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1 of 4 DOCUMENTS

RICHARD F. MILLER, Plaintiff, v. PHILIPP HOLZMANN, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 95-1231 (RCL)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

575 F. Supp. 2d 2; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500

August 12, 2008, Decided

August 12, 2008, Filed

SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Costs and fees proceeding Michael J. Friedman, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
at, Motion granted by, in part, Motion denied by, in part JUSTICE, Washington, DC.
United States ex rel. Miller v. Bill Harbert Int'l Constr.,
Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14927 (D.D.C., Feb. 26, For PHILIPP HOLZMANN, A.G., Defendant: John H.
2009) Shenefield, LEAD ATTORNEY, MORGAN, LEWIS &
BOCKIUS, LLP, Washington, DC; Phillip Craig Zane,
PRIOR HISTORY: Miller v. Holzmann, 563 F. Supp. LEAD ATTORNEY, BAKER, DONELSON,
2d 54, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48093 (D.D.C., 2008) BEARMAN, CALDWELL & BERKOWITZ, PC,
Washington, DC.

COUNSEL: [**1] For RICHARD F. MILLER, For BILL HARBERT INTERNATIONAL

Plaintiff: Keith V. Morgan, LEAD ATTORNEY, U.S. CONSTRUCTION, INC., [**2] Defendant: Charles
ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Washington, DC; Robert B. Anthony Zdebski, LEAD ATTORNEY, TROUTMAN
Bell, LEAD ATTORNEY, Rebecca J.K. Gelfond, SANDERS, LLP, Telecommunications & Technology,
Washington, DC; Gregory B. Reece, Jennifer M. Washington, DC; June Ann Sauntry, LEAD
O'Connor, Matthew B. Baumgartner, WILMER ATTORNEY, Brian P. Watt, Bryan B. Lavine,
CUTLER PICKERING HALE & DORR, LLP, TROUTMAN SANDERS, LLP, Atlanta, GA; Barry
Washington, DC; Howard M. Shapiro, PRO HAC VICE, Coburn, PRO HAC VICE, Coburn & Coffman, PLLC,
WILMER, CUTLER & PICKERING, Washington, DC; Washington, DC;
Jonathan Goldman Cedarbaum, WILMER HALE,
For HARBERT INTERNATIONAL
Washington, DC; Monya Monique Bunch, WILMER
ESTABLISHMENT, INC., Defendant: Charles Anthony
CUTLER PICKERING HALE AND DORR, LLP,
Zdebski, LEAD ATTORNEY, TROUTMAN
Washington, DC; Robert D. Cultice, WILMER CUTLER
SANDERS, LLP, Telecommunications & Technology,
PICKERING HALE & DORR, LLP, Boston, MA.
Washington, DC; June Ann Sauntry, LEAD
For UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff: Carolyn ATTORNEY, TROUTMAN & SANDERS, Atlanta, GA;
Gail Mark, LEAD ATTORNEY, U.S. DEPARTMENT Barry Coburn, PRO HAC VICE, Coburn & Coffman,
OF JUSTICE, Civil Division, Washington, DC; Keith V. PLLC, Washington, DC.
Morgan, LEAD ATTORNEY, U.S. ATTORNEY'S
For HARBERT CORPORATION, HARBERT
OFFICE, Washington, DC; Michael F. Hertz, LEAD
INTERNATIONAL, INC., Defendants: Charles Samuel
ATTORNEY, Department of Justice, Washington, DC;
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575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **2

Leeper, Jeffrey J. Lopez, Michael Reilly Miner, LEAD & MURPHY, Atlanta, [**4] GA; Stephen Printiss
ATTORNEYS, Michael J. McManus, DRINKER Murphy, LEAD ATTORNEY, REED SMITH,
BIDDLE & REATH, LLP, Washington, DC; Elizabeth Washington, DC.
Ewert, DRINKER BIDDLE, LLP, Washington, DC.
For HARBERT INTERNATIONAL, INC., Counter
For HARBERT U.K. SERVICES, LTD, Defendant: Claimant: Charles Samuel Leeper, LEAD ATTORNEY,
Charles Anthony Zdebski, LEAD ATTORNEY, DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH, LLP, Washington, DC.
TROUTMAN SANDERS, LLP, Telecommunications &
Technology, Washington, DC. For RICHARD F. MILLER, Counter Defendant: Jennifer
M. O'Connor, WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE
For J.A. JONES CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., & DORR, LLP, Washington, DC; Robert B. Bell,
J.A. JONES CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, Washington, DC; Robert D. Cultice, WILMER CUTLER
Defendants: Alan William Hugh Gourley, LEAD PICKERING HALE & DORR, LLP, Boston, MA.
ATTORNEY, CROWELL & MORING, LLP,
Washington, DC. JUDGES: Royce C. Lamberth, Chief Judge.

For HARBERT CONSTRUCTION [**3] SERVICES OPINION BY: Royce C. Lamberth

(U.K.) LTD., BILHAR INTERNATIONAL
ESTABLISHMENT, formerly known as HARBERT OPINION
INTERNATIONAL ESTABLISHMENT, Defendants:
June Ann Sauntry, LEAD ATTORNEY, Brian P. Watt,
Bryan B. Lavine, TROUTMAN SANDERS, LLP, [*3] MEMORANDUM OPINION
Atlanta, GA; Barry Coburn, PRO HAC VICE, Coburn &
Coffman, PLLC, Washington, DC. Winston Churchill prescribed magnanimity in
victory. See Winston S. Churchill, THE SECOND
For BILL L. HARBERT, Defendant: June Ann Sauntry, WORLD WAR, VOLUME I: THE GATHERING
LEAD ATTORNEY, Brian P. Watt, Bryan B. Lavine, STORM xiii (1948).
TROUTMAN SANDERS, LLP, Atlanta, GA.
But Churchill, of course, spoke of war, not litigation.
For PHILIPP HOLZMANN A.G., Defendant: Phillip
Craig Zane, BAKER, DONELSON, BEARMAN, On August 10, 2007, relator emerged victorious in
CALDWELL & BERKOWITZ, PC, Washington, DC. this False Claims Act ("FCA") suit of epic duration when
this [*4] Court entered judgment against six defendants
For FRU CON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 1 for over $ 90 million. 2 (See generally Judgment [883].)
Defendant: Jeffrey T. Green, SIDLEY AUSTIN, LLP, He now seeks another $ 20 million in attorneys' fees and
Washington, DC. costs.

For BILL L. HARBERT, Defendant: Barry Coburn, 1 They are: individual defendant E. Roy
LEAD ATTORNEY, PRO HAC VICE, Coburn & Anderson ("Anderson"); and corporate defendants
Coffman, PLLC, Washington, DC; Charles Anthony Harbert Corporation ("HC"), Harbert
Zdebski, LEAD ATTORNEY, TROUTMAN International, Inc. ("HII"), Bill Harbert
SANDERS, LLP, Telecommunications & Technology, International Construction, Inc. ("BHIC"), Bilhar
Washington, DC; June Ann Sauntry, LEAD International [**5] Establishment f/k/a Harbert
ATTORNEY, TROUTMAN & SANDERS, Atlanta, GA; International Establishment ("Bilhar"), and
David Schertler, SCHERTLER & ONORATO, L.L.P., Harbert Construction Services (U.K.) Ltd.
Washington, DC. ("HUK").
2 The jury set total damages at $ 34,346,029.22.
For ROY ANDERSON, Defendant: Andrew Lawrence (See Verdict Form [858] at 9, 10, 12.) The Court
Hurst, LEAD ATTORNEY, PRO HAC VICE, REED then trebled the damages award in accordance
SMITH, LLP, Washington, DC; Charles C. Murphy, Jr., with 31 U.S.C. section 3729(a) and set off the $
LEAD ATTORNEY, Ellen G. Schlossberg, VAUGHAN 13.7 million the government had received from
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575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *4; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **5

settling co-defendants. (Mem. Op. of Aug. 10, 5 Relator's original fee petition sought $
2007 [882] at 10-11.) It further determined the 9,989,707 in fees. (See Mot. for Fees, Costs, and
appropriate civil penalty to be $ 10,000 per false Expenses [930] at 1.) Based on criticisms raised
claim, yielding a total penalty of $ 1,100,000.00. in defendants' oppositions, relator subtracted
(Id. at 7-9, 11.) The Court calculated total liability certain time that had been inadvertently included
in this case -- the sum of the trebled damages and in his original request and reduced the amount
civil penalties -- as $ 90,438,087.66. (Id. at 11.) It sought by $ 18,941.75. (See Ex. B to Bell
also adjudged defendants liable for plaintiffs' Supplemental Decl., Ex. 1 to Reply to HII's Opp'n
costs and for relator Richard F. Miller's [957].) Relator also concedes the requested
reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses. (Id. at amount must be offset by $ 25,000 in attorney's
2-3.) fees received from AICI, a settling co-defendant.
(See Mot. for Fees, Costs, and Expenses [930] at
Now before the Court are plaintiffs' bills of costs 1, n.1.)
[928, 929, 933] and relator's motion for attorneys' fees, 6 While the original petition sought $
costs, and expenses [930]. Pursuant to Federal Rule of 522,851.04, (see Mot. for Fees, Costs, and
Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) and Local Civil Rule 54.1, the Expenses [930] at 1), relator subsequently
United States asks the Court to tax its $ 54,437.87 in lowered this amount by $ 11,127.98, (see Bell
costs to defendants. 3 Relator, in turn, requests Supplemental Decl. PP 26-28, Ex. 1 to Reply to
reimbursement [**6] for $ 31,973.96 in costs. 4 HII's Opp'n [957]).
Separately, relator seeks $ 9,945,765.25 in attorneys' fees 7 Where appropriate, the Court will indicate
5 and $ 511,723.06 in associated costs and expenses. 6 which defendant(s) make(s) which arguments, but
Finally, he proposes a 100 percent enhancement of his although they have filed five [**8] separate
attorneys' fees based on exceptional quality of oppositions, defendants have largely adopted one
representation, thus raising his overall demand to $ another's objections. (See Anderson's Opp'n [946]
20,403,253.56. Defendants, naturally, oppose plaintiffs' at 1 ("[t]o the extent they are applicable and not
requests. 7 This Opinion [*5] first considers Anderson's inconsistent with []his response," adopting
argument that he shares liability only for the arguments in BHIC, Bilhar, HII, and HC's
government's costs. It then examines defendants' oppositions); BHIC and HUK's Opp'n [948] at 1
challenges to plaintiffs' bills of costs, to relator's n.1 (adopting all arguments in HII, HC, and
attorneys' fees, and to his expenses. Anderson's oppositions, to the extent they apply);
HII's Opp'n [949] at 44 (referring the Court to
3 Initially, the government requested HC's Opposition for arguments against fee
reimbursement in the amount of $ 50,702.25 -- $ enhancement); HC's Opp'n [950] at 1
838.65 for service of summons and subpoena, $ (incorporating by reference all arguments in HII's
23,706.10 for trial and hearing transcripts, and $ Opposition); Bilhar's Revised Opp'n [951] at 1
26,157.50 for deposition transcripts. (See U.S. (adopting "the grounds set forth in all
Bill of Costs [928] at 1.) Due to an unanticipated co-defendants' oppositions"); HII and HC's Notice
closure of the courthouse, the government was of Joinder [952] (adopting arguments in BHIC
unable to timely confirm certain information and HUK and Anderson's Oppositions).)
necessary to compute its witness fees pursuant to
28 U.S.C. section 1821, (id. at 2), so it later I. Anderson's Liability
requested an additional $ 3,735.62, (see U.S.
Supplemental Bill of Costs [933] at 1). Although the jury found for the government on its
4 Relator seeks $ 587.00 for clerk's fees, $ sole, live claim against Anderson, this Court dismissed
345.00 [**7] for service of summons and relator's claims against Anderson as time-barred. (See
complaint, $ 19,271.60 for deposition transcripts, Verdict Form [858] at 4, 7, 11; Mem. Op. of June 14,
$ 9,323.09 for trial and hearing transcripts, $ 2007 [872] at 29.) In opposing relator's fee petition,
299.85 for other copying, $ 1,974.92 for statutory Anderson contends the FCA permits only "prevailing
witness fees, and $ 172.00 for subpoena service. parties" to recover fees and costs from a defendant, that
(See Relator's Bill of Costs [929] at 2.) relator is not a "prevailing [**9] party" as against him,
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and that accordingly, he is not liable to relator. of the prevailing party inquiry must be the
(Anderson's Opp'n at 2-7.) Relator, however, insists the material alteration of the legal relationship of the
FCA does not limit fee and cost recovery to prevailing parties." Tex. State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland
parties, and that because the government prevailed on its Independent Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792-93, 109
claim against Anderson, Anderson is jointly and severally S. Ct. 1486, 103 L. Ed. 2d 866 (1989). [**11] In
liable with the other defendants for relator's fees and this Circuit, a prevailing party must demonstrate:
costs. (Reply to Anderson's Opp'n at 1.) (1) "a court-ordered change in the legal
relationship between the plaintiff and the
As the parties (at least, implicitly) concede, this issue defendant"; (2) that it is "a party in whose favor a
is one of first impression. (See id. at 4; Anderson's Opp'n judgment is rendered, regardless of the amount of
at 5.) damages awarded"; and (3) that it has done more
than "having acquired a judicial pronouncement
In incorporating a fee-shifting provision, the FCA is unaccompanied by judicial relief." Select Milk
far from unique among federal statutes that create private, Producers, Inc. v. Johanns, 365 U.S. App. D.C.
civil causes of action. Compare 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) 183, 400 F.3d 939, 946-47 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
(2008) (qui tam relator may recover "expenses . . . Moreover, "[t]hat a plaintiff has prevailed against
necessarily incurred, plus reasonable attorneys' fees and one party does not entitle him to fees from
costs," from the defendants), with 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) another party." Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.
(2008) (court has discretion to award "reasonable 159, 168, 105 S. Ct. 3099, 87 L. Ed. 2d 114
attorney's fee as part of [] costs" to successful civil rights (1985). Relator appears to concede that he did not
plaintiffs). "prevail" against Anderson under this definition.
Under many other fee-shifting schemes, a plaintiff The FCA does not expressly limit fee recovery to
may recover his attorneys' fees and expenses from the "prevailing" relators, but its description of which relators
defendant only when he is a "prevailing party." 8 See, may recoup their fees is not exactly a model of clarity:
e.g., Richlin Sec. Serv. Co. v. Chertoff, 128 S. Ct. 2007,
2011, 170 L. Ed. 2d 960 (2008) [**10] (Equal Access to If the Government proceeds with an
Justice Act, 5 U.S.C. section 504(a)(1), "permits an action brought by a [relator], such person
eligible prevailing party to recover 'fees and other shall . . . receive at least 15 percent but not
expenses incurred by that party in connection with' a more than 25 percent of the proceeds of
proceeding before an administrative agency"); the action or settlement of the claim . . . .
Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 127 S. Where the action is one which the court
Ct. 1994, 2002, 167 L. Ed. 2d 904 (2007) (Individuals finds to be based primarily on disclosures
with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. section of specific information (other than
1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I), "allow[s] an award [of attorney's fees] information [**12] provided by the
'to a prevailing party who [*6] is the parent of a child person bringing the action) relating to
with a disability'"); Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 109, allegations or transactions [that have been
113 S. Ct. 566, 121 L. Ed. 2d 494 (1992) ("in order to publicly disclosed] the court may award . .
qualify for attorney's fees under [the Civil Rights . no [] more than 10 percent of the
Attorney's Fees Awards Act, 42 U.S.C.] § 1988, a proceeds . . . . Any payment to a person
plaintiff must be a 'prevailing party'"). Cf. Local Civ. R. under the first or second sentence shall be
54.1(d) (providing for recovery of costs other than made from the proceeds. Any such person
attorney's fees by "the prevailing party" in civil shall also receive an amount for
litigation). reasonable expenses . . . necessarily
incurred, plus reasonable attorneys' fees
8 Under these analogous statutes, a prevailing
and costs. All such expenses, fees, and
party is one who "succeed[s] on any significant
costs shall be awarded against the
issue in litigation which achieves some of the
defendant.
benefit the parties sought in bringing suit."
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.
31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) (2008) (emphasis added). 9 Cf. 42
Ct. 1933, 76 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1983). "The touchstone
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575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *6; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **12

U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2008) (court has discretion to award bounty a relator should receive when the government
reasonable attorney's fee to "prevailing party" in suits intervenes in the action he has brought and ultimately
brought pursuant to certain civil rights statutes). secures payment for its damages. See id. The internal
cross-reference thus suggests that whenever [*7] the
9 Notwithstanding the statutory language, courts government intervenes and obtains relief, no matter the
have frequently described the FCA's fee-shifting circumstances, the relator should receive both a share of
provision as applying only to "prevailing parties," the government's proceeds and reasonable attorneys' fees.
but never under the precise circumstances
presented here. See, e.g., Fed. Recovery Servs., This reading, however, would yield absurd results --
Inc. v. United States, 72 F.3d 447, 449-50, 453 at least some of which Congress clearly did not intend.
(5th Cir. 1995) (affirming district court's denial of For example, 31 U.S.C. section 3730(e) provides that no
attorneys' fees to relator whose claims were court shall have jurisdiction over certain actions, such as
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction); United States those "based upon the public disclosure of allegations or
ex rel. ATC Distrib. Group, Inc. v. Ready-Built transactions . . . unless . . . the person bringing the action
Transmissions, Inc., No. 03 Civ. 2150, 2007 U.S. is an original source of the information" -- that is, "an
Dist. LEXIS 65963, at *1, *25 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, individual who has direct and independent knowledge
2007) [**13] (awarding attorney's fees to relator [**15] of the information on which the allegations are
who was party to settlement between defendants based and [who] has voluntarily provided the information
and United States); United States ex rel. Averback to the Government" before filing his qui tam complaint.
v. Pastor Med. Assocs. P.C., 224 F. Supp. 2d 342, See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4) (2008). Logically, having
344-45, 348 (D. Mass. 2002) (awarding attorney's erected a jurisdictional bar to these relators' claims,
fees to relator after government settled with Congress could not have intended them to receive
defendants where "[t]he fact that [relator] is attorneys' fees. See Fed. Recovery Servs., Inc., 72 F.3d at
entitled to attorney's fees is not in dispute"); 449-50, 453 (affirming district court's denial of attorneys'
United States ex rel. Butler v. Magellan Health fees to relator whose claims were dismissed as barred
Servs., Inc., 74 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1205, 1217 under section 3730(e)(4)). Cf. United States ex rel.
(M.D. Fla. 1999) (noting that "the FCA Merena v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 205 F.3d 97, 106
Amendments of 1986 authorize awards of (3d Cir. 2000) (Alito, J.) (reversing district court's award
attorney's fees to prevailing qui tam plaintiffs" of relator's share to relator whose claims were subject to
before granting defendant's motion to dismiss dismissal under section 3730(e)(4)). On the contrary,
relator's amended complaint); United States ex Congress has sought to prevent, not reward,
rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v. "opportunistic suits by private persons who heard of
Blue Cross Blue Shield of Ga., Inc., 755 F. Supp. fraud but played no part in exposing it." Cooper v. Blue
1040, 1044 (S.D. Ga. 1990) (noting that "the FCA Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 19 F.3d 562, 565 (11th
Amendments of 1986 now authorize awards of Cir. 1994) (emphasis added) (discussing comprehensive
attorney's fees to prevailing qui tam plaintiffs" 1986 FCA amendments).
before denying defendant's motion to dismiss
relator's complaint). The fee-shifting provision itself does not appear to
draw this line -- nor, for that matter, any other. 10 Relator
To interpret the vague phrase "any such person," the suggests the Court should [**16] interpret this
Court must look to its context. See Davis v. Mich. Dep't inscrutable language in light of the FCA's goals, which he
of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809, 109 S. Ct. 1500, 103 L. argues support awarding attorneys' fees to relators, like
Ed. 2d 891 (1989) ("It is a fundamental canon of statutory himself, whose claims are dismissed due to "procedural,"
construction [**14] that the words of a statute must be vice jurisdictional, defects. (See Reply to Anderson's
read in their context and with a view to their place in the Opp'n at 4-5.) Courts rightly balk at engaging in this sort
overall statutory scheme."). In light of the immediately of arbitrary line-drawing. E.g., Colgrove v. Battin, 413
preceding sentence, "any such person" must mean any U.S. 149, 182, 93 S. Ct. 2448, 37 L. Ed. 2d 522 (1973)
person who receives payment under the statute's first or (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Normally, in our system we
second sentences. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) (2008). leave the inevitable process of arbitrary line drawing to
Those two sentences merely establish the percentage the Legislative Branch, which is far better equipped to
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575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *7; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **16

make ad hoc compromises."). 109 S. Ct. 1981, 104 L. Ed. 2d 557 (1989)
("[b]ecause the plain text does not resolve these
10 The reading deduced above would, for issues, we must examine the history leading to
example, afford a relator's share and attorneys' [Federal Rule of Evidence 609's] enactment");
fees where, while investigating spurious Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 563-65, 108
allegations in a qui tam complaint, the S. Ct. 2541, 101 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1988) (looking to
government stumbled upon wholly separate fraud Congressional report for "elaborat[ion] on the
by the defendant, of which the lucky relator knew meaning of the phrase . . . 'substantially
nothing. justified'"); Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886,
893-94, 104 S. Ct. 1541, 79 L. Ed. 2d 891 (1984)
Happily, here, Congress left an additional, (relying on Senate Report in interpreting
unambiguous clue to its intent in drafting the FCA fee-shifting statute to permit calculation of fee
attorneys' fees provision. In its report accompanying the awards "according to prevailing market rates").
1986 amendments, the Senate Judiciary Committee
characterized the FCA's fee-shifting scheme as applying As the Supreme Court has observed, "[r]espect for
to "prevailing qui tam relators." S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 29 ordinary language requires that a plaintiff receive at least
(1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. [**17] 5266, some relief on the merits of his claim before he can be
5294 (emphasis added). As explained above, the qualifier said to prevail." Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760, 107
"prevailing" appears in numerous other federal S. Ct. 2672, 96 L. Ed. 2d 654 (1987), overruled in part on
fee-shifting provisions, and its meaning is other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S.
well-established. See, e.g., Farrar, 506 U.S. at 109-11. Its Ct. 2293, 132 L. Ed. 2d 418 (1995). [**19] The Senate
application here would harmonize the fee-shifting Report's "ordinary language" undercuts relator's
provision with the jurisdictional exclusions in subsection contention that Anderson, against whom his claims
(e) and with more fundamental jurisdictional concerns. 11 garnered no relief whatever, should share liability for his
See Fed. Recovery Servs., [*8] Inc., 72 F.3d at 450, 452 attorneys' fees and costs.
(government's intervention does not cure existing
jurisdictional defect in relator's complaint so as to permit Furthermore, contrary to relator's arguments,
dismissed relator to recover attorneys' fees); United declining to assess relator's attorneys' fees against
States ex rel. Taxpayers Against Fraud v. Gen. Elec. Co., Anderson comports with the FCA's underlying purposes.
41 F.3d 1032, 1044 (6th Cir. 1994) (despite government's Relator insists Congress enacted the FCA "to encourage
intervention and settlement with defendant, if district the filing of this very kind of lawsuit," in which relator
court on remand determined co-relator lacked standing, it from the outset fingered Anderson as a ringleader in the
could not recoup attorneys' fees). fraud. (Reply to Anderson's Opp'n at 3-4.)

11 The Court would ordinarily hesitate to stake First, to answer relator's implicit proposition most
its interpretation of the fee-shifting provision's directly, this Court is confident that potential relators will
eligibility criteria on a single statement in the not be discouraged from filing meritorious FCA claims
provision's legislative history. See IBEW, Local by a holding that 31 U.S.C. section 3730(d)(1) does not
Union No. 474 v. NLRB, 259 U.S. App. D.C. 168, permit attorneys' fee awards against defendants who
814 F.2d 697, 712 (D.C. Cir.1987) ("a cardinal obtain judgment as a matter of law on the relator's claims.
principle of the judicial function of statutory 12
interpretation is that [**18] courts have no
authority to enforce principles gleaned solely 12 Moreover, the Court observes that relator will
from legislative history that have no statutory be "rewarded with both a relator's share and
reference point"). Here, however, crediting this attorneys fees" from the other defendants, against
statement avoids dissonance among the statute's whom he obtained judgment, even if he receives
various provisions. And where statutory language nothing from Anderson. (See Reply to Anderson's
is unclear, resort to the legislative tea leaves is a Opp'n at 4.) The others contest only the amount of
well-accepted interpretative step. See, e.g., Green fees [**20] demanded, not relator's entitlement to
v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 511, them.
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Second, this Court has encapsulated the FCA's expenses from Anderson under the FCA. Under Federal
purposes as follows: Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1), only a "prevailing
party" may recover costs, other than attorneys' fees, from
The False Claims Act seeks, first and a private defendant. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d)(1). [**22]
foremost, to detect, punish, and deter the Because relator's legal relationship to Anderson remains
submission of false claims, while seeking wholly unchanged, he may not recover costs from
to restore funds to the federal fisc. The qui Anderson under this Rule. See Tex. State Teachers Ass'n,
tam provisions enlist private individuals, 489 U.S. at 792-93; Graham, 473 U.S. at 168.
often motivated largely by self-interest, to
report and prosecute alleged false claims. II Plaintiffs' Taxable Costs
Those provisions seek to strike a balance
As stated above, Rule 54(d)(1) permits a "prevailing
between the interests of the government
party" to recoup his costs, other than attorneys' fees, from
and the self-interest of relators.
a private defendant. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d)(1). Cf. 31
U.S.C. §3729(a) (U.S. may recover "the costs of a civil
United States ex rel. Pogue v. Diabetes Treatment Ctrs.
action" brought to recover FCA penalty or damages).
of Am., 474 F. Supp. 2d 75, 87 (D.D.C. 2007) (Lamberth,
While Rule 54(d)(1) affords the court some discretion in
J.). "The [FCA's] statute of limitations," this Court
awarding costs, the Courts of Appeals have consistently
reasoned, "advances those governmental interests." Id.
treated the allowance as presumptive, holding "that a
Yet statutes of limitations, [*9] by their nature, also
court may neither deny nor reduce a prevailing party's
"facilitat[e] the administration of claims[] . . . [and]
request for costs without first articulating some good
promot[e] judicial efficiency." John R. Sand & Gravel
reason for doing so." Baez v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 221
Co. v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 750, 753, 169 L. Ed. 2d
U.S. App. D.C. 477, 684 F.2d 999, 1004 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
591 (2008) (citations omitted). Thus, Congress clearly
(en banc) (per curiam). The unsuccessful party bears the
did not seek "to encourage the filing of this very kind of
burden of supplying this "good reason," and "trial judges
lawsuit" at the expense of these governmental interests
have rarely denied costs to a prevailing party whose
and prudential considerations. 13 Denying attorneys' fees
conduct has not been vexatious when the losing party has
to relators whose claims [**21] are time-barred strikes
been capable of paying such costs." Id.; see, e.g., Bell v.
this balance.
Gonzales, No. 03-163, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69415, at
13 When it dismissed relator's claims against *7-8 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2006) [**23] (Bates, J.) (sharply
Anderson, the Court laid responsibility at the reducing government's "plainly inflated Bill of Costs,"
government's feet, citing its "failure to exercise where costs were "not well supported factually or legally"
due diligence in investigating the civil claims and comprised "a punitive effort . . . against an
against" Anderson. (See Mem. Op. of June 14, unsuccessful discrimination plaintiff").
2007 [872] at 29.) But it was relator, in the first
In particular, by statute, a prevailing party may
instance, who failed to name Anderson as a
recover "[f]ees of the court reporter for all or any part of
defendant until he filed his Second Amended
the stenographic transcript necessarily obtained for use in
Complaint on December 28, 2000, when the
the case." 28 U.S.C. § 1920(2) (2008). This Court's local
six-year limitations period on which he might
rules refine this allowance:
otherwise have relied had already expired. (See id.
at 3-4 n.4.) This delay is virtually inexplicable
(6) the costs, at the reporter's standard
given that the Confidential Disclosure Statement
rate, of the original and one copy of any
relator provided to the government in 1995
deposition noticed by the prevailing party,
described Anderson's leading role and extensive
and of one copy of any deposition noticed
involvement in the bid-rigging conspiracy. (See
by any other party, if the deposition was
Ex. 1 to Reply to HC's Opp'n, at 2, 11, 14, 20-21.)
used on the record, at a hearing or trial;
Accordingly, the Court concludes that because
[*10] (7) the cost, at the reporter's
relator's claims against Anderson were dismissed in their
standard rate, of the original and one copy
entirety, relator may not recover attorneys' fees, costs, or
of the reporter's transcript of a hearing or
 Page 8
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trial if the transcript: (i) is alleged by the government received invoice # 11978, dated
prevailing party to have been necessary for October 9, 2006. Clearly, plaintiffs collectively
the determination of an appeal within the seek to be paid for four copies of the same thing.
meaning of Rule 39(e), Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure, or (ii) was required Similarly, both plaintiffs paid Hedrick Court
by the court to be transcribed[.] Reporting for two copies of Clarence Anderson's
October 23, 2006 deposition transcript. (See Ex. 3
Local Civ. R. 54.1(d). to U.S. Bill of Costs [928] at 1; Ex. 3 to Relator's
Bill of Costs [929] at 2.) The details plaintiffs
Defendants' sole objection to plaintiffs' bills of costs provide for the deposition transcripts of Nichols,
concerns allegedly [**24] duplicative charges for Gould, Hemler, Kitchens, Hill, and Miller are
transcripts. Specifically, the United States and relator likewise sufficiently similar that it is clear to the
have each billed for an original and one copy of thirteen Court they paid for four separate copies.
individuals' deposition transcripts. 14 In some of these
cases, it is clear that plaintiffs wish defendants to pay for Such expenditures [**26] hardly seem reasonable.
four copies of exactly the same document. 15 Further, the The Court does not suggest that as co-plaintiffs, the
United States and relator each seek reimbursement for an United States and relator must necessarily have shared a
original and one copy of each afternoon's trial transcript. single transcript, prepared according to the court
(See Ex. 1 to U.S. Bill of Costs [928] at 3-4; Ex. 4 to reporter's regular schedule. But for each plaintiff to bill
Relator's Bill of Costs [929] at 1-2.) Again, they for two copies of an expedited transcript strikes the Court
repeatedly paid for four copies of the same document, at as possibly excessive. 16
a premium for expedited preparation.
16 The Court strongly suspects that Xeroxing a
14 These individuals are: Clarence Anderson, single, expedited transcript for trial team members
Allen Hall, Evangeline Hoover, William Lalor, who needed to promptly review it might have
Alfred Hill, Michael Gould, Dieter Kadenbach, proven far less costly than purchasing a second
Werner Hoffmeister, Wolfgang Eric Kaus, hard-copy from the court reporter at $ 2.25 per
Thomas Kitchens, Richard Miller, Scott Nichols, page.
and Robert Hemler. (See Ex. 2 to U.S. Bill of
Nevertheless, this practice does not fall outside the
Costs [928]; Ex. 3 to Relator's Bill of Costs
letter of Local Rule 54.1. The Rule refers to "[a]
[929].)
prevailing party," and its choice of article ("a" rather than
15 Unlike the United States, relator has not
"the") implies that any prevailing party, even if there is
attached copies of the court reporters' invoices.
more than one, may invoke its provisions. Local Civ. R.
He has provided some supporting data -- such as
54.1(a). Further, the Rule specifically provides for
the court reporting service name, invoice number,
reimbursement for an original and one copy of deposition
invoice date, and/or hearing or deposition date --
and trial transcripts. Local Civ. R. 54.1(d). Defendants,
for [**25] each individual expenditure, however,
who bear the burden of demonstrating a "good reason"
and scrutiny yields some obvious conclusions.
for denying plaintiffs' costs, offer no authority [*11] and
For example, each plaintiff seeks little argument for deviating from this presumptive
reimbursement for precisely $ 1,282.00 for two allowance. See Baez, 684 F.2d at 1004. [**27]
transcripts of Kadenbach, Hoffmeister, and Kaus's Moreover, plaintiffs' "conduct has not been vexatious,"
depositions, provided by Anglo-American Court and it appears defendants are "capable of paying [these]
Reporters. (See Ex. 3 to U.S. Bill of Costs [928] costs." See id. Accordingly, the Court concludes
at 11; Ex. 3 to Relator's Bill of Costs [929] at 2.) defendants' meager opposition does not overcome the
Relator's chart lists a single deposition date of strong presumption in plaintiffs' favor.
September 20, 2006, while the government's
Plaintiffs' bills of costs [928, 929] shall be granted in
invoice indicates the depositions occurred on
full. 17
September 20-21, 2006. Relator indicates that his
invoice, # 11976, was dated October 19, 2006; the 17 As relator notes, his fee petition seeks these
 Page 9
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *11; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **27

same costs. (See Mot. for Fees, Costs, and the Court must resolve two contested issues: (1) which
Expenses [930] at 40 n.18.) Thus, the Court will source(s) should supply the reasonable rate; and (2)
reduce any FCA expenses award by this amount whether current or historical rates should apply to work
to prevent a double recovery. performed prior to 2007. 19

III. Relator's Attorneys' Fees 19 Relator's fee petition includes hours billed by
five Wiley Rein attorneys and two paralegals,
Relator also seeks an award of "reasonable attorneys' from 1995-1999, while relator's principal counsel,
fees" against defendants under the FCA. "The initial Robert Bell, was a partner at that firm. (See Bell
estimate of a reasonable attorney's fee is properly Decl. PP 102-03 & Ex. B-2, Ex. 2 to Mot. for
calculated by multiplying the number of hours reasonably Fees, Costs, and Expenses [930].) Hours for
expended on the litigation times a reasonable hourly Wilmer Hale, billed by eighteen attorneys and
rate." Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888, 104 S. Ct. three paralegals, stretch from September 1999
1541, 79 L. Ed. 2d 891 (1984). 18 A strong presumption through July 2007. (Id. PP 107-08 & Ex. D-2.)
exists that the product of these two variables -- the
"lodestar figure" -- represents a "reasonable fee." 1. Established vs. Matrix-Derived Rates
Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens' Council for Clean
Air, 478 U.S. 546, 565, 106 S. Ct. 3088, 92 L. Ed. 2d 439 In this Circuit, "an attorney's usual billing rate is
(1986). Upward adjustments of the lodestar are warranted presumptively the reasonable rate, provided that this rate
only in "rare" and "exceptional" cases, where supported is 'in line with those prevailing in the community for
[**28] by "specific evidence" and detailed findings. similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable
Blum, 465 U.S. at 899-901. skill, experience and reputation.'" Kattan by Thomas v.
District of [*12] Columbia, 301 U.S. App. D.C. 374, 995
18 Blum involved efforts to recoup attorneys' F.2d 274, 278 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (quoting Blum, 465 U.S.
fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1988, not the at 896 n.11).
FCA. 465 U.S. at 888. But case law construing
what constitutes a "reasonable" fee applies [W]hen fixed market rates already exist,
uniformly across federal fee-shifting statutes that there is no good reason to tolerate the
employ this language, including the FCA. See, substantial costs of turning every attorneys
e.g., City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, fee case into a major ratemaking
562, 112 S. Ct. 2638, 120 L. Ed. 2d 449 (1992) proceeding. In [**30] almost every case,
(applying Blum and its progeny to fee awards the firms' established billing rates will
under Solid Waste Disposal Act and Federal provide fair compensation. The
Water Pollution Control Act); Shaw v. AAA Eng'g established rates represent the opportunity
& Drafting, Inc., 213 F.3d 538, 542-44 (10th Cir. cost of what the firm turned away in order
2000) (applying section 1988 case law to fee to take the litigation; they represent the
awards under FCA). lawyers' own assessment of the value of
their time.
In calculating relator's fee award, the Court must
thus make three separate determinations: (1) what Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 241 U.S. App. D.C. 11,
constitutes a "reasonable hourly rate" for his counsel's 746 F.2d 4, 24 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (emphasis in original),
services; (2) which among his counsel's claimed work overruled on other grounds by Save Our Cumberland
hours were "reasonably expended on the litigation"; and Mountains, Inc. v. Hodel, 273 U.S. App. D.C. 78, 857
(3) whether relator has offered "specific evidence" F.2d 1516 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 20 "[T]he burden is on the
demonstrating this to be the "rare" case in which a fee applicant to produce satisfactory evidence -- in
lodestar enhancement is appropriate, and if so, in what addition to the attorney's own affidavits -- that the
amount. The Court considers each issue in turn. requested rates" align with prevailing rates. Blum, 465
U.S. at 896 n.11. See also Covington v. District of
A. Reasonable Rate Columbia, 313 U.S. App. D.C. 16, 57 F.3d 1101, 1107
(D.C. Cir. 1995) ("a fee applicant's burden in establishing
In calculating this component of the lodestar, [**29]
 Page 10
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *12; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **30

a reasonable hourly rate entails a showing of at least three be considered competitive within the D.C. market, Braga
elements: the attorneys' billing practices; the attorneys' compares rates for four Wilmer Hale partners with those
skill, experience, and reputation; and the prevailing charged by his own firm and other large, D.C. litigation
market rates in the relevant community"). firms for partners with similar backgrounds and litigation
experience. (Id. P 6.) He asserts that [*13] Robert
20 See also Wilcox v. Sisson, No. 02-1455, 2006 Cultice, Jennifer O'Connor, and Jonathan Cedarbaum
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33404, at *8 (D.D.C. May 25, could command higher hourly rates, and that Robert
2006) (Collyer, J.) ("The rates charged by counsel Bell's rate "appears to be set right where [**33] it should
for the winning party are presumptively [**31] be in the Washington legal market." (Id.) Braga
reasonable if they are the same rates that counsel concludes that Wilmer Hale's established rates "fall
customarily charge other fee-paying clients for squarely within the prevailing market rates in the District
similar work."); Adolph Coors Co. v. Truck Ins. of Columbia for experienced counsel to handle complex
Exchange, 383 F. Supp. 2d 93, 98 (D.D.C. 2005) civil litigation." (Id.)
(Facciola, M.J.) ("the most fundamental economic
analysis indicates that, all things considered, the The second attorney declarant, Steven K. Davidson,
rate that [a firm] charges its clients is the market currently a partner at Steptoe & Johnson -- another large,
rate"); Cobell v. Norton, 231 F. Supp. 2d 295, international law firm - has practiced commercial
302-03 (D.D.C. 2002) (Lamberth, J.) ("'There is litigation in the District since 1985. (Davidson Decl. P 2,
no better indication of what the market will bear Ex. 5 to [930].) As a member of his firm's Executive
than what the lawyer in fact charges for his Committee, he has assisted with setting professionals'
services and what his clients pay.'") (quoting billing rates. (Id. PP 2, 16.) Davidson offers an opinion
Griffin v. Wash. Convention Ctr., 172 F. Supp. 2d based not only on anecdotal knowledge of his and
193, 197 (D.D.C. 2001) (Facciola, M.J.); Allen v. competitor firms' standard billing rates but also on two
Utley, 129 F.R.D. 1, 7 (D.D.C. 1990) (Richey, J.) external sources. (Id. PP 19-21.) First, The National Law
("when an attorney has a customary billing rate, Journal's 2006 annual survey of billing rates indicates
that rate is the presumptively reasonable rate to be that Wilmer Hale's rates are comparable to those reported
used in computing a fee award"). by other large firms with D.C. offices. (Id. P 19; see id.
Ex. A.) Second, Wilmer Hale's rates also align with those
a. Wilmer Hale delineated in the Laffey matrix, as updated by relator's
economist using the nationwide legal services component
Relator asks that his attorneys be compensated at of the Consumer Price Index, a methodology approved in
their standard billing rates, and he has submitted a Salazar v. District of Columbia, 123 F. Supp. 2d 8
declaration from his lead counsel, Robert Bell, that (D.D.C. 2000) [**34] (Kessler, J.). 21 (Id. P 20; see also
provides these standard rates for Wilmer Hale personnel. Kavanaugh Decl. PP 9-15, Ex. 4 to [930].) Davidson thus
(See Bell Decl. P 108, Ex. 2 to Mot. for Fees, Costs, and concludes that Wilmer Hale's rates "are comparable to the
Expenses [930].) As one might expect, Bell avows prevailing market rates and [] well within the reasonable
[**32] that the requested rates are within the range of range of rates for a law firm such as WilmerHale
prevailing market rates charged by large law firms in the undertaking matters of the magnitude and complexity of
District of Columbia for lawyers and paralegals of similar those involved here." (Davidson Decl. P 16, Ex. 5 to
experience and qualifications. (See id. PP 104, 109.) [930].)
To supplement Bell's own assertions, relator offers 21 The Court merely notes that Davidson finds
declarations from two local attorneys. The first, Stephen Wilmer Hale's rates' correspondence with this
L. Braga, now a partner at Baker Botts -- like Wilmer matrix persuasive. As set forth more fully below,
Hale, a large, international law firm -- has practiced the Court does not adopt this methodology. See
complex, civil litigation in the District since 1982. (Braga infra part III.A.1.b.
Decl. P 1, Ex. 3 to [930].) Since 1993, Braga has also
instructed law students on the subject of attorneys' fees as Relator's evidence demonstrates that Wilmer Hale's
an adjunct professor at the Georgetown University Law established billing rates -- those charged to all litigation
Center. (Id. P 1(g).) Beyond arguing that "[u]nder basic clients -- align with the established rates of lawyers of
economic principles," Wilmer Hale's standard rates must
 Page 11
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *13; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **34

reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation the hourly rates typically charged by FCA relators'
in the D.C. legal community. 22 See Kattan, 995 F.2d at counsel are the benchmark against which this Court
278. Thus, the Court will accord these rates a should evaluate relator's requested rates. (Id. at 32-33.)
presumption of reasonableness. See Covington, 57 F.3d
at 1110. This contention fails for three reasons. First, the
authority on which defendants rely does not support their
22 Relator also bears an evidentiary burden with argument. 23 Second, case law in this Circuit does not
respect to his "attorneys' skill, experience, and support the Balkanized approach to fee calculation that
reputation." Covington, 57 F.3d at 1108. defendants advocate. In 1983, then-Chief Judge Aubrey
Accordingly, he has set forth their impressive Robinson adopted an hourly rates scheme for complex,
credentials in his fee petition. (See Mot. [**35] federal litigation under which an attorney's years of
for Fees, Costs, and Expenses [930] at 14-17.) experience determined his [**37] reasonable hourly rate.
Defendants' only challenge to this showing -- they Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 354,
advocate a 20% across-the-board reduction in fees 371-75 (D.D.C. 1983). In the ensuing twenty-five years,
based on relator's counsel's near-total lack of prior this scheme, the Laffey matrix, has achieved broad
experience with qui tam litigation -- cites no acceptance in this Circuit and has served as a guide in
authority whatever, (HII's Opp'n [949] at 39-40), nearly every conceivable type of case. See, e.g., Hansson
so the Court need not dwell on it here. A few v. Norton, 366 U.S. App. D.C. 255, 411 F.3d 231, 236
highlights will convey how formidable a team (D.C. Cir. 2005) (employment discrimination); Role
relator's counsel assembled. For example, Bell Models Am., Inc. v. Brownlee, 359 U.S. App. D.C. 237,
and Cultice, the two senior partners most involved 353 F.3d 962, 970 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Administrative
in the case, each boast over twenty-five years' Procedures Act); Covington, 57 F.3d at 1110 (civil
experience as litigators. (See Bell Decl. P 5, Ex. 2 rights); Judicial Watch, Inc. v. BLM, No. 07-1570, 562 F.
to [930]; Cultice Decl. P 3-6, Ex. 6 to [930].) Supp. 2d 159, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49069, at *40
Though more junior, O'Connor has represented (D.D.C. June 27, 2008) (Lamberth, J.) (Freedom of
corporate and individual clients in a wide range of Information Act); MacClarence v. Johnson, 539 F. Supp.
federal cases across the country. (See O'Connor 2d 155, 160 (D.D.C. 2008) (Facciola, M.J.) (Clean Air
Decl. PP 5-6, Ex. 7 to [930].) Cedarbaum, a Act). The generic matrix's use in such a diverse range of
former Supreme Court clerk and Bristow Fellow cases cuts against defendants' argument that reasonable
in the Office of the Solicitor General, made rates can be derived only from data peculiar to a case's
partner during the pendency of this case, and his legal specialty area.
litigation experience is concentrated in the
antitrust field. (See Cedarbaum Decl. P 4-5, Ex. 8 23 In one case, this Court declined to award
to [930].) The Wilmer Hale associates who "market rates" set out in a
assisted with this case are, almost uniformly, Pricewaterhouse-Coopers Survey commissioned
graduates of prestigious law schools and/or by the plaintiffs and relied instead on an updated
former [**36] judicial clerks. (See Bell Decl. P Laffey matrix. See Cobell v. Norton, 407 F. Supp.
114, Ex. 2 to [930].) Similarly, the paralegals for 2d 140, 170 (D.D.C. 2005) (Lamberth, [**38] J.).
whose time relator seeks compensation had But in Cobell, the plaintiffs presented no evidence
substantial prior experience in litigation and that these "market" rates were either comparable
formal training. (Id. P 115.) to their counsel's established billing rates or -- as
required by Blum -- "in line with those prevailing
[*14] Defendants' rebuttal to this evidentiary in the community." See id. ("PwC Survey
showing rests on a single proposition. Under Blum, a suggests plaintiffs be compensated [at] a rate
reasonable rate must align with "those prevailing in the greater than permitted by Laffey . . . without any
community for similar services . . . ." 465 U.S. at 896 supporting affidavit by an attorney or law firm
n.11. Whereas relator appears to define "similar services" knowledgeable in the activities litigated by
in terms of complex, federal-court civil litigation, plaintiffs."). Thus, this Court relied on the U.S.
defendants insist "similar" must be construed more Attorney's Office ("USAO") Laffey matrix to
narrowly. (See HII's Opp'n [949] at 30-34.) In their view, supply the "prevailing market rates in the District
 Page 12
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *14; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **38

of Columbia." Id. Here, however, relator has submarket," rates charged by a single, Ohio firm do not
complied with his evidentiary burden by constitute "evidence that submarket rates are lower than
submitting affidavits from attorneys with the prevailing rates in the broader legal market." See
knowledge of counsel's performance in this case, Covington, 57 F.3d at 1111.
their standard billing rates, and -- crucially -- the
prevailing rates in the community. Hence, Cobell 24 At least one other district court has implicitly
is inapposite. reached a contrary conclusion, requiring relators
seeking attorneys' fees under the FCA to submit
Defendants' other two authorities from this evidence of prevailing rates for "comparable qui
Circuit lend them no support whatever. Indeed, tam litigation" in the relevant market. See United
one appears to bolster relator's case. See Jordan States ex rel. Abbott-Burdick v. Univ. Med.
v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 223 U.S. App. D.C. 325, Assocs., No. 2:96-1676-12, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
691 F.2d 514, 521 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("affidavit[] 26986, at *30 (D.S.C. May 23, 2002). That court
attesting to the prevailing market rate," such as relied solely on a lone Fourth Circuit precedent,
that offered to support instant fee claim, suffices which, in turn, points only to an [**41] Eleventh
[**39] as "specific evidence of the prevailing Circuit case. See id.; Buffington v. Baltimore
community rate" so long as "affiant avows that County, 913 F.2d 113, 129 (4th Cir. 1990). In this
the quoted rate is based upon 'personal knowledge latter case, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
about specific rates charged by other lawyers'") observed that "[t]he market rate for federal civil
(quoting Nat'l Ass'n of Concerned Veterans v. litigation [was] too over-inclusive to be relevant"
Sec'y of Def., 219 U.S. App. D.C. 94, 675 F.2d to civil rights plaintiffs' fee petition. Perkins v.
1319, 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). In the other case, Mobile Housing Bd., 847 F.2d 735, 737 (11th Cir.
this Court awarded relator's counsel his requested 1988). Read in context, however, this comment is
rates because the defendants did not contest them, attributable to the evidentiary record then before
and they were below the prevailing market rate in the court:
the community. (See Mem. Op. & Order of May
18, 2004 [951] in In re Columbia/HCA Health v. The fee application in this case is
Lead Defendants, No. 01-mc-50-RCL (MDL).) inadequate. It provides the trial
judge with no guidance as to the
Third, and most critically, defendants have failed to market rate for attorneys of similar
demonstrate that for purposes of calculating a reasonable skill representing similar clients in
hourly rate, qui tam litigation differs in any [*15] similar cases in the Mobile area. . .
meaningful way from other complex, civil litigation that . The record in this case
occurs in federal court. 24 Defendants contend that "FCA demonstrates that rates vary from $
litigation, particularly for relator's counsel, is a 50 to more than $ 120 per hour for
specialized, niche practice that is distinct from other federal civil litigation without any
types of civil litigation, and certainly differs from the consideration of skill, client, or
defense-oriented commercial litigation practiced by firms type of case. The typical rate
like WilmerHale." (HII's Opp'n [949] at 33.) If, as within the range can be artificially
defendants suggest, qui tam litigation is a "niche" field raised or lowered with the
because [**40] FCA-specific treatises and hornbooks, inclusion of quotes for work for
legal symposia, and professional organizations exist, then government authorities or work of
virtually every type of litigated case could be so great complexity involving
characterized. The allegation that some attorneys sophisticated legal problems.
"dedicate their entire practice to representing relators" is
no more persuasive. (Id. at 34.) Defendants contend the Id. at 737-38. Here, however, relator has offered
rates charged by FCA specialists at Cincinnati's Helmer, evidence of the prevailing market rates for
Martins, Rice & Popham ("HMRP") establish the complex federal litigation charged [**42] by
benchmark for reasonableness. (Id. at 35-38.) "[E]ven attorneys of comparable skill and experience.
assuming, arguendo, the existence of [] a [FCA litigation] Further, his evidence reflects that in the D.C. legal
 Page 13
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *15; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **42

market, attorneys at large, international law firms here. See Jordan, 691 F.2d at 521. If non-conformity
such as Wilmer Hale typically charge a standard with updated USAO Laffey rates could doom a
rate for litigation matters, regardless of the petitioner's request, this would moot the evidentiary
"client[] or type of case." Hence, relator's showing envisioned by Blum. 25 See 465 U.S. at 896
evidence does not suffer the same deficiencies n.11. It would effectively impose a ceiling on the rates
that rendered the Perkins fee application courts can award pursuant to fee-shifting statutes -- a
"inadequate." Moreover, this Circuit's Court of ceiling never endorsed by Congress. Neither it nor the
Appeals has repeatedly endorsed a method of courts have ever "propose[d] . . . that all attorneys be
determining "reasonable rates" (the Laffey matrix) remunerated at the same rate, regardless of their
that is not subject-matter specific. See, e.g., competence, experience, and marketability." Save Our
Hansson, 411 F.3d at 236; Role Models Am., Inc., Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Hodel, 273 U.S. App.
353 F.3d at 970. Cf. Laffey, 572 F. Supp. at 374 D.C. 78, 857 F.2d 1516, 1522 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
(finding that "the relevant legal market in this
action is complex employment discrimination 25 That one Ohio FCA specialist firm's rates do
litigation [but] that this market is subject to the happen to correspond to those in the updated
same hourly rates that prevail in other complex Laffey matrix is equally unpersuasive.
federal litigation").
Second, the Supreme Court clarified in Blum that a
Defendants point out that HMRP's rates conform reasonable hourly rate should ordinarily reflect the
almost precisely to those outlined in the Laffey matrix, as quality of counsel's representation. See 465 U.S. at 899.
updated by the U.S. Attorney's Office ("USAO"), and Defendants balk at the "mega-law firm rates" relator
that using rates from either source would reduce relator's seeks. (HII's Opp'n [949] at 30.) But these rates reflect
requested fee award by 38%. (HII's Opp'n [949] at counsel's "mega-law firm"-quality representation. Having
38-39.) This tremendous disparity gives the Court [**43] observed [**45] more than a few attorneys in the past
pause. But two factors overcome its skepticism. twenty years, this Court is well-suited to judge the quality
of counsel's representation, both in the courtroom and in
First, simple reference to the Laffey matrix cannot written submissions. By this Court's assessment, relator's
defeat the presumption of reasonableness accorded counsel -- particularly the more junior trial team members
relator's requested rates. Though it "serves as a useful -- acquitted themselves admirably. Their zealous,
starting point for determining prevailing market rates in polished, and astute advocacy justifies, and is reflected
the District of Columbia," [*16] Cobell, 407 F. Supp. 2d in, their established billing rates. Further, according to
at 170, the Laffey matrix is not the only acceptable government counsel,
starting point. Our Court of Appeals has never held that
Laffey rates are the only rates that a court may consider [t]he availability of Relator's counsel
reasonable. Instead, it has advised that "an attorney's from WilmerHale was essential in meeting
usual billing rate is presumptively the reasonable rate, the overwhelming demands of discovery
provided that this rate" aligns with prevailing community and ultimately of the trial in this matter.
rates. Kattan by Thomas v. District of Columbia, 301 U.S. Indeed, attorneys and support staff from
App. D.C. 374, 995 F.2d 274, 278 (D.C. Cir. 1993). WilmerHale played a vital role in getting
"[F]ee claimants must provide the court with specific this case ready for trial and ultimately in
evidence of the prevailing community rate." Jordan, 691 successfully trying it.
F.2d at 521. See also Blum, 465 U.S. at 896 n.11 (fee
applicant must "produce satisfactory evidence -- in (Morgan Decl. P 7, Ex. 1 to Mot. for Fees, Costs, and
addition to the attorney's own affidavits -- that the Expenses [930].) During the discovery period alone,
requested rates" align with prevailing rates). This relator's counsel reviewed 665 boxes of documents, from
evidence may include the Laffey matrix, in its original which they culled over 97,000 documents with over
form and/or as updated by the USAO. See Covington, 57 320,000 pages, attended 40 depositions, taking a leading
F.3d at 1110. But it may also [**44] consist of role in some, and participated in two evidentiary
comparable fee awards or affidavits from knowledgeable hearings. (Bell Decl. PP 74-75, 78, 85, Ex. 2 to [930].)
local practitioners, such as those relator has submitted Had Wilmer Hale not been able to call on its "mega-law
 Page 14
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[**46] firm" resources, plaintiffs might have struggled to For the other five professionals, however, relator has
meet these "overwhelming demands." See Wilcox v. provided neither their current billing rates nor those of
Sisson, No. 02-1455, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33404, at *8 their Wiley Rein peers. Instead, he asks that their work be
(D.D.C. May 25, 2006) (Collyer, J.) ("The market compensated at rates derived from economist
generally accepts higher rates [*17] from attorneys at Kavanaugh's [**48] Laffey matrix. (See id. P 104.)
firms with more than 100 lawyers than from those at Unlike the USAO's matrix, which calculates inflation
smaller firms -- presumably because of their greater based on the metropolitan D.C. Consumer Price Index
resources and investments . . . ."). ("CPI"), Kavanaugh's version relies on a legal services
sub-component of the broader, national CPI. (See
For all these reasons, the Court finds defendants have Kavanaugh Decl. P 9, Ex. 4 to Mot. for Fees, Costs, and
failed to rebut relator's evidentiary showing that the Expenses [930].)
requested rates -- Wilmer Hale's established rates -- align
"with those prevailing in [this] community for similar Kavanaugh's alternative methodology has achieved
services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, only limited acceptance in this District. 28 As he did in
experience and reputation." See Blum, 465 U.S. at 896 Salazar, Kavanaugh presents a well-reasoned, if
n.11. Wilmer Hale's established billing scale will supply condensed, economic argument for his index's
the reasonable hourly rates with which this Court will superiority. (See id. PP 9-14.) Nevertheless, after
calculate the lodestar. 26 reviewing his declarations, the Court is not convinced.
Kavanaugh's matrix incorporates price inflation data
26 Four Wilmer Hale associates for whose time specific to the market for legal services, while the USAO
relator requests fees have left the firm. (See Bell matrix relies on data specific to the Washington, D.C.
Decl. P108, Ex. 2 to Mot. for Fees, Costs, and metropolitan area. (Id. P 9.) Kavanaugh's matrix thus
Expenses [930].) Relator proposes that reflects national inflation trends, while the USAO matrix
compensation for these individuals' time be paid accounts for price inflation within the local community --
at the established billing rates of current Wilmer a crucial distinction. As the Supreme Court and our Court
Hale associates who graduated law school in the of Appeals have both emphasized, rates used in
same [**47] years. (Id.) This request does not calculating the lodestar should accord with those
strike the Court as unreasonable, and it boasts the "prevailing in the community." Blum, 465 U.S. at 896
virtue of simplicity. Given that defendants do not n.11 [*18] (emphasis added); see also Covington v.
specifically object, the Court will thus order these District of Columbia, 313 U.S. App. D.C. 16, 57 F.3d
four individuals' time reimbursed at their peers' 1101, 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1995) [**49] ("plaintiff must
standard billing rates. produce data concerning the prevailing market rates in
the relevant community") (emphasis added). Kavanaugh's
b. Wiley Rein matrix does not comply with this mandate for geographic
specificity. Hence, with due respect to its colleagues, the
Relator also seeks compensation for work performed
by four Wiley Rein attorneys (other than Bell) and two Court declines to adopt Kavanaugh's methodology. It will
thus award fees for the remaining five Wiley Rein
paralegals. (Bell Decl. P103, Ex. 2 to Mot. for Fees,
professionals at USAO Laffey matrix rates. 29
Costs, and Expenses [930].) Of these six individuals, only
one, Michael Sturm, remains at Wiley Rein. (Id. P 104.) 28 Compare Smith v. District of Columbia, 466
In light of the Court's conclusion concerning Wilmer F. Supp. 2d 151, 156 (D.D.C. 2006) (Kessler, J.)
Hale's rates, Sturm's established billing rate is eminently (approving), and Salazar v. District of Columbia,
reasonable. 27 123 F. Supp. 2d 8, 13-14 (D.D.C. 2000) (Kessler,
J.) (same), with Yazdani v. Access ATM, 474 F.
27 Sturm, a 1987 law graduate and Wiley Rein
Supp. 2d 134, 138 (D.D.C. 2007) (Facciola, M.J.)
litigation partner, bills $ 495 per hour, (Bell Decl.
(declining to adopt); Am. Lands Alliance v.
P104, Ex. 2 to Mot. for Fees, Costs, and Expenses
Norton, 525 F. Supp. 2d 135, 148-49 (D.D.C.
[930]), while O'Connor, a Wilmer Hale litigation
2007) (Walton J.) (same); and Muldrow v.
partner who finished law school ten years after
Re-Direct, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3-4 & n.3
Sturm, bills $ 510 per hour, (see id. Ex. D-1).
(D.D.C. 2005) (Huvelle, J.) (same).
 Page 15
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29 Due to its widespread acceptance, this matrix award of historical fees at current market rates
has been aptly described as "the benchmark for only when delay is "substantial." See Salazar, 123
reasonable fees in this Court." Pleasants v. Ridge, F. Supp. 2d at 15. On this basis, Judge Kessler
424 F. Supp. 2d 67, 71 n.2 (D.D.C. 2006) rejected payment at 1999 rates for hours worked
(Facciola, M.J.). Like its colleagues, this Court during the previous calendar year. Id. Defendants
has frequently employed the USAO matrix in would extend this rationale to Wilmer Hale's 2005
calculating fee awards. See, [**50] e.g., Judicial and 2006 hours, which they contend should be
Watch, Inc. v. BLM, No. 07-1570, 562 F. Supp. 2d reimbursed at historic rates. (See BHIC and
159, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49069, at *40 HUK's Opp'n [948] at 19.) But circumstances here
(D.D.C. June 27, 2008) (Lamberth, J.); Bynum v. [**52] differ noticeably from those in Salazar.
District of Columbia, 412 F. Supp. 2d 73, 85 This fee award will issue in 2008. If the parties'
(D.D.C. 2006) (Lamberth, J.); Cobell, 407 F. behavior in this case to date is any guide, it will
Supp. 2d at 170 (D.D.C. 2005) (Lamberth, J.). surely snowball into the second "major
ratemaking proceeding" envisioned with horror by
2. Current vs. Historical Rates the Court of Appeals in Laffey. See 746 F.2d at
24. Relator's counsel would be exceedingly
The time entries included in relator's fee petition fortunate to receive their fees this year. Moreover,
span a thirteen-year period: Wiley Rein personnel our Court of Appeals has held that even a brief
devoted time to this case from 1995-1999, and Wilmer delay may merit an adjustment in the fee award.
Hale's involvement has stretched from 1999-2007. (See See EDF v. EPA, 217 U.S. App. D.C. 189, 672
Exs. B-2, D-2, to Bell Decl., Ex. 2 to Mot. for Fees, F.2d 42, 60 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (awarding fees at
Costs, and Expenses [930].) Relator seeks to recover all current market rates and increasing lodestar by 17
fees at current billing rates, (Mot. for Fees, Costs, and percent due to "public benefit and delay in receipt
Expenses [930] at 12), while defendants favor using of payments," where suit was filed less than three
historical rates corresponding to the years when the work years earlier, and court characterized "actual
was performed, (see HII's Opp'n [949] at 40-43; BHIC period of delay" as "no more than six months").
and HUK's Opp'n [948] at 19-21.) This Court agrees with relator that the two and
three-year delays in payment for hours worked in
In 1911, Ambrose Bierce described litigation as "[a]
2006 and 2005, respectively -- as well as the
machine which you go into as a pig and come out of as a
much longer delays applicable to counsel's other
sausage." AMBROSE BIERCE, THE DEVIL'S
pre-2007 hours -- warrant such an adjustment.
DICTIONARY 72 (1979 ed.). Since Bierce's day, the
process has become, if anything, more drawn out and Courts in this Circuit have frequently employed the
contentious. Recognizing that in many cases, an attorney Supreme Court's suggested method of adjustment. See,
may put in years of effort [**51] before realizing any e.g., Murray v. Weinberger, 239 U.S. App. D.C. 264, 741
tangible return, the Supreme Court has held that a F.2d 1423, 1433 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("Current [**53]
"reasonable attorney's fee" awarded pursuant to a market rates have been used in numerous cases to
fee-shifting statute should account for delay in payment. calculate the lodestar figure when the legal services were
See Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 282, 109 S. Ct. provided over a multiple-year period and when use of the
2463, 105 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1989). 30 "Clearly, current rates does not result in a windfall for the
compensation received several years after the services attorneys."); Muldrow, 397 F. Supp. 2d at 4 n.4 ("Nor
were rendered -- as it frequently is in complex [qui tam] does the Court object to plaintiff's use of the Laffey rates
litigation -- is not equivalent to the same dollar amount for 2005-06 even though much of the litigation took place
received reasonably promptly as the legal services are several years ago. The Supreme Court has held that it is
performed . . . ." Id. [*19] at 283. Thus, courts should acceptable to use current market rates, rather than historic
make "an appropriate adjustment for delay in payment -- rates, as a convenient method of compensating prevailing
whether by the application of current rather than historic parties for a delay in receiving payment."). See also
hourly rates or otherwise." Id. at 284. Copeland v. Marshall, 205 U.S. App. D.C. 390, 641 F.2d
880, 893 n.23 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc) (noting that
30 As defendants point out, another court in this
lodestar may be "based on present hourly rates, rather
district has read Jenkins as contemplating an
 Page 16
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *19; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **53

than the lesser rates applicable to the time period in Notwithstanding these various points, defendants
which the services were rendered," to reduce or eliminate oppose applying current rates [*20] to compensate for
"harm resulting from delay in payment"). delay for two reasons. 31 First, they contend that
application of current rates will result in a forbidden
Several observations are in order. First, though "windfall" to relator's counsel. (See HII's Opp'n [949] at
relator seeks compensation for 24,584.6 billable hours, 40-41; BHIC and HUK's Opp'n [948] at 19-21.) They
spread over thirteen years, roughly half those hours were insist that fee awards must reflect lawyers' experience
billed in 2007, the year for which relator has provided levels at the time they performed the work, lest they be
Wilmer Hale's standard billing rates. (See Exs. C-2, C-4 afforded credit for experience -- and the heightened skill,
to Bell Supplemental [**54] Decl., Ex. 1 to Reply to productivity, and efficiency that usually accompany it --
HII's Opp'n [957].) Indeed, only 1,826.3 hours -- 7.4 they did not then possess. (See HII's Opp'n [949] at
percent of the total -- were billed prior to 2006. (See id.) 40-41; BHIC and HUK's Opp'n [948] at 19-21.) This
Thus, defendants' "windfall" objection, discussed below, argument [**56] has some superficial appeal, but it
pertains to only a small portion of relator's overall fee misunderstands the rationale behind compensating for
request. delay in payment. "[C]ompensation received several
years after the services were rendered . . . is not
Second, according to Robert Bell, Wilmer Hale's equivalent to the same dollar amount received reasonably
billing cycle averages 89 days. (See Bell Supplemental promptly as the legal services are performed." Jenkins,
Decl. PP 23-24, Ex. 1 to [957].) By contrast, here, by the 491 U.S. at 283. Paying counsel at historical, or even
time Wilmer Hale receives payment pursuant to the current, rates based on their experience levels when they
instant fee award, at least a full year will have passed performed the work would not achieve this equivalence
since it billed the last hours addressed therein. because it ignores the time value of money: one dollar
received today is more valuable than it would be if
Third, as relator's economist points out, accounting
received five years from now for two reasons -- first,
for delay by applying current rates across the board
because it will buy more now than it will after five years
boasts distinct, practical advantages:
of price inflation, and second, because of the interest that
can be earned from it in the interim. Paying counsel at
There may be other ways to compensate
their current, established billing rates does not result in a
[for delay in payment] -- that is, to restore
windfall; it simply takes the this second factor into
the firm that provided the legal services to
account.
the level of wealth it could have obtained
had it been paid at the time the service was 31 Defendants also complain that relator has
performed -- but the other compensation offered no evidence of hardship 31 rdship to
methods are more complex, have higher justify an adjustment for delay in payment. (HII's
transaction costs, raise the specter of Opp'n [949] at 42 (citing Covington v. District of
interest payments and may not be any Columbia, 839 F. Supp. 894, 902 (D.D.C. 1993)
better than simply using the current (Lamberth, J.) ("Generally, to [**57] collect
prevailing market rates. current rates [a fee petitioner] must show that the
delay in fee payment has produced some degree
(Kavanaugh Decl. P 18, Ex. 5 to Mot. for Fees, [**55] of hardship such that an award of current rates
Costs, and Expenses [930].) See also Murray, 741 F.2d at does not produce a windfall.")).) This argument is
1433 ("Ease of administration is an important objective . . specious. Kavanaugh's original declaration offers
. because there is a pressing need for simple rules in a rationale for compensating for delay in this case.
attorney's fees cases."). Moreover, Kavanaugh's (See Kavanaugh Decl. PP 16-18, Ex. 5 to Mot. for
alternative proposed method of compensating for delay -- Fees, Costs, and Expenses [930].) Further, in his
using the historical prime rate to calculate the present supplemental declaration, Bell explains that
value of a timely payment stream for the hours billed -- Wilmer Hale's billing cycle averages 89 days --
produces a lodestar figure 1.6 percent higher than that far less than even the shortest delay period here.
requested by relator. (Kavanaugh Supplemental Decl. PP (See Bell Supplemental Decl. PP 23-24, Ex. 1 to
6-12, Ex. 4 to Reply to HII's Opp'n [957].) Reply to HII's Opp'n [957]; see also Kavanaugh
 Page 17
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *20; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **57

Supplemental Decl. PP 13-16, Ex. 4 to Reply to compensate relator's counsel for delay in payment by
HII's Opp'n [957] (describing how Wilmer Hale's applying current rates in calculating the lodestar.
reliance on combined debt-equity financing
magnifies the detriment it suffers from Appendix I delineates the rates the Court will use for
long-delayed payment for its services).) Finally, both Wiley Rein and Wilmer Hale professionals.
all involved are well aware that relator's counsel
B. Reasonable Hours
have worked on this case for twelve years,
presumably largely without compensation. The Several principles govern the Court's calculation of
hardship caused by delay is self-evident. this second component of the lodestar, "the number of
hours reasonably expended on the litigation." See
Second, they contend that relator bears responsibility
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S. Ct. 1933,
for the delay, and that consequently, he should not be
76 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1983). First, the fee petitioner must
rewarded with a fees adjustment therefor. [**58] (HII's
submit [**60] evidence that justifies the hours he claims
Opp'n [949] at 42-43.) Both components of this argument
his counsel have worked. Id. "Where the documentation
are flawed. Responsibility for the first period of delay
of hours is inadequate, the district court may reduce the
defendants cite -- June 1995 to March 2001 -- can be laid
award accordingly." Id. A "fee application need not
at the government's feet, but not relator's. Under the
present the exact number of minutes spent[,] nor the
FCA's qui tam provisions, once he files his complaint
precise activity to which each hour was devoted[,] nor the
under seal, a relator must simply await the government's
specific attainments of each attorney." Nat'l Ass'n of
decision on intervention. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2008).
Concerned Veterans v. Sec'y of Def., 219 U.S. App. D.C.
As this Court expressed in an earlier opinion in this case,
94, 675 F.2d 1319, 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (internal
the government's "unreasonable inaction" precipitated
quotation marks omitted). But where time entries "are so
this first period of delay. (See Mem. Op. of June 14, 2007
vaguely generic that the Court can not determine with
[872] at 30.) All parties contributed to the next, post-seal
certainty whether the activities they purport to describe
period of delay: defendants opposed plaintiffs' request to
were . . . reasonable," the petitioner has not met his
commence discovery in 2003, (see Joint Rule 16.3 Report
burden. Cobell v. Norton, 407 F. Supp. 2d 140, 158
of Nov. 13, 2003 [148] at 2), and plaintiffs repeatedly
(D.D.C. 2005) (Lamberth, J.). Instead, "the application
amended their complaints, (e.g., Relator's Third Am.
must be sufficiently detailed to permit the District Court
Compl. [233] (filed Mar. 9, 2006); Government's First
to make an independent determination whether or not the
Am. Compl. [237] (filed Mar. 9, 2006)).
hours claimed are justified." Nat'l Ass'n of Concerned
Moreover, regardless of who caused what period of Veterans, 675 F.2d at 1327.
delay, defendants' authorities for denying the responsible
Second, "[t]he hours reasonably expended are not
party compensation [*21] for delay merely confirm that
necessarily equal to the hours actually expended."
a court's decision to account for delay in awarding
McKenzie v. Kennickell, 645 F. Supp. 437, 446 (D.D.C.
attorneys' fees is discretionary. See [**59] Sands v.
1986) (Parker, J.). "Hours that are not properly billed to
Runyon, 28 F.3d 1323, 1334 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding no
[**61] one's client also are not properly billed to one's
abuse of discretion where district court refused to "apply
adversary pursuant to statutory authority." Copeland v.
multiplier to the basic hourly rate to account for the delay
Marshall, 205 U.S. App. D.C. 390, 641 F.2d 880, 891
between the investment of time and the receipt of the fee
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc). See also Laffey v. Northwest
award" because plaintiff had caused unnecessary delay);
Airlines, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 354, 369 (D.D.C. 1983)
Paris v. Dallas Airmotive, Inc., No. 97-0208, 2004 U.S.
(Robinson, C.J.), reversed in part on other grounds by
Dist. LEXIS 18893, at *35-36 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 21, 2004)
238 U.S. App. D.C. 400, 740 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(declining to exercise discretion to award fees at current
("Counsel is not free . . . to exercise its judgment in a
market rates because, but for plaintiff's actions, case
fashion that unnecessarily inflates the losing party's fee
could have been concluded at least three years earlier).
liability"). The petitioner should exercise billing
Here, having concluded that no "windfall" will judgment, making "a good-faith effort to exclude from
result, and in light of the practical advantages to be [his] fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or
derived, the Court will exercise its discretion to otherwise unnecessary, just as a lawyer in private practice
ethically is obligated to exclude such hours from his fee
 Page 18
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *21; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **61

submission." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. 32 As the Court Defendants allege a variety of tasks are
[*22] of Appeals admonished in Copeland, however, a non-compensable. The Court has grouped their
defendant "cannot litigate tenaciously and then be heard contentions under the following six subheadings. 33
to complain about the time necessarily spent by the
plaintiff in response." 641 F.2d at 904. 33 For the most part, BHIC and HUK have not
specifically identified which time entries they
32 According to relator's fee petition, his counsel challenge. Their arguments largely pertain to the
have made a first effort at exercising the required same subject areas as HII's, however, so the Court
billing judgment. (See Mot. for Fees, Costs, and will consider them with respect to the time entries
Expenses [930] at 24-27.) First, relator has cited by HII's Opposition. As an additional note,
attempted to exclude all [**62] hours attributable unless its analysis of defendants' objections
solely to his claims against Bill Harbert, who was clearly points to uncited time entries as
dismissed from the case. (See Bell Decl. P 111, non-compensable, the Court will evaluate only
Ex. 2 to [930]; Bell Supplemental Decl. P 25, Ex. those time entries which defendants have
1 to Reply to HII's Opp'n [957].) Second, he has specifically challenged. See Donnell v. United
excluded all time for individuals who worked States, 220 U.S. App. D.C. 405, 682 F.2d 240,
fewer than 65 hours. (See Bell Decl. P 112, Ex. 2 250 (D.C. Cir. 1982) [**64] ("We emphasize that
to Mot. for Fees, Costs, and Expenses [930].) the party challenging an application for fees
Finally, he has excluded time dedicated to a should frame its objections with specificity. The
variety of other, miscellaneous tasks deemed district court cannot inquire into the
tangential to the case. (See id. PP 105, 113; Bell reasonableness of every action taken and every
Supplemental Decl. P 25, Ex. 1 to Reply to HII's hour spent by counsel, and it will consider
Opp'n [957].) objections to filed hours only where it has been
presented with a reasonable basis for believing the
Third, "[c]ompensable time should not be limited to filing is excessive.").
hours expended within the four corners of the litigation."
Nat'l Ass'n of Concerned Veterans, 675 F.2d at 1335. The a. Criminal Case
petitioner need only show that the hours for which he
seeks compensation were "expended in pursuit of a After relator filed his qui tam complaint, the
successful resolution of the case in which fees are being government delayed its prosecution of the civil case to
claimed." Id. While "no compensation should be paid for pursue criminal, antitrust charges against Bilhar,
time spent litigating claims upon which the party seeking Anderson, and others. (See generally Mem. Op. of June
the fee did not ultimately prevail," a reduction in fee is 14, 2007 [872] at 18-26 (describing government's
appropriate only when the non-prevailing matters "'are deplorable lack of diligence as reason multiple claims
truly fractionable.'" Copeland, 641 F.2d at 891-92 & n.18 must be dismissed as untimely).) During this period,
(quoting Lamphere v. Brown Univ., 610 F.2d 46, 47 (1st relator's counsel assisted him in securing immunity from
Cir. 1979)). criminal prosecution, in complying with obligations
incurred as a result, and in responding to subpoenas in the
With [**63] this guidance in mind, the Court will criminal matter. (See Bell Decl. PP 12-19, Ex. 2 to Mot.
analyze relator's claimed hours along with defendants' for Fees, Costs, and Expenses [930]; Bell Supplemental
objections to them. The latter fall into two categories. Decl. PP 2-15, Ex. 1 to Reply to HII's Opp'n [957].)
First, defendants contend that certain tasks for which Defendants argue these efforts are not compensable
relator's counsel have billed time in this case are per se because the civil and criminal cases were [*23] separate
non-compensable. Second, they cite several broader and distinct [**65] matters, and because relator's
defects in relator's counsel's billing statements which they immunity deal, not his interest in the qui tam litigation,
allege warrant across-the-board, percentage reductions in obliged him to cooperate with the Antitrust Division. (See
the fee award. The Court will address each category of BHIC and HUK's Opp'n [948] at 3-5; HII's Opp'n [949] at
complaints in turn. 4-7.)

