FM Global Property Loss Prevention Data Sheets: 1.0 SCOPE
FM Global Property Loss Prevention Data Sheets: 1.0 SCOPE
FM Global Property Loss Prevention Data Sheets: 1.0 SCOPE
GAS TURBINES
Table of Contents
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13-17 Gas Turbines
Page 2 FM Global Property Loss Prevention Data Sheets
List of Figures
Fig. 1. Double block and bleed configuration ................................................................................................ 5
Fig. 2. Triple block and double bleed configuration ...................................................................................... 6
Fig. 3. Alternative triple block and double bleed configuration ..................................................................... 6
Fig. 4. Double block and bleed configuration ................................................................................................ 7
Fig. 5. Simplified lube-oil system with typical considerations for locked open (LO) and locked
closed (LC) valves ............................................................................................................................... 9
Fig. 6. Simplified lube-oil system for a gas turbine with hydrodynamic bearings ........................................ 21
List of Tables
Table 1. Alarm and Trip Summary for Protective Systems ............................................................................ 4
Table 2. Recommendations for Testing Emergency Devices ....................................................................... 10
1.0 SCOPE
This data sheet provides loss prevention recommendations for gas turbines used to drive generators for
electrical power and mechanical equipment such as compressors. It covers aeroderivative and industrial gas
turbines, however excludes microturbines.
Industrial applications include but are not limited to; prime movers for processing applications, mechanical
drive, marine, and production of power and heat.
For the purposes of this data sheet, the gas turbine assembly includes the following sections: air inlet,
compressor, combustion system (may include water injected for NOx abatement), turbine, and exhaust. The
gas turbine also includes protection systems, control and monitoring systems, and associated auxiliary
systems.
For fire and explosion protection information, refer to Data Sheet 7-79, Fire Protection for Gas Turbines and
Electric Generators.
1.1 Hazards
For information on hazards associated with gas turbines, refer to FM Global Understanding the Hazard (UTH)
publication Combustion Turbines (P0230).
1.2 Changes
July 2022. Interim revision. Made editorial changes to provide additional clarity on steam turbine bulletins/
alerts.
2.1 Introduction
The recommendations in the following sections are for both aeroderivative and industrial gas turbines unless
specifically stated otherwise. While aeroderivative and industrial gas turbine technologies have converged
over the years, this data sheet will focus on the specific differences that have a direct impact on loss
prevention. These differences include the following:
A. Maintenance of aeroderivative gas turbines is mostly done by changing out the engine (or sections
of the engine) and sending it (or them) to a shop for maintenance. Most industrial gas turbines, however,
are maintained onsite unless extensive repairs are needed. Some of the smaller (“package”) industrial
turbines can also be maintained by changing out the unit and sending it to a repair facility for maintenance
(refurbishment).
B. Aeroderivative gas turbines use rolling element bearings, while industrial gas turbines typically use
hydrodynamic bearings. In some cases, an aeroderivative gas turbine may use hydrodynamic bearings
in the power turbine section.
C. The lube-oil systems differ as a result of the types of bearings used. Units provided with rolling element
bearings have shaft-driven, positive displacement lube-oil pumps that provide an adequate oil supply for
these bearings at various speeds, negating the need for external lube-oil pumps. Units provided with
hydrodynamic bearings require lubrication during startup and shutdown and are typically lubricated using
ac/dc motor-driven pumps.
D. Aeroderivative gas turbines have multiple shafts. Heavy-duty and most other industrial gas turbines
are single-shaft machines. However, some of the smaller industrial gas turbines also have multiple shafts.
2.2.4.1 Proof-of-Flame
2.2.4.1.1 Provide a flame monitoring system interlocked to close the fuel shutoff valves and trip the gas turbine
in the event of a failure-to-ignite or flameout during operation.
2.2.4.2.2 For a unit to qualify for gas turbine purge credit, provide three fail-closed, automatic shutoff valves
in series in the fuel supply line, with proof of closure (with position indication in the control room). Provide
automatic vent valves between these valves (triple block and double bleed). Two acceptable configurations
are shown in Figures 2 and 3. Refer to Section 2.3.4 for additional information.
