, and 309 health stations, satellite clinics, and Alaska village
clinics. The range of services includes traditional inpatient and ambulatory
care and preventive activities. In addition, the IHS is responsible for environmental health on
reservations including health facilities management, health facilities construction, and sanitation system
construction and maintenance.
Solvency Broadband
[ ] Congress has the power to provide broadband service to
those in poverty
S. Derek Turner, August 2006 (Research Director, Free Press ,
“Broadband Reality Check : The Truth Behind America’s Digital
Decline”)
The 1950s and 1980s featured statutory and constitutional conflict between
the Court and Congress. In general, Congress and the Court had different
ideological positions on many issues, including government actions against
persons accused of subversive activities and the scope of civil rights laws.
Congress established an institutional voice that regularly reversed Supreme
Court decisions. To give examples, in the late 1950s Congress authorized a more conservative
interpretation of suspected individuals' rights against government investigations. The Supreme
Court recognized this interpretation's stability and certainty by reversing
some of its earlier rulings and restoring investigative power to Congress. In the
1980s, Congress, which opposed conservative Court decisions narrowing the
scope of civil rights and liberties, passed legislation to broaden civil rights
protections, especially those of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. For example, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 established that programs receiving federal funds could not discriminate based on race or national
origin and that federal funding could be terminated if the programs discriminated. In Grove City College v.
Bell the Court, agreeing with the Reagan Administration, narrowed the statute's application to specific
programs only, not the entire institution, in a case technically involving Title IX of the Federal Education
Congress's
Act of 1972. Congress overturned this ruling in the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987.
willingness to rewrite legislation that has been overturned by the Supreme
Court has been limited by divisions within Congress and the constitutional or
legislative interpretations of key committee members. Canon and Johnson argue that
the Court can make lasting policy interpretations more easily when Congress has sharply divided policy
preferences. But when there are solid coalitions opposing the Court in Congress, Congress can enforce its
preferences against the Court's.
AT: Perm
[ ] Congress solves best alone, the perm makes clash
inevitable
Bruce Fein, 9-18-07 (Constitutional Lawyer and Chairman of the
American Freedom Agenda, "Strengthening Congress?" The
Washington Times)
But perhaps the court shouldn't be in such a powerful position at all. Adrian
Vermeule, a rising-star professor at Harvard Law School with a deep family legacy in
Boston intellectual circles, says this entire conception of the Supreme Court - nine
wise and isolated elders fighting over when and whether to overrule Congress - is
hopelessly flawed. It promises only perpetual rancor and inconsistency, he
argues: the bane of good law. The court, he concludes, should stay out of
controversial matters of politics and law almost entirely, deferring - except in
painfully obvious cases - to the wisdom of elected representatives in
Congress.
***Presidential Powers***
the control and individual acts of a certain president or party in power at any given time. As Marcy
Wheeler notes [8], the co-sponsors of this bill are among the most influential in the Senate. The bill is
endowed with the two most precious Beltway commodities -- bipartisanship (with Specter on board) and
the blessing of a saintly "centrist" (McCaskill). It's a bill that is co-sponsored by the two leading Senators
on the Senate Judiciary Committee as well as the Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee (Conyers). If
they are serious about imposing meaningful limits on the Obama DOJ's attempt to shield the executive
branch from judicial scrutiny, they will be able to move this bill quickly. I hope to have more shortly on
ways to push that process along, but more vital even than limits on this privilege is having a Congress that
once again acts as a meaningful check on executive transgressions. Restoration of that system is of far
more enduring value than Obama's issuance of magnanimous and irrevocable-on-a-whim decrees.
Of course, neither fair deliberation nor even the more general hobbling of government’s tyrannical
the Framers’ sole objective. First and foremost, they wanted a
impulses, was
government that would work and that would work effectively to advance the
“permanent and aggregate interests of the community” in both domestic and
international affairs. From that standpoint, any government of separated
powers poses obvious difficulties. Because a monarchy revolves around a single source of
authority that embodies the sovereign power of the state, it can act quickly on behalf of the nation. This is
not so for America. In the United States, it is the people who are sovereign, and there is no one source of
official authority that is charged with acting unilaterally on their behalf. The
Framers thus gave
us a form of institutional interdependence that helps to check tyranny and that
orients the system toward consensus, but at a price. Their system inevitably entails delays in decision
Norms or habits of institutional cooperation are
making and a bias in favor of gradualism.
essential to enable a government of this kind—a government of separated
powers—to achieve its multiple potential virtues. It is not merely foreseeable,
but intended, that the three branches of government experience tension and
competition. Friction, to some extent, is a sign of the system at work. But life
cannot be all friction. As the British Prime Minister Lord John Russell famously put the point: “Every political
constitution in which different bodies share the supreme power is only enabled to exist by the forbearance
of those among whom this power is distributed.”A system of separated powers, in other
words, works only if every branch is committed to effective governance and
is willing to hold back from deploying its powers to their extreme theoretical
limits. In a separation of powers system designed to embody checks and balances, where powers are
allocated to each branch precisely with the purpose of rendering each branch vulnerable to the discretion
of the others, some degree of institutional self-restraint is imperative. To put this point another way, no
paper plan for the operation of government can ever be sufficient in and of
itself to guarantee the responsible exercise of power, even if it is a plan built
on thoughtfully designed checks and balances. A paper plan for government can operate
in vastly different ways depending on its participants’ commitment to the values that animate that plan
and their allegiance to those values in the form of norms or implicit, but widely recognized, rules and
customs.
Generic Link
[ ] Unilateral executive action expands presidential power
Kenneth Mayer, 2001: [Kenneth Mayer, professor of political science at
the University of Wisconsin, “With the Stroke of a Pen.” 2001, pg. 56. ]
analyses of the president’s constitutional power rely on
Much of the time,
historical evidence of how individual presidents viewed that power and how
they put it into practice. Practice matters because of the importance of
precedent to the expansion of presidential power, because the parameters of
presidential authority have often been shaped by case-by-case judicial review, and because presidents
have used their authority (often through executive orders_) in order to shape
institutional patterns and processes that in turn enhance their ability to
exercise administrative control. Each time a president relies on executive prerogative to take
some type of action, it makes it easier for a future president to take the same (or similar) action. “The
boundaries between the three branches of government are…strongly affected of custom or acquiescence.
When one branch engages in a certain practice and the other branches
acquiesce, the practice gains legitimacy and can fix the meaning of the
Constitution.
Abuses of power occurred, however, when the Nixon administration attempted to remove civil servants or
to deploy them to remote locations. Later, though, Ronald Reagan was able to use newly emerging powers
emanating from Jimmy Carter-era civil service reform legislation to transfer career employees to less
amenable locations, which forced them to resign if they wished not to relocate. These steps, taken during
the Reagan administration, while politically controversial, were nonetheless legal, and the results often
advanced the policy interests of the president. While controversial and maybe even undesirable, these
personnel actions were legally permissible and fell within the ambit of executive authority delegated by
the Civil Service Reform Act. A different idea, however, arose in the form of the
unitary executive theory. It posits that the president has sole responsibility
for the control and maintenance of the executive branch, further extending
the debate on the scope of the president's removal power (Calabresi and Yoo 1997,
2003; Fitts 1996). Proponents of the theory have sought to repudiate the Supreme Court's decision in
Humphrey's Executor v. United States (1935), which prohibits presidents from removing officials, such as
the commissioners of the independent regulatory commissions, from office for political reasons. The
unitary executive theory proclaims the president to be the sole responsible
official for all that occurs within the executive branch. In consequence, all of
the executive branch must be responsible to its chief executive. This new
theory of presidential leadership, propounded in some conservative legal
circles (the Federalist Society) and regularly cited by the George W. Bush
administration in signing statements, has been presented as a legal
justification for more expansive presidential power. In particular, it has increased the
traditional authority presidents have employed since Nixon's presidency with regard to the administrative
presidency strategy. It raises serious legal questions about the boundaries of presidential power and
Congress's ability to limit presidential discretion. By asserting that Congress does not have the right to
enact laws that limit the president's powers as chief executive or commander in chief, the unitary
presidency provides presidents with broad unchecked power in the personnel removal area. This is but one
way in which the unitary executive theory changes what, to date, has been a practice based on accepted
constitutional premises. Another component of the administrative presidency approach is the use of the
budget to control agencies. Presidents are on solid constitutional ground when they do so in consort with
Congress by approving new spending limits in congressionally enacted legislation. Presidents also can and
have aggressively used the provisions of the Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974 to defer or rescind
spending. While the 1974 law outlawed impoundments - whereby a president refuses to spend
congressionally allocated funds without congressional permission - it also created the deferral and
rescission process, which provides presidents with extraordinary flexibility to control bureaucratic
spending, particularly when the president and Congress are in the hands of the same political party. The
Reagan administration flooded Congress with such requests. It also used the same law's reconciliation
process to force Congress to accept budget reductions the administration favored. Thus, presidents have a
series of constitutionally and legally prescribed ways to control spending on bureaucratic agencies. The
unitary executive theory and other instruments of unilateral power further
expand the realm of presidential power. In his extravagant use of signing
statements, for example, George W. Bush unilaterally created what
essentially amounted to a line-item veto. This allowed the president to sign a
particular bill and then quietly, in a signing statement that generally received
less public scrutiny, assert that the president would ignore certain provisions
of the bill with which he disagreed. This mechanism provides yet another
means of skirting the constitutional structure and avoids the perils of
governing in a world of separated powers. If a president does not like a bill's provision,
rather than withhold funding, presidents can merely assert that they will not enforce the law, a dubious
claim given the mandate of their oath of office and their duty to "take care" that laws are faithfully
executed. Although much time and effort has been focused on the constitutional mechanisms at the
president's disposal, to date, less attention has been paid to the implications of this new and expansive
theory of presidential power. What, then, are the implications of the greater use of unilateral power and
the unitary executive theory for the administrative presidency?
Though Bush has gone further than any previous president, his actions are
not unprecedented. Since the early 19th century, American presidents have
occasionally signed a large bill while declaring that they would not enforce a
specific provision they believed was unconstitutional. On rare occasions, historians say,
presidents also issued signing statements interpreting a law and explaining any concerns about it. But it
was not until the mid-1980s, midway through the tenure of President Reagan, that it
became common for the president to issue signing statements. The change
came about after then-Attorney General Edwin Meese decided that signing
statements could be used to increase the power of the president. When
interpreting an ambiguous law, courts often look at the statute's legislative history, debate
and testimony, to see what Congress intended it to mean. Meese realized
that recording what the president thought the law meant in a signing
statement might increase a president's influence over future court rulings.
