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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1094110942 OF 2013
VERSUS
HILLI MULTIPURPOSE COLD
STORAGE PVT. LTD. ……RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO.8343 OF 2014,
CIVIL APPEAL NO.10831084 OF 2016,
CIVIL APPEAL NO.10851086 OF 2016,
CIVIL APPEAL NO.4473 OF 2016,
CIVIL APPEAL NO.6095 OF 2016,
CIVIL APPEAL NO.5485 OF 2016,
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1964 OF 2020,
[ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION [C] NO.20748 OF 2016]
CIVIL APPEAL NO.10127 OF 2016,
CIVIL APPEAL NO.10129 OF 2016,
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1968 OF 2020,
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
JAYANT KUMAR ARORA
[ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION [C] NO.29264 OF 2016]
Date: 2020.03.04
16:55:50 IST
Reason:
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1969 OF 2020,
[ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION [C] NO.31190 OF 2016]
2
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1970 OF 2020,
[ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION [C] NO.36048 OF 2016]
CIVIL APPEAL NO.10333 OF 2016,
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1971 OF 2020,
[ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION [C] NO.1300 OF 2017]
CIVIL APPEAL NO.10858 OF 2016,
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1972 OF 2020,
[ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION [C] NO.35551 OF 2016]
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1973 OF 2020,
[ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION [C] NO.34843 OF 2016]
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1974 OF 2020,
[ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION [C] NO.21388 OF 2017]
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1975 OF 2020,
[ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION [C] NO.13951 OF 2017]
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1976 OF 2020,
[ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION [C] NO.10796 OF 2017]
CIVIL APPEAL NO.780 OF 2017,
CIVIL APPEAL NO.4457 OF 2017,
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1977 OF 2020,
[ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION [C] NO.151 OF 2017]
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1978 OF 2020,
3
[ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION [C] NO.13567 OF 2017]
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1979 OF 2020,
[ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION [C] NO.3128 OF 2017]
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1965 OF 2020
[ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION [C] NO.25849 OF 2016]
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2339 OF 2017,
CIVIL APPEAL NO.4510 OF 2017,
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1980 OF 2020,
[ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION [C] NO.7225 OF 2017]
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1981 OF 2020,
[ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION [C] NO.8435 OF 2017]
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5219 OF 2017,
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1982 OF 2020,
[ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION [C] NO.14346 OF 2017]
CIVIL APPEAL NO.55745575 OF 2017,
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1983 OF 2020,
[ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION [C] NO.10544 OF 2017]
CIVIL APPEAL NO.7100 OF 2017,
CIVIL APPEAL NO.55785579 OF 2017,
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1984 OF 2020,
[ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION [C] NO.13962 OF 2017]
4
CIVIL APPEAL NO.10226 OF 2017,
CIVIL APPEAL NO.12456 OF 2017,
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 198586 OF 2020,
[ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION [C] NO.3631436315 OF 2017]
J U D G M E N T
VINEET SARAN, J.
Leave granted.
2. The reference made to this Constitution Bench relates
to the grant of time for filing response to a complaint under the
provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (for short ‘the
Act’). The first question referred is as to whether Section 13(2)
within 30 days or such extended period, not exceeding 15 days,
District Forum has power to extend the time for filing the
response beyond the period of 15 days, in addition to 30 days.
the commencing point of limitation of 30 days stipulated under
the aforesaid Section.
3. The first question was referred by a two judge Bench of
this Court vide an Order dated 11.02.2016 passed in Civil Appeal
Association (Reg), the relevant portion of which is as under:
however takes a contrary view and
hold that when it comes to power of
the Consumer Fora to extend the
time for filing a reply there is no
such power.
