FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 168523. March 9, 2011.]

SPOUSES FERNANDO and ANGELINA EDRALIN, petitioners, vs.

PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK, respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J : p

The right to possess a property follows the right of ownership;

consequently, it would be illogical to hold that a person having ownership of
a parcel of land is barred from seeking possession thereof.
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, 1 assailing the Decision 2 dated June 10, 2005 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 89248. The dispositive portion of the assailed
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is
hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE and the writ prayed for accordingly
GRANTED. The assailed Orders dated November 8, 2004 and January
28, 2005 dismissing the ex-parte petition for issuance of writ of
possession and denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration,
respectively, are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent
Judge is hereby DIRECTED to issue the writ of possession prayed for
by the petitioner Philippine Veterans Bank over the subject property
covered by TCT No. 78332 of the Registry of Deeds for Parañaque
City, Metro Manila.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 3

Factual Antecedents
Respondent Philippine Veterans Bank (Veterans Bank) is a commercial
banking institution created under Republic Act (RA) No. 3518, 4 as amended
by RA No. 7169. 5
On February 5, 1976, Veterans Bank granted petitioner spouses
Fernando and Angelina Edralin (Edralins) a loan in the amount of Two
Hundred Seventy Thousand Pesos (P270,000.00). As security thereof,
petitioners executed a Real Estate Mortgage (REM) 6 in favor of Veterans
Bank over a real property situated in the Municipality of Parañaque and
registered in the name of petitioner Fernando Edralin. The mortgaged
property is more particularly described in Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 204889. The REM was registered with the Registry of Deeds of the
Province of Rizal. 7 The REM and its subsequent amendments 8 were all duly
annotated at the back of TCT No. 204889. 9
The Edralins failed to pay their obligation to Veterans Bank. Thus, on
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 June 28, 1983, Veterans Bank filed a Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure 10
of the REM with the Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of Rizal.
EDATSC

In due course, the foreclosure sale was held on September 8, 1983, in

which the Ex-Officio Sheriff of Rizal sold the mortgaged property at public
auction. Veterans Bank emerged as the highest bidder at the said
foreclosure sale and was issued the corresponding Certificate of Sale. 11 The
said Certificate of Sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds of the
Province of Rizal and annotated at the back of TCT No. 204889 under Entry
No. 83-62953/T-No. 43153-A on October 25, 1983. 12
Upon the Edralins' failure to redeem the property during the one-year
period provided under Act No. 3135, Veterans Bank acquired absolute
ownership of the subject property. Consequently, Veterans Bank caused the
consolidation of ownership of the subject property in its name on January 19,
1994. 13 The Register of Deeds of Parañaque, Metro Manila cancelled TCT
No. 204889 under the name of Fernando Edralin and replaced it with a new
transfer certificate of title, TCT No. 78332, 14 in the name of Veterans Bank
on February 3, 1994.
Despite the foregoing, the Edralins failed to vacate and surrender
possession of the subject property to Veterans Bank. Thus, on May 24, 1996,
Veterans Bank filed an Ex-Parte Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Possession, docketed as Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 06-060 before
Branch 274 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque City. The same,
however, was dismissed for Veterans Bank's failure to prosecute. 15
On July 29, 2003, Veterans Bank again filed an Ex-Parte Petition for
Issuance of Writ of Possession , 16 this time docketed as Land Registration
Case No. 03-0121, before the RTC of Parañaque City. Veterans Bank
divulged in its Certification against Forum-Shopping 17 that the earlier case,
LRC No. 96-060, involving the same subject matter and parties, was
dismissed.
The Edralins moved to dismiss 18 the petition on the ground that the
dismissal of LRC No. 96-060 constituted res judicata.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss explaining that the ground
of failure to present evidence is not a determination of the merits of the case
hence does not constitute res judicata on the petition for issuance of a writ
of possession. 19
Nevertheless, the trial court found no merit in the Veterans Bank's
application and dismissed the same in its Order dated November 8, 2004. 20
The trial court explained that, under paragraph (d) of the REM, the Veterans
Bank agreed to take possession of the Edralins' property without any judicial
intervention. The court held that granting the writ of possession to the
Veterans Bank will violate the contractual agreement of the parties.
Paragraph (d) reads:
(d) Effective upon the breach of any condition of this
mortgage and in addition to the remedies herein stipulated, the
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 Mortgagee is hereby likewise appointed attorney-in-fact of the
Mortgagor with full powers and authority, with the use of force, if
necessary to take actual possession of the mortgaged
property, without the necessity of any judicial order or any
permission, or power, to collect rents, to eject tenants, to lease or
sell the mortgaged property or any part thereof, at a private sale
without previous notice or advertisement of any kind and execute the
corresponding bills of sale, lease or other agreement that may be
deemed convenient, to make repairs or improvements on the
mortgaged property and pay for the same and perform any other
act which the Mortgagee may deem convenient for the proper
administration of the mortgaged property. The payment of any
expenses advanced by the Mortgagee in connection with the
purposes indicated herein is also guaranteed by this Mortgage and
such amount advanced shall bear interest at the rate of 12% per
annum. Any amount received from sale, disposal or administration
above-mentioned may be applied to the payment of the repairs,
improvements, taxes and any other incidental expenses and
obligations and also the payment of the original indebtedness and
interest thereof. The power herein granted shall not be revoked
during the life of this mortgage, and all acts that may be executed by
the Mortgagee by virtue of said power are hereby ratified. In addition
to the foregoing, the Mortgagor also hereby agrees, that the Auditor
General shall withhold any money due or which may become due the
Mortgagor or debtor from the Government or from any of its
instrumentalities, except those exempted by law from attachment or
execution, and apply the same in settlement of any and all amount
due to the Mortgagee; 21
The trial court held that, assuming the contract allowed for the
issuance of a writ of possession, Veterans Bank's right to seek possession
had already prescribed. Without citing authority and adequate explanation,
the court held that Veterans Bank had only 10 years from February 24, 1983
to seek possession of the property. EAHcCT