Under Meese's direction in 1986, a young Justice Department lawyer named Samuel A. Alito Jr. wrote a
strategy memo about signing statements. It came to light in late 2005, after Bush named Alito to the
Supreme Court. In the memo, Alito predicted that Congress would resent the president's attempt to grab
some of its power by seizing ''the last word on questions of interpretation." He suggested that Reagan's
legal team should ''concentrate on points of true ambiguity, rather than issuing interpretations that may
seem to conflict with those of Congress." Reagan's successors continued this practice. George H.W. Bush
challenged 232 statutes over four years in office, and Bill Clinton objected to 140 laws over his eight years,
according to Kelley, the Miami University of Ohio professor. Many of the challenges involved longstanding
legal ambiguities and points of conflict between the president and Congress. Throughout the past
two decades, for example, each president -- including the current one -- has
objected to provisions requiring him to get permission from a congressional
committee before taking action. The Supreme Court made clear in 1983 that only the full
Congress can direct the executive branch to do things, but lawmakers have continued writing laws giving
congressional committees such a role. Still, Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and Clinton used the presidential
veto instead of the signing statement if they had a serious problem with a bill, giving Congress a chance to
override their decisions. But the current President Bush has abandoned the veto entirely, as well as any
semblance of the political caution that Alito counseled back in 1986. In just five years, Bush has challenged
more than 750 new laws, by far a record for any president, while becoming the first president since
Thomas Jefferson to stay so long in office without issuing a veto. ''What we haven't seen until this
administration is the sheer number of objections that are being raised on every bill passed through the
White House," said Kelley, who has studied presidential signing statements through history. ''That is what
is staggering. The numbers are well out of the norm from any previous administration."
Such political fallout from Congress is likely to be the only check on Bush's
claims, legal specialists said. The courts have little chance of reviewing
Bush's assertions, especially in the secret realm of national security
matters.''There can't be judicial review if nobody knows about it," said Neil Kinkopf, a Georgia State law
professor who was a Justice Department official in the Clinton administration. ''And if they avoid
judicial review, they avoid having their constitutional theories rebuked."
Without court involvement, only Congress can check a president who goes
too far. But Bush's fellow Republicans control both chambers, and they have shown limited interest in
launching the kind of oversight that could damage their party. ''The president is daring
Congress to act against his positions, and they're not taking action because
they don't want to appear to be too critical of the president, given that their own fortunes
are tied to his because they are all Republicans," said Jack Beermann, a Boston University law professor.
''Oversight gets much reduced in a situation where the president and Congress are controlled by the same
party." Said Golove, the New York University law professor: ''Bush has essentially said that 'We're the
executive branch and we're going to carry this law out as we please, and if Congress wants to impeach us,
go ahead and try it.' " Bruce Fein, a deputy attorney general in the Reagan administration, said the
American system of government relies upon the leaders of each branch ''to exercise some self-restraint."
But Bush has declared himself the sole judge of his own powers, he said, and then ruled for himself every
time.''This is an attempt by the president to have the final word on his own
constitutional powers, which eliminates the checks and balances that keep
the country a democracy," Fein said. ''There is no way for an independent
judiciary to check his assertions of power, and Congress isn't doing it, either.
So this is moving us toward an unlimited executive power."
Greco said that the task force’s report “constructively offers procedures that consider the prerogatives
both of the president and of the Congress, while protecting the public’s right to know what legislation is
adopted by Congress and if and how the president intends to enforce it. This transparency is essential if
the American people are to have confidence that the rule of law is being respected by both citizens and
government leaders.” The bipartisan and independent task force is chaired by Miami lawyer Neal Sonnett,
a former Assistant U.S. Attorney and Chief of the Criminal Division for the Southern District of Florida. He is
past chair of the ABA Criminal Justice Section, chair of the ABA Task Force on Domestic Surveillance and
the ABA Task Force on Treatment of Enemy Combatants; and president-elect of the American Judicature
"Abuse of presidential signing statements poses a threat to the rule of
Society.
law," said Sonnett. "Whenever actions threaten to weaken our system of
checks and balances and the separation of powers, the American Bar
Association has a profound responsibility to speak out forcefully to protect
those lynchpins of democracy."
A panel of the American Bar Association struck a blow for democracy and the
rule of law July 23 when it came out strongly against President George W.
Bush’s use of “signing statements” to nullify laws passed by Congress, legal
experts said this week. These signing statements, issued when Bush signs a
statute into law, “assert Bush’s authority to disregard or decline to enforce
laws adopted by Congress,” an ABA blue-ribbon task force report states.
These sweeping claims of unilateral presidential power “undermine the rule
of law and our constitutional system of separation of powers,” the report adds.
Michael S. Greco, president of the ABA, said the task force’s creation was prompted by a news article in
the Boston Globe that exposed Bush’s practice of using signing statements to nullify part or all of a law he
disagrees with instead of vetoing it. Bush’s veto last week of the stem cell research bill was the first of his
presidency. “This report raises serious concerns crucial to the survival of our
democracy,” Greco said. “If left unchecked, the president’s practice does
grave harm to the separation of powers doctrine and the system of checks
and balances that have sustained our democracy for more than two
centuries.” He added, “Immediate action is required to address this threat to
the Constitution and to the rule of law in our country.” The report will be submitted to
the ABA’s upcoming convention in Hawaii. Bush has used signing statements at least 800 times, more than
all his predecessors combined. From the dawn of uthe Republic, presidents have understood, in the words
of George Washington, a president must “approve all the parts of a bill or reject it” with a veto. However,
in the words of Senate Judiciary Chairman Arlen Specter (R-Pa.), Bush seems to think he can “cherry-pick
the provisions he likes and exclude the ones he doesn’t like.” The report is especially
noteworthy because the task force includes several conservatives, including
Bruce Fein, a Justice Department official in the Reagan administration, and
former FBI Director William Sessions. It was chaired by Miami lawyer Neal
Sonnett, who said, “Abuse of presidential signing statements poses a threat
to the rule of law.” Sonnett continued, “The American Bar Association has a
profound responsibility to speak out forcefully to protect these linchpins of
democracy.” Marjorie Cohn, president-elect of the National Lawyers Guild, told the World in an e-mail
message that two of Bush’s signing statements stand out as especially dangerous: “his statements of
intent not to follow the McCain ‘anti-torture’ amendment” and a signing statement in which
he vowed “not to report to Congress the use of the Patriot Act to secretly
search homes and seize private papers.” Sen. John McCain’s anti-torture
amendment was approved by a 90-9 Senate vote, yet Bush proclaimed in the
signing statement that he would “construe” the law to permit him to continue
to authorize torture in violation of U.S. and international law. Cohn added,
“Bush’s use of signing statements represents a potent threat to the doctrine
of separation of powers.” She pointed out that even Sen. Specter, a Bush loyalist, favors
legislation requiring the president to submit all signing statements to Congress for review and also to
make signing statements subject to judicial review. “This would represent a clear break with Specter’s
prior tendencies to submit to Bush’s will,” she wrote. Anthony Romero, executive director of the American
Civil Liberties Union, said the ACLU opposed Bush’s nomination of Judge Samuel Alito to the Supreme Court
because Alito was an adherent of the so-called “unitary executive theory” and urged an “aggressive
expansion” of presidential powers, including “increased use of presidential signing statements … in order
to trump congressional intent and legislative history.” Alito recommended use of signing statements, in his
own words, “to increase the power of the executive to shape the law.”Romero said, “This claim of
Imagine this scenario: after a series of bombings in New York, the President
directs U.S. armed forces to round up Arab American males over the age of
fifteen in the New York metropolitan area and confine them in a sports
stadium; those who military officers determine pose no continuing threat to
domestic security are released back to their communities, a process that
predictably will lead to some detentions lasting a month and more. (1) The
discussion by Professors Bradley and Goldsmith of the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (2)
(AUMF) adopted on September 18, 2001, (3) raises the intriguing question: would such action be
authorized by the AUMF already in place? (4) This Reply addresses only a few aspects of the problems
Professors Bradley and Goldsmith consider, in an attempt to draw out some of the more general
implications of their analysis for constitutional law. How does--or should--the
U.S. Constitution
regulate the exercise of power in response to threats to national security, to
ensure that power is used wisely? (5) Broadly speaking, two mechanisms of control are
available: a separation-of-powers mechanism and a judicial-review mechanism. (6) Both
mechanisms aim to ensure that the national government exercises its power
responsibly--with sufficient vigor to meet the nation's challenges, but without
intruding on protected liberties. (7) Under the separation-of-powers
mechanism, nearly all of the work of regulating power is done by the principle
that the President can do only what Congress authorizes. (8) Its primary
concern is what Professors Bradley and Goldsmith call Executive Branch
unilateralism, a fear that Presidents acting on their own might make unsound
decisions, engaging in too much (or too little) military action, intruding on
liberties too much (or too little). Under the judicial-review mechanism, courts enforce two sets
Other presidentialist legal thinkers, including advocates for presidentialism under Democratic
Administrations,have argued that presidentialism is such good governmental
practice that either we should read the Constitution in a more modern vein in
order to mandate presidentialism or we should welcome practices of legislative and judicial
deference to the President that allow government to behave in a presidentialist fashion. The historical
record, however, does not bear out the claims for presidentialism as good
practice. If we look at the functioning of our national executive when
behaving most consistently with the tenets of presidentialism, we frequently
find that the assumption of unilateral presidential authority prompts a
narrowness in consultation, and a defensiveness and rigidity in outlook, that
degrade the quality of executive decision making. Furthermore, as might have been
predicted, presidentialism operates as an ethos of government in a way that
undermines other critical values, such as allegiance to the rule of law and
respect for coequal branches and divergent political outlooks. As discussed in
chapters 4 and 5, the results, made dramatically manifest in the “Bush 43” Administration, have included
dangerously irresponsible government lawyering and a fetishizing of presidential prerogative in ways that
defy common sense and the public interest. When presidentialist practice is analyzed
clearly, it seems to rest on ideas about democracy and the rule of law that
are unattractive and deeply unpersuasive. Of course, the nation sometimes
benefits from unilateral presidential action—Washington’s proclamation of neutrality,
Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation, and the resolution of the Cuban missile crisis are but three
celebrated examples of the many undoubtedly available. But the realization of these benefits
does not require anything like the wholesale adoption of aggressive
presidentialism, either as constitutional theory or prevailing government practice. In all but the most
exceptional circumstances, searching congressional oversight, robust presidential accountability to the
rule of law, and a pluralist approach to policy development within the executive branch are all consistent
with the level of executive branch energy we need in order to thrive as a nation. The ambitions of
the unilateral presidency cannot be squared with either the presidency
envisioned by our Constitution or contemporary needs. Its proponents may argue that
the historical conception ought to be replaced with a new unilateral presidency because a more
autonomous, less fettered presidency actually works better in the national interest than does a presidency
subject to strong checks and balances. But time and time again, it has become evident that
Presidents, left relatively unchecked by dialogue with and accountability to
the other two branches, behave disastrously. The new unilateral presidency is
thus not appealing either as constitutional interpretation or as good
institutional design. To put the point another way, the Framers got this right. It is now critical
to restore checks and balances to robust health and reinvigorate American
democracy so that no narrow faction of the American polity can dominate policy making throughout all
Even if President Bush was a noble defender of freedom, the authority that he
claims to be able to ignore the law, if allowed to stand, would constitute a
dangerous precedent that future presidents might use to abuse their power.
