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OECD Science, Technology and
Innovation Outlook
2021
TIMES OF CRISIS AND OPPORTUNITY
In immediate responses to the COVID‑19 crisis, science and innovation are playing essential roles in providing OECD Science, Technology
and Innovation Outlook 2021
a better scientific understanding of the virus, as well as in the development of vaccines, treatments
and diagnostics. Both the public and private sectors have poured billions of dollars into these efforts,
accompanied by unprecedented levels of global cooperation. However, the economic crisis that is currently
unfolding is expected to severely curtail research and innovation expenditures in firms, while debt‑laden
governments will face multiple, competing demands for financial support. These developments threaten TIMES OF CRISIS AND OPPORTUNITY
to cause long‑term damage to innovation systems at a time when science and innovation are most needed
to deal with the climate emergency, meet the Sustainable Development Goals, and accelerate the digital
transformation. Governments will need to take measures to protect their innovation systems as part
of their stimulus and recovery packages, but should also use these as opportunities for reforms. In particular,
science, technology and innovation (STI) policy should shift towards supporting a more ambitious agenda
of system transformation that promotes a managed transition to more sustainable, equitable and resilient
futures.
OECD Science, Technology and Innovation Outlook 2021

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OECD Science, Technology
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2021

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Please cite this publication as:

OECD (2021), OECD Science, Technology and Innovation Outlook 2021: Times of Crisis and Opportunity, OECD Publishing,
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OECD Science, Technology and Innovation Outlook

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3
Foreword
The OECD Science, Technology and Innovation Outlook 2021 is the latest in a series that reviews key
trends in science, technology and innovation (STI) policy in OECD countries and several major partner
economies. This edition focuses on the COVID-19 pandemic, which has triggered an unprecedented
mobilisation of the science and innovation communities.
Science and technology offer the only exit strategy from COVID-19: they have been central in informing
governments’ efforts to limit the virus spread; and they have underpinned the rapid development of
effective vaccines in record time. The pandemic has underscored the importance of science and innovation
to being both prepared and reactive to upcoming crises.
The pandemic has also stretched research and innovation systems to their limits, revealing gaps that need
filling to improve overall system preparedness for future crises. It is a wake-up call that highlights the need
to recalibrate STI policies to better equip governments with the instruments and capabilities to point
research and innovation efforts towards the long-term goals of sustainability, inclusivity and resiliency.
The eight chapters in this edition of the STI Outlook cover a range of topics, including research system
responses to the pandemic, impacts on the research workforce, and likely implications for government
support to business research and innovation. The rapid development of COVID-19 vaccines has relied on
strong international STI co-operation that offers policy lessons for dealing with other global challenges. It
also underscores the fact that national self-interest will most often be best served by international
collaboration. Emerging technologies have important roles to play in tackling the pandemic and its impacts,
and the STI Outlook considers two such technologies – engineering biology and robotics – that show
promise in helping enhance the health resiliency of societies. A final chapter reviews various governance
challenges, including the need for governments to renew their policy frameworks and capabilities to fulfil a
more ambitious STI policy agenda.
The world is still in the midst of the COVID-19 crisis and there remain many uncertainties that will shape
research and innovation systems, and the extent to which these systems can help solve societies’ longer-
term grand challenges. The STI Outlook provides evidence and analysis that should help policymakers
when weighing their options in these times of crisis and opportunity.
This edition of the STI Outlook has a dual format, comprising both this book and a set of topic webpages
with supporting content (see http://oe.cd/sti-outlook). The STI Outlook team has also built an online
monitoring tool of governments’ STI policy responses to COVID-19 (https://stip.oecd.org/covid) that
provides evidence used in this book and beyond.
OECD SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION OUTLOOK 2021 © OECD 2021

4
Acknowledgements
The 2021 edition of the OECD Science, Technology and Innovation Outlook (STI Outlook) is prepared
under the aegis of the OECD Committee for Scientific and Technological Policy (CSTP), with input from
its working parties. CSTP Delegates contributed significantly through their replies to the OECD Survey on
STI policy responses to COVID-19 (https://stip.oecd.org/covid), and their participation in a high-level
debate on 23 November 2020 where the STI Outlook’s main findings were discussed.
The STI Outlook 2021 is a collective effort, co-ordinated by the Science and Technology Policy (STP)
Division of the OECD Directorate for Science, Technology and Innovation (DSTI). It is produced under the
guidance of Alessandra Colecchia, Head of STP Division. Michael Keenan served as overall co-ordinator
and Sylvain Fraccola as the administrative co-ordinator. Blandine Serve co-ordinated statistical inputs.
Chapter 1, “COVID-19: A pivot point for science, technology and innovation?”, was prepared by Caroline
Paunov and Michael Keenan (DSTI). It is based on work carried out by the Working Party on Innovation
and Technology Policy (TIP) on the impacts of COVID-19 on STI. This chapter benefited from contributions
by Sandra Planes Satorra and Andrés Barreneche (DSTI).
Chapter 2, “Mobilising public research funding and infrastructures in times of crisis”, was prepared by
Frédéric Sgard (DSTI). It is based on the work of the OECD Global Science Forum (GSF), with
contributions from members of the GSF expert groups on High-Risk/High-Reward research and on national
research infrastructures.
Chapter 3, “Challenges and new demands on the academic research workforce”, was prepared by Cláudia
Sarrico and Carthage Smith (DSTI). It is based on work carried out by the OECD GSF on the research
workforce.
Chapter 4, “Government support for business research and innovation in a world in crisis”, was prepared
by Fernando Galindo-Rueda and Silvia Appelt, with assistance from Georgia Ellis (DSTI). The chapter
draws on recent work by the OECD Working Party of National Experts on Science and Technology
Indicators (NESTI), and in particular the microBeRD project, conducted in collaboration with the OECD
Committee on Industry, Innovation and Entrepreneurship.
Chapter 5, “Resolving global challenges and crises through international collaboration”, was prepared by
Mario Cervantes and Michael Keenan (DSTI). It draws on CSTP work on international STI co-operation
and blended finance.
Chapter 6, “Why accelerate the development and deployment of robots?” was prepared by Alistair Nolan
(DSTI). It draws in parts on the forthcoming OECD STI Working Paper, “Robotics: Recent developments
and public policies”. Detailed comments and valuable insights were had from Gregory Ameyugo, Justine
Cassell, Johan Frisk, Chris Melhuish, Elena Messina, Alexandra Neri and José Saenz.
Chapter 7, “Engineering biology: Accelerating innovation to meet global challenges”, was prepared by
David Winickoff (DSTI). It is based on recent work carried out by the Working Party on Biotechnology,
Nanotechnology and Converging Technologies (BNCT) on synthetic biology.

5
Chapter 8, “STI governance for crisis and recovery”, was prepared by Michael Keenan, Philippe Larrue,
Carthage Smith and David Winickoff (DSTI). It draws on multiple CSTP and working party activities, notably
the CSTP project on mission-oriented innovation policies, recent work by the BNCT on technology
governance, and long-standing work by the GSF on scientific advice.
All the chapters of the 2021 STI Outlook were reviewed by Sarah Box, Alessandra Colecchia, Dirk Pilat
and Andrew Wyckoff of the DSTI. The team thanks them for their valuable comments and guidance.
Thanks are likewise due to those CSTP delegates who provided comments on chapter drafts.
The overall publication owes much to Sylvain Fraccola who oversaw all aspects of the publication process
and designed the infographics, and Blandine Serve for her statistical support. Thanks are also due to Silvia
Appelt, Michela Bello, Hélène Dernis, Fernando Galindo-Rueda, Guillaume Kpodar, Brigitte Van
Beuzekom and Fabien Verger (DSTI) for their statistical inputs and helpful advice. Andrés Barreneche
(DSTI) also contributed with inputs from the EC-OECD STIP Compass.
The authors are grateful to Beatrice Jeffries (DSTI) for her secretarial assistance and to Amar Toor (DSTI)
for his help in refining the “key findings” of chapters. Special thanks are given to Romy de Courtay for her
editorial contributions and bibliographic research. Her engagement significantly improved the quality of the
publication.

6
Table of contents
Foreword 3
Acknowledgements 4
Acronyms and abbreviations 11
Executive summary 13
1 COVID-19: A pivot point for science, technology and innovation? 15
Introduction 17
STI responses to the COVID-19 crisis and impacts on STI systems 18
Mobilising STI policies to combat the COVID-19 pandemic 28
Key uncertainties, critical pivot points, and their implications for STI systems and policy choices 32
Conclusions 45
Outline of the book 47
References 50
Notes 56
2 Mobilising public research funding and infrastructures in times of crisis 58

Introduction 60
Resources unlocked for research on COVID-19 60
Research areas supported by new research funding initiatives 62
Challenges in managing emergency research funding projects 63
Uncertainties on the long-term impacts of emergency research funding 65
Effective mobilisation of research infrastructures 67
The challenge of scientific dissemination in times of crisis 69
Lessons learned from the COVID-19 crisis 71
References 73
Notes 74
3 Challenges and new demands on the academic research workforce 77

Introduction 79
The quest for research excellence 80
Precarity of research careers 81
Strengthening the links between academia and other sectors 85
Digital transformation and data intensive science 86
Science to address societal challenges 89
A new approach to scientific research training, evaluation and careers 90

7
References 92
Notes 94
4 Government support for business research and innovation in a world in crisis 95

Introduction 97
Support for business research and innovation today 97
Support for business innovation in times of crisis: The COVID-19 shock 108
The medium to long-term outlook for business innovation support 114
Conclusions 116
References 117
Notes 121
5 Resolving global challenges and crises through international collaboration 122

Introduction 124
Stepping up collaboration to fight COVID-19 124
Beyond COVID-19, international STI collaboration is needed to meet global challenges 134
Outlook for international STI collaboration 140
References 141
Notes 143
6 Why accelerate the development and deployment of robots? 145

Introduction 147
The promise of robotics 147
Robots as a strategic technology 148
Emerging robot capabilities 149
Robots and jobs 150
Current and emerging uses of robots in healthcare 150
Conclusion 159
References 160
Notes 162
7 Accelerating innovation to meet global challenges: The role of engineering biology 163
Introduction 165
The promise of biofoundries 165
Potential applications 168
Other trends in bio-based products 169
Emerging issues and policy implications 172
Future outlook 175
References 176
Notes 179
8 Governance of science, technology and innovation for crisis and recovery 180
Introduction 182
Scientific advice in times of crisis 183
Digital technologies and data for government decision-making 186
Horizontal co-ordination to help fight COVID-19 188
Governments leading collective action: Mission-oriented innovation policies 189
Technology governance 192
Future outlook 196
References 199

8
Notes 203
Tables
Table 1.1. Critical pivot points in societal preferences and values 37
Table 1.2. Critical pivot points in the socio-economic role of digital technologies, big-data analytics and AI 39
Table 1.3. Critical pivot points regarding the distribution of socio-economic impacts 41
Table 1.4. Critical pivot points on international relations and the global order 42
Table 1.5. Broad STI policy goals and actions for crisis and recovery 46
Table 4.1. Selected examples of emergency government measures supporting business innovation 112
Table 7.1. Most common recommendations from synthetic and engineering biology roadmaps 174
Table 8.1. Basic characteristics of the main MOIP models 191
Figures
Figure 1.1. The roles of STI in the immediate crisis 19
Figure 1.2. International scientific collaboration on COVID-19 biomedical research 20
Figure 1.3. Impact of the COVID-19 crisis on scientists' work 22
Figure 1.4. Scientists’ expectations for a research career in light of the COVID-19 crisis 24
Figure 1.5. Reported R&D expense and revenue growth in selected R&D-intensive companies 27
Figure 1.6. Growth rates in enterprise creation 27
Figure 1.7. Germany’s federal level STI policy response to COVID-19, January-September 2020 29
Figure 1.8. Key issues emerging for public research organisations and researchers 33
Figure 1.9. Key issues emerging for the future of business research and innovation 33
Figure 1.10. Framework for considering the key uncertainties around COVID-19 and critical pivot points, with
implications for STI 35
Figure 1.11. Historical patterns of general government debt 44
Figure 2.1. Evolution of COVID-19 research funding programmes and pledges 61
Figure 2.2. Mix of topics targeted by funding organisations to address COVID-19 and its impacts 62
Figure 2.3. Research projects funded by public funding organisations in various research areas 63
Figure 2.4. Emergency research funding schemes face new management challenges 64
Figure 2.5. Growth in COVID-19 related publications 65
Figure 2.6. Tracking research on previous global health crises, 2000-19 66
Figure 2.7. Open access of COVID-19, Diabetes and Dementia publications, January-October 2020 70
Figure 3.1. Trends in scientific publication output by type of institution, 1995-2019 81
Figure 3.2. Share of doctorate-level attainment in the population 82
Figure 3.3. Job security of corresponding authors, by country of residence 83
Figure 3.4. Five key action areas and goals for capacity development in the digital research workforce 87
Figure 3.5. Towards a more diverse, healthy and effective research workforce: From bottleneck to pipeline 91
Figure 4.1. Confluence of objectives and constraints to government support for business innovation 98
Figure 4.2. R&D active firms are more likely to receive public support for innovation 99
Figure 4.3. Policy instruments providing financial support for business R&D and innovation 100
Figure 4.4. Shift in R&D support policy mix, 2000-18 100
Figure 4.5. Direct government funding and government tax support for business R&D, 2018 102
Figure 4.6. Responsiveness of business R&D decisions by type of policy instrument 106
Figure 4.7. The impact of the business cycle on business R&D and government support 109
Figure 5.1. Share of international scientific collaboration on COVID-19 medical research by partner economy 125
Figure 5.2. Scientists’ experiences and expectations of research collaboration during the crisis 126
Figure 5.3. Registered COVID-19 vaccine and drug studies by economy 127
Figure 5.4. Expanding the OECD framework for “blended finance” to STI finance 137
Figure 6.1. Current and emerging robot applications span the economy 150
Figure 6.2. Global purchases and main applications of service robots for professional use, 2017-22 151
Figure 6.3. Increasing old-age dependency and growing share of the population with dementia 155
Figure 7.1. The biofoundry’s DBTL cycle 166
Figure 7.2. A limited but growing number of public biofoundries 167
Figure 7.3. Engineering biology: A potential platform in many important economic sectors 170

9
Figure 7.4. A bioeconomy policy framework 172

Figure 7.5. Investments in the synthetic biology industry, 2009-18 173
Figure 8.1. Scientists’ assessment of the use of science in policy making 186
Figure 8.2. International map of selected missions in health and healthcare 190
Boxes
Box 1.1. The contributions of STI to building resilience 45
Box 2.1. Example of fast-track access to research infrastructure for COVID-19 research 68
Box 4.1. Addressing measurement gaps in government support for business innovation 101
Box 4.2. International rules shaping government support for business research and innovation 103
Box 4.3. Findings from the OECD microBeRD project on the impact of R&D tax incentives 105
Box 4.4. Lessons from past crises for business innovation support 110
Box 5.1. US public-private partnerships for COVID-19 countermeasures 128
Box 5.2. Selected key organisations supporting international STI collaboration on COVID-19 129
Box 5.3. Main international collaborative initiatives 130
Box 5.4. STI Roadmaps for the SDGs as a tool to support international STI co-operation on global challenges 139
Box 6.1. China’s development of a world-class robotics sector 148
Box 6.2. Examples of national robotics strategies 156
Box 7.1. How biofoundries work 166
Box 7.2. The Agile BioFoundry 167
Box 8.1. Principles for an effective and trustworthy scientific advisory system 183
Box 8.2. Tackling misinformation and disinformation on COVID-19 187
Box 8.3. OECD Council Recommendation on Responsible Innovation in Neurotechnology (2019) 194
Box 8.4. An example of deliberation and technology uptake: The Human Fertilisation and Embryology
Authority 195

10 
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 11
Acronyms and abbreviations
AI Artificial intelligence
AMC Advanced market commitment
ASD Autism spectrum disorder
BEPS Base erosion and profit shifting
BERD Business enterprise expenditure on R&D
DBTL Design-Build-Test-Learn
DSTI Directorate for Science, Technology and Innovation
ERA European Research Area
FDI Foreign direct investment
GAVI Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization
GDP Gross domestic product
GERD Gross domestic expenditure on research and development
GFC Global financial crisis
GISAID Global Initiative on Sharing Avian Influenza Data
GPG Global public goods
GTARD Government tax relief for R&D expenditures
GVC Global value chains
HFEA Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority
HIV Human immunodeficiency virus
IATT Inter-agency Task Team
ICB Industry Classification Benchmark
ICT Information and communication technology
ICTSD International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development
IDRC International Development Research Centre
IFR International Federation of Robotics
IFRS International Financial Reporting Standards
IMF International Monetary Fund

12 
IP Intellectual property
IPR Intellectual property rights
JEDI Joint European Disruption Initiative
MERS Middle East Respiratory Syndrome
MLP Multi-level perspective
MOIP Mission-oriented innovation policies
mRNA Messenger ribonucleic acid
NASA National Aeronautics Space Administration
OCTS-OEI Observatorio Iberoamericano de la Ciencia, la Tecnología y la Sociedad (OCTS) de la
Organización de Estados Iberoamericanos (OEI)
ODA Official development assistance
PCT Patent Cooperation Treaty
R&D Research and development
RNA Ribonucleic acid
SLS Swiss Light Source
STI Science, technology and innovation
TDR Transdisciplinary research
TFM Technology Facilitation Mechanism
USPTO United States Patent and Trademark Office
UV Ultra-violet
VC Venture capital
WFH Working from home
WHO World Health Organization
WTO World Trade Organization
SMEs Small and medium-sized enterprises
STEM Science, technology, engineering and mathematics

 13
Executive summary
The STI systems’ response to COVID-19 has been decisive, rapid and significant
STI systems have responded strongly and flexibly to the COVID-19 crisis. Newly funded research initiatives
worth billions of dollars have been set up in record time, and research and innovation have led to the rapid
development of vaccines. However, the pandemic has stretched STI systems to their limits, revealing areas
that need strengthening to improve overall STI resilience for both future and present challenges, including
climate change.
The COVID-19 crisis has accelerated trends already underway in STI. It has further opened access to data
and publications, increased the use of digital tools, enhanced international collaboration, spurred a variety
of public-private partnerships, and encouraged the active engagement of new players. These
developments could speed the transition to a more open science and innovation in the longer run.
At the same time, such widespread engagement risks diverting research efforts indiscriminately away from
non-COVID-19-related topics. Governments and research funding bodies need to define and communicate
quickly their capacities to support research in the coming years, as well as their strategic priorities, to allow
research-performing organisations to elaborate realistic long-term plans.
The effects of the pandemic, particularly lockdowns, have also disrupted the normal functioning of
innovation systems, endangering key productive and innovation capabilities, especially in hard-hit sectors.
On an aggregate basis, business investments in research and innovation are pro-cyclical, and thus prone
to contracting in times of crisis. This crisis may be different since some of the top global R&D players are
expanding their activities during the crisis. The pandemic could exacerbate existing gaps in business
research and innovation activities between “leading” and “laggard” sectors, large and small firms, and
geographical areas. This distributional unevenness could widen productivity gaps, deepen the vulnerability
of laggards, and reduce economic resilience, and should be the target of innovation-support policies.
Beyond their research activities, scientists continue to provide expert input on public health and other policy
responses to the pandemic. They have had to communicate evidence that is incomplete and changing,
and to do so in ways that promote public confidence and trust. This advice has sometimes been contested,
given its policy consequences. In response, governments should carefully communicate uncertainties,
provide a balanced presentation of potential scenarios, and be transparent about mistakes. Governments
should also draw upon multi-disciplinary advisory mechanisms to ensure they consider different types of
expertise when developing policy.
Looking forward, STI policies should be recalibrated to tackle the long-term

challenges of sustainability, inclusivity and resiliency
The pandemic and its effects offer a stark reminder of the need to transition to more sustainable, equitable
and resilient societies. Science and innovation will be essential to promote and deliver such transitions,
but the pandemic has exposed limits in research and innovation systems that, if not addressed, will prevent

14 
this potential from being realised. Governments should rethink STI policies along several lines to deal with
these limits.
First, the current crisis serves as a reminder that policy needs to be able to guide innovation efforts to
where they are most needed. This has implications for how governments support research and innovation
in firms, which account for about 70% of R&D expenditures in the OECD. The business R&D support policy
mix has shifted in recent decades towards a greater reliance on tax compared to direct support instruments
such as contracts, grants or awards. While effective for incentivising businesses to innovate, R&D tax
incentives are indirect, untargeted and tend to generate incremental innovations. Well-designed direct
measures for R&D are potentially better suited to supporting longer-term, high-risk research, and targeting
innovations that either generate public goods (e.g. in health) or have a high potential for knowledge
spillovers. Governments need to revisit their policy portfolios to ensure an appropriate balance between
direct and indirect measures.
Second, the multifaceted nature of addressing complex problems like COVID-19 and sustainability
transitions underscores the need for transdisciplinary research to which current science system norms and
institutions are ill-adapted. Disciplinary and hierarchical structures need to be adjusted to enable and
promote transdisciplinary research that engages different disciplines and sectors to address complex
challenges.
Third, governments should link support for emerging technologies, such as engineering biology and
robotics, to broader missions like health resilience that encapsulate responsible innovation principles. The
responsible innovation approach seeks to anticipate problems in the course of innovation and steer
technology to best outcomes. It also emphasises the inclusion of stakeholders early in the innovation
process.
Fourth, reforming PhD and post-doctoral training to support a diversity of career paths is essential for
improving the ability of societies to react to crises and to deal with future challenges like climate change
that require science-based responses. Reforms could also help relieve the precarity of early-career
researchers, many of whom are employed on short-term contracts with no clear prospect of a permanent
academic position. The crisis has also highlighted the need for academia to train and embrace a new
cohort of digitally skilled research support professionals and scientists.
Fifth, global challenges require global solutions that draw on international STI co-operation. The
development of COVID-19 vaccines has benefited from nascent global R&D preparedness measures,
including agile technology platforms that can be activated as new pathogens emerge. The pandemic has
created momentum to establish effective and sustainable global mechanisms to support the range and
scope of R&D necessary to confront a wider range of global challenges. However, governments need to
build trust and define common values to ensure a level playing field for scientific co-operation and an
equitable distribution of its benefits.
Finally, governments need to renew their policy frameworks and capabilities to fulfil a more ambitious STI
policy agenda. Increasing policy emphasis on building resilience, which calls for policy agility, highlights
the need for governments to acquire dynamic capabilities to adapt and learn in the face of rapidly changing
environments. Engaging stakeholders and citizens in these efforts will expose policymakers to diverse
knowledge and values, which should contribute to policy resilience. Governments should also continue to
invest in evidence about their STI support policies with a view to improving them.

 15
1 COVID-19: A pivot point for science,

technology and innovation?
The COVID-19 pandemic has called for science, technology and innovation
(STI) to provide solutions. At the same time it poses major challenges for
STI systems, and there remains uncertainty on its near-term and long-term
impacts. This chapter outlines the STI policy responses to the COVID-19
shock and the effects of the crisis on STI systems. It offers a stylised
framework for governments to systematically monitor the evolution of the
crisis and its consequences from an STI policy perspective. It discusses a
series of “critical pivot points”, where future developments could go in
radically different directions. The chapter concludes by discussing how STI
policy can best contribute to shaping those critical pivot points to support a
transition towards more equitable, sustainable and resilient futures.

16 
Key findings
 Research and innovation systems have responded impressively to the pandemic,
underpinning much of the resiliency countries have shown. Both private and public actors
in the STI system have provided solutions to the crisis, most visibly in the rapid development
of vaccines, but also in the rollout of digital technologies that have helped lessen the
pandemic’s impact. COVID-19 has accelerated trends that were already underway, opening
access to scientific publications, increasing the use of digital tools, enhancing international
STI collaboration and spurring a variety of public-private partnerships.
 The pandemic continues to pose major challenges for STI systems, endangering key
productive and innovation capabilities, especially in hard hit sectors. Important segments of
the STI system have been severely affected, including a large share of small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs), early-stage start-ups, young researchers still needing to make
their mark, and women – who, on average, devoted more time to care duties at the expense
of their STI activities during lockdown. In the short-term, governments should continue their
support for science and innovation activities that aim to develop solutions to the pandemic
and to mitigate its negative impacts, while paying attention to the uneven distributional
effects of COVID-19.
 Many uncertainties remain that will shape research and innovation systems, and the
contributions these systems can make to solving societies’ longer-term grand
challenges. The chapter discusses a series of “critical pivot points”, where future
developments could go in radically different directions. Monitoring these can provide an
early warning system that alerts policy makers (and others) to possible future
developments. It also allows decision makers to keep sight of alternative pathways and
outcomes they could pursue, or want to avoid, thereby making STI policy more agile and
resilient.

 17
Introduction
The COVID-19 pandemic poses a global health threat and has resulted in the largest global economic
crisis since the Second World War. In the absence of population immunity to the disease and effective
treatments, extensive lockdowns and related sanitary and “social distancing” measures are needed, which
involve a high socio-economic cost. In this context, much attention has been directed at science,
technology and innovation (STI) to provide solutions quickly, even though the COVID-19 crisis has also
severely affected STI activities. With ongoing uncertainty on the evolution of the pandemic, and massive
government intervention to safeguard public health and the economy, the global economy faces several
critical pivot points that will shape the longer-term impacts of the crisis. STI systems and policies have a
role to play in shaping the directions of those critical pivot points.
The objective of this chapter is to synthesise the state of STI during the COVID-19 pandemic. It first
presents how the STI system has engaged in finding solutions to the COVID-19 health challenge, and how
the diverse actors of the STI system – industry, universities, public research institutes and the research
workforce – were affected by the pandemic. Second, it provides a short overview of the types of STI policy
measures implemented across the OECD area to respond to the crisis. Third, it discusses the key critical
pivot points facing the global economy, their implications for STI, and how STI policy can best respond.
Both private and public actors in the STI system have engaged actively in providing solutions to the COVID-
19 crisis. This has led to massive investments in research on vaccines and treatments, but also produced
innovations to deal with the impacts of “social distancing” measures, such as improvements in digital tools
to work remotely. A rapid surge in COVID-19-related research articles in the medical field and other
disciplines was observed during the first months of the outbreak, and has been followed by a steady
addition of research papers informing the scientific debate (see Chapter 2). Initiatives to facilitate data
sharing and access to critical research infrastructures were also undertaken to speed up responses, along
with new processes, such as hackathons, to solicit inputs and measures supporting effective
collaborations. Nonetheless, as the world scrambles to find decisive solutions to COVID-19, it is debatable
whether these collaborations have occurred on a sufficiently global scale, and whether funding has been
sufficient and appropriately allocated.
With the sudden shock of the COVID-19 pandemic and its first wave, the operation of the STI system was
severely affected, albeit with uneven impacts. Businesses, research institutes and universities saw their
research and innovation activities severely disrupted by lockdowns and social distancing measures.
Following the initial shock, several parts of the STI system – including venture capital (VC) funding,
patenting and entrepreneurship, but also large research and development (R&D) investments by leading
firms in the digital and health sectors – recovered quickly as governments lifted lockdown measures after
the first wave of the pandemic. Many companies in the digital sector – already a leading R&D investor prior
to the crisis – grew as the COVID-19 crisis hit, since digital tools proved essential to limit the costs of social
distancing measures. The relatively quick recovery of parts of the STI system was also driven by the fact
that aside from initial disruptions in global supply chains, a number of large companies were able to resume
their activities and saw a return of demand after the lockdowns of the first wave of COVID-19 were lifted.
Funding for innovation also kept up thanks to active government interventions and boosts to a number of
firms by capital investors.
At the same time, important segments of the STI system were severely hit, including a large share of
innovative small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), early-stage start-ups, young researchers still
needing to make their mark, and women – who, on average, devoted more time to care duties at the
expense of their STI activities during lockdown. The sectors most hit by the crisis – e.g. entertainment,
tourism, retail and aviation – are among the smaller actors in terms of R&D-intensive technological
innovation performance.

18 
Early STI policy responses to the crisis strongly focused on providing funding for COVID-19-related
research and innovation, with governments, foundations and industry raising several billion dollars to fund
new vaccines and therapeutics. Governments also lent support to those STI actors most severely affected
by the crisis. An impressive battery of fast-track policy measures were rolled out to mobilise the
STI ecosystem to provide solutions to the pandemic, solicit inputs from diverse actors, facilitate co-
operation and knowledge sharing, ease barriers that slow down innovation (e.g. through regulatory
flexibilities and accelerated intellectual property examinations), and enhance international collaboration on
addressing the global challenge. However, the ongoing uncertainty poses potentially longer-term
challenges for STI to keep up as an engine of recovery.
The crisis also prompted government innovation, illustrated by the use of digital contact-tracing apps
(though with mixed results), but also the use of real-time data analysis for policy making at levels not
previously seen. Governments set up schemes to keep innovative businesses afloat (e.g. facilitating
access to finance by innovative firms and start-ups), and help researchers and research institutes adapt
to the new context (OECD, 2020[1]) Most countries are also preparing or have recently launched stimulus
and recovery packages to boost the economy and, in particular, protect jobs that directly or indirectly
support STI actors.
Looking forward, the COVID-19 pandemic presents a number of significant uncertainties for the future of
STI. Besides the course of the pandemic itself, among those explored in this chapter are (1) the value
society assigns to sustainability, inclusivity and resilience in shaping futures, but also to the role
governments and STI should play in supporting those futures; (2) the pace and direction of the digital
transformation, which influences both STI processes themselves and demands for innovation in the future;
(3) social preferences on the importance of inclusive economic and societal outcomes, which may change
fundamentally and affect the inclusiveness of innovation processes; and (4) changes in the international
political economy – driven in part by the desire to reduce vulnerabilities in the future – which will shape the
division of labour of STI systems at the national, (supranational) regional, and global levels.
STI policies are affected by these uncertainties at the same time that they can contribute to shaping them.
Policy can deploy STI to find solutions, manage effective dialogue between citizens and government
bodies to handle the COVID-19 crisis (including confinement decisions and their trade-offs), deal with the
potential distributional effects of COVID-19 on STI systems, and mobilise the responsiveness of STI
systems. STI policies will also be influenced by the manner in which the COVID-19 crisis and these key
uncertainties co-evolve, e.g. in terms of available funding for research and innovation, and the priorities
governments and other actors pursue.
More extensive analysis of the issues discussed here is provided in two policy papers on the impacts on
STI of the COVID-19 crisis between January 2020 and September 2020 (Paunov and Planes-Satorra,
forthcoming[2]), and on its possible longer-term impacts and policy implications for STI (Paunov and Planes-
Satorra, forthcoming[3])1. The analysis also leverages information on country policies collected through the
OECD Survey on STI Policy Responses to COVID-19 (OECD, 2020[4]).
STI responses to the COVID-19 crisis and impacts on STI systems
The COVID-19 pandemic has set off a cascade of responses from – and impacts on – the STI ecosystem
in many countries (Figure 1.1). This section explores the situation in public research sectors and the
business community, highlighting not only the pivot to relevant research and scientific advice, but also the
disruption to research activities and the asymmetric impacts on researchers and firms.

 19
Figure 1.1. The roles of STI in the immediate crisis
Public research organisations and researchers’ responses and impacts
Research activities that respond to COVID-19
Rapid deployment of research on solutions to COVID-19
Universities, public research institutes, and pharmaceutical and biotech firms – sometimes in collaboration
– have undertaken R&D to rapidly develop new treatments and vaccines for COVID-19. Several trackers
provide real-time information on vaccine development, including the New York Times coronavirus vaccine
tracker,2 based on World Health Organization (WHO) data. Already by the end of May 2020, 131 vaccine
candidates (10 in clinical evaluation) were under consideration. By early September 2020, the numbers
had increased to 180 vaccine candidates, 35 of which were in clinical evaluation (WHO, 2020[5]). By mid-
October 2020, the National Institute of Health’s database in the United States showed that more than 3 600
trials on COVID-19 had been conducted or were still under way around the world (NIH, 2020[6]). The vast
majority are clinical trials for drugs to treat COVID-19, around 30% of which are registered in the
United States (Chapter 5). As 2020 drew to a close, the vaccination rollout had started in a first set of
countries, providing cautious hope for an exit to the crisis, although reaching a critical mass of people will
still take months and years.
The active engagement of the scientific community is also reflected in the explosion of scientific
publications related to the virus. By mid-April 2020, more than 3 500 COVID-19-related articles had already
been published in medical academic journals – a higher rate than for previous pandemics, according to
PubMed, a free resource supporting the search and retrieval of biomedical and life sciences literature by
the US National Center for Biotechnology Information (Bryan, Lemus and Marshall, 2020[7]). By the end of
November 2020, articles related to COVID-19 on PubMed numbered around 75 000 (Chapter 2 provides
a detailed breakdown of publications on COVID-19). Other evidence of the massive and rapid engagement
comes from an international survey of researchers in different disciplines conducted by Springer Nature
and Digital Science from 24 May to 18 June, which found that 43% of the 3 436 surveyed had already or
were likely to repurpose their grants for COVID-19 research (Baynes and Hahnel, 2020[8]).
Figure 1.2 maps the country of origin of research on COVID-19 and shows that the United States and the
People’s Republic of China (hereafter, China) are among the two major contributors to COVID-
19 publications on PubMed. They are also each other’s main collaborating partner (see Chapter 5). Other
research confirms this pattern, showing that the United States and China increased their levels of
collaboration following the outbreak (compared to coronavirus research conducted prior to the COVID-19
pandemic) (Fry et al., 2020[9]). Other countries with high engagement in international research
collaborations on COVID-19 include the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, Australia, Canada and
India.

20 
Figure 1.2. International scientific collaboration on COVID-19 biomedical research

Whole counts, January to 30 November 2020
Note: A map with four clusters, also known as communities, was created based on economy affiliation bibliographic data. Economies are
assigned to clusters based on their interconnection. The colour of an item is determined by the cluster to which it belongs. The higher the weight
of an item, the larger its label and circle. Lines between items represent links. In general, the closer two economies are located to each other,
the stronger their relatedness. The strongest co-authorship links between economies are also represented by lines. Note that the territory
attribution for these indicators is entirely based on country affiliation information reported by the authors and publishers as registered on PubMed.
Please refer to https://doi.org/10.1787/888934223099 for more methodological information.
Source: OECD and OCTS-OEI calculations, based on U.S. National Institutes of Health PubMed data, https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
(accessed 30 November 2020).
StatLink 2 https://doi.org/10.1787/888934223099
Provision of scientific advice to policy makers and the public
Countries have different standing systems for providing science advice to policy makers, supplemented by
additional ad hoc mechanisms in times of crisis. While most OECD countries have relied on national
expertise, many lesser-developed economies have been more reliant on international sources of advice,
for example from the WHO. As the pandemic has evolved, the requirements for scientific advice have
expanded across ministries and geographic scales – local, national and international.
Scientific evidence that is informing the policy response to COVID-19 remains incomplete and conditional;
as more data are collected, the scientific understanding of COVID-19 changes. This dynamic situation has
represented a challenge for the scientific community at a time when policy makers and the public have
sought assurance and certainty. Scientific consensus continues to be difficult to achieve, and yet
communicating uncertainties and alternative views can undermine trust in scientific advice and related
policies (see Chapter 8).
In many countries, scientific experts have become national spokespersons, who are expected not only to
provide scientific evidence, but also to justify policy actions. This has sometimes blurred the distinction
between advisor and policy maker. With the second wave of COVID-19 infections, there exists intense
public debate about the scientific data and information that help determine policy. Trust is critical to
ensuring support and compliance with policy measures, such as obligatory wearing of masks and social

 21
distancing. In the longer term, trust will be important in ensuring solidarity and broad public support for
interventions to ensure socio-economic recovery.
Open access to journal articles has reached unprecedented levels
An important change effected by the pandemic has been the greater speed in which scientific research
results have been released, highlighting the role of open science. Many journals have accelerated their
peer-review processes to ensure rapid dissemination. Based on data from 669 articles published in
14 medical journals during and prior to the current pandemic, a study finds that the time to publish had
decreased by 49% on average, from 117 days to 60 days (Horbach, 2020[10]). Pre-prints (i.e. academic
papers that have not yet been peer-reviewed or published) have become more common in the medical
research field in a matter of weeks. Pre-prints allow increased speed of diffusion (also across scientific
fields) and reaching a wider range of potential peers. Their rapid adoption is also illustrated by the high
proportion of open-access documents published: OECD analysis of PubMed finds that the share of open-
access research on COVID-19 was 76% (compared, for example, to 43% for Diabetes and 40% for
Dementia publications over the same period – see Chapter 2).
Impacts of the COVID-19 crisis on the public research sector
Limited access to research infrastructures and tools during lockdown
With the exception of activities directly addressing the COVID-19 health emergency and others considered
essential to protect the public, research and innovation activities requiring physical access to laboratories
and other research facilities, as well as those involving field work or clinical trials, were strongly disrupted
by lockdown measures (World Bank, 2020[11]). This included activities where interruptions severely impede
research delivery (e.g. long-term experiments where time-frequency observation is critical) and those
requiring ongoing supervision for regulatory, safety or health requirements (e.g. caring for living specimens
or research that uses hazardous materials) 3.
Where access restrictions applied, many researchers shifted to research activities that can be conducted
from home (Stenvot, 2020[12]). A ResearchGate survey using data from 3 000 international researchers
across academic fields suggested that nearly half of them replaced on-site activities with more focused
writing, analysis, publishing and planning for future research during the first wave of the lockdown. In the
absence of new research data, some also spent more time analysing older data sets that had not been
explored previously (Research Gate, 2020[13]; Baynes and Hahnel, 2020[8]). Others donated their time and
expertise to fight the coronavirus, repurposing their facilities and equipment to serve COVID-19 needs. For
example, the Francis Crick Institute in London, a cancer research centre, has partly turned into a
coronavirus-testing facility (Viglione, 2020[14]; Baker, 2020[15]).
Results from the OECD Science Flash Survey 20204 echo these findings, with more than three-quarters
of scientists indicating they had shifted to working from home (Figure 1.3, Panel A). More than half
experienced or expect a decrease in the use of research materials and facilities, and around 40% a fall in
the time available for research. More than half also experienced or expect a decline in research funding
(Figure 1.3, Panel B).

22 
Figure 1.3. Impact of the COVID-19 crisis on scientists' work
A. Current impact of the COVID-19 pandemic crisis on B. Ex perienced or ex pected change in research activ ity
scientists' w ork ow ing to the current pandemic crisis
Percentage of responses from scientists Percentage of responses from scientists
Decrease Stay the same Increase
Use of research materials and

Shifted to home
facilit ies
Shifted towards
COVID-19-related topics Funding for research
Reduced in intensity
Time available for research
Intensified
Access to scientific information
Continued as normal and data
Use of digital tools for

Come to a halt research
0 50 100 % 0 50 100%
Note: Panel A shows the percentage of responses from scientists to the statement, “In recent weeks and days, as the COVID-19 emergency
intensified, your work has (i) Come to a halt; (ii) Continued as normal; (iii) Intensified; (iv) Reduced in intensity; (v) Shifted towards COVID-19-
related topics; and (vi) Shifted to home”. Panel B shows the percentage of responses from scientists to the question, “As a result of the current
crisis, have you personally experienced or do you expect to experience a change in (i) Use of digital tools for research; (ii) Access to scientific
information and data; (iii) Time available for research; (iv) Funding for research; and (v) Use of research materials and facilities?”
Source: OECD Science Flash Survey 2020, https://oecdsciencesurveys.github.io/2020flashsciencecovid/ (accessed 12 October 2020).
The “COVID-isation” of research
The lockdown measures affected scientific disciplines unevenly by diverting research efforts towards
COVID-19. Based on responses from 3 436 researchers, an international survey conducted by Springer
Nature and Digital Science from 24 May to 18 June 2020 found that the disciplines most disrupted, e.g.
due to lab closures, were chemistry, biology, medicine and materials science, while the humanities and
social sciences reported the lowest impact (Baynes and Hahnel, 2020[8]). Based on responses from nearly
1 300 researchers, the OECD Science Flash Survey, launched in April 2020, found the lockdown had the
highest disruption on immunology and microbiology, health professions, and pharmaceuticals, while
physics and astronomy, and earth and planetary sciences, reported the least disruption.
The flip side to widespread engagement of the research community in designing solutions to COVID-19 is
the risk of diverting research efforts away from non-COVID-19-related topics. The Cancer Research
Institute, for instance, registered 958 stopped clinical trials due to COVID-19 from March to
September 2020 (Cancer Research Institute, 2020[16]). This applies to the medical field, but also to other
science fields (see Chapter 2). Madhukar Pai, Director of the McGill Global Health Programs, referred to
this threat as the “COVID-isation” of research, which is leading researchers across disciplines to engage
in such activities (Pai, 2020[17]).

 23
Decline in income from research and tuition fees
Universities also face important short-term financial challenges resulting from the pandemic. Some
students may defer or abandon their plans to engage in higher education programmes in 2020/21 (Jaschik,
2020[18]). Some may also abandon or postpone their plans to study abroad. Consequently, universities that
rely heavily on student tuition fees, particularly those with an important share of international students, will
suffer from reductions in income. This could also have an impact on research spending, as teaching income
often cross-subsidises research activities. This could be accompanied by reductions in research funding
(e.g. contract research income from firms) and other income-generating activities, such as accommodation
and conferencing.
Effect of lockdown measures on researchers and successful adoption of digital

substitutes
Severe restrictions to travel imposed by lockdown measures have interrupted the mobility of human
resources in STI (e.g. visiting researchers, staff exchanges with industry). During the first months of the
pandemic, many scientific events and conferences were postponed or cancelled, and uncertainty still
prevails as to when they will fully resume. As substitutes, some of these conferences and events (including
large flagship conferences) are increasingly organised digitally, sometimes registering very high
attendance. For instance, the American Physical Society had over 7 000 registered participants for its
April 2020 meeting held online, a significantly higher number than the 1 700 participants on average who
would normally attend the in-person meeting (Castelvecchi, 2020[19]). Such a move has emphasised the
advantages of digital conferences, particularly in terms of improved accessibility, reaching more diverse
audiences, lower costs and reduction in the carbon footprint of travel. Nevertheless, virtual exchanges are
not perfect substitutes for in-person conferences, which often result in collaborations and long-term trusted
relationships, and also represent an opportunity for early-career researchers to find jobs and enhance the
visibility of their work.
Negative impacts on young and female researchers
The limitations of virtual environments have favoured ongoing connections, but not the creation of new
connections. They have also disadvantaged job starters, including early-career researchers with fixed-term
contracts, who need to connect and share their work. More than half of the scientists who had responded
to the OECD Science Flash Survey 2020 by October 2020 expected the crisis to negatively affect their job
security and career opportunities (Figure 1.4, Panel A). Getting a foot in the door of industry research was
also more difficult in the early phase of COVID-19. Evidence from the United States suggests that firms
significantly cut back on postings for high-skill jobs in March and April 2020 (Campello, Kankanhalli and
Muthukrishnan, 2020[20]). The COVID-19 shock has generally helped well-known researchers, but
challenged early-career researchers to position themselves in the field. The need for swift solutions, and
the ability of virtual events to draw more “star power”, have led to fewer opportunities for less well-known
researchers to express their views, culminating in more dominance for those singled out as superstars in
their respective networks (see Chapter 2).

24 
Figure 1.4. Scientists’ expectations for a research career in light of the COVID-19 crisis
A. Experienced or expected change in scientists' job security B. Expected change in the attractiveness of scientific careers after
and career opportunities due to the current pandemic crisis the current pandemic crisis
Percentage of responses from scientists Percentage of responses
% %
60 60
50 50
40 40
30 30
20 20
10 10
0 0
Decrease Stay the same Increase Strengthened About the same Weakened Hard to tell
Note: Panel A shows the percentage of responses by scientists to the question, “As a result of the current crisis, have you personally experienced
or do you expect to experience a change in your job security and career opportunities?” Panel B shows the percentage of all responses to the
question, “How do you expect the world of science to emerge out of the current crisis, in terms of attractiveness of scientific careers?”
Women were also particularly affected, as they spent more time on childcare and elderly care during the
lockdown of the first COVID-19 wave (OECD, 2020[21]; Minello, 2020[22]). An analysis of more than
300 000 pre-prints and registered reports finds that women’s research production significantly declined in
March and April 2020 compared to both the two preceding months and the same two months of 2019, with
a disproportionate impact on early-career researchers (Vincent-Lamarre, Sugimoto and Larivière, 2020[23]).
Another analysis based on publication data for working papers finds that although COVID-19 has spurred
research in economics, the average share of female researchers (particularly in early and mid-career
positions) engaged in research related to the pandemic is significantly lower (12% of the total number of
authors) than their average engagement in other topics (21%). However, the study also finds that women
have continued to work on their ongoing research, suggesting they have contributed less to the new
literature on the economics of pandemics (Amano-Patiño et al., 2020[24]).
Despite this gloomy picture, respondents to the OECD Science Flash Survey 2020 were more sanguine
about the attractiveness of scientific careers in the long run, with nearly half expecting it to increase
(Figure 1.4, Panel B).
Mobilising business innovation
Business innovation activities in response to COVID-19
Aside from research conducted by the health industry – often in connection with public research
organisations – industry has also moved to respond to COVID-19 challenges. A survey of R&D
professionals and decision makers at 247 patenting companies showed that close to one-quarter (23%) of
companies had repurposed their innovations in markets, such as internet services, communications,

 25
sanitation and healthcare/hospital services, even if this was not their primary industry (Kanesarajah and
White, 2020[25]). An illustrative example of industry engagement is the strong increase in United States
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) patent applications on technologies supporting working from home
(WFH) between January and May 2020 (Bloom, Davis, and Zhestkova, 2020[26]).
Another phenomenon observed during the first months of the pandemic was the quick development of
frugal innovations to remedy supply shortages in medical equipment and other emergency products (Harris
et al., 2020[27]). In mid-March 2020, an Italian start-up reverse-engineered a 3D-printed version of a
respirator valve and supplied 100 of those to Chiari hospital within a few days. Soon afterwards, the team
engineered an emergency ventilator mask, modifying a snorkelling mask already available on the market
from the French sporting goods retailer Decathlon (Isinnova, 2020[28]). Some firms in the automotive,
aviation or consumer-goods sectors repurposed (part of) their production lines to manufacture urgently
needed medical equipment, such as ventilators and respirator equipment, masks, protective face shields
and hand sanitiser.
Academic start-up companies also played an important role in answering the immediate needs posed by
the COVID-19 health challenge. Zentech,5 a biotechnology company founded in 2001 as a spin-off of the
University of Liege, developed “QuickZen”, an antibody testing kit intended for use by healthcare
professionals. AdaptVac,6 a joint venture between ExpreS2ion Biotech and the University of Copenhagen
spinout NextGen, is currently focused on developing a vaccine against COVID-19. In the technology
sector, the Indian start-up Azimov Robotics7 has developed robots to serve COVID-19 patients
(e.g. bringing them food and medicines, performing disinfection, and enabling video calls between the
doctor and the patient).
Impact of the COVID-19 crisis on business research and innovation
Innovative companies were hit by lockdowns
Many businesses scaled back on innovation activities at the height of the lockdown. According to an
April 2020 survey of innovative companies conducted by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs
and Energy, which received 1 800 responses (86% from SMEs), 54% of companies had suspended
ongoing research and innovation projects, and 24% were planning to terminate one or more projects
(BMWi, 2020[29]). An international survey and subsequent interviews of over 200 executives across
industries conducted by McKinsey in April 2020 found that the focus on innovation as a core business
priority had decreased across most industries – except the pharmaceutical and medical supply sectors –
as companies sought to address immediate COVID-19-related challenges (McKinsey, 2020[30]).
Sharp decreases in demand during the first-wave lockdown period and reduced access to research
infrastructures affected innovation. As is the case elsewhere, lockdown measures led to the closure of
most innovation and testing facilities, labs and science parks. This had a direct impact on many firms’
ability to progress with their planned research, product development and commercialisation activity, as set
out in business plans and investor agreements. More broadly, early estimates for the OECD area
suggested that in the absence of government intervention, 30% of firms would run out of liquidity after
two months of confinement (OECD, 2020[31]). A survey of 414 technology firms conducted in Israel in
May 2020 found that 54% of firms (and 65% of firms with under ten employees) would not be able to
maintain operations for more than six months (Solomon, 2020[32]).
Innovation performance persisted and recovered
The evidence from patent data to date suggests moderate and short-lived impacts of the pandemic’s first
wave. Comparing trends in Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) patent applications between November 2019
and June 2020 with the same period year on year, OECD countries experienced on average a slowdown
in patent filings following the COVID-19 outbreak. However, the pandemic itself has not resulted in a

26 
dramatic break in patenting trends. In the case of China, PCT patent filings in March 2020 even returned
to the levels registered in March 2019, and in the OECD as a whole, the gap with the previous year seemed
to be narrowing as of June 2020. Instead, reductions in innovation activities owing to COVID-19 may be
reflected in patent applications in the coming months or years. Evidence from the 2008-09 financial crisis
showed this pattern across many countries. The demand for digital innovations may, however, produce
different trends for such inventions. For example, the finding that patenting in WFH in USPTO patent filings
increased at the onset of the first COVID-19 wave (Bloom, Davis, and Zhestkova, 2020[26]) points to a
different pattern. Interview evidence from 247 leading patenting firms also shows they have maintained
their innovation activities, often by responding to new demands during the first wave of the COVID-
19 pandemic (Kanesarajah and White, 2020[25]).
Asymmetric impacts of the COVID-19 crisis across sectors
The COVID-19 crisis has had unequal effects across economies. Some firms and sectors have been
particularly hard hit, particularly those characterised by comparatively lower levels of innovation. Within
the service sectors, the tourism, travel and leisure industries, as well as activities requiring contact between
consumers and service providers (e.g. hairdressers and retailers), businesses were highly affected by
restrictions on movement and social distancing. The same services are mostly being directly impacted by
the re-confinement measures adopted to respond to the second wave of COVID-19 infections. The overall
impact on business R&D is likely to be minor, since the average company’s R&D investment in these
sectors is low. However, more R&D-intensive activities were also impacted, including manufacturing
sectors with long global supply chains (e.g. automotive and electronics), as demand for durables
momentarily dropped. Demand gradually increased again as lockdown measures were lifted, except in
those manufacturing industries that are directly linked to the tourism and transportation sectors.
Some businesses, particularly in the digital sector (e.g. cloud services, videoconferencing and digital
collaboration tools, video streaming, online shopping, online learning and telemedicine), are thriving in this
context and continue to innovate, with increased demand for their products. Figure 1.5 shows
corresponding R&D investments in the digital sector as well as the pharmaceutical sectors, compared to
a reduction in expenses among major companies in the automotive, aerospace and defence sectors.
Business creation during the first wave of COVID-19
As is common in periods of crisis, lower new-business registrations and increased bankruptcies were
observed in the first semester of 2020 compared to 2019 (Figure 1.6). Business registrations were down
in Germany, France, Belgium and Iceland, but not in Norway, Japan, Sweden and the Netherlands, where
enterprise creation was higher than during the first semester of 2019.
Early evidence for the United States shows that the initial shock of the first COVID-19 wave was short-
lived, with a rapid rebound and surge in business applications (Dinlersoz et al., forthcoming[33]). The
United Kingdom’s Office of National Statistics also reported that the number of business creations in the
United Kingdom in the third quarter of 2020 was slightly higher than during the same period in 2019,
following a small fall in the second quarter of 2020 (Office for National Statistics, 2020[34]). While this is a
positive phenomenon, it may only be temporary given future uncertainties. Moreover, some of the business
creation may stem from individuals affected by unemployment temporarily opting for private business
activities.

 27
Figure 1.5. Reported R&D expense and revenue growth in selected R&D-intensive companies
Percentage change between April-September 2019 and April-September 2020
% Software, computer services and electronic equipment Pharmaceuticals and biotechnology

Automotive, aerospace and defence Revenue growth
40
20
-20
-40
-60
Note: R&D growth rates are in nominal terms and measured between April to September 2019 and April to September 2020. Data refer to the
6-month period from the beginning of April to the end of September, except for Cisco (May to October) and Oracle (March to August). Company
reports of R&D expense need not coincide with R&D expenditures as covered in official R&D statistics compiled according to the Frascati
Manual. Methodological information can be found in the StatLink below.
Source: OECD calculations, based on published quarterly business financial reports, December 2020.
Figure 1.6. Growth rates in enterprise creation

Q1 2020/Q1 2019 and Q2 2020/Q2 2019 for a selection of countries
Q1 2020/Q1 2019 Q2 2020/Q2 2019

%
10
-5
-10
-15
Belgium France Iceland Germany Norway Sweden Japan Netherlands
Note: The concept of enterprise “creation” reflected in the data series differs across countries. The OECD Timely Indicators of Entrepreneurship
Database uses data based on national definitions only. An enterprise creation refers to the emergence of a new production unit. This can be
either due to a real birth of the unit, or creations by mergers, break-ups, splitoffs or through the re-activation of dormant enterprises.
Source: OECD (2021[35]), “Timely indicators of entrepreneurship”, Structural and Demographic Business Statistics (database),
https://doi.org/10.1787/b1bfd8c5-en (accessed on 19 October 2020).

28 
Venture-capital funding for innovative entrepreneurship
Early evidence suggests that the COVID-19 shock affected VC and angel/seed investment, a key source
of funding for innovative start-ups (OECD, 2020[1]). According to analyses by Ipsos MORI, the number of
VC deals at the global scale declined between January and August 2020, reaching its lowest level since
February 2013 (Ipsos MORI, 2020[36]). A survey of 1 000 mostly US-based institutional and corporate
venture capitalists also found they slowed their investment pace (71% of normal) during the first half of
2020 (Gompers et al., 2020[37]). Evidence from many countries suggest that early-stage companies were
hit harder by investment declines, including in China (Brown and Rocha, 2020[38]), Ireland (ICVA, 2020[39]),
the United Kingdom (Ipsos MORI, 2020[36]) and the United States (Howell et al., 2020[40]).
However, the aggregate shock to VC was much weaker than during the 2008-09 financial crisis, and
VC activity had recovered relatively swiftly by July 2020. Indeed, the analysis by Ipsos MORI shows that
the value of deals was already back to high levels by that date, although based on fewer large deals (Ipsos
MORI, 2020[36]). The study by Gompers et al. (Gompers et al., 2020[37]) also notes that the slowdown in
investments was more modest than during the 2001-02 dotcom bust (where investments declined more
than 50%) and the 2008-09 global financial crisis (when investments declined by 30%). There exist,
however, important asymmetries in funding, with more financing allotted to established larger firms and
companies operating in sectors that benefited from the COVID-19 pandemic. This change in the
distribution of VC funding may still challenge future innovation dynamics across different sectors and
actors, notably early-stage companies.
Mobilising STI policies to combat the COVID-19 pandemic
STI policy responses to the COVID-19 pandemic
STI policy makers rapidly stepped up their responses to the COVID-19 pandemic, seeking to both mobilise
and protect STI systems. Initial efforts directed resources at finding medical solutions (i.e. vaccines and
treatments), and supporting innovation actors in research and industry hit by the pandemic shock. To
address the socio-economic costs of the crisis, governments invested in STI, including through initiatives
to boost digital services, enhance the capacity of public and private organisations to use these across
education and industry, and tackle the spread of misinformation. Governments also established co-
ordination mechanisms to ensure efficient STI responses and implementation of measures at different
levels of government (see Chapter 8). For example, Ireland established a cross-governmental National
Action Plan on COVID-19, and South Africa set up a National Command Council. Countries have
implemented a wide range of measures. Figure 1.7 illustrates the measures implemented by Germany’s
federal government from January to September 2020.