Veterans Bank moved for the reconsideration 22 of the adverse

decision. It directed the court's attention to paragraph (c) of the real estate
mortgage, which expressly granted the mortgagee the right to avail itself of
the remedy of extrajudicial foreclosure in case of the mortgagor's default.
Paragraph (c) reads:
(c) If at any time the Mortgagor shall fail or refuse to pay the
obligations herein secured, or any of the amortizations of such
indebtedness when due, or to comply with any of the conditions and
stipulations herein agreed, or shall, during the time this mortgage is
in force, institute insolvency proceedings or be involuntarily declared
insolvent, or shall use the proceeds of this loan for purposes other
than those specified herein, or if this mortgage cannot be recorded in
the corresponding Registry of Deeds, then all the obligations of the
Mortgagor secured by this Mortgage and all the amortization thereof
shall immediately become due, payable and defaulted, and the
Mortgagee may immediately foreclose this mortgage
judicially in accordance with the Rules of Court, or extra-
judicially in accordance with Act No. 3135, as amended, and
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 under Act 2612, as amended. For the purpose of extra-judicial
foreclosure the Mortgagor hereby appoints the Mortgagee his
attorney-in-fact to sell the property mortgaged under Act No. 3135, as
amended, to sign all documents and perform any act requisite and
necessary to accomplish said purpose and to appoint its substitutes
as such attorney-in-fact with the same powers as above specified. . . .
23

The motion for reconsideration was set for hearing on January 28,
2005. Due to a conflict of schedule, Veterans Bank's counsel moved 24 to
reset the hearing on its motion. In apparent denial of the motion to reset, the
trial court proceeded to deny Veterans Bank's motion for reconsideration in
the Order dated January 28, 2005. 25 The trial court reiterated that
paragraph (d) of the REM allowed Veterans Bank to take immediate
possession of the property without need of a judicial order. It would be
redundant for the court to issue a writ of possession in its favor.
This prompted Veterans Bank to file a Petition for Mandamus with
Prayer for Issuance of a Preliminary Mandatory Injunction 26 before the CA.
First among its arguments, Veterans Bank maintained that it was the
trial court's ministerial duty 27 to grant a writ of possession to the mortgagee
who has consolidated and registered the property in its name.
Veterans Bank then assailed the trial court's holding that its right to a
writ of possession had already prescribed. Respondent maintained that the
writ can be issued at any time after the mortgagor failed to redeem the
foreclosed property. 28
Lastly, Veterans Bank argued that, contrary to the trial court's finding,
it did not contract away its right to an extrajudicial foreclosure under Act No.
3135, as amended, by the inclusion of paragraph (d) in the REM. Veterans
Bank pointed out that, as evidenced by paragraph (c) of the REM, it
expressly reserved the right to avail of the remedies under Act No. 3135. 29
Ruling of the Court of Appeals 30

The appellate court ruled in favor of Veterans Bank.

