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SS>upreme <!Court Third I; i , 1 •• i. in

manila AUG 1 7 2018

THIRD DIVISION

ACHERNAR B. TABUZO, A.C. No. 12005

Complainant,
Present:

VELASCO, JR., Chairman

BERSAMIN,
- versus - LEONEN,
MARTIRES,
GESMUNDO, JJ

ATTY. JOSE ALFONSO M. Promulgated:

GOMOS,

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8

x -- -- -- -- H H H H H H H H -- H -- -- - -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- x

RESOLUTION

GESMUNDO, J.:

The filing of an administrative complaint against an adjudicator is not

the proper remedy for assailing the legal propriety of an adverse decision,
order, resolution or recommendation, in the case of administrative
complaints against lawyers. More importantly, the reckless practice of filing
baseless administrative complaints against fellow lawyers undeniably
degrades rather than cleanses the ranks of the legal profession.

The Antecedents:

Before the Court is a Verified Complaint' filed by Atty. Achernar B.

Tabuzo (complainant) against Atty. Jose Alfonso M. Gomos (respondent)2

1
Rollo, pp. 2-19.
2
His term as commissioner ended last June 30, 2017; see rollo, p. 79.

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 . '

RESOLUTION 2 A.C. No. 12005

who was then a Commissioner of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
for allegedly committing the following acts:

2.1 Violation of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, the

Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline, Rule
139-B of the Rules of Court and Republic Act 6713 (Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public [O]fficials and
Employees;

2.2 Violation of Canon[ s] 1 and 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and

the Guidelines for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions of the Commission
on Bar Discipline;

2.3 Nonfeasance in deliberately refusing to institute disciplinary action

for serious violations of duties owed to the Courts and the Legal
Profession committed by a lawyer, despite repeated notice, and
contrary to the mandate of his office and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines;

2.4 Gross Ignorance of the Law;

2.5 All the foregoing were aggravated by: a) pattern of misconduct; b)

multiple offenses; [c)] substantial experience in the practice of law;
and [d)] betrayal of the trust of his office as Commissioner of the
Honorable Commission on Bar Discipline. 3

The controversy stemmed from an administrative complaint filed by

Lucille G. Sillo (Silla) against complainant before the IBP, docketed as CBD
Case No. 12-3457. The case was assigned to respondent for investigation
and report.

On August 15, 2014, the respondent issued a Report and

Recommendation 4 recommending that complainant be reprimanded for the
impropriety of talking to Sillo, without her counsel, prior to the calling of
their case for mediation conference, and for the abusive, offensive or
improper language used in the pleadings she filed in the said case.

The report and recommendation was adopted and approved by the IBP
Board of Governors (Board) in its Resolution No. XXI-2015-07 4, dated
January 31, 2015. 5

Hence, this administrative complaint.

3
Rollo, p. 2.
4
Id. at. 45-55.
5
Id. at 44.

111
RESOLUTION 3 A.C. No. 12005

Complainant alleged that respondent violated the Constitution, the

Rules of Procedure of the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (Commission),
Rule 139-B of the Rules Court and Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 6 when he
failed to act on her pleadings with dispatch and for issuing his report and
recommendation on August 15, 2014 or 174 days from the submission of the
last pleading. 7

Complainant averred that respondent was very cruel and heartless to

an inexperienced lawyer when he mutilated statements made in her
pleadings in CBD Case No. 12-3457; and that he maliciously cropped and
pasted portions of complainant's statement in her position paper to give the
wrong impression before the IBP-Board of Governors (Board) that the
introductory heading was an act of name calling against respondent, thereby
violating Rules 1.01 8 and 1.029 of Canon 1 and Rules 3.01, 10 3.02, 11 and
3.04 12 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. 13

Complainant asserted that respondent committed nonfeasance for

deliberately refusing to institute disciplinary action against a lawyer for
serious violation of duties owed to the Court and the legal profession despite
several notices. She alleged that as early as December 2013, respondent was
aware that Atty. Alan R. Bulawan committed forum shopping and other
grave malpractices but respondent refused to institute disciplinary action
reasoning that there should first be a verified complaint before he could act
on it. Complainant claimed that respondent's inaction was a violation of
Section 1, 14 Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court and Sec. 13 15 of the IBP's By-
Laws.16

