Scala Politica
Scala Politica
i principles 7
1 scalability 9
2 coercion and nudging 13
3 scalability and ethics 17
4 greek vs roman 21
5 liberty must be scale invariant. 23
6 progressive vs conservative 25
7 morality does not aggregate 27
8 nonnaive universalism 29
9 racism, homophily, & xenophobia 33
10 neither minority nor majority rules 39
11 war and peace from the bottom 41
12 precautionary government 43
13 risk asymmetries 45
14 governance vs democracy 47
15 ergodicity 49
16 nature and significance 51
17 historical narratives and agency 53
18 religion and legal systems 55
11 Political Behavior 67
12 Bigotteering, I 67
13 Bigotteering, II 68
14 Second Order Bitotteering 68
15 Retrospective Bitotteering 68
16 Deep Ministries 69
17 Pedophrasty 69
18 Cherry Picking 71
iii quaestiones 73
iv definitions 81
1 Verbalism as a Central Fallacy 83
2 Hand Waving 85
3 Uncertainty and Complexity: Definitions 87
M
ost of the tension resides between 1) embedded,
uncertainty minded, multiscale fractal localism (pol-
itics correctly seen as an ecology/complex adap-
tive system),
and 2) abstract one-dimensional universalists and
monoculturalism (politics mistakenly seen as a top-down engi-
"Right" vs. "left" is neering project).
often incoherent; rig-
orous vs. unrigorous The above distinction becomes clear once we move away from
and effective vs. inef- the verbalistic, use nonlinear properties, uncertainty approaches,
fective is a more ac-
curate representation information theory, and probabilistic rigor to look at politics with
the same eyes as when we examine highly dimensional inter-
3
4 Contents
T
he book is organized as follows. We introduce the
Incerto project to link it to the current treatise. We
then present general principles , followed by spe-
cific articles of conduct and general rules in the ar-
ticles,. We have specific questions and answers in
Quaestiones, Part iii.
A structured summary of complexity and issues that differ from
the common approaches to political philosophy is in the final
section 3.
T
he Incerto (of which this is a part) can be
summarized as follows: while there is a high
uncertainty (and causal and probabilistic opac-
ity) in the world, what to do about it –which
option to take– is always certain.
Furthermore, paradoxically, the more uncertain the world’s
outcomes are, the more certain the optimal policy. It is the
most prudent one with the most convex outcomes, that is, Uncertainty makes
the one that, first, is precautionary and insures survival decisions straightfor-
ward
and, second, carries the most beneficial second order ef-
fects.
The man of the system . seems to imagine that he can arrange the different members
of a great society with as much ease as the hand arranges the different pieces upon
a chess-board. He does not consider that the pieces upon the chess-board have no
other principle of motion besides that which the hand impresses upon them; but
that, in the great chess-board of human society, every single piece has a principle of
motion of its own, altogether different from that which the legislature might chuse
to impress upon it. Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments.
5
6 Contents
PRINCIPLES
1 SCALABILITY
Everything nonlinear
P
rinciple 1 Never describe, compare, or assess the has a scaling problem;
responses are either
effectiveness of political systems without reference locally convex or con-
to scale. cave
F
ractal Localism: Between the concrete individual
and the abstract collective there are a certain num-
ber of tangible fractal gradations.
P
olitics is not scale-free. One can be "libertarian
at the federal level, Republican at the state level,
Democrat at the county level, socialist within the
commune, and communist at the family and tribe level."
L
ocalism as proposed is not a political system but
a rigorously defined political structure that can ac-
commodate various systems, which can even in-
clude communism, libertarianism –though not anarchism
as naively presented. The main aim is to fit the dynamics
to the proper scale.
Hence this is not a discussion on localism but rather one
on scale.
L
ocal Village There is convexity to localism as fol-
lows: you build stronger bonds overall in meeting
a person five times than in meeting five people
once.
This illustrates the impossibility of a global village.
