Social Engineering - The Legal Philosophy of Roscoe Pound

St.
John's Law Review

Volume 33
Number 1 Volume 33, December 1958, Number Article 1
1
Social Engineering: The Legal Philosophy of Roscoe Pound

Linus J. McManaman
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VOLUME XXXIII DECEMBER 1958 NUMBER I
SOCIAL ENGINEERING: THE LEGAL PHILOSOPHY

OF ROSCOE POUND *
LINUS J. MCMANAMAN, O.S.B.f
INTRODUCTION
A MONG American jurists, as well as among those of the

rest of the world, there is a noticeable interest in natu-
ral law. Many are calling for some ultimate principles of
law to halt the onward march of pragmatism and its natural
offspring, legal realism. But, unhappily, they are not looking
for a natural law in the traditional Thomistic sense, a natu-
ral law that is binding even in the absence of all positive
disposition. Rather they are seeking an ideal picture of law
to serve as a norm for the elaboration of positive law.
Roscoe Pound is an example of those who see philosophy
and natural law only as something to fill lacunae in the posi-
tive law, or to serve as post factum critique of the established
law. The traditional meaning of natural law has been lost,
and scholastic philosophers are not without fault. Too often
natural law has been rejected by jurists outside of Thomistic
* This article is a portion of a thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of

the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy at, the University of
Fribourg, Switzerland.
t Professor of Natural Philosophy and Ethics, St. Benedict's College.
2 ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [ VoL. 33
schools because it has not been properly presented. There

is a task for scholastics of guarding against being deserving
of the criticism directed at the contemporary received natural
law, and of entering into the arena with our contemporaries
to confront them with the true natural-law tradition.
It is beyond the scope of this article to present a com-
plete survey of Thomistic natural law. But in reviewing the
legal theory of Roscoe Pound we may see where scholasticism
may become an effective force.
POUND AND His PROBLEMS
It was August 29, 1906, at the Capitol Building, St.

Paul, Minnesota, the twenty-ninth Annual Meeting of the
American Bar Association. A young, hitherto unheralded,
jurist and professor from the University of Nebraska shocked
the assembled jurists into attention and divided the group
into two camps with a paper entitled, The Causes of Popular
DissatisfactionWith the Administration of Justice.' It was
in this way that Roscoe Pound launched the most brilliant
career in American jurisprudence, or perhaps, in all con-
temporary jurisprudence.
In the assembly at this meeting there was on the one
side the "old guard" who felt that there was no popular
dissatisfaction, or, granting that there may have been a little,
they claimed that it was without reason. On the other side
was the avant garde who lined up with Pound in a demand
for better laws, for better and more effective administration
of justice. It is not without significance that his first ad-
dress of national importance was concerned with imperfec-
tions in the administration of justice. The task which he
undertook, and which he continues with undiminished vigor,
is that of improving the administration of justice. It is a
task in which, happily for us, he has met with a considerable
amount of success.
The St. Paul address may have earned him a number
of opponents as well as friends, but it also won him national
1 The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction With the Administration of Jus-
tice, address before A.B.A. Annual Meeting (1906), reprinted in 20 J. Am.

JUD. Soc'Y (1937).
1958 ] LEGAL PHILOSOPHY OF ROSCOE POUND 3
recognition and an invitation to move from the relative ob-

scurity of the Nebraska school to the more known and more
influential Northwestern University Law School in Evanston,
Illinois. While there, he was instrumental in organizing the
National Conference on Criminal Law and Criminology and
the Illinois Law Review, of which he was editor-in-chief. In
1909 he was appointed to the law faculty of the University
of Chicago. He next became Carter Professor of Law at
Harvard Law School, and in 1916 was elected dean of that
school, a position he held until his resignation in 1936. As
dean for twenty years of what is usually considered the na-
tion's most influential law school he was in a position to
exercise an enormous impact upon the legal profession. This
influence was widened in centrifugal circles as more than a
generation of students trained under him entered the legal
profession, many of them as professors in other schools of
law. Upon his resignation from the deanship of Harvard
he continued an active life as author, lecturer and teacher,
and performed such functions as serving on a commission
for the codification of Chinese law. More recently he spent
two years in California organizing a new law school at the
University of California, Los Angeles, before returning in
the fall of 1952 to Harvard.
The importance and influence of Pound can hardly be
called into question, but rather than assume it to be known
we can cite a few of the many tributes to his erudition.
Professor Thomas A. Cowan of Nebraska University credits
him with reworking the whole structure of American legal
thought.2 Professor Paul Sayre of New York University
notes that all the rest of the legal scholars have lived off
Pound's erudition for more than forty years. 3 Professor
Edwin Wr. Patterson finds Pound's influence in jurisprudence
an aid in preparing legislation, in predicting legal trends and
in interpreting legal literature. He continues that Pound's
ideas have become commonplace, a fact that is a tribute to
2 Cowan, A Report on the Status of Philosophy of Law in the United

States, 50 COLUm. L. REv. 1092 (1950).
3 POUND, OUTLINES OF LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE (5th ed. 1943), Sayre,
Book Review, 57 HARV. L. REv. 581, 584-85 (1944).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [ VOL. 33
his insight and vision. 4 Dean Emeritus Albert Kocourek of

Northwestern compares him to an Alpine peak towering
above all the surrounding landscape.5 And, finally, Profes-
sor Herbert D. Laube of Cornell finds that the genius of
Pound is as penetrating as John Austin's, as illuminating as
Henry Maine's, as resourceful as Rodolf von Ihering's and
as humanizing as Lester F. Ward's; his influence is more
widespread than that of any jurist ever honored by the
Roman Empire." The tribute paid to him on the occasion
of his seventy-fifth birthday in 1947 is indicative
7
of his inter-
national as well as his American reputation.
Turning now from this brief biographical note 8 we take
up the reasons he saw for the "popular dissatisfaction with
the administration of justice" in order better to understand
what he hoped to accomplish. But to understand the prob-
lems as he saw them and the solutions he offers we must re-
view, however briefly, the legal and intellectual milieu into
which he entered at the turn of the century. The principles
of natural law which served as the foundation of American
law in its inception, as stated in the Declaration of Inde-
pendence and the Constitution, and which continued as the
dominant force in the formative era of American law from
the Revolution to the Civil War, began to decline in im-
portance about the middle of the last century. By the end
of the century its importance was negligible.9
Patterson, Pound's Theory of Social Interests, INTERPRETATIONS OF MOD-

4
ERN ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROSCOE POUND 560, 571
LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES:
(Sayre ed. 1947).
5 Kocourek, Roscoe Pound as a Former Colleague Knew Hint, INTERPRE-
TATIONS OF MODERN LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES, op. cit. sufpra note 4, at 419.
6 SAYRE, INTERPRETATIONS OF MODERN LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES: ESSAYS IN
HONOR OF ROSCOE POUND (1947), 60 HARV. L. REv. 988 (1947).
7 Interpretationsof Modern Legal Philosophies: Essays in Honor of Roscoe
Pound contains essays by thirty-eight legal scholars from North and South
America, South Africa, Australia and Europe.
The Introduction contains many congratulatory messages from many for-
eign jurists, legal associations and politicians. Edmond N. Cahn finds the
fact that only two of the thirty-eight essays deal directly with Pound, a tribute
to the fact that he created a widespread and informed interest in legal phi-
losophy where he had found a generation composed almost entirely of igno-
ramuses and misologists. Cahn, Jurisprudence, ANN. SuRvEY AM. L. 1099,
1104 (1947).
s For a bibliography of works about Pound published before July 1, 1940,
see SETARO, A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE WRITINGS OF ROSCOE POUND 139-52
(1942).
9 POUND, THE FOgMATvE ERA or AMERICAN LAW 101-02, 109-10 (19387-
Beginning with the second half of the last century

the historical school of legal interpretation was in the
ascendancy. Many factors combined to explain this phe-
nomenon, not the least of which was the fact that, in 1849,
Luther S. Cushing, a student of Savigny, was teaching law
at Harvard University. This fact in addition to the appear-
ance a few years earlier of the writings of Kent (1826-30)
and Story (1832-45) led to widespread acceptance of his-
torical jurisprudence. 10 The movement received new impetus
when, after 1870, American legal students in increasing num-
bers were pursuing their studies in Germany. Stated briefly
this school maintains, after Savigny, that law cannot be made
but must be found, the growth of law being an unconscious,
organic process with legislation subordinated to custom. As
law grows and becomes more complex and the popular con-
sciousness (Volksgeist) cannot manifest itself directly, it
becomes represented by lawyers who formulate the technical
legal principles; the lawyers do not form laws but formulate
the popular consciousness; legislation follows as the last
stage. Laws are not universally valid or applicable, but
each people has its own legal habits just as it has a peculiar
language which is not applicable to others. In this system
the jurist ranks before the legislator in legal progress; but
the jurist does not make laws, rather he develops the tech-
nique of following the evolution of the Volksgeist by legal
historical research." The historical school has always been
skeptical of legislation and opposed to codification.
Competing with the historical school for the primacy
was another group which Pound calls the school of "philo-
sophical jurisprudence." 12 This is a heterogeneous group
OId. at 21: "With the rise of historical thinking in the nineteenth century
there comes to be a combination of history and philosophy, observable in Kent
and marked in Story. The stabilizing work of natural law is taken over by
history... "
11 FRIEDMANN, LEGAL THEORY 129 (2d ed. 1949). Friedmann cites the
Hayward English translation of Savigny as follows: ". . . the sum therefore
of this theory is that all law is originally formed in the manner in which in
ordinary, but not quite correct language, customary law is said to have been
formed, i.e., that it is first developed by custom and popular faith, next by
jurisprudence, everywhere therefore by internal silently operating powers, not
by the arbitrary will of a law giver." Cf. POUND, op. cit. supra note 9, at 115
(1938) ; 8 ENcYc. Soc. Sci. 477-92 (1932).
128 Ewcvc. Soc. Sci. 482 (1932) ; cf. POUND, op. cit. supra note 9; POUND,
THE SPIRIT OF THE CommoN LAW 151 (1921).
comprising many philosophies and various versions of natu-

ral-law jurisprudence. For the most part they had degen-
erated into a legal formalism, holding that a perfect legal
system could be deduced from an ideal of the nature of law
by a process of formal logic, valid for all peoples, at all times
and in every place. This theory represents the remains of
the so-called "classical natural law" of the eighteenth cen-
tury which had already been rejected on the Continent and
was rapidly losing favor in America. Like proponents of
historical jurisprudence, though for different reasons, they
maintained that law could not be made but could only be
found, the method of finding it being different. Also like
the historical school, they doubted the possibility of creative
legislation.
A third school which gained acceptance among many
jurists was analytical jurisprudence, of which Bentham was
the founder. Like Austin's mechanical jurisprudence, the
analytical school considered positive law to be self-sufficient,
divorced from any concept of natural law, ethics, or the
other social sciences. Traditionally the analytical school has
had unlimited confidence in man's ability to legislate, and
its advocates have always favored codification. However,
in the last third of nineteenth century America, Bentham's
followers began to doubt that we could add to or produce
human happiness by legislation. Consequently, they devel-
oped what Pound calls a "juristic pessimism" substantially
the same as the historical and philosophical schools. It is
a curious phenomenon that the different schools by different
paths, arrived at the common conclusion that constructive
legislation was impossible.1"
13 POUNu, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 151 (1921). "Five types of
philosophy of law in the nineteenth century. are of significance for our present
purpose. We may call those who adhered to them the metaphysical school,
the historical school, the utilitarians, the positivists and the mechanical soci-
ologists. It is a striking example of the way in which the same conclusion
may sustain the most divergent philosophical premises that all of these arrived
ultimately at the same juristic position by wholly diverse routes and from the
most diverse starting points, so that the futility of conscious effort to improve
the condition of humanity through the law and the conception of justice as the
securing of the maxims of self-assertion become axioms of juristic thought."
Id. at 151.
Just before the turn of the century, when Pound came

