Confucianism
Confucianism
Confucianism
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Chinese 儒家
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Temple of Confucius of Jiangyin, Wuxi, Jiangsu. This is a wénmiào (文庙), that is to say a temple
where Confucius is worshipped as Wéndì, "God of Culture" (文帝).
Contents
1Terminology
o 1.1Five Classics (五經, Wǔjīng) and the Confucian vision
2Doctrines
o 2.1Theory and theology
2.1.1Tiān and the gods
o 2.2Social morality and ethics
2.2.1Humaneness
2.2.2Rite and centring
2.2.3Loyalty
2.2.4Filial piety
o 2.3Relationships
o 2.4Junzi
o 2.5Rectification of names
3History
4Organisation and liturgy
5Governance
6Meritocracy
o 6.1Institutional design
o 6.2Promotion system
o 6.3Compatibility with liberalism and democracy, and critique of political meritocracy
7Influence
o 7.1In 17th-century Europe
o 7.2On Islamic thought
o 7.3In modern times
o 7.4On Chinese martial arts
8Criticism
o 8.1Contradiction with modernist values
o 8.2Women in Confucian thought
9Catholic controversy over Chinese rites
10See also
11Notes
12Citations
13Bibliography
14Translations of texts attributed to Confucius
o 14.1Analects (Lun Yu)
15External links
Terminology
Large seal
Small seal
Older versions of the grapheme 儒 rú, meaning "scholar", "refined one", "Confucian". It is composed
of 人 rén ("person") and 需 xū ("to await"), itself composed of 雨 yǔ ("rain", "instruction") and 而 ér (glossed
as "sky"). According to Kang Youwei, Hu Shih, and Yao Xinzhong, they were the official shaman-priests
(wu) experts in rites and astronomy of the Shang, and later Zhou, dynasty.[18]
Doctrines
Theory and theology
Zhou dynasty oracular version of the grapheme for Tiān, representing a man with a head informed by the
north celestial pole[25]
Worship at the Great Temple of Lord Zhang Hui (张挥公大殿 Zhāng Huī gōng dàdiàn), the
cathedral ancestral shrine of the Zhang lineage corporation, at their ancestral home in Qinghe, Hebei
Ancestral temple of the Zeng lineage and Houxian village cultural centre, Cangnan, Zhejiang
As explained by Stephan Feuchtwang, the order coming from Heaven preserves the
world, and has to be followed by humanity finding a "middle way" between yin and
yang forces in each new configuration of reality. Social harmony or morality is
identified as patriarchy, which is expressed in the worship of ancestors and deified
progenitors in the male line, at ancestral shrines.[41]
Confucian ethical codes are described as humanistic.[6] They may be practiced by all
the members of a society. Confucian ethics is characterised by the promotion of
virtues, encompassed by the Five Constants, Wǔcháng (五常) in Chinese,
elaborated by Confucian scholars out of the inherited tradition during the Han
dynasty.[47] The Five Constants are:[47]
There are still many other elements, such as chéng (诚; 誠, honesty), shù (恕,
kindness and forgiveness), lián (廉, honesty and cleanness), chǐ (耻; 恥, shame,
judge and sense of right and wrong), yǒng (勇, bravery), wēn (温; 溫, kind and
gentle), liáng (良, good, kindhearted), gōng (恭, respectful, reverent), jiǎn (俭; 儉,
frugal), ràng (让; 讓, modestly, self-effacing).
Humaneness
Main article: Ren (Confucianism)
Rén (Chinese: 仁) is the Confucian virtue denoting the good feeling a virtuous
human experiences when being altruistic. It is exemplified by a normal adult's
protective feelings for children. It is considered the essence of the human being,
endowed by Heaven, and at the same time the means by which man may act
according to the principle of Heaven (天理, Tiān lǐ) and become one with it.[12]
Yán Huí, Confucius's most outstanding student, once asked his master to describe
the rules of rén and Confucius replied, "one should see nothing improper, hear
nothing improper, say nothing improper, do nothing improper."[48] Confucius also
defined rén in the following way: "wishing to be established himself, seeks also to
establish others; wishing to be enlarged himself, he seeks also to enlarge others."[49]
Another meaning of rén is "not to do to others as you would not wish done to
yourself."[50] Confucius also said, "rén is not far off; he who seeks it has already found
it." Rén is close to man and never leaves him.