Joel Aberbach points out that “In the end, this is not a partisan issue, for someday the
Democrats will have unified control, and even that somewhat-less-disciplined
party might countenance a government of the type Bush and Cheney have
apparently structured.”56Madison argues in Federalist No. 10, “Enlightened statesmen will not
always be at the helm.” Thinking constitutionally means looking ahead and realizing that future executives
Claims to power ratchet up; they
will likely claim the same authority as their predecessors.
do not swing like a pendulum unless the other two branches protect their own
constitutional authorities. The rule of law is fundamental to a free society and
to democracy, because neither can exist without it. As Thomas Paine argued in Common Sense, “in
America THE LAW IS KING. For as in absolute governments the King is law. . .” (emphasis in original).James
“The accumulation of all powers, legislative,
Madison put it this way in Federalist 47:
executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many,
and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced
the very definition of tyranny.” In each of the above cases of claims to constitutional authority
President Bush was asserting that he alone could exercise the authority of each of the three branches.
President Bush was undermining the rule of law itself by claiming the
authority to ignore those parts of the law that he claimed impinged on his
own prerogatives and refusing to accept the legitimacy of either Congress or
the Courts to limit his authority. The president should have enough power to
accomplish reasonable policy goals, but not enough to override the other two
branches unilaterally, acting merely on the basis of his own judgment. In these cases of
extraordinary claims to executive authority, President Bush was claiming that the checks and balances in
Law and courts exist to protect every citizen of the United States in his person and property
and in his individual rights and privileges under the Constitution. The ultimate power to change or expand
the law in our system remains with its source, the people. They can elect as lawmakers those who will vote
for wise laws and vote out of office those who do not. They can also amend the Constitution as experience
dictates the necessity of change. In these days of soul-searching and re-evaluation and inventorying of
basic concepts and principles brought on by the expansion of man’s vision to the new frontiers and
horizons of outer space, we want the people of the world to know that we in America have an unshakable
belief in the most essential ingredient of our way of life—the rule of law. The law we honor is the basis
and foundation of our nation’s freedom and the freedom for the individual which exists here. And
to Americans our freedom is more important than our very lives.The rule of law has been the
bulwark of our democracy. It has afforded protection to the weak, the oppressed, the
minorities, the unpopular; it has made it possible to achieve responsiveness of the government to the
will of people. It stands as the very antithesis of Communism and dictatorship. When we talk about
“justice” under our rule of law, the absence of such justice behind the Iron Curtain is apparent to all. When
we talk about “freedom” for the individual, Hungary is recalled to the minds of all men. And when we talk
about peace under law—peace without the bloodbath of war—we are appealing to the foremost desire of
all peoples everywhere. The tremendous yearning of all peoples for peace can only be
answered by the use of law to replace weapons in resolving international
disputes. We in our country sincerely believe that mankind’s best hope for preventing the tragic
consequences of nuclear-satellite-missile warfare is to persuade the nations of the entire world to submit
all disputes to tribunals of justice for all adjudication under the rule of law. We lawyers of America would
like to join lawyers from every nation in the world in fashioning an international code of law so appealing
that sentiment will compel its general acceptance. Man’s relation to man is the most neglected field of
study, exploration and development in the world community. It is also the most critical. The most
important basic fact of our generation is that the rapid advance of knowledge in science and technology
has forced increased international relationships in a shrunken and indivisible world. Men must either live
together in peace or in modern war we will surely die together. History teaches that the
rule of law has enabled mankind to live together peacefully within nations and it is clear that this same
rule of law offers our best hope as a mechanism to achieve and maintain peace between
nations. The lawyer is the technician in man’s relationship to man. There exists a worldwide challenge to
our profession to develop law to replace weapons before the dreadful holocaust of nuclear
war overtake our people.
application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the states, and the proposal must be ratified by the
legislatures or conventions of three-fourths of the states. Despite the difficulty, the Constitution has been
amended twenty-six times. Amendment can be done when a problem is so important that it arouses the
attention and concern of a preponderant majority of the American people. But the people must be made
aware of the problem. It is hardly necessary to belabor the relative importance of the control of nuclear
warfare. A constitutional amendment may be, indeed, the appropriate method. But the most difficult issue
remains. What should the amendment provide? How can the problem be solved specifically? The
Constitution in section 8 of Article I stipulates that "[t]he Congress shall have power . . . To declare
War. . . ." The idea seems to be that only these many representatives of the people, reflecting the public
will, should possess the power to commit the lives and the fortunes of the nation to warfare. This approach
makes much more sense in a democratic republic than entrusting the decision to one person, even though
he may be designated the "Commander in Chief" of the military forces. His power is to command the war
after the people, through their representatives, have made the basic choice to submit themselves and
their children to war. There is a recurring relevation of a paranoia of power throughout human history that
has impelled one leader after another to draw their people into wars which, in hindsight, were foolish,
unnecessary, and, in some instances, downright insane. Whatever may be the psychological influences
that drive the single decisionmaker to these irrational commitments of the lives and fortunes of others, the
fact remains that the behavior is a predictable one in any government that does not provide an effective
check and balance against uncontrolled power in the hands of one human. We, naturally, like to think that
our leaders are above such irrational behavior. Eventually, however, human nature, with all its weakness,
asserts itself whatever the setting. At least that is the evidence that experience and history give us, even
in our own relatively benign society, where the Executive is subject to the rule of law. [*1640] Vietnam
But the
and other more recent engagements show that it can happen and has happened here.
"nuclear football"--the ominous "black bag" --remains in the sole possession of the
President. And, most important, his decision to launch a nuclear missile
would be, in fact if not in law, a declaration of nuclear war, one which the nation and,
indeed, humanity in general, probably would be unable to survive.
Constitution Impact
[ ] Executive power hurts both our ability to uphold the
constitution and be successful in combating terrorism
Michiko Kakutani, July 6, 2007, – Staff Writer and Pulitzer Prize-winning
critic for the New York Times: [July 6, 2007, “The Case Against Those
Expanding White House Powers,” The New York Times, Section E,
Lexis]
In their chilling and timely book Frederick A. O. Schwarz Jr., senior counsel at the Brennan Center for
Justice at the New York University School of Law, and Aziz Z. Huq, who directs the Liberty and National
Security Project at the Brennan Center, argue that the Bush administration's ''monarchist
claims of
executive power'' are ''unprecedented on this side of the North Atlantic,'' and
that its ''executive unilateralism not only undermines the delicate balance of
our Constitution, but also lessens our human liberties and hurts vital
counterterrorism campaigns'' by undermining America's moral authority and
standing in the world.'' Unchecked and Unbalanced'' contains little new reporting and is heavily
indebted to the groundbreaking work of journalists like Jane Mayer of The New Yorker, James Risen and
Eric Lichtblau of The New York Times, Dana Priest of The Washington Post and Charlie Savage of The
the book serves as a valuable compendium and chronicle of the
Boston Globe. But
Bush administration's aggressive efforts to expand the power of the
executive branch, providing a detailed account of the unilateral actions it has taken on matters
ranging from torture policy to domestic surveillance, and it is necessary reading for anyone interested in
how those efforts by the Bush White House have tipped the constitutional system of checks and balances.
Mr. Schwarz was chief counsel for the Church committee, which investigated executive branch
overreaching in the mid 1970s, and he and Mr. Huq have done a powerful job of situating the actions of
the current White House in perspective with the imperial presidency of Richard M. Nixon (who once
Equally devastating is
declared that ''when the president does it, that means that it is not illegal'').
their deconstruction of Bush administration lawyers' efforts to assert a
doctrine of unfettered presidential prerogative. They remind the reader that the founding
fathers had ''scant affection for strong executives'' like England's king, and they argue that many of the
Bush White House's claims are rooted in ideas ''about the 'divine' right of kings'' that ''did not survive the
English Civil War and the Glorious Revolution of 1688'' and that certainly did not find their ''way into our
founding documents, the 1776 Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of 1787.''Like many
reporters Mr. Huq and Mr. Schwarz point out that expanded
executive power was not a
response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 but the realization of a vision that
conservatives like Dick Cheney had harbored since the 1970s, when they
grew aggrieved over post-Watergate reforms that put the brakes on
presidential power.
who shall reconstruct the fabric of demolished government? Who shall rear
again the wellproportioned columns of constitutional liberty? Who shall frame
together the skilful architecture which united national sovereignty with State rights, individual security,
and public prosperity? No, if these columns fall, they will be raised not again. Like the
Coliseum and the Parthenon, they will be destined to a mournful, a melancholy immortality. Bitterer tears,
however, will flow over them, than were ever shed over the remnants of a more glorious edifice than
It is possible that a
Greece or Rome ever saw, the edifice of constitutional American liberty.
constitutional convention could take place and none of these drastic
consequences would come to pass. It is possible to play Russian roulette and
emerge without a scratch; in fact, with only one bullet in the chamber, the odds of being shot are
only one in six. But when the stakes are as high as one's life, or the constitutional
system that has shaped this nation into what it is today, these odds are too great to take
the risk.
Although briefings were provided to a handful of Congressional leaders, Mr. Schwarz and Mr. Huq report,
those leaders were prohibited from saying anything about them to anyone, including other Intelligence
Committee members, a stipulation that ''gutted the possibility of effective oversight.'' ''Making the
executive supreme makes the nation no safer -- either from its enemies or its
own worse impulses,'' the authors conclude. ''Indeed, the abiding genius of
the Founding Generation was its rejection of the idea that unchecked
unilateral power is ever properly vested in any one branch of government.
Our government was framed 'to control itself,' as James Madison wrote in the Federalist
Papers. 'Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.' Dividing powers between three
branches, the Founders harnessed human passions in the cause of limited government. Madison, again
writing in the Federalist Papers, provided the enduring explanation for this division of government: 'The
accumulation of all power, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same
hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-
appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of
Tyranny Impact
[ ] Tyranny outweighs full scale nuclear war
R.J Rummel, Professor Emeritus of Political Science @ U of Hawaii,
1994 Death by Government
http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/NOTE1.HTM
Power kills, absolute Power kills absolutely. This new Power Principle is the message emerging
from my previous work on the causes of war1 and this book on genocide and government mass murder--
what I call democide--in this century. The more power a government has, the more it
can act arbitrarily according to the whims and desires of the elite, the more it
will make war on others and murder its foreign and domestic subjects. The
more constrained the power of governments, the more it is diffused, checked
and balanced, the less it will aggress on others and commit democide. At the
extremes of Power2, totalitarian communist governments slaughter their people by
the tens of millions, while many democracies can barely bring themselves to
execute even serial murderers. [HE CONTINUES] Consider also that library stacks have
been written on the possible nature and consequences of nuclear war and
how it might be avoided. Yet, in the life of some still living we have
experienced in the toll from democide (and related destruction and misery among the
survivors) the equivalent of a nuclear war, especially at the high near 360,000,000 end of the
estimates. It is as though one had already occurred! Yet to my knowledge, there is only one book dealing
with the overall human cost of this "nuclear war"--Gil Elliot's Twentieth Century Book of the Dead.