One person to a future spouse:"I will deal with silly and insignificant mundane
matters: where to live, what and when to eat, where to shop, what to buy, where
to educate the children, where to go on vacation, etc. You will focus on centrally
important and vital questions: geopolitical relations, tensions with Russia, the future
of technology, space travel, and such indispensable matters." Let the State do the
important things...
12 scalability
C
entralization takes away from governance and
democracy owing to the concentration of signals.
A Lebanese fellow
said, criticizing my
These arguments miss the fact that –no matter the regime – hyper localism: "but
there is a lot of cor-
central states had at that time a very limited reach over citizens ruption within mu-
owing to reduced communications. The involvement of the states nicipalities". Answer:
in the 1900s was (across the world) an order of magnitude lower "Corruption shows
very easily within
than today’s, as measured by the share of GDP coming from the municipalities"
central government –and limited to armed forces. Some Euro-
pean countries had 5-10% of GDP controlled by the government,
most are now at 50-70%.
Centralization By the argument of fitness to current time, cen-
tralization can show immediate benefits. But these wane as the
signal from the environment gets dulled.
The only places where
communism has been Mechanisms of interaction are muted by dominant signals.
relatively success-
ful are the Kibbutz,
Moshav, and simi-
lar tiny communes Further Comments
P
rinciple 2 No entity, governmental or otherwise,
should be able to coerce an individual into a polit-
ical and economic system against her or his will.
In return the individual must reciprocate.
Thanks to nationalism,
people are coerced
N
udging and any form of creepy intervention vio- into an ethnocultural
identity that’s not
lates a person individual’s rights.
the one they would
normally choose.
N
udging individuals violates scaling rules. The re-
sult on the collective might not translate, as dis- Individual rights:
cussed with the scaling of morality. the liberties of each
individual to pursue
life and goals without
interference from
See the section 8 on how morality does not aggregate. other individuals,
groups, established
In economic terms, consider the rationality of investing in the monocultures, or the
stock market "in a diversified way" assuming we start initially at government.
13
14 coercion and nudging
P
rinciple (Isocrates)
Powerful countries need to apply the silver rule
in foreign affairs by treating weaker ones the way
they would like to be treated if the roles were reversed.
Commentary
Contra
Figure 2.1: To understand Isocrates’ rule for international affairs from multiscale
localism, keep scaling the notion up.
coercion and nudging 15
3 SCALABILITY AND ETHICS
P
recautionary decisions do not scale. Collective
safety may require excessive individual risk avoid-
ance, even if it conflicts with an individual’s own
interests and benefits. It may require an individual to
worry about risks that are comparatively insignificant.
Commentary
Example: John Ioannidis found out that the odds for an elderly to
die on the road exceeds that from Covid-19 (the statistical claim
was effectively wrong, but let’s ignore). Consider a collective,
that is a sum of individuals. Because deaths on the road are
independent (hence allow for the workings of CLT, the central
limit theorem) and the ones from Covid dependent (hence do not
scale by CLT), you witness a reversal of the source of risk. How?
The odds of a 100 elderly dying from Covid exceed the odds of
the same number dying in car accident, even if one person is
individually more likely to die on the road.
Further Comments
Additional Comments
P
rinciple 4 The main differences between po-
litical attitudes should be judged in terms of
effectiveness, never intentions. The real dif-
ference in politics isn’t the "right" vs "left"
verbalistic gradation but rather "Greek" vs
"Roman".
"Greek": puts theory above practice.
"Roman": puts practice above theory.
N
ever judge a policy by its intentions or the reason- intention. However
this reverses when it
ing behind it, except for the application of the pre-
comes to politics. It
cautionary principle. remains however that
for risky decisions
naive assessment of
Other inspirations: the episode when Cato the elder sent Greek results fail to capture
the quality of the
philosophers packing; Plato’s disastrous chance at governing in decision.
Sicily; the Republic, perhaps what Popper deemed the most de-
structive book ever owing to Plato’s intellectual brilliance. Note
21
22 greek vs roman
Background
P
rinciple 5 Liberty is fractal; it should be exercized
to all collective units at all scales, that is, commu-
nities qua communities, all the way from n = 1 to
n = ∞, with minimal scale transformation.