6
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.
7
Rollo, pp. 3-7.
8
Rule 1.0 I - A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence.
9
Rule 1.02 - A judge should administer justice impartially and without delay.
10
Rule 3 .0 I - A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence.
11
Rule 3.02 - In every case, a judge shall endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and the applicable law
unswayed by partisan interests, public opinion or fear of criticism.
12
Rule 3.04 - A judge should be patient, attentive, and courteous to lawyers, especially the inexperienced,
to litigants, witnesses, and others appearing before the court. A judge should avoid unconsciously falling
into the attitude of mind that the litigants are made for the courts, instead of the courts for the litigants.
13
Rollo, pp. 7-15.
14
Section 1. How Instituted. - Proceedings for disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys may be
taken by the Supreme Court motu propio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the
verified complaint of any person. The complaint shall state clearly and concisely the facts complained of
and shall be supported by affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged
and/or by such documents as may substantiate said facts.
The IBP Board of Governors may, motu propio or upon referral by the Supreme Court or by a Chapter
Board of Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate and prosecute proper charges against erring
attorneys including those in the government service. xxx.
Six (6) copies of the verified complaint shall l?e filed with the Secretary of the IBP or the Secretary of
any of its chapters who shall forthwith transmit the same to the IBP Board of Governors for assignment
to an investigator.

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RESOLUTION 4 A.C. No. 12005

Lastly, complainant posited that respondent was grossly ignorant of

the rules on privileged communication, on evidence, on the crime of perjury,
and on forum shopping when he failed to dismiss the present administrative
case outright because it had no merit and when he ignored the perjury and
forum shopping committed by Sillo. 17

In his Answer, 18 respondent denied the allegations and contended that

they were not only false and an unfortunate misappreciation of the laws,
facts and circumstances but also an act of harassment. He countered that it
was complainant who caused the delay of the resolution of the case because
of the numerous motions and pleadings she filed. Also, the report and
recommendation was based on facts, law and jurisprudence which was
adopted and approved by the IBP Board. If complainant felt aggrieved by
the report and recommendation, she could have filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Board's January 31, 2015 Resolution.

In Reply, 19 complainant claimed that the only proof that the report and
recommendation was adopted and approved by the Board was the Notice of
Resolution; and when she asked for a copy of the transcript and resolution of
the case, she was informed by the head of the records section that it was
confidential and that she should file a manifestation to secure a copy.
Furthermore, complainant argued that it was respondent who was guilty of
singling her out when he reprimanded her for alleged belligerence in her
pleadings and papers, and maintained that respondent was grossly ignorant,
inefficient and had no regard for due process of law.

The Report and Recommendation of the IBP

In its Report and Recommendation, 20 the Commission recommended

the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit. It ratiocinated that
complainant's allegations while seemingly couched as acts of misconduct,
actually assails the report and recommendation of respondent as
investigating commissioner in CBD Case No. 12-3457. The Commission
stated that it would be irregular and improper to review such findings

15
Section 13. Malfeasance, misfeasance, nonfeasance. - Notwithstanding the prov1s1ons of the next
preceding section, the Board of Governors may motu proprio or upon the petition of any person, inquire
into any malfeasance, misfeasance, or nonfeasance committed by any member of the Integrated Bar or of
any of its Chapters, and, after due hearing, take whatever action it may deem warranted. Such action may
include his suspension or removal from any office in the Integrated Bar or of its Chapters held by such
erring member, as well as recommendation to the Supreme Court for his suspension from the practice of
law or disbarment.
16
Rollo, pp. 15-16.
17
Id. at 17.
18
Id. at 79-85.
19
Id. at 86-89.
20
Id. at 174-177.

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 RESOLUTION 5 A.C. No. 12005

because it would be tantamount to reopening matters and issues that have

been passed upon and approved by the IBP Board. The Commission agreed
with the respondent that if complainant felt aggrieved by such findings, her
option would have been to file a motion for reconsideration or some other
appropriate remedy, but not an administrative case against the investigating
comm1ss1oner.

On August 27, 2016, the Board, in its Resolution No. XXII-2016-468,

adopted the Commission's report and recommendation dismissing the
complaint.