It held that the contractual provision in paragraph (d) to immediately
take possession of the mortgaged property without need of judicial
intervention is distinct from the right to avail of extrajudicial foreclosure
under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, which was expressly reserved by Veterans
Bank in paragraph (c) of the REM. The fact that the two paragraphs do not
negate each other is evidenced by the qualifying phrase "in addition to the
remedies herein stipulated" found in paragraph (c).
Having availed itself of the remedy of extrajudicial foreclosure,
Veterans Bank, as the highest bidder, has the right to a writ of possession.
This right may be availed of any time after the buyer consolidates
ownership. In fact, the issuance of the writ of possession is a ministerial
function, the right to which cannot be enjoined or stayed, even by an action
for annulment of the mortgage or the foreclosure sale itself.
The trial court's ruling that Veterans Bank's right to possess has
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 prescribed is likewise erroneous. As already stated, Veterans Bank's right to
possess the property is not based on their contract but on Act No. 3135. TDcEaH

Since the issuance of a writ of possession is a ministerial act of the trial

judge, mandamus lies to compel the performance of the said duty.
Petitioners immediately filed this petition for review.
Issues
Petitioners submit the following issues for our consideration:
1. Whether mandamus was resorted to as a substitute for a
lost appeal
2. Whether mandamus is the proper remedy to seek a
review of the final orders of the trial court
3. Whether the consolidation of ownership of the
extrajudicially foreclosed property through a Deed of Sale is in
accordance with law
4. Whether the issuance of a writ of possession under Act
[No.] 3135 is subject to the statute of limitations 31
Our Ruling
Propriety of the Remedy of Mandamus
Petitioners argue that Veterans Bank availed itself of the remedy of
mandamus as a substitute for a lost appeal. 32 Petitioners narrate the
relevant dates that allegedly show the belatedness and impropriety of the
petition for mandamus. Veterans Bank received the Order dated November
8, 2004 on November 18, 2004, thus it had until December 3, 2004 to file a
motion for reconsideration. Since December 3, 2004 was declared a non-
working holiday, Veterans Bank filed its motion for reconsideration on the
next working day, December 6, 2004. With the said dates, it had only one
day left from receipt of the January 28, 2005 Order, or until February 10,
2005, to file an appeal (citing Section 2, Rule 22) of the Rules of Court. Since
Veterans Bank did not file an appeal on the following day, it had lost its right
to appeal and the assailed orders allegedly attained finality.
Respondent counters that the issuance of a writ of possession is not an
ordinary action for which the rules on appeal apply. The writ being a mere
motion or an order of execution, appeal is not the proper remedy to question
the trial court's ruling. In fact, Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court
provides that no appeal may be taken from an order of execution, but Rule
65 special civil actions are available. 33 Given that the issuance of the writ of
possession is a ministerial act of the judge, respondent maintains that a
petition for mandamus is the proper remedy.
Respondent adds that, even if appeal were available, the same is not
the plain, speedy and adequate remedy to compel the performance of the
ministerial act. 34 Respondent maintains that Section 3 of Rule 65 recognizes
that the remedy of mandamus is available in conjunction with an appeal. The
qualifying phrase "and there is no appeal [available]," which appears in
certiorari and prohibition petitions, is conspicuously missing for petitions for
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 mandamus.
We rule that mandamus is a proper remedy to compel the issuance of
a writ of possession. The purpose of mandamus is to compel the
performance of a ministerial duty. A ministerial act is "one which an officer
or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in
obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the
exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act
done." 35
The issuance of a writ of possession is outlined in Section 7 of Act No.
3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, which provides:
SEC. 7. In any sale made under the provisions of this
Act, the purchaser may petition the Court of First Instance of
the province or place where the property or any part thereof
is situated, to give him possession thereof during the redemption
period, furnishing bond in an amount equivalent to the use of the
property for a period of twelve months, to indemnify the debtor in
case it be shown that the sale was made without violating the
mortgage or without complying with the requirements of [this] Act.
Such petition shall be made under oath and filed in form of an ex
parte motion . . . and the court shall , upon approval of the bond,
order that a writ of possession issue , addressed to the sheriff of
the province in which the property is situated, who shall execute said
order immediately.
During the period of redemption, the mortgagee is entitled to a writ of
possession upon depositing the approved bond. When the redemption period
expires without the mortgagor exercising his right of redemption, the
mortgagor is deemed to have lost all interest over the foreclosed property,
and the purchaser acquires absolute ownership of the property. The
purchaser's right is aptly described thus: ESacHC