Commentary
23
6 PROGRESSIVE VS
C O N S E R V AT I V E
P
rinciple 6 Never use terms such as progressive or
conservative without reference to a specifically stated
rate of change.
P
rogressive and conservative are ill defined
terms, verbalistic labels. It is required to
specify a rate of change for every specific do-
main.
Rationally progressive means embracing progress
by accepting a certain rate of change deemed optimal.
Too high a rate of change cancels the gains from previous
mutations; while too slow a change leads to misfitness.
Compare Popper’s utopian engineer to the piecemeal engineer, in the Open Soci-
ety[6], Vol I.
25
26 progressive vs conservative
Figure 6.1: Movement of packs of wolves over the summer of 2018. Voyageurs
Wolf Project, h/t Gore Burnelli. These wolves speak the same language and have
the same religion. Yet, there are separable entities.
Background
P
rinciple 7 Group morality is not the sum of
individual morality.
Never make moral inferences about an ag-
gregate or a group from attributes of indi-
vidual members and vice versa. Under ade-
quate legal and institutional structure, the intentions and
morality of individual agents does not aggregate to groups.
And the reverse: attributes of groups do not map to those
of agents.
Commentary
Make a distinction between vices that harm the agent and those
that harm others. One may hold high standards for private virtue.
But it is inconsistent to use the argument of such morality on
grounds of public good unless one can also accept absence of
scale transformation.
Adam Smith rejected Mandeville’s focus on vice (replacing it
with the milder self-interest) but nevertheless seems to have taken
the idea of scale transformation from him –as reflected in his
famous quote: "It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the
brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their
regard to their own interest."
O
ne does not necessarily build a virtuous political
system with virtuous agents. Likewise a collec-
tion of malicious agents can produce a virtuous
system.
Sometimes we get the reverse, sayings about good people collectively bad: Senatores
boni viri senatus mala bestia (Senators are good people, but the Senate is a bad animal),
falsely attributed to Cicero.
8 NONNAIVE UNIVERSALISM
P
rinciple 8 Never conflate localism with monolithic,
absorbing nationalism.
Commentary
K
ant’s naive universalism consists in the elimina-
tion of context to build a stripped-down, naive,
static, low-dimensional object out of a rich, fractal,
dynamic, interactive structure.
Some things generalize and are scale free (morals, rights), others
don’t and remain scale-dependent (nature of relations).
Background
C
orollary (Survival and Tribal Committments)
Collective survival necessitates a minimum level
of fractal tribalism, though tribes don’t necessarily
mean related people.
Commentary
Fughedaboud Kant...
The general and the
Tribes can be composed of nonrelatives as, say in the military,
abstract tend to attract where people take the bullet for their friends and co-fighters, not
self-righteous psy- a particular cause.
chopaths.
Nobody has managed to prove that abstract (particularly Kan-
tian) universalism can ensure intergenerational survival.
The saying if you are friends with everyone, you are nobody’s friend.
And if you treat all mankind the same, in other words without
some preferential treatment to your own children, you will turn
out to be an unreliable parent –eventually threatening their own
survival. Pure universalism at its ad absurdum limit implies you
drop off a kid at school in the morning and randomly pick an-
other in the afternoon.
The rules of societal symmetry cannot hold without some struc-
ture: you form a group with your own family; I form one with my own.
This renormalizes to tribes that can be as self-defined as needed.
The mechanism is convexity. You do better protecting your child
1
with intensity 1 than protecting 1000 children with intensity 1000 .
Recall that Byzantine theology was at least partly driven by com-
petition between partisans of rival teams (blue and green) in char-
iot races.
nonnaive universalism 31
Background
Further Comments
D
efinition: Racism vs. Xenophobia. Racism has
two conditions: 1) imparting population attributes
to randomly selected individuals or sub-groups
from such a population; that is, in the association of abili-
ties, personality traits, and disposition with ethnicities and
classification.
It leads to treating a person with presumed population
traits rather than the idiosyncratic ones (that is, top down
vs bottom up).