Since the question that falls for
determination here often arises
before the Consumer Fora and
Commissions all over the country it
will be more appropriate if the
conflict is resolved by an
authoritative judgment. Further
since the conflict is between
Benches comprising three Judges
we deem it fit to refer these appeals
to a fiveJudge Bench to resolve the
conflict once and for all. While we do
so we are mindful of the fact that in
the ordinary course a twoJudge
Bench ought to make a reference to
a threeJudge Bench in the first
place but in the facts and
circumstances of the case and
keeping in view the fact that the
conflict is between coordinate
Benches comprising three Judges a
reference to three Judges may not
suffice.”
passed in this very appeal being Civil Appeal No(s).1094110942
of 2013, NIA Vs. Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage Pvt. Ltd, the
relevant portion of the judgment is as under:
7
5. We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties at
length and have carefully gone through the records.
Consumer Protection Act, in paragraph 4, it has been specifically
provided that the Consumer Protection Act is “To provide speedy
machinery is sought to be set up at the district, State and Central
mentions that the Act is “to provide for better protection of the
interests of the consumers”. The nomenclature of this Act also
disposal of consumer disputes and that, it is for the protection
and benefit of the consumer.
Regulations.
the complaint for default or decide
it on merits.
(3) No proceedings complying
with the procedure laid down in
subsections (1) and (2) shall be
called in question in any court
on the ground that the
principles of natural justice
have not been complied with.
1
[(3A) Every complaint shall be
heard as expeditiously as
possible and endeavour shall be
made to decide the complaint
within a period of three months
from the date of receipt of
notice by opposite party where
the complaint does not require
analysis or testing of
commodities and within five
months, if it requires analysis
or testing of commodities:
Provided that no adjournment
shall be ordinarily granted by the
District Forum unless sufficient
cause is shown and the reasons for
grant of adjournment have been
recorded in writing by the Forum:
Provided further that the
District Forum shall make such
orders as to the costs occasioned
by the adjournment as may be
provided in the regulations made
under this Act.
Provided also that in the
event of a complaint being
disposed of after the period so
specified, the District Forum shall
1 Ins. by Act 62 of 2002, sec. 9 (w.e.f. 1532003).
11
2 Ins. by Act 62 of 2002, Sec. 9 (w.e.f. 1532003).
12
7……………….
Section19. Appeals.—Any
person aggrieved by an order made
by the State Commission in
exercise of its powers conferred by
subclause (i) of clause (a) of
section 17 may prefer an appeal
against such order to the National
Commission within a period of
13
Section24A. Limitation period.
(1) The District Forum, the State
Commission or the National
Commission shall not admit a
complaint unless it is filed within
two years from the date on which
the cause of action has arisen.
(2) Notwithstanding anything
contained in subsection (1), a
complaint may be entertained
after the period specified in
subsection (1), if the
complainant satisfies the
District Forum, the State
Commission or the National
Commission, as the case may
be, that he had sufficient cause
14
2005 are reproduced below:
Reg.14. Limitation.
(1) Subject to the provisions of
sections 15, 19 and 24A, the period
of limitation in the following
matters shall be as follows:
(i) Revision Petition shall be
filed within 90 days from the date
of the order or the date of receipt of
the order as the case may be;
(ii) Application for setting aside
the ex parte order under section
22A or dismissal of the complaint
in default shall be maintainable if
filed within thirty days from the
date of the order or date of receipt
of the order, as the case may be;
(iii) An application for review
under subsection (2) of section 22
shall be filed to the National
Commission within 30 days from
16
Reg.26. Miscellaneous.
(1) In all proceedings before the
Consumer Forum, endeavour shall
be made by the parties and their
counsel to avoid the use of
provisions of Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908):
Provided that the provisions
of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 may be applied which have
been referred to in the Act or in the
rules made thereunder.
(2)………………..
(3)………………..
(4)………………..
(5)………………..
(6)………………..”
(emphasis supplied)
17
Question No. 1: Whether the District Forum has power to
days, in addition to 30 days, as envisaged
Protection Act?
8. A bare reading of Section 13(2)(a) of the Act makes it
clear that the copy of the complaint which is to be sent to the
opposite party, is to be with the direction to give his version of (or
response to) the case (or complaint) within a period of 30 days. It
further provides that such period of 30 days can be extended by
the District Forum, but not beyond 15 days.