to the bar, pragmatism was coming into its own as the domi-
nant American philosophy. Initiated by Charles Peirce, de-
veloped and popularized by William James, and brought to
completion by John Dewey, pragmatism has dominated the
philosophical field for more than half a century. Dean Pound
has frequently pointed out that legal theory is very resistant
to change and usually lags a generation behind changes in
philosophical ideals. This was also true of pragmatism,
which had not seriously affected juristic thinking at the turn
of the century. However, with the eloquent influence of
Oliver W. Holmes, pragmatism soon became the dominant
legal philosophy. More recently pragmatism has divided into
many, and often contradictory, branches. The most vocal
contemporary group is the school of legal realism, a name
which Pound characterizes as a boast rather than a descrip-
tion. 14 This group did not merit serious consideration when
Pound first began his career, but they are introduced here
because much of his subsequent writing is concerned with
them. The realists deny the efficacy not only of natural law
and positive law, but further they repudiate the principle of
judicial precedent, which is the very cornerstone of the com-
mon-law system. 15 For them there is no law except the
judge's decision in the individual case, and that decision is
law for that case alone, not being drawn from previous cases
and not affecting future cases.
In the light of this review, however brief, of his intel-
lectual environment we can now pose the problems which
Pound saw and to the correction of which he set his mind and
his pen. Some of these problems are not original with Pound
or peculiar to America, but as ancient as law itself. Others,
however, are a peculiar product of the time and place.
The first problem, which he calls the "perennial prob-
lem" of law because it goes back to the very beginnings of
law, has two aspects, but because of their close association
14 POUND, JUSTICE ACCORDING TO LAW 63 (1951) ; cf. Pound, The Call For
a Realistic Jurisprudence,44 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1931).
15 GARLAN, LEGAL REALISM AND JUSTICE 20-21, 24, 42 (1941). "A right is
an affair of the future, and for the individual who claims the right it is an
affair of probability. Id. at 93. Cf. FRANx, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND
(1930).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [ VOL. 33'
they can be, and are, treated as one. These two aspects are,
first, the general security versus the individual life, and sec-
ondly, the need for stability versus the need for change.
Different legal theories at different times have maintained
one of these at the expense of the other. Pound feels that
these preferences cannot be maintained. In America, during
the last century, the general security was preferred. In the
present century, there is a tendency to prefer the individual
life.1" The problem is to have a legal system which gives
recognition to one without destroying the other. The for-
malists and analytical school protected the general security
by providing in advance for every eventuality, but they gave
no consideration to the individual offender; the law had to
be applied mechanically. Contrariwise the historical school,
and even more so the realists, consider only the individual
case, thereby endangering the general security.
Considering the problem from the viewpoint of stability
versus change, the alignment is almost the same. For the
formalists and analytical jurists the perfect code is valid
for all times. For the historians and realists there is only
change.'1 7 Stability is required so that men may plan a
course of action with a reasonable expectancy of what course
the law will take. It is particularly true in economic fields
that men wish to act with confidence that their operations of
today will not be judged illegal tomorrow. At the same time
the law may not be so rigorous as not to accommodate itself
to the changes in society which are constantly taking place.
There were other problems, more peculiar to the time
and place, in Pound's mind, not only in his famous St. Paul
address, but in much of his subsequent speaking and writing.
The first of these, already intimated, was what he calls
"juristic pessimism." Is The various schools of jurispru-
dence, from diverse premises, arrived at the common conclu-
sion that legislation is impossible or useless. This give-it-up
16 POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 96 (1922). "The

last century preferred the general security. The present century has shown
many signs of preferring the individual moral and social life. I doubt whether
such preferences can maintain themselves." Ibid. Cf. POUND, CRIMINAL JUS-
TIcE IN AMERICA 38 (1930).
17 Cf. FRANK, op. cit. sipra note 15.
is Cf. POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE CoMMoN LAW (1921).
philosophy generated the attitude that you cannot do any-

thing, therefore do not try to do anything. Against this atti-
tude Pound has been a relentless foe.
Secondly, a major problem for American jurisprudence
was created by the enormous changes in the social and eco-
nomic order. The law, as received into America and devel-
oped during the formative era, was ideally adapted to a
pioneer, agricultural society. But by the turn of the century
the era of expansion and frontier was rapidly being passed
and the country was becoming an urban, industrial society.
Changes in law had not kept pace with the changes in the
structure of society. 19
A third problem which he attacked was the inadequate
education of the legal profession. One could with reason cite
Pound's own biography as indicative of the meager require-
ments for admission to the bar. That he became the most
eminent among the legal scholars is a tribute to his own
initiative and genius and not to the demands of the legal
profession. That these demands were not exacting can be
seen from the fact that he was admitted to the bar before
reaching the age of twenty after having already begun a
career as a botanist. In the beginning of American legal
history this was not accidental but part of a policy. An ex-
cessive fervor for democracy and universal equality fostered
the idea that no professional class should be set apart; every
profession should be accessible to all.20 He cites examples of
blacksmiths, farmers and common laborers who were justices
of state supreme courts. 2 The practice of apprentice-
training for lawyers persisted well into the present century,
and almost anybody could serve a term as a clerk in an at-
torney's office and then go into practice for himself. 22 The
situation reached such proportions as to prompt Mr. Justice
Miller to remark that the prime factor in the formation of
23
our law was ignorance.
19 POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW 98 (1938); POUND,

CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE COMMON LAW 19 (1930); POUND, THE SPIRIT OF
THE2 0COmMON LAW ch. 5 (1921).
POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW 8 (1938).
22 Ibid.
22 POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 145 (1930).
23 POUND, op. cit. supra note 20.
A fourth problem is seen in the inadequate and poor

legislation provided by the lawmaking bodies of our govern-
ment. Reasons for this legislative inadequacy are various,
but certainly one reason was the traditional common-law
attitude toward legislation. The common-law jurist is wont
to give very little recognition to legislative law, or, at best,
to interpret it very strictly as applying to the particular case
in point and not as providing a point of departure for legal
reasoning. This attitude in turn led to legislative irresponsi-
bility, prompting legislators to give only skeleton rules or
directives, the details of which were to be worked out by
judicial decision; or they turned out laws which were prac-
tically unenforceable. Another reason can be found in a
tendency of the legislative branch to meddle in judicial func-
tions during the very early period of legal history. The net
result was a growing popular distrust of legislatures and a
turning to the judiciary not only for judgment but also for
making law. Judicial empiricism became the common man-
24
ner of lawmaking.
Related to this difficulty is a fifth problem of more recent
origin. It is what Pound calls administrative or executive
justice as contrasted with judicial justice. In recent years,
and particularly in the last two decades, he sees a growing,
and undesirable, tendency for the executive branch of the
government to assume many functions belonging properly to
the judiciary. 25 This is seen as undesirable because the
executive branch is not ex officio qualified by training and
experience for the judicial functions. More important, he sees
26
in administrative justice a tendency towards absolutism.
Finally, a sixth problem requiring attention is the ten-
dency, developed in the last half of the last century, to mix
law and politics. Another name for the same problem is the
elective judiciary.2 7 He can see no correlation between a
man's qualifications to act as a judge and his ability to in-
24 POUND, op. cit. supra note 20, at 39, 49, 59.

25 POUND, JusTICE ACCORDING TO LAW 76-78, 83 (1951); Cf. POUND, NEW
PATHS OF THE LAW ch. 3 (1950); POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICANY
LAW (1938).
26 POUND, JUSTICE ACCORDING TO LAW 76-78, 83 (1951).
27 POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 185 (1930); Cf. POUND, THE
FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW (1938).
fluence voters to elect him to the position of a judge. 28 The

general acceptance of the elected bench in state and local
jurisdictions has had an undesirable effect on the administra-
tion of justice. 29 The desire to please the voter or political
patron whose support can insure, the judge's position is too
frequently an impediment to justice.
Other problems could be considered, and their omission
is not to be considered as granting them a slight importance.
The purpose here is to mention the main problems which
Pound attempted to solve as a background against which to
view his theories on law. Further it is felt that almost any
other problem that might be mentioned could be subsumed
under one of those already indicated. It should not be ex-
pected that our author will single out each of these problems
for individual treatment. Rather does he attempt a solution
that will strike at the roots of all of them simultaneously.
In studying his predecessors Pound saw that all the nine-
teenth century schools were subject to the common criticism
of attempting to construct a science of law solely in terms of
law and on the basis of law, divorced from all other phe-
nomena of social control and civilization." For him a legal -
science, in order to meet the needs of a changing society,
must give up its exclusiveness and work in closer association
with the other social sciences.3 1 It must view law in all of
32
its senses in relation to the whole problem of social control.
The social purposes of law must be stressed more than the
sanctions, for law is to be regarded as a social institution
which can be improved by intelligent effort. 3 3 To discover
the best means of directing and furthering efforts to improve
the law, the jurist must be concerned with a wide range of
studies, and not just of law. This requires a study of the
actual effects of legal institutions and doctrines; a study of
the means of making legal rules effective; a sociological legal
28
29
Ibid.
Ibid.
30 Pound, Fifty Years of Jurisprudence(pt 1), 51 HARV. L. REv. 444 (1938).
31 Pound, Fifty Years of Jurisprudence (pt. 2), 52 HARV. L. REv. 777, 812
(1938).
32 Ibid.
33 Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence (pt. 3), 25
HARv. L. REv. 489 (1912).
history, which is a study not only of how doctrines have

evolved and developed, considered solely as jural materials,
but of what social effects the doctrines of law have produced
in the past and how they produce them.3 4 The study of legal
history is very important to see what effects the jurists de-
sired to produce, the effects actually produced and the method
used to produce the desired effect. The functional attitude,
which is the study not only of what legal materials are and
how they came to be, but also of what they aim to effect and
how they work, is fundamental in Pound's legal theory. Also,
there must necessarily be intensive study of philosophy and
psychology; in order for a legal science to be valuable it
must be consistent with the best of modern philosophy and
psychology. 5
Pound pursued this course of studies very seriously. He
studied all the contemporary jurists, both of the English
common-law jurisdictions and the continental civil law sys-
tems, taking freely from the most diverse schools of thought
the materials which he found useful; he considered that there
can be many approaches to juristic truth and that each can
be significant to a particular problem.3 6 Nor was legal his-
tory neglected; he studied widely the legal systems of the
past.3 7 In like manner he gave himself to the study of mod-
ern philosophy, psychology and sociology. In sum, there is
scarcely anyone among modern and contemporary sociolo-
gists, philosophers and jurists to whom he does not owe, and
acknowledge, a debt.3 8
It was in the light of these extensive studies that Pound
developed his system of sociological jurisprudence. It pre-
sents a curious union of many diverse, and often contradic-
34 Pound, supra note 33, at 513-14; Cf. POUND, OUTLINES OF LECTURES ON

