Ideas in

American POLICE
FOUNDATION
Number 7

Policing June 2005

Social Theory and the

Street Cop: The Case
of Deadly Force
By David Klinger

S
ocial theory can serve public support for their actions if world of policing where social
many functions in the they grasp the theoretical theory has guided agencies in a
public policy arena. Two underpinnings of their operations. variety of endeavors and helped
of the most important in the This is certainly the case in the the public understand both the
realm of crime and justice are:
(1) guiding the actions of
Ideas in American Policing presents commentary and insight from leading
criminal justice agencies and criminologists on issues of interest to scholars, practitioners, and policy makers.
personnel; and (2) explaining to The papers published in this series are from the Police Foundation lecture series of
the same name. Points of view in this document are those of the author and do
members of the public how and not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the Police Foundation.
why agencies and personnel act © 2005. Police Foundation and David Klinger.

the way they do. When members

of the criminal justice system David Klinger, Ph.D. is Associate Professor of Criminology and
have a good understanding of Criminal Justice at the University of Missouri–St. Louis. A former
social theory, they can use it as a Los Angeles and Redmond (WA) police officer, he has conducted
framework for setting goals, a good deal of research on the use of force by police officers and
developing procedures to fulfill regularly trains police officers and administrators on issues dealing
them, and tailoring training in with the use of deadly force. His recently released book “Into the
ways that further them. Similarly, Kill Zone,” addresses the personal issues faced by police officers
they will find it easier to explain who engage in force and the consequences of that force.
their work to laymen and increase
goals of the police and the are killed or injured in shootouts with citizens can have a marked
methods they use to reach them. with criminals and say, “Cops are effect on the likelihood of
One place where social theory heroes.” violence.
has been lacking, however, is in If we are to bridge, or at least In-depth case studies,
the critical area of deadly force. narrow, this divide and thereby practical experience, and empirical
No decision that an officer can ease the public’s disquiet, I research have demonstrated that
make is more important than the believe we must learn to think police will need to use deadly
one to pull the trigger, for doing about the phenomenon of police force less frequently if they
so is an exercise of the state’s shootings from a fresh frame of adhere to a few simple, tactical
supreme power—the ability to reference. We must find a principles. James Fyfe, for
end the lives of its citizens. standpoint that permits us to example, has written and spoken
Moreover, the social move past the passion-laden extensively during the past
consequences of exercising this medium of morality and towards quarter century about how
ultimate power can be quite a deeper understanding of the officers can use the principles of
profound, as time and again in social reality of deadly force in tactical knowledge and
our nation’s recent history police our society. Such a move might concealment to reduce the
shootings have led to political well serve to enlighten police likelihood of having to resort to
upheaval, community outrage, critics and other concerned deadly force when handling
and even full-blown riots citizens about the nature of potentially dangerous situations
(Skolnick and Fyfe 1993). police work, the dangers officers (Fyfe 2001; Scharf and Binder
Most officer-involved face, how this influences their 1983).
shootings do not prompt notable attitudes and actions, and what Simply put, the principle of
social disruption, but public we can realistically expect police tactical knowledge holds that
concern about deadly force is to do when confronted with life- officers should develop as much
always present. Americans have and-death situations. Such information as they can about
always been uneasy about being enlightenment could, in turn, each potentially violent situation
policed by an armed constabulary help the public, critics included, they are called upon to handle
(Chevigny 1996; Klinger 2004), to see that lethal force is before committing themselves to
and their queasiness finds its sometimes unavoidable; that a particular course of action. One
clearest expression among police police officers must sometimes critical component of this notion
critics who discover something to kill people to protect themselves is that officers should keep their
complain about nearly every time and other innocents from harm. distance from potential
an officer pulls the trigger. One A move away from the moral adversaries, whenever it is
reason for this state of affairs is plane might also help remind possible, so they can limit the
that discourse about the use of police and their supporters that threat they face as they seek to
deadly force has long revolved democratic policing requires understand better what is
primarily around competing restraint and forbearance on the happening. Concealment refers to
moral judgments about the part of those who carry a badge officers taking steps to limit the
police. Critics of law enforcement and gun. This, in turn, might ability of persons who pose a
point, for example, to cases in help officers deal with citizens in threat to harm them. An
which officers shoot unarmed ways that minimize the odds that important aspect of the
citizens and say, “Cops are trigger gunfire will erupt, for extensive concealment principle is the
happy.” Meanwhile, police evidence indicates that how the concept of cover—the idea that
supporters point to officers who police structure their interactions officers should position