Undeterred, complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration21

insisting that respondent, as an investigating commissioner, has an
accountability to the legal profession separate and distinct from that of the
IBP Board and such accountability is not a mere administrative matter inside
the IBP-Commission. Complainant insisted that respondent could be held
accountable independently of the Board or the staff assigned to him when he
issued a late report and recommendation and issued it without the mandatory
conference being held, and with no actual admissions or stipulations of facts
and no definition of issues. Complainant averred that respondent cannot
choose his deadline for submitting a report and recommendation, and his
failure to decide a case within the required period constitutes gross
inefficiency. 22

Complainant posited that respondent could be held administratively

liable because he was a quasi-judicial officer performing functions delegated
by the Court, hence, a public officer. 23

On February 23, 2017, respondent filed his Comment24 stating that the
complainant's motion for reconsideration was a mere rehash of the
arguments raised in her complaint and position paper. Respondent reiterated
that he immediately acted on the administrative case filed against
complainant as soon as he received the records of the case; and that the
cause of delay was due to the several motions filed by complainant instead
of just filing the required position paper. The respondent emphasized that the
report and recommendation was a product of a conscientious study of all the
pleadings submitted by the parties and application of the law and
jurisprudence.

21
Id. at 178-190.
22
Id. at 179-183.
23
Id. at 183-190.
24
Id. at 195-199.

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 RESOLUTION 6 A.C. No. 12005

Respondent added that complainant's inordinate liberty in calling him

"grossly ignorant" and "grossly inefficient" at practically every turn or page
of her pleadings notably characterizes her penchant for name-calling her
adversaries. He believed that he was clearly being harassed and singled out
considering that his report and recommendation was approved by the
majority members of the Board.

In its Resolution No. XXII-2017-1120 25 dated May 27, 2017, the

Board denied the motion for reconsideration.

On February 5, 2018, the IBP transmitted before the Court the records
of the case for final disposition. 26

The issues to be resolved are: (1) whether respondent may be held

administratively liable in the same manner as judges and other government
officials; and (2) whether respondent may be held administratively liable for
rendering an alleged adverse ·judgment in his capacity as an investigating
commissioner of the IBP.

The Court's Ruling

On the Respondent's Ascription of

Liability in the Same Manner as
Judges or Other Government
Officials Due to His Position as
Commissioner on Bar Discipline:

In order to have a meaningful understanding of the nature of the

functions and accountabilities of an IBP Commissioner, it is necessary to
first identify the character of the IBP as an organization. To do this, the
Court deems it imperative to dig deep and trace its legislative and
jurisprudential background.

The IBP' s existence traces its roots to Sec. 13, Article VIII of the
1935 Constitution which stated that:

Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to

promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be

25
Id. at 203.
26
Id. at 202.

f 11
RESOLUTION 7 A.C. No. 12005

uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase,
or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice, and
procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of
Courts, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the
same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter or
supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure,
and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines. (emphases
supplied)

In view of this provision, Congress enacted R.A. No. 6397 27 which

gave this Court the facility to initiate the integration process of the
Philippine Bar; the provisions of which read:

Section 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the
Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the
Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise
the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice,
and enable the bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.

Section 2. The sum of five hundred thousand pesos is hereby

appropriated, out of any funds in the National Treasury not otherwise
appropriated, to carry out the purposes of this Act. Thereafter, such sums
as may be necessary for the same purpose shall be included in the annual
appropriations for the Supreme Court.

Section 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval. (emphasis
supplied)

Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution was ratified wherein Sec. 5(5) of

Art. X enumerated the powers of this Court, thus:

Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in

all courts, the admission to the practice of law, and the integration of the
bar, which, however, may be repealed, altered or supplemented by the
Batasang Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase,
or modify substantive rights. (emphasis supplied)

Finally, the legal quandary pertaining to the integration of the

Philippine Bar culminated in the promulgation of In the Matter of the

27
An Act Providing for the Integration of the Philippine Bar, and Appropriating Funds Therefor
(September 17, 1971 ).

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RESOLUTION 8 A.C. No. 12005

Integration of the Bar of the Philippines28 where the Court upheld the
integration of the Philippine Bar on the ground that it was sanctioned by Sec.
13, Art. VIII of the 1935 Constitution.

Following this judicial pronouncement, Presidential Decree (P.D.)