1. Non-Compensable Tasks On the contrary, most of this work is compensable.

Relator likely had more than one motivation to appear for
 Page 19
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *23; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **65

depositions, provide documents, and otherwise assist the work in' this proceeding, and 'contributed directly
government with the criminal case. Compliance with the to [its] successful outcome'") (quoting Webb v.
immunity letter's terms was doubtless among them. He County Bd. of Educ., 471 U.S. 234, 249-50, 105 S.
also had a strong financial incentive to cooperate: to Ct. 1923, 85 L. Ed. 2d 233 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
ultimately secure his relator's share, he needed to concurring in part and dissenting in part)
maintain good relations with DOJ, with whom he would (alteration in original)); Perkins v. Cross, 728
prosecute the civil case as co-plaintiff, and to assist it in F.2d 1099, 1100 (8th Cir. 1984) (time spent on
developing evidence that could be used in that case. His "research or investigation done in connection with
motives, however, are irrelevant. The information relator [prior] proceeding" is compensable if it "proved
provided to the Criminal Division materially aided its directly relevant to the [instant proceeding's]
investigation, and the Civil Division later relied on that successful prosecution").
investigation's fruits in prosecuting the FCA case. 34 (See
Bell Decl. PP 24-27, Ex. 2 to Mot. for Fees, Costs, and On closer examination, defendants'
Expenses [930].) Relator's cooperation during this early authorities are not to the contrary. See Loranger v.
period ultimately proved crucial to the "successful Stierheim, 10 F.3d 776 (11th Cir. 1994); Schrader
resolution of the case in which fees are [**66] [now] v. Idaho Dep't of Health & Welfare, 631 F. Supp.
being claimed." See Nat'l Ass'n of Concerned Veterans, 1426 (D. Idaho 1986). In Loranger, where an
675 F.2d at 1335. In other circumstances, courts have attorney submitted a voluminous fee petition that
awarded attorneys' fees for hours expended on prior listed hours expended on multiple state, [**68]
litigation if those efforts also advanced the instant case. federal, and other matters, the Eleventh Circuit
See, e.g., Kulkarni v. Alexander, 213 U.S. App. D.C. 243, Court of Appeals declared that "[t]ime expended
662 F.2d 758, 766 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (legal services independent of the relevant federal litigation
rendered in prior administrative proceedings and [was] not compensable." 10 F.3d at 782. Yet the
litigation pertaining to same claim were compensable examples it cited demonstrate that its definition of
because "holding of the first suit . . . [was] a necessary "independent" matters would not reach hours
predicate for a large part of [plaintiff's] claim in the relator's counsel spent assisting the government in
present action"). 35 [*24] This Court has no qualms the criminal case. See id. at 782 n.7 (citing as
about following suit and will compensate relator for time non-compensable time devoted to defending case
his counsel spent assisting him in complying with his against petitioner's mother in state court and time
immunity obligations and in responding to subpoenas in spent on state court claims that were voluntarily
the criminal matter. dismissed). In Schrader, the district court declined
to hold one defendant liable for hours expended
34 For example, plaintiffs were able to estop by the prevailing plaintiff's attorneys before that
Bilhar from contesting its liability on Contracts defendant was joined, but it did so without any
20A and 29 based on its guilty plea in the prior, explanation of its reasoning leaving its conclusion
criminal case, and the Court admitted Bilhar's devoid of persuasive value. See 631 F. Supp. at
plea agreement and Rule 11 memorandum against 1430.
all defendants in the civil case. (See Mem. Op. &
Order of Mar. 14, 2007 [713] at 5-6; Mem. Op. & This logic does not extend to time spent securing the
Order of Mar. 20, 2007 [738] at 1-2.) government's immunity grant, however. Bell now
35 See also Armstrong v. Davis, 318 F.3d 965, characterizes the immunity letter as "unnecessary" and
971-72 (9th Cir. 2003) [**67] (work in separate insists relator would have aided the government
case was compensable because it was "important regardless. (See Bell Supplemental Decl. PP 2, 14, Ex. 1
to the preservation of the[se] [] Plaintiffs' rights, to Reply to HII's Opp'n [957].) Thus, any work relator's
and because their counsel performed the work in counsel performed to negotiate or effectuate [**69] the
order to protect their interests"); McDonald v. immunity deal had no impact whatever on plaintiffs'
Armontrout, 860 F.2d 1456, 1462 (8th Cir. 1988) subsequent success in the civil case and is therefore not
(services rendered in prior habeas action making compensable.
same claims were compensable because work in
b. Personal Matters
"habeas action 'obviated the need for comparable
 Page 20
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Relator's counsel's billing statements include gaining a tactical advantage in the civil case. Because
research and consultation concerning his personal, counsel's early research allowed them to formulate a
financial, and employment matters, and defendants disclosure strategy focused on the qui tam litigation, the
contend these efforts in no way contributed to plaintiffs' Court concludes these hours were "expended in pursuit of
successful resolution of the instant case. Conceding to a successful resolution of the case in which fees are being
some of defendants' objections, relator has excluded from claimed." See Nat'l Ass'n of Concerned Veterans, 675
his revised fee request time entries devoted to unrelated F.2d at 1335.
personal matters and preparation of counsel's fee
agreement. (See Bell Supplemental Decl. P 25, Ex. 1 to 36 (See, e.g., 6/21/95 LD ("review reference
Reply to HII's Opp'n [957].) He has not, however, materials and court decisions in case raising
eliminated all challenged entries, and the Court will issues of privileged . . . documents relied upon by
assess the remaining objections. qui tam plaintiff") (emphasis added); 10/25/1995
RBB ("Meet with Mr. Sturm and Ms. Hebert re
i. Relator's Attorney-Client Privilege Hebert's research on common interest doctrine")
(emphasis added); 12/15/95 LD ("Research and
Even before relator filed his original complaint under review Jencks Act and Federal Rule of Criminal
seal, his counsel began researching how to protect Procedure 6(e)," which limit discovery of
relevant documents potentially protected by attorney privileged matter disclosed by potential
client privilege or the work product doctrine. Relator prosecution witness to the government).)
claims his counsel were simply being proactive, and that
this research "was [] designed primarily to prevent ii. Relator's Ongoing Employment at Jones
eventual disclosure to the civil defendants in this
litigation." (Reply to [**70] HII's Opp'n [957] at 21.) He Relator continued to work at J.A. Jones after filing
points out that defendants sought and failed to obtain his complaint under seal, which named his employer as a
certain privileged documents at trial, and that his defendant. In [**72] connection with his continued
attorneys had an ethical obligation to preserve his employment at Jones, relator's counsel: (1) analyzed his
privilege. (Id.) He does not, however, point to any potential liability for removing confidential and
evidence that supports his bald claim that his attorneys' privileged documents from his employer's offices; (2)
research and discussions in 1995 were primarily directed advised him on how to respond to an internal Jones
to protecting his privilege in a case that remained under investigation commenced after Jones received a grand
seal until 2001. jury subpoena; and (3) counseled him on how to
effectuate his eventual resignation from Jones. Relator
On reviewing the filings associated with defendants' deems these tasks compensable because they are "related
failed motion to compel and the challenged time entries, to representation of a whistleblower and the potential
however, the Court concludes these hours are conflicts that arise from assisting the Government." 37
compensable. In the civil case, the magistrate judge (Reply to BHIC and HUK's Opp'n [960] at 8.)
denied defendants discovery of certain privileged
materials that relator had voluntarily disclosed to the 37 The Court does not consider relator's single,
government, holding that plaintiffs' common interest in out-of-circuit district court precedent for this
the prosecution of common defendants in the proposition as even "persuasive" authority: that
then-existing civil case defeated waiver. (See Mem. Op. court concluded that 9.15 hours "related to
of Feb. 20, 2007 [530] (denying motion to compel); Am. [defendant's] placement of [co-relator] on
Mem. Op. of Mar. 27, 2007 [750] (denying motion for administrative leave, representing the time
reconsideration).) The subject matter of counsel's earlier researching the approach and negotiating the
research suggests they had anticipated this very issue and arrangement," were "reasonable," but it did so
wanted to ensure the common interest doctrine would without any hint as to why it reached this
protect disclosed materials [**71] in the later qui tam conclusion. See United States ex rel. Doe v. Pa.
litigation. 36 Rationally, based on the results of these Blue Shield, 54 F. Supp. 2d 410, 417, 419 (M.D.
inquiries and discussions, counsel could limit the scope Pa. 1999).
of relator's disclosures to prevent defendants [*25] from
"Related to representation of a whistleblower,"
 Page 21
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however, is not the standard [**73] in this Circuit for Even before relator filed his complaint, his counsel
compensable time. While the Court accepts that had begun estimating his potential bounty, and after DOJ
"[c]ompensable time should not be limited to hours prioritized the criminal case, counsel researched whether
expended within the four corners of the litigation," to relator could claim a share of any criminal fines. When
hold that the hours challenged here were "expended in the Civil Division later settled with various defendants,
pursuit of a successful resolution" of the qui tam case relator's counsel lobbied heavily for his share and sought
would render this phrase meaningless. See Nat'l Ass'n of attorneys' fees from the settling defendants. 40
Concerned Veterans, 675 F.2d at 1335. In analyzing his Defendants object to time entries associated with each of
potential liability to his employer, relator's counsel these activities. Relator, of course, asserts that all are
sought to protect their client from a counterclaim in the compensable.
qui tam action or a collateral lawsuit. This was diligent
lawyering, but it had no effect on the qui tam claims. 38 40 Defendants further complain that relator has
Further, the narratives in counsel's time records indicate attempted to bill them for time spent negotiating
they spent substantial time weighing whether relator his own fee agreement with Wilmer Hale. (See
should refuse to cooperate with his employer's internal HII's Opp'n [949] at 11.) Relator concedes this
investigation. Whatever their substantive advice may time is not compensable and has withdrawn it.
ultimately have been -- and it appears relator resigned (See Bell Supplemental Decl. P 25, Ex. 1 to Reply
rather than cooperate - counsel's drawn out research and to HII's Opp'n [957].) Cf. Role Models Am., Inc. v.
strategy development almost certainly hindered Jones' Brownlee, 359 U.S. App. D.C. 237, 353 F.3d 962,
own investigation of the fraud and may consequently 973 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (government should not
have prolonged this litigation unnecessarily. 39 Finally, have to pay for "time spent drafting and revising
advice concerning relator's employment status lacks even [] firm's engagement letter with [prevailing
a tenuous connection [**74] to the qui tam litigation. For plaintiff]").
example, relator does not attempt to explain, and the
Fortunately, other courts have weighed these issues
Court cannot surmise, how the "resignation script" his
before. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has
[*26] attorneys prepared for him could possibly have
considered whether the FCA requires a liable defendant
served to advance the qui tam litigation. (See 2/23/96
to [**76] pay attorneys' fees a prevailing relator incurs in
MLS.) Hence, the Court will not compensate relator for
pursuing his relator's share. See Taxpayers Against
time his counsel expended on this set of tasks.
Fraud, 41 F.3d at 1045-46. Relator Miller offers, in
38 For example, Luis de la Torre spent 7.75 essence, the same argument the court rejected in that
hours in one day researching Jones' potential case: "'that as between [him] and the wrongdoer
cause of action against Miller for breach of duty [defendant], it is the wrongdoer who should bear the
of loyalty under North Carolina law. (See 2/24/96 costs.'" 41 See id. at 1046 (quoting Bigby v. City of
LD.) This research had no application to Chicago, 927 F.2d 1426, 1428 (7th Cir. 1991)) (second
plaintiffs' pending FCA claims. alteration in original). There, as here, the defendant had
39 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has no "right to participate" in relator's share negotiations
implicitly suggested that time devoted to such between the relator and the government, and "nothing
obstructionism is not compensable. See United suggest[ed] that [the defendant] prolonged the [] process
States ex rel. Taxpayers Against Fraud v. Gen. or could have hastened its conclusion." Id. Thus, the
Elec. Co., 41 F.3d 1032, 1044 (6th Cir. 1994) court concluded, "the defendant [] should not be required
(reversing as unsupported by evidence the district [*27] to pay the costs incurred by the prevailing
court's determination that virtually all relators' plaintiffs in the course of their collateral litigation." Id. 42
attorneys' fees were reasonable, and remanding This Court finds the Sixth Circuit's reasoning persuasive
for consideration of, inter alia, whether relator and will follow it here. Accordingly, hours relator's
unfairly denied GE an opportunity to conduct an counsel devoted to recovery of a relator's share from the
internal corporate investigation, thereby unduly government are not compensable. 43
extending the subsequent litigation process).
41 He also finds meaning in Congress's
iii. Relator's Share and Attorneys' [**75] Fees consolidation of the fee-shifting and relator's
 Page 22
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *27; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **76

share provisions into the same statutory [**77] counsel spent on negotiation of the Relator's share
subsection. (Reply to BHIC and HUK's Opp'n is not appropriately billed to the defendants in this
[960] at 8.) But the Sixth Circuit read this case."). Contra United States v. Stern, 818 F.
statutory subsection rather differently, declining Supp. 1521, 1523 (M.D. Fla. 1993), as modified
to find Congressional intent implied in the text: by 932 F. Supp. 277, 278 (1993) (defendants must
compensate relator for attorneys' fees incurred in
The text of the qui tam attorneys' connection with relator's share litigation).
fees provision does not address the 43 Cf. Shaw v. AAA Eng'g & Drafting, Inc., 213
question of who pays for the F.3d 538, 544-45 (10th Cir. 2000) (where
relators' legal fees and expenses government did not intervene in qui tam action,
incurred during the course of a prevailing relator who initiated execution of
Relators'-Share Litigation. Indeed, judgment [**79] and garnishment proceedings on
although the statutory text government's behalf could recover "attorneys' fees
explicitly states that the relator is for time spent in post-judgment collection
to receive between 15% and 25% activities").
of the proceeds, in a case in which
the government intervenes, it fails Authority from this Circuit speaks to the second
to contemplate that a collateral issue presented here: whether a relator may recover
litigation process may ensue attorneys' fees from non-settling defendants for time
between the government and the devoted to obtaining such fees from settling defendants.
relator. "It is well settled that hours reasonably devoted to
negotiating and/or litigating a statutory fee award are
Taxpayers Against Fraud, 41 F.3d at 1045 compensable." Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 572 F.
(citation omitted). This Court agrees that nothing Supp. 354, 367 n.21 (D.D.C. 1983), reversed in part on
in the statutory text supports charging the other grounds by 238 U.S. App. D.C. 400, 740 F.2d 1071
defendants for fees incurred in such collateral (D.C. Cir. 1984). See also Copeland v. Marshall, 205
proceedings. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (2008). U.S. App. D.C. 390, 641 F.2d 880, 896 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(en banc) ("time spent litigating the fee request is itself
Relator also claims that if he cannot recoup compensable"). Thus, the only remaining question is
these attorneys' fees from the defendant, "it would whether liability for attorneys' fees under the FCA is joint
permit the Government to force a relator to take a and several, such that non-settling defendants share
lower share under a threat of protracted liability for fees incurred in obtaining fees from settling
litigation." (Reply to BHIC and HUK's Opp'n co-defendants.
[960] at 8.) The potential for hard bargaining by
the government may weigh against [**78] Though never presented with the precise situation
requiring a relator to bear the cost of efforts to here, other courts have unanimously concluded that fee
obtain his share, but it does not necessarily follow liability under the FCA is joint and several. 44 See United
that the defendant should be required to protect States ex rel. Greendyke v. CNOS, P.C., No. 04-4105,
him against governmental parsimony. Moreover, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72987, at *21-22 (D.S.D. Sept. 27,
to paraphrase Chief Judge Sentelle of our Court of 2007) [**80] (adhering to "general rule that
Appeals at a recent oral argument, before co-defendants are to be held jointly and severally liable
attempting to "parade horribles," relator should for costs and attorney's fees," where defendants failed to
make sure they are, in fact, horrible. In the cite authority for departing from it); United States ex rel.
scenario relator describes, the relator would still Abbott-Burdick v. Univ. Med. Assocs., No. 96-1676, 2002
receive at least 15% of the take, and the U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26986, at *18-20 (D.S.C. May 23, 2002)
government would be more fully compensated for (holding defendants jointly and severally liable for
its damages. attorneys fees because FCA's "other provisions dictate a
42 See also United States ex rel. Poulton v. joint and several relationship among culpable parties,"
Anesthesia Assocs. of Burlington, Inc., 87 F. and due to "unequivocal congressional intent of
Supp. 2d 351, 358 (D. Vt. 2000) ("The time encouraging qui tam suits and the unique pro-plaintiff
 Page 23
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structure of litigation under the [FCA]"); United States ex whether, when, and under what circumstances the
rel. Wiser v. Geriatric Psychological Servs., Inc., No. government would award relator a share. In
96-2219, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12930, at *11 (D. Md. principle, it would seem inequitable to hold
Mar. 22, 2001) (holding that "attorneys fees awarded defendants accountable for fees incurred due to
under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) should [not] be apportioned governmental intransigence. Moreover, even
among defendants [because] all other recovery need not preliminary research -- such as Luis de la Torre's
be"). memorandum on "whether relator can be awarded
part of recovery from a defendant not initially
44 This conclusion also disposes of defendants' named in relator[']s complaint," (6/24/95 RBB) --
argument that relator waived his entitlement to would be non-compensable under National
attorneys' fees incurred in pursuing or settling Association of Concerned Veterans because such
claims against Bilfinger & Berger and ABB research is not directed toward "a successful
SUSA by consenting to the Civil Division's resolution of the case." See 675 F.2d at 1335.
settlements with those defendants, absent [**81]
any provision for such fees in the settlements' Relator has responded to HII's itemized list of
terms. (See HII's Opp'n [949] at 12.) allegedly non-compensable time entries with
explanations and recommended deductions. (See
Thus, under a scheme of joint and several liability Ex. E-4 to Bell's Supplemental [**83] Decl., Ex.
for attorneys' fees, if hours devoted to obtaining fees are, 1 to Reply to HII's Opp'n [957].) Bell classifies
themselves, compensable, then each and every defendant these entries, which HII characterizes as efforts to
against whom relator prevails is liable [*28] for fees the secure a relator's share and/or attorneys' fees, as,
relator incurred in obtaining fees from each and every inter alia, "relator's share," "successful
other non-prevailing defendant. The hours relator's settlement," "unsuccessful settlement,"
counsel spent attempting to recover attorneys' fees from "preservation of ability to collection judgment,"
settling co-defendants are thus compensable. 45 and "Jones fee claim." (See id.) Rather than
speculate as to counsel's primary motivation for
45 The FCA's qui tam provisions offer two activities such as "review[] extensive research on
incentives to prospective whistleblowers -- a financial condition of Philipp Holzmann,"
guaranteed share of any recovery, and (10/1/99 RBB), the Court will accept Bell's
reimbursement for attorneys' fees -- and it may classifications as having been made in good faith
seem odd that hours a relator's counsel spends and will adopt them in reducing the challenged
securing the latter for his client are compensable, time entries.
while hours devoted to obtaining the former are
not. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) (2008). One c. Settlement Efforts
factual distinction between these two tasks
justifies their differential treatment: a relator seeks Relator's petition also includes hours his counsel
his attorneys' fees from the defendant, who can spent in settlement negotiations with various defendants,
choose to prolong litigation over the fees or both successfully and unsuccessfully, and in
simply cut his losses, but the relator must obtain court-ordered mediation. Contrary to defendants' protests,
his share from the government. As the Sixth these tasks are uniformly compensable. The FCA's qui
Circuit Court of Appeals observed [**82] in tam provisions make clear that a prevailing relator may
Taxpayers Against Fraud, qui tam defendants recover fees when settlement efforts succeed. See 31
typically have no involvement in this latter U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) (2008). Under the statute, a relator
process. See 41 F.3d at 1046. They can neither receives a share "of the proceeds of the action or
hasten nor delay nor prevent the relator's receipt settlement of the claim," and any person who receives
of his share. See id. Of course, in Taxpayers such [**84] a share "shall also receive . . . reasonable
Against Fraud, the defendant had settled with the attorneys' fees and costs." Id. More broadly, settlement
government before trial to "minimize its losses," efforts, by their nature, are directed toward "successful
whereas these defendants lost at trial. See id. But resolution of the case." See Nat'l Ass'n of Concerned
here, as there, defendants had no control over Veterans, 675 F.2d at 1335. Here, pretrial settlements
 Page 24
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with some defendants narrowed the trial's scope and Inc., 87 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1163, 1168-69 (D. Kan.
yielded cooperation from key players in the conspiracy, 2000) (awarding attorneys' fees to Title VII
whose testimony significantly bolstered plaintiffs' case plaintiff who prevailed at trial for time "spent on
and doubtless contributed to the jury's verdict. 46 [*29] matters relating to mediation and settlement
Other settlement negotiations and court-ordered efforts" because "[t]o hold otherwise might
mediation in this case did not produce such tangible discourage counsel for plaintiffs from exploring
results, but hours relator's counsel devoted to these efforts settlement possibilities"); United States ex rel.
were no less "expended in pursuit of a successful Poulton v. Anesthesia Assocs. of Burlington, Inc.,
resolution." 47 See id. (emphasis added). Moreover, 87 F. Supp. 2d 351, 354, 357, 359 (D. Vt. 2000)
substantial authority supports relator's claim to (awarding attorneys' fees to FCA relator for all
compensation for his attorneys' pursuit of settlement, relator's requested hours, including successful
whatever the ultimate outcome. 48 settlement efforts); Davis v. Catholic Univ. of
Am., No. 99-1153, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15654,
46 In 1997 and 1998, relator's counsel advised at *18-19 (D.D.C. Aug. 31, 1999) (Urbina, J.)
him concerning his role in a potential government (awarding attorneys fees to civil rights plaintiff
contract debarment proceeding against J.A. Jones, for time spent on successful settlement efforts).
and defendants contend they should not be Cf. Cobell v. Norton, 407 F. Supp. 2d 140, 156
compensated for work related to this "completely (D.D.C. 2005) (Lamberth, J.) (refusing to
collateral" matter. (See HII's Opp'n [949] at 13.) compensate plaintiffs in interim fee award for
Relator represents that [**85] the government unsuccessful settlement and court-ordered
considered debarment as a means to pressure mediation efforts).
Jones to settle, (see Reply to HII's Opp'n [957] at
22), and there is some support for this position in d. Travel
the record, (see, e.g., 6/25/97 RBB (Antitrust
Division attorney requested that relator testify at In the course of this litigation, relator's counsel
AID debarment hearing)). Because this time was traveled throughout [**87] the United States and Europe
thus "expended in pursuit of a successful to meet with Antitrust Division attorneys and to depose
resolution" of the case against J.A. Jones, which witnesses. Defendants contend this time is
resolution greatly advanced the civil case against non-compensable "absent a showing that the time charges
these defendants, it is compensable. See Nat'l relate to work done in transit," and that in any event,
Ass'n of Concerned Veterans, 675 F.2d at 1335. productive travel time "is reimbursable at only half the
See also Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 670 F.2d regular rate." (HII's Opp'n [949] at 13.)
760, 766-67 (7th Cir. 1982) (awarding attorneys'
Our Court of Appeals has "not specifically addressed
fees to Title VII plaintiffs for "efforts to persuade
whether an attorney's fee award may include travel time."
the government to debar the defendant from its
Cooper v. United States R.R. Retirement Bd., 306 U.S.
federal contracts [that] . . . caused the defendant to
App. D.C. 306, 24 F.3d 1414, 1417 (D.C. Cir. 1994). In
settle the Title VII action").
Cooper, the Court first observed that "[o]ther circuits
47 Furthermore, it would be anomalous to
allow payment for attorney travel time, although
withhold compensation for fees relator incurred in
sometimes at a lower hourly rate," then somewhat
connection with mediation ordered by this Court.
cryptically "conclude[d] that travel time in this case will
Cf. Wilkett v. ICC, 269 U.S. App. D.C. 249, 844
be compensated at half the base hourly rate." Id.
F.2d 867, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (awarding fees for
(emphasis added). Seizing on the emphasized phrase,
work on court-ordered supplemental brief because
relator insists that because the attorney in Cooper billed
"[a]ny work ordered by this Court is []
for thirteen hours spent driving to and from oral
compensable").
argument, only unproductive travel time should be
48 See, e.g., Hite v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 361 F.
compensated at half the base hourly rate, and that to
Supp. 2d 935, 952 (S.D. Iowa 2005) [**86]
ensure counsel receive a fully compensatory fee,
(awarding attorneys' fees to FMLA plaintiff who
productive travel time must be compensated at the full
prevailed at trial for time devoted to unsuccessful
rate. 49 (Reply to HII's Opp'n [*30] [957] [**88] at 23
settlement negotiations); Lintz v. Am. Gen. Fin.,
 Page 25
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *30; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **88

& n.37.) Yet other courts in this Circuit have read Cooper prevailing party entitled to "reasonable" attorneys' fees
as a more definitive statement. See, e.g., Doe v. Rumsfeld, may not recoup fees for time professionals spend on
501 F. Supp. 2d 186, 193 (D.D.C. 2007) (Sullivan, J.) purely clerical tasks because such tasks "ought to be
("Travel [] time is supposed to be compensated at half the considered part of normal administrative [**90]
attorney's hourly rate."); Blackman v. District of overhead." Michigan v. United States EPA, 347 U.S. App.
Columbia, 397 F. Supp. 2d 12, 15 (D.D.C. 2005) D.C. 42, 254 F.3d 1087, 1095-96 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Cf.
(Friedman, J.) ("In this circuit, travel time generally is Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 288 n.10, 109 S. Ct.
compensated at no more than half the attorney's 2463, 105 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1989) ("Of course, purely
appropriate hourly rate."). 50 This Court will follow suit clerical or secretarial tasks should not be billed at a
and will compensate travel time at half counsel's standard paralegal rate, regardless of who performs them.").
billing rates. 51 Though paralegals, like attorneys, should be compensated
at their market rates, they may only recover fees for
49 Cooper forecloses relator's reliance on services that are legal in nature, Cobell, 407 F. Supp. 2d
Environmental Defense Fund. (See Reply to HII's at 156, such as "factual investigation, locating and
Opp'n [957] at 23.) The Court of Appeals read interviewing witnesses; assistance with depositions,
this earlier decision as having "apparently" interrogatories and document production; compilation of
included travel time in a fee award without statistical and financial data; checking legal citations; and
actually deciding the issue. 24 F.3d at 1417. drafting correspondence," Jenkins, 491 U.S. at 288 n.10.
50 Cf. In re Segal (Segal Fee Application), 330
U.S. App. D.C. 278, 145 F.3d 1348, 1353 (D.C. Relator insists the clerical duties that appear in his
Cir., Spec. Div. 1998) (in fee application under counsel's billing statements are compensable because
Ethics in Government Act, travel expenses not they "requir[ed] familiarity with the documents, case, and
reimbursable absent showing that use of local issues." (Reply to BHIC and HUK's Opp'n [960] at 11.)
counsel to accomplish task was not feasible); He points to a supplemental declaration from attorney
Cobell v. Babbitt, 188 F.R.D. 122, 127 (D.D.C. Davidson, who claims that it is customary in the District
1999) (Lamberth, J.) (refusing to include travel of Columbia to bill clients for clerical tasks performed by
[**89] time in sanctions award of reasonable paralegals, and that "much of the 'clerical work' . . . of
attorneys' fees and expenses incurred due to which [defendants] complain[] is [**91] not clerical at
defendants' failure to obey court's orders). all." (See Davidson Supplemental Decl. PP 32-35, Ex. 2
51 Due to relator's counsel's practice of block to Reply to HII's Opp'n [957].)
billing, the Court cannot perform this calculation
with precision. In his supplemental declaration, Because the law in this Circuit is to the contrary,
Bell proposes reductions the Court may use however, neither custom nor post-facto rationalizations
should it choose to compensate travel time at 50% will render clerical tasks compensable. The Court
of hourly rates. (See Bell Supplemental Decl. P 21 recognizes that certain seemingly clerical tasks -- such as
& Ex. E-7, Ex. 1 to Reply to HII's Opp'n [957].) quality checking and otherwise preparing documents for
Though Bell has not addressed all time entries production, (see, e.g., 5/24/2006 Tillotson, 5/25/2006
involving travel, his calculations appear Tillotson, 6/1/2006 Tillotson) -- necessarily involve,
reasonable given the destinations involved, and [*31] or are at least rendered more efficient by, an
the Court will apply them consistently to entries in-depth understanding of the underlying legal issues. But
involving travel to those destinations. For local the Court simply cannot fathom how, for example,
travel and for destinations for which Bell has not telephone calls to obtain corporate addresses can be
proposed travel time reductions, the Court will deemed "legal" in nature. 52 (See, e.g., 6/21/95 FHQ;
make reasonable calculations. 6/23/95 FHQ; 6/26/95 FHQ.) Similarly, the notion that
filing a change of address notice constitutes substantive
e. Clerical Work legal work strains credulity. (See 4/28/2006 MMB.) The
Court will not award fees for such administrative
At various times, relator's counsel and paralegals housekeeping.
performed clerical tasks, and relator's fee petition
includes some time entries embracing these tasks. A 52 Cf. United States ex rel. LeFan v. Gen. Elec.
 Page 26
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *31; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **91

Co., 00-222, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3020, at *12 the case in which fees are being claimed." See
(W.D. Ky. Jan. 15, 2008) ("While some of the Nat'l Ass'n of Concerned Veterans, 675 F.2d at
billed tasks, such as reviewing and organizing 1335.
documents and preparing binders for [**92]
witness interviews may appear clerical, the Court Parties often proceed under more than one
accepts the Relators' argument that these tasks had legal theory, or seek to acquire supporting
to be performed by an attorney or paralegal evidence from more than one source. See
familiar with facts and law of the case."). Copeland, 641 F.2d at 892 n.18. [**94]
Generally, some efforts succeed, while others fail,
Defendants have not attempted to identify all time but all are clearly "expended in pursuit of a
entries that include clerical tasks, and they argue that the successful resolution of the case." See Nat'l Ass'n
Court should either require relator to expunge them from of Concerned Veterans, 675 F.2d at 1335. Relator
his petition or discount all paralegal fees by 50 percent. failed to secure a modification of the protective
(BHIC and HUK's Opp'n [948] at 10.) Relator has order that would have allowed him to use grand
declined the former invitation and insists the latter jury testimony adduced in the prior criminal case,
request is excessive. (Reply to BHIC and HUK's Opp'n but his counsel's efforts in this vein were directed
[960] at 11-12.) Even if the Court were to examine toward successful resolution of the qui tam action.
counsel's time entries line by line, their practice of block Accordingly, they are compensable.
billing would still obscure the true number of hours
devoted to clerical work. In the course of preparing this While relator achieved a stunning victory on the
Opinion, the Court has reviewed many of relator's time claims litigated at trial, this Court had previously
entries, and it is convinced that clerical tasks occupied dismissed several other claims, which were not submitted
only a very small portion of the hours billed by attorneys to the jury. 54 Specifically, it adopted Magistrate Judge
and a slightly larger portion of those billed by paralegals. Facciola's ruling that this Court had personal jurisdiction
Based on these observations, the Court will discount all over HUK [*32] only as to Contract 20A, (Mem. &
attorney hours by one-half percent and all paralegal hours Order of Mar. 6, 2007 [618]), and it dismissed all claims
by five percent to ensure the fee award does not include against Bill L. Harbert on statute of limitations grounds,
[**93] compensation for clerical tasks. (Order of May 4, 2007 [854], at 3). Defendants assert that
relator's fee petition improperly includes time devoted to
f. Non-Prevailing Claims 53 pursuit of these failed claims. (BHIC and HUK's Opp'n
[948] at 5-8.); see Copeland, 641 F.2d at 891-92 & n.18
53 Defendants cite Copeland v. Marshall for the ("no compensation should be paid for time spent
proposition that "no compensation should be litigating [**95] claims upon which the party seeking the
given for hours spent litigating issues on which fee did not ultimately prevail").
plaintiff did not ultimately prevail," see 641 F.2d
at 902 (emphasis added), and on this basis, they 54 HII also argues that no work performed in
argue that hours devoted to relator's unsuccessful connection with relator's claims on Contracts 29
pursuit of grand jury materials protected by and 07 is compensable because: 1) this Court
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) are not lacked jurisdiction to hear them, as relator was not
compensable. (HII's Opp'n [949] at 14-15.) the original source of the information on which
Elsewhere in its decision, however, the Court of they were based; and 2) these claims did not relate
Appeals made clear that only non-prevailing back to the date of relator's original complaint and
claims are non-compensable. See 641 F.2d at thus were time-barred. (HII's Opp'n [949] at
891-92 & n.18 ("no compensation should be paid 15-16.)
for time spent litigating claims upon which the
party seeking the fee did not ultimately prevail") This Court has previously weighed and
(emphasis added). This reading is in harmony rejected both these arguments -- repeatedly. (See
with the Court of Appeals' subsequent holding Mem. Op. & Order of Mar. 14, 2007 [715]
that a petitioner may seek fees for hours (denying HII and HC's motion in limine to
"expended in pursuit of a successful resolution of preclude relator from participating in all phases of
trial concerning contracts 07 and 29); Order of
 Page 27
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *32; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **95

May 4, 2007 [854] (denying HII and HC's motion deposition of Billy Harbert demonstrates that it
to dismiss relator's claims on Contracts 07 and 29 clearly was taken solely with respect to issues
due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for related to Bill Harbert." (BHIC and HUK's Opp'n
reconsideration of ruling on relator's status as an [948] at 7.) They have not affixed this deposition
original source); Mem. Op. & Order of Mar. 6, to their opposition, however, and do not point to
2007 (sustaining relator's objection to magistrate its location elsewhere in the record, so the Court
judge's recommendation that his Contract 07 and cannot review the deposition for itself. Without
29 claims were time-barred); Mem. Op. of June doing so, it can only reason that issues "related to
23, 2008 [964] (denying HII's motion for Bill Harbert" are not necessarily unrelated to other
judgment as a matter of law, [**96] based on defendants -- particularly in a conspiracy case
statute of limitations, as to relator's Contract 07 such as this one. Moreover, relator insists the
and 29 claims).) younger Harbert was [**98] deposed "to
determine if he knew anything about the
HII now raises these issues yet again in a conspiracy," and to learn details of "meetings he
rather unusual procedural context -- its opposition may have had with co-conspirators and other
to relator's fee petition. Even if these questions are witnesses beyond his father." (Reply to BHIC and
properly before the Court, which it doubts, the HUK's Opp'n [960] at 10.) This explanation is
Court sees no infirmity in the reasoning of its perfectly reasonable, and the Court will
previous rulings on them. Time expended compensate relator's counsel for time devoted to
litigating relator's Contract 07 and 29 claims is preparing for and taking the deposition.
compensable.
As to relator's dismissed claims against HUK,
Relator has acknowledged that his original fee defendants contend that discovery [*33] requests
petition did include some hours devoted solely to his directed to HUK and time counsel expended on the
claims against Bill Harbert, and Bell has itemized the personal jurisdiction issue should not be compensable in
time entries now conceded as non-compensable. (See full. (See BHIC and HUK's Opp'n [948] at 7-8.)
Reply to BHIC and HUK's Opp'n [960] at 10; Bell Defendants misapprehend the law. The Court of Appeals
Supplemental Decl. P 25, Ex. 1 to Reply to HII's Opp'n in Copeland v. Marshall did, at one point, state that "no
[957].) To the extent defendants seek to exclude time compensation should be given for hours spent litigating
spent on matters involving Bill Harbert and other issues on which plaintiff did not ultimately prevail." See
defendants, the Court finds this time is compensable. 641 F.2d at 902 (emphasis added). But the opinion as a
Plaintiffs alleged an overarching conspiracy to rig bids on whole leaves the court's position quite clear: "no
government contracts of which Harbert was a ringleader. compensation should be paid for time spent litigating
(See, e.g., Order of Mar. 6, 2007 [613] at 12.) Their claims upon which the party seeking the fee did not
claims against Harbert and against the present defendants ultimately prevail." Id. at 891-92 (emphasis added). A
were "part and parcel of one matter" -- those against reduction in fee is appropriate only when the
Harbert were by no means "fractionable." [**97] See non-prevailing claims "'are truly fractionable.'" [**99]
Lamphere v. Brown Univ., 610 F.2d 46, 47 (1st Cir. Id. at 892 n.18 (quoting Lamphere v. Brown Univ., 610
1979). To illustrate their objection, defendants describe F.2d 46, 47 (1st Cir. 1979)). This interpretation accords
counsel's preparation of discovery requests propounded with positions taken by other Circuits. 56 It also accords
to Harbert and others. (See BHIC and HUK's Opp'n [948] with common sense: even efforts directed to
at 5-6.) Even leaving aside relator's claim that he sent non-prevailing issues may be "expended in pursuit of a
"similar or identical written discovery [] to all parties," successful resolution of the case." See Nat'l Ass'n of
(see Reply to BHIC and HUK's Opp'n [960] at 10), Concerned Veterans, 675 F.2d at 1335.
Harbert's responses to relator's discovery demands almost
certainly yielded material helpful to plaintiffs' case 56 See, e.g., Uniroyal v. Goodrich Tire Co. v.
against the other defendants. 55 Hence, the Court is Mut. Trading Corp., 63 F.3d 516, 526 (7th Cir.
satisfied with Bell's redactions. 1995) ("we are not prepared to link our definition
of 'reasonable' to whether the fees are incurred in
55 Defendants also claim that "a review of the pursuit of a successful task"); Grant v. Martinez,
 Page 28
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *33; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **99