Democracy Impact
[ ] Democracy solves war and extinction
Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, October 1995,
“Promoting Democracy in the 1990’s,”
http://www.carnegie.org//sub/pubs/deadly/dia95_01.html, accessed on
12/11/99
OTHER THREATS This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming
years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and
could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime
syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the
institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate.
The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these
new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or
aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for
legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern
themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another.
They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders.
Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations,
and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one
another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic
countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better
They are more environmentally responsible
and more stable climates for investment.
because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction
of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal
obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret.
Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and
the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international
security and prosperity can be built.
agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties,
property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world
order of international security and prosperity can be built.
OUR PRESIDENTIAL ERA Not since Watergate has the question of presidential
power been as salient as it is today. The recent revelation that President George W. Bush
ordered secret wiretaps in the United States without judicial approval has set off the latest round of
arguments over what the president can and cannot do in the name of his office. Over the past few
years, the war on terror has led to the use of executive orders to authorize
renditions and the detention of enemy combatants without trial -- for which the
Bush administration has been called to account by our European allies. The treatment of detainees has
also given rise to concerns in Congress about the prerogatives of the chief executive: both houses recently
voted to limit the president's authority to employ C.I.A. or other executive agents to engage in cruel and
inhumane interrogations. The limits of presidential power will almost surely be a
major topic of discussion during Samuel A. Alito Jr.'s Supreme Court
confirmation hearings, which are scheduled to begin this week. The stakes of the
debate could hardly be higher: nothing is more basic to the operation of a constitutional government than
the way it allocates power. Yet in an important sense, the debate is already long over. By historical
standards, even the Bush administration's critics subscribe to the idea of a pre-eminent president.
Administrative agencies at the president's command are widely understood
to be responsible for everything from disaster relief to drug approval to
imposing clean-air standards; and the president can unleash shock and awe
on his own initiative. Such ''presidentialism'' seems completely normal to most Americans,
since it is the only arrangement most of us have ever known. For better or worse, though, this is not
the system envisioned by the framers of the Constitution. The framers meant for the
legislative branch to be the most important actor in the federal government: Congress was to make the
laws and the president was empowered only to execute them. The very essence of a republic
was that it would be governed through a deliberative legislature, composed
carefully to reflect both popular will and elite limits on that will. The framers would no sooner
have been governed by a democratically elected president than by a king
who got his job through royal succession. The transformation of the United States from a
traditional republic to a democratic nation run in large measure by a single executive took a couple of
hundred years. Constitutional evolution, like its counterpart in the natural world, has occurred sometimes
gradually and sometimes in catastrophic jolts, like those brought about by war or economic crisis. The
process has not been entirely linear: presidential power grabs have often been followed
by a Congressional backlash, as in the wake of Richard Nixon's presidency.
But the overall winner has unquestionably been the president, who has reached
heights of power that the framers would scarcely have imagined. The modern presidency, as expressed in
the policies of the administration of George W. Bush, provides the strongest piece of evidence that we are
governed by a fundamentally different Constitution from that of the framers. While any constitution must
evolve over time to meet new circumstances and challenges, there is reason to think that, when it
comes to presidential power over national security, the latest developments
have gone too far.
It is said that on the final day of deliberation at the Constitutional Convention of 1787, a female passerby
asked an exiting Ben Franklin, "Well Doctor, what have we got--a republic or a monarchy?" He replied, "A
Republic, if you can keep it." But if Ben Franklin were alive today to witness the
unlimited, king-like power of President Barack Obama, he would answer that
we are definitely living under an elected monarch. The Honorable John V. Denson, a
Circuit Court judge from Alabama and editor of Reassessing the Presidency: The Rise of the Executive
State and the Decline of Freedom, explains that "the Founders intended for the legislative branch of
Congress, composed of both the House and Senate, to be the dominant branch of the federal government,
which was then very limited in scope and power. Today the executive has become, by far,
the dominant branch of government, even to the point that it is the main
threat to the liberty and freedom of American citizens." (Emphasis added.) It must
be stressed that the aggrandizement of power within the executive branch
certainly did not start under the current occupant of the White House.
President Barack Obama is simply the latest in a long line of presidents who
is all too happy to wield expansive presidential power that would have
horrified the Founding Fathers. Obama's "progressive" agenda and his
actions after being in office for a little over a month illustrate that he plans to
build upon that legacy of centralization and control by leaps and bounds.
Obama's Imperial Presidency When writing in the Declaration of Independence about the "long train of
abuses and usurpations" committed on the colonists by the tyrannical king of Great Britain, Thomas
Jefferson identified a series of such abuses, including "[the king] has erected a multitude of New Offices,
and sent hither swarms of Officers to harass our people and eat out their substance." The description of
this abuse has eerie similarities to the growing list of executive departments collectively referred to as
"the administrative state." Defenders of liberty have much to worry about as unelected bureaucrats based
out of D.C. exercise powers that were once solely reserved to Congress, the states, or the people
themselves.
[ ] Nuclear war
Khalilzad 1995 [Zalmay, RAND, Washington Quarterly, spring, lexis]
Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of
a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term
guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in
which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First,
the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values — understood as
democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better
chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear
proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level
conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile
***Judicial Activism***
Supreme Court's first term under Chief Justice John Roberts reflects
conservatives' antipathy to what they label judicial activism by avoiding
decisions they believe are best left to elected executive, legislatures or free
market; trend runs counter to much of past 50 years, during which court saw
litigation as way to reshape American society; drawings (L)
Yung of The John Marshall Law School in Chicago is engaged in an ongoing empirical
Corey
study of judicial activism at the federal appellate court level. He is examining decisions
from 2008 and has completed work on five U.S. circuit courts of appeals so far -- the 2nd, 3d, 4th, 7th and
8th. "All of the definitions of activism normally used come down to the judge
believing his or her judgment is better than somebody else's judgment in the
constitutional system," Yung said. Specifically for federal appellate courts then, one
measure of activism is to examine when their judges reverse district court
decisions, he said. If an appellate judge, in cases calling for deferential review, reverses district
courts at a higher rate than in cases in which nondeferential review is the standard, that judge is activist,
Based on preliminary data, Yung said, Sotomayor is "in the
according to Yung's measure.
mainstream, clearly, and less activist than the average judge -- more deferential to district
courts than the average judge among the five circuits I've looked at." And, he added, she is less activist
relative to her 2d Circuit peers. The average judge's score in his data now is 10.40. Sotomayor scores an
11.71. The lower the score, the more activist the judge, Yung said. And how does she rank in criminal
cases? Yung reports that the average judge's rank is 22.65; Sotomayor's rank is slightly more activist:
Lindquist and Cross also have begun analyzing Sotomayor's opinions.
19.05.
"They don't look activist," said Cross, but he cautioned that there is difficulty extrapolating
from what a judge has done on the circuit court to what that judge will do on the Supreme Court. "Public
discussion of judicial activism is shallow and maybe it always will be," said Cross. "But
the goal is to change the academics' view in the short term, and maybe that
will seep down into the public in the long term."
While acknowledging the past achievements of the Voting Rights Act, Roberts asserted that "past success
alone . . . is not adequate justification to retain the preclearance requirements." He also claimed that
"considerable evidence" suggested that the statute "fails to account for
current political conditions." Reading between the lines, Pamela Karlan, a Stanford Law School
professor and one of the country's leading voting rights experts, concluded that Roberts tried and failed to
put together a majority for gutting Section 5. "What the decision indicates is that the
conservative wing of the court didn't have five votes," she said in an interview. "I
don't think this was a minimalist decision. I think it's a compromise decision
because there are five justices who didn't want to strike down the act." What's likely is that one
or two conservative justices (probably Anthony Kennedy and possibly Samuel Alito) realized
that overturning an act of Congress simply because a narrow court majority
decided it was outdated would rightly be seen as an outrageous form of
judicial activism.
Conservatives’ meager attempts to navigate the difficult path opposing Sonia Sotomayor’s Supreme Court
nomination have thus far shown their own ineptitude. Some have rightly emphasized that her statement
“that a wise Latina woman uwith the richness of her experiences would more often than not reach a better
conclusion than a white male” is reverse racism – but it hardly excites public outrage beyond the already
convinced.
Conservatives should recognize this and force the next stage of the
public debate to revolve around a simple question: do the American people believe
convicted felons in prison should have the right to vote, and that laws denying them this privilege are
Sotomayor, whose
racist? If they disagree with both propositions, they are at odds with Sonia
positions on this and related issues demonstrate she is a judicial activist who
sees the world through the lens of identity politics. Sotomayor’s position came in a
terse dissent to the 2006 case Hayden v. Pataki. The case argued that New York’s law barring convicted
felons from voting until they are released from prison or complete parole is racist and thus
unconstitutional. Its supporters made this argument on the grounds that “[m]ore than 80% of the New
Yorkers disenfranchised…are Blacks or Latinos, who lose their right to vote at more than ten times the rate
of other citizens.” Plaintiff Joseph “Jazz” Hayden, before he began his humanitarian crusade on behalf of
the disenfranchised, was convicted in 1987 of stabbing a sanitation worker to death. Most Second Circuit
Court of Appeals judges disagreed with him, but Sotomayor found Hayden’s objection supported by the
“plain terms” of the Voting Rights Act. Her minority opinion (no pun intended) puts into perspective
precisely what a judicial activist she is and how deeply concerns of ethnicity
color her view of the law. Felon Disenfranchisement, from Ancient Greece to
the Present Felon “disenfranchisement” is the radical idea that those
imprisoned for serious infractions of the law should not be voting for those
who will make it. This prudent practice has a history in the United States that
predates the Constitution. Jason Schall notes in Harvard’s BlackLetter Law Journal that the idea is
as old as democracy itself, taking root in ancient Greece and continuing in Rome. The North American
colonies adopted sometimes stringent regulations disqualifying anti-social voters: In Virginia, the franchise
was denied to any “convict or person convicted in Great Britain or Ireland during the term for which he is
transported.” Maryland disenfranchised citizens upon their third conviction for drunkenness…In
Connecticut, first a majority of the town’s freeman, and then the selectmen of the town, had to present a
certificate as to the “honest and civil conversation” of an aspiring voter. Rhode Island required that voters
be “of civil conversation [and have] acknowledged and are obedient to the civil magistrate.” Other states
restricting voting rights in the nation’s early history included such Jim Crow strongholds as Ohio,
Minnesota, California, and Oregon. Even Reiman concedes, “At the time of the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, twenty-nine states had felon disenfranchisement laws. Interestingly, in
virtually all of these states, blacks had been legally denied the right to vote based on their race. Thus, the
antebellum disenfranchisement statutes cannot be thought to have been racially motivated.” The second
section of the 14th Amendment specifically states voting rights should not be “in any way abridged,
except for participation in rebellion, or other crime.” In floor debates on the 14th Amendment, Rep.
Ephraim R. Eckley, R-OH, stated, “Under a congressional act persons convicted of a crime against the laws
of the United States, the penalty for which is imprisonment in the penitentiary, are now and always have
been disfranchised, and a pardon did not restore them unless the warrant of pardon so provided.”