No. 181 29 was enacted formally creating the IBP and vesting it with
corporate personality. Sec. 2 of the law states:

Section 2. The Integrated Bar shall have perpetual succession

and shall have all legal powers appertaining to a juridical person,
particularly the power to sue and be sued; to contract and be contracted
with; to hold real and personal property as may be necessary for corporate
purposes; to mortgage, lease, sell, transfer, convey and otherwise dispose
of the same; to solicit and receive public and private donations and
contributions; to accept and receive real and personal property by gift,
devise or bequest; to levy and collect membership dues and special
assessments from its members; to adopt a seal and to alter the same at
pleasure; to have offices and conduct its affairs in the Greater Manila Area
and elsewhere; to make and adopt by-laws, rules and regulations not
inconsistent with the laws of the Philippines or the Rules of Court,
particularly Rule 139-A thereof; and generally to do all such acts and
things as may be necessary or proper to carry into effect and promote the
purposes for which it was organized. (emphasis supplied)

Significantly, Section 630 of P.D. No. 181 still recognized this Court's
constitutional power to promulgate rules concerning the IBP, and such
power of the Court was also institutionalized and carried into the present
Constitution in which Sec. 5(5), Art. VIII now reads:

Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of

constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance
to the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase,
or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and
quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the
Supreme Court. (emphasis supplied)

Now, given the IBP's statutory and jurisprudential background, the

Court proceeds to answer the question: What branch of government created

28
151 Phil. 132 (1973).
29
Constituting the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Into a Body Corporate and Providing Government
Assistance Thereto for the Accomplishment of its Purposes (May 4, 1973).
30
Section 6. The foregoing provisions shall without prejudice to the exercise by the Supreme Court of its
rule-making power under the Constitution or to the provisions of Court Rule 139-A.

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 RESOLUTION 9 A.C. No. 12005

the IBP? More importantly: Is the IBP strictly a public office or a private
institution?

To answer both questions, the Court highlights its observations

regarding the important segments of the legal history which led to the grant
of the IBP's juridical personality, viz:

Firstly, both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions gave the Court and the
Legislature the concurrent power to regulate the practice of law. In other
words, the overlapping and coequal powers of both branches of government
to regulate the practice of law became the initial bases for the IBP's
establishment.

Secondly, Sec. 1 of R.A. No. 6397 used the phraseology "to effect the
integration" which means that Congress, though it also had the power to
enact laws affecting the practice of law under the 1935 Constitution, had
acknowledged the Court's rightful (and primary) prerogative to adopt
measures to raise the standard of the legal profession. 31 At that time, only
this Court had the power to "promulgate" rules concerning the practice of
law while Congress may only "repeal, alter or supplement" these
promulgated rules. That may be the apparent reason why Congress only
appropriated (and allowed for subsequent appropriations of) the necessary
funds to assist this Court in attaining the objective of initiating the
integration of the Philippine Bar.

Thirdly, the Court had ordained the integration of the Philippine Bar
to: a) assist in the administration of justice; b) foster and maintain on the part
of its members high ideals of integrity, learning, professional competence,
public service and conduct; c) safeguard the professional interests of its
members; d) cultivate among its members a spirit of cordiality and
brotherhood; e) provide a forum for the discussion of law, jurisprudence, law
reform, pleading, practice and procedure, and the relations of the Bar to the
Bench and to the public, and publish inforrriation relating thereto; f)
encourage and foster legal education; g) promote a continuing program of
legal research in substantive and adjective law, and make reports and
recommendations thereon; h) enable the Bar to discharge its public
responsibility effectively; i) render more effective assistance in maintaining
the Rule of Law; j) protect lawyers and litigants against the abuse of
tyrannical judges and prosecuting officers; k) discharge, fully and properly,
its responsibility in the disciplining and/or removal of incompetent and

31
In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been
disputably a judicial function and responsibility [In re: Cunanan, et al., 94 Phil. 534, 544 (1954)).

,At/
 RESOLUTION 10 A.C. No. 12005

unworthy judges and prosecuting officers; 1) shield the judiciary, which

traditionally cannot defend itself except within its own forum, from the
assaults that politics and self-interest may level at it, and assist it to maintain
its integrity, impartiality and independence; m) have an effective voice in the
selection of judges and prosecuting officers; n) prevent the unauthorized
practice of law, and break up any monopoly of local practice maintained
through influence or position; o) establish welfare funds for families of
disabled and deceased lawyers; p) provide placement services, and establish
legal aid offices and set up lawyer reference services throughout the country
so that the poor may not lack competent legal service; q) distribute
educational and informational materials that are difficult to obtain in many
of our provinces; r) devise and maintain a program of continuing legal
education for practicing attorneys in order to elevate the standards of the
profession throughout the country; s) enforce rigid ethical standards, and
promulgate minimum fees schedules; t) create law centers and establish law
libraries for legal research; u) conduct campaigns to educate the people on
their legal rights and obligations, on the importance of preventive legal
advice, and on the functions and duties of the Filipino lawyer; and v)
generate and maintain pervasive and meaningful country-wide involvement
of the lawyer population in the solution of the multifarious problems that
afflict the nation. 32