2) holding the belief that such presumed population traits
and dispositions are inferior to one’s own.
Homophily consists in preferring people similar to one-
self for social or cultural purposes, though not political,
economic, or functional ones (where its pathology becomes
nepotism).
Xenophobia consists in pathological homophily, dislik-
ing strangers qua strangers.
for weightlifting cars: you hire the person with the required abil-
ities and there will be an ex post correlation.
Commentary
Background
Joe Norman: "Because they’ve understood something about evolution, that it in-
volves inheritance, they believe they should be able to reduce every complex trait
of a human being down to a neat-narrativized story of inheritance problems (...)
when we realize our most complex traits arise out of interactions, and are not re-
ducible to more directly-heritable sub-systems or modules – even the interactions of
traits between just two people (parents) leads to very-difficult-to-predict emergent
outcomes."
36 racism, homophily, & xenophobia
P
rinciple 9a (CHROMOCLASSIFICATION) Tagging
people with top-down classifications and "identi-
ties" that stifle the idiosyncratic attributes of the
individual is fundamentally racist. Chromo-categorization
using terms like "white" and "PoC" (people of color) is fun-
damentally racist and inspired by colonial classifications
–even when used by the "left". White is indicator of purity,
not race. Someone partially white is generally not classi-
fied as white in Anglo-Saxon dominated countries.
In addition, chromatic classification on a scale with "white" and The "left" tends to use
the same language
"black" is necessarily ordinal and hierarchical; geographical one and frame problems
do not. in the same way as the
"right"
When people of Northern European ancestry talk dismissively
about "whiteness", they are practicing second order racism, im-
plying some superiority in the process and patronizing other classes
of people.
T
he Nonelephant Animals problem (or "Mary Beard
Problem") consists in creating classifications with
"other", classifying people with reference to a class
that has an implied referential purity to it. In the Mary
Beard story, Romans were not "others" but Mediterraneans
from outside what is now the European Union fell anachro-
nistically under the "others" tag, when these people were
much closer to the Romans than to the native English.
It is more rigorous to
use "Nordic supremacy"
P
in place of "White rinciple 9b Never mistake homophily for xenopho-
supremacy" bia. A weak form of homophily (preference for
similar people) is not to be confused with xeno-
phobia (distaste of the foreigner), even if it undergoes a
collective scale transformation and looks like outright seg-
regation. But there do exist various forms of xenophobia.
Example
Commentary
C
orollary: Groups and Individuals. An attitude to-
wards groups is never the same as one towards
individuals. All preferences are scale dependent.
Examples
Further comments
P
rinciple 10 Neither the minority nor the majority
should be able to impose their preferences on oth-
ers.
Commentary
Commentary
39
40 neither minority nor majority rules
Background
P
rinciple Government as precautionary entity The
government’s role is survival and ruin avoidance
–tail risks. Hence, necessarily, ergodicity.
Commentary
P
rinciple 11 War and Peace] Top down conflicts have
different properties from local ones, and different
resolution methods.
C
orollary:[Peace from the Top] Peace from the top
works if and only if war is from the top.
T
he General (non-naive) precautionary principle [16]
delineates conditions where actions must be taken
to reduce risk of ruin, and traditional cost-benefit
analyses must not be used. These are ruin problems where,
over time, exposure to tail events leads to a certain eventual
extinction.
P
rinciple 12 The central government principal role
is precautionary, according to the non-naive pre-
cautionary principle, and limited to tail events.
P
recautionary decisions do not scale. Collective
safety may require excessive individual risk avoid-
ance, even if it conflicts with an individual’s own
interests and benefits. It may require an individual to
worry about risks that are comparatively insignificant.
P
rinciple 13 Risk asymmetries (Multiscale)
No risk asymmetries should be present in the sys-
tem: every single person and every single entity
needs to have skin in the game.
Background
N
o decision should ever be taken by someone who
does not exit the pool in case he or she is wrong.
45
46 risk asymmetries
P/L
time
Figure 13.1: The Generalized Bob Rubin Trade (GBRT): losses are unwittingly
paid by the taxpayer ignorant of the dynamics.