9. SubSection 2(b)(i) of Section 13 of the Act provides for
opposite party, where allegations contained in the complaint are
denied or disputed by the opposite party. SubSection 2(b)(ii) of
Section 13 of the Act provides that where no response is filed by
the opposite party, the complaint may be decided ex parte on the
basis of evidence brought forth by the complainant.
18
Protection Act further provides that where the complainant fails
to appear on the date of hearing before the District Forum, the
decide it on merits. The aforesaid provision [subSection 2(c)] was
inserted by Act 62 of 2002, w.e.f. 15.03.2003. Similarly, Section
(3A) of Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act, which was also
inserted by Act 62 of 2002, provides for deciding every complaint
receipt of notice by the opposite party, and within five months, if
the complaint requires analysis or testing of commodities. It also
provides that no adjournment shall ordinarily be granted by the
District Forum, and if the same is to be granted, costs may be
imposed, and further that reasons be recorded if the complaint is
disposed of after the time so provided.
Act, the District Forum is to provide speedy disposal of consumer
disputes. The same has been further reiterated by the legislature
by insertion of Section 13(2)(c) and 13(3A) by Act 62 of 2002.
19
contemplates where time can be extended by the District Forum,
and where it is not to be extended. Like, under subSection (3A)
of Section 13, despite the best efforts of the District Forum, in
District Forum at the time of disposing of the complaint. Meaning
intention of the legislature evident that the District Forum is to
make every effort to decide the case expeditiously within time, but
the same can also be decided beyond the said period, but for
reasons to be recorded.
13. On the contrary, subSection (2)(a) of Section 13 of the
Consumer Protection Act provides for the opposite party to give
his response ‘within a period of 30 days or such extended period
not exceeding 15 days as may be granted by the District Forum’.
The intention of the legislature seems to be very clear that the
response. No further discretion of granting time beyond 45 days
is intended under the Act.
complying with the procedure laid down in the subSection (1) and
(2) shall be called in question in any court on the ground that the
Consumer Protection Act, and in such a case, the opposite party
will not be allowed to take the plea that he was not given
Protection Act.
14. The maximum period of 45 days, as provided under the
Consumer Protection Act, would not mean that the complainant
has a right to always avail such maximum period of 45 days to
Regulations, 2005 clearly provides that ordinarily such notice to
the opposite party to file its response shall be issued for a period
depending upon the circumstances of each case.
15. Now, reverting back to the provisions of the Consumer
Section 2(a) of Section 13 granting a maximum period of 15 days
in addition to 30 days has to be read as mandatory or not, we
Protection Act where the legislature intended to allow extension of
period of limitation.
Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act provides for filing
of an appeal from the order of the District Forum to the State
discretion with the State Commission to entertain an appeal filed
after the expiry of the said period of 30 days, if it is satisfied that
there was sufficient cause for not filing it within the stipulated
National Commission beyond the period of 30 days has also been
provided under Section 19 of the Consumer Protection Act.
22
Section 24A provides for the limitation period of 2 years for
gives a discretion to entertain a complaint even after the period of
2 years, if there is a satisfactory cause for not filing the complaint
within such period, which has to be recorded in writing.
16. Regulation 14 of the Consumer Protection Regulations,
2005 also deals with limitation. In addition, the same provides for
limitation while dealing with appeals (under Section 15 and 19)
reasons to be recorded.
17. The legislature in its wisdom has provided for filing of
Protection Act for filing a response to the complaint beyond the
only directory, the provision for further extension of the period for
23
filing the response beyond 45 days would have been provided, as
appeals. To carve out an exception in a specific provision of the
statute is not within the jurisdiction of the Courts, and if it is so
done, it would amount to legislating or inserting a provision into
the statute, which is not permissible.
By specifically enacting a provision under subSection
(3) of Section 13, with a specific clarification that violation of the
principles of natural justice shall not be called in question where
Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act has been followed or
complied with, the intention of the legislature is clear that mere
denial of further extension of time for filing the response (by the
reinforces the time limit specified in Section 13(2)(a) of the Act.