Rite and centring
History
The dragon is one of the oldest symbols of Chinese religious culture. It symbolises the supreme godhead,
Di or Tian, at the north ecliptic pole, around which it coils itself as the homonymous constellation. It is a
symbol of the "protean" supreme power which has in itself both yin and yang.[65]
Birthplaces of notable Chinese philosophers of the Hundred Schools of Thought in Zhou dynasty.
Confucians are marked by triangles in dark red.
See also: History of religion in China
According to He Guanghu, Confucianism may be identified as a continuation of
the Shang-Zhou (~1600–256 BCE) official religion, or the Chinese aboriginal religion
which has lasted uninterrupted for three thousand years.[66] Both the dynasties
worshipped the supreme godhead, called Shangdi (上帝 "Highest Deity") or
simply Dì (帝) by the Shang and Tian (天 "Heaven") by the Zhou. Shangdi was
conceived as the first ancestor of the Shang royal house,[67] an alternate name for
him being the "Supreme Progenitor" (上甲 Shàngjiǎ).[68] In Shang theology, the
multiplicity of gods of nature and ancestors were viewed as parts of Di, and the
four 方 fāng ("directions" or "sides") and their 風 fēng ("winds") as
his cosmic will.[69] With the Zhou dynasty, which overthrew the Shang, the name for
the supreme godhead became Tian (天 "Heaven").[67] While the Shang identified
Shangdi as their ancestor-god to assert their claim to power by divine right, the Zhou
transformed this claim into a legitimacy based on moral power, the Mandate of
Heaven. In Zhou theology, Tian had no singular earthly progeny, but bestowed
divine favour on virtuous rulers. Zhou kings declared that their victory over the Shang
was because they were virtuous and loved their people, while the Shang were
tyrants and thus were deprived of power by Tian.[3]
John C. Didier and David Pankenier relate the shapes of both the ancient Chinese
characters for Di and Tian to the patterns of stars in the northern skies, either drawn,
in Didier's theory by connecting the constellations bracketing the north celestial pole
as a square,[70] or in Pankenier's theory by connecting some of the stars which form
the constellations of the Big Dipper and broader Ursa Major, and Ursa Minor (Little
Dipper).[71] Cultures in other parts of the world have also conceived these stars or
constellations as symbols of the origin of things, the supreme godhead, divinity and
royal power.[72] The supreme godhead was also identified with the dragon, symbol of
unlimited power (qi),[67] of the "protean" primordial power which embodies both yin
and yang in unity, associated to the constellation Draco which winds around the
north ecliptic pole,[65] and slithers between the Little and Big Dipper.
By the 6th century BCE the power of Tian and the symbols that represented it on
earth (architecture of cities, temples, altars and ritual cauldrons, and the Zhou ritual
system) became "diffuse" and claimed by different potentates in the Zhou states to
legitimise economic, political, and military ambitions. Divine right no longer was an
exclusive privilege of the Zhou royal house, but might be bought by anyone able to
afford the elaborate ceremonies and the old and new rites required to access the
authority of Tian.[73]
Besides the waning Zhou ritual system, what may be defined as "wild" (野 yě)
traditions, or traditions "outside of the official system", developed as attempts to
access the will of Tian. The population had lost faith in the official tradition, which
was no longer perceived as an effective way to communicate with Heaven. The
traditions of the 九野 ("Nine Fields") and of the Yijing flourished.[74] Chinese thinkers,
faced with this challenge to legitimacy, diverged in a "Hundred Schools of Thought",
each proposing its own theories for the reconstruction of the Zhou moral order.
Confucius (551–479 BCE) appeared in this period of political decadence and
spiritual questioning. He was educated in Shang-Zhou theology, which he
contributed to transmit and reformulate giving centrality to self-cultivation and agency
of humans,[3] and the educational power of the self-established individual in assisting
others to establish themselves (the principle of 愛人 àirén, "loving others").[75] As the
Zhou reign collapsed, traditional values were abandoned resulting in a period of
moral decline. Confucius saw an opportunity to reinforce values of compassion and
tradition into society. Disillusioned with the widespread vulgarisation of the rituals to
access Tian, he began to preach an ethical interpretation of traditional Zhou religion.