14 GOVERNANCE VS
DEMOCRACY
P
rinciple 14 Governance, not just democracy, is the
objective function –democracy can be gamed.
Commentary
47
15 ERGODICITY
P
rinciple 15 Ergodicity. No static analysis for dy-
namic processes, particularly those that depend on
absence of ruin.
Commentary
49
16 N AT U R E A N D
SIGNIFICANCE
P
rinciple 16 (Nature and Statistical Significance)
Never invoke evidence of absence for non-
natural introductions and technologies; never
invoke absence of evidence for natural things.]
What Mother Nature does is rigorous until proven other-
wise; what humans and science do is flawed until proven
otherwise.
51
17 H I S T O R I C A L N A R R AT I V E S
AND AGENCY
P
rinciple 17 No historical study or account should
be considered without filling-in the gaps of non-
events, or events that do not reflect the agency of
some top-down ruler or "leader".
C
orollary: "Leadership" is merely procedural Evo-
lution (hence improvement) never happen from the
top via positiva. But degradation takes place from
the top via interventionism and side effects of policies. And
improvement from the top is necessarily obtained via neg-
ativa.
Commentary
P
rinciple 18 Never conflate religion and legal
system. "Christian" or "Judeo-Christian" val-
ues are not about religion, but the reverse: a
secular tinkering tradition that arose princi-
pally from the separation of church and state
in the West. Sharia is both a legal and a religious system.
Commentary
55
religion and legal systems 57
P
rinciple Godel-Popper limit No person or group
should ever be allowed to use the voting system,
and more generally voting institutions, to run on
a program with elements of anti-democracy.
P
rinciple Amnesty.
Part II
1 iatrogenics
Article 1: Iatrogenics
First, do no harm.
2 ethics of office
3 duration of institutions
4 partisanship
5 bailouts
5 bailouts 63
Figure 0.1: Monofractal: layers of self similarity between branches and trees.
Branches look like small trees. There is no centralized control, simply collections
of local rules.
64 religion and legal systems
Article 5: Bailout
Every company operating thanks to the backstop of the taxpayer
should be treated like a utility, with its executives compensated
like other civil servants.
Bankers tend to hijack the state. argument of "no cost to the tax-
payer"
6 ngos
7 scale-free universalism
8 chromoracism
Article 8: Chromoracism
Never designate races by color, rather by geography of origin:
Caucasian, Subsaharan, East Asian, etc.
8 chromoracism 65
Figure 0.2: Identity politics gone wild. The exposition "Art and Identity in
the Ancient Middle East" at the Metropolitan Museum in New York was a
showcase of tagged exclusive identities brought from top-down; Edward Said-
style identity mongers proceed to destroy the notion of cosmopolitan local-
ism/Mediterraneanism of the Phoenicians by classifying them into the "Middle
East". This shows the incoherence of non-localist Nationalism. Since c. 1100
BC Phoenicians (subsequently "Lebanese") have been the most Mediterraneans
of peoples: look at food/behavior/looks. But since 1860 some low-Intellect West-
erners (Arabists and founders of AUB, etc.) have decided de-Mediterraneanize
(initially de-Ottomanize) to satisfy "identity" concepts.
Figure 0.3: Verbalism: For the Irish, Gaelic roots are held to be "left wing" and
supported by the Palestinian activists. For the Lebanese, Phoenician roots are
considered "right wing".
66 religion and legal systems
Commentary
Background
Further Comments
Many people otherwise careful in "political correctness" (at least cosmetically) com-
mit the violation of ageism. Saying "Mathematics is a young man’s game" is always
interpreted as such, not as statistical statement: "Mathematics is most often a young
man’s game".
9 negative democracy 67
9 negative democracy
11 political behavior
12 bigotteering, i
13 bigotteering, ii
15 retrospective bitotteering
16 deep ministries
17 pedophrasty
18 cherry picking
QUAESTIONES
18 cherry picking 75
Quaestio 1
Is the argument for or against regulation?