973 F.2d 96, 99 (2d Cir. 1992) ("[t]he relevant g. Summary

issue . . . is not whether hindsight vindicates an
attorney's time expenditures, but whether, at the For the reasons explained above, the Court will not
time the work was performed, a reasonable award fees for the following classes of time entries: hours
attorney would have engaged in similar time devoted to [*34] securing immunity from prosecution
expenditures"); Blum v. Witco Chem. Corp., 829 for relator, tasks arising from his ongoing employment at
F.2d 367, 378 (3d Cir. 1987) ("mere failure of J.A. Jones, research and other efforts to obtain his
certain motions or the failure to use depositions is relator's share, and clerical tasks performed by attorneys
insufficient to warrant a fee reduction under and paralegals. For the first three classes, the Court has
Hensley"). reviewed the parties' submissions and has made
reasonable reductions. Appendix II to this Opinion
The Supreme Court's language in Hensley echoes itemizes these deductions. Percentage reductions for
this standard. There, the Court indicated that the lodestar clerical tasks appear in Appendix III, along with other
should be adjusted downward where the plaintiff [**100] subtractions for broad defects in the fee petition.
"fail[s] to prevail on claims that were unrelated to the
claims on which he succeeded." 461 U.S. at 434 2. Broader Defects
(emphasis added). It explained:
Defendants have also identified several pervasive
flaws in relator's fee petition, on which basis they seek
In some cases a plaintiff may present in
across-the-board, percentage reductions in the lodestar. 57
one lawsuit distinctly different claims for
(See BHIC and HUK's Opp'n [948] at 11-18; HII's Opp'n
relief that are based on different facts and
[949] at 16-30.)
legal theories. In such a suit, even where
the claims are brought against the same 57 Comprehensive [**102] deductions are a
defendants . . . counsel's work on one well-accepted remedy for the widespread defects
claim will be unrelated to his work on defendants allege. See, e.g., Role Models Am., Inc.
another claim. Accordingly, work on an v. Brownlee, 359 U.S. App. D.C. 237, 353 F.3d
unsuccessful claim cannot be deemed to 962, 973-74 (D.C. Cir. 2004) ("A fixed reduction
have been "expended in pursuit of the is appropriate given the large number of entries
ultimate result achieved." that suffer from one or more of the deficiencies
we have described."); Cobell v. Norton, 407 F.
Id. at 434-35 (citation omitted). Here, plaintiffs alleged Supp. 2d 140, 166 (D.D.C. 2005) (Lamberth, J.)
that HUK participated in an overarching conspiracy (collecting cases).
involving Contracts 20A, 29, and 07. (See, e.g., Order of
Mar. 6, 2007 [613].) The Contract 20A claims on which a. Inadequate Records
they succeeded were closely intertwined with the
Contract 29 and 07 claims on which they failed. While As noted above, a fee petitioner must provide
these latter claims did involve some "different facts," sufficient support for his claim to "permit the District
plaintiffs developed and presented these same facts to the Court to make an independent determination whether or
jury in pursuing claims against the other defendants, not the hours claimed are justified." Nat'l Ass'n of
HUK's co-conspirators, as to Contracts 29 and 07. Concerned Veterans., 675 F.2d at 1327. Defendants
contend relator has failed at this endeavor in at least two
Where, as here, a "plaintiff has obtained excellent respects: 1) counsel's time entries consistently refer to
results, his attorney should recover [**101] a fully research, meetings, and telephone conferences without
compensatory fee," and the award "should not be reduced specifying their subject matter; and 2) counsel have
simply because the plaintiff failed to prevail on every followed the practice of block billing. 58 (See BHIC and
contention raised in the lawsuit." Hensley, 461 U.S. at HUK's Opp'n [948] at 11-13; HII's Opp'n [949] at 23-27.)
435. The Court will make no reductions based on the
dismissal of relator's Contract 29 and 07 claims against 58 BHIC and HUK also object to counsel's use
HUK. of labels, e.g., "Witness A," to identify individuals
in their time records. Relator explains in his reply
 Page 29
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *34; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **102

that these labels are designed [**103] to protect re strategy questions" and "confer with Mr. Shapiro re
attorney-client privilege and/or attorney work same." (See BHIC and HUK's Opp'n [948] at 13 (citing
product. (Reply to HII's Opp'n [957] at 15.) The 11/8/2006 JMO).)
Court finds this claim plausible, and in any event,
the problematic labels appear so infrequently that As defendants observe, these entries and others in
their impact on the Court's ability to subject the relator's petition are virtually [**105] identical to the
records to meaningful review is negligible. sorts of descriptions this Court and others have repeatedly
deemed inadequate:
Further, defendants contend that counsel's
time records are internally inconsistent: where one For example, many of plaintiffs' time
attorney bills time for a conference with another, records "provide little or no reference to
his supposed conversation partner's time entry for the substance of the work claimed."
the day fails to mention this discussion. (See Entries such as : "research read cases;
BHIC and HUK's Opp'n [948] at 11-12.) Given searched Westlaw"; "meet with attys";
counsel's consistent practice of block-billing, such "prepare for trial"; [and] "further trial
discrepancies would be unsurprising. Yet preparation and document review" . . . are
defendants' marquee example is ill-chosen. They so vaguely generic that the Court can not
cite Howard Shapiro's time entry for May 25, determine with certainty whether the
2006, which lists "meet with Ms. O'Connor," but activities they purport to describe were . . .
the quoted language to which they refer -- "confer reasonable.
with O'Connor" -- appears in the subsequent time
entry, for May 30. (Id.; see 5/26/2006 HS; . . . Other time records make, "no
5/30/2006 HS.) O'Connor's time entries for those mention . . . of the subject matter of a
days reflect a "conference with team re various meeting, telephone conference or the work
issues" which Shapiro may well have attended, performed during hours billed." Entries
(5/26/2006 JMO), and a "confer[ence] with Ms. illustrative of this particular problem
Terry and Mr. Shapiro re various issues," [**104] include: "conference call with Dennis & E.
(5/30/2006 JMO). These entries are impenetrably Worliss"; "telephone call to KH re:
vague, but they do match up. To the extent the general update"; "call for Plaintiffs";
other examples defendants relegate to a footnote "background research for RD"; "confce
fail to correspond, the Court considers this call and follow-ups."
inconsistency an outgrowth of block billing,
Similarly infirm are those time entries
addressed below, that does not require separate
containing "vague and cryptic
discussion.
designations," such as : "rvw & respond to
i. Vague Descriptions email inquiry from A. Jarett"; "confer
w/RD"; "Discussed strategy w/Dennis,
First, defendants cite several examples of time Thad, Bob & Keith"; "Met w/Keith & Bob
entries for which counsel's narrative descriptions are so re: strategy"; "conference with Elliott
vague as to preclude meaningful review. They point to Levitas regarding strategy and legal
two of Robert Bell's time entries from March 2001, in issues"; [**106] "confer w/RD & RP re:
which he billed for "telcon Carolyn Mark" and "telcon legal strategy."
Carolyn Mark re: tactics." (See HII's Opp'n [949] at 24
(citing 3/13/2001 RBB; 3/14/2001 RBB).) [*35] Even Cobell, 407 F. Supp. 2d at 158-59 (citations omitted). See
more egregiously meaningless are Michael Sturm's time also Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437 n.12 ("at least counsel
entries for "review and analyze issues re development." should identify the general subject matter of his time
(See id. (citing 11/2/1998 MLS; 11/3/1998 MLS; expenditures"); In re Meese, 285 U.S. App. D.C. 186, 907
5/27/1999 MLS).) Similarly, Jennifer O'Connor's time F.2d 1192, 1204 (D.C. Cir. Spec. Div. 1990) (time entries
entry for November 8, 2006 includes the wholly in which "no mention is made of the subject matter of a
uninformative phrases "confer with Mr. Bell, Mr. Connell meeting, telephone conference or the work performed
 Page 30
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *35; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **106

during hours billed" are "not adequately documented"); declaration is similarly unpersuasive.
In re Olson, 280 U.S. App. D.C. 205, 884 F.2d 1415, 60 Cf. United States ex rel. Abbott-Burdick v.
1428-29 (D.C. Cir. Spec. Div. 1989) (decrying time Univ. Med. Assocs., No. 96-1676, 2002 U.S. Dist.
entries "that wholly fail to state, or to make any reference LEXIS 26986, at *50 (D.S.C. May 23, 2002)
to the subject discussed at a conference, meeting or ("while the fee application may contain some
telephone conference" as well as generic references to vague entries, the Court's review of the entire fee
"strategy" conferences); Kennecott Corp. v. EPA, 256 application gives it ample information to
U.S. App. D.C. 218, 804 F.2d 763, 767 (D.C. Cir. 1986) determine the reasonableness of the request").
(per curiam) (citing "[a]nalysis of final NSO regulations;
first joint petition for review; research" as too generalized The relevant question is not whether the lodestar
to meet fee applicant's burden). The resemblance is should be reduced due to counsel's impenetrable
uncanny. narratives, but by how much. Not all counsel's time
entries exhibits such flaws. Indeed, some far exceed the
Relator characterizes defendants' examples as having minimum level of detail needed for meaningful analysis.
been "cherry-picked" from among otherwise "sufficiently And as relator urges, certain vague descriptions acquire
detailed" time entries. 59 (See Reply to HII's Opp'n [957] greater substance when considered in context. See Heard
at 13-14.) Had the Court not examined relator's counsel's v. Dist. of Columbia, No. 02-296, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
time [**107] entries at some length, it might give 62912, at *44-46 (D.D.C. Sept. 5, 2006) (Kotelly,
credence to this [*36] argument. Instead, its review of [**109] J.) (surrounding entries must be taken into
the entire fee application confirms that counsel's time account in reviewing allegedly vague time entries). Cf.
records are simply rife with ambiguous and nugatory Cobell, 407 F. Supp. 2d at 159 (declining to
entries. 60 Michael Sturm, for example, has 60 billed time "cross-reference each of plaintiffs' voluminous time
for "review[ing] and analyz[ing] issues re strategy" no entries to compensate for [counsel's] failure to more fully
fewer than sixteen times. (See 6/26/1995 MLS; 8/14/1995 describe his activities in the first instance" because this
MLS; 8/30/1995 MLS; 9/8/1995 MLS; 1/19/1996 MLS; "responsibility rests squarely with plaintiffs"). For
2/14/1996 MLS; 2/28/1996 MLS; 6/25/1997 MLS; example, on one of the five consecutive days for which
2/26/1998 MLS; 5/7/1998 MLS; 2/25/1999 MLS; Colin Rushing billed only "prepare for trial," (3/14/2007
5/28/1999 MLS; 6/15/1999 MLS; 6/24/2999 MLS; CR), Bell's time record indicates he met for some period
9/8/1999 MLS; 9/13/1999 MLS.) Other gems include of time with Rushing and others to discuss "trimming
"reviewing and revising memorandum to file; research on [the] case," (3/14/2007 RBB), and Cedarbaum's entry for
bid-rigging cases," (1/7/2000 RBB), for which relator's that day notes Rushing was present for a meeting
counsel seek $ 650.00; "review indices, docs; confer with regarding "demonstratives," (3/14/2007 JC). It seems
G. Reece," (6/20/2006 MMB), for which counsel billed $ unlikely, however, that these two meetings consumed the
1,295.00; and "prepare for trial," (3/14/2007 CR; entire thirteen hours Rushing billed that day. Moreover,
3/15/2007 CR; 3/16/2007 CR; 3/17/2007 CR; 3/18/2007 contextual analysis saves only a small portion of the
CR), for which counsel charged $ 30,021.50. problematic time entries.

59 To bolster this rebuttal, he relies on Accordingly, the Court agrees with defendants that
declarations from attorneys Braga and Davidson. counsel's time entries' ambiguity warrants an
(See Davidson Supplemental Decl. PP 7-8 and across-the-board reduction. Based on the Court's review
Braga Supplemental Decl. P 2, Exs. 2, 3 to Reply of the full fee application, it considers 10 percent to be
to HII's Opp'n [957].) But Davidson's assertion reasonable and appropriate. 61
that [**108] "courts [do not] routinely expect
more detail than that provided" is demonstrably 61 Cf. Role Models Am., Inc., 353 F.3d at 973
incorrect. (See Davidson Supplemental Decl. P 8.) [**110] (reducing compensation by 50 percent
His assurance that "[u]nder these circumstances . . due to "inadequate documentation, failure to
. the Court . . . would know precisely what justify the number of hours sought,
activities counsel have undertaken" does not inconsistencies, and improper billing entries").
render counsel's cryptic time entries more
ii. Block Billing
intelligible to this Court. (See id. P 7.) Braga's
 Page 31
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *36; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **110

Defendants also criticize counsel's use of block Kessler observed that "[n]one of the factors
billing -- that is, their time entries aggregate all tasks examined and relied upon [by our Court of
performed for this case on a given day, with no indication Appeals in issuing its "stinging criticism" of
as to how much time counsel spent on each individual block-billing] in Role Models exist in this case."
task. 62 As our Court of Appeals has [*37] observed, Id. at 157. Unlike Role Models, and much like the
block billing "make[s] it impossible for the court to instant case, Smith was [**112] exceedingly
determine, with any degree of exactitude, the amount of complex, involving "a very substantial motion to
time billed for a discrete activity," leaving the court "to dismiss," "a substantial summary judgment
estimate the reduction to be made because of such motion, and post-trial motions," as well as
insufficient documentation." In re Olson, 884 F.2d at "extremely significant" discovery. Id. More
1428-29. See also Role Models Am., Inc., 353 F.3d at 971 critically, however, Judge Kessler compared the
(time records that "lump together multiple tasks[] mak[e] underlying fee petitions:
it impossible to evaluate their reasonableness"). In
Cobell, this Court refused to "undertake the futile task of While there is no question that
separating plaintiffs' block entries into their constituent block billing does, as the Court of
tasks and apportioning a random amount of time to each." Appeals emphasized in Role
407 F. Supp. 2d at 160. Instead, it "exercise[d] the Models, make it difficult to
discretion accorded it by the Hensley Court and reduce[d] determine the accuracy and
the time requested." Id. [**111] (citing Hensley v. reasonableness of billing entries,
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 n.12, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 76 L. the use of such entries in this case
Ed. 2d 40 (1983)). 63 was not unduly excessive[,] nor did
the entries in this case[] suffer
62 For example, on October 2, 2006, Jennifer from the inadequate description
O'Connor billed 13.8 hours in this case. Her time concerns voiced in Role Models . .
entry reads: ..

Prepare for Anderson prep Id. at 158. By contrast, counsel here routinely
session, participate in same; documented their time in daily blocks, and as
prepare for light prep session, explained above, see supra part III.B.2.a.i, their
participate in same; conf Ms. Mark time entries most certainly "suffer from []
et al. re various strategic issues, inadequate description concerns," see 466 F.
emails Mr. Reece and Ms. Moore Supp. 2d at 158. Thus, Role Models offers far
re Nagel issues, review more apt guidance in the instant case than it did in
correspondence from defendants re Smith.
discovery issues, email Mr. Lang
re Hemler interview or deposition, This Court heartily agrees with Judge Kessler
finalize and send letter to Mr. that "[i]n examining the fee petition and
Murphy, emails Mr. Cedarbaum re evaluating the reasonableness of the hours
Bilhar motion to compel, emails to claimed, it is essential for the trial Court to be
Archer deposition, review practical and realistic about how lawyers actually
Wendorff letters of request, review operate [**113] in their day-to-day practice." Id.
draft protective order and Indeed, like Judge Kessler, it does not propose
correspondence re same, review that "[w]hen a lawyer writes, for example, that
email to Ms. Mark re coordination. she spent six or eight hours in one day
'researching and drafting' a brief[,]" she should be
(10/2/2006 JMO.) required to "itemize every case she looked up or
63 Another court in this district has looked on every paragraph she labored over." Id. But where
block billing with a more friendly eye. See Smith during that six or eight hours, the lawyer also
v. District of Columbia, 466 F. Supp. 2d 151 attends a meeting, makes telephone calls, reviews
(D.D.C. 2006) (Kessler, J.) In Smith, Judge (unidentified) documents, and responds to and
 Page 32
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *37; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **113

drafts emails, this Court believes she can and their reasonableness," this Court finds that a wholesale
should distinguish how much time she spent on reduction in the lodestar is appropriate. See Role Models
these various, disparate tasks. Judge Kessler Am., Inc., 353 F.3d at 971. It will thus reduce the
predicted "two undesirable results" -- "fee tentative lodestar by a further 10 percent. 64
petitions will be higher, and [] lawyers will []
waste precious time doing menial clerical tasks" -- 64 Cf. Role Models Am., Inc., 353 F.3d at 973
would follow from more detailed time-keeping. (reducing compensation by 50 percent due to
Id. This Court, however, is sanguine that existing "inadequate documentation, failure to justify the
technology and a little training can forestall both. number of hours sought, inconsistencies, and
improper billing entries"); Reyes v. Nations Title
Relator attempts to justify his counsel's block time Agency of Ill., Inc., No. 00-7763, 2001 U.S. Dist.
entries by turning again to fellow attorneys' declarations: LEXIS 8446, at *6 (N.D. Ill. June 19, 2001)
Davidson contends block billing is "[t]he most prevalent (reducing block-billed entries by 10 percent);
practice among firms in the Washington, D.C. Oberdorfer v. Glickman, No. 98-1588, 2001 U.S.
marketplace," and Braga characterizes it as "standard fare Dist. LEXIS 14677, at *18 (D. Or. Sept. 14, 2001)
in today's billing world." [**114] (Davidson Decl. P 12, (declining to allow fees for block-billed entries).
Ex. 5 to Mot. for Fees, Costs, and Expenses [930]; Braga
Supplemental Decl. P 2, Ex. 3 to Reply to HII's Opp'n b. Unnecessary Work
[957].) Davidson also insists that more truly
Defendants [**116] next contend that relator's
contemporaneous [*38] time-keeping would be
counsel engaged in unnecessary work, gratuitously
"burdensome" and "disruptive to the flow of work
inflating the fee petition. (BHIC and HUK's Opp'n [948]
involved." (Davidson Supplemental Decl. P 8, Ex. 2 to
at 13-14.) Such superfluous time is not compensable. See
[957].)
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 (requiring petitioner "to exclude
Such platitudes fail the common sense test. Wilmer from [his] fee request hours that are excessive, redundant,
Hale's time records clearly reveal a policy of billing in or otherwise unnecessary"); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines,
six-minute increments, while Wiley Rein's counsel seem Inc., 572 F. Supp. 354, 369 (D.D.C. 1983) (Robinson,
to have billed in fifteen-minute increments. In several C.J.) ("Counsel is not free . . . to exercise its judgment in
instances, an individual attorney performed only one task a fashion that unnecessarily inflates the losing party's fee
on this case in a given day and billed only six or fifteen liability").
minutes. (See, e.g., 6/30/2006 HS (0.10 hours billed for
Specifically, defendants claim that "[o]nce the
"confer with Ms. O'Connor"); 12/9/1998 RBB (0.25
government intervened, there was no need for the Relator
hours billed for "telephone call with Mr. Dillon re status
to continue to amend his complaint, merely asserting the
of investigation").) Thus, counsel were clearly able,
same claims as those contained in the government's
under both firms' existing record-keeping systems, to
complaints." (BHIC and HUK's Opp'n [948] at 13.)
document the time spent on individual tasks. The Court
Hence, they argue, the Court should order relator's
acknowledges that more consistently precise
counsel to identify all time entries associated with these
time-keeping might prove somewhat disruptive to
amendments and should exclude them from the fee
work-flow, but in a fee-shifting case, it is necessary to
award. (Id. at 14.)
facilitate subsequent judicial review. Most saliently,
counsel's [**115] time entries are riddled with This demand fails for two reasons. First, defendants
conferences, telephone calls, and meetings involving again mistake the governing "reasonableness" standard
multiple professionals, but it is impossible to determine for one of necessity. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433
how long these conclaves lasted -- or, as noted above, (lodestar calculated based on "hours reasonably [**117]
what subject matter they involved. Without such basic expended on the litigation"). Even an unnecessary
details, the Court simply cannot ascertain whether this amendment might yet be reasonable. Second, in each of
time was reasonably expended. the three instances in which relator [*39] amended his
complaint after the government had intervened,
Because relator's counsel's time records "lump
Magistrate Judge Facciola or this Court authorized the
together multiple tasks, making it impossible to evaluate
amendment. (See Order of Mar. 9, 2006 [232] (magistrate
 Page 33
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *39; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **117

judge granted relator's motion for leave to file a third Indeed, "conferences between attorneys to discuss
amended complaint); Scheduling Order of Apr. 10, 2006 strategy . . . are an essential part of effective litigation"
[253] (magistrate judge ordered that parties comply with and facilitate "proper supervision and efficient staffing."
April 24, 2006 deadline for filing amended complaints); McKenzie v. Kennickell, 645 F. Supp. 437, 450 (D.D.C.
Mem. Op. & Order of Mar. 6, 2007 [620] (this Court 1986) (Parker, J.). This Court recognizes the value of
granted relator's motion for leave to file fifth amended information-sharing and dialogue, 65 but it agrees with
complaint).) The Court will not deny compensation for defendants that "neither preparation for the defense of
work it authorized. Cf. Wilkett v. ICC, 269 U.S. App. D.C. [Musika's] deposition nor debriefing after[ward] . . .
249, 844 F.2d 867, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("[a]ny work [*40] justifies" billing $ 5,000.00 for a thirty-six minute
ordered by this Court is [] compensable"). period. 66 (See BHIC and HUK's Opp'n [948] at 15.)

c. Inefficiencies 65 On this same note, attorney Davidson deems

such conferences reasonable "because it is not at
Next, defendants point to sundry inefficiencies all uncommon on tight discovery schedules to
reflected in counsel's time records that fall into two broad divide work among different attorneys,
categories. Their "too many lawyers" complaints include: necessitating their participation in group
(1) an excessive number of meetings and conference discussions to share their knowledge." (Davidson
calls, many of uncertain duration, involving multiple Supplemental Decl. P 11, Ex. 2 to Reply to HII's
senior personnel; (2) assignment of a per se unreasonable Opp'n [957] at 6.) Division of labor, however,
number of different time-keepers [**118] to the case; does not necessarily require that each participant
and (3) assignment of too many high-billing partners to have [**120] complete knowledge of each stage
the case. Their "too many hours" complaints include: (1) in the overall process. This defeats the very
excessive time spent drafting relator's original complaint; purpose of dividing work -- improving efficiency
(2) an unreasonable amount of time devoted to basic through specialization. Assigning eleven different
research; and (3) plaintiffs' continued agreements to seal. attorneys to work on one deposition, however
The Court will briefly examine each purported crucial the witness, can hardly be characterized as
inefficiency and will then determine whether, in light of efficient.
its findings, an across-the-board reduction for "excessive, 66 Cf. In re North (Reagan Fee Application),
redundant, or otherwise unnecessary" hours is 320 U.S. App. D.C. 351, 94 F.3d 685, 691 (D.C.
appropriate. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. Cir. Spec. Div. 1996) ("Because of the number of
attorneys involved, the fees for these meetings
i. Too Many Lawyers aggregate to well over $ 1,000 per hour. While it
may be reasonable for a client facing serious
First, defendants highlight several "team meetings"
charges to pay the additional costs of having a
that illustrate their concern over the innumerable,
highly staffed case . . . this does not mean that a
multi-participant meetings and conference calls that litter
counsel's time records. On December 12, 2006, for petitioner has established the reasonableness of
billing such duplication of effort to the public
example, no fewer than eleven people attended a "team
fisc."); In re North (Bush Fee Application), 313
meeting." (See 12/12/2006 MB; 12/12/2006 AB;
U.S. App. D.C. 188, 59 F.3d 184, 191-92 (D.C.
12/12/2006 RBB; 12/12/2006 MMB; 12/12/2006 JC;
Cir. Spec. Div. 1995) (deducting hours for
12/12/2006 MG; 12/12/2006 AFM; 12/12/2006 JMO;
"multiple attendance at the same conferences, or
12/12/2006 GR; 12/12/2006 HS; 12/12/2006 STS.)
production of the same documents").
Howard Shapiro's time entry indicates the meeting lasted
0.6 hours, and Stephen Smith's time entry reveals it Similarly, the Court cannot condone counsel's June
pertained to that day's deposition of plaintiffs' expert, 2006 conference calls with BHIC's counsel. On June 23,
Terry Musika. [**119] (See 12/12/2006 HS; 12/12/2006 four attorneys participated in a teleconference with June
STS.) The price tag: $ 4,885.00.
Ann Sauntry regarding follow-up questions to defendants'
discovery responses. (6/23/2006 MMB; [**121]
Relator argues "such interactions and collaboration"
6/23/2006 JC; 6/23/2006 JMO; 6/23/2006 GR.) Due to
were necessary in "a case as complex and fast-paced as
counsel's block time entries, the Court cannot ascertain
this one." (Reply to BHIC and HUK's Opp'n [960] at 14.)
 Page 34
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *40; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **121

how long this call lasted, but its hourly price tag was a United States, it was [*41] perfectly reasonable for his
whopping $ 1,740.00. Four days later, at this same, $ counsel to attend depositions, regardless of government
1,740.00 per hour rate, these four attorneys conferred by counsel's presence. Further, while the Court questions its
phone again with Sauntry and then held a separate necessity, it cannot conclude that dispatching two Wilmer
meeting amongst themselves. (6/27/2006 MMB; Hale attorneys to each deposition was wholly
6/26/2006 JC; 6/26/2006 JMO; 6/23/2006 GR.) unreasonable. At three, however, it draws the line. 67
More is not always better.
This troublesome pattern extends to counsel's written
work product: seven different attorneys worked on 67 For example, Jonathan Cedarbaum's presence
relator's fifth amended complaint. (See, e.g., 1/30/2007 at Evangeline Hoover's deposition appears to have
JC; 1/31/2007 JC; 1/31/2007 MB; 12/22/2006 AB; been superfluous. His time records reveal no
1/30/2006 AB; 12/26/2006 RBB; 1/30/2006 RBB; advance preparation, and he appears to have
11/25/2006 MMB; 1/31/2007 MMB; 12/22/2006 MG; concentrated on the depositions of Alan Hall and
1/30/2007 MG; 1/30/2007 JMO; 1/31/2007 JMO.) BHIC's corporate representative, which he
Relator claims seven lawyers' participation was conducted on the same trip to Birmingham. (See
reasonable "because, as the last Complaint filed before 10/15-10/20/2006 JC.)
trial, various attorneys needed to review it before it was
filed to ensure that facts they knew based on their Having perused counsel's records in full, and having
particular areas of expertise on the case were studied the examples defendants cite in detail, the Court
incorporated." (Reply to BHIC and HUK's Opp'n [957] at concludes that too many attorneys were assigned to
14.) This explanation contradicts his justification for the discrete tasks. In many circumstances, assigning more
innumerable "team meetings" that occurred throughout than one attorney to a task makes eminent good sense.
the case: team [**122] members shared information so The work [**124] may be burdensome and readily
freely and regularly to ensure knowledge would not be divisible, a deadline may be fast approaching, or as the
compartmentalized. (See id.) Furthermore, this Court maxim holds, two heads may prove better than one. But
granted leave to amend "solely for the purpose of curing relator's counsel, quite simply, went overboard.
the 9(b) deficiency . . . pertaining to [HC's] involvement
Second, HII contends it was per se unreasonable for
in the alleged fraudulent conspiracy." (Mem. Op. &
Wilmer Hale to assign fifty-two attorneys and thirty
Order of Mar. 6, 2007 [620] at 3.) Satisfying this limited
paralegals to this case. 68 (See HII's Opp'n [949] at 19.)
mandate did not call for such excessive drafting
As they point out, relator's co-plaintiff, the United States,
manpower. Relator explains that he also sought to add
devoted only five attorneys to the case, and they managed
additional facts, (see Reply to BHIC and HUK's Opp'n
to perform substantially the same volume and types of
[960] at 14 n.14), but given that relator had eleven years
tasks -- attending and defending depositions, responding
to prepare the factual allegations in his fourth amended
to discovery requests, filing pleadings, and advocating at
complaint, the Court finds it difficult to believe seven
trial -- for which Wilmer Hale needed more than ten
different drafters were necessary to document any "new"
times the staff. (See id. at 20-21.)
facts. Moreover, while the Court accepts that others must
review a drafter's work, drafting by committee is a recipe 68 Exercising "billing judgment," Bell limited
for inefficiency. the fee petition to hours billed by 18 lawyers and
3 paralegals. (See Bell Decl. PP 108, 112, Ex. 2 to
Relator's justification for dispatching three attorneys
Mot. for Fees, Costs, and Expenses [930].)
to certain depositions, also attended by government
counsel, is similarly flawed. (See Ex. A to Bell Decl., Ex. As relator notes, however, HII has not identified
2 to Mot. for Fees, Costs, and Expenses [930].) The Court specific time entries it believes reflect duplication of
does not dispute that the FCA "contemplates [] continued effort. (See Reply to HII's Opp'n [957] at 13.)
participation by a relator after the [**123] government Furthermore, in calculating the lodestar, the Court's duty
intervenes in a qui tam action." United States ex rel. is to ascertain "the number of hours reasonably expended
Abbott-Burdick v. Univ. Med. Assocs., No. 2:96-1676-12, on the [**125] litigation," not the number of lawyers
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26986, at *47-48 (D.S.C. May 23, reasonably assigned. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433;
2002). Given relator's status as co-plaintiff with the Donnell v. United States, 220 U.S. App. D.C. 405, 682
 Page 35
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *41; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **125

F.2d 240, 250 n.27 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("The issue is not previous paragraph's calculations rather troubling: despite
whether [petitioners] used too many attorneys, but the involvement of so many different attorneys and the
whether the work performed was unnecessary."). assignment of associates to the "core" team, five partners'
time accounts for nearly half the fees relator seeks.
Moreover, defendants' attack on the number of Nonetheless, without evidence of duplication, the Court
Wilmer Hale attorneys who assisted the government with will not speculatively second-guess Wilmer Hale's
the "overwhelming[ly] demand[ing] [] discovery" that staffing decisions in the invited manner.
occurred in this case, (see Morgan Decl. P 7, Ex. 1 to
Mot. for Fees, Costs, and Expenses [930]), rings hollow, 69 They somewhat confuse the issue by pointing
see Copeland v. Marshall, 205 U.S. App. D.C. 390, 641 to government counsel's allegedly superior FCA
F.2d 880, 904 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc) (defendant litigation skills, downplaying relator's merely
"cannot litigate tenaciously and then be heard to "supporting role" in the litigation, and spotting
complain about the time necessarily spent by the plaintiff supposed logical fallacies in Bell's laudatory
in response"). Wilmer Hale's ability to leverage description of his own value to the case. (See
additional human resources as the case's demands HII's Opp'n [949] at 29-30.) Defendants utterly
changed may actually have rendered its representation fail to tether any of these cavils to the law, so the
more efficient. Moreover, both partners and associates Court will not address them.
frequently change firms or move between public and
private practice; consequently, one would expect some ii. Too Many Hours
turnover in assigned personnel over the course of twelve
Defendants' first "too many hours" objection
years. Hence, the Court cannot conclude Wilmer Hale's
concerns relator's original complaint: by their count,
aggregate staffing was per se inefficient.
counsel devoted 141.50 hours to drafting, reviewing, and
Third, [**126] and in the same vein, defendants revising this document. (HII's Opp'n [949] at 27.) A
contend Wilmer Hale's assignment of five different single sentence [**128] encapsulates their argument:
partners -- none with prior FCA litigation experience -- to "After three years of being involved in the case, it is hard
the case was unreasonable, [*42] leading to inflated to imagine how Wiley Rein could spend 141.5 hours in
billings. (See HII's Opp'n [949] at 29-30.) In total, drafting a Complaint which thereafter required five
partners Robert Bell (1980 law graduate), Jonathan successive amendments . . . ." (Id.) Relator's counsel's
Cedarbaum (1996), Robert Cultice (1978), Jennifer practice of block billing has inflated defendants' figure:
O'Connor (1997), and Howard Shapiro (1985), billed attorney time entries listing work on the complaint also
7,667.05 -- or about 31 percent -- of the 24,626.5 hours include other, unrelated tasks. (See, e.g. 6/21/1995 LD;
listed in relator's original fee petition. (See Exs. B-1, D-1 6/21/2005 CRY.) Further, counsel drafted a thirty-page,
to Bell Decl., Ex. 2 to Mot. for Fees, Costs, and Expenses factually detailed confidential disclosure statement along
[930].) This equates to $ 4,310,980.00 -- or about 43 with the complaint, preparation of which required
percent -- of the $ 10,014,707.00 in fees sought in that document review and privilege considerations. (See, e.g.,
petition. (See Exs. B-1, D-1 to Bell Decl.) 6/21/2005 MLS; 6/21/2005 RBB.) Hence, the Court
cannot conclude counsel devoted excessive time to
Defendants style this objection as one concerning drafting the complaint and accompanying disclosure
"duplication of work," (see HII's Opp'n [949] at 29), and statement. Cf. Cobell, 407 F. Supp. 2d at 161 (finding
indeed, Hensley prescribes exclusion of "redundant" excessive 20.7 hours spent "drafting a two-page filing
efforts from a fee petition, 461 U.S. at 434. Yet containing no legal analysis or discussion," 122.33 hours
defendants do not identify any specific areas in which spent "drafting a nine-page filing entitled Plaintiffs'
they believe Wilmer Hale's efforts, or those of an Reply to Defendants' Opposition to Setting a Trial Date,"
individual partner, were truly duplicative of others. 69 and 852.47 hours spent "drafting Appellee's 66-page
Perhaps some of the work performed by the five partners Response Brief").
-- at $ 495 per hour and up -- might have [**127] been
delegated to associates with lower hourly rates, but Second, defendants contend relator's counsel spent
defendants have neither made this argument explicitly 300.55 [**129] hours on "the most basic 'getting up to
nor endeavored to identify examples. The Court finds the speed'" research. (HII's Opp'n [949] at 27-28.) Again, this
figure is inflated due to counsel's block time entries, and
 Page 36
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *42; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **129

defendants' examples are ill-chosen. They highlight, for "basic" research is unfounded.
instance, that on June 13, 1995, Robert Bell reviewed
[*43] an ABA publication on the False Claims Act. (Id. Finally, defendants argue [**131] plaintiffs'
(citing 6/13/1995 RBB).) Yet the Court suspects that repeated agreements to extend the sealed period in this
even an attorney with prior FCA experience would wish case were unreasonable because they unduly prolonged
to ensure his familiarity with recent developments in the the litigation. 70 (See HII's Opp'n [949] at 28-29.) [*44]
field. (Accord Braga Supp. Decl. P 3, Ex. 3 to Reply to This Court has stated, and still believes, that relator did
HII's Opp'n [957] ("it is prudent for even the most expert himself a grave disservice by conceding to the
counsel . . . to perform additional research on topics they government's numerous motions to extend the seal. (See
are otherwise familiar with in order either to confirm Apr. 27, 2007 PM Tr. at 165-66; Mem. Op. [872] at 29.)
their beliefs in the state of the law or to ascertain any Nevertheless, in each instance, the government sought,
changes in the state of the law as a result of recent and a judge granted, the extension. The Court will not
developments").) On June 12, 1995, Luis de la Torre -- in deny relator's counsel compensation for work it
addition to reviewing a memo from a colleague -- authorized. 71 Cf. Wilkett v. ICC, 269 U.S. App. D.C. 249,
researched cases interpreting the FCA's statute of 844 F.2d 867, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("[a]ny work ordered
limitations and drafted a memo on the subject. (6/12/1995 by this Court is [] compensable").
LD.) Given that timeliness proved a significant and
70 HII also argues that relator and the
fiercely contested issue in this case, this research seems
government are "solely responsible" for the
entirely justified.
eleven-year delay in bringing this case to trial and
More broadly, the Court finds [**130] attorney that as a result, "a substantial portion of the
declarant Davidson's pragmatic comments on this point attorney hours expended was unreasonable."
particularly apt: (HII's Opp'n [949] at 19.) As the Court has
already explained, HII's initial proposition is
Experts in substantive practice areas are inaccurate. See supra part III.A.2. While relator
still required to conduct "research" does share some responsibility for this case's
(indeed, a lawyer would be negligent if he protracted duration, defendants have identified no
or she did not conduct "research") to evidence of bad faith. Cf. United States ex rel.
determine the current state of the law[,] Taxpayers Against Fraud v. Gen. Elec. Co., 41
and no practitioner would be expected to F.3d 1032, 1044 (6th Cir. 1994) [**132]
know all answers to legal questions, even (remanding to district court for further
within the practitioner's area of expertise. fact-finding where some evidence supported
Moreover, regardless of an attorney's level defendant's allegation that relators and their
of expertise, the pertinent authorities need counsel hatched a "deliberate scheme to delay
to be referenced and researched when filing an action, systematically 'running up'
briefing or considering the legal issues in attorneys' fees and trebling the relators'-share
the case. This time will be described as bounty"). Relator Miller's suspicions were
"research." Undertaking "research" does aroused in November 1990, and he immediately
not mean that the attorney involved is reported them to his superiors, who purportedly
undertaking basic research on the conducted an investigation that found nothing
substantive law. In my opinion, and in my amiss. (See Apr. 28, 2007 PM Tr. at 88-108.) Two
practice, it is customary for attorneys at all months later, when unusual financial transactions
levels to review case law -- to do caught his eye, he tipped the previous
"research" -- as it becomes relevant for the investigator. (See Apr. 29, 2007 AM Tr. at 24.) In
task they are performing. April 1991, he recommended an independent
audit, and when his supervisor directed him to
(Davidson Supplemental Decl. P 29, Ex. 2 to Reply to destroy the memo embodying this
HII's Opp'n [957].) Having reviewed the supposedly recommendation, he moved up the food chain,
offensive time entries, (see Ex. 1 to HII's Opp'n [949]), sending a memo to company president Johnie
the Court concludes defendants' objection to counsel's Jones. (Id. at 25-33.) Management rebuffed
 Page 37
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *44; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **132

relator's repeated attempts to draw attention to tasks).

what he believed were suspicious financial
transactions, and until June 1995, relator made no C. Lodestar
effort to raise the alarm outside the company.
Relator originally sought $ 599,351.00 as
Though he learned of the FCA in 1992, he waited
compensation for 1054.5 hours worked by Wiley Rein
three years to contact the government out of
personnel. (See Ex. B-2 to Bell's Decl., Ex. 2 to Petition
concern that he would render [**133] himself
for Fees, Costs, and Expenses [930].) His supporting
unemployable just when his children were
documents reflect a slightly lesser total of 1054.25 hours.
reaching college-age. (See Apr. 29, 2007 AM Tr.
(See Ex. B-3 to Bell's Decl.) The time entry-specific
at 49-53.) Thus, the only evidence concerning the
deductions detailed in Appendix II, infra, along with
reason for this delay suggests relator quailed
relator's voluntary withdrawals for inadvertently included
when confronted with a difficult choice.
time, reduce the Wiley Rein total to 936.05 hours. At the
Defendants must offer more than innuendo to
rates set forth in Appendix I, infra, fees for these hours
persuade the Court that relator engaged in
amount to $ [**135] 497,763.30 -- $ 3,875.00 for
calculated stalling for which his counsel's fees
paralegal work, and $ 493,888.30 for attorney work.
should be reduced.
71 Notably, the particular time entries For Wilmer Hale personnel, relator originally sought
defendants have challenged, which total only $ 9,415,356.00 as compensation for 23,572 hours' work.
37.45 hours, also include other, unrelated tasks, (See Ex. D-2 to Bell's Decl.) After the Appendix II
(see, e.g., 2/20/1996 RBB), as well as mandatory deductions and relator's voluntary withdrawals, Wilmer
attendance at court hearings, (see, e.g., 4/11/1997 Hale's total compensable hours amount to 23,283 hours.
MLS). At Appendix I rates, fees for this time run to $
9,268,467.75 -- $ 677,748.75 for paralegal work, and $
iii. Inefficiencies Summary
8,590,719.00 for attorney work.
To summarize, the Court has considered each alleged
As set forth in Appendix III, the Court has concluded
inefficiency identified by defendants and concludes that
that systematic defects in relator's fee petition warrant
counsel's time records do evince one problematic trend.
across-the-board reductions in these subtotals: ten percent
At least during the litigation's later stages, too many
for ambiguous time entries, ten percent for block billing,
attorneys were assigned to discrete tasks. The Court does
and five percent for inefficient staffing. Further, the Court
not propose to dictate law firms' staffing, and it
will discount all attorney hours by one-half [*45]
acknowledges the benefits of a division of labor. But it is
percent and all paralegal hours by five percent to omit
common knowledge that at some point, allocating
compensation for clerical work. The Court will apply the
portions of a task among group members ceases to raise
total percentage reductions -- 25.5 percent of attorney
productivity and instead begins to hinder it. As illustrated
fees and 30 percent of paralegal fees -- to fees for
[**134] above, relator's counsel passed this equilibrium
compensable time, computed above, vice requested time.
point. The Court finds the resulting inefficiency
For Wiley Rein, these percentages translate to reductions
unreasonably inflated counsel's billing statements and
of $ 1162.50 in paralegal fees and $ 125,941.52 [**136]
thus warrants an across-the-board reduction of five
in attorney fees. Subtracting these amounts from the fees
percent. 72
for compensable hours, calculated above, yields lodestar
72 Cf. Role Models Am., Inc., 353 F.3d at 973 values of $ 2,712.50 for Wiley Rein paralegals and $
(reducing compensation by 50 percent due to 367,946.78 for Wiley Rein attorneys. For Wilmer Hale,
"inadequate documentation, failure to justify the these percentages translate to reductions of $ 203,324.62
number of hours sought, inconsistencies, and in paralegal fees and $ 2,190,633.34 in attorney fees.
improper billing entries"); Okla. Aerotronics, Inc. Subtracting these amounts from the fees for compensable
v. United States, 291 U.S. App. D.C. 401, 943 hours, calculated above, yields lodestar values of $
F.2d 1344, 1347 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (upholding 474,424.13 for Wilmer Hale paralegals and $
district court's reduction of chargeable hours by 6,400,085.66 for Wilmer Hale attorneys.
40 percent due to excessive time spent on specific
The resulting lodestar sub-components appear in the
 Page 38
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *45; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **136

table below:

Wiley Rein Wilmer Hale

Attorney Fees $ 367,946.78 $ 6,400,085.66
Paralegal Fees $ 2,712.50 $ 474,424.13
Total Lodestar $ 370,659.28 $ 6,874,509.79

but it instructed that the lodestar amount "is presumed to

The total lodestar value -- "the number of hours be the reasonable fee." Id. at 897 (quotation marks and
reasonably expended on the litigation times a reasonable citation omitted. Of particular relevance here, it observed
hourly rate," Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888, 104 S. that
Ct. 1541, 79 L. Ed. 2d 891 (1984) -- thus equals $
7,245,169.07. [t]he "quality of representation" . . .
generally is reflected in the reasonable
D. Enhancement hourly rate. It, therefore, may justify an
upward adjustment only in the rare case
A "strong presumption" exists that the lodestar
where the fee applicant offers specific
figure, without more, constitutes a reasonable fee award.
evidence to show that the quality of
City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562, 112 S.
service rendered was superior to that one
Ct. 2638, 120 L. Ed. 2d 449 (1992). Yet in "rare" and
reasonably should expect in light of the
"exceptional" cases, a fee applicant may rebut this strong
hourly rates charged and that the success
presumption against upward adjustments [**137] to the
was "exceptional."
lodestar by producing "specific evidence" that shows "an
adjustment is necessary to the determination of a
Id. at 899. Absent such "specific evidence," an
reasonable fee." Blum, 465 U.S. at 898-99 (emphasis
enhancement for [*46] quality of representation would
added).
constitute "a clear example of double counting." Id.
Relator must believe his case to be exceedingly rare, Additionally, though relevant, the result obtained
indeed: he claims his counsel's quality of representation "normally should not provide an independent basis for
and the "exceptional results" achieved "entitle[]" them to increasing the fee award." Id. at 900. Indeed, as another
double the lodestar amount. (Mot. for Fees, Costs, and court in this district has observed, these two factors are
Expenses [930] at 27.) He further suggests the FCA's necessarily intertwined: "a review of [] exceptional
incentive structure supports his eye-watering request. (Id. results is integral to an analysis of the quality of
at 38-40.) The Court will evaluate each of these three representation." McKenzie v. Kennickell, 684 F. Supp.
proposed bases for a 100 percent lodestar enhancement in 1097, 1106 (D.D.C. 1988) (Parker, J.)
turn, but first, it will set out the applicable law.
Two years later, the Court adopted an even less
In his fee petition, relator relies principally on Blum, permissive [**139] stance with respect to lodestar
one of the Supreme Court's early pronouncements on the enhancements. See Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens'
subject of fee enhancements. (See Mot. for Fees, Costs, Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 106 S. Ct. 3088, 92
and Expenses [930] at 27-28.) There, the district court L. Ed. 2d 439 (1986). There, the Court elevated Blum's
had granted a fifty percent enhancement for, inter alia, presumption that the lodestar represents the reasonable
quality of representation and result obtained, and the fee to a strong presumption, explaining that fee-shifting
Supreme Court deemed this an abuse of discretion. 465 statutes "were not designed as a form of economic relief
U.S. at 891, 902. It left the door open to lodestar to improve the financial lot of attorneys, nor were they
multipliers, noting that "in some cases of exceptional intended to replicate exactly the fee an attorney could
success an enhanced award may [**138] be justified," earn through a private fee arrangement with his client."
Id. at 565. To that end, both quality of representation and
 Page 39
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *46; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **139

results obtained "are presumably fully reflected in the Mar. 23, 2007 AM Tr. at 84 (original Contract 29 bid was
lodestar amount." Id. Fundamental ethical principles $ 137.3 million); May 1, 2007 PM Tr. at 76 (arguing fair
dictate this conclusion: and reasonable Contract 29 bid would have been $ 120
million); id. (suggesting $ 1.5 million damages award on
[W]hen an attorney first accepts a case [*47] Contract 07).) Given the sum sought, the jury
and agrees to represent the client, he verdict's magnitude is far from astounding.
obligates himself to perform to the best of
his ability and to produce the best possible Relator also insists the criminal case's results -- four
results commensurate with his skill and guilty pleas, one conviction, and over $ 140 million in
his client's interests. Calculating the fee fines -- are "highly relevant in awarding an
award in a manner that accounts for these enhancement." (Mot. for Fees, Costs, and Expenses [930]
factors, either in determining the at 28.) The Court fails to see how. As BHIC and HUK
reasonable number of hours expended on point out, relator cites no authority for awarding a fee
the litigation or in setting the reasonable enhancement to counsel in a civil action based on the
hourly rate, thus adequately compensates outcome of other litigation. 73 (See BHIC and HUK's
the attorney, and leaves very little room Opp'n [948] at 22.) As discussed above, counsel will be
for enhancing [**140] the award based on compensated for their representation of relator throughout
his post-engagement performance. his assistance with the government's [**142] criminal
investigation. See supra part III.B.1.a. But the Court does
Id. at 565-66. Thus, to avoid double counting, "the not believe they deserve a bonus for Government
overall quality of performance ordinarily should not be counsel's success in translating the information relator
used to adjust the lodestar." Id. at 566. See also Donnell, provided into a full-fledged antitrust investigation that
682 F.2d at 254 ("We have found it all too common for culminated in criminal penalties. 74
the district courts to adjust the lodestar upward to reflect
73 In neither of the two decisions he cites for
what the courts view as a high . . . quality of
this proposition -- one of which has been vacated
representation. This trend should stop.").
-- did the court reward counsel for other attorneys'
With these principles in mind, the Court will weigh conduct of other litigation. See Hyatt v. Apfel, 195
relator's enhancement arguments. F.3d 188, 192 (4th Cir. 1999) (approving lodestar
enhancement where plaintiffs brought "about
1. Results Obtained fundamental change to a recalcitrant agency" and
"recover[ed] several hundred million dollars in
In this qui tam action, the jury returned a total verdict disability benefits to which they are lawfully
of $ 34.4 million against six defendants after several entitled" after years of proceedings before the
others agreed to pretrial settlements. Relator and his Social Security Administration and in federal
"experts" dwell effusively on its aggregate size. (See Mot. court); United States ex rel. Garibaldi v. Orleans
for Fees, Costs, and Expenses [930] at 28 ("this is one of Parish Sch. Bd., 46 F. Supp. 2d 546, 571 (E.D.
the three largest jury verdicts in the almost 200-year La. 1999), vacated by 244 F.3d 486 (5th Cir.
history of the FCA, and the fourth largest U.S. jury 2001) (awarding lodestar enhancement where,
verdict in 2007 at the time it was handed down"); Braga because government declined to intervene,
Decl. P 6, Ex. 3 to [930] (calling verdict "historical"); "relators' lawyers earned an enormous,
Davidson Decl. P 34, Ex. 5 to [930] ("this size of a multi-million dollar verdict for the United States
verdict from a jury in the District of Columbia is rare and government, for which the United States paid not
demonstrates exceptional success").) The Court does one penny").
[**141] not dispute that $ 90 million -- the trebled 74 HC denigrates [**143] relator's assistance to
damages value -- is a staggering sum. the criminal investigation at length. (See HC's
Opp'n [950] at 6-9.) In response, relator first
But this result must also be placed in perspective. explains that his counsel's contribution, not his
Plaintiffs sought up to $ 60.8 million in damages -- nearly contribution, is relevant to the enhancement issue,
twice the jury's ultimate award. (See May 1, 2007 PM Tr. then proceeds to tout his efforts in furthering the
at 73 (seeking $ 42 million in damages on Contract 20A);
 Page 40
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *47; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **143

government's criminal case. (Reply to HC's Opp'n 2. Representation Quality

[959] at 13-16.) Relator's initial point is accurate.
This Court must review the result as part of its Relator next argues the quality of his counsel's
"analysis of the quality of [counsel's] performance merits a lodestar enhancement, and he
representation." See McKenzie, 684 F. Supp. at identifies three separate facets of this performance as
1106. Relator's individual role in that result is establishing its superiority: (1) his counsel's "essential"
immaterial to an assessment of counsel's and "vital" role, and their coordination with the
performance. government, produced efficiencies not reflected in the
lodestar; (2) Bell's cradle-to-grave involvement in the
HC's attempts to rebut relator's claim that he case also yielded such efficiencies; and (3) a small core
was "directly responsible for the information of young lawyers who performed well beyond their
underlying [the civil] victory," (Mot. for Fees, seniority levels bore principal responsibility for relator's
Costs, and Expenses [930] at 1), are equally representation. (Mot. for Fees, Costs, and Expenses [930]
irrelevant. (HC's Opp'n [950] at 9-11.) Again, the at 30, 32, 33.) Because relator's first two justifications
pertinent issues are the nature of the result both take aim at the strong presumption that the lodestar
achieved and its causal connection to counsel's adequately reflects representation quality, Delaware
professional performance. Valley, 478 U.S. at 565, the Court will address them
together.
Next, relator emphasizes that the jury's damages
award here "goes directly to benefit the public interest by a. Unaccounted-for Efficiencies
compensating the Government for Defendants' proven
fraud." (Mot. for Fees, Costs, and Expenses [930] at 29.) To support his contention that the lodestar fails to
Yet this [**144] is true of every damages award in False capture certain efficiencies achieved by his counsel,
Claims actions: any recovery always goes to the relator turns to two sources: government counsel Keith
government. By relator's logic, successful qui tam Morgan's affidavit, and his "expert" declarations. (See
relators' counsel would receive lodestar enhancements in Mot. for Fees, Costs, and [**146] Expenses [930] at
every case. 75 The Supreme Court's admonition that the 30-33.)
result obtained "normally should not provide an
He begins with the proposition that
independent basis for increasing the fee award"
forecloses this outcome. See Blum, 465 U.S. at 900.
[b]ut for relator's counsel's active and
75 Helpfully, relator has identified two examples integral participation in this suit, it would
of the truly extraordinary circumstances in which have been extremely difficult for the
vindication of the public interest militates in favor Government to prevail because it may not
of adjusting the lodestar upward. See Ill. have been able to respond to the plethora
Congressional Dists. Reapportionment Cases, of motions effectively, meet the highly
704 F.2d 380, 381, 383 (7th Cir. 1983) (plaintiff intense demands of discovery, and present
brought successful challenge to state's failure to this case as effectively at trial.
reapportion congressional districts after 1980
census, thus protecting all state citizens' voting (Id. at 30-31.) To support this characterization of his
rights); Louis v. Nelson, 646 F. Supp. 1300, counsel's role, he relies on Morgan's declaration:
1304-05, 1318 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (human rights The availability of Relator's counsel
activists sought to free Haitian refugees who had from Wilmer Hale was essential in
been unlawfully imprisoned pending adjudication meeting the overwhelming demands of
of their political asylum applications and to stop discovery and ultimately of the trial in this
mass exclusion hearings being held without matter. Indeed, attorneys and support staff
counsel). from Wilmer Hale played a vital role in
getting this case ready for trial and
[*48] All in all, the Court finds the result obtained, ultimately successfully trying it. . . .
while laudable, does not [**145] weigh strongly in favor Throughout this period counsel for the
of awarding a fee enhancement in this case. United States and Relator's counsel met
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regularly to coordinate our efforts to total of 16 years and across his shift in law firms,"
ensure that there was no duplication of borders on hyperbole. (See Braga Decl. P 6 (relator was
efforts and that we worked as an "blessed to have complete continuity of his lead counsel,
integrated team. Robert Bell," and such long-term attorney-client
relationships are "rare indeed in this modern legal
(Morgan Decl. PP 7-8, Ex. 1 to [930].) world"); Davidson Decl. P 42 (Bell's continuous
involvement [**149] was "invaluable and result[ed] in
Relator and his attorney declarants cast this substantial savings").) Likewise, where plaintiffs' lead
straightforward prose as effusive praise, repeatedly counsel "remain[ed] at the helm" throughout fifteen years
quoting the words "essential" and "vital" from Morgan's of litigation, another court in this district observed that
[**147] otherwise terse narration of the case's progress. "[s]uch continuity promotes tremendous efficiency and
(See Mot. for Fees, Costs, and Expenses [930] at 31; necessarily reduces the ultimate expenditure of hours."
Braga Decl. P 6, Ex. 3 to [930] ("The fact that the Civil McKenzie v. Kennickell, 684 F. Supp. 1097, 1107
Division of the United States Attorney's office is willing (D.D.C. 1988) (Parker, J.). See also Hartman v. Duffey,
to recognize that Wilmer Hale's role in this case was both 973 F. Supp. 199, 202 (D.D.C. 1997) (Robertson, J.)
'essential' and 'vital' to the successful preparation and trial (awarding enhancement in part due to continuity of
of this 'overwhelming' case speaks volumes"); Davidson lawyers' efforts, which promoted efficiency and reduced
Decl. P 46, Ex. 5 to [930] ("The statements by the overall time expenditure).
Government in support of Wilmer Hale's efforts are not at
all typical and reflect the extraordinary contribution the Ordinarily, this Court would concur. Here, however,
Wilmer Hale team provided for the public benefit.").) the Court has already concluded that counsel's time
records reveal substantial inefficiencies caused by
Read objectively, however, Morgan's two-page assignment of too many attorneys to discrete tasks. See
affidavit offers only faint praise. His first statement, supra part III.B.2.c.i. Though nominally "lead counsel,"
concerning counsel's "availability," reveals nothing about Bell was one of five Wilmer Hale partners, and fifty-two
the quality of counsel's performance -- it merely suggests attorneys total, to work on this case, and he did not
Wilmer Hale provided additional warm bodies to represent relator at trial. Bell, who claims he "only added
supplement the government's resources. His second people to our team when necessary," managed the
statement does reflect significant credit [*49] on the Wilmer Hale battalions, "set strategy for the team," and
Wilmer Hale team: their participation was "vital" to "supervise[d] and direct[ed] [his] colleagues so [**150]
successful prosecution of the government's claims. But that they could use their time more effectively." (Bell
starting from relator's premise -- that the government Decl. P 66, Ex. 2 to Mot. for Fees, Costs, and Expenses
could not have handled this case without Wilmer Hale's [930].) Bell, then, presumably bears responsibility for the
[**148] assistance -- counsel owed a duty to their client staffing overkill.
to offer up the additional resources needed to permit
success, lest relator walk away with nothing. See This Court does not doubt that Bell's knowledge of
Delaware Valley, 478 U.S. at 565 ("When an attorney the case history and his relationships with government
first accepts a case and agrees to represent the client, he counsel contributed to plaintiffs' win. But the Court
obligates himself to perform to the best of his ability and believes the lodestar adequately accounts for Bell's
to produce the best possible results commensurate with lengthy involvement: he will be compensated at his
his skill and his client's interests."). The same logic standard, partner's billing rate of $ 650.00 for each of the
applies to Morgan's third statement: that relator's counsel 1,991.55 hours he reasonably expended. Presumably, he
coordinated their efforts with the government to avoid will also benefit from the contingency fee Wilmer Hale
duplication merely indicates they endeavored to avoid will receive once the government pays relator his bounty.
inefficiency; such conduct should serve as a baseline in (See Ex. 2 to Mot. for Leave to File Surreply [937] at 3.)
client representation and does not justify a bonus. But the Court will not reward him for phantom
"efficiencies" belied by the record. 76
Relator's arguments concerning Bell's continuous
involvement are similarly unpersuasive. His attorney 76 Indeed, it agrees with Judge Carnes of the
declarants' praise for Bell's loyalty to his client, "over a Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals that "bad and
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excessive billing is inconsistent with superb junior partners typically bill "at lockstep rates on the
lawyering." Kenny A. v. Perdue, Nos. 06-15514 & basis of seniority," so relator contends O'Connor and
06-15874, 532 F.3d 1209, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS Cedarbaum's rates do not accurately reflect their superior
14204, at *45 (11th Cir. July 3, 2008) (citing skill levels. (Id. at 35.)
Delaware Valley, 478 U.S. at 567). Analogously,
routinely devoting excessive manpower to tasks is 77 Relatedly, relator also declares that "Wilmer
inconsistent [**151] with efficient case Hale went to great lengths to limit the number of
management. lawyers on [this] matter." (Mot. for Fees, Costs,
and Expenses [930] at 35.) This purportedly small
Consequently, the Court concludes neither efficiency cadre of young lawyers notched some impressive
for which relator alleges the lodestar fails to account numerical records. During the discovery period
overcomes the [*50] "strong presumption" against fee alone, relator's counsel reviewed 665 boxes of
enhancements for quality of representation. See Delaware documents, from which they culled over 97,000
Valley, 478 U.S. at 565-66. documents with over 320,000 [**153] pages,
attended 40 depositions, taking a leading role in
b. Beyond-Paygrade Performance some, and participated in two evidentiary
hearings. (Bell Decl. PP 74-75, 78, 85, Ex. 2 to
Relator proposes one further basis for a lodestar [930].) In total, the parties filed 260 motions,
enhancement based on quality of representation. many of them substantive, prompting roughly 165
Specifically, he contends that "young" lawyers comprised court orders. (Id. P 10.) During the thirty-two day
the bulk of the Wilmer Hale team, and that these trial, counsel examined 31 live witnesses, whose
attorneys performed "well beyond the standards expected testimony was supplemented by ten others'
of attorneys of similar experience." 77 (Mot. for Fees, deposition transcripts, and dealt with 539 exhibits.
Costs, and Expenses [930] at 33.) He offers that Gottlieb, (Id. P 96.)
Bunch, Baumgartner, and Reece [*51] "functioned in
roles -- sitting at counsel table, examining witnesses at Attorney declarant Davidson can scarcely
trial, taking depositions, interviewing witnesses, and find sufficient adjectives to praise this work:
preparing witnesses -- in which much more senior
lawyers typically engage." (Id. at 34 (citing Bell Decl. P To gear up a case to this level in
114, Ex. 2 to [930]).) Attorney declarant Braga this short period is very
emphasizes that impressive, even for a firm with
the resources of Wilmer Hale.
[o]rdinarily traditional law firm staffing There was a staggering amount of
would have involved a lesser number of work to do. The ability of the firm
junior associates and a greater number of to commit the talented and tireless
senior associates. . . . Wilmer Hale's human resources to this case to
standard hourly rates for these [**152] meet the extremely rigorous
junior associates do[] not fairly capture the schedule set by the court is
degree of difficulty and level of extraordinary.
responsibility at which they performed
their services in this case. (Davidson Decl. P 26, Ex. 5 to [930].) Braga
declares that when this Court set "an expedited
(Braga Decl. P 6, Ex. 3 to [930].) Similarly, relator schedule which compressed discovery, pretrial
contends that O'Connor and Cedarbaum, "both young and trial proceedings into an eleven-month
partners," excelled beyond their paygrades. (Mot. for schedule, all-out litigation hell began. What
Fees, Costs, and Expenses [930] at 34.) O'Connor served followed from Wilmer Hale's attorneys was far
as lead counsel in discovery and other pretrial matters more than standard hourly rate legal service in the
and played a major role at trial, while Cedarbaum served face [**154] of such difficulties . . . ." (Braga
as "lead motions attorney." (Id.) Both were far junior to Decl. P 6, Ex. 3 to [930].)
defendants' lead trial counsel. (Id.) At Wilmer Hale, more
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Three points are in order. First, to paraphrase outstanding written and oral advocacy for their client.
HC's Opposition, by no rational definition of the They are to be commended. Similarly, young partners
term do fifty-two attorneys constitute a "small" O'Connor and Cedarbaum acquitted themselves
team of lawyers. Second, counsel had eleven creditably in their leadership roles. But as [**156] this
years to contemplate their strategy and gather Court observed above, Wilmer Hale's established billing
information before this Court set the "expedited rates are "reasonable" precisely because they align with
schedule" to which Braga refers, and the those of other highly skilled attorneys in the District of
"compressed discovery" period was entirely Columbia legal community. See supra part III.A.1.
reasonable given that the government had (in Simply put, these superstars already bill at superstar rates.
essence) tried this case once before. The Court
recognizes that a criminal antitrust conspiracy Relator's declarations do not alter this assessment.
trial and a civil FCA conspiracy trial differ in His attorney declarants' pronouncements are too
many respects. (See Reply to HC's Opp'n [959] at superficial to be of much evidentiary value. For example,
16-18.) But evidence the government compiled in Braga asserts that O'Connor and Cedarbaum "provided
pursuing its criminal case against Anderson and services at a level significantly above that contemplated
Bilhar would necessarily be probative to proving by their standard hourly rates." (Braga Decl. P 6, Ex. 3 to
their civil liability for the same conduct, giving [930].) But he does not then explain what sort of services
plaintiffs' counsel in this case a significant head he believes a client can reasonably expect for $ 510 or $
start. 495 per hour. Nor does he indicate what rates would be
reasonable for the level of service provided. Another
Third, like our Court of Appeals in Role assertion in relator's motion is equally bewildering: he
Models, this Court does not believe that declares that certain young Wilmer Hale associates
"[p]roducing high-quality work on a short "functioned in roles . . . in which much more senior
deadline" requires "specialized skills or lawyers typically engage." (Mot. for Fees, Costs, and
knowledge beyond what lawyers use on a regular Expenses [930] at 34 (citing Bell Decl. P 114, Ex. 2 to
basis." See 353 F.3d at 969. Further, its [930]).) This implies that Wilmer Hale would not
"experience with [**155] the work of many large ordinarily permit a fourth-year associate [**157] and
firms convinces [this Court] that [relator's] former U.S. Supreme Court clerk, such as Gottlieb, to sit
lawyers were far from the only ones who could at counsel table, take depositions, or examine, interview,
have achieved [this] result under the same time or prepare witnesses. Relator does not, however, describe
pressure." Id. Indeed, as the Court explained the tasks that would typically fall to Wilmer Hale
above, one factor influencing its decision to use associates of Gottlieb's seniority and credentials. In sum,
Wilmer Hale's established "mega-law firm" relator's evidence that counsel's established billing rates
billing rates in calculating the lodestar was do not adequately reflect the quality of their performance
Wilmer Hale's ability to leverage "mega-law firm" is simply too paltry to overcome the "strong
resources to meet the "overwhelming demands" of presumption" against fee enhancements for quality of
litigating this case. See supra part III.A.1.a. To representation. Delaware Valley, 478 U.S. at 565-66.
enhance the lodestar for the same reason would Absent amplifying details, this "evidence" consists of
result in "double counting." See Delaware Valley, nothing more than superlative-laden platitudes. 78
478 U.S. at 566.
78 The Court must evaluate the record before it,
Thus, neither the size of relator's litigation and factually analogous precedents thus offer
team, nor the schedule according to which they limited guidance. For that reason, the sole
worked, justifies a lodestar enhancement. relevant precedent cited in relator's petition is
easily distinguishable. In McKenzie, Judge Parker
This Court heartily agrees that relator's counsel -- on a different record - awarded an enhancement
generally, and the more junior team members in for quality of representation based in part on the
particular, performed at a consistently high standard exceptional performance of two young associates.
throughout this litigation. Nothing in this Opinion should 684 F. Supp. at 1107. He noted that the two junior
be read as dismissing the Wilmer Hale associates' associates had performed "[t]he majority of the
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work during the early stages of this proceeding" here would "satisfy" the FCA's "incentive structure."
[**158] and had "remained actively involved in (Mot. for Fees, Costs, and Expenses [930] at 38.) Even if
this litigation for fifteen years." Id. Indeed, one true, this contention would not provide an independent
"acted as lead counsel throughout." Id. Moreover, basis for awarding an enhancement absent other,
Judge Parker appears to have relied heavily on his recognized factors (such as quality of representation,
own observations, "stat[ing] without hesitation, discarded above) weighing in [**160] favor. Hence, the
that counsel's efforts were well above the quality Court will treat it only briefly.
of attorneys appearing before this Court in similar
and comparable litigation." Id. Here, by contrast, Relator begins with the uncontroversial proposition
the more junior Wilmer Hale attorneys' that Congress enacted the FCA's fee-shifting and relator's
involvement began only a year or two before trial, share provisions to encourage private citizens to expose
and while this Court commends their fraud against the government through lawsuits on its
performance, it was consistent with what this behalf. (See id.) In particular, he argues, Congress wanted
Court expects from major law firm associates to enable prospective qui tam relators to retain private
with comparable credentials and experience counsel whose assistance would prevent "resource
levels. mismatch" situations, in which "the Government's
enforcement team is overmatched by the legal teams
[*52] As the Supreme Court has cautioned, "the major contractors retain[]." See S. Rep. 99-345, at 8
overall quality of performance ordinarily should not be (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5273. 80
used to adjust the lodestar." Id. at 566. When they agreed Thus, relator [*53] reasons, "Congress's goal was for
to represent relator, Bell and his colleagues obligated relators to be equally [] well-represented as FCA
themselves "to perform to the best of [their] abilit[ies] defendants, and therefore, the fee-shifting provision is
and to produce the best possible results commensurate intended to attract counsel of the highest quality." (Mot.
with [their] skill and [their] client's interests." Id. at 565. for Fees, Costs, and Expenses [930] at 39.)
Their having fulfilled this duty to entitles them only to
compensation at a reasonable rate for the hours they 80 In full, the relevant portion of the Report
reasonably expended -- no more. 79 reads:

79 In [**159] their filings, the parties battle An additional problem noted by

over whether and to what extent relator's counsel hearing witnesses[] exists when
may take credit for various tasks performed in large, profitable corporations are
preparation for trial. (BHIC and HUK's Opp'n the subject of a fraud investigation
[948] at 23-25; Reply to BHIC and HUK's Opp'n and able to devote many times the
[960] at 18-20; HC's Opp'n [950] at 11-13; Reply manpower and resources available
to HC's Opp'n [959] at 8-18.) The Court agrees to the Government. This resource
with relator that his "counsel plainly made major mismatch [**161] was recognized
contributions to the success of Plaintiffs' case and by DOD Inspector General Joseph
the size of the award achieved." (Reply to HC's Sherick who said that in far too
Opp'n [959] at 18.) But if "major contributions to many instances the Government's
the success" of one's client's case warranted a enforcement team is overmatched
bonus, then virtually every prevailing plaintiff's by the legal teams major
counsel would be entitled to a fee enhancement contractors retain[].
under any fee-shifting statute. On the contrary,
enhancements are appropriate only in "rare" and The Committee believes that
"exceptional" cases. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 the amendments in S. 1562 which
U.S. 886, 899, 104 S. Ct. 1541, 79 L. Ed. 2d 891 allow and encourage assistance
(1984). from the private citizenry can
make a significant impact on
3. Statutory Purpose bolstering the Government's fraud
enforcement effort.
Finally, relator argues that awarding an enhancement
 Page 45
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otherwise, they "would have [had] little reason to take on

S. Rep. 99-345, at 8 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 such [a] contentious, long-running case[]," (see Mot. for
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5273. Fees, Costs, and Expenses [930] at 39) -- this was
foolishly presumptuous.
Here, relator's logic begins to break down. The
Senate Report indicates Congress believed relators' Furthermore, the Supreme Court's opinion in
counsel could supplement the government's efforts, Delaware Valley forecloses this line of argument: "In
ameliorating any resource disadvantage. Construed short, the lodestar figure includes most, if not all, of the
extremely liberally, it could be read to endorse resource relevant factors constituting a 'reasonable' attorney's fee,
parity between plaintiffs and defendants. But both the and it is unnecessary to enhance the fee . . . in order to
Report and the statutory text clearly view relator's efforts, serve the statutory purpose of enabling plaintiffs to
and those of his counsel, as secondary to those of the secure legal assistance." 478 U.S. at 566 (emphasis
federal government. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2008) ("[i]f added). 82
the Government proceeds with the action, it shall have
the primary responsibility for prosecuting the action"); S. 82 Relator relies on two, out-of-Circuit cases in
Rep. 99-345, at 8 (1986), 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5273 which specific facts persuaded courts that an
(qui tam relators and their counsel will "bolster[] the enhancement was necessary to enable plaintiffs to
Government's fraud enforcement [**162] effort"). The secure legal counsel. See Knop v. Johnson, 712 F.
fee-shifting provision thus aims to top up the Supp. 571 (W.D. Mich. 1989); Allen v. Freeman,
government's formidable resources, 81 not to bankroll 694 F. Supp. 1554 (S.D. Fla. 1988). These
relators' recruitment of private counsel of equal caliber to factually distinct cases [**164] merely illustrate
defendants' counsel. the "rare" circumstances in which fee
enhancements remain appropriate.
81 As defendants observe, DOJ "Civil Division
attorneys have for years ably represented the In Knop, a "major prison conditions case"
government's interests in FCA cases where brought by the American Civil Liberties Union
defendants are represented by large national law ("ACLU") on Michigan prisoners' behalf, the
firms." (HC's Opp'n [950] at 18.) The government ACLU tried and failed "to find private attorneys
regularly litigates cases of this size and willing to handle more than one aspect of the
complexity. case" due to "the complexity of the issues
involved, the potential for protracted litigation
Even were the Court to disregard this flaw in and the massive expenses which counsel would
relator's reasoning, his ultimate conclusion rests on shaky have to advance in order to properly litigate this
factual ground. He contends that "[w]ithout an case." 712 F. Supp. at 585. Here, by contrast,
enhancement, large firms like Wilmer Hale -- which are there is no evidence relator had any difficulty
necessary to match talented defense counsel . . . -- would whatsoever in finding counsel. Further, the Knop
have little reason to take on such contentious, court's reasoning suggests no fee multiplier is
long-running cases." (Mot. for Fees, Costs, and Expenses necessary here: "In order to convince counsel in
[930] at 39; accord Davidson Decl. P 36, Ex. 5 to [930].) private practice to accept cases of this nature, the
First, while large law firms frequently offer high-quality fee awards must . . . be sufficient to convince
representation, "mega-firm" attorneys are not the only them to forego fees they would have earned from
lawyers equipped to "match talented defense counsel." their regular clients . . . ." Id. In a competitive
More than a few talented attorneys have practiced before marketplace, Wilmer Hale's established billing
this Court, among them solo practitioners, government rates necessarily represent the prices at which its
attorneys, [**163] and lawyers at small and attorneys are willing to forego other
mediumsized firms. Second, in this very case, Wilmer representation. Thus, Knop does not support an
Hale accepted representation -- and indeed, has continued enhancement here.
it for nine years, with no guarantee of a fee enhancement.
To the extent that relator suggests his counsel assumed In Allen, a civil rights action brought against
from the beginning that they would receive a bonus -- a county [**165] sheriff and two police officers,
the court awarded a lodestar enhancement for
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several reasons. See 694 F. Supp. at 1556. First, it For the reasons discussed above, the Court concludes
noted, "[t]he quality of representation was no fee enhancement is warranted in this case. Without
superior to that which the plaintiff could have minimizing the significance of the result obtained, the
expected to receive in light of the rates claimed." Court does not [**167] find it so extraordinary as to
Id. Here, by contrast, counsel's outstanding justify a bonus for relator's counsel. Further, the FCA's
performance was in line with what relator could incentive structure supports only compensation at a
reasonably have expected in light of their reasonable rate for hours reasonably expended -- without
established billing rates. Second, the Allen court, any additional enhancement -- in this case. Finally,
pointed to "the undesirability of suing the police though the Court commends counsel's performance --
in the relatively small community of Monroe particularly that of the more junior attorneys -- it
County," noting that plaintiffs' counsel risked an concludes the lodestar, calculated using counsel's
adverse economic impact on his future practice. established billing rates, adequately reflects this superior
Id. Here, if anything, relator's victory will quality of representation. In Donnell, our Court of
generate more business for Wilmer Hale. Third, Appeals lamented district courts' increasing predilection
by accepting Allen's case, his attorney "limited his for "adjust[ing] the lodestar upward to reflect what the
small firm's ability to accept other employment." courts [subjectively] view as a high . . . quality of
Id. Here, Wilmer Hale's 1000+ other attorneys representation," urging that "[t]his trend should stop."
continued to accept other employment throughout 682 F.2d at 254. It stops here.
the case, and while at least one associate (Reece)
was apparently fully dedicated to this case, this IV. Relator's Litigation Expenses
was true only for a limited period (2006). (See Ex.
In addition to attorneys' fees, the FCA entitles a
D-2 to Bell's Decl., Ex. 2 to Mot. for Fees, Costs,
prevailing relator to an award against the defendant of
and Expenses [930].) Thus, Allen, like Knop, is
"an amount for reasonable expenses which the court finds
[**166] inapposite.
to have been necessarily incurred." 31 U.S.C. §
Like Judge Carnes of the Eleventh Circuit, 3730(d)(1) (2008). Relator seeks [*55] $ 511,723.06
this Court believes an enhancement would likely under this provision. (See Bell Supplemental Decl. PP
be entirely appropriate in cases such as Allen and 26-28, Ex. 1 to Reply to HII's Opp'n [957]).
Knop, where "an attorney's representation
Defendants contend this award must [**168] be
vindicates the federal rights of an unpopular client
limited to costs and expenses reimbursable under the
and as a result that attorney suffers a loss of
Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"), because the FCA's
standing in the community which damages his
wording is similar to the EAJA's. (BHIC and HUK's
practice and income." Kenny A. v. Perdue, Nos.
Opp'n [948] at 27-28.)
06-15514 & 06-15874, 532 F.3d 1209, 2008 U.S.
App. LEXIS 14204, at *59-60 (11th Cir. July 3, This argument is a non-starter. Having compared the
2008). As examples, Judge Carnes cited "an statutes side-by-side, the Court sees no similarity
attorney who represents a pedophile attacking a whatsoever. The EAJA refers to "other expenses, in
sexual offender registration law on Due Process addition to any costs awarded pursuant to subsection (a),
grounds, or perhaps [] an attorney in a small Bible incurred . . . in any civil action . . . unless the court finds
Belt town who succeeds in having a popular that the position of the United States was substantially
public religious practice enjoined as contrary to justified or that special circumstances make an award
the Establishment Clause." 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS unjust." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (2008). By contrast,
14204 at *61. This Court agrees that when a the FCA refers to "reasonable expenses which the court
lawyer risks permanent harm to his career to finds to have been necessarily incurred." 31 U.S.C. §
defend fundamental, if unpopular, legal 3730(d)(1) (2008). Cf. id. § 3730(g) (EAJA governs
principles, the lodestar may be inadequate to fully award of fees and expenses to prevailing defendant in
compensate him for this extraordinary sacrifice. FCA action). The FCA's statutory text requires the court
to determine whether the expenses are "reasonable" and
[*54] 4. Enhancement Summary
"necessarily incurred" -- not whether defendants' position
"was substantially justified," nor whether "special
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circumstances [exist that] make an award unjust." expenses according to these standards. 83
Compare 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) (2008), with 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412(d)(1)(A) (2008). 83 This conclusion disposes of defendant'
[**171] argument that certain categories of
Moreover, [**169] defendants have cited no expenses -- such as travel, long-distance
precedent for applying the EAJA's limitations to a costs telephone calls, and courier service -- are per se
award under the FCA. Rather, as they explicitly non-compensable under the EAJA. (See BHIC
recognize, courts commonly look to judicial and HUK's Opp'n [948] at 29.)
interpretations of 42 U.S.C. section 1988 for guidance as
to FCA expenses awards. See, e.g., United States ex rel. First, costs and expenses associated with time entries
J. Cooper & Assocs., Inc. v. Bernard Hodes Group, Inc., this Court has determined to be non-compensable are,
422 F. Supp. 2d 225, 237-38 & n.17 (D.D.C. 2006) likewise, non-compensable. Where hours were not
(Urbina, J.); United States ex rel. Coughlin v. IBM, 992 "expended in pursuit of a successful resolution of the case
F. Supp. 137, 145-46 (N.D.N.Y. 1998). Cf. Neal v. in which fees are being claimed," Nat'l Ass'n of
Honeywell, Inc., 191 F.3d 827, 834 (7th Cir. 1999) Concerned Veterans v. Sec'y of Def., 219 U.S. App. D.C.
("Having assimilated §3730(h)[, FCA attorneys' fees and 94, 675 F.2d 1319, 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1982), associated
costs provision applicable in whistleblower retaliation costs cannot have been "necessarily incurred," see 31
cases,] to § 1988 on fee issues, we finish the job by U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) (2008). Thus, the Court must exclude
assimilating it to § 1988 on cost issues."). costs associated with efforts to secure immunity from
prosecution for relator, tasks arising from his ongoing
Under section 1988, compensable expenses include employment at J.A. Jones, and research and other efforts
"those reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred by the to obtain his relator's share. 84
attorney which are normally charged to a fee-paying
client, in the course of providing legal services." Laffey v. 84 Because the Court has concluded that time
Northwest Airlines, Inc., 241 U.S. App. D.C. 11, 746 F.2d spent assisting the government's criminal case is
4, 30 (D.C. Cir. 1984), overruled on other grounds by compensable, see supra part III.B.1.a, it rejects
Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Hodel, 273 U.S. defendants' objections to associated expenses,
App. D.C. 78, 857 F.2d 1516 (D.C. Cir. 1988). See also (see BHIC and HUK's Opp'n [948] at 29-30).
Salazar v. District of Columbia, 123 F. Supp. 2d 8, 16-17
The Court has cross-referenced the time entries
(D.D.C. 2000) [**170] (Kessler, J.) (finding
including immunity-related work with relator's itemized
"out-of-pocket litigation expenses for postage,
expenses, [**172] and it finds that no expenses need be
photocopying, telephone calls, facsimile transmissions,
excluded on this basis. (Compare infra Appendix II, with
messengers, local travel, Westlaw, transcripts, medical
Ex. C-2 to Bell Decl., Ex. 2 to Mot. for Fees, Costs, and
records and miscellaneous [items] . . . eminently
Expenses [930].) For expenses arising from relator's
reasonable in light of the extensive legal services
ongoing employment at Jones and efforts to secure his
performed"). Applying this standard in FCA cases, where
relator's share, Bell has proposed cost reductions the
the court must find the expenses to have been necessarily
Court may apply should it conclude time associated with
incurred, courts have held that "relators are under a duty
these activities is not compensable. (See Ex. F to Bell
to minimize their expenses," and that "those expenses
Supplemental Decl., Ex. 1 to Reply to HII's Opp'n [957].)
incurred without proper documentation should be
Bell's proposed cost reductions correspond to his
disallowed." United States ex rel. Abbott-Burdick v. Univ.
proposed fee reductions. (Id.) While the Court adopted
Med. Assocs., No. 2:96-1676-12, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
Bell's proposals with respect to numerous time entries, it
26986, at *75 (D.S.C. May 23, 2002) (citations omitted).
also deducted time from entries Bell did not address. (See
Further, they have limited recovery to "those costs which
infra Appendix II.) Rather than comb through counsel's
are 'incidental and necessary' to the representation of the
cryptic expenses documentation and speculate about line
client." Coughlin, 992 F. Supp. at 145. "[C]osts are not
items' purposes, the Court will adopt Bell's proposed
allowed if they cannot be attached to the advancement of
deductions, with proportional adjustments. 85 Of the
a specific claim, or if they are so general that they could
89.55 hours the Court deducted for relator's share
be placed under the cost umbrella of overhead or office
recoupment efforts, Bell identified 65.80 hours, and the
expense." Id. This Court will review relator's [*56]
Court identified a further 23.75 hours. (See id.) Bell
 Page 48
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *56; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **172

recommends a corresponding expenses reduction of $ specifically rebut Bell's claims or cite to any relevant case
745.61, (Ex. F to Bell Supplemental Decl., Ex. 1 to law. Hence, the Court will take Bell at his word.
[957]), [**173] which the Court will adjust
proportionally to $ 1,014.73. Of the 67.35 hours the 86 In their final substantive paragraph,
Court deducted as arising from relator's ongoing defendants challenge [**175] several
employment, Bell identified 47.00 hours, and the Court miscellaneous charges as "clearly for the
identified a further 20.35 hours. (See infra Appendix II.) convenience of the WilmerHale lawyers." (BHIC
Bell recommends a corresponding expenses reduction of and HUK's Opp'n [948] at 32.) They object, for
$ 250.18, (Ex. F to Bell Supplemental Decl., Ex. 1 to example, to paying for a long-distance conference
[957]) which the Court will adjust proportionally to $ call involving O'Connor because she "chose to
358.50. The [*57] total reduction for these three attend the Judicial Conference, rather than being
categories sums to $ 1,373.23. at the office where she could meet in person."
(Id.) Carried to its logical conclusion, this
85 Defendants' list of proposed expense reasoning would bar payment for any telephone
deductions appears to bear no relationship to the call, because the lawyer could choose to meet
excluded time entries. (See Ex. 2 to HII's Opp'n with her client in person; for any means of
[949].) For example, they wish to exclude a $ transportation, because the lawyer could always
368.72 charge for Bell's Westlaw research from walk; or for any computerized research charge,
November 30 through December 14, 1999, as given that the lawyer could simply visit the local
associated with efforts to secure relator's share or law library. This would be clearly absurd. This
counsel's fees. (See id.) But the Court did not Court considers the challenged expenses wholly
reduce any of Bell's time entries for that period reasonable and finds they were necessarily
for any reason. Similarly, they seek to exclude incurred.
three photocopying charges from February 25,
2004, which sum to $ 142.40. (See id.) They Finally, defendants argue that relator's expenses
attribute these charges to Bowsher, (id.) though documentation is inadequate in two respects. (See BHIC
nothing in relator's fee petition associates the and HUK's Opp'n [948] at 30-31.) First, they note that
charges with him (or anyone else), (see Ex. E-2 to relator's records do not associate charges for
Bell Decl., [**174] Ex. 1 to [930] at 7), and this computerized research, copying, freight, and courier
Court did not deduct any hours from Bowsher's services, with any particular subject matter. Second, and
time entry for that day, (see infra Appendix II). relatedly, many of these charges do not correspond to
attorneys' time entries. [**176] In theory, one could look
Defendants have not offered the Court a to an attorney's time entry for the day the cost was
viable alternative to Bell's proposals. incurred to determine the subject matter of his research.
But in several instances, relator has not billed any time,
Second, defendants contend certain charges -- for or time on the relevant days, for the attorney who
books and other publications, office supplies, and offsite conducted the research. (See, e.g., Ex. C-2 to Bell Decl.,
storage -- should be deemed non-compensable Ex. 2 to [930], at 2 ($ 55.88 Westlaw research charge for
"overhead" expenses. 86 (BHIC and HUK's Opp'n [948] Sam Dickson on June 29, 1995); Ex. E-2 to Bell Decl.,
at 32.) They do not, however, direct the Court to the Ex. 2 to [930], at 11 ($ 633.00 Westlaw research charge
specific line items they consider problematic. Moreover, for Michael Gottlieb on April 23, 2006).) Because these
in his declaration, Bell avers that Wiley Rein and Wilmer charges are so vaguely described, defendants argue, the
Hale "incurred . . . [the requested expenses] in connection Court cannot meaningfully assess whether they were
with this litigation." (Bell Decl. PP 106, 116, Ex. 1 to "necessarily incurred" in pursuing this litigation. See 31
Mot. for Fees, Costs, and Expenses [930].) He further U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) (2008).
declares the costs he claims "are typical of the costs that
law firms incur in this type of complex and protracted Relator defends his time entries in three ways: (1) as
litigation, and typical of costs that law firms reasonably a matter of standard practice, law firms charge their
charge to their clients, separately, and not part of their clients for research and photocopies without identifying,
overhead expenses." (Id. P 116.) Defendants do not or even keeping track of, their subject matter; (2) keeping
 Page 49
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *57; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **176