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themselves behind barriers, such articulated in a fashion that is guidance in police matters. It will
as motor vehicles and telephone readily comprehensible to the accomplish this by briefly
poles, when confronting general public. This is where reviewing a few cases where such
individuals who are a real or social theory comes in, for there theory has proven useful in
potential threat. By maintaining exists a body of social scientific realms of policing that are less
cover, officers limit their exposure theory that can place the work of dramatic than deadly force.
to gunfire and other potentially Fyfe and other commentators on
lethal threats. This, in turn, can: police tactics in a larger How Social Theory
(1) dissuade individuals who intellectual context and therefore has Influenced Police
might otherwise be willing to shed considerable light on the
world of police violence. As a
Work and Public
attack them from doing so; and
(2) permit officers to take more result, both the police and their Understanding
time when deciding how to critics may be able to see things a Our first example of the link
respond to threatening and bit differently and thereby move between social theory and police
potentially threatening situations. toward a shared understanding of operations comes from work that
As a result, officers need not how to do good police work was done in the early 1980s to
shoot when potential threats fail when lives hang in the balance. alter how police dealt with
to materialize, and they may have The remainder of this essay spousal assault. Before this time,
enough time to decide how to articulates just how social theory police officers frequently did not
resolve those situations that do can help officers to deal better arrest men who battered their
involve danger without resorting with violent incidents and other intimate partners. Yielding to
to gunfire. potentially threatening situations. calls from battered women and
Training in the foregoing It also explains how social theory their champions for the police to
tactical principles, as well as can help members of the public treat domestic violence more
others that can help prevent to understand better what they seriously, many state legislatures
shootings, is common in U.S. law can realistically expect from those strengthened their assault laws.
enforcement, but officers do not who have sworn to serve and The new laws gave officers the
always utilize sound tactics in the protect them. As an initial step in legal authority to arrest men who
field. Moreover, few members of this process, the next section beat their partners, and many
the public at large, and even seeks to establish the value of police departments developed
fewer police critics, seem to know looking to social theory for policies encouraging or
that officers are trained to seek
ways to avoid lethal
confrontations with citizens.
I believe that one reason for
this state of affairs is that the idea
of managing interactions with an
[T]here exists a body of social
eye toward avoiding violence is
underdeveloped. One
scientific theory that can . . .
consequence of this is that the
full implications of the notion
shed considerable light on the
have yet to be realized in the law
enforcement community. A
world of police violence.
second is that it has yet to be

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mandating that officers make tolerance policing and the SARA model to the routine activities
arrests (Klinger 1995; Sherman (Scan, Analyze, Respond, and theory that Cohen and Felson set
1992). A key influence on this Assess) model. Zero-tolerance forth in 1979: crime happens
shift in law enforcement’s policing grew out of Wilson and when offenders and victims
approach to domestic violence Kelling’s (1982) “broken converge in time and space in the
was a study conducted by windows” argument that little absence of capable guardians.
Sherman and Berk (1984), which offenses lead to big problems if From this is derived the crime- or
found that men who were communities aren’t vigilant about problem-analysis triangle that
arrested when they attacked their disorder and minor offenses, a officers throughout the nation
female partners were less likely to perspective that goes back to the use in developing strategies and
batter again. social disorganization tradition of programs to deal with specific
The notion that arrest lowers the Chicago school of social problems that give rise to crime.
the odds of subsequent violence, ecology (e.g., Shaw and McKay By developing and implementing
while not always recognized as 1942). The core notion of this sound plans to change part of the
such, is clearly rooted in the school of thought is that high victim-offender-guardianship
classic theory of deterrence, levels of crime in communities are dynamic at the time and/or place
which holds that punishing due to a decline in the of incipient problems, officers can
offenders leads to lower rates of community’s capacity to control nip crime in the bud (Bynum
offending (Beccaria 1764; Gibbs the behavior of its members. By 2001). Again, a profound piece
1975). While subsequent studies taking care of small things, the of social theory provides a plan of
of the effect of arrest on domestic broken windows thesis maintains, action that is easily understood by
violence offenders did not always people can reassert their right to the general public and
support Sherman and Berk’s control the sorts of behavior that appreciated by street cops: focus
finding of a deterrent effect go on in their community and on the problem that gives rise to
(Sherman 1992), the deterrence thereby short-circuit the dynamic crime.
doctrine provided a clear, that leads to serious crime With these examples in hand,
reasonable, and simple message problems. Because many of the we can shift gears and move on
for advocates of legal and policy minor problems that spawn to a brief discussion of a social
change. It also provided a clear bigger problems are petty crimes science perspective that can help
explanation and justification for and other police concerns, the us reach a better understanding
officers’ actions: arresting police play a central role in of police shootings: the sociology
batterers will lower rates of controlling crime when they of risk and mistake.
domestic violence and protect the address matters that normally fall
vulnerable from aggressors. As a within their purview. Thus is The Sociology of
result, the social theory of broken windows policing rooted
in a simple yet profound bit of
Risk and Mistake
deterrence has been a crucial
guide to the public policy social theory that has been The sociology of risk and
response to the problem of around for decades and gives rise mistake is rooted largely in
intimate partner violence for to a dictum that both the police organizational sociology, a
more than two decades. and the public can easily subdiscipline that analyzes the
Two other examples of social understand: help promote safe structure and operation of formal
theory’s influence on communities by taking care of organizations, such as police
contemporary police practices the small stuff. departments. Much of the work
come from community- and We can similarly trace the in the risk/mistake tradition
problem-oriented policing: zero- intellectual lineage of the SARA focuses on how individual actors