Quaestio 2
Can someone be a genuine, uncorrupted, academic?
Quaestio 3
We know that current risk management methods such as VaR
and others derived from Modern Portfolio Theory based on Gaus-
sian and near-Gaussian distributions are useless and harmful to
their users. But they help students get a job. Don’t you think the
obligation of the university is to give the students skills in the
marketplace?
The collective comes first. Never harm the collective. And never
help individuals get an edge over the collective.
The primum no nocere applies to the higher layer first, lower lay-
ers later.
Quaestio 4
You run into a lobbyist (or an employee of a foreign funded think
tank) in a social setting, say a cocktail party. Can you chat with
him or her?
No.
Quaestio 5
Can politicians who privately educate their children ethically
take a policy position on state education when in office?
Yes, 1) under the conditions that the children are no longer in pri-
vate school at the time of this policy stance if the politician is in
favor of increases in funding funding public education, 2) uncon-
ditionally if the politician is against funding for public education.
More generally, one should apply retroactive rules only to situ-
ations where there is the possibility of tacit collision (say a reg-
ulator moves to the private sector, say Monsanto, hence his past
actions are tainted by a behavior in favor of the industry that
allowed him to get the job, or former Treasury Secretary Tim Gei-
thner who got a big payoff from the industry he helped get yuuge
bonuses in 2010).
18 cherry picking 77
Quaestio 6
University and tuition costs have far exceeded the pace of infla-
tion for over 20-years. This is principally driven by no economic
incentives for universities to share in the risk/cost of student debt.
Should the federal government charge back universities for de-
faulted loans?
Quaestio 7
If you believe that awards, honors, and such items are an abom-
ination that turn people into (zero-sum) spectator sports, and
marks a departure of the recipient from virtue, should one adver-
tise the turning down of a prize?
Quaestio 8
You tell someone something in private, as a person, then he goes
and publish it in a newspaper. This is standard methodology by
journalists who cozy up to you as a strategy to extract informa-
tion. It is unethical?
78 religion and legal systems
Quaestio 9
Is showing off a departure from virtue?
Quaestio 10
Fat Tony took out his fair share of enemies. Is there a SITG rule
for when you must do the dirty work yourself vs when you let
others do it?
The very idea of taking justice in your own hands violates sym-
metry if you don’t want others to take justice with their own
hands and violate due process. The entire Western civilization’s
idea of justice (which starts in Babylon) is based on such idea of
socialization of judgment and punishment –though Roman law,
socialized judgment but not punishment or restitution which you
would have to carry out yourself.
However there are plenty of degrees of freedom within the law.
Self defense is one, if you sort of see what I mean. Fat Tony would
say that only morons violate laws or, even more Fat Tonyish: only
morons get caught violating laws.
There is the argument of failure of the law, sort of the equivalent
of market failure. Even then the answer is, dura lex, sed lex.
18 cherry picking 79
Quaestio 11
Which genetics research is racist?
DEFINITIONS
1 verbalism as a central fallacy 83
Note that with such notions as "correlation" the proper meaning is reduction of
uncertainty concerning one of the variables conditional on knowing the other, which
is nonlinear: .6 correlation is far more than twice .3.
84 religion and legal systems
Commentary
2 hand waving
Commentary
Figure 0.2: Rule 110 after 500 steps starts showing shapes that are totally ran-
dom –but predictable one step ahead.
3 uncertainty and complexity: definitions 91
Commentary
Commentary
93
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[6] Karl Raimund Popper. The Open Society and Its Enemies.(vol.
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Marx and the Aftermath.). 1966.
[8] Hiroki Sayama and Yaneer Bar-Yam. The gene centered view
of evolution and symmetry breaking and pattern formation
in spatially distributed evolutionary processes. Nonlinear dy-
namics in the Life and Social Sciences (ed. by W. Sulis and I. Trofi-
mova), IOS Press, pages 360–382, 2001.
[13] Nassim Nicholas Taleb. Antifragile: things that gain from dis-
order. Random House and Penguin, 2012.