V = Valve
PT = Pressure transmitter
Vent Vent FT = Flow transmitter
DPT = Differential pressure
transmitter
V4 V5
PT/
DPT FT
PT
Fuel To gas
supply turbine
V1 V2 V3
Vent
Air or
inert gas
supply
2.2.4.2.3 Use shutoff valves that meet the gas turbine OEM’s requirements for closing time and leakage.
2.2.4.2.4 Locate an automatic shutoff valve in a safe location outside the gas turbine enclosure to
automatically isolate the fuel supply in case of a dangerous condition.
2.2.4.2.5 Monitor the gaseous fuel properties to ensure the fuel delivered is in accordance with the gas turbine
manufacturer’s recommendations for the unit. Caution is advised where fuel superheating is incorporated
in the supply system for fuel condensation.
2.2.4.3.2 Where fuel gas is preheated using steam or feedwater from the balance-of-plant (e.g., in combined
cycle plants), provide a method to detect fuel gas in the water or condensate line, or water in the fuel line
during operation, as applicable. The specific type of leak detection will depend on the design of the heating
system, and system parameters such as fuel and water pressure.
2.2.4.3.3 Develop a shutdown procedure to prevent gas migration through the balance of plant in the event
a leak is detected prior to shutting the plant down for maintenance. If leak detection is not installed per Section
2.2.4.3.2, follow this shutdown procedure for all maintenance shutdowns (i.e., assume a leak is present
whenever a shutdown occurs for the purposes of maintenance activities).
2.2.4.3.4 Prior to performing maintenance on a component that may have had fuel gas collect in it due to
leakage, test the atmosphere inside the component for the presence of fuel gas. Use an FM Approved
flammable vapor indicator to determine if flammable vapor is present, and purge the equipment of vapor
before repairs are made. Route displaced flammable vapor to a safe location. Refer to Data Sheet 7-59,
Inerting and Purging Tanks, Process Vessels, and Equipment, for additional information.
V = Valve
PT = Pressure transmitter
Fuel To gas
supply turbine
V1 V2
PT
V3
Drain
Fig. 4. Double block and bleed configuration
2.2.4.4.2 Use shutoff valves that meet the gas turbine OEM’s requirements for closing time and leakage.
2.2.4.4.3 Locate an automatic shutoff valve outside the gas turbine enclosure to automatically isolate the fuel
supply in case of a dangerous condition.
2.2.4.4.4 Install automatic drains (false start drains) in the lower combustor casings and/or exhaust casing
of the gas turbine.
2.2.4.4.5 Monitor the liquid fuel properties to ensure the fuel delivered is in accordance with the gas turbine
manufacturer’s recommendations for the unit.
C. Alarm if the exhaust temperature spread exceeds the OEM’s recommended value.
D. Track peak firing hours and temperatures, when equipped, for trending purposes.
2.2.5.2 Provide a continuous online vibration monitoring system to detect the vibration levels, issue alarms,
and shut down (trip) the unit if necessary.
2.2.5.3 If there is a history of combustor instabilities with a particular combustion system design, install a
combustion dynamics monitoring and protection system (CDMS) in accordance with the OEM’s
recommendations. This will aid in the health of the system, warn of potential issues, and forecast tuning
needs.
2.2.5.4 Provide adequate measures to monitor and protect against surge conditions, where applicable. See
the section on performance monitoring and surge in Data Sheet 7-95, Compressors, for more information
on surge descriptions, conditions, protection schemes, and mitigation strategies.
2.2.6.5 Lube-oil temperature is a critical operating parameter and if the machine operates for an extended
period of time at elevated temperatures the bearings can be damaged. Provide high lube-oil temperature or
bearing metal temperature trips as follows:
A. For an attended unit: Provide an alarm on high lube-oil or bearing metal temperature and have a
procedure in place for the operator to respond promptly to diagnose the source of the high temperature.
If the high temperature condition cannot be corrected and the oil temperature reaches the design limit,
direct the operator to trip the unit, or have the unit automatically trip when the temperature reaches the trip
set point.
B. For an unattended unit: If the oil or bearing metal temperature reaches the design set point, have
the unit automatically trip.
2.2.6.6 For units with rolling element bearings, provide chip detector(s) in either the bearing sumps or the
scavenge lines to detect the presence of metallic wear products.
2.2.6.7 Where identified and procedurally acceptable, lock open all lube-oil system valves representing single
points of failure within the piping arrangement to assist in preventing inadvertent manipulation. Include valve
positions in standard and emergency operating procedures, as well as the respective P&IDs. Refer to Figure
5 for a simplified drawing of how this is applicable under normal operation.