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in organizations perceive their the use of deadly force by police scholars call low-frequency
environment and how they officers. As will be shown below, events.
calculate the likelihood that this line of thinking is vital to A major reason why officer-
unwanted, untoward events understanding the use of deadly involved shootings are low-
might occur. A good deal of this force by police officers. Before frequency events is that the rules
work addresses monetary and explaining how the sociology of governing firearms use by police
other economic losses, but is also risk can help us to understand permit officers to shoot in just
very concerned with actual and police shootings better, however, two sorts of circumstances:
potential human losses (Short some comments about the nature (1) when they have reasonable
and Clarke 1992). As a result, of officer-involved shootings are belief that their life or the life of
there is a sizable literature that in order. another innocent person is in
seeks to assess how people’s imminent danger; and (2) to
behavior in organizational Officer-Involved effect the arrest of felons fleeing
settings can increase or decrease from the scene of violent crimes
Shootings
the threat of injury or death. (Callahan 2001).2 While millions
A key point in this body of Police shootings are quite of violent crimes and other
work is the recognition that not rare. We don’t know exactly how volatile situations take place
all deaths, injuries, and other bad rare because police agencies are across our nation each year (FBI
outcomes are avoidable. The not required to report to any 2003), the police are present at
notion of prevention is national body when their officers just a fraction of them. As a
nonetheless central because the fire their weapons, and there is result, cops and crooks don’t
risk/mistake tradition focuses no comprehensive, voluntary often find themselves together in
attention on attempts to do data-collection system. The best time and space under
things better—to design systems estimates, however, put the circumstances in which officers
better, organize units better, and ceiling on the number of officer- might theoretically have legal
have individuals behave better. In involved shootings, including cause to shoot. Furthermore,
other words, the sociology of risk those in which no one is hit by when officers do find themselves
and mistake has a high degree of police, at a few thousand per year in felonious or other volatile
policy relevance, for it seeks to (Fyfe 2002; Klinger 2004).1 circumstances, the citizens
help practitioners identify the When one considers that the U.S. involved usually do not resist to a
odds that something bad will has more than 750,000 cops point that would justify deadly
happen and then find ways to (Hickman and Reaves 2003; force under either the defense-of-
reduce, blunt, or avoid these Reaves and Hart 2001), who are life or fleeing-felon doctrines. It
negative outcomes. involved in tens of millions of follows that the number of
A fundamental precept of the contacts with citizens each year police-citizen encounters in which
sociology-of-risk framework is (Langan et al. 2001), police deadly force is legally permissible
that mistakes, mishaps, and even shootings are clearly what risk is but a fraction of the tens of
disasters are socially organized millions of situations in which
and systematically produced by
1
social structures, both macro and The FBI provides a count of the
number of citizens “justifiably killed” by
micro (Vaughn 1996). Therefore, law enforcement each year as part of its 2
These rules reflect basic federal
how people are organized and UCR program, but these data are standards, as articulated, for example, in
how they operate—not just the incomplete (Fyfe 2002). FBI figures Tennessee v. Garner (1985). State law and
place the number of citizens killed by the department policy can, of course, place
traditional villain, operator police at 338 per year for the five years additional restrictions on when officers
error—are key to understanding ending in 2003. may shoot.