Consequently, the purchaser, who has a right to

possession after the expiration of the redemption period,
becomes the absolute owner of the property when no
redemption is made. In this regard, the bond is no longer needed.
The purchaser can demand possession at any time following
the consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance
to him of a new TCT. After consolidation of title in the purchaser's
name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem the property, the
purchaser's right to possession ripens into the absolute right of a
confirmed owner. At that point, the issuance of a writ of
possession, upon proper application and proof of title
becomes merely a ministerial function. Effectively, the court
cannot exercise its discretion.
Therefore, the issuance by the RTC of a writ of possession in
favor of the respondent in this case is proper. We have consistently
held that the duty of the trial court to grant a writ of possession in
such instances is ministerial, and the court may not exercise
discretion or judgment . . . 36
With the consolidated title, the purchaser becomes entitled to a writ of
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 possession and the trial court has the ministerial duty to issue such writ of
possession. 37 Thus, "the remedy of mandamus lies to compel the
performance of [this] ministerial duty." 38
Does the charter of Veterans Bank
prohibit extrajudicial foreclosures?
Petitioners then assail Veterans Bank's power to extrajudicially
foreclose on mortgages. They maintain that the legislature intended to limit
Veterans Bank to judicial foreclosures only, 39 citing Section 18 of the
Veterans Bank's charter, RA No. 3518, which provides:
Section 18. Right of redemption of property foreclosed. —
The mortgagor shall have the right, within one year after the sale of
the real estate as a result of the foreclosure of a mortgage, to redeem
the property by paying the amount fixed by the court in the order of
execution, with interest thereon at the rate specified in the mortgage,
and all the costs and other judicial expenses incurred by the Bank by
reason of the execution and sale, and for the custody of said
property.
Respondent counters that the inclusion of the phrase "fixed by the
Court" in Section 18 of RA No. 3518 does not necessarily mean that only
judicial foreclosures are available to Veterans Bank. Moreover, resort to an
extrajudicial foreclosure was voluntarily entered into by the contracting
parties in their REM. 40
There is no merit in petitioners' contention.
The aforequoted Section 18 grants to mortgagors of Veterans Bank the
right to redeem their judicially foreclosed properties. This provision had to be
included because in judicial foreclosures, mortgagors generally do not have
the right of redemption unless there is an express grant by law. 41
But, contrary to petitioners' averments, there is nothing in Section 18
which can be interpreted to mean that Veterans Bank is limited to judicial
foreclosures only, or that it cannot avail itself of the benefits provided under
Act No. 3135, 42 as amended, allowing extrajudicial foreclosures.
Moreover, the availability of extra-judicial foreclosure to a mortgagee
depends upon the agreement of the contracting parties. Section 1 of Act No.
3135 provides: DAETcC

Section 1. When a sale is made under a special power

inserted in or attached to any real-estate mortgage hereafter made
as security for the payment of money or the fulfillment of any other
obligation, the provisions of the following sections shall govern
as to the manner in which the sale and redemption shall be
effected, whether or not provision for the same is made in the
power. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the case at bar, paragraph (c) of the parties' REM granted Veterans
Bank the special power as attorney-in-fact of the petitioners to perform all
acts necessary for the purpose of extrajudicial foreclosure under Act No.
3135. Thus, there is no obstacle preventing Veterans Bank from availing
itself of the remedy of extrajudicial foreclosure.
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 Was the consolidation of title done in
accordance with law?
Petitioners argue that Veterans Bank is not entitled to a writ of
possession because it failed to properly consolidate its title over the subject
property. 43 They maintain that the Deed of Sale executed by the Veterans
Bank in the bank's own favor during the consolidation of title constitutes a
pactum commissorium , which is prohibited under Article 2088 of the Civil
Code. 44
Respondent contends that petitioners never questioned the validity of
the foreclosure proceedings or the auction sale. The failure to do so resulted
in the ripening of the consolidation of ownership. 45
There is no merit in petitioners' argument.
Pactum commissorium is "a stipulation empowering the creditor to
appropriate the thing given as guaranty for the fulfillment of the obligation in
the event the obligor fails to live up to his undertakings, without further
formality, such as foreclosure proceedings, and a public sale." 46 "The
elements of pactum commissorium , which enable the mortgagee to acquire
ownership of the mortgaged property without the need of any foreclosure
proceedings, are: (1) there should be a property mortgaged by way of
security for the payment of the principal obligation, and (2) there should be
a stipulation for automatic appropriation by the creditor of the thing
mortgaged in case of non-payment of the principal obligation within the
stipulated period." 47
The second element is missing to characterize the Deed of Sale as a
form of pactum commissorium. Veterans Bank did not, upon the petitioners'
default, automatically acquire or appropriate the mortgaged property for
itself. On the contrary, the Veterans Bank resorted to extrajudicial
foreclosure and was issued a Certificate of Sale by the sheriff as proof of its
purchase of the subject property during the foreclosure sale. That Veterans
Bank went through all the stages of extrajudicial foreclosure indicates that
there was no pactum commissorium.
Does the right to a writ of possession
prescribe?
Petitioners assail the CA's ruling that the issuance of a writ of
possession does not prescribe. 48 They maintain that Articles 1139, 49 1149,
50 and 1150 51 of the Civil Code regarding prescriptive periods cover all kinds

