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The Soviet Navy's SSBN Bastions: Why

Explanations Matter

Breemer, Jan S.
Routledge Taylor & Francis Group

Jan S. Breemer (1989) The Soviet Navy's SSBN bastions: Why explanations matter,
The RUSI Journal, 134:4, 33-39
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/63973

This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
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United States.

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The Soviet Navy's SSBN Bastions:
Why Explanations Matter
JAN S BREEMER

Since the early 1980s, the Western estimate of would have adopted a bastion strategy matters greatly
Soviet naval capabilities and intentions has been for the formulation of appropriate Western counter-
dominated by the expectation of a Soviet ballistic measures. This article examines three 'models' of the
missile submarine (SSBN) 'bastion' strategy. Accord- bastion strategy:
ing to this assessment, the Soviet Union's first and
foremost naval priority, in time of war, is to ensure D the doctrinal model;
the survival of its SSBN force, so that it may contin- D the material-technical model; and
ue to serve as a 'national strategic reserve'. The bas- • the bureaucratic model.
tion estimate also holds that the Soviets wilt seek to
guarantee this survival by deploying the SSBNs in The doctrinal model
near-home waters, where they would enjoy the pro-
tective benefit of 'virtually all available Northern Two different doctrinal explanations have been
and Pacific Ocean Fleet surface combatants/combat advanced on behalf of the Soviet bastion decision.
aircraft, and about 75 per cent of available attack The older one, which is at the heart of the concep-
submarines...'.' tion of the Soviet SSBN fleet as a 'strategic reserve',
In several earlier articles I have stressed the infer- belongs to James M McConnell. The more recent
ential (as opposed to evidentiary) contents of the one is the work of Michael MccGwire.
bastion estimate, and urged that Western naval plan- McConnell's thesis goes back to the early 1970s
ners take a long and hard look before committing and Soviet Navy chief, Admiral Sergei G Gorshkov's
their strategy and forces to the expectation that the publication of the Morskoi Sbomik series, 'Navies in
Soviet SSBN fleet and its 'pro-SSBN' forces will be War and Peace'? Contrary to the opinion of most
'dug in' in home waters? One response was that the analysts, McConnell claimed that the articles consti-
reason why the Soviet Union had chosen a bastion tuted an authoritative, Party-approved statement of
strategy mattered little; that what really counted was current Soviet Navy doctrine and strategic priorities.
that it had made this choice in fact. The key doctrinal innovation buried within the
This article disagrees and proposes instead that the series, reported McConnell, was the de-cision, made
different rationales that have been advanced to at the 24th Party Congress, to convert the Soviet
'explain''the bastions matter a great deal. At the SSBN fleet into a strategic 'fleet in being.'
'analytical' level, different explanations carry differ- McConnell explained that the implications were
ent 'logical' weight. But far more important is the twofold: first, whereas it has been previous Soviet
strategical logic of the different bastion 'models'. It doctrine for the SSBNs to participate in the war-
matters for the substance, shape, and longevity of a opening strategic nuclear strike, now they, would be
Soviet SSBN bastion strategy whether the origins "are withheld for the purpose of intra-war deterrence and
(a) doctrinal, or (b) material and technical, or (c) compellence? The second, material implication was
bureaucratic. the construction of the Delta class SSBN with the
SS-N-8. The missile's intercontinental range was
Models of bastion strategy proof, claimed McConnell, that the Soviets intended
to ensure the integrity of their strategic 'leverage' in
This article reviews the different bastion explana- protected home waters. He wrote:
tions that have been advanced by analysts since the
concept was first formulated, in the West, about 15 No longer will Soviet SSBNs have to run the gauntlet
years ago. It shows that the broad consensus on the of Western ASW forces through relatively narrow exits
de facto authenticity of a Soviet SSBN bastion strate- and then attempt to survive, precariously, on the World
gy conceals a wide diversity of opinions on Soviet Ocean. (The SSBNs would be kept instead) in local
waters, protected in a wartime environment over a pro-
motivations. It also shows that the passing of time tracted period by the main ASW and other forces of the
has seriously undermined the plausibility of different Russian fleet?
ascribed motivations. Finally, and most important,
this article shows that understanding why the Soviets A few years later, Gorshkov published The Sea

The author is an Adjunct Professor at the US Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, where he lectures in
maritime strategy and Soviet naval affairs. The views expressed are those of the author alone, and not necessarily those of
the US Navy or any other US Government agency.