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police officers interact with patrol cars while aiming their are those who are more afraid of
citizens each year. service weapons at him. In sum going back to prison than they
That police infrequently then, by employing sound tactics, are of police bullets, people who
encounter citizens under officers can often avoid shootings believe they will prevail against
circumstances in which they have by both deterring individuals the police they face, and lost
legal cause to use deadly force from taking action that would souls who purposely provoke
does not completely explain why justify gunfire and by providing a officers to shoot them in an
shootings are so unusual, margin of safety for themselves in unconventional form of self-
however, for research indicates cases in which the use of deadly destruction known in the business
that officers often hold their fire force would be appropriate. as “suicide-by-cop” (Klinger
in cases where they could shoot Unfortunately, the obverse is 2001). Fortunately, the police
(Scharf and Binder 1983; Klinger also true: when officers don’t use rarely encounter such individuals.
2004). One reason for this would sound tactics, they can find Indeed, the vast majority of
appear to be the simple fact that themselves in shootings that people, the vast majority of the
the vast majority of police officers could have been avoided. Take, time, won’t do anything that
have no desire to shoot anyone, for example, a hypothetical case would justify the use of deadly
so they hold their fire out of in which officers are called to deal force, no matter how officers
personal choice (Klinger 2004). with an enraged man armed with behave. During training sessions
A second reason is that officers, a baseball bat who is standing on police shootings that I
as we have seen, are trained to outside his house. The officers conduct around the nation, I
handle encounters in ways that walk to within a few feet of him sometimes illustrate this point by
minimize the likelihood that they and demand that he surrender his noting that officers could take
will have to resort to lethal force. bat. The man refuses and instead their gun belts off in the vast
When officers follow their strikes one of the officers with the majority of their interactions with
training by deploying behind bat. As the stricken officer falls to citizens and hand it over to the
cover and keeping their distance the ground, his partner draws her citizen with no adverse
from armed individuals, for weapon and shoots the citizen consequences to their safety. In
example, they can afford to hold before he can strike a second, and other words, how officers
their fire even though shooting perhaps fatal, blow. It should be comport themselves tactically in
would be perfectly permissible. clear by now that the shooting most interactions will not affect
The use of proper tactics can could have been avoided, at least the likelihood of a shooting
also prevent volatile situations as it played out in this because citizens generally will not
from escalating to a point at hypothetical scenario, if the take any action that would
which deadly force would be a officers had simply maintained seriously endanger anyone.
legitimate option for police. Few some distance and kept a barrier, One can build on these
people who might be willing to such as their patrol cars, between general ideas about police-citizen
take on the police will actually do the man and themselves as they interaction to craft a simple,
so when officers confront them in sought to resolve the situation. fourfold taxonomy that cross-
ways that place them at a distinct The police cannot entirely classifies the quality of officers’
disadvantage. For example, an avoid the use of deadly force, tactics against the occurrence of a
armed robber is unlikely to try to however. Some people, no matter shooting. As shown in Figure 1,
pull his gun if he is stopped by what the police do, will take doing so yields a 2x2 table with
two police officers who keep their action that requires officers to cells that correspond to cases in
distance and stay behind their fire. Included among such people which: (1) officers used sound

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tactics and thus avoided a
shooting that might otherwise
Figure 1.
have occurred; (2) officers used
poor tactics and no shooting
occurred—because the citizen 1 2
involved did nothing to threaten No Skillful Dumb
the officers; (3) officers used poor De-escalation Luck
tactics and had to shoot their way
out of danger; and (4) officers
had to fire to protect themselves SHOOTING
or others, despite the use of
sound tactics. Borrowing heavily
4 3
from Fyfe (1988), who created a
Yes Unavoidable Avoidable
similar taxonomy to address the
Shooting Shooting
use of force by officers in general,
we can call these four cells:
(1) “skillful de-escalation,”
(2) “dumb luck,” (3) “avoidable
shooting,” and (4) “unavoidable Sound Poor
shooting.” TACTICS
Shootings rarely occur, as
previously noted, so it is apparent systems, such as nuclear power to problems. Where coupling is
that the vast majority of police- plants.3 NAT asserts that concerned, as the elements of a
citizen interactions will fall into understanding why things system become more tightly
the first two cells of the table. We sometimes go wrong requires us bound together, the amount of
should therefore direct our to pay heed to two key factors: slack in the system decreases.
attention to cells 3 and 4 as we the complexity of systems and the This, in turn, reduces the capacity
try to understand more about extent to which their elements of the system to deal with
how shootings do occur. The are coupled, or tied together. As difficulties that might arise before
next step in this process will be the number of elements in a they spin out of control and
to take a brief tour through system grows and the interactions disaster ensues. Perrow argues
normal accident theory (NAT), a among the elements increase, the that systems are more likely to
theoretical perspective in the system becomes more complex. have problems that lead to
sociology of risk and disaster that The more complex the system, negative outcomes as they
can help us in our quest for the more things can go wrong become more complex and
answers. and the less likely humans are to tightly coupled. The term normal
immediately understand what is accident is thus used to describe
Normal Accident Theory happening, which makes it his idea that the environments
difficult to respond immediately inherent in some types of systems
(NAT) and Deadly Force
are such that misfortunes are an
The eminent sociologist 3
In fact, Perrow developed the almost inevitable part of them
Charles Perrow developed NAT theory of normal accidents during and hence normal. In sum, it is
research he conducted on the 1979
in the early 1980s to explain how accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear the core contention of NAT that
bad things happen in high-tech power plant outside Harrisburg, PA. the likelihood of negative events

