Hall - 2007 - Divide and Sprawl Decline and Fall-A Comparative Critique of Euclidean Zoning - 915-952
Hall - 2007 - Divide and Sprawl Decline and Fall-A Comparative Critique of Euclidean Zoning - 915-952
Hall - 2007 - Divide and Sprawl Decline and Fall-A Comparative Critique of Euclidean Zoning - 915-952
Eliza Hall*
Table of Contents
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916
II. Euclidean Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918
A. Urban Sprawl and Decaying Cities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920
B. Racial and Socioeconomic Segregation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923
i. Historical Background: Euclid in Context . . . . . . . . . . . 923
ii. Euclid’s Legacy: A Great Divide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925
C. Environmental and Energy Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927
D. Economic Impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929
E. Reduced Quality of Life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932
III. Proposed Solutions: New Urbanism and Smart Growth . . . . . . . . 934
IV. The French Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936
A. Smart Growth Is Normal; New Urbanism Is Nothing New . . 936
i. Lack of Urban Sprawl and Inner-City Decline . . . . . . . . 936
ii. Mixed Use: A Structural Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 939
iii. Building(s) for People . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944
B. French Legal and Political Structures That Make This
Possible . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948
V. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951
* Eliza Hall, an associate at Kirkpatrick & Lockhart Preston Gates Ellis LLP, holds a JD from the
University of Pittsburgh. Her background includes BA and MA degrees in French and four years spent
living in France. She extends sincerest thanks to Dr. Vivian Curran, professor of comparative law, for her
advice on French legal research and for her inspiring perspectives on comparative legal studies.
915
916 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:915
I. INTRODUCTION
As many commentators have pointed out, the land use patterns prevalent
in the United States since the advent of Euclidean-style zoning1 have played
a direct role in the development of a surprisingly broad range of problems:
“[b]y fostering or requiring low density development with a high separation
of uses, Euclidean zoning is one of the great generators of suburban sprawl,
with all of its environmental, economic, and social costs.”2 These costs
include pollution,3 loss of wilderness and farmland,4 racial and socioeconomic
segregation of the population,5 and legal obstacles to effective urban
rehabilitation.6 Moreover, in combination with prevailing patterns of local
funding, the socioeconomic segregation caused by Euclidean zoning
perpetuates itself by channeling less well-off children into chronically under-
equipped public schools and stretching the resources of many urban
municipalities too thin, leaving them to choose between raising property tax
rates or allowing their infrastructure to decay. That devil’s bargain bolsters
the tendency of middle- and higher-income people to live in suburbs rather
than cities, deepening the downward spiral in which many American cities
find themselves. And the damage goes even further: “many current zoning
practices disregard or even work against crime prevention goals”7 in both
cities and suburbs. This is particularly problematic in light of the fact that
“Euclidean systems of separation—conventional zoning—have been
1. That is, since 1916, when New York became the first city to implement zoning laws of the type
later upheld in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). “Operating from the premise
that everything has its place, [Euclidean] zoning is the comprehensive division of a city into different use
zones.” JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING AND
DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW § 4.2, at 80 (1998) (cited in BLACK ’S LAW DICTIONARY under Euclidean
zoning). The terms “zoning” and “Euclidean zoning” will be used interchangeably here.
2. Jay Wickersham, Jane Jacob’s Critique of Zoning: From Euclid to Portland and Beyond, 28
B.C. ENVTL . AFF. L. REV . 547, 557 (2001). For an overview of the costs associated with sprawl, see Robert
H. Freilich & Bruce G. Peshoff, The Social Costs of Sprawl, 29 URB . LAW . 183, 184 (1997).
3. G.S. Kleppel, Urbanization and Environmental Quality: Implications of Alternative
Development Scenarios, 8 ALB . L. ENVTL . OUTLOOK J. 37, 40 (2002).
4. Id. See also Timothy Beatley & Richard C. Collins, Americanizing Sustainability: Place-Based
Approaches to the Global Challenge, 27 WM . & MARY ENVTL . L. & POL’Y REV . 193, 196-97 (2002).
5. See, e.g., Jerry Frug, The Geography of Community, 48 STAN . L. REV . 1047, 1048 (1996);
Richard H. Chused, Euclid’s Historical Imagery, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV . 597, 605-06 (2001).
6. See, e.g., Nicole Stelle Garnett, Ordering (And Order In) The City, 57 STAN . L. REV . 1, 5 (2004)
(stating that “when property is over- or misregulated, property regulations may impede efforts to restore a
vibrant, healthy, and organic public order”) [hereinafter Garnett, Ordering].
7. Neal Kumar Katyal, Architecture as Crime Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1039, 1108 (2002).
2007] DIVIDE AND SPRAWL: EUCLIDEAN ZONING 917
8. Andres Duany & Emily Talen, Making the Good Easy: The Smart Code Alternative, 29
FORDHAM URB . L.J. 1445, 1451 (2002).
9. Andrew G. Dietderich, An Egalitarian’s Market: The Economics of Inclusionary Zoning
Reclaimed, 24 FORDHAM URB . L.J. 23, 29 (1996).
10. Wickersham, supra note 2, at 548.
11. See, e.g., Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Public-Use Question as a Takings Problem, 71 GEO . WASH .
L. REV . 934, 953 n.119 (2003).
12. See, e.g., Beatley & Collins, supra note 4, at 201-06 (describing and critiquing approaches used
in Maryland, New Jersey, Texas, and Oregon).
13. Wickersham, supra note 2, at 556.
14. Id.
15. See, e.g., Beatley & Collins, supra note 4, at 204 (explaining how low ambitions and half-
hearted implementation have limited the success of some attempts at limiting sprawl).
16. With the exception of the country’s post-World War II flirtation with Modernism.
17. Ray Gindroz, City Life and New Urbanism, 29 FORDHAM URB . L.J. 1419, 1420 (2002).
918 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:915
use patterns in Paris and the surrounding region will be the focus of
comparison. There will also be some discussion of France in general,
because, as a highly centralized country with regional, national, and even
transnational land use planning operating in tandem with local rules,18 many
statements about France also apply to Paris and vice-versa. Finally, a brief
overview of similarities and differences between relevant French and U.S.
land use law and political structures will be provided to indicate the extent to
which the principles underlying French land use law are compatible with and
feasible in the U.S. system.
18. See, e.g., Roger W. Wilkinson, 1998 And the Law Royer Turns Twenty-Five: Combatting the
Commercial Suburbanization of France, Since 1973, 21 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT ’L L. REV . 391, 395-97
(1998); Clifford Larsen, What Should Be the Leading Principles of Land Use Planning? German
Perspective, 29 VAND . J. TRANSNAT ’L L. 967, 997 n.136 (1996).
19. Wickersham, supra note 2, at 553.
20. Garnett, Ordering, supra note 6, at 4.
21. The police power is, of course, “[t]he inherent and plenary power of a sovereign to make all laws
necessary and proper to preserve the public security, order, health, morality, and justice.” BLACK ’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1196 (8th ed. 2004).
22. Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 74 (1976) (quoting Euclid, 272 U.S. at 387-88).