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Figure 1.7. Germany’s federal level STI policy response to COVID-19, January-September 2020
Source: OECD (2020[4]), STIP COVID-19 Watch (https://stip.oecd.org/Covid.html).
Fast-tracking of research initiatives
Governments, firms and foundations have committed large amounts of funding for R&D activities aimed at
developing vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics for COVID-19. In the United States, the National
Institutes of Health (NIH) alone had devoted USD 1.8 billion to research on COVID-19 as of April 2020
(Lauer, 2020[41]). The European Commission had mobilised EUR 1 billion (i.e. USD 1.2 billion) as of
May 2020 under Horizon 2020, the EU framework programme for research and innovation (European
Union, 2020[42]). Several R&D funding trackers provide regularly updated estimates of the total amounts of
funding allocated to COVID-19 R&D projects. According to the tracker developed by Policy Cures
Research,8 a global health think tank, more than USD 9.1 billion had been committed by government,
industry and philanthropic organisations as of 18 September 2020 to COVID-19 R&D projects. Nearly 60%
of such funding has been allocated to R&D on vaccines, and around half of the funds have come from
organisations located in the United States (Policy Cures Research, 2020[43]). The COVID-19 Research
Project Tracker9 jointly maintained by the UK Collaborative on Development Research and the Global
Research Collaboration for Infectious Disease Preparedness shows a remarkable number of projects
dedicated to studying societal responses to the COVID-19 crisis (see Chapter 2). As of September 2020,
data from the OECD collection of COVID-19-related R&D funding show total public and philanthropic
investments in R&D projects amounting to USD 6.6 billion (see Chapter 2) (OECD, 2020[4]).
As described in Chapter 2, many governments have fast-tracked competitive research-funding initiatives
to support the development of COVID-19 vaccines, diagnostics and treatments. In March 2020, the French
National Agency for Research launched a Flash COVID-19 call10 for EUR 3 million (soon increased to
EUR 14.5 million) allowing the evaluation, selection and funding of research proposals within a short period

30 
of time. In some cases, support is channelled through existing funding mechanisms to accelerate
responses. In Canada, one of the measures of the Mobilize Industry11 plan is to refocus existing industrial
and innovation programmes (e.g. the Strategic Innovation Fund and Innovation Superclusters) on the fight
against COVID-19. Some government calls also encourage existing grant holders to repurpose their
research and innovation activities. The UK Research and Innovation (UKRI) grants programme for ideas
related to COVID-1912 invites researchers holding existing UKRI standard grants to switch the funding to
COVID-19 priority areas (UKRI, 2020[44]).
Governments have also invested in improving the visibility of research-funding opportunities, often by
creating online platforms that list all relevant information on STI activities related to COVID-19, such as the
European Commission’s European Research Area (ERA) corona platform 13 and Portugal’s Science 4
COVID-19 portal14 (OECD, 2020[45]).
Accelerating innovation to respond to COVID-19
Most countries have also implemented measures to stimulate quick innovative responses to the wide range
of challenges posed by COVID-19 – from preventing virus transmission, to producing essential supplies,
combatting misinformation and handling effects of the lockdown. Country approaches include:
 Launching fast-track open competitions. These seek to stimulate out-of-the box thinking by
aiming for inputs from all parts of STI systems, including from firms, research teams and individual
inventors. Ireland’s COVID-19 Rapid Response Call and the United Kingdom fast-track competition
for business-led innovation in response to global disruption are fairly open, and ask applicants to
demonstrate the relevance of the COVID-19-related challenge they address with their innovations.
 Organising or supporting virtual hackathons. Hackathons are typically 24- to 48-hour events
during which participants are provided with data they must use to create an innovative product.
Winners are compensated with funding to develop and scale their ideas. In late April 2020, over
30 000 participants from across the European Union joined the EUvsVirus hackathon hosted by
the European Commission and the European Innovation Council to address around 20 COVID-19-
related challenges. More than 2 100 solutions were submitted across different challenge
categories, with the highest contributions on health and life (898), business continuity (381), remote
working and education (270), social and political cohesion (452), and digital finance (75). A total of
117 innovative solutions were identified, including a highly scalable patient monitoring system that
minimises the need for physical contact between nurses and patients (European Commission,
2020[46]). The winners were invited to a “Matchathon” (and a Demo Day) in May 2020 to help
winning teams match with corporations, investors and accelerators around the world to put their
innovative solutions into production. This matching exercise generated more than 2 000 new
partnerships (European Commission, 2020[47]).
 Promoting research collaborations. Governments are also launching initiatives to encourage
research and innovation collaboration. In Canada, for example, the National Research Council
Pandemic Response Challenge programme15 aims to mobilise Canadian and international
researchers from universities, business and government to work together on specific COVID-19
challenges identified by Canadian health experts (Government of Canada, 2020[48]).
 Supporting data and knowledge sharing. Data-sharing initiatives have been launched to share
epidemiological, clinical and genomics data, as well as related studies (see Chapter 5). Protocols
and standards used to collect data are also being shared. The COVID-19 Open Research Dataset
(CORD-19),16 created by the Allen Institute for artificial intelligence (AI) in collaboration with the
US government and several firms, foundations and publishers, contains17 over 200 000 machine-
readable scholarly articles on COVID-19 and related coronaviruses (including over 100 000 with
full text), and serves as a basis for applying machine learning techniques to generate new insights
for COVID-19 research. Other initiatives include repositories of genome data (e.g. Nextstrain18

 31
and Gisaid),19 chemical-structure data (e.g. CAS COVID-19 data set on antiviral candidate
compounds),20 clinical studies (e.g. ClinicalTrials.org) and data for modelling research
(e.g. MIDAS).21
 Introducing regulatory flexibilities where needed to ensure rapid responses while maintaining
safeguards. In the COVID-19 emergency context, regulatory flexibilities were introduced where
feasible. In Australia, the Therapeutic Goods Administration, part of the Department of Health, has
been prioritising regulatory assessment of applications for therapeutic goods related to COVID-19.
In the United Kingdom, the Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency published a
package of regulatory flexibilities to support the healthcare response to COVID-19, including
through expedited scientific advice and rapid reviews of clinical-trial applications, and expedited
clinical investigations of medical devices.22
 Initiatives to facilitate access to research infrastructures, such as laboratories, databases and
tools, have been launched to help researchers accelerate their activities (see Chapter 2). For
instance, the public-private COVID-19 High Performance Computing Consortium in the
United States provides COVID-19 researchers worldwide with access to high-
performance computing,23 while the European Research Infrastructure on Highly Pathogenic
Agents offers access to in-vitro and in-vivo research capacities to researchers conducting studies
on COVID-19.24
 Setting incentive systems for intellectual property rights (IPR) to address the COVID-19
pandemic. In May 2020, the USPTO launched a COVID-19 prioritised examination pilot
programme to accelerate the examination of patent applications related to COVID-19 submitted by
small and micro entities, without charging additional fees (USPTO, 2020[49]). An ongoing debate
regarding the search for solutions to COVID-19 is how to harness IPR incentives in order to
develop solutions without restricting access to those solutions.
Support for STI systems to withstand the pandemic shock
Aside from STI policy action to underpin research and innovation as it responds to COVID-19 challenges,
the immediate STI policy response has focused on keeping innovative businesses afloat, and helping
researchers and public research organisations adapt quickly to the new context. Such measures are often
part of broader stimulus packages designed to boost the economy (e.g. the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and
Economic Security (CARES) Act in the United States),25 which also directly or indirectly bolster STI actors.
Compared to the 2008-09 financial crisis, the scale and speed of fiscal support provided by many countries
during the COVID-19 crisis has been exceptional (IMF, 2020[50]). However, it is important to note that
middle- and low-income countries have much more limited financial capacities to provide such support,
and some countries are likely to need international assistance to weather the crises they are facing.
Immediate policy measures to address the negative impacts of COVID-19 on STI have included the
following:26
 Closely monitoring impacts of the crisis on different STI actors. For example, Israel is
conducting monthly surveys and has organised roundtables with essential stakeholders to obtain
a comprehensive picture of the main challenges facing innovative businesses, and how these are
evolving over time.
 Introducing flexibilities for current beneficiaries of research and innovation programmes.
Most research-funding bodies have introduced flexibilities, as well as postponing application
deadlines.
 Supporting higher education institutes and researchers – including early-career researchers
– as they cope with short-term challenges. Measures have included helping higher education
institutions provide academic staff with tools and training to effectively deliver their teaching
activities online. Several measures aim to support PhD students: for example, UKRI is providing

32 
grant extensions of up to six months to funded PhD students in their final year whose studies have
been disrupted by the pandemic (see Chapter 3). In Germany, the Erasmus+ programme and
German scholarship providers have flexibly revised their conditions for national and international
students.
 Supporting higher education and research institutes in protecting research jobs and
research projects impacted by the pandemic. Given the expected income loss from a decline
in international students, the United Kingdom has launched a GBP 280 million (USD 361 million)
scheme providing low-interest loans to universities to cover researchers’ salaries and other costs,
such as laboratory equipment and fieldwork, and to fund ongoing R&D projects.27
 Facilitating access to funding for entrepreneurs and innovative firms. Such support can take
different forms, such as loans, grants and repayable advances. France launched a EUR 4 billion
(USD 4.75 billion) Emergency Start-up Relief Plan, which provides state-guaranteed cash-flow
loans; cash advances through the fast-tracked repayment of corporate tax claims that are
refundable in 2020 (including the 2019 R&D tax credit); and early payments of innovation grants
under the Investments for the Future Programme.28
 Helping businesses – particularly SMEs and start-ups – adapt to the COVID-19 context.
Enterprise Ireland provides Lean Business Continuity Vouchers up to EUR 2 500 (USD 3 200) to
companies so that they can acquire training or advice on how to continue operating their
businesses during the pandemic.
 Using digital tools to design and implement research and innovation policy. Such tools
promote quicker and more effective decision-making, based on stronger evidence. The Italian
Ministry of Universities and Research launched a mapping activity to collect information about all
ongoing and planned research projects on COVID-19, with the objective of reducing fragmentation
and preventing unnecessary duplications.
Key uncertainties, critical pivot points, and their implications for STI systems and
policy choices
The response to the pandemic raises several key issues where future developments are highly uncertain.
Figure 1.8 sets out the key issues related to public research organisations and researchers, while
Figure 1.9 does the same for key issues related to business research and innovation. In addition to these
domain-specific issues, there exist broader “key uncertainties”, e.g. related to societal and economic
dynamics, technological change, and international relations, which will shape STI activities and policies
over the coming months and years. “Going broad” is essential when thinking strategically about future
developments, as changes emanating from outside one’s own field of specialisation can often be the
greatest source of surprise and disruption. The effects of a disruptive change like COVID-19 will be felt far
and wide. Many impacts in other sectors will spill over and cascade through STI landscapes, with
implications for STI policy. Some of these broader key uncertainties are particularly acute in the context of
the pandemic and present “critical pivot points”, where future developments could go in radically different
directions. Mapping these pivot points, and outlining plausible yet sufficiently divergent visions of the future
that capture a wide range of possible future developments, can make STI policy more agile and resilient.

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Figure 1.8. Key issues emerging for public research organisations and researchers
Figure 1.9. Key issues emerging for the future of business research and innovation

34 
This section offers a stylised framework for systematically monitoring the evolution of the crisis and its
impacts from an STI policy perspective (Figure 1.10). Given the fast pace of change during the crisis,
providing such a framework, rather than just an ad hoc set of forecasts, can be useful. When combined
with regular monitoring using indicators, it can operate as an early warning system that alerts policy makers
(and others) to possible future developments. It also allows decision makers to keep sight of alternative
pathways and outcomes they could pursue – or want to avoid. Indeed, the course of uncertainty is shaped
by choices on the direction to be taken to avoid some obviously bad choices and pursue more promising
ones.
The framework has four main elements:
1. Key uncertainties: the first step is to start with a limited set of high-level key uncertainties related
to the pandemic crisis that are expected to have significant implications, including for STI and
STI policy, as shown in Figure 1.10. How these key uncertainties unfold can be influenced by STI
and STI policy, but is also somewhat influenced by exogenous factors. Other key uncertainties
could be added later as users deploy the framework. In the version below, other crises and
challenges, such as the climate emergency, are introduced as part of economic stability and
recovery packages, but they could be included as standalone elements.
2. Critical pivot points: most of the key uncertainties covered here comprise critical pivot points,
which refer to aspects of uncertainty where radically different development paths remain open. For
the time being, each critical pivot point has just two opposing “mini-scenarios”, typically just a few
sentences in length, to convey the main idea. Further mini-scenarios could be developed for each
critical pivot point in a more comprehensive exercise.
3. Implications for STI: this element presents very briefly some of the implications of the critical pivot
points’ opposing mini-scenarios for STI and STI policy. These are pitched at a high level and are
somewhat speculative, as is typical of such exercises. Developing these implications further would
be an important part of a more comprehensive and deliberative process.
4. Tracking developments: if the framework is to be used to track emerging developments, it should
identify “leading indicators” at the level of the key uncertainty itself, but also covering the more
specific effects on STI. As far as possible, these indicators should also be quantitative, but they
could also be qualitative (e.g. news stories about the impacts of the crisis on firms or their activities
and new policy announcements), signalling directions of future development. Given the lag times
both in the appearance of effects and their measurement, nowcasts and short-term forecasts would
be useful, although they are not especially well-developed in the STI policy field. On the other hand,
STI-related activities tend to react slowly, particularly on the public research and innovation side,
where long-term commitments, sunk costs and lock-ins are common. The section below briefly
discusses some of the indicator options. It includes quantitative leading indicator charts for a few
key uncertainties, both to draw attention to particular phenomena and demonstrate the framework
in action.
The following sections explore six key uncertainties, as shown in Figure 1.10. The first key uncertainty is
the evolution of the pandemic. Two main scenarios are outlined; they are presented here more as a
backdrop to the other key uncertainties, and their implications for STI policy are not explored. The next
four key uncertainties – on societal preferences, the pace and direction of digitalisation, inclusiveness and
global relations – and their critical pivot points are set out in tables that also briefly outline the implications
for STI and suggest possible leading indicators to track future developments. The tables are accompanied
by an introduction of the issues at stake and their implications for STI, followed by a short summary of
developments to date. The final key uncertainty – on the future orientation of STI policy – is treated
differently than the others, in a more discursive style, as it is more endogenous to the STI field and a central
concern of many STI policy makers. Even here, considerable uncertainty remains on the extent of future
government support for STI given the worsening economic conditions, and the degree to which

 35
government support will be directed at challenges, such as the “green transition” that is encapsulated in
several national recovery packages (OECD, 2020[51]).
Figure 1.10. Framework for considering the key uncertainties around COVID-19 and critical pivot
points, with implications for STI
This framework is likely to evolve as it is used and as the crisis unfolds. This first version is therefore highly
provisional, subject to further development through adoption and use. Policy makers and STI system
stakeholders could use the framework to engage in an exercise that provides an international perspective
on key uncertainties and critical pivot points, mapping their evolution to complement national efforts. These
elements could also be building blocks for developing exploratory scenarios of future STI systems, which
would help governments systematically appraise a wide range of policy options to shape the future state
and dynamics of STI landscapes.29
The uncertain evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic
The course of the COVID-19 pandemic remains unknown, even with the regulatory approval of the first
vaccines. Governments are tackling the “second wave” of the pandemic through containment measures
that weigh on socio-economic activities, including the forced closure of restaurants and bars, the issuance
of travel warnings and constraints, and lockdown measures of various severity. Uncertainty on the spread
of the virus, the potential duration and form of restrictions, and the possibility of future new restrictions
have prevented a full return to pre-crisis activities, particularly those involving social interactions and travel.
This uncertainty has had a negative impact on societal and economic optimism, despite the relatively good
performance of STI across several dimensions in the early months of the pandemic, and the steady

36 
recovery of trade and economic activity as demand resumed. Massive stimulus packages implemented
across the developed world have reduced even more substantive shocks, at least in the initial period.
Whether effective vaccines or treatments will remove the threat of COVID-19 (signifying “an end to COVID-
19”), or whether the virus will remain a threat for years to come (“living with the pandemic”), various
changes to future social and economic life are possible. Multiple scenarios on the course of the pandemic
can also be envisaged (Scudellari, 2020[52]). Two are briefly outlined below:
 A quick solution bringing an end to COVID-19, either through effective vaccines and/or treatments,
could mean a return to more-or-less business-as-usual. Practices that grew out of necessity during
the pandemic, such as WFH, limited or no business travel, and use of online health and education
services, would largely be reversed. However, successful experiences with some of these practices
may lead to their continuation, even after the pandemic crisis has passed. Moreover, a shorter-
lasting pandemic would offer a quicker economic recovery. Industry and governments would have
the means to make the necessary investments to improve the technologies allowing such practices
to flourish. They could also take measures to prepare against future shocks and disruptions,
including those that will likely arise from the climate emergency.
 Living with the pandemic could lead to forced long-term changes. It may also result in a return to
previous practices, despite ongoing pandemic risks, on account of the huge economic costs and
reduced public acceptance of containment measures. In the context of the second wave of the
pandemic, many governments are attempting to implement efficient social distancing to reduce
COVID-19 cases while reducing economic damage as much as possible. If “living with the
pandemic” results in a prolonged period of economic downturn, this would affect investments in
socio-technical sustainability transitions.
Working out what scenarios like these might mean for STI activities is far from easy. The following section
discusses various key uncertainties related to the pandemic and the critical pivot points they pose for the
global economy, as well as their implications and significance for STI.
Key uncertainties and critical pivot points presented by COVID-19
Societal preferences and values
The issues at stake and their implications for STI
The COVID-19 pandemic and the resulting lockdown measures – leading in April 2020 to the confinement
in their homes of more than 3.9 billion people – have affected the lives of most of the world’s population.
In such a context, social preferences and their translation into future policy priorities may change. For
instance, the experience of collective action during the crisis could spur new forms of solidarity, while
collective narratives about the COVID-19 crisis could bring the link between environmental sustainability
and societal resilience to the fore, leading societies to seek more balance in environmental, economic and
social priorities (OECD, 2020[53]). At the same time, public opinion and societal views are far from being
monolithic in democratic societies. There are varieties of opinions, values and interests at play, often
competing with but also complementing one another. Recent years have seen greater polarisation of
societies in many OECD countries, sometimes manifest as “culture wars” or inter-generational conflicts,
which have been driven in part by growing inequalities, and the rise of identity politics and “populist” political
parties.
Public opinion and societal preferences are shaped by numerous factors that are largely impossible to
disentangle, though this does not make them any less important as influences on public policy. The
management of the COVID-19 pandemic (e.g. the restrictions implemented and their effectiveness in
controlling the spread of the virus, and the communication of scientific advice to the public), as well as the
socio-economic impacts of the crisis (e.g. the level of reliance of the economy on sectors largely unaffected

 37
by the crisis, and the impacts on inclusiveness) are likely to have implications on how societies view
government intervention in general, the roles of science in society, and the need for greater attention to
sustainability, inclusivity and resiliency. Table 1.1 outlines several critical pivot points related to the impacts
of COVID-19 on societal preferences and possible implications for STI.
Table 1.1. Critical pivot points in societal preferences and values

Impacts of the COVID-19 crisis: Critical pivot points
Perspectives on making the economy more shock-proof and resilient to crises
Factors favouring resilience as a key policy goal: the COVID-19 crisis raises social awareness of the vulnerabilities of the real economy to shocks,
favouring policy action to create more resilient economies.
Factors against resilience as a key policy goal: the crisis is seen as an exceptional occurrence, which will not be repeated, and the changes
needed to make economies more resilient are viewed as too costly. Consequently, there is little demand from society for more shock-proofing of
the economy
Societal views on the need for greater inclusion
Factors favouring inclusion as a key policy goal: problems of social and economic exclusion were exposed and exacerbated during the crisis.
Inclusiveness as a goal gains ground in policy agendas as social movements like #MeToo and Black Lives Matter permeate political and social
spheres. In the economic sphere, the dominance of big companies is seen as detrimental to socio-economic well-being and leads to a wider call to
support SMEs.
Factors against inclusion as a policy goal: the need to recover after the extensive economic shock relegates inclusiveness to a lesser priority.
Movements such as nationalist groups advocating exclusion gain greater traction. Big companies provide products consumers demand and use
their resources/capacities to respond to COVID-19 challenges, leading to implicit public endorsement of their dominance.
Public opinion on the relative importance of environmental sustainability
Factors favouring sustainability as a key policy goal: the COVID-19 shock raises public awareness of the need to tackle climate change and
environmental degradation as a key policy priority, as they pose risks of future shocks at an unprecedented scale.
Factors favouring less public support: public opinion downplays the climate challenge as health matters and economic recovery (including
preserving jobs at any cost) gain in importance.
Societal views on the roles of STI
Factors favouring STI: public support for STI increases as it is seen to provide the only long-lasting solutions to the COVID-19 crisis, e.g. through
the rapid development of an effective vaccine.
Factors against STI: public opinion turns negative towards STI, e.g. because scientific advice is seen as a “culprit” for unpopular confinement
measures and other restrictions.
Public opinion on government steering of the economy
Factors promoting more government “steering”: the experience of the shock results in the perception that government needs to help “steer”
markets to protect vulnerable crisis-prone economies. Trust in government interventions increases thanks to the perceived usefulness and
effectiveness of actions taken to offset the negative impacts of COVID-19.
Factors against public opinion favouring government steering: unpopular lockdowns and high death tolls mean public perceptions of government
responses to the COVID-19 shock are unfavourable, which reduces public support for government to play key roles in steering the economy.
Examples of implications for STI
Transformative STI policies: societal perspectives on the importance of transforming socio-technical systems to be more resilient, inclusive and
sustainable in the recovery would influence the objectives of STI policies and the policy instruments they use. For example, STI policies would be
more directed towards social goals if society places greater value on issues of sustainability and inclusivity.
Scale of STI policy support: societal opinion on the intensity of government intervention and the roles of STI would shape support for STI in
stability and recovery packages. For example, if society views both STI and government intervention positively, STI would play prominent roles in
ambitious recovery packages.
Reach of STI systems: beyond influencing politics, changes in societal perceptions of STI will affect the influence of STI on society (e.g. people’s
trust in scientific advice and their resulting actions), as well as the ability of STI to draw on new talent (e.g. more students engaging in scientific
careers).
Tracking developments – indicator examples
Key uncertainties: public opinion surveys on priorities; public opinion surveys on trust in government and trust in science advice; analysis of
media, social media and online searches; mapping of government policies and legislation; and analysis of civil society activities (social movements,
demonstrations, responses to surveys).
Implications for STI: mapping R&D expenditures by socio-economic objectives, the SDGs, etc.; mapping the prominence of STI in government
stability and recovery packages, and associated strategic orientations, as well as industry/labour association statements on directing innovations at
sustainability, resilience and inclusiveness goals.

38 
Tracking developments on public perceptions of the roles of STI and governments
Perceptions of the roles of STI in the first phases of the crisis appear to be positive. For example, findings
based on a survey of 2 651 people across England, Wales and Scotland, carried out between 30 March
and 26 April 2020 show that 72% of respondents trusted health scientists and researchers completely or
to a great extent to deal with the crisis (Craig et al., 2020[54]). Responses to questions in the OECD Science
Flash Survey 2020 on scientific advice and trust suggest that researchers expect an increase in the use of
scientific evidence, enhanced reputation of science, and a wider use of scientific advice after the crisis
(see Chapter 8). They also expect scientific careers to become more attractive.
However, these positive perceptions may not necessarily last. New social distancing measures to counter
the second wave of COVID-19 infections, drawing on scientific advice, have resulted in public
demonstrations in a number of countries. More debate has raged about the proportionality of confinement
measures given the state of infections, and more active resistance has taken place among those most
affected by confinement decisions.
As for public opinion on governments’ handling of the pandemic, the EU annual Regional and Local
Barometer, a survey conducted in September 2020 showed a 44% average share of EU citizens (based
on 26 381 responses from all EU countries) trusting their national governments to take the right decisions
to overcome the socio-economic impacts of the COVID-19 crisis. This compared to 48% who said they do
not trust their national governments in this regard. Levels of trust vary substantially across countries,
however, being typically higher in the Nordic region and lower in Central and Eastern Europe. Trust levels
are likely to evolve over time as the crisis unfolds.
Pace and direction of digitalisation
The role played by digital technologies, big-data analytics and AI in the economy and society during the
crisis also represent a critical pivot point. Changes in the organisation of work (with increased remote
working and virtual interactions); the rapid expansion of digital services (e.g. digital health and education
tools); and the increased use of big data analytics, AI and digital tools by industry and government are
putting those technologies to the test.
These developments also have important impacts on STI, both because they mark new processes that
may change the productivity of STI systems, and because they are changing demands for STI (e.g. in
terms of better WFH technologies and progress in virtual reality), potentially spurring new waves of
technological innovation in these fields.
Whether digital technologies, big-data analytics and AI will take on more important roles in society and the
economy will depend on several factors, including their contributions to addressing the COVID-19 crisis.
The success of WFH, virtual conferencing, robotics (see Chapter 6), and virtual services in health,
education and entertainment will also play a role. Experience in managing the crisis using digital tools will
also influence governments’ future use of such tools. Table 1.2outlines several critical pivot points related
to the impacts of COVID-19 on the socio-economic role of digital technologies, and their possible
implications for STI.

 39
Table 1.2. Critical pivot points in the socio-economic role of digital technologies, big-data analytics
and AI
WFH and virtual work interactions
Factors for an increase in WFH and virtual work: the confinement experience stemming from the pandemic leads to widespread experimentation
with WFH and virtual exchanges. Many professional workers prefer at least part-time WFH. Firms see their cost structures shift as office space is
reduced and becomes more flexible to accommodate fewer staff on-site at any one time.
Factors against more digital work and consumption patterns: negative experiences with WFH, particularly shortcomings of virtual conferencing in
promoting effective exchanges, reduce interest in WFH and lead to limited development and uptake. Infrastructure constraints and security fears
also raise concerns, slowing the wide uptake of these technologies.
Roles of big-data analytics, AI and automation in the economy
Factors for increased uptake of digital technologies in the economy: the shock to the labour supply – caused by the confinement measures
enforced to reduce the spread of the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic – leads to more automation of factories. The possible reshoring of
economic activities may also result in more automation, to reduce labour costs from reshoring to locations where labour is expensive. At the same
time, positive business experiences with big-data analytics and AI lead to more widespread interest and adoption.
Factors for less uptake of digital technologies: a perceived lack of impact of AI and digital technologies in addressing the COVID-19 crisis may
weaken their wide adoption. Emphasis on other priorities – for example, investments in health innovation – diverts attention away from AI and
automation. Abuses of privacy; the dominance of big players; digital threats; the misuse of high-quality language models for misinformation, spam
and, phishing; and abuse of legal and governmental processes may reduce their application, as could biases in AI-based applications.
The importance of digital relative to analogue services
Factors for a surge in digital services: the widespread experience of digital services in education, health, and retail is positive and leads to their
wider application.
Factors against an increased rollout of digital services: experiences of digital services were generally unsatisfactory during the pandemic and lead
to a return to previous services. This may be reinforced by concerns over privacy (especially with regard to health data) and the increased market
concentration in the delivery of these services.
Governmental use of digital tools
Factors for increased use of digital tools in government: the COVID-19 crisis showed the benefits of real-time data to feed agile policymaking. This
leads to increased use of new real-time and digital applications across governments, drawing on a mix of data sources.
Factors hampering the uptake of digital tools in government: negative experiences with digital tools, e.g. owing to technical problems, data quality,
privacy concerns, lack of digital skills among officials, and concerns over private-sector involvement, lead to weak uptake across government until
such challenges are resolved.
Increased demand for digital innovations: if digital technology use intensifies, there will be demand pressure for improved digital tools, which
would generate new waves of technological innovation.
Changes to operations and performance of STI systems: any changes to WFH and virtual interactions would affect the operations of
STI systems. For example, they could lead to greater automation in science. Progress in STI critically depends on connections: while digital
technologies could open these up further, they could reduce in-person exchanges, which could be detrimental.
Changes in the innovation intensity of services: digitalisation may increase the innovation intensity of this traditionally less innovation-intensive
set of industries, as well as the types of businesses operating in services.
Changes in STI policies’ focus: STI policy itself would gain in agility and responsiveness by applying new digital tools, and improvements in its
effectiveness could in turn affect the performance of STI systems’ performance.
Key uncertainties: survey evidence on the uptake of WFH, big data, cloud services and AI application; diffusion of digital technologies in
businesses of various sizes, in households/by individuals and in government/by industry.
Implications for STI: indicators of digital and AI-driven innovation, as well as WFH and online education tools technologies (e.g. software
applications and patents), geographic distribution of research collaborations (e.g. international and national, etc.).
Tracking developments on the uptake of digital technologies
COVID-19 has been called the “great accelerator”, particularly when it comes to digital technologies30
enabling e-commerce, teleworking, telepresence and automation. Early evidence points to actors in the
STI system having adopted more digital tools during the crisis. For example, a survey by the Centre for
Economic Performance-Confederation of British Industry survey of 375 UK businesses in July 2020 found
that from late March 2020 to July 2020, over 60% of firms adopted new digital technologies and
management practices, and around one-third invested in new digital capabilities (Riom and Valero,
2020[55]). Digitalisation has also had an impact on research. Over half of the respondents to a survey of
professionals and decision makers at 247 patenting companies cited digitisation as the most significant

40 
change (Kanesarajah and White, 2020[25]). AI tools have also been used to help accelerate drug and
vaccine development, identify virus-transmission chains, rapidly diagnose COVID-19 cases, monitor
broader economic impacts and tackle misinformation (OECD, 2020[56]). For example, based on a data set
comprising 1.8 million papers from three pre-print repositories (arXiv, bioRxiv and medRxiv) gathered at
the end of May 2020, Mateos-Garcia, Klinger and Stathoulopoulos (Mateos-Garcia, Klinger and
Stathoulopoulos, 2020[57]) found that more than one-third of AI publications related to COVID-19 involved
predictive analyses of patient data, particularly medical scans. These papers, however, received fewer
citations than comparable papers on the same topic.
Digital services in education, health, entertainment, retail and restaurants were much used concurrently
with confinement measures, and have led to an unprecedented demand that continued even as the strict
confinement measures were lifted. Whether all of these services remain in the event the COVID-19
challenge is resolved currently seems unlikely: some reduction in demand would be expected where virtual
services are judged an imperfect substitute for their in-person alternatives.
Governments themselves have shown unprecedented agility in their use of digital tools, most exemplified
by the contact-tracing applications introduced as a way to control the spread of the disease. The COVID-
19 crisis has also shown how policy making has also changed compared to the 2008-09 financial crisis,
as illustrated by the use of real-time data (such as Google’s mobility statistics) and other tools to better
monitor and respond to the crisis. A series of pulse surveys have also been informing STI policies. The
open release of COVID-19 papers by initiatives such as CORD-19 has not only supported scientific
activities, but also helped identify the nature of scientific collaboration on COVID-19. Early analysis of such
data has pointed to a drop in female research activities and high reliance on existing networks for research
collaborations, for example. These types of tools could be more systematically used in the future to support
the responsiveness and agility of STI policies. For example, the Portuguese Foundation for Science and
Technology launched AI 4 COVID19, a competition endowed with a budget of EUR 3 million
(USD 3.6 million) for R&D projects on data science and AI that help improve public administration bodies’
response to the impact of COVID-19 and future pandemics.
Scale and distribution of socio-economic impacts
The extent to which policy measures help avoid strong negative distributional effects will be an important
critical pivot point shaping STI systems and policy. This will depend on several factors, including the
intensity of the COVID-19 shock and the related confinement measures, and the availability and uptake of
digital technologies and practices by different actors. Socio-economic exclusion influences the operation
of STI systems and the diffusion of new technologies. A combination of more limited means to invest in
leading technologies and a more limited ability to retain qualified staff to operate those technologies in
difficult times explain why exclusion negatively affects diffusion. Table 1.3 outlines several critical pivot
points related to the impacts of COVID-19 on inclusion and exclusion, and their possible implications for
STI.
Tracking developments on the scale and distribution of socio-economic impacts related to

COVID-19
As discussed earlier in the chapter, the asymmetric impacts of the COVID-19 shock on innovative
businesses, universities and public research institutes, the research workforce and entrepreneurs highlight
the different distributional challenges of the COVID-19 shock. One risk is that existing gaps in the uptake
and use of digital technologies are exacerbated, in particular between large firms and SMEs, but also
between sectors. If not addressed, such uneven diffusion may have important implications for firms’
productivity performance as the pandemic continues to accelerate digitalisation. It could potentially widen

 41
the productivity gap between digital adopters and digital laggards, enhance the vulnerability of laggards,
and reduce economic resilience. Greater policy efforts will therefore be needed to boost adoption and
diffusion of digital tools, in particular for SMEs.
An additional dimension concerns the geographic impacts of the COVID-19 shock. Differences in effects
across sectors have influenced the intensity of the shock at regional levels (Bailey et al., 2020[58]). For
example, regions highly specialised in the tourism sector are among the hardest hit by the crisis (Gössling,
Scott and Hall, 2021[59]; OECD, 2020[60]). These sectors were also most affected by “social distancing”
measures aiming to reduce international and national travel, as well as social gatherings. As the crisis
unfolds and other sectors are hit hard in the resulting recession, further regions are likely to suffer more
than others.
Table 1.3. Critical pivot points regarding the distribution of socio-economic impacts
COVID-19 and social inclusiveness
Factors pointing to more exclusion: the pandemic provides fewer opportunities for new connections for recent graduates, job seekers and people
with precarious contracts (often including younger workers and people in contract-based professions) and has a negative effect on the female
workforce, taken up by dependent (children or elderly) care. The demand for a constant online presence may also exacerbate the hurdles for those
providing more dependent care.
Factors pointing to more inclusion: the shock leads to even more awareness of inclusiveness challenges, which were somewhat hidden prior to the
COVID-19 pandemic. Accordingly, stability packages and related policy action highlight greater inclusion as an explicit goal. Changes in practices
owing to COVID-19, such as WFH and digital services, offer opportunities for more inclusion. The goal of achieving greater resilience also aligns
with promoting inclusive economic processes across firms, regions and individuals.
COVID-19 and industrial inclusiveness
Factors pointing to less inclusiveness: government recovery packages primarily focus on the big employers (airlines, large manufacturers, etc.). Big
tech companies, but also other large firms, benefited from large demand for their products during lockdowns, possibly reducing opportunities for
smaller firms in the digital and other sectors to compete.
Factors pointing to more inclusiveness: policy responses aimed at shielding the economy from the crisis have successfully targeted the financial
fragilities of SMEs, particularly young innovative firms, which emerge as catalysts for radical innovation. The pandemic provides new opportunities
for entrepreneurship, where start-ups help address the constraints created by difficult health and economic conditions, and respond to changing
preferences and needs.
COVID-19 and geographic inclusiveness
Factors pointing to less inclusiveness: the COVID-19 crisis was geographically unequal as outbreaks differed across and within countries, the
effects across sectors (e.g. tourism vs. digital tech) and regions varied, confinement measures were more or less severe, and countries’ capacities
to respond differed (e.g. depending on the level of government debt/ability to borrow).
Factors pointing to more inclusiveness: policy efforts to support the regions and sectors most affected, and regional measures to control outbreaks
and mitigate the negative effects of the pandemic were implemented. New ways of providing goods and services (such as online entertainment
offers) helped reduce unequal sectoral effects. The urban-rural divide may also be lessened as rural areas become more popular by virtue of the
higher exposure to the pandemic in cities and the reduced cost of participating in professional activities remotely through digital tools, rather than
engaging in time-consuming commuting
Impacts on STI system performance: the crisis presents different innovation opportunities for different players across firms, regions, countries
and social groupings. More diversity is conducive to more innovation, while concentration has mixed effects on innovation outcomes. Greater
inclusivity can increase market competition, which may raise the rate of innovation (albeit in non-linear ways).
Impacts on STI policy: if inclusiveness is taken seriously, STI policies will pay greater attention than in the past to those that are more excluded,
including women and minorities, and innovation in low- and medium-tech sectors and in ‘laggard’ regions. This would mean a greater focus on
technology diffusion policies and STI policies to support inclusiveness more generally.
Key uncertainties: Gini indices and distributional measures at regional, firm and individual levels in response to COVID-19.
Implications for STI: various STI performance indicators (e.g. scale and scope of publications, graduates, IP, etc.) by region (incl. rural-urban
divide), firms (by size, sector, age), and individuals (profiles of entrepreneurs and researchers).

42 
International relations and the global order
There exist considerable uncertainties about the future of the current multilateral system, and what this
could mean for international STI co-operation and mobility. On the one hand, there are signals that “peak”
globalisation has passed, and that a new fragmented global order – marked by a rise in ethno-nationalism,
more managed trade and investment, and greater strategic competition between “great powers” – is
emerging. Furthermore, the current crisis may contribute to undermining trust in global governance
solutions, fuelling the already growing pre-crisis discontent and ultimately driving a shift towards national
approaches as countries – especially larger economies – seek to become more self-reliant. These
tendencies could be augmented by multinational enterprises seeking to rely less on global value chains to
reduce uncertainty and enhance their resilience, leading to further “reshoring” of production.
On the other hand, multilateral frameworks could be reinforced as a result of a greater appreciation of risks
and challenges that transcend national boundaries and require co-ordinated responses, especially if
transnational actors in the public and private sectors are successful in leading the fight against the
pandemic. Table 1.4 outlines critical pivot points related to the impacts of COVID-19 on the international
political economy.
Table 1.4. Critical pivot points on international relations and the global order
Impacts of the COVID-19 crisis: Critical pivot points31
International relations and multilateralism
Factors pointing to strong multilateralism: the cascading systematic effects of the pandemic as well as its indiscriminate nature serve as a strong
argument for renewed endorsement of multilateral co-operation. It illustrates that global responses are needed to global crises, spurring countries
to engage in greater international collaboration. The global health emergency and economic aftermath trigger a major new commitment to
development co-operation that moves beyond a traditional North-South approach to focus on multi-directional mutual learning and solidarity. The
SDGs’ holistic vision of development is reinforced as there is a new appreciation of interconnectedness and interdependence of human
development outcomes and human security.
Factors pointing to faltering multilateralism: The multilateral system begins to break down due to lost credibility and resources, and unilateral or
bilateral actions and decisions prevail, making way for new but competing institutions, power players and alliances. Emerging and developing
economies see a rise in regional multilateralism, while the ‘old powers’ are preoccupied with internal issues and divisions and abdicate leadership
internationally
International trade and investment
Factors pointing to sustained international trade and investment: the COVID-19 crisis catalyses new global trade and investment links to address
localised supply shocks. Accelerated digitalisation enables a new wave of globalisation that is more transparent and efficient. The efficiency gains
from international collaboration and the international division of labour in production introduce a large cost to autarchic behaviour, particularly in a
period where rebuilding economic growth is essential.
Factors pointing to preferences for national or supranational regional approaches: the COVID-19 crisis has already elicited international
competition to secure scarce global resources. Wider geopolitical tensions increase national or supranational efforts to safeguard against future
shocks, including in the provision of essential goods. The shock created by the pandemic and the shortage of key products during the crisis may
amplify demands for access to key technology fields, such as 5G communications and AI, in light of concerns over national security, the risk of
future dependencies on foreign technology suppliers, and concerns over global monopolies and their potentially detrimental impact on
technological progress.
Impacts on STI systems: disruptions in international scientific collaboration and the international division of labour in production would affect the
performance of STI systems, as well as shift the orientations of national STI (as a substitute or complement to global efforts).
Impacts on STI policies: STI policies may focus on existing national specialisations and support international scientific collaborations to optimise
the global STI system. Alternatively, STI policies may be technology- or product-specific in order to ensure national access to core technologies or
products. Strategic STI alliances with chosen countries may also be sought to exploit shared values and the reciprocal benefits and costs of such
collaborations
Key uncertainties: measures of the evolution of barriers to international collaboration and economic exchanges, e.g. trade and investment data,
data on global value chains, government funding of multilateral organisations, etc.
Implications for STI: measures of the nature and extent of international STI collaboration, e.g. patent and publication data, research funding data.

 43
Tracking developments on international relations and the global order
In co-operation with national governments, a diverse range of foundations and international organisations
are actively engaged in STI actions to respond to COVID-19. The WHO, the Coalition for Epidemic
Preparedness and Innovation, and the Global Research Collaboration for Infectious Disease Preparedness
(to name just a few) are playing prominent roles co-ordinating the development of vaccines and
therapeutics (see Chapter 5). The foundations involved in this endeavour include the Bill and Melinda
Gates Foundation, the Wellcome Trust and the Novo Nordisk Foundation. Among other objectives, these
globally operating foundations seek to harness science and innovation to address infectious diseases. In
the context of COVID-19, they have not only provided research funding, but also promoted STI responses
to COVID-19 at the global level, with special emphasis on the challenges faced by developing countries.
Several bilateral and supranational regional approaches have also supported research collaborations. For
example, the National Research Foundation of Korea and the Swedish Research Council launched a grant
programme for joint research collaborations between Swedish and South Korean researchers on the
control and prevention of COVID-19, while the Nordic Health Data Research Projects on COVID-19 is a
collaborative call for proposals for funding to promote research co-operation and sharing of health data
across Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Norway, Iceland, Estonia and Latvia.32
A large number of research outputs have also been international. Analysis of research papers published
on COVID-19 from January 2020 to September 2020 shows that around half of UK-based authors, one-
quarter of US-based authors and one-quarter of China-based authors co-published their papers with an
international co-author. Chinese collaborators represent by far the largest share of co-authors in the
United States, and vice versa (see Chapter 5).
At the same time, the COVID-19 crisis has also shown that an important component of the scientific
response has occurred at the national level. National institutes working on infectious diseases, such as the
Institut Pasteur in France and the Robert Koch Institute in Germany, have played central roles in advising
domestic policy makers on the means to address the national COVID-19 situation.
The future orientation of STI policies
STI policy is shaped by the key uncertainties above, but it also influences them. Compared to the situation
during the 2008-09 global financial crisis, STI lies at the heart of solutions to the COVID-19 crisis and has
a highly visible part in shaping policies to contain the virus’s spread. The role played by STI in this context
is therefore likely to influence the positioning of STI policy in the future. However, there are also
uncertainties on the future goals and practices of STI policies and the resources they will have at their
disposal. This section considers future levels of government support for STI, in light of the highly visible
contributions STI is making to solve the pandemic, but also the public sectors’ growing indebtedness. It
also considers whether STI policy will become more directional to enact sustainability and digital transitions
over the medium and longer term.
Government support for STI
Future levels of government support will be determined by societal preferences and the recognition of STI
as an essential actor of socio-technical transitions to meet sustainability, inclusiveness and resilience
goals. Strong endorsement and recognition of STI could lead to significant increases in public R&D – the
equivalent, perhaps, of the West’s reaction to Sputnik, which ushered in the US-Soviet space race
(Subbaraman, 2020[61]). This could become a reality as the United States, China, other Asian industrialised
countries and Europe chase leadership positions in AI, quantum computing, supercomputing, robotics (see
Chapter 6) and other technologies, particularly health-related (see Chapter 7 on engineering biology). Most
OECD governments are launching recovery packages to help overcome the longer-term fallout of the
pandemic crisis. Many have lofty ambitions to modernise national economies, particularly through

44 
digitalisation, and drive a green transition towards more sustainable production and consumption. Some
also proclaim greater “technology sovereignty” as a goal.
However, the extent to which ambitions like these translate into actions that drive structural change remains
uncertain. Government intervention also needs to be affordable, which will be a major concern for many
countries as the pandemic raises the costs to the economy. Following the first wave of COVID-
19 infections, government debt for all countries was already at an unprecedented high, far above the levels
reached during the global financial crisis (Figure 1.11). The current level of support for research and
innovation emulates behaviour in 2008-09, when funding was impressive in the immediate aftermath but
dropped-off in a number of countries because of unsustainable levels of public debt. While some countries
will have few difficulties obtaining credit, others will not be so fortunate. The impacts of COVID-19 are
already substantive, and not all countries have been in a position to support those most adversely affected
by COVID-19. This applies notably to developing countries, which have left a number of their industries
unsupported. This has implications for STI, as the scale and focus of recovery packages will affect the
goals and types of measures supporting research and innovation that governments choose to implement,
as well as the level of funding.
Figure 1.11. Historical patterns of general government debt

Percentage of GDP
% WWI WWII Global Great

140 Financial Lockdown
Crisis
120
Advanced economies
100
80
60
40
Emerging market economies
20
0
1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Note: The aggregate public-debt-to-GDP series for advanced economies and emerging market economies is based on a constant sample of 25
and 27 countries, respectively, weighted by GDP in purchasing power parity terms.
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2020. Fiscal Monitor: Policies for the Recovery. Washington, October.
At the same time, the amount of public funding is not necessarily synonymous with support for
STI systems, as industry and civil society also play a role. As a possible remedy to funding constraints,
industry and civil society actors – notably foundations – working jointly with public research and innovation-
funding agencies can amplify the impacts of public support.
Directionality of STI policies
Public preferences on the need to build more resilient, sustainable and inclusive societies, as well as
perspectives on the limits of government intervention, will shape the goals and toolboxes of STI policy.

 45
The move towards a more proactive “systems transformation” model, compared to a model mainly focused
on eliminating market failures, could accelerate. This could be reflected in ambitious mission-oriented
projects aiming to engage a wide range of stakeholders from across the STI system (see Chapter 8). Such
projects may feature prominently in government recovery and stimulus packages, particularly those that
emphasise green and digital transformations. STI policy has well-established roles to play in supporting
the development of sustainable technologies (e.g. by investing in environmentally sustainable
technologies) and responding to the need for greater inclusiveness (e.g. by enabling the participation of
excluded groups in STI) (OECD, 2011[62]; Planes-Satorra and Paunov, 2017[63]; Borowiecki et al., 2019[64]).
OECD countries have been increasing their support programmes along these lines over the last decade
or more, and could now expand them. While STI policy may need to adjust to the new emphasis on building
greater socio-economic resilience, STI already makes important contributions in this regard, as outlined in
Box 1.1.
Box 1.1. The contributions of STI to building resilience

STI systems can contribute to building resilience in the following ways:
 An agile STI system that operates effectively can help find responses and solutions to
unexpected challenges. In the context of the COVID-19 crisis, the STI system has the capacity
to develop vaccines and treatments quickly (e.g. through novel technology platforms) and ways
of dealing with the virus (e.g. through tracking apps and finding alternative ways to reduce
infection rates while keeping the economy operating). It has also developed a range of digital
technologies that have helped much of the economy and society continue its operations through
remote working and electronic business. However, STI systems need to remain agile, as future
crises – including health crises and other shocks – will likely require very different responses
than those that apply to COVID-19.
 STI plays an important role in ramping up the production of goods and services that can help
address a crisis. During the initial onslaught of the COVID-19 pandemic, several countries were
able to bolster critical production quickly, thanks to their strong technological and industrial
base, and using new tools and technologies such as 3D printing and open-source designs and
software. More widely, technological strengths in core fields – such as biotechnology, the digital
sector and AI – provide the means to respond to shocks to global production.
 While the exact timing and type of future shock cannot be predicted, a number of crises are
foreseeable. Preparedness measures can benefit from STI efforts aiming to avert crises before
they emerge and build resilience to their consequences. Future shocks may emerge from
climate change, including its impacts on health, biodiversity and food production. Dealing with
such contingencies means that STI must contribute to sustainability.
 Scientific advice is also essential to helping develop effective responses to future crises.
Scientific advice can contribute to the preparedness of research systems, anticipating likely
knowledge and infrastructure requirements needed to support socio-economic systems in times
of crisis. Multi-disciplinary advice structures that simulate future crises can contribute to national
contingency planning efforts in case of emergencies.
Conclusions
Science is the only exit strategy from COVID-19, and the chapter shows that the pandemic has triggered
an unprecedented mobilisation of the scientific community. Science and innovation have played essential
roles in providing a better understanding of the virus and its transmission, and in developing hundreds of

46 
candidate therapeutics and vaccines over a very short period. The pandemic has underscored more than
in other recent crises the importance of science and innovation to being both prepared and reactive to
upcoming crises. It has also stretched research and innovation systems to their limits, revealing gaps that
need filling to improve overall system resilience and preparedness for future crises. It is a wake-up call for
all and highlights the need to recalibrate STI policies to better equip governments with the instruments and
capabilities to point innovation efforts towards the goals of sustainability, inclusivity and resiliency.
A range of relevant STI policy goals and actions will help implement this orientation for the recovery and
meet the challenges of the current crisis, as shown in Table 1.5.
Table 1.5. Broad STI policy goals and actions for crisis and recovery
STI policy goals Examples of STI policy actions
Direct STI to identify  provide research and innovation funding for diagnostics, as well as vaccine and treatment
solutions to the development
COVID-19 pandemic  support areas of research and innovation, including social sciences, that contribute solutions
to COVID-19 and mitigate the negative effects of measures taken to contain the spread of the
pandemic
 support international collaboration on STI solutions to the shared global challenge of COVID-
19.
Mitigate the negative  offer support to public research institutes in light of potentially reduced funding resulting from
impacts on the pandemic (e.g. because of lower student intake)
STI systems,  support early-career researchers and women researchers who are more affected by the
including the uneven disruptions caused by the crisis
distributional effects  support innovative SMEs and entrepreneurs affected by the COVID-19 crisis
of COVID-19  invest in the diffusion of digital technologies to help companies deal with confinement
measures
 support the agility of the STI system by providing grant extensions to innovators affected by
COVID-19, including innovative SMEs.
Provide scientific  manage the trusted communication of scientific evidence on COVID-19, including its
advice to limitations as more is learnt (including dealing with misinformation)
policy makers and  offer transparent perspectives on the trade-offs of decisions and the role of science in
the public on informing (but not deciding on) policy decisions
appropriate  communicate the contributions of STI to dealing with the impacts of COVID-19 (paying close
responses to COVID- attention to social media and possible echo chambers)
19  tackle disinformation on scientific evidence regarding COVID-19.
Raise the agility and  set policy directions that meet societal goals, including inclusiveness, sustainability and
responsiveness of resilience
STI systems  use such directionality, e.g. in recovery packages, to reduce uncertainties for businesses and
other non-governmental actors, by signalling intended investments and future demand
commitments in support of transition goals
 revisit the policy mix, e.g. in support of business innovation, if more direct measures are
necessary to meet ambitious transition goals
 use the crisis an as opportunity to reform those parts of research systems that operate sub-
optimally, e.g. the research-career pipeline
 use new policy tools for optimal and agile support of STI to address COVID-19 problems,
leveraging new digital technologies for policy making (e.g. real-time data, digital apps and
interconnected databases)
 use deliberative and anticipatory approaches to policy that systematically consider broader
dynamics and the longer-term.
The need remains for medical research and innovation to contribute solutions to the pandemic, and support
for these should continue – including international collaboration, given the global scale of the challenge.
Collaborative partnerships provide STI systems with greater agility to respond to future challenges. Policy
support for other areas of science and innovation that mitigate the effects of the crisis should also continue,
paying close attention to the uneven distributional effects of COVID-19. With the onset of the second wave
of the pandemic, scientific advice to policy makers and citizens is increasingly contested. This calls for
renewed emphasis on transparency and a multidisciplinary approach, and a clear presentation of scientific

 47
advice as just one – albeit important – input to the policy-making process. Finally, if the post-crisis recovery
is to promote the structural reforms required to meet an agenda focused on a transition to sustainability,
then STI policies will need to reform research and innovation systems. Governments will also need to
prepare more effectively against future shocks, assessing developments around key uncertainties and
their implications for STI. Policy makers and STI system stakeholders could use this chapter’s key
uncertainties framework to appraise a wide range of policy options to shape the future state and dynamics
of STI landscapes.
Outline of the book
The remainder of the book dives more deeply into several topics covered in this chapter. Chapter 2 takes
a closer look at the intense pressure of COVID-19 on research systems, revealing their inherent response
capacity and flexibility. Scientific production, in terms of academic publications, has been impressive.
Research databases and scientific publishers have removed traditional barriers, so that the scientific
community can quickly share COVID-19-related data and publications. Digital tools and open-data
infrastructures have allowed many scientists to continue to function effectively outside their usual
laboratory or field environments. COVID-19 has also shed light on areas needing strengthening to increase
research systems’ overall preparedness for (and resilience to) future crises, bringing to the fore pre-existing
concerns about risk-taking in research and research quality. In the rush to understand and find solutions
to COVID-19, the tendency has understandably been to support “safe” mainstream research, but there
also exists a need to take calculated risks and explore new ideas that might lead to breakthroughs. The
intense pressure to release data and results rapidly has cut short or circumvented normal peer-review
publication processes, though the sharp rise in pre-prints appears to have caused relatively few problems,
and experiments are under way to “speed review” such papers before they are released.
Even in the absence of COVID-19, many early-career researchers were in precarious positions, employed
on short-term contracts with no clear perspective of a permanent academic position (Chapter 3). For
women in particular, the hyper-competitive environment and lack of security have been an active
disincentive to continuing in research. Most early-career researchers now expect to have even fewer
academic career opportunities, a situation compounded by the radically disrupted international mobility of
researchers. New and more attractive career paths that provide greater security and alternative options for
mobility in and out of academia and other research sectors are required.
Regarding business research and innovation, the COVID-19 crisis is not just a key threat to the ability of
innovation systems to fulfil their normal functions, but also a call for mobilising these systems to provide
new solutions to the immediate health, societal and economic challenges posed by the pandemic
(Chapter 4). On an aggregate basis, business investments in research and innovation are pro-cyclical, and
thus prone to contracting in times of crisis. It is difficult to imagine the current crisis being any different,
given its deep – although uneven – economic impacts so far. Nevertheless, governments cannot act alone
to drive ambitious policy programmes (such as sustainability transitions): they require strong partnerships
with business and civil society to succeed. Recovery packages will need to include a mix of measures
incentivising the private sector to invest in appropriate research and innovation. An important policy goal
will be to reduce uncertainties by signalling intended public-sector investments and future demand
commitments supporting transition goals. The current crisis also serves as a reminder that innovation-
support policies need to be able to guide innovation efforts where they are most needed. Governments
need to build innovation-support portfolios that equip them with the mechanisms, instruments and
capabilities allowing them to orient innovation efforts, particularly to areas where government is a primary
user or customer of innovations. In this regard, tax incentives are an insufficient means of guiding
innovation to broader societal needs, and are suboptimal for encouraging investment in knowledge at the
interface between basic research and actual product or process development. Direct grants can support
longer-term, high-risk research, as well as target specific areas that either generate public goods

48 
(e.g. health and defence) or have a particularly high potential for spillovers. Governments should revisit
their policy mix in support of business research and innovation to ensure an appropriate balance between
direct and indirect measures.
Just as the pandemic is a global problem, it requires global solutions involving international co-operation
and collaboration (Chapter 5). No single country can beat COVID-19 on its own. Research collaboration,
both between public research and businesses, and internationally, is perhaps unparalleled as the global
scientific enterprise has pulled together to find solutions to the pandemic. The speed with which research
groups and biopharmaceutical firms are developing COVID-19 vaccines builds on years of basic research
investment, as well as the recent institutionalisation of international co-ordination efforts to develop agile
technology platforms that can be activated as new pathogens emerge. These relatively new arrangements
are performing well, but are underfunded and dependent on a handful of countries and philanthropic
institutions for financing. Governments should consider scaling them up and extending them to other global
challenges where R&D preparedness is important, capitalising on the momentum from the response to
COVID-19. R&D preparedness measures include technology platforms, infrastructures, and collaborative
networks that will improve countries’ abilities to respond effectively to a diverse range of risks.
Governments also need to work together on new financing and governance mechanisms, wherein
business and private-finance actors work with multilateral and national development banks to co-finance
STI solutions for global challenges. The rapid and unprecedented mobilisation of public and private R&D
funding for COVID-19 vaccines and their global distribution has demonstrated that new innovative funding
models can be deployed to address global challenges through international STI co-operation.
Digital and biomedical technologies are playing essential and highly visible roles in combatting the
pandemic’s impacts and in finding medical solutions, particularly with regards to rapid vaccine
development. Two emerging technologies, engineering biology and robotics, have shown promise in
helping enhance the health resiliency of societies. Engineering biology (Chapter 7) is an attempt to turn
biotechnology into a discipline more reminiscent of engineering than biology, and is focused on industrial
production. A recent technological breakthrough, the biofoundry, can greatly reduce the time from idea to
product, and improve the reliability and reproducibility of bio-manufacturing. Biofoundries are highly
automated facilities that follow detailed, complex workflows through the co-ordinated use of laboratory
robots. The messenger RNA vaccines for COVID-19 (e.g. the Pfizer and Moderna vaccines that have been
the first to clear clinical trials) are especially amenable to this approach. Beyond their use in biofoundries,
robotics can play other roles that enhance the health resiliency of societies (Chapter 6), from aiding
laboratory research, surgery and physical rehabilitation, to delivering medicines, transporting waste,
combating loneliness, and improving medical diagnostics and treatments. Governments possess several
tools to accelerate the development and deployment of technologies like these: basic and applied research
in public research organisations and firms; public private partnerships and collaborative platforms;
interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary research for converging technologies; and test-beds, demonstrators,
and regulatory sandboxes to help companies de-risk investments. Skills development is another important
requirement, as is support for standards and technology diffusion.
Countries’ governance arrangements shape their research and innovation responses to the current
COVID-19 crisis and will influence the contribution of STI to the recovery (Chapter 8). These arrangements
are broad in scope and include the ways governments set directions and choose priorities, their
relationships with other actors in the innovation system, and the technologies they use to govern. One of
the more visible – and most debated – aspects of governments’ response to the pandemic is the use of
scientific advice in designing policies. Previous OECD work has formulated guidelines on providing and
using scientific advice in international crises like COVID-19. The chapter reviews these guidelines and
considers how governments have followed them in their policy making. The effectiveness of STI policies
also depends on the policy intelligence tools used, including data-management systems and information
services that detect, monitor and communicate developments in STI systems. These can map system
dependencies, alert decision-makers to shocks and communicate the real-time impacts of possible future

 49
shocks at a granular level. The COVID-19 crisis has led to unprecedented uses of new digital tools and
data to inform policy, which could accelerate the digitalisation of science and innovation policy itself.
Governments’ ongoing experiments with mission-oriented innovation policies, which have tended to target
grand societal challenges, could feature more prominently in the STI policy mix, for instance, as part of
recovery packages targeting green transitions. Governments will need to renew their policy frameworks
and capabilities to carry out a more ambitious science and innovation policy agenda. Chapter 8 argues
that governments should link support for emerging technologies to broader missions that encapsulate
responsible innovation principles. This will help ensure an alignment of emerging technology development
with the objectives of mission-oriented innovation policies. Building government capabilities to deliver on
a more ambitious policy agenda, including capacities to use advanced analytics more effectively and
across the whole of government, will be paramount. An increased policy emphasis on building resiliency,
which calls for policy agility, highlights the need for governments to possess dynamic capabilities to adapt
and learn in the face of rapidly changing environments.