© RUSI Journal Winter 1989

33
THE SOVIET NAVY'S SSBN BASTIONS: WHY EXPLANATIONS MATTER

Power of the State? The book's message, claimed Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF).
McConnell, was the same: The Soviet Union's calculation of the necessary
'correlation' of conventional and strategic forces,
Gorshkov appears to be rationalizing a political decision MccGwire has postulated, has been much more com-
to withhold a substantial portion of Soviet SLBMs from plex. While the Soviets could be reasonably certain
the strikes of the initial period in order to carry out that the SRF could enforce the existing strategic
'deterrence' in war, conduct infra-war bargaining, and nuclear balance, they could not be certain that the
influence the peace talks at the end of the war.7 credibility of their 'main branch' would not be 'out-
flanked' by American technological ingenuity. It fol-
The 'basic' decision to set aside the SSBN fleet lowed, says MccGwire, that the Soviets decided to
for intra-war withholding purposes, he stressed, was 'hedge' and 'insure' against the possibility of an
doctrinal; the decision to withhold in home waters American SRF-neutralising 'breakthrough': the So-
was made possible by the technical features (i.e., viet SSBN fleet was turned into a strategic 'insurance
long-range) of the SS-N-8. McConnell rejected the force' that would be held back and protected in bas-
argument that the SS-N-8s might be withheld from tion waters against the eventuality that, 'in the event
the initial exchange, and that.withholding was no of war, the ICBM force could be rendered impotent
more than a Soviet option that was inherent in the in some way or other . . .'? Were the latter to hap-,
technical (read 'survivable') characteristics of the pen, he postulated, the SSBNs would revert to being
SSBN. He wrote: a 'balancing force,' and be used immediately or later,
depending on military exigiencies.13
It is sometimes taken for granted that the Soviets have a
withholding strategy, simply on the strength of the MccGwire concluded that the SSBNs' insurance
inherent capabilities of the SSBN in this role. I myself function may have outlived its usefulness, and may
am reluctant to equate capabilities with intentions, be in the process of being taken over by the Soviet
especially when it is almost always necessarily a matter Union's new land-mobile missiles, the SS-24 and
of adjusting our perceptions of Russian capabilities SS-25. He did not suggest what the possible doctrinal
rather than Russian perceptions. The intentions them- implications for the Typhoons and Deltas might be.
selves have to be demonstrated; and it seems to me the
particular case before us provides an objective lesson of The material-technical model
the truth of my contention, for whatever our percep-
tions of Soviet capabilities past and present, Soviet dis-
cussions before the 24th Congress indicated SLBMs The material-technical explanation of the bastion
were to be used in a first-strike role, whereas after the concept has come in two parts. The first has sought
Congress the focus shifted from the initial to later stages to explain the Soviet failure to imitate the high-
of the war, with an especial emphasis on the value of tempo oceanic patrols of the American SSBNs in
the Navy in securing the war's 'political goal.8 terms of certain Soviet technical and operating
weaknesses. The second part has proposed that a
Strategic Rocket Forces Soviet SSBN withholding option was made possible
by technological opportunity, i.e. the arrival of the
An alternative doctrinal explanation for the So- long-range SS-N-8, and not foreordained doctrine.
viet bastion decision has been offered by Michael Technical and operational deficiencies were at the
MccGwire in his book, Military Objectives in Soviet heart of official speculations, during the second half
Foreign Policy.9 In a rather startling reversal from of the 1970s, why the Soviet SSBN fleet 'stayed at
his decade-long critique of McConnell's thesis, he home'. The 1977 annual posture statement of the
concluded that a top level doctrinal decision and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) proposed that the Soviet
not a built-in technical immunity, was responsible, submarine fleet was saddled with a highly inefficient
after all, for the Soviet SSBN withholding assign- overhaul system!4 Other analysts thought that the
ment. McConnell, MccGwire acknowledged, had SSBN fleet was short of proficient crews, suffered
been right—'his explanation and evidence were from poor mechanical reliability, or was perhaps
wrong'.10 without the command and control arrangements
MccGwire reports that the rededication of the necessary for 'positive' control at long distances from
Soviet SSBNs away from participation in the initial home.15
strategic strike to withholding, can be traced back to
a" Politburo decision, in 1966, to abjure the Benefits of new Deltas
'inevitability' of nuclear war with the United States
and the corollary decision to give first priority to Technical vulnerability was also cited as the So-
plans and capabilities for fighting and winning a pro- viet reason for development of the SS-N-8. Defense
tracted conventional conflict. Soviet decision- Secretary Donald H Rumsfield thought, in 1977, that
makers also realised, claimed MccGwire, that the production of the Yankee class had stopped, 'in part,
'safe' pursuit of this kind of Superpower war also no doubt, because the boats would have to go on sta-
depended on the longevity of the countervailing tion within range of US and allied ASW forces in
deterrence of their strategic nuclear forces. Naturally, order to cover targets in the United States'."5 The
the task of deterring the United States from turning new Deltas, armed with SS-N-8s, he explained, bene-
a losing conventional 'long war' into a mutually-dev- fited the Soviet Union in two ways:
astating nuclear exchange was made the responsibili- D they could 'cover major targets in the United
ty of the Soviet Union's most numerous and most States from launchpoints as distant as the Barents
capable strategic arm: the land-based missiles of the Sea and the North Pacific'; and
34
 THE SOVIET NAVY'S SSBN BASTIONS: WHY EXPLANATIONS MATTER