In general, when the government restricts a property owner’s freedom in order to prevent a public harm, it
is an act of police power requiring no compensation to the owner; compensation is only required under the
Takings Clause when the restriction is imposed to confer a public benefit. ROBERT R. WRIGHT & MORTON
GITELMAN , LAND USE IN A NUTSHELL 103 (West Group, 2000).
23. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2074, 2083 (2005) (citing Euclid for the proposition
that a zoning ordinance will “survive a substantive due process challenge so long as it was not ‘clearly
arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general
welfare.’”).
2007] DIVIDE AND SPRAWL: EUCLIDEAN ZONING 919
the zoning rationale to the absolute limit: “the line ‘which in this field
separates the legitimate from the illegitimate assumption of [police] power is
not capable of precise delimitation. It varies with circumstances and
conditions.’. . . But even those historic police power problems need not loom
large or actually be existent in a given case.”24 In other words, with some
exceptions, when it comes to zoning the police power is more or less whatever
the local legislature says it is. As a result, it is common for zoning codes to
define restrictions in such detail that the owner’s freedom to use the property
as she sees fit is reduced to almost nil.25
In addition to the clack of a clear relationship between the police power
and such narrow use restrictions, “[t]he fundamental problem with Euclidean
zoning is that it . . . ignores how cities actually operate.”26 Ample literature
supports the argument that the theory behind such zoning is simply wrong;27
it has been argued that the decline of American cities and the damaging
growth pattern we call sprawl “are caused by a failed regulatory code.”28 As
for the environmental impact of zoning and the resultant sprawl, “[t]here is no
other area in environmental law where the goals of the regulatory program are
not just indifferent, but actively hostile, to the best thinking in the field.”29
Yet further, Euclidean zoning provides a legal mechanism whereby certain
classes of people can be effectively barred from living in a neighborhood or
even an entire municipality without that exclusion violating any recognized
constitutional right.30 This is not a mere theoretical possibility, but a
statement of how zoning has been used in the ninety years since its inception;
24. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 4 (1974) (quoting Euclid, 272 U.S. at 387)
(emphasis added) (citation omitted).
25. For example, in New York, owners of property designated as Use Group 12B in Manufacturing
Districts 2 and 3 can use their property only for “antique stores; art galleries, commercial; candy or ice
cream stores; cigar or tobacco stores; delicatessen stores; jewelry or art metal craft shops; music stores; and
newsstands.” New York City Zoning Resolution, art. 4, ch. 2, § 42-13 (2005), available at http://
www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/zone/art04c02.pdf. It is unclear what police power rationale could possibly
underlie such restrictions on property rights: if a commercial art gallery or a music store in this zone pose
no threat to public welfare, the proposition that a non-commercial art gallery or a bookstore would pose one,
and thus the justification for prohibiting it, seems difficult to support.
26. Wickersham, supra note 2, at 563.
27. See, e.g., Garnett, Ordering, supra note 6, at 5; Wickersham, supra note 2.
28. Duany & Talen, supra note 8, at 1452.
29. Wichersham, supra note 2, at 554.
30. In addition to the fact that disparate impact is insufficient to invalidate a zoning ordinance,
Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1977), and that zoning ordinances
do not directly target any protected class, “zoning is, by tradition and by jurisprudence, a matter of local
concern, in which federal courts are reluctant to intrude.” Westhab, Inc. v. City of New Rochelle, 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9926 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), at *30.
920 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:915
this Note will primarily address the racial and socioeconomic segregation
perpetuated by zoning, but the same backdoor methods have been used to
discriminate against gay couples and straight couples who prefer, for whatever
reason, not to marry.31
To distinguish the effects of Euclidean zoning from those of the land use
law prevalent in France, this Note describes how zoning perpetuates five
major problems: (1) urban sprawl; (2) racial and socioeconomic segregation;
(3) environmental degradation and energy waste; (4) adverse economic
impact; and (5) diminished quality of life.
31. For example, in February 2006, the town of Black Jack, Missouri denied an occupancy permit
to an unmarried couple with three children on the grounds that they did not meet the zoning ordinance’s
definition of a family. This made it illegal for them to live in the home they had just bought. Eun Kyung
Kim, Unwed Couple, Kids Face Boot by Black Jack, ST . LOUIS POST -DISPATCH , Feb. 21, 2006. The
children’s mother said, “I refuse to run down to the courthouse and get married just so I can live in my own
home.” Id. Such ordinances are common in that region, id., though it could be argued that they are
unconstitutional under Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). As for gay couples, the Ohio
Court of Appeals recently noted with approval that “courts have already rejected Lawrence [v. Texas] as
a basis to challenge laws involving . . . the definition of ‘family’ for zoning purposes. . . .” Ohio v. Jenkins,
2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 6663, at *16-17 (2004). The definition of family is not the only contested territory
in the effort to use zoning laws to perpetuate discrimination against gays; in 1993, residents of a Charlotte,
N.C. neighborhood went to court over a zoning board decision allowing the opening of a church that
ministered to gay parishioners. Editorial, Gays and the Church Unless Laws are Broken, Gays Should Be
Allowed to Worship at a New Church in Matthews, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER , Dec. 9, 1993, at 22A,
available at 1993 WLNR 1622401.
32. Timothy J. Dowling, Reflections on Urban Sprawl, Smart Growth, and the Fifth Amendment,
148 U. PA. L. REV . 873, 874 (2000).
33. Beatley & Collins, supra note 4, at 197.
34. Freilich & Peshoff, supra note 2, at 184.
35. Nicole Stelle Garnett, Unsubsidizing Suburbia, 90 MINN . L. REV . 459, 491 (2005) [hereinafter
Garnett, Suburbia] (reviewing RICHARDSON DILWORTH , THE URBAN ORIGINS OF SUBURBAN AUTONOMY
2007] DIVIDE AND SPRAWL: EUCLIDEAN ZONING 921
in which the “more affluent . . . abandon[] central cities for the suburban
fringe.”36 But cities lose more than just people in this process: the costs of
the infrastructure needed to support suburbs, such as sewers, utility-line
extension,37 and road improvements, have been disproportionately borne by
cities.38
As a result of urban municipalities essentially being forced to underwrite
the departure of the middle class, sprawl goes hand in hand with the
socioeconomic decline of America’s inner cities. As the middle and upper
classes moved to residential suburbs, jobs followed: suburban municipalities
used zoning to turn former farmland and wilderness into commercial and
industrial parks, so in the 1980s alone, “suburbs received 95% of new office
jobs and 120% of net manufacturing job growth.”39 This shift in the location
of offices and manufacturing plants changed urban centers from ‘“centers of
production and distribution of material goods to centers of administration,
information exchange, and higher-order service provision.’ As a result, jobs
remaining in the downtown core require higher levels of education, which
many city residents do not possess.”40 Meanwhile, Euclidean zoning
“virtually guarantees that the automobile will be crucial in accomplishing
(2005)).
36. Martha A. Lees, Expanding Metropolitan Solutions Through Interdisciplinarity, 26 N.Y.U.
REV . L. & SOC . CHANGE 347, 347 (2001-01) (book review).