50 
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56 
Notes
1 Both policy papers are a result of work conducted on COVID-19 under the auspices of the OECD Working Party on
Innovation and Technology Policy.
2 https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/science/coronavirus-vaccine-tracker.html.
3 The impacts on research infrastructures have been multifaceted, with sometimes extensive and enduring effects. As
an illustration, the ability to observe the ocean was impacted in unprecedented ways. In the second quarter of 2020,
governments and oceanographic institutions recalled nearly all oceanographic research vessels to home ports, and
ocean buoys and other systems could not be maintained, leading to premature failure. The observations from these
systems are vital to marine, climate, and weather forecasts and warnings, and some time and extra costs will be
required to bring back these capabilities (Heslop et al., 2020[65]).
4 This OECD Science Flash Survey 2020 is implemented through an online open-link questionnaire, inviting scientists
or any other individuals with an interest in science or science policy to answer questions on the impact of the COVID-
19 crisis from a science perspective. The survey was initially promoted through the network of the OECD Committee
for Scientific and Technological Policy and former participants of the 2018 OECD International Survey of Scientific
Authors. It is being carried out in collaboration with the Inter-American Development Bank. As of 12 October 2020,
over 2 600 responses from nearly 100 countries had been collected; 45% of responses came from individuals who
identify themselves as scientists; the remainder correspond to science policy advisors (20%), professionals involved
in science (15%), science communicators (10%) and individuals carrying out science-related administrative work
(10%). The survey does not request any information that can identify the respondents. As a result, results cannot be
considered representative of a well-defined population and should be considered with extreme caution, as a
complementary view to other evidence.
5 http://www.zentech.be.
6
https://www.adaptvac.com.
7https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/kerala/kerala-government-hospital-deploys-robot-to-serve-covid-19-
patients/article31432663.ece.
8 https://www.policycuresresearch.org/covid-19-r-d-tracker.
9 https://www.ukcdr.org.uk/covid-circle/covid-19-research-project-tracker.
10 https://anr.fr/en/call-for-proposals-details/call/flash-call-covid-19.

 57
11 https://pm.gc.ca/en/news/news-releases/2020/03/20/prime-minister-announces-canadas-plan-mobilize-industry-
fight-covid.
12https://www.ukri.org/funding/funding-opportunities/ukri-open-call-for-research-and-innovation-ideas-to-address-
covid-19.
13 https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/covid-19.
14 https://www.science4covid19.pt.
15https://nrc.canada.ca/en/research-development/research-collaboration/programs/pandemic-response-challenge-
program.
16 https://www.semanticscholar.org/cord19.
17 As of the end of September 2020.
18 www.nextrain.org.
19 www.gisaid.org.
20 https://www.cas.org/covid-19-antiviral-compounds-dataset.
21 https://midasnetwork.us/covid-19/.
22 https://www.gov.uk/guidance/mhra-regulatory-flexibilities-resulting-from-coronavirus-covid-19.
23https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/white-house-announces-new-partnership-unleash-u-s-
supercomputing-resources-fight-covid-19/.
24 https://www.erinha.eu/covid19-research/.
25 https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/cares.
26 A more comprehensive review is provided in (Paunov and Planes-Satorra, forthcoming[2]).
27 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-to-protect-uk-research-jobs-with-major-support-package.
28 https://lafrenchtech.com/en/covid19-french-tech-fights-back-n1/.
29 Such an exercise would not start from scratch and would scan existing forward-looking analyses, including national
foresight exercises and future scenario studies, to identify and explore key trends, forecasts and future scenarios that
could usefully inform strategic long-term thinking in STI policy in a post-COVID-19 world. Using dedicated workshops
conducted over the course of 2021 and 2022, the exercise would deliver a unique global perspective and provide
useful resources for STI policy making and other strategic foresight studies. It would also provide a useful basis for
the 2022 edition of the OECD Science, Technology and Innovation Outlook, which could provide compelling shared
visions on the future of STI policy.
30Some of the issues raised in this section are explored more extensively in the latest edition of the OECD’s Digital
Economy Outlook (OECD, 2020[66]).
31 These critical pivot points draw upon (Paunov and Planes-Satorra, forthcoming[3]).
32 https://funding.nordforsk.org/portal/#call/1904.

58 
2 Mobilising public research funding

and infrastructures in times of
crisis
The COVID-19 pandemic has triggered an unprecedented mobilisation of

the scientific community. In record time, public research agencies and
organisations, private foundations and charities, and the health industry at
large have set up an array of newly funded research initiatives worth billions
of dollars. Nevertheless, this exceptional response from the scientific
system has also revealed many challenges. This chapter examines how the
scientific community has been mobilised during the COVID-19 crisis, with a
particular focus on funding and infrastructures. It explores how the lessons
learned can be extrapolated to other crisis situations and the operations of
science more broadly, drawing policy implications for science policy makers
and administrators, such as the need for better preparedness, for flexible
funding mechanisms, for new policies related to early publications of
scientific results, and for strengthening the overall resilience of the research
system.

 59
Key findings
 The research system has responded strongly and flexibly during the pandemic. The
research funding system as well as research infrastructures were able to quickly refocus
towards crisis-relevant topics and streamline their procedures, although the capacity to
allocate or reallocate resources quickly could be improved. Assessing the effectiveness of
different mechanisms in producing useful research outputs could provide insights into what
works for the future.
 The COVID-19 crisis has spurred new practices in scientific communication as rapid
sharing of data and scientific discoveries worldwide has become essential. Many
traditional constraints have been lifted or relaxed to accelerate the production, publication
and dissemination of scientific results relevant to the pandemic. Pre-prints, i.e. academic
papers that have not been peer reviewed, have become more common, allowing for faster
diffusion of scientific findings, but also raising risks around quality assurance. This raises
questions as to how peer review operates, its importance and its limitations. More than
three-quarters of all COVID-19 publications are open access, compared to less than one-
half in other biomedical fields. These developments could accelerate the transition to a
more open science in the longer run.
 There are considerable uncertainties regarding long-term funding for research once
the immediate emergency has passed, as significant resources have been reallocated
towards research fields that are relevant to the crisis. Governments and research funding
bodies should define and communicate quickly their capacities to support research in the
coming years, as well as their strategic priorities, in order to foster cooperation and
collaboration, avoid unnecessary duplication and identify “dark spaces” where research is
needed but not being performed. This would allow research performing organisations to
elaborate realistic long-term strategic plans, and enable a coordinated global approach.

60 
Introduction
The COVID-19 pandemic has generated a series of exceptional challenges for the research system. Both
governments and citizens are relying on science to come up with solutions to the crisis. Starting from
limited information, research is expected to provide an understanding of the disease – its causes and
transmission, its impacts on society, potential cures and preventive actions – in record time. The intense
pressure has tested the research system to its limits, shedding light on its inherent response capacity and
flexibility, but also revealing areas needing to be strengthened to increase its overall resilience and
preparedness for existing and future crises.
This chapter examines how the scientific community has been mobilised during the COVID-19 crisis, with
a particular focus on research funding and infrastructures. Research infrastructures have mobilised their
resources and opened up their facilities to new projects targeting COVID-19. Research databases and
scientific publishers have removed traditional barriers to access, so that COVID-19 related data and
publications can be quickly shared across the whole scientific community. However, national and
international co-ordination has sometimes been slow and hindered by structural hurdles. Research
organisations and institutions have had to reorganise their operations, rapidly setting new priorities and
considering how to balance new investments to address the pandemic with the need to maintain support
for the science base as a whole. Traditional peer-review processes have been stretched, and maintaining
the quality of scientific production under intense public scrutiny has emerged as a particular challenge.
The chapter explores how the lessons learned can be extrapolated to other crisis situations and the
operations of science more broadly, drawing policy implications for science policy makers and
administrators.
Resources unlocked for research on COVID-19
The COVID-19 pandemic has led to a worldwide mobilisation of research funders and research performing
organisations. Research funders have set up numerous rapid-funding mechanisms to respond to COVID-
19, and encouraged and supported researchers to redirect their efforts towards pandemic-related priorities.
Philanthropic investment directed towards COVID-19 has also significantly increased, particularly to
support international research efforts. While it is difficult to sum up the resources allocated by various
funders to support research related to COVID-19, a preliminary analysis of the major research funding
initiatives worldwide1 (Figure 2.1) suggests that over USD 7 billion of new or redirected resources were
unlocked in the first nine months of 2020.2
 Over USD 5 billion have been announced for public research funding schemes supported by
national public research funding agencies and organisations. These include about USD 300 million
for the Asia-Pacific region (excluding the People’s Republic of China, hereafter China), over
USD 850 million for Europe, and over USD 3.5 billion for North America. These figures do not
include internal resources that have been redirected towards COVID-19 within research performing
organisations.
 About USD 2 billion (a mix of public and private money) have been pledged (mostly through the
Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovation [CEPI] and the Global Alliance for Vaccines and
Immunization [GAVI]) for international research efforts focusing on the development of COVID-19
vaccines (see Chapter 5).
 At least USD 550 million have been allocated by philanthropic foundations to COVID-19 research
in addition to their pledges to major international co-operative initiatives.

 61
Resources pledged by industry are more difficult to ascertain, but over USD 1 billion have been allocated
by private companies for public-private research initiatives. Internal research resources invested by
industry in diagnostics, therapeutics and vaccines research are likely much larger.
Figure 2.1. Evolution of COVID-19 research funding programmes and pledges

March-August 2020
Government research organisations funding calls International initiatives Philanthropic/non-profit organisations
Billion USD
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Note of caution: Overall investment is almost certainly underestimated: the expected level of funding is not yet fully known or validated for all
funding schemes, and some funders do not publicly disclose the sums allocated. There may also be some duplication when funding commitments
are redistributed among different funding programmes. These figures should therefore be treated cautiously, given the complexity of mapping
funding declarations to actual investment and the absence of data from some countries. The sharp increase in funding seen in April is linked to
the clarification by some major research funders of their resource allocation to major funding programmes.
Source: Data were gathered from public sources published by funders. Data on government research funding calls are available on the STIP
COVID-19 Watch portal: https://stip.oecd.org/covid/.
Countries have committed to funding research and the search for treatments at several high-level
intergovernmental meetings devoted to fundraising.3 However, these pledges were not allocated to specific
funders and funding schemes, and the amounts pledged probably included those already committed by
research funding agencies. More generally, reallocating funding from an existing budget during a crisis
was often challenging for governments and institutions, as budgetary processes often involve complex and
lengthy validation; this was sometimes circumvented by unlocking supplementary budgets, but “financial
flexibility” was highly heterogeneous between countries.
Looking at the level of research projects, over 2 000 projects funded worldwide (excluding China) were
registered by mid-September 2020 in a live database of funded research projects on COVID-19 maintained
by the UK Collaborative on Development Research (UKCDR) and the Global Research Collaboration for
Infectious Disease Preparedness (GloPID-R).4 The database shows that public funding organisations had
already awarded at least USD 770 million to research groups by that date. This overview of research
projects, which is mapped against the priorities identified in the World Health Organization (WHO)
Coordinated Global Research Roadmap (WHO, 2020[1]) illustrates the broad diversity of research being
supported.

62 
It is not easy to distinguish precisely, either at aggregate or project level, between entirely new funding and
resources that have simply been reallocated. Moreover, the situation appears to be very much country-
specific. In the United States, about 40% (i.e. USD 75 million) of the US National Science Foundation
(NSF) resources allocated to COVID-19 as of end of October 2020 (USD 190 million) came from additional
funds provided by the United States Congress. In France, the share of new resources provided by the
Ministry of Research was probably even higher. By contrast, resources were mostly repurposed by the
German and Norwegian research funding agencies, Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) and
Norges forskningsråd, respectively, at least in the first half of 2020. At DFG, available resources that had
not yet been allocated to specific programmes were directed towards COVID-19 funding schemes.
Finally, while research funding on COVID-19 during the first half of 2020 was characterised by the launch
of a large number of new emergency funding schemes, the situation has progressively transitioned towards
integrating COVID-19-related research calls into mainstream funding mechanisms. Many research funders
have now integrated calls for research proposals in various domains relevant to COVID-19 within their
normal operations. Whether the integration of COVID-19 research into these mainstream funding streams
is happening at the expense of funding for other disciplines – and if so, to what extent – is unclear.
Researchers in the biomedical field have warned that funding and calls for proposals in their non-COVID-
19-related domain may be severely cut back, both because of a potential reduction in overall funding
(e.g. from medical charities, which have experienced significant drops in donations) and the new
prioritisation of research related to COVID-19 (Kourie et al., 2020[2]). There are also concerns on the
potential impacts of rapid response on equity, diversity and inclusion within the research funding system
(Witteman, Haverfield and Tannenbaum, 2020[3]).
Research areas supported by new research funding initiatives
In response to the pandemic crisis, research funding and research performing organisations have launched
a diverse range of funding projects and initiatives, covering a mix of topics and objectives (Figure 2.2).
Funding schemes rarely focus on a single topic and it is difficult to assess the exact funding scale allocated
to these various categories, but support for therapeutics and vaccines has been pre-eminent. The data
provided by the UKCDR-GloPID-R tracker5 show that funding agencies have issued calls and awarded
significant funding in different categories, with a remarkable number of projects dedicated to studying
societal responses to the COVID-19 crisis (Figure 2.3).6
Figure 2.2. Mix of topics targeted by funding organisations to address COVID-19 and its impacts

 63
Figure 2.3. Research projects funded by public funding organisations in various research areas
Number of projects funded Total million USD awarded (right axis)
Number Million USD

700 250
600
200
500
400 150
300 100
200
50
100
0 0
Basic research Epidemiology Therapeutics, Vaccines Public health Societal response
treatments response
Note: Large programmes on therapeutics and vaccines, such as CEPI, are not included. No disaggregated data were available on research
projects on diagnostics and technologies. Some projects may be assigned to several priorities. The database currently has limited information
on funding amounts for a significant number of projects. Hence, the total amount displayed significantly underestimates the actual total funding
awarded.
Source: Data are derived from the UKCDR-GloPID-R tracker: https://www.glopid-r.org (accessed 15 September 2020).
Challenges in managing emergency research funding projects
Research funders that are setting up emergency schemes for research funding face a series of specific
challenges, notably around prioritisation of topics and dissemination of calls, resources and research
results (Figure 2.4). Some of these are described below.
Priority-setting
Funding organisations have various ways of setting priorities. Particularly in biomedical areas, initial
priorities were often defined on the basis of research gaps, as determined by the WHO, to ensure essential
issues were addressed. Representatives from GloPID-R, WHO, health research funders and scientists
met in February 2020 to assess the current state of COVID-19 knowledge, agreeing on key research
priorities and ways to work together to accelerate and fund priority research (see Chapter 5). As an
example, the Government of Canada designed its key research funding opportunities to align with the
COVID-19 R&D Blueprint that came from the meeting between WHO and GloPID-R. These priorities were
then often adapted to the national context, so as to take into account the relative strengths of national
research performing organisations in particular domains and avoid duplication with projects (e.g. on
vaccines) carried out by international consortia. In several countries, national priorities were determined
by established or ad hoc advisory panels of experts set up by governments to provide a co-ordinated
strategic approach. In the UK, for example, priorities were first identified by the Scientific Advisory Group
for Emergencies (SAGE) in synergy with the various relevant national and international stakeholders. By
contrast, priority-setting was much less prevalent in non-medical areas. For example, the NSF asked its
broad research community to propose research related to the non-medical and non-clinical dimensions of
COVID-19. This generated a huge and varied response, with thousands of inquiries and proposals, and
over 1 000 awards granted by end of October 2020. Co-ordination was required within the NSF to avoid
duplication, and extensive communication took place with other US agencies to avoid overlap and ensure
projects were directed to the most appropriate agency. Similarly, in France, the Agence Nationale de la

64 
Recherche (ANR) opened calls for proposals regarding the holistic impact (e.g. economic, societal and
environmental) of the COVID-19 pandemic, extending research beyond the public-health priorities defined
by the WHO.
Figure 2.4. Emergency research funding schemes face new management challenges
Fast-tracking research proposals
During the initial stages of the COVID-19 crisis, funders often assessed research proposals internally,
using their own experts and project managers to fast-track awards. Research teams with a proven track
record were often favoured.7 To keep the number of applications manageable, some funders (e.g. the
FWO Research Foundation in Belgium-Flanders) initially limited the number of funding slots per university
and added a requirement for co-operation between research institutions within projects. In other cases,
expert panels comprising both national and international researchers were established through accelerated
procedures and operated virtually (for example, the Dutch Research Council funding agency reduced the
proposal evaluation time to one month, compared to the average three to four months applicable in normal
times). As described in a later paragraph, such accelerated procedures were also successfully
implemented by research infrastructures, suggesting possible gains of efficiency in the management of
research proposals in normal operational processes. However, fast-tracking very large numbers of
research proposals in record time did stretch funding agencies’ capacities to their limits: in the UK, for
example, the number of proposals to review was twice as high as normal, and had to be done over a very
short period, which led to an intense workload and fatigue of all agency personnel and reviewers involved.
The main objective of these initial funding schemes was to deliver results that could inform solutions as
soon as possible, favouring a “low-hanging fruit” approach and the funding of well-established research
laboratories with a known track record. Nevertheless, some funders developed schemes that clearly
prioritised the interest of the project over the reputation of the team, recognising that breakthrough research

 65
proposals could be developed by non-specialist research teams (as was the case for the Flash Covid-19
et RA-Covid-19 calls for proposals issued by France’s ANR).
In most cases, funders have not set up dedicated procedures to facilitate uptake of research results.
Although responsibilities are split in this matter, it is an area that probably merits greater attention. In the
United States, the NSF supported the creation of the COVID Information Commons, 8 which connects
projects’ principal investigators, provides tools to search across NSF awards related to COVID-19, and
links to other US and international research efforts. Similarly, the Canadian Institutes of Health Research
(CIHR) also launched a call for a COVID-19 Knowledge Synthesis Network.9 In France, a new centralised
monitoring mechanism for research results is being set up by the national COVID-19 platform. While
funding agencies have largely encouraged sharing of scientific data and results (see below), exploiting
these results has been largely left to other stakeholders in the research ecosystem (i.e. researchers,
institutions and private companies). There exist opportunities for funders to support and work more closely
with these other actors.
Uncertainties on the long-term impacts of emergency research funding

Overall, although research funders reacted very quickly and effectively established strategies and funding
schemes, many lessons can be learned from the COVID-19 crisis to improve the efficiency of these
measures in future crises. While scientific production in terms of academic publications resulting from this
large investment has been impressive (Figure 2.5), a number of important questions need to be addressed
to inform future science policies on crisis preparedness and response.
Figure 2.5. Growth in COVID-19 related publications

A. Top 30 contributors to COVID-19 research publications, B. Trends in COVID-19 biomedical and life sciences research publications,
1 January to 30 November, 2020 1 January to 30 November, 2020
Number of PubMed-indexed documents, whole counts
United States 26 716 12 000

China
United Kingdom
Italy
India 10 000
Spain
Canada
France
Germany
Australia 8 000
Brazil
Iran
Switzerland
Netherlands
Japan 6 000
Turkey
Singapore
Belgium
Saudi Arabia
Korea 4 000
Pakistan
Sweden
Greece
Ireland
Israel 2 000
Chinese Taipei
South Africa
Austria
Mexico
Egypt 0
0 2 000 4 000 6 000 8 000 10 000
Note: The period covers from 1 January to 30 November 2020 and includes 74 115 documents. Publications include the following type of peer-
reviewed articles: books and documents, clinical trials, meta-analysis, randomised controlled trials, reviews and systematic reviews. Iran stands
for Islamic Republic of Iran.
Source: OECD and OCTS-OEI calculations, based on US National Institutes of Health PubMed data, https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/

66 
Quality and impact of the science produced
Although an abundance of research articles has already been published, it is still difficult to assess whether
the scientific production was worth the public investment, and what impact it will have on informing
solutions for the many problems stemming from the pandemic. It is equally important to determine whether
certain types of funding mechanisms – many funders tried to innovate to respond to the emergency – have
been more effective than others in producing useful research outputs (for example, did the “safe”
investments based on track record and reputation yield better results than “riskier” investments?).
Assessing the impacts of various funding approaches, using a range of relevant indicators, should provide
useful insights on what works for the future.
Long-term impact on research domains
As previously mentioned, the COVID-19 crisis has displaced scientific funding and efforts towards specific
areas of biomedical research. Even if definitive numbers are not yet available, significant resources have
been reallocated towards research fields that are relevant to the crisis. Whether this will be a long-lasting
shift remains unclear, but it will likely continue for some time as new waves of the pandemic take hold.
How this will affect other research domains cannot be ascertained, but it does raise questions about the
overall long-term research strategy both research funders and research performing organisations must put
in place to ensure they have balanced research portfolios and the capacity to address new challenges,
wherever they may come from. The shift in funding also has important implications for the research
workforce, potentially forcing researchers to move to domains outside their real expertise. Recent
examples such as the 2003 severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic, the 2014-16
Ebola outbreak or the 2016 Zika epidemic were associated with relatively short-term dedicated research
and vaccine-development programmes that were not pursued once the urgency disappeared (Figure 2.6).
Figure 2.6. Tracking research on previous global health crises, 2000-19

SARS Influenza H1N1 Ebola Zika virus MERS
3 500
3 000
H1N1 Zika
2009-10 Ebola
2015-16
2 500 2013-16
2 000 SARS
2002-04
1 500
MERS
1 000 2012-...
500
0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Note: Publications include the following types of peer-reviewed articles: Books and Documents, Clinical Trials, Meta-Analysis, Randomized
Controlled Trials, Reviews and Systematic Reviews.
Source: OECD calculations, based on US National Institutes of Health PubMed data, https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/ (accessed 13 October
2020).

 67
This “panic and neglect cycle” had both economic and health consequences, as federal funding agencies
reallocated funds that had been committed to vaccine development, leaving manufacturers with financial
losses and setting back other vaccine-development programmes (Lurie et al., 2020[4]). COVID-19 is on a
much larger scale and the shifts in research directions it has provoked are much more substantial. Hence,
the longer-term impact on different research domains will require careful consideration.
Impact on the science-funding system
The future of research funding after the crisis is uncertain (Subbaraman, 2020[5]). On the one hand, the
emerging economic crisis could trigger significant cuts in public research budgets, putting thousands of
researchers out of work and reducing research capacities for many years to come. In Europe, for example,
the EUR 750 billion (euros) economic recovery plan decided by the European Council will be implemented
partly at the expense of the Horizon 2020 R&D budget: only EUR 80.9 billion of the reserved
EUR 94.4 billion proposed in May by the European Commission remained in the final budget approved in
July by the European Council, a significant EUR 13.5 billion cut (Wallace, 2020[6]), although EUR 4 billon
were later recovered following discussions with the European Parliament. In parallel, research funding
charities and non-governmental organisations that rely on donors are also being affected by a decrease in
donations as companies and individuals face an uncertain financial future. By late June 2020, the
Association of Medical Research Charities in the United Kingdom, whose members sent GBP 1.9 billion
to biomedical researchers in 2019, was already reporting an average 38% drop in fundraising revenue;
other countries are seeing similar situations (Cahan, 2020[7]).
On the other hand, this pandemic may underline the importance of science in preparing and reacting to
upcoming crises, possibly translating into stronger and more lasting support for research. For example,
the United States and the United Kingdom have pledged new funding for research for the coming years.
The announced US federal R&D budget for 2021 shows a 6% increase over the fiscal year (FY) 2020
budget. Meanwhile, the United Kingdom remains committed to raising public R&D expenditure to
GBP 22 billion by FY 2024/25 and increasing its total R&D expenditure to 2.4% of gross domestic product
by 2027. Korea also announced a new science and technology policy initiative “post corona, science and
technology policy direction for a new future” that identifies 30 promising technologies which will have high
priority for government R&D funding. National strategies and funding commitments are likely to differ widely
between countries, adding to future uncertainty for all the actors in research ecosystems, with important
implications for the research workforce (see Chapter 3).
Effective mobilisation of research infrastructures
Research infrastructures (RIs) are facilities, resources and related services that are used by the scientific
community to conduct top-level research in their respective fields. They cover major scientific equipment
or sets of instruments; knowledge-based resources such as collections, archives or structures for scientific
information; enabling information and communications technology-based infrastructures such as grid
computing, software and communication; or any other entity of a unique nature essential to achieve
excellence in research. They play a major role in modern research in all scientific domains. The COVID-
19 crisis has seen an unprecedented, rapid mobilisation of RIs to support the research community. This
effort covers several key aspects, as described in the following sections.
Fast-track access
To facilitate research on COVID-19, many RIs have fast-tracked access to their equipment or services
without the need to undergo regular (and often lengthy) evaluation procedures. Many access requests
were granted within one month of the proposal’s submission. Box 2.1 provides an example of fast-track
access to an RI for research related to COVID-19.

68 
Box 2.1. Example of fast-track access to research infrastructure for COVID-19 research
The Paul Scherrer Institute (PSI) is a Swiss multi-disciplinary research institute for natural and
engineering sciences that operates unique and world-leading large scientific equipment. Immediately
at the onset of the crisis, PSI created a dedicated website for research related to COVID-19.10 PSI was
quickly able to contribute to various aspects of the underpinning COVID-19 science, from structural
biology to pulmonary pathology and epidemiology.
In July 2020, scientists from the Goethe University in Frankfurt, Germany, published results on the
papain-like protease (PLpro), an essential enzyme of SARS-CoV-2. The structural biology work was
performed at the PSI electron synchrotron Swiss Light Source (SLS), following the opening of the
“Priority COVID-19 call”. The crystallographic data collection happened on 9 April 2020, after the
planned Easter shutdown of the SLS was cancelled to allow performing this specific experiment, along
with an X-ray imaging COVID-19 experiment.
Data-sharing
The dissemination of research data on COVID-19 has been of paramount importance.11 Many RIs provide
access to data (e.g. biological, environmental and societal) that are of direct interest to COVID-19
research. Most of these data-RIs have set up dedicated portals and structures to facilitate access and use
of data on COVID-19 that are relevant to the research. For example, the Korean Bioinformation Centre 12
centralises and makes available all biological information relevant to COVID-19. Some RIs have developed
crowdsourcing initiatives that help open up and link COVID-19 data. The European research infrastructure
ELIXIR, for instance, co-organised a virtual COVID-19 Biohackathon in April 202013 to develop new tools
for working with COVID-19 data. In the United Kingdom, the national institute for health data science,
Health Data Research UK (HDR UK), has actively championed the use of health data to address the
COVID-19 challenge. Although digital infrastructure is needed to share and link data, this was not fully in
place in the United Kingdom. To remedy this, HDR UK convened a number of organisations to fund the
International COVID-19 Data Alliance (Health Data Research UK, 2020[8]), which focuses on sharing de-
identified/population-level data. In other instances, RIs that possess substantial computing and data-
analysis capacities for use in particular research fields (e.g. particle physics) have opened them up and
offered their experience to facilitate data-mining on COVID-19. For example, CERN has mobilised its open-
source technologies, established open-data repositories and developed a number of co-operative
initiatives building on its in-house capacities.14
Co-ordination
A number of biomedical RIs have created co-ordinated mechanisms to facilitate research on COVID-19.
For example, the German high-performance sequencing centres set up co-ordinated access to their
facilities,15 and in Canada, Genome Canada launched the Canadian COVID Genomics Network
(CanCOGeN) in partnership with CGEn (Canada’s national platform for genome sequencing and analysis),
national and provincial health labs, hospitals, academia and industry. At the international level, the COVID-
19 Fast Response Service was established in Europe as a co-ordinated and accelerated procedure for
researchers to access the academic facilities, services and resources of three medical RIs – the European
Research Infrastructure for Translational Medicine, 16 the European Clinical Research Infrastructure
Network17 and the European research infrastructure for biobanking,18 working together under the umbrella
of the Alliance of Medical Research Infrastructures.

 69
New COVID-19 dedicated research
While many RIs are service-oriented facilities geared towards external users, others also conduct internal
research using their own staff. In response to the crisis, a large number of service-oriented RIs developed
specific tools and programmes to facilitate COVID-19 research for their external users. They also
developed additional services, such as project management tools. Many of those RIs that have conducted
internal research with some relevance to the pandemic have undertaken dedicated actions to generate
and provide data and information related to the crisis. For example, the European Social Survey 19 launched
new modules to address pandemic-related societal issues, such as public attitudes towards government
responses to the pandemic, on the support for conspiracy theories, and on the willingness to be vaccinated.
In Japan, RIKEN began early operation of the new supercomputer “Fugaku” to support the search for
therapeutic drug candidates for COVID-19. The initial plan was to begin sharing access to the
supercomputer in 2021, but Fugaku began to exploit some of its functions as a matter of urgency in the
second quarter of 2020, during the adjustment phase. In July 2020, a team of researchers from RIKEN
and Kyoto University announced they had discovered dozens of substances that could be candidates for
treatment of COVID-19, after performing in about ten days calculations that would normally have taken
more than a year based on conventional supercomputer performance (The Japan Times, 2020[9]).
In conclusion, RIs have demonstrated considerable flexibility during the crisis
As these examples show, RIs have demonstrated considerable flexibility in adapting their facilities to meet
urgent needs. Japan’s Fugaku’s computing capacities mentioned earlier were thus also used for societal-
epidemiological projects to simulate and predict virus transmission indoors, and to model disease
propagation under various policy containment measures. This proved to be extremely influential for health
authorities (to determine the best containment policies based on scientific facts) and for the public in raising
awareness about government guidelines and their acceptability. At the same time, the crisis has led many
RIs to update their processes, as recommended in a recent OECD report on the operation and use of
national RIs (OECD/Science Europe, 2020[10]). For example, RIs have had to both clarify and better inform
potential users of their access rules, and open up their facilities to a broader community of users. Many
such actions undertaken during the COVID-19 crisis were initiated by the RIs themselves, with support
from their governing institutions and other stakeholders. Science policy makers may have an important
role to play not only in supporting RIs financially, but also in developing the framework conditions that
enable them to mobilise effectively and co-operate internationally in crises. This includes careful
consideration of mandates and incentives, and a willingness to invest in RIs to maintain a degree of
resilience and flexibility for reacting to future crises, balancing short-term efficiency gains with longer-term
preparedness and flexibility.
The challenge of scientific dissemination in times of crisis
The COVID-19 crisis has spurred new practices in scientific communication as rapid sharing of data and
scientific discoveries worldwide has become essential (OECD, 2020[11]). Many traditional constraints have
been lifted or relaxed to accelerate the production, publication and dissemination of scientific results
relevant to the pandemic, notably by lifting publication paywalls for a fixed period or making COVID-19
research fully open access (Nature, 2020[12]) and (Elsevier, 2020[13]). These efforts have been reinforced
by various initiatives. For instance, the “COVID-19 Publishers Open Letter of Intent” aimed to speed up
peer review and publication while maintaining the quality and integrity of published articles through a cross-
publisher rapid-review process (OASPA, 2020[14]). Furthermore, to facilitate international access to
relevant scientific results, the WHO is maintaining a global database of publications on COVID-19
research.20 Various COVID-19 repositories and databases for articles or data were also created21 or added
to existing platforms, such as Github and Researchgate.22 The combined effects of new funding streams,

70 
data openness and fast-track publication has had an immediate impact on scientific production. By 1 June
2020, 42 700 scholarly articles had already been published on COVID-19, 3 100 clinical trials launched,
420 datasets created, and 270 patents filed (Hook and Porter, 2020[15]). Moreover, three-quarters of
COVID-19-related scientific publications are open access, compared to 43% for diabetes research and
40% for dementia research (Figure 2.7).
Figure 2.7. Open access of COVID-19, Diabetes and Dementia publications, January-October 2020
Total and free full text PubMed publications
All publications Free full text Share of open access (right-hand scale)
%
80 000 80
70 000 70
60 000 60
50 000 50
40 000 40
30 000 30
20 000 20
10 000 10
0 0
COVID-19 Diabetes Dementia
Note: Publications include the following types of peer-reviewed articles: Books and Documents, Clinical Trials, Meta-Analysis, Randomized
Controlled Trials, Reviews and Systematic Reviews.
Source: OECD calculations based on US National Institutes of Health PubMed data, https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov (accessed 30 October
2020).
While these various initiatives have greatly facilitated the dissemination of scientific information, they have
also potentially increased the likelihood of less rigorous research results entering the public domain. This
issue can be exacerbated in times of crises, as any misleading information can quickly spread over social
networks.23 Preprints, i.e. articles published on the web before they have been peer-reviewed and
accepted for publication by a scientific journal, accounted for around one-quarter of COVID-19 research
outputs by the beginning of May 2020. While preprints can be useful in disseminating scientific information
quickly, there are risks associated with the potential release of misleading or faulty information into the
public domain without third-party screening (Dinis-Oliveira, 2020[16]). Owing to the speed of their release,
preprints rather than peer-reviewed literature may have a disproportionate influence on policies, shaping
the public discourse on the crisis (Majumder and Mandl, 2020[17]). At the same time, this widespread
dissemination can also help quickly detect errors and block poor-quality research. For example, the
mistaken claim that COVID-19 contained human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) “insertions” was one of the
first retracted preprints, in this case withdrawn by the authors themselves (Pradhan et al., 2020[18]). It
should also be noted that traditional peer review, even in the most prestigious journals, is not in itself an
absolute guarantee of scientific rigour: the paper regarding the effects of hydroxychloroquine for the
treatment of COVID-19 published in June 2020 in the prestigious Lancet journal had to be retracted after
a serious international controversy (Mehra, Ruschitzka and Patel, 2020[19]). The COVID-19 pandemic has

 71
demonstrated not only the strengths and weaknesses of traditional publications and preprints, and also
raises questions of how peer review works, its importance and its limitations.
What has emerged is the need for an in-depth rethinking of the way scientific information is disseminated
(Taraborelli, 2020[20]):
 New best practices need to be developed to help reporters evaluate what they find in preprints and
other scientific publications, and report on their findings responsibly (Khamsi, 2020[21]). The
creation of rapid-response review venues (Eisen and Tibshirani, 2020[22]) could help connect
reporters with independent scientists and offer on-demand expert views on new preprints of
interest.
 New community mechanisms may be required to facilitate the translation of scientific publications
for a more general audience.
 New technologies may be developed that would help analyse the connection between results,
methods, data and resources, for example, as supported by initiatives such as ASAPbio
(Accelerating Science and Publication in biology).24
These new “overlay services” could be built on top of existing repositories of scientific information, bringing
value to scientists and facilitating online collaboration and peer production in a more transparent scientific
publication system.
Lessons learned from the COVID-19 crisis
The mobilisation of the scientific enterprise during the COVID-19 crisis has been unprecedented. The swift
response from many different fields of research will have a lasting impact on research systems and, most
likely, on the relationship between science and society. While the global scientific effort towards solving
climate-change issues remains much more significant than research targeting COVID-19, as illustrated by
the extraordinary amount of scientific literature (about 10 000 peer-reviewed articles for physical science
alone) analysed in Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change reports, the climate emergency has not
led to a dramatic readjustment of the science system itself or the rapid mobilisation of a major segment of
the science community, as has happened for COVID-19.
The 2011 Fukushima disaster perhaps allows for a more direct comparison with COVID-19, albeit at a
smaller scale. This major national crisis led to adjustments of the Japanese scientific system over time
(Sato and Arimoto, 2016[23]; MEXT, 2012[24]). The longer-term changes were geared towards preventing
similar events and mitigating their potential impact. Although the nature of the crises is very different, the
Japanese experience may provide some important lessons for understanding the long-term implications
of COVID-19 for science systems.
In its uniqueness, this COVID-19 crisis has revealed a number of positive and desirable characteristics of
many science systems that have enabled an effective response:
 Flexibility of research funding and the ability to allocate or reallocate resources quickly as needed:
the dedicated processes set up by research funders deserve to be analysed in depth. Not only is
this relevant to future crises, but if the research projects funded through these emergency
processes prove to be high quality, there may be some very useful lessons to be learned on
streamlining current procedures, which are often burdensome for both researchers and funding
administrations. The pandemic has also highlighted the capacity of the scientific community
workforce to adapt quickly to a constrained environment while maintaining the efficiency of the
R&D system.
 A capacity for rapid sharing of data and information, which is likely to accelerate the open science
agenda: this crisis has highlighted the need for an evolution in the publication and dissemination

72 
of scientific information and data. The lessons learned from the crisis should help develop new
policies and technologies that support the validation of early publications (preprints) and data, and
facilitate their use and understanding by broader user communities. On the other hand, data
sharing has also sometimes been hampered, for example, by a lack of common standards for the
protection of health data. The crisis should spur relevant organisations to harmonise their
standards.
 Some capacity for international co-ordination on a few objectives, often with the help of large
philanthropic organisations: the crisis has shown the need for new models for scientific research
collaboration. The pandemic has triggered many valuable international scientific collaborations that
produced valuable contributions to solving the crisis. However, there has been duplication of efforts
(particularly in the field of clinical trials) and wasted resources. Some of the new collaborative
models are being developed and tested already, offering an opportunity to build on these
experiences (see Chapter 5).
 An important role for RIs from many different domains in supporting the research community to
conduct emergency research: RIs are increasingly called upon to support research targeting
societal challenges. The lessons learned during the crisis show their capacity to serve multiple
research communities and to support policy decisions, but they will require support and incentives
from their funders and hosts to maintain – and ideally strengthen – these capacities over the long
term.
At the same time, the crisis has revealed some important future challenges:
 Preparedness (before a crisis) is essential to accelerate the research system’s response time
during crisis: Although the scientific system was able to respond quickly to the challenges raised
by the pandemic, building on lessons learned from earlier epidemics, a series of unexpected issues
emerged for which it was not fully ready, such as the need to overcome divergent approaches and
regulations to sharing data and human samples between public and private partners. The crisis
has shown the need to strengthen existing national and international structures that advise
governments during emergencies.
 It could exacerbate existing inequalities within research systems or create new ones, since the
capacity to undertake research or raise funding is likely to be limited in some fields: A full analysis
of the impact and consequences of the crisis on the research system overall will be important to
improve the resilience of the system to future events.
 Ensuring the quality and rigour of scientific data, publications and communication: this also raises
questions about the current incentives driving hyper-competition and the “perish or publish” culture,
with negative spill overs on researcher behaviour during crises (see Chapter 3).
 Uncertainties regarding long-term funding for research once the immediate emergency has
passed: governments and research funding bodies should define and quickly communicate both
their capacities to support research in the coming years and their strategic priorities, in order to
allow research performing organisations to develop realistic long-term strategic plans.
These elements illustrate the need for a thorough analysis of the various response mechanisms
implemented by different stakeholders in research systems during the COVID-19 crisis, as well as their
relative efficiency and effectiveness. 25 Such an analysis could help improve the resilience and
responsiveness of research systems, as well as integrate any useful practices that were successfully
experimented with during the crisis.

 73
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74 
OECD (2020), Why open science is critical to combatting COVID-19, OECD Publishing, Paris, [11]
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Subbaraman, N. (2020), “Sputnik moment or budget breaker: How will the pandemic alter [5]
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Taraborelli, D. (2020), “How the COVID-19 crisis has prompted a revolution in scientific [20]
publishing”, Fast Company, https://www.fastcompany.com/90537072/how-the-covid-19-crisis-
has-prompted-a-revolution-in-scientific-publishing.
The Japan Times (2020), “Japan’s Fugaku supercomputer, world’s fastest, narrows down [9]
COVID-19 drug candidates”, The Japan Times,
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supercomputer-coronavirus-drugs (accessed on 4 July 2020).
Wallace, N. (2020), “EU leaders slash science spending in €1.8 trillion deal”, Science, [6]
http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.abd8830.
WHO (2020), A Coordinated Global Research Roadmap: 2019 Novel Coronavirus, [1]
https://www.who.int/blueprint/priority-diseases/key-
action/Coronavirus_Roadmap_V9.pdf?ua=1.
Witteman, H., J. Haverfield and C. Tannenbaum (2020), Positive outcomes of COVID-19 [3]
research-related gender policy changes, Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1101/2020.10.26.355206.
Notes
1 Data were collected by the OECD either directly from funding agencies or from public sources, and pooled with
data kindly provided by the NSF, which also collected similar data in parallel from other public sources. This data is
not complete and does not cover all countries but can provide a minimal estimate of scale of investment in COVID-
19 research. The national funding data can be accessed at the STIP COVID-19 Watch portal
(https://stip.oecd.org/covid/).

 75
2By way of comparison, the total amount of yearly R&D funding distributed by the European Union’s Horizon 2020
programme in all disciplines is around EUR 10 billion.
3See, for example, the European Union-led worldwide pledging marathon planned to raise EUR 7.5 billion to end the
current pandemic (https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_710).
4 Note that the database is not exhaustive, and funding is unknown for many projects. Furthermore, the database
registers funding already awarded and not the full amount pledged per funding programme. The database can be
accessed at: https://www.ukcdr.org.uk/funding-landscape/COVID-19-research-project-tracker/.
5 https://www.ukcdr.org.uk/covid-circle/covid-19-research-project-tracker/
6The focus on social countermeasures research and social science, as shown in the UKCDR tracker, also reflects
patterns seen in previous crises, such as Ebola in West Africa.
7 Feedback from expert discussion during the GSF workshop (https://www.oecd.org/sti/inno/global-science-

forum.htm).
8 https://covidinfocommons.datascience.columbia.edu; award OIA-2028999.
9 See KT FO.
10 https://www.psi.ch/en/psd/COVID-19.
11 http://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/why-open-science-is-critical-to-combatting-covid-19-cd6ab2f9
12 https://www.kobic.re.kr/covid19.
13 https://elixir-europe.org/news/hacking-pandemic.
14https://againstcovid19.cern/articles/cern-and-lhc-experiments-computing-resources-global-research-effort-against-
covid-19.
15 https://ngs-kn.de/?page_id=70.
16 https://eatris.eu.
17 https://www.ecrin.org.
18 https://www.bbmri-eric.eu.
19 http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org.
20https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/global-research-on-novel-coronavirus-2019-
ncov.
21 Center for Open Science: https://www.cos.io/about/news/cos-launches-osf-collection-aggregate-
coronavirusresearch-outputs; The Lancet: https://www.thelancet.com/coronavirus; Outbreak Science Rapid
PRE review: https://outbreaksci.prereview.org; F1000Research:
https://f1000research.com/gateways/disease_outbreaks/coronavirus; NIH-PubMed Central:
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/about/covid-19-faq/; Semantic Scholar: https://www.semanticscholar.org/cord19.
22 https://github.com/open-coronavirus/open-coronavirus; https://www.researchgate.net/community/COVID-19
23https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/view/?ref=135_135214-mpe7q0bj4d&title=Combatting-COVID-19-disinformation-on-
online-platforms
24 https://asapbio.org/ .

76 
25In this regard, a project on mobilising science in times of crisis is ongoing under the aegis of the OECD Global
Science Forum.

 77
3 Challenges and new demands on

the academic research workforce
Academic career structures and the allocation processes for research

funding largely reflect merit-based competition among individuals, which
has proven its effectiveness over time in promoting excellence in
fundamental research. However, concern is growing about how these
structures and processes affect the precarity and attractiveness of research
careers and generate a lack of diversity in the scientific workforce. There is
an expectation that science will not only produce highly-cited publications,
but also rapidly translate into societal benefits and solutions to global
challenges – such as the COVID-19 pandemic. The emphasis on individual
disciplinary excellence and short-term outputs fits uneasily alongside the
need for more transdisciplinary research, more novelty and risk-taking in
research, and more data-intensive research. This chapter reviews recent
OECD analysis of the challenges within science systems, many of which
are accentuated by COVID-19, and what these imply for policy measures to
build a diverse, appropriately skilled and motivated science workforce.

78 
Key findings
 The academic research workforce is leading the fight against COVID-19, generating
the new knowledge that is required to understand the pandemic and develop effective
mitigation strategies. This extends far beyond medical research and the development of
new diagnostics, treatments and vaccines but encompasses all research domains from
mathematics to social sciences and humanities.
 Countries need to continue to support a breadth of research, whilst implementing
measures to ensure that a new generation of researchers with inter- and trans-disciplinary
skills is encouraged. The crisis has highlighted the importance of data-intensive science, in
particular, propelling it forward as a critical tool. Investment in research data infrastructures
needs to be matched by long-term investment in human resources, including data stewards,
software engineers and data analysts.
 The COVID-19 pandemic has severely affected researchers and shed light on the
existing weaknesses in academic structures. There has been a 25% increase in the
number of people with PhDs in OECD countries over the past decade with no corresponding
increase in academic posts. The current hyper-competitive system – with its focus on
narrow measures of individual performance and evaluation by peers – discriminates against
women and a number of social groups leading to a lack of diversity in the research
workforce. Important scientific outputs, such as databases or software, policy reports or
citizen engagement activities, which are critical for crisis response, are undervalued. New
incentives and measures for evaluating and rewarding both individual and collective
contributions to science are urgently required.
 There is need for systemic changes in the way academic research is structured and
supported if it is to attract and retain the diversity of talent that is necessary to address
current and future societal challenges. New and more attractive career paths that provide
greater security and alternative options for mobility in and out of academia and other
research sectors are required. National governments have a critical role to play in engaging
all actors in the research ecosystem to develop co-ordinated research workforce strategies,
incentives to implement these strategies and indicators and measures to monitor what is
happening.

 79
Introduction
The COVID-19 pandemic is putting enormous pressure on public science systems and those who work
within them, with research being mobilised in unprecedented ways across many different disciplines.
Researchers across the world are being encouraged and incentivised to quickly redirect their efforts to
focus on COVID-19. There is intense pressure to release data and results rapidly, short-cutting or
circumventing normal peer-review publication processes (see Chapter 2) and highlighting pre-existing
concerns about quality assurance and accreditation of research findings. At the same time, scientists are
being called upon as experts to provide input on public health and other policy responses to the pandemic
(see Chapter 8) and they are being asked to communicate incomplete and changing evidence in a way
that promotes public confidence and trust. These are activities that most scientists were not trained for and
which would normally go largely unrecognised within academic structures, with their predominant focus on
scientific merit and excellence.
Even in the absence of COVID-19, many researchers, particularly in the early stage of their careers, were
in precarious positions and employed on short-term contracts with no clear perspective of a permanent
academic position. For women in particular, the hyper-competitive environment and lack of security are an
active disincentive to continuing in research (Pollitzer, Smith and Vinkenburg, 2018[1]). The COVID-19
pandemic has added to the sense of insecurity. While it has led to increased funding in some research
areas, it is also threatening the future of many universities that depend on overseas students. Although
some countries or institutions have taken mitigation measures, such as extending PhD grants and
postdoctoral research contracts, this is not universally the case. The majority of young researchers now
expect to have even more limited academic career opportunities (Woolston, 2020[2]), a sentiment
compounded by the fact that COVID-19 has radically disrupted the movement of researchers between
countries.
Many of the technological innovations introduced in response to COVID-19 have been driven by research
and development in the private sector, particularly in the digital domain. For example, artificial intelligence
(AI), which is playing a variety of roles in pandemic response and recovery (OECD, 2020[3]), is a field that
is dominated by private firms, which attract many of the best science, technology, engineering and
mathematics (STEM) graduates with employment packages and prospects that academia cannot match
(The Royal Society, 2019[4]). At the same time, efforts to develop and test effective treatments and vaccines
have been characterised by different public and private sector research actors working in tandem (see
Chapter 5). The potential benefits of inter-sectoral co-operation and exchange of skills and knowledge for
promoting innovation were obvious well before the current crisis and have long been a focus for STI policy.
Nevertheless, the reality remains that there are substantial barriers for those who enter the academic
research path and subsequently decide to make the transition from academia to other sectors and vice-
versa (Vitae, 2016[5]).
Not only have digital tools and open-data infrastructures allowed many scientists to continue to function
effectively outside their usual laboratory or field environments during lockdowns, they have also massively
accelerated data-driven discovery and knowledge dissemination. At the same time, these developments
have emphasised the digital divide between countries, institutions, disciplines and research teams,
highlighting the need for more digitally skilled scientists and research professionals to conduct data-
intensive research and support open science in academic settings (OECD, 2020[6]).
As the pandemic progresses, and governments move from the public health response to addressing the
broader socio-economic challenges, there is a growing need not only for public-private partnerships but
also for more inter- and trans-disciplinary research to produce the integrated knowledge necessary to
address these issues (see Chapter 5). Many countries are seeing the “COVID moment” as an opportunity
to transition to more sustainable and resilient societies, and interest is growing in co-design and co-
production processes that can enable such transitions. This places greater emphasis on team working,

80 
people skills and public engagement, which are not always fully valued in an academic research setting
(OECD, 2020[7]).
COVID-19 has helped reveal both the strengths and the weaknesses of existing science systems with
major implications for the research workforce of the future. This chapter reviews recent OECD work on
several topics related to the research workforce. It explores the policy implications for different actors in
the research ecosystem, including governments, research agencies, universities and public research
institutes.
The quest for research excellence
Scientific research is largely organised around disciplines. Individual career progression depends on
assessment by peers, which itself is highly dependent on a researcher’s publication record. The structures
and processes of universities, public research institutes and funding agencies heighten this focus on
disciplinary expertise and publication outputs, driven by the quest for research excellence. This
arrangement has arguably been very successful, with a growing number of scientific publications being
produced annually. This increase is particularly striking in the university sector (see Figure 3.1).
If publication numbers are an indicator of scientific performance then the system is performing well and
also responding well to the COVID-19 pandemic (see Chapter 2). But numbers rarely tell the whole story.
Excellence is an elusive concept, which can only be defined by peers. Hence, quantitative indicators of
peer-esteem such as citation indices, journal impact factors and h-indexes have become the currency of
scientific excellence or quality. Despite strong criticism (e.g. see the San Francisco Declaration on
Research Assessment (DORA, 2013[8]), these proxy measures have become a major determinant of
scientific behaviour. Being the lead author of a well-cited paper in a high-impact journal has become the
“holy grail” for an early-career researcher, and brings with it the prospect of a secure long-term future in
academia.
Hyper-competition and the “publish or perish” culture may have its merits but it is also exerting a high toll
on researchers, particularly at the doctorate and postdoctoral level, where the next position depends on
what the researcher publishes. It also has perverse effects on the composition of the research workforce
and discriminates against certain population groups, including women (Pollitzer, Smith and Vinkenburg,
2018[1]). Even if it works in terms of triaging the truly excellent from the merely good, it discourages risk-
taking and inter- or trans-disciplinary research, for which short-term outputs are less certain but which are
increasingly required for science to meet societal needs. For example, bibliometric scores are of limited
use for assessing public engagement activities or evaluating and rewarding the new cohorts of highly
skilled research software engineers, data stewards or data analysts that are urgently required to support
data-intensive research (OECD, 2020[6]).
Focusing on individual merit and disciplinary excellence has taken science a long way and should not be
abandoned altogether. However, the way these qualities are assessed and measured no longer meets the
broader societal expectations of science. Nor does it reflect the growing emphasis on open science (OECD,
2015[9]) and the increased tendency in many research areas to work in large, often distributed and diverse,
teams (see footnote to Figure 3.1). Maintaining scientific rigour and research excellence are critical for
ensuring trust in science in the current pandemic situation. However, there is a need to redefine what is
meant by excellence in relation to all of the different expectations of science.