Fourthly, P.D. No. 181 endowed the IBP with the attributes of
perpetual succession and, more importantly, "all legal powers appertaining
to a juridical person." It means that the IBP had corporate attributes which
gave it the ability to pursue desired activities on its own, subject only to the
Court's administrative supervision.

Lastly, the present Constitution's acknowledgment of the "integrated

bar" as one of the subjects of this Court's power to promulgate rules relative
to the practice of law cements the IBP's existence as a juridical person.

The aforementioned observations indubitably establish that the

collaborative enactments of the Court, the Congress (and the President
exercising legislative powers in the case of P.D. No. 181 ), and the present
Constitution all contributed to the emergence of the IBP's juridical
personality. Due to this peculiar manner of creation, it now becomes
reasonable for the Court to conclude that the IBP is a sui generis public 33
institution deliberately organized, by both the legislative and judicial

32
Supra note 28 at 135-137.
33
C.Y The characteristics of a public office, according to Mechem, include the delegation of sovereign
functions, its creation by law and not by contract, an oath, salary, continuance of the position, scope of
duties, and the designation of the position as an office [laurel v. Desierto, 430 Phil. 658. 672 (2002)],
citing F.R. Mechem, A Treatise on the law of1'11hlic Offices and ()fficers, I.

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RESOLUTION 11 A.C. No. 12005

branches of government and recognized by the present and past

Constitutions, for the advancement of the legal profession. At this juncture,
the Court needs to determine whether the IBP's officers, especially the IBP
Commissioners, are considered as public officers under the purview of the
law.

Presently, the IBP as an organization has as its members all lawyers

coming from both the public and private sectors who are authorized to
practice law in the Philippines. However, Section 434 of the IBP's By-Laws
allows only private practitioners to occupy any position in its
organization. This means that only individuals engaged in the private
practice are authorized to be officers or employees and to perform acts for
and in behalf of the IBP. Hence, the IBP Commissioners, being officers of
the IBP, are private practitioners performing public functions delegated
to them by this Court in the exercise of its constitutional power to regulate
the practice of law. This was aptly described in Frias v. Atty. Bautista-
Lozada35 where the Court declared that:

The [IBP-CBD] derives its authority to take cognizance of

administrative complaints against lawyers from this Court which has the
inherent power to regulate, supervise and control the practice of law in the
Philippines. Hence, in the exercise of its delegated power to entertain
administrative complaints against lawyers, the [IBP-CBD] should be
guided by the doctrines and principles laid down by this Court.
(emphasis supplied)

Even if the afore-cited case did not expound in what way the IBP-
Commission is to be "guided by the doctrines and principles laid down by
this Court," it can be reasonably inferred that the IBP-CBD's delegated
function of entertaining complaints against lawyers is public in nature;
but the responsible officer performing such function is a private
individual-not a public officer. Consequently, it also follows that IBP
Commissioners are not "public officers" in context of Sec. 3(b)36 of R.A.

34 Section 4. Non-political bar. - The Integrated Bar is strictly non-political, and every activity tending to
impair this basic feature is strictly prohibited and shall be penalized accordingly. No lawyer holding an
elective. judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision or
instrumentality thereof shall be eligible for election or appointment to any position in the Integrated Bar
or any Chapter thereof. A Delegate, Governor, officer or employee of the Integrated Bar, or an officer or
employee of any Chapter thereof shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his position as of the
moment he files his certificate of candidacy for any elective public office or accepts appointment to any
judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision or
instrumentality thereof. (emphasis supplied)
35 523 Phil. 17-20 (2006).
36 "Public Officials" includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary,

whether in the career or non-career service, including military and police personnel, whether or not they
receive compensation, regardless of amount. (emphasis supplied)

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RESOLUTION 12 A.C. No. 12005