18. This Court in the case of Lachmi Narain vs Union of
India (1976) 2 SCC 953 has held that “if the provision is couched
in prohibitive or negative language, it can rarely be directory, the
use of peremptory language in a negative form is per se indicative
hardship cannot be a ground for changing the mandatory nature
Jaipurai vs Union of India AIR 1962 SC 113=(1962) 2 SCR 880
and Fairgrowth Investments Ltd. Vs Custodian (2004) 11 SCC
472. Hardship cannot thus be a ground to interpret the provision
so as to enlarge the time, where the statute provides for a specific
spirit.
Prakash Sharma (2013) 11 SCC 451 has, in paragraph 23, held
as under:
While concluding, it was observed “that the hardship caused to an
language used therein, is unequivocal.”
Further, it has been held by this Court in the case of
Officer (2013) 10 SCC 765 that the law of limitation may harshly
affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its vigour
when the statute so prescribes and that the Court has no power
to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds, even if the
particular party.
response before it by the opposite party, grave injustice would be
caused as there could be circumstances beyond the control of the
opposite party because of which the opposite party may not be
extended period of 15 days. In our view, if the law so provides,
26
the same has to be strictly complied, so as to achieve the object of
equity can only supplement the law, and not supplant it.
This Court, in the case of Laxminarayan R. Bhattad
“when there is a conflict between law and equity the former shall
this Court held that “Equity and law are twin brothers and law
where the statutory provision is plain and unambiguous, the court
shall not interpret the same in a different manner, only because of
considerations have no place where the statute contained express
statutorily prescribed has to be strictly adhered to and cannot be
relaxed or departed from by equitable considerations.”
27
It is thus settled law that where the provision of the Act
is clear and unambiguous, it has no scope for any interpretation
on equitable ground.
20. It is true that ‘justice hurried is justice buried’. But in
denied’. The legislature has chosen the latter, and for a good
reason. It goes with the objective sought to be achieved by the
the consumer. It is not that sufficient time to file a response to
the complaint has been denied to the opposite party. It is just
that discretion of extension of time beyond 15 days (after the 30
days period) has been curtailed and consequences for the same
Protection Act. It may be that in some cases the opposite party
could face hardship because of such provision, yet for achieving
consumer disputes, hardship which may be caused to a party has
to be ignored.
Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short
28
submission in a suit under the aforesaid provision of the Code,
the same would apply to the filing of response to complaint under
the Consumer Protection Act as well, and hence the provision of
directory and not mandatory.
In this regard, what is noteworthy is that Regulation 26 of
the Consumer Protection Regulation, 2005, clearly mandates that
endeavour is to be made to avoid the use of the provisions of the
Code except for such provisions, which have been referred to in
enumerated in Section 13(4) of the Consumer Protection Act. It is
pertinent to note that nonfiling of written statement under Order
such nonfiling within the time so provided in the Code.
Code, it is noteworthy that Order VIII Rule 1 read with Order VIII
mandatory, but only directory. Order VIII Rule 10 mandates that
29
under Order VIII Rule 1 “the court shall pronounce the judgment
against him, or make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks
indicative of the fact that the discretion is left with the Court to
grant time beyond the maximum period of 120 days, which may
be in exceptional cases. On the other hand, subSection (2)(b)(ii)
of Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act clearly provides for
against the opposite party, if the opposite party omits or fails to
represent his case within the time given.
It may further be noted that in Order VIII Rule 10 of
the Code, for suits filed under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015,
a proviso has been inserted for ‘commercial disputes of a specified
under:
From the above, it is clear that for commercial suits, time for
filing written statement provided under Order VIII Rule 1 is meant
30
to be mandatory, but not so for ordinary civil suits. Similarly, in
our considered view, for cases under the Consumer Protection Act
also, the time provided under Section 13(2)(a) of the Act has to be
read as mandatory, and not directory.
further provided that proceedings complying with the procedure
laid down under sub Section (1) and (2) of Section 13 of the
Consumer Protection Act shall not be called in question in any
Court on the ground that the principles of natural justice have
absolutely clear that the provision of subSection 2(a) of Section
13 of the Act in specifying the time limit for filing the response to
the complaint is mandatory, and not directory.
providing for a time limit for deciding the complaints. From this it
is amply clear that the intention of the legislature was, and has
providing for extension of time for disposal of the cases filed, for
31
discretion to the Forum that wherever necessary, the extension of
the time can be provided for, and where such further extension is
achieve the object of the Act.