more detailed records would be "unduly cumbersome and required a similarly reasonable, minimal level of
[would] waste valuable attorney time"; and (3) the detail:
discrepancies between research charges and time records
stem from Bell's voluntary exclusions and from simple As the OIC points out, however,
imprecision. (See Reply to BHIC and [**177] HUK's the expense pages contain multiple
Opp'n [960] at 23-24.) entries for "Taxi" cab rides,
"Photocopying," "Courier
This last defense proves most compelling. Bell's Service," and "Computer [**179]
original declaration explained that he had excluded time Legal Research," all of which are
for twelve lawyers and six paralegals from Wiley Rein, not otherwise explained. . . . The
and 34 lawyers and 27 paralegals from Wilmer Hale, "to court has in the past made
avoid litigation over the reasonableness of [the firms'] deductions for comparable
hours." (Bell Decl. PP 105, 112, Ex. 2 to [930].) He expenses because of a lack of
[*58] did not, however, pledge that he had omitted any supporting documentation and
charges for expenses they incurred, so the presence of should do so here . . . .
charges by mystery researchers is perfectly explicable.
More broadly, lawyers regularly use research tools to In re Cisneros (Finkelstein Fee Application), 372
perform substantive tasks, and some might reasonably U.S. App. D.C. 146, 454 F.3d 342, 350 (D.C. Cir.
have listed only the broader task, such as drafting a Spec. Div. 2006) (citations omitted). Accord In re
motion, without itemizing the computer and Cisneros (Needle Fee Application, 372 U.S. App.
print-resource research, writing, and editing which that D.C. 138, 454 F.3d 334, 341-42 (D.C. Cir. Spec.
task entailed. Hence, the discrepancies defendants cite do Div. 2006); In re Madison Guar. Sav. & Loan
not render counsel's expenses unreasonable. (Marceca Fee Application), 361 U.S. App. D.C.
249, 366 F.3d 922, 929 (D.C. Cir. Spec. Div.
Relator's other two justifications, however, lack 2004) (per curiam).
equal logical force. Attorney declarant Davidson insists
"[i]t is not customary to provide the details concerning This Court imposed a ten percent across-the-board
every item of expense in a major litigation," nor "to reduction on relator's billed hours due to generic and
identify each piece of paper copied." (Davidson ambiguous narrative descriptions. See supra part
Supplemental Decl. P 39, Ex. 2 to Reply to HII's Opp'n III.B.2.a.i. Vague entries are scattered throughout
[957].) [**178] Requiring a fee petitioner to identify relator's time records, but in their expense records, such
each sheet of paper copied would, as relator suggests, be entries are downright ubiquitous. Accordingly, the Court
"unduly cumbersome." But the Court does not believe it concludes a forty percent across-the-board reduction in
would "waste valuable [] time" to briefly indicate that the compensable expenses is appropriate.
copied documents were, for example, "motions in
limine," "exhibits," or "research memos." The same logic Relator seeks $ 511,723.06 in litigation expenses.
applies to research charges. Some substantive information (See Bell Supplemental Decl. PP 26-28, Ex. 1 to Reply to
would permit the Court to ascertain that these expenses HII's Opp'n [957]). Subtracting non-compensable charges
were "necessarily incurred." See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) from this total, and accounting for the acknowledged
(2008). Relator's counsel's records list only "duplicating" duplication with relator's bill of [**180] costs, see supra
or "photocopy -- DC -- for [date]," followed by the note 17, leaves $ 478,375.87. Applying the forty percent
number of pages, or "computerized research Westlaw," wholesale reduction brings relator's total compensable
followed by the researcher's name and the date. (See expenses to $ 287,025.52.
generally Ex. E-2 to Bell Decl., Ex. 2 to [930].) To "find"
that such vaguely described charges "were necessarily CONCLUSION
incurred," this Court would have to function as a rubber
For the reasons set forth above, the Court shall grant
stamp. This, it will not do. 87
in part and deny in part relator's motion for attorneys'
87 In reviewing fee petitions under the Ethics fees, costs, and expenses [930]. Pursuant to 31 U.S.C.
and Government Act, our Court of Appeals has section 3730(d)(1), the Court shall order [*59]
defendants BHIC, HUK, Bilhar, HII, and HC to pay
 Page 50
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *59; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **180

relator $ 7,245,169.07 in reasonable attorneys' fees, and $ A separate order shall issue this date.
287,025.52 in reasonable expenses, which this Court
finds were necessarily incurred -- in total, $ 7,532,194.59. Signed by Royce C. Lamberth, Chief Judge, August
12, 2008.
Further, the Court shall grant plaintiffs' bills of costs
[928, 929]. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure APPENDIX I
54(d)(1) and Local Civil Rule 54.1, the Court shall direct
The following table lists the billing rates applied in
the Clerk to tax $ 54,437.87 in costs to all defendants,
calculating the lodestar, per the discussion in [**181]
including Anderson, on the United States' behalf. It shall
part III.A, supra.
further direct the Clerk to tax $ 31,973.96 to defendants
BHIC, HUK, Bilhar, HII, and HC on relator's behalf.

Name Firm Hourly Source

Rate
Yaa A. Apori Wilmer Hale $ 485 Bell Decl. P 108, Ex. 2 to
[930]
Matthew Baumgartner Wilmer Hale $ 350 Bell Decl. P 108, Ex. 2 to
[930]
Ashley Baynham Wilmer Hale $ 350 Bell Decl. P 108, Ex. 2 to
[930]
Robert B. Bell Wilmer Hale $ 650 Bell Decl. P 108, Ex. 2 to
[930]
David Bowsher Wilmer Hale $ 485 Bell Decl. P 108, Ex. 2 to
[930]
Monya M. Bunch Wilmer Hale $ 350 Bell Decl. P 108, Ex. 2 to
[930]
Mary Beth Caswell Wilmer Hale $ 210 Bell Decl. P 108, Ex. 2 to
[930]
Jonathan Cedarbaum Wilmer Hale $ 495 Bell Decl. P 108, Ex. 2 to
[930]
Annie L. Chelovitz Wiley Rein $ 125 USAO Laffey Matrix 2007-08 88
Robert Cultice Wilmer Hale $ 625 Bell Decl. P 108, Ex. 2 to
[930]
Michael Gottlieb Wilmer Hale $ 385 Bell Decl. P 108, Ex. 2 to
[930]
Keven C. Heffel Wilmer Hale $ 315 Bell Decl. P 108, Ex. 2 to
[930]
Monika Moore Wilmer Hale $ 385 Bell Decl. P 108, Ex. 2 to
[930]
 Page 51
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *59; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **181

Allison F. Murphy Wilmer Hale $ 275 Bell Decl. P 108, Ex. 2 to

[930]
Jennifer M. O'Connor Wilmer Hale $ 510 Bell Decl. P 108, Ex. 2 to
[930]
F.H. Quaynor Wiley Rein $ 125 USAO Laffey Matrix 2007-08
Gregory Reece Wilmer Hale $ 385 Bell Decl. P 108, Ex. 2 to
[930]
Colin Rushing Wilmer Hale $ 485 Bell Decl. P 108, Ex. 2 to
[930]
Howard Shapiro Wilmer Hale $ 750 Bell Decl. P 108, Ex. 2 to
[930]
Milton R. Shook Wilmer Hale $ 210 Bell Decl. P 108, Ex. 2 to
[930]
Stephen T. Smith Wilmer Hale $ 385 Bell Decl. P 108, Ex. 2 to
[930]
Stanley R. Soya Wiley Rein $ 440 USAO Laffey Matrix 2007-08
Michael L. Sturm Wiley Rein $ 495 Bell Decl. P 104, Ex. 2 to
[930]
Laura K. Terry Wilmer Hale $ 485 Bell Decl. P 108, Ex. 2 to
[930]
Nancy Tillotson Wilmer Hale $ 175 Bell Decl. P 108, Ex. 2 to
[930]
Luis de la Torre Wiley Rein $ 390 USAO Laffey Matrix 2007-08
Chris R. Yukins Wiley Rein $ 390 USAO Laffey Matrix 2007-08

reduction and its source -- that is, whether the particular

number of hours deducted was proposed by Bell, in the
88 See [**182] U.S. Attorney's Office for the attachments to his supplemental declaration, or calculated
District of Columbia, Laffey 88 Matrix by the Court. For certain travel-related reductions, the
1992-2003, available at Court has applied Bell's estimates for travel to or from a
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/dc/Divisions/C particular city to entries for which Bell did not propose
ivil_Division/Laffey_Matrix_7.html. any reduction; for these entries, the source is listed as
"Court/Bell." Finally, to the extent possible, the Court has
[*60] APPENDIX II attempted to highlight the non-compensable tasks listed
in the "Narrative" column in boldface type.
The tables below include all time entries from which
the Court has deducted specific amounts of time spent on A. Wiley Rein [*61]
non-compensable tasks, as discussed in part III.B.1,
supra. The far right column lists the reason for each
 Page 52
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *61; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **182

Date Attorney Billed Net Narrative

Hours Hours

06/16/1995 RBB 5.00 3.00 Review and revise complaint;

meet with Mr. Soya re
strategy; meet with team to
review and assign tasks;
review and revise draft
disclosure statement; revise
fee agreement.

Date Attorney Reduction Reason for

Reduction
(Source)
06/16/1995 RBB 2.00 Fee Agreement
(Bell)

[*62]

06/23/1995 LD 7.25 6.25 Review and edit latest

versions of complaint and
disclosure statement; research
issue of relator's entitlement
to share of recovery from
defendant not named in
relator's complaint; research
issue of discoverability of
disclosure statement; draft
 Page 53
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *62; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **182

memo regarding these two

issues; review messages from
Mr. Yukins regarding business
done by the various defendants
in Washington, D.C.; review
monograph regarding causes of
06/24/1995 RBB 0.25 0.00 action by companies being
investigated or charged with
fraud and discuss with Mr.
Yukins; discuss complaint,
disclosure statement, and
jurisdictional issue with Mr.
Bell, Mr. Sturm, and Mr.
Yukins. Read memorandum from
Mr. de la Torre on whether
relator can be awarded part of
recovery from a defendant not
initially named in relator's
complaint.

06/23/1995 LD 1.00 Relator's Share

(Bell)
 Page 54
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *62; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **182

06/24/1995 RBB 0.25 Relator's Share

(Bell)

[*63]

06/25/1995 LD 8.25 7.25 Draft alphabetical list of

relevant persons and entities;
prepare chart showing profits
on international contracts of
Jones Construction; review
documents and information
furnished by Mr. Miller for
purposes of editing latest
draft of complaint and
disclosure statement and
determining which exhibits to
use for disclosure statement;
06/28/1995 LD 5.50 5.25 leave messages for Mr. Sturm
and Mr. Yukins regarding
revisions to the disclosure
statement; review proposed
retention letter and
correspondence with Mr. Miller
Review disclosure statement
and exhibits thereto for
 Page 55
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *63; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **182

accuracy of citation to
exhibits; edit exhibit list;
draft memo regarding proposed
edits to complaint and
disclosure statement; discuss
finalizing and serving the
complaint and disclosure
statement, including possible
counterclaims and privilege
issues regarding exhibits,
with Mr. Bell and Mr. Sturm;
review recent False Claims Act
cases involving counterclaims;
review Federal Rules, local
court rules, and confirm with
clerk's office information
regarding forms, procedure,
and fee required for filing
complaint under seal.

06/25/1995 LD 1.00 Fee Agreement

(Bell)

06/28/1995 LD 0.25 Employment

(Court
 Page 56
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *63; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **182

[*64]

06/29/1995 RBB 3.00 2.75 Prepare for meeting and meeting with
Mr. Klein and Mr. Spratling (DOJ);
draft letter to Mr. Klein and letter
to Mr. Hertz

06/29/1995 MLS 2.50 2.25 Meeting at Antitrust Division;

preparation for same; telephone
conference with Mr. Miller re same.
 Page 57
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *64; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **182

07/07/1995 RBB 4.00 0.00 Review memorandum from Mr. Luh on

counterclaims in qui tam cases and
read cases cited therein; review
memorandum from Ms. Ben-David on
possible common law claims J.A. Jones,
Inc. might seek to assert against Mr.
Miller; meet with Mr. Luh and Ms.
Ben-David.

07/20/1995 SRS 0.25 0.15 Telephone conference with Mr. Bell re

possible Government use of covert
investigative techniques in connection
with anti-trust investigations and
advice to Mr. Miller re possible
questions from corporate management
once the investigation becomes public.

08/03/1995 RBB 9.00 8.00 Meet with Mr. Miller and Mr. Sturm;
all day meeting at DOJ with Messrs.
Dillon, Kindred, Morgan, and Ms. Mark;
review leniency letter.

08/03/1995 MLS 9.00 8.00 Meeting with Mr. Miller; meeting at

DOJ; review and analyze issues re
outcome of same.

06/29/1995 RBB 0.25 Immunity

(Court)

06/29/1995 MLS 0.25 Immunity

(Court)
 Page 58
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *64; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **182

07/07/1995 RBB 4.00 Employment

(Court)

07/20/1995 SRS 0.10 Employment

(Court)

08/03/1995 RBB 1.00 Immunity

(Court)

08/03/1995 MLS 1.00 Immunity

(Court)

[*65]

08/04/1995 RBB 0.75 0.25 Draft letter to Mr. Spratling;

telephone call with Mr. Miller re
yesterday's meeting

08/04/1995 LD 0.25 0.15 Review and file correspondence

regarding Antitrust Division's
investigation to date and grant of
leniency; review complaint and
 Page 59
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *65; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **182

disclosure statement.

08/29/1995 RBB 8.00 6.50 Review notes of prior meetings with

DOJ: travel to Charlotte; meet with
Mr. Miller; meet with DOJ

08/29/1995 MLS 8.00 6.50 Prepare for and meet with Messrs.
Miller, Dillon, and Kindred; prepare
Mr. Miller for meeting; travel to
Charlotte for meeting

09/18/1995 MLS 0.75 0.00 Review and analyze issues re relator's

entitlement to portion of criminal
fine; conferences with Ms. Faunce re
same.

09/19/1995 RBB 9.00 7.50 Travel to Charlotte; review memorandum

describing previous meeting; meet with
Mr. Sturm; meet with Messrs. Dillon,
Miller and Sturm, and Ms. Mueller;
post-mortem with Mr. Miller;
post-mortem with Mr. Sturm

09/19/1995 MLS 8.50 7.00 Meeting with FBI, US Attorney's Office

and DOJ in Charlotte; prepare for
same; travel to Charlotte for same.

08/04/1995 RBB 0.50 Immunity

(Court)

08/04/1995 LD 0.10 Immunity

(Court)
 Page 60
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *65; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **182

08/29/1995 RBB 1.50 Travel

(Court/Bell)

08/29/1995 MLS 1.50 Travel

(Court/Bell)

09/18/1995 MLS 0.75 Relator's Share

(Bell)

09/19/1995 RBB 1.50 Travel (Bell)

09/19/1995 MLS 1.50 Travel (Bell)

[*66]

09/20/1995 RBB 9.00 7.50 Meet with Mr. Dillon; meet with
Messrs. Miller and Dillon and Ms.
Mueller; travel.

09/20/1995 MLS 9.50 8.00 Meetings in Charlotte with DOJ and

FBI; lunch with Mr. Dillon; review and
analyze complaint against Jones, et
 Page 61
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *66; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **182

al.; return travel from Charlotte

10/17/1995 RBB 13.00 9.00 Travel to and from Atlanta; meet with
Mr. Miller; meet with Messrs. Dillon,
Kindred, and Miller; conference with
Mr. Sturm

10/17/1995 MLS 12.50 8.50 Prepare for meeting with Messrs.

Dillon, Miller, et al.; travel to
Atlanta for meeting; meeting in
Atlanta re document review; return
travel from Atlanta

11/07/1995 RBB 10.50 9.00 Review documents sent to me by Mr.

Miller; prepare exhibits to submit to
the government; travel to Charlotte;
meet with Messrs. Miller, Sturm,
Dillon, Kindred, and Ms. Mueller; meet
with Messrs. Miller and Sturm

11/07/1995 MLS 8.50 7.00 Prepare for meeting and meet with
Messrs Miller, Dillon, and Kindred and
Ms. Mueller; travel to Charlotte for
same; conference with Mr. Bell re
outcome of meeting

09/20/1995 RBB 1.50 Travel (Bell)

09/20/1995 MLS 1.50 Travel (Bell)

 Page 62
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *66; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **182

10/17/1995 RBB 4.00 Travel (Bell)

10/17/1995 MLS 4.00 Travel (Bell)

11/07/1995 RBB 1.50 Travel (Bell)

11/07/1995 MLS 1.50 Travel (Bell)

[*67]

11/08/1995 RBB 4.00 2.50 Breakfast meeting with Messrs. Sturm,

Dillon, and Kindred; travel to
Washington; attempt to reach Mr.
Miller; meet with Mr. Sturm

11/08/1995 MLS 4.50 3.00 Meeting with Messrs. Dillon and

Kindred re strategy; return travel
from Charlotte; conference with Mr.
Bell re status and strategy.
 Page 63
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *67; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **182

11/09/1995 MLS 1.00 0.75 Telephone conference with Mr. Miller

re issues raised by DOJ; conference
with Mr. Bell re same; review and
analyze memorandum re qui tam awards

01/14/1996 RBB 0.75 0.00 Telecon Rick Miller re: strategy

concerning possible interviews by
company lawyers

01/17/1996 RBB 2.75 0.00 Telephone call with Mr. Miller re

request that he be interviewed by
outside counsel; meet with Mr. Sturm
re same; separate meetings with
Messrs. Brunner and Gordon, telephone
call with Mr. Douglas, all re strategy
for whether or not to cooperate with
company investigation

01/17/1996 MLS 0.50 0.00 Review and analyze issues and response
to interview request; conference with
Messrs. Bell and Gordon re same

11/08/1995 RBB 1.50 Travel (Bell)

11/08/1995 MLS 1.50 Travel (Bell)

11/09/1995 MLS 0.25 Relator's Share

(Court)
 Page 64
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *67; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **182

01/14/1996 RBB 0.75 Employment

(Court)

01/17/1996 RBB 2.75 Employment

(Bell)

01/17/1996 MLS 0.50 Employment

(Court)

[*68]

01/18/1996 RBB 2.00 1.50 Finalize arrangements for meeting with

Mr. Miller; conference with Mr. Soya
re status of case; outline alternative
strategies

01/18/1996 SRS 0.50 0.00 Telephone conference with Mr. Bell re

status and consideration of issues in
connection with the company's request
to interview Mr. Miller

01/19/1996 RBB 8.00 0.00 Prepare flip charts for meeting with
Mr. Miller; dinner meeting with
Messrs. De la Torre, Gordon, Douglas,
and Soya; lengthy meeting with Messrs.
Miller, Sturm, de la Torre, Soya,
 Page 65
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *68; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **182

Gordon, and Douglas to discuss whether

to submit to interviews with company
counsel, refuse to be interviewed,
announce whistleblower status, or
resign

01/19/1996 LD 4.75 4.25 Review documents provided by Mr.

Miller and qui tam disclosure
statement and meet with Mr. Miller,
Mr. Bell, Mr. Gordon, Mr. Soya, and
Mr. Douglas to discuss status of
criminal investigation and its impact
on Mr. Miller's employment, and
handling of document issues; discuss
status of case with Mr. Yukins

01/18/1996 RBB 0.50 Employment

(Court)

01/18/1996 SRS 0.50 Employment

(Bell)

01/19/1996 RBB 8.00 Employment

(Bell)
 Page 66
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *68; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **182

01/19/1996 LD 0.50 Employment

(Bell)

[*69]

01/19/1996 SRS 4.00 0.00 Office conference with Mr. Miller and
Messrs. Bell, Douglas, Gordon and Soya
re. strategy; review and analyze
issues re same; telephone conference
with Mr. Bell re same.

01/23/1996 RBB 0.50 0.00 Telephone call with Mr. miller re

documents and re resignation plans

01/24/1996 RBB 0.25 0.00 Conference with Mr. Sturm re my

discussion last night with Mr. Miller

01/24/1996 MLS 0.25 0.00 Conference with Mr. Bell re

developments

02/13/1996 RBB 1.00 0.50 Telephone call with Mr. Dillon re

status; telephone call with Mr. Miller
re outside counsel seeking to
interview him

02/14/1996 RBB 4.00 3.00 Meet with Messrs. Sturm, Douglas,

Gordon, and de la Torre re strategy
 Page 67
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *69; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **182

for Mr. Miller resigning; telephone

call with Mr. Dillon re grand jury
subpoena to be served on Mr. Miller;
lengthy telephone call with Mr. Miller
re grand jury subpoena, strategy for
resigning from company, and strategy
for dealing with questions from
lawyers and co-workers

01/19/1996 SRS 4.00 Employment

(Bell)

01/23/1996 RBB 0.50 Employment

(Bell)

01/24/1996 RBB 0.25 Employment

(Court)

01/24/1996 MLS 0.25 Employment

(Court)

02/13/1996 RBB 0.50 Employment

(Bell)

02/14/1996 RBB 1.00 Employment

(Bell)
 Page 68
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *69; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **182

[*70]

02/14/1996 LD 2.25 0.50 Review notes of January 19 meeting

with Mr. Miller and discuss status of
criminal investigation and of Jones
Construction's in-house investigation,
Mr. Miller's response thereto, and the
impact of the investigations on Mr.
Miller's employment with Mr. Bell, Mr.
Gordon, Mr. Sturm, and Mr. Douglass

02/14/1996 MLS 3.00 2.50 Conference with Mr. Bell, et al. re

strategy; review and analyze issues re
same; conference with Mr. Bell re
issues raised by Mr. Dillon;
conference with Mr. Bell re subpoena

02/19/1996 RBB 0.75 0.50 Telephone call with Mr. Miller re

voice mail from Mr. Flexner and re
grand jury subpoena

02/20/1996 RBB 3.00 1.00 Telephone call with Mr. Flexner re his
request to interview Mr. Miller; draft
memorandum to file; conferences with
Messrs. Sturm, Gordon, and Douglas re
options; telephone call with Mr.
Miller; telephone call with Ms. Mark
re extending sealed period for qui tam
action

02/20/1996 MLS 1.50 0.75 Telephone conferences with Mr. Bell re

 Page 69
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *70; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **182

service of subpoena, response to

request for interview and strategy

02/14/1996 LD 1.75 Employment

(Bell)

02/14/1996 MLS 0.50 Employment

(Court)

02/19/1996 RBB 0.25 Employment

(Court)

02/20/1996 RBB 2.00 Employment

(Court)

02/20/1996 MLS 0.75 Employment

(Court)
 Page 70
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *70; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **182

[*71]

02/21/1996 RBB 2.25 0.00 Meet with Miller team re strategy;

draft scripts for telephone calls with
Mr. Flexner; conference call with
Messrs. Miller and Sturm; meet with
Mr. Brunner

02/21/1996 LD 3.25 1.25 Research and review recent False

Claims Act decision regarding the qui
tam provisions; review memo to file
prepared by Mr. Bell regarding Jones
Construction's request for interview
with Mr. Miller; discuss status of
criminal investigation and of Jones
in-house investigation and the impact
of the investigations on Mr. Miller's
employment with Mr. Bell, Mr. Gordon,
Mr. Sturm, and Mr. Douglass; discuss
status of case with Mr. Yukins

02/21/1996 MLS 1.75 0.75 Telephone conference with Mr. Miller

re developments and strategy;
conferences with Mr. Bell re approach
from Jones counsel

02/22/1996 RBB 4.50 2.00 Telephone calls with Mr. Flexner, Mr.
Dillon, Ms. Mueller, and Mr. Gardner;
conferences with Messrs. Sturm,
Douglas, and Gordon re strategy;
lengthy telephone call with Mr. Miller
re resignation

02/21/1996 RBB 2.25 Employment

 Page 71
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *71; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **182

(Bell)

02/21/1996 LD 2.00 Employment

(Bell)

02/21/1996 MLS 1.00 Employment

(Bell)

02/22/1996 RBB 2.50 Employment

(Bell)

[*72]

02/22/1996 MLS 2.00 0.50 Telephone conference with Ms. Mueller

re progress of investigation; review
and analyze issues re response to
request for interview; conferences
 Page 72
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *72; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **182

with Mr. Bell re same

02/23/1996 RBB 3.00 2.00 Two telephone calls with Mr. Flexner
re Miller's resignation; telephone
call with Ms. Mueller; telephone calls
with Mr. Miller; telephone call with
Mr. Gordon.

02/23/1996 LD 2.25 0.00 Review draft letter and talking points

regarding Mr. Miller's resignation
prepared by Mr. Bell; review reference
materials regarding claims against
employees for breach of duty of
loyalty; discuss status of criminal
investigation and of Jones in-house
investigation, the impact of the
investigations on Mr. Miller's
employment, and potential resignation
of Mr. Miller, with Mr. Bell, Mr.
Gordon, Mr. Walker, Mr. Sturm, and Mr.
Douglass.

02/22/1996 MLS 1.50 Employment

(Bell)

02/23/1996 RBB 1.00 Employment

(Bell)

02/23/1996 LD 2.25 Employment

 Page 73
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *72; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **182

(Bell)

[*73]

02/23/1996 MLS 4.75 0.00 Review and revise resignation script

and letter; conference with Mr. Bell,
et al. re same; telephone conference
with Mr. Bell re developments;
telephone conferences with Mr. Miller
re resignation; final revision of
documents; telephone conference with
Ms. Mueller re resignation

02/24/1996 LD 7.75 0.00 Research, review, and take notes on

case law and journal articles
regarding breach of duty of loyalty
under North Carolina law

02/26/1996 RBB 5.50 5.00 Telephone call with Mr. Dillon and Mr.
Gordon re Miller's resignation and re
his discussion with Mr. Corley;
telephone call with Mr. Miller;
conference call with Messrs. Miller,
Dillon, and Gordon re knowledge of
four witnesses government will
 Page 74
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *73; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **182

interview this week; draft memo to

file

02/26/1996 MLS 0.50 0.00 Telephone conference with Mr. Bell re

resignation issues and developments

02/27/1996 MLS 0.50 0.00 Telephone conference with Mr. Miller

re developments; review and analyze
draft file memorandum re telephone
conference with Mr. Flexner; telephone
conference with Mr. Bell re status

02/23/1996 MLS 4.75 Employment

(Bell)

7.75 Employment

02/24/1996 LD (Court)

02/26/1996 RBB 0.50 Employment

(Bell)
 Page 75
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *73; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **182

02/26/1996 MLS 0.50 Employment

(Bell)

02/27/1996 MLS 0.50 Employment

(Bell)

[*74]

02/28/1996 RBB 3.00 1.50 Telephone call with Mr. Ashcraft

(attorney for Fritz Beseecher);
telephone call with Mr. Miller re
status; telephone call with Mr.
Flexner; draft memo to file re
conversation with Mr. Flexner;
telephone call with Mr. Miller re
Flexner conversation

02/29/1996 RBB 4.00 3.50 Telephone call with Mr. Dillon;

draft letter to Messrs. Flexner and
Burdette; telephone call with Mr.
Burdette re Miller talking to Mr.
Bowden about issues raised in
February 23 letter; telephone call
with Mr. Miller re meeting with Mr.
Bowden; conferences with Messrs.
Sturm and Gordon

02/29/1996 LD 0.50 0.00 Review and take notes on memo to

file prepared by Mr. Bell
concerning Mr. Flexner's requests
for information regarding any
participation by Mr. Miller in
 Page 76
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *74; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **182

government's investigation and Mr.

Miller's resignation

02/29/1996 MLS 1.25 0.00 Review and analyze issues re

resignation; telephone conferences
with Mr. Miller re same; review and
analyze memorandum re telephone
conferences with Mr. Flexner;
conference with Mr. Bell re same

02/28/1996 RBB 1.50 Employment

(Bell)

02/29/1996 RBB 0.50 Employment

(Court)

02/29/1996 LD 0.50 Employment

(Bell)
 Page 77
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *74; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **182

02/29/1996 MLS 1.25 Employment

(Bell)

[*75]

03/01/1996 RBB 2.00 1.00 Telephone call with Mr. Miller re

his meeting with Mr. Bowden;
telephone calls with Ms. Mueller
and Mr. Gordon; telephone call with
Mr. Miller re grand jury appearance

03/08/1996 RBB 1.00 0.00 Telephone call with Mr. Miller re

strategy for his meetings today
with Messrs. Bowden and Davidson;
telephone calls with Mr. Miller re
outcome of his meeting with Mr.
Bowden and re not saying anything
to bankers that could harm Jones'
business relationships

03/12/1996 RBB 1.00 0.50 Telephone call with Mr. Dillon re

Miller's last day; telephone call
with Ms. Mueller; telephone call
with Mr. Miller

05/31/1996 MLS 0.50 0.00 Review and analyze issues re

responses to inquiries re job
departure

06/03/1996 RBB 1.50 0.00 Meet with Mr. Sturm; telephone call
 Page 78
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *75; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **182

with Mr. Dillon re language to be

used by Mr. Miller; telephone call
with Mr. Miller

03/01/1996 RBB 1.00 Employment

(Court)

03/08/1996 RBB 1.00 Employment

(Bell)

03/12/1996 RBB 0.50 Employment

(Court)

05/31/1996 MLS 0.50 Employment

(Bell)

06/03/1996 RBB 1.50 Employment

(Bell)

[*76]
 Page 79
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *76; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **182

06/03/1996 MLS 1.25 0.00 Review and analyze issues

re responses to inquiries
re job departure; review
and revise memorandum re
same; telephone conferences
with Messrs. Miller and
Dillon re same and case
status
06/04/1996 RBB 0.75 0.00 Draft letter to Mr. Miller
suggesting two responses
to questions about resigning
from prior employment;
telephone callwith Mr. Miller
06/04/1996 MLS 0.25 0.00 Review and revise letter to
Mr. Miller re job inquiries
09/04/1996 RBB 7.50 6.00 Travel to Charlotte, NC;
lunch meeting with Mr.
Miller; meet with Mr. Dillon
and Mr. Gordon to answer
their questions and prepare
for grand jury appearance
09/05/1996 RBB 8.00 6.50 Breakfast meeting with
Mr. Miller re grand jury
testimony; meet with Messrs.
Dillon and Gordon; wait
for grand jury appearance;
travel to D.C.
02/26/1997 RBB 1.50 1.00 Telephone call with Mr.
Miller re consulting
offer from Womble Carlyle;
telephone call with Mr. Dillon
re additional day of testimony
and re various documentissues;
conference with Mr. Sturm
re strategy
 Page 80
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *76; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **182

06/03/1996 MLS 1.25 Employment

(Bell)

06/04/1996 RBB 0.75 Employment

(Bell)

06/04/1996 MLS 0.25 Employment

(Bell)
09/04/1996 RBB 1.50 Travel
(Court/Bell)

09/05/1996 RBB 1.50 Travel

(Court/Bell)

02/26/1997 RBB 0.50 Employment

(Court)
 Page 81
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *76; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **182

[*77]

03/04/1997 RBB 13.00 11.50

Travel to Charlotte; meet with
Messrs. Sturm, Dillon, and Baker to
prepare for grand jury appearance;
post-meeting conference with Mr.
Sturm

03/04/1997 MLS 13.50 12.00 Meeting with Messrs. Miller and

Dillon re grand jury testimony
preparation; travel to Charlotte
for same

03/05/1997 RBB 10.00 8.50 Meet with Messrs. Sturm, Miller,

Dillon, and Baker to prepare for
grand jury; meet privately with Mr.
Miller to prepare; confer with Mr.
Miller during breaks from grand
jury testimony; meet with Mr.
Miller after testimony; travel

03/05/1997 MLS 10.00 8.50 Additional witness preparation;

provide counsel for grand jury
testimony; return travel to
Washington

03/12/1997 RBB 0.25 0.00 Telephone call with Mr. Flexner re

his request to be briefed on Mr.
Miller's grand jury testimony

07/10/1997 RBB 6.00 4.50 Travel to Charlotte; meet with Mr.

Miller; meet with Messrs. Miller
and Dillon to prepare for grand
jury testimony

07/11/1997 RBB 8.00 6.50 Represent Mr. Miller before grand

 Page 82
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *77; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **182

jury; return travel

TOTAL 223.55

03/04/1997 RBB 1.50 Travel

(Court/Bell)

03/04/1997 MLS 1.50 Travel

(Court/Bell)

03/05/1997 RBB 1.50 Travel (Bell)

03/05/1997 MLS 1.50 Travel

(Court/Bell)

03/12/1997 RBB 0.25 Employment

(Bell)

07/10/1997 RBB 1.50 Travel

(Court/Bell)
 Page 83
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *77; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **182

07/11/1997 RBB 1.50 Travel

(Court/Bell)

TOTAL 110.70

[*78] B. [**183] Wilmer Hale

Date Attorney Billed Net Narrative

Hours Hours

1/20/2000 RBB 2.00 1.00

TELECONS WITH RICK MILLER, BILL
DILLON RE FRUCON SETTLEMENT; JEFF
GREEN RE FRUCON SETTLEMENT; CAROLYN
MARK RE RELATORS SHARE.

1/22/2000 RBB 1.00 0.00 BEGIN DRAFTING LETTER TO CAROLYN

MARK RE WHY RELATOR SHOULD RECEIVE
25% SHARE.

1/25/2000 RBB 3.00 0.00 DRAFTING LENGTHY LETTER TO CAROLYN

MARK DESCRIBING WHY MILLER SHOULD
RECEIVE 25% SHARE.

1/26/2000 RBB 0.50 0.00 REVISING LETTER TO CAROLYN MARK;

TELECON WITH RICK MILLER RE SAME.

1/28/2000 RBB 0.40 0.00 TELECON WITH RICK MILLER RE HIS

COMMENTS ON LETTER TO CAROLYN MARK.

TELECON WITH CAROLYN MARK;

1/31/2000 RBB 0.20 0.00 FINALIZING LETTER TO CAROLYN MARK.
 Page 84
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *78; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

TELECON WITH MILLER; SENDING COPY

2/4/2000 RBB 0.20 0.00 OF LETTER TO CAROLYN MARK TO JIM
GRIFFIN (ANTITRUST DIVISION).

Date Attorney Reduction Reason for

Reduction
(Source)
1/20/2000 RBB 1.00 Relator's Share
(Bell)

1/22/2000 RBB 1.00 Relator's Share

(Bell)

1/25/2000 RBB 3.00 Relator's Share

(Bell)

1/26/2000 RBB 0.50 Relator's Share

(Bell)

1/28/2000 RBB 0.40 Relator's Share

(Bell)

1/31/2000 RBB 0.20 Relator's Share

(Bell)

2/4/2000 RBB 0.20 Relator's Share

(Bell)
 Page 85
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *78; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

[*79]

7/6/2000 RBB 2.00 1.50 TELCON MILLER RE: STATUS AND RE:
EXTENSION OF TIME; LEAVING MESSAGE FOR
MORGAN RE: AGREEMENT TO THREE MONTH
EXTENSION OF TIME, TELCON DILLON,
TELCON MARK RE: RELATOR'S SHARE.

9/20/2000 RBB 0.50 0.00 TELCON CAROLYN MARK RE: RELATOR'S

SHARE; TELCON MILLER RE: SAME.

10/19/2000 RBB 2.50 0.50 MEETING WITH KEITH MORGAN AND CAROLYN
MARK TO DISCUSS RELATOR'S SHARE;
TELCONS RICK MILLER, BILL DILLON AND
WALTER KINDRED.

10/25/2000 RBB 0.30 0.00 TELCON JIM GRIFFIN RE: RELATORS'

SHARE; TELCON FROM KEITH MORGAN RE:
SAME.

10/26/2000 RBB 0.80 0.00 TELCONS MIKE STURM, BILL DILLON AND
RICK MILLER RE: RELATOR'S SHARE.

10/31/2000 RBB 2.10 0.00 RESEARCH ON RELATORS SHARE AND ON

RELATOR'S AWARD THROUGH AN ALTERNATE
REMEDY; TELCON MILLER.

11/2/2000 RBB 2.10 0.00 READING CASES ON RELATOR'S SHARE AND

ALTERNATE REMEDIES.

11/6/2000 RBB 2.00 0.00 MEETING WITH KEITH MORGAN AND CAROLYN
MARK RE: RELATOR'S SHARE AND
LITIGATION STRATEGY.
 Page 86
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *79; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

7/6/2000 RBB 0.50 Relator's Share

(Bell)

9/20/2000 RBB 0.50 Relator's Share

(Bell)

10/19/2000 RBB 2.00 Relator's Share

(Bell)

10/25/2000 RBB 0.30 Relator's Share

(Bell)

10/26/2000 RBB 0.80 Relator's Share

(Bell)

10/31/2000 RBB 2.10 Relator's Share

(Bell)

11/2/2000 RBB 2.10 Relator's Share

(Bell)

11/6/2000 RBB 2.00 Relator's Share

(Bell)

[*80]

11/7/2000 RBB 1.70 00.0 RESEARCH ON DAMAGES ISSUES;

TELCON RICK MILLER RE:
 Page 87
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *80; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

YESTERDAY'S MEETING WITH DOJ;

TELCON MICHAEL STURM.

11/14/2000 RBB 0.40 0.00 REVIEWING GE CASE AND

OUTLINING ARGUMENT ON
RELATOR'S SHARE.

11/17/2000 RBB 1.50 0.50 TELCON RICK MILLER; TELCON

CAROLYN MARK TO NEGOTIATE
RELATOR'S SHARE; TELCON LARRY
GONDELMAN.