37. See, e.g., Mark Weiner, Water Agencies May Merge: Joining OCWA, Metropolitan Water
Board Could Save Money, Legislators Say, THE POST -STANDARD (Syracuse (N.Y.), Nov. 21, 2005, at B3,
available at 2005 WLNR 18832289 (stating that water distribution infrastructure funded by property tax-
backed bonds was built because the municipality “couldn’t serve new industry opening outside the city,”
but now “as suburban growth has fueled [the water authority’s] expansion . . . it may be unfair to continue
using property taxes to support the infrastructure”); State ex rel. City of Wheeling v. Renick, 116 S.E.2d
763 (1960) (permitting development company to bring action against city-owned sewer utility seeking to
compel it to extend sewer lines at city’s expense).
38. See, e.g., ANDRES DUANY ET AL., SUBURBAN NATION : THE RISE OF SPRAWL AND THE DECLINE
OF THE AMERICAN DREAM 8-15 (2000); Ed Bolen, Kara Brown, David Kiernan & Kate Konschnik, Smart
Growth: A Review of Programs State by State, 8 HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENVTL . L. & POL’Y 145, 147
(2002) (describing recent efforts by some cities to reduce or eliminate their spending on infrastructure
improvements for suburbs); John T. Marshall, Florida’s Downtowns: The Key to Smart Growth, Urban
Revitalization, and Green Space Preservation, 29 FORDHAM URB . L.J. 1509, 1510 (2002) (stating that
“Florida’s cities have paid for a disproportionate share of new roads and sewer systems to connect new
communities to surrounding metropolitan areas.”).
39. Jeremy R. Meredith, Note, Sprawl and the New Urbanist Solution, 89 VA. L. REV . 447, 458
(2003) (citing Michael E. Lewyn, Suburban Sprawl: Not Just an Environmental Issue, 84 MARQ . L. REV .
301, 302 (2000)).
40. Id. (quoting WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON , THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED : THE INNER CITY , THE
UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 39 (1987)).
922 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:915
one’s daily business,”41 but “the absence of car ownership [among urban poor]
and the inadequacy of public transit systems combine to create a scenario
where city residents find it difficult to gain access to employment.”42 As a
result, today’s city dwellers find themselves trapped in “once vibrant,
economically integrated neighborhoods that [are now] . . . communities in
which almost everyone [is] poor.”43
It has been noted that “[t]his pervasive urban landscape is not simply the
result of individual choices about where to live or to create a business. It is
the product of a multitude of governmental policies.”44 While sprawl has been
called “the root cause of many land-use problems across the country,”45 this
Note argues that both sprawl and the associated decline of the inner cities are
more usefully analyzed as the primary symptoms and inevitable result of
Euclidean zoning. Zoning fuels sprawl
both because exclusionary techniques (such as minimum lot size and square footage
requirements) necessitate vast amounts of land and because . . . [wealthier suburbs [use
their zoning power to] exclude new development, especially of less desirable land uses,
effectively pushing it outward to communities with more lenient land use policies. Over
time . . . the cycle . . . repeats itself. The result is the sprawling “leapfrog” style
development that characterizes our municipal areas.46
[T]he coming of apartment houses [to single-family areas] . . . has sometimes resulted in
destroying the entire section for private house purposes . . . very often the apartment
house is a mere parasite, constructed in order to take advantage of the open spaces and
attractive surroundings created by the residential character of the district. . . . Under these
Growth, 22 PACE ENVTL . L. REV . 231, 234-35 (2005) (citing a 1992 New Jersey study projecting that new
homes in sprawl developments would cost $12,000-$15,000 more than they would “in more compact
development[s]”).
50. James A. Kushner, Smart Growth, New Urbanism and Diversity: Progressive Planning
Movements in America and Their Impact on Poor and Minority Ethnic Populations, 21 UCLA J. ENVTL .
L. & POL’Y 45, 46-47 (2002-03).
51. Garnett, Ordering, supra note 6, at 4. She continues: “City officials schooled in this ideology
may naturally tend to equate ordered land uses with the absence of disorder. They also may be wrong.”
Id. at 5.
52. Kleppel, supra note 3, at 47.
53. Ambler Realty Co. v. Vill. of Euclid (Euclid I), 297 F. 307, 313 (N.D. Ohio 1924).
54. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. (Euclid II), 272 U.S. 365, 387-89 (1926).
924 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:915
The Euclid Court apparently assumed that families unable to afford single-
family homes were so undesirable that zoning for the express purpose of
keeping such families out of middle-class neighborhoods was a reasonable
government response.
It has been suggested that “the racism of the era in which [Euclid II] was
decided” provides an important clue as to why a Court with “well-known
objections to many forms of government economic regulation” approved a
zoning system that greatly limited the rights of property owners to use their
property as they saw fit.56 The 1920s were a time of “unprecedented levels of
immigration . . . [as well as] migration from the southern United States.”57
Legislation passed in 1921 and 1924 had imposed a quota system favoring
immigrants “from northern Europe and severely limiting entry from other
parts of Europe and the rest of the world.”58 More ominously,
[t]he Ku Klux Klan was a major political force at the time. . . . Indeed, the power of the
Klan was the subject of debate in Congress just before Euclid came before Judge
Westenhaver. A movement favoring anti-lynching legislation . . . passed in the House
of Representatives, only to die in a Senate filibuster.59
Moreover, the Supreme Court had endorsed racially restrictive covenants the
same year it upheld Euclidean zoning.60 Although zoning ordinances
excluding specific ethnic groups from particular neighborhoods had been held
unconstitutional in 1917 on freedom of contract grounds,61 that case was
deliberately engineered by the parties to get around the racism of the
justices;62 the defendant, who entered into the real estate contract for the
specific purpose of challenging the zoning ordinance, was the president of the
local NAACP.63 But Euclid I made it possible to accomplish the same
discriminatory purpose more discreetly: simply removing the possibility of
economic diversity within a given neighborhood went a long way towards
preventing racial and ethnic minorities from moving in. Meanwhile,
separating residential use from any and all economic use, rather than just from
clear nuisances such as industrial compounds, obviously means there will be
no businesses in the neighborhood; this means lower-income outsiders, who
most likely already have no social connections in higher-income
neighborhoods, no longer even have a reason to visit.
63. Josh Whitehead, Note, Using Disparate Impact Analysis to Strike Down Exclusionary Zoning
Codes, 33 REAL EST . L.J. 359, 363 (2005).
64. Meredith, supra note 39, at 459.
65. Gindroz, supra note 17, at 1423.
66. Garnett, Ordering, supra note 6, at 21.
67. Wickersham, supra note 2, at 553.
68. Douglas Foy, Massachusetts’ Chief of Commonwealth Development, quoted in Sam Allis,
Whither I-495?, BOSTON GLOBE , Aug. 22, 2004, at A2, available at 2004 WLNR 3586750.