 81
Figure 3.1. Trends in scientific publication output by type of institution, 1995-2019

Whole counts, index 100 = 1995
Education Healthcare Government Company
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019
Note: The numbers by institutional type are not additive, as a single paper can have multiple authors with multiple affiliations with any of the
types. Over the same period of time the average number of authors per paper has risen from 3.18 to 4.82 (based on separate OECD analysis
using SCOPUS database) indicating an increase in the size of research teams.
Source: OECD calculations based on the Lens Database, https://www.lens.org (accessed October 1, 2020).
Precarity of research careers
One of the issues that the COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted is the precarious employment situation of
many researchers in academia. Whilst precarity is not unique to academic research, it is more prevalent
than in many other sectors that depend on highly skilled professionals and it stands in striking contrast to
expectations that research will attract the ‘best minds’ to promote long-term socio-economic development
and resilience in the face of crises. The working conditions of academic researchers have been
deteriorating in recent years. This is especially true for the growing number of postdoctoral researchers on
fixed-term contracts and with limited continuous employment prospects. Country responses to the OECD
Global Science Forum policy survey on reducing the precarity of research careers showed, for example,
that in Germany, 92% of junior scholars in higher education institutions, and 83% in non-university
research facilities have a fixed-term contract; in Finland, 70% of academics are on fixed-term contracts;
and in Belgium, 58% of those working in universities are on fixed-term contracts.1
While the majority of early-career researchers display a strong intrinsic motivation and ambition for long-
term academic careers, precarity can have significant negative consequences on their motivation,
behaviour and well-being, affecting the nature and quality of scientific outputs (Vitae, 2016[5]; Wellcome,
2020[10]). At the same time, there is widespread concern about the capacity of countries to retain their best
national talent and attract good foreign researchers. In some countries and research fields, the problem is
evident even upstream of the research pipeline, as evidenced by difficulties in attracting the best
candidates to doctoral training.
The precarity and insecurity of research careers is also a major obstacle to advancing gender equality and
social diversity in the research workforce (Forrester, 2020[11]). On top of this, COVID-19 is making matters

82 
worse for many in the research precariat. Responses to the OECD Science Flash Survey 20202 suggest
that the pandemic is having detrimental effects on job security and career opportunities in science, as well
as on research funding and the time available for performing research. Younger researchers and women
appear to be more vulnerable to these effects, as also shown by a recent survey by Nature (Nature,
2020[12]).
The shift from core institutional funding to short-term, project-based funding, together with the increasingly
competitive nature of core-funding, is making research (and higher education) systems increasingly
dependent on a contingent of junior staff employed on casual contracts. In Australia, 56% of researchers
in higher education are postgraduate students. In Switzerland, 64% of researchers are doctoral and
postdoctoral researchers. In Germany the proportion of junior scholars in the scientific staff at higher
education institutions has been approximately 75% since 2010. In Finland, the number of postdoctoral
researchers has increased by 144% in the last decade.3
The inability of traditional academic career paths to absorb the growing number of doctorate holders
wishing to remain in academia is heightening the competitive pressure to extreme levels. The average
share of doctorate holders aged 25-64 year-olds in the OECD, which currently stands at around 1%, has
been steadily increasing (OECD, 2019[13]). Figure 3.2 presents the share of doctorate level attainment in
the population aged 25-64 year olds in OECD countries. It shows a 25% average increase in doctorate
holders across the OECD during the five-year period from 2014 to 2019.
Figure 3.2. Share of doctorate-level attainment in the population

25-64 years, 2014 and 2019 or latest year available
2019 or latest available 2014

%
5
Note: The data for most countries are derived from national labour force surveys. It includes Short-cycle tertiary education (L5) for Switzerland
2014-2019. 2019 data for Russian Federation correspond to 2018 value.
Source: OECD (2020[14]), “Education at a glance: Educational attainment and labour-force status”, OECD Education Statistics (database),
https://doi.org/10.1787/889e8641-en (accessed on 22 September 2020).
Higher education has been the traditional sector of employment for doctorate holders in most countries.
However, many younger PhDs will no longer find a stable career position in academic research. Around
one third of the total OECD labour force work in temporary or part-time jobs, or are self-employed (OECD,
2019[15]). The scale of precarity is even higher in the academic research sector. Results from the 2018

 83
OECD International Survey of Scientific Authors (Bello and Galindo-Rueda, 2020[16]),4 presented in
Figure 3.3 show that, while a majority of corresponding authors in Korea, France, Spain and Japan hold
an indefinite, highly protected contract (e.g. civil servant, tenure) this is not the case in most countries. In
the United Kingdom and Chile, less protected (e.g. open-ended) contracts are more common. In
Switzerland and Germany, the majority of corresponding authors are on fixed-term contracts. While these
differences may partially reflect different conventions for authorship, it is clear that in many countries
researchers who are leading scientific production do not have secure positions.
The median age of new entrants to doctoral studies across the OECD is 29 years; 60% of entrants are
between 26 and 37 years old (OECD, 2019[13]). This means that the majority obtain their doctorate in their
thirties. Most of those who transition to the postdoctoral stage stay there well into their late thirties and
even early forties, often lingering as “postdocs”, “research assistants and associates”, or even “hidden
researchers”. They normally spend long periods pursuing research, although they may be employed in
non-research roles (such as full-time teaching) while waiting for a more secure academic research position
to become available. Despite a lack of preparation and training for alternative careers, many eventually
“drop out” of academia in a move that is frequently stigmatised as failure. In fact, across the OECD, the
majority of researchers (62.5%) eventually end up working in the business enterprise sector (OECD,
2020[17]).
Figure 3.3. Job security of corresponding authors, by country of residence

Percentage of corresponding authors, 2018, selected economies
Fixed-term Indefinite, highly protected Other indefinite
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Note: Indefinite highly protected contracts mean the respondent can only be dismissed by the employer for gross misconduct. This level of
protection is typically afforded by civil servant status or tenure. Other indefinite contracts are open-ended, as opposed to fixed-term positions,
which have a set duration.
Source: OECD calculations based on OECD (2018[18]) International Survey of Scientific Authors, 2018. http://oe.cd/issa.
The precarity of research careers is particularly problematic for women. Many struggle with the pressures
of a postdoctoral position and embarking on an academic career while caring for young children or elderly
relatives. Gender stereotyping and systemic biases exist across society. They are also embedded in
science education and research systems meaning that even when women do obtain secure positions, they

84 
are less likely than their male counterparts to advance to leadership positions (Bello and Sarrico, 2020[19])
(OECD, 2020[20]).
COVID-19 is also having a disproportionately negative effect on women researchers, particularly those at
the early-career stage (Viglione, 2020[21]). Since the start of the pandemic, scientific publications have been
rising more quickly for men than women. Women are more likely to lose their jobs, as they are more likely
to be on fixed-term contracts. The pandemic is threatening the gender-equity gains of recent years (Gewin,
2020[22]), making it even more pressing to have a co-ordinated policy effort on gender that provides both
targeted support to female researchers and addresses systemic biases, with careful monitoring of progress
(Pollitzer, Smith and Vinkenburg, 2018[1]).
International mobility in the global labour market for researchers can expand opportunities – but it can also
increase precarity – for early career researchers. Although mobility at the early career stage is a choice, it
is also often considered a necessary step for those with longer-term ambitions in academia. Results from
the OECD International Survey of Scientific Authors show that corresponding authors on fixed-term
contracts are more likely to be working in a country different from the one where they earned their doctorate
and are much more likely to be planning to move to another country (OECD, 2018[18]). Working conditions
for foreign researchers are often worse than those for native researchers with respect to issues such as
access to employment contracts, right to stay and welfare benefits. Mobility, when accompanied by short-
term contracts, can entail significant personal sacrifices, especially when early career researchers are
considering starting a family and/or entering the housing market, and working abroad can lead to loss of
social capital in one’s country of origin. It is not surprising, then, that women doctorate holders are less
internationally mobile than their male counterparts.
Whether or not the short-term negative effect of COVID-19 on international mobility is destined to last, the
pandemic has most likely inhibited at least a cohort of researchers from moving abroad for either doctoral
education or postdoctoral work (Woolston, 2020[2]). Some countries are also likely to lose foreign research
talent owing to visa expirations and new regulations for visiting workers. Immediate policy intervention is
required to support the many researchers, whose already insecure positions have been made more
precarious because of the pandemic. Potential actions, which are already been put in place in many
countries, range from the extension of PhD studentships and research grants to ensuring visas for
researchers.
However, precarity in research careers existed well before COVID-19 and will certainly not automatically
disappear when the current pandemic comes to an end. Over the longer-term there are a number of areas
for policy action that governments, together with funders and research organisations, will need to address
if they wish to reduce this precarity, make academic research careers more attractive and promote
workforce diversity.5
 Doctoral training: moving the emphasis from increasing the number of doctorate holders to
broadening the training at doctoral level to encourage professional development, including
transferable skills that can be used in a variety of economic sectors.
 Employment status: making changes to the employment status of postdoctoral researchers by
including them in formal career structures (e.g. as staff scientists), and collective bargaining
agreements. In this regard, Portugal has moved away from providing stipends to granting employee
status for postdoctoral researchers, making open recruitment the norm. Spain is allowing
researchers who have occupied fixed-term positions for some time to apply for a permanent
contract in a competitive process. In Germany, the maximum duration of fixed-term contracts for
the purpose of qualification is capped at six years prior to being awarded the doctoral degree and
six years (medicine: nine years) after. France is introducing tenure-track positions.
 Tracking the careers of doctorate holders: collecting, analysing and publishing data on the careers
of doctorate holders to provide evidence to underpin the development, implementation and
effectiveness of human resource policies. For instance, Belgium has created the Observatory of

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Research and Scientific Careers, Portugal has launched a Scientific Employment Observatory, and
Korea is building a comprehensive database on postdoctoral researchers.
 Human resource management: improving human resource management in institutions. The
European Commission has adopted the European Charter for Researchers and a Code of Conduct
for the Recruitment of Researchers. The United Kingdom has developed a concordat between
funders, institutions and researchers to support the career development of researchers and
improve institutional human resource policies and practices. Belgium, the United Kingdom and the
European Union grant human resource excellence awards to institutions demonstrating good
practice.
 Funding: making funds available to enhance the independence of postdoctoral researchers and
support their training and career development. The Korean Initiative for fostering Universities of
Research and Innovation (KIURI) is focused on promoting the independence of postdoctoral
researchers. Spain has created a programme allowing the recipient of a postdoctoral fellowship to
choose the host institution. Japan is allowing young researchers employed on a research project
to pursue their own research choices for up to 20% of their time. Belgium plans to increase the
success rate of postdoctoral fellowships to 30%. Meanwhile, Portugal has created collaborative
laboratories with the private sector, and provided fiscal incentives to employ doctorate holders.
 Gender equity: targeting funding to women in fields and seniority levels where they are under-
represented; taking account of parenthood and other life circumstances in assessments for
funding, recruitment and promotion; and, giving gender equality awards to institutions that
demonstrate best practices. In Germany, the Women Professors programme provides targeted
support for women in senior positions. In the United Kingdom the Athena SWAN charter recognises
commitment to advancing the careers of women in science.
 Diversity, equity and inclusion: targeting funding at under-represented groups, defined by socio-
economic status, ethnicity, language, indigeneity and disability; promoting the development and
monitoring of equity, diversity and inclusion strategies at the institutional level; and collecting,
analysing and publishing disaggregated data on doctorate holders by gender and other groups of
interest (e.g. indigenous researchers in Canada and Australia).
Strengthening the links between academia and other sectors
There are many examples from the response to the COVID-19 pandemic where academic researchers
have combined forces with other public and private sector actors to develop new knowledge and
technologies (see Chapter 5). As described in the previous section, there are more doctorates working
outside of academia than within and most of these work in the private sector. Nevertheless, moving out of
academic research is not an easy option for many people and the two-way exchange of research personnel
between sectors is minimal.
In the OECD as a whole, researchers working in higher education represented only 30% of total
researchers, and those working in the government sector around 7% in 2016. Since 2005, the percentage
of gross domestic expenditure on research and development (GERD) in the higher education sector has
remained stable at around 17%, whilst that in the government sector has steadily decreased from 12% to
around 10% in 2018 (OECD, 2020[17]). The reality is that only a minority of doctorate holders in many
countries will continue in academia, even though doctoral training is still mostly focused on how to become
an academic. While many postdoctoral researchers eventually find successful and satisfying alternative
careers, they often report significant challenges in undertaking a transition associated with giving up long-
held ambitions of an academic career and a loss of social identity (Vitae, 2016[5]).
Over the past decade, conditions have been favourable for employment in research outside of academia.
While the total number of researchers has grown by 37% across the OECD, R&D expenditure per-capita

86 
has grown faster, by 68% between 2005 and 2018 (OECD, 2020[17]). In 2017, there were 8.6 researchers
per 1 000 people in employment, compared with 7.0 in 2005. Doctorate holders, especially those working
in the private sector, enjoy on average an earnings premium relative to other graduates. However,
opportunities greatly depend on the field of study, and there are wide differences among countries in the
distribution of doctoral graduates by field of study.
Mobility between academia and other sectors can help promote effective interaction between research,
education and innovation as well as opening up alternative career paths. However, it is not always clear
how to facilitate exchange of early career researchers between sectors. On the one hand, doctorate
holders who have been trained in academia may need further training and skills to meet the needs of other
sectors. On the other hand, they often face obstacles to returning to academic research after working
outside academia. Training and experience that may be valued in other sectors are often not aligned with
expectations for an academic career. Inter-sectoral mobility, especially at an early stage of one’s career
can represent a one-way ticket out of academia, with little opportunity of returning. The result can be a
permanent loss of talent in the academic scientific endeavour.
Countries can take a number of actions to promote the inter-sectoral mobility of researchers:
 Collaboration in doctoral education: preparing doctorate holders for diverse careers by changing
the objectives and content of doctoral training, including providing more opportunities for
institutional placements during doctoral education. Several countries, including Hungary and
Portugal are promoting new types of doctoral programme in collaboration with industry.
 Professional development: investing and promoting the professional development of doctoral and
postdoctoral researchers, including through career advice and mentoring. In the United Kingdom,
UK Research and Innovation and the Wellcome Trust fund training programmes that offer
recipients a wide range of development opportunities, including collaboration with non-academic
partners, to prepare them for their future careers. In Korea, the KIURI provides postdoctoral
researchers with opportunities to develop their careers in industry, and promotes their
independence from their research advisers.
 Publication of data on labour-market outcomes of doctorate holders: In Belgium, the Observatory
of Research and Scientific Careers provides this information; in the United Kingdom, Vitae
publishes results of their surveys on research careers.
 Portability of acquired benefits: The European Union has developed RESAVER, a multi-employer
occupational pension solution for research organisations that enables researchers to stay with the
same pension plan when moving between countries or employers.
The insecurity of individuals on short-term funding in academic research has been growing. Core university
and research funding is likely to decrease in some countries and some research fields after the COVID-19
crisis, and even more flexibility may be demanded of research personnel. There is also emerging evidence
that small firms have been halting recruitment for highly-skilled jobs, including researcher positions, during
the pandemic (Campello, Kankanhalli and Muthukrishnan, 2020[23]). These combined pressures make the
exchange and sharing of research skills and promotion of inter-sectoral mobility even more necessary. It
is vital to improve the resilience of the research workforce in an uncertain labour market in a way that is
mutually beneficial for both academia and the private sector.
Digital transformation and data intensive science
Digitalisation is changing the practice of science and all fields of research are becoming increasingly data
dependent. Digitalisation is also enabling a major shift towards open science, and increased public scrutiny
is putting additional onus on ensuring the rigour and integrity of science (Dai, Shin and Smith, 2018[24]). As
illustrated by the scientific response to COVID-19, these changes are happening rapidly (see Chapters 1

 87
and 2). They present a major challenge for workforce development, particularly in scientific domains that
have been historically less data-rich. Building digital workforce capacity is required at multiple levels,
including: individual scientists, research teams, data service providers, research infrastructures and
institutions. Traditional academic support roles, such as librarian or archivist are being re-imagined to take
on some data management functions, while others are being taken on by researchers. At the same time,
new professional roles are emerging, including data analyst, data steward and research software engineer
(OECD, 2020[6]). Some of these are in research support roles, whilst others are actively involved in
conducting research. Although different fields of research require different types and levels of digital
expertise, the prevailing trend in most fields is towards working in large teams that involve a mix of
researchers and research support professionals.
It has been estimated that up to 5% of the scientific research budget needs to be dedicated to the
management of FAIR (findable, accessible, interoperable and re-useable) data and that 1 in 20 staff in the
research workforce should be a digitally skilled research support professional (Mons, 2020[25]). In Europe
alone, this means about 500 000 professionals of various kinds are necessary to support researchers
through experimental design and data capture, curation, storage, analytics, publication and reuse. To
achieve this workforce transition, action is required in 5 key areas, as shown in Figure 3.4.
Figure 3.4. Five key action areas and goals for capacity development in the digital research
workforce
Source: OECD (2020[6]), “Building digital workforce capacity and skills for data-intensive science”, OECD Science, Technology and Industry
Policy Papers, No. 90, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/e08aa3bb-en.

88 
National governments have an important role for to play in:

 recognising at the policy level the need for a digitally skilled workforce in research, and the
importance of strategic planning that integrates the five key areas necessary to build and maintain
this workforce, i.e. definition of needs, provision of training, community building, career paths and
rewards, and broader enablers;
 analysing digital capacity needs in the national research workforce and the status (or preparedness
level) of the research ecosystem to provide the training and other actions necessary to meet these
needs; and
 facilitating and coordinating efforts to build workforce capacity at the speed and scale necessary
to optimise the benefits of data-intensive science, including monitoring and assessment processes
that keep pace with a changing landscape.
However, while leadership, planning and coordination are necessary at the national level, the most
important actions in terms of implementation lie with universities and research institutions, which are the
main venues for science education, training and research. There is an urgent need not only to train more
digitally skilled scientists and research support professionals but more importantly to develop attractive
and supportive academic research environments so that they do not all leave to take up better paid jobs
in industry. This means developing new career paths as well as new evaluation and reward systems. The
data and software outputs from research need to be considered on a par with publication outputs. More
flexible career paths need to be implemented to enable people to move smoothly between different posts
in academia, the public sector and the private sector at different stages of their lives, reversing the one-
way outflow from academia that is draining hot research areas such as AI. At the same time, promoting
diversity and lowering the obstacles to entry and progression for women and other population groups that
are under-represented in the digitally skilled scientific workforce require urgent attention.
The scale and immediacy of the challenge of building digital capacity for data-intensive research, which is
at the forefront of the scientific response to COVID-19, appears to be widely under-estimated.
Nevertheless, a number of examples from different countries demonstrate how governments and funding
agencies can successfully facilitate and support the necessary changes (OECD, 2020[6]). The German
Council for Scientific Information Infrastructures has mapped out future digital educational and training
needs at both vocational and scientific research levels (RfII, 2019[26]). In Australia, skilled workforce
development and training is one of the five areas of activity of the Australian Research Data Commons, a
national initiative supporting Australian research. The UK Arts and Humanities Research Council requires
that PhD students undertake training in digital skills and provides a framework against which these skills
are monitored.
Universities are also working together to address the challenges of building sustainable workforce capacity
and skills for data-intensive science. In January 2020, the leaders of eight university networks from multiple
nations signed the Sorbonne declaration on research data rights. The signatories committed to a number
of actions including: “Encouraging our universities in setting up training and skills development
programmes that create an environment to promote open research data management” (LERU, 2020[27]).
At the institutional level, the Technical University of Delft in the Netherlands is funding data stewards
embedded across the university and appointing researchers as data champions, as it spreads skills
through peer networks as well as with training events and on-line learning facilities (OECD, 2020[6]).
Despite these and other examples of good practice, policy initiatives around digital skills and capacity tend
to be ad hoc and short-term, with few examples of thorough needs assessments and longer-term strategic
initiatives or structural changes to address identified gaps. This may reflect in part the diversity of public
sector actors who need to work together to fully address these issues, including education and research
ministries, funding agencies, and (largely autonomous) universities and academic bodies. As witnessed
with regards to AI and COVID-19, the private sector also has a critical role to play, both as a supplier and
a user of digitally skilled researchers and professional support staff.

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Science to address societal challenges
As indicated at the beginning of this chapter and exemplified by the COVID-19 pandemic, scientific
research is increasingly being called upon to address complex societal challenges. Disciplinary
approaches, or indeed science alone, can only address these challenges to a limited extent. In many
situations, transdisciplinary research (TDR), which combines different actors and sources of knowledge,
is necessary. TDR requires additional skills and approaches and generates additional outputs to those that
are normally valued in academic research.
While many young scientists are motivated to use TDR approaches and develop solutions for societal
challenges, such as those embedded in the Sustainable Development Goals, it is not necessarily a good
career choice for scientists wishing to establish themselves in academia. TDR is complicated, has a long
lead-in time and is often conducted in large teams with no single disciplinary “home” or champion (OECD,
2020[7]). While scientific outputs and publications are important in TDR, a variety of other outputs are
equally – if not more – important. These can include policy reports, public communication documents, new
multi-stakeholder networks, and changes in practice, all of which are clearly required in the current
pandemic response situation. Good communication and facilitation skills are essential for performing TDR,
and, in larger scale projects, dedicated co-ordinators who have these skills are invaluable. However, such
TDR outputs and skills are not what is normally expected to be listed on an academic CV. Even when a
researcher’s contributions to society are clearly excellent, it can be very difficult to get full recognition and
support from peers and forge a long-term career in academia.
Recent OECD analysis (OECD, 2020[7]), including 28 in-depth case studies, indicates that governments,
funding agencies and other actors in the research ecosystem have a critical role to play in providing the
strategic leadership, support and enabling conditions for TDR. Specific policy actions include:
 introducing TDR learning modules in science education and postgraduate training courses;
 supporting early career researchers to engage in TDR projects (e.g. through jointly supervised
PhDs) and developing more flexible career paths;
 providing individual support (e.g. fellowships) for outstanding individuals who can develop and lead
TDR projects;
 extending funding and/or promoting collaboration with other donors to support capacity-building
and the participation of non-academic stakeholders in TDR projects;
 allocating core resources, including personnel, to build long-term expertise in TDR methodologies
and practice;
 changing peer review and evaluation processes, including by using multi-disciplinary and multi-
stakeholder review processes; and
 changing evaluation and promotion criteria for individuals who engage in TDR so that they are
judged not only on their scientific publications and citations, but also on their contribution to
collective research outputs that are of value to stakeholders outside of science.
In response to COVID-19, a number of research funding agencies have rapidly implemented new schemes
to support inter- and trans-disciplinary research, particularly with a focus on the socio-economic aspects
of the pandemic (see Chapter 2). With a longer-term perspective, several countries have also been taking
strategic actions to promote inter-and trans-disciplinary research (OECD, 2020[7]). For instance, the French
National Research Strategy for 2014-20 is organised along a set of societal challenges and is being
implemented by a series of programmes overseen by ad-hoc multi-disciplinary committees. The National
research agenda in the Netherlands, which is itself the product of a major public consultation exercise
(OECD, 2017[28]), is being implemented through the dedicated Research along Routes by Consortia
programme, promoting partnerships between knowledge institutes and social partners.

90 
A number of universities have also taken significant steps to break down disciplinary silos and work more
closely with citizens and other stakeholders. A much-cited example is Arizona State University (ASU),
whose overall mission is “advancing research and discovery of public value; and assuming fundamental
responsibility for the economic, social, cultural and overall health of the communities it serves”. ASU is
organised into 17 colleges, with more than 170 cross-disciplinary centres and institutes. On a more limited
scale, the University of Tokyo’s Institute of Gerontology brings together researchers and students from
different faculties and graduate schools with employees seconded from private companies and local
government to promote research on the problems of an ageing society (see OECD (2020[7]) for more details
of these and other examples).
While these examples are promising, they need to be diffused and scaled-up considerably if science is to
produce the knowledge and technologies required to address both the complex challenges of today and
those that are just around the corner. The COVID-19 pandemic provides a timely warning of the importance
in this regard. Young researchers need to be encouraged to work across disciplines and sectors, rather
than deterred by uncertain career prospects.
A new approach to scientific research training, evaluation and careers
Disciplinary research, merit-based competition and a focus on excellence have proven their worth and
enabled technological development, innovation and economic growth in OECD countries over many
decades. These traditional approaches still have an important role to play in the future. However, as the
COVID-19 pandemic has starkly demonstrated, science has a critical role to play in providing solutions to
complex societal challenges, including those that are embedded in the Sustainable Development Goals.
At the same time, digitalisation and big data are transforming the way science is conducted, with open
science and data intensive research becoming the norm across all domains. While digital technologies,
such as AI and robotics, will certainly have an impact on how science meets its multiple demands in the
future (see Chapter 6), the individual and collective human contribution will surely remain paramount.
The academic research system depends on the constant through flow of large numbers of PhD students
and postdoctoral researchers on temporary contracts, who have limited prospects of securing permanent
academic posts. The pressure to publish and the hyper-competitive environment are weighted against
women and represent an obstacle to workforce diversity. Growing evidence shows that the pressure on
early career researchers poses a threat to their mental health and wellbeing and can distort behaviours, to
the extent of undermining the integrity of research (Wellcome, 2020[10]). COVID-19 is making the situation,
for a highly skilled and highly vulnerable population of early career researchers, even worse by
emphasising the systemic weaknesses that already existed.
Research is at a crossroads. A number of recent policy projects from OECD, examining precarity in
research careers, digital capacity and skills, and inter- or trans-disciplinary research have concluded that
major changes need to be effected to the way scientists are trained, recruited, supported, evaluated and
rewarded (Figure 3.5). The COVID-19 pandemic has strongly reinforced this message. There need to be
multiple flexible career options within academia and opportunities for mobility between academia and other
sectors at different career stages. Positive actions need to be taken to help women and under-represented
population groups enter and sustain scientific careers. Research evaluation and career progression need
to move away from their dependency on bibliometric measures. Other research outputs, including data,
software and a variety of policy and decision support tools, which are critical for responding to crisis
situations, should be equally valued. Being a good team player and a skilled facilitator or communicator
should be recognised at the same level as possessing “intellectual capacities”. Science is indeed a
meritocracy but there is an urgent need to redefine those merits and what constitutes excellence in all its
different guises. In a system where the supply of PhD students at the point of entry far outweighs the final
demand (in terms of secure academic positions), it is critical to remove the stigma of failure associated

 91
with leaving academia and support early career researchers in their different career choices. Doing so will
help build more resilient research systems that are better able to deal with the aftermath of COVID-19 and
other future shocks.
Figure 3.5. Towards a more diverse, healthy and effective research workforce: From bottleneck to
pipeline
Note: The current bottleneck situation for academic research training and careers (top of graphic) favours disciplinary research and certain
population groups, with those who leave to take up alternative careers having very limited opportunities for re-entry. In contrast, an idealised
future pipeline (bottom of graphic) allows for more diverse career paths within academia and a rotating door to enable people to move in and
out of other sectors during their career. The pipeline is also shorter for those who stay in academia to obtain a secure position and more attractive
to women and social groups that are currently under-represented in academia. To move from the bottleneck situation to the pipeline, a number
of critical policy levers need to be activated.
As illustrated by the examples provided in this chapter and in recent OECD publications on this topic, many
institutions are taking actions to address the challenges for the present and future research workforce.
Governments also have an important role to play in bringing together the various actors, who have a stake
in the future of science to develop co-ordinated long-term strategies and actions. Many good practices and
initiatives are under way in different countries, and much can be learned from international comparisons
and dialogue. After all, science is a global enterprise, and a substantial share of academic researchers
have worked in more than one country. The COVID-19 pandemic has brought to light both the strengths
and the weaknesses of existing research systems. The post-COVID-19 period is likely to exert increasing
pressure on young researchers, as research budgets get tighter, but it can also provide an opportunity to
reconsider what is the real value in science, and what this means in terms of training and career paths for
the future scientific workforce. COVID-19 can provide the stimulus to shift from an uncomfortable
bottleneck in academic research careers to a more attractive, healthy and productive pipeline for
researchers (Figure 3.5).

92 
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Cambridge, https://www.vitae.ac.uk/vitae-publications/reports/vitae-what-do-research-staff-
do-next-2016.pdf.
Wellcome (2020), What Researchers Think About the Culture They Work In, [10]
https://wellcome.org/reports/what-researchers-think-about-research-culture (accessed on
15 January 2020).
Woolston, C. (2020), “Pandemic darkens postdocs’ work and career hopes”, Nature, [2]

94 
Notes
1 This information comes from country responses to the policy survey of the OECD GSF project on reducing the
precarity of research careers. The project was launched in October 2019 and the final report is scheduled to be
published in 2021. Its webpage can be found on the OECD STI Outlook website (http://www.oecd.org/sti/science-
technology-innovation-outlook/research-precariat/).
2 https://oecdsciencesurveys.github.io/2020flashsciencecovid/.
3 See endnote (1) for the source.
4 Approximately 12 000 responses from scientific authors were obtained. Although the survey response rate was only
7.55% the study’s quality checks suggest that the results can be considered representative of the target population for
the majority of countries and economies covered.
5 See the OECD project on reducing the precarity of research careers. The project was launched in October 2019, and
the final report is scheduled to be published early in 2021.

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4 Government support for business

research and innovation in a world
in crisis
What factors and trends have led to today’s patterns of government support
for innovation in OECD economies? How has this helped shape current
innovation systems? How is it relevant towards addressing the causes and
effects of the current crisis? This chapter reviews how governments
allocate public resources towards research and innovation, drawing in part
on recent evidence from OECD projects. These interact with other major
public policy discussions on the nature of government intervention and the
breadth of innovation activities, as well as international debate around
which subsidies are permissible today across highly interconnected
economies. The chapter explores how the COVID-19 crisis may result in
shifts in the volume, nature and direction of public support for innovation. It
concludes with possible scenarios and their impact on the way
governments will sustain future innovation activity in their societies.

96 
Key findings
 The R&D and innovation business response to COVID-19 has been very
heterogeneous. While for some the crisis represents an opportunity to expand such efforts,
innovation capabilities in many industries are under significant stress. Yet the mobilisation
of business innovation resources and capabilities is crucial for tackling the current crisis and
addressing long-standing economic and societal challenges. Since close to 70% of R&D in
the OECD area is nowadays carried out by firms, how governments incentivise and
influence research and innovation in firms can have major implications for our future and is
a badly needed element of injecting resilience into the economy and society.
 Public innovation support policies need to be able to guide private innovation efforts
to where they are most needed, especially where market signals prove to be insufficient
and coordination is most challenging. Recent OECD data and analysis shows that
governments’ policy mix is not entirely consistent with that ambition. R&D tax incentives are
effective in achieving their generic R&D-raising objectives as long as they are consistently
designed and implemented. However, they are insufficient as a means to guide innovation
to broader societal needs, and represent suboptimal instruments to encourage investment
in knowledge at the interface between basic research and actual product or process
development.
 Many of the assumptions underpinning the global policy consensus on the
appropriate role of government in funding and promoting innovation are likely to be
further challenged in the coming years. Business innovation support today is possible
within a delicate balance of international agreements that shape what national governments
can do to help their businesses innovate without triggering retaliatory responses by other
countries. Governments need to build a clear appreciation of the trade-offs they face in
redesigning their innovation support portfolios, in parallel with their partners and competitors
in other countries. National self-interest, also when it comes to business support for
innovation, will be most often best served by international collaboration.
 Governments can learn from each other to improve the design and administration of
innovation support during crises. Public support for innovation comes in many forms and
is not always easy to measure, track over time or compare to facilitate mutual learning.
Governments also need to continue to invest, alongside other capabilities, in evidence about
their innovation support policies in order to improve them. This requires breaking down silos
and developing capabilities to exploit this information. This is an ongoing priority of the
OECD, both in terms of measurement and policy analysis.

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Introduction
Public support has always played a key role in shaping the extent, nature and direction of innovation in
modern market economies. This chapter examines the factors and trends that have led to today’s patterns
of government support for innovation, which itself has helped shape current innovation systems. It explores
the major debates prompting a review of how governments allocate public resources towards research
and innovation, interacting with other major public policy discussions on the nature of government
intervention, the breadth and specificities of innovation activity, and the international governance
dimension, particularly which subsidies are considered permissible across highly interconnected
economies. The chapter explores how the COVID-19 crisis may result in shifts in the volume, nature and
direction of public support for innovation. It concludes by outlining possible future scenarios and their
impact on the way governments enact their support to innovation.
Support for business research and innovation today
The importance of public support for innovation
In decentralised market economies, businesses are key actors in research and innovation systems,
selecting, developing and implementing new ideas in pursuit of economic opportunities. This is also largely
true of other economies in which the government has a high degree of business ownership and control. In
addition to providing a benign socio-economic framework in which firms can fulfil their socio-economic role,
government policies also actively promote investment behaviours that are deemed beneficial to society
but firms may otherwise be reluctant to adopt. Investments in knowledge and its application are riddled
with uncertainty and are hard to co-ordinate; further, their benefits may quickly dissipate as others stand
to benefit (OECD, 2010[1]). Left to their own devices, markets may struggle to allocate resources towards
such endeavours, even when they would be beneficial from a wide societal perspective.
There exist multiple ways for governments to provide financial support for innovation (OECD/Eurostat,
2018[2]). For instance, public support can focus on the inputs (e.g. firms’ research and development [R&D]
efforts) or outputs of the innovation activity (e.g. by reducing the taxes owed on the economic returns to
R&D). The support may involve a subsidy, i.e. a net transfer of resources, more or less explicitly connected
to specific innovation activities.1 Several instruments can be used to help channel resources to firms in
order to incentivise or reward innovation efforts. Governments can buy (or promise to buy) goods or
services that either require or result from business innovations. They can provide finance in the form of
grants or loans, or encourage others to provide such loans by providing guarantees when firms cannot
repay. They can defer or forgo tax liabilities, or they can inject capital into firms in return for equity.
Governments can pay third parties to provide services that firms require to innovate, or they can provide
such services themselves through institutions they control, such as government labs. The transfer of
technology sponsored or held by governments, or preferential access to data such as health or mobility
records, are examples of in-kind support, as is the award of exclusive rights on inventions through
intellectual property rights. Public investment and support for innovation is not necessarily limited to a
country’s territorial boundaries. For example, sovereign wealth funds and related investment vehicles buy
shares in companies around the world in order to own a stake in their new technologies. Governments
also provide implicit support for business innovation through the activities of state-owned enterprises,
which are also part of the business sector.
Public support for innovation has played a major role in the design of industrial and economic development
strategies worldwide, albeit with rather uneven approaches and results. While public support remains a
hotly contested issue (Warwick and Nolan, 2014[3]) and growth-promoting industrial policies have been
insufficient without complementary reforms, most successful economies have relied on them at some point
in their history (Rodrik, 2010[4]). As indicated in the top part of Figure 4.1, the objectives of innovation

98 
support policy are multiple. Innovation policy makers care about identifying the most appropriate portfolio
of support instruments that encourage and guide business R&D and innovation; generate solutions that
transform or even create new markets; advance economic growth; and overcome long-standing societal
challenges, such as health, energy and the environment, or address short-term crises. This multiplicity of
objectives often calls for using a portfolio of support instruments rather than relying on a limited set of policy
tools.
Figure 4.1. Confluence of objectives and constraints to government support for business
innovation
Innovation policy makers also need to take into account a number of constraints including the implications
across a much wider group of policy areas, as this chapter will later discuss. In particular, finance ministries
and society at large demand evidence that investments supporting business innovation yield as high a
social return as investments in public infrastructure or other discretionary areas of spending. Controls need
to be put in place to prevent business innovation support from becoming a form of “corporate welfare”
through regulatory capture. Alternatives to support always need to be considered.

 99
Government support for innovation before the COVID-19 crisis
Public policies promote innovation by supporting different types of firms and activities. Around the world,
firms that perform R&D are far more likely to receive innovation support from the government (with a
median 36% chance) than firms that only undertake non-R&D based innovation (13% median chance)
(Figure 4.2). As a result, a majority of firms that receive innovation support are R&D active firms, even
though they represent a minority of firms active in innovation.
Figure 4.2. R&D active firms are more likely to receive public support for innovation
Firms receiving public support as percentage of firms active in product/process innovation, 2014-16
R&D firms Firms with no R&D
%
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Note: Data on public support for innovation apply to firms reporting a product or process innovation as well as firms with innovation activities
related to product or process innovation. For Canada, data refer to product/process innovative firms. For Chile and Japan, data on public support
apply to firms with innovation activities, whereas product/process innovation-active firms refer to firms reporting product or process innovations
or with ongoing/abandoned innovation activities related to product, process, marketing or organisational innovation. For Spain, R&D status refers
to 2016 only.
Source: OECD Innovation Indicators 2019 (database), http://oe.cd/inno-stats (accessed in October 2020)
The OECD Science, Technology and Innovation Policy (STIP Compass) portal, a repository of innovation
support schemes (EC-OECD, 2020[5]), shows that direct funding schemes are the most often reported
instruments of financial support for R&D and innovation in terms of counts of initiatives (Figure 4.3). 40%
of reported instruments in this area refer to grants for business R&D and innovation. An examination of the
underlying information about these instruments shows they are highly fragmented and customised to
specific target groups, compared to corporate tax incentive schemes (11% of reported support schemes).
R&D tax incentive schemes tend to be unique for an entire country, echoing the tax on which those
concessions apply, although these also exhibit considerable variations (Appelt, Galindo-Rueda and
González Cabral, 2019[6]). Few countries report on the availability of procurement programmes for R&D
and innovation, as well as the use of prizes and awards.

100 
Figure 4.3. Policy instruments providing financial support for business R&D and innovation
Number of active policy initiatives reported by countries, top 14 instruments
Grants for business R&D and innovation
Corporate tax relief for R&D and innovation
Loans and credits for innovation in firms
Project grants for public research
Innovation vouchers
National strategies, agendas and plans
Equity financing
Institutional funding for public research
Networking and collaborative platforms
Tax relief for individuals supporting R&D and innovation
Technology extension and business advisory services
Centres of excellence grants
Procurement programmes for R&D and innovation
Science and innovation challenges, prizes and awards
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
Source: (EC-OECD, 2020[5]), OECD STIP Compass (database), https://stip.oecd.org/stip/themes/TH31 (accessed October 2020).
With the increasing proliferation and generosity of R&D tax incentives across OECD countries and partner
economies over the last decades (Figure 4.4), the measured R&D support policy mix (Box 4.1) has shifted
towards a greater reliance on tax compared to direct support instruments (Figure 4.5).
Figure 4.4. Shift in R&D support policy mix, 2000-18

Government funding of R&D in the OECD area, indexed values for key figures normalised by GDP, 2007=1
Direct funding BERD Government Tax Relief for R&D
Government Budget Allocations for R&D Business Expenditure on R&D
2007=1
1.7
1.6
1.5
1.4
1.3
1.2
1.1
1
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Note: For general and country-specific notes on the estimates of government tax relief for R&D expenditures (GTARD), see
http://www.oecd.org/sti/rd-tax-stats-gtard-ts-notes.pdf. This chart displays figures for 37 OECD countries with the exception of GTARD figures,
which exclude Israel where relevant data are not available. Direct support estimates include government R&D grants and public procurement of
R&D services, but exclude loans and other financial instruments that are expected to be repaid in full.
Source: OECD R&D Tax Incentives Database, http://oe.cd/rdtax, November 2020.

 101
Box 4.1. Addressing measurement gaps in government support for business innovation
Despite sustained OECD efforts, comparative statistical information on the landscape of government
support for business innovation across countries is rather incomplete. The available aggregate statistics
on support for R&D focus on direct support for business R&D without distinguishing between different
support types, and have only recently incorporated tax support measures. In that regard, they
understate the role governments play in supporting R&D by providing explicit or implicit support to
financial intermediaries or committing to purchase goods or services that implicitly requires firms to
invest in R&D. The 2015 Frascati Manual (OECD, 2015[7]) introduced a taxonomy for tracking different
forms of government support for R&D by separating grants from procurement of R&D services, pointing
to the importance of capturing other indirect support mechanisms in an internationally comparable
fashion. Further methodological guidance is now being prepared on means to quantify government
measures of financial support, such as income-based tax incentives and innovation loans. Drawing on
previous OECD efforts to document the magnitude of support for innovation, which were discontinued
for lack of collaboration and evidence exchange (OECD, 1995[8]; OECD, 2001[9]), this new work takes
into account:
 the need to capture the full spectrum of innovation activities, including not only R&D activities,
but also diffusion activities, in line with the proposals in the 2018 Oslo Manual (OECD/Eurostat,
2018) for a more ambitious and comprehensive approach;
 the commercially sensitive and often confidential nature of the supported business activities;
 the political sensitivity of documenting support to industry, especially in light of international
regulations such as international trade agreements or competition rules on state aid;
 the inherent difficulty of identifying the innovation scope of government support, given the
overlap of innovation with other government strategic objectives, coupled with the general lack
of a requirement to use innovation as a descriptor/classifier in administrative processes within
many public authorities;
 the technical challenge of evaluating and interpreting the explicit or implicit financial flows
between government and business, separating between exchanges and transfers (not all
support for innovation is necessarily state aid), accounting for assets and liabilities, etc.;
 the diversity of intermediate organisations channelling government funds to business
beneficiaries and their agents, which may not be businesses themselves;
 the lack of co-ordination and common standards for compiling administrative data on innovation
support across and within agencies;
 the need to reconcile sponsor and beneficiary perspectives when collecting and interpreting
data; and
 the policy analysis interest in inter-linking information on different support measures by recipient
and with business characteristics and outcomes such as jobs, investment and productivity.
Across OECD countries, tax support represented around 56% of total government support of business
R&D in 2018, compared to 36% in 2006 (Figure 4.5). The shift in the policy mix has been even more
pronounced in the European Union (EU27), with tax support doubling over ten years, from 26% of total
government support in 2006 to 57% % in 2018. The evolution has not been uniform across countries, as it
has been dependent on several factors, including how countries have seen themselves compared to their
peers. For instance, Canada decided to rebalance its federal support portfolio shortly after these
international comparisons became first available and showed its high reliance on tax support.

102 
Figure 4.5. Direct government funding and government tax support for business R&D, 2018
As a percentage of GDP
Direct Funding of BERD Tax Support for BERD Subnational Tax Support for BERD Total 2006 (excl. subnational tax support)
%
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
Note: For general and country-specific notes on the estimates of government tax relief for R&D expenditures (GTARD), see
http://www.oecd.org/sti/rd-tax-stats-gtard-ts-notes.pdf. Estimates of total OECD direct funding of BERD cover 37 OECD countries, whereas
estimates of total OECD R&D tax support (central government level) cover 36 OECD countries, excluding Israel, where R&D tax relief estimates
are not available. Direct support figures refer only to intramural R&D expenditures, except for Brazil. Estimates of total OECD (EU) direct funding
of BERD cover 37 OECD (27 EU) countries, whereas estimates of total OECD (EU) R&D tax support (central government level) cover 36 OECD
(26) countries, excluding Israel (Croatia), where R&D tax relief estimates are not available. EU government-financed BERD in 2018 based on
OECD estimate.
Source: OECD R&D Tax Incentives Database, http://oe.cd/rdtax, December 2020.
Two notable factors have contributed to this shift. First, international trade and competition rules governing
state aid have restricted support to specific firms or industries, while generic tax incentives are more likely
to pass state aid tests. The progressive development of multilateral institutions to promote trade and
investment flows has had a significant impact, shaping the current legal frameworks for government
support to innovation (Box 4.2). Peace and economic growth required lifting barriers to trade and
competition, but also sustained investment in new knowledge and its applications. Compromises were
required. Policy consensus built around the idea of exempting both undirected support and support for pre-
competitive innovation activities from bans on subsidies. Such bans are designed to promote competition
and open markets. Where a subsidy is widely available within an economy, i.e. it is not restricted to a given
enterprise or group of enterprises, international agreements tend to presume there exist no unintended
distortions in the allocation of resources. Non-specific (or selective or discretionary) subsidies are therefore
looked upon more leniently, but quantitative restrictions still apply on how far downstream governments
can go in supporting innovation activities as the innovation activity gets closer to the market.
Second, within a majority of OECD member countries, proponents of non-specific R&D tax support have
successfully argued that firms and not governments are best placed to decide which projects to invest in,
thereby downsizing on bureaucracies in charge of identifying which business projects exhibit greater
potential and need of support. Such laissez-faire attitudes have tempered beliefs in governments’
capacities to select the best projects, deeming the business sector better apt to assess markets and
technologies, predict demand, and choose which projects and companies are worthy of investment.
Budgetary pressures have also led to lighter-touch funding mechanisms that appear to require less
administrative overhead.

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Therefore, industrial policy progressively became more “horizontally” oriented, focusing on business-
friendly framework conditions and generic public support for innovation, without abandoning altogether the
sectoral dimension (Hutschenreiter, Weber and Rammer, 2019[10]). These shifts have resulted in an overall
re-organisation of innovation support portfolios, reducing the use of governments’ discretionary powers in
selecting the firms and projects to be supported.
Box 4.2. International rules shaping government support for business research and innovation
In today’s globalised economies, national and supranational competition and trade authorities play a
key role in setting and enforcing rules that ensure a level playing field among firms, industries and
countries. The World Trade Organization (WTO) rules on subsidies have been traditionally permissive
of public support towards private R&D costs. In the first years of the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures signed in 1995, R&D subsidies were presumed not to distort trade and hence
classified in the “green light” or “non-actionable” category (Maskus, 2015[11]). As this category lapsed in
2000, R&D subsidies became actionable, either by dispute settlement (which have been rare and
focused on support for the aircraft industry) or unilateral countervailing duties, subject to demonstrating
that the subsidies met specific criteria and had injurious effects on another WTO member. The system
appears to have successfully encouraged governments to shift their public support towards non-specific
instruments. This means support is not limited to an individual firm or group of enterprises, and the
amounts of support provided is regulated by objective criteria for which eligibility is automatic.
The European Union’s state aid rules are another case in point. These rules consider that state aid for
R&D and innovation can be compatible with the internal market when it can be expected to alleviate a
market failure or facilitate the development of certain economic activities, and where the ensuing
distortion of competition and trade is not contrary to the common interest. The use of the selectivity
criterion under this framework is akin to the WTO notion of specificity. A scheme is considered selective
if the authorities administering the scheme enjoy a degree of discretionary power. By affecting the
balance between certain firms and their competitors, selectivity differentiates state aid from so-called
general measures that do not need to be notified. Even among measures considered to be state aid,
as is often the case for R&D tax incentives, the proportionality requirement for approval is more likely
to be met if the aid is awarded on the basis of transparent, objective and non-discriminatory criteria
(European Commission, 2014[12]).
Restricted tendering by public authorities can also be considered an implicit form of targeted business
support, even if it does not represent state aid. The WTO Revised Agreement on Government
Procurement of 2012 (to which China, for example, is not yet a signatory) aims to open up government
contracts to international competition, but a number of exemptions are allowed (WTO, n.d.a[13]).
Individual signatories also indicate limits to the scope of application of the agreement, e.g. with respect
to “set-aside” quotas for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Canada and the United States.
Most countries also exclude the provision of R&D services from the agreement’s scope.
Other recent trends influencing current innovation support systems
In the past decades, the globalisation of economic activity, manifest as goods, services, capital, people,
technology and knowledge have become easier to transfer across national borders, has led to a marked
fragmentation of economic activity, with goods and services produced and heavily traded in international
production networks known as global value chains (GVCs). Innovation support turned to be designed with
a view on where countries wished to see themselves positioned in the resulting, complex global production
and innovation networks (OECD, 2017[14]). Within this highly interlinked setup, business innovation activity
supported by governments can have significant implications not only within the countries themselves, but

104 
also globally. To some extent, the emergence of China and other Asian economies shaping today’s
GVC system is a consequence of past decisions on public support. In China, public support (e.g. the Torch
programme) was instrumental in the establishment of innovation clusters and the subsequent development
of venture capital (VC) firms that are now investing internationally. The Made in China 2025 plan, released
in 2015, became the country’s blueprint for supporting its pursuit of technological autonomy while securing
access to international markets in priority areas. Since then, said strategic considerations have become
an increasingly regular feature of policy debate even before the onset of the COVID-19 crisis. As later
discussed in the forward-looking section of this chapter, technological mistrust and trade tensions could
become a mainstay of future economic relationships, both driven by and influencing decisions on public
support for innovation.
Companies that push the boundary of knowledge to create workable solutions are ultimately destined to
operate globally in order to reap the benefits of their innovations, unless they sell their rights to third parties.
This makes multinational enterprises (MNEs) key actors in the globalisation of innovation, accounting for
the bulk of R&D performance within OECD member countries. In Sweden, for example, only 10% of R&D
is performed by companies without a presence in other countries; the remainder is more or less equally
shared between Swedish affiliates of foreign-owned companies and Swedish majority-owned companies
with subsidiaries abroad (Swedish Agency for Growth Policy Analysis, 2019 [15]).
MNEs are therefore major direct recipients of government support. They can consider national incentives
as one of several criteria for locating (and retaining) innovative activities in a particular territory. Innovation
support systems may be designed to favour independent firms, particularly SMEs and start-ups, which
face bigger barriers. While promoting new entry into R&D to new companies, concentration of R&D and
R&D assets appears to have been rising recently. In the United States, firms with more than 1 000
employees have gone from accounting for 76% of all business R&D performance in 2008 to 82% in 2017.
The filings of large R&D corporations include as R&D expenses most of the costs of R&D acquired as part
of takeovers of typically smaller R&D performers. The authorities responsible for merger control activities
are therefore increasingly paying increased attention to their effects on overall innovation, as platform
based incumbents can use their information resources to identify and acquire potential rivals early in their
lifecycle before they become a competitive threat.
As MNEs operate across national jurisdictions, they have considerable flexibility in structuring their tax
liabilities across the territories, moving intellectual property and associated profits. This accentuates
pressures on governments to offer, within the existing rules, incentives for firms to locate their innovative
activities and tax bases in the national territory. Domestic base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) stemming
from the exploitation of gaps and mismatches between different countries’ tax systems affects all countries.
BEPS requires additional international co-ordination to prevent, among other things, harmful practices such
as incentivising business reallocation of intellectual property to more convenient jurisdictions without
substantive activity requirements.
Improving the policy mix for support to business innovation
Understanding how support instruments work
The proliferation of R&D tax incentives raises important policy questions about the effectiveness of
different policy tools in stimulating R&D, the heterogeneity of effects across different types of firms and the
interaction of different policies. However, knowledge of ”what works” in public support is somewhat limited
by lack of critical data, the challenge of identifying valid counterfactuals, the multiplicity of policy objectives,
and the complex chain of policies and contextual factors that determine the overall effectiveness of support
policies in specific settings. The OECD microBeRD project investigates the structure, distribution and
concentration of business R&D and R&D funding, modelling the incidence and impact of public support for
business R&D while accounting for many such factors (Box 4.3).

