G.R. No.

L-38570 May 24, 1988

DOMINGO PADUA, petitioner,
vs.
VICENTE ERICTA, etc., RUNDIO ABJAETO, and ANTONIO G. RAMOS, respondents.

Antonio de los Reyes for petitioner.

Lazaro A. Marques for private respondents.

NARVASA, J.:

Courts should not brook undue delays in the ventilation and determination of causes. It
should be their constant effort to assure that litigations are prosecuted and resolved with
dispatch. Postponements of trials and hearings should not be allowed except on meritorious
grounds; and the grant or refusal thereof rests entirely in the sound discretion of the Judge. It
goes without saying, however, that that discretion must be reasonably and wisely exercised,
in the light of the attendant circumstances. Some reasonable deferment of the proceedings
may be allowed or tolerated to the end that cases may be adjudged only after full and free
presentation of evidence by all the parties, specially where the deferment would cause no
substantial prejudice to any part. The desideratum of a speedy disposition of cases should
not, if at all possible, result in the precipitate loss of a party's right to present evidence and
either in plaintiff's being non-suited or the defendant's being pronounced liable under an ex
parte judgment.

... (T)rial courts have ... the duty to dispose of controversies after trial on the
merits whenever possible. It is deemed an abuse of discretion for them, on
their own motion, to enter a dismissal which is not warranted by the
circumstances of the case' (Municipality of Dingras v. Bonoan, 85 Phil. 458-
59 [1950]). While it is true that the dismissal of an action on grounds
specified under Section 3, Rule 17 of the Revised Rules of Court is
addressed to their discretion (Flores v. Phil. Alien Property Administrator, 107
Phil. 778 (1960]; Montelibano v. Benares, 103 Phil. 110 [1958]; Adorable v.
Bonifacio, 105 Phil. 1269 [1959]; Inter-Island Gas Service, Inc. v. De la
Gerna, L-17631, October 19, 1966, 18 SCRA 390), such discretion must be
exercised soundly with a view to the circumstances surrounding each
particular case (Vernus-Sanciangco v. Sanciangco, L-12619, April 28, 1962,
4 SCRA 1209). If facts obtain that serve as mitigating circumstances for the
delay, the same should be considered and dismissal denied or set aside
( Rudd v. Rogerson, 15 ALR 2d 672; Cervi v. Greenwood, 147 Coloma 190,
362 P. 2d 1050 [1961]), especially where the suit appears to be meritorious
and the plaintiff was not culpably negligent and no injury results to defendant
(27 C.J.S. 235-36; 15 ALR 3rd 680). (Abinales vs. Court of First Instance of
<äre||anº•1àw> 

Zamboanga City, Br. I, 70 SCRA 590, 595).

It is true that the allowance or denial of petitions for postponement and the
setting aside of orders previously issued, rest principally upon the sound
discretion of the judge to whom they are addressed, but always predicated
on the consideration that more than the mere convenience of the courts or of
the parties of the case, the ends of justice and fairness would be served
thereby (Camara Vda. de Zubiri v. Zubiri, et al., L-16745, December 17,
1966). When no substantial rights are affected and the intention to delay is
not manifest, the corresponding motion to transfer the hearing having been
filed accordingly, it is sound judicial discretion to allow them (Rexwell Corp. v.
Canlas, L-16746, December 30, 1961). (Panganiban vs. Vda. de Sta. Maria,
22 SCRA 708, 712).

In the civil action at bar, the Trial Court rejected the plaintiffs plea for cancellation of one of
three (3) hearing dates, the very first such plea made by that party, upon a ground not
entirely unmeritorious in the premises, and under such circumstances as would not be
productive of any appreciable delay in the proceedings or any substantial prejudice to the
defendants, and summarily dismissed the complaint. Such a dismissal was unwarranted and
relief therefrom must be accorded.
The action that was thus summarily dismissed had been brought by Domingo Padua
(petitioner herein) in the Court of First Instance at Quezon City.   In that action Padua sought
1

to recover damages for the injures suffered by his eight-year old daughter, Luzviminda,
caused by her being hit by a truck driven by Rundio Abjaeto and owned by Antonio G.
Ramos (private respondents herein). Padua was litigating in forma pauperis.