11/30/2000 RBB 0.90 0.00 TELCONS KEITH MORGAN, BILL

DILLON, AND RICK MILLER RE:
SETTLEMENT ON RELATOR'S SHARE
OF AICI AND B+B SETTLEMENTS.

12/7/2000 RBB 4.30 0.00 REVIEW TIME RECORDS SINCE

INCEPTION 0F CASE; DRAFT
LETTER TO CAROLYN MARK RE
MILLER'S CONTRIBUTION;
TELECONS WITH MILLER RE
LETTER; TELECON WITH MARK.

12/8/2000 RBB 2.00 0.00 FINAL REVISIONS TO LETTER TO

CAROLYN MARK; SEND LETTER TO
MARK; TELECONS WITH MARK;
TELECON WITH MILLER.

12/11/2000 RBB 0.60 0.00 TELCONS CAROLYN MARK, RICK

MILLER RE: RELATOR'S SHARE.

11/7/2000 RBB 1.70 Relator's Share

(Bell)
 Page 88
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *80; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

11/14/2000 RBB 0.40 Relator's Share

(Bell)

11/17/2000 RBB 1.00 Relator's Share

(Bell)

11/30/2000 RBB 0.90 Relator's Share

(Bell)

12/7/2000 RBB 4.30 Relator's Share

(Bell)

12/8/2000 RBB 2.00 Relator's Share

(Bell)

12/11/2000 RBB 0.60 Relator's Share

(Bell)

[*81]

12/12/2000 RBB 1.50 0.00 TELCONS DILLON, KINDRED,

GREEN, AND MILLER RE: B+B
SETTLEMENT AND ITS
 Page 89
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *81; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

RELATIONSHIP TO REALTOR'S
SHARE.

12/13/2000 RBB 3.20 2.00 DRAFTING SETTLEMENT AND

RELEASE AMONG B+B, FRUCON AND
MILLER; TELCON JEFF GREEN RE:
TERMS OF RELEASE; REVIEWING
DRAFT AGREEMENT BETWEEN DOJ
AND MILLER ON RELATOR'S SHARE;
TELCONS MORGAN AND MARK RE:
STATUS OF RELATOR'S SHARE
APPROVALS, TELCON MORGANRE:
DAMAGES EXPERT; TELCON MILLER.

12/14/2000 RBB 3.00 2.00 NEGOTIATING TERMS OF B+B

RELEASE WITH JEFF GREEN,
REVISING RELEASE, TELCONS
CAROLYN MARK RE: RELATOR'S
SHARE; TELCON RICK MILLER RE:
CONFIRMATION OF 22% SHARE;
TELCON KEITH MORGAN RE:
CONSTRUCTION EXPERT.

12/15/2000 RBB 1.50 1.00 REVISING B+B AGREEMENT;

REVIEWING RELATOR'S SHARE
AGREEMENT AND NEGOTIATING
ADDITIONAL LANGUAGE WITH
CAROLYN MARK; EXECUTING BOTH
AGREEMENTS; TELCON KEITH
MORGAN RE: TWO ADDITIONAL
EXPERTS; TELCON MILLER RE:
STATUS.

12/12/2000 RBB 1.50 Relator's Share

(Bell)
 Page 90
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *81; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

12/13/2000 RBB 1.20 Relator's Share

(Bell)

12/14/2000 RBB 1.00 Relator's Share

(Bell)

12/15/2000 RBB 0.50 Relator's Share

(Bell)

[*82]
 Page 91
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *82; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

12/21/2000 RBB 0.20 0.00 TELCON CAROLYN MARK RE: STATUS

OF PAYMENT; LEAVING MESSAGE
FOR RICK MILLER.

12/29/2000 RBB 0.20 0.00 TELCON RICK MILLER RE: RECEIPT

OF FUNDS

3/16/2001 RBB 4.00 1.00 LEGAL RESEARCH ON ISSUE OF

WHETHER MILLER IS ENTITLED TO
SHARE OF SETTLEMENT PROCEEDS
FROM ABB; TELCONS WALTER
KINDRED AND KEITH MORGAN;
CONFERENCE RICK MILLER.

3/17/2001 RBB 2.00 0.00 ADDITIONAL RESEARCH ON

MILLER'S ENTITLEMENT TO ABB
SETTLEMENT.

3/18/2001 RBB 3.00 0.00 DRAFTING MEMORANDUM TO FILE ON

MILLER'S ENTITLEMENT TO SHARE
OF ABB SETTLEMENT.

3/19/2001 RBB 2.50 0.00 REVISING MEMORANDUM ON

ENTITLEMENT TO ABB SETTLEMENT;
DRAFTING LETTER TO MARK AND
MORGAN RE: ENTITLEMENT; TELCON
MILLER.

3/22/2001 RBB 1.30 1.10 MEETING WITH SCOTT HAMMOND

(D0J); TELCON BRIAN LEVINE
(ATTORNEY FOR HARBERT).

4/10/2001 RBB 0.70 0.00 TELCON RICK MILLER RE: STATUS

OF ABB SETTLEMENT.
 Page 92
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *82; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

12/21/2000 RBB 0.20 Relator's Share

(Bell)

12/29/2000 RBB 0.20 Relator's Share

(Bell)

3/16/2001 RBB 3.00 Relator's Share

(Bell)

3/17/2001 RBB 2.00 Relator's Share

(Bell)

3/18/2001 RBB 3.00 Relator's Share

(Bell)

3/19/2001 RBB 2.50 Relator's Share

(Bell)

3/22/2001 RBB 0.20 Solely BLH

(Bell)

4/10/2001 RBB 0.70 Relator's Share

(Bell)

[*83]
 Page 93
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *83; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

4/13/2001 RBB 4.00 0.00 PREPARING FOR MEETING; MEETING WITH

CAROLYN MARK RE: RELATOR'S SHARE OF
ABB SETTLEMENT, TELCONS RICK MILLER,
TELCON BILL DILLON.

4/16/2001 RBB 2.00 0.00 RESEARCH ON ARGUMENT THAT RELATOR

IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER ALL DAMAGES
ATTRIBUTABLE TO CONSPIRACY HE
REVEALED.

4/18/2001 RBB 3.00 0.00 RESEARCH ON CONSPIRACY LAW, TELCON

BRYAN LAVINE RE: EXTENSION OF TIME;
RESEARCH ON CONSPIRACY ISSUES; TELCON
CAROLYN MARK RE: RELATOR'S SHARE.

5/1/2001 RBB 0.40 0.00 TELCON CAROLYN MARK RE: HER

MEETINGS WITH B+B ON DAMAGES AND
RELATOR'S SHARE.

5/11/2001 RBB 0.50 0.00 TELCON MILLER RE: RELATOR'S SHARE;

TELCON MILLER RE: SAME.

5/14/2001 RBB 0.30 0.00 TELCON CAROLYN MARK RE: RELATOR'S

SHARE.

5/15/2001 RBB 0.30 0.00 TELCON RICK MILLER RE: NEGOTIATING

STRATEGY; LEAVING MESSAGE FOR
CAROLYN MARK.

5/16/2001 RBB 1.20 0.60 LENGTHY TELCON MARK AND MORGAN

RE; SETTLEMENT STRATEGY AND
RELATOR'S SHARE; TELCON MILLER.
 Page 94
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *83; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

4/13/2001 RBB 4.00 Relator's Share

(Bell)

4/16/2001 RBB 2.00 Relator's Share

(Bell)

4/18/2001 RBB 3.00 0.20 Solely

BLH + 2.80
Relator's Share
(Bell)

5/1/2001 RBB 0.40 Relator's Share

(Bell)

5/11/2001 RBB 0.50 Relator's Share

(Bell)

5/14/2001 RBB 0.30 Relator's Share

(Bell)

5/15/2001 RBB 0.30 Relator's Share

(Bell)

5/16/2001 RBB 0.60 Relator's Share

(Court)

[*84]

7/27/2001 RBB 4.00 3.50 MEETING WITH JIM GRIFFITH, SCOTT

 Page 95
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *84; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

HAMMOND, BILL DILLON (BY PHONE) AND

JOHN ORR (BY PHONE); TELCON CAORLYN
MARK RE: MOTION FOR STAY AND ABB
SHARE; LENGTHY TELCON RICK MILLER RE:
ABB STRATEGY.

8/28/2001 RBB 5.70 0.70 TELCON RICK MILLER; DRAFTING

PRESENTATION ON SHARE OF ABB
SETTLEMENT.

8/29/2001 RBB 7.10 0.00 REVISING PRESENTATION TO CIVIL

DIVISION ON ABB; REVIEWING CASES AND
ADDING NEW SECTIONS TO
PRESENTATION.

9/10/2001 RBB 3.00 2.50 TELCON CAROLYN MARK RE: MOVING FOR
STAY, JOINT DEFENSE AGREEMENT,
NEGOTIATIONS WITH HOLZMANN, AND
RELATOR'S SHARE; REVIEWING CASE CITED
BY MARK (SEAL V. SEAL); TELCON RICK
MILLER.

9/11/2001 RBB 2.00 0.00 REVIEWING SEAL V. SEAL; RESEARCH ON

JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY,
PREPARING NEW SLIDES FOR
PRESENTATION.

9/12/2001 RBB 2.50 0.00 REVISING AND ADDING TO PRESENTATION.

7/27/2001 RBB 0.50 Relator's Share

(Court)
 Page 96
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *84; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

8/28/2001 RBB 5.00 Relator's Share

(Court)

8/29/2001 RBB 7.10 Relator's Share

(Court)

9/10/2001 RBB 0.50 Relator's Share

(Bell)

9/11/2001 RBB 2.00 Relator's Share

(Court)

9/12/2001 RBB 2.50 Relator's Share

(Court)

[*85]

9/13/2001 RBB 0.60 0.00 TELCON CAROLYN MARK RE: STAY,

HOLZMANN NEGOTIATIONS, AND MEETING
WITH HERTZ ON RELATOR'S SHARE;
REVISING RELATOR'S SHARE PRESENTATION.

11/1/2001 RBB 3.10 0.60 TELCON MICHAEL HERTZ RE: ABB

RELATOR'S SHARE; TELCON BILL DILLON
RE: TRIAL STATUS AND RE: RESPONSES TO
 Page 97
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *85; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

MOTIONS; CONFERENCE ROGER WITTEN,

BEGINNING OUTLINE OF LETTER TO
HERTZ, ET AL.

11/2/2001 RBB 0.60 0.00 TELCON BILL DILLON; TELCON RICK

MILLER RE: ABB RELATORS SHARE.

11/14/2001 RBB 0.40 0.10 TELECON CAROLYN MARK RE COMMON

INTEREST AGREEMENT AND RE
AGREEMENT THAT GOVERNMENT WILL
NOT OBJECT TO POSTPONING ABB
RELATOR'S SHARE MOTION UNTIL AFTER
CRIMINAL TRIAL; TELECON MILLER.

9/13/2001 RBB 0.60 Relator's Share

(Bell)

11/1/2001 RBB 2.50 Relator's Share

(Bell)

11/2/2001 RBB 0.60 Relator's Share

(Bell)

11/14/2001 RBB 0.30 Relator's Share

(Bell)
 Page 98
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *85; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

[*86]

12/7/2001 RBB 3.10 1.60 DRAFTING AND FINALIZING LETTER TO

CAROLYN MARK MEMORIALIZING
CONVERSATION THAT GOVERNMENT WILL
NOT OBJECT TO TIMING OF MOTION TO
RECOVER RELATOR'S SHARE FROM ABB
SETTLEMENT IF MOTION IS FILED AFTER
CRIMINAL TRIAL; REVIEWING PROPOSED
COMMON INTEREST AGREEMENT; DRAFTING
LETTER TO CAROLYN MARK RE: REVISIONS
NEEDED IN COMMON INTEREST AGREEMENT.

12/7/2001 RBB 1.50 Relator's Share

(Bell)

[*87]

8/14/2002 RBB 7.90 3.70 PREPARING FOR MEETING WITH STEVE

ALTMAN TO NEGOTIATE RELATOR'S
SHARE BY REVIEWING PRESENTATION ON
ABB RELATOR'S SHARE AND LETTERS
SENT TO CAROLYN MARK RE: RELATOR'S
 Page 99
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *87; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

SHARE (1.7); MEETING WITH STEVE

ALTMAN AND EILEEN ZIMMER TO REVIEW
DOCUMENTS ABOUT JONES' FINANCES AND
DISCUSS REASONABLENESS OF
SETTLEMENT (2.1); SEPARATE MEETING
WITH ALTMAN TO NEGOTIATE RELATOR'S
SHARE (.4); REVIEWING TIME ENTRIES;
DRAFTING LETTER TO ALAN GOURLEY RE:
HOURLY RATES; DRAFTING
CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT;
ASSEMBLING PACKAGE FOR GOURLEY TO
REVIEW AND MEETING WITH VERONICA
KAYNE RE: SAME.

8/14/2002 RBB 4.20 Relator's Share

(Bell)

[*88]
 Page 100
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *88; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

8/17/2002 RBB 5.90 4.90 REVIEWING CASES ON APPORTIONMENT OF

FEES AMONG MULTIPLE DEFENDANTS;
TELCON MILLER RE: SETTLEMENT
STRATEGY; OUTLINING REASONING BEHIND
$ 315,000 COUNTEROFFER; LENGTHY TELCON
GOURLEY RE: ATTORNEYS FEES; FAXING
DRAFT AGREEMENTS TO MILLER; TELCON
MILLER RE: DRAFT AGREEMENTS; TELCON
MILLER RE: $ 180,000 COUNTEROFFER FROM
GOURLEY; TELCON GOURLEY RE: $ 275,000
MILLER COUNTEROFFER; REVISING DRAFT
RELATOR'S SHARE AGREEMENT; DRAFTING
ATTORNEYS FEE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
AMONG MILLER, JONES AND HOLZMANN.

8/17/2002 RBB 1.00 Relator's Share

(Bell)

[*89]
 Page 101
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *89; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

8/19/2002 RBB 3.70 2.00 REVIEWING JONES' DRAFT OF SETTLEMENT

AGREEMENT ON ATTORNEYS FEES; REVISING
DRAFT; TELCON GOURLEY TO NEGOTIATE
CHANGES; REVIEWING REVISED DOCUMENT
INCORPORATING NEGOTIATED CHANGES;
REVIEWING STEVE ALTMAN'S REVISIONS
TO MY CHANGES TO RELATOR'S SHARE
AGREEMENT; REVISING RELATOR'S SHARE
AGREEMENT; TELCONS ALTMAN AND
CAROLYN MARK TO NEGOTIATE
CHANGES; REVIEWING DOCUMENT WITH
NEGOTIATED CHANGES; REVIEWING
THREE-WAY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT;
MEETING AT DOJ WITH ALTMAN, MARK,
MORGAN AND GOURLEY TO EXECUTE ALL
AGREEMENTS, TELCON MILLER RE: FINAL
TERMS OF DOCUMENTS.

11/13/2002 YAA 1.50 0.00 REVIEW PLEADINGS.

11/14/2002 YAA 4.20 0.00 REVIEW NOTES AND PLEADINGS; DRAFT

QUESTIONS FOR BELL

8/19/2002 RBB 1.70 Relator's Share

(Court)
 Page 102
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *89; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

11/13/2002 YAA 1.50 Transitioning

onto case
(Bell)

11/14/2002 YAA 4.20 Transitioning

onto case
(Bell)

[*90]

11/15/2002 YAA 5.40 0.00 REVIEW NOTES AND PLEADINGS; DRAFT

QUESTIONS FOR BELL
REVIEW FALSE CLAIMS ACT TREATISE RE

11/22/2002 YAA 3.10 0.00 PROCEDURE; REVIEW FRCP 9(b) STANDARD;

REVIEW WRIGHT AND MILLER DISCUSSION
OF 9(B) CLAIMS AND NOTED CASES

11/23/2002 YAA 2.20 0.00 REVIEW TREATISE ON FALSE CLAIMS ACT;

REVIEW WRIGHT AND MILLER NOTES ON
FRCP 12; REVIEW CITED CASES

5/23/2006 RBB 3.90 3.60 REVIEW CURRENT DRAFT OF

INTERROGATORY ANSWERS; MEETING WITH
O'CONNOR, TERRY, REECE, AND MILLER (BY
PHONE) TO REVIEW INTERROGATORY
ANSWERS; VOICEMAIL FROM SAUNTRY RE:
 Page 103
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *90; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

SERVICE ON BILHAR AND EXTENSION OF

TIME; TELECON FROM MILLER RE: LETTER
TO DOJ SEEKING SHARE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEEDS; TELECON SAUNTRY RE: SERVICE
ON BILHAR AND EXTENSION OF TIME;
CONFERENCES O'CONNOR RE: DISCOVERY OF
ISSUES.

11/15/2002 YAA 5.40 Transitioning

onto case
(Bell)

11/22/2002 YAA 3.10 Transitioning

onto case
(Bell)

11/23/2002 YAA 2.20 Transitioning

onto case
(Bell)

5/23/2006 RBB 0.30 Relator's Share

(Court)

[*91]
 Page 104
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *91; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

7/5/2006 MMB 11.80 0.00 RESEARCH RE RELEVANCE OF BILL HARBERT

BANK RECORDS TO PROVING CONSPIRACY,
AND TO ESTABLISHING ABILITY TO SATISFY
DAMAGES; DRAFT MOTION TO COMPEL
RELATED INTERROGATORY ANSWER AND
DOCUMENT PRODUCTION; CONFER WITH MR.
GOTTLIEB AND G. REECE RE TASKS
RELATING TO DRAFTING MOTIONS TO
COMPEL.

7/24/2006 MMB 13.80 11.80 TRAVEL TO ATLANTA; REVIEW DOJ

ANTITRUST DOCS; PREP SPREADSHEET FOR
DOCS REVIEWED; CONFER WITH DOJ RE
STRATEGY, REVIEW, SIGNIFICANT DOCS;
CONFER WITH MS. O'CONNOR, MR.
CEDARBAUM, G. REECE RE REVIEW PROCESS.

7/24/2006 JC 10.80 6.00 TRAVEL TO AND FROM ATLANTA (4.8);

REVIEW DOCUMENT INDEXES; REVIEW
DOCUMENTS (6.0)

7/5/2006 MMB 11.80 Solely BLH

(Bell)

7/24/2006 MMB 2.00 Travel

(Court/Bell)
 Page 105
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *91; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

7/24/2006 JC 4.80 Travel

(Bell)

[*92]

7/24/2006 GR 13.50 11.50 TRAVEL TO ATLANTA; REVIEW DOCUMENTS

AT DOJ ANTITRUST DIVISION OFFICES IN
ATLANTA; DISCUSS COPYING SERVICE JOB
WITH VENDOR; PREPARE SPREADSHEET FOR
KEEPING TRACK OF DOCUMENT REVIEW
PROGRESS; INPUT RESULTS OF DAY'S
DOCUMENT REVIEW PROGRESS INTO INDEX.

7/27/2006 MMB 15.70 13.70 REVIEW DOJ ANTITRUST DOCS; UPDATE

SPREADSHEET FOR DOCS REVIEWED;
CONFER WITH MS. O'CONNOR, MR.
CEDARBAUM, G. REECE RE REVIEW
PROCESS; TRAVEL BACK TO D.C.

7/27/2006 GR 15.70 13.70 REVIEW DOCUMENTS AT DOJ ANTITRUST

DIVISION OFFICES IN ATLANTA; CONFER
WITH MS. O'CONNOR AND MR. CEDARBAUM
RE: PROGRESS OF DOCUMENT REVIEW;
UPDATE DOCUMENT REVIEW TRACKING
SPREADSHEET; TRAVEL BACK TO
WASHINGTON, D.C. FROM ATLANTA.
 Page 106
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *92; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

7/24/2006 GR 2.00 Travel (Bell)

7/27/2006 MMB 2.00 Travel (Bell)

7/27/2006 GR 2.00 Travel (Bell)

[*93]

7/28/2006 JC 4.20 2.20 MEET WITH MS. O'CONNOR RE: OVERALL

PLANNING; TELEPHONE CALL WITH BELL RE:
CONFERENCE CALL WITH DILLON;
CONFERENCE CALL WITH MS. O'CONNOR
AND MS. MARK RE: COORDINATION; EMAIL
EXCHANGES RE: DISCOVERY; BILHAR
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS;
TRIP TO BIRMINGHAM; DRAFT OUTLINE
FOR CONFERENCE CALL WITH DILLON;
DRAFT "MAP" OF CASE

8/1/2006 NT 0.50 0.00 REVIEW TEAM ELECTRONIC

 Page 107
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *93; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

CORRESPONDENCE; TELEPHONE
CONFERENCE FROM/TO MS. BUNCH/MS.
TILLOTSON REGARDING RESEARCH OF
DEADLINE TO RESPOND TO BILL HARBERT
PETITION TO UNSEAL GRAND JURY
TESTIMONY FILED WITH ELEVENTH CIRCUIT;
REVIEW ELEVENTH CIRCUIT COURT WEBSITE
REGARDING SAME

8/8/2006 JC 7.00 5.00 REVIEW AICI DOCUMENTS AT AKIN GUMP;

EMAIL EXCHANGES RE: VARIOUS
DOCUMENTSS, WITNESS CONTACT INFO;
MEET WITH MR. REECE RE: DRAFT
OPPOSITION TO BILHAR MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT ON PLEADINGS; TEAM MEETING;
TRAVEL TO BIRMINGHAM FOR HC/HII
DOCUMENT REVIEW

7/28/2006 JC 2.00 Travel (Bell)

8/1/2006 NT 0.50 Solely BLH

(Bell)
 Page 108
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *93; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

8/8/2006 JC 2.00 Travel

(Court/Bell)

[*94]

8/8/2006 MG 17.00 14.50 PREPARE FOR AICI DOCUMENT REVIEW;

REVIEW AICI DOCUMENTS AT AKIN GUMP;
TRAVEL FROM AKIN GUMP TO WILMER;
ATTEND WEEKLY MILLER MEETING; FINISH
DRAFTING FORMER TESTIMONY MEMO; FAX
MEMO TO BIRMINGHAM; TRAVEL TO
NATIONAL AIRPORT; TRAVEL DCA - CLT -
BHM; REVISE FORMER TESTIMONY MEMO;
REVIEW MASTER DOCUMENT MEMO TO
PREPARE FOR HARBERT DOC REVIEW;
TRAVEL FROM BHM AIRPORT TO
SHERATON; PRINT AND SEND FORMER
TESTIMONY MEMO TO MR. CEDARBAUM.

8/10/2006 JC 6.50 4.50 REVIEW HC/HII DOCUMENTS; RETURN

TRAVEL FROM BIRMINGHAM; REVIEW
REVISED OPPOSITION TO BILHAR MOTION
FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

8/10/2006 MG 11.20 8.70 COMPLETE HARBERT DOCUMENT REVIEW;

TRAVEL TO AIRPORT; TRAVEL FROM BHM
 Page 109
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *94; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

TO CLT TO DCA; TRAVEL FROM AIRPORT

HOME; WHILE TRAVELING, REVIEW, CLEAN
UP, REVISE NOTES / REPORT FROM
DOCUMENT REVIEW; RESEARCH
ADDITIONAL CASE LAW ON
AUTHENTICATION OF PRIOR TRIAL EXHIBITS
QUESTION.

8/8/2006 MG 2.50 2.00 Travel

(Bell) + 0.50
Local Travel
(Court)

8/10/2006 JC 2.00 Travel (Bell)

8/10/2006 MG 2.50 2.00 Travel

(Bell) + 0.50
Local Travel
(Court)
 Page 110
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *94; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

[*95]

8/25/2006 MG 11.50 10.50 PREPARE FOR AICI DEPOSITION; TRAVEL TO

AND FROM AND ATTEND AICI DEPOSITION;
DISCUSS DEPOSITION WITH MR. CEDARBAUM
AND MS. O'CONNOR; PROOFREAD REVISED
MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER REPLY;
ASSIST IN FILING OF REPLY; WRITE COVER
LETTER AND SEND COPIES OF RECENT
FILINGS TO COMPLY WITH SERVICE
REQUIREMENTS

9/14/2006 MMB 18.70 14.70 TRAVEL TO ATLANTA; REVIEW BHIC

DOCUMENTS; TRAVEL TO DC; REVIEW
CONTRACT 29 DOCUMENTS AND OUTLINE FOR
MEETING WITH GORDON LANG

9/14/2006 JC 11.50 9.50 TRAVEL TO ATLANTA TO REVIEW DOCUMENTS

AT TROUTMAN SANDERS; REVIEW DOCUMENTS;
CONF CALL WITH MS. O'CONNOR, MR.
GOTTLIEB RE: NICHOLS DEPOSITION

8/25/2006 MG 1.00 Local Travel

(Bell)
 Page 111
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *95; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

9/14/2006 MMB 4.00 Travel

(Court/Bell)

9/14/2006 JC 2.00 Travel

(Court/Bell)

[*96]

9/14/2006 JMO 7.90 7.00 MEETING WITH MR. REECE ET AL RE FRUCON

DEPOSITIONS; CONFER WITH MR. CEDARBAUM
RE DOCS IN ATLANTA AND OTHER ISSUES;
REVIEW MR. MINER'S CORRESPONDENCE;
EMAILS TO MR. MORGAN AND MS. MARK RE
SAME; MESSAGES TO DRINKER BIDDLE RE
VARIOUS ISSUES; CONFER WITH EXPERT RE
EXPERT ISSUES; REVIEW NEW DISCOVERY
ORDER, EMAILS RE SAME AND RE APPEAL OF
SAME; REVIEW MR. MINER'S
CORRESPONDENCE RE RELATOR'S SHARE;
EMAILS WITH TEAM RE SAME; EMAIL WITH
CO-COUNSEL RE SAME; CONFER WITH MR.
GOTTLIEB RE NICHOLS DEPOSITION; CONFER
WITH MR. CEDARBAUM RE NICHOLS
DEPOSITION AND STAFFING ISSUES; CONFER
WITH MR. REECE RE FILING NOTICE OF
DISMISSAL; CONFER AND EMAILS MR. LANG
RE NOTICE OF DISMISSAL; EMAILS MS.
MARK RE LANG MEETING; EDIT NOTICE OF
DISMISSAL; PREPARE FOR LANG MEETING.
 Page 112
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *96; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

9/14/2006 JMO 0.90 Relator's Share

(Court)

[*97]

9/15/2006 JC 9.00 7.00 REVIEW DOCUMENTS AT TROUTMAN SANDERS;

REVISE, OVERSEE SERVICE OF BILHAR
30(B)(6) NOTICE; CONF CALL WITH MS.
O'CONNOR, MR. MORGAN, MS. MARK RE:
NICHOLS DEPOSITION, WITNESS
INTERVIEWS; MEET WITH MS. SAUNTRY RE:
DOCUMENT MREVIEW; TRAVEL BACK FROM
ATLANTA

9/16/2006 RBB 0.10 0.00 EMAILS TO AND FROM MS. O'CONNOR

 Page 113
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *97; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

REGARDING DOCUMENTS SHOWING RELATORS

SHARE

9/16/2006 JMO 4.50 4.20 EMAILS WITH MR REECE ET AL RE

TRANSCRIPTS, FRUCON ISSUES, EMAILS
WITH MR. CEDARBAUM ET AL RE RELATOR'S
SHARE REQUESTS BY DEFENDANTS, EMAILS
WITH MR. BELL AND MR. SHAPIRO RE DOJ
STAFFING ISSUES, PREPARE FOR FRUCON
DEPOSITIONS.

9/15/2006 JC 2.00 Travel

(Court/Bell)

9/16/2006 RBB 0.10 Relator's Share

(Court)

9/16/2006 JMO 0.30 Relator's Share

(Court)

[*98]
 Page 114
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *98; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

9/17/2006 GR 9.80 9.30 REVIEW DOCUMENTS AND PREPARE SUMMARIES

OF ANTITRUST SIGNIFICANT DOCUMENTS;
REVIEW R. BELL'S FILES FOR DOCUMENTS
RE: RELATOR'S SHARE; SEND E-MAIL
SUMMARIZING CONVERSATION WITH WITNESS
F; RESPOND TO E-MAIL QUESTIONS FROM
OTHER TEAM MEMBERS; PREPARE
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SCANNING OF KWAJALIEN
PROCEEDING TRANSCRIPTS; SEARCH FOR
MISSING PLEADINGS.

9/18/2006 JMO 14.80 10.30 TRAVEL TO LONDON AND LOCAL TRAVEL RE

SAME FOR FRUCON DEPOSITIONS; PREPARE
FOR DEPOSITIONS ON PLANE; CONFER WITH
MS. MARK AND MR. MORGAN AND MR. GREEN
RE LOGISTICS; CONFER WITH MR. REECE
AND MS. MOORE RE FRUCON DOCUMENTS;
CONFER WITH MR. CEDARBAUM RE VARIOUS
DEVELOPMENTS.

9/17/2006 GR 0.50 Relator's Share

(Court)

9/18/2006 JMO 4.50 4.00 Travel

(Bell) + 0.50
Local Travel
(Court)
 Page 115
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *98; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

[*99]

9/18/2006 GR 9.00 8.00 ARRANGE FOR SCANNING OF TRANSCRIPTS;

ARRANGE FOR REVIEW OF USAID HOT
DOCUMENTS FOR REFERENCES TO UPCOMING
DEPONENTS; DRAFT SUMMARIES OF
DOCUMENTS; SUPERVISE K. KENYON IN
COMPLETION OF DOCUMENTS BINDERS;
ATTEND CONFERENCE CALL WITH EXPERT RE:
B+B DEPOSITION ISSUES; REVIEW
DOCUMENTS RE: RELATOR'S SHARE AND E-
MAIL TO TEAM MEMBERS WITH SUMMARY OF
DOCUMENTS; SEARCH DATABASE FOR
DOCUMENTS TO PROVIDE TO EXPERTS.

9/19/2006 JMO 14.80 14.30 MEETINGS WITH MR. MORGAN AND MS. MARK;
PREPARE FOR FRUCON WITNESS INTERVIEWS,
PREPARE FOR FRUCON DEPOSITIONS, LOCAL
TRAVEL, MEETING WITH MR. GREEN RE
FRUCON DEPOSITIONS, CONFER WITH MR.
KLEIN RE APPEALING MOTION TO COMPEL
ORDER, CONFER WITH MR. MORGAN AND MR.
BELL RE MBI CASE.

9/21/2006 JMO 17.30 12.80 PREPARATION FOR KAUS DEPOSITION;

PARTICIPATE IN KAUS DEPOSITION;
MEETINGS WITH KAUS ATTORNEYS; MEETINGS
WITH DOJ ATTORNEYS; LOCAL TRAVEL TO
AND FLIGHT BACK TO DC.
 Page 116
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *99; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

9/18/2006 GR 1.00 Relator's Share

(Court)

9/19/2006 JMO 0.50 Local Travel

(Court)

9/21/2006 JMO 4.50 4.00 Travel

(Court/Bell +
0.50 Local
Travel (Court)

[*100]

9/25/2006 NT 10.00 9.50 REVIEW TEAM ELECTRONIC CORRESPONDENCE;

TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH MR.
CEDARBAUM REGARDING REQUEST FOR DRAFTS
OF NOTICE OF DEPOSITIONS AND SUBPOENAS
 Page 117
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *100; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

FROM GOV., TO HALL, HILL, LALOR AND

HOOVER; REVIEW AND EDIT NOTICE OF
DEPOSITION AND SUBPOENA TO WITNESS D
TO REFLECT IT BEING SERVED BY GOV.;
MEET AND CONFER WITH MS. O'CONNOR TO
OBTAIN SIGNATURE ON SAME; TELEPHONE
CONFERENCE WITH CAPITAL PROCESS
SERVERS REQUESTING PICK UP OF JONES
SUBPOENA (CANCELLED REQUEST);
TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH MS. HENIFIN
AND MS. TREACY FROM BUCHANAN INGERSOLL
REQUESTING CONFERENCE ROOM SET UP FOR
HEMLER INTERVIEW WITH WCPHD AND US.
GOV.: ATTEND TEAM MEETING; TRAVEL
TO/FROM USAID OFFICE TO MEET AND
CONFER WITH MR. NICHOLS REGARDING
GOULD INTERVIEW DOCUMENTS

9/25/2006 NT 0.50 Local Travel

(Court)
 Page 118
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *100; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

[*101]

9/26/2006 MMB 22.40 20.40 TRIAL BOOK PREP; HEMLER INTERVIEW

PREP; CONFER WITH MS. O'CONNOR RE
SAME; PARTICIPATE IN HEMLER INTERVIEW;
EDIT LANG SUMMARY MEMO; TRAVEL TO
PRINCETON, N.J.; TRAVEL TO WASHINGTON,
D.C.

9/26/2006 JMO 11.40 9.40 CONFER WITH MR. SHAPIRO AND MR. BELL
RE STRATEGIC ISSUES, PREPARE FOR
HEMLER INTERVIEW, TRAVEL TO AND FROM
HEMLER INTERVIEW AND WORK ON TRAIN ON
PREPARING FOR INTERVIEW AND CONFERENCE
WITH MS. MARK, CONFER WITH MR. LANG RE
SCHEDULING WITNESSES, INTERVIEW MR.
HEMLER, CONFER WITH MR. CEDARBAUM RE
PASKAR DEPOSITION, EMAILS WITH TEAM RE
DISCOVERY ISSUES, REVIEW TRIAL BOOK
DRAFT AND COMMENT ON SAME AND EMAIL
QUESTIONS RE SAME TO TEAM, EDIT BILHAR
MOTION TO COMPEL, EDIT LETTER TO
EWERT, EDIT LETTER TO MURPHY, SCHEDULE
TEAM MEETING, CONFER WITH MR.
CEDARBAUM RE DEVELOPMENTS.

9/26/2006 MMB 2.00 Travel (Court)

 Page 119
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *101; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

9/26/2006 JMO 2.00 Travel (Court)

[*102]

9/29/2006 JMO 13.40 11.40 TRAVEL TO AND FROM TOLEDO TO MEET WITH
MR. NAGEL, INTERVIEW MR. NAGEL, DRAFT
MEMO RE INTERVIEW, CONFER WITH MS.
MARK, MR. MORGAN ET AL RE NAGEL
INTERVIEW AND OTHER TASKS, CONFER WITH
MR. SHAPIRO RE NAGEL INTERVIEW AND
OTHER TASKS, CONFER WITH MR. REECE AND
MS. BUNCH RE VARIOUS ISSUES, EMAILS
WITH MR. GOTTLIEB RE OUTLINES FOR NEXT
WEEK.

10/2/2006 MG 4.00 3.75 REVIEW D LIGHT DOCUMENTS FOR LIGHT

 Page 120
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *102; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

PREP SESSION; TRAVEL TO DOJ; ATTEND

PREPARATION SESSION FOR LIGHT
DEPOSITION; DRAFT SUMMARY OF PREP
SESSION TO TEAM

10/7/2006 JMO 1.30 0.00 EMAILS WITH MSRS. CEDARBAUM, REECE,

BELL AND MS. BUNCH RE HII DEPOSITION,
WITNESS D INTERVIEW, MILLER AND
KITCHENS' DEPOSITIONS, HEMLER
DEPOSITION, BILL HARBERT DEPOSITION
AND ATLANTA DOCUMENTS ISSUES; CONFER
WITH MR. REECE RE MILLER DEPOSITION
AND RESEARCH ISSUES.