interest. Decisions on policy, military doctrine, or

D 'such deployments, relatively close to home ports,
weapons are said instead to accommodate and mirror
allow more time on station (the equivalent of
a mix of national and competing institutional inter-
having additional SSBNs) and provide a degree of
ests. Political prudence dictates that the organisation
sanctuary from anti-submarine warfare (ASW)
craft its stand in a way that does not invite accusa-
forces.'17 .
tions of self-aggrandising parochialism; the 'solution'
Before he had come to the conclusion that a doc- is to reformulate organisational preferences as
trinal shift underlay the creation of the bastions after national preferences, or to recast new capabilities or
all, MccGwire had been the staunchest defender of programmes that promote the organisation's essence
the technical rationale for Soviet SSBN withhold- as evolutionary continuities of organisational mis-
ing. Some or even all Soviet SLBMs, be they the sions that already exist and have long been agreed
(relatively) short-range Yankee-based SS-N-6 or the upon. For example, during the 1950s, the US Army
much longer-range SS-N-8, he argued, could and would justify its long-range ballistic missile pro-
probably would be withheld from the initial gramme as a natural extension of its artillery role,
• exchange. But, he insisted, in 1976, that and the Air Force would claim responsibility for
developing the intercontinental ballistic missile
the evidence in the Gorshkov series will not support (ICBM) by portraying it as an unmanned strategic
the conclusion that Gorshkov is advocating a doctrinal
rationalisation for the political decision to withhold a bomber. Similarly, the US Navy has found that cost-
substantial portion of Soviet SLBM in order to carry ly shipbuilding programmes are likely to be funded
out 'deterrence' in war, conduct intra-war bargaining more readily if they are justified in terms of interna-
and influence the peace talks at the end of the war.18 tional obligations and coalition warfare instead of
unilateral US, or even worse, US Navy purposes.
SS-N-8 overcomes SS-N-6 The notion that the Soviet SSBN bastions are
perhaps a creature of Soviet Navy institutional inter-
Instead, come war, Soviet 'decisions on [the ests is implicit in the argument that the reassignment
SSBNs'] use will depend on evolving operational of Soviet naval general purposes forces from
requirements, the course and nature of the war, and
the opportunities to influence its outcome.'19 Natur-
ally, explained MccGwire, all but the few forward-
deployed Yankees would be withheld from the
opening strategic salvo, for the simple reason that
their movement to within SS-N-6 launch distance of
continental US targets had to await the preliminary
destruction of key Western ASW defences.20 Mcc-
Gwire conceded that the intercontinental-range
Delta-carried SS-N-8 had overcome the Yankee-
based SS-N-6 time-distance constraint. In this case,
he averred, the option to withhold was no more than
a function of the weapon's technical characteristics:
The option of being withheld from the initial nuclear
exchange is inherent in any weapon system which has a
high chance of surviving that exchange . . . the way in
which such systems are used will depend on the unfore-
seeable circumstances and requirements of the post-
exchange period. It is unlikely that a military-political
leadership would be prepared to tie their hands as to use
or non-use, in advance?