Trial of the case having been set in due course, Padua commenced presentation of his
evidence on December 6, 1973. He gave testimony on direct exqmination in the course of
which reference was made to numerous documents, marked Exhibits B, B-1 to B-109.   At 2

the close of his examination, and on motion of defendants' counsel, the previously scheduled
hearing of December 12,1973 was cancelled, and Padua's cross-examination was reset on
December 17, 1973.   However, the hearing of December 17,1973 was also cancelled, again
3

at the instance of defendants' counsel, who pleaded sickness as ground therefor; and trial
was once more slated to "take place on March 6, March 7 and 13, 1974, all at 9:00 o'clock in
the morning." 4

After defendants' attorney had twice sought and obtained cancellation of trial settings, as
above narrated, it was plaintiff Padua's counsel who next moved for cancellation of a hearing
date. In a motion dated and filed on March 1, 1974,   copy of which was personally served on
5

defendants' lawyer   Padua's counsel alleged that he had "another hearing on March 6, 1974
6

in Tarlac Court of First Instance entitled: Salud Dupitas vs. Mariano Abella, Civil Case No.
4904 which is of 1966 stint, and said court in Tarlac is anxious to terminate said case once
and for all," and that the cancellation would "at any rate ... leave plaintiff and defendants two
(2) hearing dates on March 7 and 13, 1974;" and on these premises, he asked "that the
hearing on March 6, 1974 ... be ordered cancelled." No opposition was filed by the
defendants to the motion, whether on the ground that the motion had not been properly set
for hearing, the clerk having merely been requested to "submit the ... motion upon receipt ...
for the consideration of the Court,"   or some other ground. Apart from filing this motion on
7

March 1, 1974, plaintiffs counsel took the additional step of sending his client's wife to the
Court on the day of the trial, March 6,1974, to verbally reiterate his application for
cancellation of the hearing on that day. This, Mrs. Padua did. The respondent Judge
however denied the application and dismissed the case. His Honor's Order, dictated on that
day, March 6, 1974, reads as follows:  8

When this case was called for hearing today, neither plaintiff nor counsel
appeared. The plaintiffs wife, however, appeared in Court and informed the
Court that the plaintiffs counsel had to attend to a very important case in the
provinces.

The hearing for today was fixed by the plaintiff himself in open court after
consulting his calendar and hence the Court will not grant the postponement
on the ground that the plaintiffs counsel had a very important case in the
provinces. Neither did the plaintiff himself appear.

In view hereof, let this case be dismissed.

Padua moved for reconsideration,   but this was denied.  Hence, this petition.
9 10

The Trial Court unaccountably ignored the fact that defendants' counsel had twice applied for
and been granted postponements of the trial; that plaintiffs counsel had filed a written motion
for postponement five (5) days prior to the hearing sought to be transferred, and this was the
very first such motion filed by him; that although the motion for postponement could have
been objected to, no opposition was presented by defendants, which was not surprising
considering that their counsel had himself already obtained two (2) postponements; that the
ground for cancellation was not entirely without merit: the counsel had a case in the Tarlac
Court scheduled on the same day, March 6, 1974, which had been pending since 1964 and
which the Tarlac Court understandably was anxious to terminate; that the Padua motion for
postponement sought cancellation of only one (1) of three settings, leaving the case to
proceed on the two (2) subsequent hearing dates; and the motion had been verbally
reiterated by plaintiffs wife on the day of the hearing sought to be cancelled, Under the
circumstances, and in the light of the precedents set out in the opening paragraphs of this
opinion, the respondent Judge's action was unreasonable, capricious and oppressive, and
should be as it is hereby annulled.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the Order of the Court a quo dated March
6, 1974, dismissing the petitioner's complaint, and the Order dated March 13, 1974 denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration, are hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE; Civil Case
No. Q-17563 is hereby REINSTATED and the Regional Trial Court which has replaced
Branch XVIII of the Court of First Instance in which the action was pending at the time of
dismissal, is DIRECTED to continue with the trial of the petitioner's action and decide the
same on the merits in due course.

Cruz, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino, and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Docketed as Civil Case No. Q-17563, and assigned to Branch XVII then
presided over by Hon. Judge Vicente Ericta.

2 Rollo, p. 15.

3 Par. 8, petition.

4 Par. 9, petition.

5 Annex FELIX petition.

6 Rollo,p.17.

7 This was, of course, a violation of Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of

8 Par. 11, petition.

9 Rollo, pp. 18-19.

10 Id., p. 20.