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will increase as systems become and thus building slack into the do any shooting that might be
more tightly coupled and social system in which they find necessary if the situation
interactively complex (Perrow themselves. This slack permits deteriorates, and appointing the
1984). officers to take an extra remaining officers to other
With this sketch of Perrow’s moment—perhaps just a split specific roles. Having just one
normal accident theory in hand, second but often much longer— officer talk and/or give
we can now move on to a to assess the intentions of citizens commands creates a linear rather
discussion of how it applies to before pulling the trigger. than a complex communication
police shootings. Our starting Police-citizen encounters are process. This, in turn, reduces the
point is the recognition that all often quite complex because a likelihood that miscommunication
police-citizen interactions are good portion of police work between police and suspect or
social systems, which can involve involves multiple officers. This is among the officers themselves
just two people—for example, a especially true of situations with a might unnecessarily escalate
single officer and a single citizen higher-than-average chance that matters. Having designated
at a traffic stop—or encompass gunfire might erupt because it is shooters permits the other
hundreds of people who play a standard law enforcement practice officers present to confidently
variety of social roles—officers, to send more than one officer to carry out whatever other activities
suspects, victims, bystanders, fire- incidents that involve a might be useful for resolving the
rescue personnel, the media, and heightened degree of danger situation short of gunfire—
so on at a large-scale public (Klinger 1997). For example, whether they involve deploying
disturbance. The next point is to take a situation involving an less-lethal weapons, such as tasers
recall the previously mentioned individual who is wielding a knife or beanbag shotguns, or directing
notion that police officers can and flailing about in a public citizens away from the area.4 The
often structure encounters in square, prompting several officers decision to draw fewer guns
ways that reduce the likelihood of to respond. Well-trained officers lessens the chance that an
a shooting—by keeping some respond to such situations by accidental discharge could lead to
distance and taking cover, for having one officer do all the sympathetic gunfire and reduces
example. If we think about these talking, assigning a small number the number of rounds fired if
tactics in the language of NAT, of officers—usually one or two shooting becomes necessary. This
what officers are doing is who are typically called both promotes the odds that the
reducing the degree of coupling “designated shooters” or suspect will survive being shot
between themselves and suspects “designated cover officers”—to and lessens the chances that stray
bullets will hit other officers or
innocent bystanders.
The value of the NAT

Police-citizen encounters are framework can also be seen in the

realm of more complicated police

often quite complex beause a activities, such as dealing with

good portion of police work 4

This involves actions that make a
situation less tightly coupled—by putting
more distance between the suspect and
involves multiple officers. potential victims—and complex, since
removing others to a distance means
there are fewer people directly involved.

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barricaded suspects. Standard is to make for less complexity and surrender, patrol calls for SWAT
police doctrine has long held that coupling when dealing with and negotiators. SWAT deploys,
officers should not rush in and barricaded suspects. and the negotiators then attempt
confront armed suspects who With all of this as to contact the suspect.
barricade themselves inside background, we now turn our Unfortunately, he repeatedly
locations. It advises them, attention to some examples that refuses to talk, so the incident
instead, to set up a perimeter to illustrate both of the shooting commander has the SWAT team
seal the suspect off from others, cells from Figure 1. We will begin employ a series of tactics to get
call for the help of a SWAT team by looking at an unavoidable him to peacefully surrender. The
and crisis negotiators, and then shooting involving an officer who suspect still refuses to surrender
try to talk the suspect into responds to a robbery call. A and ignores additional attempts
leaving his stronghold position well-trained officer, she arrives by the negotiators to open a
and surrendering (Fyfe 1996; and deploys outside the location dialogue. After some time has
Geller and Scott 1992). Staying behind the cover offered by the passed, the incident commander
outside at perimeter positions engine block of her car—thereby has SWAT fire several rounds of
makes for a relationship between minimizing the degree of tear gas into the location. The
suspect and police that is much coupling between herself and the suspect still refuses to negotiate
less tightly coupled than it would suspect—and then waits there for or exit the location. When it
be if officers entered the suspect’s additional units to show up. The becomes clear that the suspect
location. Calling for SWAT and suspect spots the officer, realizes will not come out, the
crisis negotiators rather than that she stands between him and commander decides that SWAT
simply relying on patrol officers freedom, exits the front door, must go into the location to
reduces the complexity of the and runs toward her while raising arrest the suspect and resolve the
situation because these specialists his gun. In this instance of a very situation. As the officers enter,
have unique training and work simple, two-person social system, the suspect fires his weapon and
together as a unit. This means the suspect increased the members of the entry team
that fewer officers need to be coupling between himself and the return fire, thereby ending the
involved, and there is less chance officer, precluding the officer standoff. In this case, it was the
for miscommunication and from doing anything but firing police who took the slack out of
misunderstanding among the her weapon to protect her life the system and increased coupling
police. Once SWAT and and the lives of any innocent between themselves and the
negotiators arrive, a single crisis bystanders. suspect. They did so, however,
negotiator will talk with the Continuing with the armed only after repeated attempts to
gunman, which means the robber example, we will illustrate use tactics that permit and usually
communication process will be a more involved scenario that falls achieve a bloodless resolution
quite linear, as previously into the unavoidable shooting from a distance (Klinger and
observed. Furthermore, whatever category. Let us say that the Rojek 2005). Consequently, the
discussions the negotiator has suspect in the previous situation police used deadly force only
with the suspect will generally be decides to stay put when the first when they had no remaining
done over the phone, rather than officer arrives while the store option to resolve a dangerous
face-to-face, which reduces the clerk and customers flee, creating situation—in other words,
physical coupling between police a classic barricade situation. When another unavoidable shooting.
and suspect. The end result of the suspect refuses to heed the With two hypothetical
using SWAT and crisis negotiators patrol officers’ demands to examples of unavoidable