Fig. 5. Simplified lube-oil system with typical considerations for locked open (LO) and locked closed (LC) valves
D. Out-of-specification parameters require procedure actions and/or operator intervention to limit prolonged
operation in this off-normal state. This should include alarm capabilities that notify the control room that
an upset condition is occurring.
E. As-found and as-left flow readings should be recorded for each respective unit daily.
F. Sump water quality should be sampled daily via grab sample or remote monitoring to detect any deviated
conditions and prompt operator actions. Conductivity should be measured independently and compared
to the normal system probe reading regularly.
G. Calibration of all associated monitoring, sampling, or metering equipment should adhere to OEM
specifications, or at a minimum annually.
2.3.3.3. Ensure all supporting components to the air inlet system and augmented operations (i.e. foggers,
chillers) are in good repair and working order. This may include flow meters, sight glasses, pressure gauges,
conductivity probes, level switches, etc., as well as the structure itself (e.g., hardware such as brackets,
screws, fasteners, nozzles) to ensure domestic object damage is not of concern.
A. Post-continuous operation and/or prior to layup from sporadic operations, the GT inlet duct work
downstream of the evaporative cooler, including the silencer panels, should be inspected for moisture
corrosion, evidence of any evaporative cooler water droplet, or moisture carryover at the earliest
opportunity or at a minimum annually.
B. With this configuration, the maximum gas turbine purge credit period allowed is eight days (192 hours).
If a unit purge is performed during the eight-day period, the purge credit is reinitiated for an eight-day
period. Unit purges can be performed as needed to continue to extend the purge credit period provided
the conditions in Section 2.3.4.4.2(A) are satisfied.
2.3.4.4.2 Triple Block, Double Bleed, and Pressurized Pipe Configuration
A. Provide the following for a gaseous fuel-fired unit to qualify for purge credit using a triple block, double
bleed, and pressurized pipe configuration (Figure 3):
1. During the shutdown sequence, prior to pressurizing the piping between valves V2 and V3, verify
the second shutoff valve (V2) meets the OEM’s leakage criteria.
2. Introduce air or inert gas to create and maintain a pressurized pipe section between the middle and
most downstream shutoff valves (V2 and V3).
3. Continuously monitor fuel gas shutoff and vent valve positions. If continuous monitoring is lost or
any valve deviates from its assigned position, purge credit is lost and a subsequent start of the gas
turbine requires a unit purge prior to light-off.
4. Continuously monitor pressures in the two double block and bleed pipe sections. If the continuous
monitoring is lost, or the pressure downstream of the middle shutoff valve falls to within 3 psi (0.2 bar)
of the pressure upstream of this valve, purge credit is lost and subsequent start of the gas turbine
requires a unit purge.
5. During the startup sequence, with airflow passing through the gas turbine, prove the most
downstream shutoff valve (V3) meets the OEM’s leakage criteria. If leakage exceeds the OEM’s criteria,
abort the start.
B. The purge credit period is maintained as long as the conditions in Part A above, Items 2, 3, and 4,
are met. The purge credit period is not limited to eight days.
C. Ensure fuel cannot enter the air or inert gas supply line at any time.
2.3.4.5 Inspect the fuel system in accordance with the OEM’s recommendations. At a minimum, perform
inspections, testing, and maintenance of the fuel system during scheduled dismantle inspections (see Section
2.3.7.5 for additional interval information). As part of this inspection, test fuel shutoff valves for leak tightness.
2.3.4.6 Test automatic drains in the lower combustor casings and/or exhaust casing of the gas turbine
annually to ensure they operate properly.
2.3.4.7 Inspect water injection lines for component integrity during operation, as water spray could cause
casing distortion and possible blade rubbing.
2.3.6 Maintenance
The primary scope of the maintenance effort includes the following:
• The gas turbine and its components
• Controls and accessories (including air inlet system)
• Interfaces with driven equipment
2.3.6.1 Ensure the gas turbine and its components are inspected, tested, and maintained in accordance
with the OEM’s recommended practices, typically included in the turbine operation and maintenance manuals
with supplementary material provided via technical alerts (e.g., service bulletins and technical information
letters) as part of the asset integrity program.
2.3.6.2 Ensure all OEM technical alerts have been or are being addressed in a timely manner (also see
Section 2.6).