(Emphasis added.) Disenfranchisement laws were later passed in a discriminatory fashion as part of Jim
Crow, often openly so. However, today’s voting rights milieu can hardly be called a racist dream. The vast
majority of states allow felons, even violent ones like Mr. Hayden, to regain suffrage rights after
completing their sentence, or finishing parole/probation. Vermont and Maine allow felons to vote from
prison. Not only has barring notorious prisoners from the ballot box been a staple of democracy from the
Age of Pericles to the formation of the United States, and not only is it specifically permitted by the U.S.
Constitution, but the Supreme Court had already settled the issue. In the 1974 case Richardson v. Ramirez,
the High Court rejected a previous challenge to such laws. William Rehnquist wrote the decision on behalf
of a six-justice majority that included Warren Burger and Harry Blackmun. Will Senate Democrats grill
Sotomayor over her view of stare decisis as they did John Roberts? Although leftists will not, Republicans
should. Seeking to overturn several thousands of years of juridical precedent on the flimsiest of bases
qualifies Sotomayor as a judicial activist par excellence, and conservatives ought not let the point go
unmade because any action against this Latina will bring cries of racism. The Left’s Criterion of “Racism”
For the contemporary Left to denounce any bill – or anyone – as racist, it need not actually be bigoted; it
must simply offend one of the Left’s constituent groups. Jeffrey Reiman, author of the book The Rich Get
Richer and the Poor Get Prison, writes that he “supports granting voting rights to felons, even those who
are still in prison.” His reason? “Because the vast majority of convicted felons in the U.S., black or white,
are from the lower classes, disenfranchisement works simultaneously to dilute electoral representation of
blacks and of poor people.” And, he candidly declares, these groups tend to vote Democratic. Since these
laws affect the Left, they are bad. Sotomayor’s Racialist Lens Such thinking is at the heart of much of
Sotomayor’s available legal record. While on the board of the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education
Fund (now LatinoJustice PRLDEF), she signed a 1981 memo – which she failed to disclose to the Senate –
declaring “capital punishment is associated with evident racism in our society.’’ Polls show even most
liberals, including Bill Clinton and Al Gore, support the death penalty, and the PRLDEF will never question
their allegiance to egalitarianism. Sotomayor denounced the death penalty with reasoning will sound
familiar: “The number of minorities or the poor executed or awaiting execution is out of proportion to their
numbers in the population.” (Emphasis added.) At the time of the memo, Sotomayor was hardly a mere
PRLDEF functionary but a self-described “participant in [the] development” of its “policy.” Among the
strategies formulated during her years of leadership was an attempt to “attack economic problems of our
community.” She is particularly proud of the organization’s “cases attacking civil service testing.” The
“attack” in question targeted the New York Police Department. In the 1980s, the PRLDEF found too few
minorities could pass the examination required to receive a promotion, so the Legal Left branded it, too,
“racist.” Ultimately, it was replaced. “An Affirmative Action Baby” Sotomayor’s opposition to test scores in
particular and meritocracy in general is caused and reinforced by her personal history.
[CONTINUES]
Most obvious has been the influence of the school desegregation cases. These decisions created
a magnetic field around the courts, attracting litigation in areas where judicial
intervention had earlirer seemed implausible. The more general judicial
activism of the Warren Court signale its willingness to test the conventional
boundaries of judicial action. As this happened, significant social groups thwarted in achieving
their goals in other forums turned to adjudication as a more promising course. Some organizations
saw the opportunity to use litigation as a weapon in political struggles carried
on elsewhere. The National welfare Rights Organization, for example, is said
to have turned to lawsuits to help create a state and local welfare crisis that
might bring about a federal guaranteed income. The image of courts willing to “take to
heart” was attractive, too, to legislators who were not. Such social programs
as the poverty program had elgal assistance componenets, which Congress
obligingly provided, perhaps partly because they placed the onus for
resolving social problems on the courts. Soon there were also privately
funded lawyers functioning in the environmental, mental health, welfare
rights, civil rights, and similar fields. They tended to prefer the judicial road to
reform over the legislative. They raised issues never before tested in
litigation, and the courts frequently responded by expanding the boundaries
of judicial activity.
Activism, in my view, tends to undermine what the basic role of the courts is,
which is to preserve the rule of law. Senator Feingold mentioned Africa and the value of
having an independent judiciary to enforce property writes and to write contracts. That is the basic
function of the courts, and to the extent that they dilute that moral authority,
to the extent that they dilute their effort to do that, we undermine what is,
after all, the basis for a commercial and civil and free society, which is a
private sector, a strong private sector that supports all of what we in
Government – me as a former Government employee – do. The rule of law is central to
the great freedom that we enjoy the great economy that we enjoy. I hope that it
is not an accident that the subcommittee is called the Subcommittee on Constitution, federalism and
Property rights. I hope that that is understood as being linked because property rights are, I believe, a key
factor in all of this.
intended to avoid.
1NC Shell
Text: Using the fourteenth amendment section five of the Constitution,
The United States Congress
should_________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
______________________
Solvency Natives
[ ] Congress can overrule court decisions dealing with
tribes
Students Britannica no date given( Well renowned Enclopdia
http://student.britannica.com/comptons/article-202561/American-
Indians-or-Native-Americans)
The United States Congress has complete authority over Indian affairs. It can
disband the Indian tribes as it did under the Indian General Allotment Act of 1887 and the termination
legislation of the 1950s, or it can permit them to organize as it did under the Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934. Congress can overrule court decisions dealing
with Indian tribes.
The Supreme Court's most recent tribal sovereignty case is United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004). In a
1990 decision, the Duro case, the Supreme Court held that Indian tribes lack the
sovereign authority to prosecute non-member Indians in tribal court. In
response, Congress passed a law, called the "Duro fix," which states that
Indian tribes do have this sovereign power. In Lara, the Court held that
Congress, with its plenary power, has the authority to effectively overrule the
Court's decision in Duro. Indian tribes, therefore, have the inherent right to prosecute non-
member Indians. The "good" news about Lara is that it confirms the inherent right of Indian tribes to
exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians, but the "bad" news is that Lara confirms that
Congress has plenary power over Indian affairs. Here, Congress used its power to assist
tribes, but next time Congress might do the opposite.
Congress, the Supreme Court has held, has "plenary power" over Indian
tribes, full and complete power. Congress may limit the authority that tribes
otherwise possess, and thus tribal sovereign power is subject to federal
control. Indeed, as a unanimous Supreme Court held in Menominee Tribe v.
United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968), Congress even has the authority to "terminate"
an Indian tribe, that is, forbid the tribe from exercising any governmental
powers, order the tribe to distribute all of its property to tribal members,
eliminate the tribe's reservation, and end the trust relationship between that
tribe and the federal government. Thus, according to the federal government, Indian tribes
Solvency Immigration
[ ] The Equal Protection Clause applies to immigrants.
Since Morgan Powers allow for Congress to rule on Equal
Protection cases, Congress can do the plan
New York Times 7 (news paper from new York, “Is It Fixed Yet?”
September 9, 2007 lexis)
First, immigration is a federal responsibility. State and local governments have no right to
usurp or upend a vast, ''carefully drawn federal statutory scheme'' that governs who enters the country
and the conditions under which immigrants stay, study, work and naturalize. Congress may be botching
the job, but it has not delegated it. Second, the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection
applies to all persons, not just citizens. The presumption that the 14th
Amendment can be set aside while immigrants are hunted down and
punished is widespread but false. The judge wrote: ''We cannot say clearly enough
that persons who enter this country without legal authorization are not
stripped immediately of all their rights because of this single illegal act.''
.
[ ] Congress can do the plan 3 warrants 1.Graham v.
Richardson proves discrimination against immigrants in the
areas of social welfare violates the equal protection clause 2.
Congress has all the power iin the realm of immigrant policy 3.
All Congress needs is rational basis to do the plan, which
previous court cases give them
Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy 2009 (Journal of law
@ Notre Dame “NOTE: SITTING ON ELLIS ISLAND: THE FATE OF
DISPARATE IMMIGRATION POLICIES IN THE WAKE OF THE
GUANTANAMO BAY CASES” lexis)
The Equal Protection clause directs that "all persons similarly circumstanced shall
be treated alike." n131 In 1982, the Court identified the purpose of the clause as
to "work nothing less than the abolition of all caste-based and invidious class-
based legislation." n132 To that end, the Court held that illegal immigrant children were "persons
within the jurisdiction" of the state of Texas, n133 and thus protected under the Equal [*251] Protection
clause from a Texas statute which withheld from local school districts any state funds for the education of
children who were not "legally admitted" into the United States. n134 In Cuban American Bar Association,
Inc. v. Christopher, the Eleventh Circuit held that "aliens who are outside the United States cannot claim
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that "no State
shall 'deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws,' which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike." n29 If a
state enacts legislation that classifies people on the basis of, for example,
race or gender, it must be "reasonable." n30 Under the Equal Protection Clause, "[a]
reasonable classification is one which includes all persons who are similarly
situated with respect to the purpose of the law." n31 In order to bring an equal protection
claim, a plaintiff must be similarly situated to the group or person with whom the plaintiff compares
If two people are similarly situated but are treated differently by the
herself. n32
same program or statute, then the plaintiff can bring an equal protection
claim. n33 If the plaintiff is not similarly situated to the other person, then
there is no basis for such a claim. n34 [*601] If a state enacts a policy that contains, for
example, a gender or racial classification, a court will review the challenged legislation using one of the
levels of scrutiny established by the Supreme Court. n35 The levels of scrutiny permit states to enact
needed policies while simultaneously preserving individuals' rights to be free from discrimination. n36 The
Supreme Court addressed whether a racial classification violated the Equal Protection Clause in Korematsu
v. United States, holding that "courts must subject [legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a
single racial group] to the most rigid scrutiny." n37 In a subsequent case, the Court clarified that the "most
rigid scrutiny," also known as strict scrutiny, meant that the classification must be narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling state interest. n38 The Supreme Court has also determined that state actions involving
challenges to gender classifications must satisfy a lower standard of "intermediate scrutiny." n39 The
Court defined intermediate scrutiny to require that the state show "at least that the [challenged]
classification serves 'important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed' are
'substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.'" n40 The courts employ strict scrutiny and
intermediate scrutiny tests to ensure that people are not discriminated against in a way that violates the
Equal Protection Clause. For cases involving social or economic regulations that do not involve a suspect
class such as race, the legislation at issue must meet the much lower "reasonable basis" or "rational basis"
standard of review; the legislation is valid "if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to
a legitimate state interest." n41 [*602] Incarcerated persons are entitled to protection
under the Equal Protection Clause despite the fact that they are separated from society for criminal
In addressing a prisoner's discrimination claim, n43 Justice Stevens
convictions. n42
argued in his dissenting opinion in Hewitt v. Helms that the treatment of a
particular prisoner should be compared with the treatment of the prison
population as a whole. n44 The Court in Turner v. Safely accepted Justice
Stevens's rationale and held that "when a prison regulation impinges on
inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related
to legitimate penological interests." n45 Thus, the Court initially promulgated
the lower "reasonable basis" standard of review for cases involving equal
protection challenges concerning their confinement
One of the myths of our political system is that the Supreme Court has the
last word on the scope and meaning of federal law. But time and time again,
Congress has shown its dissatisfaction with Supreme Court interpretations of
laws it passes--by amending or re-enacting the legislation to clarify its
original intent and overrule a contrary Court construction. The Supreme Court
often insists that Congress cannot really "overrule" its decisions on what a
law means: The justices' interpretation has to be correct since the
Constitution gives final say to the highest court in the land. But Congress
certainly has the power to pass a new or revised law that "changes" or
"reverses" the meaning or scope of the law as interpreted by the Court, and
the legislative history of the new law usually states that it was intended to
"overrule" a specific Court decision.