—— 9 ——
shootings in hand, we will use retreated into the vestibule and their direction. They began firing
two actual cases to illustrate the began “reaching into his right- their pistols at him. All four
notion of preventable shootings. hand side”6 with his right hand. officers ceased firing when Diallo
The first is perhaps the most Carroll and McMellon, who had fell down from the cumulative
notorious officer-involved drawn their guns in the belief effect of 19 bullets hitting his
shooting in the history of U.S. that Diallo might be attempting body.
law enforcement: the killing of to pull one himself, charged into After reloading his weapon,
West African immigrant Amadou the vestibule intending to grab Carroll went up to check on
Diallo by four detectives from the Diallo before he could retrieve Diallo and secure what he
NYPD Street Crimes Unit who the gun for which they believed believed to be the pistol Diallo
fired a total of forty-one rounds he was fishing. had pointed at him and his
after Diallo pulled his wallet from As Carroll and McMellon partners. When he grabbed the
his back pocket in the vestibule shouted at Diallo to freeze, he dark object he saw on the ground
of a Bronx apartment building quickly pulled a dark object from near Diallo’s right hand, he felt
early one winter morning in his right side and began turning the soft give of leather rather
1999. The details of the incident his body counterclockwise in than the hard firmness of steel,
have been widely reported, but their direction. Diallo then realized the object was a wallet,
here are the basics.5 As the four started to extend his right hand, and said, “Where’s the fucking
plain-clothes officers were which was still clutching the dark gun!” After coming up empty in
cruising down Wheeler Avenue in object, towards the officers. a quick search of the rest of the
the South Bronx in their Believing the object in Diallo’s vestibule for the gun he had seen,
unmarked vehicle, one of them, hand to be a firearm, Carroll Carroll realized that he and his
Sean Carroll, spotted a slightly shouted “Gun!!” and started to fellow officers had just shot an
built black male acting in what he shoot. McMellon also unarmed man.
deemed to be a suspicious fashion commenced firing as both officers The shooting became a major
at the entrance of an apartment scrambled to back out of the cause célèbre. The press played
building. Carroll told the driver, small vestibule, which was only up the story of white cops killing
Kenneth Boss, to stop so they about five by seven feet. By this an unarmed black man as part of
could investigate. Boss did so, time, Detective Boss and the a pattern of oppressive police
then backed up, and stopped fourth officer, Richard Murphy, practices against minorities by
again so that Carroll and Edward were running to the aid of their NYPD officers. The race industry
McMellon, the other detective partners. As they sprinted to and political forces that opposed
sitting on the car’s right side, assist, McMellon tripped and fell the administration of former
could get out. Diallo, who was backwards down the stairs he had mayor Rudy Giuliani made a
not yet identified, quickly just run up. Believing McMellon huge scene, and the four officers
had just been shot, Boss and were indicted. All four were
Murphy peered into the vestibule, acquitted, but many people
5
Readers interested in a more fine- where they saw Diallo standing subscribed and continue to
grained overview of the incident might and pointing a dark object in subscribe to the notion of a
want to read the sixth chapter of
Malcolm Gladwell’s Blink (2005) or Jim
racially motivated killing. No
Fyfe’s essay, Reflections on the Diallo evidence of racial animus on the
6
Case (2000), which draws on the work All direct quotes in this discussion part of any of the officers
he did as a defense expert in the criminal of the Diallo case come from Carroll’s
case against the four officers who shot testimony in the criminal trial that emerged at the trial, however, so
Diallo. resulted from the shooting. the dominant theory of the