The bureaucratic model

The most intriguing explanation of the Soviet

bastion choice is perhaps the one that has sought to
link techno-strategic opportunities and constraints
with what is held to be the Soviet Navy's perception
of its 'organisational essence'. As defined by the
term's originator, Morton H Kaplan, organisational
essence is

the view held by the dominant group in the organisa-

tion of what the missions and capabilities should be?2

Derived from the study of the behaviour of large The Typhoon class has few of the acoustic vulnerabilities that marked
organisations, the concept proposes that national the first-generation Soviet SSBNs, yet is still widely expected to limit
defence choices are rarely, if ever, the product of its wartime patrols to near-home bastion waters.
pure 'rationality' in the service of the 'national' (Photo: US DoD)

35
THE SOVIET NAVY'S SSBN BASTIONS: WHY EXPLANATIONS MATTER

the priority, in the 1960s, of combatting US SSBNs the 'facts' never speak for themselves, and it is there-
to protecting Soviet SSBNs was motivated by the fore tempting to conclude that the reality of the bas-
realisation that the technical chances of carrying off tions is very short on evidence, but very long on
the former were close to nil. It suggests that the inference!
pro-SSBN mission came about because of a fleet in But does it really matter that inferences do not
search-of-a-mission. agree as long as the 'facts' do? How important is it to
understand the potential opponent's motivations as
McGruther's argument long as one has deciphered his behaviour in practice?
This article proposes that it does. At the broadest
The most compelling bureaucratic model of the level of international behaviour, it clearly makes a
bastion strategy is the work of Kenneth R difference for the kinds,of policies that the West
McGruther in his book, The Evolving Soviet Navy}3 might pursue if Soviet goals are believed to be mo-
Writing in 1978, McGruther reported that the new tivated by ideological aspirations and methods that
types of ships and weapons being fielded by the Sovi- reject conventional calculations of inter-state con-
et Navy were 'to a great extent only explainable in duct. Clearly also, the 'right' military decision, be it
terms of economic pressures, bureaucratic politics, doctrinal or hardware, depends, in part, on the
and institutional perspectives'.24 He agreed that the expectation that it will make a difference for the
'first-generation' Soviet blue water fleet of the 1960s opponent's calculations; a strategic force posture and
had truthfully been the 'rational' product of threat- doctrine built around the concept of 'assured destruc-
responsive necessity and the technologies then at tion' would make little sense without the assumption
hand. Next however, 'possessed of new impressive of mutual rationality.
looking ships and powerful weapon systems,' the
naval leadership looked for 'the trick... to find a way START
to continue the existing trend by expanding the
rationale—or finding a new one1.25 If this line of reasoning is accepted, it follows that
McGruther believes that the Soviet political lead- understanding the Soviet SSBN bastion rationale is
ership was initially sold on the Navy's vision of a an important matter for Western defence planners. If
'dream fleet' with the full panoply of cruisers and air- a bastion strategy was forced upon the Soviet Union
craft carriers, when it 'bought' the promise that a because of certain technical constraints, then the
'balanced fleet' would join with other aerospace elimination of those constraints will presumably
defence forces, and contribute to the national task of bring about a different SSBN patrol routine. As an
deflating the weight of an enemy ballistic missile example, if, as have been speculated by some ana-
attack. Once the 'new' Soviet Navy had put to sea lysts, the bulk of the Soviet strategic submarine fleet
however, its leadership reputedly discovered that the is kept in port due to a shortage of qualified crews, a
practicality of 'strategic' ASW fell far short of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) might
promise, and that preservation of the organisation's just serve to solve this problem. It has been estimated
essence called for a different rationale. The Navy's that START could result in a 'high-quality' Soviet
'solution', claims McGruther, was the 'notion of SSBN force of Typhoons and Delta IVs numbering no
designing (or at least justifying) other portions of the more than about 10. In that case, crew selection and
fleet in terms of protecting (the) SSBNs...'. Presum- training can be more rigorous, and the task of creat-
ably, the Navy's reasoning turned on the awareness ing the command and control arrangements for keep-
that a safe and secure strategic retaliatory force had ing a large percentage of the fleet at sea more
become a national priority, and that it would there- manageable.
fore be
Face-saving device
much better to justify forces with arguments that are
easily understood, that appeal to the general instincts of The bureaucratic explanation is the most intrigu-
higher echelons, and that correspond closely with what ing of the three bastion models discussed. It is also
others are doing?6 the most volatile of the three, for the simple reason
that it is self-negating. If it is true that Soviet naval
In short, the bureaucratic model interprets the declaratory doctrine bears little relationship to the
SSBN bastions as evidence of. a Soviet Navy forces actually being built, but mirrors instead what
'militarism' that is largely irrelevant to military the Navy believes will 'sell' at the Politburo, then
efficiency.27 clearly, the West can afford few certain expectations
about the Soviet Navy's 'real' wartime designs. If the
Why explanations matter bastions and the Soviet fleet's pro-SSBN defensive
task are part and parcel, in fact, of an internal pro-
What is striking about the foregoing discussion is curement strategy, no clue is given as to the actual
that the small group of Western specialist who have war-fighting strategy of either the strategic or general
made the study of Soviet naval matters their liveli- purpose aspects of Soviet naval power.
hood encompasses such a wide divergence of opin- The claim by McGruther and others that the pro-
ions about the 'whys' and 'wherefores'. Its members SSBN mission may have been 'invented' by the
do, after all, read die same literature, publish in the Soviet Navy as a face-saving device when the leader-
same journals, and have equal access, more or less, to ship had presumably come to recognise that the ear-
the same classified intelligence data. It is said that lier anti-SSBN justification for its 'dream fleet' had
36
 THE SOVIET NAVY'S SSBN BASTIONS: WHY EXPLANATIONS MATTER