69. “Exclusionary zoning is a common tool employed by local municipalities to exclude whatever
segment of the population they deem undesirable.” Michael Kling, Note, Zoned Out: Assisted-Living
Facilities and Zoning, 10 ELDER L.J. 187, 198 (2002). While exclusionary zoning in general is illegal in
926 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:915
themselves exclude buyers who cannot afford that much space; of course this
keeps out less-wealthy families of any race, but it disproportionately affects
minorities.70 “Perhaps the most significant aspect of the ‘white flight’ . . . [of]
the past fifty years is that much of that flight has been to independent
municipalities” with comprehensive zoning powers.71 Although “it is illegal
for towns to set a minimum house value, . . . zoning [and] subdivision
regulations . . . can implicitly have the same effect.”72
Even in more affordable areas, separating residential zones by housing
type dramatically reduces the ability of lower-income people, and by
extension minorities and new immigrants, to move into the area. For example,
neighborhoods restricted to single-family housing prohibit not only apartment
buildings but even duplexes, a housing type that enables lower-income owners
to afford their mortgage by renting out half the structure.73 It is also common
to impose minimum sizes for side yards and/or to create separate zones for
attached and detached single-family housing,74 preemptively segregating
families who can afford lawns from those who cannot. This is not mere
coincidence; “fear of what is euphemistically called ‘the inner city’—a fear
that has fueled the migration to the suburbs—has been a reference to the black
poor.”75 Having set the stage for socioeconomic segregation, the Euclidean
approach then perpetuates it into the next generation: zoning that keeps out
lower-income neighbors also helps prevent lower-income children from going
to the same schools as middle- and upper-class children.
some states, such as New Jersey, see, e.g., So. Burlington County NAACP v. Mount Laurel Tp., 336 A.2d
713 (N.J. 1975), the point at which a minimum lot size becomes “exclusionary” varies widely: even five-
acre minimums have been upheld. See, e.g., County Comm’rs. of Queen Anne’s County v. Miles, 228 A.2d
450 (Md. 1967).
70. See, e.g., Whitehead, supra note 63, at 371.
71. Id.
72. William T. Bogart, “Trading Places”: The Role of Zoning in Promoting and Discouraging
Intrametropolitan Trade, 51 CASE . W. RES. L. REV . 697, 709 (2001).
73. The problem with excluding duplexes is that buying a duplex and renting out half of it enables
a lower-income family to get a foothold in property ownership that they might not otherwise be able to
afford. See, e.g., Alex Mindlin, The Accidental Landlord, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2005 (profiling a working-
class Dominican man who parlayed his first home, a dilapidated $15,000 Brooklyn duplex he purchased
in 1980, into a small empire). Prohibiting duplexes cuts off this avenue to the American dream, and it does
so without providing any clear benefit to neighbors, since duplexes do not inherently cause more negative
impact (traffic, noise, etc.) than single-family homes. This fact can be illustrated by comparing the impact
of a quiet, one-car family of three renting half their duplex to an elderly relative with the impact of a three-
car family of two parents and four rowdy teenagers in a single-family house: the impact depends on the
residents themselves, not on the housing type.
74. See, e.g., PITTSBURGH , PA, ZONING CODE art. 1, § 902.01.A.1(a) (2006).
75. Frug, supra note 5, at 1064.
2007] DIVIDE AND SPRAWL: EUCLIDEAN ZONING 927
76. Id.
77. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU , UNITED STATES—RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN ; 1790 to 1990, 1 (2002),
http://www.census.gov/population/documentation/twps0056/tab01.pdf. Whites represented 87.9% and
blacks 11.6% of the total population in 1900. Id.
78. Whitehead, supra note 63, at 361.
79. See Frug, supra note 5, at 1064-65.
80. Whitehead, supra note 63, at 359.
81. Meredith, supra note 39, at 463.
82. Bogart, supra note 72, at 713 n.61 (quoting ANTHONY DOWNS, NEW VISIONS FOR
METROPOLITAN AMERICA 14 (1994)).
83. AMERICAN FARMLAND TRUST , FARMING ON THE EDGE REPORT 1 (2006), http://www.farmland
.org/resources/fote/default.asp; http://www.farmland.org/farmingontheedge/Farming%20on%20the%20
Edge.pdf.
84. For a discussion of Maryland’s program, see Parris N. Glendening, Maryland’s Smart Growth
928 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:915
than the traditional urban sprawl rested in part on the state’s Department of
Planning “sobering prediction [that] [i]f growth patterns d[id] not change,
development w[ould] consume as much land . . . over the next twenty-five
years as it has during the entire 368-year history of the [s]tate.”85
In addition to obliterating farmland and wilderness, sprawl increases air
pollution and aggravates global warming86 by making people dependent on
cars: “[t]ransportation is responsible for one-third of all greenhouse gases
generated by Americans,” and “[b]etween 1969 and 1990, while the
population of the United States increased by 21 percent, the number of miles
driven per capita grew 72 percent.”87 Meanwhile, sprawl pollutes the
watershed via “runoff containing chemicals from asphalt, automobile
emissions, horticultural fertilizers and pesticides.”88 This problem is
exacerbated by “the extensive use of impervious surfaces, reduction of
vegetative buffers and inferior but mandatory approaches to storm water
management[, which] reduce[s] the ability of the landscape to manage
contaminant loading”; the development attributes that exacerbate the problem
are most prevalent in suburbs.89
Because these effects have been so thoroughly discussed elsewhere,90 this
Note will not dwell on them. The key point here is that the environmental
effects of sprawl arise from two factors: population density and energy waste.
Density, of course, is a direct result of zoning: minimum lot sizes define the
density of a development. Waste of energy is more complex, but zoning in a
way that obligates residents to use cars to accomplish the slightest errand is
clearly more wasteful than zoning for compact neighborhoods with schools
and small shops within walking distance. America is zoning for pollution and
global warming; we are zoning our farmland and wilderness out of existence.
D. Economic Impact
Jane Jacobs, one of the most famous critics of Euclidean zoning, “is an
economic libertarian who believes in the creative power of the market.”91 She
“criticizes the sorting out of functions into single-use districts . . . because it
stifles the cross-fertilization of ideas and experiences that is so important to
a city’s economic and social health.”92 Indeed, a central part of the land use
model she proposes “is the goal of economic diversity: the richness of
business ideas and opportunities that flourish in a city. . . . ‘Cities may fairly
be called natural economic generators of diversity, and natural economic
incubators of new enterprises.’”93 Her critique may sound theoretical, but it
rests on a solid base: Euclidean zoning and its aftereffects, namely urban
sprawl and declining cities, impose costs that “can be measured in dollars.”94
It adversely impacts the economy in several ways: by distorting the real estate
market; imposing massive infrastructure costs and associated tax increases;
increasing the cost of housing and transportation; and reducing the ability of
lower-income people—which includes, of course, not only those we normally
think of as “the poor” but also many artists and budding entrepreneurs—to
find work or create self-employment.