Often the reversal is in highly technical areas, such as the statute of limitations in securities-fraud cases,
the jurisdiction of tribal courts on Indian reservations, or the power of state courts to order denaturalization
of citizens. But in the last 20 years, a main target of congressional "overruling" has been the Supreme
Court's decisions in the area of civil rights. In 1982, for example, Congress amended the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 to overrule a narrow Supreme Court holding in
Mobile v. Bolden, a 1980 decision that addressed whether intentional
discrimination must be shown before the act could be invoked. In 1988,
Congress overruled another Supreme Court decision (in the 1984 case Grove City
College v. Bell) by passing the Civil Rights Restoration Act, which broadened the coverage
of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The legislative history of that law specifically recited that "certain
aspects of recent decisions and opinions of the Supreme Court have unduly narrowed or cast doubt upon"
a number of federal civil rights statutes and that "legislative action is necessary to restore the prior
consistent and long-standing executive branch interpretations" of those laws.
With the narrowing of Congress' Article I power to regulate interstate commerce and to authorize private
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment provides Congress
suits against states,
with an increasingly important alternative source of power to regulate and
police state conduct. However, in City of Boeme v. Flores and subsequent cases, the Supreme
Court has tightened the doctrinal test for prophylactic legislation based on Section Five. The Court has
Congress may enforce Fourteenth
clarified Section Five's legitimate ends by holding that
Amendment rights only as they are defined by the federal judiciary, and the Court
has constrained Section Five's permissible means by holding that Section Five measures must be
"congruent and proportional" to a legitimate end thus defined. This article argues that the means-ends test
for Section Five legislation should be the same as the conventional "rational relationship" test established
by McCulloch v. Maryland, not the "congruence and proportionality" test that the Court has recently
The textual language and the original meaning of the Fourteenth
adopted.
Amendment support this argument, while neither separation of powers nor
federalism principles persuasively justify the Court's contrary position. Finally,
this article speculates about the significance of Section Five's tightened means-ends scrutiny for other
Over the past decade, Congress' Section 5 power to
sources of congressional power.
enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment has taken center stage
in the unfolding drama of Our (New) Federalism.1 For the first time in seven decades, the Supreme Court
has begun to narrow the scope of Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce. While not long ago it
was plausible to describe Congress' Commerce Clause power as virtually plenary, the Court has twice now
invalidated statutes as exceeding the proper boundaries of this Article I authority. In United States v.
Lopez2 the Court invalidated the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990,3 and in United States v. Morrison4
the Court invalidated a provision of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 that provided a federal civil
remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence.5 In both cases, the Court emphasized that the federal
statutes purported to regulate activities not economic in nature6 without any jurisdictional limitation
linking particular instances of such activity to interstate commerce,7 in a manner that would trench upon a
realm of "traditional state concern,"8 thereby obliterating the "distinction between what is truly national
and what is truly local."9 While it remains unclear just how significant a reduction in the scope of Congress'
Commerce Clause power these recent precedents portend, it surely places greater pressure on Section 5
as a potential alternative source of congressional power for at least some regulations threatened by this
Commerce Clause retrenchment.
Under the Supreme Court's precedents, Congress can remove the states' constitutional
shield against private damage suits only in one limited circumstance, by invoking its power under the 14th
Amendment's guarantees of equal protection and due process. Section 5 of the 14th
Amendment authorizes Congress to enforce those guarantees through
''appropriate legislation.'' The court's recent decisions have held that efforts
to permit suits against the states under federal laws against age
discrimination and disability discrimination were not ''appropriate.''
During the Warren Court Era, the Court once again found itself, or perhaps placed itself, in the middle of
many important national dialogues. n19 The Warren Court evaluated many statutes, both state and
federal. Typically, it was federal legislation, such as the VRA, that was upheld, n20 while state legislation,
such as redistricting schemes that violated the principle of "one person, one vote," was struck down. n21
Writing in 1965, Archibald Cox examined this element of the Court's role in
promoting civil rights. n22 Cox fretted over the striking down of state laws,
noting that, on one hand, courts are not really equipped to deal with the type
of in-depth fact-finding that many of these cases required, but observing that,
on the other hand, to defer to state legislatures in many of the situations would be to put
the imprimatur of the Court on an unjust system. n23 He was much more comfortable with
the Court's decisions that upheld congressional legislation as being within the scope of
Congress's 14 § 5 powers. Having seen the Court take the lead on issues of
social change - Brown v. Board of Education n24 was mentioned repeatedly
n25 - Cox expressed hope that Katzenbach v. Morgan, n26 which had just
come down, upholding a portion of the VRA, would embolden Congress to
start taking more of a lead and thus take pressure off of the courts. n27 He
Given the current supreme Court's track record in civil rights cases, there can
be no doubt that congressional remediation is again necessary. In a series of
cases over the past two years, the Court has been giving narrow readings to
various federal civil rights laws. And once again, an attentive Congress can
and should overrule the Court's decisions if the legislators care about fairness
in the operation of government and in the workplace.
.The Morgan power, I argue, is best understood as a tool that permits the
Congress to use its power to enact ordinary legislation to engage the Court in
a dialogue about our fundamental rights, thereby "forcing" the Justices to
take a fresh look at their own judgments. Congressional exercises of the
Morgan power thus play an important role in the moral evolution of society--
and are most effectively opposed on moral grounds. -
A major force behind the judiciary's deferential posture is that the manner in
which questionsa reonsidered by a court s very differentf rom the method in
which legislative inquiries are conducted.15 Courts laborunder the tight and
logical principles dictated by the legalistic form of argument while
legislatures do not. Moreover, legislatures do not share the courts' concern
with the role of precedent.'6 Since the application of principle and precedent
rarely designatesp articular solutions but instead suggests a range of
reasonable alternatives,the legislative branch may legitimately draw
"arbitrary "lines that a court cannot.'7 Thus when courts are called upon to
striked own "arbitrary" legislative decisions, they feel compelled to defer to
legislative judgments which fall within the broad boundaries of reason-
ableness.
In Katzenbach v. Morgan itself, the Court upheld, under Section 5, a provision of the Voting Rights Act of
1965 that banned the application of an English literacy test to students who had completed sixth grade in
Puerto Rico. n45 The Court had not yet ruled on this specific issue, but had already upheld North Carolina's
use of an English literacy test. n46 The Court now proclaimed, however, that Congress was entitled to
make its own judgment about the reach of equal protection and to prohibit the application of the English
literacy test on the theory that such a test rendered a large portion of the Puerto Rican community in New
York especially vulnerable to discrimination by local officials. n47 The validity of the congressional action
did not depend on the willingness of the Court to believe that it would have come to the same conclusion
about the meaning of equal protection. n48 Congress could prohibit conduct that the Court might not
have, provided, of course, that the Court could "perceive a basis" upon which Congress might think that
the prohibited action would amount to or lead to a denial of equal protection. n49 The scope of the
Katzenbach v. Morgan principle was immediately recognized, first by commentators n50 and then by
Congress itself when it enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1968, which prohibited racial [*196] discrimination
in private housing and certain race-based violence by private actors. n51 In 1970, the Court limited the
reach of Katzenbach v. Morgan when it denied Congress the power to extend the right to vote to 18 year
olds, n52 but it continued to operate as an important font of congressional authority for the next thirty
years - a period in which Congress resisted the Court's retrenchment on rights and crafted the legislative
program that made legality turn more on the social consequences of a practice or law than on the
motivation lying behind it. A turning point in the encounter between the Court and Congress came in 1997
in City of Boerne v. Flores. n53 In that case, the Court struck down RFRA as an inappropriate exercise of
the Section 5 power. n54 Although the enactment of RFRA could be understood to conform to the ratchet
theory of Katzenbach v. Morgan - after all, Congress was not diluting any right that the Court had declared,
but rather was adding to the rights that citizens enjoyed - the Court was of another opinion. It saw RFRA as
an affront to its claim of supremacy. n55 Arguably, the Court was led to this view because of an expansive
reading of Smith, the decision to which Congress was responding in RFRA. n56 The Court understood Smith
to define the bounds of the Free Exercise Clause and to declare that laws that are neutral and generally
applicable do not interfere with the free exercise of religion. n57 From that perspective, RFRA could not be
defended as a measure to protect the religious liberty guaranteed by Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment and thus was beyond the powers of Congress under Section 5. n58 RFRA was an immediate
and direct response to the Court's decision in Smith, and Boerne may have been colored by that particular
dynamic, verging on confrontation, between the Court and the legislature. Soon, however, the assertion of
judicial authority that was the essence of Boerne spread more broadly and extended to situations more
similar to that of Katzenbach v. Morgan, in which there was no confrontation, but rather something closer
to a lacuna. Morrison was such a case, though the Court primarily treated VAWA as an exercise of the
Commerce Clause and only secondarily disposed of the Section 5 claim. n59 However, in two decisions
[*197] that soon followed - Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents and Board of Trustees of the University of
Alabama v. Garrett - the Court confronted Katzenbach v. Morgan more directly and, in effect, overruled it.
n60 Section 5 was emptied of the meaning that Katzenbach v. Morgan had given it. As before, Congress
had the power to provide remedies for well-established rights, but it no longer had the power to articulate
rights under Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment that the Court itself was not prepared to recognize.
n61 The space that Katzenbach v. Morgan had opened for an independent role for Congress in the
articulation of rights was now closed. In Kimel, the Court held that Congress could not make states liable
for damages when they discriminated against elderly employees. n62 In Garrett, the Court denied that
Congress had the power to make states liable for employment discrimination based on disability. n63 In
these two cases, Congress could not possibly be faulted for overruling a Court decision - a claim that might
seem plausible in the context of RFRA - but the Court nonetheless concluded that Congress had exceeded
the scope of its powers under Section 5. n64 In Kimel and Garrett, the Court accused Congress of altering
the substantial meaning of equal protection, but what it meant was that Congress had deemed certain
state practices a denial of equal protection in circumstances in which the Court itself was not prepared to
do so. n65 In 2003 in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, the
Court upheld the Family and Medical Leave Act as a proper exercise of the
Section 5 power. n66 This decision was a surprise to many. n67 The Court reasoned that
women were a protected group under Section 1, and that the leave
provisions were an appropriate measure to allow them to participate fully in
the economy and to do so on equal terms. n68 The next year, in Tennessee
v. Lane, the Court upheld the obligation of states to make reasonable
accommodation for the needs of the disabled in the context of guaranteeing
access to courts. n69 [*198] In these two rulings, the Court did not revive
Katzenbach v. Morgan, but rather indicated that it agreed with the
congressional judgment about the rights declared and on that ground upheld
the statutes. n70 Thus, despite Hibbs and Lane, the shadow of Boerne,
Morrison, Kimel, and Garrett remains and puts into question any effort by
Congress to enhance rights. This shadow has only intensified the
disenchantment with the Court and, as a purely historical matter, explains
the ever-increasing popularity of legislative constitutionalism. It may also
account for the especially strident form that this movement has recently
taken - throwing out the good with the bad.