become untenable, is doubtful on at least two counts. was a shortfall in capabilities that compelled the
In the first place, it confuses Soviet declarations of Soviet Navy to trade in its anti-SSBN role for a new
naval tasks with actual wartime functions. When pro-SSBN mission? Is the implication therefore that,
Soviet naval writers cite the defeat of the opponent's assuming the fleet can 'fix' its strategic ASW poten-
SSBNs as a 'main' or 'national' task, they connote tial, it will revert to the 'old' mission? And if so, does
ambitions—not necessarily the war-fighting roles that mean that the bastions will cease to exist?
and missions of capabilities already in hand. Anti-
SSBN operations and capabilities necessarily became One-time gap will narrow
a Soviet Navy requirement for the simple reason that
only military organisations are responsible and can The material-technical model that holds that a
create the wherewithal for countering new external bastion strategy was forced upon the Soviets due to
threats. It is quite certain that the Soviet Navy of their SSBNs' acoustic vulnerability, made good sense
the 1980s is incapable of carrying off a strategic during the late 1960s and early 1970s. The Yankees
ASW campaign with more than perhaps a 'token' and the early Deltas were noisy boats that stood little
measure of success; its prospects more than 15 years chance of escaping detection while in transit to their
ago, when the alleged conversion to pro-SSBN was Atlantic and Pacific patrol stations. The hypothesis
made, were even dimmer. This is not the same as nevertheless raises a question: why should the Sovi-
saying, however, that the Soviets have given up on ets have been particularly worried that their SSBNs
the ambition of neutralising the Western were being detected and perhaps even tracked
SSBN—recent Soviet writings point to a quite con- throughout their patrols in peacetime? If they were
trary conclusion.28 concerned (and this seems extremely unlikely) that
Western ASW forces might strike-out-of-the-blue,
An easier strategy to perform they could hardly have seized upon a worse solution
than a bastion strategy that evidently keeps most of
The second difficulty with the argument that the the boats tied up in a few highly geographically con-
preservation of organisational essence prompted the centrated ports and harbours:9
Soviet Navy hierarchy to change the terms of the The problem with single-cause explanations of the
'balanced fleet debate' and advocate the merits of a Soviet Navy's bastion strategy is that when the
pro- instead of anti-SSBN strategy, is the implication alleged cause is removed, the explanation is neces-
that the first is, somehow, easier to perform. While sarily falsified. This appears to be the fate of the
no one has yet fought a strategic ASW campaign material-technical model. If vulnerability to detec-
either against or in support of SSBNs, it is not clear tion was indeed the original rationale for the bas-
at all that this is so. Indeed, a strong case can be tions, then the Western solution for maintaining this
made that the kind of Soviet SSBN 'bastion defence' state of affairs (if this is indeed desirable) is obvious:
that has been portrayed in Western writings may be 'push' technology to maintain the West's detection
much more difficult to carry off (and at considerable advantage. Unfortunately, a series of widely-
risk) than a strategic, damage-limiting offensive publicised reports and testimony by Western ASW
against the opponent's SSBNs. For example, can a experts and high-level naval officials in recent years
Soviet command and control system that some ana- have left little doubt that the one-time 'gap' will
lysts claim is incapable of 'managing' a US-style probably continue to narrow instead'0 In 1987, the
oceanic SSBN patrol routine, be realistically expect- former Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic
ed to efficiently orchestrate the wartime pro-SSBN (SACLANT), Admiral Wesley L McDonald,
patrols of many dozens of'shotgun-riding' attack •sub- described the Typhoon class SSBN as the 'quietest
marines, surface combatants, and maritime patrol submarine yet to be built anywhere', yet, as far as
aircraft? And if the assessment, since the early 1980s, publicly known, the Typhoon's acoustic superiority
is correct, that the Soviet Union plans to hide its has not brought about a change in the Soviet Navy's
Typhoons and Deltas underneath the north polar ice, peacetime SSBN patrol routine?1 The material-
then how did the Soviet Navy leadership go about technical explanation of the bastions says otherwise.
persuading the General Staff and Politburo that
Kirov-size battlecruisers and Tbilisi class aircraft car- Declared policy of no first-use
riers were mandatory prerequisites for an arctic bas-
tion strategy? It has been proposed by some members The authority of the bastions' doctrinal model
of Mikhail Gorbachev's coterie of strategic academi- hinges on the longevity of the inferred Soviet calcu-
cians that pre-gtasnost military programmes were lation of the purpose and conduct of a future general
decided upon in secrecy and without the benefit of war. McConnell's 'intra-war bargaining' and Mcc-
responsible civilian oversight, but that, from now on, Gwire's 'insurance' models for Soviet SSBN with-
scrutinous calculations of cost and efficiency will holding incorporate rather different appreciations of
dictate which and how Soviet national security that calculation. McConnell interpreted the with-
objectives are to be achieved. Perhaps so. But if it is holding of Soviet SSBN fire as part and parcel of a
indeed true that the pre-perestroika military leader- Soviet doctrinal presupposition that a war between
ship had a, more or less, free hand in deciding how the two Superpowers would probably be general,
and in what programmes defence roubles would be intercontinental, and nuclear. MccGwire drew quite
invested, then there seems to have been little need the opposite conclusion, namely that SSBN with-
for the Navy's convoluted balanced fleet rationale. holding was the logical corollary to a new (since the
Finally, should one accept the hypothesis that it mid-1960s) Soviet doctrinal presumption against
37
THE SOVIET NAVY'S SSBN BASTIONS: WHY EXPLANATIONS MATTER