JURISPRUDENCE 32-34 (5th ed. 1943).
3 Pound, A Call for a Realistic Jurisprudence,44 HARV. L. Rev. 697, 710-11
(1931); cf. POUND, OUTLINES OF LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 35 (5th ed.
1943).
3 Pound, supra note 35, at 711.
37 POUND, INTERPRETATIONS ON LEGAL HISTORY (1923).
38 Pound, Fifty Years of Jurisprudence (pts. 1-2), 51-52 HARV. L. REv. 444,
777 (1938); Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence
(pt. 3), 25 HARV. L. REv. 489 (1912) ; cf. Thomas Cowan's article in INTER-
PRETATIONS OF MODERN LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROSCOE
POUND 130-42 (Sayre ed. 1947).
tory, philosophies of law. But to this peculiar union he does

give a fundamental unity based on the purpose of law.
THE NATURE op LAW
Before entering upon a detailed discussion of the nature

of law according to Pound, it is necessary first to have a
clear notion of our subject. It is to Pound's credit that,
among English-speaking jurists, he has done much in clarify-
ing the meaning, or diverse meanings, of "law." Frequently
omong treatises on law we find the term applied indiscrim-
inately to any one of a number of possibilities without
distinction.
For Pound "law" has three meanings: first, it signifies
the legal order, i.e., the ordering of human conduct through
the systematic application of the force of politically organ-
ized society. In this sense it is called a regime of social
control. Secondly, it means the sum of the authoritative
grounds for judicial and administrative decisions in such a
society. Thirdly, it may mean what is called the "judicial
process." A fourth meaning can be added since the term
"law" can be, and often is, used to mean all three of the
other meanings just mentioned. 39
When we speak of a "science of law," we are using the
term in the second sense. It is in this sense that Dean
Pound uses the term in analyzing the science of law, 40 and
it is likewise in this sense that it will be used here unless
otherwise indicated.
Used in this second sense as the body of authoritative
grounds for decisions, law is not a simple concept. There
are contained within it three elements: precepts, technique,
and ideals. 41 Furthermore, the element of precepts contains
39 Pound, A Comparison of Ideals of Law, 47 HARV. L. REv. 1-2 (1933) ;

ef. POUND, JUSTICE ACCORDING TO THE LAW 48 (1951); Pound, My Philosophy
of Law, My PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, CREDOS OF SIXTEEN AmERICAN SCHOLARS
(1941).
40 See POUND, JusTIcE ACCORDING TO THE LAW 49 (1951): "The second
sense is the one in which Lawyers habitually use the term 'law.' It is the
meaning which the word has borne since the classical Roman jurists and the
one to which we may well restrict it in the science of Law." Ibid.
41 POUND, op. cit. supra note 40, at 50; "[A]nalytical jurists had in
mind the precept element of law . . . historical jurists had in mind very largely
within itself four distinct concepts. First, there is the rule

or precept in the strict sense, which determines a detailed
set of consequences for a determined state of facts. Secondly,
there are principles or authoritative starting points for legal
reasoning. Thirdly, there are legal conceptions or authorita-
tive categories into which cases are fitted, and by reason of
which certain rules and principles become applicable, as, for
example, sale and trust. And, fourthly, there are standards42
or measures of conduct prescribed by law from which one
departs at his own peril, as, for example, the standard of
due care not to cause an unreasonable risk of injury to
43
others.
In speaking of law in this second sense there is a tempta-
tion to think only of precepts, and then only of the rules or
precepts in the strict sense. But in truth the element of
technique, or "art of the lawyers' craft," and the elemelft of
ideals are quite as authoritative and no less important. It
is the element of technique which distinguishes the two great
modern systems of the law. 44 The technique of the common-
law lawyer consists in reasoning by analogy from reported
judicial decisions while considering statutes as furnishing a
rule for the class within its purview and not as a st-rting
point for legal reasoning. The civil law, on the contrary,
reasons by analogy from legislative precepts while consider-
ing court decisions as establishing only one precise point for
the case in litigation and not as a point of departure for
legal reasoning.
Like technique, the ideal element does not determine a
detailed set of consequences for a detailed state of facts. But,
in the deciding of causes, it is of great importance and is,
the [technique] traditional art of the lawyer's craft . . . and philosophical

jurists had in mind the ideal element in law. Today we may very well give
up these discussions. All three elements should be considered and together
they constitute the background of juristic writing and judicial decision."
8 ENCYC. Soc. Sci. 486 (1932).
42 POUND, op. cit. supra note 40, at 58. "There is a characteristic element
of fairness or reasonableness in standards which makes them a point of con-
tact between law and morals." Ibid.
43 Id. at 56-58. See, e.g., POUND, SOURCES AND FORMS OF LAW (1946);
8 ENCYC. Soc. Sc. 477-92 (1932).
44 PouND, op. cit. supra note 40, at 50-51; POUND, THE TAsx OF LAW 47-48
(1944).
1958] LEGAL PHILOSOPHY OF ROSCOE POUND 15
indeed, decisive in new cases when there is necessity of choos-

ing from among equally authoritative principles. THis ideal
element is "a picture of the social order of the time and place,
a legal tradition as to what the social order is and so as to
what is the purpose of social control, which is the authorita-
tive background of interpretation and application of legal
precepts." 45 The ideal element, in that it presents a picture
of what the legal order 'ought to be and what it ought to
achieve, is undoubtedly the most important element. 46 This
is just, since in practical science the end is first in intention
and is an element in the premises of the practical discourse.
As we shall have occasion to see in greater detail later, the
ideal element has a preponderant role when there is question
of weighing interests to determine which one shall be recog-
nized and to what extent it shall be recognized.
Considering the elements just discussed we can define
law as "a body of authoritative precepts, developed and ap-
plied by an authoritative technique in.the light of authorita-
tive traditional ideals." .7 This is a definition of law in its
second sense, and is the way it is used in the science of law.
It is, therefore, this sense of the word with which we are
chiefly concerned. However, at this time it would not be
without value to examine other meanings of law given by
Pound from different points of view. Since it is extremely
difficult to find a definition in the writings of Dean Pound,
the nearest approach is descriptions from different points of
view. Besides the one just given we find three others that
consistently appear in Pound's writings.
Firstly, as a regime, law is defined as a highly specialized
form of social control in a politically organized society exer-
cised through the systematic and orderly application of the
force of such a society. 48 It is the force of politically organ-
ized society which constitutes the formal element of law.
45 POUND, JUsTicE ACCORDING TO THE LAW 54 (1951) ; POUND, THE FORMA-
TIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW 28-29 (1938); Pound, A Comparison of Ideals
of Law, 47 HARV. L. REv. 2-3 (1933); Pound, The Ideal Ele,nent in American
Judicial Decision, 45 HARV. L. REV. 147-48 (1931); Pound, The Theory of
Judicial Decision, 21 HARv. L. REv. 958 (1923).
46 Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision, 21 HARV. L. REv. 958 (1923).
47 POUND, JUSTICE ACCORDING TO THE LAW 50 (1951).
48 POUND, JUSTICE ACCORDING TO THE LAW 48 (1951); Pound, My Philos-
ophy of Law, My PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, CREDOS OF SIXTEEN AMERICAN
SCHOLARS 249 (1941).
From still another point of view, which might aptly be

called the origin, law is defined as experience developed by
reason and reason tested by experience; it is experience
organized and developed by reason, authoritatively promul-
gated by the lawmaking organs of society and backed by the
force of that society.4 9 The importance of reason is insisted
upon throughout, but it is not reasan operating in a vacuum.
It must be reason tested and guided by experience.
Finally, viewed with regard to its end, law is defined
as a task of social engineering designed to eliminate friction
and waste in the satisfaction of unlimited human interests
and demands out of a limited store of goods in existence.5 0
This is undoubtedly the most important aspect of Pound's
doctrine of law. He insists always that law cannot be judged
with reference to itself, as the analytical school judges, or-
with respect to an ideal picture of law, as the formalists do,
but must be judged functionally with respect to its end. The-
relationship between this view of law and-the ideal element
already discussed is readily seen, since it is the ideal element
which proposes the end which the law should effect and it is-
with a view to the ideal element that demands and interests,
are classified and either granted or denied recognition.
Having seen four definitions of law from different points-
of view, we can make a synthesis and achieve a composite.
definition comprising all the meanings given by Pound:
Law is a system of guides to judicial decisions, including
precepts, technique, and ideals, found by reason, tested by
experience, promulgated by the authority of politically organ-
ized society and backed by the force of that society, for the
purpose of securing the maximum of human interests and
satisfying the maximum of human demands with a minimumn
of friction and waste.
This composite definition reveals essentially the nature
of law according to Pound, but it must be elaborated in a
little more detail. He constantly refers to law as a process:
49 POUND, THE TASK OF LAW 62 (1944).

5o POUND, SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAW 64 (1942); 8 ENCYC. Soc. Sci-
487 (1932).
of social engineering. This, however, is somewhat misleading.

The analogy with engineering is not immediately evident.
Engineering is a practical art which seeks to bring into con-
crete existence a plan which has been conceived and drawn
up in detail in advance. It is difficult to see that Pound
looks upon law as striving to achieve an orderly plan which
has been well formulated in advance. He expressly denies
that law is a reflection of divine reason governing the uni-
verse or of a God-given order.5 1 Rather it is a process of
social adjusting; a system of practical compromises of con-
52
flicting and overlapping interests.
In a world in which there are an unlimited number of
human demands and desires but where the means of satisfy-
ing those demands are limited it is inevitable that conflicts
should arise. These conflicts are resolved by giving legal
effect to one interest which thus becomes a legal right, or
simply a "right." In law we must reconcile and adjust these
conflicting interests or claims so as to secure as much of the
53
totality of them as we can.
It is incorrect, Pound tells us, to speak of rights before
interests have been defined, delimited, and recognized by law.
Once this has been done, "rights" are the means by which in-
terests are secured. Theories of natural right erred in con-
fusing the interest which the law should secure with the
rights by which it is secured. For Pound a natural right is
nothing other than an interest which we think should be se-
cured, a demand which we think ought to be satisfied. 5 4 An
interest exists independently of any law and is not a creature
of the state, but it is an error to think that it has any binding
force until defined, delimited, and recognized by the law.
In the light of what principles are these interests classi-
fied, defined, delimited and recognized? Pound renounces
any pretense of immutable principles or absolute judgments.
51 Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision (pt. 3), 21 HARv. L. REv. 594
(1923).
52 POuND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AmERIcA LAW 125-26 (1938).
53 POUND, JUSTICE ACCORDING TO LAW 31 (1951); cf. Pound, My Philos-
ophy of Law, My PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, CREDos OF SixTN AMERICAN
SCHOLARS 259 (1941); Pound, Philosophical Theory and International Law,
1 BIBLIOTHECA VISSERIANA 89 (1923).
54 POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE Coml[oN LAW 91-92 (1921).
For him it is a matter of compromise of conflicting in-
terests.e5 So long as a satisfactory compromise can be
-eached and we may satisfy a social want without a dis-
proportionate sacrifice of other interests there are no natu-
ral, necessary reasons why we should not do so. Not all
interests can be satisfied, at least not fully; where interests
of equal valor are in conflict they must be reconciled and
compromised so that-neither is fully satisfied nor completely
sacrificed. 6
Pound has outlined an elaborate hierarchical system of
interests which are to be recognized, or are pressing for rec-
ognition. It is not our intention to enter into the practical
details of his legal theory to too great an extent, but since
this theory of interests forms the central core of his theory
it must be presented at least in summary form. The interests
which the law should recognize and to which it should give
effect are classified in three major groups. They are social
interests, public interests, and individual interests. 57 An
interest, for the purpose of the law, is a claim or demand
which human beings make either as individuals or in groups
or associations and of which the legal order must take ac-
count. Individual interests are those claims which indi-
viduals make as individuals and assert in title of that in-
dividual life. Public interests are those claims asserted in
title of life in politically organized society. And, finally,
social interests are those demands and claims asserted in title
of social life in civilized society; they are treated as the
55 "But I am skeptical as to the possibility of an absolute judgment. We