In his view, the power of Tian is immanent, and responds positively to the sincere
heart driven by humaneness and rightness, decency and altruism. Confucius
conceived these qualities as the foundation needed to restore socio-political
harmony. Like many contemporaries, Confucius saw ritual practices as efficacious
ways to access Tian, but he thought that the crucial knot was the state
of meditation that participants enter prior to engage in the ritual acts.[76] Confucius
amended and recodified the classical books inherited from the Xia-Shang-Zhou
dynasties, and composed the Spring and Autumn Annals.[22]
Philosophers in the Warring States period, both "inside the square" (focused on
state-endorsed ritual) and "outside the square" (non-aligned to state ritual) built upon
Confucius's legacy, compiled in the Analects, and formulated the classical
metaphysics that became the lash of Confucianism. In accordance with the Master,
they identified mental tranquility as the state of Tian, or the One (一 Yī), which in
each individual is the Heaven-bestowed divine power to rule one's own life and the
world. Going beyond the Master, they theorised the oneness of production and
reabsorption into the cosmic source, and the possibility to understand and therefore
reattain it through meditation. This line of thought would have influenced all Chinese
individual and collective-political mystical theories and practices thereafter.[77]
A Temple of the God of Culture (文庙 wénmiào) in Liuzhou, Guangxi, where Confucius is worshiped
as Wéndì (文帝), "God of Culture"
Temple of the Filial Blessing (孝佑宫 Xiàoyòugōng), an ancestral temple of a lineage church,
in Wenzhou, Zhejiang
Since the 2000s, there has been a growing identification of the Chinese intellectual
class with Confucianism.[78] In 2003, the Confucian intellectual Kang Xiaoguang
published a manifesto in which he made four suggestions: Confucian education
should enter official education at any level, from elementary to high school; the state
should establish Confucianism as the state religion by law; Confucian religion should
enter the daily life of ordinary people through standardisation and development of
doctrines, rituals, organisations, churches and activity sites; the Confucian religion
should be spread through non-governmental organisations.[78] Another modern
proponent of the institutionalisation of Confucianism in a state church is Jiang
Qing.[79]
In 2005, the Center for the Study of Confucian Religion was
established,[78] and guoxue started to be implemented in public schools on all levels.
Being well received by the population, even Confucian preachers have appeared on
television since 2006.[78] The most enthusiastic New Confucians proclaim the
uniqueness and superiority of Confucian Chinese culture, and have generated some
popular sentiment against Western cultural influences in China.[78]
The idea of a "Confucian Church" as the state religion of China has roots in the
thought of Kang Youwei, an exponent of the early New Confucian search for a
regeneration of the social relevance of Confucianism, at a time when it was de-
institutionalised with the collapse of the Qing dynasty and the Chinese
empire.[80] Kang modeled his ideal "Confucian Church" after European national
Christian churches, as a hierarchic and centralised institution, closely bound to the
state, with local church branches, devoted to the worship and the spread of the
teachings of Confucius.[80]
In contemporary China, the Confucian revival has developed into various interwoven
directions: the proliferation of Confucian schools or academies (shuyuan 书院),[79] the
resurgence of Confucian rites (chuántǒng lǐyí 传统礼仪),[79] and the birth of new forms
of Confucian activity on the popular level, such as the Confucian communities
(shèqū rúxué 社区儒学). Some scholars also consider the reconstruction of lineage
churches and their ancestral temples, as well as cults and temples of natural and
national gods within broader Chinese traditional religion, as part of the renewal of
Confucianism.[81]
Other forms of revival are salvationist folk religious movements[82] groups with a
specifically Confucian focus, or Confucian churches, for example the Yidan xuetang (
一耽学堂) of Beijing,[83] the Mengmutang (孟母堂) of Shanghai,[84] Confucian
Shenism (儒宗神教 Rúzōng Shénjiào) or the phoenix churches,[85] the Confucian
Fellowship (儒教道坛 Rújiào Dàotán) in northern Fujian which has spread rapidly
over the years after its foundation,[85] and ancestral temples of the Kong kin (the
lineage of the descendants of Confucius himself) operating as Confucian-teaching
churches.[84]
Also, the Hong Kong Confucian Academy, one of the direct heirs of Kang Youwei's
Confucian Church, has expanded its activities to the mainland, with the construction
of statues of Confucius, Confucian hospitals, restoration of temples and other
activities.[86] In 2009, Zhou Beichen founded another institution which inherits the idea
of Kang Youwei's Confucian Church, the Holy Hall of Confucius (孔圣
堂 Kǒngshèngtáng) in Shenzhen, affiliated with the Federation of Confucian Culture
of Qufu City.[87][88] It was the first of a nationwide movement of congregations and civil
organisations that was unified in 2015 in the Church of Confucius (孔圣
会 Kǒngshènghuì). The first spiritual leader of the church is the scholar Jiang Qing,
the founder and manager of the Yangming Confucian Abode (阳明精舍 Yángmíng
jīngshě), a Confucian academy in Guiyang, Guizhou.