of action, which necessarily include the issuance of a writ of possession.

Petitioners posit that, for purposes of the latter, it is the five-year
prescriptive period provided in Article 1149 of the Civil Code which applies
because Act No. 3135 itself did not provide for its prescriptive period. Thus,
Veterans Bank had only five years from September 12, 1983, the date when
the Certificate of Sale was issued in its favor, to move for the issuance of a
writ of possession. 52
Respondent argues that jurisprudence has consistently held that a
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 registered owner of the land, such as the buyer in an auction sale, is entitled
to a writ of possession at any time after the consolidation of ownership. 53 ACSaHc

We cannot accept petitioners' contention. We have held before that the

purchaser's right "to request for the issuance of the writ of possession of the
land never prescribes." 54 "The right to possess a property merely follows the
right of ownership," 55 and it would be illogical to hold that a person having
ownership of a parcel of land is barred from seeking possession thereof. In
Calacala v. Republic of the Philippines, 56 the Republic was the highest
bidder in the public auction but failed for a long period of time to execute an
Affidavit of Consolidation and to seek a writ of possession. Calacala insisted
that, by such inaction, the Republic's right over the land had prescribed,
been abandoned or waived. The Court's language in rejecting Calacala's
theory is illuminating:
[T]he Republic's failure to execute the acts referred to by the
petitioners within ten (10) years from the registration of the
Certificate of Sale cannot, in any way, operate to restore whatever
rights petitioners' predecessors-in-interest had over the same. For
sure, petitioners have yet to cite any provision of law or rule of
jurisprudence, and we are not aware of any, to the effect that the
failure of a buyer in a foreclosure sale to secure a Certificate of Final
Sale, execute an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and obtain a
writ of possession over the property thus acquired, within ten (10)
years from the registration of the Certificate of Sale will operate to
bring ownership back to him whose property has been previously
foreclosed and sold. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Moreover, with the rule that the expiration of the 1-year
redemption period forecloses the obligors' right to redeem and that
the sale thereby becomes absolute, the issuance thereafter of a final
deed of sale is at best a mere formality and mere confirmation of the
title that is already vested in the purchaser. . . . 57
Moreover, the provisions cited by petitioners refer to prescription of
actions. An action is "defined as an ordinary suit in a court of justice, by
which one party prosecutes another for the enforcement or protection of a
right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong." 58 On the other hand "[a]
petition for the issuance of the writ, under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as
amended, is not an ordinary action filed in court, by which one party 'sues
another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or prevention or redress
of a wrong.' It is in the nature of an ex parte motion [in] which the court
hears only one side. It is taken or granted at the instance and for the benefit
of one party, and without notice to or consent by any party adversely
affected. Accordingly, upon the filing of a proper motion by the purchaser in
a foreclosure sale, and the approval of the corresponding bond, the writ of
possession issues as a matter of course and the trial court has no discretion
on this matter." 59
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED for lack of
merit. The CA Decision dated June 10, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 89248 is
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 AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. HAcaCS

Corona, C.J., Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro and Perez, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1.Rollo , pp. 8-28.

2.CA rollo, pp. 195-207.
3.CA Decision, p. 12; id. at 206.
4.An Act Creating the Philippine Veterans Bank, and for Other Purposes.
5.An Act to Rehabilitate the Philippine Veterans Bank Created Under Republic Act
No. 3518, Providing the Mechanisms Therefor, and for Other Purposes.
6.CA rollo, pp. 70-71.

7.Id. at 68-69.
8.Id. at 72-73.
9.Entry Nos. 24991/S-19595, 39423/S-19595, 52016/S-19595 (id. at 69).
10.Id. at 76. Notice of Extrajudicial Sale appears on page 77 of the CA rollo.
11.Id. at 79.