general nuclear war. efficacy of the Soviet Union's land-based strategic

It is fair to say that most Western students of So- forces dependent on the survival of an SSBN 'back-
viet military affairs agree that the Soviet Union has stop' that is least likely, in fact, to survive a pro-
rejected nuclear war as the 'inevitable' or even the longed conventional war intact. No one knows how
most likely form of large-scale East-West hostilities. more or less successful (from a technical-operational
Many believe that the Soviets are serious about their point of view) a Western strategic ASW effort might
declared policy of no first-use, and that the General be, but there is no doubt that some Soviet SSBNs
Staffs contingency planning has placed priority on would be sunk. In other words, the security of the
conventional weapons for war-fighting and on nuc- Soviet SSBN fleets has, arguably, already been 'out-
lear weapons for deterring the West's first-use of flanked' by conventional Western ASW means. By
atomic force. contrast, the non-nuclear wherewithal does not exist
today to 'dig out' the Soviet ICBM fields. If, as the
Permanent solution with SS-24s and SS-25s bastions' insurance explanation claims, the ultimate
purpose of the Soviet SSBN fleet is to guard against
If this assessment is correct, important questions unwanted nuclear escalation, then how shall the
are raised for the intra- and post-war bargaining Soviets react to the slow-moving cancellation of
utility of a withheld Soviet SSBN fleet. If the Soviet their insurance 'premium'?
Union has indeed come to the conclusion that not If MccGwire's doctrinal model is the correct bas-
even the 'cause' of a war with the United States war- tion explanation, and if it is true that the new
rants the use of nuclear force, it is difficult to see why generation of Soviet mobile land-based missiles has
it would then take the risk and try to influence the rendered the bastion 'interim solution' obsolete, it
course of (conventional) hostilities by way of strate- logically follows that the Typhoons and Deltas
gic nuclear blackmail. Furthermore, the intra- or will assume a new withholding mission for a
post-war coercive promise of the withheld SSBNs purpose other than insuring against an American
would presumably depend on the prevalence of an technological breakthrough against the land-based
overall favourable correlation of strategic nuclear strategic leg. What could this new mission be, and
forces. That is to say, the withheld SSBNs would what are the implications for Western counter-
(and could) come into their own as a war-influenc- strategies?
ing lever only if and when the initial land-based Finally, if the doctrinal raison d'etre of the Soviet
strikes had produced a Soviet 'strategic advantage'. SSBN fleet can indeed best be explained as the So-
But a conventional war will leave the strategic viet Union's way of insuring against the possible
inventories on both sides intact, and therefore keep future vulnerability of its land-based strategic forces,
the Soviet Union from obtaining the favourable post then what might be the 'premium adjustments' that
first-exchange balance of strategic nuclear forces that will follow if the American Strategic Defense Initia-
would be the prerequisite for the SSBNs' war- tive (SDI) comes to fruition, and 'outflanks' the
terminating leverage. This being so, the question Eurasian landmass? Is it possible that the SSBNs will
becomes what intra-conventional war deterrence/ 'resume' their 'insurance' function at dispersed equa-
compellence purposes are served by a withheld torial latitudes?32
Soviet SSBN fleet today?
MccGwire's insurance model solves this question, Conclusion
but it raises others. It proposes that the SSBNs' pro-