2.3.6.2.1 When an alternative service provider’s gas turbine services or components are being (or have been)
procured, have an audit and inspection (A&I) program in place to ensure quality components and services
are procured. At a minimum, ensure the A&I program addresses the items listed in Appendix C as is
appropriate for the services or components being procured.
2.3.6.2.2 Recommended inspection intervals are based on usage and do not consider the actual operating
conditions for a specific unit. The intervals are affected by cyclic operation, load, firing temperature, fuel (type
and quality), steam/water injection (amount and quality), and site environmental conditions. Conduct a review
of these intervals if/when there is a change in operational profile or regime. See Section 3.7 for examples
of how these intervals are calculated.
The method of determining the recommended inspection intervals differs for each OEM and class of machine.
The following are typical methods of determining recommended inspection intervals:
• equivalent hours and equivalent starts (whichever is limiting)
• factored hours and factored starts (whichever is limiting)
• equivalent operating hours; a combination of hours and starts (each start is converted to an equivalent
number of operating hours [EOH])
• fired hours (for aeroderivatives)
2.3.6.2.3 Implement a robust foreign material exclusion program during all maintenance and inspection
activities. For further guidance on foreign material exclusion, see Data Sheet 9-0, Asset Integrity.
J. Inspect exhaust duct for warping, cracking, and evidence of overheating, as well as for soundness of
seals.
2.3.7.5.3 Hot Gas Path Inspection
The following is the minimum scope of work recommended for a hot gas path inspection (perform additional
work as recommended in the OEM’s inspection procedures):
A. For heavy-duty industrial gas turbines, remove upper half of turbine casing.
B. For aeroderivative gas turbines, remove gas generator from the gas turbine enclosure; unbolting of
hot-section subassemblies for access to high-pressure and low-pressure turbines.
C. Inspect thermal barrier coating (TBC) for evidence of spalling, erosion, and/or thermal fatigue.
D. Inspect, including nondestructive examination (NDE) to whatever extent possible, rotating blades
(buckets) for corrosion and erosion, impact damage, and thermal-fatigue cracking.
E. Remove nozzle diaphragm sections for NDE. Thermal cracking may be found in the nozzle vanes and
in the platforms. Manufacturers have standards for action to be implemented in connection with such
cracking, ranging from no action, to weld repair, to replacement, depending on the locations, lengths and
depths of the cracks.
F. Perform NDE inspections of turbine disks in blade attachment slots and at bolt holes and disk bores
for cracks and corrosion to whatever extent possible.
G. Refurbish parts in accordance with manufacturer’s recommendations as indicated, i.e. blending of nicks,
dents and small thermal cracks in rotor blades, blending and weld repair of nicks and thermal cracks in
nozzle vanes, and cleaning of cooling passages.
H. Measure the axial clearances between stationary nozzle diaphragms and rotating wheels, between
blade tips and shrouds, and of labyrinth seals. Compare these measurements with the manufacturer’s
specifications and with previous measurements.
2.3.7.5.4 Major Inspection
The purpose of the major inspection is to evaluate all of the internal components of the machine from the
inlet through the exhaust. The inspection includes the components previously inspected in the combustion and
hot gas inspections. The major inspection also provides access to the compressor rotor and stationary
compressor blading, as well as the bearing assemblies.In addition to the combustion and hot gas inspections,
include the following in the minimum scope of work for a major inspection (perform additional work as
recommended in the OEM’s inspection procedures):
A. Inspect rotor and stator compressor blades for rubs, impact damage, corrosion, pitting, bowing, and
cracking.
B. Check all radial and axial clearances, including tip clearances, against their original values.
C. Inspect casings, shells, and frames/diffusers for cracks and erosion.
D. Inspect compressor inlet and compressor flow-path for fouling, erosion, corrosion, and leakage.
E. Visually inspect the compressor inlet including the condition of the IGVs, IGV bushings, and first stage
rotating blades.
F. Inspect bearing liners and seals for clearance and wear.
G. Visually inspect compressor discharge case and turbine exhaust struts for signs of cracking.
H. Perform NDE inspections of components in accordance with the OEM’s recommendations. Consider
NDE inspection techniques such as ultrasonic, phased array, or ping testing (i.e., resonant frequency
testing) to identify defects and deficient conditions of components which have become more prevalent
in the industry.
2.3.7.5.5 Rotor Inspection and Overhaul
Inspect and overhaul the rotor in accordance with the OEM’s recommendations. The interval is based on
the expected end of serviceable life condition for some of the rotor components and is generally a teardown
inspection and is the repair/replacement interval for the rotor.