No. 6713, Art. 203 the Revised Penal Code, 37 Sec. 4(e) 38 R.A. No. 9485, 39 or
even Sec. 2(b)40 of R.A. No. 3019. 41 Especially in the context of R.A. No.
6713, they are not "public officials" as they are not elective or appointive
officials of the "government" as defined by Sec. 3(a)42 of the same law.
Moreover, it is also obvious that IBP Commissioners cannot be held liable
for violation of Sec. 15(1 ), 43 Art. VIII of the Constitution because they are
neither members of the Judiciary in the context of the Constitution or
statutory provisions organizing lower collegiate and trial courts nor quasi-
judicial officers in the context of applicable laws creating quasi-judicial
agencies. Finally, IBP Commissioners cannot be held administratively liable
for malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance in the framework of
administrative law because they cannot strictly be considered as being
"employed" with the government or of any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality including government-owned or controlled corporations. 44

Nonetheless, IBP Commissioners and other IBP officers may be held

administratively liable for violation of the rules promulgated by this Court
relative to the integrated bar and to the practice of law. Even if they are not
"public officers" in the context of their employment relationship with the
government, they are still "officers of the court" and "servants of the law"
who are expected to observe and maintain the rule of law and to make
themselves exemplars worthy of emulation by others. 45 Most importantly,
no less than Sec. 5(5) of the Constitution placed them under the Court's
administrative supervision. Therefore, IBP Commissioners may be held
administratively liable only in relation to their functions as IBP officers-
not as government officials.

37
A public officer is defined in the Revised Penal Code as "any person who, by direct provision of the law,
popular election, or appointment by competent authority, shall take part in the performance of public
functions in the Government of the Philippine Islands, or shall perform in said Government or in any of
its branches public duties as an employee, agent, or subordinate official, of any rank or class [Zoleta v.
Sandiganbayan, et al., 765 Phil. 39, 53 (2015), emphasis supplied].
38
"Officer or Employee" refers to a person employed in a government office or agency required to perform
specific duties and responsibilities related to the application or request submitted by a client for
processing. (emphasis supplied)
39
Anti-Red Tape Act of2007 (June 2, 2007).
40
"Public officer" includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary,
whether in the classified or unclassified or exempt service receiving compensation, even nominal, from
the government as defined in the preceding subparagraph. (emphasis supplied)
41
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (August 17, 1960).
42
"Government" includes the National Government, the local governments, and all other instrumentalities,
agencies or branches of the Republic of the Philippines including government-owned or controlled
corporations, and their subsidiaries.
43
All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within
twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme
Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts.
44
See Section 2( I 0), 2( 13) & 2(15), Introductory Provisions of Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative
Code of 1987, July 25, 1987); Sections 13 & 16 of Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989
November 17, 1989).
45
See De Leon v. Atty. Castelo, 654 Phil. 224, 231 (2011 ), citations omitted.

J
RESOLUTION 13 A.C. No. 12005

On the Alleged Delay of

the Resolution of CBD
Case No. 12-3457:

Sec. 1, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the IBP-CBD provides

that "[t]he only pleadings allowed are verified complaint, verified answer
and verified position papers and motion for reconsideration of a
resolution." 46 Such restrictive enumeration is consistent with the summary
nature of disciplinary proceedings as well as the basic tenets of practical
expediency encouraged by Sec. 5(5), Art. VIII of the Constitution which
mandates this Court to adopt such rules for a "simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases." Relatedly, this is also the
reason why a party has to first ask for a leave of court before filing any
pleading which is not expressly sanctioned by applicable rules of procedure.
Such practice is intended to alert litigants that the resolution of unsanctioned
motions and other pleadings seeking for affirmative reliefs is discretionary
on the part of the courts (including quasi-judicial bodies or investigatory
administrative agencies). This is because these unsanctioned pleadings
clutter up court (or any administrative quasi-adjudicative or investigative
body) records and tend to impede the speedy disposition of cases.