 105
The OECD recommends that governments carefully design their support for business innovation to
consider the heterogeneity of potential beneficiaries (OECD, 2016[16]). This includes looking at the position
of “standalone” firms without cross-border tax-planning opportunities, as well as young, innovative firms
without the profit-generating capacity to benefit from allowances or credits when the instruments are tax
concessions.
Box 4.3. Findings from the OECD microBeRD project on the impact of R&D tax incentives
The OECD microBeRD project investigates whether R&D tax incentives and direct funding are effective
at stimulating additional R&D investment (“R&D input additionality”) by business using a novel
internationally distributed method of microdata-based impact analysis. Its analytical strategy combines
the benefits of studies conducted at the macro level (e.g. on generalisability) and the micro level (e.g. on
the ability to explore heterogeneous effects across firms). Results for 20 OECD countries show that the
effects of such measures vary across different types of firms and R&D expenditures, shedding light on
the mechanisms driving these effects (OECD, 2020[17]). Key policy findings from the microBeRD project
include the following:
 Both R&D tax incentives and direct funding are successful in incentivising R&D investment by
business. One monetary unit (euro) of either translates into around 1.4 units of business R&D.
 R&D tax incentives help increase R&D activity, principally through changes to R&D personnel
and other inputs. They do not appear to affect R&D unit-labour costs, suggesting that the effects
of tax incentives are not absorbed into higher wages.
 R&D tax incentives encourage additional business R&D, both because existing
R&D performers increase their R&D expenditure (intensive margin) and because additional
firms start to perform R&D (extensive margin).
 The input additionality of R&D tax incentives is larger for firms that perform less R&D. As smaller
firms tend to perform less R&D than larger firms, SMEs show larger input additionality.
 The effect of R&D tax incentives on experimental development is about twice as large as the
effect on basic and applied research, while the effect of direct funding on experimental
development is half the size of the combined effect on basic and applied research. Tax
incentives and direct funding, therefore, complement each other.
 Firm-level analysis within microBeRD-participating countries highlights substantial variation in

the R&D input additionality of R&D tax incentives and direct funding across countries. This
underscores the need for more in-depth analysis of the link between business innovation policy
uptake, policy design and innovation activity and outcomes, including R&D inputs and outputs.
 Changes in R&D tax incentives targeting smaller firms or involving ceilings or thresholds tend
to have stronger effects on business R&D investment, as small R&D performers appear more
responsive than larger firms to the availability of R&D tax subsidies.
Source: OECD (2020[18]), “How effective are R&D tax incentives? New evidence from the OECD microBeRD project”, STI Policy Note,
OECD, Paris, http://www.oecd.org/sti/microberd-rd-tax-incentives-policy-note.pdf.
Setting aside differences in design and implementation that can blur the dividing line between tax support
and grants, there appears to be a broad consensus that tax incentives are more suited in principle to
encouraging R&D activities aiming to develop applications with the potential to be brought to the market
within a reasonable timeframe. By contrast, direct grants are more suitable for supporting longer-term,

106 
high-risk research, as well as for targeting specific areas that either generate public goods (e.g. health and
defence) or have particularly high potential for spillovers (Figure 4.6). The optimal mix of direct and indirect
support will depend on both the specific circumstances and policy preferences.
Figure 4.6. Responsiveness of business R&D decisions by type of policy instrument

Elasticity of R&D to the user cost of R&D and direct
A. R&D tax incentives B. Direct funding of BERD

User cost elasticity Elasticity of R&D to direct funding
% %
-1.0 0.07
0.06
-0.8
0.05
-0.6
0.04
-0.4 0.03
0.02
-0.2
0.01
-0.0 0
Basic and applied research Experimental development Basic and applied research Experimental development
Note: This figure displays the percentage change in R&D in response to a one percentage reduction in the user cost of R&D through R&D tax
incentives (user cost elasticity) and a one percentage increase in direct funding (elasticity to direct funding) respectively. Vertical lines mark the
90% confidence interval, which covers the “true” elasticity with a probability of 90%.
Source: (OECD, 2020[17]) “The effects of R&D tax incentives and their role in the innovation policy mix: Findings from the OECD microBeRD
project, 2016-19”, https://doi.org/10.1787/65234003-en.
It has been advocated that public sponsorship of innovation should primarily target research by public-
purpose organisations such as universities and research institutes, with residual support for business
innovation assigned through non-discretionary incentives. Showing a growing division of innovation labour
whereby public-purpose scientific institutions increasingly focus on research and corporations focus on
developing products and processes, Arora, Belenzon, Patacconi, and Suh (2020[19]) argue that universities
produce knowledge that is rarely in a form that can be readily digested and turned into new goods and
services through the input of technology transfer offices. In their view, the research specialisation process
might “have slowed […] the transformation of that knowledge into novel products and processes”. The
authors opine that a widespread return to active business engagement in research (both basic and applied)
is not particularly likely, except for situations in which companies, “due to complements such as specialized
equipment or proprietary data, have strong incentives to invest, especially if they can appropriate enough
of the benefits by restricting spillovers to rivals”. Targeted government support can only partly overcome
the hollowing out of application-oriented research. Thus, policy makers have had to reconsider how to
address this gap, by considering direct and indirect forms of support that match research and technology
infrastructures with medium and long-term business needs, and by helping businesses boost their scientific
capabilities to engage in such partnerships.

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In this context, several countries have experimented with adapting to their local context programmes that
are perceived to have successfully linked knowledge supply and demand in different countries. Examples
include widespread policy interest in supporting proof-of-concept and commercialisation of technologies
with public-sector applications through national adaptations of the Small Business Innovation Research
(SBIR) programme in the United States. Howell (2017[20]) argues that the SBIR awards owe their impact
(particularly in terms of attracting additional private VC funding) to their facilitation of technology
prototyping and demonstration of a technology serving the US federal government and the potentially wider
need. The pathway from pre-commercial procurement of R&D to actual procurement of effective solutions
is quite different across countries for companies receiving SBIR-equivalent grants, depending on the
possibility of governments favouring awarded SMEs during this transition to the commercial phase. Korea
has implemented a recommended set-aside for contracting with SMEs for technology development
purposes, in combination with a mandatory “new excellent product” purchase quota. Despite their huge
potential, the implementation of demand-side innovation support policies is still hampered by a lack of
policy clarity, instrument co-ordination and evidence to support the widespread use of targets (Appelt and
Galindo-Rueda, 2016[21]).
Government intervention aimed at addressing failures in the market for finance for business innovation has
also been the subject of increasing attention. Innovators often count intangibles as their main assets. These
are difficult to deploy independently from their own ventures and personal engagement, resulting in a lack
of collateral for investment and business growth in areas where the markets do not perceive a high
likelihood of success. For instance, repayable government loans have played a key role in shaping
technology development in the civil aerospace sector in recent decades, and VC interventions such as
those implemented in Israel have attracted considerable interest worldwide. State-owned or guaranteed
development banks play an important role in facilitating the flow of finance to innovative firms in many
countries, including those where available statistics indicate they provide limited support. However, they
expose governments to considerable liabilities, as loans may not be repaid, investments may fail, or
guarantees may be called by private lenders. (Lach, Neeman and Schankerman, forthcoming[22]) describe
how the design of innovation loans should correspond to project features and policy objectives, avoiding
both projects with a high probability of success that will be funded by the private market regardless and
those that do not justify public financing because their expected net impacts are negative. The authors
also draw attention to the evidence that the role of VC firms is to provide not only finance, but also “advice”
and a network of connections that enhance the probability of success of the supported start-up projects.
Implementation matters
The design of policy instruments also needs to keep up with practical considerations regarding their
implementation. For example, policy design should simplify the business support landscape and reduce
uncertainty, so that support requests and claims procedures give potential beneficiaries legal certainty
when embarking on sponsored activities, while also protecting the public interest. This also involves
operationalising RDI definitions regarding software development and other service-based activities of
increasing importance for innovation. For example, the United Kingdom’s tax authority released specific
guidelines on the eligibility of software for R&D tax relief (HMRC, 2018[23]). The new guidelines recognise
the continuous evolution of information technologies (e.g. artificial intelligence, cloud and mobile
computing), as well as the ongoing development of new applications (e.g. software robots, augmented
reality and internet of things). Interagency collaboration is essential to prevent double or even triple-dipping
into public resources, but especially to ensure the highest possible coherence in policy delivery and fully
exploit synergies in terms of expertise. Public support information systems are not always fit for purpose
and are not particularly suited to conducting reliable assessments of the potential impacts of domestic
reforms, as is common in other policy areas.
Regardless of the type of instrument considered, implementing business support is a complex undertaking,
which requires building internal capabilities within public agencies and enhancing innovation planning

108 
among beneficiaries. This can be underpinned by a professional network of specialised intermediaries

acting in the best interest of companies, while complying with the letter and spirit of the rules on public
innovation support. This is particularly important for non-discretionary schemes in order to prevent an
unmanageable number of potentially bogus claims that may ultimately undermine trust in the system.
Overall, governments wishing to introduce new measures in support of innovation have had to contend
with multiple regulatory and budgetary restrictions that limit their margin of operation. This is evidenced by
innovation support measures where the government acts as a financial investor intent on leveraging
additional financial resources into long-term investments. Compliance with international subsidy control
rules, and pressures to ensure that financial assets and liabilities (including those of a contingent nature)
are absent from the government or the broader public sector’s balance sheet (e.g. to avoid exceeding
public-debt limits) shape the room for manoeuvre. In the United Kingdom, the Industry Panel Response to
the UK Treasury’s review of patient capital recommended that the UK government not have control over
the board of the proposed new investment vehicle, or any direct or indirect influence on decisions regarding
its individual investments, stating reasons of compliance rather than other arguments (HM Treasury,
2017[24]). The potential downside of forgoing control and influence stems from difficulties in ensuring value
for money and maintaining directionality.
A shift towards greater directionality of business support for innovation
In contrast to the trend towards reduced directionality in innovation support, some argue that governments
have erred too much in renouncing some of their discretionary powers, failing to recognise the implications
of their choices in terms of guiding the markets. Such views have become more prominent in recent years.
This is apparent in the Aho Group Report (Aho et al., 2006[25]), which calls for EU governments to adopt
an innovation lead-user perspective, and in the growing popularity of the concept of smart specialisation
(OECD, 2013[26]). This trend was further fuelled by the global financial crisis (GFC) and its aftermath. The
GFC exposed a number of ways in which markets incentivise innovation towards outcomes that do not
necessarily match public interests, e.g. through financial innovations that socialise risks and privatise gain,
or through suspect methods to overcome regulatory controls on vehicle emissions. Greater awareness of
corporate tax strategies, and concerns about growing concentration, have helped cast doubts on policies
offering unconditional support to business innovation. Furthermore, a number of studies pointing to
concrete examples where government interventions have played an important role in supporting the growth
of new businesses and the emergence of new industries have also challenged narratives about industrial
policies necessarily resulting in failures (Mazzucato, 2013[27]). In the public discourse, the attribution of
merit underpinning innovation has become a hotly contested issue, highlighting the complexity of the
innovation enterprise and how value is captured from the generation of ideas to their commercialisation.
The growing realisation and sense of urgency around key societal challenges has resulted in calls for
outcome or mission-oriented approaches, raising questions about the adequacy of current support
instruments and portfolios (Mazzucato, 2018[28]). Among the growing trends in the run-up to the current
COVID-19 crisis, OECD member countries have continued to witness a progressive rehabilitation of
industrial policy from the perspective of innovation, with arguments that governments should actively
engage in making explicit innovation policy choices on where to focus their limited resources (e.g. (HM
Government, 2009[29]; HM Government, 2017[30]), for the United Kingdom; (Ministry of Economic Affairs,
2011[31]), for the Netherlands).
Support for business innovation in times of crisis: The COVID-19 shock
The disruption to normal financing conditions and economic activity is a major existential challenge for
businesses, for which preserving innovation capabilities may shift from representing an unaffordable luxury
to an imperative for survival. The COVID-19 crisis is not only a key threat to innovation systems’ ability to

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fulfil their normal functions, but also a call for mobilising these systems to provide new solutions to the
immediate health, societal and economic challenges posed by the pandemic. Against this backdrop,
investments in R&D and broader innovation are essential. The COVID-19 emergency, and the measures
adopted across the world to overcome its pernicious health impacts, pose major challenges for innovation
systems, questioning major assumptions – about the definition of collective priorities; the bearing of risks
and rewards; and the role of the market, civil society and governments – while also irreversibly endangering
the survival of key productive and innovation capabilities, especially within sectors hit the hardest. The
innovative potential of businesses and the broader private sector has been called upon to deliver a wide
range of solutions to help cope with the health emergency and emerge from it as robustly as possible. In
this context, innovation support policies can make a major difference.
Lessons from previous crises
COVID-19, like the 2008 GFC and previous economic crises, is having major negative repercussions on
business RDI through multiple yet interconnected channels. The evidence shows that uncertainty is a
principal driver of business decisions during crises (OECD, 2009[32]). Historically, business
R&D expenditure and patent filings have moved in parallel with measures of economic activity such as
GDP, slowing markedly during the economic downturns of the early 1990s and early 2000s. On an
aggregate basis, investments in RDI are pro-cyclical, and thus prone to contraction in times of crisis
(OECD, 2009[32]). While R&D projects already under way are expensive to interrupt, the GFC experience
indicates that the business sector was the first to cut its R&D investments as conditions deteriorated
(Figure 4.7).
Figure 4.7. The impact of the business cycle on business R&D and government support
OECD area, annual growth rate
GDP Government-financed GERD Business-financed BERD Government-financed BERD
30
25
20
15
10
-5
-10
-15
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Note: The estimate of government-financed business enterprise expenditure on R&D (BERD) for 2008 reflects to some extent a break in the
series for federally funded support to business in the United States. This also applies to a less visible extent to the estimate of government-
financed gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD).
Source: OECD Main Science and Technology Indicators (database), http://oe.cd/msti (accessed October 2020).

110 
Cuts to plans to subcontract R&D and other knowledge services tend to be faster to implement than
adjustments to the R&D workforce, which tend to be avoided for as long as possible. Business are aware
that policy makers are very sensitive to R&D workforce-adjustment decisions, bidding for support for
projects that enable them to retain such a hard-to-replace workforce. During crises, as risk portfolios are
revised, some R&D and technology-based operations can sometimes be sold to collaborators in the supply
chain, triggering concern about potential losses of strategic capabilities, or left to spin off. In past crises,
sales functions tended to be privileged over knowledge-creation activities, to boost liquidity and near-term
solvency. By depressing demand, financial crises appear to be associated with overall declines in rates of
product innovation as new product launches become less likely to succeed and product innovation may be
more oriented towards frugal consumer behaviours. Such crises may encourage resource-saving process
innovations, but only to the extent that business appreciate a tangible short-term return on the investment
and are in a position to raise the necessary finance.
The policy response during the GFC recognised the need to mitigate the crisis’s impact on productive and
innovative capacities as many countries introduced stimulus and recovery packages with substantial
measures to support innovation (OECD, 2009[32]; OECD, 2012[33]; Izsak et al., 2013[34]). Most countries did
not substantially alter the structure of their innovation policies as an immediate response to the GFC
(Pellens et al., 2018[35]). Instead, they opted to enhance existing support measures and introduce additional
short-term measures to address liquidity constraints (e.g. loans, loan guarantees) and maintain business
innovation activity (e.g. innovation vouchers, structural funds). Additional financial support for businesses
– i.e. a sharp temporary increase in direct funding (e.g. R&D grants), coupled with a higher use of R&D tax
incentives – helped attenuate the decline in business R&D investment during the GFC.
Although countries greatly differed in their reaction to the GFC and its aftermath, the crisis accentuated
national innovation systems’ pre-existing weaknesses. Not all economies were equally able to support
business innovation. In the European Union, for example, special rules allowed countries to use the
Temporary Framework for state aid. As business R&D and innovation investments recovered and resumed
growth (Figure 4.7), government R&D budgets, which had proved resilient until 2010, came under
increased budgetary pressure, owing to the phasing out of emergency measures and political requirements
for fiscal consolidation. While this shift greatly restricted the scope for innovation policy directionality,
abundant examples point to the crisis driving renewed interest in tools allowing greater innovation targeting
and prioritisation. For instance, the GFC prompted a re-examination of policy attitudes towards innovation
financing institutions such as national development banks, e.g. the KfW banking group in Germany, with
the capacity to direct resources to businesses with innovation financing needs. KfW is one of the members
of the D20 Long-Term Investors Club, which was created in 2009 and has since expanded to include,
among others, the China Development Bank, the Russian state development corporation VEB.RF and the
Brazilian Development Bank.2 Based on the experiences gathered through OECD studies (OECD,
2012[33]), Box 4.4 outlines a number of lessons learned from previous economic crises as a basis for further
reflection.
Box 4.4. Lessons from past crises for business innovation support
 use public support as a tool to manage and combat uncertainty as a priority
 adopt measures that help stabilise the economy and initiate recovery, ensuring it is durable and
oriented towards sustainable growth, as crises expose structural weaknesses
 identify key R&D and broader innovation capabilities most exposed to the impact of the crisis
and with the highest long term potential
 enhance and draw on available evidence to make the case for innovation to finance and
economic ministries

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 understand the scope for temporary asset-purchasing programmes conducted by monetary

authorities and consider under what conditions non-financial sector assets might be eligible
 explore mechanisms to facilitate the use of knowledge-based assets as collateral for raising
private finance and securing public support
 prioritise addressing rigidities and bottlenecks in implementing support
 assess the relative merits of different instruments with respect to objectives and trade-offs;
consider implications for the policy support mix and balance
 have efficient appraisal systems in place, drawing on all relevant expertise within government
and its delivery agencies, while engaging intermediaries that contribute to implementation
 evaluate adaptability to the local context of measures introduced elsewhere
 embed reasonable information and evaluation requirements to facilitate policy learning
 limit measures that only benefit incumbents and monitor implications of potential concentration
 engage proactively with other countries and multilateral organisations to address cross-
boundary implications within the available governance frameworks, which may evolve and
adapt to circumstances.
This time is different
As all crises differ, it is hard to extrapolate from past episodes, both in terms of the potential impacts of the
current crisis and the lessons to be drawn regarding the appropriate policy response. In contrast to the
previous financial crisis, the current phase of the COVID-19 crisis is forcing businesses to enter
unchartered waters. Businesses today are constrained by a unique and probably unprecedented
combination of marked supply and demand constraints, coupled with very substantive uncertainty about
whether and how the crisis will be resolved. This uncertainty also makes it more complicated to identify
the appropriate policy response. Chapter 1 lays out some key features of the current crisis, as well as its
implications for business innovation and the general policy response. Mandated and voluntary lockdowns,
combined with physical distancing measures, contribute to reduced levels of production and consumption
activities – especially those requiring personal proximity and mobility. Restrictions have complex impacts
across supply and demand chains.
OECD analysis of the published financial reports of large publicly listed R&D investors covering the second
and third quarters of 2020 shows significant differences across and within sectors in terms of how these
companies are adapting their R&D investment portfolios (see Chapter 1). Among non-traded companies,
evidence is scarcer, but points (e.g. in Canada) to a threefold increase in the number of companies
reporting a decline in R&D (e.g. 22% more companies reporting lower rates of manufacturing R&D vs. 6%
reporting higher rates) (Statistics Canada, 2020[36]). Large businesses’ quarterly reports highlight
uncertainty as a major factor driving business responses and the immediate outlook. The sentiment clearly
differs by sector, from potential concerns about advertising revenue, through uncertainty about the success
of ongoing trials in pharmaceutical companies, to uncertainty about the future of transportation and
personal services, especially if business travel and tourism continue to contract significantly even after the
pandemics has been contained. Company reports highlight concerns over liquidity management,
adaptation to supply chain disruption, and protecting workers and customers. In the United Kingdom, a
sample of Innovate UK support beneficiaries reported that two-third of firms suggested future R&D plans
remained unchanged, with the remainder slowing or cutting back on their projects (Roper and Vorley,
2020[37]).
While the underlying pandemic persists, business practices need to be constantly revised as new
information becomes available and new policies are adopted. Adaptive innovation seems rather prevalent,
spurred by necessity. According to Statistics Canada, over two-fifths (45.4%) of Canadian businesses

112 
reported they had added new ways to interact with or sell to customers; nearly two-fifths (38.1%) reported
they had increased their internal use of virtual connections; and 2.8% of businesses indicated they had
begun manufacturing new products in response to government requests to help cope with the crisis.
A distinctive feature of the COVID-19 crisis, compared to previous ones, is the realisation that innovation
has a clear and explicit role to play in its containment resolution, over and above its role in the ensuing
economic recovery. This is particularly obvious in the development and deployment of diagnostics,
vaccines and treatments for COVID-19, but is not exclusive to the sectors that are directly preoccupied
with such issues: designing new products and processes that enable greater resilience to the current and
related future disruptions is important to society as a whole. A significant portion of the required innovation
potential rests within the business sector. In the United States, for example, (Azoulay and Fishman,
2020[38]) point out that clinical trials have increasingly been conducted in private practices and dedicated,
for-profit study sites since the 1990s. The continuity and upgrade of network services also rests on the
capacity of (private or state-owned) business to adapt to the situation and provide new responses.
Business innovation support as part of the government response
As highlighted by (Gans, 2020[39]), efforts to incentivise private, market-based innovations addressing an

urgent global challenge such as the pandemic face a fundamental paradox. Profit-driven innovators will
ultimately wish to price their solutions at rates that will make access prohibitive to many people, which is a
socially unacceptable outcome. The anticipation of “expropriation”, in turn, deters private investment, an
innovation incentive paradox that highlights the limitations of the market mechanism and the need to
identify appropriate instruments to serve the public interest.
Most governments have steered clear of utilising market-replacing interventions within their statutory
powers, such as those allowed by the Defense Production Act in the United States, which allows issuing
loans to expand a vendor’s capacity, controlling the distribution of a company’s products and compelling
companies to prioritise government orders over those of other clients. Instead, governments have mostly
opted for moral persuasion and appeals to corporate responsibility, along with significant financial support,
as allowed by emergency funding bills. Table 4.1 lists selected examples of recently adopted business
innovation measures, split between R&D tax incentives and other initiatives. It shows that some measures
focus on promoting innovation in the fight against the disease, while others seek to support the overall
business innovation ecosystem at a time of distress.
Table 4.1. Selected examples of emergency government measures supporting business innovation
R&D tax incentives
Instrument re-design
Increase of R&D tax credit/allowance  Australia (SME rates and rates for R&D-intensive large firms (R&D intensity >2%) for income
rates years starting on or after July 1, 2021), Denmark (subject to ceiling), Iceland, Italy (Southern
regions), Spain (technological innovation)
Adjustments in ceilings on qualifying  Australia (increase in R&D expenditure ceiling for income years starting on or after July 1,
R&D expenditure or R&D tax benefits 2021), Germany (increase), Iceland (increase), New Zealand (partial removal and
simplification)
Administration and monitoring
Extension of time limit for filing  Australia, Canada (Quebec and British Columbia SR&ED tax credits),
applications  Mexico, Portugal
Accelerated or earlier processing of  Canada (refundable claims under federal SR&ED tax credit), Poland
R&D tax relief claims
Advanced and/or expedited cash  Denmark, France, Ireland
payments (refunds)
Other business RDI support measures
Improved access to funding for innovative  China (R&D subsidies for SMEs), France (Investments for the Future Programme innovation
companies grants), Germany (VC financing for start-ups), United Kingdom (investment fund for high-

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growth companies, grants and loans for SMEs focusing on R&D), Hungary (subsidies of wage
costs for R&D staff), New Zealand (Callaghan Innovation's R&D Loan Scheme), Spain (partially
reimbursable grants for SMEs), United Kingdom (continuity loans, grants and loans for SMEs
focusing on R&D)
Postponement of application deadlines,  EU28 (Horizon 2020), Austria, Germany, Norway, Spain
increased flexibility for existing
beneficiaries and/or assistance for new
applicants
Funding for innovation on COVID-19  Austria (KLIPHA-COVID19), Belgium (regional grants), Canada (Challenge programme),Czech
solutions Republic (grants), EU28 (European Innovation Council accelerator and Innovative Medicines
Initiative, ERAvsCorona Action Plan), Germany (Bundesregelung Forschungs-, Entwicklungs-
und Investitionsbeihilfen), Ireland (rapid response funding, direct grants and repayable
advances), Italy (Innova), Korea (R&D project to foster medical device industry), Luxembourg,
Malta (grants), Poland, Portugal (grants), Slovak Republic, Spain (soft loans for innovative
companies with COVID-19 projects), United Kingdom (sustainable innovation fund), United
States (NIH/FNIH public-private partnership for COVID-19 vaccine and treatments)
Note: This table does not attempt to provide a comprehensive representation of all measures supporting business innovation introduced by
governments in response to COVID-19; such a list would be too large to present here and would require constant updating.
Source: OECD elaboration, based on the OECD STIP COVID-watch (https://stip.oecd.org/covid), OECD survey of R&D tax incentives, and other
sources (OECD, 2020[40]).
Public procurement of innovations, or more generally of solutions that may require an innovation on the
part of firms or other actors, is a salient form of policy response to address the innovation paradox posed
by this crisis and other similar grand challenges. The transformation potential of government procurement
action in response to COVID-19 is probably an order of magnitude above other forms of innovation support.
In the United States, COVID-19-related federal procurement amounted to close to USD 28 billion from
March to September 2020.3 This amount is by no means entirely dedicated to new products or new
applications of existing products. The information collected by the OECD ; (OECD, 2020[41]) suggests that
governments are placing innovation agencies in key procurement support roles during this crisis.
Authorities have tended to commit to products that are closer to the market, where the risks are mostly
located downstream of the innovation chain. In many cases, however, public procurement as a form of
innovation policy can contribute to societal missions through the careful design of advance market
commitments and the building of public-private partnerships (Edquist and Zabala-Iturriagagoitia, 2012[42]).
In addition to the measures outlined above, countries have increasingly updated the legislative and
regulatory frameworks covering support for business innovation. In April 2020, the European Commission
announced the adoption of an amendment to the Temporary Framework initially adopted in March. Among
other actions, the amendment extended the framework to include support for coronavirus-related R&D
(European Commission, 2020[43]). The framework has since been further amended to better accommodate
the position of otherwise viable start-ups which incurred losses before the COVID-19 crisis and hence
would not have been considered eligible for support.4 The United Kingdom is currently reviewing its
approach to state aid, an issue that is intertwined with trade-agreement negotiations following Brexit.
Bilateral trade deals, such as the agreement UK-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement
of September 2020, contain commitments to transparency regarding the subsidies awarded and
consultations over concerns about subsidies that may affect the other party, highlighting the
interconnectedness between industry support and access to markets in a globalised world.

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The medium to long-term outlook for business innovation support
Possible scenarios and implications
As highlighted in Chapter 1, a range of generic factors will shape the outlook for science, technology and
innovation policies. These have marked implications for the future design, implementation and impact of
public policies supporting business innovation.
At the time of writing, the COVID-19 pandemic is a principal driver of public policy. As long as the crisis
persists, governments will be compelled to sustain and drive business participation in identifying and
implementing solutions to the health crisis. Governments have been providing multiple forms of support
for firms’ innovative activity, recognising the need to engage the business sector in fighting the pandemic
as part of the ongoing broader public health intervention.
Over the medium to longer run, evidence and perceptions of future pandemic vulnerabilities or infectious
disease issues will determine whether authorities maintain and possibly expand the innovation support
mechanisms developed during the current crisis to mitigate future successive pandemic shocks. A
“recovery” scenario in which viral and other infectious disease outbreaks are recurrent and difficult to
contain will heighten demand for a greater focus of public support on health-related R&D and innovation.
This will likely diminish interest in horizontal forms of public support and will have uncertain implications on
support towards other domains that may not appear to be as directly relevant to building pandemic
preparedness. Under an alternative scenario in which recurrence or alternative outbreaks are perceived
as less likely, there will be reduced willingness to sustain incentive mechanisms towards business driven
health R&D and innovation. Resources dedicated to innovation in pandemic prevention will eventually be
re-allocated to other uses, but policy makers will need to beware of the risk that core capabilities in this
area might be irreversibly lost, eventually exposing societies to future risks. Indeed, the current crisis has
brought into question the way innovation priorities are determined.
Paraphrasing John Maynard Keynes (Keynes, 1919[44]), future scenarios for policy will be shaped by the
social and economic consequences of the COVID-19 peace and the terms on which it is ultimately
achieved. A key dimension in the scenarios for socio-economic damage and the shape of a future recovery
is the extent to which structural change becomes a consequence of a “new normal”, where the pre-COVID
baseline was a protracted period of lacklustre productivity growth compared to recent history (Andrews,
Criscuolo and Gal, 2016[45]; OECD, 2019[46]). The range of possible scenarios is too broad to detail here;
it relates to how people can and prefer to work, interact with each other and enjoy their leisure. Plausible
scenarios have entire industries and locations transforming their models to remain viable settings of
economic activity. In such cases, transformation and disruption will become regular features; governments
will be called upon to support and manage such processes, beyond designing strictly people-based
policies.
As happened during previous crises, tensions will likely arise between the idea of government sustaining
industries and firms or re-allocating resources towards new opportunities. The cloud of uncertainty will
often not allow predicting which changes will be temporary and which will be permanent. As a result,
identifying the optimal response will be challenging, and the results often controversial. A key consideration
for national innovation policy makers will be to identify and prioritise business innovation capabilities that
should be preserved for the long run. Considerable uncertainty is likely to hold back investment for an
extended period, particularly by companies with high debt (OECD, 2020c).
The room for manoeuvre for policies supporting business will be shaped by the future state of government
finances and the macroeconomic policy response. The experience of the GFC highlights the plausibility of
a scenario in which governments seek to reduce the currently heightened public-debt levels at a fast clip,
initiating a period of rapid budgetary adjustment. Aside from the important direct impacts the timing of such
a process may have on the economy, the budgetary envelope for government financial support for R&D

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and innovation as a discretionary area of spend stands to fall if it is not deemed a national priority. This
may trigger a search for complementary funding mechanisms, including a greater role for private, non-
corporate R&D funding. Differences in budgetary responses across countries may also shift the global
landscape and accentuate national differences in businesses’ innovation capabilities. Firms will tend to
move innovation activities to locations where the business environment, including the availability of public
support, appears to be more favourable. In this context, the focus and actual implementation of short and
medium-term recovery packages will be critical. They will straddle competing priorities, from resolving
short-term business liquidity and solvency concerns, to addressing the challenges and opportunities
presented by the pace and direction of digitalisation and automation, as well as the pursuit of the ecological
transition. The OECD Economic Outlook (OECD, 2020[47]) also notes that government support for
companies through wage subsidies, tax deferrals and guarantees will need to be phased out gradually in
phase with the recovery, to ensure that unviable firms are not supported for an extended period.
The global crisis accentuates pressures on the international governance mechanisms that have defined
the terms allowing governments to support the business sector. Such systems have demonstrated some
flexibility in times of crisis as emergency frameworks have been put in place, but the yet unknown severity
and duration of the current crisis casts some doubts about their future. The opportunities associated with
the “next production revolution” (which is occurring through the confluence of a range of technologies,
including artificial intelligence, 5G, new materials, 3D printing, nanotechnology and industrial
biotechnology) have set the scene for support and regulation of business innovation to become one
additional driver of the push towards greater productive technological autonomy. President Xi Jinping of
the People’s Republic of China, for example, points to the need to drive original innovation capabilities and
achieve more “zero-to-one” breakthroughs (Xi, 2020[48]). The agreement between Germany and France in
2019 to support funding for the R&D and innovation activities of two companies in the area of next-
generation lithium-ion batteries, as well as their initial industrial deployment, could be a sign of further
initiatives to come. The rather fuzzy idea of technological sovereignty as a policy objective to be served by
government innovation support has been exacerbated by the crisis effect on perceived dependence from
supply chains controlled by a few countries. The underlying struggle for geopolitical technological
hegemony, evident well before the crisis, may result in further trade tensions.
In this context, multilateral frameworks could eventually be reinforced as a result of a greater appreciation
of risks and challenges that transcend national boundaries, requiring co-ordinated responses to bring new
products and processes to markets. This would be especially true if transnational actors in the public and
private sectors succeeded in fighting the pandemic. In such a scenario, international rules governing state
aid and public procurement of innovation may ultimately result in arrangements that are more
accommodating towards discretionary actions targeting priority challenges. On the other hand, the current
crisis and pressures to decouple value chains may undermine trust in global governance solutions,
exacerbating the existing pre-crisis discontent. This may ultimately entail a shift towards national
approaches as countries – especially larger economies – seek to become more self-reliant and favour their
domestic companies, instead of pursuing more distributed mechanisms to build resilience to shocks.
For instance, the COVID-19 pandemic has spurred many governments to enhance their foreign investment
screening mechanisms or introduce new ones, in the midst of an already steep drop in global foreign direct
investment (FDI) flows. This may bring about transformational change to policy practice on investment
screening, and the way governments and societies view the benefits and risks associated with foreign
investment (Novik, Pohl and Rosselot, 2020[49]). The European Commission recently connected the
adoption of defensive trade measures and screening of FDI flows to new proposals for assessing the role
of foreign subsidies and their potential impact on the internal market, publishing a White Paper and a
consultation on the subject (European Commission, 2020[50]).
Mechanisms aiming to ensure a level playing field within and across countries may come under undue
criticism at a time when they are more necessary than ever. While possibly welcoming greater flexibility,
innovation policy makers also need to acknowledge the importance of the business environment and the

116 
benefits of such arrangements in terms of market access. In this context, it may be necessary to reform
current systems, developing a consistent approach towards public-sector engagement towards the broader
aspects of innovation rather than its R&D component alone. Networks of bilateral agreements between
countries are likely to shape the delicate balance of public support for innovation, but their complexity may
be too difficult to navigate, even for medium-sized countries.
In the future, the effective possibilities for public support for business innovation will also be linked to
governments’ ability to use the opportunities of digital transformation and adopt innovative practices.
Digitalisation may completely transform the way that governments assess the merits of business claims
for support and monitor the projects they fund as a portfolio. Some multilateral collaboration scenarios
could enable timely information sharing between governments, such as those developed for the automatic
exchange of information for tax purposes. The G20/OECD Inclusive Framework on base erosion and profit
shifting has been working on reform of the international tax system to address the tax challenges arising
from the digitalisation of the economy, restore stability to the international tax framework and avoid the risk
of further unco-ordinated, unilateral tax measures (OECD, 2020[40]). The experience of this initiative will
also shape how governments can use tax incentives as a means to attract innovation to their countries.
As implied by all of the above, political economy considerations will be critical. The outlook for the role of
government in supporting and shaping innovation activity involving the business sector will depend on how
society, through the prism of the current crisis and its immediate aftermath, perceives businesses as
deserving beneficiaries of public assistance as they pursue innovations promoting social well-being, and
views governments as capable facilitators of this process.
Conclusions
This chapter has provided innovation policy makers with an overview of the factors that have helped shape
today’s landscape for public support for innovation and the main questions open going forward. It has
touched upon the lessons learned from recent OECD studies, particularly in relation to past crises and
recent government responses to the COVID-19 crisis in the area of innovation.
The mobilisation of business innovation resources and capabilities is crucial for tackling the current crisis
and addressing long-standing economic and societal challenges. As recent experience shows, how
governments incentivise and influence research and innovation in firms has major implications for our
future. The R&D and innovation business response to COVID-19 has been very heterogeneous. While for
some the crisis represents an opportunity to expand such efforts, in many industries, innovation capabilities
are under significant stress. Public support for innovation is not an exclusive concern of innovation policy
makers. Its design and implementation has to take into account several implications and constraints that
cut across several policy areas, thus calling for horizontal coordination and implementation approaches.
Public innovation support policies need to be able to guide private innovation efforts to where they are
most needed, especially where market signals prove to be insufficient and coordination is most
challenging. Recent OECD data and analysis shows that governments’ policy mix is not entirely consistent
with that ambition. R&D tax incentives, the undirected innovation support policy instrument that a majority
of OECD governments have come to increasingly rely on in the last couple of decades, are effective in
achieving their generic R&D-raising objectives as long as they are consistently designed and implemented.
However, they are insufficient as a means to guide innovation to broader societal needs, and represent
suboptimal instruments to encourage investment in knowledge at the interface between basic research
and actual product or process development. Governments need to build balanced innovation support
portfolios through mechanisms, instruments and capabilities that allow them to guide business innovation
efforts, especially to areas where government is a primary user or customer of innovations.

 117
Many of the assumptions underpinning the global policy consensus on the appropriate role of government
in funding and promoting innovation are likely to be further challenged. International policy collaboration
for business innovation support is critical. Business support today is possible within a delicate balance of
international agreements that shape what national governments can do to help their businesses innovate
without triggering retaliatory responses by other countries that restrict market access. Governments need
to build a clear appreciation of the trade-offs facing them as they redesign their innovation support
portfolios, in parallel with their partners and competitors in other countries. National self-interest, also when
it comes to business support for innovation, will be most often best served by international collaboration.
Governments can learn from each other on how to improve the design and administration of innovation
support during crises. Public support for innovation comes in many forms and is not always easy to
measure, track over time or compare to facilitate mutual learning. Governments also need to continue to
invest, alongside other capabilities, in evidence about their innovation support policies in order to improve
them. This requires breaking down silos and developing capabilities to exploit this information. This is an
ongoing priority of the OECD, both in terms of measurement and policy analysis.
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1According to WTO rules, a financial contribution by a government is not a subsidy unless it confers a “benefit”, to be
determined by comparison with what the “market” would provide (WTO, n.d.a[13]).
2 http://www.d20-ltic.org/.
3 https://www.fpds.gov/fpdsng_cms/index.php/en/reports.html.
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sized companies in scaling up remains a contested issue.

122 
5 Resolving global challenges and

crises through international
collaboration
Collaboration lies at the heart of the science, technology and innovation

(STI) response to COVID-19, where national and international collaborative
platforms for technology are revolutionising vaccine design and production.
The chapter argues that policy makers should capitalise on the momentum
from the international community’s response to COVID-19 to re-focus
international STI co-operation on global public goods problems through
greater transdisciplinary research, new public-private funding mechanisms,
and stronger collaborative innovation models.

 123
Key findings
 The development of vaccine candidates has been exceptionally rapid and has drawn
on nascent global R&D preparedness measures, including support for novel platform
technologies that are revolutionising vaccine design and production, and the
institutionalisation of international co-ordination efforts to develop agile technology
platforms that can be activated as new pathogens emerge. These relatively new
arrangements are performing well, but are underfunded and dependent on a handful of
countries and philanthropic institutions for financing. Governments should consider scaling
them up and extending them to other global challenges where R&D preparedness is
important, capitalising on the momentum from the response to COVID-19.
 The concerted response to COVID-19 offers renewed hope that international STI co-
operation can help provide solutions to other global challenges. However, this will
require reinforcing a new paradigm of international STI co-operation that places more value
on challenge-driven, transdisciplinary research. In particular, governments need to work
together on new financing and governance mechanisms, wherein business and private-
finance actors coordinate with multilateral and national development banks to co-finance
STI solutions for global challenges.
 Government responses to the COVID-19 pandemic highlight the importance of
national politics, leadership and values in influencing international STI co-operation.
Governments will need to balance national STI priorities and goals with the need for
internationally co-ordinated action to address grand challenges and global public goods
problems. Without such collective action, the capacities to deal with them – in the form of
scientific knowledge, technology platforms and international co-ordinating institutions – will
remain underdeveloped, leaving countries more exposed to global shocks. At the same
time, governments need to build trust and define common and shared values to ensure a
level playing field for scientific co-operation and an equitable distribution of benefits.

124 
Introduction
The science and innovation response to COVID-19 has been a largely international effort, reflecting the
steady growth of international science, technology and innovation (STI) collaboration in recent decades. 1
Much STI collaboration on COVID-19 is “bottom-up”, initiated by scientists themselves. But the challenges
posed by a pandemic also call for more orchestrated responses at an international level, in order to share
data, identify and fill knowledge gaps, exploit complementarities and pool resources. These increasingly
involve not only governments, but also businesses, philanthropies and civil society actors. Ideally, such
responses should be truly global, but in their absence, bilateral and regional approaches may offer
opportunities for “coalitions of the willing” to move forward, including the participation of low- and middle-
income countries, many of whom bear the brunt of the worst effects of global challenges.
Public-private partnerships have proliferated in response to COVID-19, mobilising public researchers,
businesses, governments and philanthropic organisations from around the world to work together on
developing various countermeasures, notably vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics. The World Health
Organization (WHO) plays a convening role in many of these efforts, while various specialised global
research partnerships co-ordinate and implement research and finance initiatives, most visibly in pursuit
of COVID-19 vaccines. These partnerships – most of which were established in recent years in the wake
of infectious disease outbreaks like Ebola – are well-regarded and are making significant contributions to
the development and equitable distribution of vaccines through international co-operation. Crucially, they
have been able to draw on recent global research and development (R&D) preparedness measures,
including support for novel platform technologies that are set to revolutionise vaccine design and
production.
The international response to COVID-19, although not free of difficulties, offers renewed hope that
international STI co-operation can help provide solutions to other global challenges. Societal or grand
challenges, such as climate change, food security and public health issues, are increasingly targeted by
international STI co-operation, mirroring their adoption as priorities in national policies. The Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs) in particular have become a significant focus, with ongoing efforts to translate
them into national and international research priorities supported by funding bodies. Targeting
STI collaborative efforts on global challenges and issues related to global public goods (GPGs) will,
however, require a paradigm shift in the priorities and practices of much existing STI co-operation. For
instance, greater use of “blended finance” could support collaborative STI projects directed at the SDGs,
pooling funding from governments, business, philanthropists and the financial community. Overall, the joint
mobilisation of science, industry, government and civil society at a global level will be essential to trigger
the deep transformations required to tackle challenges like the climate emergency.
Stepping up collaboration to fight COVID-19
Collaboration has been a hallmark of STI responses to the pandemic crisis
International scientific co-operation on COVID-19 started through exchanges of data and genetic and viral
material, originally from China to other research centres across the world, marking a relatively rapid
development compared to previous pandemics. Less than 24 hours had elapsed between the sequencing
of the first coronaviruses by the Chinese public health laboratories to full genome data being publicly
shared on the Global Initiative on Sharing Avian Influenza Data (GISAID) EpiCoV™ database, 2 a public-
private-partnership. Since then, numerous international open data-sharing platforms have sprung up to
provide access to epidemiological, clinical and genomics data, as well as related studies. Protocols and
standards used to collect the data are also being shared, together with analytical tools. The COVID-
19 Open Research Dataset (CORD-19), created by the Allen Institute for AI in collaboration with the
US government and a number of firms, foundations and publishers, contains more than 280 000 full-text

 125
machine-readable scholarly articles on COVID-19 and related coronaviruses, and serves as a basis for
applying machine-learning techniques to generate new insights supporting COVID-19 research. Other
initiatives include repositories of genome data (such as Nextstrain and GISAID), chemical-structure data
(e.g. CAS COVID-19 antiviral candidate compounds dataset), clinical studies (e.g. ClinicalTrials.org for
COVID-19-related studies) and data for modelling research (e.g. MIDAS). The European Commission
launched the COVID-19 Data Portal in April 2020 to bring together relevant datasets for sharing and
analysis in an effort to accelerate coronavirus research. It enables researchers to upload, access and
analyse COVID-19 related reference data and specialist datasets as part of the wider European COVID-
19 Data Platform.3 Most scientific journal publishers have waived traditional access costs related to
scientific articles on COVID-19 (OECD, 2020[1]).
As highlighted in Chapter 2, there continues to be an impressive output of scientific articles on COVID-19.
OECD analysis of PubMed data shows that the United States and China are the two largest contributors
to COVID-19 publications4 (see Chapter 1), and are also one another’s main collaborating partner
(Figure 5.1). Other research confirms these patterns. For instance, an analysis by (Fry et al., 2020[2]) of all
scientific articles on coronaviruses published from 1 January 2018 until 8 April 2020 found that the
United States and China increased their collaboration in the wake of the COVID-19 outbreak.
Figure 5.1. Share of international scientific collaboration on COVID-19 medical research by partner
economy
Top five economies, in terms of total number of documents (fractional counts), and their top 5 partner economies,
from 1 January to 30 November 2020
%
16
14.2
14 13.3
12 10.7 10.7
10
7.5 7.9
8
5.5 5.2 5.1
6 4.7 4.6
3.8 3.7 4.0 3.7 3.8
3.6
4 3.1 3.1
2.3 2.4 2.5 2.2
1.7 1.9
2
0
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
Germany
United Kingdom
Saudi Arabia
Italy
Italy
India
France
Canada
United States
Canada
United States
United States
Canada
Hong Kong (China)
United States
Australia
Spain
Australia
Thailand
China
China
China
United States China Italy United Kingdom India
Note: The period covers 1 January to 30 November 2020 and includes 74 115 documents. The United States co-authored 16 964 documents.
84% of those were domestic co-authorships, while the remainder involved international collaboration. The top collaboration partner of the United
States is China, and US-China collaboration represents 5.5% of all United States publications on COVID-19-related medical research.
Source: OECD and OCTS-OEI calculations, based on US National Institutes of Health (NIH) PubMed data, https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/

126 
When asked in the ongoing OECD Science Flash Survey 2020 about their experiences and expectations
of research collaboration during the pandemic crisis, scientists are more or less evenly split as to whether
they have experienced an increase or decrease in collaboration Figure 5.2, Panel A). However, almost half
expect enhanced research collaboration and exchange of scientific information after the current pandemic
crisis, while less than 10% expect weakened collaboration (Figure 5.2, Panel B).
Figure 5.2. Scientists’ experiences and expectations of research collaboration during the crisis
A. Experienced or expected change in research collaboration B. Expected change in research collaboration and
due to the current pandemic crisis exchange of scientific information after the current
pandemic crisis
Percentage of responses from scientists Percentage of responses
Decrease Stay the same Increase Strengthened About the same Weakened Hard to tell
% %
100 100
90 90
80 80
70 70
60 60
50 50
40 40
30 30
20 20
10 10
0 0
Collaboration with Collaboration with other Collaboration with other Scientist Other
researchers in other researchers abroad organisations (excluding
organisations in the research institutions)
same country
Note: For Panel A, respondents were asked, “As a result of the current crisis, have you personally experienced or do you expect to experience
a change in (i) collaboration with researchers in other organisations in the same country; (ii) collaboration with other researchers abroad; and
(iii) collaboration with other organisations (excluding research institutions)?” For Panel B, respondents were asked, “How do you expect the
world of science to emerge out of the current crisis, in terms of collaboration and exchange of scientific information?”
Collaborations on clinical research and clinical trials on COVID-19 have also grown significantly. Hundreds
of clinical trials have been registered since early 2020, most of them to test drug candidates, but also
several vaccine candidates. Figure 5.3 shows the number of COVID-19 studies registered on the NIH’s
portal ClinicalTrials.gov by 8 December 2020. The United States accounts for the largest number of clinical
trials by far, particularly for drugs. China comes second on vaccine trials. Based on data from
BioMedTracker and Pharmaprojects, two online platforms that track drug development, Bryan, Lemus and
Marshall (2020[3]) found that 40% of drug therapies for COVID-19 were being developed by teams of firms
(significantly higher than 21% for H1N1 influenza virus therapies, 9% for Ebola and 11% for Zika). They
also found that about one-third of these collaborations are new.

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Figure 5.3. Registered COVID-19 vaccine and drug studies by economy

Number of COVID-19 studies, 1 January to 8 December, 2020
A. Economies with more than two listed vaccine studies B. Economies with more than 15 listed drug studies
United States 34 United States 409

China France
Germany Spain
Canada Brazil
Russian Federation United Kingdom
United Kingdom Mexico
South Africa China
Australia Italy
Japan Egypt
Mexico Canada
Brazil Russian Federation
Argentina Germany
Spain Argentina
Netherlands Colombia
Belgium Pakistan
Pakistan India
India Turkey
Peru Israel
Colombia Switzerland
Chile Denmark
France Iran
Turkey Belgium
Chinese Taipei Netherlands
0 5 10 15 20 25 0 20 40 60 80 100
Note: The charts show the number of COVID-19 studies registered at the NIH’s ClinicalTrials.gov. The International Committee of Medical
Journal Editors requires trial registration as a condition for publishing research results generated by a clinical trial. Multi-economy registered
studies are counted in each economy. Note that the number of studies is not necessarily indicative of the breadth or depth of the studies
conducted within each territory. Iran stands for Islamic Republic of Iran.
Source: United States National Institutes of Health, https://clinicaltrials.gov, (accessed 8 December 2020).
Public-private partnerships are at the heart of COVID-19 countermeasures
Public-private partnerships (often involving several firms) are playing central roles in the fight against
COVID-19. For example, the United States had allocated, through its Operation Warp Speed (OWS), more
than USD 11 billion by October 2020 among more than 40 companies to fund the development of vaccines,
diagnostics, therapeutics and other rapidly deployable capabilities. In parallel (and under the umbrella of
OWS), the NIH is funding a public-private partnership to prioritise and accelerate development of the most
promising COVID-19 treatments and vaccines (Box 5.1). Much of the funding from OWS is intended to
deal with market failures associated with vaccine development and production. Many other countries have
used similar rationales to fund vaccine and therapeutics research, though on a smaller scale. For example,
Germany has committed around EUR 750 million to accelerate vaccine R&D through a special programme
targeting three companies to set up their projects more broadly and to progress more quickly.5 At a
multilateral level, COVAX is another public-private partnership that has been playing a crucial role in
vaccine development while paying special attention to the needs of low- and middle-income countries
(Box 5.3).
All of these initiatives have some strategic features in common. Besides R&D, they invest in manufacturing
capacity, advanced market commitments, and liability limitations, reducing uncertainties for the private
sector to become involved. Moreover, to avoid delays between regulatory approval and the rolling out of
vaccines, many of the activities that usually occur after completion of the R&D and marketing authorisation
stages are being executed in parallel, with the result that manufacturing of some vaccines started while
they were still in clinical trials. This fast track is intended to ensure a sufficient number of doses are globally
available (by the end of 2021) once regulators grant their approval.

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Box 5.1. US public-private partnerships for COVID-19 countermeasures

Overall, because of their scale and scope, US investments in basic and applied research and in clinical
trials are providing a major boost to global efforts to develop COVID-19 vaccines and therapeutics
Operation Warp Speed (OWS)

The goal of OWS is to produce and deliver 300 million doses of safe and effective vaccines, with initial
doses available by January 2021, as part of a broader strategy to accelerate the development,
manufacturing and distribution of COVID-19 vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics (collectively known
as countermeasures). By early October 2020, OWS had invested more than USD 11 billion into seven
vaccine candidates, with funding coming from the United States Congress, including through the
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (the CARES Act). To accelerate development while
maintaining safety and efficacy standards, OWS has been selecting the most promising
countermeasure candidates and providing co-ordinated government support. Protocols for
demonstrating safety and efficacy are being aligned, allowing trials to proceed more quickly. The
protocols for the trials are overseen by the federal government. Rather than eliminating steps from
traditional development timelines, these are proceeding simultaneously, such that manufacturing of a
promising vaccine at an industrial scale can start well before the complete demonstration of its efficacy
and safety, which would normally be required. The federal government is making investments in the
necessary manufacturing capacity at its own risk, giving firms confidence that they can invest
aggressively in development, and allowing faster distribution of an eventual vaccine. The manufacturing
capacity developed will be used for whatever vaccine is eventually successful, regardless of which firms
have developed the capacity. OWS is a partnership among components of the Department of Health
and Human Services that engage with private firms and other federal agencies.
National Institutes of Health – Accelerating COVID-19 Therapeutic Interventions and Vaccines (ACTIV)
Announced in April 2020, ACTIV is a public-private partnership headed by the NIH to develop a co-
ordinated research strategy for prioritising and accelerating development of the most promising
treatments and vaccines. It acts, for example, by streamlining clinical trials, co-ordinating regulatory
processes and/or leveraging assets among all partners to rapidly respond to COVID-19. Co-ordinated
by the Foundation for the National Institutes of Health, ACTIV brings the NIH together with its sibling
agencies in the Department of Health and Human Services, other government agencies, OWS, the
European Medicines Agency, representatives from academia, philanthropic organisations (including the
Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and the Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center), and
20 biopharmaceutical companies.6
Sources: OWS website: https://www.hhs.gov/coronavirus/explaining-operation-warp-speed/index.html (accessed 16 October 2020);

NIH ACTIV website: https://www.nih.gov/research-training/medical-research-initiatives/activ (accessed 16 October 2020).
STI co-operation supporting timely and globally equitable solutions to COVID-19
Identifying and developing appropriate and viable COVID-19 tests, treatments and vaccines require large
investments with a high level of risk. This means countries need to pool their investments globally. In this
regard, the WHO is playing a lead convening role in formulating STI responses to COVID-19 (see Box 5.2).
It has published an R&D Roadmap for COVID-19, and is a partner in the influential Access to COVID-19
Tools (ACT) Accelerator, a global collaboration to accelerate development, production, and equitable
access to COVID-19 tests, treatments, and vaccines (see Box 5.3).

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Building on the philosophy that no single country can beat COVID-19 on its own, the ACT-Accelerator
works to shape the market for solutions and incentivise manufacturers to invest in developing and
manufacturing their supply. The ACT-Accelerator also offers governments access to a portfolio of solutions
that spread the risk of failure of individual treatment or vaccine candidates, as well as other solutions
(across multiple geographies and multiple technical platforms) should one of them prove not to be viable
(WHO, 2020[4]). The ACT-Accelerator is organised into four pillars of work, led by different organisations.
The most prominent is the vaccine pillar, known as COVAX (see Box 5.3), which is led by the Coalition for
Epidemic Preparedness Innovation (CEPI) and the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunizations
(GAVI). As outlined in Box 5.2, CEPI funds R&D and up-scaling processes into a diverse portfolio of
COVID-19 vaccine candidates, while GAVI focuses on the procurement and allocation of vaccines.
Box 5.2. Selected key organisations supporting international STI collaboration on COVID-19
World Health Organization (WHO)
The WHO is leading the international response to the COVID-19 pandemic. It has published an
R&D Roadmap for COVID-19 and established the ACT-Accelerator with the assistance of Global
Research Collaboration for Infectious Disease Preparedness (GloPID-R), an international network of
research-funding organisations. The ACT-Accelerator brings together governments, the private sector,
philanthropic entities and other international organisations to accelerate development, production and
equitable access to COVID-19 tests, treatments and vaccines. The WHO also set up the Solidarity Trial
to facilitate the robust worldwide comparison of unproven treatments for COVID-19. Box 5.3 provides
more details on these and other initiatives.
Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovation (CEPI)

Established in 2017, CEPI is a global partnership between public, private, philanthropic and civil society
organisations that aims to accelerate the development of vaccines (based on the WHO R&D Blueprint
of emerging infectious pathogens) and enable equitable access to these vaccines for affected
populations during outbreaks. CEPI takes an end-to-end approach, operating as both a funder and a
facilitator. It focuses on vaccine development, licensure and manufacturing while supporting the efforts
of vaccine discovery and delivery. Among its tasks, it funds new and innovative platform technologies
with the potential to accelerate the development and manufacture of vaccines against previously
unknown pathogens, the so-called “Disease X” from the WHO Blueprint. Based on platform technology
work and funded research on Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS), CEPI was able to quickly
start building up a COVID-19 vaccine R&D portfolio in January 2020. CEPI has been expanding its
COVID-19 work and is currently funding R&D for nine different vaccine candidates with the aim of
providing up to 2 billion vaccine doses by the end of 2021.
Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunizations (GAVI)

Created in 2000, GAVI is an international organisation that brings together the public, private and
philanthropic sectors with the shared goal of creating equal access to new and underused vaccines for
children living in the world’s poorest countries. It does this by creating robust markets for vaccines and
other immunisation products, thereby allowing manufacturers to plan production based on known
demand, and low- and middle-income countries to buy suitable products at prices they can afford. With
the support of CEPI and the WHO, GAVI is responsible for administering the COVAX facility, described
in Box 5.3.