are confronted at this point by a fundamental question of social and political
philosophy. I do not believe that the jurist has to do more than recognize
the problem and perceive that it is presented to him as one of securing all
social interests so far as he may, of maintaining harmony among them that
is compatible with the securing of all of them." POUND, AN INTRODUCTION
TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 96 (1922).
56 "What I do say is, that if in any field of human conduct or in any human
relation the law, with such machinery as it has, may satisfy a social want
without a disproportionate sacrifice of other claims, there is no eternal limi-
tation inherent in the nature of things, there are no bounds imposed at creation,
to stand in the way of its doing so." POUND, Op. cit. supra note 55, at 97-98;
cf. POUND, SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAW 78 (1942).
57 Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1943) ; cf.
POUND, THE TASK OF LAW (1944); POUND, OUTLINES OF LECTURES ON JURIS-
PRUDENCE (5th ed. 1943); POUND, SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAW (1942).
This division is attributed to Ihering.
claims of the entire social group. 58 1 Not every claim that

men might make is necessarily or always in one of these
groups, but when they are compared for the purpose of ad-
justing conflicts they must be compared with reference to
the same group. In general, they should be compared under
the most general form, i.e., social interests. 59 While the law
of the last century saw only individual interests, the law
today is more and more subsuming them to social interests.
Wherever a demand can be satisfied if treated as a social in-
terest rather than an individual one, it should be considered
0
a social interest.6 For this reason Dean Pound devotes most
of his planning to social interests as being the more inclusive
order.
The first of Pound's social interests is the interest in the
general security. This is a claim that social life be secure
against forms of actions and courses of conduct which
threaten its existence. In its simplest form, this interest is
concerned with the general safety as the highest law, but it
extends to such forms as interest in general morals, gen-
eral health, peace, order, security of transactions and of
acquisitions.
Second is the social interest in the security of social in-
stitutions, i.e., the claim that fundamental institutions of so-
cial life be secure from courses of conduct that threaten their
existence or impair their efficiency. This includes interest
in the security of domestic institutions, religious institu-
tions, political institutions, and, more recently, economic
institutions.
Pound's third social interest is in the general morals, or
the claim that social life in civilized society be secure against
forms of action offensive to the moral sentiments of the gen-
eral body of individuals therein for the time being. This
includes policies against such misdemeanors as dishonesty,
corruption, gambling and things of immoral tendency.
;8 Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HARv. L. REv. 1-2 (1943).

59 Id. at 2-3.
60 Pound, A Comparison of Ideals of Law, 47 HARV. L. REv. 15 (1933);
Cf. POUND, OUTLINES OF LEcrURs ON JURISPRUDENcE 32-34 (5th ed. 1943);
Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence (pt. 3), 25 HARV.
L. REv. 489 (1912).
Fourthly, there is the social interest in the conservation

of social resources, or the claim that the goods of existence
shall not be wasted; that courses of conduct which tend
needlessly to destroy these goods be restrained. This refers
chiefly to common property which is used but not owned by
individuals, and is closely related to the interest in the pro-
tection and training of dependents and defectives.
Fifth is the social interest in general progress, or the
demand that the development of human powers and of human
control over nature for the satisfaction of human wants go
forward; the claim that social engineering be increasingly
and continuously improved for the development of human
powers. This includes interest in economic, political and
cultural progress.
Sixth, and last, is the social interest in the individual
life. This is in many ways the most important. It is the
claim that each individual be able to live a human life in
civilized society according to the standards of that society.
Such, in brief, are the social interests which are recog-
nized or are coming to be recognized by the law.61 When
looked at functionally, and it is in this way that it must be
viewed, 62 the law is an attempt to satisfy, to reconcile, these
conflicting and overlapping interests and claims either
through securing them directly, or through securing certain
individual interests so as to give effect to the greatest total
of interests, or the interests that weigh most, with the least
possible sacrifice of the scheme of interests as a whole.
The public and individual interests are less elaborately
treated by Pound and the reason is not difficult to divine.
61 The essentials of this summary are taken from Pound, supra note 58.
They may also be found in: POUND, OUTLINES OF LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE
(5th ed. 1943); POUND, SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAW (1942); POUND, THE
SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW (1921) ; cf. Patterson, Pound's Theory of SociAl
Interests, INTERPRETATIONS OF MODERN LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES: ESSAYS IN
HONOR OF ROSCOE POUND (Sayre ed. 1947); FRIEDMANN, LEGAL THEORY
230-31 (2d ed. 1949).
62 Pound, Fifty Years of Jurisprudence (pt. 2), 52 HARV. L. REv. 777, 812
(1938); POUND, OUTLINES OF LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 32-34 (5th ed.
1943); POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY (1923); Pound, The Call
for a Realistic Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REv. 697, 710 (1931); Pound, The
Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence (pt. 3), 25 HARV. L. REv.
489 (1912).
From the social interests just presented it is possible to see

how most of the public and individual interests could be
subsumed to the social interests. And where this is possible,
he finds it desirable that it should be so done. 3 Yet he does
not neglect the public or individual interests altogether. The
public interest is, first, the interest of -the state as a juristic
person. This interest includes the claim to integrity, free-
dom of action and honor of the state as a moral person, as
well as the claim of the state as a corporation to hold prop-
erty for corporate purpose. And, secondly, there is the in-
terest of the state as the guardian of social interests. 4 But,
he concludes, to the extent that the public interest is one only
of the dignity of the sovereign, it ought to give way under
modern conditions.65 As already mentioned, whenever pos-
sible the interests should be subsumed to the social interests
as the more inclusive order. Individual interests are given
a still more summary treatment. Most of the interests which
formerly were granted as belonging to individuals as indi-
viduals are now, he says, subsumed under social interests.
Thus the right of the individual to possess property is taken
as a social interest in security of possessions.68 The right
to expect exact performance of promises and contracts is sub-
sumed to the social interest in security of contract and
transactions. 67 However, the common law is coming more
and more to recognize the-binding force of such promises.6 8
It remains to be seen upon what basis these interests are
so classified and either recognized or denied recognition.
Pound believes that the basis for such a classification is what
he calls the presuppositions of civilization, or, the "jural
postulates." These are the reasonable expectations which
all men have in civilized society. They are the minimum re-
quirements in order that that society may survive. 69 Stated
6G
Cf. POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 145 (1930).
64 Pound, A Survey of Public Interests, 58 HAR,. L. REv. 910 (1945).
65 Id. at 925.
66 Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HARv. L. REv. 1, 20 (1943)
Cf. POUND, AN INTRODUCrION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 234 (1922).
07 Pound, supra note 66; cf. Pound, op. cit. supra note 66, at 237.
6s 4 ENCYC. Soc. Sm. 42 (1932).
69 POUND, A, INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 169-79, 188
(1922) ; cf. POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 148-49 (1923) ; POUND,
SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAW 112 (1942); POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE CoM-
briefly these postulates are, first, in civilized society men

must be able to assume that men will commit no intentional
aggressions upon them. Secondly, we must assume that men
may control for beneficial purposes what they have dis-
covered and appropriated for their own use, created by their
own labor, or acquired according to the existing social and
economic order. Third, we must assume that those with
whom we deal will act in good faith, making good their prom-
ises, carrying out their undertakings according to the expec-
tations of the moral sentiment of the community, and restor-
ing specifically or by equivalent what comes to them by mis-
take or in any way whereby they receive at another's expense
what they could not expect to receive under other circum-
stances. Fourth, we must assume that men will act with due
care not to cast on others an unreasonable risk of injury.
And, finally, we assume that those who keep things, such as
animals, which are likely to get out of hand and do damage
will restrain them within proper boundsY'
In the light of these "jural postulates" the various in-
terests which press for recognition are examined, defined, de-
limited and, if recognition is granted, they are secured by
the law.
THE END OF LAW
What the end of law should be according to Pound has

already been briefly intimated but since it plays such a pre-
ponderant role in his legal theory it must receive greater
consideration than already given.
Analyzing the history of law Pound finds three theories
of the end of law that have been held successively in legal
history and a fourth which is beginning to assert itself. The
first, and simplest, which existed in the period of primitive
law, was that of keeping the peace at any price.7 1 Under
MON LAW 82 (1921). Pound admits borrowing these postulates from Kohler.
Cf. KOHLER, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 83.
70 POUND, INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LA-W 169-79, 188 (1922);
cf. FRIEDMANN, LEGAL THEORY 233 (2d ed. 1949) ; De Sloovre, Jurisprudence,
ANN. SURVEY Amr. L. 913, 920-21 (1942) ; POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL
HISTORY 148-49 (1923).
71 POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 72-74 (1922);
POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 85-87 (1921).
the influence of Greek philosophers this was superseded by

the second theory which was one of preserving the status quo.
This theory maintained itself through the period of classical
Roman law, and, except for a brief interruption of primitive
1 2
law under German influence, through the Middle Ages.
According to this theory, the end of law is to insure social
stability by putting everybody in his place and keeping him
there. Emphasis is on the social order, with the individual
destined to serve that order at all costs to personal liberty.
With the beginning of law in the modern sense, after
the Protestant Revolution, the emphasis shifted from society
to the individual. At first the purpose of law was conceived
as securing natural rights, which got their warrant from the
inherent moral qualities of man; there should be no restraint
for any other purpose. In the nineteenth century, this mode
of thought turned metaphysical with juristic emphasis on in-
dividual consciousness; the social problem was one of recon-
ciling conflicting human wills. Kant had rationalized the
law in these terms as a system of principles or universal
rules applied to human actions whereby the free will of each
might coexist with the free will of all others making a maxi-
mum of self-expression the end of law. Hegel also empha-
sized liberty and rationalized law as an idea of liberty being
realized in human experience. Bentham considered law as a
body of rules laid down and enforced by the state, the end
of which was to secure a maximum of happiness conceived
as free individual self-assertion. Spencer also conceived of
the function of law as promotion, the liberty of each limited
only by the liberty of all.7 3 In any of these ways, the end
of law was conceived as that of securing the greatest possible
individual self-assertion.
Toward the end of the last century and the beginning
of the present, the emphasis in juristic thinking began to
shift from human wills to human wants or desires. Instead
of thinking of the end of law as the maximum of self-assertion
jurists began to think of it as the maximum satisfaction of
wants and interests. The problem for jurisprudence became
7
2 POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 78-79 (1922).
73 POUND, op. cit. supra note 72, at 83-84; POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COM-
MON LAW 87, 194 (1921).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [ VOL. 33:
one of finding the criteria of the relative value of interests.7 4

Pound adopts this German Interessenjurisprudenz,developed'
from the ideas of Ihering, and gave it its greatest elaboration
in his sociological jurisprudence.
Law is spoken of by Pound as one very specialized form
of social control.7 5 As such, the end of law must ultimately
be the same as the entire system of social control, the other-
agencies of which are morals, religion, family and school..
And so he tells us that the end of law is, at bottom, the end
of social control. 76 But the other agencies of social control
no longer exercise an organized effect.77 Hence, in modern
78
society, law has become the paramount agency.
Now, we can ask, what is the end of social control of
which law is the paramount agency? It is defined as an
ideal of co-operation toward civilization, to raising human
powers to their highest possible unfolding, to a maximum of'
human control over external and internal nature for human
purposes. 7 9 Pound is speaking in the same vein when he
refers to law as giving external support to man's social in-
stincts as against his selfish, aggressive instincts, approving
the opinions of some last-century jurists who spoke of law
and government as extensions of individual self-control.8"
74 POUND, op. cit. supra note 72, at 89; POUND, JUSTICE ACCORDING TO THE
LAW 19-20 (1951); cf. POUND, NEW PATHS OF THE LAW 4-5 (1950).
7s Compare the definitions of law as found in footnotes 48-50 supra.
76 Pound, My Philosophy of Law, My PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, CREDOS OF
SIXTEEN AMERICAN SCHOLARS 250-52 (1941): "If, as lawyers must, we look
at law, in all of its senses, functionally with respect to its end, as the end is
at bottom the end of social control, our science of law cannot be self-sufficient.
Ethics has to do with another great agency of social control covering much of
the ground covered by the legal order and having much to tell us as to what
legal precepts ought to be and ought to bring about."
77POUND, SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAW 21-25 (1942).
78 POUND, op. cit. supra note 77, at 20: "In the modern world law has be-
come the paramount agency of social control. Our main reliance in the so-
ciety of today is upon the force of politically organized society."
79 POUND, op. cit. supra note 77, at 127, 132: "An ideal of civilization of
raising human powers to their highest possible unfolding of the maximum of
human control over external nature and over internal nature for human
purposes . . ."; Cf. POUND, A SURVEY OF SOCIAL INTERESTS 30 (1943): "Social
interest in general progress, that is the claim . . . that the development of
human powers and of human control over nature for the satisfaction of human
wants go forward, the demand that social engineering be increasingly and con-
tinuously improved, as it were the self-assertion of the social group toward
higher and more complete development of human powers."
80 POUND, THE TASK OF LAW 25-26 (1944).
Law, unlike the laws of physical sciences which are based on