We therefore propose an account of Section 5 power that would enable it to perform this function. We call
this account the model of policentric constitutional interpretation. The policentric model holds that for
Section 5 power the Constitution should be regarded as having
purposes of
multiple interpreters, both political and legal. The model attributes equal
interpretive authority to Congress and to the Court. The model thus entails (1) that
Congress does not violate principles of separation of powers when it enacts
Section 5 legislation premised on an understanding of the Constitution that
differs from the Court's, and (2) that Congress's action does not bind the Court,
so that the Court remains free to invalidate Section 5 legislation that in the
Court's view violates a constitutional principle requiring judicial protection.
This account of Section 5 power combines a robust legislative
constitutionalism with a vigorous
Section Five grants Congress the authority to "enforce" the provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment. n250 Congress may not legislate against private
individuals; it may only enact legislation in response to state laws. n251
Under City of Boerne, Section Five does not empower Congress to restrict
constitutional rights; Section Five is strictly limited to the enforcement of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment is "remedial," not "substantive." n252 Congress cannot enforce a
constitutional interpretation that differs from "the interpretation that the
Court itself would adopt." n253 Some scholars argue that courts should give
Congress leeway, and that the Supreme Court should not supervise
Congress's actions under Section Five. n254 Because Congressmen are
elected by a democratic process, there is a certain legitimacy to their actions
that does not exist in the court system. n255 Moreover, proponents of giving
Congress flexibility rely on Justice Brennan's opinion in Katzenbach, n256
which indicated that "Congress might find a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause even where the Court has not." n257 Congress may be better
equipped than the courts in finding constitutional violations because of its
resources and confidence. n258 It might enact "complex and preventive
remedies" more elaborate than an action a court would take. n259
The Court gave Congress the power to act prophylactically: Congress may
ban permissible state conduct to prevent or remedy constitutional violations.
n260 Nonetheless, the Court must "distinguish between prophylactic legislation and legislation that seeks
to change the substantive meaning of the Constitution." n261 Thus, if Congress [*2016] acts
prophylactically, the legislation must have ""congruence and proportionality' to the constitutional violation
at issue." n262
U.S. civil rights leaders said yesterday that an increase in hate crimes
committed in recent years against Hispanics and people perceived to be
immigrants "correlates closely" to the nation's increasingly contentious
debate over immigration. Hate crimes targeting Hispanic Americans rose 40
percent from 2003 to 2007, the most recent year for which FBI statistics are
available, from 426 to 595 incidents, marking the fourth consecutive year of
increases. The Leadership Conference on Civil Rights Education Fund
issued a report that faulted anti-immigrant rhetoric in the media and
mobilization of extremist groups on the Internet. The conference said
that some groups advocating for tighter immigration laws have
invoked "the dehumanizing, racist stereotypes and bigotry of hate
groups." "Reasonable people will disagree . . . but the tone of discourse
over comprehensive immigration reform needs to be changed, needs to be
civil and sane," said Michael Lieberman, Washington counsel for the
Anti-Defamation League.
Moreover, the Wisconsin statute singles out for enhancement bias inspired
conduct because this conduct is thought to inflict greater individual and
societal harm. For example, according to the State and its amici, bias
motivated crimes are more likely to provoke retaliatory crimes, inflict distinct
emotional harms on their victims, and incite community unrest. See, e. g.,
Brief for Petitioner 24-27; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 13-
15;Brief for Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law as Amicus
Curiae 18-22; Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus
Curiae 17-19; Brief for the Anti Defamation League et al. as Amici
Curiae 9-10; Brief for Congressman Charles E. Schumer et al. as Amici
Curiae 8-9. The State's desire to redress these perceived harms
provides an adequate explanation for its penalty enhancement
provision over and above mere disagreement with offenders' beliefs or
biases. As Blackstone said long ago, "it is but reasonable that among
crimes of different natures those should be most severely punished,
which are the most destructive of the public safety and happiness." 4
W. Blackstone, Commentaries *16.
Levin and McDevitt (1993) suggest that hate crimes differ from other
types of reported offenses in several ways. They are more likely than other
offenses to involve personal violence, to evoke excessive brutality, and to
result in greater injury to the victim. Often they appear to be senseless or
irrational crimes perpetrated randomly on total strangers, in contrast
to the high proportion of other offenses against acquaintances and
intimates. Hate crimes also tend to be perpetrated by multiple offenders,
whereas most violent crimes are perpetrated by individuals acting alone.
Mammoth Cave National Park has long banned guns from its underground
treasures, saying that keeps the public and employees safe. "Once you get
inside a cave tour, there are not a lot of exits — you can be two miles from an
exit, and half a mile from a phone," said supervisory park ranger Brad McDougal. But
legislation passed by Congress in April, and signed by President Barack Obama, is intended to
open national park, as well as federal wildlife refuges, to people carrying
loaded guns, making "it clear that the Second Amendment rights of an
individual should not be infringed." It remains unclear, however, how far the new
law will extend gun rights in national parks and federal wildlife refuges. At
Mammoth Cave National Park, for example, it's not certain whether the new law means guns will be
allowed inside the park's cave — known for its gypsum lined passages, narrow canyons, large rooms, and
dripstone formations — or in the park's visitor center and staff offices, or whether they'll only be allowed in
campgrounds, or on roads, trails and in the backcountry of the 82-square-mile natural and historical
preserve 75 miles south of Louisville. That's because federal
attorneys are still sorting
through legal issues, including how the new law can work with an existing
general ban on guns in federal facilities. At Mammoth Cave park, officials have deemed the
cave, park offices and the visitor center to be a "federal facility," but not campgrounds and trails,
McDougal said. So, "We are waiting for guidance from Washington" he said.
Bryan Faehner, an associate director of the National Parks Conservation Association, a parks advocacy
group, said he believes having people in national parks with loaded guns will only
lead to accidental shootings of people and more poaching of wildlife. Faehner
cited examples of incidences in California when visitors illegally shot guns in
crowded campgrounds in misguided efforts to protect themselves against
bears. While no individuals were hurt, he said, there are much more effective means to
keep bears out of people's tents, including proper management of food. "We
shouldn't be telling the public to lock and load going in," he said. Opposition to the new law has also come
from seven National Park Service directors under Republican and well as Democratic administrations,
dating to 1964. "Informing visitors as they enter a park that their guns must be
unloaded and stowed away puts them on notice that they are entering a
special place where wildlife are protected and the environment is respected
for the visitor's enjoyment and the enjoyment of others," they wrote in a joint
statement last year. "Failure to comply with this minimal requirement can be a
signal to rangers that something is wrong."
Since Congress has much of the responsibility to flesh out the entities of
``judicial power,'' Congress appears to have substantial power to control and
bend the courts to its will. To a great degree, however, this power has proved to be illusory.
What Congress has done is to create a Federal judiciary with powers known perhaps nowhere else in the
world. Its efforts to use these powers to alter the decisions of the courts and to divest the courts of their
Congress has
independence have been episodic and only sporadically successful.1 However,
utilized many of these basic powers to influence the Supreme Court and the
lower Federal courts. The Constitution is silent on the number of associate justices, so Congress in
the 1789 Judiciary Act provided for a Supreme Court of a chief justice and five associate justices. The
number was gradually increased until it reached a total of ten in 1863, but with Andrew Johnson's
accession to the Presidency, the number was reduced to seven, so that Johnson could not fill any
vacancies that might occur. After he left office, Congress increased the number to nine where it has since
remained.2 Although it ultimately was not enacted by Congress, President Roosevelt's ``Court-packing
plan'' to enlarge the membership of the Court by one justice for each justice over age 75 has been cited as
the underlying reason for the Court's changed course in the late 1930s, the ``switch in time that saved
nine.''3 On another occasion, Congress used its authority to determine the time and place of sessions of
the Court in order to postpone for 14 months a Court session to forestall a constitutional attack on the
repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801.4
A reference was made above to ``[c]onstitutional decisions by the courts limiting legislative powers'' that
would need an amendment to the Constitution to overturn. The distinction was made that in many cases
the courts will hold that the Constitution does not require some protection of rights or does not deny the
States some power. Assuming that Congress has legislative jurisdiction to act -- and
in these days of expansive interpretation of the commerce clause, 5 fourteenth amendment and 2
fifteenth amendment powers, combined perhaps with the taxing and spending authority -- Congress
may through ordinary legislation counter many of these constitutional
interpretations and enact laws of a constitutional nature. For example, in
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), the Court upheld a congressional enactment that barred the
application of English literacy requirements to certain classes of voters, despite an earlier holding that
nondiscriminatory English literacy qualifications did not violate the equal protection clause. Congress,
through its authorization to enforce the fourteenth and fifteenth
amendments, ``brought a specially informed legislative competence'' to its
appraisal of the effect of state legislation on rights secured by the
Reconstruction amendments, to which the Court would defer. The career of
this principle has been varied, and it is a highly controversial doctrine, but yet
the Court continues to recognize the existence of some power in Congress to
define constitutionality.13
The second reason for legislative movement is opportunism. Obama is popular and
has large reserves of political capital. But it is less about where we are in the presidential cycle and more
about the public mood. Four
out of five Americans express deep concern over
immigration, but they also share a desire for action. When asked who is to
blame, the public let employers and immigrants off the hook and blame
government and Congress by a two-to-one margin. The public are anxious
about immigration, especially illegal immigration, but they want the problem
solved.
