No. L-28078.

 April 29, 1971.

INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED LUIS C. DOMINGO,SR., CONSUELO
DOMINGO DE LOPEZ, administratrix-petitioner, vs. PEDRO A. AQUINO, deceased,
substituted by SALVACION YUSAY AQUINO,ETC., and the HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
Remedial law; Change of counsel; Court should be informed.—Atty. Unson continued on record in
the appellate court as counsel for the estate as appellant therein and did not file therein any withdrawal as
counsel and neither did the petitioner inform said court of any change of counsel or of party-
administrator, as required by Rule 138, section 26 of the Rules of Court. More so, no appearance of any
new counsel for the estate was ever filed with the appellate court.
Same; Completeness of service by registered mail.—Service by registered mail of the appellate
court’s decision upon the petitioner’s counsel of record was deemed completed and effected upon the
addressee’s failure to claim his mail on the fifth day after the first notice of the postmaster. This has ever
since been the prevailing rule in the interests of public policy and sound administration of justice, as most
recently affirmed in Fojas vs. Navarro, L-26365, April 30, 1970, citing a long line of applicable
precedents.
Same; Counsel of estate, not of administrator.—The party in the subject case was the intestate estate
of the deceased
473

VOL. 38, APRIL 29, 1971 473

Intestate Estate of the Deceased Luis C. Domingo, Sr. vs.
Aquino
Luis C. Domingo, Sr. and that Atty. Unson represented the estate as counsel in the said case. The
fact that his services were engaged by Luis Domingo, Jr., in his (Luis’) official capacity as administrator,
did not make him the personal counsel of Luis. Thus, notwithstanding Luis’ removal as administrator,
Atty. Unson continued to represent the estate as counsel in the appellate court. He continued to be
authorized to represent the estate as its counsel, until the new administrator should terminate his services
which she never did.
Same; Court’s admonition to counsel; Cooperation of litigants and their attorneys needed.—The
cooperation of litigants and their attorneys is needed so that needless clogging of the court dockets with
unmeritorious cases may be avoided. There must be more faithful adherence to Rule 7, section 5 of the
Rules of Court which provided that “the signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he
has read the pleading and that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is good ground
to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay” and expressly admonishes that “for a willful
violation of this rule, an attorney may be subjected to disciplinary action.”

ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Teodoro P. Regino for petitioner.
     Angel Sanchez for respondent.

TEEHANKEE, J.:

An original action for certiorari challenging a judgment of the Court of Appeals as null and void
for having been allegedly entered in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion.
On August 7, 1961, the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan rendered judgment approving
the money claim of respondent Pedro A. Aquino against the petitioner estate by ordering the then
special administratrix, Asuncion Domingo Sta. Maria, “to pay from the available funds of the
estate the sum of P20,000.00 with 12% interest per annum, from June 10, 1954 to Pedro A.
Aquino.”
Both parties appealed from the said judgment to the Court of Appeals, insofar as it was
adverse to them, and
474
474 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Intestate Estate of the Deceased Luis C. Domingo, Sr. vs.
Aquino
on January 20, 1967, the appellate court in an extended nineteen-page decision penned by
Justice Ruperto C. Martin, which dealt mainly and exhaustively with the contentions of appellant
estate, found for respondent as appellant, and affirmed the lower court’s judgment with
modifications in favor of respondent, as follows: “IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, except with
the modification of the order as to the payment of the corresponding interest stipulated in the
promissory note (Exhibit C) the claim of Atty. Pedro A. Aquino is hereby approved and allowed,
and the administratrix ordered to pay, from the available funds of the estate, the sum of
P20,000.00 with compound interest at the rate of 12% per annum from July 27, 1953, plus
P500.00 as attorney’s fees, to Pedro A. Aquino.”
According to the present petition itself, the estate’s counsel of record in the appellate court,
Atty. Jose A. Unson, did not receive the notice and copy of the appellate court’s judgment sent to
him by registered mail; but the estate’s attorneys in the intestate proceedings pending in the
lower court, Attys. Primicias, Del Castillo and Macaraeg, were verbally informed by
respondent’s counsel of the judgment rendered on appeal by the appellate court. 1

Pursuant to said information, petitioner caused to be filed on March 9, 1967, with the

appellate court an “Appearance with Motions for Substitution and to be served with a copy of the
Judgment,” stating inter alia, that the former special administratrix, Asuncion Domingo Sta.
Maria had long resigned as such with the permission of the intestate court, that the other co-
special administrator, Atty. Luis Domingo, Jr. (who had caused the prosecution of the appeal)
was removed from his trust by the intestate court’s order dated May 21, 1963, for having
squandered cash funds of the estate, and that as a consequence, Mrs. Consuelo Domingo de
Lopez was appointed judicial administratrix and has since been administering the estate alone;
that Mrs. Lopez as judicial administratrix wished to file a motion for reconsideration of the
appellate court’s judgment and that the clerk of court be di-
_______________

 Par. 14, petition.