-observation of what is, must be based on experience and ob-
servation of what ought to be, of how men ought to conduct
themselves in relation with others. 81 The law is compared
to some traffic regulations, such as lines in the middle of a
82
road, which direct human actions the way they ought to go.
Still using traffic regulations as an example, he tells us that
law must form habits of proper behavior instead of waiting
for them to develop, 83 even though the reasonableness of the
law is not apparent at once to all. In still other instances
he says that the end of law is justice, which in turn is defined
.as "an ideal relation among men." 84
Looked at functionally with respect to its end, which is
the end of social control, law is not self-sufficient. It de-
pends upon other agencies, especially ethics, to point out
what legal precepts ought to be and what they ought to
effect.8 6
This presentation of the end of law would be readily
-acceptable to any scholastic philosopher and it is all found
in Pound's writings. However, he frequently contradicts
these statements or qualifies them until they have no mean-
ing, or at least, no acceptable meaning left. Thus the highest
-development of human powers 86 loses some of its lofty ap-
peal in his survey of social interests when he goes on to ex-
plain that this fifth interest, which he calls the "social in-
terest in general progress," 87 covers such major policies
as freedom of property, free trade and protection from
monopoly, free industry, and encouragement of inventions,
s' POUND, op. cit. supra note 80, at 49; POUND, SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH
LAW 32 (1942) : "But we are not dealing with physical nature, as to which
opinions of good and bad and criticisms of its phenomena are irrelevant. We
-are dealing with phenomena in the domain and under the control of the human
will and what it does not tell the whole story. Here the ultimate question is
.always what ought to be- .. " See also 8 ENCYC. SOC. Sci. 485 (1932).
62 POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 29 (1930).
83 POUND, op. cit. supra note 80, at 65; cf. POUND, JUSTICE ACCORDING TO
LAW 17 (1951).
84 POUND, op. cit. supra note 80, at 19.
85 POUND, SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAW 62 (1942) ; Pound, My Philos-
•ophy of Law, My PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, CEDOS OF SIXTEEN AMERICAN
.SCHOLARS 252 (1941).
86 Cf. note 9 supra.
87 POUND, A SURVEY OF SOCIAL INTERESTS 30 (1943).
as well as a policy of political progress

8
through free criti-
cism, free education and the like.
The conflict between selfish instinct and social in-
stincts 89 which law is to help control is seen to be a conflict
between moral virtue and justice. The self-assertive instincts
are identified with individual moral development and the so-
cial instincts with justice. The two are seen to be in essential
conflict. Hence law must maintain one set of moral values
against another. 90
By justice as the end of law, Pound does not mean an
individual virtue; nor does he mean the ideal relation among
men. Rather he means a regime, an adjustment of relations
and ordering of conduct so as to satisfy the maximum of
human claims and desires with a minimum of friction and
waste. 9 1 This 92tells us not only what law does but also what
it ought to do.
SOURCES oF LAw
In considering the question of the sources of law there

are two major problems. First, there is question of the
proximate authoritative sources from which the existing legal
precepts are drawn. Secondly, there is the issue of the source
of the authority of the law as such.9 3 The second of these
poses three distinct problems: the immediate practical source,
the ultimate practical source, and the ultimate moral source
8s Ibid.
90 POUND, THE TASK OF LAw 25, 36 (1944) : "Undoubtedly there are in-
herent difficulties in a regime of justice according to law. But we must pay a
price for order, security, and a developed economic order. We must pay a
price for a balance of security, justice in the sense of the ideal relation among
men, and morals in the sense of the highest individual development. No one
of these can be carried out to a logical extreme at the expense of the others.
Free individual self-assertion-spontaneous free activity-on the one hand, and
ordered, even regimented cooperation, are both agencies of civilization. A so-
cial order which ignores and would repress either is not moving toward the
highest unfolding of human powers." Cf. POUND, JuSTICE ACCORDING TO
LAW 21 (1951), citing Radbruch whom Dean Pound had just referred to as
the ". . . foremost philosopher of law . . . in the present generation" as
saying there is an irreducible antimony between justice, morals and security.
91 POUND, SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAW 64-65 (1942).
92 Pound, My Philosophy of Law, My PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, CREDOS OF
SIXTEEN AMERICAN SCHOLARS 252 (1941).
93 POUND, SOURCES AND FORMS OF LAW 3 (1946).
of the authority of law.9 4 In dealing with the first problem

the term "source" has been, and still is, used to mean at least
four different things: the authoritative texts which are the
bases of juristic and doctrinal development; the "raw ma-
terials" from which judges derive the grounds for deciding
cases; the formulating agencies by which rules and principles
are shaped; and the literary shapes in which precepts are
found. This last Pound prefers to call "form" rather than
"source" of law.95 All of these answer the questions of how
and by whom the content of the precepts has been worked
out, and whence they derived their content as distinct from
their force and authority. 6
A. Source of Content
Considering the factors to which legal precepts owe their

content, Pound finds there are six: usage, religion, moral and
philosophical
97
ideas, adjudication, scientific discussion and
legislation.
Usage becomes a source of law when a rule or principle
that has been worked out and formulated by common usage
is given the authority of law by courts or legislature. The
usage of merchants is an example.9 8 Religion, in earlier
stages of legal development, was a principal source. In mod-
ern law, particularly on the Continent, the influence of the
law of the Church is still evident; 99 moral and philosophical
ideas have their influence not only in affecting old precepts
but also in shaping, or helping to shape new ones. This is
particularly true in times when equity and natural law are a
predominant force and there is a tendency to identify law
and morals. 10 0 Adjudication gives rise to a tradition of judi-
cial action as usage gives rise to a tradition of popular action.
94 POUND, SOURCES AND FORMS OF LAW 5 (1946) ; POUND, SOCIAL CONTROL

THROUGH LAW 51 (1942).
95 POUND, op. cit. supra note 93, at 3-5.
06 POUND, op. cit. supra note 93, at 5.
11 POUND, op. cit. supra note 93, at 5-9.
98 Ibid.
o9 POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COmmON LAW ch. 2 (1921) ; cf. Puritanism
and the Common Law, ANN. PROC. KAN. B. Ass'N (1910).
100 POUND, LAW AND MORALS (1924); Law and Morals, ANN. PROC. W. VA.
B. Ass'N (1915).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [ VeOL. 33
In civil law systems, where legislative precepts rather than

judicial decisions form the starting point for legal reasoning,
a settled course of decision may be a form rather than a
source of law. In common-law systems a course of judicial
decisions which has only persuasive authority is a form
rather than a source. But if the decisions are so well formu-
lated that they are adopted by a higher court they become
authoritative and so are a source of law.10 1 Scientific dis-
cussion is a source of law when the discussions of text writers
and commentators are given formal authority by being em-
bodied in the decisions and statutes of courts or legislatures.
Doctrinal writing has been a very important agency in for-
mulating our law. "While in form our law is chiefly the
work of judges, in great part judges simply put the guinea
stamp of the state's authority upon propositions which they
found worked out for them in advance. Their creative work
was often a work of intelligent selection." 102 Finally legis-
lation or direct formulation of legal precepts by the lawmak-
ing organs of the state is an important source of law. This
is a particularly important source in civil law jurisdictions,
while it is less so in common-law systems, and, in America,
has made no lasting contribution to law.10 3
Briefly, the forms or literary shapes in which the com-
mon law of the United States are found authoritatively ex-
pressed are seven: 1) decisions of old English courts (before
the American Revolution); 2) American judicial decisions,
after the Revolution; 3) judicial decisions of English and
other common-law jurisdictions since the Revolution; 4) the
Law Merchant; 5) the Canon Law of the Church in some
matters such as probate and divorce; 6) International Law;
and 7) English statutes before the Revolution so far as they
were applicable and received into the United States law." 4

102 POUND, op. cit. supra note 101, at 7-8; Cf. POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA
OF AMERICAN LAW 42-43 (1938).
103 POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW (1938); POUND, THE
SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW (1921); POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN
LAW (1920).
104 POUND, op. cit. supra note 101, at 32; cf. POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA
OF AMERICAN LAW (1938).
From the foregoing it is seen that a developed legal sys-

tem is made up of two elements: a customary or traditional
element, and an imperative or legislative element. The cus-
tomary element must not be thought to derive from a cus-
tomary mode of popular action. It is rather a product of
customary modes of professional or juristic handling of con-
troversies and is developed by professional writing and
teaching.' 0 5 The imperative element is that part of the legal
system in the form of rules or standards authoritatively
promulgated by the legislative bodies of the state prior to
judicial decisions, and usually prior to action. 10 6
One more point remains for brief consideration in con-
nection with the content of legal precepts. We have just seen
the origin of the precepts. There remains the modes of
growth, or to use Maine's expression, the "agencies by which
law is brought into harmony with society." 107 The agencies
of growth through the traditional element are eight: fictions,
interpretation, equity, natural law, juristic science, judicial
empiricism, comparative law, and sociological studies. 0 8 In
the imperative element there are five stages of development:
unconscious legislation, declaratory legislation, selection and
amendment, conscious constructive legislation, and habitual
legislation as an ordinary agency which often culminates in
codification.1 0 9
B. Source of the Authority of Law