Chinese folk religious temples and kinship ancestral shrines may, on peculiar
occasions, choose Confucian liturgy (called 儒 rú or 正统 zhèngtǒng, "orthopraxy")
led by Confucian ritual masters (礼生 lǐshēng) to worship the gods, instead of Taoist
or popular ritual.[11] "Confucian businessmen" (儒商人 rúshāngrén, also "refined
businessman") is a recently rediscovered concept defining people of the economic-
entrepreneurial elite who recognise their social responsibility and therefore apply
Confucian culture to their business.[89]
Governance
子曰:為政以德,譬如北辰,居其所而眾星共之。
The Master said, "He who exercises government by means of his virtue may be
compared to the north polar star, which keeps its place and all the stars turn towards
it."
— Analects 2.1 (Legge translation).
A key Confucian concept is that in order to govern others one must first govern
oneself according to the universal order. When actual, the king's personal virtue (de)
spreads beneficent influence throughout the kingdom. This idea is developed further
in the Great Learning, and is tightly linked with the Taoist concept of wu wei (无为; 無
為; wú wéi): the less the king does, the more gets done. By being the "calm center"
around which the kingdom turns, the king allows everything to function smoothly and
avoids having to tamper with the individual parts of the whole.
This idea may be traced back to the ancient shamanic beliefs of the king being
the axle between the sky, human beings, and the Earth. The emperors of
China were considered agents of Heaven, endowed with the Mandate of Heaven.
They hold the power to define the hierarchy of divinities, by bestowing titles upon
mountains, rivers and dead people, acknowledging them as powerful and therefore
establishing their cults.[90]
Confucianism, despite supporting the importance of obeying national authority,
places this obedience under absolute moral principles that curbed the willful exercise
of power, rather than being unconditional. Submission to authority (tsun wang) was
only taken within the context of the moral obligations that rulers had toward their
subjects, in particular benevolence (jen). Confucianism — including the most pro-
authoritarian scholars such as Xunzi — has always recognised the Right of
revolution against tyranny.[91]
Meritocracy
子曰:有教無類。
The Master said: "In teaching, there should be no distinction of classes."
— Analects 15.39 (Legge translation).
Although Confucius claimed that he never invented anything but was only
transmitting ancient knowledge (Analects 7.1), he did produce a number of new
ideas. Many European and American admirers such as Voltaire and Herrlee G.
Creel point to the revolutionary idea of replacing nobility of blood with nobility of
virtue.[92] Jūnzǐ (君子, lit. "lord's son"), which originally signified the younger, non-
inheriting, offspring of a noble, became, in Confucius's work, an epithet having much
the same meaning and evolution as the English "gentleman."
A virtuous commoner who cultivates his qualities may be a "gentleman", while a
shameless son of the king is only a "petty person". That Confucius admitted students
of different classes as disciples is a clear demonstration that he fought against the
feudal structures that defined pre-imperial Chinese society.[93]
Another new idea, that of meritocracy, led to the introduction of the imperial
examination system in China. This system allowed anyone who passed an
examination to become a government officer, a position which would bring wealth
and honour to the whole family. The Chinese imperial examination system started in
the Sui dynasty. Over the following centuries the system grew until finally almost
anyone who wished to become an official had to prove his worth by passing a set of
written government examinations.[94]
Confucian political meritocracy is not merely a historical phenomenon. The practice
of meritocracy still exists across China and East Asia today, and a wide range of
contemporary intellectuals — from Daniel Bell to Tongdong Bai, Joseph Chan,
and Jiang Qing — defend political meritocracy as a viable alternative to liberal
democracy.[95]
In Just Hierarchy, Daniel Bell and Wang Pei argue that hierarchies are
inevitable.[96] Faced with ever-increasing complexity at scale, modern societies must
build hierarchies to coordinate collective action and tackle long-term problems such
as climate change. In this context, people need not — and should not — want to
flatten hierarchies as much as possible. They ought to ask what makes political
hierarchies just and use these criteria to decide the institutions that deserve
preservation, those that require reform, and those that need radical transformation.