210, this Court, was dealing with a case relating to the filing of
written statement under the Code, in respect of a case under the
brought in Order V Rule 1, Order VIII Rule 1 and Order VIII Rule
10 of the Code with regard to ‘commercial disputes of specified
insertion of the Provisos in the aforesaid provisions, this Court
held that “….the clear, definite and mandatory provisions of Order
V read with Order VIII Rule 1 and 10 cannot be circumvented by
opposite of what is stated therein”. It was, thus, held that there
was no scope for enlarging the time for filing of written statement
provision with regard to such suits would be mandatory, and not
directory. The said judgment has been affirmed by a Bench of
in Civil Appeal No.433 of 2020.
(2004) 11 SCC 472, this Court was dealing with the provisions of
the Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in
Securities) Act, 1992, and the question was whether the Special
Court has power to condone the delay in filing the petition under
Section 4(2) of the said Act. While holding, that the said
provision would be mandatory, it was held in paragraph 13 as
under:
Shoes Ltd. vs. Corporation Bank (2002) 6 SCC 33 and Dr. J. J.
33
Court held that “the period for filing an objection in Section 4(2) in
the Act is a mandatory provision given the language of the Section
and having regard to the objects sought to be served by the Act.”
25. Certain other cases, which have been referred to by the
learned Counsel for the parties, have, in our considered opinion,
no direct bearing on the facts and issue involved in the present
case relating to the Consumer Protection Act, and thus, the same
are not being dealt with and considered here.
26. We may now deal with the decisions rendered by this
Court, which have been referred to in the Reference Order.
Bar Association vs. Union of India (2005) 6 SCC 344 on the one
hand.
34
Court, while dealing with the provisions of Section 13(2)(a) of the
Consumer Protection Act, has held that the said provision would
consequence of nonfiling of the response to the complaint within
45 days is provided for in the Consumer Protection Act.
In paragraph 8 of the said judgment, this Court held:
Reasons of the Consumer Protection Act, the legislature provided
justice”, however, the same is to be observed generally, and not
where the same is specifically excluded. In the said judgment,
subSection (3) of Section 13 has neither been referred, nor taken
35
note of. The same mandates that no proceedings complying with
the procedure laid down in subSections (1) and (2) of Section 13
shall be called in question in any Court on the ground that the
principles of natural justice have not been complied with. From
this it is evident that while considering the provisions of Section
13(2)(a) of the Consumer Protection Act, the law mandates that
the principles of natural justice cannot be said to be violated by
adopting the said procedure and that the time of 30 days plus 15
days provided for filing the response to the complaint would be
sufficient and final.
of the view that in the Consumer Protection Act, “no consequence
is provided in case the time granted to file reply exceeds the total
period of 45 days”. While observing so, the Bench did not take
into account the provisions of Section 13(2)(b)(ii) of the Consumer
Protection Act, which provides that where the opposite party fails
provided in Clause (a), “the District Forum shall proceed to settle
the consumer dispute……… on the basis of evidence brought to its
has provided that the District Forum shall proceed to settle the
word “ex parte” has been added by the Amending Act. As we have
observed herein above, the consequence of not filing the response
noticed by the Bench while deciding the aforesaid case.
29. In the case of Kailash vs. Nanhku (supra), this Court
Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code, it held the same to be directory,
and not mandatory. While holding so, the Court was of the view
that “the consequences flowing from nonextension of time are not
present reference before us is under the Consumer Protection Act,
where, as we have already observed, consequences are specifically
provided for.