—— 10 ——
Amadou Diallo shooting does not before deciding on a course of together in a way that led to the
offer a sound explanation for action. unnecessary death of the citizen.
what happened early that Once Carroll shouted “Gun,” No racial animus, no evil intent,
February morning in 1999. interactions between the people just a group of human beings
If we look at the shooting present and the physical caught up in a tightly coupled,
through the lens of Perrow’s environment came into play. As interactively complex system in
normal accident theory, however, Carroll and McMellon tried to which a series of misunder-
we can make a good deal of sense move away from Diallo—and standings led to disaster. In sum,
about it. Indeed, a review of key thereby reduce the degree of NAT provides an elegant
points of the incident in light of coupling—an unexpected framework for understanding one
NAT will disclose that what interaction between McMellon of the most controversial
happened might be viewed as a and the stairs emerged when he applications of deadly force in the
predictable outcome of a five- lost his footing and fell down. history of U.S. policing.
person social system in which the The gunshots that were ringing A second and far less well-
behavior of the participants and out seemed to indicate to the known example of a normal
the nature of the physical space other officers that one of their accident shooting will further
produced a situation that was team had been shot. Confirming demonstrate the value of the
very tightly coupled and highly this definition of the situation was NAT perspective for
complex. additional evidence that resulted understanding police shootings.
When Carroll and McMellon from the complex interactions In the late evening hours of
left the car to investigate, no one between the participants and the August 27, 1997, a man named
was clearly in charge. This meant physical environment of the Sap Kray threatened his estranged
that the officers were working as vestibule. The interior door that wife with an assault rifle at her
independent units instead of a Diallo was standing in front of home in Tacoma, Washington.
single team, which unnecessarily had a highly reflective coating of Kray’s wife left and went to her
complicated the social system in paint, a metal kick plate at the job in a neighboring community.
place when Carroll and bottom, a small pane of glass in Kray then took his rifle and
McMellon confronted Diallo. the middle, and additional glass showed up there after a few
Further difficulty arose when immediately above. As Carroll hours, causing one of his wife’s
Carroll and McMellon and McMellon fired their co-workers to notify the local
approached Diallo in the weapons, their muzzle flashes police. When the police arrived,
vestibule because they greatly reflected off the door and its they confronted Kray and saw
reduced the slack in the surroundings. Meanwhile, some that he was armed with a rifle.
subsystem involving themselves of the officers’ shots ricocheted They let him go since he did not
and Diallo. With just feet back towards them, making it seem to have committed any
between themselves and Diallo, look as if Diallo was firing at crimes in their jurisdiction. They
no cover between them, and no them. did, however, advise Kray’s wife
place for Diallo to move, the All of this (and other aspects to tell the Tacoma Police
system was very tightly coupled. of complexity and coupling that Department about her earlier
When Diallo unexpectedly pulled would take more space than assault. She left work, drove
an object from his right hand, the would be appropriate here) adds home, found her husband there,
high degree of coupling meant up to a tragic accident in which and called Tacoma police.
that officers had but a fraction of four officers, one citizen, and Because the case involved an
a second to identify the object their physical surroundings came assault rifle, the Tacoma patrol

—— 11 ——
officers who responded decided pointing an assault rifle in his Had the members of the SWAT
to request assistance from their direction. He ordered Kray to team remained behind the tree,
SWAT team. drop the weapon, but Kray fired they would have maintained slack
Soon after the SWAT officers at the officers. Lowry returned in the micro social system that
had deployed, a group of them three rounds from his weapon, had developed that day, which
saw Kray exit from the front door shouted, “I’m hit,” and quickly would have kept them from the
and walk towards his vehicle, left the house along with the rest mortal danger that stood just
which was parked in front the of the entry team. Lowry was meters away.
residence. Believing him to be airlifted to a regional trauma System complexity also played
unarmed, they demanded that center, where he was pronounced a key role in the Lowry shooting.
Kray surrender, but he retreated dead. One of the points that Perrow
toward the front door. Officer Several hours after he makes in his discussion of NAT is
William Lowry and other murdered Lowry, Kray peacefully that the presence of safety devices
members of the team gave chase surrendered to members of the can create unexpected
in an attempt to prevent him Pierce County SWAT team, who interactions between system
from reentering the house. Kray had been called in to relieve elements, thus increasing the
nonetheless made it inside the Tacoma’s team after Lowry’s degree of complexity, which in
house, while Lowry and some of death. Lowry’s autopsy showed turn increases the degree of
the other officers who had chased that a single bullet from Kray’s danger. Less-lethal launchers—
him took cover behind a large gun had led to his death. This such as the ARWEN used by
tree approximately twenty feet was the only shot that Kray fired, Tacoma SWAT—are designed to
from the door. as it turned out, and it went help officers subdue combative or
The officers tried to convince through Lowry’s left arm, otherwise resistant subjects short
Kray to surrender, but he refused. penetrated his body armor near of using deadly force while
At some point, Kray came to the his left armpit, and exited his maintaining some distance. In
open door, and one of the torso near his right armpit.8 other words, they are safety
officers behind the tree shot him If we look at the tragedy that devices that help police to resolve
twice in the torso with less-lethal played out in Tacoma that day volatile situations, such as the
munitions from an ARWEN through the lens of NAT, we can standoff with Kray, without
launcher.7 Kray then fell back understand it as a classic example resorting to gunfire.
inside the residence, and Lowry, of a normal accident shooting. In this case, however, it was
followed by three other officers, First off, if we think about the the presence of the less-lethal
rushed in after him. As Lowry led officers’ movements from the ARWEN that set in motion the
the way into the residence, he cover of the tree to the front events that led to Lowry’s death.
observed Kray approximately ten door in light of normal accident As well-trained officers, Lowry
feet inside the front door, theory, we can quickly see that and his partners would not
this move increased the coupling normally leave the safety of a
between Kray and the officers. cover point in a confrontation
7
ARWEN stands for Anti-Riot with an armed suspect. In this
Weapon Enfield. The term “less-lethal
instance, they left only because
munitions” refer to a class of projectiles,
such as wooden dowels, plastic batons, 8
For an additional account of the the ARWEN rounds had struck
rubber bullets, and beanbags that are Lowry slaying, see: Jack Hopkins, Slain Kray. Believing that it was safe to
typically fired from shotguns and 37 or Tacoma officer Lowry is hailed as a ‘true
40mm launching systems, such as the hero,’ final farewell, Seattle Post-
do so, they moved in to take
ARWEN (Hubbs and Klinger 2004). Intelligencer, 4 September 1997. their suspect into custody. By the