The source of the content of legal precepts could be de-
veloped at much greater length. However, it is a question
of technical nature, of interest primarily to the jurist and
legal historian." 0 For our present purpose the source of the
authority of law is of primary concern. This problem is not
so elaborately developed by Pound as the former, but it pro-
vides a better clue as to his philosophy. As already indi-
cated, 1 1 ' this question poses three distinct problems.
101 Id. at 70.
0 7
1 Id. at 40.
100 Ibid.
1 9 Id. at 74-75.
110 See POUND, SOURCES AND FORMS OF LAW (1946).
"I' Cf. note 94 supra.
The first problem is that of the immediate practical

source of the authority of the legal order. This is found to
be in the legislative and administrative bodies of politically
11 2
organized society and backed by the force of that society.
The second question, that of the ultimate practical
source of authority, Pound considers to be a question for
political science to solve. However, he submits, in our politi-
cal theory we have come to accept the theory that the source
is consent-the consent of a free people to be ruled by a gov-
ernment of their own choosing and by laws which they
113
approve.
Turning now to the ultimate moral source of the author-
ity of law Pound notes that in the classical juristic theory
it was held that law deduced its authority directly from jus-
tice and derived its binding force from justice of which it is
declaratory. Today, the dominant legal philosophy tells us
we cannot speak of an ultimate moral source. But he sub-
mits that the legal order has kept authority because it per-
forms, and performs well, the11task
4
of social engineering; in
other words, because it works.
It might well be asked upon what premises this work
of social engineering is effected, upon what principles we
select and classify, compromise and reconcile the overlapping
and conflicting demands which press for recognition. We
cannot reconcile conflicting demands except in the light of
some principle of justice, some idea as to the end of law.
Pound tells us that in the past the process of social engineer-
ing has been governed by ideals of the end of law and the
legal and social order, and so it should be today.1 15 But, he
112 Cf. POUND, SOURCES AND FORMS OF LAW 5 (1946); POUND, SOCIAL CON-
TROL THROUGH LAW 51 (1942).
113 POUND, SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAW 52 (1942).
114Id. at 53: "The classical juristic theory is that law may be deduced
directly from justice, from the ideal relation between men, and owes its binding
force to the binding force of justice which it declares. The dominant legal
philosophy of today tells us that we cannot answer this question .... But
the legal order goes on, whatever may be the basis of whatever rightful au-
thority it has, and I submit it has kept and holds authority because it performs,
and performs well, its task of reconciling and harmonizing conflicting and
overlapping human demands and so maintains a social order in which we may
maintain and further civilization." See also Pound, The Pioneers and the
Common Law, 27 W. VA. L. REv. 1 (1920).
115 POUND, THE THEORY OF JUDICIAL DEIsIoN 953 (1923) : "In the past
continues, for our purposes today we do not have to be guided

by any God-given order laid down once and for all, nor by
any reflection of this divine reason governing the whole uni-
verse.1 1 6 For our purposes, he continues, and the point is
sufficiently significant to warrant direct quotation: "If but
his precept is otherwise good social engineering, it is quite
immaterial what are the premises of the legislative lawmaker
or how he develops them or whether he has any premises
at all." 117
Is it possible that law can achieve its purpose without
principles, that justice can be really attained by a process of
compromising and reconciling conflicting claims? If a com-
promise has been successfully effected in a controversy can
we really say that justice has been realized? For Pound the
answer must necessarily be affirmative."' The judicial proc-
ess is one not of seeking a reasonable principle of justice but
of a trial and error method of finding the workable legal
precept."" The workableness, the functional approach, is
always stressed rather than the intrinsic reasonableness of
legal precepts. Therefore, because the intrinsic reason and
justice of rules do not give them an unchallengeable author-
ity, he approved the jurists of the last century who rejected
20
natural law.
it has been governed and its path defined by ideals of the end of law and of
the legal and social order, and it is submitted that such ideals must be our
reliance today and tomorrow."
116 Id. at 954.
117 Id. at 956.
118 Cf. Pound, My Philosophy of Law. MY PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, CREDOS OF
SIxTEEN AmXERICAN SCHOLARS 252 (1941).
119 POUND, op. cit. supra note 115, at 953: "Our chief agency of lawmaking
is judicial empiricism-the judicial search for the workable legal precept, for
the principle which is fruitful of good results in giving satisfactory grounds
of decision of actual causes, for the legal conception into which the facts of
actual controversies may be fitted with results that accord with justice be-
tween the parties to concrete litigation. It is a process of trial and error
with all the advantages and disadvantages of such a process." Cf. POUND,
THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW 124 (1938).
120 POUND, PHILOSOPHICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 83 (1923):
"Yet the jurists of the last century were right in their judgment that the
classical law-of-nature philosophy could serve them no longer. They did not
perceive that the ,facts of political life which it assumed and interpreted were
changing fundamentally. But they did perceive vividly that its theory of the
source of legal obligation was unsuited to the times. A theory that found the
binding force of legal rules in the intrinsic reason and justice of the rules
themselves did not put behind its rules the unchallengeable basis of authority
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [ VOL. 33:
Necessarily connected with the question of the source of
the authority of law is that of the source of rights and obli-
gations. By reviewing Pound's opinions as to the source of
these rights and obligations we obtain a clearer insight into
his theory of law.
Looking first at the question of rights, Pound reviews
opinions of his predecessors and notes that, in antecedent
legal theories, it was commonly held that rights were a neces-
sary consequence of human nature and pertained to man
simply because he is man. They thought of law as giving
effect to these rights simply because they are natural
rights.121 Now, however, we should speak rather of interests
than of rights. These interests are the demands or desires
which human beings, living in society, seek to satisfy and of
which the legal order must take account. These interests
do not, however, give rise to an unchallengeable claim against
society, or against other individuals, until they have been
defined, delimited, and given legal recognition within the
defined limits. They are similar to what jurists used to call
natural rights in that they are not created by law and would
exist independently of law. "[M]uch of a kernel of truth
• . . was in the old ideas of a state of nature and in the
theory of natural rights." 122
We can illustrate this shift in emphasis by one concrete
example, the right to property. Pound sees in the institution
of property not a natural right which is given effect by legal
precept, but a wise bit of social engineering. Private prop-
which men have been eager to provide for the law of the land." Cf. 8 ENcYc.
Soc. Sci. 483 (1932).
1218 EN cYc. Soc. Sci. 489 (1932) : "Where the nineteenth century thouht
of law as existing to give effect to natural rights . . . , jurists since Ihering
have thought of recognizing, delimiting and securing interests. It is conceived
that a legal system attains its end by recognizing certain interests, by defining
the limits within which these interests shall be recognized legally and given
effect through legal precepts and by endeavoring to secure the interests so,
recognized within the defined limits. For such a theory an interest may be
defined within the defined limits. For such a theory an interest may be defined
as a demand or desire which human beings, either individually or in groups,
seek to satisfy and of which therefore the ordering of human relations must
take account ..."
1221Ibid.: cf. POUND. THE TASK OF LAW 26-30 (1944) ; POUND, AN INTRO-
_DUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 41-43 (1922).
erty is a way of satisfying more interests, more demands and

1 23
desires with a minimum of friction and waste.
Turning next to the root of obligations, Pound finds this
also to be in social interest. Emphasis is no longer on the
individual will but upon the desires and claims involved in
civilized society. 124 The basis for delictual fault is a jural
postulate of civilized society that men act -with due care 125
and the basis for delictual liability is the social interest in

the general security. 1 26 The obligation to keep promises or
to honor contracts comes not from the will of the person who
binds himself, but from the social interest in the security of
transactions. 1 27 It is wise social engineering. If we think
that it is the order of nature it is only because the habitual
application of the rules of an art come to be taken for
28
granted.1
123 PouND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 234 (1922):

"Social-utilitarian theories explain and justify property as an institution which
secures a maximum of interests or satisfies a maximum of wants, conceiving
it to be a sound and wise bit of social engineering when viewed with reference
to its results. This is the method of Professor Ely's well-known book on
Property and Contract. No one has yet done so, but I suspect one might
combine this mode of thought with the civilization interpretation of the neo-
Hegelians and argue that the system of individual property, on the whole,
conduces to the maintaining and furthering of civilization-to the development
of human powers to the most of which they are capable-instead of viewing
it as a realization of the idea of civilization as it unfolds in human experience.
Perhaps the theories of the immediate future will run along some such lines.
For we have had no experience of conducting civilization on any other basis,
and the waste and friction involved in going to any other basis must give us
pause. Moreover, whatever we do, we must take account of the instinct of
acquisitiveness and of individual claims grounded thereon. We may believe
that the law of property is a wise bit of social engineering in the world as
we know it, and that we satisfy more human wants, secure more interests,
with a sacrifice of less thereby than by anything we are likely to devise-we
may believe this without holding that private property is eternally and abso-
lutely necessary and that human society may not expect in some civilization,
which we cannot forecast, to achieve something different and something better."
See also POUND, A SURVEY OF SOCIAL INTERESTS (1943) ; POUND, THE SPIRIT
OF THE COMMON LAW 196-98 (1921).
124 POUND, A SURVEY OF SOCIAL INTERESTS (1943); POUND, AN INTRODUC-
TION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 169 (1922).
125 POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 170, 188-90 (1922).
126 Id. at 177.
127 Id. at 188-90, 237; cf. Pound, Individual Interests of Substance-Promised
Advantages, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1945).
128 POUND, op. cit. supra note 125, at 278: "Two circumstances operate to
keep the requirements of consideration alive in our law of simple contract.
One is the professional feeling that the common law is in an idealized form
of natural law and that its actual rules are declaratory of natural law. This
EVALUATION AND CRITIQUE
In the light of the expos6 just presented of Pound's legal

doctrine, we may evaluate, both positively and negatively, his
contribution to the advancement of jurisprudence. Recalling
the problems presented in the first chapter we may well in-
quire to what extent he has been successful in solving or
alleviating those difficulties. Naturally every solution of
such a problem cannot be attributed to him directly and in-
dividually, but in the development of American law during
the last half-century, lie has a pre-eminent role. Even yet
he is not satisfied that the law is perfect, but it must be ad-
mitted that there have been many improvements since he
spoke in St. Paul in 1906.129
Pound's main endeavor has been in the field of legal edu-
cation. In this domain alone he has contributed enormously
towards raising the standards required for the legal profes-
sion. Not only has he assisted in improving the basic re-
quirements for admission to the legal profession, but also, by
his voluminous reading and writing, he has helped to create
a widespread interest in legal philosophy. 130 If there is a
growing interest in natural law now in America, as there
seems to be, 131 there can be no doubt but that Pound helped
to foster it. Though not a strong advocate of natural law
himself, he has been largely responsible for introducing
European ideas of legal philosophy into America. Realizing
that there did exist a generation of lawyers who studied law
solely in terms of law divorced from all other social phe-
nomena; he has striven, both in and out of the classroom, to
bring about a closer alliance between law and the other so-
1 82
cial sciences.
mode of thinking is to be found in all professions and is a result of habitual

application of the rules of an art until they are taken for granted."
129 We cannot agree with the observation of Edmond Cahn that Pound
appears ". . . so well satisfied with the law as it now is." See Cahn, Jurispru-
dence, ANN. SuRvY AM. L. 1160 (1944). From the time of his first major
address, note 1 supra, until his book, Justice According to Law, he has been
seeking and suggesting methods for improving the law.
131 Cf. Utz, Neue Stramungen in der NordamerikanischenRechtsphilosophie,
1949-50 ARCHIV FunR RECHTS-UND SOZIALPHILOSOPrIE 38.
132 Cf. note 30 mepra.
Pound's efforts in the field of education have been pro-

ductive of some good results elsewhere. It has helped to over-
come much of the "juristic pessimism" of which he spoke. 133
It has enabled other lawyers, as well as himself, to adapt
the laws of the country to changed social and economic
circumstances.
Dean Pound has certainly achieved a great personal suc-
cess in winning adherents to his legal theory. Hre has earned
for himself a host of friends, admirers and followers nation-
ally and internationally. Yet it cannot be said that his
every effort was positive contribution. Many of his observa-
tions and conclusions merit critical examination.
A. Historical Critique
Our historical critique is not going to be prolonged to

include every historical observation, nor is it to be specifi-
cally detailed. However, there are a few points which need
to be corrected. If it is not too pedantic to bring up such a
point, it should be said, as a general criticism, that he is
guilty of a methodological error on a grand scale. Time
after time he cites various authors with never a reference to
the locus. The reader is left without an easy opportunity to
read the text in its context. It is extremely difficult, to the
point of impossibility, to check all the references. In The
Spirit of the Common Law, which he considers his most im-
portant work, Pound cites more than sixty individual au-
thors, either directly or indirectly, besides groups of schools
of legal thought, without one reference note.
For this reason we do not know his source of informa-
tion when he writes about Aristotle, but he certainly could
not have been reading Aristotle's text. Pound calls Aristotle
the first of the mechanical jurists, for he held that the rule
of law was to be applied strictly without regard for the jus-
tice of the individual case. 3 4 Pound professed a great ad-
miration for Kohler, yet had he read Kohler correctly he

134 Cf. POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 109-10 (1922);
POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 86 (1921).
would have discovered

5
that Kohler admired Aristotle for just
13
the opposite.
However, it is not necessary to go to Kohler for ap-
proval of Aristotle. The text of Aristotle makes it clear that
he looked on the judge as a sort of animate justice. 13 6 He
37
considered equity a correction of the law.
Since Pound makes the same comments with regard to
St. Thomas Aquinas as he did of Aristotle, we can turn for
contradictory evidence to Thomas' commentaries on the same
text of Aristotle. According to Pound, St. Thomas conceived
the end of law to be one of putting everybody in his place
and keeping him there. 38 As to the application of law in
particular case, the Scholastics, says Pound, ignored the
moral aspects of the case, asking only if the prescribed legal
forms were followed. 1 39 In his commentary on Aristotle,
St. Thomas also tells us plainly that the judge is considered
to be a sort of incarnate justice in that his mind is totally
possessed with justice. 40 Likewise he praises equity as being
more excellent in that it observes the intention of the legis-
lator when his words are at variance with justice in an
individual case. For the legislator, he says, looks to the
plurality of cases, but is aware that his rule may not fit every
particular case. So the judge, in resorting to equity to attain
justice in an individual case,
14
is doing what the legislator
would do if he were there.
Pound's contention that the Scholastics conceived of law
as a matter of mere authority can hardly be reconciled with
the definition of St. Thomas. For Pound, reason came into
the law after the Reformation.142 St. Thomas defines law
as essentially an act of reason. 43 As to its end, law is or-
dered to the common good 144 and not to putting everybody in
135 KOHLER, PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 6-7, 86 (1914).