They call this approach "progressive conservatism", a term that reflects the
ambiguous place of the Confucian tradition within the Left-Right dichotomy.[97]
Bell and Wang propose two justifications for political hierarchies that do not depend
on a "one person, one vote" system. First is raw efficiency, which may require
centralized rule in the hands of the competent few. Second, and most important, is
serving the interests of the people (and the common good more
broadly).[98] In Against Political Equality, Tongdong Bai complements this account by
using a proto-Rawlsian "political difference principle". Just as Rawls claims that
economic inequality is justified so long as it benefits those at the bottom of the
socioeconomic ladder, so Bai argues that political inequality is justified so long as it
benefits those materially worse off.[99]
Bell, Wang, and Bai all criticize liberal democracy to argue that government by the
people may not be government for the people in any meaningful sense of the term.
They argue that voters tend to act in irrational, tribal, short-termist ways; they are
vulnerable to populism and struggle to account for the interests of future generations.
In other words, at a minimum, democracy needs Confucian meritocratic checks.[100]
In The China Model, Bell argues that Confucian political meritocracy provides—and
has provided—a blueprint for China's development.[101] For Bell, the ideal according to
which China should reform itself (and has reformed itself) follows a simple structure:
Aspiring rulers first pass hyper-selective examinations, then have to rule well at the
local level to be promoted to positions as the provincial level, then have to excel at
the provincial level to access positions at the national level, and so on.[102] This
system aligns with what Harvard historian James Hankins calls "virtue politics", or
the idea that institutions should be built to select the most competent and virtuous
rulers — as opposed to institutions concerned first and foremost with limiting the
power of rulers.[103]
While contemporary defenders of Confucian political meritocracy all accept this
broad frame, they disagree with each other on three main questions: institutional
design, the means by which meritocrats are promoted, and the compatibility of
Confucian political meritocracy with liberalism.
Institutional design
Bell and Wang favour a system in which officials at the local level are democratically
elected and higher-level officials are promoted by peers.[98] As Bell puts it, he defends
"democracy at the bottom, experimentation in the middle, and meritocracy at the
top."[102] Bell and Wang argue that this combination conserves the main advantages
of democracy — involving the people in public affairs at the local level, strengthening
the legitimacy of the system, forcing some degree of direct accountability, etc. —
while preserving the broader meritocratic character of the regime.
Jiang Qing, by contrast, imagines a tricameral government with one chamber
selected by the people (the House of the Commoners 庶民院), one chamber
composed of Confucian meritocrats selected via examination and gradual promotion
(the House of Confucian Tradition 通儒院), and one body made up of descendants of
Confucius himself (The House of National Essence 国体院).[104] Jiang's aim is to
construct a legitimacy that will go beyond what he sees as the atomistic, individualist,
and utilitarian ethos of modern democracies and ground authority in something
sacred and traditional. While Jiang's model is closer to an ideal theory than Bell's
proposals, it represents a more traditionalist alternative.
Tongdong Bai presents an in-between solution by proposing a two-tiered bicameral
system.[105] At the local level, as with Bell, Bai advocates Deweyan participatory
democracy. At the national level, Bai proposes two chambers: one of meritocrats
(selected by examination, by examination and promotion, from leaders in certain
professional fields, etc.), and one of representatives elected by the people. While the
lower house does not have any legislative power per se, it acts as a popular
accountability mechanism by championing the people and putting pressure on the
upper house. More generally, Bai argues that his model marries the best of
meritocracy and democracy. Following Dewey's account of democracy as a way of
life, he points to the participatory features of his local model: citizens still get to have
a democratic lifestyle, participate in political affairs, and be educated as "democratic
men". Similarly, the lower house allows citizens to be represented, have a voice in
public affairs (albeit a weak one), and ensure accountability. Meanwhile, the
meritocratic house preserves competence, statesmanship, and Confucian virtues.