In passing, in paragraph 35 of the said judgment, the
considered to be directory, and not mandatory. In our view, the
Topline Shoes (supra) since the Court, in the aforesaid case, was
dealing with the provisions of the Code and not the specific
provisions of Consumer Protection Act.
We are thus of the opinion that Kailash vs Nanhku
(supra) with regard to the provision of the Consumer Protection
Act.
Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code and in paragraph 20, it has been
held as under:
Thereafter, the Court proceeded to refer to the provisions of Order
VIII Rule 1, along with Order VIII Rule 10 of the Code. On a
provisions of Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code would be directory,
and not mandatory. Relevant paragraph 21 of the said judgment
is below:
use of the word “shall”, the court
has been given the discretion to
pronounce or not to pronounce the
judgment against the defendant
even if the written statement is
not filed and instead pass such
order as it may think fit in relation
to the suit. In construing the
provision of Order 8 Rule 1 and
Rule 10, the doctrine of
harmonious construction is
required to be applied. The effect
would be that under Rule 10
Order 8, the court in its discretion
would have the power to allow the
defendant to file written statement
even after expiry of the period of
90 days provided in Order 8 Rule
1. There is no restriction in Order
8 Rule 10 that after expiry of
ninety days, further time cannot
be granted. The court has wide
power to “make such order in
relation to the suit as it thinks fit”.
Clearly, therefore, the provision of
Order 8 Rule 1 providing for the
upper limit of 90 days to file
written statement is directory”.
As such in our view, the said judgment would hold the
field with regard to Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code and would not
be applicable to cases dealing with the provisions of Section 13(2)
of the Consumer Protection Act, or such other enactment wherein
a provision akin to Section 13(2) is there and the consequences
are also provided.
40
to the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, and has been
decided by a Bench of three Judges of this Court (which is after
the decision in the case of Topline Shoes (supra) was rendered).
Protection Act, as provided under Section 13(2)(a), is to be strictly
paragraph 13 of the said judgment, it has been held that:
holding that the time limit prescribed would be mandatory and
subsequently enacted as Act 62 of 2002 and has come in force
41
consumers……….” and that “the disposal of cases is to be faster”
have also come to light in the implementation of various provisions
consumer complaints, certain amendments were made in the Act,
complaints are to be admitted, notices are to be issued to opposite
party and complaints are to be decided”. With this object in mind,
in subSection (2)(b)(ii) of Section 13, the opening sentence “on
basis of evidence”. By this amendment, consequences of not filing
the response to the complaint within the specified limit of 45 days
consumer dispute ex parte on the basis of evidence brought to its
notice by the complainant, where the opposite party omits or fails
to take action to represent his case within time. For achieving
the objective of quick disposal of complaints, the Court noticed
that subSection (3A) of Section 13 was inserted, providing that
the complaint should be heard as expeditiously as possible and
42
that endeavour should be made to normally decide the complaint
within 3 months, and within 5 months where analysis or testing
reasons for the same were to be recorded at the time of disposing
of the complaint.
amendments, this Court held that the time limit of 30 plus 15
days in filing the response to the complaint, be mandatory and
strictly adhered to.
considered in the referring order was passed by a bench of two
Judges in the same case, after noticing a conflict of views in the
(supra).
Consumer Protection Act, the reference was answered “that the
43
law laid down by a three Judge Bench of this Court in Dr. J. J.
the following was observed in paragraphs 25 and 26 of the said
judgment:
33. Although, after the above decision, no further reference
was required to be made, but still we have proceeded to answer
44
the question referred to this Constitution Bench and are of the
considered opinion that the view expressed by this Court in the
case of Dr. J. J. Merchant (supra) is the correct view.
Question No. 2: What would be the commencing point of
limitation of 30 days under Section 13 of
the Consumer Protection Act, 1986?
filing the response by the opposite party to the complaint would
commence from the date of receipt of the notice of the complaint
by the opposite party, or the receipt of notice accompanied by a
copy of the complaint.