Euclidean zoning distorts the real estate market in so many ways that it
manages to simultaneously conflict with conservative, libertarian, and liberal
values. In addition to increasing the average price of housing,95 “[t]he fact
that a zoning map allows high density housing in some areas, only single
family housing in others, only industrial and commercial use in designated
locations, and high rise office buildings in downtown areas, creates great
disparity in value among a city’s many properties.”96 While “[a] local
regulation imposing a maximum land value would almost certainly be viewed
as a [Fifth Amendment] taking, . . . zoning laws that effectively impose a
maximum land value have been upheld. . . .”97 And because municipal zoning
authorities, rather than the market, dictate what housing types will be available
and favor single-family homes, “profitable sites for [multifamily housing] are
artificially scarce”98 and thus artificially expensive. Such a situation is clearly
incompatible with free-market principles, and since affordable housing often
means some type of multi-family housing, it is also hostile to the goal of
increasing the access of lower-income families to affordable housing. In
addition, Euclidean zoning increases the burden on middle-class families:
while the artificial scarcity of multi-family sites might be expected to reduce
the cost of single-family homes by increasing the availability of single-family
sites, this possibility is nullified by the tendency of suburban municipalities
to require large minimum lot and house sizes.99 That “forces people to
consume land and improvements they do not want,”100 at a higher cost than
they would pay were they allowed to buy only the amount of property they
want. “This forced consumption is inefficient because the recipient could sell
the extra land and improvements on the market for more than what they are
worth to the recipient. . . .”101
It has already been mentioned that sprawl “leads to tremendous demand
for expanded public services and infrastructure, all of which cost substantially
more to provide”102 to a scattered population than to a more compact one. The
problem is enormous in scope: nearly fifteen years ago, “[a] New Jersey study
estimated that over a twenty-year period, capital costs associated with sprawl
would exceed $1.3 billion with annual maintenance costs of over $400
million.”103 Single-use zoning and urban sprawl are an expensive
combination: a 1989 Urban Land Institute monograph estimated that
“providing services to a three unit per acre development located ten miles
from central facilities and employment centers” would cost $48,000—in 1989
dollars—while “[t]he same costs for a home in a twelve-unit per acre
development, located closer in with an equal mix of townhouses, garden
apartments and single family [homes], would be 50% lower.”104 Current land-
use policies “forc[e] our citizens to pay higher and higher taxes to cover the
infrastructure costs created by sprawl.”105 Moreover, the way suburban
municipalities use Euclidean zoning “segregates the tax base into wealthy
suburban and poor urban components, creating a greater disparity between
property tax rates and the return in public services per tax dollar paid.”106
But single-use zoning has even more direct effects on the financial
situation of American families. It reduces people’s ability to respond
efficiently to economic developments, such as by starting a business in their
garage to seize a new opportunity or renting out rooms in their home to get
through a difficult period.107 Separating residential use from any and all
economic uses, rather than just from clear nuisances such as heavy industry,
not only makes it more difficult for lower-income people to get to work by
locating the workplace farther away, it eliminates the option of supporting
themselves entrepreneurially by preventing them from living and working in
the same space. Live/work spaces are increasingly popular, but Euclidean
zoning tends to banish them to undesirable areas108 and to prevent people from
starting a business in their home unless they already live in such a space.109
Zoning thus effectively snuffs out small-scale entrepreneurialism in residential
zones; meanwhile, the transportation costs necessary to get to jobs located in
other zones fall “disproportionate[ly] . . . on working families of low or
modest incomes.”110 Those costs can make employment virtually impossible
for lower-income city dwellers: if they cannot afford a reliable car and public
116. Glendening, supra note 84, at 1496, citing Chen May-Yee, The Global Battle: ‘Let’s Make a
Deal,’ WALL ST . J., Sept. 25, 2000, at R. 10.
117. Gindroz, supra note 17, at 1424.
118. Whitehead, supra note 63, at 359.
119. See, e.g., Peter T. Kilborn, “Relos”: America’s Domestic Expatriates, INT ’L HERALD TRIB .,
June 2, 2005, at 3 (describing high-income new arrivals to suburbia who “found good schools, safe streets,
neighbors they like and a big house and a yard. But they did not count on the grueling traffic, on how far
away everything seems . . . or on the stresses of a breadwinner’s travels.”).
120. Glendening, supra note 84, at 1501.
121. Id. at 1506.
122. Id. at 1495.
123. Wickersham, supra note 2, at 558.
934 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:915
dictating the physical features of the homes in a given zone strongly promote
cookie-cutter suburbs with identical homes on identical cul-de-sacs.
Meanwhile, the sheer distance between the various locations of everyday life
complicates social and recreational activities and wastes time: the average
American spends fifty-five minutes a day driving.124
As for crime, the Euclid court speculated that zoning would reduce it:
“[a] place of business in a residence neighborhood furnishes an excuse for any
criminal to [enter] . . . where, otherwise, a stranger would be under the ban of
suspicion.”125 This is simply incorrect: first, most crimes are not committed
by strangers or outsiders.126 Second, “[m]ixed-use districts that provide
housing, offices, shops, and other services, attract a far wider range of people,
while spreading out their activities over longer periods of time. Consequently,
the streets . . . are . . . safer both day and night, while being less congested at
peak periods.”127 Euclid’s legacy is visible in the quality of life in America’s
inner cities, where “[a] crisis of economic stagnation deprives our poorest
neighborhoods of the commercial activity that might promote a healthy street
life . . . [and] public spaces once filled with busy shoppers have become the
‘turf’ for gang members and drug dealers.”128
124. U.S. DEP ’T OF TRANSP., BUREAU OF TRANSP. STATISTICS, NAT ’L HOUSEHOLD TRAVEL SURVEY
DAILY TRAVEL QUICK FACTS (2005), http://www.bts.gov/programs/national_household_travel_survey/
daily_travel.html.
125. Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 393 (1926) (citation omitted).
126. See, e.g., FBI, U.S. DEP ’T OF JUSTICE , CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2002, available at
http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_02/html/web/offreported/02-nmurder03.html (stating that 75.6% of murder
and manslaughter victims knew their assailant); Press Release, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Women Usually Victimized By Offenders They Know (Aug. 16, 1995), available at http://
www.bedfordcountyso.org/resources/domestic/DOJstat.htm.
127. Wickersham, supra note 2, at 550.
128. Garnett, Ordering, supra note 6, at 33-34.
129. Kushner, supra note 50, at 52.
130. Garnett, Ordering, supra note 6, at 33.
2007] DIVIDE AND SPRAWL: EUCLIDEAN ZONING 935
The potential benefits to the environment and the economy are clear, and
it has also been argued that implementing Smart Growth and New Urbanism
together is “the best feasible strategy for reforming American urban design
and rejuvenating its cities and suburbs . . . [while also] offering minority and
poor communities the best opportunity for enhanced access to employment,
community destinations, and an improved urban living environment.”141
Whether these arguments are true or not cannot be demonstrated by any
American city, because zoning law and local government structure have
hampered efforts to implement these ideas; existing Smart Growth efforts are
pilot projects established too recently to show definitive results, and true New
Urbanism has not been tried on a large scale, since “most communities enact
New Urbanism on a parcel-by-parcel basis through an overlay zoning
amendment enacted at the developer’s request.”142 But “[t]he New Urbanist
approach is really not new; it comes from observations of cities that work.”143
We now turn to one such city: Paris.
of land available for development.”147 The situation in the Paris metro area is
quite different: fully 80% of Ile-de-France is farmland, woods, or forest.148
That leaves only 20% of the region—929.6 square miles—as land used for
housing, industry and commerce, infrastructure, etc., which gives the region
a much higher density of 11,781 people per square mile. Interestingly,
Manhattan, which as an island measuring under twenty-three square miles is
by far the most densely populated city in America, is much denser than Paris:
it houses 66,429 people per square mile,149 while Paris intra muros houses
52,387.150 New York thus manages to have both extreme population density
at its core and sprawl everywhere else. In contrast, despite its population
density, the Paris region is not a stifling megalopolis surrounded by empty
land. Big-city life is obviously an option for residents interested in that
lifestyle, but those who prefer the quiet life can find it: Paris has upscale
single-family home sections,151 and 60% of the municipalities in Ile-de-France
have populations of less than 2,000 people.152 Obviously, they use their land
very differently than we do: we sprawl, they don’t.153
As for inner-city decline, there is no such thing in Paris. The center of
Paris contains the Louvre, the Latin Quarter, and residential areas whose value
147. Laura Mansnerus, New Jersey Is Running Out of Open Land It Can Build On, N.Y. TIMES,
May 24, 2003.