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475
VOL. 38, APRIL 29, 1971 475
Intestate Estate of the Deceased Luis C. Domingo, Sr. vs.
Aquino
rected to serve copy of said judgment on her counsel instead of on Atty. Unson as the former
special administrator’s counsel “for purposes of starting of time to move for re-hearing or
reconsideration;” and praying that as present judicial administratrix, she be substituted in lieu of
the former joint administrators and that her counsel be served with copy of the appellate court’s
decision.
 Upon due opposition of respondent on the ground of finality of the judgment, the appellate
court denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration per its resolution of April 27, 1967.
No further move was made by petitioner thereafter until almost five months later when
on September 23, 1967, after respondent had filed in the intestate court a motion for execution of
the judgment, as affirmed in his favor by the appellate court, it filed the present petition. Upon
the representations—contrary to the records—that the appellate court had granted “new or
further relief” in favor of respondent by awarding compound interest on the sum due respondent
and that Atty. Unson has ceased to be the estate’s lawyer since May 21, 1963 with the removal of
the former administrator, Luis Domingo, Jr. as such, the Court issued on October 3, 1967, the
corresponding summons and required respondents to answer the petition.
The Court, upon urgent supplemental petition of petitioner, further issued on November 7,
1967, upon a P1,-000.00 bond, a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement, through
sale of the estate’s properties, of the appellate court’s judgment.
The court finds no merit in the petition.
1. The records at bar amply show that Atty. Jose A. Unson was the counsel on record of the
petitioner estate in the appellate court and never filed any withdrawal as such counsel. As a
matter of fact, even after the removal on May 21, 1963 of Luis Domingo, Jr. as administrator of
the estate, Atty. Unson filed in the appellate court his memorandum dated August 17, 1963, for
the estate as ap-
476
476 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Intestate Estate of the Deceased Luis C. Domingo, Sr. vs.
Aquino
pellant. While it may be true that Atty. Unson ceased as counsel for the estate and for the former
administrator sometime on November 8, 1966, when the intestate court granted his motion
dated November 2, 1966, to withdraw as counsel by virtue of his appointment to and assumption
on February 8, 1966 of the public office of Assistant Administrator of the Sugar Quota
Administration,  this was true only insofar as the case in the intestate court was concerned. He
2

continued on record in the appellate court as counsel for the estate as appellant therein and did
not file therein any withdrawal as counsel and neither did the petitioner inform said court of any
change of counsel or of party-administrator, as required by Rule 138, section 26 of the Rules of
Court. More so, no appearance of any new counsel for the estate was ever filed with the appellate
court.
2. Notice and copy of the appellate court’s decision of January 20, 1967, were therefore duly
served by registered mail on the estate’s counsel of record at his address of record at 307 Trinity
Building, San Luis, Ermita, Manila, in accordance with Rule 13, section 8 of the Rules of
Court.  And in accordance with said Rule, service by registered mail of the appellate court’s
3

decision upon the petitioner’s counsel of record was deemed completed and effected upon the
addressee’s failure to claim his mail on the fifth day after the first notice of the postmaster.  This 4

has ever since been the prevailing rule in the inter-

_______________

2
 Annex M, petitioner’s reply.
3
 “SECTION 8. Completeness of service.—Personal serivce is complete upon actual delivery. Service by ordinary mail
is complete upon the expiration of five (5) days after mailing, unless the court otherwise provides. Service by registered
mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee; but if he fails to claim his mail from the post office within five (5)
days from the date of first notice of the postmaster, service shall take effect at the expiration of such time.
  Attached in the appellate court’s record is the Manila postmaster’s certification dated March 14, 1967, that Atty.
4

Unson did not claim Registry Letter No. 156 from the post office and that the same was returned to the appellate court on
March 9, 1967.

477
VOL. 38, APRIL 29, 1971 477
Intestate Estate of the Deceased Luis C. Domingo, Sr. vs.
Aquino
este of public policy and sound administration of justice, as most recently affirmed in Fojas vs.
Navarro,  citing a long line of applicable precedents.
5

3. The present administratrix gives no satisfactory explanation as to her failure to substitute

herself vice Luis Domingo, Jr., since the latter’s removal on May 21, 1963, when she became the
sole administrator (which she previously shared with Luis from December 21, 1961), or to then
engage new counsel vice Atty. Unson in the appellate court. Her very motion for substitution
filed on March 9, 1967 with the appellate court after its decision of January 20, 1967 recognized
the fact that the appellate court had already duly handed down its adverse decision and merely
expressed her wish to belatedly file a motion for reconsideration on behalf of the petitioner
estate. After the appellate court’s denial of her motion on April 27, 1967, she was apparently
resigned to the futility of filing any such motion, in view of the finality of the appellate court’s
decision—for such motion was never filed.
4. One vital factor that the present administratrix, Mrs. Lopez, has obviously failed to
appreciate, wittingly or otherwise, is that the party in the subject case was the intestate estate of
the deceased Luis C. Domingo, Sr. and that Atty. Unson represented the estate as counsel in the
said case. The fact that his services were engaged by Luis Domingo, Jr. in his (Luis’) official
capacity as administrator, did not make him the personal counsel of Luis. Thus, notwithstanding
Luis’ removal as administrator, Atty. Unson continued to represent the estate as counsel in the
appellate court. He continued to be authorized to represent the estate as its counsel, until the new
administrator should terminate his services, which she never did.
5. The representations made by the present administrator and her counsel in the petition at bar
—filed almost five months after the appellate court’s denial of her belated motion for
substitution and to be served with copy
_______________