tected withholding assignment amounted to a (tem- Understanding why the opposite side makes
porary) 'fix', designed to guard against the possibility certain strategic choices, why it builds the kinds of
of an American technological 'outflanking' manoeu- weapons it does, and why its military manoeuvres
vre against the SRF. MccGwire has also concluded and deployments are practised differently from one's
that the rail- and road-mobile SS-24s and SS-25s are own does matter (hence the contemporary popularity
the Soviet Union's 'permanent' solution for land- of so-called 'confidence-building measures'). It makes
based ICBM vulnerability, that consequently the a great deal of difference for the efficacy of Western
SSBN insurance 'premium' will no longer need to be wartime counter-plans whether observed Soviet
paid, and that therefore the requirement for a bastion peacetime SSBN patrol practices are dictated by
strategy will become obsolete, and the bastions material constraints, doctrinal preferences, or institu-
themselves de-established. tional interests. Depending on the explanation, the
likely wartime behaviour of the Soviet SSBN fleet
A familiar ring and associated 'pro-SSBN' general purpose forces
becomes more or less predictable, and so in conse-
The bastions' 'insurance' explanation is attractive quence, the ability of Western naval power to (more
because it has a familiar ring. It is appealing, in part or less) influence events. The Soviet Union has
because it faithfully echoes the long-standing Amer- never acknowledged the existence of a wartime
ican reasoning on behalf of a strategic triad, namely bastion strategy—it is strictly a Western construct!
the argument that only a combination of manned This construct has served as a powerful descriptive
bombers, ICBMs and SLBMs can ensure against the framework of Soviet naval behaviour, but it has
possibility that one all-out Soviet technological failed at the explanatory level of analysis. Because
effort might neutralise a single-leg deterrent. of this, it can offer the analyst few 'plannable'
The drawback of the insurance rationale for the clues to the future modus operandi of the Soviet
bastions is that it proposes to make the deterrence SSBN fleet.
38
 THE SOVIET NAVY'S SSBN BASTIONS: WHY EXPLANATIONS MATTER
1 Statement of Rear Admiral William O Studeman, US Military Publishing House, 1988).
Navy, Director of Naval Intelligence, Before the Seapower and 29 A graphic depiction of the geographical concentration of
Strategic and Critical Materials Subcommittee of the House the Soviet Northern Fleet's submarine basing complex can be
Armed Services Committee on Intelligence Issues. Washington, found in my Soviet Submarines: Design, Development, and Tactics
DC, 1 March, 1988, p. 4. (London: Jane's Information Group, 1989), p. 175.
2 See Jan Breemer, 'The Soviet Navy's SSBN Bastions: Evi- 30 See the Report of the Advisory Panel on Submarine and Anti-
dence, Inference, and Alternative Scenarios,' RUSI Journal, June submarine Warfare to the House Armed Services Committees on
1985; 'US Maritime Strategy: A Re-Appraisal,' Naval Forces, Research and Development and Seapower and Strategic and Critical
April 1987; and 'The Soviet Navy's SSBN Bastions: New Ques- Materials (unclassified edition) (Washington, DC, March 21,
tions Raised,' RUSI Journal, June 1987. 1989).
3 The English language translation of 'Navies in War and 31 Wesley L McDonald, 'A Priority Shift from N A T O Could
Peace' was published in 11 successive installments of the US Invite Disaster'. The Almanac of Seapower 1987 (Arlington, VA:
Naval Institute Proceedings, January through February 1974. Navy League of the United States, 1987), p. 70.
4 James M McConnell, 'Gorshkov's doctrine of Coercive 32 The argument that Soviet SSBNs, deployed at equatorial