Concomitantly, it is settled that considering the serious consequences

of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, the Court has
consistently held that preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the
imposition of administrative penalty on a member of the Bar. 47 Here,
preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is,
as a whole, superior to or has greater weight than that of the other or that
which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is
offered in opposition thereto. 48 Conversely, bare allegations, unsubstantiated
by evidence, are not equivalent to proof. 49

In this case, the source of the complainant's main gripe against the
respondent is the supposed delay in the resolution of the following motions
as alleged50 in the complaint, to wit': -·

46
Ramientas v. Atty. Reyala, 529 Phil. 128, 135 (2006).
47
Aba, et al. v. Atty. De Guzman, Jr., et al., 678 Phil. 588, 600 (2011 ), citations omitted.
48
Castro, et al. v. Atty. Bigay, Jr., et al., A.C. No. 7824, July 19, 2017, citations omitted.
49
Real v. Belo, 542 Phil. I 09, 122 (2007), citations omitted.
50
Rollo, p. 3.

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RESOLUTION 14 A.C. No. 12005

Approximate
Motion/Pleading Filed Remarks
Days Unresolved
Motion for the Issuance of Ignored by previous
a Subpoena Duces Tecum Commissioner, denied
529 days
and Subpoena Ad by current
Testificandum Commissioner
Ignored by previous
Respondent's
Commissioner, denied
interrogatories to 529 days
by current
Complanant Lucille Sillo
Commissioner
Ignored by previous
Commissioner and
granted by current
Commissioner on the
ground that
"complaints for
Motion to Sever 349 days disbarment, suspension
or for discipline of
attorneys are to be
instituted before this
Commission by filing
six (6) copies of a
verified Complaint"
Ignored by previous
Commissioner and
deemed by current
Commissioner as
follows "Let it be
Motion to Inhibit 384 days
placed on record that
Commissioner Irving
C. Corvera may now be
deemed to have
inhibited himself xxx"

These charted allegations show that the complainant had filed several
pleadings which are not among those that are explicitly enumerated in Sec.
1, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the IBP-CBD. The rule uses the
term "only" which is patently indicative that the enumeration is tightly
restrictive. Clearly, the respondent had no positive duty at all to act on these
unsanctioned pleadings, especially in a manner favorable to the complainant.
The complainant cannot blame respondent for not acting on prohibited or
unsanctioned pleadings. Her insistence in having the aforementioned
motions resolved despite not being mentioned as among the pleadings
allowed by Sec. 1, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the IBP-CBD
actually contributed to the delay of the whole proceedings in CBD Case No.
12-3457.

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 RESOLUTION 15 A.C. No. 12005

Even if the Court were to consider the aforementioned pleadings as

not prohibited for the sake of argument, the complainant never attached in
her complaint or adduced during the hearings before the IBP-Commission
certified true copies of the same documents to show the dates of actual filing
so the periods to act on them may be fairly reckoned. She also failed to
submit copies of respondent's supposed resolutions denying or granting
these motions to show the date on when they were actually rendered or
issued. These material omissions leave this Court unable to verify with
certainty or to determine with practical accuracy the existence of delay. The
only basis of the complainant in imputing delay on the part of the respondent
was her Position Paper51 which merely alleged the existence of her motions
in CBD Case No. 12-3457 and their supposedly tarried resolution.
Undeniably, the complainant failed to offer any preponderant proof of
respondent's supposed delay in the resolutions of her motions in CBD Case
No. 12-3457 and merely relied on bare allegations and factual conclusions to
support her administrative complaint. Clearly, the quantum of proof
required in disbarment or administrative disciplinary cases was not satisfied
by the complainant. Therefore, contrary to the complainant's hasty
imputation of delay, it only appears that respondent merely disregarded the
unsanctioned pleadings filed pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule III of the Rules of
Procedure of the IBP-CBD and prudently proceeded to render the report and
recommendation thereby belying the allegations of nonfeasance.

At any rate, the Court evinces its observation that the complainant's
charge of delay in the resolution of the subject unsanctioned pleadings of the
complainant appears to be a mere retaliation on the adverse Resolution No.
XXI-205-074 dated January 31, 2015 in CBD Case No. 12-3457. The Court
had already declared that an administrative complaint is not the appropriate
remedy for every act of a judge deemed aberrant or irregular where a judicial
remedy exists and is available. 52 Similarly, an administrative complaint is
not the proper remedy for an adverse decision, order or resolution of an
administrative adjudicator deemed by a complaining party as erroneous;
especially when there are other remedies under the ordinary course of law
such as a motion for reconsideration. Thus, a party who has lost his or right
to appeal a decision, resolution or order of a court or quasi-judicial body
(including administrative offices or agencies empowered to conduct
investigations) cannot re-litigate the same matters in another administrative
case filed against the adjudicator. · ·

51
Id. at 20-43.
52
Atty. Tamondong v. Judge Pasal, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2467, October 18, 2017.