148. INSTITUTE FOR URBAN PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE PARIS-ILE -DE -FRANCE REGION ,
ATLAS DES FRANCILIENS VOL. I, summary available at http://www.iaurif.org/fr/ressources_doc/
publications/publicationsrecentes/atlas/somatlas1.htm.
149. Manhattan island is 22.4 square miles, with a population of 1,488,000. Greater New York
Chamber of Commerce, New York City Facts and Figures, http://nyc.chamber.com/NYC_FACTS.html.
The fact that New York is more densely populated than Paris is no doubt due to the fact that it permits
much taller buildings in the urban core. For purposes of comparison, Chicago has only 12,603 people per
square mile and the city of Los Angeles just 8,198. WORLD ALMANAC 417, 420 (2006).
150. WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA 160 (2006).
151. Article UG.1.2 of the Paris zoning code, noting that the zoning map defines a few areas within
Paris’s General Urban zone that happened to develop as primarily single-family homes and villas (i.e. small
mansions), forbids new construction for industrial use, small craft workshops, warehouse or office purposes
in those defined areas, except in two such areas, where small craft workshops may still be built. Note that
the uses themselves are not forbidden, only new construction designed for those uses; also, commercial
activities other than those specified are apparently permitted.
152. INSTITUTE FOR URBAN PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE PARIS-ILE -DE -FRANCE REGION ,
ATLAS RURAL ET AGRICOLE DE L’ILE -DE -FRANCE , summary available at http://www.iaurif.org/fr/
ressources_doc/publications/publicationsrecentes/atlas/atlas_rural.htm.
153. In offering lifestyle options ranging from apartments in the densely-populated urban core to
single-family homes in rural areas, the organization of the Paris region resembles the “sequence of
environments [that] . . . eliminates the ‘urbanizing of the rural’ . . . [and] the ‘ruralizing of the urban,’”
precisely as Duany and Talen have argued American cities should. Duany & Talen, supra note 8, at
1453-54.
938 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:915
154. FRENCH SENATE REP ., QUEL RETOURNEMENT POUR LE MARCHÉ IMMOBILIER ?, available at
http://www.senat.fr/rap/r05-006/r05-0065.html. One square meter equals 10.76 square feet, making the
price 441€/sq. ft. The exchange rate used is that of Feb. 16, 2006.
155. KHS apartment rentals, citing Paris Chambre des Notaires, Le marché immobilier, ventes—avril
2005, available at http://www.khs.fr/ParisArchives.cfm?IDTexteNewsArchives=154.
156. David J. Barron, The Community Economic Development Movement: A Metropolitan
Perspective, 56 STAN . L. REV . 701, 706 (2003).
157. Kim Willsher, A country in flames . . . French cities teeter on the edge of anarchy, THE DAILY
TELEGRAPH (London, UK), Nov. 6, 2005.
2007] DIVIDE AND SPRAWL: EUCLIDEAN ZONING 939
158. Paris is not alone in this: France’s Code of Urbanism requires municipalities to adhere to the
principle of “diversity of urban functions,” i.e. mixed use, and to pay particular attention to the balance of
jobs and housing in a given area. C. Urb. Art. L. 121-1(2).
159. See “NYC Zoning Glossary,” http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/zone/glossary.shtml#
use_group.
160. See, e.g., “New York City Zoning Residence Districts,” http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/
zone/zh_resdistricts.shtml (stating that the residential use groups are subdivided into the basic categories
R1 through R10, each of which may be further subdivided).
161. See, e.g., “New York City Zoning Commercial Districts,” http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/
zone/zh_commdistricts.shtml (stating that the numerical suffix used in some zoning classifications indicates
variations in parking, floor area ratio, and other such requirements).
162. In most New York City zones, special permits, variances, and similar methods of bureaucratic
waiver may allow for exceptions to one or more general rules. This is also typical of American zoning
codes, whose detail and complexity make it necessary to create a bureaucratic apparatus by which at least
a minimal degree of flexibility can be introduced into the system.
163. Those three are Zone N (Nature and Forests); Zone UV (Green Urban), i.e. parks and other
public landscaped areas; Zone UGSU (Major Urban Services), i.e. train stations and rail lines, hospitals,
waste treatment centers, water reservoirs, riverside ports, convention centers, and major centers of industrial
distribution. Detailed descriptions of each zone are available at http://www.v2asp.paris.fr/v2/urbanisme/
PLU/Reglement/Default.ASP.
164. In French, “zone urbaine générale.” This covers everything not covered by the previous three
zones.
165. The Plan d’Occupation des Sols. Law of 28 Feb. 1977.
940 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:915
172. French law recognizes three types of servitudes: public servitudes (e.g. for protection of natural
resources or historically significant sites, or for public utilities such as underground cables; see Code de
l’Urb., Art. R. 126-1); servitudes of urbanism (e.g. imposing maximum building heights); and private
servitudes (e.g. to ensure that owner A does not build a structure that impedes owner B’s enjoyment of B’s
property). It is worth noting that as a general rule all three types address structures rather than uses. The
first two types are discussed in JACQUELINE MORAND -DEVILLER , DROIT DE L’URBANISME , at 23-24 (Dalloz
ed., 6th ed. 2003). Private servitudes in France function very similarly to the U.S., in that they run with the
land unless the parties agree otherwise and they are enforceable by affected parties (i.e. neighbors) rather
than by the government. All the public servitudes in Paris are listed in a single document, available at
http://www.v2asp.paris.fr/fr/urbanisme/PLU/Annexes/ANN1.pdf.
173. I.e., the classification of major industrial and similarly large-scale, high-impact uses (train
stations, hospitals, etc.) into the Major Urban Services zone. See supra note 161.
174. The few exceptions to this freedom affect a comparatively tiny number of owners: in the Paris
region (Ile-de-France), most new non-residential uses that require very large spaces, and thus might create
traffic, noise, or similar nuisances if left unregulated, require an agrément (official permission) in addition
to construction permits. Agrément is theoretically required for construction, expansion or rehabilitation of
any space used for industrial, commercial, professional, administrative, technical, scientific or teaching use.