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Global Research Collaboration for Infectious Disease Preparedness (GloPID-R)

GloPID-R is an international network of research-funding organisations. It was launched in 2013 by the
heads of international research organisations to facilitate, accelerate and deepen collaboration among
research funders on emerging diseases by investing to strengthen global research preparedness
between crises, and mobilising resources to respond rapidly and effectively to significant infectious
disease outbreaks. In the COVID-19 context, GloPID-R has convened working groups on priority
research, together with the UK Collaborative on Development Research. It has also created an online
database of funded research projects mapped to the WHO R&D Roadmap. The European Commission
finances the GloPID-R Secretariat, which is split between the Mérieux Foundation and the University of
Oxford.
Sources: WHO website, https://www.who.int/; CEPI website, https://cepi.net/; GAVI website, https://www.gavi.org/; GloPID-R website,
https://www.glopid-r.org/ (accessed 16 October, 2020).
Box 5.3. Main international collaborative initiatives

WHO R&D Blueprint
Following the Ebola outbreak in West Africa, the WHO drew up in 2016 a global strategy and
preparedness plan. Known as the R&D Blueprint, the plan aims to support the rapid activation of
R&D activities during epidemics7 and fast-track the availability of effective tests, vaccines and
medicines. The WHO uses the R&D Blueprint to convene a broad global coalition of experts from
medical, scientific and regulatory backgrounds to work on a given priority disease, leading to the
creation of an R&D roadmap for that disease. The R&D roadmap is then used to guide the response to
outbreaks through both urgent actions and developing ways to improve the global response for future
epidemics. As part of the WHO’s response to COVID-19, the R&D Blueprint was activated to accelerate
diagnostics, vaccines and therapeutics for the new virus. In collaboration with GloPID-R, in
February 2020 the WHO organised a global forum on research and innovation for COVID-19 where
experts identified key knowledge gaps and research priorities. The WHO published its resulting
R&D Roadmap for COVID-19 in March 2020, outlining immediate, mid-term and longer-term priorities
to build a robust global research response to the crisis.
WHO Access to COVID-19 Tools (ACT) Accelerator

The ACT-Accelerator is a global collaboration to accelerate development, production and equitable
access to COVID-19 diagnostics, therapeutics and vaccines. Launched in April 2020 and building on
the commitment made by G20 leaders in March 2020 to the Coronavirus Global Response, the ACT-
Accelerator is a framework for collaboration, rather than a decision-making body or new organisation.
It is organised into four pillars of work – diagnostics, treatment, vaccines and health system
strengthening – led by a range of collaborating organisations, including the Bill & Melinda Gates
Foundation; CEPI; GAVI; the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria; Unitaid; the
Foundation for Innovative New Diagnostics; the Wellcome Trust; the World Bank; and the WHO. The
ACT-Accelerator has ambitious targets: it aims to provide 245 million courses of treatment and
500 million diagnostic tests to low- and middle-income countries in 2021, and 2 billion vaccine doses to
the world by the end of 2021.
COVAX

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COVAX is one of the four pillars of the ACT-Accelerator, dedicated to advancing the work on vaccine
development, manufacturing, procurement and delivery at scale, as well as policy and allocation.
COVAX enables risky investments in production capacity across several vaccine candidates to ensure
that doses can be made immediately available at scale upon regulatory approval. COVAX combines
the power and expertise of CEPI’s R&D role on the “push side” with GAVI’s procurement and allocation
function on the “pull side”, e.g. through the COVAX AMC. Through portfolio diversification, pooling of
financial and scientific resources, and economies of scale, participating governments and blocs 8 can
hedge the risk of backing unsuccessful candidates, just as governments with limited or no ability to
finance their own bilateral procurement can be assured of access to life-saving vaccines that would
otherwise have been beyond their reach.
WHO Solidarity Trial

Solidarity is an international clinical trial launched by the WHO and partner organisations to help find
an effective treatment for COVID-19. It is one of the largest international randomised trials for COVID-
19 treatments, enrolling almost 12 000 patients in 500 hospital sites in over 30 countries. Enrolling
patients in a single randomised trial helps facilitate the robust worldwide comparison of unproven
treatments, overcoming the risk of multiple small trials not generating the strong evidence needed to
determine the relative effectiveness of potential treatments.
Sources: WHO R&D Blueprint website, https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/a-coordinated-global-research-roadmap (accessed

25 October 2020); ACT-Accelerator website, https://www.who.int/initiatives/act-accelerator; COVAX website,
https://www.who.int/initiatives/act-accelerator/covax; WHO Solidarity Trial website, https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-
coronavirus-2019/global-research-on-novel-coronavirus-2019-ncov/solidarity-clinical-trial-for-covid-19-treatments. All accessed 16 October
2020.
Health systems will need to vaccinate 50% to 75% of the global population to end the pandemic. This
requires building manufacturing and distribution capacity, ensuring a new vaccine is affordable, deciding
who should get access first and planning massive vaccination campaigns at a global scale. Vaccines have
been described as GPGs, but this will not be the case initially with COVID-19 vaccines, since their limited
supply will mean they are neither non-excludable or non-rival (Bollyky and Bown, 2020[5]). Several
countries, as well as the European Union, have concluded advanced purchase agreements with COVID-
19 vaccine manufacturers. More than 10 billion doses of COVID-19 vaccines had been pre-ordered by
late-2020, accounting for most of the manufacturing capacity for the leading vaccine candidates in 2021.
High-income countries bought up broad portfolios of products early in the pandemic, placing bets on a
number of candidates. Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and the European Union
have each pre-ordered more than four doses of COVID-19 vaccines per person. Countries with excess
doses could ultimately donate these to COVAX (Mullard, 2020[6]; Callaway, 2020[7]).
To avoid a situation where a small number of wealthy economies secure the global supply of vaccines only
for themselves, COVAX has also signed advanced purchase agreements to secure manufacturing capacity
and vaccine doses even before any vaccines were licensed. COVAX aims for affordable, fair and equitable
access to safe and effective COVID-19 vaccines for all. More than 180 countries and economies are now
involved,9 including 92 low-income economies that would otherwise be unable to afford these vaccines
and will be supported through an advanced market commitment (AMC).10 To gain access to 1 billion doses
for AMC-eligible economies, GAVI’s COVAX AMC has set an initial fundraising goal of USD 2 billion by
the end of 2020 to reserve and accelerate the production of doses. Already by October 2020, GAVI had
reached USD 1.8 billion in contributions and pledges from sovereign donors, the private sector and
philanthropic sources.11 At least USD 5 billion more will be needed in 2021 to procure doses as they come
through the portfolio.

132 
COVAX also provides direct protection for countries that already have their own bilateral deals with vaccine
manufacturers by increasing their chances of securing safe and efficacious vaccine doses, given that not
all candidates will ultimately be successful. COVAX also offers indirect protection by covering low-income
countries that would otherwise be unable to afford these vaccines, thereby reducing the chances of a
COVID-19 resurgence in their territories that could quickly spread across the globe (WHO, 2020[8]).
Accordingly, most OECD countries are now members of COVAX.
The essential roles of global R&D preparedness
Development of vaccine candidates has been exceptionally rapid. Hundreds of vaccines are currently in
development across the world; three had announced Phase 3 clinical trials results by the end of
November 2020; and one had already gained regulatory approval in several jurisdictions by early-
December and was being administered to vulnerable groups. This scale, combined with the scope of
utilising a range of different technology platforms, increases the chances of success. While most would
agree that the world was ill-prepared for COVID-19, despite repeated warnings that a new pandemic was
“a question of ‘when’, not ‘if’” (Global Preparedness Monitoring Board, 2019[9]), certain steps – such as
long-term commitments to basic research, as well as various technological and institutional innovations at
the global level – had been undertaken in recent years to improve global R&D preparedness, and these
appear to have paid off to some extent.
The WHO R&D Blueprint was an important cornerstone (Box 5.3), prioritising, accelerating and co-
ordinating product-related R&D for epidemic risk diseases with no existing treatments. The diseases
covered included the so-called “Disease X”, caused by a hypothetical pathogen not yet known to infect
humans. R&D funding for the pathogens listed on the WHO R&D Blueprint list was provided by CEPI,
including a call for proposals for the development of platform technologies able to expedite some stages
of clinical development and permit advance development of multiple vaccine candidates at the same time.
Such technologies can also be extended to manufacturing, allowing progress in setting up production
facilities before the targets of the upcoming vaccines are even decided (see Chapter 7). Platform
technology approaches include DNA and messenger RNA vaccines, adjuvants, monoclonal antibodies
and broad-spectrum antivirals (Hall, Jamieson and Wardle, 2019[10]; van Riel and de Wit, 2020[11]).
Its work on platform technologies enabled CEPI to respond very quickly to the outbreak at the end of
January 2020. Within two weeks of the publication of the SARS-CoV-2 sequence, it was able to leverage
and support several of its research partners to begin developing vaccines against the virus (WHO, 2020[8]).
The existence of vaccine development partners for MERS, combined with readily available funding and
established expertise, enabled the rapid roll-out of vaccine development for COVID-19, using an
accelerated paradigm to conduct development and scale up activities in parallel. Major research groups
and research-funding agencies had already switched their vaccine development strategies to invest in
novel vaccine platforms for particular virus families, which also helped considerably (Keusch and Lurie,
2020[12]). With the ongoing approval of a first generation of vaccines, CEPI is establishing the ‘Wave 2
Portfolio’ of COVID-19 vaccine candidates, which aims to optimise the vaccines that are available in the
longer term.12
CEPI is an example of a “collaborative platform”, an emerging form of multisector partnership in which
participants co-develop new technologies and processes with significant potential for advancing health and
more resilient societies (OECD, forthcoming[13]). Collaborative platforms are convergence spaces that
bring together a high diversity of stakeholders, disciplines, technologies and cultures. In the area of
healthcare, they can optimise access to and use of information generated in research, clinical settings and
markets for the benefit of patient care. They offer opportunities for experimentation in health innovation
and de-risking research on emerging technologies, complex health challenges (e.g. dementia, antibiotic
resistance and pandemics), and products with limited markets and potentially low returns on investment.
The pooling of resources, competencies and complementary skills enables communication across sectors,

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manages risks, offers access to infrastructure and drives technology translation. Besides CEPI, several
other healthcare collaborative platforms are wholly committed to ensuring equitable access to research
data and products related to COVID-19. These include the Joint European Disruption Initiative (JEDI)
Billion Molecules against COVID-19 Grand Challenge, and the Research Investment for Global Health
Technology Fund (The RIGHT Fund).
The momentum created by the pandemic offers opportunities to establish effective and sustainable global
mechanisms to support the range and scope of R&D necessary to confront a wider range of potential
health emergencies (Global Preparedness Monitoring Board, 2020[14]). For example, ACT-Accelerator and
COVAX represent major innovations. They indicate that with effective global leadership, it is possible to
support market commitments, procurements and the fair global allocation of vaccines (Keusch and Lurie,
2020[12]). They have also promoted the technological advancement of the tools they have invested in
(WHO, 2020[4]). Collaborative responses to COVID-19 have also seen the emergence of an array of new
intellectual property rights (IPR) agreements to support access to medicines, possibly laying the
groundwork for new modalities of R&D on GPGs moving forward.
The crisis has also exposed several shortcomings that need to be addressed for STI collaboration to play
its full role in building resilience, and addressing future crises and grand challenges.
 Despite its strong performance, CEPI was formed to deal with regional epidemics and lacks
sufficient funding for a global pandemic response. Its funding derives from a mix of R&D funding
and traditional development assistance that relies on a small number of generous countries and
private foundations. There are calls to expand CEPI’s funding base, drawing on national and
regional health security budgets that have yet to be established. This would allow CEPI to become
a lead actor in the context of global health security (Global Preparedness Monitoring Board,
2020[14]). Options like these will need to be discussed more broadly in the wider context of the
lessons learnt from the current pandemic.
 GloPID-R was created with funder and research co-ordination in mind. However, because there
was no ready pool of funding to draw on and country limitations with regard to speed were not fully
anticipated at the outset, it has not been able to move as quickly as needed to respond to the
pandemic (Keusch and Lurie, 2020[12]).
 While much attention has focused on COVID-19 vaccines, improving R&D preparedness for
therapeutics may require a similar mechanism to CEPI and vaccines. Furthermore, despite the
obvious need, little innovation has taken place over the last five years in novel platforms and
technologies for diagnostic tests (Hall, Jamieson and Wardle, 2019[10]; Keusch and Lurie, 2020[12]).
 Rapid activation is a “cost of preparedness”. This approach was taken by CEPI as part of its
preparedness efforts with regards to vaccine development. Extending such an approach to
diagnostics and therapeutics would require governments worldwide to rethink the concept of health
security budgets and invest in the necessary infrastructure. One approach is that global funders
agree on a reasonable, “no regrets” annual budget underpinning preparedness, and ensure those
resources are always available and can be rapidly released (Keusch and Lurie, 2020[12]).
 Early research on COVID-19 was plagued by too much uncoordinated experimentation and a lack
of adherence to shared standards on pre-clinical research, impeding the generation of robust
evidence to underpin medical knowledge (OECD, 2020[15]). With so much development happening
in parallel, organising clinical trials has been challenging. The WHO Solidarity Trial (Box 5.3)
represents a novel and potentially capacity-building effort on clinical trials, which could be
replicated (Keusch and Lurie, 2020[12]). The OECD Recommendation on the Governance of
Clinical Trials (OECD, 2012[16]) is also relevant here, as the persistent lack of harmonisation
between national regulations slows down the implementation of international clinical trials (OECD,
2020[17]).

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These are some early observations concerning the successes and shortcomings of the international
STI response to COVID-19. In time, as countries move from response to recovery, a fuller analysis and
evaluation will be needed to draw lessons that should prove invaluable in informing STI collaboration for
other “grand challenges”, as discussed below.
Beyond COVID-19, international STI collaboration is needed to meet global

challenges
Global public goods and global challenges
There is a sense of urgency to direct international STI co-operation activities towards “global challenges”,
broadly defined as persistent, complex and large-scale problems facing humanity. Such challenges require
co-operative resources, because no single country can solve them alone (OECD, 2012[18]). A common
feature that has characterised the collective response to COVID-19, through organisations and platforms
like GAVI and CEPI, is the notion that certain global challenges are not simply challenges that require
international co-operation, but that the very nature of the global challenge represents the under-provision
of a GPG. A GPG is a good where “it is rational, from the perspective of a group of nations collectively, to
produce for universal consumption, and for which it is irrational to exclude an individual nation from
consuming, irrespective of whether that nation contributes to its financing” (Woodward and Smith, 2003[19]).
Another definition is that GPGs are public goods that “cannot or will not be adequately addressed by
individual countries acting alone and that are defined through a broad international consensus or a
legitimate process of decision-making” (ITFGPG, 2006[20]; Miedzinski et al., 2020[21]). GPGs share certain
properties with public goods, i.e. their non-excludability and non-rivalry. Non-excludability means that once
provided, the public good is available to all to consume; non-rivalry means that consumption of the public
good by one party does not reduce the amount available to the others. 13 A practical example of a GPG is
greenhouse emissions control or a vaccine against a highly communicable disease that protects human
populations in more than one country. Of course, vaccines are not intrinsically non-excludable because
they are produced by private firms who can limit their universal accessibility through the price mechanism,
but policy interventions in the form of government purchases and distribution through public health
systems, for example, can make them less or non-excludable. Because of their limited economic
resources, developing countries are especially exposed to global challenges and the under-provision of
GPGs, and support from the international community is therefore essential.
The global challenges are heterogeneous. Some derive from public goods problems on a global scale,
while others derive from global challenges on a national or bilateral/regional scale (e.g. pollution generated
and concentrated in cross-border regions). While not all global challenges are public good problems, very
little multilateral collaboration is around public-good production. On the contrary, policy-makers undertake
collaboration where they can identify direct (and preferably quantifiable) benefits, in the form of increments
to GDP, employment, or exports (Smith, 2017[22]). The challenge for countries is how to balance their
national STI priorities and goals (e.g. competitiveness and research excellence) with the need for co-
ordinated collective action at the international level to address global challenges, including GPG problems.
The international STI policy community needs to encourage a more collaborative mode of STI, in which
shared goals and missions underpin individual and collective STI actions. However, mobilising international
STI collaboration to address GPGs and global challenges faces several hurdles, the most notable being
that collective action for the provision of the good suffers from an economic problem common to the
provision of public goods; i.e. their under-provision by markets. Whereas a national public good can be
provided by governments through taxation, there is no global government that can mobilise global tax
revenues to provide such goods directly or through public procurement. Additional challenges include:
 different national research foci and limited alignment between national and global STI priorities;

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 unwillingness of individual countries to pay the costs of action (“tragedy of the commons”);
 lack of knowledge of different national capabilities, especially in developing countries;
 lack of trust and legal regimes, including appropriate IPR protection, especially in less-developed
economies;
 low government and business capacity in some countries, including low number of researchers
and lack of necessary research infrastructure to enable international co-operation;
 major problems to meet the necessary scale of investment and technological uncertainty requiring
multiple search paths;
 governance arrangements to co-ordinate and manage multiple actors, necessary not only to
advance the necessary STI, but also to deploy systems that deliver technological solutions; and
 implementation challenges including the lack of appropriate interface organisations such as
technology extension centres or community organisations that can apply solutions to the local
context.
Compounding the effects of these hurdles, international co-operation in research remains dominated by
collaborations aiming first and foremost to advance the knowledge frontier or share costs on international
research infrastructure, and to a much lesser extent to develop solutions to societal problems. Moreover,
the direction of international research co-operation remains primarily driven by the “bottom-up” priorities of
individual researchers and research performing organisations, even if a number of collaborations on
climate change, global health, renewable energy or sustainable agriculture are initiated through “top-down”
processes.
In this regard, the current paradigm for international co-operation in science can be seen to focus on:
(i) raising the quality of national public research systems; (ii) sharing costs though scientific collaboration
on basic research; (iii) promoting the international mobility of researchers for the (mutual) benefit of multiple
partners; and (iv) internationalising public research. This paradigm has been successful in advancing
knowledge among countries with the capacity to engage in research collaboration, i.e. mainly
OECD countries; Brazil, Russia, India and China; and some emerging economies. With some notable
exceptions in East Asia, it has been less successful in helping developing countries mobilise STI for their
own development. Instead, these countries have relied on STI-related official development assistance
(ODA) and multilateral development bank finance; imports of foreign technology and foreign direct
investment; and, for middle-income countries, their own investments in education and science. Cost
sharing under this paradigm is generally characterised by national control over funding: each country funds
its share of international collaboration rather creating a “common pot” of funding (with the exception of the
European Union’s Framework and Horizon programmes). The response to COVID-19 by research funders
has been similarly focused mainly at the national level, although it has been characterised also by co-
ordination among national research funding agencies, for example, through GloPID-R (see Box 5.2).
Towards a new paradigm for international collaboration on STI
A focus on GPGs and global challenges requires a new paradigm for international STI co-operation that
goes beyond cost-sharing and expanding fundamental knowledge through co-operation in basic research
or mega-science projects. The immediacy and urgency of the current pandemic has brought home the
need for a new paradigm of international co-operation in STI. This new paradigm will require new financing
and governance mechanisms that bring together business and private-finance actors with multilateral and
national development banks. These include tax and regulatory policies that will allow the international
research system to incentivise and reward businesses and financial institutions to invest in solutions to
GPGs. The new paradigm will also require specific institutional capabilities for multi-stakeholder
partnerships to broker, orchestrate and fund global challenge-driven STI programmes. These new
arrangements will need to manage growing tensions between the need for more global co-operation and

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the increasingly inward-looking nature of national policies, which are more protective of STI as a source of
national security and independence. These, and other challenges, are further discussed below.
International STI co-operation is fragmented
Research-funding agencies have a great deal of expertise in funding international collaborative projects
that promote research excellence in specific disciplines and areas, but they are less well equipped to fund
and organise collaboration to address grand challenges – especially those involving developing countries.
Some very real practical challenges impede international collaboration, such as visas and work permits for
researchers, or purely national grant schemes that do not allow financing international projects. Many
research-oriented collaborations are uncoordinated on a global scale, many of the potential synergies from
sharing costs or information are lost, and there exists a risk of duplicating research and innovation efforts.
Data on international co-operative R&D projects around global challenges and the SDGs are also lacking,
and yet such data would greatly enhance the ability of decision makers to monitor and evaluate these
activities, and prioritise successful experiences. To reduce this fragmentation of international efforts, co-
ordination of national public research agendas oriented toward global challenges is essential.
Institutional elements of the new paradigm aimed at building GPGs and addressing global challenges
through international STI collaboration are already in place, but need to be consolidated and reinforced.
Some of these institutional set-ups can build upon existing organisations, such as Canada’s International
Development Research Centre (IDRC), whose Technology and Innovation Program leverages science
and advanced technologies, including digital innovations to build human capital to support inclusive growth
in developing countries. New partnerships will also need to be created, such as the United Kingdom’s
Newton Fund, which was created in 2014 to fund collaborations on global challenges between academics
and innovators in the United Kingdom and developing countries.
There already exist several examples of international collaboration focused on mobilising STI for global
challenges. They range from mandate-based international organisations (e.g. the Consultative Group for
International Agricultural Research, the International Energy Agency and Mission Innovation, and the
Global Knowledge Centre for Antimicrobial Resistance R&D) to partnerships initiated by governments and
philanthropies such as CEPI (see Box 5.2). One characteristic of these new partnerships is the involvement
of a broader range of stakeholders, including companies, civil society groups and notably private
philanthropic organisations.
International financing of GPGs: the case of blended finance in STI
Addressing and delivering on global challenges, including GPGs, will require financial resources that
exceed most countries’ budgets for domestic public resources. Many estimates have been made of the
investments needed to achieve the SDGs by 2030. One estimate points to an overall need for a
USD 7 trillion annual investment up to 2030, representing 7-10% of global gross domestic product and 25-
40% of annual global investment. By comparison, only USD 1.4 trillion are invested annually to meet the
SDGs, leaving a vast investment gap. For developing countries alone, the investment gap has been
estimated at around USD 2.5 trillion per year (Remøe and Cervantes, forthcoming[23]). Closing this gap will
require mobilising financial resources from public coffers as well as the private sector, including investment
banks, philanthropic sources and multilateral institutions.
Hence, many governments seek to combine public financial resources with private financing. “Blended
finance”, in the space of SDGs and Agenda 2030, has been defined as the strategic use of development
finance for the mobilisation of additional finance towards the SDGs for and in developing countries.
Blended finance has also been described as hybrid finance, or as a combination of concessional and
commercial funding provided by public or philanthropic development partners, along with private partners.
It can be structured around various formats combining grants, debt, equity or guarantees (insurance) from

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public/philanthropic and private sources. The concept is also linked to the more general concept of social-
impact investments.
A main idea of blended finance in STI is mobilising capital that would not otherwise be committed to
development-related projects, including developing technology to create solutions that are relevant to the
SDGs. Through blending financing, commercial capital may be moved to benefit society while also
providing reasonable returns to investors. Thus, frameworks that remove disincentives and bottlenecks
preventing private investors from targeting countries, sectors or technology areas for additional funding
are needed (Figure 5.4).
Figure 5.4. Expanding the OECD framework for “blended finance” to STI finance
Source: Adapted from OECD Tri Hita Karana Forum on Blended Finance, http://www.thkforum.org (accessed 15 October 2020).
One example of such a framework is Deutsche Bank's Universal Green Energy Access Programme
(UGEAP), which typically becomes involved when public actors provide a “first-loss” facility that buffers
private investment. The UGEAP is, for example, active in African countries, where it contributes to universal
electricity access. Another example is the European Investment Bank’s recent Malaria Fund initiative to
develop a cure.
Many schemes in development finance use these concepts to finance green technologies, agriculture
technologies and health technologies when a private-only finance model does not work owing to market
failures. However, fewer schemes seem to have been established (so far) to finance riskier technological
innovation that requires a portfolio of projects. Combining private and public sources of finance is not new
in STI, and risk-reduction schemes for private partners typically comprise grants or subsidies. Ultimately,
blended finance implies an equal sharing of risk through joint positions regarding return on investments,
and risk profiles and positions may be designed differentially according to project specificities (Remøe,
2020[24]).

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Geopolitical developments and their impact on international STI co-operation
Although COVID-19 has led to greater calls for international co-operation, it has also led countries to
reassess their reliance on global value chains – especially for essential goods – and consider national
actions to strengthen their citizens’ access to critical technologies, goods and services. This goal can
appear in contrast with the GPG paradigm for international co-operation, where cross-border public
R&D investments are a way to invest in a country’s own national security and economic and technological
development.
Indeed, efforts to mobilise national funding for projects related to global challenges can create tensions
between the design of programmes to benefit national taxpayers and the realities of international economic
and technological interdependence. Policy makers face strong (and understandable) pressures to ensure
that foreign universities or firms are not taking a “free ride” on public R&D investment, with concerns
expressed about subsidies, trade-related investment measures and IPR, to name only a few (see
Chapter 4).
However, the response to these pressures often consists of increased restrictions on international scientific
and technological co-operation, international researcher mobility and technology exports. Such measures
may be counterproductive, especially if other countries can supply technology, as well as higher education
and research opportunities to foreign students. Moreover, foreign firms can easily shift production to lower-
cost countries to avoid trade tariffs, and can always acquire firms in foreign markets to diversify their
production.
To balance the benefits and risks of international co-operation, governments will need to revamp the
international rules for technology exchange and international STI co-operation, allowing allow them to
rebuild trust, and find common and shared values. One such rule involves the notions of mutual benefit
and reciprocity that have long guided international relations. Mutual benefit and reciprocity play out
differently in research collaboration than they do in collaboration on innovation that is closer to the market.
Concerns and even frictions between countries over “reciprocal access” to one another’s innovation
systems have been growing, including over access to soft and hard research infrastructure (e.g. skilled
personnel, open-science and open-data systems), as well as to technology markets.
Scientific integrity and academic freedom in international scientific co-operation is another issue, which
has normally been the domain of scientific academies and universities. Governments increasingly seek to
promote a common understanding of these values as a way not only to ensure a level playing field for co-
operation, but also to limit the risks to scientific co-operation, such as fraud or theft of intellectual property
or research data.
Of course, public policies are just one element of the “national innovation systems” of OECD countries.
The performance of these systems within the most advanced economies depends on the actions and
decisions of business enterprises. For example, new policies that allow greater scrutiny of mergers and
acquisitions to protect national interests have led to stronger controls on inward investment in “strategic
sectors”. Concerns over access by one country’s firms to another country’s technology base may be well-
founded, but their resolution is likely to be slow because firms operate globally.14
The role of international organisations
International organisations have a role to play in helping link national investment strategies to global
challenges. In the COVID-19 context, the WHO continues to lead the international response to the
immediate health crisis (see Box 5.2), for example, through the ACT-Accelerator (see Box 5.3). As part of
the OECD’s strategic response to the COVID-19 pandemic,15 the Committee for Scientific and
Technological Policy (CSTP) has created a policy platform, the STIP COVID-19 Watch, to monitor and
collect information on countries’ responses to the COVID-19 crisis around a core set of issues, including

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scientific advice arrangements, promotion of R&D collaboration, and the STI content of economic stimulus
packages (OECD, 2020[25]).
The EU has similarly been active on the STI policy front through its ERAvsCorona Action Plan (European
Commission, 2020[26]) launched in April 2020 that sets out key measures to co-ordinate, share and jointly
increase support for research and innovation to address COVID-19, in line with the objectives and tools of
the European Research Area. The United Nations has also mobilised its agencies to contribute to the UN
Research Roadmap for the COVID-19 Recovery.16 The Roadmap articulates five research priorities for
each of the five pillars identified in the UN Framework for the Immediate Socio Economic Response to
COVID-19. The UN Roadmap aims to guide global research efforts, minimise research gaps and
duplication, and foster partnerships in order to accelerate progress toward the SDGs. The UN initiative on
STI Roadmaps for the SDGs is an another example of a policy exercise aiming to help member states
engage multiple stakeholders, including development aid agencies, economic ministries and
STI ministries, to align investments and policies to direct and scale up support for the SDGs (Box 5.3).
Box 5.4. STI Roadmaps for the SDGs as a tool to support international STI co-operation on
global challenges
As part of the Technology Facilitation Mechanism (TFM), the United Nations’ Inter-agency Task Team
(IATT) has been working towards developing STI Roadmaps for SDGs as a tool to strengthen
international co-operation on global challenges. STI for SDGs Roadmaps can help align national
STI policy agendas with the SDGs, and develop new instruments and partnerships for international STI
co-operation on global challenges in both developing and developed countries. The evidence suggests
that the most effective collaborations are aligned with the domestic policy agendas of key partners.
The STI for SDGs Roadmaps are based on the following pillars:
 Pillar 1 – Building up national STI capabilities to address the SDGs: focus on strengthening
national STI capabilities, mostly in developing countries, to address challenges underpinning
the SDGs; any well-functioning national innovation system needs to be connected
internationally.
 Pillar 2 – Boosting international knowledge and technology flows for the SDGs: focus on
expanding international flows of relevant knowledge and technology across countries, and
supporting cross-country STI collaborations addressing the SDGs.
 Pillar 3 – Brokering international STI collaborations for the SDGs: focus on brokering
international collective STI actions aiming to tackle global challenges, notably GPGs.
The work of the United Nations Interagency Task Team on Science, Technology and Innovation for the
SDGs Roadmaps illustrates the potential benefits of policy roadmapping. In particular:
 Donor countries can improve policy coherence by streamlining challenge-oriented STI policies
with ODA.
 Developing countries can co-ordinate and synergise STI-related efforts among ministries,
international partners and key stakeholders.
 Countries, international organisations and key partners at the global level can engage in
concerted analytical and facilitation efforts to share knowledge and experience, disseminate
and apply good practices, and design new or improved mechanisms.

140 
 Scientists need to be mobilised around the globe through international collaborations (e.g. the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change of the United Nations [IPCC]) focused on
orchestrating and conducting collective actions to co-develop and deploy innovations at the
adequate scale to achieve transformative impact.
Source: United Nations (2020[27]), Guidebook for the Preparation of STI for SDGs Roadmaps,
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/26937Guidebook_STI_for_SDG_Roadmaps_final_Edition.pdf.
Outlook for international STI collaboration
Despite the various restrictions brought about by the COVID-19 crisis, the immediate response of the
international scientific community gives rise to optimism that international co-operation remains strong and
will continue to advance. The response also generates hope that STI co-operation for grand challenges
and GPGs can finally become a core objective of the scientific community, alongside advancing knowledge
and the scientific frontiers that have characterised much STI collaboration in the 20th century. Such a shift
will not be straightforward, and will require scientific institutions to adapt by placing more value on
challenge-driven, transdisciplinary research than is currently the case (see Chapter 3).
The collective action to combat COVID-19 provides some useful lessons and new approaches for
enhanced global STI co-operation. Governments need to take bolder initiatives to increase support to STI
co-operation for both grand challenges and GPGs. R&D preparedness to manage numerous potential
global crises besides human-disease pandemics should be a leading policy priority. The speed with which
research groups and biopharmaceutical firms are developing COVID-19 vaccines builds on years of basic
research investment, as well as the recent institutionalisation of international co-ordination efforts (in the
form of CEPI and its partners) to develop agile technology platforms that can be activated as new
pathogens emerge. Although these relatively new arrangements are performing well, they are underfunded
and dependent on a handful of countries and philanthropic institutions for financing. Pending discussions
among governments and other stakeholders, they could be scaled up and extended to other areas where
R&D preparedness for crises is important, capitalising on the momentum from the response to COVID-19.
Many global grand challenges do not present themselves in the same way as a pandemic. Global
challenges like climate change and biodiversity loss are “slow-burning” crises that can only be tackled
through international STI collaboration. This chapter has argued for a new paradigm of international
STI co-operation. It has shown that elements of such a paradigm are already in place, but need to be
consolidated and reinforced. In particular, governments need to work together on new financing and
governance mechanisms, wherein business and private-finance actors work with multilateral and national
development banks to co-finance STI solutions for global challenges and GPG problems. The rapid and
unprecedented mobilisation of public and private R&D funding for COVAX has demonstrated that new
innovative funding models can be deployed to address global challenges through international STI co-
operation.
Effective and transparent multilateral institutions and programmes have a role to play in this new paradigm.
Programmes such as the International Clinical Trials Registry Platform are helping countries share
information and data on COVID-19 vaccine trials. Existing international organisations and research
infrastructures (see Chapter 2) are being mobilised to analyse data on the coronavirus and provide
solutions to local research teams in diverse areas, from diagnostics to medical equipment. In time, new
institutions (or new mandates for existing institutions) will be needed. The Intergovernmental Science-
Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services is an example of a fresh intergovernmental
initiative to protect biodiversity.

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Government responses to the COVID-19 pandemic highlight the importance of national politics, leadership
and values in influencing international STI co-operation (Cohen, 2020[28]). Governments will need to
balance national STI priorities and goals with the need for internationally co-ordinated action to address
the grand challenges and GPG problems. Without such collective action, the capacities to deal with them
– in the form of scientific knowledge, technology platforms and international co-ordinating institutions – will
remain underdeveloped, leaving countries more exposed to global shocks.
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Notes
1 Much of this growth has been enabled by the increased mobility of researchers and the growth of science in middle-
income countries.
2 https://www.gisaid.org/.
3 https://www.covid19dataportal.org/.
4 If
taken together, the European Union is the second largest contributor to the scientific literature on COVID-19. It also
has almost the same number of co-authored papers as the United States – 16 483 in the first 11 months of 2020, 77%
of which were domestic co-authorships, compared to 16 964 in the United States, 84% of which were domestic.
5https://www.bmbf.de/de/karliczek-unsere-foerderung-ebnet-der-impfstoff-forschung-gegen-covid-19-den-weg-
12729.html.
6The ACTIV website lists the following companies as participants: AbbVie, Amgen, AstraZeneca, Bristol Myers
Squibb, Eisai, Eli Lilly and Company, Evotec, Gilead, GlaxoSmithKline, Johnson & Johnson, Merck & Co., Moderna,
Novartis, Novavax, Pfizer, Rhythm Therapeutics, Roche-Genentech, Sanofi, Takeda and Vir Biotechnology.
7 The R&D Blueprint was subsequently updated in 2017. See https://www.who.int/teams/blueprint/about.
8 The European Union is a major funder of COVAX.

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9After China joined COVAX in October 2020, the only large countries remaining outside of the facility at the end of
2020 are the United States and Russian Federation.
10 In an advance market commitment (AMC), buyers commit in advance to purchasing a specified volume of a health
technology still in development at a guaranteed price and if it meets specific criteria. Thus, AMCs not only incentivise
R&D, but also the production and delivery of the final product, because funds are only disbursed upon its purchase.
Once the guaranteed volume is purchased, the manufacturer is contractually obliged to supply further volumes at a
lower price. A two-stage pricing system is therefore in place: one relatively high price, guaranteed up to a fixed volume
purchased, which provides a risk-adjusted return to the R&D investment made by the producer; and a second, lower
price, set at a level closer to the cost of production (the “base price”). Criteria specified in the commitment include
technical requirements such as the disease to be prevented or treated, the target population, minimum efficacy,
dosage, route of administration, storage, and quality and safety requirements. AMCs can also specify conditions for
procurement, licensing of IPR and affordability or access (OECD, 2020[15]).
11The funding will be used to support the procurement of safe and effective COVID-19 vaccines for 92 AMC-eligible
countries, which include all economies with a gross national income per capita under USD 4 000.
12 According to the CEPI website, “Wave 2 vaccines are candidates in early stages of development that offer scientific,
technical or manufacturing differentiation compared to candidates currently in advanced development. They will be
selected based on characteristics that could make them particularly suitable for use in specific target populations –
such as older or immune-compromised individuals, or pregnant women – and also in low-resource settings where
logistical challenges can make the use of certain vaccine approaches more challenging. The selection criteria include
potential to protect from COVID-19 after a single vaccine dose, temperature stability, manufacturing scalability,
improved or differentiated immune response, and the use of different antigens. Vaccine candidates in the Wave 2
Portfolio will be subject to global access commitments which will require vaccine output funded by CEPI’s investment
to be made available for procurement and allocation through COVAX.” (CEPI, 2020[30]).
13 Elinor Ostrom made a vital contribution to thinking on public goods by focusing on subtractability of the resource
units, which allowed her to distinguish between public goods and common-pool resources (CPRs). CPRs are “a natural
or man-made resource system that is sufficiently large as to make it costly (but not impossible) to exclude potential
beneficiaries from obtaining benefits from its use” (Ostrom, 2015[29]). Whereas crowding effects and overuse problems
are irrelevant for public goods (e.g. weather forecasts), they are chronic for CPRs, where overconsumption can lead
to temporary or permanent negative impacts on man-made structures or biological resources.
14Similarly, global firms can tap into R&D tax credits in one country but choose to operate production in other countries
for competitive reasons, depriving the country offering the tax subsidy of broader economic returns.
15 https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/en/.
16 https://www.un.org/en/pdfs/UNCOVID19ResearchRoadmap.pdf.

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6 Why accelerate the development

and deployment of robots?
Robots are an iconic technology of the digital era, whose sophistication and
diversity are growing rapidly. Autonomous vehicles, drones and automated
vacuum cleaners are all widely known. Laboratory robots; collaborative
industrial robots; ocean-going, space-faring, search-and-rescue robots; and
robot surgeons, among many others, are less widely known. Progress in
robotics is essential to make life easier, cleaner, healthier and richer.
Robots have also aided the response to COVID-19, but their potential to
help manage a range of crises is just beginning to be tapped. Robotics
could play a major role in healthcare, increasing the resilience of health
systems. Their role in combating future waves of the virus, or entirely new
contagions, should be recognised and supported. Governments should
scale up investment in research and development for robotics, support the
wider diffusion of robots, and develop standards and innovation-friendly
regulation. This chapter examines frontier developments in robotics,
emerging applications across society and the diverse impacts of robots.
Governments can use a number of tools to accelerate the deployment of
socially valuable robot systems. They should act now.

146 
Key findings
 Robots can help to combat infectious disease and increase the resilience of health
systems. In some applications, like elder care, better robots are likely to become
essential. But good policy is needed to realise these aims. Governments should: create
a portfolio of targeted innovation prizes, which have features well-suited to advancing
robotics; deploy tools such as regulatory sandboxes to help companies adapt to a
particularly complex regulatory landscape; accelerate deployment of existing robot
solutions in health systems, for instance by providing platforms that highlight leading-edge
solutions; help develop and share useful data for training AI-enabled robots, especially in
niche applications where data samples are small; and support the development of
healthcare innovation hubs that bring together healthcare providers, research and
academia, industry and regulators.
 Despite often negative public perceptions, robots could make life richer, healthier,
safer and easier, and governments can do much to accelerate these beneficial
outcomes. Governments should: invest in the R&D needed to solve widely identified
research problems; help to broker and support public-private research partnerships, and
support technology transfer; support robot uptake in firms, especially SMEs; deploy tools
such as test-beds to help companies de-risk investments; facilitate SME participation in
standards processes; and support digital connectivity, particularly 5G broadband.
 Over time, advances in robotics could increase many aspects of societal resilience
– from responding to the effects of natural disasters, to coping with population
ageing. To this end, governments should: encourage innovation in education and training
initiatives; increase awareness in government of the current and potential uses of robotics
– which will also help prepare for more effective uses of robots in future crises; advance
research in systems for protecting and operating critical infrastructures and for crisis
response; adopt a positive stance on the role of robots in advancing the public good; and,
strengthen the security of cyber-physical systems.

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Introduction
This chapter examines frontier developments in robotics and the applications of robots across the economy
and society. It considers robots’ diverse impacts, and the science and technology policies that can focus
these impacts for maximum social benefit. It pays particular attention to the roles of robots in healthcare.
These include laboratory robots, robot surgeons, robots that help reduce injuries to nurses (which exceed
those of any other class of manual worker) and robots that assist people with autism spectrum disorder.
Robots have so far played a minor role in the COVID-19 pandemic, and their uses in health systems are
far below their potential. This reflects general unfamiliarity with potential robot applications, the high cost
of leading-edge robot systems, institutional inertia and the incipient nature of some uses. Low wages,
especially among care workers, also discourage investments in assistive robots. However, with suitable
policies in place, robots could provide significant support in addressing future crises – including new
contagions – while increasing the overall resilience of health systems and society.
The promise of robotics
Robots are an iconic technology of the digital era,1 sitting at the centre of many topics in science and
technology policy. Advances in many fields of science, digital technology and artificial intelligence (AI) are
increasing the sophistication and diversity of robots. Their development and future impacts will be shaped
by policies on basic and applied research and development (R&D), as well as taxation, public-private
partnerships, technology diffusion, regulation and legal frameworks, technical standards, and digital
connectivity and security. Indeed, some major recent advances in robotics trace directly to public policy,
such as the challenge prizes run by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in the
United States.
The economic and social impact of robots is expected to increase greatly in coming years. 2 With the
exception of surgical robots, exoskeletons and advanced prosthetics, and systems to aid rehabilitation,
most robots used in healthcare today serve relatively simple functions, such as delivering medicines and
transporting waste. Wider diffusion and more sophisticated applications will be spurred by advancing
technologies. Among many current developments, cell-sized robot prototypes can traverse the body’s
circulatory system, gathering information and downloading it after a task is performed; using AI and
cameras to precisely apply nasal swabs, a newly developed robot can improve sample quality and lower
infection exposure for nurses; and robot surgeons are set to provide human surgeons with feedback during
operations. If more lethal or contagious pathogens than COVID-19 arise in the future, new robot systems
could confer greater resilience on society as a whole. They might, for example, operate essential services
such as waste treatment, power generation and public transport, which in the current crisis have only
functioned thanks to risk-exposed workers.
Robots also occupy a unique place in the public imagination. Humans react differently to objects in physical
space than to objects on screens. Experiments show that people unconsciously treat robots as if they were
human (Fussell et al., 2008[1]).3 As robots come to possess more social attributes than current systems,
how they are used, and how people interact with them, is set to change in possibly surprising ways.
Autonomous vehicles, drones, vacuum cleaners and lawn mowers are all widely known. Less familiar
systems include laboratory robots; collaborative industrial robots; ocean-going, space-faring, and search-
and-rescue robots; and robot surgeons.
Robots also represent the most significant interface between AI and the physical world. Developments in
both fields have been deeply intertwined. Advances in machine vision and AI were initially spurred by the
goal of better robot navigation; in turn, robots served as platforms for demonstrating more capable AIs.
Some consider that robots provide the best setting for tackling some crucial challenges of AI research.
They argue that using AI in systems with a human-like form is more likely to allow research to find how to

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create AIs with human-like attributes, such as “common sense”. At the very least, the so-called “Moravec
paradox” – that robots often easily do things that humans find difficult, and vice versa – points to fertile
terrain for discovery. Beyond research, it is also through the actions of robots that many questions in AI
governance will arise and require solutions.
Robots as a strategic technology
Some governments attribute strategic importance to robotics. Although national priorities vary, a common
concern is the impact of robots on competitiveness. Because they are faster, stronger, more precise and
consistent than workers, robots have vastly raised productivity in critical parts of the economy, such as the
automotive industry. They will do so again in an expanding range of sectors and processes, as robotics
advances.
Advanced robotics is also important to counteract sluggish labour productivity growth in many countries
for the past decades. Progress in robotics creates global market opportunities, which some countries plan
to supply. Accordingly, governments frequently voice concerns when leading robotics companies pass into
foreign ownership, as openly expressed in a number of national robot strategies (e.g. in Japan and the
United States). As Box 6.1 shows, the People’s Republic of China is perhaps pre-eminent in terms of its
strategic ambition in robotics.
Box 6.1. China’s development of a world-class robotics sector

No country is more active than China in developing an advanced robotics industry. Among other
measures, China has acquired established robotics companies abroad, with support from central and
provincial governments. The acquisitions have often been esteemed German and Italian robot
manufacturers and integrators (i.e. companies that assist others to deploy robots). Examples include
Germany’s robot integrator KraussMaffei, acquired in 2016 by a consortium led by the state-owned
China National Chemical Corporation, and the jewel in the crown of European robot manufacturers,
Germany’s Kuka AG, acquired in 2016 by China’s home appliance maker Midea.
China’s National Development Plan for Robotics (2016-20) announced its goal of developing a domestic
industrial robot sector technically equal to the leading international competitors, which would supply at
least 45% of the domestic market, and expand production of robots for seniors and medical care.
A national robotics roadmap was prepared after the launch of the strategic manufacturing plan “Made
in China 2025”, issued in 2015. It identifies key technologies and components for industrial and service
robots; opportunities to strengthen co-ordination between research and application; and initiatives for
standardisation, quality assessment and certification. In November 2016, China announced its first
robot-certification scheme, and issued the first certificates. China has also become a leader in patent
filings for robotics.
Compared to countries such as Japan and Korea, robot density in China is low. However, Chinese
regions that lead in manufacturing mechanical and electrical products, such as the southeast provinces,
have initiated large-scale “Robots Replace Humans” programmes. Many provincial governments also
subsidise firms that buy robots.

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Emerging robot capabilities
Robots are not a single technology. Rather, they embody combinations of technologies, some of which are
developing faster than others. Some of the building blocks of progress in robotics include advances in
sensors, such as laser systems with improved range and angle resolution; control systems, such as cloud-
based robots and predictive control; actuators, such as dexterous grippers; and materials science, e.g. to
help robots harvest energy from their surroundings.
Progress in manufacturing technology, such as laser sintering (a form of 3D printing) and micro-scale
moulding, lowers costs and helps build more capabilities into robots. The proliferation of robot types and
capacities also come from advances in basic and applied science. Neuroscience, biomechanics, materials
science, computer science and mathematics are just some of the relevant fields. New fields, such as
computational psychiatry, will also contribute to progress in robotics. Robots have even become tools of
basic science in their own right, for instance, by helping to understand better how humans walk.
This section reviews some emerging developments in robotics. Many are recent research achievements
or prototypes, which could be some years from commercial use. Others are just beginning to find
commercial applications. These developments suggest the nature of future possibilities.
Soft robotics: until recently, robots were physically rigid. Advances in fields such as materials science,
actuators (forms of motor that converts energy into work), sensing and modelling have produced an
emerging class of deformable and compliant robots that can squeeze, stretch, climb, shape-change and
self-heal (Terryn et al., 2017[2]). Research in soft robotics aims to further develop abilities to grow, evolve,
self-heal and biodegrade (Laschi, Mazzolai and Cianchetti, 2016[3]). Many developments in soft robotics
are inspired by examples from the natural world.
Miniaturisation: together with advanced fabrication, Moore’s Law has helped engineers build ever-smaller
robots.4 In one of the most striking examples of miniaturisation to date, researchers at MIT recently built
self-powered robots the size of a human cell. These robots are able to follow pre-programmed instructions,
as well as sense, record and store information about their environment, gathering data that can be
downloaded once a task is completed. While these robots are at the laboratory stage, potential uses exist
in medical diagnostics and industry (Chandler, 2018[4]).
Increased intelligence: in the late 1990s, most robots possessed only insect-grade intelligence. Today,
progress in AI, particularly machine learning, is revolutionising robotics. Combining AI with other
innovations is conferring a myriad of new capabilities on robots, including greater autonomy. Major
developments include better vision, learning transfer between robots and across robot swarms, learning in
virtual environments, learning by doing, learning by curiosity, emotional awareness, better object
manipulation and more collaborative robots (“cobots”).
Thanks to these growing capabilities, robots have current and potential applications in many areas of the
economy (Figure 6.1).

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Figure 6.1. Current and emerging robot applications span the economy
Sources: Haridy (2020[5]), “Machine Learning helps robot harvest lettuce for the first time”, https://newatlas.com/robot-harvest-lettuce-vegetable-
machine-learning-agriculture/60465/; Hutson (2017[6]), “Searching for survivors of the Mexico earthquake – with snake robots”,
https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/10/searching-survivors-mexico-earthquake-snake-robots; Ridden (2019[7]). “Plastic hunting robot crab
takes its first dive”, https://newatlas.com/silver-2-plastic-hunting-robot-crab/60097/
Robots and jobs
Machine-driven substitution of workers is the subject of a large and growing literature, which this chapter
does not aim to assess. However, industrial robots – especially the more recent models – differ in important
ways from other types of automation, such as computer numerical control systems. For instance, they can
be reprogrammed and flexibly applied to diverse tasks. Atkinson (2019[8]) reviews the robot-specific
research. He shows that many firm-level studies find only limited job destruction or loss of total hours
worked attributable to robots. In some cases, significant increases in manufacturing employment are seen
a few years after adoption, often because of increased product demand. When industrial robots are shown
to have reduced the hours worked, this has applied primarily to low-skilled workers; the declines are less
pronounced for workers with mid-level skills. Although little studied to date, robots in the health sector are
unlikely to have major impacts on job numbers as they mainly augment the capabilities of health workers
(e.g. by lowering injury risk), rather than substituting for them. The opportunity to work with robots might in
fact make some health-sector jobs more attractive, especially among the younger population.
Current and emerging uses of robots in healthcare
This chapter pays particular attention to robots in healthcare, given the possible role of robots in
ameliorating the current COVID-19 crisis or future outbreaks of infectious diseases. In 2018, global sales

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of medical robots reached USD 2.8 billion. Some 5 100 units were sold in 2018, a number that is forecast
to rise to 19 700 units by 2022 (IFR, 2019[9]) (Figure 6.2). Robots have many roles in healthcare; some are
well established, but others are just beginning to appear in health systems. Applications range from aiding
laboratory research, surgery and physical rehabilitation, to delivering medicines, transporting waste,
combating loneliness, and improving medical diagnostics and treatments. Moreover, by improving working
conditions in many occupations outside of healthcare, robots can alleviate expensive medical problems,
benefitting firms and society more broadly.
Figure 6.2. Global purchases and main applications of service robots for professional use, 2017-22
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

Billions USD
25
22.5
20
15 14.2
10 8.9 9.1
6.7
5.7
5
5 3.7 3.7
2.4 2.2 2.8
1 1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4
0
Logistics Medical robotic s Field robotics
Note: Field robots are non-factory robots designed for unstructured and often dynamic environments on land, sea and air, e.g. in mining,
agriculture and underwater exploration.
Source: IFR (2019[9]), World Robotics 2019, https://ifr.org (accessed September 2019).
COVID-19 has focused attention on how robots might reduce infection risks and stress among frontline
health workers. As the crisis escalated, leading roboticists wrote an editorial in Science Robotics, a journal
of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, stressing the potential of robots to combat
the COVID-19 pandemic and infectious diseases more generally. To enhance preparedness, the authors
called on governments to target and fund multidisciplinary basic and applied science, bringing together
scientists, engineers and infectious disease professionals to work in partnership with government agencies
and industry (Yang et al., 2020[10]).
With a few notable exceptions, (e.g. surgical robots), most uses of robots in healthcare today are relatively
simple (e.g. drones for delivering medicines). As technologies advance, broader diffusion and more
sophisticated applications are set to emerge, potentially increasing the resilience of health systems to new
diseases. Over a longer period, comprehensive use of robot systems in elderly care is likely to become
essential as the global population ages.
The remainder of this section considers the main categories of robot use in healthcare, with an emphasis
on COVID-19. It also highlights some of the existing challenges to progress.