136 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in 5 THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE
(1941).
137 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in 5 id. at 1137b10.
138 POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COmmON LAW 86-87, 98 (1921).
139 Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision, 36 HARV. L. REV. 658 (1923).
140 AQUINAS, IN DECEM LIBROS ETHICORUm ARISTOTELIS AD NICOMIACHUMI
EXPOSITO, bk. V, lect. 6, No. 955 (Marietti ed. 1934).
141 AQUINAS, op. cit. supra note 140, lect. 16.
142 Pound, A Comparison of Ideals of Laz', 47 HARM. L. REv. 10 (1933).
143 AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA I-II, q. 90, art. 1.
144 Id. I-II, q. 90, art. 2.
his place by force and keeping him there. The common good
includes the ultimate happiness of all the members.
Dean Pound appears to have been too easily convinced
by a popular Renaissance notion that the middle ages were
dark ages. Had he investigated the Scholastic writers more
carefully, rather than taking the word of a secondary source,
he could not possibly have come to the conclusions he did.
In helping to perpetuate a story that is no longer believed
by prudent historians, he has rendered a disservice to scholar-
ship in general as well as to jurisprudence. It is unbeliev-
able that a man of Pound's intellectual ability could commit
so gross an error if the doctrine of St. Thomas on law had
ever once been presented to him objectively.
Turning to contemporary scholars we find that Dean
Pound takes suitable phrases or ideas out of context and
uses them to his own advantage. It has already been noted
that from Kohler he takes the jural postulates by a scissors-
and-paste method while rejecting the principles upon which
1 45
they were conceived by Kohler.
In a like manner, Pound claims to take his scheme of
social interests from Ihering. For Ihering an interest pre-
supposes a right and the interest is artificially stimulated, if
necessary, in order to maintain rights. For Pound, on the
contrary, there are only interests which the law may or may
not recognize. Private property for example, is considered
by Pound to be a wise bit of social engineering, a way of
securing more interests. For Ihering, property is a part of
personality extended to things. 146 To speak of property in
terms of interest is, for him, a degeneration of the proper
sense of property and a denial of its natural basis. 4 7 In
short, if one's knowledge of Ihering were limited to what can
be gained from Pound it would be very inexact. In effect
he has taken from Ihering only the terminology of "interests"
and given it an altogether different meaning.
Another case in point is G~ny. Where he speaks of
science and technique as necessary to law, Pound takes only
the elements of technique as though that were all that was
145 POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 150 (1923).

146 HERING, DER KAmPF 40.
147 Ibid.
mentioned by G-6ny. G~ny is the foremost natural-law legal

scholar in France, and it would be an injustice to him to
intimate that he extolls technique over science in law. But
there is nothing to be gained by multiplication of examples.
This method of citation is destined only to deceive. The use
of convenient texts does not in any considerable extent
change the essential pragmatism of Pound's legal theory.
B. Philosophical Critique
A philosophical critique of Pound's legal theory is much
more difficult since there is very little of philosophy to be
found therein. This is not intended as a harsh criticism
since he makes no great pretense at philosophy and very
aptly refers to his theory as sociological jurisprudence.
Nevertheless there are fundamental presuppositions, the lack
of which is itself a matter of investigation in legal theory.
With Pound the difficulty is made greater by reason of
his extraordinarily loose use of language and distrust of, or
disrespect for, logic. One well known American professor of
law was almost driven to despair when he could not under-
stand the legal Realists. But he felt relieved to learn that
Pound could not understand them, nor could they understand
him.148 The fact is, he rarely makes a statement of conse-
quence without surrounding it with so many qualifying and
conditional phrases that one wonders at the end if he is
speaking or quoting. However, even with the lack of logic
and loose language a few notions do emerge distinctly.
Definition of Law: It has already been noted that
Pound gives various descriptions of law but never arrives
at a precise definition. 149 Each of the descriptions reveals
something of his philosophy of law but no one of them, nor
even all of them taken together, gives a clear notion of what
he means by law. Nevertheless, by considering not only the
descriptions of law which he gives, but also the various mean-
ings of law which he criticizes, one can gain a clearer concept
of what he himself understands by law.
148 Lucey, Natural Law and Americam Legal Realism, 30 GEO. L.J. 493-94
(1942).
149 See text at note 39 supra.
Thus Pound criticizes the ancient jurists because they

considered the purpose of law to be the maintenance of peace.
It is, therefore, clear that for Pound law is not an instrument
for securing and maintaining peace in society.
Likewise he criticizes Aristotle and the scholastics for
holding that the end of law is the maintenance of the status
quo. The historical dubeity of this point has already been
indicated. But from his criticism of this alleged purpose it
is clear that for Pound the end of law is not the preservation
of the existing order in society.
On the other hand, he says, using Ihering's system of
social interests, law is not in the person but in society. It
is clear that, for Pound, law and rights are not in the person.
In each person there are only interests which he seeks to have
recognized. Only when the interests are recognized can we
speak of rights. Each individual seeks his own proper good
by pressing for the recognition of his interests.
Likewise Pound takes from G6ny the element of tech-
nique. It has already been pointed out that for G~ny the
element of technique is always secondary to the science and
is at the service of science to realize the ends which the sci-
ence of law proposes. But, as interpreted by Pound, the
technique of G6ny becomes a means of attaining an order of
peace among those who seek to satisfy their own interests.
Taking the various descriptions which he gives, and the
criticisms of other jurists, we see that, for Pound, law is a
compromise imposed by authority in a society where each
one seeks his own interests. This definition, however, has
special qualities. It is not a pure positivist definition as, for
example, we find in Kelsen. For Kelsen there is no recog-
nition of personality but only pure law. For him the no-
tion of law is derived purely from law as such, abstracting
from any concept of personality or of any given society of
persons. For Lauterpacht also, law is defined as an instru-
ment of order in a society with no consideration of the per-
sons in the society or of the determined structure of the
society. Del Vecchio also gives a definition of law in which
he envisages a determined society but abstracts from the in-
ternal structure of the society.
For Pound, on the other hand, there is always a real

element since he sees law as an instrument in a free society,
a society in which he takes into consideration the liberty of
all who seek their personal development. For this reason
he is certainly not a positivist in the sense of Kelsen. We
recognize here a realization of a demand of natural law, that
is, that the definition of law must imply the real human na-
ture, or a society of free men. Unfortunately, however, with
Pound it is not human nature as universally given.
Despite this approach to natural law, there is in his
conception of law an element far removed from natural law,
properly speaking. From Ihering he takes the notion of in-
terests and develops it as though there were no rights in the
person but only interests which struggle for recognition. It
is thus clear that for Pound rights and law exist only in so-
ciety and not in persons. Parenthetically, it might be said
that there is a sense in which this is correct, for if there were
only one person in the world there would be no law. Law
formally exists as a relation among several free, moral sub-
jects. Nevertheless, what exists before this formal law is
more than a personal interest only. There is a real law real-
ized in the same nature of the several subjects, as we shall
explain in more detail later. Dean Pound believes law is
an instrument of organization in a concrete political society
where each seeks his own interests. But according to natu-
ral law one can well imagine that, before the state, there is
a society founded upon human nature as such. While it is
true that in one sense society has a primacy over the indi-
-vidual, it is also true that man exists before the actual crea-
tion of the state, and carries his personal rights into the state
which he founds. The rights of the individual are not crea-
tions of the state, but, as Pound remarks regarding interests,
they exist in the person independently of any state. Cer-
tainly, law always exists in any social organization. But
this social organization precedes positive legislation, being
included in the social, not only individual, nature of man.
For this reason it is clear that Pound does not take all
of human reality into consideration, although he does not
abstract completely from human personality as do some other
jurists. But since he does not consider all of human reality
he remains outside the natural-law concept of law and closer

to the positivist definition.
Finality: Considering finality as it is found in law,
Pound approaches the idealists and also, to a certain extent,
the natural-law jurists. A philosophy of pure law, such as
advocated by Kelsen for example, eliminates all finality and
considers only the operation of pure positive law. Pound,
on the contrary, introduces the notion of finality into his
conception of law.
However, the notion of finality with which Pound is
concerned tends to confuse juridical politics and the finality
of law itself. What he is really concerned with is the finality
as found in juridical politics. In this sense all idealists, such
as Stammler and Del Vecchio, admit a finality. But juridi-
cal politics is not law; it does not establish a juridical order.
It is rather the antecedent effort to establish a juridical order.
In the juridical order itself Pound does not admit of a final-
ity but rather of a conflict of competing interests which seek
for recognition. The order which he imposes is not, there-
fore, a juridical order.
In the theory of natural law, on the other hand, man
with all his rights is social. And we must consider the com-
plete nature of man as a member of a social community with
a task to perform, not merely as he is known by social psy-
chology as an intelligent being who has interests he wishes
to satisfy. Finality, as understood by natural law, is im-
posed by the very nature of man as a social being who must
by nature seek the common good. This finality is itself ju-
ridical and not merely ethical in the modern sense of indi-
vidual ethics, and it creates law by itself prior to and inde-
pendently of positive legislation.
Some might object that this theory-that a determined
finality is the first principle of the legal order-creates law,
and favors dictatorship in the formation of law, as for ex-
ample Nazism. With Pound's theory, they would add, this
danger is absent because there is no predetermined finality
but only juridical politics in a determined society.
To this objection we reply that it is clear that juridical
finality could be abused and made to serve the end of totali-
tarianisn. To avoid this danger we must create barriers
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [ VOL.. 33:
and also have recourse to a certain individualism. This in-