Naval Diplomacy in Both War and Peace'; James M McConnell, latitudes, may be relatively safe from space-based SDI coverage
Robert G D Weinland, and Michael K MccGwire, Admiral has been advanced by, among others, Jeffrey R Cooper in 'SDI
Gorshkov on 'Navies in War and Peace', Report No. CRC 2757 and the Sub Threat,' US Naval Institute Proceedings, December
(Arlington, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 1974), p. 74. 1988, p. 22.
5 Ibid.
6 S G Gorshkov, Morskaya moshch gosudarstva, 2nd rev. ed.
Moscow: Military Publishing House of the Ministry of Defense of
the USSR, 1976. Published in the English language as The Sea
Power of the State (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1979).
7 James M McConnell, 'The Gorshkov Articles, the New
Gorshkov Book, and Their Relation to Policy' in Michael Mcc-
Gwire and John McDonnell, Eds., Soviet Naval Influence:
Domestic and Foreign Dimensions (New York, NY: Praeger Publish-
ers, 1977), p. 577.
8 Ibid., p. 585.
9 Michael MccGwire, Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign
Policy (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution), 1987.
10 This comment was footnoted in a draft to MccGwire's
book, but deleted from the published version of Military We will never
forget you
Objectives.
11 Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy, pp. 36-66.
12 Ibid., p. 153
13 Ibid, pp. 98-102.
14 Joint Chiefs of Staff, United States Military Posture for FY
1978 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1977),
pp. 13-14.
15 See, for example, Ian Bellany, 'Sea Power and the Soviet
Submarine Forces', Survival (London), January/February 1982,
p. 5.
16 Annual Department of Defense Report FY 1978 (Washing-
ton, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 62.
17 Ibid., p. 63.
18 Michael MccGwire, 'Naval Power and Soviet Oceans Pol-
icy' in John Hardt and Herman Franssen, Eds., Soviet Oceans
Development. Report prepared by the Congressional Research
Service for the use of the US Senate, Committee on Commerce
and National Ocean Policy Study, 94th Congress, 2nd session,
1976 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1976),
p. 171.
19 Ibid.
20 Michael MccGwire, 'The Evolution of Soviet Naval Pol-
icy, 1960-74' in Michael MccGwire, Ken Booth, and John
McDonnell, Eds. Soviet Naval Policy: Objectives and Constraints
(New York, NY: Praeger Publishers, 1975), pp. 498-501.
Please Remember
21 Michael MccGwire, 'Naval Power and Soviet Oceans Pol- A donation, a covenant, a legacy or through
icy', p. 182 the Payroll Giving Scheme to The Army
22 Morton Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy Benevolent Fund will help soldiers,
(Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1974), p. 28 ex-soldiers and their families in distress
23 Kenneth R McGruther, The Evolving Soviet Navy (New-
port, RI: Naval War College Press, 1978).
24 Ibid., p. 3. THE ARMY BENEVOLENT FUND
25 Ibid., p. 24. DEFT.RUS1 41 QUEEN'S GATE, LONDON SW7 5HR
26 Ibid., p. 34.
27 On the distinction between 'militarism' and the 'military
way,' see Alfred Vagts, A History of Militarism—Civilian and
Military, revised edition (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1959),
p. 13.
28 For example, the recently-published Soviet book, The
Navy: It's Role, Prospects for Development, and Employment cites
'repulse of an enemy aerospace attack', including the 'hunting
and destroying the principal strategic weapon platforms in sea
and ocean theaters' as a naval mission 'of vital importance to the
state'. The book in question was edited by S G Gorshkov, and
included the contributions of Rear Admiral N P V'yunenko and
Captains 1st Rank B N Makeyev and V D Skugarev (Moscow:

39