Promotion system
Defenders of Confucian political meritocracy all champion a system in which rulers
are selected on the basis of intellect, social skills, and virtue. Bell proposes a model
wherein aspiring meritocrats take hyper-selective exams and prove themselves at
the local levels of government before reaching the higher levels of government,
where they hold more centralized power.[102] In his account, the exams select for
intellect and other virtues — for instance, the ability to argue three different
viewpoints on a contentious issue may indicate a certain degree of
openness.[106] Tongdong Bai's approach incorporates different ways to select
members of the meritocratic house, from exams to performance in various fields —
business, science, administration, and so on. In every case, Confucian meritocrats
draw on China's extensive history of meritocratic administration to outline the pros
and cons of competing methods of selection.[107]
For those who, like Bell, defend a model in which performance at the local levels of
government determines future promotion, an important question is how the system
judges who "performs best". In other words, while examinations may ensure that
early-career officials are competent and educated, how is it thereafter ensured
that only those who rule well get promoted? The literature opposes those who prefer
evaluation by peers to evaluation by superiors, with some thinkers including quasi-
democratic selection mechanisms along the way. Bell and Wang favour a system in
which officials at the local level are democratically elected and higher-level officials
are promoted by peers.[108] Because they believe that promotion should depend upon
peer evaluations only, Bell and Wang argue against transparency — i.e. the public
should not know how officials are selected, since ordinary people are in no position
to judge officials beyond the local level.[109] Others, like Jiang Qing, defend a model in
which superiors decide who gets promoted; this method is in line with more
traditionalist strands of Confucian political thought, which place a greater emphasis
on strict hierarchies and epistemic paternalism — that is, the idea that older and
more experienced people know more.[110]
Compatibility with liberalism and democracy, and critique of
political meritocracy
Another key question is whether Confucian political thought is compatible with
liberalism. Tongdong Bai, for instance, argues that while Confucian political thought
departs from the "one person, one vote" model, it can conserve many of the
essential characteristics of liberalism, such as freedom of speech and individual
rights.[111] In fact, both Daniel Bell and Tongdong Bai hold that Confucian political
meritocracy can tackle challenges that liberalism wants to tackle, but cannot by itself.
At the cultural level, for instance, Confucianism, its institutions, and its rituals offer
bulwarks against atomization and individualism. At the political level, the non-
democratic side of political meritocracy is — for Bell and Bai — more efficient at
addressing long-term questions such as climate change, in part because the
meritocrats do not have to worry about the whims of public opinion.[112]
Joseph Chan defends the compatibility of Confucianism with both liberalism and
democracy. In his book Confucian Perfectionism, he argues that Confucians can
embrace both democracy and liberalism on instrumental grounds; that is, while
liberal democracy may not be valuable for its own sake, its institutions remains
valuable — particularly when combined with a broadly Confucian culture — to serve
Confucian ends and inculcate Confucian virtues.[113]
Other Confucians have criticized Confucian meritocrats like Bell for their rejection of
democracy. For them, Confucianism does not have to be premised on the
assumption that meritorious, virtuous political leadership is inherently incompatible
with popular sovereignty, political equality and the right to political
participation.[114] These thinkers accuse the meritocrats of overestimating the flaws of
democracy, mistaking temporary flaws for permanent and inherent features, and
underestimating the challenges that the construction of a true political meritocracy
poses in practice — including those faced by contemporary China and
Singapore.[115] Franz Mang claims that, when decoupled from democracy, meritocracy
tends to deteriorate into an oppressive regime under putatively "meritorious" but
actually "authoritarian" rulers; Mang accuses Bell's China model of being self-
defeating, as — Mang claims — the CCP's authoritarian modes of engagement with
the dissenting voices illustrate.[116] Baogang He and Mark Warren add that
"meritocracy" should be understood as a concept describing a regime's character
rather than its type, which is determined by distribution of political power — on their
view, democratic institutions can be built which are meritocratic insofar as they
favour competence.[117]
Roy Tseng, drawing on the New Confucians of the twentieth century, argues that
Confucianism and liberal democracy can enter into a dialectical process, in which
liberal rights and voting rights are rethought into resolutely modern, but nonetheless
Confucian ways of life.[118] This synthesis, blending Confucians rituals and institutions
with a broader liberal democratic frame, is distinct from both Western-style liberalism
— which, for Tseng, suffers from excessive individualism and a lack of moral vision
— and from traditional Confucianism — which, for Tseng, has historically suffered
from rigid hierarchies and sclerotic elites. Against defenders of political meritocracy,
Tseng claims that the fusion of Confucian and democratic institutions can conserve
the best of both worlds, producing a more communal democracy which draws on a
rich ethical tradition, addresses abuses of power, and combines popular
accountability with a clear attention to the cultivation of virtue in elites.