dividualist principle of order is found in natural law and as
a juridical principle. Natural law does not say that any
finality is juridical. If that were the case, then it would be
true that the objectives proposed for itself by any determined
political regime would have the power to create law. But
only that finality which corresponds to human nature has the
power to create law. Therefore the principle cannot serve
the ends of any form of totalitarianism. On the contrary,
it is the surest protection against absolutism since it insists
that finality as found in human nature not only creates law
but also renders morally and juridically void any positive
legislation contrary to that finality. In Pound's theory, on
the other hand, this protection is absent because there are
no rights in the person but only interests which are recog-
nized by political authority. It follows, if there are no higher
norms, that the authority which granted recognition to cer-
tain interests could likewise withdraw that recognition.
With our conception of finality we can resolve questions
of law where there is no positive determination. For Pound,
on the other hand, these questions can only be resolved by a
compromise of conflicting interests. If understood properly
his principle is not entirely false because interests, in so far
as they are conformed to human nature, are a principle of
order. But experience demonstrates that not every interest
which men seek to secure is conformed to human nature.
Because interests which are in conformity with human na-
ture are a principle of order, Christian theory of natural
law has always supported the principle of subsidiarity as a
juridical principle. According to this principle, individuals
seek to satisfy their own interests in an order which is con-
formed to nature and which seeks first the common good.
This cannot be identified with Pound's theory of interests,
which are not and cannot be juridical principles.
Norms: The most important part of Pound's philos-
ophy of law gives occasion to a discussion of his conception
of norms. Actually he has no juridical norms in the strict
sense. What he admits as similar to norms are the interests
of the citizens organized in a political society. Peace and
order are to be realized in this society, not according to any

superior norms, but only according to the different wills.
To be sure, there is some rule, some norm, i.e., freedom.
But this freedom has no determined content. The content,
the manner, of this freedom is in continuous evolution, de-
pending on the decision of the citizen. The concept of free-
dom as a rule is, therefore, similar to a categorical concept of
Kant, without any determination. Nevertheless we have to
recognize that Pound, by underlining individual freedom, is
in no way in agreement with the neo-Kantian, Kelsen, for
whom there is nothing determined by the concept of law.
For Kelsen, Russian law would be law in the same way as
American law. Pound's doctrine of freedom, on the contrary,
determines the concept of law in a restricted sense, though
he does not admit any determination for this freedom.
Here the doctrine of natural law proceeds by determin-
ing the freedom of man according to a really strict norm,
that of human nature. And in this manner we come to an
ethical concept of norms, that is, a norm imposed as an ideal
for everyone. For human nature is not only a norm for the
individual man; it is the same for all of humanity. Thus
human nature becomes a principle for organizing every
human society.
But this doctrine of natural law as an ethical norm of
society provokes a delicate question, i.e, whether this norm
must be rigorously and rigidly applied to society. The diffi-
culty is evident. When we have to apply ethical norms to
society in the same way as to the individual man, there is no
more freedom for each man in the sense that his own dis-
cretion and arbitrariness be the norm of social organization
and social engineering. There, only the objective truth,
which is imposed on everybody, is a norm. Here, one could
speak of a dogmatic function of law, settled by an authority
like divine authority. But where is this infallible authority?
Contemporary society no longer acknowledges such an au-
thority as it was in medieval times when Christian faith was
the foundation of all social action. Modern society has no
common conscience. On the contrary, human conscience has
disintegrated to the point where there are as many con-
sciences as there are human beings.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [VOL. 33
For this reason we are forced to regulate social order

according to the principle of individual freedom. Otherwise
there would be no order. Or should we, perhaps, regulate it
according to authoritarianism? This is excluded by reason
of the fact that no human authority can guarantee to con-
duct human society in a really objective sense. Therefore
authoritarianism must always remain a social or political
system opposed to ethical norms.
We come, apparently, to the same conclusion proposed
by Pound: individual freedom is the rule for social engi-
neering. That much is certainly true. But there is a great
difference. Our conclusion is really a conclusion, that is an
application of ethical principles. According to our principle
there is not simply individual freedom but freedom abso-
lutely subjected to objective truth. Only in the application
can we agree that individual freedom can be recognized as a
rule of order. 150 And even in this we can never abandon the
ethical demand that the juridical order, in so far as it is pos-
sible, must constantly seek the absolute truth. According
to the doctrine of natural law, there exists in every man a
certain general knowledge of ethical demands. It is for this
reason, for example, that after World War II it was possible
to punish war criminals.
It appears that Pound supposes this general knowledge
of ethical demands in saying that apart from freedom there
is another norm, i.e., "civilization." However, it is not clear
what he means by this term. Like freedom, this concept of
civilization is, with Pound, evolutionary and devoid of any
determined content. Nevertheless, this conception seems to
approach the above mentioned idea of a general knowledge
of ethical demands. However, this is an interpretation which
may not have been Pound's when he speaks of civilization.
Because the term as used by him is vague and used to de-
nominate a future possible, it cannot serve as a juridical
norm. To summarize, Pound attempts to build a juridical
system without any juridical norms.
150 Cf. UTZ, RECHT UND GERECHLIGKELT 564-71 (1953).

CONCLUSION
We have seen briefly, but in its essential elements, the

legal philosophy of Roscoe Pound. For him, law is a process
of social engineering, a process of adjusting and compromis-
ing conflicting claims so that the maximum of human interest
may be satisfied with a minimum of friction and waste. The
philosophical foundations of Pound's legal theory is essen-
tially pragmatism; law is defined in terms of function.
Natural law and philosophy are admitted as supplying ideal
norms which may be used as a critique of existing law or to
formulate positive laws, but they are not admitted as juridi-
cal norms. Natural law, in the Thomistic sense, is rejected
chiefly because it is not known. When Pound speaks of natu-
ral law he is referring to later concepts of the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries.
Pound's legal theory is radically deficient because he at-
tempts to create a legal order without juridical norms.
Although he speaks frequently of absolute norms of justice,
in reality he does not admit of such norms or he confuses
them with social or cultural norms. As i evident from his
use of the jural postulates, the law should be designed to
meet the reasonable expectations of the society of the time
and place. The law then is, for him, an instrument for order-
ing social life in a determinate society, something which is
wholly foreign to the absolute norms of natural law of which
St. Thomas speaks. Pound speaks of morality in the law,
but on these principles it could be only a morality born of the
social conscience of the time and place. A Thomist could not
admit such a norm of morality. For a Thomist human nature
is the principle not only of individual ethics but also of so-
cial ethics, of which legal philosophy forms a part. The legal
order must, therefore, enforce a moral conduct which is ob-
jective and not born of a particular social or cultural
conscience.
In practice, however, it is extremely difficult to change
an established legal system and theory. If the norm for juris-
prudence is to be the individual will, then the task that faces
the scholastic legal scholar is one of juridical politics. The
individual conscience must be so formed that what each one
wills corresponds with what he should will. The principle

that the individual will provides the ultimate norm for a
legal system can provide the basis for a stable social and
legal order only when the individual will is perfectly sub-
jected to the objective norms deriving from human nature.
Admittedly it would be difficult to the point of impossibility
to form the conscience of all so that they corresponded ex-
actly with objective norms of human action. But if a major-
ity, or even a large number, of the citizens were so formed
then their desires would be reflected in laws more in con-
formity with the demands of natural law.
In the practical order, one of Pound's constant concerns
has been to avoid any form of absolutism in government. To
this end he insists that we must have absolute norms of
values. If the ideals are absolute, he says, it puts something
above the ruler or ruling body, something by which to judge
them and by which they are held to rule. Yet it is impos-
sible for Pound himself to have absolute ideals of justice.
Based as it is on a theory of social interests, his measure of
values must necessarily be relative and also must necessarily
be constantly changing and adjusting to the needs of the
time and place. Further, since this theory of interest admits
of no absolute rights but only interests that have been recog-
nized by the political force of the society, it follows that the
political force that granted the recognition can likewise with-
draw its recognition. Thus the individual is left without any
rights that owe their existence to his nature. The interests
of the individual are enforceable only if and to the extent
that they are recognized by the political force of the society.
It is evident, therefore, that the very thing that Pound is
most anxious to avoid is rendered more easily, possible and
the door is left open to absolutism in government. Only when
there is recognition of rights based on human nature is free-
dom guaranteed.
Besides the juridical politics mentioned above there is
yet .another way that scholastic philosophers and legal
scholars can exercise an influence in the accepted schools of
jurisprudence. It has been seen that Pound draws his ma-
terials from the most diverse sources. Although this does
not alter his fundamental pragmatism, it does offer an op-
portunity to modern scholastics to exercise an influence even

within the framework of pragmatic legal theory. At the pres-
ent time there is in America a decided dissatisfaction with
the reigning legal theory. Jurists, and Pound among the
first, are calling for legal philosophy to direct the new move-
ment. In the past jurists have rejected natural-law theories
because they have been confronted with pseudo theories. The
task for scholastics is to present the authentic natural law
and allow it to be judged on its own merits.
Another strong movement which can be noticed among
American jurists is a sentiment for codification of the law.
If such a move should come, it would not necessarily destroy
the common-law technique, but it would give a greater sta-
bility to the law. Modern scholastics must be prepared to
present the traditional Thomistic doctrine of law. The time
is ripe and the sentiment is well disposed for it to be received
into the law.

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St.

John's Law Review

Social Engineering: The Legal Philosophy of Roscoe Pound

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SOCIAL ENGINEERING: THE LEGAL PHILOSOPHY

A MONG American jurists, as well as among those of the

* This article is a portion of a thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of

schools because it has not been properly presented. There

POUND AND His PROBLEMS

It was August 29, 1906, at the Capitol Building, St.

1 The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction With the Administration of Jus-

tice, address before A.B.A. Annual Meeting (1906), reprinted in 20 J. Am.

recognition and an invitation to move from the relative ob-

2 Cowan, A Report on the Status of Philosophy of Law in the United

his insight and vision. 4 Dean Emeritus Albert Kocourek of

Patterson, Pound's Theory of Social Interests, INTERPRETATIONS OF MOD-

Beginning with the second half of the last century

comprising many philosophies and various versions of natu-

Just before the turn of the century, when Pound came

16 POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 96 (1922). "The

philosophy generated the attitude that you cannot do any-

19 POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW 98 (1938); POUND,

A fourth problem is seen in the inadequate and poor

24 POUND, op. cit. supra note 20, at 39, 49, 59.

fluence voters to elect him to the position of a judge. 28 The

history, which is a study not only of how doctrines have

34 Pound, supra note 33, at 513-14; Cf. POUND, OUTLINES OF LECTURES ON

tory, philosophies of law. But to this peculiar union he does

THE NATURE op LAW

Before entering upon a detailed discussion of the nature

39 Pound, A Comparison of Ideals of Law, 47 HARV. L. REv. 1-2 (1933) ;

within itself four distinct concepts. First, there is the rule

the [technique] traditional art of the lawyer's craft . . . and philosophical

indeed, decisive in new cases when there is necessity of choos-

From still another point of view, which might aptly be

49 POUND, THE TASK OF LAW 62 (1944).

of social engineering. This, however, is somewhat misleading.

55 "But I am skeptical as to the possibility of an absolute judgment. We

claims of the entire social group. 58 1 Not every claim that

;8 Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HARv. L. REv. 1-2 (1943).

Fourthly, there is the social interest in the conservation

From the social interests just presented it is possible to see

briefly these postulates are, first, in civilized society men

What the end of law should be according to Pound has

the influence of Greek philosophers this was superseded by

one of finding the criteria of the relative value of interests.7 4

Law, unlike the laws of physical sciences which are based on

as well as a policy of political progress

In considering the question of the sources of law there

of the authority of law.9 4 In dealing with the first problem

Considering the factors to which legal precepts owe their

94 POUND, SOURCES AND FORMS OF LAW 5 (1946) ; POUND, SOCIAL CONTROL

In civil law systems, where legislative precepts rather than

101 POUND, SOURCES AND FORMS OF LAW 25 (1946).

From the foregoing it is seen that a developed legal sys-

B. Source of the Authority of Law

The first problem is that of the immediate practical

continues, for our purposes today we do not have to be guided