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Robots in the laboratory
Laboratory automation is increasingly essential in many fields of science. Robots have helped automate
routine laboratory processes for some years. Today, AI-driven laboratory robots can go beyond this
mechanical task, executing closed-loop cycles of testing, hypothesis generation and renewed testing.
Hundreds of hypotheses can be generated and tested in parallel. Such systems can also automatically
record experimental procedures and associated metadata, which are important for reproducing research.
In 2009, “Adam”, a laboratory robot developed by researchers at the universities of Aberystwyth and
Cambridge in the United Kingdom, became the first such system to make an independent scientific
discovery (concerning the genomics of baker’s yeast). Such robots can greatly speed experimentation,
e.g. by screening and testing thousands of pharmaceutical compounds per day. As well as contributing to
research, laboratory robots have also helped accelerate testing for COVID-19. For example, the VIB-VUB
Centre for Structural Biology in Brussels uses its KingFisher robot to perform an additional 1 000 tests
per day (euRobotics, 2020[11]). On the downside, laboratory robots remain costly and difficult to use.
However, adding AI to robots is not enough to improve the entire process of laboratory testing, especially
in a crisis. Greater flexibility in handling, combining vision, gripping tools, and grip sensing, is also needed.
During the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic, laboratories faced shortages of test kits, and medical
practitioners sent patient samples in many types of containers, with no standardised shapes and sizes.
Human dexterity was needed to handle, open and extract the samples for testing. Most automated
processes could not have dealt with this variance. Some robot systems could have done this, but were not
used owing to the high costs of installation, programming and peripheral sensing. This manipulation
challenge is a generic problem in robotics and requires further progress.
Robots in patient screening and initial care
In the second quarter of 2020, during the first COVID-19 peak, patients arriving at Antwerp’s University
Hospital in Belgium were met by a robot that checked whether they were wearing masks, ensured these
were properly positioned, screened for signs of fever and admitted those who could safely attend an
appointment. The system, which speaks 35 languages, reduces crowding among waiting patients and
lowers infection risk for staff (Parrock, 2020[12]).
Nasal and throat swabs are currently the standard for initial diagnostic testing for COVID-19. This requires
qualified personnel, whose time is scarce when demand is high. In response, researchers have developed
a fully automated robot that performs the delicate task of taking coronavirus swabs. Using AI and cameras
to apply the swab precisely, it can improve sample quality and lower infection exposure for nurses (Filks
and Skydsgaard, 2020[13]).
Researchers aim to achieve greater functionality for remote interaction with patients, such as through high-
resolution cameras to measure pulse rate from the skin. Since drawing blood carries a high risk of exposure
for medical staff, engineers are examining ultrasound imaging of veins for robotic venepuncture (Yang
et al., 2018[14]). Assisting emergency medical technicians (EMTs) is even more challenging. EMTs perform
complex cognitive and physical tasks, such as rapid assessment of a patient’s condition or inserting
breathing tubes. If AI-enabled robots could assist EMTs, more attention might shift to the most urgent
procedures.
Robot surgeons
The first documented use of a robot assisting surgeons occurred in 1985, when a robot arm helped to
biopsy neurological tissue. Surgical robots are now categorised under three broad types: active systems
that perform pre-programmed tasks under human supervision; semi-active systems, where a surgeon
complements an active system; and systems under a surgeon’s sole control which precisely reproduce the

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surgeon’s hand movements (Lane, 2018[15]). Most experts consider fully autonomous robot surgeons a
distant prospect.
Several thousand prostate operations using minimally invasive robots are performed every year in the
United States. The robotic procedures reportedly lead to shorter admission periods, fewer infections and
faster recovery (CCC/CRA, 2009[16]). Robotic kidney transplantation is increasing at transplant centres
around the world. The first surgery with the patient and the surgeon in different countries took place in
2001. Some systems allow the surgeon a physical sensation of what the robot touches. Non-invasive
abdominal surgery, kidney surgery, orthopaedic surgery and neurosurgery are now all part of the medical
robotics market.
To complement the work of surgeons, robots can be designed with more limbs, digits and freedom of
movement than a human. They do not tire or get distracted, and they can operate with extreme and
consistent accuracy. A new system, the Microsure Musa, developed for super-microsurgery, can even
compensate for human traits such as hand tremor. Thus, robots may help to lower the frequency of
preventable surgical errors.
The main challenge in surgical robotics is achieving greater autonomy. The predictability in which industrial
robots work is not available to surgical robots. Vastly greater variation and uncertainty exist in patients’
bodies and surgical needs, and in the actual implementation of surgical procedures. Beyond traditional but
limited clinical decision-support tools – such as decision trees – engineers are attempting to integrate the
most synergistic features of human and machine intelligence, with humans and machines collaborating to
enhance in situ surgical decision-making (Loftus et al., 2020[17]). Among many other topics, research is
examining how robot surgeons might learn from the human surgeon, follow the surgeon’s gaze, share
control of some steps in an operation, and even record and provide feedback to the surgeon.
Another research challenge concerns the clinical efficacy and secondary outcomes of robotic surgery.
Claims of efficacy in some procedures are contested. In some circumstances, the need to reconfigure the
robot’s tools during surgery could lengthen the time spent by the patient under anaesthesia. Cost-benefit
analyses on the use of surgical robots might also miss some variables relevant to a crisis like COVID-19,
such as the value of treating patients with greater than usual speed when hospital beds are scarce.
Robotic exoskeletons
An exoskeleton is a hard or soft structure that fits around one or more body parts, affording physical
support. Wearable exoskeletons, for instance, can reduce a surgeon’s fatigue during long operations.
Passive exoskeletons, which only give static support, are now complemented by active systems that
amplify some aspect(s) of the wearer’s abilities.
One use of exoskeletons is physical rehabilitation. Systems can interpret the kinetic properties of a
person’s movements, helping patients such as stroke victims perform therapeutic movements precisely.
Some exoskeletons give performance and motivational feedback, adjusting the difficulty of therapeutic
tasks. A notable recent breakthrough comes from the French Alternative Energies and Atomic
Commission, which developed a brain-controlled exoskeleton that allows a subject with four paralysed
limbs to walk, achieving control over arms and legs. This achievement stems partly from progress in
“neurobotics”, the study of the brain in conjunction with technology.
Robots in the supply chain
In a growing number of Chinese towns and cities, drones are being used to share information (over
loudspeakers), spray disinfectant, deliver medical supplies and even take people’s temperatures (using
thermal imaging). Drones routinely fly to the centre for disease control in Xinchang County, traversing
China’s first anti-epidemic “urban air transport channel” (Cozzens, 2020[18]). Such systems could also help
deliver medical supplies to remote regions. For instance, companies in the United Kingdom have partnered

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to deliver COVID-19 tests to a remote island off the Scottish coast. Drones could also be helpful in
developing countries, where road coverage may be limited and/or roads are poorly maintained.
Autonomous hospital-delivery robots
Robots are freeing the time of hospital staff by autonomously transporting hazardous materials, laboratory
specimens, medications and meals for persons in quarantine. Many hospital robots can respond to
requests placed through touchscreen interfaces, performing tasks and returning independently to charging
points. Robots are also being designed to perform tasks in hospital kitchens and pantries.
Robot disinfectors
Hospital-acquired (nosocomial) infections are a leading cause of death in OECD countries, also imposing
major costs on health systems. Short-wave highly energetic ultra-violet (UV) light can destroy genetic
material in bacteria and viruses. Robots using high-intensity UV light can disinfect frequently touched
areas, creating more sanitary conditions, lowering the workload for hospital staff and reducing risk
exposure compared to manual disinfection. In response to COVID-19, Bucharest Robots deployed a UV-
based robot that disinfected a hospital space spanning 7 500 m2 in just a few hours (euRobotics, 2020[11]).
Robotic disinfection systems have existed for many years but are not yet widely deployed, partly because
of their limited ability to navigate in uncertain environments, as well as detect and reach shadow areas.
Progress in such areas is needed.
Micro-robots for drug delivery
There exist two main classes of medical micro-robots – man-made and bio-hybrid. In the man-made
category, robots are just emerging that sense and record information about micro-scale environments in
the body, and move under their own power. Bio-hybrid systems, for their part, integrate biological and man-
made components (such as nano-tubes, nano-particles and micro-machines). The biological components
have functionalities that complement the man-made parts. Bacteria, for example, can self-propel in ways
that most man-made systems cannot, leading researchers to examine if bacteria swarms can be used to
push man-made drug delivery devices. Bacterial micro-robots have been the main object of research in
the field of bio-hybrid systems, and have begun to be used more widely in drug delivery.
Research priorities for micro-robotic drug delivery include developing biodegradable and non-toxic systems
capable of high autonomy and intelligent targeting, catheter-based robot delivery near disease targets,
monitoring and controlling of swarms of micro-robots, and therapies best suited for robotic delivery (Yang
et al., 2018[14]).
Robots supporting mental health
Research has recently begun on robots and mental health. Loneliness is a growing problem in OECD
countries, and the isolation felt by many during the COVID-19 lockdowns has itself created mental stress.
Robot systems can diminish loneliness in some people. Research has shown that a robot speaking
encouraging phrases can positively affect a subject’s mood and game-playing performance. Interaction
with the PARO therapeutic robot – which looks like a seal – has improved the mood of dementia patients
and reduced feelings of isolation (Robinson, Broadbent and MacDonald, 2015[19]).
Autism spectrum disorder (ASD), which affects around 1 in 160 children worldwide, is another target for
research. For example, to study if they could improve social skills in children with ASD, (Scassellati et al.,
2018[20]) took robots out of the laboratory setting, where experiments are usually brief, and into homes and
longer-term interactions. The robots helped to teach social skills such as taking turns, seeing the

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perspective of others and making eye contact. The research showed that personalized therapeutic robotics
could eventually aid parents and therapists and provide children with ASD with more comprehensive care.
Research is needed to develop more effective social robots. Such robots would build and maintain
multidimensional models of human counterparts, understanding more of what they know, believe, feel and
intend, while also accounting for context (Yang et al., 2018[14]). Contributing to this goal, Canada’s National
Research Council aims to help develop robots that process emotional responses.
Robots in elderly care and nursing homes
Population ageing in OECD countries and the ensuing prospect of widespread age-related physical,
cognitive and socio-emotional decline (Figure 6.3) have spurred interest in how robots might help. With
the world’s oldest population, Japan is the global leader in robotics for elder care. One priority is how robots
might complement the caregiver workforce, which is projected to grow significantly. The United States
alone could need 2.5 million additional long-term care workers by 2030 (Bryant, 2017[21]). Various
companies make social robots for elder care. These perform basic non-medical tasks, such as reminding
the elderly to take medications, while also providing cognitive stimulation and a form of companionship. A
related development is systems that connect users to navigable mobile robots, allowing them to experience
sights and sounds in the robot’s environment. These systems, which provide telepresence, are proliferating
thanks to their simplicity and wide range of uses, including helping convalescent or immobile patients
interact with family members at home, young patients attend school and persons of any age visit museums.
One drawback to such robots is their cost. Hence, some companies have developed simpler designs that
interface with the user’s own tablet computer.
Elder care raises particular challenges for robot systems. For instance, older people – especially the most
impaired – interact with caregivers differently from younger adults. Robotic care for individuals requires
better understanding and modelling of verbal and non-verbal communication between the elderly, human
carers and robot systems. More research is also required on the outcomes of older persons’ interactions
with social robots. Another need is lowering costs while ensuring safety.
Figure 6.3. Increasing old-age dependency and growing share of the population with dementia
Note: In Panel A, the old-age dependency ratio is defined as the number of individuals older than 65 years for every 100 persons of working age
(20 to 64 years).
Sources: OECD (2019[22]), Pensions at a Glance 2019: OECD and G20 Indicators, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/b6d3dcfc-
en (Panel A); OECD (2018[23]), “Care Needed: Improving the Lives of People with Dementia”, OECD Health Policy Studies, OECD Publishing,
Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264085107-en (Panel B).

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Robots and public policy
This section examines selected public policies that are relevant to the development of robotics, and the
use of robots in firms and public services (the full range of policies includes topics such as connectivity
and cybersecurity, not covered here) (Nolan, forthcoming[24]). The section also considers options for
governments to influence the direction of future developments in order to meet short- and long-term
societal challenges. Several governments have national robotics strategies in place (Box 6.2).
Box 6.2. Examples of national robotics strategies

Led by China, Japan, Germany, Korea and the United States, all robotics-related strategies aim to
increase applications in industry, with differences however in funding priorities.
Japan was the world’s leading industrial robot manufacturer in 2018, delivering 52% of the global
supply. Under the New Robot Strategy, the country increased its R&D budget for robotics to
USD 351 million in 2019, with the aim of making Japan the world leader in robotics innovation.
Korea’s Intelligent Robot Development and Supply Promotion Act focuses on the role of robots in
advanced manufacturing. The country’s 2019 Basic Plan for Intelligent Robots proposed targeting
public and private support at promising areas of robot development and use.
The European Union’s Horizon 2020 programme supports many fields of robotics R&D, including
manufacturing, healthcare, transportation, agriculture and consumer technologies. The European
Commission committed EUR 780 million (euros) over seven years, beginning in 2014. The European
Union’s 2018-2020 Work Programme includes funding for robotics in industry and core technologies
such as AI and cognition, cognitive mechatronics, socially co-operative human-robot interaction, and
model-based design and configuration tools.
The United Kingdom’s 2020 Robotics and Autonomous Systems programme is a national strategy to
capture value across the industrial and innovation system through co-ordinated development of assets,
challenges, clusters and skills.5
Although the United States does not possess an overall industrial or automation policy, there have been
efforts to develop national strategies for robotics, AI, drones and autonomous vehicles. The National
Robotics Initiative (NRI) supports robotics R&D. NRI-2.0 focuses on cobots and encourages
collaboration between academia, industry, non-profits and other organisations, in the same vein as the
Advanced Robots for Manufacturing Institute and regional robotics clusters. At USD 35 million, the NRI
budget for 2019 was relatively small.
Source: Demaitre (2020[25]), “Robotics R&D still driven by government initiatives worldwide, says IFR report”,
https://www.therobotreport.com/robotics-rnd-still-driven-government-support-worldwide-says-ifr/.
Interdisciplinarity in robotics research
Addressing research challenges in robotics requires interdisciplinary collaborations, for example among
physicists, mathematicians, materials scientists, engineers and biologists, in both public and private-sector
organisations. Policy needs to ensure robotics is not hindered by obstacles to cross-disciplinary research,
such as hiring, promotion and tenure policies, and by funding systems favouring traditional disciplines (see
Chapter 3). Ethical, legal and social implications of robotics, which are often hard to foresee, also need to
be a part of research.

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Robotics research needs public-private partnerships
The complexity of some research challenges may exceed the research capacities of even the largest
individual institutions, necessitating a spectrum of public-private research partnerships (see Chapter 5). In
terms of resources and focus, such partnerships can help create synergies between basic and applied
research. Partnerships should also involve engineers, who usually play a major role in finding the best
ways to implement robotic solutions. The Advanced Robotics for Manufacturing Institute (ARM) in the
United States is one example of a research partnership model. ARM aims to create and deploy robotic
technology by integrating industry practices and institutional knowledge across many disciplines, from
materials science to human and machine behaviour modelling. Another example is euRobotics, the private-
sector pillar of the Partnership for Robotics in Europe (SPARC). With EUR 700 million in funding from the
European Commission over 2014-20 and triple that amount from European industry, SPARC is the largest
civilian-funded robotics innovation programme in the world.
Support for technology transfer
Policy might also direct the trajectory of robotics development by providing targeted support for technology
commercialisation. Many institutional settings affect knowledge transfer and commercialisation, from
licensing and patenting arrangements, to the modus operandi of intermediary organisations
(e.g. technology transfer offices). Policy should aim to optimise this ecosystem regardless of the type of
technology. Where social priorities are urgent, however, technology transfer in specific fields might be
facilitated. For example, a mobile disinfection robot was awarded the euRobotics Technology Transfer
Award 2020.
Moonshots for robotics in society
Grants, R&D-based procurement and innovation prizes all have a role to play in tackling research “grand
challenges” for robotics, and aligning robotics with societal needs. Public- and private-sector challenge
prizes have played a prominent role in the recent development of robotics. In the United States, DARPA,
the Office of Naval Research and the National Aeronautics Space Administration (NASA) have all run
challenge prizes in robotics. From a policy perspective, challenge prizes are attractive because of the
relatively small public investments involved: the NASA Space Robotics Challenge awarded the winning
team a total of USD 300 000. Summed across all competitors, the R&D effort elicited by such a prize might
dwarf the prize money. Moreover, competitions can help identify talented individuals and teams, drawing
attention to ideas that deserve a second chance.
Challenge competitions in robotics could be envisaged for a range of major social goals, such as helping
older adults to live longer and with more autonomy in their own homes. A portfolio of challenge competitions
could also be considered for healthcare, and more specifically COVID-19 and infectious diseases. Some
competitions could focus on critical safety and efficacy-enhancing tasks that cannot yet be performed by
robots. Comprehensive consultation with health workers and other stakeholders might help identify and
prioritise competition goals.
Diffusion of robots in healthcare
General unfamiliarity with the potential uses of robots, combined with the high cost of leading-edge robot
systems, institutional inertia and the incipient nature of some applications, has constrained the application
of robots in health systems. Low wages, especially among care workers, also discourage investments in
assistive robots.
Among other steps, governments could examine how to accelerate the deployment of existing robot
solutions, e.g. by providing platforms that highlight leading-edge solutions. The evidence indicates that

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public reporting of technology use by hospitals can accelerate the pace of adoption (Skinner and Staiger,
2015[26]). A high level of familiarity with robot technologies could have another positive consequence in a
crisis situation, in that it could increase readiness to rapidly repurpose or innovate with currently available
robot solutions. This might be quicker and more effective than relying on older robots stockpiled in
preparation for a crisis. During the Fukushima disaster, for example, stockpiled robots were reportedly less
suitable than routinely used commercial models. The specific capabilities (e.g. radiation resistance and
advanced mobility) of older robots designed for interventions in nuclear facilities were outweighed by their
slow speed and limited energy storage.
Education and training
Workforce skills are the most critical variable in an institution’s ability to adopt new technology. Populations
with broad and strong generic skills – i.e. literacy, numeracy and problem solving – are better positioned
to acquire fast-changing technical knowledge. More specifically, some countries are rapidly developing
curricula relevant to education and training in robotics at all levels. China, for instance, is developing
robotics education tailored to primary schools.
Skill-related needs are also in flux. As robots are deployed more widely, demand will likely rise for roles
such as “robot co-ordinators” who oversee robots and respond to malfunctions. Not all robot-related jobs
are software jobs – many concern hardware. Training could help open such jobs to workers who possess
mechanical skills taught in vocational courses. Many of the necessary skills do not require a four-year
degree. Shorter courses could help, especially if delivered at scale. In the United States, for example, the
intensive 12-week Rockwell programme trains and certifies underemployed veterans as instrumentation,
control and automation technicians.
Regulation
Regulating robotics is an increasingly complex endeavour, owing to rapid technical change, growing robot
capabilities and novel forms of human-robot interaction. For example, as intelligent robots become more
widely used in care facilities or domestic settings, they might gather sensitive personal data, e.g. on
religious or political views. Technically, such data could also be shared across robots, or with third parties
(the OECD is currently working with independent experts to develop practical guidelines for implementing
the OECD AI Principles; among other topics, it is examining how regulatory authorities can best address
the challenges raised by AI).6 Regulation has multifaceted goals, i.e. to provide producers with certainty,
protect consumers and facilitate innovation. The aim is to create a regulatory framework that best balances
all three goals. The space available in this chapter is not sufficient to review the differences across
jurisdictions, the intricacies of legal scholarship and the comparative merits of competing legal proposals.
Thus, this section only touches on some main challenges, drawing heavily on (Holder et al., 2016[27]).
An obvious concern is that the field of robotics changes faster than regulatory frameworks (see Chapter 8).
While existing laws are often adequate to resolve potential legal disputes arising from the use of robots,
some changes may be necessary. For instance, while it is now technically feasible for a surgeon to operate
on a patient in another country, legal frameworks do not yet stipulate which country’s laws would apply in
the case of a mishap.
Another new issue regulation may need to address is the human-like appearance of some robots. If people
unconsciously attribute an especially high degree of agency to humanoid robots, they might be less prone
to question the instructions or behaviour of such systems. This could have implications for the protection
of consumers, who might overly trust human-like robots and become more susceptible to misleading
information. For the same reason, the safety of some critical systems could also be impaired when human
operators deal with humanoid robots. Safeguards may therefore be needed in the future so that robots are
not overly anthropomorphic.

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A central question for wider robot use – and the insurance industry – concerns legal liability. The major
legal conundrum relates to machine learning in the field. Today, if an unintelligent robot is programmed
incorrectly and harms someone, liability lies with the user, not the robot manufacturer. In the case of robots
with AI-enabled control functions, two possibilities exist:
1. The robot goes to school before being deployed, i.e. learning takes place at the manufacturer.
2. The robot learns during operation, including new tasks not imagined by the manufacturer.
The first option presents a technical challenge for manufacturers of AI-enabled robots as they ponder how
to guarantee that the learning process will not produce unforeseen consequences, without testing the robot
exhaustively in every situation. The second option may be simpler (provided the first option cannot be
solved). Clearly, the manufacturer cannot be held responsible for the robot’s actions if it does not control
the environment in which it is used, the situations it learns from, and so on. A possible solution might be to
certify a robot’s baseline learned capabilities; once the user unlocks a learning process, however, the
warranty is void.
Autonomy levels for road vehicles exists on a scale from 1 to 5. For medical robots, there exists no
established definition of autonomy levels. Such a definition is more complicated to achieve: the range of
tasks, working environments, technologies and risks to be considered is much greater than for road
vehicles. Defined levels of autonomy effectively allocate technologies to different regulatory approval
procedures, which vary in stringency, cost and time. A categorisation of autonomy for medical robots is
necessary for the entire sector (Yang et al., 2018[14]).
It is also important to examine whether regulation hinders new robotic solutions. In a crisis situation such
as COVID-19, regulation for some robot applications might justifiably de-emphasise risk avoidance and
lower liability for innovators. A case in point could be regulations governing robotic delivery systems, which
present fewer safety implications if a population is in lockdown.
Lastly, complex regulation can hinder robot adoption, particularly in small and medium-size firms, which
typically lack teams specialising in regulatory compliance. Public programmes exist to help such firms
deploy robots when regulation is hard to interpret.7 However, a better solution would be to begin with a
more amenable regulatory framework.
Conclusion
Progress in robotics could increase standards of living, quality of life and societal resilience, as well as
strengthen healthcare systems. The potential of robotics is vast, but has only begun to be achieved.
Governments possess a number of tools to accelerate the deployment of socially valuable robots. Support
for both public R&D and public-private partnerships is essential, and the community of robot scientists and
engineers broadly agrees on priorities (Nolan, forthcoming[24]). Policy makers can shape the course of
future of developments to better meet challenges in areas such as healthcare, productivity growth,
disruptive effects on labour markets, and new or increased skill needs. As with many digital technologies
(even mature technologies such as cloud computing), the diffusion of robots across the economy and
health systems is vastly below potential. This shortfall has a variety of causes, all of which can be
influenced through public policy. As robots acquire new capabilities, they raise new policy issues, from
privacy to legal liability. Robots can do more for society than is the case today, but active policy is a
prerequisite.

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Notes
1The Oxford English Dictionary defines a robot in two ways. The first definition is “a machine capable of carrying out
a complex series of actions automatically, especially one programmable by a computer.” Under this definition, smart
phones are robots: they perceive something (through microphones, cameras and text input), and they act on their
perceptions (putting appointments in calendars, sending money, etc.). The second definition – although the distinction
between the two is not strictly technical – is “a machine resembling a human being and able to replicate certain human
movements and functions automatically.” This chapter focuses on machines that more closely accord with the second
sense.
2As Colin Angle, co-founder of iRobot, the world’s most successful consumer robotics company, recently put it, “we
are just about none of the way to achieving the potential of robotics”.
3When they first appeared, YouTube clips of Boston Dynamic’s “Atlas” robot performing backflips and appearing eerily
human went viral. In 2015, MIT demonstrated the quadruped robot “Cheetah” leaping untethered over obstacles at a
speed of 23 kilometres per hour. Here again, the images were unprecedented and arrestingly lifelike.
4The term “Moore’s Law” refers to a trend of exponential shrinking of transistors on integrated circuits, described by
Gordon Moore in 1965.
5 www.ukras.org.
6 https://oecd.ai/.
7 See, for example, the EU-funded COVR project (www.safearoundrobots.com).

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7 Accelerating innovation to meet

global challenges: The role of
engineering biology
Life science innovation will be critical for addressing the major challenges of
our time, from pandemics, through climate change, to transitioning to
sustainable production systems. Synthetic biology, also known as
“engineering biology”, aims to harness biologic processes to act as a
platform technology across a wide range of key economic sectors. What is
required to create the enabling conditions for the field, and how might the
field contribute solutions to the complex problems we face? This chapter
locates the challenges of the pandemic and sustainability, writ large within
the landscape of key advantages and advances in engineering biology.
Beginning with the “biofoundry”, these approaches to engineering practice
promise to open up new opportunities for manufacturing. These span a
wide range of sectors and products, whether new materials, greener
chemicals or – most pertinent for this particular moment – diagnostics and
vaccines.

164 
Key findings
 The COVID-19 crisis underlines the need to promote a mission of health resilience,
both on shorter and longer time horizons, requiring robust investment in health science and
technology. Promising new technologies like engineering biology deserve consideration as
a possible means towards the achievement of health resilience as a longer-term mission.
The field’s development could be driven through mission-oriented policies in order to assure
alignment of technology development and the goal of health resilience.
 Governments could establish and support pre-competitive infrastructure and
collaborative platforms, such as networked biofoundries and research consortia, by
ensuring long-term and stable funding. Such research and translational infrastructures
could de-risk private investment and accelerate commercialisation.
 Collaborative platforms, built around biofoundries and other emerging technologies,
can help deepen the engagement of broader society with emerging technologies. In
that context, the societal engagement of collaborative platforms with actors outside its
innovation activities is becoming increasingly important. Maintaining levels of public
involvement and engagement over the platform lifetime can build the mutual trust and social
contract that needs to support the enterprise.
 Governments should encourage the development of multidisciplinary environments
and transdisciplinary skills to promote convergence. Engineering biology extends
beyond traditional discipline boundaries, drawing from engineering, biology, data science
and physical sciences. Multidisciplinary environments are key to its success, and rely on
people who can communicate across disciplines.

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Introduction
The race is on to limit the effects of climate change by all available means. With around 70 000 derived
products (Cayuela Valencia, 2013[1]), chemistry is the largest commercial enterprise on the planet, but is
responsible for very large greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Moreover, the chemical and petrochemical
industry is the largest contributor to industrial (fossil) energy demand worldwide (Griffin, Hammond and
Norman, 2018[2]). The appeal of engineering biology lies in the fact that biological reactions require
renewable carbon resources (e.g. sugarcane) as feedstocks and reactions occur at low temperatures and
ambient pressures, requiring few energy inputs, in direct contrast to the incumbent fossil economy.
Engineering (or “synthetic”) biology as a discipline of basic biology research started early in the 21st
century (Cameron, Bashor and Collins, 2014[3]), and its applications to various branches of manufacturing
were clear from the outset. The terms “engineering biology” and “synthetic biology” are now considered
synonymous, even though practitioners see some nuances. If there is a difference, it is that engineering
biology is an attempt to turn biotechnology into a discipline more reminiscent of engineering than biology,
i.e. more sharply focused on industrial production.
The arrival of the COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted problems associated with society’s readiness to
deal with emerging viruses and pandemics, underscoring the importance of new biotechnology
approaches. Indeed, COVID-19 may represent an opportunity for engineering biology to exert a tangible
economic and social impact on health.
This chapter first examines the recent emergence of the new technology platform in engineering biology
called the “biofoundry” – a promising new vehicle to speed up the development of useful constructs. The
chapter then turns to the possible application of engineering biology and the biofoundry to vaccines and
diagnostics, which are critically important in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. While engineering
biology has struggled to make an impact on liquid fuels and commodity chemicals (where the largest gains
in GHG emissions reductions are to be made), there is hope that it could play a significant role in other
fields. Third, the discussion reviews emerging trends in the development of bio-based products, from spider
silk to encoding information using DNA. Finally, it sets out a suite of policy considerations that would prove
useful for developing road maps and other policy interventions related to engineering biology.
The promise of biofoundries
The field of engineering biology has advanced rapidly in recent years (Opgenorth et al., 2019[4]), to the
point where a Design-Build-Test-Learn cycle (DBTL) has emerged. This has been made possible by
robotics and machine learning that can integrate and enhance human intervention (Figure 7.1). This cycle
is encapsulated in the biofoundry, where many candidate molecules can be run iteratively through the
DBTL cycle to quickly obtain an optimised candidate.
The technical challenges are many, but one of the greatest challenges for engineering biology is scale-up.
The reasons lie with the technical details of biology: the feedstocks have to be dilute; the bioprocess is
slow; and the products are also dilute, requiring considerable effort to concentrate and purify (Wu and
Maravelias, 2019[5]). In chemistry, by contrast, the opposite is true: feedstocks are concentrated; reactions
are fast; and products are concentrated, requiring less effort and cost to purify. For these reasons, biology
will continue to struggle to compete with chemistry, particularly as the chemical industry is also rising to
the challenge of sustainability (Horváth, 2018[6]).
Biofoundries are highly automated facilities that allow the co-ordinated use of laboratory robots. They are
based on information infrastructures that enable programming robots and other equipment within the
biofoundry to follow detailed, complex workflows (Chao et al., 2017[7]). Bio-designers are able to produce

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genetic constructs which, when placed in a cell (or chassis, such as Escherichia coli, or E. coli), act as an
instruction set for the cell to produce other molecules that it would not naturally produce.
The hope is that biofoundries will greatly reduce the time from idea to product, and improve the reliability
and reproducibility that have been lacking until now in biotechnology. One of the drivers of engineering
biology is the aim to increase reproducibility so as to enable the quantitative precision required for modern
manufacturing. Standards, automation and machine learning are key to the success of this approach,
which is applicable to both research and industrial production (Box 7.1).
Box 7.1. How biofoundries work

Biofoundries rely on the ability to modularise gene constructs and then study the behaviour of the
construct using a technique called “characterisation”. Typically, a construct is characterised over several
days, systematically following a workflow protocol. The workflow approach is designed to greatly
increase reliability and reproducibility, with machine learning being key to speeding up the cycle. When
a gene construct has been fully characterised, the process should be geographically transferable, thus
building the link to distributed manufacturing. Many industrial bioprocesses have never had the
biocatalyst optimised in any way to deal with the conditions of fermentation or maximise productivity.
Thus, the biofoundry may represent a “missing link” in industrial bioprocessing.
The combination of bio-design tools and biofoundries is producing the digital biology that could
revolutionise the manufacture of many desirable bio-based products. A feature of the biofoundry
approach consistent with modern manufacturing is that the design site (the biofoundry) can be totally
separated from the manufacturing site (typically the biorefinery).
Figure 7.1. The biofoundry’s DBTL cycle
Note: The iterative DBTL cycle forms the core of the biofoundry. Biofoundries design DNA parts through computational methods and
assemble those parts, prototyping and testing the performance of designs in living cells. These are followed by the application of machine
learning tools to inform the design process. Iterations of the DBTL cycle result in genetic designs that aim to fulfil the design specifications.

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The biofoundry as a public-private partnership
Biofoundries exist, albeit in small numbers (Figure 7.2). As with other areas of bio-based production, the
private sector may not be willing to take the risk of building expensive infrastructure in the absence of
supportive policy or a market in which the products can compete on price. To advance the diffusion of this
technology, many biofoundries have been built using public support.
Figure 7.2. A limited but growing number of public biofoundries
Ideally, private-sector enterprises can interact with public facilities to advance their R&D capabilities,
creating true public-private partnerships. When industry sectors come together to identify high-risk, capital-
intensive fundamental research questions aligned with government priorities, high-impact partnerships can
result, and major barriers preventing bioeconomy advances can be overcome. There exist relatively few
working models for such partnerships, but the Agile BioFoundry (ABF) in the United States is an interesting
example (Box 7.2). The ABF acts as a nucleus for developing industrial and innovation ecosystems for the
bioeconomy. Some of the best-known synthetic biology companies in the United States have worked on
projects with the ABF (Philp and Winickoff, 2019[8]). A biofoundry like the ABF is able to perform this
function because it aligns perfectly with a central tenet of distributed manufacturing, namely, that much of
the physical supply chain is replaced by digital information. Such infrastructure is expected to enable
smaller (and even micro-scale) manufacturing much closer to the end user (Srai et al., 2016[9]).
Box 7.2. The Agile BioFoundry

The ABF is a facility of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). This public infrastructure investment
totalling USD 20 million per year is designed to increase US industrial competitiveness while creating
opportunities for private-sector growth and jobs. Any legal entity within the United States or abroad is
eligible to use the platform, subject to DOE review/approval and the terms specified in the two primary
contractual mechanisms governing the performed work: Collaborative Research and Development
Agreements (CRADAs) and the Strategic Partnership Program (SPP).1 The ABF operates under full

168 
cost-recovery accounting practices, meaning that collaborators pay for labour and laboratory
consumables.
Interaction is strongly influenced by intellectual property (IP) arrangements, which are governed by the
contracting mechanism (CRADA vs. SPP). For SPP projects, which are typically smaller in scope than
CRADAs, a US-owned partner (such as a company) using non-federal funding to pay for the project
can elect title to all project inventions. For CRADA projects, IP ownership follows inventorship. If
DOE funding supports any of the work (i.e. “for DOE lab inventions”), the collaborator can choose
between a six-month no-cost option on a royalty-bearing exclusive licence in a field of use, or an 18-
month no-cost option on a royalty-bearing non-exclusive licence in all fields of use. The CRADA is non-
negotiable. If no DOE funds are used for the project, the CRADA is negotiable, and the collaborator is
offered the standard six-month option on an exclusive licence in a field of use.
It is possible, as part of CRADA projects, for companies to embed their employees within the ABF as
they pursue the collaborative work. Non-governmental organisations and foundations may help co-
ordinate activities (e.g. through the Global Biofoundry Alliance (Hillson et al., 2019[10])) and set the
standards practised at the ABF (e.g. the Synthetic Biology Open Language). 2
Potential applications
Vaccines
Despite several important outbreaks of viral disease during the first decades of the 21st century, the vaccine
industry is being challenged. An important study (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and
Medicine, 2020[11]) indicated that the amount spent by the United States on vaccines “appears to be
insignificant compared with that spent on other medical and social interventions that may have lesser social
benefits.” Fixed costs for traditional vaccine production plants are very high. Even if there exists
theoretically no shortage of a particular vaccine, there is every chance that there exists a shortage in the
places where it is most needed – i.e. close to the location of disease outbreak. Transportation of vaccines
often depends on a very robust cold chain, but many instances of cold-chain temperature failures have
been recorded.
Engineering biology could present a useful set of tools in this context. Several COVID-19 vaccines either
in current use or in late-stage clinical trials are messenger RNA (mRNA) vaccines, which are amenable to
an engineering biology approach. The mRNA is specifically designed to produce the exact antigens
required to counteract the target virus. Many prototypes can be designed and built in biofoundries. This
approach presents a number of advantages. First, production/manufacture can be achieved directly in the
laboratory, cell-free and egg-free. Second, instead of transporting a vaccine over a cold chain that often
fails, it is digital information that is transferred to a small production plant close to where the vaccine is
actually needed. Third and most importantly, speed is of the essence. (Ulmer, Mansoura and Geall,
2015[12]) described a proof of concept for the production of a self-amplifying mRNA influenza vaccine, from
gene synthesis to formulation and release, in 13 days, which they anticipated could be reduced to 5 days.
Various existing non-commercial biofoundries offer an integrated infrastructure, including automated high-
throughput equipment to enable prototyping biological testing standards and developing liquid-handling
workflows for diagnostic testing of SARS-CoV-2 (Crone et al., 2020[13]). The biofoundry can also be applied
to the design of certain vaccine types (Ulmer, Mansoura and Geall, 2015[12]).
Beyond the potential of engineering biology in vaccine design, it is also important to consider its use in
design and optimisation of vaccine (and other viral vector) bio-manufacturing processes and cell lines to
enhance production. Similarly, engineering biology has myriad applications in design and optimisation of

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cellular therapeutics, and their parallel manufacturing processes; this becomes important when considering
point of care delivery of cell products.
In some sectors – particularly chemistry – replacing the economies-of-scale model is difficult, since great
efficiencies have been achieved by centralised, large-scale manufacturing. In pharmaceutical production,
however, there exist compelling reasons for the industry to scale down (National Academies of Sciences,
Engineering, and Medicine, 2020[11]). An essential enabler is that many pharmaceuticals – especially
biopharmaceuticals – do not respond to economies of scale. This is certainly true of vaccines: compared
to commodity chemicals, they are high-value, low production-volume products. Simply increasing
production volume would not translate into lower costs or prices.
The engineering biology approach also lends itself to the vision of so-called distributed manufacturing3 in
small facilities at many locations that might offer a more attractive production model. The combination of
remote design facilities like biofoundries and small-scale production plants located as close as possible to
the point of care makes sense in a world that needs to act much more urgently when threatened by new
disease outbreaks and pandemics. The pharmaceuticals industry is, in fact, looking at ways to downsize:
biopharmaceuticals do not respond to economies of scale in the same way that commodity chemicals do.
Distributed manufacturing could help “democratise” the responses to pandemics (National Academies of
Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 2020[14]) and oppose the spectre of “vaccine nationalism”
(Weintraub, Bitton and Rosenberg, 2020[15]). Vaccine manufacturers in developing countries already
supply more than half of the vaccines used in developing-country immunisation programmes, so the
capabilities exist. Implementing distributed manufacturing is a matter of political will and further diffusion
of the relevant technologies.
Diagnostics and medical devices
Beyond vaccines, the biofoundry/distributed manufacturing approach is also applicable to diagnostics and
medical devices. The potential of the approach was demonstrated by (Crone et al., 2020[13]), who showed
that an automated SARS-CoV-2 clinical diagnostics technical platform designed and developed in a
biofoundry could be quickly deployed and scaled.
Other trends in bio-based products
Engineering biology partly owes its appeal to its ability to act as a platform technology across a wide range
of the most important economic sectors (Figure 7.3). The need to reduce carbon emissions and fossil-fuel
consumption also represents an opportunity for engineering biology to emerge as a service and
manufacturing sector: by 2100, more than 95% of chemicals and polymers may need to be derived from
renewable resources (Devaney, 2016[16]). Applications for engineering biology even exist in space: the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration in the United States, for example, supports engineering
biology to reduce the risks associated with space exploration (U.S. Government Accountability Office,
2018[17]). Back on Earth, engineering biology could be used to engineer microbes to produce targeted
nutrients for human consumption, while bacteria could be manipulated to produce lightweight construction
tools and materials. With this range of applications in mind, engineering biology needs to make the leap
from a science-centred discipline to a field of engineering that incorporates modern paradigms of
manufacturing.

170 
Figure 7.3. Engineering biology: A potential platform in many important economic sectors
Note: applications in bold are those for which the earliest impacts have yet to be seen.
The shift from biofuels to higher-value bio-based products
Consistent with an alignment on sustainability goals, the earliest commercial scale efforts in engineering
biology focused on producing liquid biofuels. Some high-profile initial public offerings targeting this area
were launched in 2010-12, especially in the United States. Despite many research successes, these
companies were unprepared for the magnitude of the task of bringing a liquid biofuel to sufficient scale to
significantly influence the market for fossil fuels (Westfall and Gardner, 2011[18]). Further, there was much
criticism about the sustainability of the feedstock used, and their impacts on carbon emissions.
“Second-generation” engineering biology companies have since emerged, targeting higher-value, lower
production-volume products (Check Hayden, 2014[19]). The commercialisation of synthetic biology vanillin
is one notable recent success. Used in many products, synthetic vanillin is typically produced from
petrochemicals or chemically derived from lignin (wood pulp). The Swiss company Evolva created a
genetically modified yeast that converts sugars to vanillin. It is the first major synthetic biology food additive
to hit supermarkets, and others are in development. Flavours and fragrances can command prices ranging
from USD 10 to USD 10 000 per kilogramme, compared with around USD 1 per kilogramme for biofuels.
New materials: Spider silks
The application of engineering biology to the development of new materials is a promising avenue for
innovation. Spider silks, the sturdiest known biological materials, are an interesting example. They are
stronger than steel and tougher than Kevlar® but also flexible, with a large range of applications. Spider
silks are lightweight and virtually invisible to the human immune system, leading to “revolutionary potential”
for medicine and industry (Babb et al., 2017[20]). Engineering biologists are interested in spider silks
because they can be customised for different materials and applications. Among the newer potential
applications of spider silk are microphones in hearing aids and cell phones. The German company AMSilk
has entered into an agreement with Airbus to develop structural materials for aircraft using synthetic spider
silk, and Adidas has developed a biodegradable shoe using this material. Silk also has high-value
applications in cosmetics, and Givaudan has acquired the cosmetics business of AMSilk.

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Adipic acid as a petrochemical equivalent
Whereas spider silk represents an entirely new industrial material, many of the products derived from
synthetic biology are petrochemical drop-ins, i.e. bio-based, sustainable equivalents of an existing
petrochemical. Switching to bio-based alternatives has proven difficult for a variety of reasons, including
that many of these petrochemicals are produced very efficiently (although unsustainably, with large
GHG emissions). A classic example is adipic acid, one of the most important small molecules in the modern
chemicals industry and an intermediate in the production of nylon. Industrial production of adipic acid relies
on fossil feedstocks and produces large amounts of nitrous oxide, a GHG that is 300 times more potent
than carbon dioxide (CO2). (Suitor, Varzandeh and Wallace, 2020[21]) described the first synthesis of adipic
acid from guaiacol, a lignin-derived feedstock, in the biotechnology industry workhorse bacterium E. coli.
Lignin is available in large quantities and is recalcitrant to many applications. It is effectively a waste
product, and its conversion to adipic acid using synthetic biology keeps it in circulation, contributing both
to the bioeconomy and the circular economy.
Green chemistry
Green chemistry and automated chemistry are obvious technologies for convergence with engineering
biology. Automated chemistry is also developing rapidly, using the same principles as engineering biology,
i.e. robotics, artificial intelligence and machine learning (Coley et al., 2019[22]).
A potential example of chemistry/biology convergence is graphene, which conducts electricity better than
copper and will eventually find its way into consumer electronics. Electricity conductance and flexibility
mean that graphene has a very wide range of potential applications, from energy-storage devices to lighting
and displays, solar panels, tyres, bicycle frames and fashion items (Mertens, 2018[23]). For example,
deformable graphene batteries with flexible, foldable, and/or stretchable capabilities are ideal for wearable
and portable electronics (Ye et al., 2018[24]), and graphene may be the material of choice for 3D printable
batteries. However, the cost of graphene has until now been much higher than mass-market applications
can support.
Researchers at the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) in Australia
have created a new method of graphene synthesis, which involves heating cheap and available soybean
oil in air until it breaks down into carbon-building units that are essential for the synthesis of graphene (Seo
et al., 2017[25]). The CSIRO researchers demonstrated the versatility of the method by using other
renewable carbon-containing materials, such as butter. It is conceivable that automated biology could
produce the optimum bio-based feedstocks for this conversion, while automated chemistry would create
graphene molecules for different applications.
Long-term data storage
By 2040, if all data were stored for instant access, the global data archive would consume 10 to 100 times
the expected supply of microchip-grade silicon (Zhirnov et al., 2016[26]). Without radical change, a data
crunch may be unavoidable. The storage potential of DNA is shown to vastly exceed the storage potential
of all other media. In fact, it is estimated that all the world’s data could be stored in one kilogramme of DNA
(Extance, 2016[27]). At first sight, it seems far-fetched to store digital data in DNA, but this technology is
already leaving research laboratories: companies such as Twist Bioscience are seriously engaging with
DNA storage for research and commercial purposes.4 Although currently expensive, storage costs are
likely to drop as the customer base increases.

172 
Emerging issues and policy implications
Several governments, notably the People’s Republic of China, the United Kingdom and the United States,
have invested heavily in engineering biology. To sustain such commitments, the engineering biology
community needs to provide more examples of success in transforming ideas into commercial products
and services (OECD, 2014[28]). Creating the enabling conditions for the development of engineering biology
would require a range of policy interventions addressing specific issues along bio-based value chains, as
well as more generic framework conditions. Among the most critical policy interventions in this area are
those discussed in Figure 7.4, notably: developing a pre-competitive infrastructure and innovation
ecosystem for engineering biology, addressing systemic business risk in bio-based value chains, ensuring
the sustainability of feedstocks and supply chains, enhancing policy co-ordination, promoting public
acceptance of these technologies and preventing potential digital-security risks.
Figure 7.4. A bioeconomy policy framework
Source: Ole Jørgen Marvik and Jim Philp (2020[29]), The systemic challenge of the bioeconomy: A policy framework for transitioning towards a
sustainable carbon cycle economy, https://doi.org/10.15252/embr.202051478.
Pre-competitive public infrastructure
Perhaps the most pressing issue for governments today is to develop the basic pre-competitive
infrastructure and innovation ecosystems for engineering biology. An interesting test case is the United
Kingdom, which has invested since 2014 some GBP 350 million in synthetic and engineering biology
infrastructure, comprising basic research centres, biofoundries and an industrial translation centre. Since
then, around 180 engineering biology companies have been launched, and public investment has
leveraged approximately a six-fold private investment.5

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Business risks in the value chain
Bio-based value chains often find themselves in direct competition with fossil-based value chains. This
represents a high hurdle, especially if bio-based products are to conform to the higher standards demanded
by sustainability. Without attention to sustainability and carbon footprints, bio-based value chains will not
be compatible with climate-change objectives.
Bio-based value chains are new and unproven. Although the technologies and ambitions of engineering
biology are attractive, investors will look to the entire value chain. If weaknesses are apparent, from the
feedstocks to the products and even beyond (e.g. end of life for bioplastics), investors may look elsewhere.
This represents a “systemic business risk” (Marvik and Philp, 2020[29]). This risk is especially important in
small countries: even small advanced countries can suffer from a lack of home-grown biotechnology, which
has to be imported. Providing the public infrastructure described above is one way to address this, so that
investors and the private sector are confident that a government is serious about promoting engineering
biology in a sustainable manufacturing future.
That being said, global private-sector investments in synthetic biology have increased steadily year on
year since 2009, with a significant acceleration in 2018 (Figure 7.5). Investments came from a variety of
sources: established biotechnology firms like Bayer and Novartis, investment groups such as SoftBank
and start-up accelerators.
Figure 7.5. Investments in the synthetic biology industry, 2009-18
Note: Figures for all of 2019 were not available. The investments for the first two quarters of 2019 showed a similar trend, amounting to just
under USD 2 billion in total.
Source: Redrawn from Synbiobeta data, published in Cumbers (2019) https://www.forbes.com/sites/johncumbers/2019/09/04/synthetic-biology-
has-raised-124-billion-here-are-five-sectors-it-will-soon-disrupt/#5f2492803a14 (accessed 14 September 2020).
The United States and the United Kingdom are the most prominent investors in synthetic biology start-ups,
with over USD 12 billion invested so far (Clarke and Kitney, 2020[30]). To date, health-related biotechnology
applications have dominated product commercialisation. Synthetic biology start-ups developing tools and
services account for between 10% (in the United Kingdom) and 25% (in the United States) of private
investment activity.
Around 20% of synthetic biology start-ups address industrial biotechnology targets, but they currently only
attract around 11% in private investment, often due to the scale-up issue discussed above. While there
exist some key technical barriers to scale-up, a number of policy interventions could help overcome some
of the difficulties. (Clarke and Kitney, 2020[30]) cite the need for the various stakeholders to adopt a more
networked approach linking specialists, infrastructure and ongoing research to de-risk the economic
challenges of scale-up. If governments see this as part of the future of manufacturing, then an effective
long-term funding strategy is needed, but one that addresses the outstanding scale-up issues. A promising

174 
field in this regard is cell-free synthetic biology as the presence of the microbial cell itself is responsible for
some scale-up difficulties (Kelwick, Webb and Freemont, 2020[31]).6
Previous OECD work has highlighted that balanced measures on both the supply and demand side are
needed in order to diffuse a technology (OECD, 2011[32]). Bioeconomy policies face this balancing act
across diverse sectors, including industrial manufacturing, agriculture, forestry, marine resources and
waste management. Many bioeconomy forums, including multiple OECD workshops (Philp and Winickoff,
2019[8]), highlight the need for a wide range of supply- and demand-side policies. Governments have
traditionally preferred supply-side measures, yet demand-side measures, such as public procurement of
bio-based products, would send strong signals to bioeconomy stakeholders. 7 This is not easy for various
reasons. Public procurers are known to be cost-sensitive, and many bio-based products (such as
bioplastics) still struggle to compete with their fossil equivalents on price. The United States Department
of Agriculture (USDA) BioPreferred Program 8 is the only prominent example of a successful public
procurement policy for bio-based products that specifies sustainability criteria. To date, the USDA has
identified 139 categories of bio-based products for which agencies and their contractors have purchasing
requirements. Each mandatory purchasing category specifies the minimum bio-based content for products
within the category.
Policy co-ordination
All of the policy areas highlighted above need to be addressed to avoid value-chain weaknesses and
failure. This is a whole-of-government issue that needs to be co-ordinated. A good approach might be to
establish an independent advisory body, akin to the German Bioeconomy Council. 9 Such a body could
help align diverse ministries and facilitate the interaction of government and industry. If a country
possesses a synthetic biology or engineering biology roadmap, the advisory body could be asked to ensure
that its milestones and deadlines are met.
Roadmaps themselves can also be used as policy co-ordination tools, although synthetic biology
roadmaps are currently rare and have different intentions. Investments in centres of excellence and
technology platforms, as well as in accelerating technology to market, are the most common steps being
considered (Table 7.1).
Table 7.1. Most common recommendations from synthetic and engineering biology roadmaps
Recommendations Australia Finland France United Engineering Biology European (Le Feuvre and
Kingdom Research Consortium Union Scrutton,
(2012)10 (EBRC, 2019[33])11 2018[34])
Centres of excellence /      
technology platforms
Education/training      
Safety/security    
regulation/governance
Acceleration to market       
Public/stakeholder    
engagement
International aspects      
Public acceptance
Another important, but often overlooked, issue is public acceptance (OECD, 2017[35]); see Chapter 8 in
this volume). As engineering biology applications become more entrenched in future markets, the

 175
representative organisations will become increasingly visible to the public. To avoid repeating past
mistakes in communicating around genetically modified organisms, scientists, technologists, practitioners
and policy makers need to work closely with biofoundry operators and the public to shape and guide future
developments (Dixon, Curach and Pretorius, 2020[36]).
Digital security: An emerging threat for policy makers
There exist many ways to launch a cyberattack on a bio-production company. The convergence and
integration of robotics, microfluidics, cell-free systems design, synthetic metabolic engineering and other
technologies will reveal new vulnerabilities and offer new opportunities for nefarious actions (Richardson
et al., 2019[37]).
The ability to separate design from manufacturing completely could heighten such threats. Ultimately,
design will be possible from any location (including home), exacerbating potential threats to manufacturing
facilities. Many different types of organisations are involved in bio-production security, from feedstock
suppliers, through information technology professionals at law firms and IP offices, to customers. Digital
security is only as strong as the weakest link in the overall system of protection, and calls for co-operation
across many private and public institutions. Moreover, because attacks can also be launched by hostile
governments, countries must act to develop the policy and infrastructure to prevent cyber-attacks (OECD,
2020[38]).
Future outlook
Given the current context of multiple sustainability crises and now the COVID-19 pandemic, science,
technology and innovation (STI) systems are redirecting their efforts towards grand challenges, and
reimagining in the process the ends and means of technological development (see Chapter 8). The health
crisis has only accelerated the trend towards a greater mission orientation in the STI system, highlighting
the importance of steering technology to address the most pressing problems. Clearly, many kinds of
socio-technical solutions will need to be pursued simultaneously to address the uncertainties and complex
challenges facing humanity.
This chapter has explored how engineering biology might contribute in time to novel approaches towards
vaccine development and sustainability, given the new salience of mRNA approaches and the new-found
convergence between the biotechnology and digital technologies embodied in the biofoundry. Significant
policy and technological barriers exist, and will need to be addressed. The payoffs are potentially large:
technological developments might open up new opportunities for manufacturing across a range of sectors
and for a wide range of products, whether medicines, new materials or greener chemicals.
In the context of the current COVID-19 pandemic, this chapter has argued that engineering biology
provides a model that is well-suited to overcoming the shortcomings of modern vaccine, diagnostics and
antibody production. Looking towards the future, the opposite is also true. For a domain like engineering
biology, in which the promise frequently outstrips the reality in terms of the actual economic and social
impact, the COVID-19 crisis is an opportunity to realise the overall potential of the field. Such successes,
if they can be accomplished, would bolster public confidence in these technologies.
With the emergence of viable mRNA vaccine approaches against COVID-19, and other developments in
biotechnology, it is clear how engineering biology could be leveraged to address significant global
challenges – not only for vaccines, but also cancer treatment, personalised medicine, sustainable fuels
and industrial chemicals, remediation of polluted environments and food supplies. But research is far from
capitalising on its fullest potential.

176 
Figure 7.4 outlines many tracks for future policy options. To develop the field, governments could:
 establish pre-competitive infrastructure and collaborative platforms, such as networked
biofoundries and research consortia, by ensuring long-term and stable funding for engineering
biology research and translational infrastructures, and accelerate its commercialisation by
supporting the growth of an ecosystem of start-ups;
 address systemic business risk in bio-based value chains, e.g. by supporting translation and testing
of technical scaling activities, including access to technical expertise and guidance, as well as
equipment for start-ups and smaller businesses;
 support engagement of scientists, technologists, practitioners and policy makers with biofoundry
operators, members of the public and stakeholder groups, to promote trust in (and trustworthiness
of) the technology;
 support strong science-industry collaboration, e.g. by introducing support specific to these types of
risky technologies, such as proof-of-concept funding, to determine whether larger-scale
collaboration is warranted; and
 build multidisciplinary environments and transdisciplinary skills to promote convergence (as
engineering biology extends beyond traditional discipline boundaries, drawing from engineering,
biology, data science and physical sciences, and multidisciplinary environments are key to its
success), and rely on people who can communicate across disciplines.
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Notes
1 https://agilebiofoundry.org/work-with-us/ (accessed 14 September 2020).
2 https://sbolstandard.org/ (accessed 14 September 2020).
3https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/03/top-10-emerging-technologies-of-2015-2/ (accessed 15 September

2020).
4 https://twistbioscience.com/products/storage (accessed 10 July 2020).
5 Richard Kitney, personal communication.
6At the time of writing, an annual conference held in Canada is dedicated solely to scale-up. Learn more at:
https://www.scalingupconference.ca/ (accessed 15 September 2020).
7In OECD member countries, public procurement accounts for 12% of gross domestic product on average and
29% of total government expenditures, with a significant effect on trade flows (OECD, 2018[39]).
8 https://www.biopreferred.gov/BioPreferred/ (accessed 15 September 2020).
9 https://biooekonomierat.de/en/ (accessed 10 July 2020).
10 (UK Synthetic Biology Coordination Group, 2012[40])
11An example of a non-government initiative along similar lines is the EBRC roadmap (EBRC, 2019[33]). This very
detailed technical roadmap, along the lines of industry roadmaps, consists of a matrixed framework that considers
challenges, bottlenecks and other limitations observed or predicted in research, development and applications in
engineering biology tools and technologies. This is done by combining a bottom-up approach, focusing on tool and
technology innovations, and a top-down approach, focusing on how engineering biology can tackle national and
global challenges.

180 
8 Governance of science, technology

and innovation for crisis and
recovery
In contrast to the 2008-09 global financial crisis, science, technology and

innovation is central to providing solutions to the COVID-19 crisis, and is
clearly seen to be doing so. These solutions are shaped by the ways in
which governments organise themselves, the sorts of relationships they
have with other groups, including businesses and civil society
organisations, and the resources they have at their disposal, including
expertise and other capabilities. The chapter focuses on how various
governance arrangements deployed by countries influence both their
response to the current crisis and their scope for dealing with the
challenges of the recovery phase. It covers governments’ use of scientific
advice to underpin COVID-19 policy, its use of digital tools to improve policy
design and tackle the misinformation “infodemic”, and its approaches to
cross-government coordination. The chapter also covers governments’
experiments with mission-oriented innovation policies and responsible
innovation practices.

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Key findings
 Governments should reinforce public trust in policy through scientific advice. Public
trust is critical for ensuring support and compliance with policy measures, such as the
wearing of masks and social distancing, and requires openness and transparency on the
data and information underpinning these measures. Governments should carefully
communicate uncertainties and provide a balanced presentation of potential scenarios.
They should also draw upon multi-disciplinary advisory mechanisms to ensure they
consider different types of expertise when developing policy.
 Governments should link support for emerging technologies to broader missions
that encapsulate responsible innovation principles. This will help ensure an alignment
of emerging technology development with the objectives of mission-oriented innovation
policies. The responsible innovation approach seeks to anticipate problems in the course
of innovation and steer technology to best outcomes, and emphasises the inclusion of
stakeholders in the innovation process. This makes it well suited to mission-oriented
innovation policies, which tend to target grand societal challenges, such as the ‘green
transition’.
 Governments will need to renew their policy frameworks and capabilities to carry out
a more ambitious science and innovation policy agenda. Through their recovery and
stimulus packages, governments have potentially more leverage to initiate a transition to
more sustainable and equitable futures. Governments will also need to invest in
preparedness measures, including technology platforms, infrastructures and collaborative
networks that improve countries’ abilities to respond effectively to a diverse range of risks.
These roles and objectives require governments to acquire appropriate skills and
capabilities to fulfil them, including dynamic capabilities that support learning and
adaptability, which are needed for policy agility in times of great uncertainty.