C. Urb. Art. R. 510-1. However, the exceptions nearly swallow the rule: certain municipalities, certain uses
(e.g. retail stores, see Art. 510-6-I(2), and movie theaters, see Art. 510-6-I(2)), all industrial and warehouse
properties under 5000m2 (53,820 sq. ft.), and all other non-residential uses occupying less than 1000m2
(10,764 sq. ft.), are exempted. Art. 510-6-I. Likewise, Art. 510-6-I(5) exempts mere changes in use or
changes of users/owners from this requirement. In fact, when a law was proposed that would have required
mayoral permission for owners of buildings used in commerce or trade to change their buildings to a
different use, the Constitutional Counsel declared it unconstitutional as a violation of property rights and
the right to do business. Cons. Const. no. 2000-436, 7 Dec. 2000, J.O. 14 Dec. 2000.
175. Cited in Wickersham, supra note 2, at 563.
176. The Royal Declaration of 10 April 1783 and the Patent Letters of 28 August 1784 fixed the
maximum building height—defined as the height of the façade, not including rooftop rooms—at the width
942 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:915
184. The Paris Zoning Code states that “limestone and plaster are dominant in Paris and give the city
its general tonality,” and while this should be respected, the use of other materials and colors that coordinate
with the existing urban fabric is not forbidden. It notes, however, that materials and colors may be
restricted if construction is within an architecturally homogenous area. Art. UG.11.1.3(4).
185. See, e.g., Paris Zoning Code Art. UG.10.3-10.4. Defining maximum building heights according
to the width of the street on which the buildings face, as Paris has long done, could be based on safety
concerns such as reducing traffic congestion by limiting the number of people living on narrow streets, but
it also has the aesthetic result of inciting all the owners on the street to make their buildings the maximum,
and thus the same, height.
186. Even La Défense is mixed use, with 150,000 jobs and 20,000 inhabitants. See the web site of
the Hauts-de-Seine county council, http://www.hauts-de-seine.net/portal/site/hds, click on Cadre de Vie,
then Urbanisme, then La Défense.
187. Paris City Hall, Local Urbanism Plan, Planning and Durable Development, Ch. 1 (Improving
the Quality of Life for All Parisians in a Lasting Way), at 3, http://www.v2asp.paris.fr/fr/urbanisme/PLU/
PADD/PADD_CadreVie.pdf. Note, “durable development” is a literal translation of a French term
describing city, regional and national planning that aims to coordinate economic progress, social welfare,
and environmental protection.
188. Id. at 6.
944 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:915
This Note has listed five key consequences of Euclidean zoning: (1)
urban sprawl and the corresponding deterioration of city centers; (2) racial and
socioeconomic segregation; (3) environmental and energy problems; (4)
adverse economic impacts; and (5) reduced quality of life. While Paris’s lack
of urban sprawl and its vibrant city center have already been discussed, an
analysis of the environmental status or energy usage of the Paris region is
beyond the scope of this Note; suffice to say that French law has “provisions
requiring consideration of traffic-minimization measures in . . . land use
planning,”189 Paris proper averages only 0.5 cars per household,190 and the
less-wasteful, less-polluting energy policies of France and of Western Europe
in general are well known.191 What remains, then, is a brief discussion of
economics, segregation, and quality of life. They will be treated together.
Though an examination of the Paris economy is beyond the scope of this
article, it should be clear by now that since sprawl has not happened in Paris,
the associated economic impact—such as massive infrastructure expenses and
the displacement of jobs to areas many people have trouble getting to—is a
non-issue there. Again, it is only in the Modernist social-housing wastelands
outside the city proper that people are physically isolated from economic
activity. The government recently responded to that problem by designating
every neighborhood in France that is characterized by deteriorating residential
buildings and “a marked imbalance between housing and jobs”192 as a
“Sensitive Urban Zone,” which qualifies businesses relocating there for a
subsidized incentive package.193 In effect, the government is trying to make
189. Richard L. Ottinger & Mindy Jayne, Global Climate Change Kyoto Protocol Implementation:
Legal Frameworks for Implementing Clean Energy Solutions, 18 PACE ENVTL . L. REV . 19, 35 n.101
(2000).
190. Paris, DÉPLACEMENTS, supra note 170, at 58. The Paris region as a whole, meanwhile, averages
0.9 cars per household. Id.
191. For example, the U.S. Department of the Environment’s E.I.A. INT’L ENERGY ANNUAL shows
that Western Europe produces only somewhat more than half as many carbon dioxide emissions as North
America. See Table 2, Global Carbon Dioxide Emissions by Region from 1980-2002, http://www.calvert-
henderson.com/energy-table2.htm. This is despite an equivalent quality of life and a population that
exceeds North America’s by some 50 million people.
192. The French phrase is “un déséquilibre accentué entre l’habitat et l’emploi.”
193. FRENCH SENATE REP ., LE PROJET DE LOI D ’ORIENTATION ET DE PROGRAMMATION POUR LA
VILLE ET LA RÉNOVATION URBAINE : UNE RÉPONSE AUX INSUFFISANCES DE LA POLITIQUE DE LA VILLE ,
http://www.senat.fr/rap/a02-403/a02-4032.html. The French term for these neighborhoods is “Zone
Urbaine Sensible.”
2007] DIVIDE AND SPRAWL: EUCLIDEAN ZONING 945
194. For example, the new Paris zoning code defines certain neighborhoods as lacking affordable
rental housing, and requires new residential developments that exceed 1000m2 in those areas to set aside
25% of the development for affordable housing. Paris Zoning Code, UG2.3(1). There are, of course,
incentives for such construction; see, e.g., Construction Code, Title 3 (describing subsidies and favorable
loans for construction, acquisition, and renovation of social housing).
195. INSTITUTE FOR URBAN PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE PARIS-ILE -DE -FRANCE REGION ,
ATLAS DES FRANCILIENS VOL. II, summary available at http://www.iaurif.org/fr/ressources_doc/
publications/publicationsrecentes/atlas/somatlas2.htm. The term translated here as “single-family homes”
is maisons individuelles.
196. Gindroz, supra note 17, at 1421. This is generally true in Paris, with the unfortunate exception
of the 1960s-70s era Modernist housing projects: they typically dedicate all floors, not just the ones above
ground level, to residential use, and contain apartments too similar to each other to permit notable variation
in value.
197. Id. With the introduction of elevators, the hierarchy was altered. See notes 202-03, infra, and
accompanying text.
198. Gindroz, supra note 17, at 1421.
199. Id. at 1421.
200. Attic apartments are called “chambres de bonne,” literally “maid’s rooms,” and are commonly
rented to students. LAROUSSE FRENCH -ENGLISH ENGLISH -FRENCH DICTIONARY UNABRIDGED 144 (1993).
201. Gindroz, supra note 17, at 1421.
946 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:915
altered building structures. The city’s control over building structure enables
it to impose minimum standards, like the 1902 rule setting the minimum area
of an interior courtyard at thirty square meters,202 that have sometimes
modified the pattern of desirable apartments: those facing the courtyard were
left for servants and the poor in pre-1902 buildings whose cramped courtyards
inhibited access to fresh air, but in post-1902 buildings, particularly with the
rise of street noise due to cars, street-facing apartments became cheaper and
courtyard-facing ones more expensive.203 The advent of elevators likewise
shifted the pattern without destroying it; for example, since the city’s planning
regulations still impose some form of Mansard-style roof in most districts, and
thus top-floor rooms whose ceilings follow the roofline,204 the top floor alone
may not be suitable for American-style penthouse apartments, but developers
can give upper floors a different value in other ways. They can make them
more desirable by turning the top two stories into a loft with a mezzanine
under the roofline, placing less desirable apartments underneath; or they can
keep them cheaper by focusing their construction or renovation budget on the
apartments below, which become correspondingly more desirable and
expensive.