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RESOLUTION 16 A.C. No. 12005

On the Respondent's Comments

Against the Complainant in the
Report and Recommendation
for Her Behavior:

The Court has, in some instances, even conceded that "a lawyer may
think highly of his [or her] intellectual endowment." 53 Such observation is
but a moderate and fair commentary to remind members of the legal
profession to espouse humility in all their dealings not only with their clients
and with their fellow lawyers but also against their adversaries.

The respondent's comment, that the complainant "must have thought

so highly of herself that...she finds it necessary to declare that [Sillo's
words] are not words a graduate of the only Pontifical University in Asia and
a law school ran by monks would use," is merely a fair and realistic
observation. Clearly, an academic slur implicating incompetence on a
person's intellectual capabilities due to his or her scholastic background
simply amounts to an intemperate language on the complainant's part. It
finds no place in decent legal argumentation and debate. Besides, lawyers
should not be too onion-skinned and should be tolerant of criticisms
(especially those which are fair or mild) against them as litigation is
inherently a hostile endeavor between adverse or contending parties. Hence,
it was proper on the part of Commissioner Limpingco to recommend for the
dismissal of the complainant's charges of impropriety for the respondent
merely made a fair comment.

Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:

CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy,

fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid
harassing tactics against opposing counsel. (emphasis supplied)

Obviously, the filing of baseless and unfounded administrative

complaints against fellow lawyers is antithetical to conducting oneself with
courtesy, fairness and candor. It reduces the Bar's disciplinary process into
an avenue for childish bickering and trivial catfights. Realistically, filing
harassment administrative complaints definitely causes undue anxiety and
considerable psychological stress on wrongly charged respondents. Thus, it
should be understood that the aforementioned Canon proscribes the filing of

53
See Cruz v. Justice Alino-Hormachuelos, et al., 4 70 Phil. 435, 445 (2004), citations omitted.

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RESOLUTION 17 A.C. No. 12005

frivolous administrative complaints against fellow members of the legal

profession to prevent exploitative lawyers from abusing the disciplinary
process. Besides, an important portion of the Lawyer's Oath which should
be the guiding beacon of every member of the legal profession states: "I will
not wittingly nor willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful
suit, or give aid nor consent to the same."

Here, the Court cannot help but notice that even a cursory reading of
the complainant's pleadings exhibits her propensity for filing baseless
complaints and penchant for hurling denigrating allegations against her
adversaries. Moreover, the instant affidavit complaint contains a
smorgasbord of violations ascribed to the respondent which the complainant
had inaccurately and miserably failed to substantiate. Worse, the
complaint's pointless perplexity was compounded by convoluted allegations
which made it laborious for the Court to make coherent sense. Accordingly,
the Court deems it proper to sternly warn the complainant and her
collaborating counsel, Atty. Barboza, to refrain from filing and maintaining
baseless administrative suits against fellow lawyers under pain of
administrative sanctions.

Final Note

Lawyers are reminded to treat their fellow members of the legal

profession and even their non-lawyer adversaries with utmost candor,
respect and dignity. More importantly, the primary purpose of
administrative disciplinary proceedings against delinquent lawyers is to
uphold the law and to prevent the ranks of the legal profession from being
corrupted by unscrupulous practices-not to shelter or nurse a wounded ego.
Such is the reason why lawyers should always set a good example in not
using the law and the rules as weapons or tools of malicious vindication
during petty squabbles as it degrades the credibility of the legal profession
and tarnishes its integrity.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Court

AGREES with the Report and Recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines - Committee on Bar Discipline adopted by the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines - Board of Governors, and DISMISSES the administrative
complaint filed against Atty. Jose Alfonso M. Gomos.

i , .

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RESOLUTION 18 A.C. No. 12005

Furthermore, the Court STERNLY WARNS Atty. Achernar B.

Tabuzo and her collaborating counsel Atty. Gaudencio A. Barboza, Jr. to
REFRAIN from abusing the disciplinary proceedings thru filing and
maintaining frivolous administrative complaints against fellow members of
the Bar. A repetition of the same or commission of similar acts will be dealt
with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERQIJ. VELASCO, JR.

Ass£ciate Justice
hairperson

'VWA/llYfll OJ~
MA\lTIRES
Associate Justice

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