35. In paragraph 12 of the judgment dated 04.12.2015, of
three Judge Bench of this Court, in this very case of NIA vs. Hilli
commencing point of limitation of 30 days under Section 13(2) of
the Consumer Protection Act, it has been held that “The whole
issue centres round the period within which the opponent has to
give his version to the District Forum in pursuance of a complaint,
45
which is admitted under Section 12 of the Act. Upon receipt of a
complaint by the District Forum, if the complaint is admitted under
Section 12 of the Act, a copy of the complaint is to be served upon
the opposite party and as per the provisions of Section 13 of the
Act, the opposite party has to give his version of the case within a
complaint.”
36. However, another two judge Bench of this Court, by an
Cold Storage, has expressed the view that the declaration made
in Dr. J. J. Merchant’s case to the effect that the said period is
to be reckoned from the date of receipt of notice by the opposite
point of the limitation of 30 days stipulated in Section 13 of the Act
question has been placed before us for an authoritative decision.
directing him to give his version of the case within a period of 30
days or such extended period, not exceeding 15 days. As such,
from the aforesaid provision itself, it is clear that it is the copy of
period to file the response would commence.
Regulations, 2005 also specifies the procedure of issuing notice,
petitions as the case may be and other documents filed shall be
complaint that the period of limitation for filing the response by
the opposite party shall commence.
38. Even in the Code of Civil Procedure, Order VIII Rule 1
“Summons” has been defined in Order V Rule 1 of the Code and
copy of the plaint.” While considering the aforesaid provisions, a
two judge Bench of this Court in the case of Nahar Enterprises
vs Hyderabad Allwyn Ltd. (2007) 9 SCC 466 has, in paragraph 8,
9 and 10, held as under:
(8) The learned counsel appears to
be correct. When a summons is
sent calling upon a defendant to
appear in the court and file his
written statement, it is obligatory
on the part of the court to send a
copy of the plaint and other
documents appended thereto, in
terms of Order 5 Rule 2 CPC.
(9) Order 5 Rule 2 CPC reads as
under:
“2. Copy of plaint annexed to
summons. – Every summon shall
be accompanied by a copy of the
plaint.”
(10) The learned Judge did not
address itself the question as to
how a defendant, in absence of a
copy of the plaint and other
documents, would be able to file
his written
statement…………………….……..”
Section (5) of Section 31 provides that “after the arbitral award is
48
under Section 34 of the said Act. The delivery of the award sets in
motion the limitation for challenging the award under Section 34
of the said Act. While interpreting the nature and scope of Section
31(5) of the said Act, a three Judge Bench of this Court in Union
SCC 239, has, in paragraph 6, held as under:
provided, either for filing response/written statement or filing an
49
appeal, it is the copy of the plaint or the order/award which is to
commence the period of limitation.
Section (2) of Section 13 would make the position absolutely clear
accompanied by a copy of the complaint, and not merely receipt of
the notice, as the response has to be given, within the stipulated
time, to the averments made in the complaint and unless a copy of
the complaint is served on the opposite party, he would not be in a
position to furnish its reply. Thus, mere service of notice, without
service of the copy of the complaint, would not suffice and cannot
be the commencing point of 30 days under the aforesaid Section of
the Act. We may, however, clarify that the objection of not having
received a copy of the complaint along with the notice should be
redressal of consumer disputes.
50
question is that the District Forum has no power to extend the
period of 15 days in addition to 30 days as is envisaged
Act; and the answer to the second question is that the
commencing point of limitation of 30 days under Section 13 of the
Consumer Protection Act would be from the date of receipt of the
notice accompanied with the complaint by the opposite party, and
not mere receipt of the notice of the complaint.
This Judgment to operate prospectively.
The referred questions are answered accordingly.
………………………………..J.
[Arun Mishra]
………………………………..J.
[Indira Banerjee]
………………………………..J.
[Vineet Saran]
51
………………………………..J.
[M. R. Shah]
………………………………..J.
[S. Ravindra Bhat]
New Delhi
Dated: March 4, 2020