As in the criminal context, judicial review has always played a special role as guarantor of individual rights
Over the last decade, however, the government has
in the realm of immigration law.
repeatedly attempted to restrict the access of immigrants to the courts
through various jurisdiction-stripping clauses, to streamline the process of
review, and to enact provisions that constrain the discretion of judges. In 1996,
Congress passed, and the President signed, both the AEDPA and the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act [*325] (IIRIRA). n123 The anti-immigration clauses of the AEDPA and the
IIRIRA were aimed at restricting judicial review of final orders of deportation for permanent legal residents
convicted of certain enumerated criminal offenses, including minor crimes. n124 Similar to the efforts
discussed below with regard to the enemy combatants, AEDPA and IIRIRA collectively place the entire
deportation process under the control of the executive branch. The
Acts effectively exclude all
opportunities for judicial participation in some cases and limit the scope of
review in others. n125 These changes are profound given the judiciary's historically important role in
immigration matters. n126
Feinstein also borrowed from, and further reinforced, other cultural tropes concerning the litigation
explosion and the rising costs of litigation. She presented the Senate with "facts" stating that "[t]here are
estimates that dozens of existing alien tort suits claim damages collectively in excess of $ 200 billion
dollars." n148 Feinstein then editorialized, "[t]hat's an extraordinary sum that rightly concerns the U.S.
business community, particularly given numerous inconsistent federal courts verdicts handed down in the
the law is unruly and
past two decades." n149 In other words, this is a substantial threat, and
prone to excess and irrational behavior. Therefore, the current law needs to
be reigned in and controlled through reform. Feinstein reinforces this threat
by presenting the ATS in its current formulation the way Justice Berger and
the corporate propaganda machine portrayed the proliferation of rights and
legal remedies a few decades ago. Her legislation "deters private plaintiffs
from filing sweeping and specious claims simply because a corporation has a
U.S. legal nexus and deep pockets." n150 In defending the need for a requirement of specific
intent, Feinstein argued that "[i]n my view, we need to deter legal fishing expeditions,
whereby plaintiffs come to the bar with flinty facts backing weak charges."
n151 Here Feinstein taps into what Galanter, Haltom, and McCann have shown to be popular
cultural beliefs about conniving claimants and predator lawyers: the
zealousness with which American [*330] lawyers tempt potential clients into
suing for baseless claims is nothing more than greedy opportunists going
after large corporate defendants' deep pockets. n152
Whatever may be the scope of the Morgan power, there can be no doubt that when
Congress acts under its power to regulate commerce or enforce its taxing and spending power,
perhaps adding on its Morgan power, it may impose on the States and on local
governments substantively higher constitutional standards than the courts
would. It is in this context, for instance, that Congress is now considering the so-called freedom of
choice bills, S. 25 and H.R. 25, to apply to the States the standards of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973),
as they existed prior to more recent Supreme Court decisions. Another congressional initiative, the bills to
restore the interpretation of the free exercise of religion clause to its meaning prior to Oregon Employment
Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), (see S. 578 and H.R. 1308), probably depends on Morgan as well as
the commerce clause. 14 Congress also may simply persist in enacting somewhat
different measures in order to probe the courts' willingness to stand against
what may be the popular will. An example of this is the 1930s and Depression legislation. The
Supreme Court had restrictively interpreted the meaning of the commerce clause, allowing Congress only
to reach interstate movement, but faced with continued legislating, with President Roosevelt's ``Court-
packing plan,'' and with severe economic distress, the Court, in a series of cases, gave in and permitted
Congress to regulate not only every step in the course across state lines but also activities that occur only
within one State but ``affect'' interstate commerce.15
It is significant to note that the IIRIRA's name harkens back to the moralizing arguments by social
conservatives from the litigation and tort reform debates. Social conservatives blamed
conniving claimants and the litigation explosion for eviscerating both the
moral fabric of the nation and the longstanding commitment of Americans to
individual responsibility. Their argument was that people had stopped taking
responsibility for their own actions and instead preferred to "pass the buck"
by suing someone else rather than face their guilt. n127 Here too, harsh deportation
procedures against an unwanted population are presented as necessary. The IIRIRA puts forth the moral
argument that if a legal, permanent resident has committed a crime, then the resident has abused his or
her privileges and the kind hospitality of the United States. Therefore, a legal, permanent resident must
assume individual responsibility for illegal actions. As will be seen with the DTA, the scope of the IIRIRA
taps into a persistent trope that warns against both overextending the resources of the U.S. legal system
and, more importantly, not being taken advantage of by forces that seek to undermine our society. The
argument behind the latter warning is [*326] that providing undeserved support makes us vulnerable. In
truth, however, providing such support is merely providing equal protection under the law.
What is fascinating about this instance of the jaundiced view is that the rhetoric is wielded by a
Democratic politician, demonstrating the absolute prevalence of this discourse in our society. In
advocating for her legislation, Feinstein pointed to a Washington Post editorial on Alvarez-Machain, which
expressed concerns that deciding the grounds for lawsuits in the United States for
is "surely a legislative question, not one for the
human rights abuses abroad
freewheeling discretion of judges." n145 To this Feinstein added, "[t]he Court's
hesitation to legislate from the bench shifts the responsibility to this body . . . ."
n146 Feinstein's rhetoric should not be seen solely in terms of separation of powers; it partakes in, and
thereby reinforces, folklore positioned against "an intrusive activist judiciary" and all that has been shown
above to go along with it. n147
of this view have responded forcefully, though, with claims such as that of Adamany (1973), that "none
who bottom their arguments on the Court's legitimacy-conferring capacity offer the slightest empirical
basis for its reality (p. 807)."
Polls show that most Americans believe in the Second Amendment, but most also want stronger gun laws.
The percentage of Americans who support an assault-weapons ban, however,
has slid several percentage points in the past few years. In 2007, gun groups
spent nearly $2 million to lobby Congress; pro-gun control groups spent
$60,000.
In the end, though, the most compelling reason reform can succeed lies in
the personality and huge ambition of the current White House. For many, and
seemingly for the Obama team, immigration reform has become the civil
rights issue for the 21st century. This is the prize that makes reform more
likely than not, and sooner rather than later.
The Supreme Court is heading into the final two weeks of its term and, as
usual, the justices have left some of the hardest decisions for last. Among
the cases to be decided are ones involving politically charged movies, strip-
searches of students, and the rights of prisoners who say DNA will prove their
innocence. But the two cases likely to get the most attention concern civil
rights and the proper role of race in the law. Conservative justices have favored removing
race as a factor in the law, even if it means repealing part of the historic Voting Rights Act. Liberals say
protections against discrimination must be preserved in law to ensure fair elections and equality in the
workplace. The outcome in these cases, like so many others, probably depends on Justice Anthony M.
In all, 14 cases remain to be decided, with the next round of decisions
Kennedy.
expected today.
The Justice began his talk by discussing the Supreme Court routine throughout the year. He explained
that a substantial amount of time each year is spent going through thousands
of petitions for writ of certiorari. The Supreme Court hears less than one
percent of the cases that are petitioned to the court. Justice Alito also
explained that the court has twenty-six conferences during the year during
which Justices meet and vote on cases that they thought should be heard by
the court. Students asked Justice Alito what specific things the Court looked for in selecting cases to
hear. The Justice responded that the Court mainly looked for conflicts between the Circuits, conflicts
between state law and decisions of the Supreme Court, or cases that had crucial issues that the Court felt
needed immediate attention. Justice Alito went on to describe duties of the law clerks, the routine that
ensued once Justices were assigned to write an opinion for a pending case, and the procedure that led up
to the hearing of oral arguments.
You're asking about the court's decision not to review a lower court's ruling
that threw out a challenge to the military's "don't ask, don't tell" policy on gay service members. Here's
the thing: the court accepts just about 1 percent of the cases presented to it.
To those of us who cover the court, it was pretty clear it would not accept this one. The Obama
administration didn't want it to, even some of the challengers didn't want it to and it seems likely that the
president is going to do something on this on his own. Further, there was no disagreement yet among the
lower courts. Such "circuit splits" are most often what the court looks for in deciding whether to accept a
case. Now, there could be such a split before long; the 9th Circuit has decided to let such a challenge go
forward. That would seem a more likely case for the court to take, should the policy not be changed in the
meantime.
Now in his fourth term, Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. has moved to scale
back the civil rights laws that give special protection to minorities. If he has a
majority to pull back on voting rights and job discrimination, it will provide a
powerful end to the court term -- and an opening salvo in the Senate's confirmation battle over
Sotomayor.
Court of Appeals
[ ] The purpose of the court of appeals is to ease the
workload of the Supreme Court
The Justice System Journal, 1988 (Sue Davis and Donald R. Songer, The
Changing Role of the United States Court of Appeals, Accessed June 25
2009, http://www.heinonline.org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/HOL/Page?
handle=hein.journals/jusj13&id=325&type=text&collection=journals)
The United States courts of appeals are approaching their one hundredth birthday.1
Created to alleviate the workload of the Supreme Court and to increase the
power of the federal courts to apply the national law, the intermediate appellate
judiciary has become a major political institution that functions not only as a norm enforcer
but also as a creator of public policy. Despite their importance, the courts of appeals were
the "courts nobody knows"2 until J. Woodford Howard provided his comprehensive study of three circuits
(1981). Howard studied the business and behavior of the second, fifth, and D.C. circuits during the fiscal
years 1965-67 in order to describe the functions of the appellate courts in the federal system and their
relations with other courts.3
The US Courts of Appeals are important policymakers not only because they hear
issues that have important political consequences, but because in the resolution of those
issues they are the final forum for the resolution of the most disputes over
the meaning of federal law. In theory, all decisions of the courts of appeals
are reviewable by the Supreme Court. If the High Court actually did review a
large percentage of their decisions then the role of the courts of appeals in
policy making would be slight. But a basic condition of our judicial system is
that the Supreme Court exerts very little direct supervision over any of the
lower courts.
Conventional wisdom holds that in the American constitutional system the branches try to avoid
constraints imposed by the other branches. Still, Supreme Court justices routinely vote
to
ask the executive branch’s solicitor general for his opinion on cases to which the
United States is not a party. Why would members of one branch solicit the views of another branch?
Scholars typically explain such interactions as the function of the justices’
respect for the legal expertise proffered by the administration’s solicitor
general. Using newly available data from the papers of Justice Harry Blackman, we demonstrate instead
that political and institutional, as well as legal, forces help to account for the Court’s requests for input
from the executive branch. The results, we argue, suggest that the justices are well aware of
both the legal and strategic value of information culled from the executive
branch.
We believe that Matthew Shepard Hate Crimes Prevention Act (MSHCPA) will do little good and a great deal
of harm. It’s most important effect will be to allow federal authorities to re-prosecute a broad category of
defendants who have already been acquitted by state juries – as in the Rodney King and Crown Heights
cases more than a decade ago. Due to the exception for prosecutions by “dual sovereigns,” such double
prosecutions are technically not violations of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. But they
are very much a violation of the spirit that drove the framers of the Bill of Rights, who never dreamed that
federal criminal jurisdiction would be expanded to the point where an astonishing proportion of crimes are
now both state and federal offenses. We regard the broad federalization of crime as a menace to civil
liberties. There is no better place to draw the line on that process than with a bill that purports to protect
While the title of MSHCPA suggests that it will apply only to “hate
civil rights.
crimes,” the actual criminal prohibitions contained in it do not require that the
defendant be inspired by hatred or ill will in order to convict. It is sufficient if
he acts “because of” someone’s actual or perceived race, color, religion,
national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, or disability.
Consider: Rapists are seldom indifferent to the gender of their victims. They
are virtually always chosen “because of” their gender. A robber might only
steal from women or the disabled because, in general, they are less able to
defend themselves. Literally, they are chosen “because of” their gender or
disability.