Syngas Fire in Ammonia Plant Compressor House

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FIORDA Case Study

Syngas Fire in Ammonia Plant


Compressor House

Case Study Report


Doc. No: AKH01-STD-ENG-RPT-003
Doc. Origin: www.fiorda.eu
Summary Incident Database, No: 35
35
No:
11/01/2018
Date
AMOXY
Plant Code
AMOXY35
Incident Code
Ammonia
Technology
Synthesis
Plant section
SynG Compressor
Main Equipment
Valves
Sub-Main Equipment
Start-up phase (transient)
Operation phase (during event)
900 MTPD stable production
Operating parameters (during event)
Syngas
Medium
Equipment failure
Risk category
Operation
Hazard type
Control procedures
Failure Cause
Leakage
Failure Mode

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2
Hours of operation
Unknown
No of failures last 6 months
Unknown
No of failures last 12 months
Unknown
No of failures last 24 months
None
Warning signs
Ammonia plant start-up was in progress after of cold shut-down for maintenance work.
Event description The synthesis gas compressor was started at 5:30 p.m., and the electrical start-up
heater was activated at 7:00 p.m. Liquid ammonia product export to the storage at 4:30
a.m. Morning shift operator and the shift supervisor did their routine synthesis gas
compressor check. Nothing abnormal was observed. At 8:30 a.m., the production rate
was stable at approx. 900 MTPD and the team was preparing the start-up of the purge
gas treatment unit. The plant was in steady state operation, and all process parameters
of the ammonia synthesis section were normal. At 8:33 a.m., three fire detectors located
in the compressor room alarmed simultaneously. The alarm is reported both in the
control room and in the site fire station. At 8:34 a.m., the synthesis section emergency
shut-down was activated manually from the control room. At the same time, the site fire
brigade left the fire station. At 8:43 a.m., as the fire was developing, the operators
realized that there was a risk of extension of the fire. The plant was tripped completely,
and the natural gas cut-off valve was isolated. The control room operators started to
depressurize the process gas through the vents. Around 8:45 a.m., the emergency
management team was set up in the administration building. The civil fire service was
called to support the site firemen. At 8:57 a.m., the roof of the building, partly consisting
of transparent polycarbonate plates, began to burn producing a heavy, black smoke.
The smoke could be seen several kilometers away. The fire then propagated to the
process gas vents located nearby. At 9:00 a.m., the west wall of the compressor room,
made of concrete blocks, collapsed, and the gas fire, which up to now was contained
inside the building, escaped outside, threatening the main pipe rack. All the plant
personnel, with the exception of the firefighting team, were evacuated and sheltered
inside the blast-proof control room building. At 9:06 a.m., the civil fire brigade arrived on
site and up to 70 firemen were prepared to support and replace the site

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firemen, if necessary. At 9:17 a.m., the site firemen established fire hoses outside the
building to protect the main pipe rack. At 9:24 a.m., the synthesis loop residual pressure
was less than 1 MPag (150 psig). At this point a 2 MPag (300 psig) nitrogen hose was
connected to the loop in order to inject inert gas. At 9:55 a.m. (1 hour and 22 minutes
after the incident start) the fire was totally extinguished. The action of the civil fire
brigade was no longer required.
The synthesis section emergency shut-down was activated manually from the control
Immediate response action room followed by total plant shut-down.
The immediate cause of the incident appears to be a hydrogen-rich gas leakage on a 1
Findings inch ASME class 2700 lb, welded bonnet, forged steel valve located on the by-pass line
of the synthesis gas compressor main discharge valve. This manual valve is operated
during each plant start-up in order to pressurize the synthesis loop. Sequence of
Events:1. Appearance of gas leakage on the packing.2. Ignition of the gas, the jet fire
impinges on the 1 inch pipe downstream the valve.3. Pipe material overheats.4. Creep
failure of 1 inch pipe.5. The gas leakage and fire intensity increases considerably.6.
Immediate rupture of nearby ¾ inch pipe.7. 1 inch pipe bends, with a jet fire directed
towards the wall.8. Building steel structure overheats.9. Wall collapses.10. The fire
escapes outside the building towards the main pipe rack. Root Cause: The investigation
concluded the only possible failure mechanism was as follows:1. Grooved rivet (#35)
was missing.2. Nearly complete unscrewing of the yoke bushing (#11) during operation
of the valve.3. Rupture of the last thread as a consequence of the internal pressure rise
during the normal start-up process.4. Vibration of the stem (#4) and loss of tightness of
the packing.5. Gas leakage and ignition.
Extensive damage to buildings, compressor and piping and instrumentation
Consequence Primary
16.7 million €
Consequence Primary cost
11 month production loss
Consequence Secondary
Unknown
Consequence Secondary cost
Damage to the Building
Consequence Details The wall in front of the compressor collapsed from top to bottom.
The steel structure of the building was damaged and thermally affected.
The roof plates above the compressor were damaged and partially burnt.
The outside wall covering in Eternit was destroyed and broken into small pieces, which
were sprayed all