2.4 Operators
2.4.1 Refer to Data Sheet 10-8, Operators, for guidance on operator training programs, the competence of
operators in their day-to-day roles, the supporting management structure, and organizational culture.
2.4.2 Ensure operators are trained to identify operational deviations that may lead to equipment damage,
such as fuel or water quality excursions.
2.4.3 Ensure there are procedures in place to evaluate the effects of these operational excursions on the
safety of operating the equipment.
2.4.4 Due to operational profiles changing, adequate refresher training and material should be made available
to refamiliarize operating crews with methods of identifying trends of an off-normal state, as well as
preparatory guidance to emergency conditions based on these profiles.
2.6 Alerts
Original equipment manufacturers and alternative service providers issue technical alerts or bulletins when
design or operating problems occur that differ from expectations. Implement an alert/bulletin management
process to track, prioritize, and implement these alerts, as well as evaluate how they may affect the
management of change process in regard to procedures, design, drawings, etc.
sufficiently developed, may lead to blade failure. Any source of visible water in the compressor inlet, including
rainwater ingress and evaporative cooler sump overflow, can have these effects. The use of evaporative
cooling and fogging in normally restricted when ambient temperatures are <50°F (10°C).
Experience has shown that, depending on the quality of water used and condition of the inlet silencer and
ducting material, fouling of the compressor can be severe with inlet foggers or evaporative coolers. Operation
of a compressor in such an environment may lead to long-term degradation of the compressor due to
corrosion and erosion, fouling, and material property degradation. The OEM’s water quality standards for
inlet foggers or evaporative coolers should be strictly followed.
5. Since valve V1 was proved leak-tight during the preceding shutdown, failure of this test indicates
that a failure or leak in downstream shutoff valve V2 may have occurred. Leakage could also have been
through vent valve V3.
3.2.2.2 The following is an example of a valve-proving system for a gas turbine with gaseous fuel systems
as shown in Figure 2 and 3:
A. Valve V2 leakage test (test sequence during shutdown):
1. Gas vent valves (V4 and V5) are opened, and the three fuel shutoff valves (V1, V2, and V3) are
closed when the fuel system control logic shuts off the fuel.
2. To test V2, close both vent valves (V4 and V5) and open V1.
3. Monitor the pipe section between the middle and most downstream shutoff valves (V2 and V3) for
a pressure increase. The allowable pressure decrease should be within the OEM’s acceptance criteria.
Typically, a pressure increase of more than 10 psi (0.7 bar) in 30 seconds is considered excessive.
4. Failure of this test indicates that a failure or leak in the middle shutoff valve (V2) has occurred.
B. Valve V3 leakage test (test sequence during startup: Prior to any startup sequence, both gas vent valves
(V4 and V5) are open, and the three fuel shutoff valves (V1, V2, and V3) are closed.
1. To test V3 during the startup sequence, close both vent valves (V4 and V5) and open V1 and V2.
2. Close V1 and V2 and open V4.
3. Monitor the pipe section between the middle and most downstream shutoff valves (V2 and V3) for
a pressure decrease. The allowable pressure decrease should be within the OEM’s acceptance
criteria. Typically, a pressure decrease of more than 10 psi (0.7 bar) in 30 seconds is considered
excessive.
4. Failure of this test indicates that a failure or leak in the most downstream shutoff valve (V3) may
have occurred. Leakage could also have been through vent valve V5.
C. Same as (A or B) except that, in place of the emergency pump, a gravity or pressurized rundown tank
(designed in accordance with OEM recommendations) is used for emergency backup.
A simplified diagram showing a typical lube oil system that utilized two AC motor driven pumps and a DC
motor driven emergency pump is shown in Figure 6.
Fig. 6. Simplified lube-oil system for a gas turbine with hydrodynamic bearings
When a single DC bus system is designed to provide power for the entire DC load, there is a potential for
a unit trip and loss of electric power to the emergency lube oil pump when DC power is lost. If the AC pump(s)
require DC power to either stay in operation or start up on low oil pressure, the resulting damage from lube
oil starvation can be significant.