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Introduction
Countries’ governance arrangements shape their research and innovation responses to the current
COVID-19 crisis and will influence the contribution of science, technology and innovation (STI) to the
recovery. These arrangements are broad in scope and include the ways governments set directions and
choose priorities, their relationships with other actors in the innovation system, and the technologies they
use to govern (including digital and social technologies).
The first part of the chapter primarily relates to how governments have responded to the COVID-19 crisis:
 One of the more visible – and most debated – aspects of this response is the use of scientific
advice in designing policies. Previous OECD work has formulated guidelines on providing and
using scientific advice in international crises like COVID-19. The chapter reviews these guidelines
and considers how governments have followed them in their policy making.
 Governments are undergoing a digital transformation, which will profoundly change the ways they
govern. The pandemic, its impacts, and responses to it all leave digital traces, which governments
are increasingly exploiting to respond to the crisis. The COVID-19 crisis has led to unprecedented
uses of new digital tools and data to inform policy, which could accelerate the digitalisation of
science and innovation policy itself. This chapter highlights some of the initiatives put in place by
governments to inform citizens of the latest developments on COVID-19 and tackle the “infodemic”
of misinformation.
 Most parts of government are responding to the crisis in one way or another, leading to risks of
duplication and insufficient scale if efforts are fragmented. Contemporary governance is highly
distributed in most OECD countries, involving ministries and implementation agencies, as well as
various degrees of subnational autonomy. This presents multiple co-ordination challenges for
governments when responding to COVID-19. The chapter focuses on just one axis, horizontal
cross-government co-ordination of STI responses to the pandemic. Most governments have set up
mechanisms, for instance, to co-ordinate calls for research proposals. The chapter outlines the
benefits and challenges, and highlights a few examples of how countries are trying to improve
policy co-ordination.
The second part of the chapter focuses on STI governance arrangements for the recovery phase. It returns
to a few of the big challenges already facing STI policy before the pandemic crisis hit, including whether
and how to set directions in STI policy, how to account sufficiently for longer-term concerns in defining
sound policies, and how to be inclusive in policy processes and outcomes to meet grand societal
challenges. The chapter covers the following topics:
 Governments’ ongoing experiments with “mission-oriented innovation policies” (MOIPs), which
have tended to target “grand societal challenges”, could feature more prominently in the STI policy
mix, for instance as part of recovery packages targeting “green transitions”. The chapter provides
a simple typology of MOIPs and maps some MOIPs targeting health and healthcare.
 While science and technology will be essential to address challenges like sustainability and ageing,
they can also raise societal concerns, as witnessed during previous waves of technological change.
Indeed, many of the barriers to enabling emerging technologies lie not in the technology itself, but
in technology governance. The OECD has developed an approach to “responsible innovation” that
aims to enhance societal capacities to shape technology through its course of development, so
that it might advance to market under conditions of trust. The chapter outlines how the OECD has
applied this approach to the new OECD Recommendation on Responsible Innovation in
Neurotechnology.
 A final section looks ahead to how STI governance and policy making may need to change if they
are to play a role in redirecting economies and societies towards more equitable, sustainable and
resilient futures. It considers how governments might adapt four key areas – policy goals,

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frameworks, practices and capabilities – to meet the ambitious STI policy agenda that is now
emerging.
Scientific advice in times of crisis
Science is informing the policy response to the COVID-19 pandemic and providing the greatest hope of a
long-term solution. Even in where the role of experts has been questioned, policy makers find themselves
turning to experts for advice. In some countries, the political leadership has even devolved much of the
responsibility for communicating and explaining its policy choices to scientific experts. Different standing
systems are in place for providing scientific advice to policy makers, often supplemented by additional
ad hoc mechanisms in times of crisis. While most OECD countries rely on national expertise, many lesser-
developed economies rely more on international sources of advice. As the pandemic has evolved, the
requirements for scientific advice have become increasingly distributed across ministries and geographic
scales – local, national and international.
The scientific evidence informing the policy response to COVID-19 is incomplete and conditional: as more
data is collected, the scientific understanding of COVID-19 changes. This dynamic situation is a challenge
for the scientific community, at a time when policy makers and the public seek assurances and certainty.
Consensus is difficult to achieve, but communicating uncertainties and alternative views can undermine
trust in scientific advice and related policies. In such circumstances, those providing advice need to be
supported by an effective national (and international) scientific advisory system that complies with several
basic principles (Box 8.1). Attention to these principles will both enhance the efficiency and quality of the
scientific advice provided and help ensure the necessary trust between scientists, policy makers and the
public.
Box 8.1. Principles for an effective and trustworthy scientific advisory system
An effective and trustworthy scientific advisory process needs to:
1. Have a clear remit, with defined roles and responsibilities for its various actors. This includes having:
a. a clear definition and – insofar as possible – a clear demarcation of advisory vs. decision-
making functions and roles
b. defined roles and responsibilities, and the necessary expertise for communication
c. an ex ante definition of the legal role and potential liability of all individuals and institutions
involved
d. the necessary institutional, logistical and personnel support relative to its remit.
2. Involve the relevant actors, i.e. scientists, policy makers and other stakeholders, as necessary. This
includes:
a. using a transparent process for participation, and following strict procedures for declaring,
verifying and dealing with conflicts of interest
b. engaging all the necessary scientific expertise across disciplines to address the issue at
hand
c. giving explicit consideration to whether and how to engage non-scientific experts and/or
civil society stakeholders in framing and/or generating the advice
d. having the effective procedures necessary for timely exchange of information, and co-
ordination with different national and international counterparts.

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3. Produce advice that is sound, unbiased and legitimate. Such advice should:
a. be based on the best available scientific evidence
b. explicitly assess and communicate scientific uncertainties
c. be preserved from political (and other vested-interest group) interference
d. be generated and used in a transparent and accountable manner.
Source: OECD (2015[1]), “Scientific Advice for Policy Making: The Role and Responsibility of Expert Bodies and Individual Scientists”, OECD
Science, Technology and Industry Policy Papers, No. 21, OECD Publishing, Paris. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5js33l1jcpwb-en.
The OECD has identified five key areas that are particularly important in providing and using scientific
advice in international crises such as COVID-19 (OECD, 2018[2]):
1. Enhancing capacity to provide advice that fits the national context: there exist differences in
countries’ capacity and structures, not only to develop and provide scientific evidence on the status
and likely direction of a crisis, but also to provide evidence on the likely effectiveness of different
policy interventions. Both aspects are important, but may require different types of expertise.
Unless advisory systems are organised to bring different disciplines and perspectives together on
an equal footing, there exists a danger that not all of the pertinent scientific evidence will be
considered in developing policy. This is increasingly an issue in relation to COVID-19 as the longer-
term effects of current policy actions, such as social distancing, become apparent. Certainly, many
OECD countries do have multidisciplinary advisory mechanisms, but it is not clear that all countries
are fully taking into account potentially useful scientific knowledge.
2. International co-operation: the World Health Organization (WHO) is the intergovernmental body
with the remit to monitor and co-ordinate the response to global pandemics of infectious diseases
(see Chapter 5). The WHO has its own scientific advisory mechanisms. It releases data,
information and advice for all countries, which are publicly available and updated daily. The
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control also plays a co-ordination role and supports
European countries with advice on responding to the epidemic. In addition, a variety of ad hoc co-
ordination mechanisms have been implemented in response to COVID-19, including regular
meetings of scientific advisors from Group of Seven and Group of Twenty countries. Most
OECD countries consider the information emanating from international bodies as an important
supplement to their own national advisory mechanisms, but certainly do not feel limited or bound
by this advice (OECD, 2018[2]). The situation is somewhat different for lesser-developed
economies, which are generally much more dependent on WHO advice – often in association with
bilateral inputs from strategic partners. However, cultural practices and norms are critical for
developing effective mitigation strategies. Policy interventions that are applicable in one country
will not necessarily be as directly applicable or effective in other countries. International scientific
research networks can play an important role in building and maintaining local scientific capacity
that can be called on in times of crisis.
3. Promoting mutual understanding and trust among people and networks: promoting trust between
different advisors and users of scientific data, information and advice is a long-term challenge. It
requires appropriate support, mandates and incentives at the national level, and mechanisms for
building mutual understanding at the international level. Openness and transparency regarding the
data and information underpinning the scientific advice given in different countries is critical. This,
in turn, entails support for international scientific networks and infrastructures that can complement
and implement formal international frameworks – including, with specific regard to COVID-19, the
WHO International Health Regulations.

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4. Being prepared and learning from past experience: preparation for health pandemics ideally begins
in times of calm, i.e. before crises occur. Most OECD countries do organise drills and exercises,
involving their public health agencies and crisis management bodies, to rehearse possible
scenarios during an actual crisis. Valuable as they are, such exercises may not always be given
the priority they deserve and may not always engage all the necessary actors. They are more
difficult to organise and more expensive at the international level – and unless conducted regularly,
the turnover of individuals can mean that their value is reduced. Thus, establishing clearly defined
structures with long-term responsibilities for crisis management and related scientific advisory
processes is important for learning from the past to inform the present and future.
5. Communication with the public: no matter how good the scientific advice, and how well it is
integrated into crisis management and decision-making processes, the manner in which it is
communicated to the public will have a major impact on its effectiveness. This is clearly the case
with regard to COVID-19, where the performance of political, medical and scientific leaders has
been closely scrutinised and variously criticised or complimented. It is striking that in many
countries, scientists have become national spokespersons, who are expected not only to provide
scientific evidence, but also to justify policy actions. The reality is that in times of crisis, the
distinction between advisor and policy maker can sometimes be blurred, and public debate about
the scientific data and information accredited with determining policy can be intense.
How are countries meeting these challenges?
The available information suggests that the governments of OECD member countries are assessing and
using scientific advice along the principles outlined above. However, to what extent they are meeting all of
the conditions identified for optimising scientific advice varies considerably. Issues such as clarifying
advisory roles vs. decision-making or communication roles and responsibilities vary across countries and
over time, and are not always transparent. The engagement of many disciplines and non-academic experts
in generating advice appears limited in some countries, although this may change as the public health
imperative shifts to a fuller integration of socio-economic issues. Communication of uncertainties also
seems to vary across countries. This is understandable in a situation where the scientific evidence is
conditional, changing over time as more data and information become available. Nevertheless, when
asked in the OECD Science Flash Survey 20201 how they would rate on a scale between 0 and 10 the
way policy authorities and decision makers in their country have been using scientific advice, 40% of the
responding scientists gave a score between 0 and 4 (where 0 corresponds to the worst and 10 is the best
possible use) (Figure 8.1, Panel A). Two-fifths of survey respondents, however, expected the use of
scientific advice and expertise in policy making to increase after the current pandemic crisis (Figure 8.1,
Panel B).

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Figure 8.1. Scientists’ assessment of the use of science in policy making
A. Views on the current use of scientific advice by policy B. Expected use of scientific advice and expertise in policy
authorities and decision makers making after the current pandemic crisis
Share of total Percentage of responses
Scientist Other Strengthened About the same Weakened Hard to tell
% %
60 100
90
50
80
40 70
60
30 50
40
20
30
10 20
10
0 0
0-4 5-7 8-10 Use of scientific advice by policy Integration of medic al and other
makers scientific expertise for policy
advice
Note: For Panel A, scoring on a scale between 0 and 10, where 0 corresponds to the worst and 10 is the best possible use, respondents were
asked, “How would you rate the way in which policy authorities and decision makers in your country have been using scientific advice?” For
Panel B, respondents were asked, “How do you expect the world of science to emerge out of the current crisis, in terms of (i) use of scientific
advice by policy makers and (ii) integration of medical and other scientific expertise for policy advice?” Besides scientists, “other” respondents
refers to science policy advisors (20%), professionals involved in science (15%), science communicators (10%) and individuals carrying out
science-related administrative work (10%).
Source: OECD Science Flash Survey 2020, https://oecdsciencesurveys.github.io/2020flashsciencecovid/, (accessed 12 October 2020).
Whether or not the policy actions currently being implemented in different countries to limit the effects of
COVID-19 are ultimately judged optimal, they must be based on and reinforce trust across the science
community, between scientists and policy makers, and within the public at large. Trust is critical to enhance
support and compliance with policy measures such as the wearing of masks and social distancing. In the
longer term, it will be important to garner solidarity and broad public support for interventions to ensure
socio-economic recovery.
In the age of social media, openness and transparency are critical. Governments have been criticised for
not providing rapid access to the primary scientific data and models underpinning their decision-making.
Careful communication of uncertainties and balanced presentation of potential scenarios – including worst-
case scenarios – appear to be broadly appreciated and understood by most of the public. The promise –
and hype – associated with potential scientific or medical breakthroughs, such as reports of effective
treatment with chloroquine, can also be managed with careful communication and explanation of scientific
uncertainties by trusted experts.
Digital technologies and data for government decision-making
Digitalisation is profoundly affecting the public sector and the evidence base on which it formulates,
implements, monitors and evaluates public policy. The STI policy field is no exception. In recent years,

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many countries have begun to develop initiatives around digital science and innovation policy to build a
picture of the incidence and impact of their science and innovation activities, and formulate better policies.
The COVID-19 crisis has led to an unprecedented use of new data and digital tools to inform policy,
possibly accelerating a process of innovation in policy making. For example, real-time granular data – such
as daily evidence on COVID-19 cases, hospitalisations, deaths and scientific information on the COVID-
19 pandemic – have helped inform policy actions. New data sources, e.g. data from job portals, have been
used to provide quick information on the sectors and professions most affected by the COVID-19 crisis,
while new tools from data science, computer science and machine learning are being used to automatically
collect and analyse those types of data.
Such tools and data allow for entirely new policy approaches (OECD, 2020[3]; Paunov and Planes-Satorra,
forthcoming[4]). The contact-tracing applications implemented in many OECD countries, which follow the
movement of infected people and alert those who have come into close contact with them, are perhaps
the most striking example. The rich granularity of the information collected (e.g. real-time data on the exact
location of individuals), compared to typical statistical data, allows much more targeted evidence-based
policy approaches, though it also raises challenges related to data quality and privacy (OECD, 2020[5]).
Another prominent example is the proliferation of national COVID-19 portals that monitor the pandemic
and its impacts, typically linking granular data from across government and providing information services
on a variety of issues. In many cases, these portals include open-data application programming interfaces
that allow other portals to download the data for other applications and analyses. Many of these portals
have also been instrumental in tackling the torrent of misinformation and disinformation around COVID-19
(OECD, 2020[6]; OECD, 2020[7]) (Box 8.2).
Box 8.2. Tackling misinformation and disinformation on COVID-19

The global spread of COVID-19 has been accompanied by a wave of disinformation that undermines
policy responses and amplifies distrust and concern among citizens. Online platforms are a key channel
for this disinformation, but they can also play an important role in limiting its circulation (OECD, 2020[6]).
At the same time, governments around the world are using various public communication tools to
counteract disinformation and support policy (OECD, 2020[7]).
Centralising official information in a single website: most countries have created an official website
to provide up-to-date information about COVID-19. Such websites are often a one-stop-shop where
citizens can find official health-related advice (e.g. measures they can take in their daily lives to prevent
the spread of the virus and how to react if they have symptoms.) and information regarding all the
measures taken by national public authorities. Governments also issue statements about COVID-19
through social-media channels (e.g. Twitter, Facebook, Instagram). They also operate official websites
on the coronavirus (e.g. in Australia,2 Denmark,3 Finland,4 France,5 Korea, New Zealand,6 the United
Kingdom,7 Brazil,8 Greece9 and Italy).10 Other information websites are operated by national or regional
health services (e.g. in Finland,11 Norway)12 or organisations for science diffusion (e.g. the Danish
Videnskab.dk and United Kingdom Research and Innovation’s Coronavirus: the science explained).13
Fact-checking services to counter the spread of false information: some countries have created
specific websites to alert the public to the spread of inaccurate and false information. In Germany, the
Federal Ministry of Education and Research’s webpage about fake news related to COVID-1914 is
updated regularly, and findings are diffused through social-media channels. In the United States, the
Federal Emergency Management Agency has developed a Coronavirus Rumor Control website15 to
help the public distinguish between rumours and facts regarding the COVID-19 pandemic. Japan’s
Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare16 and the Flemish Agency of Care and Health 17 have also
created fact-checking webpages.

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Official chatbots, apps and other tools developed in collaboration with technology firms: the
WHO launched the WHO Health Alert,18 a free service on WhatsApp that answers questions from the
public about COVID-19, as well as the “Verified” service offering prompt and reliable responses based
on the latest official health information.19 Several countries have developed (in collaboration with
technology firms) automated chatbots on WhatsApp, e.g. “MyGov Corona Helpdesk” in India. Some
governments have also launched their own COVID-19 app (e.g. Brazil’s “Coronavírus-SUS” and
Ireland’s “HSE COVID 19”) allowing citizens to monitor their symptoms and stay up-to-date on the latest
official information and advice.
Source: Paunov and Planes-Satorra (forthcoming[4]).
The increasing public availability of project-level funding data, often set in the context of public
transparency measures, is enabling related efforts looking specifically at data about R&D funding. It is
currently very difficult to respond to requests for fine-grained information or categories of R&D funding that
do not align with established classifications. This is manifest today with regard to COVID-19 research
funding. It also applies to policy requests for information on research targeting particular technology fields
(e.g. artificial intelligence) and grand challenges (e.g. the Sustainable Development Goals), where there
exists widespread demand for data resources, tools and methods that help identify features of
R&D funding. Funding organisations, and a growing number of commercial providers of research support
services, have been not only compiling and offering access to data, but also providing semantic search
and analytical functionalities using machine learning. However, this remains a fragmented landscape
(OECD, 2018[8]; OECD, 2020[3]) and data could be better shared and exploited, both nationally and
internationally.
Horizontal co-ordination to help fight COVID-19
The virtues of policy co-ordination are well-known and widely accepted. Whole-of-government co-
ordination mechanisms – within and across levels of government – are essential to resolving discrepancies
between sectoral priorities and policies. By concentrating resources towards common objectives, they also
promote coherent and mutually supporting actions across sectors and institutions. Yet policy co-ordination
and coherence remains one of the oldest and most prevalent challenges for governments, made even
more difficult by multidimensional systemic problems such as climate change, ageing societies – or a
pandemic. Such societal challenges involve institutions far beyond those responsible for STI policies.
Two factors are particularly detrimental to ensuring an effective policy response to the COVID-
19 pandemic, making the need for policy co-ordination even more acute:
 Uncertainty: despite a wealth of information and scientific advice, there still exists little consensus
on how the spread of the virus could evolve and how it may be treated. Policy makers must
therefore take decisions amid changing – and at times conflicting – evidence.
 Urgency: when faced with an urgent need to react (as with the COVID-19 situation),
decision makers across all sectors tend to act without sufficient consultation or exchange of
information. Many research and innovation actors have reoriented some of their previously funded
activities towards COVID-19, but often with little guidance from policy makers, or with different
signals and incentives from different organisations.
Greater policy co-ordination within governments can enhance responses to COVID-19 by limiting the
duplication of efforts, ensuring a sufficient scale of efforts, enabling a wider and more sustainable
exploration of potential solutions, and providing greater visibility to initiatives that offer funding for COVID-
19 (OECD, 2020[9]). Co-ordination of STI policies can be achieved in several ways, from top-down strategic

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co-ordination led by a cabinet office (as in Japan), to agency-level co-ordination (as in Norway). There
exists no single best approach, and co-ordinating STI activities to tackle COVID-19 must be adapted to
each country’s specific governance structures.
Co-ordinating STI policy with other policy fields
While many countries have rightly allowed health authorities to lead the initial response to COVID-19,
governments have followed the WHO guidance for national pandemic preparedness plans by establishing
various cross-sectoral mechanisms to co-ordinate actions with other ministries. These have different
activity portfolios aimed at containing, delaying and mitigating the virus, depending on the country’s
strategy and current public health situation.
Co-ordinating COVID-19 research initiatives
Many countries have also established specific governance structures and initiatives to co-ordinate activities
within the STI system itself. One of the goals is to reduce silos between authorities overseeing research
and innovation policies – including in the health area, which remains somewhat separated from the rest of
the STI system in many countries. These efforts vary in scope and focus. They range from collaborative
networks and working groups to integrated programmes and joint calls for research or innovation
proposals, which are commonly used when two or more research agencies or councils pool resources to
solicit and select proposals. These joint initiatives typically cover shorter research and knowledge-transfer
horizons, with results expected in 3 to 12 months. A few are used to support later stages of the innovation
process – for example, developing and rapidly manufacturing new technologies and services for detection
and treatment. A notable example is the Accelerating COVID-19 Therapeutic Interventions and Vaccines
(ACTIV) public-private partnership, led by the United States, which promotes a co-ordinated research
strategy at the federal level to prioritise and speed the development of the most promising treatments and
vaccines. This initiative is headed by the National Institutes of Health, together with other relevant US
agencies, philanthropic organisations and biopharmaceutical companies. It is also linked with the
European Medicines Agency for greater coherence with international efforts (see Chapter 5).
Co-ordinating efforts to communicate about funding opportunities
To complement these initiatives, governments have invested to communicate about research and
innovation funding opportunities from different agencies. Initiatives include inventories and maps of
relevant STI projects, as well as various online platforms and portals that list all the relevant information
on COVID-related STI funding opportunities. Better collection and dissemination of such information
facilitates formal and informal co-ordination across government. For example, the European Commission
has launched the European Research Area (ERA) corona platform, a one-stop shop for information on
coronavirus research and innovation funding (e.g. calls and funded projects). In France, the REACTing
consortium monitors and encourages data sharing, promotes good practices and standardisation of data
collection, and assembles and co-ordinates the French research actors working on COVID-19.
Governments leading collective action: Mission-oriented innovation policies
In parallel to co-ordinated early policy responses, more comprehensive approaches are needed to tackle
COVID-19 in the longer run and prevent future pandemics. Governments’ ongoing experiments with MOIPs
could offer useful lessons in this regard. MOIPs bundle together a range of complementary public
interventions to achieve ambitious goals for which traditionally fragmented STI policies have produced (at
best) mixed results. These co-ordinated “packages” of research and innovation policy and regulatory
measures can span different stages of the innovation cycle, from research to demonstration and market

190 
deployment. They can mix supply-push and demand-pull instruments, and cut across various policy fields.
Several countries are currently experimenting with different types of MOIPs to tackle a broad range of
societal challenges. This section focuses on MOIPs targeting health challenges.
A range of tailor-made systemic policies for different missions
While some models have begun to emerge as countries learn from one another and emulate good
practices, each MOIP is tailored to its objectives, most often combining imperatives to tackle selected
societal challenges and strengthen national competitiveness in new growth areas. Several of these
systemic initiatives are currently implemented in health and healthcare, in pursuit of various goals or
mission statements (Figure 8.2).
Figure 8.2. International map of selected missions in health and healthcare
Note: DARPA refers to Defense Advanced Resarch Projects Agency and PPR refers to Programme prioritaire de recherche (research priority
programme).
The mission-orientation imperative
The need for new approaches to better orient and co-ordinate health-related STI policies arises in the
context of several specific challenges:
 Several intersecting transformations are affecting the sector, notably emerging or evolving threats
such as the COVID-19 pandemic or issues related to an ageing population, the digital
transformation of health and health care, and new trends towards personalised medicine. These
transformations are driven in part by STI developments, but also demand directed STI responses.

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 While health research and innovation is cross-sectoral, it is still often governed by its own “system”
in many countries, with specific institutional structures and funding channels. The system itself is
typically fragmented, with multiple actors operating at different stages of the innovation cycle and
at different governance levels (national, regional or local) through a great variety of support
measures and initiatives. This fragmentation is a challenge to co-ordinate efforts around national
health strategic goals and missions.
The main MOIP models
Scanning the worldwide landscape of MOIP initiatives, two main models are apparent: “national mission-
oriented strategic frameworks” and “challenge-based programmes”. These are briefly summarised in
Table 8.1.
Table 8.1. Basic characteristics of the main MOIP models

Type Leadership Missions Examples
National mission-oriented  Horizon Europe (European
strategic frameworks Union)
 Multiple missions or mission  Mission-driven Top Sectors
areas policy (Netherlands)
 Centre of government (high-
 Pursue ambitious  High Tech Strategy 2025
level committee, cabinet,
challenges, including (Germany)
prime minister)
transformative change  Moonshot R&D Programme
 Long-term horizon (Japan)
Challenge-based programmes  Focused  Pilot-E (Norway)

 Seek incremental or  Industrial Strategy
 Policy implementation body breakthrough results Challenge Fund (United
(ministry, agency)  Better fit for “accelerator” Kingdom)
missions
 Mid- to long-term horizon
 National mission-oriented strategic frameworks are broad initiatives launched at the highest level
of policy making. They provide concrete and ambitious targets within an overall strategic framework
that helps co-ordinate actions among a wide array of public and private actors. In Japan, for
example, the Moonshot R&D Programme was established in 2020 at the national level to solve
six “Moonshot goals”, including the development of ultra-early disease prediction and intervention
by 2050. A characteristic of this programme is its multi-layered governance structure. At the overall
programme level, it is governed by the Moonshot Strategy Council, which gathers different
ministries and agencies to fund and implement the activities. A programme director is assigned to
each goal and is responsible for all projects towards that goal, enabling portfolio management;
project managers are in charge of designing the best team to carry out their project. At the
European Union (EU) level, the “Conquering Cancer” mission – one of the five missions included
in the future Horizon Europe Framework Programme for Research and Innovation (2021-2027) –
has a target of saving more than 3 million lives, and living longer and better by 2030. A dedicated
group of experts, the Cancer Mission Board, is engaged in extensive consultations with Member
States, members of the European Parliament and several Directorates-General of the European
Commission. One novelty of this initiative is its consultation and engagement of EU citizens,
including cancer patients and survivors. This process resulted in a portfolio of European
Commission and Member States actions to be implemented in five main intervention areas. The
next step will be the design of a relevant governance and implementation framework for effective
portfolio management that enables cross-sectoral and cross-institutional coordination. An

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important challenge for these overarching frameworks is to engage a wide range of actors without
broadening or multiplying the missions, and enlisting high-level political actors without sacrificing
the long-term time horizon and boldness of missions.
 Challenge-based programmes focus on solving specific problems and are implemented by
dedicated agencies or programmes. They often pursue ambitious technological or even scientific
challenges, in line with their narrower scope and focus. One of their main objectives is to embed
support for selected projects throughout the innovation chain, from research to market introduction,
to increase the chance of innovation success and accelerate development through closer linkages
between researchers, business firms and users (including patients). Several of these programmes
are implemented by funding agencies and draw on the well-known experience of DARPA in the
United States. An early application of this model in the health area took place in the early 1990s,
when USD 300 million were allocated to the Department of Defense to fight breast cancer. Rather
than apply a bottom-up, curiosity-driven research approach, the Department of Defense used a
directed approach, with significant participation of patient-activists in the planning process and the
final selection of the scientific projects to be funded. The programme funded research that is
credited with developing drugs and therapies considered among the most important advances in
breast cancer treatment in recent decades (Sarewitz, 2016[10]). In a more recent example, the
United Kingdom’s Industrial Strategy Challenge Fund targets four health-related challenges. These
include inventing new ways of detecting and preventing the development of diseases, and the
“healthy ageing challenge”, which asks industry and researchers to develop products and services
to help people remain independent, productive, active and socially connected for longer. Each
challenge mobilises a tailor-made range of instruments to reach its objectives. In Norway, building
on the experience of Pilot-E, a cross-agency integrated scheme aiming to accelerate the
development of sustainable energy solutions, the government plans to set up a Pilot-H scheme to
co-ordinate focused and joined-up interventions in the health area. As of today, many agency-led
challenge-based initiatives are experimental pilots. To have a significant transformational impact,
they will need to be evaluated appropriately. There also needs to be political willingness to scale
them up and elevate them to the national level. Countries such as Austria, Norway and Sweden
are currently at this pivotal stage.
Several of these ambitious systemic policies are created out of a sense of urgency related to the challenge
to be solved, enlisting the high-level political support that is essential to create initiatives of such scale and
scope. However, designing and endowing these policies with the proper resources and governance
structures takes time. The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic has not been the best time to establish
MOIPs, beyond the co-ordinated responses identified in the previous section. Nevertheless, as
government recovery packages embrace longer time horizons, some MOIPs have turned to COVID-19
and post-COVID-19 challenges. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Japan’s Moonshot programme
added a seventh goal in July 2020, namely, establishing a sustainable medical and care system to
overcome major diseases by 2040, and living until the age of 100 without health concerns. The programme
has also launched a consultation in September 2020 to create a new Moonshot goal to tackle the
challenges facing society and the economy in post-crisis Japan.
Technology governance
Science and technology will be essential to increase resilience and address the challenges of our time,
such as pandemics, sustainability and ageing. Yet they also raise societal concerns, as witnessed during
previous waves of technological change in industry and current debates around nuclear power, gene
editing, neurotechnology and artificial intelligence. Traditional means of governing science and technology,
whether through institutionalised research ethics, government regulation or market mechanisms, are
increasingly ill-equipped to capture the pace and depth with which innovations are reshaping societies.

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Developments in emerging technologies have triggered a global debate about the consequences of the
resulting commercialisation and the potential need for new oversight mechanisms (Jasanoff and Hurlbut,
2018[11]). Under conditions of uncertainty, traditional regulatory instruments – e.g. risk assessment,
product-based standard-setting, export controls and liability – tend to focus on managing the immediate or
readily quantifiable consequences of emerging technology, or are put into play only after key decisions
about technology design have been made. Yet many of the issues raised by emerging technologies are
more fundamental and long-term.
The governance of emerging science and technologies poses a well-known puzzle: the so-called
Collingridge dilemma holds that early in the innovation process – when interventions and course
corrections might still prove easy and cheap – the full consequences of the technology, and hence the
need for change, might not be fully apparent. Conversely, when the need for intervention becomes
apparent, changing course may become expensive, difficult and time-consuming (Collingridge, 1980[12]).
Uncertainty and lock-ins are at the heart of many governance debates. What is needed is a novel approach
to technology governance that anticipates concerns early on, addresses them through open and inclusive
processes, and steers innovation trajectories in a socially desirable direction. Alternatives to the existing
paradigms of governance must emerge alongside a form of innovation that is more responsible and
responsive to the needs of society.
Several new approaches in science and technology policy seek to overcome the Collingridge dilemma by
addressing concerns with technology governance upstream. The key idea is to make the innovation
process more anticipatory, inclusive and purposive, injecting public good considerations into innovation
dynamics and ensuring that social goals, values and concerns are integrated as they unfold. Process
governance shifts the locus from managing the risks of technological products to managing the innovation
process itself: who, when, what and how. It aims to anticipate concerns early on, address them through
open and inclusive processes, and steer the innovation trajectory in a desired direction.
Reaping the benefits of emerging technologies while preventing or mitigating their potential negative
effects is a critical challenge for science and society today. Many of the barriers to emerging technologies
lie not in technology itself, but in technology governance. Technology governance can be defined as the
process of exercising political, economic and administrative authority in the development, diffusion and
operation of technology in societies. It can consist of norms (e.g. regulations, standards and customs), but
can also be operationalised through physical and virtual architectures that manage risks and benefits.
Technology governance pertains not only to formal government activities, but also to the activities of firms,
civil society organisations and communities of practice. In its broadest sense, it represents the sum of the
many ways in which individuals and organisations shape technology and conversely, how technology
shapes social order.
Responsible research and innovation
A persistent but misguided view is that resistance to technology stems mostly from public ignorance about
the benefits of particular technologies or innovation in general. Social science research shows that such
resistance might be steeped more in basic value conflicts, distributive concerns and failures of trust in
governing institutions, such as regulatory authorities and technical advisory bodies (Gaskell, 1999[13]);
(Bauer, 2009[14]). As a general rule, governments and innovators should take into account inasmuch as
possible social goals and concerns from the beginning of the development process.
Neurosciences and neurotechnology are a case in point: they have dramatic potential for promoting human
health and well-being. At the same time, they raise complex ethical, legal, and policy questions, including
on (brain) data privacy, cybersecurity, human enhancement, the regulation and marketing of direct-to-
consumer devices, the vulnerability of cognitive patterns for commercial or political manipulation, new
inequalities of access, and implications for human rights (Ienca and Andorno, 2017[15]; Wexler and Reiner,
2019[16]). Such questions do not exclusively pertain to the field of science: policy choices around innovation

194 
and regulation will also steer these technologies. Thus, science and society more broadly must address
these issues together in order to realise the full potential of neurotechnology.
Drawing from country practices around responsible research and innovation (Stilgoe, Owen and
Macnaghten, 2013[17]) and “ethical, legal and social implications” frameworks, the OECD has been
developing an approach to responsible innovation, culminating in the Recommendations on Responsible
Innovation in Neurotechnology (OECD, 2019[18]) (Box 8.3). The Recommendation embodies a “responsible
innovation” approach, drawing inspiration from the field of science and technology studies (Stilgoe, Owen
and Macnaghten, 2013[17]) and recent work funded by the European Union (European Commission,
2020[19]). This approach seeks to anticipate problems during the course of innovation and steer technology
to best outcomes, involving many stakeholders in the innovation process (OECD, 2018[20]). The OECD has
also published the Recommendation on Artificial Intelligence (OECD, 2019[21]), which promotes artificial
intelligence that is innovative and trustworthy, and that respects human rights and democratic values.
Box 8.3. OECD Council Recommendation on Responsible Innovation in Neurotechnology (2019)

1. Promote responsible innovation
2. Prioritise safety assessment
3. Promote inclusivity
4. Foster scientific collaboration
5. Enable societal deliberation
6. Enable capacity of oversight and advisory bodies
7. Safeguard personal brain data and other information
8. Promote cultures of stewardship and trust across the public and private sector
9. Anticipate and monitor potential unintended use and/or misuse
Source: OECD (2019[18]), OECD Recommendation of the Council on Responsible Innovation in Neurotechnology,
https://legalinstruments.oecd.org.
Good governance can actually enable, rather than constrain, technology. This insight, focusing on
governance from the perspective of innovation, is a touchstone of the Recommendation. In creating a
responsible innovation system, at least five overarching elements stand out: (i) directionality, (ii) inclusivity,
(iii) anticipation, (iv) deliberation, and (v) the role of the private sector. Each is gaining traction in innovation
policy.
 Directionality. The Recommendation responds to calls to better align research, commercialisation
and societal needs. In other words, it promotes “mission-oriented” and “purposive” technological
transformation to better connect innovation to mental health.
 Inclusivity. Discussions about inclusive innovation usually focus on technological divides and
access inequality. The Recommendation highlights further forms of inclusivity, i.e. how the
inclusion of stakeholders, citizens, and systematically excluded actors within the innovation
process can help drive innovation (OECD, 2018[20]).
 Anticipation. From an innovation perspective, end-of-pipe-approaches can be inflexible,
inadequate and even stifling. In the realm of technology governance, governments and
policy makers are currently experimenting with test beds, sandboxes, new technology assessment
methods and foresight strategies.

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 Deliberation. More demanding than public participation, deliberation implies an iterative exchange
of views in hopes of achieving reasoned discourse and even finding common ground. The
approach requires enhancing societal capacities to understand, communicate on and shape
technology through the course of development so that technology might advance under conditions
of trust, enabling their development to market. A good example of public engagement and
deliberation is the process followed by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA)
in the United Kingdom during its examination of a controversial technology (Box 8.4).
 Role of the private sector. Whereas many ethics of technology codes place duties on scientists
and clinicians, the Recommendation also advances an institutional approach directing guidance to
funding agencies, oversight bodies and companies. Firms in particular have a critical role to play
in governance. They are on the front lines of product development, regulation, diffusion and
marketing, and should commit themselves to a responsible innovation framework.
Box 8.4. An example of deliberation and technology uptake: The Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Authority
The HFEA was established in 1990 to license and monitor in vitro fertilisation and insemination clinics
throughout the United Kingdom, as well as institutions conducting embryonic research and storing
gametes and embryos (Jasanoff, 2005[22]). In 2007, the HFEA launched a public consultation to explore
the public’s views on whether or not research scientists should be allowed to create embryos containing
animal DNA (HFEA, 2007[23]; Starza-Allen, 2007[24]). The programme, entitled Hybrids and Chimeras,
was supported by Sciencewise, a programme currently run by UK Research and Innovation, which aims
to assist policy makers in conducting public engagement activities.
The consultation ran from April to July 2007 and involved a range of approaches to consultation. A
public opinion poll gathered the general views of a representative sample of the public. Public
deliberations expanded upon these general findings and opened up new questions, focusing on the
effects of deliberation and new information on participants’ views. A written consultation and a public
meeting then took place. The HFEA analysed the results of the public consultation and decided that
cytoplasmic hybrid research should be allowed to move forward, with caution and careful scrutiny
(HFEA, 2007[23]).
More recently, the HFEA conducted a public consultation and submitted a proposal to the
UK Parliament on whether to allow mitochondrial replacement in embryos intended for implantation.
The parliament accepted the recommendation, with high public approval.
Participatory technology assessment
Technology assessment is another mechanism enabling responsible innovation. Initiated in the 1960s,
technology assessment has been increasingly adopted in many countries and has evolved over time,
based on the lessons learned. Innovation policy in many OECD countries is now guided by forms of
societal technology assessment carried out by a mix of actors, including national ethics committees and
other government bodies charged with considering wider social effects, and health and safety risk
assessment. Some of these assessments are more broadly participatory, and include procedures involving
stakeholder and public input (Durant, 1999[25]).
These societal technology-assessment processes involve formal risk analysis. Beyond the immediate
health and safety risks, they can also be mindful of the longer-term social implications of technological
adoption. Questions to consider relate to the distribution of the possible benefits and costs, the

196 
consequences of intellectual property in the field, the existence of particular pathways of greatest social
benefit, the sources of uncertainty in assessing the technology, and the potential benefits of innovation.
Generally speaking, there has been a shift from more expert-based forms of assessment to more
participatory models (see below). Born out of controversies around technologies like nuclear energy,
technology assessment in the United States initially focused rather narrowly on providing objective,
probabilistic knowledge about future trajectories of emerging technologies. Over time, it was increasingly
recognised that framing assumptions (e.g. problem definitions, scope and methodologies) shaped the
conclusions of technology assessment (Wynne, 1975[26]; Ely, Stirling and Van Zwanenberg, 2011[27]). In
particular, an overemphasis on technical consequences could overshadow important issues associated
with the social, ethical and political impacts of technologies. For these reasons, countries began to shift
towards more inclusive, open and deliberative forms of technology assessment.
Some mechanisms of technology assessment involve formal public procedures that feed directly into
innovation policy and governance decisions, particularly through consultation with expert advisory bodies.
One approach consists in relying on scientific academies or regulatory authorities to assess the more
technical aspects of emerging technologies; another is to establish public advisory bodies. Examples of
these approaches include the Danish Board of Technology Foundation, the Nuffield Council on Bioethics
in the United Kingdom, and presidential bioethics committees in the United States. Such groups might be
charged with gathering evidence on particular technologies through research and public testimony, and
writing reports that can inform public reasoning. Other methods include using public surveys and
stakeholder interviews to assess emerging technologies and gauge current opinion, as well as holding
hearings to collect input from various publics and inform regulatory agencies.
Recent efforts to introduce participatory technology assessment have variously been termed “constructive
technology assessment” (Schot and Rip, 1997[28]), “participatory technology assessment” (Guston and
Sarewitz, 2002[29]) and “real-time technology assessment”, among others. These approaches emphasise
the value of engaging citizens and stakeholders alongside experts, based on the notion that technology
assessment is inherently value-laden and citizens should therefore have a voice in the process. There is
also growing recognition that non-experts and other stakeholders possess relevant knowledge that would
otherwise be missed.20
More participatory modes of technology assessment recognise that the public is more likely to accept
assessments of which they have been a part, and that the knowledge produced during these assessments
will likely be more robust if diverse stakeholders are engaged. These approaches might include socio-
technical mapping, which combines stakeholder analysis with plotting of recent technical innovations; early
experimentation to identify and manage unanticipated impacts; greater dialogue between the public and
innovators; public opinion polling and focus groups; and scenario development (Guston and Sarewitz,
2002[29]).
Future outlook
This chapter has reviewed a diverse range of issues facing the governance of STI. It has touched on
lessons learned from recent OECD studies and highlighted outstanding policy challenges. Looking ahead,
periods of crisis can offer opportunities to revisit existing policy goals, models and practices, as well as
redirect economies and societies towards more equitable, sustainable and resilient futures. This final
section explores some of the options available to countries when pursuing such policy goals, using
currently underutilised policy frameworks and theories to guide policy action. It discusses policy practices
in light of the pandemic crisis, and highlights the importance and challenges of developing the capabilities
within government to successfully implement the ambitious STI policy agenda that is now emerging.

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Revisiting policy goals
In contrast to the 2008-09 global financial crisis, STI is clearly central to providing solutions to the COVID-
19 crisis. It is playing a prominent role in shaping policies to contain the virus through scientific advice, and
the race to develop effective vaccines and therapeutics is drawing on the latest cutting-edge medical
research and innovation. Such highly visible contributions could play a decisive role in the positioning of
STI in the future.
The pandemic crisis has pushed the issue of “resilience” (i.e. the ability to recover from and adapt to
disruption, and if need be, shift towards transformative paths) centre stage in policy agendas. While
STI policy may need to adjust to this new emphasis, STI already makes important contributions to socio-
economic resilience, by generating new knowledge and furthering its applications through innovation. In
the COVID-19 context, new technology platforms are facilitating the development and production of
vaccines and therapeutics at a rate that would have been unimaginable only a decade ago (see Chapter 5).
The emphasis on resilience may therefore bring with it increased attention on supporting flexible platforms
such as these and furthering collaborative partnerships that provide STI systems with greater agility to
respond to future challenges.
It also seems likely that STI policy will continue to lean towards a more proactive “systems transformation”
orientation, particularly to address the challenges of the climate emergency. While this shift has been under
way for some time in several OECD countries, it could well accelerate in response to COVID-19 and the
ambitious goals (e.g. green transitions) contained in many countries’ recovery and stimulus packages
(OECD, 2020[30]). Similarly, STI policy agendas may emphasise more the need to ensure an inclusive
recovery (OECD, 2017[31]). Given that the COVID-19 crisis has had highly unequal effects, with a higher
impact on many vulnerable groups in society and on some regions more than others, working towards
greater inclusiveness could become as important a goal for STI policy as supporting national
competitiveness and growth (Paunov and Planes-Satorra, forthcoming[4]).
Revisiting policy theories and frameworks
Reorienting policy goals towards sustainability, inclusiveness and resilience in the recovery period will
require altogether different policy frameworks and practices. In their efforts to “build back better”,
STI policy makers and analysts could usefully deploy a range of novel and emerging frameworks and
concepts. Some of these are well established in other policy fields, but largely overlooked by STI policy.
Others have been at the fringes of STI policy for a decade or more, but have yet to be mainstreamed. The
socio-technical transitions multi-level perspective (MLP), which emerged in sustainability research in the
2000s, is a prominent example. MLP underpins much contemporary discussion around the need for a new
“transformative STI policy” (Schot and Steinmueller, 2018[32]) and is increasingly being promoted by
international organisations (OECD, 2015[33]; European Environment Agency, 2019[34]; Pontikakis et al.,
2020[35]) as an encompassing policy framework to promote sustainability transitions. However, despite
many notable examples over the last decade (e.g. the Challenge-driven Innovation and Strategic
Innovation programmes operated by Vinnova in Sweden, the Academy of Finland’s Flagship initiative, the
Pilot-E programme in Norway, and the Grand Solutions programme in Denmark), the framework has yet
to be widely applied.
Such transformations call for system-level interventions to enact “systems innovations” – which, in turn,
have highlighted the complexity of systems and the need to shift away from “command-and-control” notions
of policy intervention (Hynes, Lees and Müller, 2020[36]). Furthermore, the COVID-19 crisis has exposed
both the strengths and vulnerabilities resulting from strong interdependencies across countries and
sectors, where changes in one component may directly or indirectly shape impacts in other parts of
complex systems. Thus, the pandemic has emphasised the relevance of designing and implementing
policies as components of a complex system (Paunov and Planes-Satorra, forthcoming[4]). As with MLP,

198 
while policy discussions of complex systems are more prominent than ever, there remains a sizeable gap
in putting this thinking into STI policy practice.
Transformations and transitions create winners and losers. They can threaten powerful incumbents, who
may seek to maintain some semblance of the status quo (Geels, 2014[37]). Power is ubiquitous in science
and innovation, yet tends to be predominantly framed in narrow competition terms. Other policy fields, such
as developmental aid (Whaites et al., 2015[38]), use broader concepts of power, deploying tools like
political-economy analysis to better understand and map the drivers of change, and using these insights
to design policies with greater chances of success.
The significance of values informing policy choices, including in the STI policy field (Bozeman, 2020[39];
Mazzucato and Ryan-Collins, 2019[40]), and the role of narratives and collective mobilising visions (Jasanoff
and Kim, 2015[41]) in enacting transformations are increasingly recognised, yet rarely considered or
mainstreamed in STI policy. STI should be a source of “collective hope” for societies (Mulgan, 2020[42]),
but existing techno-economic visions will likely need to be renewed to serve a positive, sustainable and
fairer socio-technical transition. While strategic foresight exercises can contribute to building such visions,
these alone will be insufficient. Sustained, multifaceted and multi-stakeholder actions will likely be required,
involving government, civil society organisations, the media and business.
Revisiting policy practices
The COVID-19 crisis has obliged governments to engage in “forced experimentation”, from organising new
ways of working from home, to using new data, policy tools and partnerships to formulate, design and
implement policies. It is difficult to assess the long-term impacts these experiments will have on policy
practice, but some will no doubt be scaled-up and diffused more widely. The new emphasis on building
greater socio-economic resilience to dynamic change and future shocks means that various preparedness
measures – including support for public-private networks, platforms and infrastructures that improve
countries’ abilities to respond to diverse risks – will likely be designed and implemented.
Ambitious recovery and stimulus packages may give policy more leverage to initiate a transition towards
more sustainable and equitable futures. For example, the aviation and automotive industries require public
subsidies as part of the recovery, which could be tied to various sustainability targets. Initial steps in that
direction have already been taken. The bailout package for Air France requires the company to cut its
emissions on all flights by 2030 (OECD, 2020[43]; Paunov and Planes-Satorra, forthcoming[4]). Thus, the
crisis may strengthen the role of governments in both shaping the recovery and signalling the direction of
desirable socio-technical transitions.
On the other hand, whether and to what extent ambitious recovery packages spur structural change
remains uncertain. Government intervention needs to be affordable, which will be a major concern for
many countries as the pandemic raises costs to the economy. Government debt for all countries is
unprecedentedly high, far above the levels reached during the global financial crisis. Such unfavourable
fiscal conditions could severely restrict the scope and scale of STI policy, reducing its ambition (see
Chapter 1). Fiscal constraints will also leave STI policy facing some hard choices about the research and
innovation areas and activities it should prioritise. Given the current pandemic crisis, more resources are
likely to be directed towards health research and innovation. But if the total amount of funding remains
unchanged or even decreases, this implies a decline of public resources for other research and innovation
areas (see Chapter 2).
If STI policy is to apply some of the frameworks mentioned above, particularly MLP and systems
approaches, an even greater use of new digital tools and data would be highly beneficial. Big-data analytics
and artificial intelligence can help map entire systems at granular levels and in real time, allowing a better
capture of system dependencies and improving understanding of how policies targeting one area can affect
others. However, as with approaches to technology governance, such mapping and assessment activities

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should be performed with citizen and stakeholder engagement. Stakeholders and non-experts possess
different types of knowledge and values that are relevant to STI policy. Even if it were technically feasible
to capture or model such knowledge and values, the act of engaging stakeholders and citizens at different
stages of the policy cycle brings process benefits that will make STI policies more robust and effective.
Revisiting government capabilities
The governance topics covered in this chapter, from using scientific advice and big-data analytics, to
driving mission-oriented policies and governing technology, assume that sophisticated capabilities exist
within the public sector. This section has highlighted the possibility of establishing new goals, new
frameworks and new practices for STI policy, which will require expanding such capabilities. Beyond the
skills of public servants (important as they are), organisational capacities and routines will also be needed.
These are not easy to develop quickly – nor can successful organisational capacities and routines be
simply replicated, given their embeddedness in organisational histories and cultures.
Developing the capabilities to deliver on a more ambitious policy agenda will become an increasingly
significant concern for STI policy. Increased policy emphasis on building resilience, which calls for policy
agility, highlights the need for governments to possess “dynamic capabilities”, which (Teece, Pisano and
Shuen, 1997[44]) define as the “ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external competences
to address rapidly changing environments”. Dynamic capabilities are distinct from the ordinary routines
and capabilities organisations possess to exploit existing strengths and opportunities. They refer to an
organisation’s ability to adapt and learn, essential traits for effective governance.
Dynamic capabilities need to be distributed across the public sector, rather than focused in just a few
agencies or innovation labs. Non-governmental actors, such as businesses, universities and civil society
organisations, also possess knowledge and competencies that governments will need to leverage in order
to fulfil ambitious policy agendas. This calls for developing both co-ordinative and absorptive capacities, to
understand and act on knowledge generated by others. This can be challenging, particularly in leading-
edge technologies like artificial intelligence, where the public sector competes against higher-paying
businesses to hire technical experts. Government capacities have also been somewhat “hollowed out” in
many OECD countries over the last decades, and some countries may need to rebuild them.
Thus, building capabilities in governments to meet the challenges ahead will be a major challenge in itself.
While it has been beyond the scope of this chapter to explore this challenge in any detail, it is common to
all governance topics covered here, and deserves greater attention in STI policy agendas.
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 203
Notes
1 This survey has been implemented through an online open-link questionnaire, inviting scientists or any other
individuals with an interest in science or science policy on the impact of the COVID-19 crisis from a science
perspective. The survey has been initially promoted through the network of the OECD Committee for Scientific and
Technological Policy and former participants of the 2018 OECD International Survey of Scientific Authors (ISSA). It is
being carried out in collaboration with the Inter-American Development Bank. As of 12 October 2020, over 2 600
responses from nearly 100 countries had been collected. 45% of responses correspond to individuals that identify
themselves as scientists, with the rest comprising science policy advisors (20%), professionals involved in science
(15%), science communicators (10%) and individuals carrying out science-related administrative work (10%). The
survey does not request any information that can identify the respondents. As a result, results cannot be considered
to be representative of a well-defined population and should be treated with extreme caution and considered as a
complementary view to other evidence.
2 https://www.australia.gov.au/.
3 https://politi.dk/corona/.
4 https://valtioneuvosto.fi/en/information-on-coronavirus.
5 https://www.gouvernement.fr/info-coronavirus.
6 https://covid19.govt.nz/.
7 https://www.gov.uk/coronavirus.
8
https://coronavirus.saude.gov.br/.
9 https://eody.gov.gr/neos-koronaios-covid-19/.
10 http://www.salute.gov.it/nuovocoronavirus.
11 https://thl.fi/en/web/infectious-diseases/what-s-new/coronavirus-covid-19-latest-updates.
12 https://helsenorge.no/.
13 https://coronavirusexplained.ukri.org/en/.
14 https://www.bmbf.de/de/faktencheck-zum-coronavirus-11162.html.
15 https://www.fema.gov/coronavirus-rumor-control.
16 https://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/seisakunitsuite/bunya/0000164708_00001.html.
17 https://www.gezondheidenwetenschap.be/dossiers/coronavirus.
18https://www.who.int/news-room/feature-stories/detail/who-health-alert-brings-covid-19-facts-to-billions-via-
whatsapp.
19 https://shareverified.com/en.

204 
20Toxicological risks are a good example. It is the users of potentially toxic substances in their places of work that are
well positioned to provide knowledge of how workers might become exposed in particular workplaces, given normal
habits, etc. To give another obvious example, an assessment of the risks of pesticides would have to take into account
the everyday practices of field workers, for example, whether protective clothing is in fact routinely used.

OECD Science, Technology and Innovation Outlook
2021
In immediate responses to the COVID‑19 crisis, science and innovation are playing essential roles in providing OECD Science, Technology
and Innovation Outlook 2021
a better scientific understanding of the virus, as well as in the development of vaccines, treatments
and diagnostics. Both the public and private sectors have poured billions of dollars into these efforts,
accompanied by unprecedented levels of global cooperation. However, the economic crisis that is currently
unfolding is expected to severely curtail research and innovation expenditures in firms, while debt‑laden
governments will face multiple, competing demands for financial support. These developments threaten TIMES OF CRISIS AND OPPORTUNITY
to cause long‑term damage to innovation systems at a time when science and innovation are most needed
to deal with the climate emergency, meet the Sustainable Development Goals, and accelerate the digital
transformation. Governments will need to take measures to protect their innovation systems as part
of their stimulus and recovery packages, but should also use these as opportunities for reforms. In particular,
science, technology and innovation (STI) policy should shift towards supporting a more ambitious agenda
of system transformation that promotes a managed transition to more sustainable, equitable and resilient
futures.
OECD Science, Technology and Innovation Outlook 2021

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2 Mobilising public research funding and infrastructures in times of crisis 58

3 Challenges and new demands on the academic research workforce 77

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4 Government support for business research and innovation in a world in crisis 95

5 Resolving global challenges and crises through international collaboration 122

6 Why accelerate the development and deployment of robots? 145

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OECD SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION OUTLOOK 2021 © OECD 2021

Figure 7.4. A bioeconomy policy framework 172

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Follow OECD Publications on:

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Acronyms and abbreviations

OECD SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION OUTLOOK 2021 © OECD 2021

OECD SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION OUTLOOK 2021 © OECD 2021

Looking forward, STI policies should be recalibrated to tackle the long-term

OECD SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION OUTLOOK 2021 © OECD 2021

OECD SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION OUTLOOK 2021 © OECD 2021

1 COVID-19: A pivot point for science,

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OECD SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION OUTLOOK 2021 © OECD 2021

OECD SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION OUTLOOK 2021 © OECD 2021

STI responses to the COVID-19 crisis and impacts on STI systems

OECD SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION OUTLOOK 2021 © OECD 2021

Figure 1.1. The roles of STI in the immediate crisis

Public research organisations and researchers’ responses and impacts

Research activities that respond to COVID-19

Rapid deployment of research on solutions to COVID-19

OECD SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION OUTLOOK 2021 © OECD 2021

Figure 1.2. International scientific collaboration on COVID-19 biomedical research

Provision of scientific advice to policy makers and the public

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Open access to journal articles has reached unprecedented levels

Impacts of the COVID-19 crisis on the public research sector

Limited access to research infrastructures and tools during lockdown

OECD SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION OUTLOOK 2021 © OECD 2021

Figure 1.3. Impact of the COVID-19 crisis on scientists' work

Decrease Stay the same Increase

Use of research materials and

Use of digital tools for

The “COVID-isation” of research

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Decline in income from research and tuition fees

Effect of lockdown measures on researchers and successful adoption of digital

Negative impacts on young and female researchers

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