 L-26365, April 30, 1970.

5

478
478 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Intestate Estate of the Deceased Luis C. Domingo, Sr. vs.
Aquino
of its decision—to the effect that the appellate court had granted respondent “new and further
relief” in its decision by the award of compound interest on the sum due respondent are
deplorable. They failed to set out before the Court the full facts, viz, that respondent had duly
prayed for the award of compound interest by the intestate court in accordance with the very
stipulation of the promissory note sued upon; that respondent had duly moved the intestate court
to reconsider its decision failing to provide for such compound interest; that the intestate court, in
denying respondent’s motion, merely stated “that the issue may just as well be decided in the
appellate court, since both parties had indicated their intention to appeal; and that respondent in
fact filed his appeal from this adverse portion of the intestate court’s decision, as well as the non-
award of the stipulated attorney’s fees of P500.00. The appellate court therefore properly
modified the intestate court’s decision by awarding such compound interest and attorney’s fees
as prayed for in the errors assigned in respondent’s brief as appellant.
6. It results clearly that the petition, alleging and praying that the appellate court’s decision of
January 20, 1967, be declared null and void for having been rendered and entered in excess of or
without jurisdiction or that this Court send for the records from the appellate court “for purposes
of review and thereafter render its own decision reversing the judgment [of the appellate court]”
notwithstanding its long having become final and executory, is utterly untenable and without
legal justification.
7. Petitioner’s counsel are reminded of this Court’s admonition in Pajares vs. Abad
Santos,  and other cases cited therein, to wit, that “the cooperation of litigants and their attorneys
6

is needed so that needless clogging of the court dockets with unmeritorious cases may be
avoided. There must be more faithful adherence to Rule 7, section 5 of the Rules of Court which
provides that ‘the signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the
pleading and that to the best of his knowledge,
_______________

 30 SCRA 748 (Nov. 29, 1969), emphasis copied.

6

479
VOL. 38, APRIL 29, 1971 479
Intestate Estate of the Deceased Luis C. Domingo, Sr. vs.
Aquino
information and belief, there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for
delay’ and expressly admonishes that ‘for a willful violation of this rule, an attorney may be
subjected to disciplinary action.’ ”
WHEREFORE, the petition is ordered dismissed and petitioner’s counsel shall pay treble
costs. The writ of preliminary injunction issued on November 7, 1967 is hereby dissolved and
upon promulgation of this decision, respondent may proceed immediately with the enforcement
and execution by the intestate court of the appellate court’s judgment of January 20, 1967, in his
favor. This decision shall be noted in the personal record of the counsel for petitioner and of their
associate attorney, Teodoro P. Re-gino, who signed and verified the petition. So ordered.
     Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Barr
edo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Petition dismissed.
Notes.—(a) Notice by registered mail; effect of failure to claim within five days.—Failure of a
party to claim a notice sent to him by registered mail, in accordance with the rule authorizing
service of notice in such manner, after he has been notified of receipt by the postmaster, is not
the soft of “excusable neglect” which will serve as ground for new trial or the granting of relief
from judgment (Pielago vs. Generosa, 73 Phil. 654).
The rule is that service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee,
but if he fails to claim his mail from the post office within five days from the date of the first
notice of the postmaster, the service shall take effect at the expiration of such time. When the
rule speaks of “from date of notice of the postmaster,” it presupposes that the addressee actually
received the mail on said date, and when he fails to do so because of some justifiable excuse, the
presumption of the law cannot apply, for to interpret this rule rigidly or to the letter may work
injustice rather than promote justice. Thus, where
 480

480 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Acoje Mining Co., Inc. vs. Director of Patents
the first notice did not actually reach the counsel for the applicant because it was given to his
minor children and when he got the mail eight days thereafter he saw to it that the record on
appeal was filed within the reglementary period, it was held that equity demands that the relief
prayed for be granted in keeping with the principle that the rules should be liberally construed to
promote the interest of justice (Cabuang vs. Bello, L-14781, July 15, 1959). The presumption
was also held inapplicable when the addressee was already dead and there was no showing that
the notice was received by a person of sufficient discretion in behalf of the party’s counsel
(Rueda vs. Juan,  L-13764, Jan. 30, 1960).