Independent DC systems for the emergency lube/seal oil system and for the control/ protection systems
allow for a more resilient lube oil system.When a single DC bus system is designed to provide power for the
entire DC load, the reliability of the AC lube oil pump should be ensured. This can be achieved by using
fail-safe designs. In some designs fail-safe AC pumps are achieved by using the scheme of de-energizing
in motor control circuit (MCC) to start the motor. This means normally energized (closed) coil of the relay in
the control logic when the motor starter is in ″auto position. To start the motor or to maintain the motor in
running status, the relay coil is de-energized (open). It is also referred as “drop-out-to-run” design. By this
method, the risk of failure to start the motor when required can be reduced.The intent of the recommendations
in Section 2.2.6 is to ensure maximum reliability (resiliency) of the lube oil supply to turbine-generators,
compressors, etc.
4.0 REFERENCES
4.1 FM Global
Data Sheet 5-19, Switchgear and Circuit Breakers
Data Sheet 7-43, Process Safety
Data Sheet 7-59, Inerting and Purging Tanks, Process Vessels
Data Sheet 7-79, Fire Protection for Gas Turbines and Electric Generators
Data Sheet 7-95, Compressors
Data Sheet 7-101, Fuel-Fired Thermal Electric Power Generation
Data Sheet 9-0, Asset Integrity
Data Sheet 10-8, Operators
Data Sheet 17-4, Monitoring and Diagnosis of Vibration in Rotating Machinery
UTH Combustion Turbine (P0230)
4.2 Other
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). NFPA 85, Boiler and Combustion System Hazards Code.
International Standards Organization (ISO). ISO 8217:2017, Petroleum Products-Fuels (class
F)-Specifications of Marine Fuels.
International Standards Organization (ISO). ISO 10816, Mechanical Vibration-Measurement and Evaluation
of Machine Vibration-Part 8: Reciprocating Compressor Systems.
Fail-safe condition: When a piece of machinery or other component reverts to a safe condition in the event
of breakdown or malfunction.
Functional overspeed test: A functional (fired) test of the overspeed trip system, performed at or below
rated overspeed, to verify the systems integrity.
Hydrodynamic (sliding) bearings: Bearings that carry a shaft load on a self-renewing film of lubricant. Thrust
bearings support the axial loads, and radial loads are supported by journal bearings.
Industrial (frame) gas turbine: Any gas turbine manufactured solely for use in industry. The larger machines
(OEM dependent, typically >100MW) are referred to as “heavy-duty gas turbines” and the smaller units (OEM
dependent, typically 5-70MW) as “packaged gas turbines.”
Integrity operating window (IOW): Sets of limits used to determine the different variables that could affect
the integrity and reliability of a piece of machinery or process. Machinery operated outside of IOW’s may
cause otherwise preventable damage or failure.
Load following unit: A generating unit operated over a range of MW versus standard base load MW output
to satisfy grid demand. Due to load changes required for these output variations, thermal stresses may see
a significant increase.
Microturbine: A small gas turbine engine typically of radial design, closer in concept to low-cost turbochargers
than the more complex axial industrial and aeroderivative gas turbines. The size of these machines is usually
2 MW or less.
Peaking unit: A generating unit that undergoes load following profiles but with additional attributes of high
load-change ramp rates. Units of this profile may see increased thermal stresses due to the cyclic nature of
the required load changes.
Ping test: Physical test to determine the natural and resonant frequencies of an assembly
Rolling element bearings: Bearings that carry a shaft load by interposing rolling elements between an inner
and outer race. The two general types of rolling element bearings are ball and roller. Either can carry radial
or thrust (axial) loads or both.
Runback: A reduction in load due to upset conditions during operation.
Simulated overspeed test: A test in which the functioning of the overspeed response, signal transmission,
and emergency shutoff valve control respond to a simulated overspeed signal. Simulated tests typically do
not test the emergency trip device and the fuel shutoff valves. The test can be conducted while the unit is
online, without actually overspeeding it.
Triple modular redundant (TMR): A fault-tolerant system in which three systems monitor a process and
the results are processed by a voting system to produce a single output. If any one of the three systems fails,
the other two systems can correct and mask the fault. If the voter fails, the complete system will fail; however,
in TMR systems the voter is much more reliable than the other TMR components.
Turndown: A generating unit that undergoes load changes to minimum operating parameters, typically to
limit start/stop cycles while remaining connected to the grid.
July 2020. Interim revision. Updated contingency planning and sparing guidance. Added new terms to the
Glossary.
July 2019. Interim revision. Minor editorial changes were made.