This pattern contrasts powerfully with the American approach: a century
before the ill-fated Urban Renewal movement, New York City developers
were already building poorly-constructed residential developments consisting
of a concentrated mass of identical homes targeted exclusively towards the
poor—that is, slums.205 Euclidean zoning, which New York City invented in
1916, simply provided a legal framework that set this pattern of segregation
in stone by providing municipalities with a mechanism to prevent future
development that did not follow the principle of separating uses and housing
types, and, by extension, socioeconomic groups.
In contrast, avoiding socioeconomic segregation is an express goal of
France’s Code of Urbanism, which requires city plans and municipal maps—
the rough equivalent of American zoning maps—to adhere to the principle of
While the political and legal framework underlying land use in France is
different than in the U.S., similar principles underpin both systems. An in-
depth discussion is beyond the scope of this article, but a few points may help
illustrate that Paris’s approach to land use is not totally alien to American
ways. At least one scholar has noted that “[t]he word ‘police’ as used in
‘police power’ may have . . . entered English from French,”219 a point
responsible for only 26% of education spending in France, versus 92% in the U.S. Nat’l Ctr. for Educ.
Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., COMPARATIVE INDICATORS OF EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND
OTHER G8 COUNTRIES: 2004, at 19. http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2005/2005021.pdf [hereinafter N.C.E.S.,
COMPARATIVE ]. The point here is thus not so much that Paris’s mixed-income residential areas give lower-
income children access to better-funded schools, although that is to some extent the case, but that lower-
income children get the exact same curriculum, teachers, and materials as middle-class children.
215. N.C.E.S., COMPARATIVE , supra note 214, at 31.
216. Mark Sullivan, Study Finds U.S. High School Seniors Lag Behind Global Peers in Math and
Science, THE BOSTON COLLEGE CHRONICLE , vol. 6, no. 12, Feb. 26, 1998, available at http://www.bc.edu/
bc_org/rvp/pubaf/chronicle/v6/f26/timss.html.
217. N.C.E.S., COMPARATIVE , supra note 214, at 16.
218. See, e.g., David Rusk, Classmates Count: Housing Policy is Also School Policy (Gamaliel Fdn.
1999), available at http://www.gamaliel.org/Strategic/StrategicpartnersRuskChatauqua.htm.
219. David A. Thomas, Finding More Pieces for the Takings Puzzle: How Correcting History Can
Clarify Doctrine, 75 U. COLO . L. REV . 497, 501 (2004).
2007] DIVIDE AND SPRAWL: EUCLIDEAN ZONING 949
220. COMPACT EDITION OF THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY VOL. II 2227 (1971).
221. See, e.g., CODE GÉNÉRAL DES COLLECTIVITÉS TERRITORIALES, Art. L-2211-1 (stating that
mayors’ pouvoir de police is what gives them the ability to act in the name of public safety); Cour adm.
d’appel de Douai, Nov. 29, 2004, N° 02DA00265, unpublished (analyzing a lawsuit over a construction
permit in terms of the Code of Urbanism and the pouvoir de police of the municipal authorities who granted
the permit).
222. Thomas, supra note 219, at 502-03.
223. Id. at 503.
224. See, e.g., Hoeck v. City of Portland, 57 F.3d 781 (9th Cir. 1995); Parking Ass’n of Georgia, Inc.
v. City of Atlanta, 450 S.E.2d 200 (Ga. 1994).
225. C. Urb. Art. L. 510-1(III) and R. 510-6 (requiring official permission—a complex bureaucratic
process—for development of commercial, industrial, and similar uses in Ile-de-France, but exempting
development in certain targeted areas).
226. Glendening, supra note 84, at 1494.
227. E.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Com., 483 U.S. 825, 836 (1987) (holding it to be a taking if
the municipality conditions a building permit on the granting of a public easement across the owner’s
private beach).
228. This may be part of the reason such lawsuits are much less common in France. One study
indicates that suits by developers seeking zoning approval are about nine times less common than in the
U.S. Jefferey M. Sellers, Litigation as a Local Political Resource: Courts in Controversies Over Land
Use in France, Germany, and the United States, 29 LAW & SOC ’Y REV . 475, 486 (1995).
950 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:915
outcome.229 The state must also pay moving costs for those displaced by the
expropriation230 and incidental damages such as lost rental income,231 and
displaced owners have preferential status for certain benefits that help mitigate
the impact of their property loss, such as low-interest construction loans.232
And while the concept of expropriation does not apply to acts by the state that
merely diminish the value of property without physically affecting it,233 such
acts are by definition much less common: what typically provokes takings
lawsuits in America is rezoning a parcel to a less profitable use, but that
cannot often happen in a country that barely zones for use at all. The other
common trigger for takings lawsuits in the U.S. is the placing of uniquely
onerous conditions on construction permits,234 but the French Code of
Urbanism prohibits conditioning building permits on anything other than
mitigating risks that the construction itself would pose to public safety or
health.235 As such, many widely cited U.S. land use cases would probably
never have arisen in France.
The key political difference in French land use law is that the power to
regulate land use is diffused between the nation, each region, and each
municipality.236 In contrast, “[l]and use control in the United States
traditionally has been the domain of local government[;] . . . most states have
passed enabling statutes that grant zoning power to municipal and county
governments, which then may choose to exercise the powers granted,”237 and
as evidenced by the fact that 97% of incorporated communities in the U.S. use
Euclidean zoning,238 municipal and county governments offered that power
almost universally take it. Such statutes, based on the 1922 Standard Zoning
Enabling Act, were of course necessary because under the U.S. system, the
power to regulate the land within a state inheres in the state itself, not in
municipalities. During the 1960s and 1970s some states began a “quiet
revolution” to take some of these powers back; the American Law Institute
promulgated a Model Land Development Code, which, inter alia, “submit[ted]
any development that is of regional impact or affects an area of critical
concern to extra scrutiny under a state-mandated procedure before
approval.”239 This new approach was adopted by several states, but never
caught on; where it was implemented, the question of where local power stops
and state power begins continues to be an issue.240 France’s political structure
is quite different from America’s, but for those interested in exploring how a
similar approach to zoning can be implemented within a federal system more
structurally similar to the U.S., Germany offers an intriguing example.241
V. CONCLUSION
of life.”244 Clearly, legal and political changes must take place in order for
this solution to be workable in the United States. The alternative, however,
is to maintain a status quo that is at odds with all parts of the political
spectrum: Euclidean zoning violates conservative principles by distorting the
market and restricting property rights to an absurd degree, and it offends
liberal ones by perpetuating America’s decades-long slide into stark racial and
socioeconomic segregation. In most American municipalities, “conformity
with the [zoning] ordinance has . . . become an end rather than a means of
achieving a better quality of life or addressing some greater community
vision.”245 It is time for this to change.