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over.
Because this material contains asbestos, all the debris had to be cleaned up before the
investigation and repair work could be started, causing about three weeks of delay.

Damage to the Syngas Compressor


The instrument and lubrication lines were damaged by the fire and the debris.
The control cabinet was totally burnt.
The floor grating was distorted.

Damage to the Piping and Valves


The main compressor discharge line was apparently intact, only the small bore piping
was damaged.
Two small process lines were broken.
The piping in the main pipe rack was impacted by the fire but had not failed (except for
small steam tracing and instrument air lines).

Damage to the Instrumentation


Inside the building in the compressor area, control valves with their actuators were
damaged or destroyed, and transmitters and their connecting cables were destroyed.
Inside the building in the compressor area and in the main pipe rack in front of the
building cable trays were impacted by fire and partly destroyed.

Comments
Catastrophic
C
Moderate
L
12
R
None
Prevention Safeguards
None for this type of failure.
ESD and Blowdown system in place.
Mitigation Safeguards Internal and external fire crews
Emergency evacuation system in place

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Inspection of Flammable Gas Lines
Corrective Recommendation
Include all flammable gas lines, regardless of size and operating pressure, in the plant
inspection program. Perform a complete inspection of these lines before startup.

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1 inch welded bonnet forged steel valve, ASME class 2700 lbs

Inspection of Manual Valves

A complete visual inspection of all manual valves on flammable gas lines was also
performed. This inspection was conducted together with a valve specialist, a pressure
vessel inspector, and a plant operator.
Leak Detection Systems

Nitrogen commissioning of the plant - after each major plant shutdown, a pressure test
is performed with 2 MPag (300 psig) nitrogen on the front end, and 10 MPag (1500

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psig) nitrogen on the synthesis loop. All valves on flammable gas lines are tested for
leakage using a bubble-test. Leak testing with portable gas detectors - after each plant
start-up, each manual valve which has been operated during the start-up (those listed
in the operating manual) is tested for leakage with a portable gas detector. A check-list
is used to ensure no valve is missed. Leak detection with fixed gas sensors in the
compressor room - the existing 3 gas sensors have been complimented by 6 additional
gas sensors, with automatic synthesis compressor shut-down (2 out of 3 voting). High
pressure flanges leak detection - each high-pressure flange on the synthesis gas
compressor and on the synthesis loop has been fitted with a leak detection system
consisting of a closed box, with a vinyl hose connected to a bubbling bottle. Operators
can immediately identify a leak during their rounds. A total of 509 flanges have been
equipped with such a system

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Example of leak detection system on high pressure flanges
Do not underestimate the size and operating pressure of flammable gas lines and
Lesson Learned associated isolation valves by non-including these equipment in periodic inspection
program.

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Fertilizer Industrial Services Ltd
Venture House, Arlington Square
Downshire Way, Bracknell, RG12 1WA, UK
P: + 44 (0) 7494 783 534
Web: www.fertilizer.services
E-mail: [email protected]

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