April 2019. This document has been completely revised. Significant changes include the following:
A. Added guidance for overspeed and lube-oil protection systems, in addition to lube-oil testing.
B. Added guidance for auxiliary systems and their associated hazards.
C. Added guidance on an audit and inspection program for evaluating alternative service providers.
D. Added inspection, testing, and maintenance (ITM) strategies, where applicable, regarding intervals
and associated programs.
E. Addressed flexible operation and industry trends.
January 2019. Interim revision. Minor editorial changes were made.
October 2018. Interim revision. Minor editorial changes were made.
April 2018. Interim revision. Minor editorial changes were made.
October 2017. Interim revision. Minor editorial changes were made.
April 2017. Interim revision. Minor editorial changes were made.
April 2012. This data sheet has been completely revised and reorganized. The main thrust of the
reorganization was to combine the loss prevention recommendations common to heavy-duty and
aeroderivative gas turbines.
Technical changes include the following:
• Added inlet air system recommendations
• Updated overspeed protection recommendations
• Removed cooling air flow and temperature alarm and trip recommendations
• Updated lube-oil temperature trip recommendations
• Addressed condition monitoring (EGT spread, vibration, performance monitoring)
May 2010. Minor editorial changes were done for this revision.
January 2005. The following changes were done for this revision:
1. Section 2.1.2.1, Maintenance Testing. Overspeed revised from actual to simulated at less than rated speed.
2. Section 2.1.2.6. Revised to be consistent with 2.2.2.6. Actuation of back-up lube oil pump quarterly versus
weekly. Quarterly is adequate for verification of functionality. The emergency pump provides further back-up.
May 2003. Minor editorial changes were done for this revision.
January 2001. This revision of the document was reorganized to provide a consistent format.
C. At a minimum this program should also address the items listed below as is appropriate for the service(s)
or components being procured. This guidance should not be considered to be complete but rather as a
starting point for the development of a detailed A&I Program.
D. The A&I should be put in place by the purchaser or the party designated by the purchaser to procure
the services and/or components.
B. The service provider should utilize appropriately skilled, trained, experienced and documented
personnel. The service provider should have documented training records for all reconditioning
personnel.The service provider should follow industry established good engineering practices, processes
and procedures.
C. The service provider should have appropriate reconditioning capabilities (or an approved vendor), as
well as documented quality control of critical turbine equipment performance measures.
D. The service provider should have access to replacements for parts that are scrapped during the repair
process. The service provider should verify the suitability (histories or pedigrees) of the replacement parts
to be utilized for one more service interval(s) in a turbine, whether that service interval is a combustion
inspection or a hot gas path inspection.
E. The service provider should have verified the source of all consumable materials used during the repair
process, such as weld wire, filler materials, braze materials etc. Repairs such as brazing and/or welding
should undergo an engineering evaluation including metallurgical analysis to confirm that the suggested
repair has been identified as adequate for the specific application, material, temperature, and method.
F. The service provider should have an adequate and verifiable source for all miscellaneous hardware
required during the repair process, such as pins, seals, etc.
The service provider should be knowledgeable of the strengths and weaknesses of the controls platform
being utilized, including response rate and sample rate. The service provider should be able to articulate how
the offered controls platform compares to the system being replaced and be able to address any perceived
relative weaknesses of the new system.
The service provider should understand the known failure modes of the controls hardware being offered
and should be able to address how these failure modes can manifest and how to protect against them.
The TCS should incorporate all gas turbine OEM recommended protection systems.
The TCS should be designed such that it can be programmed to avoid critical speeds and combustion
instability points.
Sufficient redundancy should be provided in the turbine protection systems such that no single failure will
cause a unit trip or prevent the unit from being tripped.
System diagnostics should be provided as an integral part of the TCS. Automatic recognition and location
of instrumentation and control faults should be available at the engineering and operators workstations. Fault
alarms should be available for each device fault.
The new/modified system should provide the capability to test the protection systems. If the proposed systems
are ″self-diagnostic″ to the extent that separate testing is not considered to be necessary, the supplier should
provide documentation verifying that the ″self-diagnostic″ features are sufficient to eliminate the need to
separately test the components of the system.
Comprehensive Factory Acceptance Testing (including critical auxiliary systems) should be done as a part
of the commissioning process to ensure the system works as intended. The hardware should be physically
tested to ensure it is functioning properly.
Comprehensive Site Acceptance Testing (including critical auxiliary systems) should be done as a part of
the commissioning plan to ensure the system works as intended.