12.Entry No. 83-62953 (id. at 69).

13.Entry No. 3139 Affidavit of Consolidation (id., back of p. 69); id. at 80-81.
14.Id. at 82.
15.Respondent's Memorandum, p. 7; rollo, p. 300.
16.CA rollo, pp. 83-91.

17.Id. at 88.
18.Id. at 41-42.
19.Order dated July 13, 2004 (id. at 123).
20.Id. at 43-46; penned by Judge Brigido Artemon M. Luna.

21.Id., dorsal portion, p. 70.

22.Id. at 49-58.
23.Id., dorsal portion of p. 70.
24.Rollo , pp. 155-160.
25.CA rollo, pp. 47-48.

26.Id. at 2-38.
27.Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 89248, pp. 14-17; id. at 15-18.
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 28.Id. at 27-31; id. at 28-32.
29.Id. at 20-25; id. at 21-26.
30.Id. at 195-207; penned by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. and
concurred in by Associate Justices Lucas P. Bersamin and Lucenito N. Tagle.
31.Petitioners' Memorandum, p. 10; rollo, p. 334.
32.Id. at 11-12; id. at 335-336.
33.Respondent's Memorandum, pp. 18-21; id. at 311-314.

34.Id. at 22-23; id. at 315-316.

35.FERIA AND NOCHE, CIVIL PROCEDURE ANNOTATED, Vol. II (2001 ed.), p. 487.
36.Saguan v. Philippine Bank of Communications, G.R. No. 159882, November 23,
2007, 538 SCRA 390, 396-397. Emphasis supplied.
37.Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Tarampi, G.R. No. 174988, December 10, 2008,
573 SCRA 537, 543; Fernandez v. Espinoza, G.R. No. 156421, April 14, 2008,
551 SCRA 136, 150-151; Spouses Carpo v. Chua, 508 Phil. 462, 477-478
(2005); Philippine National Bank v. Sanao Marketing Corporation, 503 Phil.
260, 274-275 (2005).
38.Spouses Carpo v. Chua, 508 Phil. 462, 477 (2005).

39.Petitioners' Memorandum, pp. 13-14; rollo, pp. 337-338.

40.Respondent's Memorandum, p. 28; id. at 321.

41.Rule 68 (Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage), "Sec. 3. Sale of mortgaged

property; effect. — . . . Such sale shall not affect the rights of persons holding
prior encumbrances upon the property or a part thereof, and when confirmed
by an order of the court, also upon motion, it shall operate to divest the
rights in the property of all the parties to the action and to vest their rights in
the purchaser, subject to such rights of redemption as may be allowed
by law ." See Limpin v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 248 Phil. 318, 325-326
(1988).
42.An Act to Regulate the Sale of Property under Special Powers Inserted in or
Annexed to Real-Estate Mortgages.

43.Petitioners' Memorandum, p. 14; rollo, p. 338.

44.Id.
45.Respondent's Memorandum, pp. 26-27; rollo, pp. 319-320.

46.PENA, REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLES AND DEEDS (2008 ed.), p. 351.

47.Ong v. Roban Lending Corporation, G.R. No. 172592, July 9, 2008, 557 SCRA
516, 524. Emphasis supplied.

48.Petitioners' Memorandum, pp. 24-25; rollo, pp. 339-340.

49.CIVIL CODE, Article 1139. Actions prescribe by the mere lapse of time fixed by
law.

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 50.CIVIL CODE, Article 1149. All other actions whose periods are not fixed in this
Code or in other laws must be brought within five years from the time the
right of action accrues.

51.CIVIL CODE, Article 1150. The time for prescription for all kinds of actions, when
there is no special provision which ordains otherwise, shall be counted from
the day they may be brought.

52.Petitioners' Memorandum, pp. 25-26; rollo, pp. 349-350.

53.Respondent's Memorandum, pp. 24-25; id. at 317-318.

54.Spouses Paderes v. Court of Appeals, 502 Phil. 76, 97 (2005), citing Rodil v.
Judge Benedicto, 184 Phil. 108 (1980).
55.Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v. Santos, G.R. No. 157867, December 15,
2009, 608 SCRA 222, 234.

56.502 Phil. 680 (2005).

57.Id. at 689-691.
58.Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v. Santos, supra note 55 at 236, citing Ancheta
v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, Inc., 507 Phil. 161 (2005).
59.Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v. Bance, G.R. No. 167280, April 30, 2008, 553
SCRA 507, 515-516. Emphasis supplied.

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