—— 12 ——
 social systems that led to disaster.
In sum, the perspective provided
Both tragedies were instances by NAT can help citizens see that
the use of deadly force cannot be
in which well-meaning police eliminated entirely and that
shootings that didn’t need to
officers created tightly coupled, happen often involve a large dose
of human error rather than evil
highly complex, social systems intent.
NAT can also help the police.
that led to disaster. Police officers have a good deal
of motivation to avoid shootings.
In addition to the afore-
mentioned aversion to taking life,
time they realized that Kray had force beyond providing insight officers seek to avoid gunplay
rearmed himself, the members of into specific officer-involved because shootings put them in
the arrest team found themselves shootings. One of these is that it physical danger and can expose
in exposed positions staring down can help most citizens understand them to substantial legal,
the barrel of an assault rifle. With that some shootings are plainly administrative, and financial
no cover available, Lowry was an unavoidable. All but the most liability (Bayley and Garofolo
easy target for Kray’s murderous extreme critics of the police can 1989). The desire to avoid these
attack. see that officers must shoot when negatives translates into a desire
The added complexity arising dangerous suspects force their to know how to lower the odds
from the presence of the less- hand and foil police attempts to of finding themselves in
lethal ARWEN was therefore a avoid gunfire through tactics that shootings.
critical determinant of the make for loose coupling and low NAT offers an easily
officers’ decision to leave the complexity. NAT can also help understood framework to help
cover of the tree and increase the citizens understand shootings officers accomplish this goal: keep
coupling between Kray and that might otherwise seem things simple and don’t get too
themselves. Had the system been incomprehensible—or be close, for in its distilled form,
less complex—had the arrest team attributed to evil police designs— that’s what NAT is really about as
not had a purported safety device for it can make sense of cases it concerns tactics in police work.
in the form of the ARWEN— such as the Diallo incident. The Keeping these precepts in mind
Tacoma SWAT would have used value of NAT for understanding can help officers on the streets
other tactics that would have police shootings is clarified when today see the importance of
maintained the relatively loose we reflect on the Diallo shooting hewing to concepts such as
coupling that linked Kray and in light of Officer Lowry’s tactical knowledge and
police until the arrest team fired murder because no reasonable concealment. Attention to these
the ARWEN rounds. person could argue that the precepts, moreover, can also help
Tacoma SWAT team set out to guide the development of new
get Lowry killed. Both tragedies tactical doctrines that might
Concluding Comments
were instances in which well- further reduce the likelihood of
NAT has important meaning police officers created shootings in the future.
implications regarding deadly tightly coupled, highly complex, The underlying simplicity of

—— 13 ——
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 ABOUT THE POLICE FOUNDATION
The Police Foundation is a private, independent, not-for-profit organization dedicated to
supporting innovation and improvement in policing through its research, technical assistance,
communication, and professional services programs. Established in 1970, the foundation has
conducted seminal research in police behavior, policy, and procedure, and works to transfer to
local agencies the best new information about practices for dealing effectively with a range of
important police operational and administrative concerns. Motivating all of the foundation’s
efforts is the goal of efficient, humane policing that operates within the framework of democratic
principles and the highest ideals of the nation.

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RESEARCH ADVISORY COMMITTEE

David B. Lewis

David Weisburd, Chair

W. Walter Menninger
Hebrew University and University of Maryland Laurie O. Robinson
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George Mason University Weldon J. Rougeau
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