9/29/2006 JMO 2.00 Travel (Court)

10/2/2006 MG 0.25 Local Travel

(Court)

10/7/2006 JMO 1.30 Solely BLH

(Bell)
 Page 121
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *102; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

[*103]

10/10/2006 JC 9.00 7.00 TEAM MEETING; TELECON WITH MS. EWERT

RE: WINDLE DEPO; MEET WITH MS.
O'CONNOR, MR. REECE RE: VARIOUS
DISCOVERY ISSUES; FINALIZE PREP FOR HC
30(B)(6) DEPO; TRAVEL TO BIRMINGHAM
FOR 4 DEPOS

10/12/2006 JC 13.00 11.00 TAKE, ATTEND C MILLER, R HARBERT

DEPOS; TRAVEL BACK FROM ATLANTA;
TELECONS WITH MS. O'CONNOR RE: VARIOUS
DISCOVERY ISSUES; VISIT CLERK'S OFFICE
RE: ANDERSON GRAND JURY PETITION; MEET
WITH MS. MARK RE: DISCOVERY ISSUES;
EMAIL EXCHANGES RE: SAME

10/15/2006 RBB 7.80 5.80 PREPARE FOR OLLIS DEPOSITION;

CONFERENCE BUNCH RE: OLLIS DEPOSITION
DOCUMENTS; TRAVEL TO ASHEVILLE, NC

10/15/2006 MMB 10.10 8.10 OLLIS DEPO PREP; REVIEW DOJ DOCS
RECEIVED BY CAROLYN MARK; TRAVEL FROM
WASHINGTON, DC TO ASHEVILLE, NC;
CONFER WITH R. BELL, MR. CEDARBAUM, G.
REECE

10/16/2006 RBB 13.50 11.50 DEPOSE JOHN OLLIS; TELECON O'CONNOR

RE: 2.00 Travel KITCHENS DEPOSITION;
REVIEW LANG INTERVIEW MEMO, HEMLER
INTERVIEW MEMO, AND HEMLER DOCUMENTS;
 Page 122
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RETURN TRAVEL

10/10/2006 JC 2.00 Travel

(Court/Bell)

10/12/2006 JC 2.00 Travel

(Court/Bell)

10/15/2006 RBB 2.00 Travel (Court)

10/15/2006 MMB 2.00 Travel (Court)

10/16/2006 RBB Court)

[*104]
 Page 123
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *104; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

10/16/2006 MMB 15.50 13.50 ATTEND OLLIS DEPO; TRAVEL FROM

ASHEVILLE, NC TO WASHINGTON, DC;
PREP FOR HEMLER DEPO; CONFER WITH
R. BELL RE SAME

10/16/2006 JMO 16.30 14.30 PREPARATION FOR KITCHENS

DEPOSITION, TRAVEL TO SAME, CONFER
WITH TEAM AND CO-COUNSEL RE
VARIOUS DEPOSITIONS AND OUTLINES;
CONFER WITH WITNESS E; MEETING
WITH KENT GARDINER RE WITNESS D
AND DAVIDSON AND CONFER WITH TEAM
RE SAME AND REVIEW OF DOCUMENTS RE
SAME; CONFER WITH KITCHENS'
ATTORNEY; REVIEW OF RESPONSE TO
ANDERSON MOTION; EDIT WENDORFF
MOTION; EMAILS AND CONFER RE OLLIS
DEPOSITION; EMAILS AND CONFER RE
WITNESS E CORRESPONDENCE

10/16/2006 GR 13.70 11.70 PREPARE TOMMY KITCHENS DEPOSITION

OUTLINE; PREPARE OTHER MATERIALS
TO TAKE TO ORLANDO; TRAVEL TO
ORLANDO FOR TOMMY KITCHENS
DEPOSITION

10/16/2006 MMB 2.00 Travel (Court)

10/16/2006 JMO 2.00 Travel (Court)

 Page 124
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *104; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

10/16/2006 GR 2.00 Travel (Court)

[*105]

10/17/2006 MB 11.60 8.60 TERRY WINDLE DEPOSITION PREP.;TOMMY

KITCHENS' DEPOSITION PREP.; BHIC 30(B)(6)
DEPOSITION PREP.; REVIEW TOMMY
KITCHENS' NOTES FOR EVIDENCE OF
CHARLIE DAVIDSON AND JOHNNY JONES'
CONFRONTATION OF BILL HARBERT ABOUT
RIGGED BIDS
10/18/2006 JC 12.00 10.00 PREPARE FOR BHIC 30(B)(6) AND ALAN HALL
DEPOSITIONS; REVISE LETTER RE: WITNESS E
SUBPOENA; TELECONS WITH MS. O'CONNOR,
MR. SHAPIRIO RE: SAME; WORK ON OTHER
DISCOVERY MATTERS; TRAVEL TO
BIRMINGHAM FOR DEPOSITIONS; FINISH
PREPARATIONS FOR BHIC 30(B)(6)
DEPOSITION
 Page 125
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *105; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

10/18/2006 MG 16.00 11.00 TRAVEL FROM WILMER - BWI - BHM -

OPELEIKA, ALABAMA; COMPLETE VAN
HOOVER OUTLINE; PREPARE FOR WINDLE
DEPOSITION; DRAFT CORRESPONDENCE;
CONFER WITH TEAM RE DEPOSITIONS AND
DISCOVERY MATTERS; CONFER WITH MR.
BAUMGARTNER RE: MOTIONS; REVIEW
DRAFT MOTIONS

10/17/2006 MB 3.00 Solely BLH

(Bell)

10/18/2006 JC 2.00 Travel

(Court/Bell)

10/18/2006 MG 5.00 Travel (Bell)

[*106]
 Page 126
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *106; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

10/18/2006 JMO 18.20 13.20 PREPARE FOR AND TAKE

KITCHENS DEPOSITION,
TRAVEL ORLANDO TO
OPELIKA, CONFER AND
EMAILS CO-COUNSEL RE
DEPOSITIONS, EDIT
CORRESPONDENCE TO
OPPOSING COUNSEL, MEET
AND CONFER OPPOSING
COUNSEL RE VARIOUS
MOTIONS AND ISSUES
10/18/2006 GR 15.00 13.00 PREPARE FOR TOMMY
KITCHENS DEPOSITION;
ATTEND TOMMY KITCHENS
DEPOSITION; TRAVEL
BACK TO WASHINGTON,
DC FROM ORLANDO
10/19/2006 JMO 16.30 14.30 PREPARE FOR WINDLE
DEPOSITION; WINDLE
DEPOSITION; TRAVEL
TO BIRMINGHAM; PREPARE
FOR VAN HOOVER DEPOSITION;
CONFER WITH JUDGE ACKER'S
CLERK; PREPARE FOR
ORAL ARGUMENT; CONFER
WITH CO-COUNSEL RE
VARIOUS ISSUES;CONFER
WITH OPPOSING COUNSEL
RE VARIOUS ISSUES;
MEET AND CONFER
LEEPER RE ADDITIONAL
EXHIBITS TO RELATOR'S
STATEMENT
 Page 127
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *106; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

10/18/2006 JMO 5.00 Travel (Bell)

10/18/2006 GR 2.00 Travel (Court)

10/19/2006 JMO 2.00 Travel

(Court/Bell)

[*107]
 Page 128
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *107; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

10/20/2006 JC 12.00 10.00 ATTEND HEARING ON MOTION TO QUASH

BILLY HARBERT SUBPOENA; ATTEND VAN
HOOVER DEPOSITION; PREPARE FOR, TAKE
BILLY HARBERT DEPOSITION; WORK ON
OTHER DISCOVERY MATTERS; MEET WITH MS.
O'CONNOR, MR. GOTTLIEB, MR. KLEIN RE:
SAME; TELECONS, EMAIL EXCHANGES RE:
SAME; TRAVEL BACK TO D.C. FROM
BIRMINGHAM

10/20/2006 JMO 11.00 9.00 PREPARE FOR ORAL ARGUMENT AND VAN
HOOVER DEPOSITIONS, VAN HOOVER
DEPOSITION, BILLY HARBERT DEPOSITION,
CONFER WITH CO-COUNSEL RE VARIOUS
ISSUES, CONFER WITH OPPOSING COUNSEL
RE VARIOUS ISSUES, TRAVEL FROM
BIRMINGHAM TO DC

10/21/2006 RBB 16.20 10.20 DEPOSE IATROU; RETURN TRAVEL FROM

LONDON TO DC, REVIEW EMAILS RE: HOOVER
AND LALOR DEPOSITIONS

10/22/2006 MMB 16.00 9.00 PREP FOR SMILIE ANDERSON DEPO; TRAVEL
FROM D.C. TO BOISE, IDAHO

10/23/2006 MMB 17.00 10.00 ATTEND SMILIE ANDERSON DEPO; TRAVEL

FROM BOISE, IDAHO TO D.C.

10/20/2006 JC 2.00 Travel

(Court/Bell)
 Page 129
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *107; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

10/20/2006 JMO 2.00 Travel

(Court/Bell)

10/21/2006 RBB 6.00 Travel (Bell)

10/22/2006 MMB 7.00 Travel (Bell)

10/23/2006 MMB 7.00 Travel (Bell)

[*108]

10/23/2006 MG 16.20 12.70 PREPARE FOR BARNES DEPOSITION; TRAVEL

TO SAN FRANCISCO; CORRESPOND WITH
TEAM; DISCUSS HILL AND BARNES
DEPOSITIONS WITH MR. REECE AND MS.
O'CONNOR

10/23/2006 JMO 15.20 13.20 CONFER WITH CO-COUNSEL AND OPPOSING

COUNSEL RE DISCOVERY MATTERS, REVIEW
DRAFT BRIEFS, PREPARE FOR HILL
DEPOSITION, TRAVEL TO BIRMINGHAM,
CONFER WITH MR GOTTLIEB TO PREPARE FOR
BARNES DEPOSITION
 Page 130
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *108; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

10/23/2006 GR 15.50 13.50 REVIEW AND PREPARE MATERIALS FOR ALF

HILL DEPOSITION; REVISE ALF HILL
DEPOSITION OUTLINE; DISCUSS ALF HILL
DEPOSITION WITH MS. O'CONNOR; TRAVEL
TO BIRMINGHAM FOR ALF HILL DEPOSITION

10/24/2006 MG 13.00 9.50 PREPARE FOR BARNES DEPOSITION; TAKE

BARNES DEPOSITION; RETURN TRAVEL FROM
SAN FRANCISCO TO DC; REVIEW NOTES AND
DRAFT SUMMARY OF DEPOSITION

10/23/2006 MG 3.50 Travel

(Court/Bell)

10/23/2006 JMO 2.00 Travel

(Court/Bell)

10/23/2006 GR 2.00 Travel

(Court/Bell)

10/24/2006 MG 3.50 Travel (Bell)

 Page 131
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *108; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

[*109]

10/24/2006 JMO 16.00 14.00 PREPARE FOR HILL DEPOSITION, TAKE HILL
DEPOSITION, CONFER WITH MS MARK AND
MR REECE RE SAME. CONFER AND EMAILS
WITH MR GOTTLIEB RE BARNES DEPOSITION,
TRAVEL FROM BIRMINGHAM TO DC.

10/24/2006 GR 16.00 14.00 REVISE OUTLINE FOR ALF HILL DEPOSITION;

DISCUSS ISSUES RELATED TO ALF HILL
DEPOSITION; ATTEND ALF HILL DEPOSITION
WITH O'CONNOR; TRAVEL BACK TO D.C.
FROM BIRMINGHAM

10/25/2006 MB 10.80 8.80 PREPARE FOR FRANK KIMBALL DEPOSITION;

REVIEW DOCUMENTS AND PREPARE
POTENTIAL QUESTIONS; FRANK KIMBALL
DEPOSITION PREPARATION SESSION;
TRAVEL FROM D.C.TO HILTON HEAD, SC

10/26/2006 MB 9.30 7.30 FINALIZE FRANK KIMBALL DEPOSITION

OUTLINE; TAKE FRANK KIMBALL
DEPOSITION; WRITE SUMMARY OF SAME;
TRAVEL FROM HILTON HEAD BACK TO D.C.

10/24/2006 JMO 2.00 Travel

(Court/Bell)

10/24/2006 GR 2.00 Travel (Bell)

 Page 132
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *109; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

10/25/2006 MB 2.00 Travel (Bell)

10/26/2006 MB 2.00 Travel

(Court/Bell)

[*110]

11/2/2006 GR 15.80 13.80 PREPARE AND COLLECT DOCUMENTS FOR

FINANCIAL EXPERT; REVIEW DEPOSITIONS
FOR FINANCIAL EXPERT; REVIEW MORRISON-
KNUDSEN DOCUMENTS; PREPARE OUTLINE
FOR DEPOSITION OF BRIEN GOODALE;
DISCUSS DEPOSITION OUTLINE WITH MS.
O'CONNOR AND MR. CEDARBAUM; TRAVEL
TO NASHVILLE; REVIEW TRIAL TRANSCRIPT
OF BRIEN GOODALE AND SMILEY ANDERSON;
REVIEW GRAND JURY TRANSCRIPT OF ROY
ANDERSON

11/3/2006 GR 16.50 14.50 PREPARE DEPOSITION OUTLINE FOR BRIEN

GOODALE; ATTEND AND TAKE DEPOSITION
OF BRIEN GOODALE; TRAVEL FROM
NASHVILLE TO D.C.; REVIEW DEPOSITION
TRANSCRIPT OF RICK MILLER AND
SUMMARIZE RELEVANT PAGES FOR
EXPERTS; PREPARE SUMMARY OF BRIEN
GOODALE DEPOSITION AND E-MAIL TO TEAM
 Page 133
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *110; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

11/2/2006 2.00 Travel (Bell)

11/3/2006 2.00 Travel (Bell)

[*111]

11/7/2006 MT 14.00 13.50 REVIEW TEAM ELECTRONIC

CORRESPONDENCE AND RESPOND
ACCORDINGLY; MEET AND CONFER WITH MS.
KENYON REGARDING DELIVERY AND
QUALITY CHECKING OF DUPLICATED EXPERT
EXHIBIT MATERIAL; TELEPHONE CALLS TO
LANGUAGE INNOVATIONS TO INQUIRE
ABOUT GERMAN TRANSLATIONS, FOLLOW
UP TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH MR.
 Page 134
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *111; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

REECE REGARDING SAME; TELEPHONE

CONFERENCE WITH MR. CEDARBAUM
REGARDING DELIVERY OF DOCUMENTS TO
BE TRANSLATED; MEET AND CONFER WITH
MR. REECE REGARDING ADDITIONAL EXPERT
EXHIBITS AND COMPARISON OF EXPERT
INDEX TO TEAM INDEX; TRAVEL TO, FROM
LANGUAGE INNOVATIONS FOR MEET AND
CONFER WITH MARIELA BUTLER REGARDING
HAND OVER OF DOCUMENTS TO BE
TRANSLATED, MEET AND CONFER WITH MR.
REECE REGARDING SAME; ATTEND TEAM
MEETING REGARDING EXPERT REPORTS;
FINALIZE PRODUCTION OF EXPERT REPORTS
AND EXHIBITS THERETO TO CASE PARTIES

11/7/2006 MT 0.50 Local Travel

(Court)
 Page 135
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *111; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

[*112]

11/20/2006 JMO 14.30 8.30 TRAVEL TO/FROM ST. LOUIS; INTERVIEW

WITNESS J; CATCH UP ON
READING/RESPONDING TO TEAM EMAILS.
12/7/2006 JMO 12.10 11.60 PREPARE FOR, TRAVEL TO/FROM AND
PARTICIPATE IN HEARING.
12/19/2006 MG 9.80 9.30 PREPARE FOR NEWMAN DEPOSITION;
TRAVEL TO/FROM AND CONDUCT NEWMAN
DEPOSITION; REVIEW FILINGS AND EMAILS;
DISCUSS HARBERT U.K. HEARING.

1/23/2007 JMO 11.20 7.20 SET UP MEETINGS RE MOTIONS TO COMPEL

BHIC AND HII; SET UP CONFERENCE RE
AMENDMENT COMPLAINT; EMAIL SCHUBERT
RE MEETING; EMAILS RE DOCUMENT
TRANSLATIONS; CONFER W/ MR. GOTTLIEB
RE AMENDED COMPLAINT; CONFER W/ MR.
SMITH RE C&L DOCUMENT; CONFER W/ MR.
REECE AND MR. BAUMGARTNER RE
WENDORFF DEPOSITION AND DOCUMENTS;
PREPARE FOR WENDORFF DEPOSITION;
EMAILS RE FACCIOLA; EMAILS AND
MESSAGES RE PWC WITNESSES; CONFER W/
MR. ZANE RE WENDORFF DOCUMENTS;
EMAIL GOVERNMENT RE WITNESS F;
TRAVEL TO GERMANY FOR WENDORFF
DEPOSITION.
 Page 136
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *112; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

11/20/2006 JMO 6.00 Travel (Bell)

12/7/2006 JMO 0.50 Local Travel

(Court)
12/19/2006 MG 0.50 Local Travel
(Court)

1/23/2007 JMO 4.00 Travel (Court)

[*113]

1/24/2007 RBB 10.008.50 REVIEW DOCUMENTS RELATED TO KRINGS

AND ICON; DRAFT LIST OF QUESTIONS FOR
CRANDALL; INTERVIEW CRANDALL;
CONFERENCES SMITH RE: INTERVIEW AND
INTERVIEW MEMO; RETURN TRAVEL.
 Page 137
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *113; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

1/24/2007 JMO 16.1011.60 TRAVEL TO GERMANY FOR DEPOSITION;

LOCAL TRAVEL; MEET WITH USAID AGENTS;
MEET WITH GERMAN ATTORNEYS; CONFER
W/ MR. ZANE RE WENDORFF DOCUMENTS;
PREPARE FOR DEPOSITION; CONFER W/ TOM
FINNEGAN, PWC.

1/24/2007 STS 10.108.60 TRAVEL TO METROPARK, NJ WITH MR.

BELL TO CONDUCT INTERVIEW OF BRIAN
CRANDALL (ICON); PREPARE ROUGH DRAFT
OF IMPORTANT NOTES FROM MEETING WITH
BRIAN CRANDALL; COORDINATE WITH
PARALEGAL STAFF RE: PREPARATION OF
C&L DOCS FOR REVIEW WITH MR. GOTTLIEB

1/24/2007 1.50 Travel (Court)

1/24/2007 4.50 4.00 Travel +

0.50 Local
Travel (Court)

1/24/2007 1.50 Travel (Court)

 Page 138
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *113; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

[*114]

1/25/2007 JMO 15.40 15.15 TRAVEL TO AND TAKE AND DEFEND

WENDORFF DEPOSITION; PREPARE FOR SAME
AND PREPARE FOR NEXT DAY; CONFER W/
LOCAL COUNSEL AND USAID AGENTS;
CONFER WITH MR. CEDARBAUM AND MR.
BELL RE VARIOUS ISSUES; EMAILS W/ MR.
SCHUBERT RE UPDATE; EMAILS W/ USAID
AGENTS RE WITNESS SEARCHES.

1/26/2007 JMO 12.10 11.85 LOCAL TRAVEL AND TAKE AND DEFEND
WENDORFF DEPOSITION; EMAIL MR. ZANE RE
SAME.
1/27/2007 JMO 11.10 6.60 LOCAL TRAVEL AND TRAVEL TO US; EMAIL
RE CRANDALL.

1/25/2007 JMO 0.25 Local Travel

(Court)

1/26/2007 JMO 0.25 Local Travel

(Court)

1/27/2007 JMO 4.50 4.00 Travel +

 Page 139
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *114; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

0.50 Local
Travel (Bell)

[*115]

1/31/2007 JMO 8.90 8.65 PREPARE FOR STATUS CONFERENCE;

TRAVEL TO STATUS CONFERENCE; STATUS
CONFERENCE; TRAVEL RETURN; CONFER
WITH MS. WIGMORE RE PLANNING; CONFER
W/ MR. SHAPIRO RE PLANNING; CONFER W/
MR. CEDARBAUM RE PLANNING; REVIEW
LOCAL RULES AND DEPOSITION
DESIGNATION MATERIALS; EDIT AND
CONFER RE AMENDED COMPLAINT AND
MOTION TO FILE SAME; EDIT TALKING
POINTS; CONFER W/ MR. REECE, MR.
BAUMGARTNER AND MR. GOTTLIEB RE
SCHEDULE.

1/31/2007 JMO 0.25 Local Travel

(Court)
 Page 140
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *115; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

[*116]

2/6/2007 NT 11.00 10.75 CONTINUE DRAFTING PRETRIAL STATEMENT

PLAINTIFFS WITNESS LIST; REVIEW
DEPOSITIONS, NOTICES AND SUBPOENAS FOR
DEPONENT RESIDENCY INFORMATION,
ELECTRONIC CORRESPONDENCE WITH MR.
CEDARBAUM REGARDING SAME; MEET, CONFER
AND SUPERVISE MS. PRICE WITH REVIEWING
TRANSCRIPTS FOR EXHIBITS HELD AND
ORDERING COPIES OF SAME FROM COURT
REPORTERS; FORWARD DRAFT OF PRETRIAL
STATEMENT PLAINTIFFS' WITNESS LIST,
WITNESS INTERVIEW LIST AND DEPOSITION
DESIGNATION LIST TO MS. O'CONNOR, MR.
CEDARBAUM AND MR. SHOOK; ELECTRONIC
CORRESPONDENCE WITH MS. CARRINGTON AND
MR. SHOOK REGARDING MS. CARRINGTON'S
REQUEST FOR DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPTS
INFORMATION AND FORWARDING OF TOWSEY
AND BILLY HARBERT, JR. TRANSCRIPTS TO
MS. BARRY, DOJ PARALEGAL; TRAVEL TO
FROM AND TIME SPENT AT FEDERAL
FINGERPRINTING CENTER FOR GOVERNMENT
SECURITY CLEARANCE; EDIT WITNESS LIST
AND PRETRIAL STATEMENT PLAINTIFFS'
WITNESS LIST

2/6/2007 NT 0.25 Local Travel

(Court)
 Page 141
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[*117]

2/19/2007 JMO 15.20 11.20 TRAVEL TO/FROM TOLEDO; INTERVIEW MR.

NAGEL; PREPARE FOR NAGEL MEETING;
CONFER W/ MR. SHAPIRO RE STRATEGY AND
PRETRIAL STATEMENTS; REVIEW
DEPOSITION EXCERPTS; PREPARE FOR
ECKERT CALL RE BRINKMANN DEPOSITION;
WORK ON PRETRIAL STATEMENTS.

2/19/2007 HS 11.20 7.20 PREPARE FOR AND CONDUCT INTERVIEW OF

MR. NAGEL; REVIEW DRAFT VERDICT FORM
AND JURY INSTRUCTIONS; TRAVEL
TO/FROM TOLEDO; EMAIL TO MR. MORGAN

3/15/2007 MG 14.30 14.15 PARTICIPATE IN VARIOUS WITNESS

 Page 142
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *117; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

PREPARATION SESSIONS; REVISE PROOF

OUTLINE; REVIEW DIRECT EXAMINATION
OUTLINES; REVIEW EXHIBIT DESIGNATIONS;
REVIEW AND REVISE GRAPHICS; TRAVEL TO
DOJ AND PARTICIPATE IN
VIDEOCONFERENCE INTERVIEW OF DAVID
WILLIAMS; OTHER MISCELLANEOUS TRIAL
PREPARATION

2/19/2007 JMO 4.00 Travel (Court)

2/19/2007 HS 4.00 Travel (Court)

3/15/2007 MG 0.15 Local Travel

(Court)

[*118]
 Page 143
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *118; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

3/17/2007 NT 13.00 12.90 REVIEW TEAM ELECTRONIC

CORRESPONDENCE; BEGIN GATHERING OF
DOCUMENTS AND DRAFTING OF INDEX FOR
MILLER TRIAL PREPARATION BINDERS IN
PREPARATION FOR CLIENT MEETING PER MR.
BELL'S REQUEST; TRAVEL TO COURT
HOUSE AND ASSIST WITH WORK ROOM SET
UP; SUPERVISE PROJECT ASSISTANTS WITH
WORKLOAD; MEET AND CONFER WITH MR.
REECE REGARDING MILLER RESPONSES TO
DEFENDANTS INTERROGATORIES; MEET AND
CONFER WITH MS. CASWELL REGARDING
PENDING WORK ASSIGNMENTS

3/19/2007 MG 16.60 16.50 PREPARE DOCUMENT BINDERS FOR JURY

SELECTION; PREPARE TO ARGUE MOTIONS IN
LIMINE; TRAVEL TO COURT; ATTEND FIRST
DAY OF TRIAL; PREPARE WITNESSES;
REVIEW DEMONSTRATIVES; RESEARCH
CONSPIRACY ADMISSIONS CASE LAW;
PREPARE TALKING POINTS AND BINDER FOR
MS. O'CONNOR RE: DEFENSE
DEMONSTRATIVES AND CONSPIRACY
ADMISSIONS ARGUMENT

3/17/2007 NT 0.10 Local Travel

(Court)
 Page 144
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *118; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

3/19/2007 MG 0.10 Local Travel

(Court)

[*119]

3/22/2007 NT 11.00 10.80 REVIEW AND MONITOR TEAM ELECTRONIC

CORRESPONDENCE; TRAVEL TO - FROM COURT
HOUSE TO ASSIST WITH WORK ROOM CLEAN
UP; TELEPHONE CONFERENCES WITH MS.
BAYNHAM REGARDING READING OF GRESELIN
AND PENDING TRIAL EXHIBITS TO BE USED;
MEET AND CONFER WITH MS. BUNCH
REGARDING HEMLER TRIAL EXHIBITS; MEET,
CONFER AND ELECTRONIC CORRESPONDENCE
WITH MR. BYRDSONG REGARDING LOADING OF
HEMLER DOCUMENTS INTO TRIAL DIRECTORY;
UPDATE MASTER LIST OF EXHIBITS
ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE; MEET AND
CONFER WITH MS. CASWELL REGARDING
PENDING ASSIGNMENTS
 Page 145
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *119; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

3/22/2007 NT 0.20 Local Travel

(Court)

[*120]

3/27/2007 NT 12.00 11.80 REVIEW TEAM ELECTRONIC

CORRESPONDENCE;
PREPARE SABBIA
STIPULATION COPIES
AND PDF SAME PER MR.
CEDARBAUM'S REQUEST;
TRAVEL TO AND
FROM DISTRICT COURT
AND ASSIST TEAM
WITH TRIAL ROOM SETUP,
PREPARE WORK
ROOM FOR AFTERNOON BREAK;
REVIEW PDX
DEMONSTRATIVE EXHIBITS
FOR NEXT NUMBER AVAILABLE
PER MR. RUSHING;
UPDATE OF MASTER
EXHIBITS ADMITTED
 Page 146
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *120; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

LIST; MEET WITH AND

SUPERVISION OF
PROJECT ASSISTANTS;
MEET AND CONFER
WITH MS. DAVIS
REGARDING TRIAL
TRANSCRIPTS

3/27/2007 NT 0.20 Local Travel

(Court)
 Page 147
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *120; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

[*121]

3/28/2007 NT 15.00 14.80 REVIEW TEAM ELECTRONIC

CORRESPONDENCE; PREPARE EXHIBITS AND
GATHER WITNESS DOCUMENTS; TRAVEL TO
AND SET UP OF COURT WORK ROOM; ASSIST
TRIAL TEAM WITH COURT ROOM SET UP;
EDIT BRINKMANN DESIGNATIONS TO ADD
HC/HII COUNTER DESIGNATIONS,
ELECTRONIC CORRESPONDENCE WITH MR.
RUSHING AND MR. BAUMGARTNER
REGARDING SAME; MEET AND CONFER WITH
MR. SMITH REGARDING BOOTH DOCUMENTS;
MEET AND CONFER WITH MR. REECE
REGARDING MILLER DIRECT EXAMINATION
EXHIBITS; TRAVEL TO COURT HOUSE FOR
AFTERNOON DELIVERY OF EXHIBITS TO BE
USED; MEET AND CONFER WITH PROJECT
ASSISTANTS REGARDING TOWSEY
DESIGNATION COPIES NEEDED IN COURT PER
MS. O'CONNOR'S REQUEST; ASSIST TRIAL
TEAM WITH COURT ROOM AND COURT WORK
ROOM CLEAN UP; REVIEW AND EDIT MASTER
EXHIBITS ADMITTED LIST; MEET AND
CONFER WITH MS. CASWELL, MR. RUSHING
AND MR. CULTICE REGARDING PENDING
WITNESS PREPARATION; MEET AND CONFER
WITH MR. CEDARBAUM REGARDING
WENDORFF

3/28/2007 NT 0.20 Local Travel

(Court)
 Page 148
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *121; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

[*122]

3/29/2007 NT 15.00 14.90 REVIEW TEAM ELECTRONIC CORRESPONDENCE;

PREPARE DOCUMENTS FOR COURT; TRAVEL TO
AND ASSIST WITH COURT ROOM AND COURT
WORK ROOM SET UP; ATTEND TRIAL AND
ASSIST TRIAL TEAM AT COURT; MONITOR
ELECTRONIC CORRESPONDENCE; PREPARE
HOOVER EXHIBITS FOR PENDING HOOVER
DIRECT; UPDATE MASTER EXHIBITS
ADMITTED LIST; MEET AND CONFER WITH
TEAM MEMBERS REGARDING UPDATES TO
 Page 149
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *122; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

WITNESS FILES; SUPERVISE PA STAFF WITH

CASE PROJECTS; MEET AND CONFER WITH
MS. CASWELL REGARDING PENDING
ASSIGNMENTS

4/3/2007 NT 12.00 11.90 REVIEW TEAM ELECTRONIC CORRESPONDENCE;

PREPARE DAILY COURT DOCUMENTS FOR
COURT; TRAVEL TO AND SET UP OF COURT
WORK ROOM AND COURT ROOM; ATTEND TRIAL
AND ASSIST TRIAL TEAM; PACK UP COURT
ROOM; UPDATE MASTER EXHIBITS ADMITTED
LIST AND FORWARD TO TEAM; MEET AND
CONFER WITH MR. RUSHING REGARDING
TOWSEY AND MASHBURN EXHIBITS;
SUPERVISE PROJECT ASSISTANTS

3/29/2007 NT 0.10 Local Travel

(Court)

4/3/2007 NT 0.10 Local Travel

(Court)
 Page 150
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *122; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

[*123]

4/4/2007 NT 13.00 12.90 REVIEW TEAM ELECTRONIC

CORRESPONDENCE; PREPARE FURTHER
EXHIBITS FOR MASHBURN TESTIMONY;
REVIEW AND PRINT OUT MASTER ADMITTED
EXHIBIT LIST FOR COURT; TRAVEL TO AND
ASSIST WITH COURT ROOM SET UP; ASSIST
AND ATTEND TO TRIAL TEAM AT COURT;
ASSIST WITH PACK UP OF COURT ROOM;
ATTEND TEAM MEETING; UPDATE MASTER
ADMITTED EXHIBIT LIST AND DISTRIBUTE TO
TEAM; PREPARE MASHBURN EXHIBITS FOR
REDIRECT; ELECTRONIC CORRESPONDENCE
WITH MR. RUSHING REGARDING PENDING
PROJECTS; MONITOR OF TEAM ELECTRONIC
CORRESPONDENCE

4/4/2007 NT 0.10 Local Travel

(Court)
 Page 151
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *123; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

[*124]

4/5/2007 NT 12.00 11.90 REVIEW TEAM ELECTRONIC

CORRESPONDENCE; TRAVEL TO AND
PREPARE TRIAL TEAM AND COURT
ROOM; ATTEND AND ASSIST TRIAL
TEAM DURING TRIAL; PACK UP OF
COURT ROOM AND TRIAL TEAM
MATERIAL; PREPARE PENDING
EXHIBITS; SUPERVISE PROJECT
ASSISTANTS ON CREATION OF
CROSS WITNESS BINDERS; MEET
AND CONFERS WITH MS. CASWELL
AND MR. RUSHING REGARDING
PENDING PROJECTS; MONITOR TEAM
ELECTRONIC CORRESPONDENCE

4/6/2007 GR 14.80 10.80 REVISE OUTLINE AND PREPARE

DOCUMENTS FOR MIKE GWYN
INTERVIEW; TRAVEL TO AND FROM
CHARLOTTE FOR GWYN INTERVIEW;
DRAFT MEMORANDUM RE: INTERVIEW
OF MIKE GWYN; RESEARCH ISSUE
RE: ALF HILL.
 Page 152
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *124; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

4/5/2007 NT 0.10 Local Travel

(Court)

4/6/2007 GR 4.00 Travel

(Court/Bell)

[*125]

4/9/2007 NT 10.00 9.90 MONITOR OF ELECTRONIC

CORRESPONDENCE; PREPARE DOCUMENTS
FOR COURT; TRAVEL TO COURT AND ASSIST
WITH PACKING OF COURT MATERIAL; MEET
AND CONFER WITH MS. CASWELL
REGARDING PROJECT ASSISTANT
WORKLOAD; MEET AND CONFER WITH MR.
RUSHING REGARDING PENDING
ASSIGNMENTS; REVIEW AND UPDATE
MASTER ADMITTED EXHIBITS LIST,
FORWARD SAME TO TEAM; SUPERVISE
 Page 153
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *125; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

PROJECT ASSISTANTS WITH PENDING

WITNESS BINDERS

4/10/200 NT 12.00 11.90 REVIEW TEAM ELECTRONIC

CORRESPONDENCE; PREPARE DOCUMENTS
FOR COURT SESSION; TRAVEL TO AND
ASSIST WITH COURT ROOM SET UP; PREPARE
HILL PHOTO EXHIBITS AND SUPERVISE
PROJECT ASSISTANTS REGARDING SAME;
TRAVEL TO AND FROM COURT TO ASSIST
WITH AFTERNOON SESSION; REVIEW
PLAINTIFF'S TRIAL EXHIBIT LIST; UPDATE
MASTER ADMITTED EXHIBIT LIST; MONITOR
OF TEAM ELECTRONIC CORRESPONDENCE

4/9/2007 NT 0.10 Local Travel

(Court)

4/10/200 NT 0.10 Local Travel

(Court)
 Page 154
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *125; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

[*126]

4/11/2007 NT 12.00 11.80 PREPARE DOCUMENTS FOR TODAYS COURT

SESSION; TRAVEL TO AND ASSIST WITH
COURT ROOM SET UP; TELEPHONE
CONFERENCES, MEET AND CONFERS WITH
MR. HEFFEL REGARDING BOUTWELL AND
INSURANCE DOCUMENT RESEARCH IN
CPORT; REVIEW TRIAL TRANSCRIPTS VIA
LIVENOTE; TRAVEL TO AND ASSIST WITH
PACK UP OF COURT ROOM AND WORK ROOM
SPACE; ATTEND TEAM MEETING; MEET AND
CONFER WITH MR. GOTTLIEB REGARDING
REDACTION OF HII'S RESPONSES TO
RELATORS FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES,
MEET AND CONFER WITH MS. BROWN
REGARDING SAME; SUPERVISE PROJECT
ASSISTANTS AND TEMPORARY ASSISTANTS
REGARDING PENDING WITNESS
PREPARATION MATERIAL; UPDATE MASTER
ADMITTED EXHIBITS LIST; MEET AND
CONFER WITH MR. RUSHING REGARDING
BURLES EXHIBITS AND PENDING WITNESS
PREPARATION

4/11/2007 NT 0.20 Local Travel

(Court)
 Page 155
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *126; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

[*127]

4/12/2007 NT 12.00 11.90 PREPARE COURT DOCUMENTS FOR TODAYS

COURT SESSION; TRAVEL TO AND ASSIST
WITH COURT ROOM SET UP; REVIEW AND
ORGANIZE BURLES EXHIBITS; REVIEW APRIL
11, 2007 TRIAL TRANSCRIPT AND COMPARE
NOTED EXHIBITS TO MASTER ADMITTED
EXHIBITS LIST; TRAVEL TO COURT HOUSE
AND ASSIST WITH REMOVAL OF COURT
DOCUMENTS AND CLEAN UP OF WORK
ROOM; MEET AND CONFER WITH MR.
RUSHING REGARDING PROJECT ASSISTANT
WORKLOAD AND SCHEDULING; UPDATE
MASTER ADMITTED EXHIBITS LIST;
 Page 156
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *127; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

ELECTRONIC CORRESPONDENCE TO AM
COURT REPORTER REGARDING
DISCREPANCIES FOUND ON APRIL 11, 2007 AM
TRIAL TRANSCRIPT; SUPERVISE PROJECT
ASSISTANTS REGARDING WITNESS
PREPARATION MATERIALS; MEET AND
CONFER WITH MS. CASWELL REGARDING
TODAYS COURT SESSION; MONITOR TEAM
ELECTRONIC CORRESPONDENCE

4/12/2007 NT 0.10 Local Travel

(Court)

[*128]
 Page 157
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *128; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

4/13/2007 NT 11.50 11.40 REVIEW TEAM ELECTRONIC CORRESPONDENCE;

PREPARE EXHIBIT LISTS AND TRANSCRIPTS
FOR TODAYS COURT SESSION; TRAVEL TO
AND ASSIST WITH COURT ROOM SET UP;
DELIVER DOCUMENTS TO COURT ROOM ON
DAILY BASIS; REVIEW TRANSCRIPTS IN
LIVENOTE; REVIEW AND EDIT ADMITTED
EXHIBIT LIST; SUPERVISE PROJECT
ASSISTANT TEAM; MEET AND CONFER AND
ELECTRONIC CORRESPONDENCE WITH MS.
CASWELL REGARDING UPDATES OF DOCUMENT
REQUESTS FROM COURT; ORGANIZE PLEADING
DOCUMENTS AT COURT HOUSE WORK ROOM;
ATTEND TRIAL AND ASSIST WITH COURT
ROOM CLEAN UP; MONITOR TEAM ELECTRONIC
CORRESPONDENCE

4/13/2007 NT 0.10 Local Travel

(Court)
 Page 158
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *128; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

[*129]

4/18/2007 NT 12.00 11.90 REVIEW TEAM ELECTRONIC

CORRESPONDENCE; ASSIST MR. GOTTLIEB
WITH WILLIAMS EXHIBIT DOCUMENTS;
TRAVEL TO AND ASSIST WITH SET UP OF
COURT ROOM; ATTEND TRIAL AND ASSIST
TRIAL TEAM; PACK UP COURT ROOM;
\SUPERVISE PROJECT ASSISTANTS
REGARDING ATTORNEY REQUESTS; REVIEW
PLAINTIFFS AND DEFENDANTS EXHIBIT LISTS
AND UPDATE ADMITTED EXHIBIT LIST;
MONITOR TEAM ELECTRONIC
CORRESPONDENCE AND RESPOND
ACCORDINGLY

4/19/2007 NT 12.00 11.90 REVIEW TEAM ELECTRONIC

CORRESPONDENCE; ASSIST WITH
PREPARATION OF MCCUE CROSS EXHIBITS;
TRAVEL TO AND ASSIST WITH COURT ROOM
SET UP; ATTEND TRIAL AND ASSIST TRIAL
TEAM; ASSIST WITH PACK UP AND
UNLOADING OF COURT PRODUCTION;
REVIEW ADMITTED EXHIBIT LIST; SUPERVISE
PROJECT ASSISTANTS REGARDING
ATTORNEY REQUESTS; MONITOR TEAM
ELECTRONIC CORRESPONDENCE AND
RESPOND ACCORDINGLY

4/18/2007 NT 0.10 Local Travel

(Court)
 Page 159
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *129; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

4/19/2007 NT 0.10 Local Travel

(Court)

[*130]

4/20/2007 NT 12.00 11.90 REVIEW TEAM ELECTRONIC

CORRESPONDENCE; ASSIST WITH
PASKAR AND PLEADING PRINT OUTS
FOR TRIAL TEAM REVIEW; TRAVEL
TO AND SET UP OF COURT ROOM;
ATTEND TRIAL AND ASSIST TRIAL
TEAM; MEET AND CONFER WITH
COURT DEPUTY CLERK REGARDING
FORMAT OF PLAINTIFFS EXHIBITS
4/30/2007 NT 14.00 13.90 TO BE USED BY JUDGE AND JURY
 Page 160
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *130; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

DURING DELIBERATIONS REVIEW

TEAM ELECTRONIC
CORRESPONDENCE; PREPARE
DOCUMENTS FOR COURT; TRAVEL TO
AND ASSIST TEAM DURING TRIAL;
PACK UP OF COURT MATERIAL;
DOWNLOAD DEFENDANTS' CLOSING
DEMONSTRATIVES TO L DRIVE;
REVIEW AND PRINT OUT PARTIES
5/1/2007 NT 12.00 11.90 CLOSING DEMONSTRATIVES IN
PREPARATION FOR COURT; MONITOR
ELECTRONIC CORRESPONDENCE
REVIEW TEAM ELECTRONIC
CORRESPONDENCE; TRAVEL TO,
ATTEND AND ASSIST TRIAL TEAM
DURING CLOSING ARGUMENTS; MEET
AND CONFER WITH MR. RUSHING
REGARDING PENDING CASE
ASSIGNMENTS

4/20/2007 NT 0.10 Local Travel

(Court)

4/30/2007 NT 0.10 Local Travel

(Court)
 Page 161
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *130; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

5/1/2007 NT 0.10 Local Travel

(Court)

[*131]

5/2/2007 NT 12.00 11.90 REVIEW TEAM ELECTRONIC

CORRESPONDENCE; ASSIST MR. CEDARBAUM
WITH CD COPY REQUESTS OF PROPOSED
JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND PLAINTIFFS
OPPOSITIONS TO DEFENDANTS JURY
INSTRUCTIONS; TRAVEL TO AND ASSIST
WITH COURT ROOM SET UP; ASSIST TRIAL
TEAM; PACK UP OF COURT ROOM

5/4/2007 MG 4.40 4.30 RESEARCH VERDICT FORM LAW; TRAVEL TO

AND ATTEND FINAL DAY OF TRIAL; DISCUSS
POST-TRIAL WORK
5/7/2007 MG 2.00 1.80 TRAVEL TO/FROM COURT TO ATTEND
SESSION FOR JUROR QUESTION ANSWER
5/14/2007 MG 4.50 4.30 REVIEW COUNTERCLAIM INSTRUCTIONS AND
MTD; TRAVEL TO/FROM COURT FOR
VERDICT; ATTEND COURT SESSION RE:
VERDICT
5/14/2007 JMO 1.80 1.60 TRAVEL TO AND FROM AND ATTEND COURT
 Page 162
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *131; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **183

FOR VERDICT.

TOTAL 1,047.00

5/2/2007 NT 0.10 Local Travel

(Court)

5/4/2007 MG 0.10 Local Travel

(Court)

5/7/2007 MG 0.20 Local Travel

(Court)
5/14/2007 MG 0.20 Local Travel
(Court)

5/14/2007 JMO 0.20 Local Travel

(Court)

TOTAL 288.50

dedicated to non-compensable tasks and to counter

unreasonable and/or excessive billing:
APPENDIX [**184] III
[*132] Clerical Tasks (non-compensable)
The Court has determined the following,
comprehensive reductions are necessary to exclude time

Attorney Hours 0.5 %

 Page 163
575 F. Supp. 2d 2, *132; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62500, **184

Paralegal Hours 5.0 %

Ambiguous Time Entries 10.0 %

Block Billing 10.0 %
Inefficient Staffing 5.0 %